Obstacles to mining formalization in Colombia

Date of Publication

2021 12:00 AM

Security Theme

Illegal Mining

Keywords

Illegal Mining, Formalization, Armed groups, Illicit mining

Description

The central argument here is that a number of factors conspire to impede the initiation of a serious, State-led formalization process. The most important of these is the vast profits to be gained from illicit mining on the part of a wide array of armed groups, and the potentially corruptive influence of bribes to government officials to perpetuate this incredibly lucrative illegal trade. It is important to underscore that it is not the informal miner accruing massive profits, but rather that illegal armed groups that organize and preside over the trade. There also has been tight connections between government officials and mining executives, some of whom gained from the process of privatized, corporate-led privatization. Who benefits most from illicit mining and the failed model of privatized formalization? The clear answer is illegal armed groups and transnational mining corporations. Given the vast and empowering profits associated with illicit mining, the situation is not likely to change anytime soon. This highly complex issue is perhaps best addressed conceptually through an intersectional approach with an emphasis on class politics.

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Jan 1st, 12:00 AM

Obstacles to mining formalization in Colombia

The central argument here is that a number of factors conspire to impede the initiation of a serious, State-led formalization process. The most important of these is the vast profits to be gained from illicit mining on the part of a wide array of armed groups, and the potentially corruptive influence of bribes to government officials to perpetuate this incredibly lucrative illegal trade. It is important to underscore that it is not the informal miner accruing massive profits, but rather that illegal armed groups that organize and preside over the trade. There also has been tight connections between government officials and mining executives, some of whom gained from the process of privatized, corporate-led privatization. Who benefits most from illicit mining and the failed model of privatized formalization? The clear answer is illegal armed groups and transnational mining corporations. Given the vast and empowering profits associated with illicit mining, the situation is not likely to change anytime soon. This highly complex issue is perhaps best addressed conceptually through an intersectional approach with an emphasis on class politics.