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SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
PERSONALIZATION UNDER CUBA'S 1940 CONSTITUTION

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DEDICATION

To my family, who sacrificed it all.

To the Cuban people, who continue to sacrifice it all.

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Cuban poet and independence leader José Martí y Pérez wrote that “Gratitude, like certain flowers, does not grow in the highlands and flourishes better in the good earth of the humble.” This dissertation is the result of years of work, which would not have been possible without the constant support and encouragement of several people to whom I will eternally be indebted.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
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by

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The ratification of Cuba’s Constitution of 1940 ushered hopes for democratic stability, most notably through the implementation of a semi-presidential system. Innovative for its time, semi-presidentialism sought to reduce the “perils of presidentialism” that plagued the Cuban Republic. Yet, over the next two decades, the Cuban Republic declined and fell as it devolved into authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

This study analyzes the extent to which Cuba’s executive branch was institutionalized or personalized under the 1940 Constitution. Taking a close look at the presidential administrations of Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar (1940-1944, 1952-1954, and 1954-1959), Ramón Grau San Martín (1944-1948), Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948-1952), Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo (1954-1955), and Manuel Urrutia Lleó (1959), this study offers an overview of institutional concepts and characteristics of political culture while exploring their manifestation in decrees, ministerial appointments, newspaper and magazine headlines, political caricatures, and other features. The study concludes that the executive branch became more personalistic and less institutionalized during the period, significantly contributing to the Cuban Republic’s collapse.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR	Alianza Auténtico Republicana
AR	Acción Republicana
CEC	Centro de Estudios Convivencia
CLD	Coalición Liberal Demócrata
CND	Conjunto Nacional Democrático
CPN	Coalición Progresista Nacional
CSD	Coalición Socialista Democrática
D.E.U.	Directorio Estudiantil Universitario
F.E.U.	Federación Estudiantil Universitaria
M-26	Movimiento 26 de Julio
OA	Organización Auténtica
PAP	Partido Acción Progresista
PAU	Partido Acción Unitaria
PD	Partido Demócrata
PDR	Partido Demócrata Republicano
PL	Partido Liberal
PNR	Partido Nacional Revolucionario (Realista)
PPC	Partido Popular Cubano
P.P.C.(O.)	Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo)
PR	Partido Republicano
P.R.C.(A.)	Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico)
PSD	Partido Social Demócrata

PSP	Partido Socialista Popular
PUC	Partido Unionista Cubano
PUR	Partido Unión Radical
UNa	Partido Unión Nacionalista
URC	Partido Unión Revolucionaria Comunista

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 8, 1959, French journalist Hubert Beuve-Méry, writing under the pseudonym of Sirius, published an article in *Le Monde* entitled “De la Dictature Temporaire au Régime Semi-Présidentiel.” In it, he described the key features of France’s new Fifth Republic, recently established by President Charles de Gaulle.

That same day, 5,000 miles away, Fidel Castro and his rebel forces rode into Havana, Cuba on tanks. After almost six years of fighting, throngs of jubilant Cubans celebrating the overthrow of President Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar welcomed the rebels into the capital. Unbeknownst to the Cuban people and the rest of the world, Castro would soon establish a communist dictatorship that remains in power. In doing so, he also undid the semi-presidential system that was in place since the ratification of the Cuban Constitution in 1940.

1.1 Statement of Problem

Cuba’s political development has been mired in conceptual misconceptions and misunderstandings that have shaped how scholars study it. The country’s innovative semi-presidential system was largely misunderstood when it was implemented in 1940, at the time making it only the second country in the Western Hemisphere to have adopted the model. Following decades of political upheaval, Cuba’s political elites sought to curtail the powers of the president while maintaining elements of the country’s political culture in place. Though relatively new as a political regime type, semi-presidentialism was considered a viable compromise between the pure presidentialism that existed since Cuban independence and varying degrees of absolutist and constitutional parliamentary monarchy imposed during Cuba’s colonial era.

Yet Cuba's semi-presidential experiment was short-lived. After almost 12 years of democratic governments elected in free and fair elections. Cuba's constitutional order was interrupted by a coup d'état in 1952. Semi-presidentialism returned three years later with the reinstatement of Cuba's Constitution of 1940, albeit with some important restrictions. When Cuba's revolutionary government reached power in 1959, semi-presidentialism and the rest of Cuba's 1940 Constitution were gradually dismantled, paving the way for a totalitarian communist dictatorship that has remained in place for over six decades.

The 2019 ratification of a new constitution in Cuba offers some significant modifications to the totalitarian political model established in 1959 and institutionalized by the Political Constitution of 1976. The reestablishment of an Office of President that is independent from the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers and the resurrection of the Office of Prime Minister leads observers to wonder whether significant changes in the political system will take place soon, or whether those changes are merely an attempt for Cuba's leaders to maintain control.

While these institutional and cosmetic changes may seem innovative, they harken back to Cuba's 1940 Constitution. This Constitution turned towards semi-presidentialism in an attempt to reduce the powers and "Caesarist" tendencies of Cuban presidents (Carbonell Cortina 2001, 319). It did so by separating the offices of head of state and head of government and providing greater legislative and judicial oversight of the executive branch and its actions. (Cuba Const. Title XIV, Sec. 2, Art. 174, d).

The period of study begins on October 10, 1940, when President Batista (1940-1944) was inaugurated as Cuba's first president under the 1940 Constitution. The study will also cover the administrations of presidents Ramón Grau San Martín (1944-1948), Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948-1952), Batista's government following the 1952 coup (1952-1954), the interim presidency of Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo (1954-1955), Batista's last presidency (1955-1959), and the presidency of Manuel Urrutia Lleó (1959). Given the totalitarian nature that developed in Cuba's government in the early months of 1959, the study will end with President Urrutia's resignation on July 17th of that year.

The period of study presents different government types, varying from democratic governments to hybrid and authoritarian regimes. However, the period's commonality lies in the almost-uninterrupted existence of semi-presidential institutions during the period between 1940 and 1959. This study does not seek to make value judgments regarding individual administrations or leaders. Instead, it aims at studying the institutionalization and personalization of Cuba's executive branch during the period.

During this period, political personalities came at odds with established or nascent institutions. Often times, it became difficult to distinguish between the executive branch's institutions and their leaders as individuals. Although the regime type in place today is significantly different from those that developed during the period of study (1940-1959), the reestablishment of the presidency and of the prime ministership as institutions raises questions regarding the nature of the offices and its implications for Cuba's political future.

This study fills several gaps in the literature on semi-presidentialism and Latin American and Cuban politics. While there is extensive literature on the presidency, the rarity of semi-presidentialism in the Latin American context allows this study to provide new and useful insights into this political system and its potential viability in the region. Furthermore, the current literature on Cuban politics covering the period of study takes a historical approach. As a result, a general and pervasive misunderstanding and simplification of the development of Cuban politics has developed over the past 80 years. This dissertation uses a political science framework to study Cuba's political processes under the Constitution of 1940 to offer a different lens through which to view Cuba's historical and contemporary politics.

1.2 Background and Theory

This study employs Maurice Duverger's landmark definition and conceptualization of semi-presidentialism as its theoretical framework. Duverger defined the concept of semi-presidential government as "a political regime [in which] the constitution which established it, combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them" (Duverger 1980, 166). Adding to this definition, Giovanni Sartori indicated: "Semi-presidential systems perform on a power sharing basis: the president must share power with a prime minister; and, in turn, the prime minister must obtain continuous parliamentary support" (Sartori 1994, 121).

According to Duverger: “As an analytical model, the purpose of the concept of semi-presidential government is to explain why relatively homogeneous constitutions are applied in radically different ways. It has only four parameters: the actual content of the constitution, the combination of tradition and circumstances, the composition of the parliamentary majority, and the position of the president in relation to this majority” (Duverger 1980, 177).

1.3 Research Question and Goals

The central question that this study seeks to answer is “To what extent did the executive branch in Cuba institutionalize?” Answering this question is important towards the understanding of the nature of Cuban politics. While the executive branch was itself composed of four main institutions (the presidency, the vice presidency, the prime ministership, and the Council of Ministers), semi-presidentialism had a relatively short history in Cuba. During this period, the Spanish tradition of the *caudillo* (strongman) was prevalent as it transitioned from the battlefield to the ballot box. The clashes between the institutionalization of the executive branch and the personalization of politics are evident during the period in question, but it is not always clear where one ended and the other began.

When studying the relationships between the presidency, the prime ministership, and the council of ministers in Cuba, it is important to determine whether any of these relationships demonstrate a higher level of institutionalization or personalization. The links between these executive branch institutions can help in understanding the role that the presidency played within Cuba’s political system and within Cuban society.

Data collection and analysis allows for pondering what lessons this study's findings can offer the present and future Cuban leadership. This study contributes to the literature of semi-presidentialism, comprised largely of single-case studies, by providing the first study on Cuban semi-presidentialism and, at the same time, one of the first studies of semi-presidentialism in Latin America.

1.4 Hypothesis

The central hypothesis of this study posits that Cuba's executive branch experienced low institutionalization and high personalization. As a set of political institutions, the executive branch is expected to strive to maximize its levels of institutionalization. However, this study hypothesizes that, during the period of study (1940-1960), the executive branch in Cuba experienced low levels of institutionalization and high levels of personalization. Executive administrations vary in some respects from one another. However, the executive branch's institutions in Cuba were highly personalistic, making who was heading them more important than what the office's constitutional duties and responsibilities indicated.

This hypothesis is rooted in several related phenomena in Cuban politics during the period. Since independence, power in Cuba has been concentrated in the executive branch. Efforts to reduce the powers of the presidency by creating the office of prime minister did not live up to its intended goal, as his role was not well defined, and his duties and responsibilities were unclear. The concentration of executive power also highlighted traditional and colonial patterns of power and power relationships in Cuba. Given that only four decades had passed since the Cuban Republic became independent,

the country's Spanish colonial era was not too far removed from the Cuban psyche. Therefore, it is natural to posit that characteristics of political culture, like personalization, continued to play a role in Cuban politics in spite of institutional efforts to curtail executive power.

1.5 Methods, Research Design, and Techniques

Duverger's four parameters of semi-presidentialism offer a useful theoretical framework that can explain how the executive branch developed in Cuba. These parameters can also serve to measure the institutionalization and personalization of Cuba's executive branch.

The first parameter, the actual content of the constitution, is useful in determining if Cuba's presidents, vice presidents, prime ministers, and cabinet members adhered to their constitutional duties and responsibilities. This parameter is measured through process tracing by identifying the enumerated powers and responsibilities granted to each office under Cuba's Constitution of 1940.

The second parameter, the combination of tradition and circumstances, emerges from the idea that "legal rules which are unapplied, are not dead. They hibernate, and the person who has the necessary skill, can always bring them to life again" (Duverger 1980, 180). Measuring this second parameter requires identifying instances in which Cuba's tradition of *caudillismo* and strong presidentialism survived into the period under the 1940 Constitution. Important measures for this parameter include the ratio of presidential decrees to legislation and the number of ministerial changes.

The third parameter, the composition of the parliamentary majority, posits that a lack of parliamentary majority offers the greatest coincidence between the constitution and practice, while a parliamentary majority provides less coincidence between the constitution and practice. This parameter is measured by determining the parliamentary composition of each legislature during this period by party and coalition.

The fourth parameter, the position of the president in relation to the legislative majority, offers insights into the relationship between the president, the prime minister, and the cabinet. It can help illustrate whether the prime minister exerts his constitutional power of if he acts as a chief of staff to the president, depending on the composition of the legislature. This parameter is measured by studying if the president's party is the same as that in the majority in the legislature.

This study considers personalization to be a component of political culture. After identifying Cuba's political culture, Gideon Rahat and Tamir Sheafer's (2007) study on "the personalization of politics" serves as the backbone for measuring personalization. The authors argue that "political personalization should be seen as a process...in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines...[and] argue that it is helpful to look at political personalization as a general concept that can be divided into three different types" (Rahat and Sheafer 2007, 65). As a result, this study applies Rahat and Sheafer's conceptualization of political personalization to a semi-presidential system by using their three categories: individual, media, and behavioral personalization.

In this study, individual personalization is measured by examining the cohabitation between the president and the vice president, the crisis mechanism, and the proliferation of ministers during the period. Media personalization is measured by identifying instances of institutional and personal references in print media during the period of study. Focusing on headlines due to their higher and more prominent visibility in newspapers, the study quantifies the use of institutional titles (president, minister, ministry name, etc.) and given names and other personalistic attributes (i.e. Batista, Grau, Prío, general, doctor). Behavioral personalization is measured by studying the president's role in selecting presidential candidates, the use of presidential prefixes, and the complex relationship between the period's three main political leaders: Batista, Grau, and Prío.

Some studies have pursued parts of the same methodology employed in this study. Ernst Veser (1999) used Duverger's four parameters to measure characteristics of semi-presidentialism in different countries where this regime type has been implemented (Veser 1999, 40). Similarly, Oleg Zaznaev (2008) applied Duverger's parameters in his study on the presidentialization of Russia's semi-parliamentary regime (Zaznaev 2008, 27). Scholars of political culture have also applied Rahat and Sheafer's three types of personalization to other cases. Silke Adam and Michaela Maier (2010) referred to Rahat and Sheafer's study in their analysis of personalization (Adam and Maier 2010, 218). Focusing on Western Democracies, Diego Garzia (2011) used Rahat and Sheafer's view of personalization as a process to study the causes and consequences on leader-follower relationships (Garza 2011, 698). However, no previous studies on institutionalization and personalization have combined the same methodology or used the same indicators found in this study.

This study sets out to demonstrate how and why Cuba's executive branch became more personalistic over time. Based on the premise that strong institutions are vital for democracy, a review of institutionalization is necessary, as it provides the theoretical basis necessary to measure deviations from it. Next, a review of the roots of personalization will demonstrate what factors of Cuba's political culture facilitated executive branch personalization. Following the presentation of these theoretical roots, theoretical frameworks in both areas will be applied to Cuba's semi-presidential system. A study of institutional dynamics based on Duverger's four parameters of semi-presidential government will demonstrate the deviation of Cuba's executive institutions from their Constitutional definition. Similarly, a review of Rahat and Sheaffer's three types of personalization offers different indicators of executive branch institutionalization. Finally, the conclusions demonstrate patterns of personalization while highlighting the study's relevance considering Cuba's recent political developments.

II. INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The degree to which institutionalization and personalization in Cuba's semi-presidential system developed needs to be studied in two general areas. The first of these is rooted in the institutional argument, based on the Cuban government's institutions as defined in the Constitution. To understand how semi-presidentialism developed in Cuba, it is also important to first study the features of presidentialism to determine whether semi-presidentialism achieved the goals of the Constitution's framers of diluting the president's powers. The second area that needs to be studied hinges on a political culture argument, where elements including the personalization of the presidency and other offices may shed light on the development of semi-presidentialism in Cuba.

The scholars cited in this section have written extensively on institutionalization and have studied the strengths and weaknesses of institutional arrangements in presidential and semi-presidential systems. Some scholars provided a general institutional framework by conceptualizing the regime types (Maurice Duverger, Giovanni Sartori, Matthew Sjøberg Shugart, Arendt Lijphart, Juan J. Linz, John M. Carey, Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, Yuksel Alper Ecevit, Ekrem Karakoç, Robert Elgie, Petra Schleiter, Gabriel L. Negretto, and Humberto Nogueira Alcalá). Others applied those concepts to Latin America (Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, Jacques Lambert, Kate Ferris, Segundo V. Linares Quintana, Raúl Niño Buitrago, Santiago Niño Novoa, Eilen Páez Rocha, and Julio César Ycaza Tigerino). A few of them focused their studies on the institutional dynamics in Cuba during the period (Jan Suter, Dieter Nohlen, Enrique Baloyra, Beatriz Bernal Gómez, Enrique Hernández Corujo, and Néstor Carbonell Cortina).

Cuba's Constitutional Assembly of 1940 had three regime types to choose from for the country's political future. Presidentialism had already been tried and discarded by the drafters of the new Constitution due to the presidency's growing power in the decades since independence. For centuries, parliamentarism has been notably present in the United Kingdom and other European countries, but its implementation in Cuba would have marked a significant shift away from traditional patterns of executive authority common throughout Latin America. A third regime type, semi-presidentialism, combined elements of the two systems, allowing for a reduction in presidential power while keeping some of the presidency's key features in place.

2.1 Presidentialism

Since establishing an independent republic in 1902, Cuba instituted a political system that followed traditional patterns of presidentialism. Cuba's presidential system was defined by characteristics that leading scholars of presidentialism like Giovanni Sartori (1997), Matthew Søberg Shugart (2005), and Arendt Lijphart (2012) attributed to this regime type: a popularly elected president who heads the executive branch for a fixed term and is (generally) not dismissible by the legislature. Shugart (2005) elaborated on the basic concept of presidentialism by indicating an important characteristic that distinguishes it from semi-presidentialism, namely that "The president names and directs the cabinet and has some constitutionally granted lawmaking authority" (Shugart 2005, 324-325). As a result, presidents derive their power from three sources: constitutions, the legislature, and direct popular elections (Lijphart 2012, 116).

Context plays a central role in the success or failure of regime types. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) considered that presidentialism is not necessarily "a problematic

regime type,” that it “comes in different varieties,” and that its function “depends upon the broader institutional arrangements,” including the president’s legislative powers, the party system, and societal conditions” (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 3-4).

While presidential systems may be similar, context provides significant variations in presidential dominance. Lijphart (2012) contended that a “variation in the degree of executive dominance can occur, depending on exactly how governmental powers are separated...” (Ibid., 13). These differences in presidential dominance have contributed to the debate on presidentialism’s success in fostering democratic stability. Scott Mainwaring (1995) indicated that “Presidential systems are less favorable for institutionalizing democracy than parliamentary systems, and the disadvantages of presidentialism are compounded by highly fragmented multiparty systems. Multipartyism reduces the likelihood that the president will enjoy majority backing in Congress, and hence increases the likelihood of presidential-legislative impasse” (Mainwaring 1995, 392).

Since, as Lijphart (1994) argued, “presidentialism spells majoritarianism,” a key weakness of presidentialism lies in “its strong inclination toward majoritarian democracy, especially in the many countries where, because a natural consensus is lacking, a consensual instead of a majoritarian form of democracy is needed” (Lijphart 1994, 91). This scenario was evident in Cuba, where governing coalitions were needed to establish majority governments.

The rules and regulations for coalitions were detailed by Cuba’s Congress when it approved a new Electoral Code in 1943. This Electoral Code stipulated “that all coalitions were obligated to nominate the same candidates for President and Vice-

President in all the provinces,” which according to William S. Stokes (1949) “denied the flexibility of nomination and expression of opinion so ardently desired. Coalition agreement on senators and for provincial and municipal elections was likewise required” (Gutiérrez Sánchez, Gustavo 1943, 223; Stokes 1949, 340). Together with the Constitution, this Electoral Code sought to “encourage participation in the electoral process by making suffrage universal, equal, secret and obligatory for both sexes over twenty years of age and endeavor to provide adequate safeguards against fraud through an elaborate system of registration and election control” (Stokes 1949, 339).

As was the case throughout Latin America during independence, presidentialism was selected as the preferred political regime in Cuba because it broke with the European models of monarchy and parliamentarism that were in place during the nineteenth century. Looking towards the north, Latin Americans borrowed many features from the U.S. government, the world’s first presidential system and the initial prototype for similar regimes.

The birth of American democracy revolutionized political regimes with its advent of an elected presidency. What were once relationships between monarchs and subjects now flourished between citizens and their elected representatives. As Spain’s colonial empire in the Americas fought for independence in the early part of the nineteenth century, independence leaders looked to their neighbors to the north for political inspiration. Jacques Lambert (1964) correctly observed that the development of presidential regimes in Latin American “signals that it imitates the regime of the United States, but with the difference that the President counts on even greater powers than in the original model” (Lambert 1964, 403). However, what worked for the United States

was not necessarily successful in Latin America, as traditional patterns of governance soon emerged in different forms.

The new republics were soon governed by elected executives, many of them former military independence leaders, or caudillos. As Lambert explained, the region witnessed the rise of “regimes of presidential preponderance,” where the presidency became the preponderant actor in the nation’s political life. Similarly, Dieter Nohlen (1991) identified the presidency as “The preeminent organ...towards whose centralism that national formation is produced, in some cases with much success, for example, in Chile” (Nohlen 1991, 47). It would seem that Cuba’s political system ran the risk of becoming less institutional and more personalistic as time went by.

What developed in Latin America was a form of presidentialism marked by an imbalance of power, with more authority granted to the executive. Over time, it seemed that the use of presidentialism was inevitable, but as scholars like Juan J. Linz (1978) and Raúl Niño Buitrago, Santiago Niño Novoa, and Eilen Páez Rocha (2016) pointed out, its perils would also be present.

Presidential politics during Cuba’s early decades also demonstrated parallels with the era’s regional patterns of presidentialism. Specifically, it illustrates several concepts that have defined executive leadership in Latin America since most of its country’s gained independence in the early-nineteenth century.

Writing about presidential preponderance in Cuba, Enrique Baloyra (1971) explained: “In Cuba, as in most Latin American systems, rule-making was primarily an executive function predominantly exercised by the President and his Cabinet (Baloyra 1971, 221). Consequently, the pattern of interactions and behaviors that defined the style

of a political regime in the Cuban Republic was the pattern of interactions and behavior between the President, his ministers, and his most trusted advisors, and all other actors who were able to participate in national decision-making” (Ibid., 222). In his study of political leadership in Cuba between 1944 and 1958, Baloyra found that “In summary, there was a shared impression among the judges [interviewees] that the personal power of the office tended to maximize the impact of individual differences on the style of the regime” (Ibid., 223).

Yet Presidentialism in Cuba, as in Latin America, is closely related to Guillermo A. O'Donnell's (1994) concept of delegative democracy. Since presidents are viewed as the "embodiment of the nation and the main custodian and definer of its interests," O'Donnell argued, it is generally understood and accepted "that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office" (O'Donnell 1994, 59-60). Here, the president is seen as having a mandate to govern based on his or her personal priorities, presenting a more personality-driven relationship to voters than the one found in representative democracies.

As the last Spanish possession in the Americas to gain independence, Cuba's 1901 Constitution was drafted during a period of U.S. occupation following the end of Spanish colonial rule after Cuba's final war of independence (1895-1898) and the Spanish-American War (1898). As a result, Cuba's political system shared many characteristics with that of the U.S., including the establishment of an electoral college, a cabinet made up of department secretaries, and the appointment of Supreme Court justices and diplomatic officials with Senate approval (Márquez-Sterling 1969, 315).

Cuba's 1901 Constitution established the President of the Republic as the individual that would exercise the duties and responsibilities of the executive branch. Presidents were elected by an electoral college and would serve for a four-year term while being prohibited from serving for three consecutive terms. The president would also appoint cabinet secretaries as determined by law (Ibid.).

The 1901 Constitution was amended to include the text of the Platt Amendment. This Amendment allowed the U.S. to intervene in Cuban affairs upon the Cuban government's request "to preserve Cuban independence, maintain an adequate government for the protection of life, property and individual liberty and to carry out the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now assumed by the government of Cuba" (OurDocuments.gov 1903, para. XX).

From the very beginning, presidentialism had an overall history of poor performance in Cuba. The new republic ushered in a period of governance, as novelist Carlos Loveira y Chirino (1920) put it, by "generals and doctors" (Loveira 1920, 426). The country's first president, Tomás Estrada Palma, sought reelection in 1905, facing off against independence war general José Miguel Gómez Gómez, who ran under the banner of the Liberal Party (Müller 1984, 350). The assassination of Colonel Enrique Villuendas, a former congressman and supporter of the Liberal cause, led Gómez to resort to *retramiento* (Camacho 1938, 223). An aspect of Latin American political culture, Juan J. Linz defined *retramiento*, as "A traditional pattern of opposition behavior in Spanish and Latin American politics that involves a withdrawal from the legislature and a refusal to participate in parliamentary debates or in free elections and results in delegitimation" (Linz 1978, 30). *Retramiento* would play a role in Cuba's politics during the years prior

to the collapse of the Republic. In this case, it led to Estrada Palma's unopposed reelection, which now lacked the necessary legitimacy for its survival.

A Liberal Party uprising soon emerged, pressuring Estrada Palma to invoke Article III of the Platt Amendment to request a military intervention on the part of the U.S. government (López 1921, 107). President Theodore Roosevelt rejected Estrada Palma's request for troops and ships to pacify the island. Instead, he sent two warships to escort U.S. Secretary of War William Howard Taft to mediate a solution to the crisis (Santovenia and Shelton 1966, 14). When this mediation failed, President Estrada Palma, Vice President Fernando Méndez Capote, and the entire cabinet resigned (Bosch 1970, 650). Constitutionally, Congress was responsible for selecting the new president under these circumstances, but it was unable to do so given the deep partisan divisions. Taft declared the Second U.S. Intervention and became Provisional Governor of Cuba on September 29, 1906 (Márquez-Sterling and Márquez-Sterling 1996, 169-170).

Following a U.S. military occupation that lasted three years (1906-1909), Cuba was set to return to its course as an independent republic. It also demonstrated some of the characteristics that would continue to haunt Cuban democracy, particularly as it related to the presidency. Political violence and assassinations, *retraimiento*, disputed election results and subsequent uprisings, and unclear presidential succession rules in times of crisis would continue to appear in the following decades.

After the Second U.S. Occupation, two predominant political factions vied for power under the leadership of two prominent veterans of the War of Independence. Major General Gómez continued to lead the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party), while Major General Mario G. Menocal y Deop headed the Partido Conservador (Conservative Party).

What emerged was a system of “*caudillage*” or “*caudillismo*” that had been a prominent feature of post-independence regional leadership during the nineteenth century. Segundo V. Linares Quintana (1963) argued: “There is no doubt that it has deep roots in the antecedents and tradition of Hispanic America, the predominant tendency in the institutional landscape of said countries, that makes the president of the Republic a caudillo, that absorbs the most important powers of the State...” (Linares Quintana 1963, 167).

Cuban historian Leví Marrero Artiles employed another term, “*cesarismo*,” to evoke a similar concept, which he defined as “personal power.” Marrero added that this is a “unipersonal regime, based on naked force, its weakness borne out of its own inability for ordered succession” (Marrero 1956, 127).” The Cuban republic would be plagued by conflict among political personalities that impeded ordered succession on several occasions.

Addressing the topic of *caudillismo*, Julio César Ycaza Tigerino (1971) highlighted the preponderance of these characteristics in Latin America. “The phenomenon of caudillismo that in other countries is sporadic,” Ycaza Tigerino argued, “in Hispanic America it comes to be a constant of our politics...it constitutes in itself a system without any other justification than the aesthetic of the personality...it comes to be an expression of a fundamental anti-rationalism...” (Ycaza Tigerino 1971, 22).

Juan Linz (2000) conceptualized “*caudillage*” by using four characteristics: “(1) the repeated emergence of armed patron-client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and submission, and by a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms; (2) the lack of institutionalized means for succession to offices; (3) the use of violence in

political competition; and (4) the repeated failures of incumbent leaders to guarantee their tenures as chieftains” (Linz 2000, 156).

Caciquismo was another important feature in the Cuban republic’s early decades. Similar to *caudillage* and *caudillismo*, *caciquismo* places its emphasis on a political figure. The term comes from the word *cacique*, a term borrowed from the Taino tribe’s word for chief. Cuban sociologist and ethnographer Fernando Ortiz Fernández (1998) explained: “When we evoke a tribal and barbaric figure of political *caudillejo* we call him *cacique*, like the Taíno ruler, and *caciquismo* to refer to his personal and authoritarian regime” (Ortiz 1998, 199). One of Cuba’s founding myths tells the story of Hatuey, chief of the Taíno and Cuba’s most famous *cacique*, who chose to be burned at the stake by the Spanish conquerors rather than living under their domination. Applying the term to twentieth century Latin American politics, Kate Ferris (2012) referred to *caciquismo* as “the practice of negotiating power and privilege between the political center and the locality through clientelist networks mediated by *caciques* (local bosses), endured through the revolutionary *sexenio* and well into the twentieth century in Spain” (Ferris 2012, 69).

Demonstrating the relationship between *caciquismo* and *caudillage* or *caudillismo*, Linz stated: “On the periphery of the modern Western world, particularly Latin America after independence, under formally democratic constitutions, forms of non-strictly traditional personal rulership emerged: *caudillismo* and the oligarchic rule of local notables, landowners, and *políticos*, sometimes in alliance with a more modern center, a system known as *caciquismo*” (Linz 2000, 143). It is also important to note that, in political terms, caudillos wielded national and provincial party control, while *caciques*

operated as party bosses who generally operated from their respective municipalities or neighborhoods.

General Gómez was elected president in 1908 and served a four-year term from 1909 until 1913. That same year Menocal, the rival Conservative Party *caudillo* who had been elected president in 1912, succeeded him as president. Unlike Gómez, Menocal successfully sought reelection in 1916 amid accusations of electoral fraud. Gómez and the Liberals led an unsuccessful insurrection known as *La Chambelona* (named after the Liberal Party's song). The rebellion's defeat and the imprisonment and subsequent exile of Gómez and other Liberal Party leaders ensured Menocal's completion of his second term in 1921.

