

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Miami, Florida

THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FACILITY  
SUBSIDIES IN FLORIDA

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

POLITICAL SCIENCE

by

Sean Daniel Foreman

2003

To: Dean R. Bruce Dunlap  
College of Arts and Sciences

This dissertation, written by Sean Daniel Foreman, and entitled The Politics of Professional Sports Facility Subsidies in Florida, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved

Dario V. Moreno

Keith L. Dougherty

Betty H. Morrow

Susan A. MacManus

Rebecca Mae Salokar, Major Professor

Date of Defense: September 25, 2003

The dissertation of Sean Daniel Foreman is approved.

Dean R. Bruce Dunlap  
College of Arts and Sciences

Dean Douglas Wartzok  
University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2003

© Copyright 2003 by Sean Daniel Foreman

All rights reserved.

## DEDICATION

To Helen Virginia and John Daniel, my mother and father, for their lifelong support of my goals.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My dissertation topic was initially sparked by a literature review assignment for a course on Urban Economic Development. Merging the study of state and local politics with the subject of public funding for professional sports facilities allowed me to ask important questions about politics in local communities. I take this opportunity to acknowledge the faculty of the Department of Political Science at Florida International University who sparked my interest in this topic, guided me in my work, and encouraged me to completion. As the first student to complete a doctoral degree in political science at Florida International University, it is my hope that many more political science graduate students will follow in my footsteps.

I thank each of the committee members for their professional advice and feedback as my dissertation evolved. Dr. Dario V. Moreno provided expertise on Miami and Miami-Dade County politics and pointed me to the theories of ethnic political empowerment. Dr. Keith L. Dougherty and Dr. Betty H. Morrow helped hone the design and my methodological approaches, and guided me in my field research. Dr. Susan A. MacManus of the University of South Florida graciously added her expertise on Florida politics and her knowledge of Tampa and Hillsborough County politics. Finally, my committee chair, Dr. Rebecca Mae Salokar, shepherded me through the process all the way to the finish line with extreme dedication and with a passion that served as my motivation. Writing a dissertation is grueling; the guidance and leadership of an assertive academic advisor is an asset that I am fortunate to have enjoyed. No outside funding was secured for the work presented here. Instead, I labored as an adjunct for most of my A.B.D. tenure, teaching political science courses at several institutions across South Florida. Many thanks to Dr. E. Timothy Smith at Barry University, Dr. Jonathan West at the University of Miami, Dr. Gary Feinberg at St. Thomas University, and Dr. German Munoz of Miami-Dade Community College for their success in keeping me employed. I also taught and advised undergraduate learners at the Union Institute & University, which has been my home institution for the past two years. A special thanks to Dr. Marie Bogat, Dean of the Florida Academic Center, Dr. Roger Sublett, University President, and the faculty and staff of UI&U for their encouragement and support.

Writing a dissertation demands that the writer have support in their personal life. I thank my brother, Chris Foreman, and my parents, to whom my work for this degree is dedicated, for standing by me. Finally, I especially thank the sweetest woman I know, Aynoha Galindo, who deserves many nights of dancing and many weekends of kayaking for suffering through my writing endeavors over the past several years.

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION  
THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FACILITY  
SUBSIDIES IN FLORIDA

by

Sean Daniel Foreman

Florida International University, 2003

Miami, Florida

Professor Rebecca Mae Salokar, Major Professor

Political leaders in urban settings regularly confront difficult decisions over how to distribute public funds. Those decisions may be even more controversial when they involve public subsidies of professional sports facilities. Yet, state and local governments in the United States have granted billions of dollars in financial and land-based subsidies for professional sports facilities over the past two decades, raising questions about how these types of corporate welfare decisions are made by local leaders. Scholarship on urban politics and community power suggests a number of theories to explain political influence. They include elitism, pluralism, political economy and growth machines, urban regimes, coalition theory, and minority empowerment. My hypothesis is that coalition theory, a theory that argues that public policy decisions are made by shifting, ad hoc alliances within a community, best describes these subsidy decisions.

To test this hypothesis I employ a public policy process model and develop a framework of variables that is used to methodically examine four sports facilities funding decisions in two Florida counties between 1977 and 1998: Joe Robbie Stadium and the American Airlines Arena in Miami-Dade, and the Ice Palace Arena and the Raymond James Stadium in Hillsborough County. The framework includes six variables that permit a rigorous examination of the actors involved in the decision, their interactions, and the political environment within which they operate. The variables are formal political structure, informal sector, subsidy proponents, subsidy opponents, public policy options, and public opinion.

This research rests on qualitative data gathered from interviews of public and private officials involved in subsidy decisions, public records, and media reports. Employing a case study analysis, I offer a rich description of the decision making process to publicly fund sports stadiums and arenas in Florida. My findings confirm that the best theory to explain decisions to subsidize sports facilities is one in which short-term, temporary coalitions are formed to accomplish policy goals.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Politics of Sports Facility Subsidies.....	2
Research Design .....	5
Organization .....	6
I. POLITICS, POWER AND SPORTS .....	8
Theories of Power.....	9
Elitism .....	10
Pluralism .....	12
Political Economy and Growth Machine .....	14
Urban Regimes .....	17
Coalition Theory .....	19
Minority Empowerment .....	21
The Debates over Sports Facilities.....	27
Summary.....	32
II. POLICY FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY.....	33
Employing a Policy Framework.....	33
Policy Process.....	36
The Framework .....	41
Decision to Subsidize.....	42
Formal Political Structure .....	46
Informal Sector .....	49
Subsidy Proponents .....	51
Subsidy Opponents.....	54
Public Policy Options .....	58
Public Opinion .....	59
Method and Case Selection .....	63
Data Collection .....	70
Summary .....	72
III. CASE 1: MIAMI-DADE AND JOE ROBBIE STADIUM .....	73
Background .....	73
Formal Political Structure .....	75
Informal Political Structure.....	78
Subsidy Proponents.....	82
Subsidy Opponents.....	86
Public Policy Options .....	94
Public Opinion .....	95
Summary .....	96
IV. CASE 2: MIAMI-DADE AND AMERICAN AIRLINES ARENA .....	98
Background .....	98
Formal Political Structure .....	103
Informal Political Structure.....	108
Subsidy Proponents.....	111
Subsidy Opponents.....	116

	Public Policy Options .....	120
	Ridder Plan .....	121
	Penelas Plan .....	122
	Public Opinion .....	129
	Summary .....	131
V.	CASE 3: TAMPA-HILLSBOROUGH AND ICE PALACE .....	133
	Background .....	133
	Formal Political Structure .....	136
	Informal Political Structure.....	140
	Subsidy Proponents.....	146
	Subsidy Opponents.....	152
	Public Policy Options .....	155
	Public Opinion .....	158
	Summary .....	160
VI.	CASE 4: TAMPA-HILLSBOROUGH AND RAYMOND JAMES STADIUM .....	161
	Background .....	161
	Formal Political Structure .....	164
	Informal Political Structure.....	169
	Subsidy Proponents.....	172
	Subsidy Opponents.....	177
	Public Policy Options .....	182
	Public Opinion .....	186
	Summary .....	189
VII.	CASE ANALYSIS .....	191
	Decision to Subsidize .....	191
	Formal Political Structure .....	195
	Informal Sector .....	204
	Subsidy Proponents.....	208
	Subsidy Opponents.....	212
	Public Policy Options .....	216
	Public Opinion .....	220
	Reexamining the Framework .....	222
	Sports Development Grant Coalitions.....	224
	Summary .....	234
	CONCLUSION.....	235
	Observations.....	235
	Suggestions for Future Research.....	237
	Summary.....	239
	REFERENCES.....	241
	APPENDICES.....	261
	VITA.....	268

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1. The Debate over Public Subsidies for Sports Facilities.....	27
2. Socio-Economic and Demographic Data Comparisons.....	68
3. Subsidies Requested and Subsidies Received.....	192
4. Formal Sector (FS) and Informal Sector (IS) Political Influences.....	196
5. Proponents and Opponents of Sports Facility Subsidies.....	209

## Introduction

On March 29, 1996, on opposite coasts of the State of Florida, two county commissions sat down for emergency meetings to consider whether or not to commit public money to building sports facilities in their communities. Both the Miami-Dade and the Hillsborough County Commissions were to deliberate over a \$160 million package of public funding to build an arena in Miami and a stadium in Tampa. Miami-Dade commissioners were given little information about the arena plans or even much advance notice of the meeting. The deal they were asked to approve had been negotiated largely in private discussions between a community facilitator, the county manager, and Miami Heat officials. Their colleagues across the state, however, were more informed about the decision they were about to make on sending a multipurpose tax plan to Hillsborough County voters on a November ballot. Eventually, both communities would see their sports facilities built with public monies, but how those decisions were made, the amount of public subsidy ultimately committed, and the processes of coalition building varied significantly.

Political leaders in urban settings regularly confront difficult decisions over how to distribute public funds. Those decisions may be even more controversial when they involve public subsidies of professional sports facilities. Seen as a form of corporate welfare, sports subsidy decisions have the potential to evoke broad opposition especially in an environment of competing demands for limited public resources (Keating 1999; Rosentraub 1999). My research explains the political process behind decisions to subsidize professional sports facilities and advances the thesis that these decisions are best described by coalition theory.

I develop a model to test this thesis that permits a methodical examination of four funding decisions in two Florida counties between 1977 and 1998. Using a case study approach, I analyze the subsidy decision process involved in building Joe Robbie Stadium and the American Airlines Arena in Miami-Dade, and the Ice Palace Arena and the Raymond James Stadium in Hillsborough County. The role of the formal political structure and the informal sector is studied, as is the development of proponent groups and the opposition to public funding. Attention is also given in this research to the policy options available and to public opinion.

My research not only offers a rich description of the decision making process to publicly fund sports stadiums and arenas in Florida, but my findings confirm that the best theory to explain decisions to subsidize public sports facilities is one in which short-term, temporary coalitions are formed to accomplish policy goals. While alternative explanations of political power like elitist, pluralist, political economy, growth machine, urban regime, and minority empowerment are useful theories of urban politics they do not fully capture the dynamics of sports facility funding in the four cases examined here.

### **The Politics of Sports Facility Subsidies**

Public subsidization of professional sports facilities is common policy in the United States. Around \$20 billion in public money has been used to subsidize construction of more than 50 professional sports stadiums and arenas and to refurbish another 20 facilities since 1980 (see Appendix A) (Beeh 1998; Cagan and deMause 1998; Keating 1999; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Quirk and Fort 1992; Rafool 1998a, 1998b; Rappaport and Wilkerson 2001; Rosentraub 1999). As a result, politicians and voters in most major North American cities are familiar with the arguments for and against the use of government subsidies for these public works projects. The issues faced by local government officials concerning sports facility funding as public policy are complex and costly. These multi-million dollar public works projects engender strong feelings from proponents and opponents concerning the use of tax subsidies. Many of the debates over whether or not to build, the amount of public subsidy, and where the facility should be located are replicated in various cities across time. The mere price tag alone justifies closer scrutiny by academics, citizens, and officials who should be armed with the facts when it comes time for a contest over public funds for these facilities.

Sports facilities, like art museums, film festivals, dance and music companies and major entertainment complexes, are viewed as part of the cultural life of large urban areas (Eisenger 2000; Euchner 1999; Fainstein et. al. 1983; Judd and Fainstein 1999; Judd and Swanstrom 1994, 1998). But major league sports are different in that they are capable of attracting a significant population of local fans to games on a regular basis. Hosting a major league sports team also guarantees a level of regional and national media coverage that is closely identified with the host city. Stadiums and arenas are high profile

projects that local government and civic leaders may undertake to enhance a city's prestige or economic standing, two fundamental goals of cities (Logan and Molotch 1987; Peterson 1981). The nature of hometown sports can also build community spirit and pride. And the duration of the perceived infusion of economic benefits over a sports season simply outstrips the attendance at even some of the more popular traditional cultural events. The Miami Film Festival, for example, boasts an average total attendance of 50,000 viewers over a ten-day period ("Quick Facts..." 2003). The Miami Heat, on the other hand, attracted over 655,000 fans to 41 home games in the 2001-02 season, which was played over a period of 25 weeks ([www.aaarena.com](http://www.aaarena.com); [www.ballparks.com](http://www.ballparks.com)). Sports teams are big businesses in urban areas.

Sports franchises are assets in a game of political prestige played among local governments, assets that are believed by some to translate into benefits in commercial and tourist development. Like properties on a Monopoly board, the number of franchises available is limited, and the demand by metropolitan areas to host a franchise has remained relatively high in recent decades. The globalization of sports has also increased the economic and social identity of the Big Four leagues, Major League Baseball (MLB), National Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL) (Clough 1996; LaFeber 2000). These are multinational corporations with significant political influence that grants their individual franchises bargaining power within local communities (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1999).

Politics, the competitive struggle over resource allocation, and sports come in contact on a number of issues including legal, social, environmental and other concerns that are often debated in local, state and federal legislatures and courts. Legal issues include the antitrust exemption for baseball and the partial protections for the other major sports. There are also issues of eminent domain involved in identifying the location of new facilities and threats to vacate one site for another. Yet other legal concerns arise over labor issues. The social aspects of sport politics involve race relations and conflicts between urban and suburban priorities. Finally, the environment is impacted by decisions over land use and preservation and the dynamics of facility planning and location issues.

The largest and most visible issue on which sports and politics intersect is the issue of stadium and arena construction. Governments have frequently subsidized sports facilities and in recent decades the

scope and depth of public support for sports facilities increased dramatically (Beeh 1998; Keating 1999; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1999). Much of this construction took place despite evidence that stadiums usually do not produce benefits proportional to the claims of project proponents in their feasibility studies (Baade 1996a; Chema 1996; Cagan and deMause 1998; Euchner 1993; Hudson 1999; Johnson and Sack 1996; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Quirk and Fort 1992; Rosentraub 1988, 1997; Rosentraub et.al.1994). But often politics and battles over the allocation of public funds are based more on people's perceptions of reality rather than the realistic facts and figures of spreadsheets. It is typical for local and state governments to provide subsidies with low citizen involvement. Rarely are questions of sports subsidies put to public referenda, though when they are the policy decision gains greater credibility with the local taxpayers.

The public funding of sports stadium and arenas provides a ready-made topic from which to study the politics of local governments and metropolitan areas. The growth period in sports facility construction coincides with a competing trend in the 1980s and 1990s toward an ideology of less government intervention and involvement in many areas of American life (Eisenger 1988; Posner 1998; Walker 2000). The fact that sports facilities became a priority in a time when government spending was devolving to essential functions shows the clout of sports facilities as public works projects. Although the era of pure publicly financed stadiums seems to have passed, the current period of public-private partnerships is producing more facilities with more public funding (Beeh 1998; Cagan and deMause 1998; Keating 1999). Even though the percentage of the public burden is lower, the absolute dollar figure continues to rise as new marvelous palaces with modern amenities and great architectural detail take shape (Keating 1999).

Many communities are grappling with the question of publicly financing the playing facilities of privately owned sports franchises. In some instances a political deal may be reached where team owners receive direct subsidies or indirect support through tax abatements from the state or local governments. On other occasions there are various packages consisting of local and state incentives and subsidies with land acquisition and clearance. There may even be some sort of private-public venture in the building of a facility like the ones studied here.

The usual process of eliciting public funding for a sports facility starts when a new franchise owner buys or seizes control of a team, and then makes a visible demand for public funding of a new sports

facility. Implicit or explicit threats to dismantle or move the team may be made if political officials respond too slowly or not at all on the request for public financial support. Consultants, lobbyists, and public relations professionals are hired to garner public support for these new projects, and as plans emerge, citizens, media, and opposition interests form opinions that help shape the parameters of the debate ahead. Often the outcome is a new arena or stadium with a substantial public subsidy or public support system of some kind. Possibly the team will move out of the area, but this is more rare than a move to somewhere within the same metropolitan region.

While citizens and fans may survive if a team leaves town, there can be times when such a loss is damaging to the psyche of the city. Consider the example of the Colts football team leaving Baltimore for Indianapolis in 1984, or the Browns football team leaving Cleveland in 1995 for Baltimore, and the impact these moves had on the collective image of those cities (Cagan and deMause 1998; Keating 1999). The threat that teams pose in moving to another city becomes a powerful bargaining chip for franchise owners in their negotiations with local officials. Taxpayers in both Baltimore and Cleveland eventually subsidized new stadiums to attract the NFL back to those cities.

While the actors in the stadium and arena subsidy game are similar across the country, local politics and procedures differ across cities, counties, and states. The question for political scientists is whether we can identify patterns of behavior across cases that will permit us to better understand struggles over power. Thus, my research strives to test a general theory of political power that will best explain the decision to publicly fund professional sports facilities in the four cases studied here.

## **Research Design**

Scholarship on urban politics and community power suggests a number of theories to explain political influence. These include elitism, pluralism, political economy, growth machine, urban regimes, minority empowerment, and coalition theory. My hypothesis is that coalition theory, a theory that argues that public policy decisions are made by shifting, ad hoc alliances within a community, best describes these subsidy decisions. In order to test this hypothesis, I propose a framework that allows me to examine and understand who or what impacts those decisions and in what context. The framework includes six variables

that permit a rigorous examination of the actors involved in the decision, their interactions, and the political environment within which they operate. The variables are formal political structure, informal political structure, subsidy proponents, subsidy opponents, public policy options, and public opinion.

I use a case study method to examine four subsidy decisions in two counties in Florida. To determine how each factor impacts the decision to fund professional sports facilities, I analyze the debates and decisions concerning the development of Joe Robbie Stadium and the American Airlines Arena in Miami-Dade, and the Tampa Ice Palace and Raymond James Stadium in the Tampa Bay area. This research rests on qualitative analysis rooted in elite interviews, review of public documents, and a search of local newspapers.

## **Organization**

The foundation for my thesis is presented in Chapter 1 with a discussion of the competing theories of power in urban politics. A review of the classic community power debate between elitism and pluralism is offered and the limits of these perspectives for understanding professional sports subsidy decision making are identified. The synthesis of these schools of thought in the political economy field is mined and important conceptual models for urban politics such as the growth machine, urban regime, minority empowerment, and coalition theory are reviewed in the context of sports stadium and arena subsidy debates. The final section of the chapter contains an overview of the reasons in support of and in opposition to local governments subsidizing these facilities.

In Chapter 2, the discussion turns to the politics of subsidizing sports facilities more particularly and provides a justification for the framework used to examine the four cases. The proposed approach is based on a process model of political analysis (Dye 1998b; Stone 1997; Waste 1982). Six variables are identified and their value in understanding the politics of public subsidy plans is explored. These variables are formal political structure, informal political structure, subsidy proponents, subsidy opponents, public policy options, and public opinion. These factors are then isolated in the case studies of sports facility public subsidy decisions in the Miami-Dade and Tampa-Hillsborough areas.

Miami-Dade County and the City of Miami are the focus of Chapters 3 and 4. Their political structures and descriptions of major political changes in these areas over the recent decades are discussed and the cases are examined using the formula as a framework for the discussion. These cases are Joe Robbie Stadium, named for the late NFL Miami Dolphins owner who privately financed the facility near the Miami-Dade-Broward county line, and the American Airlines Arena, the Biscayne Bay home of the Miami Heat NBA basketball franchise, built three blocks to the east of their old home, the Miami Arena.

