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UNDERSTANDING BURDENS: ON THE CONSTRUCTION, REDUCTION, AND  
CONSEQUENCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN

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This dissertation, written by Donavon Antoney Johnson and entitled Understanding Burdens: On the Construction, Reduction, and Consequences of Administrative Burden, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

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## DEDICATION

To my dad- may I inherit half your strength

To my mom- may your wisdom be ever with me

To Abigayle- may my life lived be a worthy example for yours

To Euranique- may your love abide with me eternally

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION  
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by

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This dissertation sets out to specifically examine how administrative burden is constructed, how administrative burden is reduced, and the consequences of administrative burden. This exploration is of consequence to the discipline insofar as it provides empirical evidence of the crucial role that public administration has to play in advancing democracy and democratic institutions (Ziblatt and Levitsky, 2018). Administrative burdens have social equity implications (Herd and Moynihan, 2018). By fettering access to social services or government programs, burdens have the ability to impede democratic activities thereby fettering democratic outcomes. This makes it important to study burdens in this context especially given that public administration is expected to produce these democratic values and outcomes that burdens often fetter. Burden is a venue where politics has considerable influence (Herd and Moynihan, 2018) and so the scholarship should be improved to remain abreast with these consequential effects that politics may have on the practice of public administration but also on the lives of those being served by public administrators.

I extend these arguments and claim that the effect that politics have on burden is strong enough to affect the burden-reducing effect of even politically neutral tools such as e-government. More specifically, I argue that burdens on welfare are more likely to thrive under fiscally conservative political ideologies. I go further to argue that representative bureaucracy and identity politics shape perceptions of burden. More specifically, persons will be more likely to tolerate burdens when they are being served by bureaucrats who look like them (racially), or when programs are designed to benefit persons who look like them (racially). Finally, I advance a claim that despite the nuanced ways in which burdens unfold in the business context, excessive burdens will deplete entrepreneurial activity, thereby shafting entrepreneurial culture within economies. I also argue that motivated entrepreneurs are able to stave off the debilitating effects of burdens.

This dissertation uses three empirical essays to answer the aforementioned research questions. A mixture of micro level and macro level data were used to answer these questions. The dissertation draws upon two panel-data studies and an experimental study, supported by the application of regression analysis. The results confirm the previously held hypothesis that administrative burden is a political venue and that burden-reducing tools such as e-government are also affected by politics. While no evidence was found to support my claims on representative bureaucracy and identity politics, I find that whites are more likely to tolerate burdens in cases where black recipients are being served by white bureaucrats. This signals the presence of white paternalism operating in the context of administrative burden, but there is need for deeper exploration. Burdens do have consequences for businesses as the findings show that burdens reduce entrepreneurial activity, which further depletes entrepreneurial culture.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Purpose of the Study

If the purpose of democratic institution is to enhance the lives of people, what explains the existence of administrative burdens in democratic societies? Herd & Moynihan (2018) contend that administrative burdens regulate the social contract that citizens have with their governments. Burdens are designed and deployed in a way that reflects the great political question of Laswell (1958)—who gets what, when, and how. Broadly defined, administrative burdens are the costs of interacting with the state and its agencies (Moynihan, Herd & Harvey, 2015; Herd & Moynihan, 2018; Burden et al. 2012). As Heinrich (2016) puts it, administrative burdens refer to onerous experiences of policy implementation. Thus, administrative burdens can be thought as the culmination of various costs: learning costs, compliance costs, psychological costs of doing business with the state or its agencies (Herd and Moynihan, 2018).

Moynihan, Herd, & Harvey (2015) present a three-prong framework for administrative burden. Within this framework, learning costs are levied when one has to engage in a process of finding relevant information about government programs or services that they might be eligible for—they must learn the nature of benefits, as well as how to access these benefits. Given that this information is often not readily available, some individuals will have to expend more resources to develop such knowledge. Compliance costs, on the other hand, refer to the extensive rules and regulations that one must undergo in order to access government goods or services. Citizens face lengthy and time-consuming applications, requiring supplemental documentation, with specific requirements for quality of documents, as well as excessive standards and compliances to

be met. Finally, psychological costs relate to the stigma associated with certain government services, especially when a regulation/practice by the state causes embarrassment for users. Some examples include standing in long lines outside the welfare office or using physical food stamps at the cashier in sight of others. As Moynihan et al. (2015) note, psychological burdens are associated with a sense of a loss of autonomy or excessive stress when interacting with the state.

It is important when conceptualizing administrative burdens to not confuse it with red tape—a similar but fundamentally different concept. While red tape and burdens are both underpinned by onerous rules, regulations and procedures, red tape is levied on the organization by its own internal actions, while burdens are levied by the organization on outsiders. Organizational red tape refers to the tedious rules and procedures that staggers organizational efficiency and reduce organizational performance (Bozeman & Feeney, 2014; Rosenfeld, 1984; Yang & Pandey, 2009). Red tapes are processes and procedures levied within an organization, often by the leadership or the management of that organization. Red tape directly affect only those within the organization and the internal operation of the organization (DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005). On the other hand, administrative burdens refer to the arduous rules and regulations and processes that are levied by the organization on those external to the organization. Despite these differences, red tape and burdens are connected since red tape can be the progenitor of burdens (Hattke, Hensel, & Kalucza, 2019).

While we know that burdens fetter access to government services and are venues for politics, this dissertation sets out to explore the effects of administrative burden in the context of welfare. The dissertation therefore makes empirical arguments about the

consequences of burdens for underserved populations specifically in politically laden environments. By examining e-government, representative bureaucracy, identity politics and entrepreneurial motivation as possible tools to heal the defects of burdens, this dissertation responds to a gap in the literature by providing possible burden-reducing strategies. The research agenda set forth in this dissertation is also needed in order to enrich and refine our understandings of the true implications of burdens particularly in the contexts of signing up for and maintaining welfare, the burden-reducing effect of e-government, the intersection of burden and politics, perceptions of burden on administrative action, its intersection with representation and race, and inhibiting or promoting business development. The three-essay approach of this dissertation also presents an opportunity to intersect a wide cross section of literatures and concepts in studying burdens; an approach that is needed to provide a comprehensive understanding of how burdens are constructed and their far-reaching implications.

### **1.1.1 Research Question**

This dissertation sets out to broadly answer three questions. Firstly, how are administrative burdens constructed? The current nuanced understandings of burdens underscore the need for empirical research to unpack this question. In some cases, burdens are seen as good and in other cases, bad. We know that burdens are the products of deliberate actions and ideological preferences that are often exercised through legal constructs. For example, politics is a factor that shape our understanding of how burdens

are constructed. This question is therefore critical in deepening our understanding in this regard.

Secondly, what are the consequences of administrative burden? We know that burden fetter access to government services but how further does the impact of administrative burden go? This dissertation seeks to understand how the way welfare programs are organized impacts citizens access to these programs. Further the dissertation sets out to uncover the consequences that administrative burden presents for entrepreneurial culture and entrepreneurial activity. Studying the consequences of burdens provides more precise outlook on the effects of burden. This puts public administrators in a more advantageous position of not only framing future research agendas on burdens, but also enable practitioners to be more perceptive of their role in the burdens process especially for some groups.

Thirdly, how can administrative burden be tolerated/reduced? Since burdens produce onerous circumstances that fetter the access of underserved populations and minority groups, public administrators should concern themselves with the strategies that can unburden citizens or reduce the stress citizens faces a result of countenancing burdens. This dissertation examines the extent to which e-government is, representative bureaucracy, identity politics, and entrepreneurial motivation are forces that can help to reduce or tolerate burden.

### **1.1.2 Importance and contribution of the topic**

The discipline of public administration is at a crucial juncture in history. When President Roosevelt enmeshed public administration as the cornerstone of the New Deal,

a clear signal was sent that public administration has a crucial role to play in advancing democracy (Ziblatt and Levitsky, 2018) . Still, many years after the New Deal, public administrators are at the vanguard of the battle for the preservation of democratic values. When scholars of public administration converged on Minnowbrook, values such as social equity and public administration playing a compensatory role in balancing the democratic architecture featured prominently (Gooden and Protillo, 2011). This dissertation touches upon these things thereby underscoring its importance.

Information requirements are the bedrock of citizens' interaction with their governments (Beldad et al., 2012). Interaction with government is often always an exercise which includes providing government agencies with some form of information in exchange for goods, services, or other information. These information requirements are the venues for burdens. Administrative burdens possess the ability to diminish democracy by disrupting social equity and fostering inequity by fettering the lives of some vulnerable groups of people. This dissertation will also show that administrative burdens have consequences for race as well as for the economy through its impact on businesses and entrepreneurs.

This dissertation provides insights to lengthen and deepen the discussion on how we understand burdens, their consequences and how we can mitigate their negative effects. Administrative burdens are levied from the desk of public administrators; paradoxically, the same persons who are charged with serving the public. While not all burdens are bad, the preponderance of the literature on burden underscore its deleterious effect. The relevance of this dissertation is therefore found in its focus on enriching our understanding of this important aspect of public administration.

Bringing about answers to these research questions will contribute to theory by examining the intersection of burdens and other streams of research that have been currently disconnected in the literature. This dissertation intersects the burden literature with that on fiscal conservatism, e-government, representative bureaucracy, identity politics, entrepreneurial activity, and entrepreneurial culture. As a contribution to the practice of public management and administration, this dissertation examines policy design and policy feedback as places where burdens are constructed and thus, as places where burdens can be neutralized. In paper 1 the dissertation examines how welfare programs are organized at the operational level produce burdensome conditions for some groups. In paper 3 the dissertation examines how the burdens that are placed on businesses have a ripple effect that feedback onto entrepreneurial culture and depletes it. The findings also outline burden-reducing solutions such as e-government and entrepreneurial motivation that both bureaucrats and citizens can employ to improve access to government services. When entrepreneurs are highly motivated, they are able to withstand the deleterious effects of burden. More advanced electronic applications platforms are likely to provide ease in government program application processes and ultimately increase program take-up

## **1.2 State of the Literature and Gaps**

The extant literature identifies administrative burdens as the nuts and bolts of policy design (Herd and Moynihan, 2018) as they influence the pace at which government services reach citizens or if people get government services at all. Administrative burdens in the form of learning costs have been found to fetter citizens'

access to the election polls (Ingram, 2018; Keyssar, 2009). Administrative burdens have also been active in compromising applicants' access to citizenship by naturalization (Gonzalez-Barrera, Lopez, Passel, & Taylor, 2013). Hoxby & Avery (2013) further lament that students' education has been sacrificed on the altar of burdens. Students have missed out on financial aid because of high learning cost that accompanies access to financial aid. Administrative Burdens have also been intimated to have negative influence on law enforcement. From data gathered on the Los Angeles Police Department, Linos & Riesch (2019) find that high compliance costs have deterred prospective police officers from applying or from completing their applications to the police force. What we do not know, is how exactly are these burdens constructed and what are the conditions under which burdens thrive or are engendered. Put differently, while know some of the possible effects of these burdens, we are unclear about what affects these burdens and the forces that shape them.

Keiser & Miller (2019) provide a different perspective of burdens that is antithetical to the general view that burdens make citizens displeased with their government. The study finds that "by providing information about high levels of administrative burden in the application process, people will focus on the vetting that takes place, which should, in turn, make them more likely to see the program as legitimate and its recipients as deserving" (pp. 139). Keiser & Miller (2019), however, indicate that these findings are conditional on party identification which briefly underscores the effect of politics on burdens. We know that administrative burdens are venues where politics play out, especially in the welfare domain (Moynihan, Herd & Harvey, 2014). Elected officials use burdens to reduce citizens' access to programs that

they believe are oversubscribed, programs they believe are being abused, or programs that are antithetical to their political agenda or general political ideology (Herd & Moynihan, 2019). What we are unclear about are the specific ways in which politics may induce or reduce burdens as well as the sector-specific effects of politics on burdens. We are also still very early in our understanding of how far the effect of politics go. The literature could also benefit from unpacking the ways in which burden is a factor of how programs are organized at the operational level. Above all, the extant literature is inundated with evidence that administrative burdens fetter citizens' access to government services (Brodkin & Majmundar, 2010; Burden, Canon, Mayer, & Moynihan, 2012; Heinrich, 2016; Moynihan et al., 2015).

Filling these gaps and answering these questions, specifically strategies to reducing burdens, will inform citizens on how to wade through burdens and improve their access to government services. Public Administration scholars have been criticized for 'publishing for each other' instead of publishing for the public or practitioners who interface with the public (Orr & Bennett, 2012). Filling these gaps provides an opportunity to broach greater public interest in the scholarship simply because most citizens can relate to burdens and have a story to tell about their experience with burdens. In this sense, the findings of this dissertation are relevant to the citizens' experience of their social contract with the state.

### **1.3 Approach of the Dissertation**

This dissertation sets out to expand the literature by filling some of the identified above gaps by developing three separate but interconnected papers. All three center on

answering the research questions centered on the construction, consequences and reduction of administrative burdens. While the papers are connected by a common theme, each paper uses a different method, a different sample, and draws upon different theories. This three-essay approach paves the way for distant theories and different levels of data to be coalesced into one larger approach to answer the questions and fill research gaps. For example, the first paper examines the intersection of fiscal conservatism and administrative burdens, the second paper examines the intersection between representative bureaucracy and identity politics, while the third paper takes an even broader scope to examine burdens and entrepreneurship/business.

Each paper however uses a different unit of analysis. While the first paper takes a meso perspective by using the U.S. states as the unit of analysis, the second paper takes a micro view by using people as the unit of analysis in an experimental setting. The third takes a macro perspective and use countries as the unit of analysis. Public administration scholarship has been chided for neglecting the big questions in the field due to the predominant focus on micro-level analysis (Moynihan, 2018). Scholars currently disagree on which level of analysis is most ideal for the field of public administration (Jilke et al., 2019) especially given the divide in the field of public administration regarding levels of analysis (Raadschelders 2011). Notwithstanding this debate, this dissertation cuts across this divide by coalescing all three levels into a single thrust to empirically unpack administrative burdens. Furthermore, we recognize that a benefit is to be found in applying symbiotic accountability that exists between different levels of analysis (Moynihan, 2018).

Each paper uses a different methodological approach to answer the research question. The first and third paper featured the use of Fixed Effects regression models to analyze the change in the respective units of analysis overtime. The second paper however uses an experiment to test the respective effects. While the first and third papers used secondary data, each paper drew data from a variety of sources which dealt with issues of common source bias. While primary data was used in the second paper, the data used in the first paper are drawn from the Census Bureau, National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), The Kaiser Family Foundation, and United States Department of Agriculture. The data for the third paper were drawn from Global Entrepreneurship Development Institute (GEDI), Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), the World Bank's Doing Business Index (DBI), and the Human Development Report (HDR). The use of multiple sources of data and multiple methodical approaches enables this dissertation to benefit from data and method triangulation; thereby further increasing the reliability of the findings of each paper and the dissertation as a whole.

Figure 1 lists four broad thematic areas related to administrative burdens that this dissertation seeks to address: reducing burdens, policy design/feedback, burdens and social equity issues, and tolerating burdens. The dissertation is therefore chaptered by three articles; each positioned to answer one or more of the research questions mentioned earlier and in respect of one or more of the four thematic areas.

	<b>PAPER 1</b>	<b>PAPER 2</b>	<b>PAPER 3</b>
<b>Reducing Burdens</b>	e-government	Representative Bureaucracy	
		Identity Politics	
<b>Policy Design/Feedback</b>	Fiscal Conservatism		Feedback from Business-Burdens
<b>Burden and Social Equity</b>	Welfare and underserved Populations	Representative Bureaucracy (Race)	Entrepreneurial Culture
<b>Tolerating Burden</b>		Representative Bureaucracy	Entrepreneurial Motivation
		Identity Politics	

*Figure 1: Matrix of thematic Areas Covered in the Dissertation*

### 1.4 Explanation of the Three Essays

The first essay is titled “The effect of electronic program applications amidst the politics of administration burden.” Previous research has shown that administrative burden is used politically to constrain access to welfare programs. This paper examines the role of e-government within the politics of program implementation. The study hypothesizes that eServices related to program applications will ease burdens on applicants and, therefore, increase program take-up. Although eServices are known as neutral, operational tools, I argue that their use bears politicization potential. Thus, eServices are expected to be less effective in fostering program take-up under conservative as opposed to liberal leadership. The analyses draw on panel data from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid across 50 American states between 2016 and 2018. The paper also broaches the issue of the ideological effects that may creep into areas that offer some degree of discretion. While state involvement in SNAP is limited and general ideological effects are largely absent, it is

expected that they will be found in the organization of SNAP's application process, where discretion is possible. The study also touches upon how underserved populations can use e-government to reduce the burdens and catalyze their access to government services. In this sense, the findings challenge a longstanding ethos that members of the underserved populations were unable to use digital technologies due to the negative effects of the digital divide on them.

The second essay, titled "What makes us tolerant of administrative burden? race, representation, and identity," examines the role that representative bureaucracy and identity politics play in moderating the effect that administrative burdens have on organizational outcomes that have been proven to be positively associated with organizational success. While prior research has examined the effect of administrative burdens on program access (Herd & Moynihan, 2019), we know little about how burdens are affected by other conditions, such as a representative bureaucracy, that have been shown to improve government efficiency, effectiveness, and overall responsiveness.

While administrative burdens may cause citizens to harbor negative perceptions of their government, representation and identity politics may abate this negative effect by causing people to reconsider their tolerance for burdensome situations. This study is therefore poised to examine how administrative burdens, identity politics, and representative bureaucracy interact within the ambits of public administration. Is our negative perception of burdens lowered if they are enforced by people who look like us? Is our negative perception of burdens lowered if they are ensuring that those who look like us are the beneficiaries? To answer these questions, the study will use a between-

subjects factorial experiment with 400 participants recruited through Prolific, an online survey platform.

The third essay takes a more macro perspective by examining the administrative burdens in the business context. Titled “Burdens are Everybody’s Business: Examining the effects of Administrative Burdens on Businesses,” the final paper examines the impact that administrative burdens have on reducing business activity and entrepreneurial culture in global economies, and further, the implications that these reductions have for socioeconomic development. Administrative burdens have been at the doorstep of businesses for decades, restricting access to many.

Drawing on panel data from 40 countries between 2016 and 2018, this study employs the World Bank Doing Business Index (DBI), the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and the Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEI/GEDI) to examine the socioeconomic implications of the burdens-business interaction, and further, the role of entrepreneurial motivation as a burden reducing tool. It is expected that administrative burdens threaten the prosperity of economies, thereby suppressing entrepreneurial activity, while also negatively affecting the entrepreneurial culture within economies. More optimistically, it is expected that entrepreneurial motivation can be weaponized against administrative burdens by enabling entrepreneurs to be more resilient against burdens. These findings provide useful insights for scholars of public administration and business alike.

The next pages of this dissertation will go straight into the first paper, immediately followed by the second and the third papers respectively. This will be followed by an overall conclusion and an overall list of references used throughout the

dissertation. Each paper will have its own introduction, literature review, data/methods, results, discussion, and conclusion.

## II. ESSAY 1: THE EFFECT OF ELECTRONIC PROGRAM APPLICATIONS AMIDST THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION BURDEN

### **2.1 Abstract**

E-government innovations are known to help reengineer and improve organizational processes in ways that can reduce administration burden. At the same time, however, research has shown that burdens are often deliberately created and used as a means through which politics play out. We connect these literatures and argue that the positive effect of e-government will likely vary under different political leadership. We examine this argument in the context of the U.S. welfare administration where federal programs, such as Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), are implemented by the states. Using panel data for all U.S. states, we model the impact of varying adoptions of electronic application portals on program take-up for Medicaid and SNAP. In line with expectations, we find stronger effects of electronic program applications on enrollment under Democratic leadership and weaker effects under Republican leadership, although this difference is more pronounced for Medicaid than SNAP.

