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  A Strategic Opening: Fighting Haiti's Criminal Insurgency

  Bruce Vitor, Guido L. Torres, José Gustavo Arocha, and Leonardo Coutinho

  territorial control, degrading state authority, and evolving into what Max G. Manwaring defines as “third-generation gangs,” criminal-insurgent hybrids that challenge the state’s monopoly on force. As of September 2025, armed groups control approximately 85 percent of Port-au-Prince, govern critical routes in Artibonite and Centre, regulate economic life through taxation and extortion, and conduct coordinated military-style assaults against state institutions.1 The result is a de facto criminal state within the state. Haiti’s instability now represents an acute threat to regional security, migration management, and U.S. strategic interests in the Caribbean. The crisis exemplifies an irregular warfare environment in which nonstate actors contest the state’s legitimacy through armed coercion, economic predation, and information manipulation—blurring the line between criminality and insurgency.

  This report concludes that Haiti is not facing a conventional crime problem but an entrenched insurgency. The country sits at a tipping point: Without rapid, coordinated, and adequately funded international action, Haiti risks fully transitioning into a criminally governed state with profound regional consequences. To reverse this trajectory, the report offers a tiered set of near-term, medium-term, and long-term policy recommendations for the U.S. interagency, regional partners, and the incoming GSF.

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  Ghost Guns, Branded Violence: New Trends in the Weapons Seizures Markings

  Sofia Molina and Andrei Serbin Pont

  The enduring proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) remains a critical factor in the security and stability challenges facing Latin America. These armaments fuel organized crime, exacerbate violence, and empower non-state armed actors, thereby undermining governance and public safety. The foundational analysis presented by Andrei Serbin Pont and Alex Miller in the "Small Arms and Light Weapons Black Markets in Latin America" story map established a comprehensive framework for understanding these dynamics (Serbin Pont & Miller, 2022). This report builds upon that essential work, leveraging a new database of open-source seizure incidents to provide a current and granular update on the state of the illicit arms market.

  The data analyzed, derived from police operations and journalistic reports compiled in the SALW dashboard from Brazil, Argentina, Panama, and Guatemala, reveals a market that is not only robust but also increasingly sophisticated and adaptive. A rigorous examination of the new dataset uncovers two significant phenomena that represent an evolution in the illicit arms trade. First, there is a proliferation of fake Colt markings on assault rifles. Second, the presence of other specific markings such as the "Punisher" skull, on seized firearms introduces another layer of analysis, indicating that weapons are not merely tools of violence but are also powerful symbols of criminal identity and ideology.

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  Quarterly IUU Fishing Insights: July-September 2025

  Sabrina Dineshkumar and Tanvi Dani

  • From July-September 2025, fishing activity in the SOUTHCOM AOR concentrated along the high seas adjacent to the EEZs of Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina, with additional clusters near the Galápagos Islands and Rapa Nui. High levels of ship-to-ship (STS) meetings and dark activity were observed in these areas, some overlapping with known Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). Chinese-flagged vessels accounted for the large majority of activities.
  • Three fishing vessels, SHUN ZE 729, HANYI 18, and HANYI 19, exhibited strong behavioral indicators for Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing practices, including dark activity, forced labor, and transshipments. The FU YANG 1 and FU YANG 3, both Vanuatu-flagged but Chinese-owned, also displayed high-risk behaviors near Argentina’s EEZ.
  • Three tankers, OCEAN ACE, HAI ZHI RUN 7, and HUI ZE LENG YUN 16, conducted the most STS meetings in the quarter, providing logistical support to suspected IUU fishing vessels in the Southeast Pacific. These tankers, flagged to Panama and China, are owned by firms linked to the Chinese distant-water fleet and remain flagged as High Risk by Windward’s risk models.
  • Three vessels, ZHOU JU 1, JULIA D, and DANIELA, were identified for the highest number of dark activities. The ZHOU JU 1, owned by Zhoushan Ningtai Ocean Fish, has been repeatedly linked to IUU fishing and labor abuse in South America. The JULIA D, a Costa Rica-flagged vessel, has prior open-source records of IUU tuna discards, while the DANIELA, a U.S.-flagged vessel, operated for extended periods without AIS transmission across the Peru–Kiribati corridor.