In Chapters 5 and 6, the City of Tampa and Hillsborough County are the focus. The two cases examined for this area are the Tampa Ice Palace, the downtown arena for the NHL Tampa Bay Lightning, and Raymond James Stadium, home of the NFL Tampa Bay Buccaneers, built on Dale Mabry Highway in unincorporated Hillsborough County next to the old Tampa Stadium.

A summative analysis of each of the variables in the framework is presented in Chapter 7 and the argument is made that coalition theory best describes the political decisions to publicly fund professional sports facilities in these four cases. My conclusion explicates the limits of my study and provides ideas for future work on the politics of public subsidy decisions for professional sports stadiums and arenas.

## Chapter I

### Politics, Power and Sports

Political scientists have long argued over the nature of the struggle for political power. Who has power, how they get it, and what they do with it are questions that drive much of the discipline's scholarly work. To answer these queries, the political scientist analyzes and describes the game of politics and the rules of public policy decision making by gathering data about the underlying factors that shape political processes (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Dye 1966, 1998b; Waste 1980; Wilson 1968). The ultimate goal is to provide us with theoretical explanations of who rules and what that means for governmental action.

My research looks at one narrow policy arena at the level of urban politics and asks the same questions. Who is involved in the decision making process to publicly fund sports facilities and what are the outcomes? The frequency and volume of sports facility subsidies in the 1980s and 1990s raises questions about how and why local governments fund these projects (Baade 1996a; Baade and Dye 1988; Cagan and deMause 1998; Danielson 1997; Euchner 1993; Johnson and Sack 1996; Keating 1999; Noll 1974; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Pelissero et. al. 1991; Quirk and Fort 1992; Rosentraub 1988, 1996, 1999; Rosentraub et.al.1994; Shropshire 1997; Sidlow and Henchen 1998; Swindell and Rosentraub 1998). Knowledge about the policy process and how subsidy decisions are reached ultimately provides a snapshot of power and influence over at least a part of the public agenda.

In this chapter I review the major theories on power in urban communities that might explain how and why local governments decide to fund sports facilities. I focus especially on recent developments in the literature on growth machines, urban regimes and coalition theory, and make connections to existing studies on sports and the politics of facility funding. Because my research involves two metropolitan areas that have significant racial and ethnic populations, I include a discussion of research on minority empowerment in urban communities. Finally, this chapter concludes with an exploration of the public debates over public subsidy of sports facilities and the scholarly work that has been published in this area.

## Theories of Power

Fundamental questions in political science concern the nature of power, how to define it, how to describe it, and how to determine who has it and in what instances. The most common debates in the urban politics literature have been over who has power in making policy decisions, or who can get people to do what, when and how in the local political community (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Dahl 1961; Domhoff 1980; Dye 1966; Hunter 1953; Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995; Lasswell 1958; Ricci 1971; Vogel 1997; Waste 1984). Politics and sports both involve contests over power and they intersect when questions arise over government subsidies for stadiums and arenas.

Although the United States was largely urbanized by the 1920s, urban politics did not emerge as a subfield of the discipline until the 1950s and 1960s. At that time a number of studies on city politics were undertaken to identify who held influence over decision-making processes and to understand how that influence was exercised (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Dahl 1961; Domhoff 1980; Dye 1966; Hunter 1953; Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995; Mills 1956; Polsby 1960, 1980; Presthus 1964; Ricci 1971; Vogel 1997; Waste 1986, 1987). Scholars looked beyond matters of process to ask questions about whether decision-making power was concentrated in the hands of a few elites or whether it was subject to the competition of groups, interests, and individuals. Research focused on the question of who really rules in our society while testing popular notions of democracy in various urban areas.

Two main perspectives on the sources of power in urban areas are elitism, a school of thought postulating that key policy decisions result from competition amongst a few elite individuals and groups, and pluralism, which advances the belief that decisions are influenced by a plurality of groups and individuals (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Dahl 1961; Dye 1966, 1998b; Domhoff 1980; Hunter 1953; Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995; Mills 1954; Polsby 1960, 1980; Presthus 1964; Ricci 1971; Vogel 1997; Waste, 1980, 1987). The synthesis of these two perspectives led some scholars to focus on urban politics from a political economy and growth machine perspective (Jonas and Wilson 1999; Logan and Molotch 1987; Mollenkopf 1983; Molotch 1976, 1993; Peterson 1981; Savitch 1988; Walzer and Jacobs 1991) or to identify urban regimes (Elkin 1987; Imbrascio 1997; Pelissero et.al. 1991; Stone 1989, 1993). Yet another variation focuses on agenda setting and the formation of coalitions for and against certain policy proposals

(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1972, 1983; Kingdon 1984; Olson, Olson and Gawronski 1998; Riker 1962; Stone D. 1988, 1989; Sabatier 1988, 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). More recently, theories about minority empowerment have emerged to explain the process of black and Hispanic/Latino political incorporation in several U.S. cities (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1990, 1997, 2003; Garcia and de la Garza 1977; Garcia et. al. 1992; Hero 1992; Harrigan and Vogel 2000; Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Mohl 1983; Moreno and Warren 1992; Portes and Bach 1985; Stack, Warren and Moreno 1998; Warren 1997; Warren and Moreno 2003).<sup>1</sup>

In the following sections, I review the major perspectives of urban political power, namely, elitism, pluralism, political economy and growth machines, urban regimes, and coalition theory. I also offer examples of research that have attempted to fit these theories to public sports facility subsidy cases.

Elitism. The elite approach assumes that a relatively small group of people exercises influence over public policy decisions in a community (Dye 1995, 1998b; Domhoff 1980; Hunter 1953; Waste 1986, 1987). The basic point of elitism is that commercial interests hold a privileged position in society and the market system allows businessmen to have a dominant interest in policy outcomes (Dye 1998b; Domhoff 1980; Hunter 1953; Lindbloom 1977; Warner 1968). Elites are usually identified through their reputation for wielding influence (Hunter 1953), their institutional position (Dye 1995; Mills 1956) and their societal roles (Ricci 1971; Waste 1986). The presence of an elite power structure shows that decision-making power is not held by individuals but is institutionalized (Dye 1995; Domhoff 1980; Hunter 1953; Mills 1956).

The notion that social and political elites exist and dominate politics is not new. Modern society is designed with hierarchical arrangements and the iron rule of oligarchy demonstrates that it is the few who rule and the many who are ruled. Money is a main ingredient in determining who will have more influence on the system. Economic and social wealth can create advantages for select individuals and groups. Elites have greater ability to spend money and shape the political agenda through the influence of campaign contributions, media messages, and public relations.

---

<sup>1</sup> The term Hispanic is used in this study to describe people with roots in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Private interests heavily influence the political processes of capitalist cities and the fortunes of cities have always been tied to the vitality of the private sector. According to the cultural tradition of “privatism,” local political leaders have historically been encouraged to link with private actors to enhance the city’s interest (Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Warner 1968). The culture of privatism works on the assumption that people rationally value individual gains over collective economic purposes. Under these cultural conditions, the power that private individuals have in influencing public policy decisions increases.

Political sociologists exposed networks of political power brokers who were primarily concentrated in commercial activities and usually had common social ties. Their conclusions were that political power resided with those who held private wealth (Hunter 1953) or occupied positions of authority in government, military or business organizations (Mills 1956). Hunter found that cliques or circles of influential business leaders were the decision makers in his anonymous Regional City (later identified as Atlanta) and that commercial ties were common among these people (Hunter 1953; Presthus 1964; Ricci 1971; Waste 1980). The general maintenance of society and routine business of city life was served by the activities of working men, women and groups encompassing pluralistic interests such as the church, civic groups and Chamber of Commerce members, but the decision making influence of these groups consisted of simply carrying out the agendas set forth by the reputed city leaders. Interest group influence was only symbolic and largely structured toward further legitimizing the elite power structure.

Another view of elite power is the ability to influence policy by blocking items from reaching the public agenda. The analysis of a decision not taken, or non-decisions, provides a significant second face of power as presented by Bachrach and Baratz (1970). Non-decisions are the means by which demands for the reallocation of benefits or values within a political system are suppressed or thwarted by decision makers before they even surface to the policy making process. Elites often have the ability to make decisions not to take specific policy actions and to mobilize bias against certain alternatives before they are presented (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Ricci 1971; Schattschneider 1960).

In my study, the owners, team executives, and professional players are examples of elites who may choose to participate in local politics and present subsidy demands to decision makers (Bachelor 1998;

Danielson 1997; Judd and Swanstrom 1998; LaFeber 2000; Logan and Molotch 1987; Pelissero, Henschen and Sidlow 1991; Reiss 1998; Rosentraub 1988, 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998; Turner and Marichal 1998). Members of this wealthy group may hold greater sway in the political process as a result of their economic, political and social connections inside and outside the sports industry. Individually, some people like New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner or Jack Kent Cooke, the former owner of the Washington Redskins and Los Angeles Lakers, can be power brokers through their political or social connections outside of their professional sports ownership. This political capital could be cashed in like when Kent Cooke received generous land subsidies from Maryland state officials on which he financed a football stadium (Stewart 2000). Other times it may not as Steinbrenner has been unable to convince New York officials to subsidize a new ballpark to replace Yankee Stadium.

Elite power structures have also been active in the building of ballparks and stadiums in New Orleans (Burck 1973; Whelan 1987), Arlington, Texas (Rosentraub 1988), Los Angeles (Reiss 1981, 1998) and other cities (Cagan and deMause 1998; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1999). These elites include the commercial leaders and sometimes even local political officials. They may work in concert to promote sports facility subsidies as part of a larger growth campaign or simply to boost their city's image. At other times, influential governors, mayors or legislators provide political leadership in brokering deals with team owners and business leaders (Pelissero et. al. 1991; Rich 1998; Sidlow and Henschen 1998).

In the event that the goals of elite actors are in conflict with the larger public interest, elite theory suggests that political leaders will side with the elite (Dye 1998b; Waste 1980, 1986). Even when elite interests exist, they may have to form coalitions in order to achieve their political goals. Elite domination is incomplete and the political process still includes some competition amongst groups for resources. As long as many groups are able to compete under the rules of the political process, notions of elite rule still must still be considered against the pluralist perspective.

Pluralism. Pluralism posits a competing vision of power in the political process. According to this view, various groups compete for political influence, not simply the elite, wealthy or famous individuals but a plurality of organized interests (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Barry 1977; Dahl 1961; Dye 1998b; Truman

1951; Vogel 1997; Waste 1980, 1987). Studies of pluralism do not dispute that elites influence political decisions. Instead they claim there is a legitimate process of bargaining and compromise that allows for political competition in policy conflicts.

The pluralist tradition has deep roots in the American republic. It is reflected in the concept of representative democracy and the constitutional rules of the game are written with group competition in mind (Berry 1984; Ricci 1971; Truman 1951; Waste 1987). The decentralized design of governmental structure with the system of federalism and the subdivision of public authority into branches with different powers provides interest groups many points of access into the political system (Dye and MacManus 2003; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Waste 1987, 1989). There are also checks and balances and multiple legal and administrative processes in which policy matters arise and are handled, thus limiting the ability of any small group of elites from mastering all decision making control. Further, not all groups are interested in every issue that enters the public domain (Dahl 1961). In the event that elites attempt to dominate, their control would be uneven and short lived given the design of the system and the ability of an opposition to continually challenge for power.

Some scholars note that as more interest groups compete in the decentralized system, a condition of hyper-pluralism exists (Lowi 1969; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Yates 1977). Yates (1977) found city politics to be “fragmented, unstable, and reactive” and characterized the struggle over resources as “street-fighting pluralism” or a “political-free-for-all, a pattern of unstructured multilateral conflict” in various urban forms (Yates 1977, 85). The proliferation of pressure groups competing for government attention in a fragmented political system weakens formal public authority (Ferman 1996; Lowi 1969). The open and competitive nature of the field that allows pluralism to exist also contains the seeds to undermine it.

Pluralism and hyper-pluralism may help explain the politics of sports facility subsidies. At the root of these policy debates are competing proponent and opponent interest groups. Sports subsidy policy decisions often involve a plurality of players from city, county and state government as well as influential commercial and citizen groups. For example, in 1993 the mayor of Cincinnati and the Hamilton County Commission appointed a 27-member regional task force to plan riverfront development including new baseball and football stadium facilities (Blair and Swindell 1997). This group represented a plurality of

interests from Ohio, Indiana and northern Kentucky leaders, but they had little time to act before Reds baseball team owner Marge Schott attempted to bypass the redevelopment task force. She originally planned to purchase the existing Riverfront Stadium and the adjacent parking facility and intended to ask city and county leaders to pay for renovations to them, but after conducting a feasibility study, Schott changed her mind about buying the stadium. Over the next few years, representatives of the Bengals football team, the Reds and several government and non-government actors battled over financing and location plans.

In 1996, several public and private organizations, numerous local governments and Ohio state officials shaped a compromise for approval by the Hamilton County Commission. The Regional Stadium Task Force report called for a one-cent increase in the sales tax to 6.5 percent for 20 years to fund two facilities plus some additional county projects. After two contentious public meetings, two of the three county commissioners accepted a plan to build one new stadium and to renovate Riverfront Stadium for the team not getting a new facility. Public opinion polls showed little support for the county plan and swelling citizen opposition moved a local lawyer to get the finance plan placed before voters. With wide taxpayer opposition, the anti-stadium tax group succeeded in gathering signatures from more than 27,000 people. But after a massive public relations campaign by the teams, the referendum was approved by 61.4 percent of the voters (Blair and Swindell 1997).

Unlike decisions in which elites dominate the policy process, the decision of Hamilton County/Cincinnati taxpayers to pay in excess of \$500 million for two sports facilities is more reflective of a competition between groups that resulted in the public funding decision. Though the outcome was determined by the public in a referendum, anti-tax groups continued to argue that the decision to commit such a significant amount of public money to the teams was paramount to corporate welfare (Blair and Swindell 1997). Other cities have witnessed similar mixtures of public and private players involved in the decision making process that suggest pluralism may be operating in those cases.

Political Economy and Growth Machines. With evidence of both elite and plural forces shaping politics in American cities, the debate between oligarchy and polyarchy continues in urban studies. It is difficult to

form a cohesive theory of urban politics based on individual studies of who holds power in Atlanta, New Haven, or any other American city one chooses to examine. What emerges from these earlier works is an understanding that one policy goal is consistent in urban politics: economic growth. Regardless of who rules, it seems that concerns over growth and economic development play a particular role in shaping public policies (Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Lindbloom 1977; Warner 1968). Recent studies view urban politics through a political economy tint in their analytical lenses (Eisenger 1988; Elkin 1987; Fainstein et al. 1986; Kantor 1995; Mollenkopf 1983; Savitch 1985; Stone and Sanders 1987). For example, Logan and Molotch (1987) note Edward Banfield's discussion of a public quarrel over the placement of a convention center in Chicago where he failed to recognize that no group or individual argued that the convention center not be built (Logan and Molotch 1987, 65).

Urban leaders face tough choices over the use of scarce fiscal resources (Mollenkopf 1983; Peterson 1981). Decisions must be made that balance different social, economic and political priorities within a metropolitan area (Waste 1986). Paul Peterson (1981) stressed the internal and external structural constraints on cities that limit the range of public policy choices. City leaders face internal political and economic obstacles along with external geopolitical and legal restraints. Local autonomy and formal city power are limited by a city's position in greater socioeconomic and political contexts (Peterson 1981). In the global market system cities compete for political and economic resources. The position a city occupies in the national and international economy affects the policy choices available to urban leaders.

The range of policy options available to decision makers increases when there are fewer constraints on economic resources. Even with these financial limits, local and team leaders find ways to accomplish objectives like subsidizing professional sports facilities. Federal reforms on unfunded mandates and block grants in the 1980s and 1990s granted some flexibility to local governments and more discretion over spending decisions (Kelly 2003; Posner 1998). The gradual devolution of power to state and local governments eased some limits on city leaders but introduced new challenges as overall percentages of federal funding directed to local governments decreased (MacManus 1998; Walker 2000). Combined with the migration of businesses and population from central cities to surrounding suburban areas, economic

constraints continue to limit city leaders (Abbott 1981; Bernard and Rice 1988; Downs 1994; Eisenger 1988; Fainstein et. al. 1986; Mollenkopf 1983; Peterson 1981; Stone and Sanders 1987).

Some cities became more entrepreneurial over time with a shift from supply-side policies to a demand-oriented approach (Eisinger 1988; Imbracio 1997). Entrepreneurs develop business opportunities. Leaders in entrepreneurial cities enhance business environments to make them more attractive for investors. As entrepreneurial cities finance progressive projects in conjunction with the private sector, the political-economic web becomes more complex. With the growing number of public-private partnerships undertaken by local governments, opportunities for those with private capital to influence or impact the public agenda increase (Peters 1999; Savas 1987).

A natural evolution of the political economy approach is the theory of urban growth machines. Some studies of local politics posit that city governance is dominated by development-driven elites forming growth machines (Jonas and Wilson 1999; Logan and Molotch 1987; Molotch 1976, 1993) or pro-growth coalitions (Mollenkopf 1983; Savitch 1988). Urban growth machines consist of stable coalitions of public and private elites dedicated to policies that favor conditions for economic growth (Logan and Molotch 1987; Molotch 1976, 1993). Members include those linked to the banking, corporate, and real estate interests in the local community interested in exerting influence over issues of land use, control, exchange and development (Jonas and Wilson 1999). Developers, residents, landlords and tenants concerned with land use are also included in the growth machine. Some auxiliary components include chambers of commerce members, media personnel, university-types, members of the entertainment industry, and owners of professional sports franchises (Logan and Molotch 1987).

Members of growth machines are interested in investments in urban development and renewal efforts that may benefit their own or their organization's standing as a result of subsidy decisions. The social entrepreneurs of the machine seek profits and are uninterested in minimizing conflict or in preserving the physical aspects of communities. According to this view, primary urban conflicts are between those who covet land for exchange value versus those who favor managed growth and development of community land.

Professional sports team owners have been identified as part of the pro-growth coalition in studies of several cities (Pelisserro et. al. 1991; Rosentraub 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998). The team owners are usually multi-millionaires who have other business interests and political clout at the local or national level and are able to wield influence over political decisions. They benefit from the existence of machine support because stadiums and arenas are popular projects for the civic and business elite due to their symbolic value. The growth imperative justified efforts in the 1980s and 1990s to revitalize cities and communities with urban tourism, and sports stadiums and arenas naturally played important roles (Judd 1999; Judd and Swanstrom 1994; 1998; Eisenger 2000; Pelisserro et. al. 1991; Sidlow and Henschen 1998; Turner and Marichal 1998). Sports facilities that complement larger metropolitan development goals and have rewards to spread to various proponents also have a heightened chance of getting machine support.

While groups interested in growth are able to influence political debates, their control over public policy is incomplete. At times a more inclusive governing regime may take shape depending on the demographics of the electorate. The realization that city leaders may have goals to pursue other than economic growth led scholars to identify regimes that focus on the distribution of a variety of political resources. The primary difference between regimes and machines is that regimes carry out decisions seeking to maximize the economic health of the city in a socially productive manner while the growth machine functions more narrowly for the interests of the growth minded. While growth machine models assume a class-based view that economics drives political decision-making, proponents of regime theory argue the importance of politics (Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995).

