Criminal Governance and Productive Enclaves of Illegal Mining in Ecuador
Date of Publication
1-1-2023 12:00 AM
End Date
17-8-2023 12:00 AM
Security Theme
Illegal Mining
Keywords
Illegal mining, productive enclaves, criminal governance, neo-extractivisim, state presence, Ecuador
Description
This investigation intends to characterize the productive enclaves of the criminal governance of illegal mining in Ecuador. To do this, the paper is divided into three parts: first, an approach to the concept of criminal governance and its application to illegal mining; second, a summary of the mining context from weak State presence and increasing criminal governance presence; third, the concept of productive enclaves applied to illegal mining in Ecuador. Criminal governance depends on the absence of law enforcement and the weak guarantee of State rights, the level of convergences between illicit activities, and the degree of perception of mutual benefit among members. Within this framework, criminal governance of illegal mining is inserted into a system of networks in which criminal organizations and corporate actors work together to achieve their illicit objectives. The Ecuadorian State's actions against illegal mining translate to a weakness of the rule of law in territories where criminal governance of illegal mining is established. The relationship between criminal governance and productive enclaves of illegal mining is linked to a similar relationship of neo-extractivism, in which criminal organizations take advantage of the boom in prices of mining material and reproduce extractive practices based on labour exploitation and the absence of the State. Productive enclaves are referred to as those activities that are based on the exploitation and production of commodities of illicit origin, due to their interaction and concentration in a given geographical space. They establish a geographical concentration based on the exploitation and production of metals that promote a model of criminal learning between illegal miners and organizations. Four enclaves are noted in this study: Sierra-Norte, located in the provinces of Carchi, Esmeraldas and Imbabura; Central Amazon, covering Carlos Julio Arosemena Tola, Puerto Napo and Talag; South-Amazon, in the provinces of Morona-Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe; and the Southwest enclave in the provinces of Azuay, El Oro and partially Loja. The relationship between criminal governance brings about distinctive elements. Enclaves usually maintain close proximity to Ecuadorian borders, most likely due to the weak State being taken advantage of. Corruption or direct and indirect participation of government officials were seen partaking in the enclaves. The growth of criminal governance surrounding enclaves is also directly related to the lack of presence from the state. It was concluded that the profitability of illegal mining in Ecuador is higher than the state income, which proves that illegal mining has the potential to move more money than legal mining in Ecuador.
Criminal Governance and Productive Enclaves of Illegal Mining in Ecuador
This investigation intends to characterize the productive enclaves of the criminal governance of illegal mining in Ecuador. To do this, the paper is divided into three parts: first, an approach to the concept of criminal governance and its application to illegal mining; second, a summary of the mining context from weak State presence and increasing criminal governance presence; third, the concept of productive enclaves applied to illegal mining in Ecuador. Criminal governance depends on the absence of law enforcement and the weak guarantee of State rights, the level of convergences between illicit activities, and the degree of perception of mutual benefit among members. Within this framework, criminal governance of illegal mining is inserted into a system of networks in which criminal organizations and corporate actors work together to achieve their illicit objectives. The Ecuadorian State's actions against illegal mining translate to a weakness of the rule of law in territories where criminal governance of illegal mining is established. The relationship between criminal governance and productive enclaves of illegal mining is linked to a similar relationship of neo-extractivism, in which criminal organizations take advantage of the boom in prices of mining material and reproduce extractive practices based on labour exploitation and the absence of the State. Productive enclaves are referred to as those activities that are based on the exploitation and production of commodities of illicit origin, due to their interaction and concentration in a given geographical space. They establish a geographical concentration based on the exploitation and production of metals that promote a model of criminal learning between illegal miners and organizations. Four enclaves are noted in this study: Sierra-Norte, located in the provinces of Carchi, Esmeraldas and Imbabura; Central Amazon, covering Carlos Julio Arosemena Tola, Puerto Napo and Talag; South-Amazon, in the provinces of Morona-Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe; and the Southwest enclave in the provinces of Azuay, El Oro and partially Loja. The relationship between criminal governance brings about distinctive elements. Enclaves usually maintain close proximity to Ecuadorian borders, most likely due to the weak State being taken advantage of. Corruption or direct and indirect participation of government officials were seen partaking in the enclaves. The growth of criminal governance surrounding enclaves is also directly related to the lack of presence from the state. It was concluded that the profitability of illegal mining in Ecuador is higher than the state income, which proves that illegal mining has the potential to move more money than legal mining in Ecuador.