## 2.2 Introduction

Administrative burden is influential in shaping state-citizens interactions (Fox et al., 2020; Heinrich, 2016; Johnson and Kroll, 2020; Shapiro, 2013). Such burdens include learning, psychological, and compliance costs that citizens encounter when they abide by the requirements established as a part of a government program or regulation (Herd and Moynihan, 2018). Among examples of burden are restrictions on voting that have been found to lower turnout rates (Ingram, 2018). Similarly, burden in the area of immigration cause a significant number of U.S. residents eligible for naturalization to not apply (Gonzalez-Barrera et al., 2013). In education, students have been missing out on financial aid that they qualify for simply because they were unaware that they are eligible (Hoxby and Avery, 2013). More broadly, statues like the Paperwork Reduction Act have been put in place to reduce burden on businesses and individuals, albeit with mixed results (Shapiro, 2013).

One way to reduce burden is using e-government or e-services. Here, the idea is that standards regarding the collection of information could substantively remain the same, but the experience of burden would be lowered due to more user-friendly ways to learn about services or submit information. While this notion is widely shared, its underlying causalities require more empirical testing and possible context-specific qualifications (Arendsen et al., 2014). Furthermore, research has again and again documented that administrative burden is not simply the necessary but resented byproduct of effective regulation (Herd and Moynihan, 2018). Instead, burden has been employed as a tool to purposely restrict access to government services above and beyond the material stipulations made within the original regulation or statute. Along these lines,

burdens have been found to disenfranchise disadvantaged populations and those with little resources in particular (Christensen et al., 2020; Jilke et al., 2018).

This is the background in which we setup our study. On the one hand, we know that e-government and e-services have the potential to lower burdens. On the other hand, burdens tend to be produced intentionally as a means of politicized policy implementation. Hence, we ask what happens if a seemingly neutral instrument such as e-services finds itself amidst the politics of administrative burden? We contextualize this question looking at welfare recipients' interactions with the state as a part of popular government programs. We consider electronic program applications as a means of using e-services, which we expect to increase program take-up over time, while holding the context constant. Against this backdrop, we advance the argument that political ideology matters to the extent that the effect of electronic applications will be curbed in modes of conservative as opposed to liberal program implementation.

To add more nuance to testing our hypothesis, we select two contexts – Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) – in which the implementing jurisdictions have different degrees of control over the program application process and contrast e-government and ideology effects across program settings. Both are federal programs implemented by the U.S. states, but while the states have a great deal of discretion when getting involved with Medicaid, they have less influence over administering SNAP (Miller, 2002; Salmon, 2017; Wagner and Huguelet, 2016). To test our hypothesis about political ideology, we compare the roles of Democratic and Republican governors and legislative majorities in the implementation of the two programs.

Empirically, we examine the effects of using electronic applications for Medicaid and SNAP on these programs' take-up numbers for a period of three years (50 states over three years resulting in 150 observations), while employing two-way fixed effects to control for year and state idiosyncrasies. Overall, we find that the positive effects of electronic applications on program take-up are significantly mitigated under Republican leadership. Yet, ideology plays less of a role for SNAP than it does for Medicaid.

### **2.3 Study Context: Medicaid and SNAP**

To be able to further qualify theories about the effect of e-government on program access via the incorporation of political ideology variables, we aimed at selecting two government programs that are fairly comparable but vary regarding the extent to which they give discretion to the states when it comes to program implementation. Hence, opportunities to realize ideological preferences via implementation vary greatly across contexts. We chose the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid, which are two of the most salient welfare programs in the United States of America; providing food assistance and health coverage respectively to low income-households. SNAP (formerly known as the food stamps program) is a \$6 billion food assistance program that is designed to provide beneficiaries with funding to access food and groceries (Wilson, 2014). SNAP benefits are fully funded by the federal government while only half the administrative costs are paid by the states, with the federal government paying the other fifty percent (CBO, 2012)

The funding arrangement for Medicaid is different. Medicaid is designed to provide medical insurance to pregnant mothers, parents of a minor, persons with disabilities, and low-income individuals. Medicaid is jointly funded by the state governments and the federal government. While the federal government pays a portion of the funding, the states must match that amount. This matching amount is calculated by the federal government using a specific program called the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage, which is based on a formula that takes into account the per capita income of each state, relative to the national average (HHS, 2020).

Both programs are entitlement programs, which means that fundamental eligibility for these programs is decided at the federal level and handed down to states that then have some discretionary powers. Entitlement programs receive funds from the federal government for specific purposes for which state governments must use the funds as the use of the funds is not transferable (Schott et al., 2001). Despite state-level discretion being available in both programs, states have less discretionary powers in SNAP since eligibility rules and benefit levels are set at the federal level with uniformity across states (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2018).

On the other hand, despite being guided by federal guidelines, Medicaid is administered by the states themselves, which in turn have greater discretionary powers. For example, each state has the power to set up its own payment rates and procedures for medical providers (HHS, 2020). Payments regarding inpatient hospital services are another example: Most states use payment methods that are based on diagnostic related groups; some states pay for the number of days the beneficiary is in the hospital; and

other states choose to use a method where they reimburse the hospitals based on the reported costs (MACPAC, 2020).

The political climate of 2016-2018 was underpinned by tensions regarding the expansion of Medicaid via the Affordable Care Act. “Obamacare” sought to increase access to Medicaid by providing supplemental funding to states; a move which undercut conservative ideals of a reduction of the welfare state and a general downsizing of big government (Bulman-Pozen & Metzger, 2016; Ollove, 2019). By removing certain requirements and lowering eligibility thresholds, Obamacare granted over 133 million more Americans access to healthcare (Abelson and Goodnough, 2020; Claxton et al., 2019; HHS, 2017). Currently, 12 states have not adopted the Medicaid expansion while two states have adopted but not implemented (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2020). Three states adopted and implemented the expansion during the period of focus of this study (2016-2018).

#### **2.4 Electronic Applications, Program Take-Up, and Political Ideology**

According to Kettani and colleagues (2009) “e-government is a means for the realization of good governance because it changes both the back office (government internal operations and relations) and the front office (government relations with citizens and other external stakeholders) in a way that makes the different components of good governance a reality” (p. 8). In fact, the reengineering and streamlining of delivery processes using e-government tools such as electronic application portals may reduce administrative burden along the way (Brown, 2005). E-government has optimized the

ways in which citizens interact with their governments using live-chats and online portals, which have reduced the need for walk-ins and made it possible to submit documentations, requests and applications for government services, and even make payments for government services in much more convenient and efficient ways (Thomas & Streib, 2003).

Overall, e-government has been shown to reduce administrative burdens (Arendsen et al., 2014; Zuurmond & Robben, 2009). Social Security and tax related e-services as well as electronic procurement have produced considerable benefits that abate burdens (European Commission, 2006). Employing e-administration solutions have demonstrably reduced learning and compliance costs by speeding up communication and removing some paper-based requirement (Bharosa et al., 2011; Boonstra & De Vries, 2005; Elgarah et al., 2005; Makipaa, 2006). E-government solutions have also eased psychological costs by speeding up processes and therefore reducing wait times and making citizen-state interactions less stressful (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000), and they automated data transfer that eliminated the need for in-office visits (West, 2004).

Our main concern here is not with the overall effect of electronic applications on program enrollment. Rather, we take on a contingency perspective and argue that this effect may vary with the existence of additional contingency factors – and one such factor is the political ideology to which a state government has subscribed. In other words, even a mostly politically neutral implementation tool such as e-government may not show its full impact if it is employed within certain political environments. Moynihan et al. (2015) outline that administrative burden is a place where politics play out and that regulations are used as conduits through which burdens are delivered upon select populations.

Hacker (2004) refers to this as “hidden politics” or, as Moynihan et al. (2015) put it, “policymaking by other means.”

This idea of state-engineered burdens is not entirely new to the public administration scholarship. Choi and Neshkova (2019) confirm the race-to-the-bottom thesis that, in an effort to not be a “welfare-magnet,” states engage in a subtle competition to offer less attractive welfare benefits to citizens than their neighboring states. Comparatively, social programs that are specifically geared towards welfare receive significantly less take-up than social programs that are intended for universal take-up. When policies are designed from a conservative ethos, they tend to raise administrative burdens for programs such as welfare. Fiscal conservatism broadly rejects frequent interventions of the state in the lives of citizens (Hess et al., 2015). Fiscal Conservatives tend to curb state actions that foster the expansion of the welfare state, and therefore are more likely to use administrative burdens to punctuate the welfare-access process and fetter access.

Dueck (2010) asserts that the Republican Party has long been associated with fiscal conservatism, which has been evident in the economic policies that they broadly pursue (Busch, 2011). On the verso, however, the moderating effect of policy design swings both ways along the political ideology continuum: while conservatives will befuddle welfare programs, liberals may advance burdens aimed at regulating businesses (Box, 1999; Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014; Giauque, 2003). The effect that policy design – as a result of political ideology – has on administrative burdens is therefore domain-specific. In the domain of interest for this paper (welfare), it is therefore expected that when the dominating party in a state is Republican led, this will reduce the attention

placed on welfare. This includes efforts to actively cut welfare appropriations, thereby making welfare less attractive and more difficult to access.

The effect of e-government on burdens can be undermined by levying burdens that e-government cannot reach. In examining Medicaid in the state of Wisconsin Herd and Moynihan (2019) find that in times of Republican leadership at both the state and federal levels, there were concerted efforts to increase burdens (including burdens that are outside the reach of e-government) whenever it was felt that Medicaid had sweltered and became too large. Mandating face-to-face interviews for eligibility requirements, introducing work requirements, drug-testing for applicants, and introducing processing fees are means by which conservative policy implementation neutralizes the effect of e-government. Another way for electronic applications to decrease program take-up, rather than facilitate it for eligible applicants, is that rigid automatization may reduce discretion at the street level. Figure 2 maps the expected moderation as hypothesized.

Hypothesis: The positive effect of electronic applications on program take-up is curbed under Republican leadership.




Figure 2: Hypothetical path- moderating effect of Republican leadership

## 2.5 Methods

### 2.5.1 Data and Modeling

The data used for this paper were drawn from several state and federal agencies that are listed in appendix 1.A, which increases confidence in the findings and addresses common method bias issues. This includes data gathered from United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), Kaiser Family Foundation, and the United States Census Bureau. We created a panel data set, ranging from 2016 to 2018, which are the years that we were able to obtain data for when constructing our independent variable, capturing variation in electronic application process for Medicaid and SNAP. In total, we work with three data points for a census of all 50 U.S. states, resulting in 150 observations.

To capture the effect of electronic applications on program take-up contingent upon political ideology, we interact the application measure with a dummy variable that is dichotomously coded for Republican versus Democratic leadership. We replicate the analysis with the leadership variable being operationalized at the levels of the i) state governor and ii) control of the state legislature, respectively. To account for the differences and idiosyncrasies across states, we use state fixed effects in all models. That is, we do not compare effects between states but estimate coefficients for changes over time within the same states. This estimation strategy allows us to hold all differences across states, which do not vary over time, constant. We also account for annual specifics using year fixed effects. We use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to address issues related

to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-sectional dependence and essentially present the findings from identical analyses for Medicaid and SNAP.

Being cognizant of the fact that the fluctuation of the SNAP and Medicaid take-up rates is not only a factor of the application process or state fixed effects, it is prudent to account for a set of state variables that may vary over time (Amato et al., 2015; Markowitz and Grossman, 2000; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001). States' population size is expected to have some effect on the number of welfare applicants since an increase in state population would reasonably correlate with an increase in applicants. The state poverty rate is also expected to have some impact on the number of welfare recipients. Increasing poverty, for example, is expected to increase the number of welfare applicants, which would inadvertently affect take-up. The education level as well as the income level of the citizens of the state are also expected to be a determining factor of welfare participation. Finally, the states' welfare spending was included. The latter variable seems particularly relevant, as it picks up on spending increases associated with the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act that some states engaged in during the period of our study

### 2.5.2 Measures

*Dependent Variable: Take-Up of SNAP and Medicaid.* Like other studies of administrative burden, we use a setup where we employ program take-up as the dependent variable, assuming that variation in the application process – if influential – should be related to changes in take-up (Herd et al., 2013; Herd & Moynihan, 2019). Specifically, we use the annual enrollment numbers for Medicaid and SNAP. More details on all measures can be found in table 1.

*Independent Variable: Electronic Application Portal.* The data for this variable were drawn from the 2016 to 2018 U.S. Department of Agriculture Annual Report on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and the 2016-2018 Kaiser Family Foundation Medicaid Report. The sophistication of the online application portals was measured as an index variable constructed by a series of dummy variables, each coded as ‘1’ if the portal for the respective state allowed this function and ‘0’ if it did not. Table 1 below shows these dummy variables for the respective programs under “electronic applications.”

Table 1 displays that a number of functions that are allowed by these online platforms are varied and numerous. The Medicaid online platforms have a greater level of functionality than those for SNAP, as the former offers a wider range of functions. Five dummy variables were used to measure the sophistication of the SNAP portal (Cronbach’s Alpha = .83). Nine (9) items were used to measure the quality of the Medicaid portal (Cronbach’s Alpha = .93). The appendix provides a ranking of states by the quality of their internet application portal (scores were averaged over time).

*Moderator Variables: Conservative policy implementation/influences.* To comprehensively measure conservative policy influences, two variables were used; the political affiliation of the governor of the state as well as the partisan composition of the state’s legislature. This was done by coding the political affiliation of the governor of the state as 1 if the Governor is Republican and 0 for all others (Democrat, Independent). Since states do not all have their gubernatorial elections at the same time nor in the same year, election results data are not centralized in a single source. The data were therefore drawn from a variety of state and federal data sources. We followed the same coding

procedure for the partisan composition of the legislature. The variable was coded as 1 if the legislature was majority Republican and 0 for all others.

*Control Variables:* Both the states' population and poverty rates (percentage of persons living at or below the poverty line) were garnered from the U.S. Census Bureau. The income level (average income of residents of the state) and educational level (percentage of residents completing high school and above) were garnered from the Census Bureau. Each state's budget spending (actual dollar amount spent on each program) for both SNAP and Medicaid were also included as controls, respectively.

## **2.6 Results**

Table 1 shows our main findings. The results for the interaction effects in both model 2s by and large confirm our hypothesis that the effects of electronic applications on program take-up are conditioned by political ideology. Specifically, in the Medicaid model we see that electronic applications yield about 75,000 program participants less under a Republican governor and 58,000 participants less under a Republican legislature. The numbers are fairly similar for the SNAP program, which is somewhat unexpected because, as we argued before, states have less discretion when implementing SNAP compared to Medicaid.

As a robustness check, we replicate this analysis in appendix 1.C, but this time we lag the dependent variable (program take-up) by one year to account for the possibility that changes in the application process as well as in political leadership may take some time before they materialize.

Table 1: Effects on Program Take-Up

	Medicaid		SNAP	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
e-gov Applications	53,095 (47,190)	131,208 (47,506)	53,186** (6,207)	130,032** (16,054)
Republican Governor	- 423,019* **	-627,039***	91,426***	6,424
Republican Legislature	(41,852) -74,999 (74,395)	(38,278) -291,389* (87,714)	(3,422) 63,106** (8,950)	(32,799) -71,870 (29,393)
e-gov*Republican Governor		-75,680***		-70,701**
e-gov*Republican Legislature		(1,988) -58,572** (12,983)		(9,240) -52,501* (14,209)
<b>Controls</b>				
Poverty Rate	-19,130 (14,545)	-22,414 (16,298)	25,996** (4,206)	7,223 (10,166)
Income Level	329.4** (50.40)	323.1** (51.80)	0.842 (4.256)	-4.885 (2.565)
Education Level	275,266 (94,643)	367,814** (85,084)	40,839 (44,868)	-54,801* (14,599)
Population	1.366** (0.148)	1.365** (0.141)	0.0928 (0.0877)	0.0480 (0.0531)
Welfare Spending	0.000601 (0.00173)	0.000681 (0.00169)	0.00292** (0.000657)	0.00213** (0.000428)
Constant	- 5.075e+07 **	- 5.830e+07* *	-3.834e+06	5.648e+06*
	(8.530e+06	(9.111e+06)	(3.836e+06)	(1.528e+06)
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Within R-Squared	0.0653	0.0681	0.3754	0.5749
Observations	150	150	150	150
Number of groups (US states)	50	50	50	50

The results in appendix 1.C confirm our previous findings for Medicaid (model 2) but show insignificant interaction terms for SNAP (model 2). Cumulatively then, our

original modeling combined with the lagged models show mixed findings for SNAP that, however, appear to make sense. Ideology may affect the impact of e-government on SNAP take-up, but the true ideology effect is likely to be lower for SNAP than Medicaid, and possibly has a substantial standard error attached.

Table 1 also shows that improvements in electronic application portals by themselves have mixed effects on program take-up (model 1 of both programs), and appendix 1.C confirms that such effects, overall, trend towards being not significantly different from zero. The effects of political ideology, independent of the electronic application portal, are as expected for Medicaid. The negative signs suggest that take-up is generally higher under Democratic leadership (Medicaid model 1). This is different for the SNAP program (SNAP model 1). Here, enrollment is actually higher under Republican leadership, which is somewhat surprising. However, appendix 1.C shows that the coefficient flips its sign for Republican governors (SNAP model 1), suggesting being cautious with any conclusions about the unconditional ideology effects for SNAP.

It is worth recalling that these are fixed-effect models that do not compare across states but examine changes within each state. Hence, the control variables capture changes in poverty rates, income level and so forth within the same state over time and should be interpreted along these lines. It is interesting that changes in Medicaid spending are not significantly related to Medicaid take-up since this variable would capture variation attributed to a potential Medicaid expansion. One explanation might be that only three states adopted and implemented a Medicaid expansion during our study period, while for all other states' expenses were likely to be fairly constant between 2016 and 2018, which is why this variable might play no major role in our analysis.

While our tables so far have shown whether the effect of electronic applications on take-up differed significantly under Republican as opposed to Democratic leadership, the marginal effects in table 2 provide specific point estimates for each sub-group. What is interesting is that the e-government effect is positive across all groups. That is, even under Republican leadership, electronic applications portals never diminish program participation. However, what we do see is that, with respect to SNAP, e-government effects are about three-times larger under Democratic leadership compared to Republican leadership. Similarly for Medicaid, the effects of electronic applications on take-up are about four times as strong under Democratic leadership, while positive effects are not significantly different from zero under Republican leadership.

*Table 2: Marginal Effects of Republican Governorship and Legislature on the effect of Electronic Applications (e-gov) on Program Take-Up*

	<b>State Governor</b>		<b>Control of State Legislature</b>	
	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>
e-gov ( <b>SNAP</b> )	97131.8***	26430.5***	84783.32***	32282.76***
e-gov ( <b>Medicaid</b> )	94503.41**	18823.76	82773.38*	24201.66

Note: Marginal effects were predicted based on the equations used in table 2.

## 2.7 Discussion

In our study, we find that the effect of electronic application portals on the take-up of U.S. welfare programs varies based on the political ideology to which gubernatorial or legislative leaders subscribe. Specifically, this effect was lower under Republican compared to Democratic leadership. In combination, the different modeling strategies we employ suggest that such ideology effects are more pronounced for Medicaid than SNAP, most likely because the states have more control over the implementation of the former than the latter.