Urban Regimes. In some cities, political coalitions form as governing regimes on issues that emerge beyond the growth imperative (Imbrascio 1997; Stone 1989, 1993). Leaders may have to focus on the need to make political alliances between racial and ethnic groups that hold sway in elections even while downtown business interests retain economic influence in shaping policy outcomes. Urban regimes are identifiable informal coalitions that remain relatively stable through having a sustained “access to institutional resources” allowing it to govern local political structures (Stone 1989, 3-4). As Stone said,

"The study of urban regimes is thus a study of who cooperates and how their cooperation is achieved across institutional sectors of community life" (1989, 9).

The regime concept suggests that business interests are not the only allies with government, though they may be the strongest. Leaders of groups like labor, non-profit and civic organizations and churches may participate in the urban regime. A regime is more empowering of broader community interests than the growth machine. Members of the regime work to manage conflict not for reasons of social control as suggested in elitist and pluralist theories, but rather to channel political participation for socially productive purposes in an atmosphere where authority is limited and diverse.

What separates a regime from any random set of elected leaders is that the regime acts more like a governing coalition than simply an electoral coalition. The important factor for Stone's regime is not just that it is an informal partnership that can maintain social control through the alliance, but that it has the organizational and institutional means to accomplish its goals of social production.

Unlike what Hunter observed in the 1950s, the Atlanta that Stone studied was one where black voters made up a majority of the city population and held the electoral balance. Black voters could elect a black mayor and other officials to represent their interests, but these leaders would still have to align with the downtown business establishment and other private actors to govern. The regime included a public-private partnership of elected officials who enjoyed popular support and ensured community representation. They worked in coalition with civic and business leaders concerned with the long-term growth and health of the downtown area. Stone emphasized the use of selective incentives or the strategic use of resources by the regime to satisfy these objectives. The object was to produce enduring stable relationships between governmental and non-governmental players who were committed to civic cooperation and metropolitan governance.

The types of urban regimes vary from city to city (DiGaetano 1997; Kantor, Savitch, and Haddock 1997; Pelissero, et. al. 1991). Some cities may exhibit corporate regimes with a business-politician coalition. This type may be likely to support sports-based subsidies as part of overall civic and cultural development plans. There are also progressive regimes that may use sports subsidies as a strategy to redevelop a downtown area by building infrastructure and encouraging employment. In the case of the

New Orleans Superdome, it also meant that Mayor Moon Landrieu could engage in political patronage by rewarding supporters with service contracts. A third type of regime, the caretaker regime, is more resistant to spending on sports subsidies over other community needs (Pelissero et. al. 1991).

While regime participants and purposes may vary from city to city, regimes themselves tend to be stable arrangements within cities and change little from issue to issue. The existence of an urban regime does not guarantee success for those in support of sports subsidies. Some corporate or progressive regimes may resist pressure from team owners. Proponents of sports facility subsidies have to form coalitions with interests within the regime and be able to build public support in pursuit of public funding.

Coalition Theory. While growth machine and urban regime theories may provide a partial explanation for sports subsidy decisions, some cases require further analysis to gain insight on the political behavior of local government officials. Public policy decisions are mostly crafted through bargaining and compromise between various groups and coalition building is essential to increasing group support for subsidy policy outcomes (Riker 1962). The study of coalition formation based on specific policy goals holds promise for identifying the important factors in shaping decision outcomes.

One useful approach to the study of policy coalitions is the typology set forward by Caplow (1959). He suggests that there are continuous coalitions that contain relatively permanent members, episodic coalitions that distribute rewards among group members thus producing an incentive for coalition participation, and terminal coalitions or groupings that form in pursuit of a single distribution and then dissolve after policy adoption (Caplow 1959; Rich 1996). In many cases, public and private interest groups form temporary coalitions around a single issue rather than join in more permanent networks or policy subsystems as policy demands change over time (Cammissa 1995). Berry (1977) notes that ad hoc coalitions in national politics are more likely to form when, among other reasons, it is clear the coalition will be temporary and when it is confined to a single issue.

Policy entrepreneurs and interest groups must form coalitions to gain formal support for their policy goals in shifting political environments. There are obstacles to coalition participation and the most pressing one is known as the collective action problem (Berry 1977; Olson 1965; Riker 1962; Sabatier and

Jenkins-Smith 1999). The collective action problem refers to overcoming the fact that it is not rational for individuals to engage in group action (Olson 1965). Participation in coalitions is also limited by the cost of commitments. Ad hoc coalitions formed around specific policy goals limit the costs to coalition members and minimizes obstacles to participation.

The study of policy innovation and changing political agendas has gained prominence in the study of political processes. The emergence of a “window of opportunity” or a “triggering event” to stimulate coalition formation has been identified as a significant part of the process (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1971, 1972; Kingdon 1984; Olson, Olson and Gawronski 1998; Riker 1962; Stone D. 1988, 1989; Sabatier 1988, 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Others have focused on the formation of coalitions in the context of policy subsystems. This approach, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), explicitly recognizes the complexities of the policy making process (Sabatier 1988, 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). The ACF consists of public and private actors with a shared set of values who engage in non-trivial, coordinated activities over a period of time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999).

Each of the theories of community power previously discussed rely to some degree on notions of coalitions regardless of whether the coalition is dominated by elite or pluralist interests, is growth-oriented, or constitutes a more comprehensive regime. The policy game necessarily consists of coalition building in order to gain support and achieve policy action. Whether or not a coalition is successful, however, depends on how quickly it is formed and whether it is a temporary or long term organizational arrangement (Berry 1977; Schattschneider 1960; Peters 1999).

Sports development coalitions have been identified in sports facility subsidies decisions in several U.S. cities (Bachelor 1998; Pelissero et. al. 1991; Rosentraub 1988, 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998; Turner and Marichal 1998; Noll and Zimbalist 1997). These coalitions combine support from city, county and state government leaders, development interests, financial institutions and urban planners. They also include franchise owners, team fans and stadium-related interests. While the capacity for a sports-oriented coalition exists in cities capable of hosting a professional team, their formation depends on the local political culture and political structure of that area.

Authors in the United Kingdom (UK) have also identified sports development coalitions in urban areas. Cochrane, Peck and Tickell (1996) found lobbying by a coalition in support of a public-private partnership to gain public subsidization for Manchester, England's failed 2000 Olympic bid. Members of the grant coalition hoped to leverage their use of public money for sports policies to encourage further growth and development in the city. Another UK study finds grant coalitions, "...formed to maximize the opportunities to access government monies rather than a growth coalition seeking to foster urban growth by maximizing exchange values of urban resources" (Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999, 644). Sports-based coalitions form to maximize access to grants for their particular projects rather than in pursuit of a greater growth initiative or a part of the prevailing regime.

These coalitions may face strong opposition from other elected officials, groups with alternative business agendas, and other subsidy opponents concerned with protecting the environment, public space, managing growth or the use of taxpayer money (deHaven-Smith 1995, 1998; Dye 1998; Swanson and Vogel 1989). Some urban planners may specifically try to alter sports-based development that is expected to harm the environment, congest traffic, or cause an increase in crime and disorder in a particular neighborhood. If members of the sports development coalition are aligned with the governing regime on other local political issues then their chances to secure subsidies should increase. Alignment with the dominant political regime, however, does not guarantee success and creative sports development coalitions may be needed to secure subsidy support.

### **Minority Empowerment**

Ethnic and racial conflict is a salient feature in urban politics and provides yet another perspective on the exercise of political power. Because my research examines two metropolitan regions where minorities play a significant role in the political and economic arena, this theory of community power is particularly relevant and worthy of rigorous examination. In many respects minority empowerment provides a nuanced lens through which to view existing theories of power in urban politics because of the history of immigrant participation in American cities (Dahl 1961; Dye and MacManus 2003; Erie 1988; Harrigan and Vogel 2003).

White Western European immigrants that dominated both commercial and political interests in many locales earliest held political power in U.S. cities. They were eventually challenged by waves of Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants that arrived in the latter part of the 1800s (Erie 1988; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Judd and Swanstrom 1998). The new immigrants learned to mobilize voters, recognized that their strength lay in their large numbers, and eventually seized control of political power through political machine organizations. Machines were instruments of political power operated by mayors or party bosses for the benefit of clientele interests.

In the early 1900s, reformers guided by beliefs in “good government” generated numerous structural adjustments in local governments in efforts to break the political control of machines (Erie 1988; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Hofstadter 1955; Rice 1977; Wiebe 1967). These reformers often represented traditional business and upper class interests and sought to professionalize government administration. The reform movements that challenged political machines later shaped the manner in which minority groups compete in city politics (Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Judd and Swanstrom 1998).

Racial politics impacted the development of most post-World War II cities in the United States. Historically blocked from political power, African-Americans organized, mobilized, and protested for civil rights during the 1950s and 60s. Their persistence paid off as national policies on race were slowly transformed in the courts, through congressional statutes and by executive enforcement (Wasby 1993). Local political incorporation became the first real test for African Americans as they sought opportunities to exercise their political voice (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984, 1997, 2003). In cities with large black populations like Atlanta, Baltimore and Newark, black voters mobilized and backed candidates for office. Voters elected black mayors and council members who formed coalitions with the downtown business interests (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1997, 2003; Stone 1987; Rich 1996).

But getting racial minorities elected to office was one step; establishing effective participation in routine policy making would be another. Though there was greater inclusion as black candidates won elections to city councils and mayoral offices, the structural restraints on power within cities made these gains more symbolic than real (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984, 1997, 2003). Political representation alone was usually not sufficient to influence local government policy and organized protest and symbolic

electoral victories could not secure the degree of influence necessary to see minority interests through the political agenda. Full political incorporation required either structural changes to the local political system or it demanded engaging in another level of coalition building in order to gain influence over policies important to minority groups. Where African-Americans and Hispanics succeeded, it was largely through local political reforms that provided minorities with access to formal power (Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Warren 1997).

But in other cities, minority groups have come to participate meaningfully in local governance and decision-making through a strategy of coalition building. Coalitions are political arrangements that particularly suit ethnic and racial groups that have traditionally held minority shares of political power (Rich 1996). In order to shape the direction of city governments, minorities need to become part of a governing coalition that is committed to the minority agenda. That coalition might be a biracial or multiracial coalition; the key is that it can effectively compete for governmental power (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1997).

The most recent wave of immigration in the mid to late 1900s brought Hispanics and Asians to the urban areas of the United States. Among Hispanics, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans have been the most significant populations to arrive over the past 50 years and have settled predominately in the southwest, the southeast, and in New York and Illinois (Garcia and de la Garza 1977; Garcia et. al. 1992; Hero 1992; Harrigan and Vogel 2000; Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Portes and Bach 1985). The growing numbers of people from those countries and from Central and South America have made Hispanics the largest minority group in the country. Research also shows that Hispanics gravitate to metropolitan areas (Judd and Swantstrom 1998). Not surprisingly, they are active in urban politics (Hero 1992).

The Hispanic political experience in U.S. cities has clearly differed from the black experience and scholars suggest that Latinos are simply politically “different” than other minority groups (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1997; Garcia and de la Garza 1977; Hero 1992; Moore and Pachon 1985). Understanding Hispanic politics requires altering traditional perspectives on immigrants and focusing instead on the crosscutting issues of race, ethnicity and class (Hero 1992; Grenier and Stepick 1992). Garcia and de la Garza’s analysis of the Mexican experience in the U.S. argues that the usual perspectives

of pluralism and elitism do not adequately capture the “Chicano” experience. They suggest instead a model of “internal colonialism” as a way to understand the institutionalized powerlessness of Mexican Americans and the differences between them and other immigrant groups in American society. The characteristics of colonial relationships relevant to urban areas include cultural imperialism, racism and a history of colonial administration (Hero 1992; Garcia and de la Garza 1977).

These obstacles were partially overcome when, in 1981, a Mexican-American mayor was elected in San Antonio, Texas, and Denver, Colorado seated its first Mexican-American mayor just two years later. But the experiences of the two cities differed in important ways. In San Antonio, growth in the Mexican-American population and a change in political structure that instituted single-member districts (the result of a legal compromise) gave Mexican-Americans the electoral power to control both the city council and the mayor’s office. In the ensuing years, San Antonio experienced great economic growth that provided jobs and political incorporation for Hispanics. A governing coalition between Mexican American neighborhood groups and business leaders fueled that city’s development (Judd and Swanstrom 1998).

In Denver, Hispanics were able to elect a Mexican-American mayor even though Hispanics account for just one-fifth of the city’s population (Harrigan and Vogel 2003). Their success stemmed from the use of resources for political incorporation common to the experiences of African-Americans in several California cities (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1997; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Hero 1997). These tools of empowerment included a population large enough to influence elections, a base of middle-class Hispanics to provide economic support, the absence of a business establishment dominated by non-Hispanics, and the absence of political structures like at-large city councils that could hinder the interests of minority groups (Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Hero and Clarke 2003). While the election of a Hispanic mayor in Denver helped to produce jobs and political inclusion for Mexican-Americans, the coalition of minorities and white liberals lacked significant support from business elites and ultimately fell short in the economic development arena (Harrigan and Vogel 2003).

The Hispanic population in Florida is significant. Estimates from the 2000 Census indicate that 16.8% of Florida’s citizens identify themselves as Hispanic compared to a national average of 12.5%. The primary population has its roots in the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, most especially Cuba, as well as

Central and South America. The concentration of Hispanics in Florida cities ranges widely and in the two cities under study here, Hispanics are 65.8% of the population in the City of Miami and 19.3% in Tampa-St. Petersburg. Hispanics are most concentrated in Miami-Dade County, comprising 57.3% of the population compared to 18% Hispanics in Hillsborough ([www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov)).

While many Cubans migrated to the Tampa area around the turn of the nineteenth century, these and other Latin immigrants from Spain, Italy and Central America have been largely assimilated into mainstream society (Kerstein 2001; Moreno and Warren 1992). A Latino mayor was first elected in Tampa in the 1950s, but the structural power remained with the business community and did not rest with a population motivated by ethnicity (Kerstein 2001; Mormino 1983). Ethnic issues have not been significant in Tampa Bay electoral politics.

The experience of Miami-Dade County with Florida's greatest Hispanic population is different from that of Tampa. Furthermore, the Cuban-American political incorporation process differs from that of other Hispanic groups in the U.S (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1997; 2003; Hero and Clarke 2003, Stack, Warren and Moreno 1998; Warren 1997; Warren and Moreno 2003). Part of the reason for this can be explained by their distinctive immigration experience. The first significant wave of political refugees started in the late 1950s, and many of the early immigrants were able to bring financial resources with them to Florida (Gottlieb 1998; Moore and Pachon 1985; Moreno and Warren 1992). The "Golden Exiles," as they have been called, had second homes in Miami or had shopped and vacationed in South Florida (Gonzalez-Pando 1998; Olson and Olson 1995). They arrived from Cuba with economic, social and political capital to invest in Miami (Grenier et.al 1994; Portes and Bach 1985). Miami Cubans created an enclave economy based on their ethnic connections and that economic base was well-integrated in the construction industry, a sector deeply interested in regional growth and development (Portes and Bach 1985; Abrahamson 1996; Gonzalez-Pando 1998; Perez-Stable and Uriarte 1993; Portes and Stepick 1993). The economic incorporation of Miami Cubans facilitated the process of political incorporation (Hero 1992; Harrigan and Vogel 2000; Stack, Warren, and Moreno 1998; Stowers and Vogel 1994; Moreno and Warren 1992; Warren and Moreno 2003).

The second migration wave prompted by the Mariel boatlift in the early 1980s, however, generally brought less-affluent Cubans from a lower socio-economic status and with darker skin (Gottlieb 1995; Hero 1992; Olson and Olson 1995; Portes and Stepick 1993). Rather than undergo a process of assimilation in Miami, these new immigrants experienced acculturation in reverse where the black and white populations have to adapt to Hispanic culture, norms, traditions, and language.

Cuban-Americans are the dominant Hispanic group in Miami-Dade County and in each of the county's three largest cities, Miami, Hialeah and Miami Beach. These significant population increases also meant that Hispanics gained electoral influence throughout the 1980s and rose to leadership positions in commerce and in civic associations (Moreno and Warren 1992; Perez-Stable and Uriarte 1993; Portes and Stepick 1993; Stack, Warren, and Moreno 1998; Warren and Moreno 2003). Given this significant population, it is no wonder that the "Latinization" process that changed the language, street names and dominant culture of Miami-Dade has also made its way into the power structures of the county (Levine 1985). Changes in formal political structures from at-large to single-member district elections further empowered Hispanics as they gained political representation in proportion to their population and ultimately replaced non-Hispanics as the dominant power in political and social institutions (Grenier and Stepick 1992; Portes and Stepick 1993; Stack and Warren 1992; Stack, Warren, and Moreno 1998; Warren 1997; Warren and Moreno 2003). Hispanics have secured leadership positions in both the formal and informal sectors.

In many American cities biracial coalitions were formed with the goal of political incorporation for minority groups. In Atlanta blacks came to control the seats of local government but their agenda was co-opted by the white business community (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 2003; Stone 1983). Political incorporation through electoral strategies may not be enough for minorities to gain a piece of urban power. In cases when Latinos and blacks support the growth model chances for political incorporation increase. The minority coalition in San Antonio under Mayor Henry Cisneros mixed support from Mexican neighborhood-based groups while working with the business community to promote economic growth (Harrigan and Vogel 2003). Miami Cubans have generally been economically successful because of their

support for the growth agenda rather than challenging the traditional non-Hispanic white business interests (Warren and Moreno 2003). Following strategies for growth enhances avenues of minority empowerment.

Whether it is elitism, pluralism, political economy, or minority empowerment, existing research provides us with a range of perspectives on political power in urban governance and suggests a framework for studying sports facility subsidy decisions in metropolitan areas. Governments have tended to grant stadium and arena subsidies based on economic, political, and social rationales. A review of the reasons why local government officials support subsidy policies helps us to understand the dynamics surrounding this public policy issue.

### **The Debates over Sports Facilities**

The debates over subsidies for stadium and arena projects usually center on common themes that have been repeated in U.S. cities since the 1970s (see Table 1) (Burck 1973; Danielson 1997; Rich 2000; Riess 1998; Rosentraub 1988, 1999; Shropshire 1995; Swindell and Rosentraub 1998; Turner and Marichal 1998).

**TABLE 1. The Debate over Public Subsidies for Sports Facilities**

<b>PRO</b>	<b>CON</b>
Keeps team in town and avoids perceived loss to rival community	Philosophical opposition to corporate welfare of any type
Creates multi-sector jobs	Philosophical opposition to corporate welfare of sports facilities
Enhances economic development through capital investment	Financial burden on community
Encourages civic pride and/or prestige	Displacement of other community priorities both of a social and industrial nature
Promotes/develops sports, entertainment and tourism industry	Negative or neutral economic gain
Provides national media exposure	Market is artificially controlled by league owners
Revitalize neighborhoods	Environmental impact concerns
	Community is sports averse

As communities struggle with issues of funding public assembly facilities, professional sports venues have gained more attention on the academic agenda. Literature on the stadium debates includes useful case studies in the analysis of local politics in Baltimore (Cagan and deMause 1998; Kalich 1998; Noll and Zimbalist 1997), Chicago (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Peterman 2000), Cincinnati (Blair and Swindell 1997; Brown and Paul 2000; Kalich 1998), Cleveland (Kalich 1998; Keating 1996; Noll and Zimbalist 1997), Dallas/Fort Worth (Rosentraub 1988, 1999), Indianapolis (Euchner 1999; Rosentraub et. al. 1994; Rosentraub 1996, 1999), Minneapolis (Klobuchar 1982), and Minor League Baseball cities (Baim 1994; Johnson 1993, 1998).

