



**QUARTERLY IUU FISHING
INSIGHTS (CARIBBEAN FOCUS)**

JANUARY 1ST - MARCH 31ST, 2026

AUTHORS: SABRINA DINESHKUMAR & TANVI DANI



Jack D. Gordon
Institute for Public Policy

WINDWARD[°]

Caribbean IUU Fishing Insights: January 1- March 31, 2026

April 17, 2026

Executive Summary

- Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU) in the Caribbean is driven primarily by small-scale regional fishers rather than distant-water fleets, and is compounded by limited enforcement capacity and the convergence of IUU fishing with other illicit activity
- China, which operates the world's largest distant water fleet (DWF) fleet and has been implicated in IUU fishing and associated forced labor, has been linked to illicit maritime activity in the Caribbean, including IUU and drug operations under the Venezuelan flag, according to open source intelligence.
- Venezuelan-flagged fishing vessels conducted the highest amount of detected Caribbean fishing activity in Q1 2026, with over half operating outside Venezuelan waters, primarily in the EEZs of Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
- Dark activity by Venezuelan fishing vessels surged in November 2025 and March 2026, concentrated along the Guianas shelf, a corridor with a well-documented overlap between IUU fishing and narcotics trafficking.
- A likely Taiwanese DWF operation (CHUNG KUO fleet) is operating Guyana and Suriname under Panama/Belize flags of convenience, carrying high IUU risk and possible forced labor indicators due to extended time at sea without port calls.
- Panama serves as a convergence point for at-sea transshipment activity and refueling, enabling potential fish laundering outside port oversight and the operations of IUU vessels in the region

VESSELS OF INTEREST

- **CAYO CRASQUI** (IMO: 8718079) - Venezuela-flagged purse seiner with high IUU risk, linked to Grupo Natoli, a Venezuelan-origin tuna fishing group operating through Panamanian-registered entities. The vessel conducted a meeting with the Panama-flagged cargo vessel **MISS ELECTRA SUPPLY** near Taboga, Panama in late March 2026 and has multiple dark activities on record. The 70-meter fishing vessel operates across the Pacific EEZs of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and extensively within Colombia and the neighboring international waters
- **NOVAYA ZEMLYA** (IMO: 9249922) - A Russian-flagged fishing vessel previously implicated in illegal fishing by NAFO. The vessel conducted a bunkering meeting in Kingston, Jamaica and a dark activity in Cuba's EEZ during the latest quarter.

- **CONTADORA I** (IMO: 7385409) - A 76-meter Panama-flagged fishing vessel tied to Spanish beneficial ownership, operating in the fishing grounds of the Southeast Pacific west of the Galapagos. The vessel conducted meetings with cargo vessels near Taboga, Panama, including the MISS ELECTRA SUPPLY, likely to offload catch, and has interacted with other (likely) Spain-affiliated and Panama-flagged fishing vessels near Manta, Ecuador.
- **CHUNG KUO FLEET**- Belize-flagged, likely Taiwanese-operated fishing vessels rated high IUU risk with forced labor indicators. The fleet was detected operating across Guyana and Suriname's EEZs during the quarter.
- **ADELAIDE** (IMO: 9957622) - A Liberia-flagged cargo vessel conducted meetings with Panama-flagged fishing vessels. The vessel is beneficially owned by a subsidiary of China Construction Bank, one of China's four major state-owned commercial banks.

Overview

Enforcement against IUU fishing in the Caribbean remains a persistent challenge due to the prevalence of small-scale operations, vast ocean areas that are difficult to monitor, and limited governance and enforcement capacity across the region ([source](#)). Small-island developing states (SIDS) often lack the patrol capacity and monitoring infrastructure to police their waters effectively, a problem compounded by the convergence of narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, and forced labor in the same maritime spaces ([source](#)). Latin America and the Caribbean is identified as a priority region under the U.S. National 5-Year Strategy for Combating IUU Fishing (2022-2026), yet significant gaps in monitoring, control, and surveillance persist across the sub-region ([source](#), [source](#)).