The Liberals returned to power in 1921 following the election of Dr. Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso and maintained power with General Gerardo Machado y Morales' election in 1925. An independence war veteran like his predecessors Gómez and Menocal, Machado carried out an extensive public works program towards the first part his term. However, as his term came to an end, he sought to remain in power. With the help of his allies in Congress, Machado benefitted from a prorogation of powers, which extended the president's term in office from four years to six (Carbonell 1928, 157). The changes, codified in the Constitution of 1928, also abolished the office of vice president.

Soon, the traditional Conservative opposition headed by former President Menocal joined a coalition of university students, organized as the *Directorio Estudiantil Universitario* (D.E.U.), and members of the military's lower echelons in opposition to Machado's government.

As pressures against Machado increased, so did his government's repression of opposition groups. Once again, political violence became commonplace, as both opposition and government supporters were harassed, attacked, and killed. Students rallied around the September 30, 1930 killing of fellow student Rafael Trejo González during an anti-Machado demonstration (Suchlicki 2002, 89). The murder of Liberal Senate President Clemente Vázquez Bello was part of a larger, but unsuccessful, plot orchestrated by the ABC, an opposition cell organization that would later become a political party, to assassinate Machado and members of his administration while in attendance at the late Senator's funeral (Aparicio Laurencio 1994, 131). On the opposition side, the retaliatory assassination of Representative Gonzalo Freyre de Andrade and his brothers, Leopoldo and Guillermo, as well as the attempted assassination of Representative Miguel Ángel Aguiar contributed to the pattern of violence against elected officials that would continue in later years and decades (Machado y Morales 1982, 50).

After attempts by the United States to mediate between the opposition and the government failed, Machado left office on August 12, 1933. Before submitting his resignation, Machado appointed General Alberto Herrera y Franchi, the Head of the Army, to serve as Secretary of State to replace Machado as president upon his resignation, in accordance with the Constitution in place at the time. Herrera himself resigned as president and was replaced by Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada, himself appointed Secretary of State shortly before to succeed to the presidency.

The Céspedes government was also short lived. On September 4, 1933, a group of students from the D.E.U. headed by Carlos Prío Socarrás and others, along with mid-

level military officers headed by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar overthrew Céspedes' government in what became known as the Sergeants' Revolt (Ros 2005, 154). It was during this period that three defining figures in Cuban politics between 1940 and 1959, Fulgencio Batista, Ramón Grau San Martín, and Carlos Prío Socarrás, emerged from within the opposition movement.

A native of the town of Banes in Cuba's easternmost Oriente Province, Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar grew up in poverty and was self-educated before joining the Army in 1921 (Argote-Freyre 2006, 2). He had risen to the rank of sergeant stenographer by 1933 when he was involved in a revolt led by sergeants against the Céspedes government and soon emerged as the group's leader.

Ramón Grau San Martín was a medical doctor and professor at the University of Havana from La Palma, Pinar del Río Province, who served as the philosophical and political leader of the anti-Machado student movement (Lancís y Sánchez 1985, 14). Imprisoned briefly for his political activities, he went into exile, where he continued to offer ideological and technical support to the D.E.U. members and students who called on him.

Another native of Cuba's westernmost province, Carlos Prío Socarrás hailed from Bahía Honda, Pinar del Río (Riera Hernández 1968, 180). A law student at the University of Havana, Prío became one of the D.E.U.'s top student leaders in the anti-Machado movement. As the events of 1933 unfolded, Prío was selected to preside the *Junta Revolucionaria Cubana* (Cuban Revolutionary Junta), comprised of university students united against Machado.

The Revolt ushered the anti-Machado opposition into office, first under an Executive Commission of the Provisional Government of Cuba, commonly referred to as the Pentarchy, and then under the leadership of Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, himself a member of the Pentarchy, as president (Masó 1976, 552). The Grau government ruled by decree for 120 days until it too was forced from office. Fellow anti-Machado leader Carlos Hevia y Reyes Gavilán briefly served as president, as did Manuel Márquez Sterling y Loret de Mola, before different political factions were able to agree on appointing Colonel Carlos Mendieta y Montefur, another Independence War veteran, as provisional president (Aguilar 1972, 228). Mendieta served for a year before resigning and being succeeded by José A. Barnet y Vinageras. A diplomat, Barnet oversaw the first elections in four years, which were held on January 10, 1936.

The winner of the presidential elections, Miguel Mariano Gómez Arias, was the son of former President Gómez Gómez (Álvarez 1990, 62). Originally allied to Batista, their relationship soon soured and reached a tipping point in late-1936, when President Gómez Arias announced his intended veto on a bill that would impose a nine-cent tax on each sack of sugar produced in Cuba. The revenue collected from the tax would help fund *Escuelas Cívico-Rurales* (Civic-Rural Schools), allowing the military to play a role in education and control some of its funding. In a speedy process, President Gómez Arias was impeached and removed from office on December 24th of that year, making Vice President Federico Laredo Brú the country's eleventh president in six years (Rodríguez Morejón 1944, 107). A new Constitution would soon take shape.

Cuba's presidential politics during its first three decades under presidentialism highlights some of the drawbacks that some scholars have presented against

presidentialism. Warning against the “perils of presidentialism,” Juan J. Linz (1990), explained:

“Given his unavoidable institutional situation, a president bids fair to become the focus for whatever exaggerated expectations his supporters may harbor. They are prone to think that he has more power than he really has or should have and may sometimes be politically mobilized against any adversaries who bar his way. The interaction between a popular president and the crowd acclaiming him can generate fear among his opponents and a tense political climate. Something similar might be said about a president with a military background or close military ties-which are facilitated by the absence of the prominent defense minister one usually finds under cabinet government” (Linz 1990, 62).

The preponderance of two former military leaders during the early decades of the twentieth century presented a pattern that would be repeated a generation later. At the same time, it set the stage for struggles between the government and the opposition.

Giovanni Sartori (1997) echoed Linz’s view, indicating: “By and large, presidentialism has performed poorly. With the sole exception of the United States, all other presidential systems have been fragile – they have regularly succumbed to coups and breakdowns” (Sartori 1997, 86). Sartori concluded that two-party presidentialism is more functional than a multiparty one,” a reality that became evident in Cuba (Ibid., 179). Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2006) supported this line of thinking, explaining: “The intuitive idea is that presidents, because they are elected in a popular vote, tend to represent the preferences of the median voter in society” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 115). By 1939, Cuba’s political leaders were ready to try a new regime type.

2.2 Semi-Presidentialism

By the late 1920s and early 1930s, the “perils of presidentialism” resonated among some sectors in Cuba’s political class. Semi-presidentialism has often been selected as an alternative to presidentialism in post-authoritarian scenarios with the goal of significantly weakening the office of the president in cases where the office had exercised broad powers while threatening the country’s democratic processes. Similar to the emergence of semi-presidential governments in other countries, Cubans pointed to the need to reduce the powers of the executive as a key motivation in moving away from presidentialism while maintaining some of the same institutions to which Cubans were accustomed. This rationale falls in line with Elgie’s (2011) view that “the adoption of semi-presidentialism is consistent with a country wanting to reduce, or be seen to reduce, the power of the president by increasing the role of the legislature” (Elgie 2011, 14).

Addressing the “Cuban perils of presidentialism” in the country’s early decades, Cuban attorney and constitutional scholar Néstor Carbonell Cortina (1974) wrote that “In the political order, it was necessary to substantially modify the Cuban presidential system, rigid, personal and irresponsible, without valves or springs that would impede the continuous clash of the President of the Republic with public opinion, a serious friction that has been the root cause of our revolutions” (Carbonell Cortina 1974, 62).

In 1940, ABC leader and Senator Pedro López Dorticós expressed similar sentiments when he declared: “The crisis of parliamentarism could not reduce us to maintain the rigid and inflexible presidential system, whose aggressions to political freedom do not have an escape other than revolution” (López Dorticós 1940, 232). López Dorticós reflected the ABC’s desire to decentralize the president’s power. The previous

year, another prominent ABC member, Emeterio S. Santovenia, expressed the ABC's proposal for a new regime in the 1940 Constitution, indicating that "The President of the Republic should be elevated to the role of moderating power. The governmental and political functions will be directed by a new high official: The Head of Government. The President of the Republic will be above partisan controversies. The Head of Government and Cabinet will respond in each instance to the dominating state of opinion" (Santovenia 1939, 242).

During President Machado's government, legislative steps were taken to restrain presidential powers. Seeking a peaceful solution to the violence of the period, the House of Representatives approved a bill that would implement several constitutional reforms, including a system of "regulated parliamentarism." The bill failed in the Senate, but its sponsor, José Manuel Cortina García, continued defending the concept. Years later, as Majority Leader of the Constitutional Assembly that drafted the Constitution of 1940, Cortina successfully codified a semi-presidential regime (Jorge 1990, 60).

In many ways, the concept of a semi-presidential system for Cuba was innovative. Semi-presidential systems had only emerged in Finland and Weimar Germany in 1919 after World War I as a form of government separate from presidentialism and parliamentarism (Elgie 2011, 1). In 1931, semi-presidentialism emerged in Spain's Second Republic, created following the abolition of the monarchy (Linz, Jerez, and Corzo 2003, 15). Two years later, Peru's Constitution of 1933 established a semi-presidential system, the first in the Western Hemisphere (Chirinos Montalbetti 1991, 281). However, semi-presidentialism had not yet been conceptualized as a separate form of government. Instead, it was considered as a hybrid between presidentialism and

parliamentarism, borrowing from both regime types in varying degrees, and was usually referred to as semi-parliamentarism.

The literature on presidentialism and semi-presidentialism in Cuba is fairly limited. The Cuban example is included in a very limited number of comparative studies on semi-presidentialism. Robert Elgie (2011) was among the most prominent scholars on semi-presidentialism who indicates that Cuba had a semi-presidential constitution between 1940-1952 and 1955-1959 (Elgie 2011, 25). To support this view, Elgie explained:

“In Cuba, Art. 140 of the 1940 constitution stated that the ‘President of the Republic shall be elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage...for a term of four years...’. Art. 151 stated that there was a Council of Ministers and that one of the ministers ‘shall hold the title of Prime Minister’. Arts. 164-169 detailed the relations between the Congress and Government and included Art. 168, which stated: ‘In any case in which a vote of confidence is refused the Government...must resign within forty-eight hours following the parliamentary decision...’ (Ibid.)”

Matthew C. Mirow (2015) placed the creation of semi-presidential institutions in Cuba against the backdrop of political reforms occurring in Latin America at the time. “The Cuban Constitution of 1940,” Mirow explained, “created a Council of Ministers reporting to the Congress and incorporated many of the social aspects common in the region at the time (Mirow 2015, 215).”

Much of the literature refers to Cuba’s semi-presidential system does so in the context of its institutional components as codified in the Constitution of 1940. Mario Riera Hernández (1966) described the Cuba’s political system under the 1940

Constitution as “the semiparliamentary regime headed by a Prime Minister” (Riera Hernández 1966, 23).

Similarly, Beatriz Bernal Gómez (2008) summarized the innovations to Cuba’s political system that were codified into the Constitution of 1940. She indicates that “In relation to the organic part, the Constitution of 1940 designed a State based on the principle of the division of Powers and on the coordination among these. The novelties in relation to the Constitution of 1901 was to define a semiparliamentary regime, half way between American presidentialism and European parliamentarism, as well as the inclusion of the figures of the vicepresident and the prime minister, the latter of these a figure that was never put into place” (Bernal Gómez 2008, 37). Reintroduced by the 1940 Constitution, the office of vice president was not new to the 1940 Constitution, but the vice president’s *de facto* duties and responsibilities did expand. Cuba’s semi-presidential system provides an example of what Matthew Sørberg Shugart defined as president-parliamentarism. Under this subtype of semi-presidentialism, “the prime minister and cabinet are dually accountable to the president and the assembly majority” (Shugart 2005, 333).

One key method of congressional accountability over the council of ministers occurs in the form of interpellation of ministers. Through this process, Congress compels cabinet ministers to submit information or appear in person to answer questions during hearings. The interpellation of ministers is enumerated in Articles 142 and 163 of the 1940 Constitution.

Several scholars come to different conclusions in term of this political system’s relative success or failure in Cuba. Enrique Hernández Corujo (1960) indicated that

“There were, in that Constitution, a group of precepts that had, in practice, more or less full effect; others that were practiced, sometimes clashing against the doctrinal principles that informed said text, while another group was still not being practiced” (Hernández Corujo 1960, 226-227). To illustrate the point, Hernández Corujo “mentions among the second the overreach of the Executive in the use of its regulatory function, in essence, the tendency to govern by decree” (de la Cuesta 2006, 134). This tendency to “govern by decree” is further explored in this study.

There is a consensus among scholars that the Constitution of 1940 was not fully enforced as it related to the executive branch. Carbonell Cortina (1974) wrote that “Unfortunately, none of the Presidents of the Republic (Batista, Grau, and Prío) put into function the expressed regime” (Carbonell Cortina 1974, 30). He also (2001) points to semi-parliamentarism’s short lifespan as a key downfall. “Unfortunately,” Carbonell Cortina stated, “semiparliamentarism was only partially in place in Cuba during twelve years of constitutional governments” (Carbonell Cortina 2001, 319). Yet he explains that “The aforementioned notwithstanding, it is fair to recognize that the failures of semiparliamentarism in Cuba were above all functional – originated by old corrupt practices, by entrenched presidentialist burdens, and by a lack of time for the reforms to catch on. A people are not parliamentarized from night to day, nor are presidential excesses subdued by simply printing constitutional proclamations on paper, and not on the citizen conscience” (Ibid.). This echoes the conclusions that Lambert, Nohlen, and Baloyra reached regarding the presidency’s preponderance. The stage appeared set for a personalistic presidency to cast a shadow over an institutional executive.

Between 1940 and 1959, the number of decrees from administration to administrations was upwards of a few thousand, while Congressional legislation hovered at around a few dozen. This phenomenon reflects a continuation of what Marifeli Pérez-Stable (1993) called an executive-dominated political system. She explains that “During the 1940s, Batista, Grau, and Prío maximized their rule-making power: the average ratios of congressional legislation to executive decrees were 1:57, 1:70, and 1:26...” (Pérez-Stable 1993, 45).

A little over a year after the 1940 Constitution entered into force, Cuba joined the Allies in World War II. After declaring war against Germany and Japan in December 1941, Cuba’s Congress passed Law #34 on December 19th, with which it established a State of National Emergency as permitted under Article 281 of the Constitution (Colegio de Abogados de La Habana 1946, 19). Under the State of National Emergency, Congress delegated some of its powers to the Council of Ministers for a period of 45 days (Secretaría de Estado 1941, 154; Lazcano y Mazón 1952, 458). During this period, the Council of Ministers issued *Acuerdos-Ley*, or Agreement-Laws, which were ratified by Congress on February 9, 1942 upon the end of the State of National Emergency (Duarte Oropesa 1975a, 659).

Four decades after the 1940 Constitution was ratified, Maurice Duverger (1980) became the first scholar to conceptualize semi-presidentialism, focusing on the model of government found in his native France. Originally, the concept’s definition centered around his focus on “the content of the constitution” (Duverger 1980, 166). Duverger explained: “A political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which established it, combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by

universal suffrage, (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them” (Ibid.). The regime defined in the 1940 Constitution incorporates all three of Duverger’s defining features.

Matthew Sjøberg Shugart, along with John M. Carey (1992) and Scott Mainwaring (1997), contributed to Duverger’s concept by developing two subtypes: president-parliamentary and premier-presidentialism. They defined president-parliamentary systems as those where “the president both appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers, and if the ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence” (Shugart and Carey 1992, 24). Conversely, they identify premier-parliamentary systems as those “in which there is both a premier (prime minister), as in a parliamentary system, and a popularly elected president” (Ibid., 23). According to Shugart and Carey, this latter subtype is the same as Duverger’s definition of semi-presidentialism. However, Shugart and Carey identified “one presidential power that moves a regime outside of the category of premier-presidentialism: the power to dismiss ministers unilaterally. Such power would contradict the third criterion of the definition, namely, the dependence of the cabinet on the assembly” (Ibid., 24).

Shugart (2005) indicated that, under a president-parliamentary system, “the president selects the cabinet and also retains the possibility of dismissal. In this sense, this form of semi-presidentialism is much closer to pure presidentialism and is the reason why the figure places the cabinet beneath the president, in contrast to the depiction of premier-presidentialism. Nonetheless, these systems are semi-presidential because the assembly

majority may dismiss the cabinet even if the president would prefer to retain it. Thus the president and assembly must engage in transactions..., but unlike in pure presidential systems these transactions are not only over policy-making. They are ongoing transactions over the composition and direction of the cabinet, brought on by the dual accountability that defines the president-parliamentary subtype” (Shugart 2005, 334). During the period between 1940 and 1959, each Cuban president had several partial or total cabinet changes during his term.

Focusing on the constitutional parameters for the presidency, Humberto Nogueira Alcalá (2017) indicated that “In principle, the President of the Republic in a semipresidential regime, differentiates itself from the parliamentary head of State in that the first constitutionally possesses powers of regulation, or arbitration, of pressure and even, in exceptional cases, of government substitution” (Nogueira Alcalá 2017, 71). “This way,” Nogueira Alcalá adds, “it will only be possible to pinpoint the notion of arbitration of the President of the Republic in the Constitutions of a semipresidential nature, in the analysis of the powers and specific duties that may be granted to him in the respective constitutional text” (Ibid.).

However, Gabriel L. Negretto (2018) correctly addressed the different *de jure* and *de facto* characteristics found in presidential and semi-presidential systems. Negretto explained that “The real power of presidents results from a complex interaction between their formal attributions, the unwritten constitutional conventions, the characteristics of the party system and of the partisan organization and the strength of other institutions. Also important are extra-institutional factors, such as the changing preferences of

political actors and the characteristics of the social and economic context” (Negretto 2018, 134).

Several scholars on semi-presidentialism have offered support for semi-presidentialism when offered as an alternative to presidentialism. Giovanni Sartori (1997) indicated that while semi-presidentialism is not the best regime type, it is more applicable than presidentialism (Sartori 1997, 137). He further explained: “Let me start with the assertion that semi-presidentialism is better than presidentialism...especially on the ground that the former system can cope with split majorities far better than the latter” (Ibid., 135). Sartori also argued that “...semi-presidentialism is far more amenable to constitutional engineering than premiership systems” (Ibid., 136).

Addressing Lijphart’s view of majoritarianism as a weakness of presidentialism, Sartori also indicated that “a virtue of the semipresidential formula is precisely that it can cope with split majorities. They enfeeble the president and force him into cohabitation with a prime minister of a different party; but this engenders a strengthened premier, who can and will find a coalition majority for his government. Thus semipresidentialism can solve the problem that pure presidentialism cannot solve” (Sartori 1994, 115). Yet, despite Sartori’s arguments in favor of semipresidentialism, he concluded: “I am prepared to admit that the case *for* semipresidentialism is not strong” (Ibid.). Regarding the concept of cohabitation, itself a main criticism of semi-presidentialism, Elgie (2008 and 2010) concluded that “There is insufficient evidence to make the claim that cohabitation is perilous under semi-presidentialism” (Elgie 2008, 49).

A few years earlier, Sartori (1994) explained the importance of context in determining which regime type worked in a particular place at a specific moment in time.

Sartori's minimal definition for context refers to "(1) the electoral system, (2) the party system, and (3) the political culture or degree of polarization" (Sartori 1994, 110). Sartori believed "that semipresidentialism can improve presidentialism and, similarly, that semiparliamentary systems...are better than plain parliamentary ones" (Ibid.). Presenting a different view in their study, Robert Elgie and Petra Schleiter (2011) placed greater importance on constitutional design, concluding "that political conditions pale in significance as determinants of the survival of these democracies when compared to constitutional design" (Elgie and Schleiter 2011, 43).

Criticism of semi-presidentialism is largely centered around its duality of legitimacy. Part of this duality centers around potential conflict between the president and the prime minister. Yuksel Alper Ecevit and Ekrem Karokoç (2017) concluded their study by indicating that, "compared to presidential and parliamentary systems, semipresidential systems often generate dual-legitimacy problems, thereby reducing confidence in both government and parliament" (Ecevit and Karokoç 2017, 4).

Another part of this duality centers around the problems presented by cohabitation. Elgie (2008) indicated that "semipresidential countries run the risk of experiencing difficult periods of 'cohabitation' between a president and a prime minister who are opposed to each other, and because they may also experience periods of divided minority government that encourage the president to rule by decree and subvert the rule of law" (Elgie 2008, 49). During the period under the 1940 Constitution, issues of cohabitation arose not between the president and the prime minister, but between the president and the vice president. Constitutionally, the vice president's sole duties were to replace the president in case of incapacitation and death and to cast a tie-breaking vote in

the Senate. Yet the president and vice president, who ran on the same ticket, belonged to different parties. The vice president, therefore, played a key role in keeping the governing coalition together.



EL ULTIMO CONSEJO, por Prohías.
...y sobre todo, Carlos, mucho ojo con el vice...

Image 1: Bohemia cartoon depicting outgoing President Grau warning president-elect Prío to “be careful with the Vice President,” June 13, 1948.

Under Cuba’s Constitution of 1940, the country’s prime ministers belonged to the same party as the president. However, cohabitation occurred in relation to the president and the vice president, the latter coming from a different party in the coalition. While the Constitution limited the vice president’s role to succeeding the president in the case of incapacitation or death and casting a tie-breaking vote in the Senate, the vice president played a significant role in keeping the coalition in place. This type of cohabitation gave rise to a popular phrase during the period, “*Cuidado con el vice*” (“Be careful of the Vice President”) (Image 1). The phrase reflects both the suspicions that Cubans held of the office of vice president and the *choteo* that they used to address it.

During the 1950s, the vice president's constitutional responsibility to succeed the president in the case of his absence was not put into practice on two occasions when it should have been implemented. Following Prío's ouster on March 10, 1952, Vice President Guillermo Alonso Pujol remained in office until submitting his resignation a week later. Constitutionally, Alonso Pujol should have assumed the presidency. Alonso Pujol justified his resignation by indicating: "It is evident that last Monday's coup d'état, upon producing the overthrow of the President and his Government has dispossessed me in effect of my legitimate investiture as the second in Command of the Republic" (*Diario de la Marina* March 18, 1952, 1). It is important to note that not all political actors gave up their constitutional positions without a fight. Days after the coup, Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona Loredó, then President of Congress, convened a legislative session at the Capitol, where legislators were dispersed by gunfire (Segura Bustamante 1994, 284).

Similarly, the vice president failed to fulfill his constitutional duties seven years later when Batista resigned the presidency on January 1, 1959. Constitutionally, Vice President Rafael Guas Inclán should have assumed the presidency. Indicating that Guas Inclán was unavailable at the time of Batista's resignation, the presidency was offered to Senate President Anselmo Alliegro Milá, who was constitutionally next in line to the presidency following the vice president. Alliegro himself resigned the presidency, which then went to the next in the constitutional line of succession, Supreme Court Justice Carlos Manuel Piedra y Piedra, the most senior member of the Supreme Court.

Although both Alonso Pujol and Guas Inclán were elected to a position where their key role was to succeed the presidency in times of crisis, they stood aside from doing so when the political system was violently challenged. Essentially, the institution

was unable to survive challenges from personality-led movements and challenges to the government.

The lack of a true balance of power in a semi-presidential system is a possibility that is not lost on some scholars. Juan Linz (1994) saw a significant problem in semi-presidentialism in that "...the president can dissolve the parliament" (Linz 1994, 48). It is important to note that during the period of study (1940-1959), no Cuban president dissolved Congress. However, the president's ability to do so represented a significant power held by the presidency in relation to the other branches of government. Following the 1952 coup d'état, Batista did not dissolve Congress, opting instead to wait for the expiration of "the terms of all senators and half the members of the House of Representatives" on September 15, 1952 (Ameringer 1985, 330). Charles D. Ameringer (1985) explained that "Since Batista had cancelled the elections to renew or replace these legislators, the Congress had, in effect, ceased to exist..." (Ameringer 1985, 330).

Linz further studied this issue of a true balance of power in relation to the role of the military. He explained that "A dual executive system is likely to have at least three major actors and very often four: the president, the prime minister, the minister of defence, and generally a joint chief of staff who has the immediate command of the forces" (Linz 1994, 57). However, Linz added, "The hierarchical line that is so central to military thinking acquires a new complexity. Will the president act through the minister of defence? Or will the minister of defence establish a direct relationship with the president bypassing the prime minister and reporting directly to the president, who makes

decisions without necessarily informing and obtaining the consent of the prime minister?" (Ibid.).

The concerns that Linz raised regarding the role of the military in a semi-presidential regime were particularly evident in Cuba. The front-page headlines in the *Diario de la Marina* newspaper during the period made little reference to Ministers of Defense, usually only mentioning his name or title in relation to ceremonial duties. Instead, events and topics of a military nature highlighted the role of the Chief of the Armed Forces and other military leaders. This demonstrates a clear contradiction between the Constitution's parameters for civilian leadership of the military and the *de facto* role played by military leaders vis-à-vis civilian leadership.

Semi-presidentialism alone did not reduce the threat that the military posed on Cuba's political system. Menocal and other political leaders believed that Batista would pose less of a threat by persuading him to leave the military. The natural way of doing this seemed to be to encourage and facilitate his run for president in 1940.

Despite Batista's military background, his administration faced a military challenge shortly after taking office. Following a heated meeting with Batista, Army Chief José Eleuterio Pedraza Cabrera met with military officers on February 4, 1941 and told them that they needed to choose between him and Batista (López Vilaboy 1973, 205). The officers, who kept Batista informed of the conversations, chose the latter, and Batista himself went to the Camp Columbia barracks, stripping Pedraza and his co-conspirators of their military ranks (López Vilaboy 1973, 206; Duarte Oropesa 1975a, 665). In doing so, the military was able to bolster Cuba's new constitutional order for the time being. However, the question remains: were they bolstering the president or Batista?

Taking advantage of the “State of National Emergency” in place immediately following Cuba’s entry into World War II, the Council of Ministers approved Agreement-Law No 7 of January 27, 1942, also referred to as the Organic Law of the Army and Navy. Among other things, this Agreement-Law retroactively granted President Batista the rank of general (Fornés-Bonavía Dolz 2003, 174). The timing of this Agreement-Law (almost a year after Pedraza’s coup d’état and while the country was on a war footing) gave the promotion political importance and shades of personalization. While it can be argued that Batista was a “wartime” president, a military promotion would not have been necessary to begin with, since the Constitution of 1940 stipulates that the president is the supreme chief of the Armed Forces. A similar promotion was neither necessary nor possible for presidents Grau (himself a “wartime president” during his first year in office) and Prío.

Pedraza’s attempted coup and Batista’s promotion to general reflects the military’s long-standing role in Cuban politics. Ricardo Adam y Silva (1986) traced this trend back to the Sergeant’s Revolt of September 4, 1933. Adam y Silva explained: “The classist coup set a fatal precedent in the military arena that could never again be repaired. The constant conspiracies of military officers against constitutional presidents Grau San Martín and Prío Socarrás, demonstrated that discipline and the principle of authority were never regained with the new concepts established by the improvised chiefs” (Adam y Silva 1986, 152).

Elgie (2011) presented an argument that hints at the success or failure of semi-presidentialism based on different factors. Making an institutional argument, he “suggests that there is a direct causal link between the form of semi-presidentialism that a country

has chosen and the democratic performance of that country” (Elgie 2011, 35). Elgie went on to argue that “In the former case under president-parliamentarism, neither the president nor the legislature has an incentive to negotiate over the formation of the government. Political deals are likely to be fragile. This means that there is likely to be political instability, which will be damaging for the performance of democracy” (Ibid.). Furthermore, Elgie stated that “Overall, premier-presidential democracies should be less likely to collapse than president-parliamentary democracies and, within the set of democracies, the performance of democracy should be better under premier-presidentialism than under president-parliamentarism” (Ibid.).

Following the March 10, 1952 coup d’état, Batista suspended the Constitution of 1940 and replaced it with the *Estatutos Constitucionales del Viernes de Dolores* (Constitutional Statutes of the Friday of Sorrows) on April 4th of that year. This document suspended the semi-presidential regime, instead combining the offices of president and prime minister into one (held by Batista) and granting the Council of Ministers broader powers (República de Cuba 1952, 39-40). Yet Manuel Márquez-Sterling (2009) indicated that “Determined to allay the fears that he would install an ironclad military junta, Batista formed a civilian provisional government and a consultative council with several distinguished personalities” (Márquez-Sterling 2009, XXIII). At the same time, the document maintained the Council of Ministers (adding the Ministries of Transportation and Information) but suspended Congress, replacing it with a Consejo Consultivo (Consultive Council), a legislative body that was subordinate to the executive branch and whose members were appointed by the Council of Ministers (Rojas 2011, 46).

Seeking to legitimize his government, Batista reinstated the Constitution of 1940 in 1954 and ran for president. Under the Constitutional Statutes of 1952, the Council of Ministers designated the president (Article 118) and the president's successor "in case of definitive absence or of incapacity" (Article 122) (República de Cuba 1952, 37). Yet, given that the 1940 Constitution prohibited the consecutive reelection of the president, Batista stepped aside as president and the Council of Ministers appointed the Minister of the Presidency, Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo, to serve as president from August 14, 1954 until February 24, 1955 (González del Valle Ríos 1980, 37). As president, Domingo oversaw the general elections held on November 1, 1954 and U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon's February 1955 trip to Cuba. Both events served to grant Batista and his government a veil of democratic legitimacy and international recognition.