The era of public subsidies for stadiums began in the 1930s with public support for stadiums in Los Angeles, Cleveland and Chicago in attempts to attract the Olympic Games (Keating 1999; Reiss 1998). In 1957, two baseball teams left New York for publicly subsidized ballparks in California symbolizing watershed events in the movement of professional franchises and the use of public incentives (Danielson 1997; Judd and Swanstrom 1994; Keating 1999; Shropshire 1995; Reiss 1998; Rosentraub 1988, 1999). The Giants went to San Francisco where officials built Candlestick Park for \$32 million. The Dodgers left Brooklyn for a stadium that was primarily built with private funds while the team gained significant land-based subsidies and infrastructure (Keating 1999; Rosentraub 1999).

A four-decade trend of public investment in sports stadiums and arenas followed fueled by competition by cities for professional teams (Beeh 1998; Keating 1999; Noll and Zimbalist; Rafool 1998a). As western and southern United States markets opened the opportunity for growth in the professional leagues, the number of cities and teams involved in professional sports stadium bidding increased (Bernard and Rice 1983; Euchner 1983; Judd and Swanstrom 1993).

Professional sports franchises appeal to some local government leaders and citizens who see potential benefits from hosting them. For cities and counties, the franchises are pieces in a game of political prestige played by local governments for power. Professional franchises are scarce commodities and demand for hosting a team has remained relatively high in recent decades (Euchner 1983; Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Alternatively, public officials often support subsidies in cases where the threat that the team will leave town is high if facility support is not granted (Rosentraub 1999;

Sidlow and Henschen 1998; Turner and Marichal 1998). Politicians, in particular, do not want to be perceived as being responsible for losing the home team.

A common claim by stadium proponents is that these projects bring economic and cultural benefits to the neighborhoods where they are located (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Swindell and Rosentraub 1998). Government officials may also point to a desire to create jobs and to engage in economic development or neighborhood revitalization. They cite the generation of employment, ancillary industries, new business investment and increased corporate involvement in the community that is associated with sports facilities (Pelissero et. al. 1991; Riess 2000; Rosentraub 1988, 1999).

Proponents also point to the prestige of having a team, hosting major sporting events, the symbolic and intangible benefits of being a Major League city, and garnering positive national and international media attention (Baade 1996a 1996b; Johnson and Sack 1996; Swindell and Rosentraub 1998). The prestige factor of hosting a team weighs heavily as local officials assess the appropriate amount of risk in return for their public investment.

These projects may also increase civic pride and have a positive social and psychological impact on local communities. Consider the Florida Marlins, whose surprise drive to the World Series Championship in 1997 appeared to unite people in Miami-Dade County for a short period of time. South Floridians of various ethnic and racial backgrounds were brought together by the pitching arm of Livan Hernandez, a Cuban immigrant who won the World Series MVP award. "If we did not have the Marlins, we would not have had 10 days of celebration after they won the World Series in 1997," said Miami-Dade Mayor Alex Penelas. "Could we have lived without 10 days of celebration? Sure. But people had a great time. It is all part of building community" (Penelas, interview, 2001).

Many cities are using sports stadiums and arenas along with convention centers and shopping districts as part of an effort to bolster their entertainment and tourism industries (Eisinger 2000; Euchner 1999; Fainstein et. al. 1986; Judd 1999; Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Sanders 1992; Strom 1999). Proponents of sports facility subsidies argue that a stadium or arena will make the downtown area look nicer, revitalize activity in the surrounding neighborhoods, and establish an architectural framework for enhancing the local area's image.

Professional sports leagues are not typical business entities due to the limited number of franchises available under the league arrangements. Due to the unique nature of their industry, individual professional franchise owners have a bargaining advantage with local officials and enjoy the ability to demand subsidies. Because the team owners regulate the number of firms in their industry through controlled expansion, they are able to exert pressure on city officials who may be afraid to lose a team or who, alternatively, are hoping to attract a new franchise to their area (Burstein and Rolnick, 1995; Danielson 1997; Eskridge 1991; Euchner 1993; Greenberg and Gray, 1996; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Quirk and Fort 1992; Rosentraub 1988, 1999; Shropshire 1995; Sullivan and Hovenkamp 1994).

Critics of governmental fiscal support of sports charge that taxpayers are subsidizing business owners who are among the wealthiest elite in the U.S. Others contend that tax money is being used inefficiently or that the economic benefits are overstated or simply false. They claim that these deals are simply corporate welfare for rich business owners (Cagan and deMause 1998; Keating 1999; Rosentraub 1999). One scholar likens the situation to a welfare system designed to subsidize a very healthy industry and some of the wealthiest people in the country, calling team owners and players "...the true welfare kings and queens of America" (Rosentraub 1999, 1).

The evidence from much of the stadium or arena construction of the 1980s and 1990s shows that financial benefits to the community do not support the subsidies given (Baade 1996a; Baade and Dye 1988; Chema 1996; Cagan and deMause 1998; Euchner 1993; Hudson 1999; Johnson and Sack 1996; Noll 1974; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Quirk and Fort 1992; Rosentraub 1988, 1996, 1999; Rosentraub et.al.1994; Swindell and Rosentraub 1998). The finding of *Sports, Jobs and Taxes*, a comprehensive examination of the economic impact of stadiums and arenas, is that, "...the economic case for publicly financed stadiums cannot credibly rest on the benefits to local business, as measured by jobs, income, and investment" (Noll and Zimbalist 1997, 6). In one case, a team of researchers found that a sports-based growth strategy including professional and amateur sports in Indianapolis aimed at economic development likely had "...an inconsequential impact on development and economic growth" (Rosentraub et. al. 1994, 221). In other words, the numbers do not add up favorably for stadium investments.

Economic projections for these projects requires accounting for the substitution effect, the fact that spending on sports events only substitutes for spending on other entertainment and tourism activities rather than adding to the total revenue pie (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub et.al 1994). Subsidy critics claim that sports ticket spending does not generate new activity but only substitutes for other entertainment dollars in the community.

Stadium and arena construction and management decisions are multimillion-dollar projects. These decisions have long-range implications for land use patterns and local development dollars. They impact a core neighborhood where the building is located, as well as a metropolitan area that claims a facility and the professional team as their own. Because of the enormous costs of funding sports facilities and the perceived trade-offs of funding other public goods and services, the efficacy of local and state government spending on sports facilities is debatable. Local officials and taxpayers may assume some level of risk to be acceptable in exchange for investing public funds in sports facility construction.

The battles behind the stadium game are less over the wisdom of municipalities spending public money on building sports facilities than over how much of the costs the public and private sectors will each bear. When urban leaders devote political and fiscal resources to large entertainment programs they must subordinate other needs in the urban community (Eisinger 2000; Euchner 1999). A common critique of these subsidies is that local leaders have left other priority areas such as school construction, social services, law enforcement, and transportation, for example, under funded while unduly focusing on sports facilities.

Noll and Zimbalist (1997) suggest that five questions or themes arise in the debate over stadium studies due to the patterns of public spending.

First, are these facilities worth it: to the teams, the leagues, and the cities that foot part of the bill? Second, what are the effects of teams and stadiums on a metropolitan area, a city, and its local neighborhood? Third, who actually pays for stadiums, and who benefits from them? Fourth, why do cities subsidize sports facilities, and what determines the amount of subsidy a team receives? (Noll and Zimbalist 1997, 5-6).

The answers to the fourth and fifth questions require an analysis of street-level politics and bureaucratic public policy making, which is a goal of this study.

Promises of profitable deals have to be believed on faith because the long term benefits of stadium or arena subsidies are difficult to adequately measure in the planning stages. By the time a deal has been completed and the results are tallied, the public is long committed to the debt payments and infrastructure costs related to sports facility development. While the arguments and the contestants may be similar across the country, the policy decisions differ depending upon the shape of political coalitions, the structure of political systems and the source of political leadership within any given community.

## **Summary**

I have identified the main theories of community power in urban politics in order to lay the groundwork for a close examination of public subsidy decisions for sports facilities in four cases. Elitism, pluralism, political economy and the growth machine, urban regimes and coalition theories provide alternative explanations for understanding when and why local governments dedicate public subsidies to building sports facilities. The minority empowerment literature provides a particular focus on urban politics that is especially important to the Florida setting of the current research. And existing studies on sports and politics illuminate the important debates over the use of public subsidies for sports facilities.

To determine which theory best explains the decision to grant public subsidies for sports facilities, I examine four cases using a policy process model. In the following chapter, that model is explained and justified, and the specific components of the model are outlined. Methodological issues regarding case selection, the case study approach, and data collection techniques are also explored before turning to the four case studies.

## Chapter II

### Policy Framework and Methodology

The decision to grant subsidies for professional sports facilities can be a contentious public policy issue for local government officials and is especially so in times of retrenchment. As resources are constrained, non-essential expenditures on public goods that are perceived to be luxury items or less deserving relative to other governmental functions are more likely to attract public attention as inappropriate uses of taxpayer funds. Elected politicians, ever cognizant of public opinion, may be less inclined to support high profile items like professional sports facilities for fear of losing public support at the voting booth. On the other hand, it is clear that the trend toward public funding of sports facilities is likely to continue as other team owners seek new buildings to replace aging arenas and stadiums to host their professional teams.

Understanding the players and the processes involved in these funding decisions can tell us much about local government and public policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the literature on political power and the question of “Who governs?” suggests several theories of local government decision making. In this chapter, I first discuss the merits of focusing on the policy process as an approach to studying sports subsidy decisions. I then outline a framework for studying the four cases in Florida, justify the variables included in the framework and substantiate my case selection. This lays the groundwork for the four case studies and my analysis of political power in the subsequent chapters.

#### **Employing a Policy Framework**

A main goal of political science is to gather and organize knowledge that can be presented to others in a logical and scholarly manner (Eisenger 1997; Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995). In order to understand decisions to publicly subsidize professional sports facilities at the local government level, I employ a case study design in which I examine each case using a policy framework that structures our understanding and assists in explaining these decisions. This approach provides an increased level of rigor over the purely exploratory case study and is useful for the study of imprecise sets of political processes

(Dye 1966; Feagin et. al. 1991). Models are useful tools for explaining public policy decisions (Dye 1966, 1998b, Parsons 1995; Waste 1989). My policy model focuses the data in a manner that allows for testing of alternative theoretical explanations for each subsidy decisions with an eye toward explaining the outcomes in the context of the main perspectives of power in urban politics.

There are several models of analysis available to political scientists who study public policy decisions. Some of the more prominent include process, institutional, incremental, elite, group, game theory, rational and public choice, and systems models (Dye 1966, 1998b; Parsons 1995; Peters 1999; Sabatier 1999; Waste 1989; Wilson 1969). All are important for understanding some aspects of public policy; however, none adequately address all of the policy dynamics involved in local government decisions to subsidize sports facilities. An institutional approach focuses on the formal actors and decisions of government to the exclusion of the informal sector and influential people representing civic and commercial interests. The elite model suggests that sports facility subsidies are a form of corporate welfare or public support for wealthy entrepreneurs who own professional sports teams. Since team owners rarely receive automatic or even immediate support for subsidy policies, the explanatory value of the elite model is suspect.

The group model starts from the assumption that group interaction is central to politics. As an issue comes to the public agenda, such as the demands for sports facility subsidies studied here, groups coalesce to support policy alternatives while others form in opposition (Truman 1951; Waste 1986, 1987). As Dye (1998b, 21) writes, "Politicians attempt to form a majority coalition of groups. In so doing, they have some latitude in determining what groups are to be included in the majority coalition." This model suggests that public policy outcomes are rooted in the equilibrium between competing groups in the process of bargaining and compromise that is politics (Berry 1984; Dye 1998b; Waste 1987).

Public choice models apply economic analysis to the study of non-market decisions (Dye 1998b; Sabatier 1999) and have been useful for studying economic aspects of stadium and arena subsidies (Kalich 1998). But this approach assumes rational economic actors and cannot fully capture the political dynamics behind decision making (Feagin et. al. 1991; Stone 1997). Public and private leaders support subsidy policies for reasons other than forecasts of economic impact. There are intangible and non-economic issues

that factor into decision makers' actions. The presentation of policy alternatives and the process of gaining support for specific options require a nuanced explanation of how and why subsidy decisions are made.

A more useful model for understanding the art of political decision-making is a political process approach (Dye 1996; Jones B 1983; Jones C 1987; Eisenger 1997; Stone 1997; Williams and Adrian 1963, 1968; Waste 1989; Wilson 1968). Thinking of policy as process permits the researcher to detect fluctuations in interests, changes in actors and the evolution of policy alternatives over time. "In this sense, variations in the composition of the political process may be an important factor in explaining policy variations and may not necessarily be simple reflections of dominant value preferences in the communities" (Williams and Adrian 1968, 30). A mayor or a manager may have one preference prior to taking their job and then change that position once in office. Political leaders may initially declare support for one set of subsidy options and later in the process need to seek alternatives as popular opposition arises or legal challenges are issued. The political process model captures these circumstances as part of the analysis.

James Q. Wilson discussed the advantages of this approach in the context of encouraging researchers to focus on local government and public policy processes.

I believe that such a concern has traditionally been part of political science since Aristotle attempted to show the capacity of various regimes to produce virtue among their citizens. The best empirical political science, has, in my view, usually (not always) been that which has tried to explain why one goal rather than another is served by government, and the consequences of serving that goal, or serving it in a particular way (Wilson 1968, 3).

Stone (1997) used an appropriately named Polis Model to allow for analysis of changes in actors' goals throughout the process and to recognize the desirability of different policy goals over time. This model can serve as a tool for examining how the policy boundaries are reshaped through the policy process and considers the impact of political charisma (or lack of it) and personality characteristics among key public and private officials (Stone 1997).

The framework employed in my case studies allows for the examination of factors impacting public policy decisions and the processes by which they were devised. My model contains variables that are particularly designed to focus on individuals and groups as interested political actors. Five of the variables in my framework specifically capture elements of human behavior and policy interests: formal political structure, informal sector, subsidy proponents, subsidy opponents, and public opinion. As defined,


the formal political structure and public policy options variables also permit an examination of the structural constraints and the political environment in which the process takes place. The identification and assessment of these variables reveals the details of politics and policy making that may not be captured by other methods of inquiry about urban politics. Such an approach can shed light on the real question of how these subsidy decisions are made.


### **Policy Process**

Examining political decision making through the lens of the policy process permits scholars to focus on *why* and *how* decisions are made by local governments with less concern for policy contents or *what* results from the process (Dye 1966; Wilson 1968). Such an approach highlights the forces and influences that shape policy options and reshape alternatives prior to their adoption or rejection by the formal political authority (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Sidlow and Henschen 1991). The process model understands politics as a cycle that evolves and comprehends individual actors and groups, structures and rules, and policy options (Jones 1983; Waste 1989). While public policy process models are limited in that they cannot truly account for causation, they can be useful in understanding and explaining urban political processes and decision making (Cochran and Malone 1995; Peters 1999; Sabatier 1991; Waste 1989; Wilson 1968).

The standard public policy process model generally characterizes the process as a life cycle that can be divided into identifiable stages. While there are various versions outlined in the literature, the general schematic of the policy process includes six main components (Anderson 1994; Dye 1998b; Jones 1983; Peters 1999; Ripley and Franklin 1986; Waste 1989). Those stages are problem identification, agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy evaluation (see Figure 1). My research is more concerned with the first four stages of the policy process, specifically, the problem identification, agenda setting, policy development and policy adoption stages of the policy process. While implementation and evaluation are important components of the policy process, they are beyond the scope of the current study. Finding answers to how and why sports facilities are subsidized requires a focus on the early stages of the process (Kalich 1998; Sidlow and Henschen 1998).

**Figure 1. Stages of the Policy Process**






Problem identification is the stage at which demands are made for governmental action. Those demands may be direct requests to a governmental entity from private individuals or groups, or demands that result from electoral outcomes like the adoption of a constitutional amendment limiting classroom size. Demands may also be indirect in that they result from lobbyists, interest groups, and public agencies or even by an investigative report published by the popular press (Peters 1999; Waste 1989).

With respect to sports stadium subsidy demands, the problem identification stage is likely to involve either a direct or indirect demand from the team owner utilizing media outlets to voice their demands and lobbyists to make the case in the public arena (see Figure 2). I anticipate that the initial demand is also not likely to include many other interests beyond the sports team owners and executives. While the need for a new stadium or arena may not necessarily present a “problem” for local government, the issue is likely to gain attention through the actions of political entrepreneurs that market plans to the public and to policy makers (Kingdon 1984; Peters 1999; Roberts 1992). Alternatively, the threat to move or a championship season may open a “window of opportunity” for policy makers to place the subsidy issue on the public agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1972, 1983; Kingdon 1984; Olson, Olson and Gawronski 1998; Sabatier 1988, 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).

The debate over facility subsidies can become problematic for policy makers when team owners make the threat to move their team outside of the community and thus raise visibility of the subsidy issue (Euchner 1983; Sidlow and Henschen 1998). Sports facility subsidy policies, in this way exemplify the “mountain climber problem” (Peters 1999, 54-55). Sports facilities are issues—like a single stranded mountain climber—that may gain attention and willingness from leaders to spend money on solving the problem while other issues like spending on health care, which could save many more lives, are not given the same attention.

How the team owner gets the request on to the public agenda concerns the second stage of the policy process, agenda-setting. During this stage, the problem is transformed into an issue worthy of public resolution and political attention (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1972, 1983; Kingdon 1984). Inclusion on the policy agenda means that the problem can be viewed as an issue with pro and con arguments making it part of the public debate (Waste 1989). Those actors who can establish and control the

**Figure 2. The Policy Process of Sports Stadium Subsidies**



### **Policy Formulation**

Policy alternatives are identified as to sources of funding, types of funding, amount of funding, land use versus direct outlays

Opposition is likely to harden and offer alternatives

### **Policy Adoption**

Process of policy approval is determined and consensus is sought for policy option favored.

Vote by political authorities or citizens.



agenda gain substantial influence over ultimate policy decisions (Peters 1999). Issues that reach the public's agenda usually stay there, but they may sometimes be displaced by other, more pressing matters (Peters 1999; Waste 1989).

Scholars have also distinguished between a systemic agenda, those issues "perceived by the political community as meriting public attention and resolution...[that] are largely symbolic in nature" (Cochran and Malone 1995, 41), and an institutional agenda that receives significant attention by established decision makers (Cobb and Elder 1983; Peters 1999; Waste 1989). It is likely that team owners seeking public funding of a facility will work hard to identify potential proponents from within the informal sector, the media, and the formal political structure in order to move their demands from the systemic to the institutional political agenda and achieve policy implementation.

The policy formulation stage is where the mechanisms for problem solving are identified (Peters 1999; Waste 1989). This stage is critical for identifying options and policy alternatives available in the political decision making cycle (Jones 1983). One of those alternatives must always be the null; governments always have the option to recognize a public problem but may consciously choose not to address it in a remedial fashion. For sports stadium subsidies, policy alternatives are likely to be proposed by team owners, bureaucrats familiar with funding schemes, the business community, elected politicians informed on the issues, and even by opponents who seek to influence the outcome of the policy process (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Pelissero et. al. 1991; Reiss 1998, 2000; Rosentraub 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998). While incremental changes may suffice in many routine issue areas, policies concerning sports facility subsidies usually require crafting innovative options (Peters 1999). These alternatives may include limiting or expanding the amount of funding available, identifying various sources of funding, engaging in creative policy developments that tie stadium funding to other policy matters or substituting land grants for direct cash outlays.