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  Territories and Coca and Cocaine: Bolivia's Drug Economy, Political Movements, and Transnational Crime (2005-2025)

  Eduardo Gamarra

  This study questions whether Bolivia in the period between 2005 and 2025 should be considered a narco-state, a narco-democracy, or a new hybrid model.1 The evidence suggests that Bolivia is best described as a narco-competitive authoritarian regime, a system in which elections are held and formal democratic institutions persist, but incumbents tilt the playing field through repression, judicial manipulation, and systematic harassment of opponents, while the cocaine economy penetrates unions, regions, and state institutions.2 Presidents Evo Morales and later Luis Arce sought to build a one-party state under the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS). Human rights violations were routine, political prisoners and exiles were common, and civic spaces were restricted. Both leaders kept Bolivia deeply enmeshed in the global cocaine economy.

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  The Strategic Implication of Russian and Chinese Expansion in Central America

  Alonso E. Illueca

  Russia and China’s strategy seeks to expand its presence in Central America, a region traditionally aligned with the interests of the United States. To that end, subregional multilateral organizations such as PARLACEN, the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) are the gateway for this strategy. Also, Russia and China are seeking to expand their security and military cooperation with the subregion, which may have strategic implications for the United States and its allies in Central America. This paper offers comprehensive background information and analysis on Russia and China’s expansionism in Central America and its subregional multilateral institutions while delving into the prospective security and military implications of such activities and how to effectively counter them.

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  The Grenade Trade: An Illicit Pipeline from Peru to Ecuador

  Sofia Molina and Andrei Serbin Pont

  The illicit diversion and trafficking of grenades and other explosives across the Peru-Ecuador border presents a significant and ongoing challenge to regional security. This movement of explosive materials, often originating in Peru and transiting through Ecuador before reaching armed groups in Colombia. The extent of this issue became evident in October 2022, when an investigation by Punto Final identified a lack of effective border controls, which facilitates these illegal transfers. This border vulnerability is a key factor enabling the operation of trafficking networks. The urgency of this matter was highlighted by an Infobae article, which revealed that throughout 2022, Ecuador's Military Intelligence Command consistently communicated concerns to the Peruvian Army, reporting that thousands of explosives, including grenades and other types of weapons, were regularly crossing the Tumbes border.

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  Weapons in the Crosshairs: The Flow of Grenades in Brazil

  Camila Rojas and Andrei Serbin Pont

  Incidents involving firearms and grenades are becoming increasingly common, and almost a daily occurrence in Brazil. This situation reflects an escalation in the tactical capabilities of criminal factions, which are actively using high-impact explosives in their operations. High levels of violence and arms trafficking are exacerbated by the alarming number of weapons in the country. The problem is not limited to illegal imports but is also fueled by domestic sources. The "militarization" of criminal groups gives them greater offensive capabilities and a constantly self-sustaining chain of supplies and financial resources, often linked to drug trafficking. To understand these dynamics, the incidents cited throughout this analysis come from the Small Arms and Light Weapons Dashboard, a research resource produced by the Regional Coordinator of Economic and Social Research (CRIES) in collaboration with Florida International University (FIU).

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  National Security and Economic Development In the Americas

  Martin Redrado

  This paper examines how the Americas’ security and economic development agendas interact with each other in this historical period of transition and growing competition between the two powers. The goal is to evaluate how this new reality has shaped and continues to shape U.S. policy toward the region. It will also seek to understand what kind of foreign policy options this competition creates for the United States and Latin American countries while offering some recommendations and policy prescriptions for future U.S. engagement in the region.