We see several explanations as to why some approaches to implement electronic application systems may be less effective in facilitating the enrollment of eligible applicants than others. First, electronic applications are only one means of reducing administrative burden and are likely to have little effect if they are accompanied by other measures that, in fact, create burdens. For example, if electronic innovations were complemented by additional face-to-face interviews, drug-testing, or processing fees, we would not expect to see significant effects on program enrollment. Second, automatization may reduce discretion at the level of the street-level bureaucrat. That is, if submissions via electronic portals are directly linked to decisions about eligibility, then electronic systems may in fact reduce take-up in cases in which assessments are set up to be rigid and made without a great deal of additional human oversight (Herd and Moynihan, 2018).

A final explanation is that the adoption of innovations, such as electronic application portals, is often more symbolic than instrumental (March & Olsen, 2010). Sometimes governments engage in the adoption of reforms and innovations to signal to important stakeholders that they are striving for improvement, whereas demonstrating the real benefits of the innovation becomes an afterthought. Specifically, adopting reforms to mimic organizations that are considered to be successful is one strategy employed to generate legitimacy and secure funding streams (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For the case of electronic application portals this could mean that some state agencies adopt such systems for the sake of doing “something,” without devoting much attention to the details of reform implementation and true gains for clients.

Our paper takes on a contingency perspective, which we think adds value and contributes to the existing literature (Arendsen et al., 2014; Zuurmond & Robben, 2009). If we had not considered the contingency effects featured in this paper, we would have concluded that electronic applications do not have much of an impact of program take-up. We would have missed the observation that such portals do matter, but that such effects are more or less pronounced under different political leadership. Our empirical setup also allowed us to learn more about the politicization potential of an otherwise neutral implementation tool like e-government. While information and communication technologies are widely known as an instrument that can help reengineer and improve front- and back-office processes, our study shows that the way such technology is used may vary based on agencies' intentions and motivations.

Like all research, our paper is not free from limitations. While we are able to leverage the advantages of panel data analysis, examining the impact of electronic application portals over a period of three years (due to the limitations of existing data) is still a snapshot. Nevertheless, we are able to utilize a balanced panel of all 50 states, and although it is true that we would expect to see more variation across states if we were able to use multi-year time series data, the fact that we capture significant effects over a three-year period suggests that our findings are robust and most likely still underestimated. Another concern may be omitted variables. However, we employ two-way fixed effects that capture the idiosyncrasies of all states that are constant over time as well as differences that are unique to a specific year. Additionally, we use a set of controls accounting for demographic and economic over-time changes unique to each state. While it is true that panel data are superior to cross-sectional data sets, the former

as are not free from statistical limitations that we, however, diagnosed and addressed as recommended (Hoechle, 2007).

We see three specific avenues for future research. First, studies should attempt to measure citizen perception of burden more directly. In addition to modelling effects on program enrollment or outcomes, we see value in capturing perceived burdens, particularly since the role of compliance, learning, and psychological costs will be difficult to disentangle without such client-level data. Second, the role of e-government, and electronic application systems more specifically, needs to be examined and contrasted across different contexts. While we think it is crucial to examine welfare programs such as Medicaid and SNAP, because they are so consequential for many peoples' lives, it seems equally necessary to study more locally delivered services or state-business interactions. Third, the scholarship would benefit from a deeper understanding of the intersection of different program types; entitlement funded versus block funded programs would be an interesting starting point.

Additional research is needed to support a more nuanced understanding of the intersection of e-government and administrative burden. While our current study uses an omnibus measure for e-government burden, we believe that the scholarship can benefit from a disarticulated assessment by looking at how specific e-government tools intersect with specific categories of burdens (learning, psychological, compliance costs). For example, we know that depriving persons of information exposes them to learning costs, but how can governments use electronic means of communication to unburden citizens? The coronavirus pandemic may provide us with one opportunity to examine this by

looking at the different attempts as to how e-government tools can be used to reduce learning costs in citizen-state interactions and information sharing.

## **2.8 Conclusion**

In this paper, we examined the effect of electronic application portals on program take-up in the U.S. welfare administration. Based on a three-year panel study of all U.S. states and a set of fixed-effects regressions, we found that this effect was positive but significantly co-varied with changes in political leadership. Overall, the effect was stronger under Democratic as opposed to Republican leadership and more consistently observed for Medicaid than SNAP, that is, in the area in which the states have more implementation discretion.

One contribution of the paper is that it connects the literature on e-government with that on administrative burden. The former has documented effects on burden as well as improvements in compliance and communication (e.g., Arendsen et al., 2014; Bharosa et al., 2011; Boonstra & De Vries, 2005), whereas the latter has examined the role of politics in the creation of burden, leveraging theories on policy design and implementation (e.g., Heinrich, 2016; Herd and Moynihan 2018; Jilke et al., 2018). Interestingly, while work on burdens considers e-government as one means to mitigate the underlying problem, we are unaware of any empirical studies that have examined e-government effects via a political policy implementation prism. We think that making this connection is important to facilitate a dialogue between literatures that otherwise are at risk to remain somewhat siloed.

Administrative burden has significant consequences for policy design and implementation. The extant literature chronicles its effect on access to education and even revered democratic exercises such as voting (Ingram, 2018). While we also know that burden is a venue for politics (Moynihan et al., 2015), our study augments this knowledge by exploring the intersection between politics and electronic applications in context of welfare applications. Examining this intersection is important insofar as it sharpens our understanding of how politically neutral tools like e-government may fall prey to political influence, albeit constructive or destructive. The influence of politics may also help us explain why e-government tools sometimes do not yield the intended outcomes (Twizeyimana and Andersson, 2019).

Connecting politics, e-government, and burden becomes even more consequential since it is being examined in the context of welfare. Herd and Moynihan (2018) lament the deleterious effects of burden on underserved populations. By deepening our engagement with the welfare area, this study not only uncovers methods of unburdening but also inches public administration closer to servicing its social equity expectations. Taken together, these findings provide lessons on how public action and policy implementation can be organized to better serve constituents. We are also brought within a deeper understanding of how the practices of public administrators have consequences for different groups of people. Though we do not locate our findings on any end of the political spectrum, practitioners may use these lessons to improve how they serve.

III. ESSAY 2: WHAT MAKES US TOLERANT OF ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN?  
RACE, REPRESENTATION, AND IDENTITY

**3.1 Abstract**

This article connects the literatures of administrative burden with those of representative bureaucracy and group identity. We derive two hypotheses from extant scholarship that, adapted to the case of administrative burden, propose the following: Citizens will be more tolerant of burden if their race identity overlaps with that of the bureaucrat administering the burden, and if potential benefits are targeted at people who are similar to them. Using a survey experiment based on a stratified sample of 465 U.S. residents, we find little support for the hypotheses. In fact, while Black participants barely responded to the treatments at all, we see that white participants were most tolerant of burden when served by a white bureaucrat in a program that benefits Black clients. The article calls for more research on the subject to build nuanced theory, including contextualizing propositions across identity groups and drawing on additional theoretical ideas.

**3.2 Introduction**

Reasonable people tend to agree that government needs to reduce administrative burden. However, there is no general consensus on what the “right amount” of burden ought to be. What Herbert Kaufman said about red tape in (1977, p. 4) seems to hold true for administrative burden in 2020 as well: “One person’s red tape is another’s treasured safeguard.” Or, put more specifically for the purpose of our research: What one person

sees as administrative burden, is considered by another person as the much-needed information requirement to effectively regulate businesses or determine program eligibility. Since discussions about the “optimal level” of burden are ultimately highly political (Herd & Moynihan, 2018), research on factors that may ease the experience of burden or help cope with and overcome burden can be of value (Christensen et al., 2020). This may include scholarship on the ‘nudging potential’ of redesigning program applications, the role of coproduction, or the use of information technology.

While administrative burdens are generally consequential in shaping citizen-government relations (Fox et al., 2020; Heinrich, 2016), we know that marginalized and disadvantaged populations with few resources are particularly detrimentally affected. Examples include cases where eligible citizens cannot benefit from government programs because they were not able to navigate through the application process or where discretion was used to discriminate against minority clients (Christensen et al., 2020; Herd & Moynihan, 2018; Jilke et al., 2018).

This study adds to this line of research. We link the scholarship on burden to work on representative bureaucracy and group identity and ask: What makes citizens more tolerant of administrative burden? Since research has shown that varying groups of people may perceive the same rule (and its potential dysfunctions) very differently (Hattke, Hensel, & Kalucza, 2020; Kaufmann & Feeney, 2012), we expect people to show different degrees of tolerance of administrative burden based on how burdens are framed and experienced. In line with previous research (e.g., Jardina, 2019; Meier, 2019; Nicholson, 2008; Riccucci & Van Ryzin, 2017), we assume that social identity is a significant driver of human behavior, and that race plays an important role in constructing

identity. Specifically, we deduce from this research that burdens will be perceived as less onerous if the citizen (i.e., a potential client for a government program) and the bureaucrat administering the burden share the same race identity. Further, we infer from previous work that burdens will be perceived as less onerous by citizens if they share the same race identity with the potential beneficiaries of a government program, and burdens are employed to restrict access to this group.

Using a sample of 465 U.S. residents (stratified into white and Black responses<sup>1</sup>), we test these hypotheses employing a two-factorial randomized experiment. All four groups are asked to work through the application process for a fictive government financial aid program in the area of education and, hence, have an actual experience of administrative burden. The first factor within the experiment that varies across groups is the description and visualization of white versus Black program beneficiaries whose needs can only be met if abuse is minimized via ‘valid applications.’ The second factor is the description and visualization of the virtual person that guides participants through the application process: a white versus Black bureaucrat.

Overall, we find little evidence that perceptions of burden vary across treatment groups based on participant race in line with the hypothesized expectations. However, we do find differences across white and Black participants, and we offer some theoretical explanations, followed by avenues for future research.

### **3.3 Literature Review**

We understand administrative burdens as learning, psychological, and compliance costs that citizens encounter when they abide by the requirements established as a part of

a government program or regulation (Herd & Moynihan, 2018). One factor that can shape people's experiences of burden are the commonalities between the citizen and the front-line bureaucrat who is involved in the administering of information requirements related to a government program. To develop this argument, we tap into the literature on representative bureaucracy. This scholarship has shows that "matches" between citizens and bureaucrats based on a shared identity can yield positive outcomes for said citizens, either via passive signaling effects or direct action (Meier, 2019; Riccucci & Van Ryzin, 2017; Gade & Wilkins, 2013). We pay specific attention to passive representation which emphasizes the benefits that accrue to clients who are being served by administrators who look like them (Andersen, 2017).

One attribute based on which shared identities may develop is race. Race-representation can result in citizens having greater appreciation, greater comfort, and overall greater trust when interacting with administrative or government agencies (Van Ryzin et al., 2014; Riccucci et al., 2018; Selden, 1998;). Specifically, Riccucci and colleagues (2014) show that African American citizens perceive a police department as well-performing, fair, and trustworthy if the department is representative of African Americans.

While the positive effects of representative bureaucracy have been widely documented, we know fairly little about its mitigating role on citizens' experience of administrative burden. Drawing on previous work on different, but related, phenomena, we expect to see the following mechanism play out. We anchor our expectations within the ambits of passive representation; a realm where a shared race identity may help establish a visible connection between citizen and bureaucrat, even before any interaction

has taken place (Andersen, 2017; Llorens, Wenger, & Kellough, 2008). Such a connection is often based on the citizen's assumption that the bureaucrat – due to the same identity – would have had similar life experiences and will understand and sympathize with the citizen (Meier, 2019; Bradbury & Kellough, 2011). Because of this, the assumption suggests that the bureaucrat will act in the citizen's best interest, which in the case of administrative burden means to do their best to help navigating through paperwork related to information requirements.

While these are assumptions on the part of the citizen that can be triggered from a shared identity, the same mechanism may also lead to changed citizen perceptions of the administrative process itself, not just of the bureaucrat. Here, familiarity and potential trustworthiness may increase the citizen's willingness to collaborate in the process (“coproduction inducement,” Lim, 2006), creating a state of mind where requirements are more likely to be seen as necessary rather than a burden.

*H<sub>1</sub>: Citizens will perceive administrative burden associated with a government program as less onerous if they share the same race identity with bureaucrat administering the burden.*

The literature on group identity provides another perspective on race and belongingness. We understand identity “as a psychological, internalized sense of attachment to a group” (Jardina, 2019, p. 4). Individuals predominantly act in the interest of in-group members and are more willing to undergo personal cost for the sake of the in-group than the out-group (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). We also know that people actively protest government policies that threaten the stability of their racial in-group (Hoblein & Hassell, 2018). Group members build solidarity as a shield to enhance the

wellbeing amongst members while also staving off threats from out groups (Shelby, 2005).

Research on identity politics emerges from an understanding that political outcomes, political behavior, and political culture are products of citizens' identification with groups of similar "others" based on a racial, religious, national, ideological, demographic or gendered identity (d'Abrera, 2017; Nicholson, 2008; Steele & Aronson, 1995;). Identity politics provide a strong sense of belonging to group members, and people are inclined to act in the interest of those whom they identify with (Gutmann, 2009).

Race has been a key dimension from which identity politics emerges (Kinder & Winter, 2001), which has become evident in the racial patterns of voting and support during Presidential elections (Craighill & Sullivan, 2013; Edsall, 2020). In this context of race and group identity, we examine an argument put forward by advocates of stringent standards and requirements for government programs: Administrative burdens are needed to determine program eligibility (as documented in Herd & Moynihan, 2018). We know that despite the deleterious effects that burdens can have, they can also increase public support for government programs under some conditions (Keiser and Miller, 2019). Research shows that identity groups, even those that are usually critical of government programs, are supportive of government assistance if the latter is directed to members of the group (Jardina, 2019; Keiser and Miller, 2019). We adapt this point to burdens more specifically and propose that citizens are more tolerant of burdens if those are used to make sure in-group members will benefit from a government program, while access for others is restricted.

*H<sub>2</sub>: Citizens will perceive administrative burden associated with a government program as less onerous if they share the same race identity with the beneficiaries of a government program.*

### **3.4 Methods**

#### **3.4.1 Data**

We collected data from a stratified sample of 465 United States residents (231 white and 234 Black individuals) in May-June 2020. To recruit participants, we used the crowdsourcing platform Prolific Academic that connects researchers to a pool of more than 120,000 potential survey takers (more than 38,000 are residing in the U.S.).<sup>2</sup> The platform allows researchers to build a stratified sample such as the one needed for our research because it makes it possible to filter potential participants by demographics and other variables. This allowed us to push our survey invitation only to Black and white individuals residing in the United States. To confirm the correctness of these filters, we used additional screening questions and only began with the main survey if the Prolific filters matched with people's self-assessments regarding race and country of residency.

We also employed two attention check questions (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and dropped survey responses from individuals who failed both checks (n=8). Platforms like Prolific or MTurk have been found to be useful and sufficiently validated particularly if the subject pool of interest is a cross-section of regular citizens (Huff & Tingley, 2017; Palan & Schitter, 2018; Peer et al., 2017), and applications include studies in public management (e.g., Pedersen & Favero, 2020; Stritch et al., 2017).

Our sample is 49% female, and respondents are on average 32 years old with a standard deviation of 10 years and a range between 18 and 74 years. Roughly 65% of the participants have a college degree, and out of the entire sample 35% would be considered to be the first in their family to go to college. About 63% of the respondents are currently employed. The sample is slightly more liberal than conservative: on 0-10 scale, where 0 is most conservative, 10 is most liberal, and 5 is the midpoint, our samples averages at about 6.5.

### **3.4.2 Inducing Administrative Burdens and Assigning Identity Treatments**

Since the research interest is in examining people's varying perceptions of administrative burden, all experimental groups had to work through the same burdensome task. We asked participants to complete an application process we created for a fictive government financial aid program in the area of education. The program description was kept broad ("financial aid to further one's education"), so that all participants may theoretically be able to serve as potential beneficiaries. The application was constructed in the shape of an online survey including questions related to applicants' educational background and future aspirations; previous experiences with government programs; demographics; and income and employment. What made the process burdensome was that the survey a) included several irrelevant questions and b) was poorly designed.

Here are some examples of the means through which we tried to induce burdens: we included three open-ended questions such as this one: "Before you go, please tell me, what is your career objective? Please respond in at least 160 characters." Rather than using skip questions, we put all respondents through all questions and provided long lists

of choices (e.g., 20 different college concentrations). Questions about one's education went all the way back to high school. We asked for exact GPAs and provided pull-down lists that showed detailed grades separated by the first decimal (4.0; 3.9; 3.8 etc.). We asked twice for the location of an academic institution and listed all fifty states but not in alphabetical order. It should be noted that survey participation was voluntary and compensated.

The expectation is that these induced burdens will produce emotional responses that will lead to variations in our outcome variable – respondents' perception of burdens. In assessing the extent to which differing conditions of administrative burden, delay, and rule dysfunctionality in citizen-state interactions spark discrete emotional reactions, Hattke and colleagues (2020) find that bureaucratic actions are powerful enough to drive emotional responses in people who are experiencing the effects of these administrative actions. We rest our expectations in this scholarship.

The first treatment factor is the group of people that will benefit from the government program and, indirectly, the burden associated with the application process. Specifically, we stated that the financial aid program targets "all low-income students"<sup>3</sup> (versus "African American students with little income"). The picture associated with the statement is that of a group of white (versus Black) college students. It was explained to all groups that program beneficiaries need to meet several requirements to qualify, so that the "most deserving candidates" can be selected and abuse by "free riders or dishonest persons" prevented. The second treatment factor is the appearance of the bureaucrat (or administrator) that guides participants through the application process. The administrator pops up several times during the application process and provides explanations to the

participants. His name and picture were either that of a white male (“Brett Smith”) or Black male (“Tyrone Johnson”) (our choice of names is based on previous research, see Einstein & Glick, 2017).

Table 3: Randomized Treatment

	Administrator	
	white / white (n=116)	white / Black (n=113)
Beneficiaries	Black / white (n=118)	Black / Black (n=118)

Note: The first label represents the row variables and the second label represents the column variable.

To make sure participants were primed as intended, we asked them one multiple-choice question after describing the program target group and another one after explaining the role of the program’s information requirements in the selection of beneficiaries. When participants got these questions wrong, we showed another screen with the correct description of the program’s target population and use of requirements. In total, participants were exposed two to four times (depending on whether they got our manipulation check questions wrong) to the images of the beneficiary group, and 11 times to the image of the administrator.<sup>4</sup> Using different combinations of the two treatment factors, we created four treatment groups to which participants were randomly assigned (see table 3).

### 3.4.3 Perceptions of Administrative Burden

To measure participants’ perceptions of the burden they experienced when working through the application process, we employed a set of 10 items. Since we are

still lacking an established survey scale of administrative burden, we wrote the items following the conceptualization by Herd and Moynihan (2018). Items 1-4 tap into people’s learning costs, that is in our case, the issues related to the understanding of our instructions and questions. Items 5-7 capture psychological costs, in that they measure people’s experience of the entire process, including feeling stressed or uncomfortable. Items 8-10 pick up on compliance costs with a focus on responding to the application’s information requirements. Item 10 can also be considered as a single-item global measures of burden, which is highly correlated with the entire list ( $r=0.83$ ).

To make sure that items were perceived in the context of our hypothetical application process, we included the following statement: “Please recall that the purpose of asking the questions was to establish eligibility for a hypothetical financial aid program. Keeping this in mind, to what extent do you agree with the following statements.” We factor analyzed the 10 items resulting in a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 5.95 and no significant cross-loadings on additional factors (see table 4). For our subsequent analysis we use a factor score consisting of the ten burden measures.