Finally, the policy adoption stage is the point at which the policy is determined to be politically viable and legitimated (Parsons 1995; Peters 1999; Waste 1989). Part of this process includes building consensus for the policy proposed from among the alternatives. At this stage we are likely to see increased opposition in advance of the formal decision. The formal decision may be made by elected politicians like

a county commission or city council or, in some cases, the decision made be made by the electorate at large through a ballot measure or referendum (Brown and Paul 2000; Fort 1997; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Quirk and Fort 1992; Rich 2000; Rosentraub 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998).

Formal decisions are also subject in some cases to legitimization by courts (Peters 1999). Policy opponents may pursue legal strategies during the policy formation stage or, as a last resort, during implementation phases. In the case of sports facilities, legal challenges can delay access to bond subsidies or can prevent construction while decisions made by legislators or by voters are reviewed in the courts.


Two additional aspects of the policy process should also be addressed to fully understand political decision making: triggering mechanisms and containment mechanisms (see Figure 3). These concepts refer to events that trigger some action at the agenda setting stage and to subsequent attempts to control the scope of the policy process (Cobb and Elder 1972; Parsons 1995; Waste 1989). Triggering mechanisms are events that "convert a routine problem into a widely shared, negative public response" (Waste 1989, 38). Natural catastrophes, changes in technology, and an imbalance in the distribution of resources can serve as triggering events (Cobb and Elder 1972; Olson, Olson, and Gawronski 1998; Parsons 1995; Sabatier 1988, 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). In thinking about sports stadium subsidies, an outdated facility or the threat by an owner to move the team out of the metropolitan area may serve as triggering events and move the owner's demand onto the public agenda.

Containment mechanisms occur later in the policy process and are "strategies or events designed to, or having the effect of, hindering the progress of a policy at the formulation, enactment, implementation, impact or evaluation, or feedback stages" (Waste 1989, 38; see also Cobb and Elder 1972; Parsons 1995). Thus, lawsuits by opponents to stadium subsidies or even a mayoral race wherein the winner is a former opponent to a subsidy plan can serve as containment mechanisms in the politics of sports stadium funding.

## **The Framework**

A model for explaining public policy outcomes can describe relationships between socio-economic forces, policy system characteristics, and policy outcomes (Dye 1966; Parsons 1995; Sabatier

Figure 3. An Expanded Policy Process of Sports Stadium Subsidies



1999; Waste 1989). The framework that I employ to examine cases where varying amounts of public subsidies were granted by local governments includes six variables. Each variable is expected to add in its own way to a rich description of the policy process involved in granting public subsidies to sports stadiums. Similar to the policy process model employed by Bachrach and Baratz (1970), my variables address structural and human characteristics.

In essence, these variables serve to focus the case studies on a structured framework assessing the factors most likely to shape how public policy decisions are made (Dye 1966; Waste 1989; Wilson 1968). Applying the policy formula to the four Florida cases provides a framework for analyzing sports subsidy decisions across time and space. My hope is that it may also aid in studies of local political power and policy making on other substantive policy issues in the Miami-Dade and Tampa-Hillsborough areas and be useful to those who study sports subsidy decisions in other locations. Scholars seeking to assess the odds of a particular sports facility or other large public works project proposal gaining support in other urban communities can use this formula to gain insight on particular decision making processes.

The following explanation of these variables presents the framework to be used in analyzing the four cases under study. I then turn to a discussion on the use of the case study method, the rationale for selecting these four cases, and my data collection techniques. The case studies in Chapters 3 through 6 provide descriptive analyses of the political processes of stadium and arena funding plans for Joe Robbie Stadium and the American Airlines Arena in the City of Miami and Miami-Dade County, and the Ice Palace and Raymond James Stadium cases in the City of Tampa and Hillsborough County. In each of these cases, team owners asked for and ultimately received some level of public funding. I do not include in my research those cases where public funding was denied.

Decision to Subsidize. “Decision” refers to the policy outcomes and the type of public subsidy granted in each case. Subsidy decisions include financial commitments and land-use policies. Under a traditional view of policy types, proponents of sports facility subsidies consider them as distributive public policies that distribute new revenue (Parsons 1995; Sidlow and Henschen 1998). In Peterson’s (1981) typology of policies, sports facility subsidies are pitched by proponents as developmental policies designed to increase

the economic standing of the city, as opposed to redistributive policies that have relatively neutral economic effects (Peterson 1981; Waste 1989). Opponents may classify these as allocational policies. Building sports facilities became more common policy for local governments as city leaders shifted their focus from redistribution to development in the 1960s and 1970s (Euchner 1993; Reiss 1998).

Policy decisions range from no financial or land subsidy granted to full financial commitment and land acquisition support for a facility. Decisions usually involve some combination of financial and land-based subsidies with varying degrees of public costs coupled with private commitments (Anderson 1994; Brown and Paul 2000; Cagan and deMause 1998; Danielson 1997; Eisenger 2000; Euchner 1993; Johnson 1993, 1998; Judd and Swanstrom 1994; Keating 1999; Noll 1974; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Peterman 2000; Quirk and Fort 1992; Shropshire 1995; Sidlow and Henschen 1998; Sullivan 1998; Riess 1989, 1998; Rosentraub 1988, 1999; Rosentraub et. al. 1984; Zimbalist 1998). In some cases, public officials may be able to allocate subsidies with little or no public input while at other times decisions to subsidize sports facility construction are subject to public participation and voter approval. Subsidy proposals may be placed before voters either in a referendum by the choice of public officials or as a result of a citizen initiative (Brown and Paul 2000; Fort 1997; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Quirk and Fort 1992). Decisions that involve voters are usually in addition to the decisions made by public officials.

Subsidy policies differ in terms of both the quantity and quality granted. The dollar amount of subsidies granted for sports facilities range from a few thousand dollars in some cases to a several hundred million dollars in others (see Appendix A). While the total cost of these facilities can be many million dollars, those costs are often distributed between several public entities and private sources over a period of several years (Sidlow and Henschen 1998). The quantity of public subsidies granted depends on the availability of existing or new revenue sources to decision makers and the options for gaining formal approval of policy preferences.

Subsidy decisions also differ in terms of quality. Direct subsidies include paying construction costs, subsidizing facility management and operations, and favorable tax rates. The types of bonds used for these projects vary from ones that carry favorable borrowing rates to other more risky investments. Favorable bond ratings are important for long term borrowing needed to finance a facility. Government

loan rates and terms are more favorable than those of private investors (Peters 1999; Rosentraub 1988). The ability to back a private project with public funding bolsters project credibility and financial commitments with lending institutions and investors.

Allowing for tax relief or tax rebates to professional teams and facilities are other forms of subsidies (Andelman 1992; Sidlow and Henschen 1998). Providing locational incentives through land purchases, expedited environmental and zoning clearances, favorable lease contracts, and infrastructure improvements through transportation and related services provide a greater quality subsidy beyond the amount of dollars allocated for facility construction costs (Euchner 1993; Kalich 1998; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Reiss 1998; Rosentraub 1988, 1999; Rosentraub et. al. 1994; Swindell and Rosentraub 1998).

Issues concerning sports facility subsidies usually appear on the policy agenda triggered by a change in franchise ownership or with a threat from team owners that they will relocate the professional team if public subsidies are not granted (Cagan and deMause 1998; Euchner 1993; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Pelissero et. al. 1991; Reiss 1998; Rosentraub 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998). The greater the potential threat that a team will move, it would seem the greater chance that political leaders will act on the subsidy issue. Euchner (1993) noted that nearly every professional franchise publicly issued a threat to move during the past decade in order to gain leverage in negotiating with local leaders.

How rapidly policy makers react to demands and in what manner depends on the options available to them given the structure of local government and their formal position in the governing system. When the sports facility subsidy issue becomes set on the public agenda, the policy alternatives are identified. The policy concerns include sources of funding, types and amount of funding, land use issues and infrastructure decisions. Proponents will attempt to find support for specific plans and push them through to policy adoption. At this point opposition is likely to harden and offer alternatives. In reality, the process usually becomes one where there is early policy formulation followed by potentially numerous reformulations during the course of the debate. The longer it takes for policy options to form and for coalitions of support to emerge, the more likely it is that opposition will arise and a contest over power and policy outcomes will ensure.

Formal Political Structure. One factor that may influence subsidy outcomes is the formal political structure under which they are decided. Formal political structure in this case refers to municipal charter design, the routine rules of government and the elected politicians and non-elected government officials. Government design and policy procedures have internal biases that set the parameters for political action. The rules and formal structures of local governments shape public policy decisions, and they are often not neutral (Harrigan 1993; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Shattschneider 1960). Political power is usually arranged in a particular city to reflect the general patterns of conflict within that city. Local governments may institutionalize conflict along community fault lines and impose inherent patterns of bias in the political processes of metropolitan areas (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Banfield 1964; Banfield and Wilson 1963; Burns 1994; Ferman 1996; Harrigan 1993; Harrigan and Vogel 2000; Shattschneider 1960). The way government rules and regulations are written biases decision-making and, to an extent, may determine who will have the opportunity and ability to influence policy outcomes. Public policy decisions must be analyzed in light of the particular formal political structure in which decisions are made.

Sports facility projects are significant public works projects in terms of planning and financing and any efforts to build one revolve around government institutions. The formal political structure shapes the policy options available for sports subsidies and gives certain players a better chance at influencing political outcomes over others. The design of power enables or constrains certain subsidy packages from being implemented. Particular formal and informal players may be able to influence the process but ultimately decisions are made under the particular constraints of local political structures.

Formal political structures in the United States take various structural forms (Bowman 1997; Berman 2000; Burns 1994; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; MacManus 1999; Ostrom, Bish and Ostrom 1988; Ross and Levine 1999; Svava 1990, 1994, 1999; Waste 1981). In 2000, there were 3,043 counties and 19,372 municipalities around the country with differing designs (Dye and MacManus 2003; Harrigan and Vogel 2003). Florida, with 67 counties and 401 cities, stood near the national average of 60 counties and 400 cities during the 1990s (Bowman 1997; Colburn and deHaven-Smith 1999; Dye 1998a). Counties and cities primarily have either a mayor-council structure, council-manager structure or, less frequently, a commission form of government (Berkley and Fox 1978; Berman 2000; Bowman 1997; Burns 1994; Dye

and MacManus 2003; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Svava 1990, 1994, 1999; Rice 1977; Waste 1989). Council-managers systems may or may not have a mayor who usually is elected as another voting member of the council.

Some mayor-council structures allow for a higher level of authority in decision making and produce a “strong” mayor while other structures provide for a “weak” mayor who is essentially a first among equal council voting members (Berman 2000; Svava 1990, 1994; 1999; Waste 1989). The mayor may have strong formal powers concerning appointments, budgets, and legislation. Mayors could have the ability to set the agenda in dealing with council, and may use this power to push through legislation that otherwise lacks support. The move toward strong mayors was the product of efforts to reform machine systems that dominated many cities. Many reformers felt that the decentralization of authority under a weak mayor left cities susceptible to machine rule (Harrigan and Vogel 2003). In retrospect, it seems that machines were more successful in reformed and more streamlined structures than in decentralized and fragmented systems (Judd and Swanstrom 1998). Still, cities and counties continue to implement strong mayor systems in growing metropolitan areas.

In other structures where the mayor has weak statutory power, she may compensate by using moral suasion or her office’s pulpit to forge coalitions amongst public and private community leaders (Peters 1999). Mayors can draw on informal resources such as experience, charisma, and public and staff support to increase their influence with their council counterparts (Svava 1990; 1999). Regardless of the amount of formal authority a mayor possesses, it may be that political skills are the key to strong mayoral leadership (Bowers and Rich 2000; Ferman 1985; Svava 1999). The leadership potential entrusted in this office provides a vehicle for shaping the political agenda and influencing the decision process.

There might also be a professional city or county manager who serves with the mayor. In strong mayor systems the manager is usually appointed by and accountable to the mayor; where there is a weak mayor structure, the manager acts as the executive. The manager plan of government was implemented to unify control over local administration in a professional executive (Harrigan and Vogel 2003). Beyond providing administrative leadership, managers often exercise policy leadership. This means that the manager may play a part in political processes rather than simply maintaining the administrative sphere of

government activity (Svara 1999). In particular, administrators provide facilitative leadership to support council members and promote policy goals.

Managers are most effective in cities with a broad political consensus and are most popular in medium sized cities ranging from 10,000 to 500,000 people. The larger the municipality, the weaker the consensus will be on political issues as more demands are placed on the local government (Harrigan and Vogel 2003). Administrators may be considered as having weak authority and acting primarily as a consultant to commissioners and not directing departments. Alternatively, there are strong managers such as that which existed under the Metropolitan Dade County structure where the manager had authority over budget and personnel and supervised county departments (Berkley and Fox 1978).

There is great variation in the design of city councils and county commissions in the U.S. (Burns 1994; Dye and MacManus 2003; MacManus 1999; Ross and Levine 1999; Svara 1990). Commissioners may be elected in single-member districts or in at-large contests. Some races are partisan while others are nonpartisan. Commission members often reflect their constituencies in terms of their ethnic or racial composition. These elected officials may serve in jobs that demand more than a full-time commitment in exchange for a part-time salary. They are leaders in the community but they are co-equal votes on a commission of friends and foes. The number of commissioners as well as the manner in which they are elected will have an impact on policy-making decisions.

In some structural arrangements, a commission or council chairperson can have influence in shaping the legislative agenda. A chair may be selected by getting the highest vote total in a general election, by a vote amongst commission peers, or by rotation of the chair. If a council follows a strong chair model, it may operate in a more centralized way, whereas other models provide for a more decentralized or dispersed system of power amongst a body of equals (Pelissero and Krebs 1997; Svara 1990, 1994).

State and local governments may also create special districts to propose and administer sports subsidy policies. These sports authorities often manage or own the facilities and they have authority to levy bonds or pursue other public sources of revenue for facility construction (Colburn and deHaven-Smith 1999; Dye 1998a). Establishing special governmental districts allows public officials to designate an entity responsible for implementing sports subsidy policies and administering the project outside regular policy

making. Some evidence shows that special districts are largely a financial tactic used by local officials to overcome taxing and debt limits while satisfying additional policy needs (Burns 1994; Peters 1999).

Board members have significant voting power in many instances. In some scenarios, council members also sit as sports authority board members. As a chair or influential member of the sports authority, a public official may change the membership of the authority and influence the policy goals of sports authorities. Sports authority officials may be allied with proponents or they may become opposition through their desire to support a competing agenda.

Overall, the rules and government structure shape decision-making power in policy debates. Thus, the possible range of subsidy plans can only occur within the parameters of what is feasible through regular government channels. Proponents of the subsidy plans must be able to work through formal procedures in order to accomplish their policy goals.

Informal Sector. While the rules and structure matter, influential players in shaping policy decisions usually extend beyond the formal governmental officials to include those who are part of the informal governing coalition (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Hunter 1953; Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995; Logan and Molotch 1987; Presthus 1964; Stone 1997; Vogel 1997; Waste 1986). Government officials may not be the only or even the most significant players in the political structure. An acknowledgement of the influence of the commercial sector in community policy making runs deep in the history of American cities (Warner 1968). Thus, the role of the informal sector must be examined in the policy process.

Informal power may be exercised by non-government officials in a variety of settings. Each of the main perspectives of community power, elitism, pluralism, growth machine, urban regime and theories of political coalition, acknowledge the influence commercial leaders can have over urban politics (Dahl 1961; Hunter 1953; Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995; Lindbloom 1977; Ricci 1971; Waste 1981, 1986). The informal sector includes members of the civic community, business leaders, and political elites who influence those in the formal seats of power. An analysis of policy decision-making processes must take into account the role of non-governmental institutions like banks, corporations, and civic organizations and

the actions of business and civic community leaders. Locating informal sector sources of power can help identify the main catalysts behind shaping decisions over major public policies.

A survey of the urban studies scholarship points to the influence of informal political forces in metropolitan areas (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Dahl 1963; Frederickson and O'Leary 1973; Harrington and Vogel 2000; Hunter 1953; Judge, Stoker, and Wolman.1995; Presthus 1964; Rich 2000; Vogel 1997). Beyond an examination of the formal rules of the game, the search for community power goes to finding how the mobilization of bias influences power, and should include analysis of the dominant values and social myths as well as the local rules of the game (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Harrigan and Vogel 2003). The role of the researcher of community power is to discover which groups or interests benefit from the mobilization of power structures in local communities (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Frederickson and O'Leary 1973; Waste 1986, 1989).

The informal sector is identified by investigating the literature about a particular region and by interviewing local elites involved in shaping subsidy policy decisions. The identity of particular members of the informal sector can be gleaned from a review of newspaper reports about subsidy policy debates. The answers found in discussions with those people involved in the policy process can also lead to identifying other actors who were involved in attempts to informally influence policy outcomes. Hunter (1953) constructed a list of influential people tied to the commercial sector who held a reputation for having power over decision-making. From this list he gathered further names of people with reputed influence before pairing the list to those perceived to wield community power.

One of the roles civic and commercial forces play is to assist in agenda building. Interest groups are also valuable to public officials for the information they bring and their support, both financial and symbolic, in various campaigns. Through their advocacy for policy options, interest groups place issues on the agenda of government decision makers (Berry 1984). Beyond agenda setting, members of interest groups may even write pieces of legislation in some cases. They are also important for coalition formation and in building public support (Parker 1998). A common problem among interest groups is lack of resources, they will benefit from joining coalitions (Berry 1984). The level of commitment required from groups in a short-term alliance is limited and thus lowers the barriers to participation (Barry 1984). Ad hoc

cooperative engagements are more likely since a group will expend resources on issues in which it has significant interest and not on all issues.

It is likely that proponents of sports facility subsidies would attempt to align in coalition with the members of the informal sector to strengthen their chances of getting public support (Pelissero et. al. 1991; Rosentraub 1988; 1997). Subsidy proponents would benefit from forming coalitions with representatives of growth machines or corporate regimes that could provide them with access to formal decision making channels (Logan and Molotch 1987). Members of growth-oriented groups spread the perception that economic development is in the interest of the larger community and that sports subsidies are essential. Through public relations support and political leverage they provide a logical source for the proponents of sports facility subsidies.

Subsidy Proponents. Proponents are the people and groups in pursuit of public subsidies for a professional sports facility. The primary proponents are the sports franchise owner or ownership group and the team executives (Bachelor 1998; Kalich 1998; Pelissero et. al. 1991; Rich 2000; Sidlow and Henschen 1998). Owners may ask for subsidy support or alternatively, make demands on the public. Team representatives and loyal followers will seek additional proponents in elected and non-elected public officials who perceive they will benefit politically from a new facility as well as support from members of the informal sector.

Commercial and real estate interests are also a source of proponents as are other growth-oriented and civic-minded community interest groups (Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Kalich 1998; Logan and Molotch 1987; Rosentraub 1988, 1999). Subsidy proponents assert that professional sports facilities can generate economic activity and increase local social capital. They produce studies and engage in public relations campaigns to rally support behind the claim that new sports facilities result in economic benefits to other businesses, increase company relocations to the area as well as boost convention bookings and media coverage, and potentially bring a championship team to the host city.