Once the 1940 Constitution was reinstated and Batista was sworn into office as president, the semi-presidential regime's features were reintroduced. Yet, when prime ministers held other positions in the council of ministers simultaneously, their constitutional roles and duties often became unclear. By the time that Batista's last prime minister, Gonzalo Güell y Morales de los Ríos, was in office, the role of prime minister transformed *de facto* to that of a chief of staff and emissary for the president. U.S. Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith (1962) related his interactions with Prime Minister Güell, who served concurrently as Foreign Minister, indicating that Güell, a career diplomat, relayed messages between Batista and the U.S. Ambassador (Batista 1963, 124).

While this interaction defines part of a foreign minister's responsibilities, it does not reflect the prime minister's traditional and constitutional role. Concurrently holding the offices of prime minister and foreign minister makes it difficult to determine where

one role ends and the other begins. This distinction is important because, while the foreign minister represents the foreign ministry, the prime minister represents the government. Blurring the lines between the two can send mixed signals to domestic and international actors, which is particularly dangerous in a time of crisis like the one that the Cuban government was going through in the late 1950s. Smith would go on to write that “It was unfortunate for Foreign Minister Güell that he accepted Batista’s appointment as Prime Minister. This appointment removed him from the diplomatic world and placed him side by side with Batista in his fight for political survival” (Smith 1962, 106).

The establishment of a semi-presidential regime in Cuba addressed concerns of excessive presidential power. Yet the institutional modifications to the political system did not address aspects of political culture that would hinder the institutionalization of the semi-presidential regime.

III. ROOTS OF PERSONALIZATION

The literature on political culture offers an alternate argument to the institutional model centered around the development of presidential and semi-presidential regimes. As in the case of institutionalization, the scholars who study political culture offered an interdisciplinary approach to understanding political culture and personalization as concepts (Gabriel A. Almond, Sidney Verba, Lucian W. Pye, Seymour Martin Lipset, Pippa Norris, Tatiana Kostadinova, Barry Levitt, Matthew Rhodes-Purdy, and Raúl L. Madrid), as it is manifested in Latin America (Howard J. Wiarda, Martin C. Needler, Jaime E. Rodríguez Ordóñez, Peter G. Snow, Mario D. Serrafiero, Daniel Cosío Villegas, and Scott Mainwaring), and as it stands out in Cuba (Mauricio Solaún, Rafael Rojas, Edward Gonzalez, Ileana Fuentes, Zoë Valdés, Lydia Cabrera, Carlos Alberto Montaner, Severo Sarduy, Jorge Mañach Robato, Rolando A. Alum Linera, and Felipe P. Manteiga).

A pioneer in the study of political culture, Gabriel A. Almond (1956) defined political culture as “a particular pattern of orientations to political action” (Almond 1956, 396). Almond emphasizes that political culture “does not coincide with a given political system or society,” nor is it the same as “the general culture, although it is related to it” (Almond 1956, 396).

A decade later, Sidney Verba (1965) elaborated on Almond’s concept, defining political culture as “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place,” adding that “it provides the subjective orientation to politics” (Verba 1965, 513). Writing at the same time, Lucian W. Pye (1965) explained that “The concept of political culture assumes that each individual must, in his own historical context, learn and incorporate into his own

personality the knowledge and feelings about the politics of his people and his community. This means in turn that the political culture of a society is limited but given firm structure by the factors basic to dynamic psychology” (Pye 1965, 7).

Seymour Martin Lipset (1990) elaborated on the rigidity of cultural factors relative to institutions. “Cultural factors deriving from varying histories are extraordinarily difficult to manipulate,” wrote Lipset (Lipset 1990, 83). He went on to conclude that “Political institutions--including electoral systems and constitutional arrangements--are more easily changed. Hence, those concerned with enhancing the possibilities for stable democratic government focus on them” (Ibid.). This was evident in Cuba, where political culture prevented institutions from taking root.

Therefore, a picture emerges of political culture as a separate, subjective, and rigid cultural expression that drives political institutions, behavior, and other elements in society, varying from one society to another. Pippa Norris (2004) spoke to Sartori’s assertions on the importance of context when she writes about the convergence of political culture and institutional rules. She stated that “The interaction of political culture and the institutional rules may help to provide insights into persistent puzzles about why apparently similar institutional reforms may turn out to have unanticipated consequences, even among relatively similar political and social systems” (Norris 2004, 204).

Scholars have long debated the role of political culture in Latin America’s political development. One line of thought, proposed by Seymour Martin Lipset (1990) and Howard J. Wiarda (2001), highlighted the importance of political culture in the region. While Lipset listed economic and cultural factors as differentiating political development in Latin America and the United States, Wiarda placed more emphasis on

several aspects of colonial Spanish society in Latin America that remained in place after independence (Lipset 1990, 82; Wiarda 2001, 13).

Specifically, Wiarda pointed to “the rigidly two-class and hierarchical nature of Spanish society, the pattern of large, often unproductive estates, a particular kind of militaristic feudalism, the system of patrimonialism and of societywide patron-client relations, the structure of top-down and absolutist authority reaching from king to local landowner, and the uniquely Iberian-Latin American system of state-society relations that also formed the distinctively Hispanic definitions of “democracy” and “constitutionalism.” This formative period was important in shaping not only Iberian society but also, by extension, that of Latin America” (Wiarda 2001, 13). The elements that Wiarda presented were evident in Cuban politics and society to varying degrees.

Other scholars have adopted an opposing view, arguing that political culture is not a determining factor in Latin America’s political development. Among these, Martin C. Needler (1989) addressed the assertions made by the opposite camp and challenges their basic premise as false. Similarly, Jaime E. Rodríguez Ordóñez (2018) observed that the term *caudillo*, a linchpin of authoritarianism in Latin American society, is not unique to that context. “The term *caudillo*,” Rodríguez Ordóñez argued, “is not unique to the Spanish language. It is *the leader* in English, *der Führer* in German, and *il duce* in Italian, and it simply means ‘he who directs.’ Nevertheless, scholars imbue the terms *caudillo* and *caudillaje* (the actions of the caudillo) with having explanatory significance when explaining the complex political events in the countries of the Hispanic world” (Rodríguez Ordóñez 2018, 163).

Identifying the role of personalization in political culture is critical in studying if Cuba's executive branch experienced low institutionalization and high personalization. Before studying personalization as a separate process with its own characteristics, it must be understood as part of a broader concept of Cuban political culture. Ambassador Mauricio Solaún (1998) presented the essence of Cuban political culture through a set of three matrices that led to weak political institutions. He contended that these are "general cultural configurations that have been used to interpret democratic pathologies in Latin America (Solaún 1998, 345-346)." It is important to note that, while Solaún studied Cuba's political culture as three different matrices, they are all interconnected and cannot be studied separately from each other.

3.1 Personalismo/machismo/ familismoamiguismo/clientelismo

The first of Solaún's matrices is "the personalismo/machismo/ familismoamiguismo/clientelismo syndrome or matrix" (Ibid., 346). Here, Solaún directly linked the role of the individual and his familial and other personal connections in granting him (usually a male given the *machista* component) political power and opportunities. Defining the core element of this matrix, the "personal," Solaún explained: "Personal" means one's own; private interest or domain. Also, it refers (especially in a hostile way) to an individual's private character, as in the phrase "no need to be personal" (Ibid., 347).

Peter G. Snow (1967) and Mario D. Serrafiero (1991) both offered definitions that identify personalism as a systemic phenomenon. While Snow focused on "reliance on personal relationships" (familismoamiguismo) and "personal guarantees in politics,"

Serrafero highlighted the “greater prestige” that men hold over institutions (Snow 1967, 256; Serrafero 1991, 219).

While writing about Mexico, Daniel Cosío Villegas’ (1975) analysis of a president’s “personal style of governing” is applicable to presidents in Cuba and the rest of Latin America given its emphasis on the importance of personal characteristics. At the core of Cosío Villegas’ argument lies the assertion “that the temperament, the character, the sympathies and the differences, the education and personal experience will influence in a clear way in all of his public life and, in doing so, in his governmental actions” (Cosío Villegas 1975, 8).

Much of the literature on personalization addresses the phenomenon in relation to political parties rather than branches of government. While the dynamics involving political parties are different from those related to government institutions like the presidency, some important information regarding the former can shed light on the latter. Party leadership played an important role in who became president. For the most part, Cuba’s political parties centered around personalities rather than ideology, contributing to increased party fragmentation over time. Cuba’s presidents were party leaders themselves before coming to power. As a result, party personalization was closely associated to the personalization of the presidency and other executive branch institutions.

Looking at personalism through the lens of partisan politics, Tatiana Kostadinova and Barry Levitt (2014) defined personalistic leadership as “the exercise of authority vested in influential individuals based on personal attributes rather than organizational role” (Kostadinova and Levitt 2014, 490). Matthew Rhodes-Purdy and Raúl L. Madrid (2020) built on Kostadinova and Levitt’s definition, “measur[ing] personalism as a bi-

dimensional concept, involving two constitutive factors: presidential dominance of the ruling party; and ruling party organizational weakness (Rhodes-Purdy and Madrid 2020, 322).”

Kostadinova and Levitt (2014) argued that “In transitional democracies with nascent institutions and weak parties, the tendency toward personalism can be particularly pronounced” (Kostadinova and Levitt 2014, 491). This observation is important in the Cuban case given the transitional nature of the country’s political system in the years and decades following the ratification of the Constitution of 1940. Referring to personalist parties, Kostadinova and Levitt offered “Two main criteria: the presence of a dominant leader and a party “organization” that is weakly institutionalized by design. Within such a group, we argue, interactions between the leader and other politicians are driven mainly by loyalty to that leader rather than, for example, organizational rules, ideological affinities, or programmatic commitments” (Ibid., 492).

Cuba’s multiparty political system had its roots in colonial Cuba. While still a Spanish colony, several parties formed during the late-nineteenth century to promote different positions regarding Cuba’s future. Upon becoming an independent state in 1902, Cuba’s political parties began to vie for office and voters. The party system in place during the first decades after independence was dominated by two parties and two *caudillos*, with Conservative general Menocal facing off against Liberal general Gómez. The 1933 overthrow of President Gerardo Machado Morales’ government marked a shift between the old party system dominated by two traditional and personality-based parties, and the new party system, in which a multiparty system emerged with the leaders and participants of the anti-Machado insurgency marking the differences between them.

While Julio Antonio Mella founded Cuba's Communist Party in 1925 during the Zayas administration, the party would become an important player in the decades following the Machado administration (Masó 1976, 516). Over the years, the Party's name changed several times. In 1939, the Communist Party merged with the Partido Unión Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Union Party, or PUR) to become the Partido Unión Revolucionaria Comunista (Communist Revolutionary Union Party, or URC) (García-Montes and Alonso Ávila 1970, 246). On January 21, 1944, the URC formally changed its name to the Partido Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Party, or PSP) (Ibid., 312). Unlike other Cuban political parties, the Communist Party had several leaders throughout its history and had a more cohesive ideological basis like that of communist parties in the Soviet Union and other Latin American countries.

After Liberal President Machado left office, the Liberal Party underwent a process of fragmentation. In 1935, Havana Mayor Miguel Mariano Gómez Arias, the son of former Liberal President José Miguel Gómez Gómez, founded *Acción Republicana* (Republican Action, or AR), representing an opposition, or *marianista*, wing of the Liberal Party. While Gómez Arias proved himself to be a successful, honest, and "model" administrator during his first tenure as Mayor of Havana (1927-1931), his status as the son of the Liberal *caudillo* provided him with a significant degree of legitimacy.

In 1927, Independence War colonel Carlos Mendieta y Montefur broke with the Liberal Party over Machado's government and founded the Partido Union Nationalist (Nationalist Union Party, or UNa) (Duarte Oropesa 1975b, 495). Mendieta would remain leader of the UNa in the years after Machado and would himself serve as president of Cuba from 1934 until 1935. Soon, a splinter group of the UNa, the Partido Social

Demócrata (Social Democratic Party, or PSD) emerged as a vehicle for former Liberals led by former Representative Justo Luis del Pozo y del Puerto. Two smaller parties, the Partido Unionista Cubano (Cuban Unionist Party, or PUC), headed by Carlos Asbert, and the Partido Popular Cubano (PPC), also splintered from Liberal Party.

This new wave of parties would organize during the 1930s. Originally founded in 1931 as a cellular organization to fight against the Machado government, the ABC reorganized itself into a political party in 1938. The ABC presented itself as an alternative to the Liberal and Conservative parties, which it accused of “defrauding the citizenry, lowering the tone of politics, and ending up colluding against the people in the sober chapter of the machadato (Machado dictatorship)” (Ardura 1989, 163; Ichaso 1940, 210). The ABC played an important role in government coalitions but gradually became a minority party and dissolved in 1952 (Aguilar 1972, 197).

The Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico) (P.R.C. (A)) was founded in 1934 by Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín and the student leaders of the anti-Machado insurrection. While the PRC(A) was new to the political scene, its leaders had governed by decree with Grau as President for 120 days between September 10, 1933 and January 15, 1934. These decrees, which included universal suffrage and the establishment of the eight-hour workday, would go on to form the Party’s platform.

Former President Mario G. Menocal Deop maintained his stature as a political figure as leader of the Conservatives, which was renamed the Conjunto Nacional Democrático in 1935. Menocal, “disappointed with certain actions by the Conjunto Nacional Democrático, stepped down from that organization, and proving once more the

power of his huge personality organized a new party, the Democratic Republican, to which he was followed by numerous friends who also caused resignations (sic.) in the former” (Rodríguez Morejón 1941, 72-73).

The notion of the military as a fourth branch of the government, whether official or unofficial, was first proposed during colonial times. Developing a proposed constitution for Cuba in 1812, Joaquín Infante proposed the separation of the military as a fourth branch of government (Infante 1959, 17). This concept never materialized constitutionally, but it remained alive in the dynamics of Cuban politics following independence. By the mid-1930s and early 1940s, the military became an unofficial political force headed by Colonel Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar. The Partido Nacional Revolucionario (Realista) (National Revolutionary Party (Realist), or PNR) emerged as a faction of the PRC(A) that supported Batista and the military’s role in government. Headed by Rubén de León García, a founder of the PRC(A), and José Maceo González (a nephew of Independence War General Antonio Maceo Grajales), the party had one delegate in the 1940 Constitutional Convention (Maceo González) and supported Batista in the 1940 elections before dissolving.

Ten parties participated in the elections for Constitutional Assembly delegates held in 1939. The Constitutional Assembly met in 1940 and drafted a new Constitution, which remained in place without interruption until 1952. Many have pointed to the 1940 Constitutional Assembly as the hallmark of Cuban democracy given the ability of Cuba’s political parties to debate political positions peacefully within a democratic framework.

However, the proceedings masked a serious deficiency in the institutionalization of Cuba's political parties.

The 1940s saw the end of some political parties and the fragmentation and merger of others. AR dissolved when Miguel Mariano Gómez Arias retired from political life shortly after the 1940 elections. Following Menocal's death in 1941, the Partido Demócrata Republicano (Democratic Republican Party, or PDR) split in two, giving rise to the Democratic Party in 1942 and the Republican Party in 1943 (*Diario de la Marina* 1943, 1). The Republican Party joined the Auténticos in a coalition for the 1948 general elections with its founder, Guillermo Alonso Pujol, running for vice president alongside Carlos Prío Socarrás.

By the middle of Prío's administration, the Auténtico-Republican coalition disintegrated, with Prío accusing Grau and Alonso Pujol of crimes. At the time, Prío stated: "I have been able to break the last tie that bound my regime to obstructing political factors, and, free from pitfalls, I can completely abandon all the compromises into which the bad inheritance forced me, and launch myself, resolutely, down the open path of a government like the people want it, like the true *autenticismo* demands it, and how my revolutionary history and responsibility as a ruler demand it..." (Duarte Oropesa 1974, 117). Following the ministerial crisis that emerged, Prío brought in a new cabinet to usher in "Nuevos Rumbos" ("New Directions") in the Cuban government (Riera Hernández 1965, 22). Yet Alonso Pujol remained in office as vice president.

The Republican Party underwent further fragmentation, with Vice President Alonso Pujol and Havana Mayor Nicolás Castellanos Rivero creating the Partido

Nacional Cubano (Duarte Oropesa 1974, 161). Castellanos joined Batista in an Alliance that lasted until December 1951 (Comisión Internacional de Juristas 1962, 34).

By 1948, the P.R.C.(A.) had also split after some of its dissident members, headed by senators Eduardo Chibás Ribas and Emilio (Millo) Ochoa, created their own political party, the *Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo)* (P.P.C.(O)). The P.R.C.(A.) further split up when President Grau had a rift with new President Prío Socarrás, leading to the former's creation of the *Partido de la Cubanidad*.

Batista established the Partido Acción Unitaria (Unitary Action Party, or PAU) in 1949. Cuban historian and essayist Rafael Rojas (2015) stated that he organized this party “to return to power” (Rojas 2015, 25). The PAU changed its name to the Partido Acción Progresista (Progressive Action Party, or PAP) in January of 1953. Another, more left-leaning wing of Batista's supporters organized the Partido Unión Radical (Radical Union Party, or PUR) (Ramos 2007, 176). Originally headed by Public Works Minister Alfredo E. Nogueira Herrera, the PUR was led by several close and prominent Batista associates, including former Presidency and Agriculture Minister Amadeo López Castro, Batista's former personal secretary and PUR Secretary General Raúl Acosta Rubio, and Senator Rolando Masferrer Rojas (Acosta Rubio 1977, 81, 84).

Some scholars highlight the linkages between the level of personalization and the relative strength or weakness of the party system. Scott Mainwaring (1995) argued that weaker party systems set the stage for higher levels of personalization. “Politicians from the catchall parties,” Mainwaring argued, “rely on popular votes in order to win elections. But with weak parties and weakly organized popular sectors, they can win votes on the

basis of personal charisma (principally for executive positions), through clientelistic mechanisms (providing local communities and groups with services or public works), or through the support of local notables who influence the poor population” (Mainwaring 1995, 393).

While writing about Fidel Castro, Professor Edward Gonzalez (1974) explained that “For many Cubans, of course, he [Fidel Castro] possessed the personal qualities of the supreme caudillo—physical strength, valor, audacity, and authoritativeness—which they themselves lacked but could now achieve vicariously through their hero” (Gonzalez 1974, 169). “In brief,” Gonzalez summarized, “charismatic rather than institutionalized leadership characterized Cuba’s revolutionary politics” (Ibid., 170). Gonzalez’s description of the Cuban dictator echoed the characteristics shared by previous Cuban leaders, regardless of how they came to power.

The conflict between *caudillos* Gómez and Menocal during the early Republic ended with Gómez’s death in 1921. Yet, by the end of the 1930s Cuba’s political system saw the emergence of Batista and Grau as Cuba’s new political *caudillos*. While Batista and Grau became Cuba’s predominant political leaders in the years immediately before and after the ratification of the 1940 Constitution, it is still important to include former President Menocal as a third political *caudillo*. During the Constitutional Assembly of 1940, Grau and Batista (through proxies) controlled the coalitions that debated and drafted the 1940 Constitution. Grau’s presidency of the Constitutional Assembly quickly came to an end when Menocal and members of his Democratic Republican Party withdrew their support from the opposition coalition in favor of the government coalition.

Upon Menocal's passing on September 7, 1941, Cuban newspaper *¡Alerta!* prominently displayed the front-page headline "Profound Sadness in the Nation due to the Death of the Caudillo" (*¡Alerta!*, September 8, 1941). With the independence general and *caudillo* gone, Batista and Grau went on to play roles like those of Gómez and Menocal decades earlier.

Cuban-American feminist author Ileana Fuentes (1994) identified a direct link between machismo and *caudillismo*, defining the latter as machismo "taken to its political extreme" (Fuentes 1994a, XVIII). "In the case of Cuba," Fuentes explained, "machismo has dragged an additional weight: that of glorifying not only the *caudillo*, but also the military individual" (Fuentes 1994b, 30). She concluded:

"We Cubans – Latin Americans – are conditioned by a cultural discourse in which government is a synonym of power. This gives us an idea of the traditional discourse that we articulate when we propose solutions to our political nightmares: we speak in terms of *topple, overthrow, come down, depose...* a whole vocabulary that carries the *substitution by force of a figure* that abusively enjoys *absolute power*. What passes for a democratic process is neither a process, nor is it democratic" (Fuentes 1994c, 56-57).

Examples of the *machismo-caudillismo* connection that Fuentes wrote about abound in Cuban history. During the 1940s and 1950s, Batista was known by many nicknames, among them "*El Hombre*" ("The Man"), "*El Indio*" ("The Indian"), "*El Mulato Lindo de Banes*" ("The Good-looking Mulatto from Banes").

Cuban novelist Zoé Valdés (2020) wrote about Batista's personality and impact on Cuban politics in her novel, "*Pájaro Lindo de la Madrugá*." The book's title came from the popular Cuban song "*Sun Sun Babae*," penned by José Curbelo in 1952 after

Batista's coup of that year. The onomatopoeic song references a Cuban songbird, described as the "Pretty Bird of the Early Morning." At the same time, the song lyrics serve as a euphemism for Batista, who was nicknamed "*mulato lindo*" and staged his coup during the early morning hours of March 10th.

During a previous coup attempt, this time against Batista, another symbol of his machismo and command would emerge. When arriving at the Camp Columbia barracks to put an end to Pedraza's coup attempt on February 3, 1941, Batista was wearing a leather jacket which "[came] to be regarded in Cuba as the symbol of forceful authority and fast, effective action. Whenever Batista [did] anything of a spectacular character, such as staging the *coup d'état* of March 10, 1952, the people [said] that he "put on the jacket" (Batista 1962, 215; Chester 1954, 191).

Dueling was another manifestation of personalism and machismo. Agustín Cervantes (1894) defined duels, a tradition with roots in Cuba's Spanish and European heritage, as "questions of honor" (Cervantes 1894, XVI). Cuba's Social Defense Code of 1936 explicitly made dueling illegal in Cuba and punishable by fines or prison for principals, seconds, and witnesses (Rivanera 1954, 99). Yet well into the 1940s and 1950s, Cuban legislators and cabinet ministers challenged each other to duels, with sabers or pistols, that were sometimes carried out in the Capitol building.

"Familismoamiguismo," or close kinship and friendship bonds, were a significant component of Cuban politics, and of Latin American politics more broadly. Carlos Alberto Montaner (2001) explained that in this concept, "the strong ethical link and the system of reciprocal moral obligations are established, with the family, with the circle of

Friends and with those with whom private transactions are carried out, but not with the State” (Montaner 2001, 16).

Using a term of Arabic origin often used by Cubans to refer to a generic person, José Antonio Ramos (1916) conceptualized the term “*fulano*” in political terms. “The Fulano,” Ramos explained, “is generically the individual who is considered to have the social prestige and, above all, the sufficient political pull to be designated as a candidate to the Presidency of the Republic. And in all cases the visible head of a political group” (Ramos 1916, 31). Ramos also wrote about clientelistic bonds and “the extraordinary advantage that it means to be the *President’s friend*, to be of those who rushed to recommend his candidacy, to work to make it viable and to defend it later once it is accepted and consecrated as the banner of a great political group” (Ibid., 45).

The administrations under the 1940 Constitution continued this pattern that was prevalent since the beginning of Cuba’s independence. During Batista’s first term in office (1940-1944), his brother Francisco Batista Zaldívar served as a Representative from Havana province. In April 1944, Batista’s oldest daughter, Mirta Batista Gódinez, married Antonio Pérez-Benitoa Fernández, the nephew of Customs Director Manuel Pérez Benitoa (*New York Times* 1943, 4).

President Grau San Martín appointed his cousin, José R. San Martín Odría Minister of Public Works in 1945 (Portell-Vilá 1996, 556). San Martín’s brother, Ángel San Martín Odría, was also appointed to serve as Subsecretary of Public Works. A nephew, Ramón Grau Alsina, was elected representative from Oriente province in 1948. Yet Grau’s clearest exercise of politics through kinship relationships occurred with the creation of the Bloque Alemán-Grau-Alsina (Alemán-Grau-Alsina Bloc, or BAGA)

(Ibid., 558). This Auténtico Party political machine centered around an alliance between José Manuel Alemán Casharo, the Minister of Education, and Francisco Grau Alsina, another of Grau's nephews (del Águila 1984, 28). Although not a public official herself, Grau's sister-in-law and first lady, Paulina Alsina Fernández, also wielded significant political power in the administration.

Similarly, President Prío appointed his brother, Antonio Prío Socarrás, as Minister of the Treasury (Portell-Vilá 1996, 595). At the same time, another brother, Francisco Prío Socarrás, represented Pinar del Río province in the Senate since filling a vacancy in 1946 and was elected to the same office in his own right in 1948. Carlos Prío Socarrás had represented Pinar del Río in the Senate since 1940, and upon leaving to assume the presidency in 1948, Francisco Prío's election that year ensured that the Prío Socarrás family would continue to represent their home province. Their sister, María Regla Prío Socarrás, was elected as a Representative from Oriente province in 1950, joining her husband, Enrique C. Henríquez Lauranzón, who was elected to represent the same province in 1948 (Riera Hernández 1974, 127, 131). Already serving in the House of Representatives from Las Villas province since 1944, Congressman Antonio Fuentes Rodríguez, married to Prío's sister-in-law Ana Tarrero Serrano, was reelected in 1950 (Ibid., 111).

Following Batista's 1952 coup d'état, kinship relationships reappeared in government. Francisco Batista Zaldívar had been elected to serve as Governor of Havana province in 1948, continued to do so following the 1954 elections, and was slated to remain in the post following the 1958 election (Ibid., 93). Another brother, Hermelindo Batista Zaldívar, was elected to the House of Representatives from Pinar del Río province

in 1954 (Ibid., 87). Batista's nephew, Ramón Batista Diéguez, was elected to the House that same year, representing Havana province (Ibid., 92). Batista's eldest son, Rubén Batista Godínez, was elected to represent the same province in 1958 (Ibid., 92).

Batista also appointed two of his wife's brothers-in-law, Carlos Salas Humara and Rafael Saladrigas Hevia to serve as Minister of Health and Under Secretary of Public Works, respectively. Given the military foundations of Batista's government, these kinship relations extended to the military establishment. General Luis Robaina Piedra's daughter, Carmen Robaina Llana, married Rubén Batista Godínez, while General Roberto Fernández Miranda, Batista's brother-in-law, served as Director of the General Sports Commission and Chief of the Military District of La Cabaña fortress (Fernández Miranda 1999, 177).

3.2 Miraculous/manicheanism/salvationism/messianism

Solaún's "second syndrome or matrix, grounded in folk religiosity, can be called the miraculous/manicheanism/salvationism/messianism" (Solaún 1998, 346). The most well-known use of this second matrix appears with the nickname that Cubans have given poet and independence hero José Martí. Dubbed "The Apostle of Cuba's Freedom," generations of Cubans have referred to "*el Apóstol* José Martí," or simply as "*el Apóstol*."

President Carlos Prío Socarrás' most famous address took place on June 30, 1951. On that day, Martí's remains were transferred to a new, grandiose tomb at Santiago de Cuba's Santa Ifigenia Cemetery. After placing Martí's remains in the tomb, Prío delivered a moving and stirring speech that received wide media coverage. At the core of Prío's address, the president said:

“But even if he does not sing nor preach nor hear, as the mountain ranges do not sing nor preach nor hear, here we are, before him. That my voice reaches the firm silence in which you find yourself, father and Apostle; that here I come, in the name of Cuba by the Cubans elected to govern them, to render accounts to you of what we have done since you have gone missing from us!” (Prío Socarrás 1951, 9-10).

Prío’s address was full of messianic imagery but, unlike the case of other Cuban leaders who used their own messianism to their advantage, Prío’s tone, as elected representative of the Cuban nation, was that of a confessant “rendering accounts” to a messiah (Martí). This is clear in his repetition of the phrase “*padre y Apóstol*” (“father and Apostle”) to refer to Martí. To a largely Catholic Cuban population in 1951, the structure of Prío’s address came across as a rosary-like prayer at the tomb of the nation’s national hero. Writing about Prío’s address, Gastón Baquero (1951) remarked: “The presidential word yesterday was an act of citizen contrition, and a promise of entrenchment of the best” (Baquero 1951, 23).

President Ramón Grau San Martín was referred to “*el Divino Galimatías*” (“the Divine Galimatias”) given his tendency to speak gibberish. Grau’s supporters also referred to him “*el Mesías de la Cubanidad*” (“the Messiah of Cubanness”) (Ramos 2007, 12). Even Grau’s hands, perhaps one of his most distinguishing physical features, took on a mythical status. A legend emerged surrounding what became known as “the sick hand of popularity.” The story went that during a campaign, so many supporters shook Grau’s hand that they broke it, forcing him to shake hands with his left hand after that (Pardo Llada 1947, 10). Looking back on the period, historian Raúl Shelton concluded: “Grau

ignored the semi-parliamentary regime and in accordance with his character acted as a highly personalist ruler in his decisions (Shelton 1993, 272).

Cuban playwright Severo Sarduy (1984) observed a union between caudillismo/machismo and messianism, which he dubs “*torquemadismo*” after priest and Grand Inquisitor during the Spanish Inquisition Tomás de Torquemada. In Sarduy’s view, *torquemadismo* is “repressive, fascinated by the image of a demanding crucified figure: by humiliation and death” (Almendros and Jiménez-Leal 2008, 136). Applying the concept of *torquemadismo* to Cuba’s political culture, Sarduy drew on the example of “Batista, who was...EL HOMBRE [THE MAN], and in the executioners of repression upon request who surrounded him, all, Men” (Almendros and Jiménez-Leal 2008, 136).