IUU fishing in the Caribbean region has direct food security implications. In 2022, roughly 60 percent of the Caribbean population experienced moderate or severe food insecurity, and fisheries remain essential to protein intake and livelihoods in coastal communities ([source](#)). Two regional bodies anchor the governance response: the Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC), which coordinates management for high-value species including Queen Conch and Caribbean Spiny Lobster ([source](#)), and the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM), which facilitates data sharing, MCS coordination, and implementation of the CARICOM Common Fisheries Policy ([source](#)).

The IUU threat operates at distinct levels in the Caribbean. At the artisanal level, small-scale fishers cross maritime boundaries to harvest conch and lobster, with IUU-driven overfishing forcing the Dominican Republic to increase seafood imports and Jamaica to limit queen conch catch quotas ([source](#)). IUU fishing in the Caribbean is perpetrated mostly by small-scale fishers from within the region rather than distant-water fleets, although both exist ([source](#)). China, which operates the world's largest DWF fleet ([source](#)) and has been implicated in IUU fishing and forced labor aboard fishing vessels ([source](#)), has also been linked to illicit maritime activity in the Caribbean, including operations under the Venezuelan flag ([source](#)).

Figure 1 below depicts fishing operations, dark activities, and meetings conducted by fishing vessels in the Caribbean region in the first quarter of 2026 (January 1 - March 31, 2026).




Figure 1 - Fishing operations, dark activities, and ship-to-ship meetings in the Caribbean region in the first quarter of 2026 (January 1 - March 31, 2026). (Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

1. SPATIAL TRENDS AND HOT ZONES

1.1 Fishing Hot Zones

Fishing activity in the Caribbean over the past quarter was concentrated along the southern and eastern Caribbean, with hotspots in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, and Martinique (see Figure 2). Venezuelan fishing vessels largely dominated activity by count in several regions, with a significant number of operations detected inside the territorial waters of Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. French-flagged fishing vessels were active in Martinique and Saint Barthelemy, both French overseas territories, but were also detected operating in Saint Kitts and Nevis.




Figure 2 - Major fishing activity hotspots in the Caribbean region in the first quarter of 2026 (January 1 - March 31, 2026).
(Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

1.2 Meeting Hot Zones

Monitoring meetings between fishing vessels and their logistical support fleet, which includes tankers, reefers, and supply vessels, is critical to understanding IUU risk because these encounters enable fishing vessels to refuel, resupply, offload catch, and exchange crew without returning to port, where they would be subject to inspection and oversight. At-sea transshipment in particular can facilitate fish laundering by mixing illegal catch with legal cargo, and has been identified by the FAO as a key enabler of IUU fishing globally ([source](#)). In the past quarter, fishing vessels conducted ship-to-ship (STS) meetings near the Venezuelan coast, Trinidad and Tobago (near Couvas and the Port of Spain), Suriname (near Paramaribo), the Bahamas, and Panama, near Panama City and Tobago (see Figure 3).



Figure 3 - Major hotspots of meetings conducted by fishing vessels in the Caribbean region in the first quarter of 2026 (January 1 - March 31, 2026). (Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

Fishing vessels were detected meeting with tankers near the port of Cristóbal in Panama, Barcelona in Venezuela, Port of Spain in Trinidad and Tobago, and in the vicinity of Pointe-à-Pitre in Guadeloupe and Martinique’s EEZ (see Figure 4). Interestingly, Japan-flagged fishing vessels met with tankers in Panama, a likely refueling spot for the fleet.




Figure 4 - Major hotspots of meetings involving fishing vessels and tankers in the Caribbean region in the first quarter of 2026 (January 1 - March 31, 2026). (Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

1.3 Dark Activity Hot Zones

In the first quarter of 2026, dark activities by fishing vessels were detected across several regions, including the EEZs of Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, and the Bahamas. Smaller clusters of dark activities were also observed in Martinique, Guadeloupe, Haiti, and Puerto Rico (see Figure 5). Open sources indicate that Venezuelan fishing vessels have been heavily implicated in drug trafficking, particularly cocaine, from Venezuela to ports in Guyana and Suriname, a region where a high number of Venezuelan fishing vessels have been detected conducting dark activities in the past quarter. Paramaribo in particular has been identified as a destination of concern ([source](#)). Given the well-documented overlap between IUU fishing and other forms of illicit maritime activity in the Caribbean, including drug trafficking, human smuggling, and sanctions evasion, dark activity by fishing vessels in these zones is notable. Fishing vessels, including those involved in possible IUU, often use the same trade routes, landing sites, deceptive methods and vessels involved in smuggling drugs, arms, and other contraband, a convergence that the U.S. government has identified as most acute in the Caribbean, where enforcement capacity is low ([source](#)).