Sports team owners have been identified as part of the growth machine in local politics (Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Logan and Molotch 1987; Rosentraub 1988; Turner and Marichal 1998). “Professional teams serve many latent social functions; sustaining the growth ideology is clearly one of them” (Logan

and Molotch 1987, 80). Members of the growth machine are concerned with land use policy and stadium and arena projects involve decisions over large tracts of land. Other members of the growth machine who generally promote and support sports facility subsidies include the downtown real estate interests, bankers, bond investors, local media and those associated with Chambers of Commerce. The goal of economic growth usually unites these people on a policy agenda supporting sports facility subsidies. If the team owner has established civic and cultural ties with the informal sector their capacity to shape subsidy decisions increases.

Proponents will also need to have some key public officials on their side in order to secure their desired policy outcomes. Politicians' motives and goals are mixed on sports stadiums. Not all politicians are proponents and some may be the most vocal opponents based on their own political calculations. Conventional wisdom holds that public officials will be proponents of sports subsidies when they can do so without bringing harm to themselves at the ballot box since the primary goal for political officials is to get reelected (Mayhew 1974). Political leaders evaluate the benefit to themselves politically and to the community financially when deciding whether or not to support sports subsidies (Bachelor 1998; Turner and Marichal 1998). They must use their "political calculus" to determine whether support for subsidies will help or harm their careers and they must ponder possible policy outcomes (Wolman with Sptizley 1999, 241). Thus elected officials are likely to support sports subsidies when the voters do, and oppose them when voters are against subsidies.

Politicians may also support these projects because they themselves have some direct political or financial benefit from the construction of a new facility. Mayors and legislators must consider how alliances with project proponents or opponents can affect their chances of reelection. Many politicians are willing to support sports facility subsidies despite negative popular opinion and the uncertain risk of fiscal return. Decision makers may support expensive public expenditures for these public works projects when they can take credit for them even when faced with difficult economic choices and an unclear assessment of the benefits of a proposed project (Feiock and Clinger Mayer 1986). They may believe that claiming credit for saving the team or for attracting high profile events and publicity to the facility are more valuable goals than worrying about getting reelected.

Alternatively, public officials may be willing to risk their fate to voters at the ballot box on these issues, believing that their support of this spending is important for the greater good of the city (Andelman 1992; Noll and Zimbalist 1997). They may calculate that the electoral risk will be mitigated by the credit they can claim for keeping or landing a team or hosting Super Bowls, All-Star games and other entertainment events. It may be worth the risk to try to attract these events rather than be seen as someone who lost them. Political punishment for these decisions would have to come from retrospective voters, but the relative success or failure of stadium and arena projects will always be a matter of perception, one that public officials, team owners, and media sources can shape and reshape through the use of rhetorical campaigns and the rewriting of history.

Politicians will presumably try to frame a deal that produces valuable returns for the city while producing a positive political image to promote their own political agenda and electoral chances. Related to credit claiming as a motivation for a policy position is blame avoidance (Mayhew 1974). As with companies in other industries, economic incentives must sometimes be provided to private investors to keep them in the local area (Kalich 1998; Eisgener 1988; Stone and Sanders 1987; Wolman with Spitzley 1999). With the high costs involved in sports facilities, officials do not want to be saddled with blame for an expensive project that does not live up to expectations. Nor do they wish to risk losing a professional franchise perceived, at least symbolically, as part of an important industry.

Some public officials, such as appointed administrators, managers and department personnel, may not be directly impacted by election outcomes and can act more independently of voter concerns. In some political structures these key administrators may be quite dependent on the elected politicians who appointed them to their positions. In other systems their livelihood may be connected to electoral concerns, albeit not directly. Administrators who advocate positions contrary to the mayor or commission members could risk their job security. At other times they may be able, as non-elected careerists, to make decisions more or less autonomously. The attorneys, accountants, and department managers also participate in developing the details of subsidy policies that are presented to voting commissioners and mayors.

The proponents of sports facility subsidies in each case are identified through public records, media coverage, and responses to interviews with people involved in the decision process. Individual

proponents vary in the access they have to the formal decision mechanisms. Proponents should be successful if they can form a coalition with those who can influence the policy process.

Subsidy Opponents. Regardless of the relative strength of proponents, there will usually be some level of opposition, organized or spontaneous, to the policy proposals. As public awareness of subsidy plans increases, opposition voices will speak. The ability of opponents to form coalitions in reaction and response to sports subsidy policy proposals will be an important piece in the overall decision.

For every proposed public policy, there is generally an opposing policy agenda. All political projects have their supporters and detractors. The opponents of stadium subsidies may include civic elites, some public officials and organizations such as anti-tax groups, environmentalists, and other civil libertarians or free market advocates (Keating 1999; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1999). Sources of opposition may be based on protest against subsidies for facility construction, opposition to the land subsidies or to the possible environmental impacts of a plan. The longer it takes for an opposition group to coalesce, the more fully the agenda may be set and shaped by proponents (Schattschneider 1960; Peters 1999; Vogel and Swanson 1989). The chances for successful opposition will increase if these groups unite their efforts and form a common front against more powerful and proactive proponent forces.

The success of a proposed sports subsidy policy will partially depend on the size and the intensity of organized opposition to those plans. It also depends on the speed by which the opposition forms. Because growth regimes are particularly suited for getting policy results, people in the opposition who are results-oriented many times will "go along" with growth rather than take on a long struggle to reshape the regime and its agenda (Stone 1989, 229). It generally takes some triggering event to rally interest groups into action. Until project proponents make their initial inquiry, there is nothing for people to oppose. Thus the opposition is usually going to take form after the proponents begin to be identified and present a plan. Being the opponent may even fuel a self-fulfilling prophecy where opponents will cease to fight projects they oppose for fear of failing.

The sides of the debate on subsidy policies often mirror the particular social, political and cultural cleavages within local communities (Adranovich, Burbank, and Heying 2001; Burbank, Heying,

Adranovich 2000). Groups advocating public space, environmental protections or opposition to tax increases form the core of an anti-growth movement (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). They would be expected to be leaders in any organized opposition to sports subsidies. Some other grassroots opposition may spring out of particular concerns for land use policy, neighborhood and housing issues, and from those general critics who see sports facility subsidies as a form of corporate welfare (Burstein and Rolnick 1995; Rosentruab 1999). Some public officials could generate significant opposition movements and elites or they could be fueled by a swell in public opinion or the involvement of neighborhood groups.

Where a growth machine or urban regime exists opposition coalitions will be limited in their chances for waging successful antigrowth movements (Stone 1989). The first time a controversial political issue is encountered in a local area an anti-grant coalition may be slow to develop and will lack the money and support to serve as a viable opposition (Vogel and Swanson 1989). It is usually only a minority of the vocal opponents to government projects who actually mobilize and participate in a movement. In many cases, the opposition group is likely to be newly mobilized and faces the obstacles of being under financed and less politically connected compared to the prevailing power structure.

The success of opposition groups in gaining access to decision making and influencing outcomes is relative to the amount of money and number of members they can expend on their efforts. Opposition groups in general have a difficult time halting the actions of downtown development regimes in city politics and are at a disadvantage in the public policy process (Stone 1989). Even if mobilized early, the opposition lacks access to significant power unless it has money for a mass public education and media campaign. Often a community activist emerges to lead an opposition charge, but their effectiveness depends on resource availability (Vogel and Swanson 1989). While certain individuals may generally be against spending taxpayer money on sports facilities, their opposition has little impact unless they participate in a larger campaign to alter or defeat a policy proposal. With a support network, they may run a public relations campaign or organize neighborhood meetings to raise awareness. Opponents may also bring attention to their concerns by writing letters and opinion pieces to newspapers. Opposition opinions shared on talk radio shows, in pubs and on the streets also represent a reservoir of dissident support, but it must be organized to be effective in blocking subsidies.

Like successful proponent ventures, opponents need charismatic leadership and deep pockets to compete in the political arena. Influential civic elites are needed to lead opposition movements if they hope to be successful. If a wealthy individual willingly finances or raises funds for a crusade to defeat public subsidy policies, they are usually identified as the leader of the opposition. Someone is needed to finance the opposition campaign out of his or her own pockets or to act as a magnet for further fund raising. An elite concerned citizen may oppose sports subsidies as a matter of personal conviction. Their objections may be based on principles about the environment, taxes, or a competing public vision of the city's future. Others may base their opposition on professional grounds because they have competing business interests. Some renegade citizen may even have sinister interests behind their opposition such as their own desire to plan a public facility. Elite leaders might even agree with proponents on other aspects of the growth initiative in the city, but may differ on their level of support for sports facility subsidies.

Opponents often will find a few public officials who are also against sports subsidy plans. These politicians may oppose subsidies as a fiscal investment or they could be following public opinion polls and the pulse of their constituents. Opposition politicians may have the ability to derail subsidy plans through legislative, procedural or public relations efforts. The greater weight one carries in legislative and administrative affairs, the more that opponent politician can alter the process. On the other hand, some politicians may be vocal opponents but they are powerless with their single voice on a commission or board to stop subsidy policy decisions.

An opposition mobilized from previous stadium or arena battles or part of an antigrowth movement in the city increases their chances of preventing proponents' policies (Adranovich, Burbank, and Heying 2001; Burbank, Heying and Adranovich 2000; Vogel and Swanson 1989). It is expected that cities where opposition groups have had multiple or prolonged encounters with resisting public subsidies on sports facilities will be more successful at achieving their policy objectives. Normally, anti-sports subsidy groups are ad hoc coalitions formed from various urban opposition forces. If there is a repeat debate on a big policy issue like sports subsidies then the opposition may be ready to prepare for and contest any new stadium proposals.

A group of scholars examined the political processes and antigrowth movements in three U.S. cities that won bids to host the Olympic Games (Adranovich, Burbank, and Heying 2001; Burbank, Heying and Adranovich 2000). They viewed the politics of sporting “Mega-Events” to assess the prospects for an antigrowth movement in response to politics for Olympic-related growth in Los Angeles (1984), Atlanta (1996) and Salt Lake City (2002). These cases, the authors presumed, contained the seeds for viable antigrowth coalitions to challenge the status quo growth coalitions. If citizen opposition is visible, they suggest, it will occur against Olympic-related growth because of the "...short duration, limited beneficiaries, and need for extensive planning..." involved in the Olympic bidding process (Burbank, Heying and Adranovich 2000, 351). According to their analysis, opposition to sports-based development projects could take one of two forms: anti-growth politics or piecemeal resistance. Their findings suggest that those who oppose growth politics or urban regimes face long odds because, by definition, they are battling against an established power structure equipped with predominant political and economic resources. They found little orchestrated activity of opposition movements in any of the areas. Instead, the conflicts tended to be piecemeal and break down along the preexisting political fault lines of the areas; racial divisions in Los Angeles and Atlanta, and tax and environmental issues in Salt Lake City. Their conclusion was that opponents of active growth face tough challenges in overcoming obstacles to economic development (Burbank, Heying and Adranovich 2000).

Interest groups and public opinion focus on managing growth especially in areas surrounding Miami and Tampa (Colburn and deHaven-Smith 1999; deHaven-Smith 1995, 1998; Dye 1998). Politics in Florida tend to break down along the lines of pro-growth versus anti-growth interests (Swanson and Vogel 1989). There is a potential for opposition to form in these cases from the seeds of groups concerned with environmental protection and growth management. Anti-growth forces were unsuccessful in their opposition to development in South Florida and mainly co-opted under the rhetoric of growth management as a compromise with commercial-minded forces (Colburn and deHaven-Smith 1999; deHaven-Smith 1995, 1998; Swanson and Vogel 1989).

One measure of the impact of opponents is through their participation in county and city meetings related to stadium and arena plans. The meeting minutes reflect who actually showed up at public meetings

and documents speakers. The number and effectiveness of legal actions are other measures of opposition impact on policy decisions. Through court action disgruntled citizens may draw some concessions over facility location, traffic patterns, or the amount of public versus private finance. The amount of money raised and spent by opposition groups also is important for some measure of their success.

The impact of the opponents will depend upon their organizational capacity, their level of elite leadership and resources, and the issue over which opposition coalesces (financial or land based subsidies). The presence of elite leadership, grassroots groups, and public officials opposed to sports facility funding may not be enough to defeat a proposal. A more likely outcome would be for opponents to alter the terms of the decision and act as a check on the unaccountable use of public funding for sports facility projects. Opponents may be able to craft a more equitable policy balance than if they had not been active and vocal.

Public Policy Options. The decision to grant public subsidies to professional sports facilities depends on the public policy choices and revenue sources available to policy makers. Policy options must be considered because they are in reality alternatives that are available for policy makers. Debates over subsidy decisions depend partially on what policy options exist for local leaders. With a major project like a professional sports facility, designated subsidy streams need to be clearly identified and coalitions of support nurtured to secure passage of these policies.

Beyond using the tax system to collect revenue for general services governments also use taxes as a policy instrument by providing incentives for certain business activities (Eisenger 1988; Peters 1999 Stone and Sanders 1987). States and local governments employ a variety of subsidy policies to promote sports and entertainment venues that vary depending on the local conditions of a community. Common types of public subsidies include municipal bonds, tax abatements, sales tax increases, special taxes on hotel beds or rental cars, generous land usage, favorable facility leases, and infrastructure improvements (Baim 1994; Eisenger 1988, 2000; Keating 1999; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Pelissero et, al. 1991; Quirk and Fort 1992; Rosentraub 1988; 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998).

Some state legislatures and municipalities have established sports authorities to construct, manage, or operate these facilities (Rosentraub 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998). As government special districts,

these entities have authority to sell public bonds to finance sports facility projects (Burns 1994; Dye 1998a). In many states these special authorities are viewed as separate units that can borrow funds for projects without charge to municipal debt limits (Berman 2000; Martin 1990). A common criticism of special districts is that their appointed officials are unaccountable to the public.

Because of the high cost of professional sports facilities, a combination of creative public policies is usually needed for these deals. The greater the possibility a team will move if it does not receive subsidies, the more credible are their demands. If public policies do not exist to meet team demands, some plan will have to be created by proponents seeking public subsidies and a coalition formed in support of specific policy alternatives. When tax hikes are necessary, policy makers need to find ways to distribute the impact of any levies fairly evenly across taxpayer groups.

The impact of public policy options must be explored because the possible policy alternatives shape the decision process. For example, in San Francisco, voters generally must approve public bond issues, a procedural rule that shaped attempts by owners of the San Francisco Giants to gain public subsidy support (Cagan and deMause 1998; Noll and Zimbalist 1997). In many instances local governments need to gain state legislative approval before advancing certain options (Pelisserro et. al. 1991; Peterman 2000). Some sports facility policy deals involve approval from multiple government entities including states, sports authorities, and one or more cities and counties for a single deal. The ability to propose innovative public policy options depends largely on the particular political structure of local governments. The rules of the formal government decision-making process will promote certain policy options and deter others from being placed on the agenda.

Public Opinion. Public opinion toward specific public policy decisions aids in discovering how and why a policy equilibrium was reached. Getting public opinion to tip in support or opposition to subsidy plans is an important part of the formula. The public has become more actively involved in shaping subsidy decisions through voter initiatives and referendums, public hearings, protest movements, legal battles in the courts (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Voters who were rarely involved in past subsidy decisions are becoming more active (Brown and Paul 2000; Fort 1997). Previously their only redress if dissatisfied with the public

financing of sports facilities was to boycott games or to vote against politicians who supported these deals when they faced reelection. The spectators to the political game, like those of sporting events, have the ability to shape the outcome by their support or lack of support for one side or the other (Schattschneider 1960). When opinions take shape on an issue the public may form groups to support, groups that oppose, or groups that are undecided.

Public opinion can be measured through local election and referendum results, media coverage of ideas and expressions, and polls conducted about people's attitudes and beliefs. Polls are often taken throughout the policy process from the moment an idea is placed on the agenda through to the implementation stage. Different organizations measure public opinion at different stages in the policy game. These snapshots are reflected in the public opinion polls conducted by media outlets, government agencies, or private interests in support of or opposed to sports subsidies.

Organizations such as the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press provide independent polls on a variety of attitudes toward politics, public policy and media coverage. The Center provides a forum for ideas to be explored and information shared by scholars, journalists, and public officials (<http://people-press.org/about/> 816/03). Other polling outlets include Gallop Organization, Harris-Black, and Roper. Media polls conducted for television networks and major newspapers also inform policy makers about public opinion and help shape perceptions about policy preferences (Dye, Zeigler and Lichter 1992; Lavrakas and Traugott 2000).

Data on public opinion provides feedback for political leaders about reactions of citizens to issues (Dye et. al. 1992). Polls inform public officials, interest groups and the public at large about voter preferences. This enhances the democratic process by at least symbolically showing that all opinions matter, not simply those of elites. At the same time, media may use poll data to proactively shape opinions and to make the news rather than simply report it (Lavrakas and Traugott 2000).

The formation of public opinion needs to be viewed through at least three perspectives: political coalitions, elites, and the mass public. Political coalitions are "major political groupings" that come together and persist with an ability to influence public opinion (Holloway with George 1986, 14). Elites form a class set apart from society by their positions of authority and leadership in economic and political

sectors. The masses consist of the general public, the people whose public opinion is expressed in elections, polls, and protests. The mainstream masses do not necessarily have a consistent view on policy matters and their opinions can continuously change. In fact, there seems to be two mass groups to consider, an attentive public and an inactive mass (Holloway with George 1986).

Sports subsidy debates have high visibility and are placed in the public spotlight. Public attitudes are more likely to impact political decisions when the issues are widely known and important to the public (Parker 1998). The political debates over stadium and arena funding deals usually become visible since they are big ticket items and their financing is controversial. Political leaders concerned with their electoral connections must consider the views of the public when making decisions, as should the proponents and opponents of sports subsidies. Around the country, public opinion varies in its basic support for sports subsidies. Citizens can have ambivalent feelings about funding sports facilities when ideas are initially floated. The sides become clearer when proposed costs are defined and possible benefits outlined. If an existing stadium seems structurally acceptable, the public may not be willing to pay for a new facility. At times, taxpayers are willing to shoulder some of the economic costs for sports facilities through minor tax increases. They may also see benefits to themselves or to their home team and community. However, when teams invoke the threat to move, they could incur the ire of public opinion shifting against them.

Print and broadcast media coverage of political issues shapes public opinion and the ability of proponents and opponents to raise resources and support (Dye et. al. 1992; Lavrakas and Traugott 2000). New outlets can shape public perceptions through editorials, opinion pieces and the amount and bias of their coverage toward certain policy issues. More recently, some organizations have moved beyond simply informing the public about community issues to promoting civic activism (Berman 2000). Local newspapers may be more influential in urban politics than state or national politics because fewer sources of local news exist limiting the competition (Berman 2000). In some cities it may be the case that one major newspaper supports stadium construction while another is opposed. A situation such as this would lend more balance to the policy debate than one dominated by a single major media source.