The use of religious customs and symbolism in politics was not limited to Catholicism. Elements of *Santería*, a syncretistic religion that blended elements of the Roman Catholic, Yoruba religion, and Spiritism, also made their way into Cuban politics. At the time, much speculation arose surrounding Fulgencio Batista’s alleged adherence to *Santería*, making one of his nicknames, “*El Indio*” (“The Indian”), particularly stand out. The moniker alluded to Batista’s mixed-race background and his warrior-like strength, while evoking images of mystical powers and *caciquismo*. The gold-toned profile of a Native American chief appeared on campaign pins and other accessories worn by Batista’s followers.

Cuban novelist Alejo Carpentier (1979) referred to Batista’s spiritual identification with the image of “the Indian” explaining that “...inasmuch as the current Batista was satisfied in knowing that he was identified with an Indian, whose effigy in terracotta or painted plaster was already located in some “Santería” altars along with the

images of Shangó and Ogún, hypostatic representations of Thunder and Iron” (Carpentier 1979, 328). Another feature that characterized Batista during the 1940s and 1950s, was “his predilection for rings with amethyst stones, which he distribut[ed] among his friends as an accessory of personal esteem” (Pardo Llada 1947, 10). Cuban ethnographer Lydia Cabrera (1986) indicated that, in *Santería*, amethyst stones are associated with Ogún, the deity related to metals and war (Cabrera 1986, 16). At the same time, Cabrera explained that “It was and has been firmly believed for centuries, that the amethyst in particular protects those in the military and frees them from the dangers that they face in war” (Ibid., 47). The amethyst rings, therefore, represented both a spiritual and a personalistic symbol of support for Batista among his inner circle, largely comprised of military officers.

Highlighting the juxtaposition between the prejudiced views that many Cubans held against Batista prior to coming to office and the messianic aura that he enjoyed afterwards, novelist Zoé Valdés (2020) wrote: “Cuban high society no longer found the poor mulatto disgusting...on the contrary, they saw him as a deity, and as their divine totem they adored him” (Valdés 2020, 281).

Messianism was on full display during the early days of 1959 as Fidel Castro and his armed rebels made their way to the capital. As the Rebel Army rode into Havana on tanks, many were wearing rosaries around their necks. Fidel Castro’s image was depicted in a Christ-like way, taking advantage of his bearded face, youth (coming to power at 32, Castro was a few months shy of being the same age as Jesus of Nazareth when he was crucified), and triumphant entrance to the capital (reminiscent of Christ’s entry into Jerusalem, celebrated by Christians on Palm Sunday). At a rally at the Camp Columbia

barracks, trained white doves landed on Castro's shoulders as he spoke. The doves' representation of the Holy Spirit in Christianity was meant to symbolize a divine blessing for the new government in the eyes of the Cuban people. Meanwhile, *Bohemia's* cover depicted a profile of the new leader looking upward, perhaps to the heavens.

Martyrdom should also be considered a sub-matrix that combines elements of these two matrices. Captured in the lines of "El Himno de Bayamo" (1868), Cuba's national anthem, the phrase "*no temáis una muerte gloriosa, que morir por la patria es vivir*" ("Do not fear a glorious death, For to die for the homeland is to live") has served as a mantra recited by generations of Cubans, instilling the idea of martyrdom as a valid, useful, and efficient, method of political change. Similarly, Rolando A. Alum Linera and Felipe P. Manteiga (1977) pointed out that, in Cuban society, "Great value is placed on eloquence, heroism, and martyrdom" (Alum and Manteiga 1977, 11). This concept has served as the rallying cry of the Castro dictatorship, embodied in the phrase "*Patria o Muerte*" ("Fatherland or Death"). Interestingly, the antonymic phrase "*Patria y Vida*" ("Fatherland and Life") has become the rallying cry of Cuba's anti-government protesters in recent years.

Cuba's political history is full of individuals who are not only celebrated for their contributions, but also for their willingness to die for their beliefs. It is no surprise that independence heroes like Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, Ignacio Agramonte, José Martí, and Antonio Maceo are all known for their lives as well as for the dates, locations, and circumstances of their deaths. This trend continued under the Republic in the twentieth century, with Julio Antonio Mella, Rafael Trejo, Antonio Guiteras, Emilio Tró, José

Antonio Echevarría, and others being viewed and used as martyrs symbolizing different political struggles.

While cases abound of martyrdom being used for political means by others, Eduardo Chibás Ribas used the threat of self-immolation to advance his political goals. A former Auténtico Party leader, Chibás and other dissident Auténticos broke with the Grau administration and founded the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) (Cuban People's Party (Orthodox) in 1947. Chibás is best remembered for his fiery political speeches, during which he launched often-unfounded accusations of corruption against political leaders. On several occasions, Chibás either threatened to shoot himself or did so to gain popular support and sympathy for his causes. His strategy ultimately cost him his life on August 16, 1951, succumbing to a self-inflicted gunshot wound to his abdomen a few days at the end of his last address on live radio. Chibás' passing represented not only the death of the Ortodoxo *caudillo*, but the beginning of his myth as a martyr for Martí's ideals.

3.3 Choteo

The third of Solaún's matrices centers around the concept of *choteo*, explaining that "the carnivalistic-*choteo* cultural subethos was relatively very prominent in Cuba" (Solaún 1998, 345-346). Cuban writer Jorge Mañach Robato (1969) defined *choteo* as "Not taking anything seriously (Mañach 1969, 17)," "Poking fun at everything" (Ibid.)," "A habit of disrespect (Ibid., 19)," and "A repugnance to all authority (Ibid.)." "The subject of *choteo* is, on the other hand," Mañach concluded, "that which has a precarious or false reputation: that which is discredited (Ibid., 35)." In Cuba, Mañach considered the development of systematic *choteo* as centered around envy and resentment (Ibid., 76).

Choteo has a long history in Cuba in the form of political satire. Numerous publications poked fun at political figures, often supporting one individual or group against another. Founded in 1905, *La Política Cómica* was a weekly publication devoted to political satire. In the 1940 election, the publication actively supported Batista's race for president against Grau. Highlighting his rural background and family's contributions to the War of Independence, Batista was billed as the "*Presidente Guajiro*" ("Peasant President"), "*El Guajiro de Banes*" ("The Peasant from Banes"), "*Hijo de Mambises*" ("Son of Independence Guerrilla Fighters" (sic.), and "*Hijo de Veteranos*" ("Son of Veterans") (*La Política Cómica*, 1940a, 15). Meanwhile, the paper dubbed Grau as a "bad Cuban, usurer, irresponsible, clumsy and incapable," as well as "con artist" and "racist" (Celorio 1940, 3).

Political caricatures and cartoons became the representation *par excellence* of *choteo* in Cuba's print media. Writing early in the twentieth century, journalist and novelist Bernardo G. Barros explained: "Caricatures, today, many times force one to think. In its irony or in its kindness is often enclosed a question, if not a concept. Why not then political caricature?... Does it ridicule?... Does it attack cruelly?... No; it does more: it analyzes. And she, like brainy in-depth articles, speaks to the masses. And she speaks perhaps better, because she unfolds (in a matter of speaking) the cunning intention of the opposing party" (Barros 1917, 10-11).

La Política Cómica also mocked then-Auténtico Party leader Eduardo Chibás' penchant for shooting himself for personal or political benefit, a messianic habit that would have political ramifications and lead to his death a decade later. A cartoon titled "*El tiritito de Chibás*" ("Chibás' Little Gunshot") depicted a shirtless Chibás shooting

himself on the side with a caption that read “To be elected [sic. Delegate to the 1940 Constitutional Assembly] he gave himself a little gunshot in an arm, and so that he would again be elected he is thinking about shooting himself with a cannon” (*La Política Cómica* 1940b, 21). Another cartoon, titled “*El cañonazo de Chibás*” (“Chibás’ Cannon Shot”) and published a few weeks later showed Chibás holding a small cannon aimed at his bare, bullet-riddled foot. This time, the caption read “My trick is disgusting, I shoot this little cannon against this damned bunion, excise it, and a Representative I will be in July for sure!” (*La Política Cómica* 1940b, 17).

At the same time, a newer publication, *Zig-Zag*, became another popular source for political satire. Founded in 1938, *Zig-Zag* had its greatest impact and readership under the leadership of José Antonio Roseñada. During this period, “Its greatest successes were its covers, with large headlines and caricatures where double *entendres* satirized the Government” (Díaz de Villegas 1974, 476).

Bohemia was founded in 1910, becoming one of Cuba’s leading magazines by the 1940s and 1950s (Esquenazi-Mayo 1993, 8). The magazine covered a wide range of topics, but its political publications had a significant impact on Cuban society. *Bohemia*’s readership rapidly and steadily increased in the 1940s and 1950s, reaching 140,000 editions in 1948 and 210,000 editions in 1950. Unlike the *Diario de la Marina*, *Bohemia*’s writers offered weekly political commentary and analysis. Originally, *Bohemia*’s editorial line was pro-Grau and anti-Batista. While the magazine kept its anti-Batista stance, it also attacked Grau and the Auténticos when Chibás split from them and co-founded the Ortodoxo Party in the mid-1940s.

Aside from its opinion pieces, *Bohemia* had several weekly sections devoted to political commentary. Most notable among these was “En Cuba,” a section begun in 1943 that “became a diary of Cuban life in all its aspects,” including politics (Ibid.).

“En Cuba” also included caricatures of political leaders. Another section in *Bohemia*, “Picadillo a la Criolla” (“Ground Beef a la Creole”), featured caricatures of Cuba’s presidents and other political leaders in different situations that reflected current events. In 1947, a new comic strip, “El Reyecito Criollo” (“The Little Creole King”), applied Cuban *choteo* directly on the sitting president. In the comic strip (see Image 2 below), cartoonist Silvio Fontanillas depicted the president, referred to as “El Reyecito Criollo,” wearing a crown and fur-trimmed robe and interacting with a character named Liborio, who donned a white linen guayabera, *guajiro* straw hat, neckscarf, and a machete on his belt.



Image 2: President Carlos Prío Socarrás and Liborito depicted in “El Reyecito Criollo,” August 13, 1950.

Liborio appeared in different media and publications, including *La Política Cómica* and *Zig-Zag*, and served as the visual representation of the Cuban people (in the style of the U.S.’ Uncle Sam or the U.K.’s John Bull). In 1948, a version of Liborio received his own comic strip, *Liborito*, under the pen of caricaturist Antonio Prohías and

published in the *Diario de la Marina*. Like the Liborio that appeared in “El Reyecito Criollo,” Liborito interacted with Cuba’s presidents and other political leaders.

Political satire was also transmitted via radio, primarily through the show “*Los Cuatro Grandes*” (“The Four Greats”). Considered to be the first political satire program in Cuba, the show consisted of impersonator Raúl F. “Tito” Hernández Blanco impersonating Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar, Ramón Grau San Martín, Carlos Prío Socarrás, and Eduardo Chibás Ribas, referred to as “the four greats” of Cuban politics at the time.

President Prío formally inaugurated Cuban television from the Presidential Palace on October 24, 1950. The advent of television in the early-1950s brought political *choteo* to television screens throughout Cuba. On November 6, 1950, Union Radio TV aired “*Los Cuatro Grandes*” (“The Four Greats”), transferring the popular radio show to a television format. The show, itself the first political satire program on Cuban television, included Hernández’s impersonations, this time accompanied by papier-mâché hand puppets representing the four leaders (see Image 3 below). In jest, these were dubbed as “*el que manda*” (Prío, “the one who governs”), “*el que mandó*” (Batista, “the one who governed”), “*el que dijo que las mujeres mandaban*” (Grau, “the one who said that the women governed”), and “*el que está loco por mandar*” (Chibás, “the one who is crazy to govern”). During one season, both programs were on the air simultaneously until it ended in July 1951.

Later that same year, Hernández continued his political impressions with a new show, “*Títeres criollos*” (“Creole Puppets”). Believed to be the first television program featuring puppets, Hernández provided the voices and Maruja García and Vicente Revuelta served as puppeteers behind papier-mâché representations of Ramón Grau San

Martín, Carlos Prío Socarrás, Eduardo Chibás, Fulgencio Batista, and Liborio. The 15-minute live show aired daily at noon during the news broadcast.

Theater also served as a popular venue for political satire. Actress María de los Ángeles Santana remembered: “In the repertory, substantial weight was carried by the sainete of political satire, in which [Carlos] Robreño was a teacher from the times of the Alhambra, and we debuted with one of his plays called “*Carlos, Prior o El Convento Nacional*” (“Carlos, Prior or The National Convent”), in which imitator Tito Hernández received several ovations for making a masterful characterization of Ramón Grau San Martín ... At the end of this scene in the play, Grau himself got up and applauded Tito Hernández, his imitation being fabulous” (Fajardo Estrada 2004, 266).



Image 3: Puppeteers Maruja García and Vicente Revuelta with puppets depicting, from left to right, Prío, Grau, Chibás, and Batista.

Even philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre noticed the role of *choteo* in Cuban culture. Writing at the time of Castro’s rise to power, Sartre wrote of the country’s new leaders:

“At the head of the country, they found they were just what they had been while in the opposition—talkers. Already the people were murmuring, like Polly’s parrot, “Talk, talk, that’s all you know how to do” (Sartre 1961, 46-47).

Presenting a combination of the institutional and political culture arguments as they relate to Cuba’s political development during the period, Carlos Márquez-Sterling y Guiral (1987), President of the 1940 Constitutional Assembly, explained:

“Divided into several titles, several sections, and 286 articles, the Constitution of 1940 enshrined the semi-parliamentary regime, the most adequate one for our idiosyncrasy, which did not work because the elected presidents, according to their standards—Batista, Grau and Prío—preferred the presidential one. It occurs to us to say, that if the parliamentary regime, although regulated, had been practiced in Cuba, after 1940, many things would have been avoided, and perhaps even the very rise to power of the revolution of 1959, which provided a wide margin to the formation of governments, emerging from a state of necessity” (Márquez-Sterling 1987, 30).

IV. INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS

The first part of this study will focus on institutional dynamics in Cuban politics and will employ Maurice Duverger's landmark definition and conceptualization of semi-presidentialism as its theoretical framework. According to Duverger: "As an analytical model, the purpose of the concept of semi-presidential government is to explain why relatively homogeneous constitutions are applied in radically different ways. It has only four parameters: the actual content of the constitution, the combination of tradition and circumstances, the composition of the parliamentary majority, and the position of the president in relation to this majority" (Duverger 1980, 177).

Using the text of the Constitution of 1940, in line with Duverger's first parameter, sets the baseline measure for institutionalization. The application of the constitutional text in the following years will either follow the text or stray towards a more personalistic style of government. The second parameter begins to show the influence and survival of traditional rules and patterns of governance, including *caudillismo* and strong presidentialism. The composition of the parliamentary majority, as Duverger outlines in his third parameter, will demonstrate if and how powerful majority parties and coalitions are in Congress. Finally, Duverger's fourth parameter, the position of the president in relation to the majority, will indicate if and how the president will exert more personal, rather than institutional, power or influence.

Exploring each parameter will shed light on the development of semi-presidentialism in Cuba under the Constitution of 1940, paying special attention to the institutionalization and personalization of the offices. This study analyzes similarities, differences, and trends in the administrations of Fulgencio Batista (1940-1944), Ramón

Grau San Martín (1944-1948), and Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948-1952), as well as Batista's second administration (1952-1954), Andrés Domingo Morales del Castillo's provisional presidency (1954-1955), Batista's third administration (1955-1959), and Manuel Urrutia Lleó's administration (1959).

A clear distinction should be made between the period preceding Batista's March 10, 1952 coup d'état and the period that followed it. It is generally accepted that, as Roberto Batista Fernández, one of Batista's sons, wrote that "the Government's democratic legitimacy was lacking no matter the efforts to give an image of democracy" (Batista Fernández 2021, 49). However, this study includes this period because the Executive Branch institutions established under the Constitution of 1940 remained in place, albeit with some variations during certain periods.

4.1 The actual content of the constitution

Duverger's first parameter, the actual content of the constitution, will set the baseline for measuring executive branch institutionalization. Paying close attention to the titles and articles that establish that branch's institutions will help determine if their text and spirit were further institutionalized. The sections that require careful analysis are those that list the duties and responsibilities for the president, the vice president, the prime minister, and the council of ministers.

4.1.1 President of the Republic

Established in Title X of the Constitution, the President of the Republic serves as head of state and representative of the Nation, and is granted directive power as a moderating force for the country. Along with the Council of Ministers, the president represents the Executive Branch (Title X, First Section, Article 138). This Article clearly

indicates some of the titles later used to refer to Cuba's presidents, namely "*Presidente de la República*" (President of the Republic) and "*jefe del Estado*" (head of State). An important feature of the executive branch is that it is comprised of two institutions, namely the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers. To understand the dynamics between these two institutions, they should be studied separately.

The Second Section of Title X begins by enumerating the President of the Republic's powers and duties, while the president's seventeen enumerated powers appear in Article 142 and indicate the assistance of the Council of Ministers in carrying them out (Table 1). Article 139 requires that a president is Cuban by birth, at least thirty-five years of age, "in full enjoyment of civil and political rights," and, in the case of a member of the Armed Forces, "not to have belonged to the armed forces of the Republic in active service during the year immediately preceding the date of designation as presidential candidate."

The president was "elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, in a single day" for a four-year term, and could not run for consecutive reelection (Title X, Article 140). Upon taking office, the president was required to be sworn in by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (Title X, Article 141). While seemingly innocuous, this Article would play a role years later.

OFFICES, DUTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES	1901 CONSTITUTION	1940 CONSTITUTION
PRESIDENCY		
Sanction and enforce laws	YES	YES
Call extraordinary sessions of Congress	YES	YES
Suspend sessions of Congress	YES	YES
Present message to Congress	YES	YES
Present budget to Congress	YES	YES
Provide reports to Congress upon request	YES	YES (Interpellation option added)
Lead diplomatic and treaty negotiations	YES	YES
Appoint cabinet secretaries/ministers	YES	YES
Power to appoint Chief Justice, Supreme Court Justices, and diplomatic representatives	YES	YES
Power to appoint officials	YES	YES
Suspend Constitutional Guarantees	YES	YES
Suspend agreements by Provincial and Municipal Councils	YES	NO
Suspend Provincial Governors	YES	NO
Accuse Provincial Governors	YES	NO
Power to pardon	YES	YES (Except electoral fraud)
Receive diplomats	YES	YES
Supreme Chief of Armed Forces	YES	YES
Provide for national defense and internal order	NO	YES
Comply and enforce Superior Electoral Tribunal rules, orders, and provisions	NO	YES
Elastic clause	NO	YES
May not leave country without Congressional authorization	YES	YES
Supreme Tribunal role in presidential wrongdoing	NO	YES
VICE PRESIDENCY		
Serve as President of the Senate with tie-breaking vote	YES	YES
CABINET/ COUNCIL OF MINISTERS		
Countersign presidential decrees, orders, and resolutions	YES	YES
Personal and/or joint responsibility for signed decrees	YES	YES
Legislative impeachment process for removal	YES	YES
Prime Minister	NO	YES

Table 1: Comparison Between the Constitutions of 1901 and 1940.

Constraints from within the executive branch are listed in Article 143, which stipulated that presidential “decrees, orders, and decisions” needed to be countersigned by the corresponding Minister. A check from the legislature prevented the president from leaving the country “without the authorization of the Congress” (Title X, Article 144). Another check, this one from the judicial branch, made the president responsible to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice “for crimes of common character that he may commit during the exercise of his office,” with authorization of two-thirds of the Senate (Title X, Article 145).

It was clear that the Constitution’s drafters placed several key provisions to reduce the president’s powers and prevent them from expanding. Unlike the Constitution of 1901, the Constitution of 1940 removed the president’s power to suspend agreements by provincial and municipal councils and to accuse and suspend provincial governors. The president kept the ability to pardon individuals, but the provision was changed to excluded cases of electoral fraud.

The Constitution granted the president an elastic clause, allowing for the office to expand or retract as times changed. It also granted the president the power and responsibility to provide for the country’s national defense and internal order and to comply and enforce the Superior Electoral Tribunal’s rules, orders, and provisions.

4.1.2 Vice President

The Constitution of 1940 only explicitly identifies the presidency of the Republic and the council of ministers as the institutions that comprise the executive branch. However, the vice presidency is also an implicit institution of the executive branch, given

that the president and vice president were elected on the same ticket and served for the same term (Title XI, Article 147).

The vice president had two main functions: to “replace the President in cases of absence, incapacity, or death” and to preside the Senate and “vote only in case of a tie” (Title XI, Articles 148 and 150). The language of these Articles was unclear and would cause confusion when they had to be implemented years later.

While the Vice President served as the President of the Senate, another office, also called President of the Senate, also existed. This President of the Senate was a sitting Senator from the majority party or coalition in that body. The President of the Senate was also referred to as the President of Congress, with the President of the House of Representatives serving as Vice President of Congress. In the presidential line of succession, this President of the Senate was second in line after the Vice President (Title XI, Article 148).

Article 149 further expanded the presidential line of succession, indicating that if the president, vice president, and president of the Congress could not exercise their duties as presidential substitutes, “the most senior Magistrate of the Supreme Tribunal shall occupy the presidency of the Republic in the interim, and shall call national elections within a period of not more than ninety days. In case the vacancy should occur within the last year of the presidential term, the substitute Magistrate shall hold the office until the end of the term (Article 149).” This Article further stated that “The person occupying the presidency in any of the substitutions referred to in the preceding articles may not be a presidential candidate for the next election (Article 149).”

4.1.3 Council of Ministers and Prime Minister

The third institution that comprises the executive branch, the council of ministers, is first mentioned in Title VII. Ministers are considered “political offices and positions of trust.” According to Title XII, Article 142 and Article 151, the role of the council of ministers is to assist the president of the Republic “for the exercise of the executive power” (Title XII, Article 151). Council meetings required a simple majority of ministers to be present, and decisions by the council of ministers required a simple majority of the votes of those ministers present.

The number of members on the council of ministers was determined by law, and one of the ministers would be the prime minister. During the period between 1940 and 1959, the number of standing ministries in the council of ministers remained steady, except for the creation of the Ministries of Transportation (which was separated from the Ministry of Communications) and Information in 1952. The ministries that remained unchanged during the period were those of State, Justice, the Treasury (Hacienda), National Defense, Education, Labor, the Interior (Gobernación), Commerce, Communications, Health and Social Assistance, Agriculture, and Public Works (Obras Públicas). Of these, the ministries of Education, Health and Social Assistance, Agriculture, and Public Works acted as “technical organizations” (Title XII, Article 160).

The Minister, or Secretary, of the Presidency acted as council secretary, as outlined in Title XII, Article 155, and was entrusted with “keeping the records of the Council, certifying their decisions, and expediting the business of the presidency of the Republic and of the Council of Ministers” (Title XII, Article 155). He did not oversee a ministry but was a member of the council of ministers. Similarly, Ministers without Portfolio were incorporated into councils of ministers to give minority parties in the

coalition representation in the government. Batista would describe the post of Minister without Portfolio as “a nominal position, without administrative or executive functions” (Batista 1964b, 57).

The requirements to serve as minister in the council of ministers were like those for president, except for a lower minimum age requirement (thirty years of age) and the ban on having “business relations with the State, the Provinces, or the municipalities” (Title XII, Article 152). In the case of temporary absence or disability, ministers would be replaced by their Subsecretary (Title XII, Article 153).

Generally, the president was to preside over the Council of Ministers, and if he was unable to do so, the prime minister would take his place (Title XII, Article 154). The Prime Minister’s key role was to “represent the general policy of the Government, and shall represent the latter before the Congress” (Title XII, Article 154).

The relationship between ministers and their ministries is outlined in Article 156: “The Ministers shall have charge of the offices of their respective ministries and shall deliberate and decide upon all questions of general interest that do not fall within the jurisdiction of other dependencies or authorities, and shall exercise the powers belonging to them in accordance with the Constitution and the law.”

Checks and balances that existed within the council and in relation to the other branches of government are addressed in Title XII, Articles 158 and 159. Internal checks and balances were stipulated in Article 158: “The Ministers of Government shall be individually responsible for measures that they countersign and collectively responsible for measures that they jointly approve or authorize.”

Article 159 relates to checks and balances *vis-à-vis* the judicial branch: “The Prime Minister and the Ministers of Government are criminally responsible before the Supreme Tribunal of Justice for common crimes that they may commit in the exercise of their offices.”

The relationship between the Ministers, the President, and the Prime Minister, as specified in Articles 161 and 162, is important in understanding the semi-presidential nature of the system that was being implemented. The Constitution reinforced the President’s role as head of state by obligating Ministers to “swear or affirm before the President of the Republic faithfully to comply with the duties inherent in their offices, as well as to observe and enforce the Constitution and the law (Title XII, Article 161).” Ministers were given a more tangible role in relation to the Prime Minister’s status as head of government, being tasked to assist the prime minister in expediting (sic) “the affairs of the respective departments” (Title XII, Article 162).

Ministers were responsible for upholding the Constitution and laws, writing legislation, countersigning laws and other documents signed by the president (except decrees appointing or removing Ministers), and reporting before Congress “to answer interpellations, to deliberate therein, and to propose votes of confidence individually or collectively” (Title XII, Article 163). Therefore, ministers were both a check on the president, and were checked themselves by the legislature. It is important to note that ministers could, but were not required to, serve concurrently as senators or representatives, but could only vote in the body to which they belonged (Title XII, Article 163).

The implementation of semi-presidentialism in Cuba was met with skepticism early on. In an article published by *Bohemia* discussing the role of prime minister and its inaugural holder, Dr. Carlos Saladrigas Zayas, the author declared: “The devotees of parliamentarism, among us, should not get their hopes up: the head of Government is not, in reality, the Prime Minister, but the President of the Republic” (*Bohemia* 1940, 22).

Duverger’s first parameter sets the Constitution’s text as a starting point for studying institutionalization and personalization in Cuba following its enactment. The text establishes the duties and responsibilities for each office in the Executive Branch. In doing so, it sets the foundation for determining if these institutions were respected and their rules followed, or if office holders took advantage of loopholes or violated them for their own personal benefit.

4.2 Tradition and Circumstance

The second parameter, the combination of tradition and circumstances, emerges from the idea that “legal rules which are unapplied, are not dead. They hibernate, and the person who has the necessary skill, can always bring them to life again” (Duverger 1980, 180). During the period following the 1940 Constitution’s ratification, Cuba’s traditions of *caudillismo* and strong presidentialism survived. These traditions were kept alive by succeeding Cuban presidents in the form of decrees and frequent ministerial changes.

4.2.1 Decrees

The 1940 Constitution granted the president seventeen enumerated powers. Of these, the president’s power to issue decrees, resolutions, and proclamation, as well as his power to appoint cabinet ministers, offer insights that can be measured due to their larger number of occurrences.

The president's first enumerated power allowed him:

“To sanction and promulgate the laws, to execute them and enforce their execution; to enact, when the Congress does not do so, the regulations for the best execution of said laws; to issue decrees and orders which, for this purpose, and as far as is incumbent upon the Government and the administration of the State, may be proper, without in any case contravening what is established in the laws.”

Cuban legislation under the 1940 Constitution came in two forms. Laws originated in the legislative branch, being drafted and approved by Congress before going to the president for signature. Decrees originated in the executive branch and came in several forms. Presidential decrees were issued by the president and required the signature of the minister in charge of the department related to the decree (Figure 1).

Hybrid types of legislation emerged during irregular circumstances of governance. *Acuerdos-Leyes*, or Agreements-Laws, were issued by the executive branch while Cuba was under a State of National Emergency after declaring war on Nazi Germany and Japan on December 9th, 1941. During this period, which lasted for 45 days as allowed by the Constitution, the Council of Ministers issued *Acuerdos-Leyes*. These were all ratified by Congress when the State of National Emergency ended.

Following the Constitution's suspension between the March 10, 1952 coup the *état* and its reinstatement on February 24, 1955, legislation was enacted in the form of *Leyes-Decretos*, or Law-Decrees. Batista's Constitutional Statutes of 1952 suspended Congress and granted law-making authority to the Council of Ministers and the Consultive Council.

In addition, resolutions were issued by the president and, to a much greater extent, by the council's ministers. The president also issued proclamations, although these were formal announcements of legislative action already taken and did not hold the power of law.

A close look at these different types of legislation illustrates the development of Cuba's executive institutions. Data for this measure were taken from "*La Jurisprudencia al Día*" ("Jurisprudence To Date"), published by the Havana Bar Association, and "*Compilación ordenada y completa de la legislación cubana*" ("Ordered and Complete Compilation of Cuban Legislation") by Milo A. Borges and Mariano Sánchez Roca. The data for these two sources originated from the Cuban government's *Gaceta Oficial* (Official Gazette) and was indexed into annual volumes legislation type, source, and date.

It is important to note that this study first used the former source to obtain its numeric data because these provide more detailed information on the different types of legislation. In doing so, the study includes all decrees, resolutions, and proclamations as listed by the authors. The latter source was used to verify the data and to adjust for instances where pieces of legislation were listed several times in "*La Jurisprudencia al Día*".

