Document Type
Dissertation
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Major/Program
International Relations
First Advisor's Name
Thomas A. Breslin
First Advisor's Committee Title
Committee Chair
Second Advisor's Name
Rebecca Friedman
Second Advisor's Committee Title
Committee Member
Third Advisor's Name
Harry D. Gould
Third Advisor's Committee Title
Committee Member
Fourth Advisor's Name
Felix E. Martin
Fourth Advisor's Committee Title
Committee Member
Keywords
Coercive diploamcy, credibility, U.S. foreign policy
Date of Defense
7-2-2021
Abstract
In coercive diplomacy, states employ the threat of force to get an opponent to change its behavior. A common belief is that strong military powers, such as the United States, make persuasive threats due to their capability to inflict punishment in the case of noncompliance. However, the record shows that the failure of asymmetric coercion has been a persistent feature of international crises. This finding inspires the core question of this dissertation: Why do weak states resist coercive threats from a militarily superior state, and under what conditions do weak states concede?
This dissertation addresses the question by proposing the Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle, a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crisis. At the core of this model are three conditions: Credible threats, credible assurances, and the international strategic environment favoring the coercer. This model predicts that in asymmetric interstate crisis, the target will acquiesce to the coercer’s demands when all three conditions are present. To test the explanatory power of this model, this dissertation examines U.S. coercive strategies during the Bosnian War (1992-95) and during the Kosovo Crisis (1998-99). The dissertation employs a process tracing, structured, focused comparison, and a modified form of the Boolean truth table to analyze how these three conditions influence the outcome of coercive diplomacy in three episodes of U.S. coercion in the Bosnian War and five episodes of U.S. coercion during the Kosovo War.
The evidence shows, as predicted by the CD Triangle, that credible threats, credible assurances, and the international environment favoring the coercer are present when coercive diplomacy succeeded. The evidence also shows that coercion in asymmetric interstate crises often fails even if the threats are credible (“believable”) and even if the international environment favors the coercer because the coercer underestimates the target’s “need” for assurances that the coercer’s demands are limited and true to those stated by the coercer. Consequently, to improve the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric interstate crises, a coercer should combine threats with assurances that the target will not be harmed if the target complies with the demands.
Identifier
FIDC010225
ORCID
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5739-1212
Recommended Citation
Felendes, Danijela, "Credibility and Opportunity: The Limits on U.S. Coercive Strategies After the Cold War" (2021). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 4725.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/4725
Rights Statement
In Copyright. URI: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).