Table 4: Factor Analysis of Perception of Administrative Burden

#	Item	Factor loading
01	Reading and understanding the questions took too long	0.777
02	Many questions seemed irrelevant	0.717
03	Too many questions required additional research and calculations	0.720
04	The instructions provided to me could have been more helpful	0.660
05	Answering some of the questions made me uncomfortable	0.732
06	The survey could have been more user friendly	0.792
07	Overall, answering the questions was stressful	0.830
08	The survey was too lengthy	0.820
09	Responding to the questions took too much time	0.822
10	Answering the questions was burdensome	0.830

Note: Principal component factoring was applied; the factor’s Eigenvalue is 5.95 and no additional factors were significant. Items were measured using a 7-point scale.

### 3.5 Results

In the analysis, we are interested in examining differences in the perceptions of administrative burden across treatment groups sorted by race. One first step to get some insight into the issue is by comparing the means across sub-groups. This was done in table 5, where we use an index variable to capture administrative burden (ranging between 1 and 7), which for our descriptive purpose here is more illustrative than the factor score. The table provides two main insights. First, the mean for all Black groups scatters closely around the mean for the entire sample (2.34), suggesting that this group did not respond much to the four treatments. Second, this is different for the white groups, whose lowest perception of burdens (2.01), however, occurred in response to the treatment where the administrator is white but the beneficiaries are Black, not the expected white-white-white match. Both findings seem interesting and worth further exploring.

Table 5: Perception of burden means across treatment groups by race

	Black beneficiaries and Black administrators (1)		Black beneficiaries and white administrators (2)		White beneficiaries and white administrators (3)		White beneficiaries and Black administrators (4)	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
Mean	2.33	2.55	2.41	2.01	2.33	2.56	2.27	2.32
SD	1.42	1.49	1.30	1.01	1.21	1.45	1.16	1.26
Obs	59	57	56	58	55	57	60	52

Note: Perceptions of administrative burden were measured on a 7-point scale. Here, we used an index variable consisting of the 10 items listed in table 2 because its interpretation is more intuitive than that of the factor score we employ in our regressions. The total mean across all groups is 2.34 (SD= 1.30). SD = standard deviation; Obs = observations.

Table 6 shows the regression analysis of our treatment-race interaction framework. The coefficient of main interest is the one for the interaction effect. The table is organized by

treatment group, estimating two models per group as a robustness test: one with and one without the control variables listed below the table. The interaction effect quantifies the extent to which the treatment effect on burden perceptions across the four groups varies between white (0) and Black (1) respondents.

Table 6: Regression analysis of burden perceptions by treatment groups and race

	Black benefic. & Black admin.		Black benefic. & white admin.		White benefic. & white admin.		White benefic. & Black admin.	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
Benefic/admin treatment	0.21 (1.22)	0.18 (1.12)	-0.36* (-2.69)	-0.33* (-2.55)	0.20 (1.20)	0.19 (1.21)	-0.05 (-0.31)	-0.03 (-0.20)
Black respondent	0.03 (0.30)	0.11 (1.12)	-0.13 (-1.20)	-0.07 (-0.63)	0.03 (0.25)	0.09 (0.86)	-0.02 (-0.16)	0.04 (0.42)
Treatment x Black	-0.22 (-0.93)	-0.27 (-1.15)	0.43* (2.14)	0.44* (2.18)	-0.20 (-0.90)	-0.18 (-0.85)	-0.02 (-0.08)	0.01 (0.02)
Constant	-0.04 (-0.54)	-0.49* (-2.19)	0.10 (1.24)	-0.32 (-1.42)	-0.04 (-0.50)	-0.48* (-2.09)	0.02 (0.29)	-0.43 (-1.96)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.047	0.013	0.055	0.004	0.046	0.001	0.043
Obs	454	449	454	449	454	449	454	449

Note: \* p<0.05 (two-tailed tests); t statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors. Dependent variables is an administrative burden factor score. Controls include gender, age, college degree, status “first in family to go to college,” currently employed, and liberal ideology. “benefic” = beneficiaries; “admin” = administrator.

The only significant interaction effect is that for the treatment, where the beneficiaries are Black and the administrator is white. In this scenario, burdens are being perceived 0.43 or 0.44 points higher by Black participants as opposed to white ones. While the results for the first treatment group are not significant in our sample of about 450 observations, the differences across respondents are still of substantive sizes. Considering that the dependent variable in this table is constructed as a factor score with a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one, the interaction coefficients suggest a 22% to 27% standard deviation difference between white and Black participants. Specifically, what this

means is that when both beneficiaries and the administrator are Black, then the perception of burden by Black applicants is about a quarter of a standard deviation lower than that by white applicants.

Table 7: Marginal effects from regression analysis for race variable

	Black benefic. & Black admin.		Black benefic. & white admin.		White benefic. & white admin.		White benefic. & Black admin.	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Benefic/admin treatment	0.21 (1.22)	-0.01 (-0.06)	-0.36* (-2.69)	0.08 (0.50)	0.20 (1.20)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.05 (-0.31)	-0.07 (-0.47)

Note: \*  $p < 0.05$  (two-tailed tests); t statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors. Marginal effects are predicted from the regression models (without controls) shown in table 4.

Table 7 predicts specific marginal effects from the models presented in table 4. While table 4 shows whether the differences in perceptions between white and Black respondents vary significantly, table 7 provides us with a straightforward illustration of the point estimate for the treatment effects of white and Black participants. In line with our previous observations, all treatment effects for Black respondents are virtually zero, while there is more variation among white participants. For white respondents, the treatment reduced burden (significantly) when in the second experimental group, whereas perceptions of burden increased (insignificantly) for groups one and three.

### 3.6 Discussion and Conclusion

In this article, we connected the literatures on administrative burden with those of representative bureaucracy and racial group identity. Adopting previous findings to this study of the administrative burden phenomenon, we derived two guiding hypotheses: Perceptions of burden will be lower if 1) citizens and administrators match in terms of

their race identity and 2) citizens' race identity matches the one of potential program beneficiaries. Using a two-factorial survey experiment based on a race-stratified sample of 465 U.S. residents, we found fairly little support for these hypotheses. In fact, white and Black participants responded somewhat differently to treatments, and the treatment that triggered a greater tolerance of burdens was a hybrid one: Here, white applicants interacted with a white administrator, but the beneficiaries of the program in question were largely Black.

One explanation of this hybrid finding is that theories around administrative burden and race may be more complex than what adaptations of findings from the area of representation and identity might suggest. There are several mechanisms that could help explain why white program applicants show the most tolerance for burdens when they are being served by white administrators but, at the same time, program beneficiaries include non-white citizens. First, the support for identity politics is largely grounded in self-interest motives channeled through collective actions of homogenous groups. However, research has documented that behavior can be motivated by a variety of (often conflicting) values (Witesman and Walters, 2014). Second, one known restriction to self-interested behaviors is a person's self-image (Bonner et al., 2017). That is, while according to this view people try to maximize gains, they would only engage in related behavior as long as they can still maintain a positive self-image; and taking advantage of disadvantaged populations can significantly curb such image. Third, the finding could be explained by white paternalism that tends to course-correct for the impediments that often endure to the benefit of white privilege (Baker, 2015; Ben-Ishai, 2012).

We need further research to develop theory that connects burden, race, and identity. One route would be to elaborate on our client-administrator match and model active interaction (virtually or via the means of a laboratory experiment) as opposed to passive reception. Involving the administrator more actively in the process of service delivery will likely strengthen the priming effect. Future research could also benefit from designing more burdensome treatments in order to effectively tease out the effects of administrative burden. Conducting in-person experiments for real programs can provide the conditions for actual and heavier burdens to be levied by researchers in more controlled research settings.

Like other research, this essay is not free from limitations. The fact that we had to use the term “low-income students” (complemented with a picture of white students) instead of “white students,” in order to create a realistic and believable treatment, may have curbed priming effects. Like with most experiments the focus of this experiment is on internal rather than external validity. Nevertheless, generalizability may be another limitation of this study, although the use of a nationwide sample of U.S. residents mitigates this problem to a good extent.

For public management practice, the article points to the fact that the perception of burden can sometimes be as important as the actual information requirement itself. This is not to say that governments should not engage in the reduction of burden. But in cases in which discussions about burdens (i.e., information requirements) are so politicized that consensus is unlikely, practitioners may want to think through options to ease experiences of burden via means of nudging, coproduction, or information technology.

Overall, addressing the question as to whether perceptions and experiences of burden vary based on the race and identity of applicants constitutes an exciting and promising research program. This article examined the impact of race-identity matches between clients and administrators as well as clients and program beneficiaries. This research suggests effective theories will require nuanced specification rather than adaptation of findings from existing scholarship. The observation that white and Black participants responded differently to our treatments indicates that theoretical propositions may need to be contextualized across different identity groups. We consider this study a first step into a novel research direction, but developing generalizable theory in this area certainly calls for further research.

### Notes

1. In this article, we contrast results between white/Caucasian on one side and Black/African American on the other. We [capitalize 'Black'](#) throughout (retrieved 6/22/2020).
2. <https://www.prolific.co/demographics> (retrieved 6/22/2020)
3. We used the term “low-income students” (and complemented it with a picture of white students) as opposed to “white students” because referring to a program that only serves the latter would have been an odd and artificial treatment.
4. The manipulation check is different from the attention check. The former was used to make sure our treatments were understood as intended (the treatment screen was shown twice to a few participants who did not pass the manipulation check question),

whereas the latter tested whether participants generally paid attention to the survey,  
and this could lead to subjects being dropped from the study

## IV. ESSAY 3: BURDENS ARE EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS: EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS PLACED ON BUSINESSES

### 4.1 Abstract

The adverse effects of administrative burden touch the lives of ordinary citizens—the clients of public administrators *and* businesses. Administrative burdens have consequences for entrepreneurial outcomes, and entrepreneurial outcomes have consequences for the quality of life that people lead. This should therefore be a concern for public administrators since they are the gatekeepers in democratic societies. Moreover, public administrators should begin to contemplate how to reconcile the paradoxes between their democracy related obligation to citizens and their duty and oversight of businesses in context of administrative burden. Drawing on data from forty countries, this paper examines the implications of placing burdens on businesses. The findings indicate that burdens suppress entrepreneurial culture by reducing entrepreneurial activity. The evidence also shows that entrepreneurial motivation can enable entrepreneurs to be more tolerant and resilient against burdens.

### 4.2 Introduction

Administrative processes have real consequences for the operational capacity of public administration specifically. Herd, & Moynihan (2018) refer to some of these processes as administrative burdens; onerous costs that citizens or institutions are forced to endure if they wish to have successful interactions with state agencies (Burden, Canon,

Mayer, & Moynihan, 2012). Herd & Moynihan's (2019) typology of administrative burdens is premised on a three-pillared framework; learning costs, psychological costs, and compliance costs. These costs have been proven to make citizens' interaction with their governments tedious and unwelcoming thereby encumbering their access to state resources to which they are entitled.

While the extant scholarship has examined administrative burdens faced by individual citizens (Herd and Moynihan, 2016; Christensen et al., 2020; Johnson and Kroll, 2020), the burdens faced by organizations and businesses has been understudied. We know that burdens are sometimes levied with noble intentions and with an interest to produce democratic outcomes (Kitching, 2015; Kotnik et al., 2020; Hodgson, 2009). For example, the government can place more burdens on businesses to prevent/reduce corporate abuse or tax evasion, or even fraudulent abuse of public programs (Moynihan et al., 2015). Burdens, therefore, can produce positive results within the contexts that are deployed—they are not always dispatched with bad intentions. Notwithstanding this, the fact remains that regardless of the underlying motivations—good or bad—burdens produce effects and consequences.

We also know that placing burdens on businesses can reduce economic prosperity by affecting economic growth (Poel, Marneffe, Bielen, Aarle, & Vereeck, 2014), capital productivity in the economy (Dawson, 2007), and GDP (Haidar, 2012).

What we are however unclear about is how can businesses and public administrators deal with burdens. Additionally, while scholars have briefly examined the effect that burdens have on existing businesses, we have not yet fully explored the spillover effects, that is, what are the feedback effects when we place burdens on

businesses? Finally, the burdens scholarship has not fully examined what characteristics of burden-bearers enable them to tolerate burdens and empower them to be more resilient against burdens.

We know that placing burdens on businesses can have deleterious consequences for the economy. We also know that people rely on an optimally functioning economy in order to improve their quality of life which is a fundamental element of democratic societies (Hacker and Pierson, 2016). Burdens placed on business therefore have consequences for democracy and should be of concern to public administration.

The purpose of this paper is to include the business-burdens interaction to demonstrate that administrative burdens placed on businesses have consequences for entrepreneurial activity and arguably, the economy of a country. While the current research focuses on tools and processes as means to reduce burdens, this research deepens our understanding of the role individuals play in how administrative burdens can be tolerated or reduced. This study examines the role that the resilience of entrepreneurs plays in staving off the effects that administrative burdens on businesses have on reducing entrepreneurial activity.

While there is evidence to suggest that there are instances where administrative burden can result in improved entrepreneurial activity (Blackburn and Hart, 2002; Kitching, 2006; Tabomne and Baldocchino, 2003), I argue that generally, less entrepreneurial activity will occur in economies that place greater administrative burdens on businesses. I also argue that the entrepreneurial culture within economies is reduced when burdens fetter entrepreneurial activity. On a more positive note, I advance the claim that the entrepreneurial motivation is a useful tool that can overcome burdens- when

entrepreneurs are highly motivated, they are able to stave off burdens. Using data- on a panel of 40 countries from 2016 to 2018- from the World Bank's Doing Business Index (DBI), the Global Entrepreneurship and Development Institute's Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEI) as well as the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), the study finds support for all hypotheses.

This study is relevant to the public administration scholarship firstly because burdens are levied by public administrators. The practice of public administration benefits from a deeper understanding of how actions that originate within its domain have rippling consequences for external (business) domains. Furthermore, democracy is an important domain for public administration. The direct effect that burdens have on entrepreneurial activity as well as its indirect effect on entrepreneurial culture has consequences for democracy.

There is a methodological contribution to be found in this study's use of a new approach- and dataset- to studying administrative burdens. Firstly, instead of the use of program take-up to study burdens, this study employs the use of actual burdens faced by the business community. This paper draws conclusion from data at three levels: the macro level (countries), the meso level (businesses), and the micro level (entrepreneurs). The paper therefore makes a methodological contribution by examining the effects of how burdens levied at the meso and macro level have micro-level implications and ramifications.

Theoretically, this study moves our focus beyond individuals being victims of administrative burdens but to now show how these individuals play a part in reducing burdens by their mere resilience. Finally, this study examines the intersection between

administrative burdens, entrepreneurial culture and entrepreneurial motivation, concepts that have been researched but hitherto, largely disconnected within the literature. In addition, while the extant scholarship shows entrepreneurial culture as a determinant of entrepreneurial activity (Azzaoui, 2021; Kao, 1993; Yusof et al., 2017; Alaei, 2011; Aryana et al, 2017), I move that further to show the reverse; that entrepreneurial activity is a determinant of entrepreneurial culture. Taken together with the currently scholarship, I show that there is a symbiotic relationship between entrepreneurial culture and entrepreneurial activity.

In the succeeding sections, I will endeavor to first set forth the literature on administrative burdens and how it intersects with the business literature to support my hypotheses. I will then provide details on the nature of the dataset and the source of the data. This will be followed by the findings, discussion and conclusion, where implications for practice and future research will be outlined.

### **4.3 The Study Context**

I drew from a three-year panel ('16 to '18) of forty (40) countries. The dataset has at least one country from each continent. Even though the panel was selected based on the data availability, as I will later show, the sampled countries are diverse in the size, population, and socioeconomic status absolve the study from statistical biases. Using a global dataset therefore means that the findings of this study are best read as starting points to more detailed and intricate research programs on burdens. Undoubtedly, this broad scope provides us with a general idea of how administrative burden unfold globally.

Theoretically, the study is situated in a public administration/business context. The intermingling of disciplines in research is the true venue for knowledge creation and producing interesting findings. The intersection of the fields of public administration and business has produced scholarship ranging from the merits of collaborative governance in policy formation (Kim and Barnall, 2015), to scholarship on the PA/Business importance to governance (Morcol and Wolf, 2010), and even policymakers' contemplation on the role of business improvement districts as a driver of civic capacity that eventually make communities work better (Banyan, 2008).

The context of this intersection is therefore important to public administrators for many reasons. The goals and interest of public administrators are often antithetical to those of the business (Warburg, 2015). Public administrators are the boundary-spanners of government and so are at the vanguard of this often-tempestuous relation with business. More research is therefore needed to not only understand the nature of this relationship but to also discover ways to make it work better (Warburg, 2015).

## **4.4 Literature Review**

### **4.4.1 Administrative Burdens at a Conceptual Glance**

Administrative burden refers to the costs associated with interacting with the state and its agencies (Burden et al., 2012; Herd & Moynihan, 2019; Moynihan, Herd, & Harvey, 2015). Put simply, by Heinrich (2016), administrative burdens refer to onerous encounters that unfold at the level of policy implementation.

Moynihan et al. (2015) posit that burdens are experienced as a manifestation of one or more of three costs: compliance costs, learning costs and psychological costs.

Learning costs are encountered when those seeking to access government services must expend additional excessive time and effort to edify themselves of the processes, eligibility rules, and requirements needed to access these services (Burden et al., 2012).

Psychological costs are experienced when the processes to receive state resources result in the stigmatization, discrimination, or embarrassment of those seeking to use these resources. Welfare applicants standing in long lines along the thoroughfares waiting to enter the welfare office is an example of a psychological cost that applicants have to face while trying to access welfare (Burden et al., 2012). Moynihan et al. (2015) note that any process of interacting with the state becomes psychologically costly when it begins to rob the applicant of their sense of autonomy, self-dignity, or it begins to levy excessive stress.

The third and final prong of administrative burdens is the compliance costs. These refer to the onerous regulations and rules that one must undergo in order to successfully acquire government products and services. Lengthy and time-consuming applications, numerous required documentations, numerous specificities regarding quality of documents, as well excessive standards and compliances to be met.

Defining administrative burden in context of business require deeper attention. Burdens placed on businesses are often understood as requirements that go beyond the spirit of what is legally required for business compliance (Ntaliani and Costopoulou, 2017). Compliance costs for example are understood as unproductive compliance requirements that deviate business resources away from actual activities that improve business outcomes (Crain and Crain, 2020). Doherty (2012) notes that administrative burdens in the business context are those costs that businesses would not have to bear if

they were not legally obligated to do so (Kotnik et al. 2020). Some of these burdens include the cost that are related to recordkeeping, information gathering, and the capital a business may expend to ensure that it stays compliant with government regulations (Bradford, 2004). In Mozambique, for example, a business owner must pay US\$256 and maneuver 19 procedures across 149 business days in order to start a business (Djankov, et al., 2002).

#### **4.4.2 The nuances of burdens placed on businesses**

We know that not all burdens placed on businesses originate from bad intentions or have negative outcomes. We know that burdens are often levied in order to curtail corporate abuse or business/private activities that fetter the public good (Kotnik et al., 2020). In the context of business, burdens are therefore often intentionally levied by governments for the purposes of engineering democratic outcomes. For example, some burdens on businesses reduce monopolies thereby achieving greater democratic values such as equity and trust in markets (Hodgson, 2009). Other burdens are levied in order to shape the activities and motivations of business operators in ways that best serves societal values and norms (Lang, 2003). Governments may levy reporting requirements and tougher specifications on businesses to ensure that they are producing and distributing food that is safe and that meets the expectations of citizens (Barling and Lang, 2003; Lang, 2003).