The first particularly-revealing finding relates to the overwhelming number of presidential and ministerial decrees in relation to congressional legislation (Figure 2). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Batista has the highest number of presidential decrees, with 1,327 presidential decrees issued during his first term in office (1940-1944). Dr. Lincoln Rodón Álvarez, who served as President of the House of Representatives during the Prío administration, wrote that "the parliamentary regime began its development with certain

hesitations and Congress was able to function normally although we cannot say that those legislatures were very brilliant or fruitful” (Rodón 1990, 172). Batista’s successor, Grau San Martín (1944-1948), issued 743 decrees. While this number is smaller, it is still significantly high, and was not lost on caricaturists at the time (Image 4) (Vergara 1945, 18).



Image 4: “Picadillo a la Criolla” depicted Batista uses multiple pens to sign his many decrees, December 2, 1945.

The trend in the reduction of presidential decrees continued under the Prío Socarrás administration (1948-1952), during which the president issued 820 decrees. It is important to note that this administration ended abruptly following the coup d’état on March 10, 1952. President Prío Socarrás had seven months left in his term, providing ample opportunity to issue additional decrees during that time. Yet even Prío, who Carlos Márquez-Sterling referred to as “el Presidente-Legislator” (“the President-Legislator”),

issues far more decrees than Congress did legislation during his term in office (Márquez-Sterling 1969, 547).




Figure 1: Presidential Decrees




Figure 2: Decrees and Laws

Following the 1952 coup, Batista became the predominant figure in Cuba’s executive branch, although he was not always serving as president during this period (1952-1959). Batista issued 513 presidential decrees during his second term (March 10, 1952-August 14, 1954). To be constitutionally-eligible to run for president, Batista resigned the presidency and was substituted by his Minister of the Presidency, Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo. During Domingo’s six months in office, he issued 102

presidential decrees. During his final term in office (1955-1958), Batista issued 714 presidential decrees. In relation to Batista’s final term, it is important to note that he did not complete his term, which was set to expire on February 24, 1959, because he resigned on January 1st of that year. As in Prío’s case, it is possible that Batista could have issued additional presidential decrees had he completed his term in office.




Figure 3: Ministerial Decrees (1940-1959).

The monumental use of presidential and ministerial decrees in relation to laws passed by Congress diminishes the institutional role of Congress while increasing that of the executive in general and the president in particular (Figure 3). While some would suspect that Batista would issue more decrees during his terms in office given his military background and reputation as a “strongman,” the data indicate that, regardless of the president in office, decrees far outnumbered laws enacted by Congress.

The number of ministerial decrees issued during this period varied with each administration. During Batista’s first administration (1940-1944), 147 ministerial decrees were issued. The number of ministerial decrees increased to 250 during Grau San

Martín's administration (1944-1948). During Prío's administration (1948-1952), the number decreased to 118. In the year's following Batista's coup (1952-1954), 40 ministerial decrees were issued. Only 6 ministerial decrees were issued during Domingo's administration (1954-1955), while 63 ministerial decrees were issued during Batista's last government (1955-1959).

Between 1940 and 1959, ministerial decrees were only issued by the Ministers of Agriculture, Commerce, the Treasury, and Justice. All the Minister of Agriculture's decrees were issued during Batista's 1940-1944 administration (16). A similar trend is observable in the decrees issued by the Minister of Commerce. Most of this ministry's decrees were issued during Batista's 1940-1944 administration (66), while only one of these was issued during the succeeding Grau administration. A significant increase in the issuance of ministerial decrees is visible with the Ministry of the Treasury, with 225 ministerial decrees issued between 1940 and 1959. These ministerial decrees were issued as follows: Batista (34), Grau (54), Prío (49), Batista (post-coup) (27), Domingo (four), and Batista (57). The largest total number of ministerial decrees came from the Ministry of Justice, whose ministers issued a total of 317 decrees between 1940 and 1959. These ministerial decrees were issued as follows: Batista (44), Grau (195), Prío (70), Batista (post-coup) (six), Domingo (two), and Batista (zero).

4.2.2 Ministerial Changes

Frequent ministerial changes were characteristic of the period under the 1940 Constitution (Figure 4). Some of these changes occurred when officeholders resigned to run for elected office, as required by law. Others occurred when ministers took temporary leaves of absence and were replaced by their subsecretaries. Yet other changes took place

when parties left the ruling coalition. In total, 426 ministerial changes were identified as holding ministerial positions between October 10, 1940 and July 17, 1959. This study analyzes cases where any ministerial change occurred, including the scenarios previously mentioned, and includes prime ministers and ministers without portfolio.

The frequency of ministerial changes was not lost on the press at the time. In 1950, columnist Emma Pérez alluded to this phenomenon in one of her headlines: “51 Ministers of Education in 48 Years as a Republic” (Pérez 1950, 38). In an Editorial published shortly after Prío selected his “New Directions” cabinet, *Bohemia* strongly criticized the new cabinet selection as “so absurd, so insignificant, and above all in contradiction with the announcements that had preceded it...” (*Bohemia* 1951, 57)

The Constitution of 1940 included the crisis mechanism to facilitate cabinet changes. In doing so, it created a legal loophole through which presidents could (and did) circumvent other accountability measures by the legislature, such as interpellations or votes of confidence. In 1945, Commerce Minister Alberto Inocente Álvarez Cabrera was involved in a barter scheme, through which Cuba traded sugar for animal fats with Argentina for rice with Ecuador. The Senate interpellated Álvarez to inquire into the barter system, but before he could appear to testify, and to legally impede him from doing so, Grau appointed him to serve as Minister of State.

Another ministerial crisis arose in April 1947 when the Ministers of Commerce and Education, César Casas Rodríguez and José Manuel Alemán Casharo, were interpellated by the Senate (Duarte Oropesa 1974, 52). The Grau administration’s reticence to have the ministers appear before the Senate threatened the entire council of

ministers with a vote of no confidence. Using a constitutional loophole provided by Article 167 of the Constitution and facing a vote of no confidence in the Senate, Grau's entire cabinet resigned, being replaced by the Subsecretaries of each ministry, giving rise to the so-called "Sub-Cabinet." The use of the constitutional loophole to prevent a vote of no confidence was facilitated by Grau's personal willingness to exploit it.




Figure 4: Ministers Per Administration.

A closer look at the ministers that held office in each administration shows a systemic problem that persisted regardless of a president's background (Appendix 1). During Batista's first administration, which inaugurated the Constitution of 1940, the highest number of ministers held office (85). The numbers decreased only slightly during the Grau (73) and Prío (74) administrations. Yet the pattern increased significantly during Batista's second administration, which registered 55 ministers in two and a half years. Domingo's six months in office saw the appointment of 22 ministers. During Batista's third administration, 83 ministers were appointed. A little under half that number (40) held office during Urrutia's seven months in office.

The use of traditional practices to implement institutional arrangements broadens the role of personalities while diminishing the role that institutions played in Cuba's semi-presidential system. The Executive's extensive and systematic use of its decree power personalizes politics while diminishing the institutional role usually held by Congress. Similarly, the extensive ministerial turnover, while constitutional, prevented ministries from institutionalizing, instead making their success, failure, or term in office depend on their personal characteristics and abilities, as well as their relationship with the president.

4.3 The composition of the parliamentary majority

Duverger's third parameter, the composition of the parliamentary majority, is grounded on the premise that the lack of a parliamentary majority offers the greatest coincidence between the constitution and practice due to a greater need to reach compromise to govern, while the existence of a parliamentary majority provides less coincidence between the constitution and practice because there is less of a need, if any, to compromise. This parameter is measured by determining the parliamentary composition of each legislature during this period by party and coalition.

Most of the data related to the composition of Congress that exist centers on the number of seats that parties and coalitions gained in each election. However, given that only a part of the House was up for election every two years, these data do not add the number of incumbents elected in the previous cycle. Jan Suter and Dieter Nohlen (2005) explained the difficulty in finding accurate data for this period:

“Despite all efforts, collecting historical and recent electoral data was very difficult. There are no systematic official reports on Cuban elections. The figures presented were

mainly taken from secondary sources, the format adopted for reporting electoral data was not consistent. Data are incomplete and not completely reliable” (Suter and Nohlen 2005, 202).

Yet relevant data can be extrapolated from different sources. A review of Mario Riera Hernández’s (1974) study offers the same numbers of House members as Suter and Nohlen’s, which indicates that the numbers are generally correct. The data that both Suter and Nohlen and Riera Hernández present coincide with those presented in the *Libro de Cuba* (1954). This source, in turn, offers the numbers of total House seats for each congressional period, which helps determine the overall majority and minority in the House as opposed to just the election results (Table 2).

Legislature	Duration	Senate Seats (Total)	Election Type	Majority Coalition	Majority Margin	Minority Coalition	Minority Margin	Parties (Other)	Margin (Other)
18 th	1940-1942	54	General	CSD	22	Opposition Front	14	0	0
20 th	1944-1946	54	General	CSD	30	Opposition Front	24	0	0
22 nd	1948-1950	54	General	AAR	36	CLD	18	1	4
24 th	1955-1957	54	General	CNP	36	PRC(A)	18	0	0

Table 2: Composition of the Senate (1940-1958).

During the period of study (1940-1958), elections to the House of Representatives were held every two years from 1940 until 1950. A multiparty electoral system with proportional representation was in place during this period, making coalitions necessary to govern. The elections that were scheduled for 1952 were suspended following Batista’s coup on March 10th of that year. Legislative elections were again held in 1954 and 1958. However, the legislators selected in the latter were unable to take office.

General elections were held in 1940, 1944, 1948, 1954, and 1958, while midterm elections took place in 1942, 1946, and 1950.

The 1940 Constitution allocated representatives to each of the six provinces based on the population, allocating “one representative for every thirty-five thousand inhabitants of a fraction greater than seventeen thousand five hundred” (1940, Title IX, Section 3, Article 123). As a result, the number of representatives between 1940 and 1958 varied.

Under the 1940 Constitution, the Senate was composed of 54 senators, with nine senators representing each of the six provinces. The entire Senate was up for election every four years during general elections. The standardized number of senators per province and the Senate’s complete election every four years makes these data easier to analyze than that of the House of Representatives (Table 3).

Legislature	Duration	Senate Seats (Total)	Election Type	Majority Coalition	Majority Margin	Minority Coalition	Minority Margin	Parties (Other)	Margin (Other)
18 th	1940-1942	243	General	Gov’t.	181	Opposition Front	62	0	0
19 th	1942-1944	138	Midterm	CSD	80	Opposition Front	58	0	0
20 th	1944-1946	127	General	CSD	90	AAR	37	0	0
21 st	1946-1948	136	Midterm	AAR	80	CSD	56	0	0
22 nd	1948-1950	136	General	AAR	87	CLD	45	PPC(O)	4
23 rd	1950-1952	136	Midterm	AADL	92	PAP/PR	35	PPC(O)	9
24 th	1955-1958	130	General	CNP	114	PRC(A)	16	0	0

Table 3: Composition of the House of Representatives (1940-1959)

Strictly speaking, no individual party held a parliamentary majority between 1940 and 1959. However, when considering the development of electoral coalitions, a majority-minority legislature was always in place. This reality echoes Lijphart’s conclusion that “presidentialism spells majoritarianism.” The existence of Congressional

majorities indicates that majoritarianism remained in the country's new, semi-presidential period. At the same time, it also reduced the need to reach compromise, contributing to the personalization of the presidency. A study of the distribution of parties and coalitions, which changed following elections every two years, helps trace the development of the legislature's composition.

When the 18th congressional period (1940-1942) convened on November 4, 1940, it was the first legislature to do so under the 1940 Constitution (*Diario de Sesiones* 1940, 1). The elections held that year saw 162 representatives elected, which, combined with the 81 representatives that had been elected previously and were still serving their terms, provided for a total of 243 representatives. This was the largest number of representatives in the history of Cuba's House of Representatives. While most of these representatives was elected to serve four-year terms, some were elected to serve two-year terms due to adjustments made following the 1940 Constitution's ratification.

Given that the opposition parties did not participate in the 1938 midterm elections, the government's *Coalición Socialista Democrática* (Democratic Socialist Coalition, or CSD) had an advantage going into the 1940 elections because it held 81 House seats and gained 100 in those elections for a total of 181 seats. The CSD's seats were distributed as follows: PL (46 seats), CND (42 seats), UNa (43 seats), PSD (6 seats), PPC (four seats), PUC (two seats), URC (three seats). PNR (Realista), PDR. The PRC(A) led the *Frente de Oposición* (Opposition Front) 62-seat minority with 34 seats, followed by AR with 16 seats, and the ABC with 12 seats.

The first Senate under the 1940 Constitution was composed of 18 incumbent senators serving the remainder of their term and 36 newly-elected senators. The CSD

coalition held a majority of 22 seats, distributed as follows: CND (20 seats), PDR (ten seats), PL (five seats), UNa (five seats). The Frente de Oposición held 14 seats, divided among the PRC(A) (eight seats), ABC (three seats), AR (three seats) (Suter and Nohlen 2005, 213).

During the nineteenth congressional period (1942-1944), the CSD government coalition retained a majority of the 138 House seats, this time adding seats to its member parties: PL (21), CND (18), UNa (21), PD (21), URC (three). The Frente de Oposición remained in the opposition but made slight gains, with the PRC(A) picking up ten seats and the ABC adding two seats. The ABC later joined the CSD coalition, leaving the PRC(A) as the lone opposition party in the House.

The twentieth congressional period (1944-1946) kept the CSD coalition in the majority, holding 90 of 127 total House seats, which were split along partisan lines as follows: PL (39), PD (38), PSP (seven), ABC (six). The new Alianza Auténtico Republicana (Authentic Republican Alliance, or AAR), a coalition between the PRC(A) and the Republican Party remained in the opposition with 37 seats, with 29 seats for the PRC(A) and eight for the PR.

The CSD expanded its majority in the Senate to 30 seats, with seats distributed to its member parties as follows: PL (13 seats), PD (ten seats), ABC (four seats), and PSP (three seats). The Frente de Oposición also gained seats, bringing their total to 24 seats, distributed between the PRC(A) (17 seats) and the PR (seven seats) (Suter and Nohlen 2005, 213).

The 21st congressional period (1946-1948) had a total of 136 House seats and, for the first time, the Alianza Auténtico-Republicana would obtain a majority, this time with

the help of the PSP and ABC. The Alianza's seats were distributed as follows: PRC(A) (49 seats), PR (15 seats), PSP (nine seats), ABC (seven seats). The Coalición Liberal Demócrata (Liberal Democratic Coalition, or CLD) garnered less House seats for their member Liberal (29 seats) and Democratic (27 seats) Parties.

A by-election took place to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Oriente Senator Manuel Benítez González. Francisco Prío Socarrás, brother of then-Prime Minister Carlos Prío Socarrás, was elected to fill the seat, representing a pickup for the Auténtico coalition (Alfonso Roselló 1954, 335).

The 22nd congressional period (1948-1950) debuted in 1948. The Alianza Auténtico-Republicana expanded its majority to 87, with the PRC(A) leading with 59 seats and the PR following with 18 seats, and the PSP adding ten seats. The CLD remained in the opposition, with the Liberals occupying 26 seats and the Democrats occupying 16 seats. The ABC maintained three seats, and the new PPC(O) competed in elections for the first time, winning four seats.

In the Senate, the Alianza Auténtico-Republicana also gained a 36-seat majority, distributed among the PRC(A) (27 seats) and the PR (nine seats) (Zayas 1975, 712). The CLD went into the Senate with an 18-seat minority, divided among the PL (13 seats) and the PD (five seats) (Suter and Nohlen 2005, 214). Two of the Liberal seats included those won by Ortodoxos Pelayo Cuervo Navarro and Federico Fernández Casas (Ibid.).

For the 23rd congressional period (1950-1952), the government coalition expanded its majority to 92 of 136 total House seats. Moving from the opposition to the government coalition, the Liberal and Democratic Parties joined the PRC(A). Several

parties remained in the opposition, holding House seats as follows: PPC(O) (nine), PR (seven), PSP (four), PAU (four), and AP (four).

Two Senate by-elections took place in 1950 to fill the vacancies caused by the deaths of Pinar del Río Senator José Manuel Casanova Diviñó and Havana Senator José Manuel Alemán Casharo. Voters elected Alberto Inocente Álvarez Cabrera and Eduardo Chibás Rivas to fill these seats respectively (Alfonso Roselló 1954, 336).

This Congress was interrupted when Senator Fulgencio Batista staged his coup d'état on March 10, 1952. Legislative responsibilities were transferred to a Consultive Council composed of 80 members selected by Batista and the Council of Ministers, in accordance with the Constitutional Statutes of 1952 (Ibid., 361). Given the interruption of Cuba's constitutional system during this period and the different dynamics at play, the Consultive Council cannot be analyzed as a regular legislative body.

Following the 1940 Constitution's reinstatement in 1954, all 130 House seats were filled by representatives elected on November 1, 1954. The 24th congressional period (1955-1959) was inaugurated in 1955. The governing *Coalición Progresista Nacional* (National Progressive Coalition, or CPN), composed of the PAP (60 seats), PL (24 seats), PD (15 seats), and UR (15 seats) held an overwhelming majority in the House (114 seats). The PRC(A) remained as the only opposition party in the House, securing 16 seats (Riera Hernández 1974, 86; Suter and Nohlen 2005, 211). The members of the 24th congressional period were the last to serve in the House of Representatives, as the 166 legislators selected in the 1958 elections did not take office (Riera Hernández 1974, 84).

In the Senate, the CPN garnered a 36-seat majority, divided among the coalition's members as follows: PAP (25 seats), UR (five seats), PL (four seats), and PD (two seats)

(Pubillones 1955, 2). Remaining as the lone opposition party, the PRC(A) received 18 seats (Suter and Nohlen 2005, 214).

The distribution of the legislature offers important insights into dynamics within the legislature and the role that majoritarianism plays in explaining differences between constitution and practice. Yet the study of Duverger's fourth parameter, the position of the president in relation to the legislative majority, sheds additional light into the personalization of the executive branch.

4.4 The position of the president in relation to the legislative majority

Duverger's fourth parameter, the position of the president in relation to the legislative majority, builds on his third parameter. Here, it is important to note that presidents always held a majority in the legislature, except for President Grau San Martín during the first two years of his administration (1944-1946). This was the result of the Constitution's provision that the President be elected by direct suffrage, which meant that "the voter may vote for a presidential candidate representing one party or coalition and for senators and congressmen representing another" (Stokes 1949, 340). This opened the door for split governments to emerge.

During Batista's first administration (1940-1944), the president's CSD coalition held a majority in both houses of Congress. During the 1940-1942 legislative session, the CSF held a 181-seat majority in the House and a 22-seat majority in the Senate. The House majority expanded, and the Senate majority remained the same during the 1942-1944 legislative session.

President Grau was the only president to govern under a divided government in the period between 1940 and 1959. President Grau entered office with a minority in both houses of Congress during the 1944-1946 legislature. Batista later commented that this scenario put the Grau administration “in an awkward position” and made it “one of the most unstable regimes” in Cuban history (Batista 1964a, 18). Grau’s AAR coalition had a 37-seat minority in the House compared to the CSD’s 90-seat majority. In the Senate, the AAR held a 24-seat minority, while the CSD had a 30-seat majority.

During the 1946-1948 legislative session, the Grau administration gained a majority in the House. While Grau maintained a Senate minority, the AAR gained the single Senate seat that was contested in the 1946 by-election. This brought Grau’s Senate minority to 25 seats, providing a five-seat difference between the majority and minority coalitions.

President Prío entered office with a majority in both houses. During the 1948-1950 legislative session, the AAR gained an 87-seat majority House majority and a 36-seat Senate majority. Both legislative majorities increased for the government coalition, giving the Prío administration a 92-seat House majority.

A noticeable pattern emerged between 1940 and 1950. Batista began with a legislative majority during his first administration. Coming into office as the “anti-Batista” opposition candidate, Grau began with a split government, but ended his term with a majority in Congress. This majority held, and even grew, under Prío’s administration. By 1950, it was clear that Batista’s influence in Congress was rapidly waning. This may have been a contributing factor to his decision to oust President Prío via coup d’état in 1952.

Following the restoration of the semi-presidential regime in 1955, Batista's CPN coalition held an overwhelming 114-seat majority in the House and a 36-seat majority in the Senate. Here, it is important to note that conditions were not regular, given the *de facto* authoritarian nature of Batista's government derived from his coming to power through a coup.

Duverger's four parameters contribute to the hypothesis that Cuba's executive branch experienced low institutionalization and high personalization. The Constitution established a regime type that removed power from, and added additional checks and balances to, the Executive Branch. Yet the Constitution's text was unable to stand against traditional personalistic patterns and traditions, such as rule by decree and frequent ministerial changes. In Congress, majorities and minorities developed, reducing the majority's need to reach compromise to govern while further personalizing politics. Cuba's presidents, with one exception, always had majorities in Congress, granting them the sense of obtaining a personal mandate to govern.

V. TYPES OF PERSONALIZATION

Offering a broader look into personalization, Gideon Rahat and Tamir Sheafer propose that “political personalization should be seen as a process...in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines... [and] argue that it is helpful to look at political personalization as a general concept that can be divided into three different types: institutional, media, and behavioral” (Rahat and Sheafer 2007, 65).

Rahat and Sheafer define institutional personalization as “the adoption of rules, mechanisms, and institutions that put more emphasis on the individual politician and less on political groups and parties” (Ibid., 66). They go on to define media personalization as “a change in the presentation of politics in the media, as expressed in a heightened focus on individual politicians and a diminished focus on parties, organizations, and institutions. In media personalization, which refers to a heightened focus on individual politicians and a diminished focus on parties, the focus is usually on the *political characteristics and activities* of individual politicians” (Ibid., 67). Behavioral personalization is defined as “the process in the case of politicians is expressed in an increase in individual political behavior and a decline in party activity” (Ibid., 68).

In this study, institutional personalization is measured by studying the use of presidential professional prefixes and the number of ministerial crises, conspiracies, the concept of revolution as source of law, and presidential succession in each administration under the Constitution of 1940. Media personalization is measured by identifying instances of individual and personal references and depictions of the president in caricatures. Behavioral personalization is measured by studying the president’s role in

selecting presidential candidates and the relationship between the period's three predominant Executive Branch figures, Batista, Grau, and Prío.

5.1 Individual Personalization

Rahat and Sheaffer's definition of individual personalization was evident during this period and came in different forms. One of these manifestations was the frequent use of a president's professional prefix when addressing him (Figure 5). This practice demonstrates a cultural factor prevalent in Latin America. In society, leaders are given importance and status based on their profession. Other prefixes, particularly Sr. (*Señor*, or Mister), Ing. (*Ingeniero*, or Engineer), and Arq. (*Arquitecto*, or Architect) were also used to refer to other Cuban public officials, but none of these applied to presidents during the period. Frequent references to personal prefixes indicate the importance of the president's characteristics. At the same time, the use of prefixes highlights a president's rank in their profession and allows them to stand out above others in society.




Figure 5: Presidential Professional Prefixes in *Diario de la Marina* and *Bohemia*

While the data demonstrates a higher reference to presidents Grau, Prío, and Domingo as “Doctor,” it is important to note that other politicians of the period were referred to in the same way. Meanwhile, Batista was one of the few politicians who had a military title during this period of the Cuban Republic (the previous political generation being comprised of many Independence War veterans). Given Cuba’s tradition of *caudillismo*, references to Batista’s military rank, despite his civilian status as president, connected him to a perception of military power and authority. It is important to point out that Batista was promoted from colonel to major general in 1942 in response to the coup attempt the previous year. Batista took this step to project an image of control over the political and military spheres. At the same time, the use of Batista’s military rank as a prefix to his name made him stand out above other politicians who were doctors.

Constitutionally, the vice president’s roles were limited to succeeding the president and presiding the Senate. Yet the Vice President played a significant role in holding the governing coalition in place. This additional role changed the dynamic of Executive Branch politics by increasing the possibility of opposition to the government from within.

Cuba’s vice presidents belonged to a different party than the president, but were integral members of the ruling coalition. On several occasions, the vice president left the coalition during their tenures, but remained serving as vice president. A significant rift emerged in the Democratic Party following the death of General Mario F. Menocal Deop, former President and the Party’s leader. Their sights set on the presidential nomination for the 1944 elections, Vice President Cuervo Rubio and Prime Minister Saladrigas vied for control of the Party. Following Batista’s selection of Saladrigas as the CSD’s

presidential candidate in the next elections, Cuervo Rubio and his supporters, Havana Mayor Raúl Menocal Seva (former President Menocal's son), and Senate President Guillermo Alonso Pujol left the Democratic Party in 1943 and created the Republican Party (Costa 1998, 275).

Similarly, in 1950, Alonso Pujol, now as Vice President, entered an alliance with Batista and Havana Mayor Nicolás Castellanos Rivero, who was running against Auténtico candidate Antonio Prío Socarrás (the president's brother) (Costa 1992, 58). This pact essentially dissolved the ruling Auténtico-Republican Alliance, and while a new cabinet was ushered in, Vice President Alonso Pujol remained in office, leaving the opposition leader in a key role in the administration.

In both instances, the vice presidents remained in their position after breaking with the president. While this type of cohabitation was not established in the Constitution, it developed early on due to the vast number of parties in existence and the subsequent need to govern by coalition. Thus, the phrase "Be careful of the Vice President" proved to be a popular warning.

5.1.1 Proliferation of Ministers

Cuba's councils of ministers underwent a proliferation of ministers under the Constitution of 1940. Between October 10, 1944 and July 17, 1959, 426 ministerial changes took place. Part of the cause of this phenomenon can be found in the Constitution itself. Evidently, many qualified individuals from different parties and backgrounds held ministerial posts during this period. In his "*Saludo a Batista*" ("Greeting to Batista") during the former Cuban president's visit to Chile shortly after leaving office in 1944, famed poet and Senator Pablo Neruda praised his administration

“for having increased, with a Government of National Unity, with Saladrigas and with Marinello, with Mañach and with Sosa de Quesada, the richness of his country giving greater hopes and categorical realizations for the welfare of workers in Cuba” (Santí 2012, 142).




Figure 6: Ministerial Crises

Article 166 of the Constitution defines the parameters for the development of governmental crises. According to the Constitution, “Crises in questions of confidence may be total or partial. Those that concern the Prime Minister or that concern more than three Ministers shall be considered total. Others shall be considered partial.” Sixteen government crises took place during the period (Figure 6). Six of these crises occurred during Prío’s administration, five during Batista’s first administration, three during Grau’s administration, and two during Batista’s third administration. Interestingly, Prío’s final crisis occurred on March 7, 1952, just three days before Batista’s coup d’état.

5.1.2 Conspiracies

The period under the Constitution of 1940 saw several military conspiracies launched against the government. These conspiracies significantly threatened Cuba's constitutional order and further personalized the Executive Branch.

In exile, former Colonel Ramón M. Barquín López evaluated the state of civil-military relations under the Constitution of 1940, writing:

“The Constitutional interregnum from 1944 until 1952 was not taken advantage of by Cuban civilian rulers to excise from the armed forces the seed of military caciquismo and the unhealthy residues of barrack opportunism; indispensable actions for its transformation into an effective instrument of national security, which the nation's judicial framework demanded” (Barquín 1975, 86).

Constitutionally, Cuba's armed forces were subordinated to the executive branch and to the president, who served as commander in chief of said structure. However, Cuba's long history of *caudillismo* set the stage for clashes between the institutional language and the practical tradition. The 1940 Constitution's first challenge on this front came on February 4, 1941, when the Army Chief, Colonel José Eleuterio Pedraza Cabrera, gave Batista a 24-hour ultimatum to leave office. Batista ignored the ultimatum and, accompanied by Colonels Manuel Benítez and Ignacio Galíndez, went to the Camp Columbia barracks and quelled the conspiracy. In response to this coup attempt, a new military law was enacted, and Colonels Batista, Benítez, and Galíndez, along with Colonels Manuel López Migoya, Abelardo Gómez-Gómez, and Arístides Sosa de Quesada were promoted to the rank of general (Márquez-Sterling 1969, 507).

The conspiracy demonstrated that the Constitution faced challenges from the military. At the same time, it showed that Batista could defend himself and the Constitutional order from military conspiracies. This ability garnered admiration and loyalty from most of the military, and some of its sectors looked for ways to keep him in office. Without Batista's endorsement or support, a military plot emerged to stage a self-coup, cancel the upcoming elections, and keep Batista in office after his term came to an end in 1944. Batista, along with presidential candidate Carlos Saladrigas Zayas, Miguel Ángel de la Campa Caraveda, Aurelio Fernández Concheso, Amadeo López Castro, and others opposed the plan, and the President went to the Camp Columbia Military Barracks to convince the plotters to abandon their plan, upholding the Constitution in the process (Fernández-Concheso Mulet 2015, 93).

Military challenges to presidential authority continued under President Grau's administration. The first of three conspiracies was stopped on March 16, 1945, barely five months after Grau was sworn in. On that day, military forces surrounded a farm owned by former General Pedraza in San Antonio de las Vegas. Upon his arrest, Pedraza only had on him a revolver and a toothbrush, leading the conspiracy to be known as the *Conspiración del Cepillo de Dientes* (The Toothbrush Conspiracy). Pedraza and a couple of dozen of his co-conspirators were sentenced to one year in prison (Chao 2016, 336).