Figure 5 - Major hotspots of dark activities conducted by fishing vessels in the Caribbean region in the first quarter of 2026 (January 1 - March 31, 2026). (Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

Trend analysis of the past year reveals that dark activities by Venezuelan fishing vessels have been the most active in the EEZs of Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname. Dark activities by Venezuelan fishing vessels registered a peak in November 2025 and most recently in March 2026 (see Figure 6).




Figure 6 - Trend analysis of dark activities conducted by fishing vessels in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname's EEZs in the past year (March 2025 - March 2026) (Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

2. FLAG STATE TRENDS

2.1 Flag State Breakdown of Fishing Activity

Venezuelan-flagged vessels dominated fishing activity in the Caribbean in the first quarter of 2026, accounting for the largest share of detected operations, followed by fishing vessels flagged to the United States, France, and Vietnam. Over half of Venezuelan fishing operations were detected outside Venezuelan waters, primarily in Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago's territorial waters.




Figure 7- Fishing activities by flag in the Caribbean region from January 1 to March 31, 2026
(Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

According to open source intelligence and analysis, Venezuela-flagged fishing vessels have been tied to Chinese interests and operators. Chinese-affiliated fishing vessels flying under the Venezuelan flag have been implicated in large-scale IUU fishing off Venezuela, including industrial-scale shark finning and harvesting of protected species. A December 2025 report by CARICOM IMPACS and Auxilium Worldwide, drawing on transnational investigative research and law enforcement sources, found that IUU fishing off Venezuela is often conducted by Venezuelan-flagged but Chinese-operated boats ([source](#)). A 2023 investigation by Earth League International (ELI) and IUCN Netherlands into criminal networks in Suriname provided further detail: according to an informant close to the network, the sharks are caught by large Chinese state-owned companies operating in Venezuela using Chinese-crewed boats flying Venezuelan flags, with an estimated capacity of 30 to 50 metric tons of shark fins per month. As of 2021, these companies reportedly had over 80 metric tons of shark fins stockpiled in Venezuela. The fins move through South American intermediaries before reaching China, with a parallel supply chain feeding into European markets through routes not yet fully identified ([source](#)). This means that not all Venezuelan-flagged fishing activity detected should be assumed to be Venezuelan-owned or operated; some activity could be linked to Chinese interests, a practice that complicates attribution and underscores the need to look beyond flag state when assessing IUU risk in the region.

United States-flagged fishing vessels conducted a total of 859 fishing activities in the Caribbean region over the first quarter of 2026. The majority of these activities were concentrated near Florida, with smaller clusters in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Bahamas. U.S.-flagged fishing vessels need a fishing permit before operating in Bahamas’ waters, a rule enforced by national authorities ([source](#), [source](#)).

French-flagged vessels were active in the French overseas territories of Saint Martin and Saint Barthelemy but were also detected fishing in St. Kitts and Nevis waters.

Interestingly, a fleet of Vietnamese-flagged fishing vessels with no IMO numbers and Vietnamese MMSIs, conducted sustained fishing operations almost exclusively in Surinamese waters, with activity increasing month over month across the quarter.

The CHUNG KUO fleet, a group of vessels split between Panama and Belize flags, was detected operating across Panama and Suriname in the latest quarter. The naming convention ("Chung Kuo" uses Wade-Giles romanization associated with Taiwanese rather than mainland Chinese operators), the mix of Panama and Belize registration, and the fact that two of these vessels are rated High IUU risk with forced labor flags, point to a likely Taiwanese-operated distant water fishing operation using flags of convenience. Taiwan operates the second-largest distant-water fishing fleet globally behind China, with over 1,100 vessels, and the two fleets combined account for the majority of all distant-water fishing activity worldwide ([source](#)).