We also know that size matters in this context. Burdens placed on businesses have the potential to facilitate the creation of new market opportunities for upcoming businesses (Edwards et al., 2003). Small businesses' unwillingness to invest in workforce training or to formalize certain business processes can make them less innovative and

therefore less profitable (Grimshaw and Carroll, 2006). Administrative burdens have to potential to correct some of these ills and produce positive outcomes for these small businesses (Kitching et al., 2015). Environmental regulations have the potential to prompt innovation among smaller business if they intend to be competitive (Vickers and Cordey-Hayes, 2004). While larger business may see excessive and detailed employment regulations as unnecessary and burdensome, smaller businesses may appreciate this as forms of clarification and providing guidelines that help them to overcome learning costs (Blackburn and Hart, 2002). Additionally, increased information requirements can force smaller businesses to develop better information management strategies that may benefit their business operations over the long term (Kitching, 2006). Tabone & Baldocchino (2003) found that requiring small businesses to provide additional documentations for statutory audit resulted in greater fiscal discipline by these smaller firms which eventually improved their financial efficacy. Further, by requiring businesses to provide information on business processes and regulations, information requirements often prompt small business owners to formalize human resource management procedures that can eventually aid in business efficacy, personnel management and even avoidance of lawsuits (Edwards et al. 2003).

Size also matters in another dimension. Bigger corporations are often better prepared to deal with administrative burdens than smaller firms (Dixon et al. 2006). The literature on regulatory capture by businesses points to businesses influencing government regulatory policy in ways that serve their own interests and give them an advantage in their respective markets (Etzioni, 2009; Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Shapiro, 2012). Over 81% of those that tried to influence the US government on

environmental policies were businesses (Furlong, 2005), while almost half of the total lobbyists of Congress are businesses (Baumgartner and Leech, 2001). Larger firms have more resources and more experience in the market to be able to withstand the pressures of administrative burdens or to avoid them altogether. Larger firms not only have resources to overcome burdens, but they actively support the deployment of burdens that will keep smaller firms from entering the industry (Dean et al., 2000; Hopkins, 1995; Bradford, 2004). In the environmental industry for example, it is more difficult for new firms to enter the industry. Larger firms do not advocate for reducing these burdens since they have learned the most cost-effective and efficient ways to escape these burdens (Dixon et al., 2006; Dean et al., 2000).

Levy (2020) suggests that size also matters for industry-specific experiences of administrative burden. Burdens on businesses are experienced differently based on the industry and the size of the businesses within that industry. For example, businesses will support burdens if their support for the burdens will give them marketing capital in the given industry. This behavior is found to be more prevalent among larger corporations. For example, car manufacturers will support environment-related regulations so that they may position a “green” image to customers (Levy, 2020).

There are also nuances in the direct impact of administrative burden. Burdens placed on businesses produce different outcomes at different levels of intensity. While entrepreneurs may be willing and capable to tolerate lower levels of burden, tolerance becomes less likely at higher levels of burden, especially for smaller firms (Arrowsmith et al., 2003).

#### **4.4.3 Administrative Burdens, Doing Business, Local Investment**

Administrative burdens have consequences for entrepreneurial activity. Increasing the time and cost associated with registering a business will reduce the number of start-ups (Branstetter et al., 2013). Evidence from Mexico shows that a reduction in registration burden not only led to increases in new business creation but also job creation that results from new business activity (Bruhn, 2011). Placing too many burdens on businesses can therefore create viscous cycles. The negative effect of burdens can cause economic downturn which further creates unhealthy environments for entrepreneurial growth. Placing burdens on businesses can reduce economic prosperity; a 25% reduction in burdens on businesses in the European Union countries has a positive effect of 1.62% economic growth (Poel, Marneffe, Bielen, Aarle, & Vereeck, 2014). Correspondingly, in the United States, a percentage increase in burdens on businesses was associated with a 0.26% decrease in capital productivity in the economy (Dawson, 2007). Haidar (2012) finds that with the shedding of each administrative burden on businesses, GDP increases by 0.15%. These unfavorable economic environments result in further reduction in entrepreneurial activity by making the business environment unhealthy for entrepreneurial activity. Burdens associated with paying taxes can have serious implications on growth and ultimately, development of businesses. With increased burdens, businesses face serious threats to stability and profitability, especially since most burdens are mandatory inescapable processes for businesses wishing to remain compliant.

When business owners decide to invest in an economy, they often seek to understand the barriers/burdens to doing business in that economy (Waller, Williams,

Hawthorne, & Johnson, 2018). Investors are less likely to invest in economies that are laden with too many administrative burdens (Corcoran & Gillanders, 2015; Piwonski, 2010). Local investors and prospective entrepreneurs are less likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities where the business environment is saturated with burdens (Eifert, 2007; Djankov, McLeish & Ramalho, 2006; Djankov, et al., 2002). Piwonski (2010) examined this from the perspective of external investors and found that if an economy moves up only a single rank on the Doing Business Index, that economy's FDI can increase to up to USD \$44Million. Investors are generally in favor of less impediments to their business operations. Impediments are often costly which results in more expenditure of businesses and ultimately narrows price margins. Despite the nuanced effects of burden, entrepreneurs are generally unsupportive of burdens that fetter their own business success. Investors are rational actors who seek to maximize their gains. They are, therefore, expected to be less likely to invest in economies that have higher administrative burdens that have the potential to affect their own businesses.

H<sub>1</sub>: Countries that place greater administrative burdens on businesses will have less entrepreneurial activity




Figure 3: Hypothetical Path

#### **4.4.4 Entrepreneurial Culture, Motivation and Administrative Burdens**

The effect of administrative burden is so powerful that it has the potential to even reduce entrepreneurial culture. The culture of a society shapes entrepreneurship within that society (Hayton, George & Zahra, 2002). An entrepreneurial culture is one in which the beliefs cultural norms and values of a people promote entrepreneurial activity and are conducive to entrepreneurial behavior (Bogenhold et al., 2016; Azzaoui, 2021).

Entrepreneurial culture is one in which there is a system of shared beliefs and norms that encourage creativity and creative people, promoting innovation and seizing market opportunities in order to ensure socioeconomic survival, tackle environmental uncertainty, and neutralize competitors' threats (Beugelsdijk, 2010; Shah et al., 2019).

Having more burdens in a business sector, reduces a people's cultural inclination towards entrepreneurship (Cruz e Silva 2018). Countries- such as Belgium- that place heavier burdens on businesses, rank lower on the entrepreneurial culture spectrum (Cruz e Silva, 2018). For example, Belgian businesses have excessive legislative requirements that are perceived to be useless, complicated and time-consuming (Doherty, 2012). The complexity of legislative requirements places considerable learning costs on businesses as they try to remain compliant.

However, burdens abrogate the entrepreneurial culture within an economy only after it has first crippled entrepreneurial activity. Tax administrative burden have been proven to reduce peoples' impetus for entrepreneurship within their cultural milieu (Braunerhjelm, Eklund, & Thulin, 2019).

The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recounts the damage done by earthquakes in Haiti and cites that despites widespread

devastation, the entrepreneurial motivation, cultural beliefs, values and practices centered on community, were important resources in rebuilding a sense of community and socioeconomic stability. Their aim was to demonstrate how culture is a tool that can be used to protect whatsoever the culture represent (UNESCO, 2019).

Entrepreneurial culture is as a crucial product of entrepreneurial activity (Waller et al. 2018). The authors draw our attention to the power of a culture of entrepreneurship amongst a people and how entrepreneurial culture is woven into the fabric of business development; that entrepreneurial culture is driven by the presence and furtherance of entrepreneurial activity. A threat to entrepreneurial activity is therefore expected to threaten entrepreneurial culture. This idea is not foreign to public administration. Cultural organizations' adoption and implementation of cultural policies has been proven to enhance the innovation and economic viability of these organization (Vicente, Camarero, & Garrido, 2012).

Waller et al. (2018) applied a qualitative methodology in studying business activity which revealed that despite the mounting challenges/burdens to doing business in a country, business activity can flourish as a result of the culture of entrepreneurship which exists amongst the people due to prolonged business activities in formal and informal markets. Entrepreneurial culture is impacted upon by the internal and external environmental within which it operates (Shah et al., 2019). The entrepreneurial culture of an entity is therefore expected to be impacted upon by the kind of entrepreneurial activity within its environment. The more business activity takes place in diverse and numerous forms, the stronger a culture of entrepreneurship is established within that economy. Diversity gives rise to new ideas and solutions, especially when they intersect. The

current culture in the tech industry where companies believe and orient their processes around providing more user-friendly and agile technologies is arguably partly due to the fact that other firms in the tech industry has seen massive rewards for this kind of business activity. Danish et al. (2019) finds that innovation and creativity amongst existing business activity impacts upon entrepreneurial culture.

I also draw on Jaeger and Breen's (2016) theorizing on cultural reproduction where they outline that a culture is best sustained and reproduced in context where the culture itself is pervasive. We therefore expect that entrepreneurial culture is best preserved in context of high entrepreneurial activity; thereby showing that entrepreneurial activity is a cornerstone factor affecting entrepreneurial culture. An entrepreneurial culture will thrive best when the current entrepreneurial activities facilitate a market within which that culture can survive. As depicted in in Figure 3, we can therefore expect that a reduction in entrepreneurial activity will lead to a reduction It therefore stands to reason that if entrepreneurial activity is depleted, soon, the culture of entrepreneurship will also deplete.

H<sub>2</sub>: When administrative burdens cause a reduction in entrepreneurial activity it results in a reduction in entrepreneurial culture

The field of behavioral economics also provide some useful lessons on burden. Individuals' inclination to overcome burdens is also a factor of how they perceive probability and risk (Shafir, 2013). People are willing to endure burdens for things they are motivated by or have reason to value. It is not unreasonable to conclude that a person who underestimates the risks of bad health would be less likely to spend an extra hour in a shopping line to acquire newly released/upgraded fitness gear. The probability of

receiving a benefit is a strong motivation to tolerate administrative burdens (Shafir, 2013).

The *ordeal mechanism*, a body of scholarship from the field of economics is also instructive in this regard. This perspective holds that as rational, utility-maximizing beings, humans who are motivated towards a particular end, will endure the obstacles required to achieve that end/goal (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982). Motivation is therefore expected to yield results as a burden-toleration tool.

When entrepreneurs are more motivated, they tend to do better in their business ventures (Collins, C., Locke, E., 2000; Johnson, 1990; Shane, Locke, & Collins, 2012). Motivated entrepreneurs have a stronger need for achievement (Collins, C., Locke, E., 2000; Johnson, 1990; Shane et al., 2012), are more risk-taking (Babb & Babb, 1992; Begley, 1995; Sarasvathy, Simon, & Lave, 1998), have more tolerance of ambiguity (Begley & Boyd, 1987; Schere, 1982), have a stronger locus of control (Bowen & Hisrich, 1986), have stronger drive (Tosi, Locke, & Latham, 1991) and more passion (Robert Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001). As depicted as path H<sub>3</sub> in Figure 3, I argue that these traits enable them to be able to stave off administrative challenges that may threaten their entrepreneurial success. Shane et al. (2012) argue that entrepreneurs' need for achievement allows them to withstand challenges and become successful in their business efforts. This indicates that motivation enables entrepreneurs to become resilient and more likely to succeed in the field than those who are less motivated.

H<sub>3</sub> When entrepreneurs are highly motivated, administrative burdens will have a lesser effect on entrepreneurial activity

## 4.5 Methods

In this section, I set out to examine the effect that administrative burdens have on entrepreneurial activity, and further, the effect that entrepreneurial motivation has on reducing burdens. Finally, I expect that the effect that burdens have on entrepreneurial activity can affect entrepreneurial culture and so that relationship will also be examined in this chapter.

### 4.5.1 Data and Modeling

The data used in this study come from several sources. The World Bank, The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and the Global Entrepreneurship and Development Institute are the three major data sources from which the main variables were drawn. The data cover forty (40) countries from 2016 to 2018 resulting, for a total of 120 observations. One salient benefit that accrues from constructing a dataset from multiple sources is that the possibility of common source bias is mitigated, or even completely diminished thereby improving the reliability of the data.

The countries in this sample are diverse in several areas This makes for more generalizable findings and theorizing. As shown in Table 13 the 40 countries in this sample have an average population 112 million people with an average 57% employment rate (ranging from 38% to 87%) and an average of 67% (ranging from 15% to 96%) of its labor force being skilled. The countries have an average GDP of US\$2.8 Trillion (from a minimum of \$0.03 trillion to a maximum of \$21.2 trillion). The countries in the sample rank between 26 to 89 in the Corruption Perception Index<sup>1</sup> and have income inequality

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<sup>1</sup> Scale of 0 to 100 where 0 = highly corrupt and 100 = very clean

ranging from 0.6 to 0.9 based on the Human Development Index<sup>2</sup>. An average 69% of the populations of these countries believe that entrepreneurs in their countries receive a high status; there were countries recording percentage as low as 43% and countries with a high of 88% of its population sharing this view.

To capture the moderating effect that entrepreneurial motivation has on the relationship between burden and entrepreneurial activity, I interact the motivation measure with the burden measure. I include year fixed effects to account for unobserved changes over time. To account for the idiosyncratic features of each country, state fixed effects were used in every model. By holding time-invariant factors/variables constant, fixed effects modeling is particularly useful for its ability to estimate effect changes overtime within the same country rather than between different countries (Hsiao, 2003). I use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors for its capacity to deal with issues of cross-sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation that are frequent issues when using panel data.

Entrepreneurial activity is not only a factor of the number of burdens placed on businesses. Accordingly, a suite of country-level variables was included as controls (Bryan and Jenkins, 2013; Moreno-Serra & Smith, 2015) in the models to account for other plausible explanations of entrepreneurial activity. A country's GDP may affect entrepreneurial activity in an economy (Fritsch, 2008) and so it was included as a control variable. The same is true for entrepreneurship education (Laukkanen, 2010), perceived success in business (Dimov, 2010), income inequality (Bapuji and Neville, 2015), and

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<sup>2</sup> A Scale ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 corresponds with perfect equality (where everyone has the same income) and 1 corresponds with perfect inequality (where one person has all the income—and everyone else has no income)

employment rate (Fritsch et al., 2015). Fritsch et al. (2015), for example, finds that there is a positive relationship between unemployment rates and entrepreneurial activity, thereby underscoring the importance of controlling for this variable.

#### **4.5.2 Measures**

*Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurial Activity.* The Global Entrepreneurship and Development Institute (GEDI) produces the Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEI) which measures entrepreneurial dimensions across 137 countries. I use the GEI as a proxy to measure entrepreneurial activity. The GEI is comprised of three sub-indexes: the Attitudes Index, which measures citizens attitudes towards entrepreneurship, the Abilities Index, which measures citizens perception of their ability to function in the entrepreneurial space given the existing structures, and the Aspiration Index, which measures citizens desire of entrepreneurial success.

We know that if people have a positive attitude towards entrepreneurship it will translate to entrepreneurial activity (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Caliendo et al., 2009; Ozgen and Baron, 2007; McMullen and Sheperd, 2006; Bandura, 1986). We also know that where people are equipped with entrepreneurial abilities, it often translates into actual entrepreneurial activity (McMullen et al, 2007; Coad and Rao, 2008; Levie and Autio, 2008; Schumpeter, 1996). Finally, we know that where people have strong aspirations to engage in entrepreneurship, it translates into entrepreneurial activity (Deeds, 2001; Stam and Wennberg, 2009; Clercq et al, 2005; Sapienza et al., 2006). Combining these three indexes makes the GEI a good indicator of entrepreneurial activity. Given the theoretical link between these pillars and entrepreneurial activity, we

can reasonably expect that when persons have positive *attitude* towards entrepreneurship, possess the characteristics and *abilities* of an entrepreneur, and have the *aspirations* to be an entrepreneur, entrepreneurial activity will be an outcome.

The GEI measures these three pillars and produce scores. Higher scores indicate a higher presence of the respective entrepreneurial dimensions (attitudes, abilities, aspirations). Combining the three pillars in to a single score produces the penultimate GEI score which I use as a proxy for entrepreneurial activity. Higher GEI scores therefore indicate higher levels of entrepreneurial activity

*Independent Variable: Administrative Burdens.* Administrative burden faced by businesses is measured by using the World Bank’s ten (10) dimensions of doing business that are measured in their publicly available dataset and annual report. The Doing Business Index (DBI) ranks and provides scores for 190 countries across the following dimensions: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering a property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency. The information used in the DBI comes from 18,493 “local experts, including lawyers, business consultants, accountants, freight forwarders, government officials and other professionals routinely administering or advising on legal and regulatory requirements” (World Bank, 2020).

The DBI Index was chosen because of its capacity to measure actual burdens faced by businesses- a measurement power that is limited in the burden scholarship, since most studies on burdens rely on proxy measures (Herd and Moynihan, 2015). “Getting Electricity” for example, reflects a number of sub-dimensions that captures the total

number of procedures (compliance costs), the total number of required documentation (compliance costs) as well as the total number of time that entrepreneurs spend in government processes (psychological costs) in order to acquire electricity at their business premises (World Bank, 2019). A similar lens is applied in measuring the other 10 dimensions. World Bank (2019) provides a detailed information of how scores are calculated.

The DBI ranks countries on each dimension and provide an overall doing business score for each country. The overall score was used in this paper. This DBI score ranges from 0 to 100 where 0 represents the worst performing economies and 100 represents the best performing ones. The Doing Business Index has been used in over 100 academic papers in top 50 Journals worldwide (World Bank, 2019) and in a number of studies where scholars, for example, studied the effects of specific dimensions such as starting a business (Herrendorf & Teixeira, 2011; Munemo, 2014) and paying taxes (Bayer & Cowell, 2009; Fisman & Svensson, 2007).

*Independent Variable- Entrepreneurial Culture.* The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is the single largest, and globally recognized database that measures a variety of components of entrepreneurial activity (Bergmann, Mueller, & Schrettle, 2014; Reynolds, Hay, & Camp, 1999). The data has been used to reliably study the relationship between economic growth and entrepreneurship (Reynolds et al., 1999) as well as to catalyze evidence-based policies surrounding entrepreneurship. This study is focused on GEM's Motivational Index (the measure for Entrepreneurial Motivation) and the Culture Index (the measure for Entrepreneurial Culture).

The Cultural and Social Norms Index (Culture Index) measures the extent to which social and cultural norms encourage or allow actions leading to new business methods or activities that can potentially increase personal wealth and income. This index is taken from the GEM's National Expert Survey (NES) which captures the responses of at least 36 experts in each country in order to make this determination. The scale is transformed to ultimately range from a low of 0 to a high of 1. Countries with a score of 1 are perceived to have a higher entrepreneurial culture.

In generating this index, entrepreneurial experts were asked to indicate their agreement with the following statements: In my country, the national culture is highly supportive of individual success achieved through own personal efforts; In my country, national culture encourages entrepreneurial risk taking; In my country, national culture encourages entrepreneurial creativity and innovativeness.

*Moderating Variable- Entrepreneurial Motivation.* The Motivational Index is taken from the GEM's Adult Population Survey (APS), which captures the views of at least 2000 adult entrepreneurs in each country. The index uses an instrument to measure the extent to which entrepreneurs are improvement-driven and opportunity- motivated towards entrepreneurship. Multiple variables were used to establish the motivation index. Entrepreneurs were asked to indicate the extent to which they were motivated to participate in entrepreneurship because of the desire to earn a living because jobs are scarce; build great wealth or high income; make a difference in the world; or continue a family tradition. These variables were combined and then expressed as a ratio of the total early-stage entrepreneurs. The motivation index is therefore an expression of the improvement and opportunity drivers for entrepreneurs among emerging entrepreneurs.

*Control variables.* The level of entrepreneurial education within any given economy is expected to affect entrepreneurial activity and so it was controlled for. Additionally, citizens' perception that they will succeed at entrepreneurial activity is expected to affect the likelihood of them engaging in the activity. To account for the socioeconomic differences within countries that may have an effect on entrepreneurial activity, countries' GDP, income inequality and employment rate were included as controls. Because Fixed-Effects modelling hold unobserved effects between states constant and focuses on the changes within a state over time, an elaborate list of control variables is not needed in this type of modelling.