Just a year later, on May 17, 1946, another attempt was made to overthrow Grau. The failed attack on the Camp Columbia barracks had a notable casualty: a mule that had taken significant machine gun fire (Ibid.). This led it to be dubbed the *Conspiración del Mulo Muerto* (The Dead Mule Conspiracy).

A third conspiracy, also headed by Pedraza, was disarticulated five months later, on October 24, 1946, when 50 people were detained in Havana, Marianao, and Pinar del Río. Upon his detention, the conspiracy's chief was said to have been donning a black raincoat, leading to it being named the *Conspiración de la Capa Negra* (the Black Cape Conspiracy). When National Defense Minister Salvador Menéndez Villoch went to tell Grau that a military conspiracy was afoot, Grau told him that he already knew, demonstrating his closer ties to the military's upper echelons than to his civilian minister (Hernández-Bauzá 1987, 104).

Prío also had his fair share of conspiracies prior to the March 1952 coup. Vice President Alonso Pujol stated in *Bohemia* that, during a secret meeting in March of 1951, Batista told him:

“There is a movement of young officers in the Army towards the impeachment of President Prío and his replacement by the Vice President. They feel I am the political figure that could give a key historical perspective to their movement. If we ignore their feelings, the Republic runs the risk of their acting on their own; this would be very serious because the military have no sense of political orientation” (Chao 2013, 13)

Therefore, Batista's March 10, 1952 coup was not unprecedented, nor was it the last. Several military anti-government conspiracies took place during Batista's authoritarian government (1952-1959). Among these stand out the April 1956 *Conspiración de los Puros* (Conspiracy of the Pure Ones), led by Colonel Ramón M. Barquín López, then Military Attaché at the Cuban Embassy in Washington, D.C. Another military uprising took place at the Cayo Loco Naval Base in Cienfuegos on September 5, 1957. This conspiracy had the distinction of being organized by Navy as

well as by 26th of July Movement (M-26) and Organización Auténtica (OA) members (Bonachea and San Martín 1974, 147). Unlike the conspiracies that preceded them, these were aimed, in some measure, at restoring the 1940 Constitution and ending Batista's authoritarian government.

Although the anti-government conspiracies and coup attempts that took place only a few years after the implementation of the 1940 Constitution were quickly quashed, they helped set the stage for Batista's successful 1952 coup. Part of this coup's success was the active participation of both civilian and military leaders. This was embodied by Batista himself, who held the rank of major general and was serving as Senator from Las Villas province at the time of the coup, having been elected *in absentia* in 1948. Batista himself used the threat of conspiracies to justify the coup, accusing Prío of planning an *auto golpe* (self-coup) on March 15th to suspend the elections scheduled for June 1st of that year.

5.1.3 Legalizing Revolution

The concept of revolution in Cuba further indicates institutional personalization due to the legal rationale that Cuba's Supreme Tribunal of Justice elaborated and upheld on several occasions. The underlying result is that revolutions trumped the Constitution. Since Cuba's revolutionary movements were led by an individual, broader revolutionary movements became personal and centered around the individual *caudillo*, as the Batista-led Sergeant's Revolt of September 4, 1933 illustrates (Batista 1973, 31).

On March 1, 1934, on the heels of the 1933 Revolution, Cuba's Supreme Tribunal issued a ruling in which it determined that "the revolution was a source of law." This ruling effectively subordinated any constitutional text to an armed, popular uprising. At

the same time, the ruling provided legal cover for future armed struggles that would be justified by their leaders in “revolutionary” terms. This decision contradicts those of other scholars and jurists who take a different view regarding the relationship between revolution and law. Ignacio González Rubio wrote that “it is not possible to refer the revolution for its significance to the judicial order in place, because a right cannot be consecrated to the violation of law...It is at this moment in the history of the nations where we have to investigate the validity of the norm produced by a revolution and seek its judicial significance. The precise moment where law cannot be established in the Law” (González Rubio 1952, 101-102).

Batista himself used the Supreme Tribunal’s legal precedent to justify his 1952 coup, defining it as a step towards returning to the ideals and vision of the 1933 Revolution. The Constitutional Statutes of April 4, 1952 stated: “Before this scene of desolation and crisis, full of dangers and somber auguries, it was necessary to return to the starting point of the Revolution as source of law...” (de la Cuesta 1974, 330). Batista himself would frequently refer to his government established on March 10, 1952 as a “revolutionary Government” (Batista 1961, 61).

5.1.4 Presidential succession

Following president Carlos Prío Socarrás’ overthrow by the Batista-led coup d’état on March 10, 1952, Vice President Guillermo Alonso Pujol, the constitutional successor to the presidency, remained in office. Since he did not submit his resignation until March 17th, he should have been sworn-in as president.

Once the April 4, 1952 Constitutional Statutes were enacted, the justices of the Supreme Tribunal and the prosecutors and secretaries of the branch’s different chambers

swore upon the new law. There is debate regarding the extent to which taking an oath on the Statutes was mandatory, as Riera Hernández indicated (Riera Hernández 1968, 192). Indeed, some of the older justices, including long-serving Chief Justice Juan Federico Edelmann Rovira, opted to begin filing their retirement paperwork (*Diario de la Marina* 1952, 1). Yet, the Supreme Tribunals' united stand in support of the Statutes effectively sealed the 1940 Constitution's fate.

The hours following Batista's resignation in the early hours of January 1, 1959 demonstrate a failure in the line of presidential succession. Batista's constitutional successor, Vice President Rafael Guas Inclán, was passed over due to not being in Havana at the time and being poised to take over as Mayor of Havana in a matter of weeks. The second-in-line to the presidency, Senate president Anselmo Alliegro y Milá, resigned the presidency as soon as he received it. The presidency went down the line of succession to the most senior justice on the Supreme Court, Carlos Manuel Piedra y Piedra. The Justice made it to the president's office at the Presidential Palace as provisional president and was poised to fulfill his constitutional duties, issuing several decrees and selecting potential ministers, including Dr. Gustavo Pelayo as Prime Minister. Yet Fidel Castro, not yet in Havana, refused to accept a provisional presidency headed by Piedra. In a bulletin issued from Santiago de Cuba, Fidel Castro said: "This Sr. Piedra, who, if he has not yet resigned, should get ready, because we're going to make him resign. I don't think he will last twenty-four hours. It will break a record" (Franqui 1980, 488). Upon hearing the Leader of the Revolution's pronouncement, "the Supreme Court did not administer the oath of office to the Justice" (Smith 1962, 186-187). Rufo López Fresquet, Treasury Minister during Urrutia's administration, echoed this view,

writing that “The government considered itself to be an instrument of the revolution and felt obligated to create a constitution that embodied the principles that brought it to power” (López-Fresquet 1966, 77)

It became evident that three key factors, developing simultaneously, would prevent Piedra from exercising his constitutional duties. First, Piedra’s civilian authority had to compete with a separate military authority, held by the newly Batista-appointed head of the Armed Forces, Major General Eulogio Cantillo Porrás. Cantillo met with a Civil Military Junta that was poised to take over the reins of power. Second, the Supreme Court refused to administer Piedra’s oath of office as provisional president, citing that the situation at hand represented a “victorious revolution which has taken place in the nation’s territory for a long period of time. That revolution is the fount of law...leaving the revolutionary forces in the position of organizing its own government” (Bonachea and San Martín 1974, 314). In doing so, the Supreme Court broke the constitutional line of succession. Third, Fidel Castro’s vocal opposition to Piedra’s provisional presidency demonstrated that *caudillismo* was alive and well in the face of constitutional order.

Individual personalization of the executive branch manifested itself in different ways since the Constitution of 1940 was enacted. The frequent use of professional prefixes, the number of ministers under the Constitution of 1940, legalizing revolution, and presidential succession further indicated that individuals played a greater role in Executive Branch politics than institutions did.

5.2 Media Personalization

5.2.1 Headlines

Newspaper and magazine headlines of the period are useful indicators of media personalization, as they offer valuable insights into executive institutionalization and personalization. Two of Cuba's most popular and widely-circulated publications paint a particularly vivid picture of executive politics and perceptions in twentieth century Cuba. Known as "the Dean of the Cuban Press," the *Diario de la Marina*'s long and storied history dates back to 1844, towards the end of Spain's colonial presence in Cuba. As Cuba's paper of record, the *Diario de la Marina* ran 6 days a week, excluding Mondays and holidays, and by 1953 had a nation-wide circulation of 28,000 on weekdays and 35,000 on Sundays (American Embassy 1953, 2).

Among Cuba's numerous popular magazines, *Bohemia* was perhaps the most widely read. Founded in 1908, *Bohemia* rapidly rose in readership and influence, and its scope and national importance were comparable to those of *Life* magazine in the United States. While the *Diario de la Marina* was considered more conservative and traditional in content and style, *Bohemia* was regarded as more progressive, offering a mix of news and commentary.

Both publications are important sources of information on perceptions of executive politics during the 1940s and 1950s due to their wide circulation and different editorial lines. The headlines and decks that mentioned key words relating to the executive branch were catalogued. Front-page headlines, decks, and subheads from the *Diario de la Marina* were used because they are more likely to catch the eye of a reader who, at the very least, skimmed the front page of the newspaper.

Article titles from inside *Bohemia* were used given the publication’s magazine format and weekly edition. There are more instances of relevant key words from *Diario de la Marina* than from *Bohemia* because the former was published daily, while the latter appeared weekly. However, both publications offer a useful comparison. The key words were sorted into two categories. The first category included terms related to executive branch institutions, while the second one included any mention of the officeholder’s name.




Figure 7: Personalization of the Presidency in *Diario de la Marina*.

A study of the *Diario de la Marina* indicates that institutional references to the president began to decrease, while personal references increased (Figure 7). During Batista’s first presidency (1940-1944), the *Diario de la Marina* demonstrated a significant number of institutional references (823) in relation to personal references (420). Yet during Grau’s administration, institutional references decreased (634), while personal references increased (718).

This pattern continued under Prío's administration, with 490 institutional references and 626 personal references. The pattern remained under Batista's second administration (1952-1954), with 480 institutional references and 503 personal references. However, the gap between both narrowed significantly. The original distribution returned under Domingo's government (1954-1955) with 205 institutional and 37 personal references. Batista's third and final administration (1955-1958) saw a higher number of institutional (731) *vis-à-vis* personal (634) references. The pattern was again inverted during the Urrutia administration (1959), with 59 institutional and 68 personal references.

A similar evaluation of institutional and personal references in *Bohemia* tells a different story (Figure 8). The pattern begins like that of *Diario de la Marina* during Batista's first administration, with 24 institutional and 19 personal references. The Grau administration showed 43 institutional and 54 personal references. Prío's administration demonstrated a virtual tie between institutional (69) and personal (68) references. The pattern towards personalization began like that found in *Diario de la Marina*, but shifted more significantly during Batista's second term, with 8 institutional and 53 personal references, and continued under Domingo (three institutional and nine personal references) and Batista's third administration (eight institutional and 21 personal references). Under Urrutia's administration, three institutional references and one personal reference appeared




Figure 8: *Personalization of the Presidency in Bohemia.*

Both *Diario de la Marina* and *Bohemia* demonstrate a reduction in the use of institutional titles and an increase in personal references. These results indicate a pattern of presidential personalization that began to emerge soon after the Constitution of 1940 was enacted.

When studying data from different presidential administrations under the 1940 Constitution, it is important to bear in mind the significant differences between the democratic system in place before 1952 and the authoritarian system that replaced it following Batista’s 1952 coup. As Dr. Miguel A. Faria, Jr. summarizes, “although Batista did not formally abolish the 1940 Constitution by 1957-1958, he effectively ended constitutional rule” (Faria, Jr. 2002, 52). Although Batista’s final two administrations and Domingo’s interregnum had significant authoritarian features, it is important to analyze the data available during this period due to the permanence, with brief interruptions, of the constitutional institutions established in the 1940 Constitution




Figure 9: Personalization of the Vice Presidency in *Diario de la Marina*.

Unlike the references to the president, during Batista's first presidency (1940-1944), the *Diario de la Marina* demonstrated a significant number of personal (57) references to Vice President Gustavo Cuervo Rubio in relation to institutional references (26) (Figure 9). Yet during Grau's administration, although institutional references decreased (16), while personal references increased to Vice President Raúl de Cárdenas Echarte (19). This pattern continued under Prío's administration, with 11 institutional references and 53 personal references to Vice President Guillermo Alonso Pujol. The office of vice president was vacant following Batista's 1952 coup and was reinstated along with the 1940 Constitution in 1954. Batista's third and final administration (1955-1958) saw a continuation of the pattern with 6 institutional and 24 personal references to Vice President Rafael Guas Inclán. The vice presidency was again abolished under the Urrutia administration.

A very different pattern emerged upon reviewing *Bohemia's* headlines (Figure 10). Only three institutional mentions were made of Vice President Cárdenas (one in 1946 and two in 1947) under the Grau administration. No personal references were made to the vice presidents of the period.




Figure 10: *Personalization of the Vice Presidency in Bohemia.*

Unlike the other offices in the executive, the office of the Vice President was referenced in more personalistic terms after the Constitution of 1940's enactment. The pattern in relation to institutional references continued throughout the period. One possible explanation for this is the vice president's role as party leader and his key role in keeping the coalition together, duties that were not granted to the office by the Constitution but emerged soon after it came into effect.

The study of the Council of Ministers considers references to the term “Consejo de Ministros”, as well as the interchangeable terms “consejo” and “gabinete” (cabinet) (Figure 11). During Batista’s first presidency (1940-1944), the *Diario de la Marina* demonstrated 199 references. The Grau administration saw the greatest number of references during the period (293). Under Prío’s administration, the number of references decreased to 200. The pattern slightly increased under Batista’s second administration (1952-1954), with 208 references. The number of references dropped significantly for the rest of the period, with 43 references under Domingo’s administration, 156 under Batista’s third administration, and 77 under Urrutia’s administration.




Figure 11: Personalization of the Council of Ministers in *Diario de la Marina* and *Bohemia*.

During Batista’s first presidency (1940-1944), *Bohemia* demonstrated two references. The Grau administration saw four references. Prío’s administration saw the greatest number of references during the period (six). The pattern slightly decreased under Batista’s second administration (1952-1954), with one reference. The number of

references dropped to zero under Domingo's administration, increased to one under Batista's third presidency, and returned to zero under Urrutia's administration.

The role of the Council of Ministers began to increase. However, it steadily decreased as the decades progressed. This demonstrates that the Council of Ministers' role as a significant institution within the Executive Branch began to wane.

During Batista's first presidency (1940-1944), the *Diario de la Marina* demonstrated a significant number of institutional references to the prime minister (266) in relation to personal references (155) (Figure 12). This pattern continued during Grau's administration, although institutional references decreased (81), while personal references increased (34). The trend remained under Prío's administration, with 57 institutional references and 37 personal references. The pattern reversed under Batista's second administration (1952-1954), with ten institutional references and 47 personal references during the month when Batista held the office. The office of prime minister was suspended during the remainder of Batista's second administration and Domingo's government (1954-1955). Batista's third and final administration (1955-1958) saw a higher number of institutional (75) to personal (43) references. The pattern was inverted again during the Urrutia administration (1959), with 85 institutional and 194 personal references.




Figure 12: Personalization of the Prime Minister in *Diario de la Marina*.

An evaluation of institutional and personal references to the Prime Minister in *Bohemia* tells a similar story (Figure 13). The pattern begins to resemble that of *Diario de la Marina* during Batista’s first administration, with four institutional and two personal references. The Grau administration showed one institutional and zero personal references. Prío’s administration demonstrated six institutional and two personal references. The pattern towards personalization shifted more significantly during Batista’s second term, with zero institutional and 17 personal references, and continued under Domingo (one institutional and zero personal references) and Batista’s third administration (two institutional and five personal references). Under Urrutia’s administration, one institutional reference and 27 personal references were identified.




Figure 13: Personalization of the Prime Minister in Bohemia.

The Prime Minister’s office is referenced more frequently in institutional terms than in personal ones. However, the gap between both types of references narrowed over time. The only change in pattern between *Diario de la Marina* and *Bohemia* is seen during Batista’s third administration, where Bohemia points to more personal than institutional references. Batista’s second administration is understandably referenced in more personalistic terms because he held the offices of head of state and head of government, combined into one after the March 10, 1952 coup d’état. The institutional pattern returned under Batista’s third administration (1955-1959) before once again becoming personalistic under Urrutia’s administration. Here, it is important to note that Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s massive popularity and personal appeal contributed significantly to changing that pattern.

The term “*gobierno*” (“government”), and institutional term, refers to a particular president’s administration, even though the Constitution distinguishes between the president as head of state and the prime minister as head of government (Figure 14). However, the term becomes personal with the blurring of this distinction. This process

diminishes the Prime Minister's role while granting extra influence to the president. The *Diario de la Marina's* headlines refer to Batista's first "government" the most (399). This is followed by Grau's government (286). Prío's government was mentioned 218 times. Batista's second government was mentioned 272 times. Domingo's brief government was mentioned 56 times. Batista's third administration was mentioned 220 times, and Urrutia's government was mentioned 111 times.




Figure 14: Personalization of "Gobierno" and "Palacio" in *Diario de la Marina*.

Bohemia paints a different picture regarding the term. Batista's first administration only saw the term mentioned seven times. Grau's government was mentioned 21 times. The term was most used during Prío's administration (47). Batista's government was mentioned six times during his second administration, and only one time during Domingo's administration. Batista's third administration was mentioned 13 times, and Urrutia's was mentioned seven times.




Figure 15: Personalization of “Gobierno” and “Palacio” in Bohemia.

In *Diario de la Marina*, references to the government generally decreased, with a couple of exceptions. Meanwhile, *Bohemia*’s references to the government increased until Batista’s second administration and continued at lower numbers during the following administrations.

The terms “*Palacio*” and “*Palacio Presidencial*” are also worth analyzing because they are used euphemistically to refer to the president and his administration. As with “*gobierno*,” “*Palacio*” can be seen as both an institutional and a personal term. In this context, the Presidential Palace was more than a building. It was a symbol of the presidency and its power. The Presidential Palace served as the setting for meetings, official events, press conferences, mass demonstrations, and other events, both governmental and nongovernmental. The March 13, 1957 attack on the Presidential Palace, for example, served as both the setting of an assassination attempt on Batista as well as the meeting place of his triumphant rallies a few days later. Serving as the

headquarters of the presidency, the Presidential Palace also represented a centralization of executive power.

In *Diario de la Marina*, the Presidential Palace was referenced 176 times during Batista's first administration. The number of references increased to 209 during Grau's administration but decreased to 81 during Prío's administration. The number increased slightly to 87 during Batista's second administration before dropping to 15 during Domingo's brief government. References jumped up to 157 during Batista's third administration before reducing to 22 during Urrutia's government.

In *Bohemia*, the term "*Palacio*" was referenced 13 times during Prío's administration, eight times during Grau's administration, one time during Batista's first administration, four times during Batista's second and fourth administrations, and three times during Urrutia's administration (Figure 15). While the number of references to the Presidential Palace in *Bohemia* is less than in *Diario de la Marina*, it still appears as a prominent feature during several presidential administrations.

Overall, a review of headlines with institutional and personal references to the executive branch indicate a trend towards media personalization. Another important element in Cuban media during the period, caricatures, also serve as a useful tool for measuring executive branch personalization.

5.2.2 Caricatures

The prevalence of political cartoons in newspapers and magazines reflects the personalization of the presidency as illustrated by the role of *choteo* as a pillar of Cuba's political culture. As it relates to the presidency, *Bohemia*'s "El Reyecito Criollo" comic strip is useful in studying perceptions of the office's institutionalization and

personalization under each administration. However, given that the strip debuted in 1947, it does not cover Batista's first administration and most of Grau's administration. The cartoons by Vergara appeared in the *Bohemia* section, "Picadillo a la Criolla," which ran from 1943 until 1952. While it did not feature the president as regularly as "El Reyecito Criollo", the instances in which it did so offer additional information.

While both caricatures were drawn by different cartoonists, they shared several motifs. One such motif was the *lío*, depicted as a white garment bag tied in a knot used to hold dirty laundry. In the Cuban vernacular, "*lío*" also means "problem" or "mess" (Sánchez-Boudy 1999, 404). Similarly, another motif, the "*rollo*" was used in "Picadillo a la Criolla," depicted as an anthropomorphic roll of paper. *Rollo* is synonymous with *lío*, and both the *lío* and the *rollo* are often seen accompanying the president as reflections of a particular administration's systemic and ever-present problems.

Highlighting another characteristic in Cuban politics, the *guataca*, or hoe, was frequently referenced or illustrated in the period's comic strips. The term "*guataca*" is "a short hoe that is used to clear the terrain of grass" (RAE 2021) However, the term is used to refer to a "person who flatters slavishly" (RAE 2021; Sánchez-Boudy 1999, 341). In caricatures, this agricultural instrument is often carried by a particular politician or other individual to illustrate the role of those surrounding the president and his relations with them. "Picadillo a la Criolla" introduced the *bombín*, or bowler hat, referencing "a person that appears to be worth much and is not worth much." The "*bombín*" was used to refer to the *parvenus* in the Prío administration (Sánchez-Boudy 1999, 99; Duarte Oropesa 1974, 118).




Figure 16: Caricature Motifs in “Picadillo a la Criolla.”

Another common motif came in the form of a leg of ham emblazoned with a lone star. This ham represents the state’s coffers and is depicted as being sought after or divided and distributed by the president or other politicians. In caricatures, the ham represents the president’s power to distribute state funds and the corruption that is often a byproduct of that power.

The use of these five motifs reflected characteristics of Cuba’s political system. Their frequent and prominent depictions in caricatures demonstrated how each president dealt with them. By depicting them with personal characteristics (faces, arms, legs), cartoonists made these motifs stand out from other issues and made them almost inseparable from the president.

5.2.2.1 “Picadillo a la Criolla”

“Picadillo a la Criolla” debuted in January 1943, half-way through Batista’s first term. While Batista himself only appeared in five cartoons during his term, it is telling

that one of them featured the ham, one referenced nepotism, and one addressed the governing coalition (Figure 16).

Grau's administration offers a better indication of his administration's perceptions in "*Picadillo a la Criolla*" due to the strip's publication during his entire term. In total, Grau was featured 101 times in the cartoon. Most references depicted Grau in relation to his "*rollos*" (56) and/or "*lios*" (49). However, there were 19 references to Grau's reelection, the only references made to reelection in "*Picadillo a la Criolla*" throughout its run. These references were significant given the 1940 Constitution's prohibition of consecutive reelection.

By comparison, Prío's four-year administration was referenced 36 times, significantly less than Grau's references. The "*bombín*" made its debut during this administration, appearing ten times and often sharing the cartoon space with "*lios*" (six) and "*rollos*" (two).

"*Picadillo a la Criolla*" saw its demise following Batista's 1952 coup, after which he was only mentioned once before the column stopped. The section had been in decline for some time, with presidential cartoons becoming more prevalent and regular with "*El Reyecito Criollo*."

5.2.2.2 "*El Reyecito Criollo*"

Given the debut of "*El Reyecito Criollo*" in August 1947, Batista's first administration was not covered. In fact, the strip only covered a little over a year at the end of Grau's administration. In that short period, Grau appeared 50 times, or half the number of times that he appeared in "*Picadillo a la Criolla*" during his entire presidency (Figure 17). References were made relating to "*lios*" (three), *guatacas* (four), corruption

(two), and the ham (three). Elections were referenced seven times, with parties and the coalition being referenced four times each. Unlike references in “*Picadillo a la Criolla*,” Grau’s potential reelection was only referenced once.




Figure 17: Caricature Motifs in “*El Reyecito Criollo*.”

Prío appeared the most times in “*El Reyecito Criollo*” (171) during his four-year term. The references to the ham increased to 14 during Prío’s administration, while depictions of “*líos*” stood at 11. Political parties were referenced 19 times, with elections mentioned almost as many times (18), and the coalition mentioned 15 times.

During Batista’s second administration, Batista appeared 112 times, during which elections saw the highest number of references at 26, followed by political parties at 16. “*Líos*” were referenced six times, with “*rollos*” and the ham referenced four times each. Domingo’s short administration only appeared twice, including a strip in the August 22, 1954 issue of *Bohemia* in which he is making a point of not “sitting on the throne” while dressed in royal trappings (Silvio 1954a, 65). In doing so, the strip addressed Batista as

the “power behind the throne,” which Domingo was respectfully reserving for his return to office (Image 5).



Image 5: President Domingo, as “el reyecito criollo,” reserves Batista’s presidential throne for his return, August 22, 1954.




Figure 18: Presidential Appearances in Caricatures.

Batista appeared 101 times during his final, four-year term. Here, 13 references were made to “líos.” At the same time, 21 references were made to political parties, 13 to elections, and two to reelection. It is important to note that press censorship during this period, particularly from 1956 to 1959, restricted the types of political topics and news sections that could be covered in publications like *Diario de la Marina* and *Bohemia*, including political cartoons like “*El Reyecito Criollo*” (Figure 18). Urrutia appeared only

once as “*el reyecito criollo*,” but none of the traditional motifs are attributed to him (Image 6).



Image 6: Depiction of President Urrutia in “*El Reyecito Criollo*,” February 8, 1959.

5.3 Behavioral Personalization

Since behavioral personalization comes to light with “an increase in individual political behavior and a decline in party activity,” it is important to identify indicators that point to an increase in behavioral characteristics that presidents during this period exhibited. Two very telling characteristics are the president’s role in selecting presidential candidates and the relationship between presidents Batista, Grau, and Prío.

5.3.1 Presidential Candidate Selection

The president also gained a role as the selector of his coalition’s presidential candidate. This role was not delineated in the Constitution but evolved from the multiparty system that had grown significantly by 1940. While party assemblies were tasked with selecting presidential candidates on paper, it was the president who truly selected his party’s and/or coalition’s candidate for president. This extraofficial selection process had the adverse effect of fostering disaffection among candidates that were not selected while furthering party fragmentation.

In May 1943, Vice President Cuervo Rubio and former President Mario G. Menocal Deop left the Democratic Party, then an integral part of the CSD. However, the

Vice President remained in office for the remainder of his term, bringing internal divisions to the Batista administration. After Batista's term was over, Cuervo Rubio was appointed Minister of State by the new Grau administration.

Similarly, Grau's support of the nomination of Prime Minister Carlos Prío Socarrás as the Auténtico party's presidential candidate for the 1948 elections caused a schism within the party. The Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) was founded on May 15, 1947 by disaffected Auténticos headed by Senators Emilio Ochoa Ochoa and Eduardo Chibás Ribas. Even before the party's formal break with the Auténticos, the dissident Auténtico's supported Chibás' Auténtico candidacy for president in 1948.

Three Auténtico candidates ran for the party's nomination that year: Carlos Prío Socarrás, José San Martín, and Miguel Suárez Fernández. Overtly, Grau remained neutral while giving his vocal support to all three candidates. However, according to Duarte Oropesa (1974), Grau favored his cousin San Martín, but without popular support for his candidacy, the president supported Prío's bid (Duarte Oropesa 1974, 62). Suárez Fernández decided to go ahead with his own, albeit unsuccessful bid, a "Third Front," seeking to bring in a coalition of the Democratic and Ortodoxo parties.

A similar scenario, albeit less contentious, developed in the lead-up to the 1952 elections. Senate President Manuel Antonio de Varona Loredó seemed poised to be the nominee, given his background and reputation for decency and honesty. However, Prío's support went to Carlos Hevia, who ended up receiving the Auténtico nomination.

5.3.2 Batista-Grau-Prío Relations

An important behavioral dynamic that cannot be overlooked is the relationship between Batista, Grau, and Prío. All three participated together in the turmoil following

President Machado's ouster in 1933 and signed the Proclamation to the People of Cuba that overthrew the Céspedes government on September 4, 1933. As the decade progressed, Cuba's political sphere returned to its traditional, bipolar state as Batista and Grau emerged as the country's new *caudillos*, representing the government and the opposition respectively. The political tug of war continued throughout the decade, with both leaders facing off in the runup to the Constitution of 1940 and the race for the presidency.

Meanwhile, Prío developed a successful political career, following closely in Grau's footsteps. First elected to office as a delegate to the 1940 Constitutional Convention, Prío went on to win election as Auténtico Representative and Senator before being appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Labor by President Grau.

After leaving office, Batista left Cuba and settled in Daytona Beach, where he stayed abreast of Cuban affairs. It was from his Florida haven that he successfully ran for a seat in the Cuban Senate, representing the Province of Las Villas. In a show of "cordialidad," Prío allowed Batista to return to Cuba with full guarantees to return to politics in November of 1948 (Díaz-Balart 2006, 45).

By then, relations between Prío and Grau had soured, significantly fragmenting the Auténtico Party. The main reason for the schism was Grau's attempts to pressure the Prío administration into continuing his policies, acting as a sequel to his own administration.

Relations became further strained when Grau was indicted for embezzlement. In 1948, Ortodoxo Senator Pelayo Cuervo Navarro accused the Grau administration of committing fraud, embezzlement, and participating in illicit business dealings. When told

of Cuervo's accusations, Grau challenged him to take him to court over the matter, which the Senator promptly did, establishing Cause 82 of 1949 (Justiniani 2016, 27). According to Col. Barquín, Grau was upset that Prío "allowed or did not impede the instruction of charges under Cause 82," further contributing to the division between both Auténtico leaders (Barquín 1975, 133).