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  IUU Fishing Dashboard Quarterly Report #1 (April - June 2025)

  Sabrina Dineshkumar and Tanvi Dani

  From April to June 2025, fishing activity in the SOUTHCOM AOR was focused near the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina, driven by productive ocean currents. High volumes of ship-to-ship (STS) meetings and dark activity were observed, especially near EEZ boundaries and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). Chinese-flagged vessels dominated the activity, with tens of thousands of fishing events.

  
  Three fishing vessels, the GALOPIN_, IKER 1, and PINGTAINRONG678#10, exhibited strong behavioral indicators for Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing practices, particularly prolonged dark activity near EEZs (when AIS is intentionally switched off). The LU RONG YUAN YU fleet, comprising vessels like LU RONG YUAN YU 979, 978, and 977, also conducted numerous fishing operations and were flagged by Windward risk models for IUU practices, including dark activity, suspected forced labor, and transshipments.

  Three tankers, SARONIC BAY, HAI XING, and JASON, conducted the most transshipments in the quarter, supporting suspected IUU fishing operations in high-risk areas. These vessels, flagged to Liberia and owned by Lavinia Corporation and Taihua Ship Management Limited, play a key logistical role in these activities.

  In the fishing hotspot near Argentina’s EEZ, three Chinese-flagged vessels, LURONGYUANYU979, LURONGYUANYU978, and LURONGYUANYU977, were identified for the highest number of fishing hours and flagged as 'High Risk' for IUU fishing based on Windward's risk models. Notably, Windward’s MAI Expert™ Tool flags the LURONGYUANYU978 for suspected illegal fuel transshipment and serious labor abuse, including a 2021 incident involving a severely injured Indonesian crew member.

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  IUU Fishing Dashboard Quarterly Report (Panama Focus)

  Sabrina Dineshkumar and Tanvi Dani

  Concentration near Panama City: 25 IUU-linked ship-to-ship (STS) meetings in the past nine months occurred near Panama City, where dense maritime traffic can provide cover for illicit transfers.

  Activity Trends: 25 STS meetings and 4 dark activities were detected in or close to Panama’s EEZ (Dec 2024–Sep 2025). Panama-flagged vessels dominated, followed by Venezuela and Liberia, both common “flags of convenience.” One dark event lasted eight days inside a marine protected area.

  High-Risk Vessels: Tankers HAI XING, HAI ZHI RUN 7, and PROSPERITY 12, along with fishing vessels LOS ROQUES and TEMPLARIO, repeatedly engaged in high-risk activity tied to IUU fishing. Several of these high risk vessels are flagged for suspected forced labor.

  Flags of Convenience: Open registries in Panama and Liberia can be exploited for low fees and weak oversight, allowing fleets to obscure ownership, evade sanctions, and blend illicit operations with legitimate traffic.

  Strategic Concerns: The Canal’s vessel density and weak registry transparency enable illicit actors to operate in plain sight. Dark activity in MPAs undermines both enforcement and environmental protection. Dashboard analysis suggests Panama’s EEZ is being used as a logistics hub for high-risk vessels.

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  Women, Peace and Security in Brazil: Progress at a Crossroads

  Joan Johnson-Freese and Dulia Mora Turner

  Like many other countries, including the United States, Brazil has taken two steps forward and one step back when it comes to furthering gender equality in support of national security. While rhetorical support comes easily, including the passage of the 2017 U.S. Women, Peace and Security Act, implementation has been slow and cumbersome. As of 2024, for example, U.S. efforts to educate those in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), one of four U.S. organizations specifically charged with implementing the act, remain nascent despite clear evidence linking gender equality and national security. As of April 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced on social media that he was canceling the Women, Peace, and Security program. Official reiteration of that intent is expected to follow. Globally, the gap between rhetorical support for supporting gender equality and funding efforts to do so remains significant.1