#### **4.6 Results**

In this section, I use a series of fixed-effects models to analyze the moderating effect of entrepreneurs' motivation on administrative burdens. I also test the effect that burdens have on entrepreneurial activity. I go further to examine how the effect of burdens on entrepreneurial culture is mediated by its negative effect on entrepreneurial activity. This mediation was also tested using a series of fixed effects models instead of a structural equation model (SEM). Despite the benefits of the SEM, using a series of regressions was more feasible in this case for two reasons. Firstly, the SEM is sensitive to too many control variables and this study requires some control variables to rule out alternative explanations. Secondly, to leverage the benefits of the panel nature of the data, I used fixed effects models for each path of the mediation.

Correlational statistics presented at Table 8 reveal that the variable "income inequality" is moderately correlated with three independent variables (Administrative

burdens and Entrepreneurial culture). Removing this variable from the models did not change the findings so it was retained. Further, inter-collinearity usually leads to the underestimation of true effects, which, however, does not seem to be a problem since these results do not present null findings. Furthermore, the Driskoll-Kraay Standard Error was used for its unique capability to deal with issues of collinearity, heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence.

*Table 8: Correlational Statistics*

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) Entrepreneurial Activity	1.000								
(2) Admin Burden	0.789	1.000							
(3) Entrep. Motivation	0.553	0.499	1.000						
(4) Entrep. Culture	0.859	0.623	0.532	1.000					
(5) Entrep. Success	0.240	0.106	0.189	0.313	1.000				
(6) Entrep. Education	0.148	0.087	0.205	0.173	0.035	1.000			
(7) GDP	0.146	0.128	-0.030	-0.040	-0.092	0.071	1.000		
(8) Income Inequality	0.784	0.643	0.452	0.647	0.063	0.005	-0.057	1.000	
(9) Employment p/c	0.233	0.240	0.303	0.380	0.174	0.503	0.150	0.032	1.000

The effect that administrative burdens have on the entrepreneurial activity is consistent across all models as shown in Table 9. This is a demonstration of robust findings. Model 1 shows the main effect without controls, Model 2 shows the main effect with controls, and model 3 (Full Model) shows the main effects, the controls and the moderating effect. The findings bear evidence to support the first hypothesis that when administrative burdens are high, there is a reduction in the entrepreneurial activity within the respective economies.

The findings further indicate support for the motivation hypothesis. While administrative burdens reduce entrepreneurial activity, if entrepreneurs are motivated, the negative effect that administrative burdens have on business activity is reduced. Put differently, administrative burdens will deter business activity more, when entrepreneurs are not motivated.

*Table 9: Effects on entrepreneurial activity*

Entrepreneurial Activity	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<b>Main Independent Variable</b>			
Administrative Burden	-.444* (.129)	-.256* (.173)	-0.262 (.170)
<b>Moderating Variable</b>			
Motivation-Burden			.024** (.0043)
<b>Business-Rebated Controls</b>			
Entrepreneurial Motivation		.278 (.184)	.170 (.204)
Entrepreneurial Culture		30.27** (4.354)	31.771** (4.418)
Perceived Entrp. Success		.197** (.028)	.196* (.034)
Entrepreneurial Education		-1.936 (1.456)	-1.840 (1.443)
<b>Socioeconomic Controls</b>			
Gross Domestic Product		-1.370 (5.721)	-.690 (5.796)
Income Inequality		-143.320 (123.119)	-148.358 (122.038)
Employment Per Capita		-.0003 (0.140)	-0.016 (0.120)
Constant	79.09** (8.908)	169.416 (82.670)	152.324 (80.947)
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YS
Adjusted R-Squared	.1750	.4179	.4213
Observations	120	120	120
Number of groups	40	40	40

Notes: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. The motivation and administrative burden variables have been mean-centered in the interaction models.

These findings suggest that motivation is part of the antidote to the debilitating effects of administrative burden. Importantly however, though motivation reduces the negative effect the burdens have on the entrepreneurial activity, it does not totally obliterate it. The marginal effects plot at Figure 4 shows that as entrepreneurs become more motivated, the negative effect of administrative burdens reduces (or becomes less negative). However, this effect is still negative which means that though motivation is weakening the effects of administrative burdens, these burdens still have a negative impact. On one hand this provides evidence of the positive role that motivation can play in aiding entrepreneurs to be able to tolerate burdens. On the other hand, it shows how powerful burdens are; that even in the presence of burden-reducing solutions, administrative burden is still able to reduce entrepreneurial activity.





Figure 4: Marginal Effects Plot- Moderating Effect of Motivation

There is support for hypothesis 3 regarding the effect that administrative burdens have on entrepreneurial culture. The findings indicate that administrative burdens reduce entrepreneurial culture, but that effect is completely mediated by entrepreneurial activity. While administrative burdens deter the entrepreneurial activity, that deterrence feedback onto entrepreneurial culture negatively by weakening the culture of entrepreneurship among people within economies. As shown in Figure 5, burdens have a negative total effect on entrepreneurial culture. While the entrepreneurial activity boosts entrepreneurial culture, burdens deplete the entrepreneurial activity thereby creating a negative total effect of burdens on entrepreneurial culture.



*C = Total Effect*  
*C' = Direct Effect*

*Figure 5: Path Model- Mediating Effect of Entrepreneurial Activity*

#### 4.7 Discussion

The current findings provide very useful lessons for the field of public administration insofar as our understandings of the effect of burdens on businesses are concerned. I must endeavor to stress the importance of public administration as a major pillar in any democratic society (Brugué & Gallego, 2003) yet it finds itself in a paradoxical entanglement with burdens. Administrative agencies are the sources of these

burdens, yet they are the source from which the burdened seek liberation from burden. Admittedly, not all burdens are bad. Some are engineered to serve democratic interests. If nothing else, these findings indicate that administrative agencies should begin to rethink and retool burdens. Burdens that block unwanted actions and burdens that are blockades to legitimate actions should be of concern for researchers and practitioners in the field.

The work of previous scholars regarding the deleterious effect that burdens have on attracting foreign direct investment (Corcoran & Gillanders, 2015; Piwonski, 2010) is documented with copious record. Administrative burdens weaken entrepreneurial activity. The effects of administrative burdens are so powerful that they deter both local and foreign investment. It is not surprising that if taxation burdens alone can rob citizens a total of 6.7 billion hours annually (Sunstein, 2013), rob a single small business 218 hours (World Bank, 2014), and an accumulated value of \$1.2 billion annually (Benzarti & Carloni, 2019) then a whole battery of burdens is powerful enough to deter any entrepreneurial activity in the industry.

Entrepreneurial activity is linked to democratic outcomes (Audretsch & Moog, 2020). The negative effect that burdens have on the entrepreneurial activity can have even greater implications for socioeconomic development and the preservation of democracies. One function of a democracy is to ensure that citizens have access to the means to improve the quality of their lives through adequate healthcare, jobs, and social services (Hacker and Pierson, 2016). The provision of these things depends heavily upon a functioning economy. A vibrant business sector is one factor of bolstering economic growth (Foster et al., 2008), social and economic inclusion (Hughes et al, 2012), and the furtherance of social goals (Saebi et al., 2019). Democracy is premised on the idea of free

will and the ability of people to choose and exercise their volitions (Frankfurt, 1971; Arendt, 2003). Entrepreneurship is the very expression of right to choose since diversity and innovation in business outcomes provide citizens with these choices. The business community also plays a compensatory role in providing public services that ensures the stability of democracy. During the coronavirus pandemic, General Motors' provision of ventilators was very instrumental in the United States' fight against the virus (Wayland, 2020). Audretsch & Moog (2020) also link entrepreneurship to the act of holding government accountable, which is a feature of any democracy. The autonomy that the business sector has acquired, allows it to effectively check government action and lobby government especially in times when government action becomes too oppressive.

Public administrators have a duty to secure the stability of the state through proper policy execution. They are the conduit through which the social contract between the state and citizens is maintained and democratic values are furthered (Brugué & Gallego, 2003). By reducing entrepreneurial activity in an economy, the administrative burdens levied by bureaucrats can, by extension, reduce the positive impact that entrepreneurial activity has on other outcomes such as entrepreneurial culture, economic development (Poel et al. 2014; Daswon, 2007) and socioeconomic wellbeing of citizens (Sarubbi & Pingel, 2018; Burden et al., 2012).

The effect that burdens wield is iterative, and it ripples throughout the administrative state, further underscoring its powerful effect. Scholars should therefore begin to expand knowledge on the feedback effect or any direct effect of administrative burdens. Burdens have shown themselves to be so powerful that they are able to catalyze stimuli throughout systems and structures within which they are introduced. The real

challenge however is that public administrative agencies should act in the name of the people. These agencies should therefore rarely ever find themselves at a place where their actions have dire consequences for citizens- especially in ways that cannot be sufficiently justified.

The effect that burdens have on entrepreneurial culture has significant implications for human development and the sustenance of the economic benefits of a vibrant business sector. Waller et al. (2018) underscores the importance of entrepreneurial culture by noting that it is the lifeblood of the business sector of many countries. Chakraborty et al. (2016) refers to entrepreneurial culture as the “spirit” of entrepreneurship. Whenever there is a vibrant culture of entrepreneurship, even in when the business sector experiences periods of downturn, the presence of an entrepreneurial culture is the ‘insurance policy’ that will ensure a rebound of entrepreneurial vibrance. A threat to this entrepreneurial culture is therefore detrimental to the prosperity of any economy.

Taken broadly, burdens’ negative effect on entrepreneurship can have consequences for human and economic development. Entrepreneurial activity in an economy signals an increase in the quality of the human resource stock of a country (Twyford, Alagaraja and Shuck, 2016; Barrett and Mayson, 2007). The prosperity of the business sector in any economy is crucial for the provision of jobs. Businesses also contribute to the provision of social services through corporate social responses. The prosperity of the business sector also provides strength to the economy and is also a source of revenue that contributes to the funding the mandate of government administrative agencies. When businesses within an economy thrive, more new local

businesses begin to emerge, and the more likely human development will also rise as a result of the economic benefits of new businesses. New jobs for citizens, more revenue in taxes for government, more corporate social responsibility and overall, an opportunity for more citizens to improve their standard of living resulting from the jobs made available (UNDP, 2011; Canzanelli, 2001; Twyford, Alagaraja and Shuck, 2016; Barrett and Mayson, 2007).

In the midst of these unpleasant effects of burdens, public administrators must harken to the evidence found in this study that these burdens can be reduced where persons are highly motivated. Highly motivated entrepreneurs have a greater tolerance for ambiguity (Begley and Boyd, 1987). This particular trait may enable them to hurdle over learning costs by being more tolerant of the complicated and ambiguous information that government publish. Additionally, a strong locus of control can also enable entrepreneurs to be able to be tolerant of psychological costs and compliance costs. Entrepreneurs with a strong locus of control coupled by a strong drive have a firmer grip on their activities and are highly focused on the outcomes. Their fixation on the outcomes and its benefits may enable motivated entrepreneurs to pay less attention to the mountain of paperwork or the psychologically stressful situations that accompany the process, and push through to establish their businesses and engage in entrepreneurial activity. While burdens may be everywhere, the motivation that emanates from within burden-bearers is a powerful tool of resilience towards, and tolerance of administrative burdens. An important question to be answered by public administrators, therefore, is how administrative sciences can be organized to allow those interacting with government, to become empowered enough to maneuver burdens.

While this paper is limited by the use of macro-level aggregates, the benefit to be found in the cross-country comparison that prevails over this limitation. Moynihan (2018) laments that the PA scholarship has become too beholden to micro-level analysis which has resulted in the scholarship ignoring the big questions in the field; big questions that we often have to answer by connecting the literature in a multidisciplinary way. Further, this study coalesces the micro and macro level into a seamless cocktail by showing how micro effects of entrepreneurial motivation can affect macro-outcomes. The common-source bias that may result from the exclusion of confounding factors may have also been a limit on this paper. To neutralize this limitation, year fixed-effects as well as time-fixed effects were used to control for the unique confounding factors that are constant overtime and unique to each state. I also include a number of control variables that are expected to vary overtime in each country.

Additionally, while I take advantage of the statistical power of panel data analysis, limitations on data availability has restricted this panel to only three (3) years. Notwithstanding this, the panel was balanced (across 40 countries) and produced significant results for all hypotheses. We generally expect that larger panels yield much more variation that is needed to produce significant results. However, the fact that a three-year panel yields significant results is an indication that these findings are robust.

#### **4.8 Conclusion**

Tilting the focus away from the micro level to the meso level, this paper examines the impact of administrative burdens in a more categorical sense. This paper takes a

broader view on administrative burdens and so is not intended to provide lessons for specific industries. The findings are consequential insofar as they sharpen our understandings of the experiences that entrepreneurs face with burdens and the manner in which people (specifically entrepreneurs) are able to tolerate/cope with burdens. The paper examines the effect that burdens have on the entrepreneurial activity and how that further affects entrepreneurial culture. Finally, from a solution-oriented ethos, the paper examines the ways in which burden bearers can be more tolerant of burdens, thereby neutralizing their effects.

The findings reveal that the more burdens governments place on businesses, the less likely businesses will thrive. Further, this creates a negative feedback which depletes entrepreneurial culture- a fundamental ingredient to the preservation of a vibrant business ecosystem. While burdens create problems for the entrepreneurial activity- a more short-to-medium term effect- they also have more long-term effects where they create problems for the preservation of entrepreneurial culture.

Methodically, the study makes a contribution by using a new approach and a new dataset to study burdens. Instead of the use of program take-up which is the most widely used proxy in studying burdens, this study employs the measure of actual burdens faced by businesses. A conceptual contribution is made where the study expands how we construct burdens, by examining burdens from the perspective of businesses- a perspective that is emerging the scholarship. This study also represents an early attempt at understanding how burdens levied at the macro/meso level have micro-level implications.

As a contribution to practice, the study shifts our focus beyond people being victims of administrative burdens but to now show how these people- acting in the context of an institution/business- play a part in reducing burdens by their mere individual characteristics and resilience. Entrepreneurs are now better able to locate themselves along the business-burden continuum and maneuver the space using these findings. Public administrators may find lessons in these results as well by causing us to begin to reimagine the “trickle-down” effect of government action taken at the institutional level- the “citizen” is every part of society and so government action affects them, no matter where the action targets. Decision making and practice must be informed by this view within democracies.

The main contribution of this paper is that motivation matters as a burden-tolerating “tool”. The paper also contributes by extending our understanding of burdens that are placed on entrepreneurial activity. While we may know that burdens affect entrepreneurial activity, what are the consequences of that effect. This paper shows that this effect has consequences for entrepreneurial culture- a very important aspect of entrepreneurial ecosystem. The study makes a theoretical contribution by underscoring the intersection between administrative burdens and entrepreneurial culture, two concepts that have been researched but hitherto, largely disconnected. Bridging the gap between concepts of public administration and the business literature accords to a theoretical contribution for both schools; advancing the literature by synthesizing knowledge across disciplines.

These findings provide a roadmap for future research. Firstly, these findings are very early in assessing the role that individual/innate characteristics play in tolerating

burdens. More attention should be given to how burden-bearers can be agents of burden-reduction either by some innate characteristics or through characteristics that they can learn in order to reduce the effects of burdens or better tolerate burdens.

Secondly, since administrative burdens are not restricted to just individuals, the literature would benefit tremendously from a greater focus on burdens faced by groups of all sizes and forms. Perhaps it would be interesting to examine burdens faced by civil society and NGO groups would also be interesting especially in the context of politics since we know that burden is a venue for politicking (Moynihan and Herd, 2015).

Finally, while this study takes a wide view of examining burdens on businesses generally, future research is needed to examine industry-specific intersections with administrative burden. What are the effects of businesses on small versus larger corporations? What types of business actions/activities are governments most likely to place burdens on? Or, what type of business activities when burdened produce the most dire consequences for businesses? Such a research program would be useful for a deeper understanding of the effects of burdens and better prepare practitioners and entrepreneurs alike in reimagining the relationship between public administration and businesses of certain sectors.

## V. CONCLUSION

This dissertation is built on three essays, each in service to deepening our understanding on how burdens are constructed, how they can be reduced, and the consequences that accompany them. All three essays are empirical pieces, each employing a different method, a different sample, and a different dataset. By viewing the question of burdens through diverse approaches, perspectives and contexts, I offer a more nuanced understanding that builds on current literature and creates paths for future studies. I will close this section with implications for theory, practice, and future research.

Administrative burdens have serious consequences for society. They have the ability to create a blockade against access to education, citizenship, welfare, and even optimal economic conditions. E-government has a role to play in reducing administrative burden, especially for underserved populations even in political contexts. Further, the intersection representation and burden are much more complicated and nuanced than expected and require deeper research. There is evidence that race plays a role in how burdens are tolerated and essentially reduced. Finally, burden can be reduced by the innate characteristics of burden-bearers. Highly motivated entrepreneurs can stave off the deleterious effects of burden by tapping into the qualities associated with their motivation and provide antidoting remedies.

## **5.1 Conclusion of Essay 1: Burden- E-government/electronic applications and Fiscal Conservatism**

E-government is considered a tool that can optimize processes and make them more efficient, speedy, and convenient. With this in mind, I set out to examine how these benefits of e-government can be leveraged in order to unburden welfare applicants. Against the backdrop that burden is a venue for politics (Herd and Moynihan, 2018) and that burden may fetter access to social programs, I go further to examine what role politics play in this context.

It was therefore hypothesized that e-government is able to help neutralize the effects of burdens. More specifically, when welfare applicants are able to apply for programs via electronic applications, there will be higher program take-up. We expect that burdens in welfare are proliferated by the fiscally conservative nature of Republican leadership. It was therefore hypothesized that the positive effect that electronic applications have on reducing burden will be neutralized in moments of fiscal conservatism.

These hypotheses were tested using fixed-effects modeling on three-year panel data for SNAP and Medicaid across all 50 US states. Overall, politics moderate the effect that electronic applications have on welfare program take-up. Electronic applications have a lesser effect on SNAP and Medicaid take-up when a state has a Republican governor, or the legislature of the state has a Republican leaning. The effect that political ideology has on take-up is more vividly observed in Medicaid, where states have more control over implementation than in SNAP where such control is less. This implies that implementation decisions may deliberately encourage or inhibit participation consistent with the ideological preferences of elected officials.

By including the contingency effect that political ideology has on the e-government/burden relationship, this paper expands the literature beyond the extant focus of either politics and burden or e-government and burden. This accords to a much tighter connection of the literature on e-government and burden. In this realm of discovery, we find that even a politically neutral tool such as e-government can be politicized as a prop at the venues of burden where politics play out. Connecting these streams of research is important for the scholarship and the production of new knowledge.

Policymakers are therefore better equipped to understand the effects of burdens, especially for underserved populations that rely on welfare to survive. By exploring the unburdening effects of e-government, this paper provides lessons on how public administrators may advance their social equity expectations by employing tools such as e-government to improve access for their constituents.

## **5.2 Conclusion of Essay 2: Burden- Race, Representation and Identity Politics**

This paper examined the impact of race-identity matches between clients and administrators as well as clients and program beneficiaries. More specifically, the paper set out to test two hypotheses. Firstly, it is hypothesized that citizens will perceive administrative burden associated with a government program as less onerous if they share the same race identity with bureaucrat administering the burden. Secondly, it was hypothesized that citizens will perceive administrative burden associated with a government program as less onerous if they share the same race identity with the beneficiaries of a government program.