Divisions between Grau and Prío took another dimension following Batista's coup in 1952. While both leaders were opposed to the new government, they fought against it in different ways. Grau decided to challenge it electorally, running for president against Batista in the 1954 elections before going into *retramiento* and withdrawing from the race just days before election day. Meanwhile, Prío took the insurrectionist route, actively supporting the armed struggle against Batista that began with the attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953.

Behavioral personalization was best illustrated by caricaturist Silvio in a comic strip published in *Bohemia* in May 1954, a few months before the elections were held (Image 7). Titled "Historieta Sin Palabras" ("Short Story Without Words"), Batista and Grau are depicted as tied at the waist by a rope (Silvio 1954b, 149). Two hams appeared, one on each side of the leaders (the ham closer to Batista was larger). Seeing that they would never reach either ham by pulling in different directions, the two decided to work together. Grau gave Batista enough room for him to reach and enjoy his ham. Once Batista has left only the bone, he returns Grau's favor. Satisfied after having devoured the ham, both leaders smile. Interestingly, Prío was left out of the caricature. The cartoon depicts both leaders as personalities, not institutional representatives, vying for the spoils of power.




Image 7: Cartoon depiction of Batista-Grau relationship.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The weaknesses and potential failure in the implementation of Cuba's semi-presidential system were evident along the way. Upon taking office as the country's second Vice President since the Constitution was enacted, Dr. Raúl de Cárdenas declared "The semi-parliamentary regime has not functioned in the terms foreseen in the Constitution" (*Diario de la Marina* 1944, 1). To try to remedy this issue, the following year Congress passed the "Ley de Relaciones entre los Cuerpos colegisladores y entre el Congreso y el Gobierno" ("Law of Relations between the colegislative Bodies and between Congress and the Government"), which served as a complementary law to the Constitution of 1940 (*Diario de la Marina* 1945, 1).

A decade later, Carlos Márquez-Sterling y Guiral, the President of the 1940 Constitutional Assembly, echoed Cárdenas' statements, concluding:

"Never...have our prime ministers represented what the constitutional text, with evident foresight, conferred upon them. Starting as semi parliamentary, the Political Regime, under the governments of Batista, Grau, and Prío, beginning with the enactment of the Charter of '40, turned into pure presidentialism, and the Prime Minister – with some exceptions, it is fair to say (Zaydín, Lancís, Tony Varona) was turned into a 'gofer' of the president without daring to participate in any activity that could bother or pester, in the very least, the National Executive" (Márquez-Sterling 1955, 59).

Days after the coup, the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (Federation of University Students, or F.E.U.) symbolically buried a casket carrying a copy of the Constitution of 1940 at the University of Havana on April 2, 1952 to protest Batista's

coup (Suchlicki 1969, 60). The symbolic and solemn protest was the visual manifestation of a turning point in Cuban politics.

While some efforts had been made to strengthen Cuba's semi-presidential system, the measures proved unsuccessful. By 1955, the Constitution had been challenged by force several times. While most of the military conspiracies against the government failed, it only took one, Batista's 1952 coup d'état, to succeed and subvert the country's constitutional order. Yet some Cuban political leaders, loyal to the Constitution and confident in its supremacy, sought to use it as the foundation of their rejection of Batista's coup.

Following the coup, respected Independence War Colonel Cosme de la Torriente y Peraza and former Prime Minister Dr. Ramón Zaydín Márquez-Sterling, exhibiting great faith in the Constitution and in the country's judicial system, "sought to remove Batista through judicial means, filing a case petitioning Cuba's Supreme Court of Justice (Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales y Sociales) to declare Batista's regime illegal, null, and void" (Márquez-Sterling 2009, 36-37). The Tribunal ruled in favor of Batista, ending any hope for a judicial solution to the country's political situation.

The concept of revolution as source of law posed a major problem for Cuba's semi-presidential system, as well as its broader constitutional order. After establishing the precedent in 1934, Cuba's Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Cuban democracy's last line of defense, subjected the Constitution to revolutionary movements, rather than granting it legal supremacy. The order of presidential succession established by the Constitution's framers in 1940 was broken on several occasions with explicit permission from the

Supreme Tribunal, once again violating institutional mechanisms in place while setting a dangerous precedent that contributed to the Republic's collapse.

It was evident institutional reforms could not easily change the spirit and tradition of pure presidentialism, shrouded in a culture of *caudillismo* and personalism. Evidently, the application of Duverger's four parameters of semi-presidential government indicated a trend towards personalization and away from institutionalization. Part of this trend was dictated more by political culture aspects than by institutional design itself. While Cuba's semi-presidential system was put in place to reduce the "perils of presidentialism" that had dogged the country's politics since independence, political culture, manifested in the personalization of politics, proved hard to keep in check.

At the same time, a perfect storm of institutional failure and a solid manifestation of political culture emerged, combining Rahat and Sheaffer's three types of personalization. Fidel Castro was the embodiment of Cuban political culture. Married to Mirta Díaz-Balart Gutiérrez, the daughter of Batista's Minister of Transportation and sister of the House Majority Leader, Castro appealed to elements of Cuban political culture that were ingrained in the Cuban psyche (Machover 2018, 39). His manipulation of religious symbols at rallies, such as rosaries and white doves, appealed to Solaún's "miraculous/manicheanism/salvationism/messianism" matrix.

Soon, what had traditionally been a personalization of political power used by different presidents and politicians morphed into a cult of personality. Even the conservative newspaper *Diario de la Marina* began referring to Castro simply as "Fidel" in its headlines (the ultimate form of media personalization), a familiarity not accorded to previous Cuban leaders. This pattern continues today, as the next generation of Castros

continues to wield power. After decades of communist rule, Enrique Baloyra (1993) attributed the Castro dictatorship's survival to the idea "that the Cuban state is a personalist dictatorship largely unaffected by the world crisis of Leninism" (Baloyra 1993, 38). Even in this scenario, Fidel Castro's personal characteristics trumped the institutions of Marxist-Leninist communism. At the core of this cult of personality was Castro himself, surrounded by his inner circle, many of whom were related by blood or marriage, such as Castro's brothers Raúl and Ramón Castro Ruz, as well as Vilma Espín Guillois, Raúl Castro's wife.

Upon arriving in Havana days after the Batista government collapsed, a new government was set up, with Manuel Urrutia Lleó as President and José Miró Cardona as Prime Minister (Clark 2013, 180). Yet Fidel Castro was formally out of the constitutional power structure. He was anointed with the title "Jefe de la Revolución" ("Head of the Revolution"), a role that does not appear in the Constitution of 1940. Soon it became clear that Fidel Castro's role had to be institutionally formalized, and in February 1959 Miró Cardona resigned and Castro stepped in to fill the role of Prime Minister. In doing so, Castro demonstrated institutional personalization by showing that institutions did matter in granting his new government an air of legitimacy and legality.

Soon, the power dynamics in the new Cuban government became clear. Years later, President Urrutia wrote: "I had only nominal power; all real power, political and military, was in the hands of Fidel Castro" (Urrutia Lleó 1964, 30). Ironically, this power structure was closer to what the Constitution of 1940 intended, albeit with a host of political, economic, and social guarantees that are part and parcel of any democratic system. After several clashes with Fidel Castro that led to the Prime Minister's

resignation (in a show of behavioral personalization), Urrutia was forced to resign by the pro-Castro masses, after which Castro returned to power as Prime Minister and appointed Minister of Revolutionary Laws Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado as President (Urrutia 1975, 102; Suchlicki 2002, 138). Urrutia's resignation on July 17, 1941 came exactly 18 years to the day after the first ministerial crisis under the Constitution of 1940 occurred, during Batista's first administration.

Fidel Castro also enjoyed a carnivalistic atmosphere (Solaún's third matrix of Cuban political culture) in the early days and weeks of 1959. Thousands of people gathered in public squares to hear his hours-long speeches and cheered the new regime's dictats, including the extensive use of the "*Paredón*," or execution by firing squad.

Freedom of expression in Cuba quickly fell victim to the new dictatorship. Pro-government mobs stormed the *Diario de la Marina* on May 10, 1960 and destroyed its printing presses (Rivero 1986, 303). Two days later, in a scene that harkened back to the symbolic burial of the Constitution of 1940 only eight years before, government supporters carried a casket labeled "*Diario de la Marina*" and buried it at the University of Havana. Humberto Medrano, the Assistant Editor of *Prensa Libre*, openly expressed his solidarity with the *Diario de la Marina* and its Director, José Ignacio Rivero Hernández, as they withstood attacks from the government and its supporters, (Bethel 1969, 182). Soon, both Medrano and Rivero were in exile. While *Bohemia*'s Director, Miguel Ángel Quevedo y de la Lastra, also went into exile, *Bohemia* became a government media outlet and continues in print.

When combined with part of Solaún's third matrix, the significance of *choteo*, freedom of expression posed an even greater threat to the new regime's claim to power.

A significant clash between the Castro government and *choteo* occurred in 1961, when famed Cuban comedian Leopoldo Fernández was performing with his Review Company at Havana's Teatro Federico García Lorca. During one scene, the actors took portraits of Cuba's past presidents, with Fernández telling them to throw each one out. When Fernández picked up the final portrait, that of Fidel Castro, he declared, tongue-in-cheek: "A ese lo cuelgo yo" ("I will hang this one") (Rosell 1992, 99; Morin 1998, 284). Months later, Fernández was in exile in Miami, joining other Cuban artists and intellectuals who fled political repression and restrictions on freedom of expression.

Six decades later, Cuba is still grappling with the effects of the Republic's collapse. While Fidel Castro died in 2016, the Castro family continues to wield virtually-unchallenged power in the Cuban dictatorship. In 2021, Raúl Castro, who succeeded his brother in 2006, stepped down from all public roles.

A new Constitution was enacted in 2019, which seeks to maintain the socialist, single-party structure of the Cuban dictatorship while making certain cosmetic changes to the composition of governmental institutions. For the first time since 1976, the positions of head of state and head of government were separated. The President of the Republic became the "Head of State," while the position of Prime Minister was reintroduced to serve as "Head of Government of the Republic" (Title VI, Chapter III, Section I, Article 125 and Chapter IV, Section II, Article 140) (Republic of Cuba 2019, 9, 11). The office of Vice President was also reintroduced and tasked with succeeding the President "in case of absence, illness, or death" and "fulfilling the duties delegated or assigned to him by the President of the Republic" (Title VI, Chapter III, Section I, Articles 130 and 131) (Republic of Cuba 2019, 9-10).

As the Constitution of 1940 approached its 80th anniversary, Cuban dissidents and opposition leaders have renewed their interest in it and studied its legacy, relevance, and viability as the foundation for a future democratic government. Both the Constitution itself and the process by which it was drafted and ratified offer important and valuable lessons. Motivated by a desire to strengthen democracy and include all sectors of Cuban society in the political sphere, studying the Constitution of 1940 can shed light on what worked and what did not, which lessons can still be applied, and which need to be reconsidered. This Constitution offers a democratic alternative to the Marxist-Leninist totalitarian regime codified by the Constitutions of 1976 and 2019. The inclusive nature and collaboration among the delegates of the 1940 Constitutional Assembly also serves as a lesson in democratic governance regardless of political ideology.

Today, views on the Constitution's viability and relevance for a future, democratic Cuba. In 2014, an initiative called Consenso Constitucional (Constitutional Consensus), headed by historian and dissident Manuel Cuesta Morúa, was launched to study ways to establish a constitutional system in Cuba, whether by reinstating the Constitution of 1940, modifying the Constitution of 1976, or creating a new Constitution (CADAL 2014).

Similarly, the “Acuerdo por la Democracia en Cuba” (“Agreement for Democracy in Cuba”), signed by numerous pro-democracy organizations in Cuba and abroad, includes the Constitution of 1940 in its vision for a democratic Cuba. Signed at Florida International University (FIU) on February 20, 1998 and ratified on several occasions, it calls for, among other things, “referring to the Constitution of 1940 as applicable, during the transition period, and call for free elections with the supervision of international

bodies in a term no longer than one year, for a Constituent Congress that will establish a Constitution, and that during its existence can legislate and supervise the Executive. Achieving democratic legitimacy, it will call for general elections as established by the Constitution” (OCC 2019, para. 10). The recognition of the need to “supervise the Executive” shows a general understanding of the problems posed by the development of the institutions in that branch of government.

Those who oppose the Constitution of 1940’s future implementation point out that it “was too extensive. It included details that corresponded to the complementary laws” (Castellanos 2021). Luis Aguilar León contended that “defending a return to the Constitution of 1940 is an honorable way of being wrong” (Aguilar León 2003, 51). Yet its supporters point to the Constitution’s democratic roots and aspirations. Opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize nominee Dr. Oscar Elías Biscet González stated: “We respect the constitutional history of Cuba so we can start a new government based on the Constitution of 1940 and its Bill of Rights. Then, we can have a legitimate government” (Biscet 2016). Offering recommendations for a future Constitution that combines elements of the Constitutions of 1901 and 1940, Argentine jurist Ricardo Manuel Rojas proposes the semi-presidential regime (Rojas 2008, 170).

Considerations of the Constitution of 1940’s role in a future Cuba have also been a source for debate among Cubans on the island and abroad, taking shape in online forums and social media. Weekly Twitter Spaces are dedicated to discussing the topic, and the hashtag #C40 has gained traction, particularly since the nation-wide protests of July 11, 2021. In some instances, images appeared of protesters holding signs supporting the Constitution of 1940.

While a wide range of differences exists in terms of the applicability of the Constitution of 1940, there is more consensus in relation to its definition of the Executive Branch. Cuban opposition leader and lawyer René Gómez Manzano wrote in favor of separating the offices of state and government, indicating:

“That division of roles not only tends to prevent authoritarian temptations, but also contributes to the stability of institutions, by permitting that the possible cyclical political crises be resolved through the removal of the Prime Minister” (Gómez Manzano 2008, 157)

In 2016, the Centro de Estudios Convivencia (Convivencia Studies Center, or CEC), a think tank based in Pinar del Río, Cuba, developed a report with constitutional proposals for a future Cuba. The report stated:

“It is proposed that the Cuban State adopts a semi-parliamentary system to prevent the caudillistic excesses of the presidential system and carries out its functions through the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches, which will function in an independent and autonomous manner, as a guarantee of the safeguard of democracy, and the organisms recognized in the Constitution, or that in accordance to it, are established by Law” (CEC 2016, 53).

Semi-presidentialism has flourished in countries around the world, with prominent cases in France, Lithuania, Niger, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Timor-Leste, and Ukraine. Yet in the three cases of semi-presidentialism found in the Western Hemisphere, (Cuba, Peru, and Haiti), this system has not fared well. Still, Cuban semi-presidentialism did achieve some important benchmarks. It is important to note that Cuba’s semi-presidential system was only fully in place for twelve years, between

Batista's first inaugural on October 10, 1940 and his coup d'état against Prío on March 10, 1952.

Despite the lack of time necessary for semi-presidentialism to take root, Cuba's governments during this period achieved the approval of several substantial pieces of legislation. Among these, the creation of the National Bank of Cuba, the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (BANFAIC), the Tribunal of Constitutional and Social Guarantees, the Tribunal of Accounts, and the Superior Electoral Tribunal, as well as the establishment of the civil service and municipal autonomy, served as significant accomplishments of Cuba's governments during the period. (Suárez Rivas 1964, 249-250).

While Cuba's semi-presidential system was unsuccessful, not all its shortcomings were intrinsic to this regime type. Elements of political culture, corruption, and political violence were some of the many problems that plagued Cuban politics and society. It is likely that Cuba's political culture, not the semi-presidential system itself, made this regime type susceptible to failure while leading to the fall of the Cuban Republic.

Cuba's dual legacy of traditional Latin American patterns of governance and a decades-long totalitarian communist dictatorship makes the study of semi-presidentialism particularly important. From a comparative perspective, semi-presidential systems were implemented in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe with varying degrees of success. These post-communist legacies can offer valuable insights into what a democratic Cuban government can look like in the future. Yet studying Cuba's political development within the broader Latin American context is equally important.

This study offers a significant contribution to the literature on semi-presidentialism. Given the limited number of cases of semi-presidentialism in Latin America, this case study employs an innovative mixed methodology to explore different aspects of institutionalization and personalization in executive branch politics. At the same time, it presents the first study of Cuban semi-presidentialism while exploring a variety of related concepts and traditions at a time when events unfolding in Cuba raise questions about possible regime types for the country's eventual return to democratic governance.

Many in Cuba and abroad have placed their hopes on a return to democratic institutions and norms following six decades of a highly personalistic, single-party dictatorship. It is important to consider Cuba's options for a democratic system when conditions are ripe for it. Given Cuba's traditions, history, and political culture, it is unlikely that the country's future leaders will seek to implement a full parliamentary system. It is also likely that they will be hesitant to opt for a pure presidential system, which poses a significant threat to Cuba's democratic prospects. This leaves semi-presidentialism as a viable regime option. For semi-presidentialism to work, discussions on Cuban political culture must address how some of its elements contributed to institutional shortcomings and how those mistakes can be avoided in the future.

In exile, José Manuel Cortina García, the father of Cuban semi-presidentialism, wrote a letter to Orestes Ferrara Marino, his former colleague in Cuba's House of Representative. Reminiscing on the old Republic, Cortina told his old friend: "I remember one afternoon that we were going to the House, and you, looking at the Morro and the turquoise blue sea that surrounded us, told me: "Beautiful country!" What great

things we can do if we know how to lead it!” (Carbonell Cortina 1972, 9). The Cuban Republic can do great things, and introspection into its political culture and personalistic past while establishing strong institutions can help usher in a new era of democracy.

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APPENDIX

Appendix A: Members of Cuba's Council of Ministers (1940-1959)

Minister	Ministry	Began	Ended	D	Adm.
Carlos Saladrigas Zayas	Prime Minister	10/10/40	8/18/42	677	Batista
Ramón Zaydín y Márquez-Sterling	Prime Minister	8/18/42	3/15/44	575	Batista
Anselmo Alliegro Milá	Prime Minister	3/15/44	10/10/44	209	Batista
Félix Lancís Sánchez	Prime Minister	10/10/44	10/13/45	368	Grau
Carlos Prío Socarrás	Prime Minister	10/13/45	5/1/47	565	Grau
Raúl López del Castillo	Prime Minister	5/1/47	10/10/48	528	Grau
Manuel Antonio de Varona Loredo	Prime Minister	10/10/48	10/6/50	726	Prío
Félix Lancís Sánchez	Prime Minister	10/6/50	4/3/51	179	Prío
Félix Lancís Sánchez	Prime Minister	4/3/51	9/30/51	180	Prío
Oscar Gans Martínez	Prime Minister	10/1/51	3/7/52	158	Prío
Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar	Prime Minister	3/10/52	4/4/52	190	Batista
Jorge García Montes	Prime Minister	2/24/55	3/26/57	761	Batista
Andrés Rivero Agüero	Prime Minister	3/26/57	3/6/58	345	Batista
Emilio Núñez Portuondo	Prime Minister	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Gonzalo Güell y Morales de los Ríos	Prime Minister	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
José Miró Cardona	Prime Minister	1/5/59	2/13/59	39	Urrutia
Fidel Castro Ruz	Prime Minister	2/13/59	4/15/59	61	Urrutia
Augusto R. Martínez Sánchez	Prime Minister	4/15/59	5/8/59	23	Urrutia
Fidel Castro Ruz	Prime Minister	5/8/59	5/17/59	70	Urrutia
Joaquín Pérez Roa	Agriculture	10/10/40	7/18/41	281	Batista
Andrés Rivero Agüero	Agriculture	7/18/41	8/18/42	396	Batista
Sergio M. Valdés Alba	Agriculture	8/18/42	3/6/43	200	Batista
Joaquín Martínez Saenz	Agriculture	3/6/43	3/9/44	369	Batista
Carlos Felipe de Armenteros Demestre	Agriculture	3/9/44	10/10/44	215	Batista
German Álvarez Fuentes	Agriculture	10/10/44	4/30/47	932	Grau
Raúl López del Castillo	Agriculture	4/30/47	5/9/47	9	Grau
Germán Álvarez Fuentes	Agriculture	5/9/47	12/4/47	209	Grau
Román Nodal Jiménez	Agriculture	12/5/47	10/10/48	310	Grau
Francisco Grau Alsina	Agriculture	10/10/48	2/5/49	118	Prío
Virgilio Pérez López	Agriculture	2/5/49	2/7/50	367	Prío

Carlos Hevia y Reyes Gavilán	Agriculture	2/7/50	4/5/51	422	Prío
Eduardo Suárez Rivas Alfredo Jacomino	Agriculture	4/5/51	3/8/52	338	Prío
López	Agriculture	3/11/52	8/7/54	879	Batista
Oswaldo Valdés de la Paz	Agriculture	8/7/54	2/24/55	201 110	Dom.
Fidel Barreto Martínez Pedro Menéndez	Agriculture	2/24/55	3/6/58	6	Batista
Rodríguez	Agriculture	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Pedro Menéndez Rodríguez	Agriculture	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Humberto Sorí Marín	Agriculture	1/5/59	6/12/59	158	Urrutia
Pedro Miret Prieto	Agriculture	6/12/59	7/17/59	35	Urrutia
Elena Mederos Cabañas Raquel Pérez González	Social Welfare	1/23/59	6/12/59	140	Urrutia
de Miret	Social Welfare	6/12/59	7/17/59	35	Urrutia
José Tomás Oñate Gómez	Commerce	10/10/40	7/18/41	281	Batista
Alfredo Jacomino López	Commerce	7/18/41	6/22/42	339	Batista
Wilfredo Albanés Peña	Commerce	6/22/42	3/9/43	260	Batista
Anselmo Alliegro Milá	Commerce	3/9/43	3/31/43	22	Batista
Edgardo Buttari Puig Miguel Ángel Cisneros	Commerce	3/31/43	3/16/44	351	Batista
Govantes	Commerce	3/16/44	10/10/44	208	Batista
Alberto Inocente Álvarez Cabrera	Commerce	10/10/44	10/12/45	367	Grau
César M. Casas Rodríguez	Commerce	10/12/45	4/30/47	565	Grau
Rolando Acosta Marcos	Commerce	4/30/47	10/10/48	529	Grau
José R. Andreu Martínez	Commerce	10/10/48	4/10/51	912	Prío
Ramón Zaydín y Márquez-Sterling	Commerce	4/10/51	3/8/52	333	Prío
Oscar de la Torre Reyné	Commerce	3/11/52	2/13/53	339	Batista
Raúl Lorenzo Ruiz	Commerce	2/13/53	8/7/54	540	Batista
Carlos Manuel Ferretti Vidal	Commerce	8/7/54	2/24/55	201 110	Dom.
Raúl G. Menocal Seva	Commerce	2/24/55	3/6/58	6	Batista
José Ramón Pérez Magariños	Commerce	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
José Ramón Pérez	Commerce	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista

Magariños

Raúl Cepero Bonilla	Commerce	1/5/59	7/17/59	193	Urrutia
Orosman Viamontes					
Romero	Communications	10/10/40	7/17/41	280	Batista
Marino López Blanco	Communications	7/17/41	3/6/43	597	Batista
Adelardo Valdés					
Astolfi	Communications	3/6/43	10/10/44	584	Batista
Sergio I. Clark Díaz	Communications	10/10/44	4/30/47	932	Grau
Alberto C. Cruz Caso	Communications	4/30/47	3/31/48	336	Grau
José Ramón Gutiérrez					
López	Communications	3/31/48	9/1/48	154	Grau
Alberto C. Cruz Caso	Communications	9/1/48	10/10/48	39	Grau
Virgilio Pérez López	Communications	10/10/48	2/5/49	118	Prío
Carlos Maristany					
Sánchez	Communications	2/5/49	5/25/49	109	Prío
Arturo Illás Cuza	Communications	5/25/49	2/4/50	255	Prío
Sergio I. Clark Díaz	Communications	2/4/50	10/6/50	244	Prío
Sergio M. Megias Pérez	Communications	10/6/50	4/3/51	179	Prío
Sergio M. Megias Pérez	Communications	4/3/51	3/8/52	340	Prío
Pablo F. Carrera Justiz	Comm./Trans.	3/11/52	5/28/53	443	Batista
Rafael Díaz Balart	Comm./Trans.	5/28/53	7/31/53	64	Grau
Rafael Guas Inclán	Communications	7/31/53	8/4/54	4	Batista
Pablo F. Carrera Justiz	Communications	8/4/54	8/13/54	9	Batista
Ricardo Eguilor Vinent	Communications	8/14/54	2/24/55	194	Dom.
Ramón Vasconcelos				110	
Maragliano	Communications	2/24/55	3/6/58	6	Batista
Ricardo Eguilor Vinent	Communications	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Alberto García Valdés	Communications	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Enrique Otulski Ozacki	Communications	1/9/59	5/27/59	138	Urrutia
Julio Camacho Aguilera	Communications	5/27/59	7/17/59	51	Urrutia
Enrique Otulski Ozacki	Communications	7/17/59	7/17/59	1	Urrutia
Domínguez F. Ramos					
Delgado	National Defense	8/11/38	2/2/42	480	Batista
Carlos Saladrigas Zayas	National Defense	2/2/42	2/25/42	23	Batista
Arístides B. Sosa de					
Quesada	National Defense	2/25/42	9/18/44	936	Batista
Manuel Pérez Benitoa	National Defense	9/18/44	10/10/44	22	Batista
Salvador Menéndez					
Villoch	National Defense	10/10/44	4/30/47	932	Grau
Luis A. Collado Díaz	National Defense	4/30/47	5/30/47	30	Grau
Salvador Menéndez					
Villoch	National Defense	5/30/47	10/10/48	499	Grau
Román Nodal Jiménez	National Defense	10/10/48	3/16/49	157	Prío

Manuel Antonio de Varona Loredó	National Defense	3/16/49	6/22/49	98	Prío
Segundo Curti Messina	National Defense	6/22/49	2/6/50	229	Prío
Rubén de León García	National Defense	2/6/50	4/3/51	421	Prío
Rubén de León García	National Defense	4/3/51	3/8/52	340	Prío
Nicolás Pérez Hernández	National Defense	3/11/52	8/7/52	149	Batista
Pablo Carrera Justiz	National Defense	8/7/52	2/24/55	931	Dom.
Santiago Verdeja Neyra	National Defense	2/24/55	3/6/58	110	6
Miguel Ángel Campa Caraveda	National Defense	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Miguel Ángel Campa Caraveda	National Defense	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Luis Orlando Rodríguez	National Defense	1/5/59	1/20/59	15	Urrutia
Augusto R. Martínez Sánchez	National Defense	1/20/59	7/17/59	178	Urrutia
Juan J. Remos Rubio	Education	10/10/40	2/25/42	503	Batista
José A. Martínez-Viademonte y Martínez	Education	2/25/42	6/19/42	114	Batista
Ramón Vasconcelos Maragliano	Education	6/19/42	1/6/43	201	Batista
Rubén Dario Rodríguez	Education	1/6/43	3/6/43	59	Batista
Carlos Márquez-Sterling Guiral	Education	3/6/43	3/31/43	25	Batista
Anselmo Alliegro Milá	Education	3/31/43	10/10/44	559	Batista
Luis Pérez Espinós	Education	10/10/44	10/27/45	382	Grau
Diego Vicente Tejera Rescalvo	Education	10/27/45	5/6/46	191	Grau
Jesús Casagran	Education	5/6/46	5/8/46	2	Grau
José Manuel Alemán Casharo	Education	5/8/46	4/30/47	357	Grau
Carlos Arazoza Forcade	Education	4/30/47	6/17/47	48	Grau
José Manuel Alemán Casharo	Education	6/17/47	10/1/47	106	Grau
Carlos Arazoza Forcade	Education	10/1/47	3/31/48	182	Grau
Miguel A. de la Guardia Pascual	Education	3/31/48	10/10/48	193	Grau
Aureliano Sánchez Arango	Education	10/10/48	4/3/51	905	Prío
Aureliano Sánchez Arango	Education	4/3/51	9/6/51	156	Prío
Felix Lancís Sánchez	Education	9/6/51	3/8/52	184	Prío
Andrés Rivero Agüero	Education	3/11/52	11/24/52	258	Batista
Laureano López Garrido	Education	11/24/52	12/11/52	17	Batista