Media sources may be more effective at political agenda setting than in shaping mass opinion (Dye, et. al. 1992; Holloway with George 1986). When it comes to sports subsidies, the media is often

criticized for being too supportive of sports (Turner and Marichal 1998). Media generally shuns the hard stories on the politics and economics of sports and instead focuses only on the entertainment value. Sports are a cash cow, the media's "bread and butter" (Rosentaub 1999, 51). Consider that there is a separate section or segment, and sometimes special sections of the news, dedicated solely to sports. Sports can also be front page or headline news. It attracts readers and viewers and is therefore a magnet for advertising dollars. The media has discovered a gold source and "...that goose is rarely analyzed for local officials who must decide whether or not a subsidy is needed" (Rosentraub 1999, 54).

There may even be deeper connections between newspaper owners and the interests of sports team owners. They may have common political connections or concerns over land use issues (Logan and Molotch 1987; Peters 1999). Media support, or lack of it, can be a large part of the formula for getting support for subsidies. More recently, the era of overblown sports subsidies led to a new focus of accountability by reporters looking to uncover the true costs and benefits of these major projects.

Radio and television coverage may also be biased, but this bias is difficult to quantify in any meaningful way. It would be nice to know how many radio hours were dedicated to stadium issues and how many callers the talk shows received since many of the most boisterous debates and arguments probably occurred here. But this data is difficult to gather after the fact. Like much of the substance of politics and public opinion, the conversations on talk radio that probably had an impact on local politics remain intangible and beyond measurement.

In my study I rely upon measures of public opinion obtained through polls by local media outlets about stadium or arena projects. Public opinion may also be gauged through the number and tone of letters to the editors of local newspapers, the editorials and news stories. Public input can also be measured by the number of lawsuits filed and their success in altering the terms of the debate. Print media is more manageable in a retrospective analysis due to the archival data maintained by most periodicals. The impact of print media is measured by the number of editorials dedicated to the sports stadium issue and whether they are positive or negative. A comparison with coverage of other pressing local issues at the time would give some idea of the relative importance of the stadium or arena issue.

The overall expected impact of public opinion and media coverage is moderate. Media outlets are the primary purveyors of information and they help shape the political agenda through the extent and tone of their coverage. They can elevate or subvert a proposal on the public agenda with their coverage. The role of political coalitions, elites, and masses and how they shape and are shaped by media will be an important part of the sports subsidy equation. It is the integrative factor as there are different public opinions depending on the design of political coalitions and the local political structure.

Policy decisions on the quantity and quality of subsidies for professional sports facilities are influenced by the formal political structure, the informal sector, the composition of the proponents and opponents to subsidy policies, the range of public policy options, and measures of public opinion. Decisions in support of facility subsidies must ultimately be approved by the formal local government structures. The formal rules of these structures set the parameters for debate. But members of the informal community structure can influence policy makers and the policy-making channels. The proponents and opponents to subsidy strategies can only shape the public policy options based on the formal political framework and guided by prevailing public opinion. The framework presented allows for an analysis of sports subsidy decisions while isolating those factors that should play the most important roles. An analysis of the agenda setting and coalition formation process in support and opposition to these sports facility subsidies will allow for greater generalization about the political processes and community power structures of each region. The case study method allows us to examine the interaction of the six variables in specific urban policy settings.

### **Method and Case Selection**

The case study method facilitates comparisons of empirical data and has many benefits for the researcher. The use of case study research provides depth and nuance of social settings revealing observations that otherwise may not be reflected in the data (Babbie 1992; Feagin et. al. 1991; Wilson 1968; Yin 1989). This method provides “an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single phenomenon” (Feagin et. al. 1991, 2). Case studies are particularly relevant for

uncovering complex public policy decision-making processes (Dye 1966; Wilson 1968; Williams and Adrian 1963, 1968).

The case study method is also useful for generating hypotheses (Glaser and Strauss 1970; Wilson 1968). Qualitative studies allow for analysis of the interactions of units such as small interest groups or political cliques (Feagin et. al. 1991). Case-based approaches also aid in the study of institutions and organizations, and help explain how these larger groups may be impacted by the actions and ideas of individuals. Through case study analysis we can delve into the details about the particular actions and inquire about the individual motivations of players in sports facility subsidy decisions while gaining a greater understanding of local political processes.

Comparing data across case studies is especially useful in policy analyses of a small number of cases involving observable similarities and differences (Feagin et. al. 1991; White 1994; Williams and Adrian 1963). Using a comparative research approach one can describe and explain particular occurrences with great depth in hopes of uncovering patterns that will help explain phenomena in other cases and expand the comparison of policy processes across U.S. cities (Bowers and Rich 2000; Ferman 1996; Stern and Kalof 1996; Williams and Adrian 1963; Wilson 1968). Previous studies of sports facilities employ an exploratory case study approach to understanding sports subsidies decisions (Kalich 1998; Pelissero et. al. 1991; Rosentraub 1988). As one scholar of the economics and politics of sports facility subsidies put it,

While it is certainly possible to consider the policy and societal consequence of public investments of this nature, the real dimensions of the power relationship between sports franchises and local governments are only evident through case study analyses. Only in this way is it possible to understand some of the subtle and the not-so-subtle pressures used to secure subsidies for sports franchise moves (Rosentraub 1988, 78).

As with any method, there are also drawbacks to the use of case studies. A rigorous use of the case study method limits the number of cases that the researcher can examine at one time. There are also limits to the number of variables that can be viewed, quantifying their relative weight in shaping a decision, and in the ability to test correlational relationships (Stern and Kalof 1996). A drawback to qualitative analysis is that the line between data collection and analysis is easily blurred and not clearly delineated (Glaser and Stauss 1970). However, the need to be scientific in social science research is ultimately

stymied by the reality of changing formal structures and informal economic, political and social relationships within U.S. communities over time.

Political scientists use field research or methods known as participant observation, direct observation, and case studies to produce qualitative data for interpretations that do not easily reduce to numbers and equations (Babbie 1992; Glazer and Stauss 1967, 1970; White 1994). Grounding use of the case study method in the quest for substantive theory allows for a greater depth of understanding about the basic social processes or core variables in the political processes of each public policy decision outcome. Grounded theory provides a framework from which to analyze social processes and sets forth a substantive or low level theory that is based on the case data (Glazer and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990).

Successful use of qualitative research in case studies rests with effective case selection (White 1997). For this study, data has been gathered on the political processes surrounding sports subsidy decisions in four cases of stadium and arena construction from two large urban Florida counties and their central cities during the 1980s and 1990s. Subsidy policy cases for the Greater Miami and Tampa Bay areas were selected because they are two Sunbelt regions that experienced rapid population growth during the last half century, which also impacted their political and economic designs (Abbott, 1981; Bernard and Rice 1983; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Mohl 1990). One result of that growth for these two regions was the expansion of professional sports franchises into their markets. By looking at these two Florida metropolitan areas there is a control for state level politics and variances that might be attributed to state law and political activity in terms of financing and land use issues. The legislative and judicial decisions on sports facility subsidy policies in Florida set the parameters for the local formal government structures and public policy options in each of the cases.

Florida citizens have a reputation for being tax averse and the legislature is known to be conservative on taxation (Colburn and deHaven-Smith 1999; deHaven-Smith 1995; Dye 1998a; Kelley and Taylor 1992; MacManus 1998; Parker 1998). Florida is one of seven states without a state personal income tax thus the state government relies more heavily on consumption taxes than income or wealth based taxes for general revenues. Lawmakers have relied on sales tax and user fees to finance its growing population of older Americans, immigrant arrivals, and school-aged citizens all competing for scarce budget

allocations (MacManus 1998). Commitment to the process and creative financing ideas were necessary ingredients for public and private leaders who, if they allied with proponents, tried to craft formulas for subsidizing sports facilities.

The state constitution places major constraints on the ability of local governments to raise revenue (Dye 1998a; MacManus 1998). Florida local government officials were traditionally more restricted in their ability to raise sales taxes than officials in other states, but legislators authorized fifteen new local sales tax options between 1976 and 1996. These proposals to raise local taxes must also be approved by voters and sometimes by extraordinary votes of city or county officials. Cities and counties also must gain state approval in order to raise revenue from hotel bed, rental car, or so-called “sin” taxes on alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, tobacco products and pari-mutuel gambling. Like general sales tax options, these tax increases must also be approved by voters or in some cases may be ratified by extraordinary majorities of a local council or commission (MacManus 1998).

State lawmakers have exempted sales taxes by giving rebates to subsidize sports facilities. Legislators supported the efforts of St. Petersburg city leaders in the 1980s to build a ballpark by passing a law granting \$2 million in annual tax abatements for sports facilities. Similar subsidies were approved for subsequent Florida sports facilities in Orlando (basketball arena), Miami (basketball arena and retrofit of football stadium for baseball), and Tampa (hockey arena). Competition ensued between representatives from different Florida counties and sometimes between different sets of proponents to subsidize a facility for the same team.

The need for state approval of tax proposals impacts the policy cycle timeline as Florida legislators traditionally meet in March for a 60-day session. Often they extend the session or special sessions are called to deal with pressing issues not covered during the regular period (Dye 1998a). Land use is also regulated by state agencies that are concerned with environmental issues and growth management (Colburn and deHaven-Smith 1999; deHaven-Smith 1996, 1998; Dye 1998a).

The Miami primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA), commonly called the Greater Miami area, encompasses Miami-Dade County, has 1,946 square miles of land and a population of 2,253,362 in 2000. Miami and Ft. Lauderdale combined form a consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA), an area

where two or more metropolitan areas have grown together (Harrigan and Vogel 2003). My focus is on the Miami PMSA and Miami-Dade County. The Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater metropolitan statistical area (MSA), or Tampa Bay area, is comprised of four counties, Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco and Hernando. My focus in this study is on Hillsborough County, which contains the City of Tampa, has 1,051 square miles of land and a 2000 population of 1,027,318 (see Table 2).

The Greater Miami and Tampa Bay areas share characteristics of environmental, economic development and migration patterns. Miami and Tampa also have parallel histories as Florida pioneer cities founded around the turn of the twentieth century through the building of their growth engines during World War II, and their emergence as international cities in the 1980s (Bernard and Rice 1983; Kerstein 2001; Mohl 1990). Both areas have benefited greatly from the general growth of the Sunbelt since the 1960s. Following the trend in other metropolitan areas, the growth in both regions was greater in the county than in the central city (Harrigan and Vogel 2003). In 1980, the Miami-Dade region reached a population of 1,625,781, while Tampa-St. Petersburg numbered about 1,569,134 (Bernard and Rice 1983). In 1990, the population was 1,937,094 in Miami-Dade and 2,067,959 in the Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater MSA. By 2000, Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater had 2,395,997 residents compared to Miami-Dade at 2,253,362 (Census 2000).

As the Miami-Dade and Tampa-Hillsborough regions became major entertainment, tourism, television markets they were also targeted as potentially lucrative markets for the professional sports industries (Dye 1996a; Judd and Swanstrom 1998; Savitch and Thomas 1991). Both areas have benefited economically from the expansion of the professional leagues and have hosted marquee events including Super Bowls and All-Star games. Their stature as national and international entertainment and sports markets has grown since the 1960s with the aid of their professional sports images (Bernard and Rice 1983; Kernstein 2001; Mormino 1983).

Four distinct subsidy decisions were reached in the cases examined here and each decision produced some level and type of public funding. The four case studies involve two cities and two counties. The City of Miami and Miami-Dade County and the City of Tampa and Hillsborough County are the formal political structures predominately involved in these cases. Miami-Dade experienced two very

**TABLE 2. Socio-economic and Demographic Data Comparisons**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Florida</b>	<b>Miami-Dade County</b>	<b>Hillsborough County</b>
Land Area (square miles)	53,927	1,946	1,051
Population 2001 estimate	16,396,515	2,289,683	1,027,318
Population 2000	15,982,378	2,253,362	998,948
Persons under 18	22.8%	24.8	25.3
% Persons 65 and over	17.6	13.3	12.0
Black	14.6	20.3	15.0
Hispanic	16.8	57.3	18.0
Non-Hispanic White	65.4	20.7	63.3
Living in Same house in 1995 and 2000	48.9%	50.2%	46.0%
% Foreign Born persons	16.7	50.9	11.5
Language other than English spoken at home	23.1	67.9	20.9
High School Graduates (age 25 and older)	79.9	67.9	80.8
Bachelor's degree or higher	22.3	21.7	25.1
Housing Units 2000	7,302,947	852,278	425,962
Housing units in multi-unit structures 2000	29.9%	45.5%	28.8%
Households	6,337,929	776,774	391,357
Median household income 1999	\$38,819	\$35,966	\$40,663
Per capita \$ income 1999	\$21,557	\$18,497	\$21,812
Persons below poverty, 1999	12.5%	18.0%	12.5%
Retail Sales per capita, 1997	\$10,297	\$9,718	\$12,018
Minority-owned firms, 1997	22.0%	58.2%	21.9%
Women-owned firms, 1997	25.9%	23.6%	25.4%
Federal Funds and Grants 2001 (\$1000)	99,998,376	12,518,613	5,346,632

Source: <http://quickfacts.census.gov> (27 July 2003)

different political structures during the time period under study. Before 1993, Miami-Dade County was governed by a county commission-manager form of government. The eight commissioners were elected at large and one ran for the largely symbolic post of mayor. After 1993, the county commission expanded to 13 seats elected in single-member districts. Three years later, the position of an executive mayor who is elected at large was established (Hill, Moreno and Cue 1997; Warren and Moreno 2003). The City of Miami traditionally had a council-manager system as it did during the time of these two cases (Mohl 1989; Vogel and Stowers 1991). There were four council members residing in districts and elected at-large with a mayor who sat essentially as the fifth council member and symbolic leader.<sup>1</sup>

Hillsborough County has had a manager-council structure since the 1970s (Kerstein 2001). Of the seven commissioners, four are elected from single-member districts and three are elected at-large. Commissioners select a chairperson from among their peers. The City of Tampa is governed by a mayor-council structure where the mayor has strong budget and city administration powers and veto authority with the seven-member city council. Three Tampa council members are elected at-large and four represent single member districts. No structural changes occurred in these arrangements during the case studies examined here.

The funding decisions in these cases range from one with a relatively low amount of public subsidy to one with a relatively high quantity of public subsidy, with two cases yielding a moderate level of subsidization. Joe Robbie Stadium is commonly described as a privately financed stadium. In fact, 97% of the facility's construction was privately financed, but the project also received public subsidies for land and infrastructure, favorable lease terms and access to government development bonds (Keating 1999; Kleinberg 1999). Construction of the American Airlines Arena was privately financed, but a public subsidy pays annual arena operating costs and the land was purchased and cleared for use by the county. Miami-Dade County and the City of Miami were the primary government actors in these two cases. The Tampa Ice Palace received a public subsidy for 62% of construction costs while the Raymond James

---

<sup>1</sup> The City of Miami changed to five single member districts and implemented a strong mayor system in 1997.

Stadium was built entirely with public funds (Rafool 1997a). These two policy decisions were reached within a close time frame and were shaped by the City of Tampa and Hillsborough County officials.

In all four cases selected the team owners made demands for a stadium or arena facility to replace their team's present playing location. Each franchise had been added to their professional leagues during expansion and each team had previously played in stadiums or arenas in which they had little or no initial input into the building decisions.<sup>2</sup> There is one stadium case and one arena case from each geographic region, and the cases take place during the 1980s and 1990s. In all four cases, credible threats were made to the effect that without public subsidy the team might move to another city. In each case, the team owner initially demanded a larger subsidy than what was eventually granted.

### **Data Collection**

My case study approach included gathering data from personal interviews, public documents, and newspaper articles in the two Florida metropolitan regions. I reviewed records of the public meetings where subsidy options were discussed, newspaper articles, and scholarly materials to construct an overall picture of how and why decisions were made. These documents provided the background for understanding the process as it evolved. Data collected from these four subsidy decisions is analyzed using the framework detailed in the first part of this chapter to help understand which perspective of political power best describes the process in each case.

In each case I identified the significant actors who could respond to questions about the four sports facility subsidy decisions. These names were gathered from newspaper reports, public records, and leads from interviewees. I prepared structured interviews for each of my respondents, but also planned for follow-up questions (see Appendix B). Each respondent was asked a "grand tour question" to get them talking, and these were followed by questions with specific prompts about the subsidy decisions probed in this study (Berry 2002; Leech 2002). The 20 formal interviews were conducted with public and private leaders in Miami-Dade and Tampa Bay (see Appendix C). They included former and current office holders

---

<sup>2</sup> The Dolphins joined the newly formed American Football League (AFL) in 1966. The AFL merged with the National Football League (NFL) for the 1968 season. NFL expansion added the Buccaneers 1976. The Heat joined the NBA in 1988, and NHL Lightning started play in 1993.

as well as members of the civic community who supported or opposed the subsidy decisions or had insight into the particular political processes.

An important task when undertaking field research is to ask questions that aim toward getting the relevant answers from respondents (Babbie 1992; White 1997). Structured data gathering such as questions prepared for surveys collect information according to specified categories, whereas unstructured data gathering based on interviews allows for open-ended data collection (White 1997). The use of unstructured interviews introduces interaction between the researcher and the respondent and enables the interviewer to connect with their source and with their topic (Babbie 1992; Berry 2002). A mixture of structured questions and open-ended follow-up probes results in a semi-structured interview method (Leech 2002). Discussions of issues that arise during the conversation but were not covered in the structured questions provide the researcher with additional perspectives on the topic and offer further clues to explore.

Interviewing public officials requires particular care and attention in order to keep the respondent focused on the specific questions asked. This may mean asking the same question more than once or even slightly altering the wording in follow-up questions to get a more precise response. The use of a semi-structured method is common in elite interviewing, especially as elites may prefer some flexibility to share their own views rather than being confined by close-ended questions. (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Berry 2002; Leech 2002). The interviewer also needs to maintain focus through any pauses in individual interview sessions, for example, if the interviewee receives a phone call or a visitor, or if the respondent steers the conversation away from the scope of the relevant topic.

Regardless of the skill of the interviewer and the scholarly merit of the questions asked, respondents may not be forthcoming or even truthful with the researcher (Berry 2002; Feagin et. al. 1991). The interviewee may have an incomplete or even an incorrect recollection of events. While it is important for the interviewer to build a rapport with the respondent, the validity and reliability of information gained from a comfortable conversation is threatened. Berry (2002, 679) notes “the paradox of elite interviewing: the valuable flexibility of open-ended questioning exacerbates the validity and reliability issues that are part and parcel with this approach.” Reconstruction of the policy process through a review of public records

and secondary source material supplement the data gathered from respondents and provide a broad view of how and why subsidy decisions were made in these four cases.

## **Summary**

In this chapter, the policy framework that I use is introduced and the key variables are described. The formal city and county governments as well as the informal sector in which officials operate shape these decisions. The number and type of proponents and opponents are also important in understanding the policy process. The parameters of public policy options available for decision makers and public opinion about potential plans also matter. While each of these variables can be examined independently, there is also a need to explore their interaction thoroughly. I have also justified my use of the case study method and the reasons for the selection of these four cases, and discussed the types of data collected.

The next four chapters explore the data from the cases using the framework to organize the presentation of facts. They are organized in the order the variables were presented in this chapter with background ideas introducing each case. Comparative analysis and a summary of findings is provided in Chapter 7, where I return to defend my thesis that coalition theory best describes the processes at work in these subsidy decisions.