These hypotheses were tested using a two-by-two factorial experimental design from a stratified sample of 465 United States residents (231 white and 234 Black individuals). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups that differed by the race (black or white) of the bureaucrat and the beneficiary. The only significant interaction effect is that for the treatment, where the beneficiaries are Black and the administrator is white. In this case, burdens are perceived as higher by Black participants as opposed to white ones. A more specific point-estimate analysis shows that whites perceive requirements to be less burdensome if they are levied in situations where white administrators are serving black clients. We could speculate that this is an expression of white paternalism.

These findings signal the need for more extensive research on the intersection among burden, race, and identity politics. Assessing the effects of burden in more burdensome conditions is expected to improve priming effects and yield more conclusive results. Additionally, employing methods to improve the client-administrator interaction can aid in enriching future research.

Overall, this paper highlights that how we perceive burdens is as consequential as the actual burden itself, which is a notable contribution to the practice of public administration. While we know that burdens are sometimes politically deployed, previous research finds social equity benefits for clients, thereby underscoring the role of public managers in achieving equity through easing burdens via nudges, coproduction and information technology.

### **5.3 Conclusion of Essay 3: Burden and Businesses**

In my third essay, I took a broader view and studied the intersection between administrative burden and businesses. More specifically, I was interested in a closer examination of the feedback effect of burdens placed on businesses. Like paper 1, this paper helped to identify both consequences and solutions to burdens. Like paper 2, this paper helped to provide deepened construction of burdens and sharpen our understanding of how we define burdens. Firstly, I examined the effect that administrative burdens have on entrepreneurial activity within an economy. I then examined the feedback that this has on entrepreneurial culture. Finally, I examined how the motivation of entrepreneurs can enable them to be more tolerant of burdens thereby weakening the deleterious effects that burdens wield.

Burdens in the context of business is very nuanced. One must recognize that when governments levy burdens on businesses it is often deliberately done to reduce corporate abuse and activities that often disenfranchise some at the expense of others. Notwithstanding this, the onerous and unnecessary layers of bureaucratic processes have resulted in loss of economic growth (Poel et al. 2014), loss in capital productivity (Dawson, 2007), and reduction in GDP (Haidar, 2012).

I hypothesized that burdens would reduce the entrepreneurial activity, that will in turn reduce entrepreneurs' interest in doing business. More positively, I hypothesized that when entrepreneurs are more motivated, they are better able to tolerate burdens and stave off the negative effects that burdens introduce. To test these hypotheses, I drew on panel data ('16-'18) from 40 countries of varied economic realities and from all continents. Using robust Fixed Effects modelling I found that my hypotheses were affirmed.

The findings reveal that the more burdens that governments place on businesses, the less likely businesses will be able to thrive. Further, this creates a negative feedback, which depletes entrepreneurial culture which is a fundamental ingredient to the preservation of a vibrant business ecosystem. Burdens levy short to medium term effects by creating problems for entrepreneurial activity. They also have more long-term effects where they create problems for the preservation of entrepreneurial culture.

Undoubtedly this paper takes a broader view on administrative burdens and so is not intended to provide lessons for specific industries, however, the findings are consequential insofar as they sharpen our understandings of the experiences entrepreneurs face with burdens and the manner in which people (specifically entrepreneurs) are able to cope with burdens.

Public managers need to begin to reimagine how bureaucratic actions can potentially have negative implications in a chain reaction and harm the very people they are trying to protect. Administrative burdens placed on businesses can be extremely powerful and far-reaching. The business sector in any economy is critical insofar as the sector is an avenue for job creation, economic diversity, and an overall avenue for socioeconomic prosperity. It is reasonable to imagine that anything that threatens the successful thriving of any business sector is, to some degree, a threat to socioeconomic stability. This should therefore be of concern to public administrators and scholars of the discipline who seek to bring about the conditions under which the social contract between man and his government can be dutifully exercised.

The paper makes a methodical contribution because a new dataset was used and a new method of measuring burden was applied. The paper also made a conceptual

contribution by sharpening our understanding of how we define burdens placed on businesses by providing a conceptual platform from which to detangle “burdens” that harm from routine “regulations” that are meant as oversight. This study therefore represents an early attempt at understanding how burdens levied at the macro/meso level have micro-level implications.

By examining people in their places and entrepreneurial culture, the study makes a theoretical contribution by underscoring the intersection between administrative burdens and entrepreneurial culture, two concepts that have been researched but hitherto, largely disconnected. Bridging the gap between concepts of public administration and the business literature accords to a theoretical contribution for both schools, advancing the literature by synthesizing knowledge across disciplines.

#### **5.4 Synthesized Conclusion**

This dissertation broadly sets out to examine three questions; how administrative burden is constructed, what are the consequences of administrative burden and how can administrative burden be reduced. A series of statistical methods and data structures were employed in answering these questions across three stand-alone but connected papers. Panel data were used in two (Papers 1 and 2) of the papers in this dissertation. One paper featured the use of a two-by-two factorial experiment. Fixed effects and robust regression modelling were used to analyze the data.

### **5.4.1 The construction and consequences of burden**

On the question of how burden is constructed, the dissertation explores how politics shape our conceptual understanding of burden. The findings of this paper reveal that administrative burdens are sometimes political in how they are constructed. We are brought to understand that burdens are used a political tool in servicing political ideologies. More specifically, Republicans' preference for smaller government that often leaves social support to communities rather than government provision, leads to a reduction the positive effects that e-government has on reducing administrative burden.

This also segues into the second question that this dissertation touches upon- what are the consequences of administrative burdens? The paper concludes that burdens have consequences for even politically neutral tools such as e-government when they are deployed in political contexts. Further, by examining these effects in the context of welfare programs, the dissertation also touches upon the consequences that burden have for social equity in general and more specifically, underserved populations. The question of the consequences of administrative burden is further addressed in where I examine the effects that burdens have on entrepreneurial activity within economies. Burdens have negative consequences for entrepreneurial activity and entrepreneurial culture within economies. These findings raise questions of the impact that burden can have on the livelihoods of people as well as human development considerations. Undoubtedly, the rippling effects of administrative burden is found in its cross-cutting impact across many sectors of society. If public administration is to service its compensatory role, these consequences and impact deserve more attention in the scholarship.

#### **5.4.2 Mitigating and tolerating burden**

In answering the question of how can burdens be tolerated/reduced, this dissertation examines how e-government is a tool in reducing burden. E-government can reduce burden for underserved populations in the context of welfare applications. These findings also preliminarily indicate that the digital divide, which once characterized persons of the underserved populations, is now narrowing. The dissertation further examines the extent to which representative bureaucracy and identity politics are also antidotes for burden. Though no evidence was found to support the hypotheses, the findings indicate that white paternalism is a venue where burdens are negotiated. Finally, the role that entrepreneurial motivation plays in reducing burden on business is examined. The findings reveal that when entrepreneurs are highly motivated, they are able to stave off the deleterious effects that burdens levy onto their businesses.

Admittedly, these mitigation and tolerance measures are not exhaustive, but they set the extant scholarship on a path of an exciting research agenda. Mitigating administrative burden, especially in contexts where they have deleterious effects, is an area of research in which public administrators should find interest.

Administrative burdens are often levied by public administrators. If these administrators are the stewards of democracy (Ziblatt and Levitsky, 2018; Hacker and Pierson, 2010), then anything that hinder democracy, undoubtedly falls within the remit of focus for PA scholars and practitioners. Put more broadly, the role that public administrators play in engendering democratic outcomes as well as shielding citizens from undemocratic forces are considerations that this dissertation raises. Though the role

of public administration is still a domain of contestation (Christensen, 2009), the findings of this dissertation signal the need for considerations of these issues at the very least.

### **5.4.3 Limitations and implications for future research**

This dissertation sets an agenda for future research. For example, the burden-business interaction examined in this research points public administration scholars in the direction of embarking on research programs that further deepen our understanding of how burden intersect with streams of research from other disciplines. Future research would also endeavor to find ways to measure citizens' perception and experiences of burdens more directly. In some instances, the true effect of burden is more richly understood in time series since the effects may not be immediate. While this research used limited timespans because of data availability, future research may bring this research program further by expanding the scope of such analysis.

Additionally, while this study was limited in its omnibus assessment of burden, future research may apply a disarticulated assessment approach in expanding this current research agenda. When studying the effects of "burden reducers" such as e-government, future research should examine the effect of these reducers in varying contexts. An intervention may reduce burden for some in specific contexts but not for others in a different context. Further, the scholarship can benefit from assessing the impact of paired-solution approaches to burden. That is, how specific tools may reduce specific categories of burden. For example, we now know that e-government reduces burden for welfare applicants, but is this the same for a farmer applying for a government service or license? Additionally, we now know that e-government reduces burdens for welfare

applicants, but what are the specific burden-related costs that e-government affect on the part of the client? Do electronic applications reduce psychological costs? This research agenda is expected to improve the scholarship by showing which specific categories of burden yield the greatest effect in given contexts. This has the potential to improve public management by helping public managers to better deploy burden-reducing solutions in targeted ways.

While I admit that burdens, or rather “information requirements” are needed to govern effectively, the scholarship is slow in providing empirical evidence on how influential “good burdens” are. What is the point of diminishing returns of good burdens? In this dissertation I hypothesize that burdens that are engineered to ensure deservingness will be tolerated if they are levied by people with whom we share the same race identity and if they are levied to ensure that our racial counterparts are the beneficiaries. I, however, find that these burdens are only tolerated by whites in cases where their white counterparts are serving black beneficiaries. The same is true for burdens placed on businesses. We know that burdens are often used to check business practices that are harmful to society. But at what point do burdens that are engineered to regulate businesses begin to have deleterious effects on the same society that they were engineered to protect? These findings underscore the need for more research on burdens that we expect to have both good and bad consequences.

#### **5.4.4 Contributions to practice, theory and method**

This dissertation makes a contribution to the practice of public management by unearthing ways in which public managers and employees may reduce the burdens faced by their clients. Additionally, by deepening our understanding of the intersection of burdens and business, public managers are brought within understanding of how policies enterprise in the context of administrative burden, and how they as public managers “fit” into that process. Policymakers should endeavor to constantly assess how their actions may lead to onerous outcomes for their clients, especially underserved populations. They should reimagine how their actions and the interpretation of their roles can lead to better access to the services they are expected to deliver. Public managers should also think about how already existing resources can be retooled to serve burden-reducing agenda. They should design strategies that can effectively exclude underserving persons without burdening the deserving ones.

A contribution to theory is to be found in the dissertation’s thrust to connect different streams of literature. Paper 3, for example, connects administrative burden with literature on entrepreneurial activity and entrepreneurial motivation or from the business management area. Paper 2 connects burden with representative bureaucracy and identity politics, while Paper 1 connects burden with politics and e-government simultaneously. All these are interesting intersections in the literature and not only accords to an interesting read but also an improvement in the scholarship in bridging divides and creating new knowledge.

Methodically, this paper makes a contribution by using different levels and structures of data to answer the research questions. Of note, Paper 3 uses both micro and

macro level data to understand the effect that burden has on businesses across 40 countries, while also assessing how the motivation of individual entrepreneurs' impact upon this process. This contribution specifically answers the call for public administration scholars to become less beholden to micro-level analysis and enrich the scholarship by answering the bigger questions in the field by using macro-level data as well (Moynihan, 2018).

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Supplementary Analysis- Paper 1

The Tables in this Appendix are supplementary analysis for the study in Essay 1 of my dissertation. Tables that were too large to fit into the body of the dissertation were also included in this appendix.

*Table 10: Appendix 1.A: Descriptive Statistics*

VARIABLES	Description	M	SD	Min	Max	Data Source
<b>Dependent Variable</b>						
SNAP Take-up	Number of SNAP recipients	829113.7	925527.4	29330	4340042	USDA
Medicaid Take-up	Number of Medicaid recipients	1306828	1595856	51992	1.09e+07	Medicaid.gov
<b>SNAP</b>						
<b>Main Explanatory Variable</b>						
Electronic Applications	Total of online application	4.180	1.990	0	6	Researcher Generated
<i>Apply Online</i>	States that allow for online application	0.887	0.318	0	1	USDA
<i>Recertify</i>	State that allow recertification online	0.727	0.447	0	1	USDA
<i>Manage Application</i>	States that allow online case management	0.753	0.433	0	1	USDA
<i>View Case Information</i>	States that allow applicants to view their case information online	0.647	0.480	0	1	USDA
<i>Report Changes</i>	States that allow applicants to report changes online	0.593	0.493	0	1	USDA
<i>Upload Documentation</i>	States that allow applicants to upload documents	0.573	0.496	0	1	USDA
Republican Governor (RG)	The Governor of the State is Republican	0.640	0.482	0	1	NCSL
Republican Legislature (RL)	The State Legislature is Republican-Controlled	0.627	0.485	0	1	NCSL
Welfare Spending	States' spending on SNAP	330666.7	1.26e+07	-4.24e+07	9.15e+07	NASBO
<b>MEDICAID</b>						
Electronic Applications	Total of online application	5.460	3.256	0	9	Researcher Generated
<i>Online Account</i>	States that allow for online applicants to setup an online portal	0.793	0.406	0	1	Kaiser-FF
<i>Report Changes</i>	Portal Allows for Reporting Changes to Application	0.740	0.440	0	1	Kaiser-FF
<i>Review App. Status</i>	Portal Allows for Reviewing Application Status	0.720	0.451	0	1	Kaiser-FF
<i>Renew Coverage</i>	Portal Allows for Renewing coverage	0.720	0.451	0	1	Kaiser-FF
<i>View Notices</i>	Portal Allows for Viewing Notices	0.640	0.482	0	1	Kaiser-FF
<i>Authorize 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Access</i>	States that allow applicants to upload documents	0.587	0.494	0	1	Kaiser-FF
<i>Upload Documentation</i>	Portal Allows for Authorizing Third Party Access	0.573	0.496	0	1	Kaiser-FF
<i>Go Paperless</i>	Portal Allows for going paperless	0.567	0.497	0	1	Kaiser-FF
<i>Pay Premium</i>	Portal Allows for Paying Premium	0.120	0.326	0	1	Kaiser-FF
Republican Governor (RG)	The Governor of the State is Republican	0.640	0.482	0	1	NCSL
Republican Legislature (RL)	The State Legislature is Republican-Controlled	0.627	0.485	0	1	NCSL
Welfare Spending	States' spending on Medicaid	-6273333	5.49e+07	-3.70e+08	1.67e+08	NASBO
Poverty Rate	The percentage of persons living at or below the poverty line	13.31	2.949	7.300	20.80	Census Bureau
Income Level	Average income level of residents of the state	59,322	9,750	42,590	80,776	Census Bureau
Education Level	Percentage of residents completing High School and above	88.72	2.948	82.10	93	Census Bureau

Table 11: Appendix 1.B: States' Rank by Electronic Application for both Medicaid and SNAP

States' Electronic Application Platform 2016-2018 (SNAP)					States' Electronic Application 2016-2018 (Medicaid)						
Rank	State	Score	Rank	State	Score	Rank	State	Score	Rank	State	Score
1	Delaware	7	26	Alabama	4	1	Arizona	9.00	26	Pennsylvania	7.00
2	California	6	27	Illinois	4.33	2	Colorado	9.00	27	Wyoming	7.00
3	Colorado	6	28	Mississippi	4.33	3	Georgia	9.00	28	Vermont	6.67
4	Florida	6	29	New York	4.33	4	California	8.00	29	Delaware	6.33
5	Kentucky	6	30	Ohio	4.33	5	Connecticut	8.00	30	New Mexico	6.33
6	Louisiana	6	31	Rhode Island	4.33	6	Hawaii	8.00	31	Maine	5.33
7	Montana	6	32	Arizona	4.33	7	Kentucky	8.00	32	Alabama	5.00
8	Nebraska	6	33	Indiana	4	8	Maryland	8.00	33	Massachusetts	5.00
9	New Hampshire	6	34	North Dakota	4	9	Michigan	8.00	34	West Virginia	5.00
10	Pennsylvania	6	35	Tennessee	4	10	Montana	8.00	35	South Dakota	4.67
11	Texas	6	36	Massachusetts	3.67	11	Nebraska	8.00	36	Indiana	4.00
12	Wisconsin	6	37	Kansas	3.33	12	New Hampshire	8.00	37	Louisiana	3.00
13	New Mexico	5.67	38	Nevada	3.33	13	New York	8.00	38	Illinois	2.67
14	Oklahoma	5.67	39	Alaska	3	14	North Dakota	8.00	39	South Carolina	2.00
15	Utah	5.67	40	Oregon	2	15	Oklahoma	8.00	40	Minnesota	1.33
16	Virginia	5.67	41	Vermont	2	16	Oregon	8.00	41	Nevada	1.33
17	West Virginia	5.67	42	Georgia	1.67	17	Rhode Island	8.00	42	Alaska	0.00
18	Idaho	5.33	43	Arkansas	5	18	Texas	8.00	43	Arkansas	0.00
19	Maine	5.33	44	Iowa	1.33	19	Washington	8.00	44	Iowa	0.00
20	Washington	5.33	45	New Jersey	1.33	20	Wisconsin	8.00	45	Kansas	0.00
21	Michigan	5	46	North Carolina	1.33	21	Idaho	7.67	46	Mississippi	0.00
22	South Dakota	5	47	South Carolina	1.33	22	Ohio	7.67	47	Missouri	0.00
23	Maryland	4.67	48	Minnesota	1	23	Utah	7.67	48	New Jersey	0.00
24	Missouri	4.67	49	Hawaii	0	24	Virginia	7.33	49	North Carolina	0.00
25	Connecticut	4.67	50	Wyoming	0	25	Florida	7.00	50	Tennessee	0.00

Note: Scores are three-year averages.

Table 12: Appendix 1.C: Effects on Program Take-Up Lagged by One Year

	Medicaid		SNAP	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
e-gov Applications	44,947 (46,892)	131,208 (47,506)	-22196 (13,297)	-52944 (30,899)
Republican Governor	- 463970**	-627,039**	22618*	41,565
Republican Legislature	(18,913) -79,489 (71,072)	(38,278) -291,389* (87,714)	(5,840) -57,839** (4,998)	(27,349) 14,142 (41,384)
Republican Governor*e-gov		-75,679*** (1,988)		10,679 (13,828)
Republican Legislature*e-gov		-58,571** (12,983)		-41,170 (19,713)
<b>Controls</b>				
Poverty Rate	-32,125 (29,413)	22,414 (16,298)	-2480 (2,974)	6705 (3,905)
Income Level	314* (74)	323** (52)	1.611 (2.382)	6.548** (.450)
Education Level	245,662 (119,839)	367,814** (85,084)	-112,366 (49,817)	-79926 (64,691)
Population	1.942** (0.260)	1.365** (0.1410)	-.851** (0.132)	-0.833** (0.1621)
Welfare Spending	0.000868 (0.00183)	0.0006811 (0.00169)	-0.0009 (0.001)	-0.0005746 (0.000874)
Constant	- 5003667** (1.14e+07)	- 5.83e+07** (9110887)	-1.62+07* (6852)	1.27e+07 (5463931)
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Within R-Squared	0.0752	0.0777	0.4075	0.4449
Observations	150	150	150	150
Number of groups (US states)	50	50	50	50

Notes: \*\*\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.1; Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables, program take-up, is lagged by one year (t+1). The e-gov Applications variable has been mean-centered in the interaction model

## Appendix 2- Paper 2 Instruments

### Appendix 2.A- Survey Instrument

4/26/2021

Qualtrics Survey Software

#### Introduction/Informed Consent



Thanks for participating in our survey. Participation in the survey is voluntary, anonymous, without considerable risks, and the responses will be kept confidential. If you agree to complete this online survey, you will also agree to give your consent to participate in the study.