  Decades of empirical research demonstrate the linkage between gender equality and national security. For example, researchers Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer began looking at the linkage between gender, violence, and international crisis in 2001.2 They found that the severity of violence in crisis decreases as domestic gender equality increases. In 2005, Caprioli continued that research, looking at the role of gender inequality in predicting internal conflict, controlling for other possible influences on domestic conflict, including “transitional polities, polity type, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, GDP per capita growth rate, prior domestic conflict, peace years, and the existence of and number of at-risk minorities.”3

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  External State Actors and Irregular Migration in Latin America: Assessing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian Patterns

  Gil Guerra

  This report examines the increasing flows of irregular migrants from China, Russia, and Iran through Latin America to the United States, focusing on potential security risks, state involvement, and connections to transnational criminal organizations. It builds on previous migration studies, offering a detailed examination of how these external state actors might intersect with migration patterns while highlighting their distinct drivers, methods, and security implications for the Western Hemisphere.

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  Transnational Organized Crime in the Dominican Republic: A Convergence Center for Illicit Economies

  Douglas Farah, Eduardo A. Gamarra, and Pablo Zeballos

  For more than four decades, the Dominican Republic has been a key warehousing center for cocaine heading for the U.S. market, beginning with the rise of the Medellín Cartel in the 1980s, whose leader Pablo Escobar pioneered multi-ton shipments of the drug through the Caribbean for consumption in the United States. As the primary routes shifted to Central America in the late 1990s, the Dominican Republic and its Caribbean neighbors, while remaining critical, were no longer the primary routes.

  Now, as Latin American markets face a new “Fourth Wave” of rapidly evolving transnational organized crime structures1, the Dominican Republic is again becoming a central player in the multi-faceted, rapidly shifting global criminal economy. As a result, the multi-billion dollar illicit economies of Latin America, for more than four decades, centered on one primary product – cocaine – with the United States’ primary market diversifying into new commodities, new trafficking routes, and new lucrative markets globally.

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  "Strategic Support Points" in LAC: China's Evolving Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean

  Leland M. Lazarus

  This paper explores the evolution of the People’s Republic of China’s strategic aims in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Through a detailed analysis of Mandarin and English-language sources, including People’s Liberation Army (PLA) publications, Chinese white papers, and official statements, the paper finds that China initially viewed LAC strictly through the lens of trade and investment, “win-win cooperation,” and South-South solidarity.

  However, over time, Chinese writings increasingly describe LAC as a potential network of “strategic support points” (战略支点) that could enhance the PLA’s global mobility and sustainment. Mexico, Argentina, and Chile play key roles in China’s Sitian (司天) global space domain awareness program. Moreover, China enlists regional governments to adhere to Beijing’s international cybersecurity norms, even as several LAC countries have been victims of China-based cyber intrusions.

  These moves fit within China’s broader initiatives—such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilization Initiatives—to project influence and shape global norms. While China currently lacks military bases in the hemisphere, its layered strategy integrates commercial, diplomatic, and soft-power tools to potentially normalize a security presence in the future.

  The paper concludes that LAC is no longer considered a peripheral region in Chinese strategic thought but an emerging flank of China’s “Far Seas Protection” strategy—in which infrastructure, political alignment, and crisis-response capabilities lay the groundwork for future national security contingencies.

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  Guns, Gangs, and Borders: Tracking the Illicit Arms Trade in Honduras