2.2 Flag State Breakdown of Meetings

As depicted in Figure 8 below, U.S. flagged fishing vessels conducted the highest number of meetings in the region, the overwhelming majority of which occurred in the Bahamas and likely represent transshipments and logistical support for the domestic fleet. The data indicates Panama serves as a primary convergence point for fishing vessel meetings with tankers, reefers, and supply vessels. Venezuelan-flagged fishing vessels conducted a high number of meetings, operating across Panama, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuelan waters. Flags of convenience states, particularly Liberia, Marshall Islands, and Comoros, are heavily represented among the vessels that fishing vessels met with, consistent with how open registries continue to facilitate opacity across both IUU and sanctions-adjacent maritime activity ([source](#)).




Figure 8 - Meetings by flag in the Caribbean region from January 1 to March 31, 2026. (Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

Notably, the high IUU risk Venezuela-flagged fishing vessel CAYO CRASQUI met with the cargo vessel MISS ELECTRA SUPPLY near Taboga, Panama in late March 2026. The 70-meter fishing vessel operates across the Pacific EEZs of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and within Colombia. Recent tracking data indicates CAYO CRASQUI is currently operating in international waters just outside Colombia’s EEZ, approximately 350 nautical miles west of Tumaco, as of April 17, 2026. It has conducted several dark activities in the region, a risk indicator for potential IUU fishing. Ownership data lists the registered owner of CAYO CRASQUI as Pesquera Crasqui S.A. and the commercial manager/operator as Global Tuna S.A., both based in Panama. The vessel was previously named SOLOMON TOPAZ before being acquired and renamed by Grupo Natoli, a Venezuelan-origin tuna fishing group described as the largest tuna vessel owner in Panama and Venezuela ([source](#)). The sister vessel CAYO NORONKY, formerly SOLOMON SAPPHIRE, was acquired in the same transaction and also appears in the data. Both vessels operate under Panamanian-registered entities within what appears to be the Natoli corporate network, a common structure for Venezuelan fishing interests operating through Panama. Open sources suggest the CAYO CRASQUI is a purse seine fishing ([source](#)), and it is plausible that it is targeting yellowfin and skipjack tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific.

Another fishing vessel of interest, the CONTADORA I, is a 76-meter Panama-flagged fishing vessel linked to a company in Spain that primarily operates in the South East Pacific Ocean west of the Galapagos Islands. The vessel’s pattern of life indicates it conducts meetings with tankers near Taboga, Panama, including the HERCULES 300, NEO TRADER, and HARRIER. The CONTADORA has also conducted meetings with cargo vessels in the region, including the MISS ELECTRA SUPPLY in the same region of Panama, likely

transferring its catch. The CONTADORA I has interacted with other Panama-flagged but likely Spain-affiliated fishing vessels near Manta, Ecuador based on behavioral analysis.

2.3 Flag State Breakdown of Dark Activity

Vessel tracking data reveals Venezuela-flagged fishing vessels conducted a high number of dark activities in the Caribbean in the last three months, followed by fishing vessels flagged to the U.S., Vietnam, Belize, Martinique and Trinidad and Tobago (see Figure 9).




Figure 9 - Dark activities by flag in the Caribbean region from January 1 to March 31, 2026.
(Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

While dark activity on its own is not unusual for fishing vessels, it often appears alongside illicit behavior, including fishing in protected areas, closed seasons, fishing of protected species, use of illegal gear types, illegal transshipments, and more. In the Caribbean, much of the fishing fleet consists of small-scale vessels that are not required to carry AIS, so AIS gaps are common and not inherently indicative of IUU fishing. At the same time, the region does face documented IUU risks and related maritime crime, particularly with artisanal fleets, with underreported local activity, and unlicensed and/or IUU foreign vessels, so dark behavior should be assessed within additional context.

3. VESSELS OF INTEREST

3.1 Top Vessels Engaged in Fishing Operations

The vessels listed below recorded the highest number of fishing activity hours in the Caribbean region during the first quarter of 2026 (January - March 2026).