Please find below the link to our consent form.

[Informed Consent](#)

This Survey should take **10 minutes** to complete.



Having read the consent form above, do you agree to participate in this study?

- I agree to participate in this study
- I do not agree to participate in this study

#### Does Not Consent

[https://ha.zu1.qualtrics.com/Q1/d1/c/section/Blocks/Agree/GetSurvey/PrintPreview?ContextSurveyID=5V\\_95/R2/V6/6/F1FKK8&ContextLibrayID=138\\_8190p/Guest...](https://ha.zu1.qualtrics.com/Q1/d1/c/section/Blocks/Agree/GetSurvey/PrintPreview?ContextSurveyID=5V_95/R2/V6/6/F1FKK8&ContextLibrayID=138_8190p/Guest...) 1/57

As you do not wish to participate in this study, please return your submission on Prolific by selecting the 'Stop without completing' button

### Record Participant IDs

Before you start, please switch off phone/e-mail/ music so you can focus on this study.

Thank You!

Please enter your Prolific ID:

### Demographics/Screening Validation

Please indicate your ethnicity (i.e. peoples' ethnicity describes their feeling of belonging and attachment to a distinct group of a larger population that shares their ancestry, colour, language or religion)?

- African
- Black/African American
- Caribbean
- East Asian
- Latino/Hispanic
- Middle Eastern
- Mixed
- Native American or Alaskan Native
- South Asian
- White/Caucasian
- Other (please feel free to let us know your ethnicity via email)
- White/Sephardic Jew
- Black/British
- White Mexican
- Romani/Traveller



needed to get well-paying jobs.



Click to Continue

Which group of beneficiaries does the program target?

- Hispanic low-income students
- Black low-income Students
- All low-income Students

You selected the wrong answer. Please note that this hypothetical financial aid program is targeted at **black low-income students**.

needed to get well-paying jobs.



Click to Continue

Which group of beneficiaries does the program target?

- Hispanic low-income students
- Black low-income Students
- All low-income Students

You selected the wrong answer. Please note that this hypothetical financial aid program is targeted at **black low-income students**.

Why is the application going to be full of requirements?

- To make sure only deserving students will receive the funding
- To accelerate admission by forwarding relevant information to potential colleges
- To facilitate background checks of criminal records

You selected the wrong answer. Please note that the application will be full of requirements **in order to ensure that only the most deserving students receive the funding.**



[Click to Continue](#)

Our Virtual Assistant Tyrone will take you through the rest of the Application



Hey there!

I am Tyrone Johnson and I am an agent with the Department of Education

I am delighted to be helping you through this application today

I will be popping up throughout your application to give you general guidance of to give you Key Information that you need to pay attention to.



We know that there are many educational paths you can take

Imagine you received financial aid for additional education, what type of education would you use the aid for, and why? Please respond using at least 160 characters (equivalent to about 30 words).





I want you to consider a scale of 1-10 where 1 is strongly disagree and 10 is strongly agree. To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Strongly Agree
I would be able to obtain additional credentials without financial aid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When obtaining my most recent credentials, my grades were excellent	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have a great deal of experience navigating applications for government programs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My costs of living are higher than those of my friends and peers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is important that you pay attention to this study. Please select strongly disagree here.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



*Thank you for your answers thus far. Now tell me, would you be considered a first-generation college student?*

- Yes, I am the first among my parents or grandparents to attend college
- No, my parents or grandparents have attended college

What was your average, after tax income over the past five years?

- Less than \$10,000
- \$10,000 to \$19,999
- \$20,000 to \$29,999
- \$30,000 to \$39,999
- \$40,000 to \$49,999
- \$50,000 to \$59,999
- \$60,000 to \$69,999
- \$70,000 to \$79,999
- \$80,000 to \$89,999
- \$90,000 to \$99,999
- \$100,000 to \$149,999
- \$150,000 or more

What was the average number of your dependents for the last five years? By "dependent" we mean a person who relies on you for financial support

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9





To which ethnic group would you say you belong? (select all that apply)

- White (Caucasian)
- White (German)
- White (Irish)
- White (English)
- White (other)
- American Indian or Alaskan Native
- American Indian or Alaskan Native (Navajo Nation)
- American Indian or Alaskan Native (Blackfoot Tribe)
- American Indian or Alaskan Native (Other)
- Black or African American
- Black of African American (Jamaican)
- Black of African American (Ethiopian)
- Black of African American (other)
- Native Hawaiian Pacific Islander (Tongan, Fijian, Marshallese, etc)
- Asian (Indian)
- Asian (Vietnamese)
- Asian (Pakistani)
- Asian (Iranian)
- Asian (other)
- Chinese
- Filipino
- Latin American
- Korean
- Japanese

4/26/2021

Qualtrics Survey Software

- Native Hawaiian
- Vietnamese
- Samoan
- Chamorro

What is your sex?

- Male
- Female



Please tell me, in what year were you born?



In this segment, I want to ask you some questions about your time in high school.

What was your overall GPA in high school?

[https://a.z1.qualtrics.com/Q11d1fSectionBlocksAjax/GetSurvey/ViewPreview?ContextSurveyID=SV\\_956RZYU66F1FKKNS&ContextLibraryID=LIR\\_8D90pGen...](https://a.z1.qualtrics.com/Q11d1fSectionBlocksAjax/GetSurvey/ViewPreview?ContextSurveyID=SV_956RZYU66F1FKKNS&ContextLibraryID=LIR_8D90pGen...) 13/17

In what year did you graduate high school?

What is the home state of your high school?



Now I want to ask you some questions about your time in college.

What was your overall GPA in college?

In what year did you graduate College?

What is the home state of your college?

If you have attended college classes, what is or was your major area of study?









**Click to Continue**

Our Virtual Assistant Brett will take you through the rest of the Application



Hey there!  
I am Brett Smith and I am an agent with the Department of  
Education  
I am delighted to be helping you through this application today  
  
I will be popping up throughout your application to give you  
general guidance of to give you Key Information that you need to  
pay attention to.





	Strongly Disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Strongly Agree
My costs of living are higher than those of my friends and peers	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is important that you pay attention to this study. Please select strongly disagree here.	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>




*Thank you for your answers thus far. Now tell me, would you be considered a first-generation college student?*

- Yes, I am the first among my parents or grandparents to attend college
- No, my parents or grandparents have attended college

What was your average, after tax income over the past five years?

- Less than \$10,000
- \$10,000 to \$19,999
- \$20,000 to \$29,999
- \$30,000 to \$39,999
- \$40,000 to \$49,999
- \$50,000 to \$59,999
- \$60,000 to \$69,999
- \$70,000 to \$79,999





Which statement best describes your current employment status?

- Working (paid employee)
- Working (self-employed)
- Not working (temporary layoff from a job)
- Not working (looking for work)
- Not working (retired)
- Not working (disabled)
- Not working (not looking for work)



To which ethnic group would you say you belong? (select all that apply)

- White (caucasian)
- White (German)
- White (Irish)
- White (English)
- White (other)
- American Indian or Alaskan Native
- American Indian or Alaskan Native (Navajo Nation)
- American Indian or Alaskan Native (Blackfoot Tribe)
- American Indian or Alaskan Native (Other)
- Black or African American
- Black or African American (Jamaican)
- Black or African American (Ethiopian)
- Black or African American (other)
- Native Hawaiian Pacific Islander (Tongan, Fijian, Marshallese, etc)
- Asian (Indian)
- Asian (Vietnamese)
- Asian (Pakistani)
- Asian (Iranian)
- Asian (other)
- Chinese
- Filipino
- Latin American
- Korean
- Japanese

- Native Hawaiian
- Vietnamese
- Samoan
- Chamorro

What is your sex?

- Male
- Female



Please tell me, in what year were you born?



In this segment, I want to ask you some questions about your time in high school.

What was your overall GPA in high school?



- Agriculture
- Biological/life sciences (biology, biochemistry, botany, zoology, etc.)
- Business (accounting, business administration, marketing, management, etc.)
- Communication (speech, journalism, television/radio, etc.)
- Computer and information sciences
- Education
- Engineering
- Ethnic, cultural studies, and area studies
- Foreign languages and literature (French, Spanish, etc.)
- Health-related fields (nursing, physical therapy, health technology, etc.)
- History
- Humanities (English, literature, philosophy, religion, etc.)
- Liberal/general studies
- Mathematics
- Multi/interdisciplinary studies (international relations, ecology, environmental studies, etc.)
- Parks, recreation, leisure studies, sports management Physical sciences (physics, chemistry, astronomy, earth science, etc.)
- Pre-professional (pre-dental, pre-medical, pre-veterinary)
- Public administration (city management, law enforcement, etc.)
- Social sciences (anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, sociology, etc.)
- Visual and performing arts (art, music, theater, etc.) Undecided
- I have not attended college



Before you go, please tell me, what is your career objective? Please respond in at least 160 characters (equivalent to about 30 words).

All low-income Students

You selected the wrong answer. Please note that this hypothetical financial aid program is targeted **at all low-income students**.



Before you begin, it is important that you know that this financial aid application has **a lot of requirements**. This is to ensure that we collect enough information to make sure that we are selecting the **most deserving candidates** and that there is no abuse of the program by free riders or dishonest persons.





[Click to Continue](#)

Our Virtual Assistant Brett will take you through the rest of the Application



[https://a.z1.qualtrics.com/Q1d16SectionBlocksAjax/GetSurveyPrintPreview?ContextSurveyID=SV\\_956ZV66F1FKK8&ContextLibraryID=LR\\_8D90pGen...](https://a.z1.qualtrics.com/Q1d16SectionBlocksAjax/GetSurveyPrintPreview?ContextSurveyID=SV_956ZV66F1FKK8&ContextLibraryID=LR_8D90pGen...) 32/37





	Strongly Disagree										Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
I would be able to obtain additional credentials without financial aid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When obtaining my most recent credentials, my grades were excellent	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have a great deal of experience navigating applications for government programs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My costs of living are higher than those of my friends and peers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is important that you pay attention to this study. Please select strongly disagree here.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



*Thank you for your answers thus far. Now tell me, would you be considered a first-generation college student?*

- Yes, I am the first among my parents or grandparents to attend college
- No, my parents or grandparents have attended college

What was your average, after tax income over the past five years?





Please tell us, why would you specifically deserve to get the financial aid? Please make your case using at least 160 characters (equivalent to about 30 words).



Which statement best describes your current employment status?

- Working (paid employee)
- Working (self-employed)
- Not working (temporary layoff from a job)
- Not working (looking for work)
- Not working (retired)
- Not working (disabled)



- Korean
- Japanese
- Native Hawaiian
- Vietnamese
- Samoan
- Chamorro

What is your sex?

- Male
- Female



Please tell me, in what year were you born?



In this segment, I want to ask you some questions about your time in high school.

What was your overall GPA in high school?

In what year did you graduate high school?

What is the home state of your high school?



Now I want to ask you some questions about your time in college.

What was your overall GPA in college?

In what year did you graduate College?

What is the home state of your college?





Before you go, please tell me, what is your career objective? Please respond in at least 160 characters (equivalent to about 30 words).

**Low-Income Beneficiary-Black Administrator**

The financial aid program is targeted at all low-income students. Its purpose is to help individuals in our traditionally low-income communities acquire skills and qualifications needed to get well-paying jobs.



Click to Continue

Which group of beneficiaries does the program target?

- Hispanic low-income students
- Black low-income Students
- All low-income Students

You selected the wrong answer. Please note that this hypothetical financial aid program is targeted **at all low-income students**.



[Click to Continue](#)

Why is the application going to be full of requirements?

- To make sure only deserving students will receive the funding
- To accelerate admission by forwarding relevant information to potential colleges
- To facilitate background checks of criminal records

You selected the wrong answer. Please note that the application will be full of requirements **in order to ensure that only the most deserving students receive the funding.**



[Click to Continue](#)

Our Virtual Assistant Tyrone will take you through the rest of the Application



Hey there!

I am Tyrone Johnson and I am an agent with the Department of Education


I am delighted to be helping you through this application today

I will be popping up throughout your application to give you general guidance of to give you Key Information that you need to pay attention to.



We know that there are many educational paths you can take

Imagine you received financial aid for additional education, what type of education would you use the aid for, and why? Please respond using at least 160 characters (equivalent to about 30 words).



Which of the following, if any, Financial Aid programs in education have you ever applied for? (Choose all that apply)

- Grants (e.g. Pell Grant, FSEOG, TEACH, FAFSA etc.)
- Scholarship
- Work-Study Job
- Loans (Subsidized Loans, Unsubsidized Loans, PLUS Loans, Consolidation Loans)
- Aid for Military Families (e.g. ROTC Scholarship, Veterans Affairs Education Benefit, etc.)
- Aid for International Students (eg. FAFSA)
- Aid and Other Resources From the U.S. Federal Government (e.g. Tax benefits for Education, AmeriCorps, Vouchers)
- Aid From Your State Government
- Aid From Your College or Career School
- None

Which of the following, if any, government programs have you ever applied for? (Choose all that apply)

- Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
- Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
- Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
- Housing Assistance
- Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
- Medicaid
- None



I want you to consider a scale of 1-10 where 1 is strongly disagree and 10 is strongly agree. To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Strongly Agree
I would be able to obtain additional credentials without financial aid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When obtaining my most recent credentials, my grades were excellent	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have a great deal of experience navigating applications for government programs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My costs of living are higher than those of my friends and peers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is important that you pay attention to this study. Please select strongly disagree here.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>







Which statement best describes your current employment status?

- Working (paid employee)
- Working (self-employed)
- Not working (temporary layoff from a job)
- Not working (looking for work)
- Not working (retired)
- Not working (disabled)
- Not working (not looking for work)



To which ethnic group would you say you belong? (select all that apply)

- White (Caucasian)
- White (German)
- White (Irish)
- White (English)









Please recall that the purpose of asking the questions was to establish eligibility for a hypothetical financial aid program. Keeping this in mind, to what extent do you agree with the following statements:

	Not at all 1	2	3	4	5	6	A Great Deal 7
Reading and understanding the questions took too long	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Many questions seemed irrelevant	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Too many questions required additional research and calculations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The instructions provided to me could have been more helpful	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Answering some of the questions made me uncomfortable	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The survey could have been more user friendly	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Overall, answering the questions was stressful	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The survey was too lengthy	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

4/26/2021

Qualtrics Survey Software

	Not at all 1	2	3	4	5	6	A Great Deal 7
Responding to the questions took too much time	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Answering the questions was burdensome	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is important that you pay attention to this study. Please select number 5 here.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Rate your political view on this scale by moving the slider. (0= Very conservative, 10= Very liberal)


0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Move the slider

Powered by Qualtrics

[https://a1.qualtrics.com/Q1d16SectionBlocksAjax/GetSurveyPrintPreview?ContextSurveyID=SV\\_9562YU66F1FKK8&ContextLibraryID=LIR\\_8D90pGen...](https://a1.qualtrics.com/Q1d16SectionBlocksAjax/GetSurveyPrintPreview?ContextSurveyID=SV_9562YU66F1FKK8&ContextLibraryID=LIR_8D90pGen...) 57/57

*Appendix 2.B: Experimental Design*



*Figure 6: Appendix 2.I: Experimental Design*

### Appendix 3: Supplementary Analysis- Paper 3

The Tables in this Appendix are supplementary analysis for the study in Essay 3 of my dissertation. Tables that were too large to fit into the body of the dissertation were also included in this appendix.

*Table 13: Appendix 3.A: Descriptive Statistics*

VARIABLES	Description	M	SD	Min	Max	Data Source
<b>Dependent Variable</b>						
Entrepreneurial Activity	The likely occurrence of activities related to entrepreneurship	47.00383	18.31031	17.9	86.2	GEDI
<b>Main Explanatory Variable</b>						
Administrative Burdens	Administrative burdens faced by businesses in the economy	69.76892	8.306821	53.97	82.76	DBI-World Bank
Entrepreneurial Motivation	Percentage of entrepreneurs in an economy who are improvement driven and opportunity motivated towards entrepreneurship	3.01525	2.098327	.55	11.8	GEM
<b>Socioeconomic Controls</b>						
Income Inequality	Disparity of income distribution across social groups in country/economy	.8274781	.0887125	.6125	.944	HDR
Gross Domestic Product	The GDP of a country/millions	2828.847	5371.243	26.8	212223.9	GEDI
Employment Rate	Employment rate of the country/economy (% 15 years/^^)	57.15885	10.02659	37.7625	87	HDR
<b>Business-Sector Related Controls</b>						
Entrepreneurial Education	The extent to which training in creating or managing SMEs is incorporated within the education and training system in higher education such as vocational, college, business schools, etc.	2.875417	.4453096	1.82	3.95	GEM
Entrepreneurial Culture	The way in which the country generally views entrepreneurship. The extent to which entrepreneurship is embraced by cultural norms/practices	.5025	.248749	.14	1	GEDI
Perceived Entrepreneurial Success	Percentage of persons in an economy who believe that they would be able to be successful if they entered entrepreneurship	68.77	10.70	42.97	87.77	GEM

Table 14: Appendix 3.B: Feedback (Mediating) Effect of Burdens on Entrepreneurial Activity

	Entrepreneuria 1 Culture (Model 1)	Entrepreneurial Activity (Model 2)	Entrepreneurial Culture (Model 3)
<b>Main Effect</b>			
Administrative Burden	-.0119* (.00408)	-.615** (.0783)	-.00744 (.00389)
<b>Mediating Effect</b>			
Entrepreneurial Activity			.00720*** (.000447)
<b>Business-Related Controls</b>			
Motivation	.000805 (.00129)	.305 (.219)	-.00139 (.000663)
Perceived Entrep. Success	-.000837* (.000224)	.168** (.0375)	-.00204** (.000278)
Entrepreneurial Education	-.0276 (.0214)	-2.687 (1.056)	-.00826 (.0275)
<b>Socioeconomic Controls</b>			
Income Inequality	.892 (1.944)	-140.1* (47.21)	1.900 (2.204)
Gross Domestic Product	-1.09e-05 (5.44e-06)	-8.58e-05 (4.39e-05)	-1.02e-05 (5.47e-06)
Employment Per Capita	-.00206 (.00631)	-.0535 (.316)	-.00168 (.00421)
Constant	.883 (1.506)	205.6** (46.85)	-.597 (1.783)
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Within R-Squared	.1866	.2544	.3661
Observations	120	120	120
Number of groups	40	40	40

VITA

DONAVON ANTONEY JOHNSON

Born, Kingston, Jamaica

- 2018 Teaching Assistant  
Florida International University
- 2017 Senior Adjunct Lecturer  
Department Sociology, Psychology and Social Work UWI Mona
- 2016 Director  
Leadership Academy (University of the West Indies)
- 2016 Board Chairman  
UWI-OneLife (University of the West Indies)
- 2016 Board Director  
eGov Jamaica
- 2016 Senior Policy Analyst and Research Consultant  
Ministry of Science, Technology, Energy and Mining (Jamaica)
- 2015 Research Consultant  
Organization of American States (Jamaica)
- 2015 Research Assistant  
Department of Government (University of the West Indies)
- 2014 Parliamentary Intern  
Houses of Parliament Jamaica
- 2013 Research Fellow  
Center for Leadership and Governance
- 2013 Clerk of Court (Understudy)  
Supreme Court of Jamaica
- 2012 Intern  
Caribbean Action Researchers

## PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

Johnson, D., Kroll, A. (2020). What Makes Us Tolerant of Administrative Burden? Race, Representation, and Identity, Forthcoming in *Journal of Behavioral and Public Administration*

Waller, L. G., Williams, D. A., Hawthorne, O. E., & Johnson, D, . (2018). *Doing Business in Jamaica: A Qualitative Perspective*. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.

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