  Sofia Molina

  Honduras faces a serious problem of illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, which fuels the high rates of violence and crime in the country. This phenomenon has been exacerbated by a combination of structural weaknesses — including porous borders, corruption, limited stockpile management, and under-resourced law enforcement institutions. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Central America remains one of the regions most affected by illicit firearm flows, with trafficking often enabled by the diversion of state-held weapons, theft, and transnational smuggling routes that exploit weak controls and surveillance capacities (UNODC 2020, 15–17). Gangs, drug traffickers, and other criminal groups benefit from the proliferation of illegal weapons, reaching from pistols to assault rifles and explosives. Honduran authorities conduct frequent operations to seize these weapons; in recent years (2021-2024), dozens of weapon seizure incidents have been documented across the national territory in the SALW Dashboard. This report analyzes patterns and trends observed in these real cases – based on information from 95 documented incidents of firearm seizures that illustrate the dynamics of arms trafficking in Honduras. Additionally, the report will examine the trafficking routes of the seized weapons, the variety of weapon types and emerging trends, the main geographical “hotspots,” and the links of this phenomenon with the local criminal organizations.

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  Winning Hearts, Changing Minds: A Data-Driven Approach to Measure China's Influence in Latin America

  Narayani Sritharan and Jonathan A. Solis

  Between 2000 and 2021, China provided US$382.63 billion (constant 2021 US$) in development finance to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). China’s expanding footprint in LAC through development finance poses strategic challenges to U.S. influence in the region. By coupling financial investments with public diplomacy efforts, Beijing has sought to improve its favorability among recipient countries, often bypassing the governance and transparency requirements typical of Western aid. This approach raises questions about the long-term implications for democratic governance and U.S. strategic interests. Yet, the extent to which this engagement influences recipient countries remains an open question.

  This paper argues that while greater China’s development financing will increase the public approval of Beijing’s leadership in LAC, this relationship is moderated by (1) domestic government approval, and (2) media freedom. Greater approval for a citizen-won government will bolster the positive relationship between China’s development funding and perceptions of China’s leadership. At the same time, respondents in more open and freer media environments where the media can criticize the government could diminish this positive effect. An ancillary analysis examines how switching diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing influences development financing from China in Panama, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

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  Weapons in the Crosshairs: Colombia’s Shifting Small Arms Trade and Venezuela’s Growing Role

  Andrei Serbin Pont

  Recent events in Colombia underscore the complex dynamics of its illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) trade, notably influenced by Venezuelan sources. The frequent seizure of diverse weaponry—including AR-15 rifles, Venezuelan-marked AK-103s, and military-grade arms—highlights extensive diversion from military stockpiles in both countries. Addressing this challenge requires cross-border cooperation, improved security of arms stocks, and comprehensive efforts targeting the broader regional drivers of armed conflict.

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  Shadow Games: Russian Disinformation, Criminal Networks, and Strategic Encroachment in the Central Andes

  Joseph Bouchard

  This report examines Russia’s increasing influence in the Central Andes, specifically in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, and highlights the adverse outcomes associated with this influence. Russia has significantly expanded its regional presence through security, diplomatic, and disinformation channels, taking advantage of geopolitical instability and economic vulnerabilities. Key developments include Russia’s involvement in Bolivia’s energy sector, particularly oil and lithium, mainly through its giant state-controlled companies Gazprom and Rosatom.

  Russian disinformation has also significantly amplified propaganda, mainly through Bolivia’s Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) government. It has also used media manipulation to limit dissent and silence opposition, using its leverage and connections to increase its gray zone footprint in the region. Although Russian influence is most pronounced in Bolivia, changing electoral and geopolitical dynamics in Peru and Ecuador could potentially contribute to expanding it in those two countries.

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  Tech Leap or Tech Lag: Latin America's Quest to Keep up with Emerging Technologies

  Juan Manuel Aguilar Antonio

  This paper analyzes how Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries adopt or develop emerging technologies (ET) such as artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), quantum computing, 5G networks, and cybersecurity. The region depends on imported technology and lacks internal development, which limits its ability to innovate and compete globally, thus preventing it from fully capitalizing on ETs economic opportunities.

  One of the key challenges identified is the significant disparity in ET investment compared to regions like North America, Europe, and Asia, where large-scale government and private sector initiatives drive technological innovation. Regional governments struggle to secure sufficient funding for research and development and lack clear regulatory frameworks that promote ET adoption and address ethical and security concerns.

