Gang Violence: Concepts, Benchmarks and Coding Rules
Date of Publication
1-1-2023 12:00 AM
Security Theme
Political Stability
Keywords
Political gang violence, de facto control, spatial dispersion and level of gang violence, political stability
Description
The operations of large-scale, organized groups like Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) in El Salvador, drug cartels in Mexico, and anti-drug operations in the Philippines pose conceptual problems by occupying “a gray zone between ordinary crime and political violence” (Kalyvas, 2015: 1517). Political violence can be understood as “the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation” (ACLED; 2019, 1). Such violence generally manifests as attempts to take over control of a state, make secession demands, increase one’s political influence or position, and/or express demands or views with regards to specific political issues. Gang violence in Latin America (e.g. El Salvador, Mexico, and Brazil), Africa (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria) and in South-East Asia (e.g. Philippines), however, is not perpetrated with any of these intentions in mind. This seems to make it ‘non-political’ and sets it apart from more clear-cut examples of political violence seen in these regions. Yet, large-scale organized crime is not so easily classified as simply ‘criminal’: organized crime is not well-defined, but most definitions highlight elements of material or economic benefit and – for larger groups – a notion of monopolizing illegal markets (Reuters, 2008; OrganizedCrime). While this definition fits the raison-d’être of groups like MS-13, the Sinaloa Cartel, or the Red Command, it does not fully capture their range of activities. These groups directly involve themselves in politics through pressure, bribery, direct clashes, financing of campaigns, and even grooming cartel members to become politicians. Moreover, they engage in indirect yet highly relevant political acts; their activity of displaying bodies or rendering certain areas de facto no-go zones for state forces severely challenges the state’s monopoly of force. While intentions may not be political, the consequences are. To complicate matters further, these patterns are not always restricted to large and transnational groups; they hold equally true for some national, regional, and sometimes even local groups.
Gang Violence: Concepts, Benchmarks and Coding Rules
The operations of large-scale, organized groups like Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) in El Salvador, drug cartels in Mexico, and anti-drug operations in the Philippines pose conceptual problems by occupying “a gray zone between ordinary crime and political violence” (Kalyvas, 2015: 1517). Political violence can be understood as “the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation” (ACLED; 2019, 1). Such violence generally manifests as attempts to take over control of a state, make secession demands, increase one’s political influence or position, and/or express demands or views with regards to specific political issues. Gang violence in Latin America (e.g. El Salvador, Mexico, and Brazil), Africa (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria) and in South-East Asia (e.g. Philippines), however, is not perpetrated with any of these intentions in mind. This seems to make it ‘non-political’ and sets it apart from more clear-cut examples of political violence seen in these regions. Yet, large-scale organized crime is not so easily classified as simply ‘criminal’: organized crime is not well-defined, but most definitions highlight elements of material or economic benefit and – for larger groups – a notion of monopolizing illegal markets (Reuters, 2008; OrganizedCrime). While this definition fits the raison-d’être of groups like MS-13, the Sinaloa Cartel, or the Red Command, it does not fully capture their range of activities. These groups directly involve themselves in politics through pressure, bribery, direct clashes, financing of campaigns, and even grooming cartel members to become politicians. Moreover, they engage in indirect yet highly relevant political acts; their activity of displaying bodies or rendering certain areas de facto no-go zones for state forces severely challenges the state’s monopoly of force. While intentions may not be political, the consequences are. To complicate matters further, these patterns are not always restricted to large and transnational groups; they hold equally true for some national, regional, and sometimes even local groups.