Figure 10 - The top 15 fishing vessels based on total fishing hours in the Caribbean in the first quarter of 2026 (January 1 - March 31, 2026) ((Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

1. **MISS ADRIANNE** (IMO: 8885767, MMSI: 367146820) is a United States-flagged fishing vessel which conducted 15 fishing activities, lasting approximately 1,200 hours, off the coast of Miami and north of Cuba’s EEZ in the past quarter
2. **F/VSEA EXPLORER** (IMO: 8856297, MMSI: 367680670) is a United States-flagged fishing vessel which conducted 8 fishing activities totalling approximately 1,100 hours near the Miami coast. The vessel’s registered owner is Florida-based Versaggi Shrimp Corp.
3. **ALBATROS** (MMSI: 775993119) is a 21 meter-long, Venezuela-flagged fishing vessel which conducted 8 fishing activities lasting approximately 992 hours in the EEZs of Guyana and Suriname during the first quarter of 2026. The fishing vessel operates without an IMO, which while not usual, can complicate enforcement and monitoring efforts. The vessel also conducted several dark activity events in Suriname’s EEZ during the past quarter. The vessel regularly calls into the port of Paramaribo, Suriname.

Fishing Vessels of Interest

In the past quarter, several Belize-flagged and Taiwan-owned fishing vessels were detected conducting fishing activities in Guyana, Suriname, and their vicinity. These vessels are owned by Star Trading Corporation Limited, based on recent reporting from 2023. However, historical records indicate they previously operated under the Suriname flag and were owned by Paramount Fishery N.V. ([source](#), [source](#)). Globally, based on open source intelligence and reporting, Taiwanese fishing vessels have often been implicated in IUU-related offenses and human rights abuses on board, and a plausible Taiwanese fishing fleet operating in the region is notable ([source](#), [source](#)).

1. CHUNG KUO NO.31 (MMSI: 312866000)
2. CHUNG KUO NO.212 (MMSI: 312827000)
3. CHUNG KUO NO.37 (MMSI: 312811000)

3.2 Top Vessels By Meeting Activity

Top Fishing Vessels

The fishing vessels listed below recorded the highest number of meetings in the Caribbean region during the first quarter of 2026 (January - March 2026).




Figure 11 - The top 15 fishing vessels based on the number of meetings they conducted in the Caribbean in the first quarter of 2026 (January 1 - March 31, 2026) (Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

1. **TRIPLE NET** (MMSI: 368443110) is a U.S.-flagged fishing vessel which conducted numerous meetings with pleasure-class vessels in the Bahamas during the past quarter.
2. **BIG TROUBLE** (MMSI: 338555201) is a U.S.-flagged fishing vessel which also conducted meetings with pleasure-class and other fishing vessels in the Bahamas during the past quarter
3. **SHE DEVIL** (IMO: 8855176, MMSI: 354404000) is a Panama-flagged fishing vessel that conducted a total of 25 meetings with cargo vessels, tankers, service vessels, and passenger vessels in Trinidad and Tobago's EEZ during the past quarter. The vessel is owned by the Aruba-based company Miami Driver International Nv.



Figure 12 - Image of the SHE DEVIL (Source: Windward)

Top Logistical Support Vessels

The tanker and cargo vessels listed below conducted the highest hours of meeting activity with fishing vessels in the Caribbean region in the first quarter of 2026.

1. **MISS ELECTRA SUPPLY** (MMSI: 355103000) is a Panama-flagged cargo vessel that conducted STS meetings with Venezuela and Panama-flagged fishing vessels in the Caribbean region during the past quarter, including the High IUU Risk vessel CAYO CRASQUI.
2. **KING FISHER** (IMO: 9556038, MMSI: 232059973) is a United Kingdom-flagged tanker detected conducting meetings with Panama-flagged fishing vessels in Venezuelan EEZ during the past quarter.

3. **ADELAIDE** (IMO: 9957622, MMSI: 636022860) is a Liberia-flagged cargo vessel which conducted meetings with Panama-flagged fishing vessels in the past quarter. The vessel is beneficially owned by CCB Financial Leasing Corporation Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Construction Bank, one of China's four major state-owned commercial banks ([source](#)).

Additional Vessels of Interest Meeting in the Caribbean

A Russian-flagged fishing vessel, NOVAYA ZEMLYA (IMO: 9249922, MMSI: 273312370), which has been previously implicated in illegal fishing in the North Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NAFO) regulatory area, was detected conducting bunkering meetings with the tanker KELLY TRADER (IMO: 9013438) in the port of Kingston, Jamaica ([source](#)).

In the past quarter, several Japanese fishing vessels conducted meetings with Panama-flagged tankers in Panama, near the port of Cristobal. These fishing vessels operate in the North Atlantic Ocean and travel to Panama for refueling, on their way from the North Atlantic to their homeports in Northeast Asia.