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  Shadow Games: Russian Disinformation, Criminal Networks, and Strategic Encroachment in the Central Andes

  Joseph Bouchard

  This report examines Russia’s increasing influence in the Central Andes, specifically in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, and highlights the adverse outcomes associated with this influence. Russia has significantly expanded its regional presence through security, diplomatic, and disinformation channels, taking advantage of geopolitical instability and economic vulnerabilities. Key developments include Russia’s involvement in Bolivia’s energy sector, particularly oil and lithium, mainly through its giant state-controlled companies Gazprom and Rosatom.

  Russian disinformation has also significantly amplified propaganda, mainly through Bolivia’s Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) government. It has also used media manipulation to limit dissent and silence opposition, using its leverage and connections to increase its gray zone footprint in the region. Although Russian influence is most pronounced in Bolivia, changing electoral and geopolitical dynamics in Peru and Ecuador could potentially contribute to expanding it in those two countries.

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  Trilateral Authoritarian Alliance: And the People's Republic of China

  Douglas Farah

  Over the past decade an alliance of authoritarian regimes has systematically built an interlocking series of echo chambers and media amplification nodes across Latin America for disinformation, misinformation and malign influence operations to undermine U.S. policy and actions in the hemisphere. The primary actors are Russian and Iranian state media and their regional allies of the Bolivarian alliance led by the Maduro regime in Venezuela.

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  From Fujian to Flushing: Chinese Criminal Networks in the Americas and Beyond

  Leland Lazarus, Myah Havertong, Javier Alvarez Kuan, and Nicole Writt

  This paper builds on the 2023 FIU report, providing even more of an in-depth analysis of Chinese criminal activities throughout the Western Hemisphere, including the United States and Canada. In this second volume, our team focused on who the groups and individuals are and how they carry out illicit activities. Partnering with the California-based law firm Enso Law, we conducted an extensive literature review, read dozens of news articles and think tank reports, reviewed California police records, and interviewed several current and former U.S. and international law enforcement agents, as well as a California-based Chinese-American community organization.

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  Argentina’s Illicit Firearms Market: A Unique Case in Latin America

  Andrei Serbin Pont

  Argentina's illicit firearms market uniquely differs from other Latin American countries due to low domestic demand and the absence of territorial conflicts between criminal groups and state forces. Its illegal firearms primarily originate from unregistered civilian arms, private security stocks, and state force diversions. Although domestic demand remains modest, substantial price differentials fuel cross-border trafficking, particularly to high-demand markets like Brazil, exacerbating regional security challenges.

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  Russia's Energy Interests in the Central Andes: Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador

  Joseph Bouchard

  This report examines the increasing energy influence of Russia in the Central Andes, namely in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, and highlights the negative outcomes associated with this influence. In the last few years, Russia has significantly expanded its presence in the region through energy, taking advantage of geopolitical instability and economic vulnerabilities. Key developments include Russia’s involvement in Bolivia’s energy sector, particularly oil and lithium, particularly through its large state-controlled companies, Gazprom and Rosatom. Although Russian influence is most pronounced in Bolivia, changing electoral and geopolitical dynamics in Peru and Ecuador could potentially increase Russian influence in those two countries in the future.

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  How Russian Surveillance Tech is Reshaping Latin America

  Doug Farah

  Over the past decade, Russian-based companies have provided sophisticated surveillance technology to several Latin American countries. These technologies are critical to the survival of the repressive regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, and possibly criminal nonstate actors that weaken democracy and threaten U.S. national security.

  The transfer of surveillance technologies and other cyber activities, often run by Russian intelligence officials directly tied to Russia’s state cyber structures, goes beyond traditionally understood gray zone activities. While these technologies empower the region’s most repressive regimes and criminal threat networks, they also give Russia access to key military, law enforcement, and financial data in multiple countries in the Western Hemisphere.