Andres Rivero Agüero	Education	12/11/52	10/17/53	310	Batista
Augusto Rodríguez Miranda	Education	10/17/53 Nov. 22,	11/22/53	36	Batista
Andrés Rivero Agüero	Education	1953	8/6/54	257	Batista
José López Isa	Education	8/7/54	2/24/55	201	Dom.
Aurelio Fernández Concheso+	Education	2/24/55	11/11/55	260	Batista
Zoila Mulet Proenza	Education	11/15/55	11/15/55	1	Batista
Evelio Pentón y Martínez Moles	Education	11/15/55	1/15/56	61	Batista
Zoila Mulet Proenza	Education	1/15/56	3/26/57	436	Batista
Jorge García Montes	Education	3/26/57	3/6/58	345	Batista
José M. Pérez Cabrera	Education	3/6/58	3/11/58	5	Batista
Vicente Cauce Carrazana	Education	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Armando Hart Dávalos	Education	1/5/59	7/17/59	193	Urrutia
José Manuel Cortina García	State	10/10/40	8/18/42	677	Batista
José Agustin Martínez- Viademonte	State	8/18/42	3/9/43	203	Batista
Emeterio S. Santovenia Echaide	State	3/9/43	3/7/44	364	Batista
Jorge Mañach Robato	State	3/7/44	10/10/44	217	Batista
Gustavo Cuervo Rubio	State	10/10/44	2/16/45	129	Grau
Rafael Pérez y González Muñoz	State	2/16/45	3/11/45	23	Grau
Gustavo Cuervo Rubio	State	3/11/45	10/12/45	215	Grau
Alberto Inocente Álvarez Cabrera	State	10/12/45	9/30/46	353	Grau
Rafael Pérez y González Muñoz	State	9/30/46	12/16/46	77	Grau
Alberto Inocente Álvarez Cabrera	State	12/16/46	2/1/47	47	Grau
Rafael Pérez y González Muñoz	State	2/1/47	4/30/47	88	Grau
Ángel A. Solano García	State	4/30/47	5/13/47	13	Grau
Rafael Pérez y González Muñoz	State	5/13/47	10/10/48	516	Grau
Carlos Hevia y Reyes Gavilán	State	10/10/48	2/7/50	485	Prío
Ernesto Dihigo y López Trigo	State	2/7/50	4/3/51	420	Prío
Ernesto Dihigo y López Trigo	State	4/3/51	5/7/51	34	Prío
Miguel Suárez Fernández	State	5/7/51	8/22/51	107	Prío

Raul Ruiz	State	8/22/51	8/30/51	8	Prío
Oscar Gans Martínez	State	8/30/51	10/2/51	33	Prío
Aureliano Sánchez					
Arango	State	10/2/51	3/8/52	158	Prío
Miguel Ángel Campa					
Caraveda	State	3/11/52	8/14/54	886	Batista
Andrés Domingo y					
Morales del Castillo	State	8/14/54	8/14/54	1	Batista
Miguel Ángel Campa					
Caraveda	State	8/14/54	2/24/55	194	Dom.
Carlos Saladrigas Zayas	State	2/24/55	8/30/55	187	Batista
Gonzalo Güell y					
Morales de los Rios	State	8/30/55	11/21/55	83	Grau
Carlos Saladrigas					
Zayas+	State	11/21/55	1/13/56	53	Grau
Gonzalo Güell y					
Morales de los Rios	State	1/13/56	4/15/56	123	Grau
Gonzalo Güell y					
Morales de los Rios	State	4/15/56	5/2/56	48	Batista
Gonzalo Güell y					
Morales de los Rios	State	5/2/56	3/12/58	679	Grau
Gonzalo Güell y					
Morales de los Rios	State	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Roberto Agramonte					
Pichardo	State	1/3/59	6/12/59	160	Urrutia
Raul Roa García	State	6/12/59	6/27/59	15	Urrutia
Armando Hart Dávalos	State	6/27/59	7/16/59	19	Urrutia
Raul Roa García	State	7/16/59	7/17/59	1	Urrutia
Raúl Castro Ruz	Armed Forces	2/16/59	7/17/59	151	Urrutia
Juan Rodríguez					
Pintado	Interior	10/10/40	7/17/41	280	Batista
Victor Vega Ceballos	Interior	7/17/41	6/19/42	337	Batista
Antonio Bravo Acosta	Interior	6/19/42	3/1/44	621	Batista
Máximo Rodríguez					
Alonso	Interior	3/1/44	10/10/44	223	Batista
Segundo Curti Messina	Interior	10/10/44	7/1/46	629	Grau
José Manuel Casado					
Guerrero	Interior	7/1/46	2/5/47	219	Grau
Alfredo Pequeño					
Mejias	Interior	2/5/47	4/30/47	84	Grau
Nicolás Torrado					
Hidalgo	Interior	4/30/47	5/28/47	28	Grau
Alejo Cossío del Pino	Interior	5/28/47	11/17/47	173	Grau
José Antonio Núñez					
Carballo	Interior	11/17/47	9/3/48	291	Grau

Humberto Becerra de la Campa	Interior	9/3/48	10/10/48	37	Grau
Rubén de León García	Interior	10/10/48	2/4/50	482	Prío
Tebelio Rodríguez del Haya	Interior	2/4/50	9/21/50	229	Prío
Manuel Antonio de Varona Loredo	Interior	9/21/50	10/6/50	15	Prío
Lomberto Díaz Rodríguez	Interior	10/6/50	4/3/51	179	Prío
Lomberto Díaz Rodríguez	Interior	4/3/51	10/1/51	181	Prío
Segundo Curti Messina	Interior	10/1/51	3/8/52	159	Prío
Ramón O. Hermida				108	Batista/
Antorcha	Interior	3/11/52	2/24/55	0	Dom.
Santiago C. Rey Pernas	Interior	2/24/ 55	1/2/57	678	Dom.
Ramón Jimenez Maceda	Interior	1/2/57	1/24/57	22	Batista
Santiago C. Rey Pernas	Interior	1/24/57	3/6/58	406	Batista
Ramón Jimenez Maceda	Interior	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Ramón Jimenez Maceda	Interior	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Luis Orlando Rodríguez	Interior	1/5/59	1/24/59	19	Urrutia
Augusto R. Martínez Sánchez	Interior	1/24/59	1/30/59	6	Urrutia
Luis Orlando Rodríguez	Interior	1/30/59	6/12/59	133	Urrutia
José Alberto Naranjo Morales	Interior	6/12/59	7/17/59	35	Urrutia
Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo	Treasury	10/10/40	7/17/41	280	Batista
Oscar García-Montes Hernández	Treasury	7/17/41	6/28/42	346	Batista
Luis Vidal y de la Torre	Treasury	6/28/42	7/15/42	17	Batista
Oscar García-Montes Hernández	Treasury	7/15/42	7/15/42	1	Batista
José M. Irisarri Gamio	Treasury	7/15/42	5/5/43	294	Batista
Luis Vidal y de la Torre	Treasury	5/5/43	5/10/43	5	Batista
Eduardo I. Montoulieu y de la Torre	Treasury	5/10/43	8/14/44	462	Batista
Mario Díaz Cruz	Treasury	8/14/44	10/10/44	57	Batista
Manuel Fernández Supervielle	Treasury	10/10/44	1/22/46	469	Grau
Florentino Martínez Rodríguez	Treasury	1/22/46	4/30/47	463	Grau
Jorge Ruiz Cerdá	Treasury	4/30/47	6/26/47	57	Grau
Isauro Valdés Moreno	Treasury	6/26/47	10/10/48	472	Grau

Antonio Prío Socarrás José M. Bosch Lamarque	Treasury	10/10/48	1/9/50	456	Prío
José Alvarez Díaz	Treasury	4/6/51	3/8/52	337	Prío
Marino López Blanco Gustavo Gutiérrez Sánchez	Treasury	3/11/52	7/31/53	507	Batista
Santiago Rosell Perea Gustavo Gutiérrez Sánchez	Treasury	7/31/53	11/2/54	459	Dom.
	Treasury	11/2/54	12/13/54	41	Dom.
	Treasury	12/13/54	2/24/55	73	Dom.
				110	
Justo García Rayneri Alejandro Herrera y Arango	Treasury	2/24/55	3/6/58	6	Batista
Alejandro Herrera y Arango	Treasury	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Rufo Lopez Fresquet	Treasury	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Raúl Cepero Bonilla	Treasury	1/7/59	4/15/59	98	Urrutia
Rufo López Fresquet	Treasury	4/15/59	5/7/59	22	Urrutia
Victor Vega Ceballos	Treasury	5/7/59	3/17/60	132	Urrutia
	Justice	10/10/40	2/17/41	130	Batista
				100	
Federico Laredo Bru José Agustín Martínez- Viademonte	Justice	2/17/41	11/23/43	9	Batista
Carlos E. de la Cruz y Valdés Montiel	Justice	11/23/43	10/10/44	322	Batista
José Alberni Yance	Justice	10/10/44	10/28/45	383	Grau
Jorge Casuso y Díaz- Albertini	Justice	10/28/45	4/30/47	549	Grau
José Alberni Yance	Justice	4/30/47	6/3/47	34	Grau
Evelio Álvarez del Real	Justice	6/3/47	12/5/47	185	Grau
Pedro Yodú Hernández	Justice	12/5/47	8/11/48	250	Grau
Jorge Casuso y Díaz- Albertini	Justice	8/11/48	9/19/48	39	Grau
Ramón Corona García	Justice	9/19/48	10/10/48	21	Grau
Oscar Gans Martínez	Justice	10/10/48	2/4/50	482	Prío
Oscar Gans Martínez	Justice	2/4/50	4/3/51	423	Prío
Jorge Casuso y Díaz- Albertini	Justice	4/3/51	8/29/51	148	Prío
Miguel Ángel Céspedes Casado	Justice	8/29/51	3/8/52	192	Prío
Gastón Godoy Loret de Mola	Justice	3/11/52	1/21/53	316	Batista
Rosalía Camín de Gaytán	Justice	1/21/53	7/16/54	541	Batista
Raúl López Ibáñez	Justice	7/16/54	8/7/54	22	Batista
	Justice	8/7/54	2/24/55	201	Dom.

Recio					
César E. Camacho				110	
Covaní	Justice	2/24/55	3/6/58	6	Batista
Bernardo Caramés y Camacho	Justice	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Bernardo Caramés y Camacho	Justice	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Ángel Fernández Rodríguez	Justice	1/3/59	2/17/59	45	Urrutia
Alfredo Yabur Maluf	Justice	2/17/59	7/17/59	140	Urrutia
Francisco Herrero Morató	Public Works	10/10/40	7/17/41	280	Batista
José A. Mendigutía Silvera	Public Works	7/17/41	6/19/42	337	Batista
Enrique Luis Varela Cernadas	Public Works	6/19/42	8/18/42	60	Batista
Evelio Govantes Fuentes	Public Works	8/18/42	3/6/43	200	Batista
Jerónimo Acosta Recio	Public Works	3/6/43	3/17/43	11	Batista
José F. Tejidor Rodríguez	Public Works	3/23/43	3/27/44	370	Batista
Alfredo Nogueira Herrera	Public Works	3/27/44	10/10/44	197	Batista
Gustavo Moreno Lastres	Public Works	10/10/44	4/18/45	190	Grau
Jose Ramón San Martín Odría	Public Works	4/18/45	4/30/47	742	Grau
Pedro Suárez Hernández	Public Works	4/30/47	5/5/47	5	Grau
José Ramón San Martín Odría	Public Works	5/5/47	10/10/48	524	Grau
Manuel Febles Valdés	Public Works	10/10/48	4/3/51	905	Prío
Luis Felipe Casero Guillén	Public Works	4/3/51	3/8/52	340	Prío
José A. Mendigutia Silvera	Public Works	3/11/52	8/16/52	158	Batista
Enrique Luis Varela Cernadas	Public Works	8/16/52	11/2/52	78	Batista
Alfredo Nogueira Herrera	Public Works	11/2/52	2/17/54	472	Batista
José Pardo Jimenez	Public Works	2/17/54	8/10/54	174	Batista
Antonio R. Carvajal Rojas	Public Works	8/10/54	2/24/55	198	Dom.
Nicolás Arroyo Márquez	Public Works	2/24/55	3/6/58	110	6
Ramiro Oñate y Gómez	Public Works	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Ramiro Oñate y Gómez	Public Works	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Manuel Ray Rivero	Public Works	1/5/59	11/1/59	193	Urrutia

Faustino Pérez Hernández	Recuperation of Embezzled Funds	1/3/59	11/1/59	195	Urrutia
Demetrio E. Despaigne y Grave de Peralta	Health/Social Asst.	10/10/40	7/18/41	281	Batista
Sergio García Marruz	Health/Social Asst.	7/18/41	2/2/42	199	Batista
Domingo F. Ramos Delgado	Health/Social Asst.	2/2/42	6/22/42	140	Batista
Gustavo Adolfo Bock y Jorge	Health/Social Asst.	6/22/42	8/18/42	57	Batista
Juan Miguel Portuondo Domenech	Health/Social Asst.	8/18/42	3/8/44	568	Batista
Alberto Recio Forns	Health/Social Asst.	3/8/44	10/10/44	216	Batista
José Antonio Presno Bastiony	Health/Social Asst.	10/10/44	4/17/45	189	Grau
Octavio Rivero Partagás	Health/Social Asst.	4/17/45	11/19/45	216	Grau
José R. Andreu Martínez	Health/Social Asst.	11/19/45	5/2/47	529	Grau
Ramiro de la Riva Domínguez	Health/Social Asst.	5/2/47	6/3/47	32	Grau
José R. Andreu Martínez	Health/Social Asst.	6/3/47	12/5/47	185	Grau
Ramiro (Armando?) de la Riva Domínguez	Health/Social Asst.	12/5/47	10/10/48	310	Grau
Alberto Oteiza Setién	Health/Social Asst.	10/10/48	6/24/49	257	Prío
Carlos M. Ramírez Corria	Health/Social Asst.	6/24/49	9/28/50	461	Prío
Juan A. Rubio Padilla	Health/Social Asst.	9/28/50	4/10/51	194	Prío
José R. Andreu Martínez	Health/Social Asst.	4/10/51	3/8/52	333	Prío
Enrique Saladrigas Zayas	Health/Social Asst.	3/11/52	7/31/53	507	Batista
José Elias Olivella	Health/Social Asst.	7/31/53	8/7/54	372	Batista
Carlos Salas Humara	Health/Social Asst.	8/7/54	2/24/55	201	Dom.
Armando J. Coro	Health/Social Asst.	2/24/55	7/19/55	145	Batista
Alberto Recio Forns+	Health/Social Asst.	7/19/55	1/27/56	192	Batista
Carlos Salas Humara	Health/Social Asst.	1/27/56	3/6/58	769	Batista
Octavio Montoro y Saladrigas	Health/Social Asst.	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Manuel Ampudia González	Health/Social Asst.	3/12/58	10/25/58	227	Batista
Felix Fernández Toriza	Health/Social Asst.	10/25/58	1/1/59	68	Batista
Julio Martínez Paez	Health/Social Asst.	1/3/59	6/12/59	160	Urrutia
Serafín Ruiz de Zarate	Health/Social Asst.	6/12/59	7/17/59	35	Urrutia
Juan A. Vinent Griñán	Labor	10/10/40	7/17/41	280	Batista
Carlos Márquez-	Labor	7/17/41	10/17/41	92	Batista

Sterling Guiral

Oscar Gans Martínez	Labor	10/17/41	6/19/42	245	Batista
José Suárez Rivas	Labor	6/19/42	3/3/44	633	Batista
Alberto García Valdés	Labor	3/3/44	10/10/44	221	Batista
Carlos Azcárate Rosell+	Labor	10/10/44	8/28/46	687	Grau
Carlos Prío Socarrás	Labor	8/28/46	2/10/47	166	Grau
Francisco Benítez Rodríguez	Labor	2/10/47	4/30/47	79	Grau
Tomás de Vega Zamora	Labor	4/30/47	5/13/47	13	Grau
Carlos Prío Socarrás	Labor	5/13/47	12/5/47	206	Grau
Francisco Aguirre Vidaurreta	Labor	12/5/47	10/10/48	310	Grau
Edgardo Buttari Puig	Labor	10/10/48	2/6/50	484	Prío
José Morell Romero	Labor	2/6/50	8/1/50	176	Prío
Manuel Antonio de Varona Loredó	Labor	8/24/50	8/30/50	6	Prío
José Morell Romero	Labor	8/30/50	10/27/50	58	Prío
Arturo Hernández Tellaheche	Labor	10/27/50	4/3/51	158	Prío
Arturo Hernández Tellaheche	Labor	4/3/51	10/1/51	181	Prío
Edgardo Buttari Puig	Labor	10/1/51	3/8/52	159	Prío
Jesús Portocarrero Montero	Labor	3/11/52	11/2/52	236	Batista
Carlos Saladrigas Zayas	Labor	11/2/52	8/7/54	643	Batista
Ricardo Eguilor Vinent	Labor	8/7/54	8/14/54	7	Batista
Emilio Núñez Portuondo	Labor	8/14/54	2/24/55	194	Dom.
				110	
José Suárez Rivas	Labor	2/24/55	3/6/58	6	Batista
Alberto García Valdés	Labor	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
José Suarez Rivas	Labor	3/12/58	9/17/58	189	Batista
Leopoldo Pio Elizalde	Labor	9/17/58	1/1/59	106	Batista
Manuel Fernández García	Labor	1/5/59	7/17/59	193	Urrutia
Marino López Blanco	Transportation	4/27/54	8/7/54	102	Batista
				110	
Mario Cobas Reyes	Transportation	2/24/55	3/6/58	6	Batista
Luis F. Ramos Ravella	Transportation	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Luis F. Ramos Ravella	Transportation	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Aurelio Fernández Concheso	Presidency	10/10/40	1/2/41	84	Batista
Amadeo López Castro	Presidency	1/2/41	6/21/41	170	Batista
Marino López Blanco	Presidency	6/21/41	11/7/41	139	Batista

Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo	Presidency	11/7/41	3/5/44	849	Batista
Cristobal Muñoz y Valdés Gómez	Presidency	3/5/44	10/10/44	219	Batista
Julián F. de Solorzano Renau	Presidency	10/10/44	5/7/47	939	Grau
Cristobal Muñoz y Valdés Gómez	Presidency	5/7/47	10/10/48	522	Grau
Orlando Puente Pérez	Presidency	10/10/48	4/3/51	905	Prío
Orlando Puente Pérez	Presidency	4/3/51	3/8/52	340	Prío
Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo	Presidency	3/11/52	8/10/54	882	Batista
Cristobal Muñoz y Valdés Gómez	Presidency	8/10/54	2/24/55	198	Dom.
Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo	Presidency	2/24/55	3/6/58	110 6	Batista
Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo	Presidency	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo	Presidency	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Luis María Buch Rodríguez	Presidency	1/3/59	7/17/59	195	Urrutia
Daniel Compte Molina	Without Portfolio	10/10/40	6/19/42	617	Batista
Ramón Vasconcelos Maragliano	Without Portfolio	10/10/40	6/19/42	617	Batista
Marino López Blanco	Without Portfolio	10/10/40	7/17/41	280	Batista
Alfredo Jacomino López	Without Portfolio	10/10/40	7/17/41	280	Batista
Andrés Domingo y Morales del Castillo	Without Portfolio	7/17/41	3/1/44	958	Batista
Santiago Verdeja Neyra	Without Portfolio	7/17/41	6/19/42	337	Batista
José Agustín Martínez-Viademonte	Without Portfolio	6/19/42	8/18/42	60	Batista
María Gómez Carbonell	Without Portfolio	6/19/42	3/17/43	271	Batista
Gustavo Gutiérrez Sánchez	Without Portfolio	6/19/42	3/6/43	260	Batista
Rafael Santos Jiménez Fernández	Without Portfolio	8/18/42	3/6/43	200	Batista
Juan Marinello Vidaurreta	Without Portfolio	3/6/43	3/1/44	361	Batista
Elio Fileno de Cárdenas y Acosta	Without Portfolio	3/17/43	3/1/44	350	Batista
Carlos Rafael Rodríguez	Without Portfolio	3/1/44	10/10/44	223	Batista
Orosman Viamontes Romero	Without Portfolio	3/1/44	10/10/44	223	Batista
Mario Díaz Cruz	Without Portfolio	11/24/43	8/11/44	261	Batista

Eduardo I. Montoulieu y de la Torre	Without Portfolio	8/11/44	10/10/44	60	Batista
Joaquín Martínez Saenz	Without Portfolio	1/21/46	10/31/46	283	Grau
José M. Alemán Casharo	Without Portfolio	10/1/47	10/10/48	375 157	Grau
Sergio I. Clark Díaz Mariblanca Sabas Alomá	Without Portfolio	11/20/47	3/8/52	0	Grau
Mariblanca Sabas Alomá	Without Portfolio	10/10/48	4/3/51	905	Prío
Mariblanca Sabas Alomá	Without Portfolio	4/3/51	3/8/52	340	Prío
Ramón Vasconcelos Maragliano	Without Portfolio	10/10/48	8/29/50	688	Prío
Primitivo Rodríguez	Without Portfolio	10/10/48	2/4/50	482	Prío
Miguel A. de León y Fuentes+	Without Portfolio	5/27/49	5/19/50	357	Prío
Ángel Manuel Ferro Martínez	Without Portfolio	6/20/50	4/3/51	287	Prío
Ángel Manuel Ferro Martínez	Without Portfolio	4/3/51	3/8/52	340	Prío
Sergio M. Mejias Pérez	Without Portfolio	2/4/50	10/6/50	244	Prío
Orlando Puente Pérez	Without Portfolio	10/10/48	4/3/51	905	Prío
Juan A. Rubio Padilla	Without Portfolio	4/3/51	3/8/52	340	Prío
Antero Rivero Morales	Without Portfolio	10/1/51	4/3/51	181	Prío
Antero Rivero Morales	Without Portfolio	4/3/51	3/8/52	340	Prío
José Manuel Casado Guerrero	Without Portfolio	10/1/51	3/8/52	159	Prío
Carlos Hevia y Reyes Gavilán	Without Portfolio	4/5/51	2/6/52	307	Prío
Alberto Armando Alejandro Fernández	Without Portfolio	2/6/52	3/8/52	31	Prío
Ernesto de la Fe Santiago Álvarez	Without Portfolio	3/11/52	9/13/54	916	Batista
Rodríguez Leonardo Anaya	Without Portfolio	3/11/52	8/13/54	885	Batista
Murillo	Without Portfolio	3/11/52	8/13/54	885	Batista
María Gómez Carbonell	Without Portfolio	3/11/52	8/13/54	885	Batista
Amadeo López Castro	Without Portfolio	3/11/52	8/13/54	885	Batista
Justo Luis Pozo del Puerto	Without Portfolio	3/11/52	8/13/54	885	Batista
Justo Salas Arzuaga	Without Portfolio	3/11/52	8/13/54	885	Batista
Gastón Godoy Loret de Mola	Without Portfolio	11/3/52	1/21/53	79	Batista
Justo García Rayneri	Without Portfolio	1/21/53	2/24/55	764	Batista
Miguel Suárez	Without Portfolio	3/11/52	11/19/52	192	Batista

Fernández						
Miguel Suárez						
Fernández	Without Portfolio	11/19/52	2/17/53	90		Batista
Raúl Lorenzo Ruiz	Without Portfolio	11/19/52	2/17/53	90		Batista
Rafael Díaz Balart	Without Portfolio	7/31/53	4/27/54	270		Batista
César J. Camacho						
Covaní	Without Portfolio	7/31/53	8/14/54	379		Batista
Enrique Luis Varela						
Cernadas	Without Portfolio	3/11/52	8/14/54	886		Batista
Mario Díaz Cruz	Without Portfolio	8/22/53	8/14/54	357		Batista
Mario Leyva	Without Portfolio	8/7/54	2/24/55	201		Dom.
Arsenio González	Without Portfolio	8/7/54	2/24/55	201		Dom.
Eugenio Cosculluela	Without Portfolio	8/14/54	2/24/55	194		Dom.
José Pardo Jiménez	Without Portfolio	2/17/53	8/14/54	543		Batista
Carlos Fernández						
Campos	Without Portfolio	2/17/53	7/31/53	164		Batista
Luis Loret de Mola	Without Portfolio	8/14/54	2/24/55	194		Dom.
Fidel Barreto Martínez	Without Portfolio	8/14/54	2/24/55	194		Dom.
Evangelina de la Llera	Without Portfolio	8/14/54	2/24/55	194		Dom.
				115		
Justo García Rayneri	Without Portfolio	1/4/55	3/6/58	7		Batista
				110		
Jorge Barroso y Piñar	Without Portfolio	2/24/55	3/6/58	6		Batista
				110		
José Pérez González	Without Portfolio	2/24/55	3/6/58	6		Batista
Julia Elisa Consuegra				110		
Rodríguez	Without Portfolio	2/24/55	3/6/58	6		Batista
Gustavo Gutiérrez				110		
Sánchez	Without Portfolio	2/24/55	3/6/58	6		Batista
				110		
Amadeo López Castro	Without Portfolio	2/24/55	3/6/58	6		Batista
				110		
José Pardo Jiménez	Without Portfolio	2/24/55	3/6/58	6		Batista
Pastor Torres Sánchez	Without Portfolio	7/18/55	3/6/58	962		Batista
Eduardo Borrell y						
Navarro	Without Portfolio	3/6/58	3/12/58	6		Batista
Eduardo Borrell y						
Navarro	Without Portfolio	3/12/58	1/1/59	295		Batista
Dionisio Suárez de la						
Portilla	Without Portfolio	3/6/58	3/12/58	6		Batista
Dionisio Suárez de la						
Portilla+	Without Portfolio	3/12/58	8/24/58	165		Batista
Armando Pérez Cobo	Without Portfolio	9/2/58	1/1/59	121		Urrutia
Gustavo Gutiérrez						
Sánchez	Without Portfolio	3/6/58	3/12/58	6		Batista
Gustavo Gutiérrez	Without Portfolio	3/12/58	1/1/59	295		Batista

Sánchez

Francisco de Pando Armand	Without Portfolio	3/6/58	1/1/59	301	Batista
Gustavo Nordelo López	Without Portfolio	3/6/58	1/1/59	301	Batista
Generoso Campos Marquetti	Without Portfolio	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Generoso Campos Marquetti	Without Portfolio	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Raúl Valdivia y Pérez	Without Portfolio	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
Raúl Valdivia y Pérez	Without Portfolio	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
María Gómez Carbonell	Without Portfolio	3/6/58	3/12/58	6	Batista
María Gómez Carbonell	Without Portfolio	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Octavio Montoro y Saladrigas	Without Portfolio	3/12/58	1/1/59	295	Batista
Regino Boti León	Economy	1/20/59	4/15/59	85	Urrutia
Oswaldo Dorticós					
Torrado	Economy	4/15/59	5/26/59	41	Urrutia
Regino Boti León	Economy	5/26/59	7/17/59	52	Urrutia
Julio Camacho Aguilera	Transportation	1/7/59	7/17/59	191	Urrutia
Oswaldo Dorticós	Proposal and Enactment				
Torrado	of Revolutionary Laws	1/9/59	7/17/59	189	Urrutia

CURRICULUM VITA

DANIEL I. PEDREIRA

EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, FELLOWSHIPS, AND AWARDS

- Spring 2022 PhD, Political Science
Florida International University
Miami, Florida, U.S.A.
Major Field: Comparative Politics
Minor Field: International Relations
Graduate Certificate: Latin American and Caribbean
Studies
- Summer-Fall 2021 Dissertation Year Fellow in Political Science
Florida International University
- 2020-2021 Graduate Instructor
Florida International University
Introduction to American Politics
Award for Best Graduate Instructor in Political Science
- 2016-2020, 2022 Teaching Assistant
Florida International University
Award for Best Teaching Assistant in Political Science
- Fall 2014 M.S. Peace Operations
George Mason University
Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A.
- 2007-2013 Congressional Aide
Office of Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-18/27)
Miami, Florida, U.S.A.
- Fall 2006 B.A., International Studies
University of Miami
Coral Gables, Florida, U.S.A.
Minor Field: Political Science

PUBLICATIONS

Pedreira, D.I. (2019). PEN Club of Cuban Writers in Exile: Foundation, Struggle and Present. Miami: PEN Club of Cuban Writers in Exile.

Pedreira, D.I. (2019). An Instrument of Peace: The Full-Circled Life of Ambassador Guillermo Belt Ramírez. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Pedreira, D.I. (2014). *Cuba's Prospects for a Military Oligarchy*. Cuban Affairs Journal, 9, (1):243-247.

Pedreira, D.I. (2013). El último constituyente: El desarrollo político de Emilio "Millo" Ochoa. Valencia: Aduana Vieja.

PRESENTATIONS

Pedreira, D.I. (March 2022). *Presidents and Choteo: Artistic Perceptions of Executive Politics in Cuba (1940-1959)*. Paper presented at the annual Conference of the Florida Political Science Association at Bethune-Cookman University.

Pedreira, D.I., (April, 2021). *Mixing Academics & Practical Politics*. Roundtable discussion at the annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association via Zoom.

Pedreira, D.I. (April, 2021). *How to Be Heard by Policymakers*. Roundtable discussion at the annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association via Zoom.

Pedreira, D.I. (March, 2020). *Cuba, the U.S., and the UN: Dilemmas Among Neighbors*. Paper presented at the annual Conference of the Southeastern Council of Latin American Studies, Austin, Texas.

Pedreira, D.I. (May, 2019). *Bipolar Governance: Causes and Outcomes of Dictatorial Executive Branch Splits*. Paper presented at the annual Conference of the Latin American Studies Association, Boston, Massachusetts.

Pedreira, D.I. (February, 2019). *Of Auténticos and Ortodoxos: Party Institutionalization and Leadership in Cuba (1940-1952)*. Paper presented at the annual Conference of the Florida Political Science Association at the University of Tampa, Tampa, Florida.

Pedreira, D.I. (April 2018). *Sent from Above: The Rise and Fall of Cuba's Electoral College*. Paper presented at the annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, IL.

Pedreira, D.I. (March 2018). *Youth and Revolution: The Paradox of Political Demography in Cuba*. Paper presented at the annual Conference of the Florida Political Science Association at Florida Gulf Coast University.

Pedreira, D.I. (March 2017). *Spain's "Stolen Children": Human Rights, Culture, and the Search for Truth and Justice*. Paper presented at the annual Conference of the Association for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies at New York University.