In the past quarter, the following three fishing vessels assessed as high or moderate risk for IUU conducted several meetings in Panamanian EEZ:

1. The Venezuela-flagged **CAYO CRASQUI** (IMO: 8718079, MMSI: 775635000) met with the Panama-flagged cargo vessel MISS ELECTRA SUPPLY (MMSI: 352005623).
2. The Venezuela-flagged **TALENDUIC** (IMO: 8919465, MMSI: 775140000) met with three other Venezuelan fishing vessels and a Panama-flagged tanker named GREAT PANAMA (IMO: 9280158, MMSI: 352005361).
3. The Panama-flagged **CONTADORA I** (IMO: 7385409, MMSI: 352986162) met with the Panama-flagged tanker named GREAT PANAMA (IMO: 9280158, MMSI: 352005361).

3.3 Top Vessels Engaged in Dark Activity

The fishing vessels listed below recorded the highest number of dark activity hours in the Caribbean region during the first quarter of 2026 (January - March 2026).




Figure 13 - The top 15 fishing vessels based on the number of dark activities they conducted in the Caribbean in the first quarter of 2026 (January 1 - March 31, 2026) (Source : [FIU IUU Fishing Dashboard](#))

1. **ANDREINA** (MMSI: 775993361) is a 14 meter-long, Venezuela-flagged fishing vessel that conducted dark activities totalling approximately 11,600 hours in the Caribbean region during the past quarter. The vessel traveled with its AIS turned off from Venezuela to Suriname where it called into the port of Paramaribo.
2. **DON ENMA** (MMSI: 775993481) is a 14 meter-long, Venezuela-flagged fishing vessel that conducted dark activities totalling approximately 11,400 hours in the Caribbean region during the past quarter. The vessel traveled from the Netherlands Antilles to Guyana with its AIS turned off and called before calling into the port of Georgetown, Guyana.
3. **HG** (MMSI: 574112990) is a 26 meter-long, Vietnam-flagged fishing vessel that conducted seven dark activities in Suriname’s EEZs, totalling approximately 9,400 hours during the past quarter. The vessel changed its MMSI at the port of Paramaribo prior to conducting fishing operations and dark activities in Suriname’s waters.

The aforementioned Russian-flagged fishing vessel NOVAYA ZEMLYA was detected conducting a dark activity in Cuba’s EEZ during the last quarter. The vessel operates predominantly in the fishing grounds of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean and the Barents Sea, and has been previously implicated in illegal fishing by NAFO authorities ([source](#)).

Appendix



Windward Terminology, Data Sources, and IUU Risk Methodology

Fishing Operation

Fishing vessels maneuvering at low speeds, suggesting engagement in fishing activity within the area of interest.

Dark Activity

Vessels that intentionally disable their AIS transmissions to conceal activities or visits to areas of interest.

Ship-to-Ship (STS) Meeting

A direct interaction between two vessels, during which goods, fuel, or personnel may be transferred.

Windward Data Sources

AIS : Spire; Kpler (MarineTraffic); OHB LuxSpace, S&P Global

Vessel Ownership and Specifications: Affinity; MarineTraffic, Gibson; ShipsDNA, Windward Proprietary Database, Customer sourced Data, various classification societies (such as ABS and Lloyd's Register)

Ultimate Beneficial Ownership: Dun & Bradstreet

Counterparty Due Diligence (CDD): LSEG World-Check One

Sanction List Screening: LSEG World-Check One

Vessel photos: AirNav Systems

Map: Open Street Map, Google Maps (global use), MapBox (notifications)

Media and Adverse Media: Dataminr, Websearch engines API



IUU Fishing Risk Methodology

Windward's IUU fishing risk model applies a behavioral scoring system to identify vessels engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing or related activities. The model assesses vessels using dynamic indicators – such as dark activity, ship-to-ship meetings, and prolonged slow-speed operations – and static indicators like inclusion on IUU blacklists. Each indicator is weighted based on behavioral analysis and domain expertise. The model also differentiates between fishing and support vessels and highlights global "hot zones" where IUU activity is concentrated. These assessments are integrated into Windward's platform and API to enable users to evaluate risk levels and detect suspicious patterns across the maritime supply chain.

For more information, please contact —