## Chapter III

### Case 1: Miami-Dade and Joe Robbie Stadium

Joe Robbie Stadium opened for professional football in August 1987.<sup>1</sup> Located in a northwestern section of unincorporated Miami-Dade County<sup>2</sup>, the stadium originally was named for Robbie, the owner of the NFL's Miami Dolphins who financed its construction. The Dolphins initially played in the City of Miami's Orange Bowl but by the mid-1970s, Robbie wanted to leave the stadium located in a crowded, downtown neighborhood. Robbie combined private financial resources with public subsidies in the form of a land purchase, a favorable lease, and infrastructure support to finance the new facility. A low level of support from the formal and informal political structures, combined with legal and popular opposition from homeowners near the Lake Lucerne stadium location presented obstacles to Robbie's attempt to secure public subsidies for the professional sports facility.

#### Background

The Miami Dolphins joined the expansion American Football League (AFL) in 1965. Joe Robbie, a South Dakota attorney and Florida vacationer, bought a stake of the expansion AFL professional football franchise in a limited partnership with actor Danny Thomas (Glick 1987; Merzer 1987). The Dolphins first game in the Orange Bowl in 1966 drew 26,700 fans and attendance did not improve quickly for the team. Within two years, Robbie and a partner bought back shares from Thomas and other investors. Robbie later acquired the full team and along with his wife, Elizabeth, and four children, owned the Dolphins through the South Florida Sports Corporation (Glick 1987). By 1970, the AFL merged with the established National Football League (NFL), and fortunes changed for professional football and for the Dolphins. The Dolphins won Super Bowls VII and VIII in the 1970s and had the only undefeated season in NFL history in 1972.

---

<sup>1</sup>In August 1997, a sports apparel company brand of Fruit of the Loom Inc., agreed to pay \$20 million over ten years for the right to rename the facility Pro Player Stadium. The Dolphins and Marlins still played there in 2003 though the baseball team actively attempted to move since 1993.

<sup>2</sup>Metropolitan Dade County was established in 1957 and commonly called Metro-Dade or Dade. On November 13, 1997 voters approved a changed county name to Miami-Dade. The Lake Lucerne

In the mid-1970s Robbie publicly stated that he wanted to build a new stadium for his team, and he hired consultants to study the feasibility. In 1977, concrete chunks fell into the Orange Bowl stands prompting a City of Miami study on stadium safety (*Miami Herald* 1985). While the Dolphins had a favorable lease with the city where they paid only one-third the rent other NFL teams paid, Robbie was ashamed of the old facility. Originally built in 1937 as a New Deal public works project, the Orange Bowl had only minimally been updated over the years. Robbie desired a modern facility with luxury suites and seating for his franchise (Robbie 1985).

City officials attempted to upgrade the Orange Bowl, but Miami voters refused on November 15, 1977, to approve a \$15 million bond issue for stadium renovations. Robbie opposed the city bond issue as well as a second failed bond proposal, suggested by Mayor Maurice Ferré to renovate the facility. Robbie had already decided he would not return to the Orange Bowl after the 1986 season when the lease expired, but he feared his team would have to continue playing in the stadium if voters approved a bond issue. Despite Ferré's willingness to publicly fund Orange Bowl renovations, Robbie wanted out of the neighborhood northwest of downtown Miami (Ferré, interview, 2001). The surrounding residential area was overcrowded and heavily populated by recent immigrants and allowed little room for new development (Stack and Warren 1992).

In January 1985, Miami-Dade and Broward County officials formed a joint sports authority with the goal of constructing a stadium on land near the county border. But voters in both counties defeated a bond proposal to subsidize the facility. In total, four South Florida referenda from 1976 to 1984 failed to produce public support either for financing Orange Bowl repairs or for subsidizing a new stadium. Emboldened rather than discouraged by the defeats, Robbie proceeded without public financing.

Since stadiums are large public works projects, Robbie needed to enlist public support and government involvement concerning property and zoning. Robbie privately financed stadium construction and received subsidies from Miami-Dade County in the form of government-backed bond ratings, a favorable land lease agreement, and crucial infrastructure and state transportation support. The project benefited by support from the South Florida Regional Planning Council. Robbie also received aid from

---

stadium neighborhood was incorporated as part of the City of Miami Gardens in 2003.

Claude Pepper, an influential South Florida U.S. Congressman, in securing Industrial Revenue Bonds (IRBs) that granted a public bond rating for the essentially private investment (DeGeorge 1996; Kleinberg 1998, 1999).

Joe Robbie Stadium opened in unincorporated Miami-Dade County on August 16, 1987, to a crowd of 63,451 at a cost of \$115 million. Over time, Robbie encountered difficulty in making bond payments and eventually sold a portion of the stadium and the franchise to businessman H. Wayne Huizenga, founder of Blockbuster Entertainment (DeGeorge 1996). After Robbie's death, his family sold the remaining stadium and team interests to Huizenga, who later sold the naming rights to the stadium.

### **Formal Political Structure**

Joe Robbie's attempts to gain stadium subsidies confronted officials in the City of Miami and Miami-Dade County, and to a lesser extent Broward County and several sports authority special districts. Robbie wanted to leave the city-owned Orange Bowl despite attempts by the mayor to keep the Dolphins playing there. When Robbie was unable to find financial support from several sports authorities, he pursued a private funding process while still lobbying for support on land and zoning aspects of the project. Plans for the new stadium, built in unincorporated county territory, were primarily influenced by actions by Miami-Dade County officials.

The Miami-Dade metropolitan area has a peculiar governance structure with the county government encompassing more than 30 incorporated municipalities, the City of Miami having the largest population. Under the county home rule charter a two-tier system was established where the county has certain authority over countywide system maintenance while the municipal governments retain authority over other issues (Harrigan 1993; Stack and Warren 1992; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren, 1997). The county provides services to the unincorporated areas and sets minimum service standards for the incorporated cities while the cities have the power to exceed county standards and can contract with the county for some of the services it provides such as fire and criminal investigations (Sofen 1968; Mohl 1983; Warren 1997).

Reform movements that can be traced through their histories have influenced the current formal government structures of both the City of Miami and Miami-Dade County (Banfield 1964; Mohl 1983, 1989; Sofen 1968; Stack and Warren 1992; Warren 1997; Warren and Moreno 2003). These reformist tendencies resulted in the county and the city both having council-manager structures, at-large elections, and non-partisan affiliations during most of the twentieth century and, by the 1960s, the county "...stood as a model of reformed local government..." (Warren 1997, 229).

The City of Miami was traditionally governed by a council-manager government structure with political power residing with the at-large elected city commission. Bankers, realtors and other Anglo, or non-Hispanic white, business elites held the city council and dominant political offices. At one point in the early 1920s, the five city commissioners were also the city's leading bankers (Mohl 1983). With commissioners focused on commercial concerns, the system allowed for incompetent administrators to run amuck with city affairs. "Despite -- or because of -- a council-manger form of government, with many nonprofessional managers over the years, the City of Miami was in constant political turmoil" (Sofen 1968, 88). As a result, city government experienced corruption, mismanagement and police misconduct in the 1930s and 1940s that resulted in calls for reform.

Part of the response to these activities was the creation of a citizen's group, the Greater Miami Crime Commission, and a private group called Dade County Research Foundation, designed to monitor government activities and recommend reforms where necessary (Sofen 1968). Also during the 1940s, the control of the Port of Miami and Jackson Hospital transferred from the city to the county. These reforms were designed to strengthen county government and lessen the authority of corrupt city officials over key resources, and marked the beginning of a movement to reshape the contours of city and county government in South Florida.

Two groups emerged to argue for reform - the consolidationist and the localists (Warren 1997). The consolidationist forces wanted to centralize county government operations, especially for commercial efficiency. The consolidationists included major business and civic organizations like the *Miami Herald* and *Miami News* newspapers, Dade County Research Foundation, the Miami Chamber of Commerce, the Junior Chamber of Commerce and members of the League of Women Voters (Sofen 1968). Localists

wanted to keep decision making at the municipal government level. Officials and employees from some larger cities like Miami, Miami Beach, Coral Gables, Hialeah, Sweetwater, the Dade County League of Municipalities, and some suburban newspapers with vested interests in the current cities opposed a reformed county structure (Mohl 1983). Ultimately, a compromise resulted in the creation of the two-tier metropolitan system.

Metropolitan Dade County was incorporated in 1957 after statewide and local referenda approved the decision of the state legislature to grant it a home rule charter (Sofen 1968; Mohl 1983; Stack and Warren 1992; Warren 1997). The charter created a more autonomous county government than that approved in a 1956 statewide vote. The Dade Charter Committee, headed by local lawyer Dan Paul, organized the details of the new structure. After wrangling over specifics, the new charter passed in a 1957 countywide referendum by a 44,404-42,620 margin with a 25% voter turnout (Harrigan 1993). It took the next couple of years to work out the details as localists introduced thirty-seven changes and filed some six hundred lawsuits over the charter in the early 1960s before “Metro-Dade” took the form it assumed for the next 35 years (Sofen 1968; Mohl 1983).

Miami had four commissioners and a mayor, while Miami-Dade County had eight commissioners and a mayor when Robbie sought support for a new stadium. City and county commissioners were elected at-large though they had to live within district boundaries. Both the city and county had council-manager systems with a weak mayor. The mayor positions were administratively weak so the power of the position depended on the personal charisma of its occupants. Since the city prestige was higher than that of the county’s the Miami mayor was often more visible than the county mayor through the 1990s (Vogel and Stowers 1991).

County Mayor Steve Clark, an influential leader with weak formal leverage over the commissioners, enlisted a panel in 1978 that recommended the county hire a consultant and create a sports authority to build a stadium. County commissioners supported Robbie’s efforts but they could not commit subsidies to directly fund construction. In May 1981, commissioners created the Dade County Sports Authority, which initially advocated building a single multi-purpose, domed facility for football and baseball, as well as basketball and hockey, to be located at a downtown site. The problem was that Robbie

did not want the downtown site nor did he endorse the authority's architectural plan. When a private donor offered land in an unincorporated part of the county, Robbie's focus moved to gaining support for the new location.

Both stadium proponents and opponents tried using the formal county structure to achieve their political objectives. Under the at-large county system, commissioners who gained support from the business and commercial sector stood a better chance of being elected (Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren 1997). The commissioner representing the neighborhoods in North Dade where the proposed stadium would be located was Barry Schreiber, a stadium proponent, who essentially ignored the concerns of local residents about the impact of proposed development (Ferguson, interview, 2002). Because the election was countywide, the commissioner could take a position contrary to many of his constituents and be reelected without winning a single vote in his home district. Schreiber won reelection in 1986 against Betty Ferguson, a leader of the subsidy opponent interest group (Grenier et. al. 1994).

When Robbie approached the county for subsidy support, the demographic design of the county commission was seven non-Hispanic whites, one black, and one Hispanic member. Ethnic and racial concerns were kept out of most county political debates as whites worked in coalition with business leaders to promote economic growth in the county. One result of the growth-minded agenda was to keep minorities under-represented in county government (Vogel and Stowers 1991).

The lone black commissioner at the time, Barbara Carey, also voted in support of the stadium lease and zoning. Carey allied with county development forces to support the stadium project "...despite the deleterious impact such development would have on a solid, middle-class black neighborhood" (Stack and Warren 1993, 169). The support from county officials that Robbie found for the Lake Lucerne location minimized the impact of opposition to the stadium subsidy decisions and the need for informal sector input.

### **Informal Sector**

The relative youth of the Greater Miami area, the lack of strongly organized business, labor or minority groups, and the lack of consistent community leadership deprived South Florida of a cohesive growth oriented regime as seen in other major U.S. metropolitan areas through the 1950s (Sofen 1968;

Croucher 1997; Warren 1997). By the 1960s, the interests of an emerging business class merged with that of the daily newspapers and major law firms forming the base for a structure of private influence, and in the 1970s, a group of civic leaders calling themselves the Non-Group emerged to influence the Miami-Dade political agenda (Keonig et. al. 1990; Dugger 1985; Warren 1997). Robbie was a Non-Group member but despite his connections to the informal political channels of influence, this linkage did not drive the subsidy decisions.

Under the at-large Metro structure, the civic and downtown business interests were able to exert influence over the election of commissioners to the disadvantage of minority voters (Mohl 1983; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren 1997; Warren, Corbett & Stack 1990). The at-large election system favored the majority population of white voters countywide while the relative high cost of campaigning countywide made alliances with commercial interests desirable. “These groups included the larger law firms, developers, mid-to-large size companies engaged in tourist-related industries, and the county’s growing manufacturing sectors committed to a new and better Miami” (Stack and Warren 1992, 164). Business interests topped the county agenda and the influence of informal actors in local politics increased through the 1960s as population grew.

Alvah Chapman, then-president of the largest newspaper, the *Miami Herald*, and Harry Hood Bassett, then-chairman of the largest bank in the state, founded the Non-Group in 1971 when they informally asked a dozen local business leaders from important Miami civic institutions to meet over dinner and discuss politics (Dugger 1985; Koenig et. al. 1990). By invitation only, the group met monthly to discuss community issues and strategies for influencing the agenda of the county commission, city commission, state legislature, local media and local businesses (Vogel and Stowers 1991). This private association of approximately a dozen white male leaders met in secret to discuss Miami-Dade politics and design strategies to shape public policy decisions. “Members refer to themselves, tongue-in-check, as non-members who attend non-meetings run on a non-agenda by non-chairmen Chapman and Bassett” (Dugger 1995). The Non-Group substituted for formal decision making channels and placed private interests in control of Miami-Dade’s fragmented political community. Because of their various civic and commercial

ties, members of the group were in some ways able to set the local political agenda (Dugger 1985; Croucher 1997; Koenig et.al. 1990; Mohl 1983; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren 1997).

Chapman, later chairman of Knight-Ridder Corporation, the parent corporation of the *Herald* newspaper, primarily chaired the group. The political prominence of Chapman's newspaper had increased with its support of metropolitan county government. The *Herald* battled out the rival daily *Miami Times* and by 1988 became the only daily English-language newspaper in the Greater Miami area. "For more than two decades any list of Miami power brokers started with Chapman's name. And to fill in the other names, you would need only hang around Chapman's office for a week or so. Sooner or later, all the local powers that be would call or stop by" (Koenig et. al. 1990). Although Knight-Ridder president James Batten and *Herald* publisher Richard Capen were Non-Group members, the organization was not even known to the public until a *Herald* reporter broke the story in 1985 (Dugger 1985; Mullin 1996). When a reporter asked to attend one of the meetings, Chapman reportedly said, "No. We don't have visitors unless it is for a special purpose. It destroys the purpose of what we're trying to do" (Dugger 1985).

Thus, private citizens influenced government decisions unnoticed by the masses and politically shielded from the growing number of minority voters in the county (Warren 1997). As Miami Mayor Ferré, a former member, put it: "The Non-Group is the shadow government of metropolitan Dade County. The system of government we have creates a vacuum that's filled by this group. This is the central power in Miami. This is where things are decided" (Dugger 1985). While no public officials belonged to the group, former Governor Ruben Askew, a former Florida Secretary of State, and a former Dade County Manager participated. Steve Clark, as county mayor the top elected official in the metropolitan area during much of the time the Non-Group exerted influence, said he was never invited to one of their meetings (Dugger 1985). "This isn't government," said Chapman. "We're a group of interested citizens trying to help the community" (Dugger 1985).

Robbie was one of the 38 leaders who secretly guided Miami-Dade politics in the 1970s and 1980s though membership in the Non-Group (Dugger 1985). Non-Group members included leaders in banking, industry, and retail, publishing executives, and local university presidents. Many also were Chamber executives, Orange Bowl Committee members and University of Miami trustees. Other elites in

this exclusive group included a partner in the law firm that represented Robbie, the president of a public relations firm that represented the Dolphins, and the chairman of the South Florida Regional Planning Council, which eventually provided environmental clearance to the stadium project. The public relations executive, whose firm represents several institutions with Non-Group members, said that the Non-Group meetings were not about personal business. The planning board chairman denied that these common ties had anything to do with stadium decisions, reporting that he and Robbie missed many Non-Group's meetings and had not seen each other at a meeting during the year and a half prior to the board's decisions. (Dugger 1985).

Meanwhile, the changing ethnic and racial composition of the community challenged the influence of the white non-Hispanic members of the Non-Group. Migration from Latin American and Caribbean countries increased rapidly from the 1960s forward, especially among Cubans (Colburn and deHaven 1999; Grenier and Stepick 1992; Mohl 1983; Moreno and Warren 1992; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Stepick 1993; Stack and Warren 1992; Warren 1997). While white voters and business interests were able to influence county elections, the strength of Hispanic voting power increased. Maurice Ferré, descendant of a wealthy Puerto Rican family, was appointed to the city commission in 1967, and was reelected to that seat before being elected Miami's first Hispanic mayor in 1973. The first Cuban-American appointed to the Miami commission in 1972, Manolo Reboso was then elected in 1973 (Gonzales-Pando 1998; Croucher 1997). Ferré served for more than a decade as mayor and is often credited for developing the downtown corridor, especially the Brickell Avenue banking area. During his tenure, Miami became a "financial metropolis" and an economic crossroads for the Americas (Colburn and deHaven 1999, 3; Levine 1985).

Assisted by black voters, in 1981, Ferré defeated Reboso in an election where ethnic issues were prominent (Stack and Warren 1992). In 1984, Ferré allied with two Cuban American city commissioners to remove a black city manager, Howard Gary, and the next year Xavier Suarez, a Cuban American lawyer, defeated him (Mohl 1989; Stack and Warren 1992). Ferré tried to keep the Dolphins in the city's Orange Bowl, but lost this battle and then his race for mayor partly due to the unpopularity of his firing of Gary (Stack and Warren 1992). Robbie solicited support from county officials and the civic community while forging ahead with his plans for a privately financed stadium.

In 1981, Hispanics comprised 36 percent of the registered voters in the City of Miami, and held three out of five of the city council seats (Mohl 1983; Stack and Warren 1992; Vogel and Stowers 1991). By 1990, Hispanics comprised a majority of the county population and they were quickly mobilizing for political power (Grenier et.al 1994; Stack and Warren 1992; Moreno and Warren 1992). Throughout this period a structure of Hispanic chambers of commerce and professional organizations had developed parallel to the civic institutions dominated by white non-Hispanics (Gonzalez-Pando 1998; Grenier and Stepick 1992; Moreno and Warren 1992; Stowers and Vogel 1992; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren 1997; Warren and Moreno 2003).

A changing ethnic population marked the informal political structure during the 1970s and 1980s. The rise of minority leaders and interests served to challenge the influence of the Non-Group and other sources of non-Hispanic white power in both the city and the county (Grenier and Stepick 1992; Moreno and Warren 1982; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren and Moreno 2003). While Robbie was a member of the Non-Group, support from the traditional civic and commercial sector did not translate into a coalition for pursuing stadium subsidies and none was seriously pursued with the emerging Hispanic leadership.

### **Subsidy Proponents**

Joe Robbie and Miami Dolphins representatives were the main proponents for subsidies to build a stadium to replace the Orange Bowl. A majority of Miami-Dade County officials as well as local civic and commercial leaders supported their efforts. Members of the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce and the North Dade Chamber allied with stadium proponents. Robbie also received support from board members of the South Florida Regional Planning Council and U.S. Congressman Claude Pepper. Editorially, the *Miami Herald* supported Robbie's plans for a suburban stadium and shopping district (Cappan 1985; Pope 1985).

Robbie was a member of the Non-Group, though not an active participant during the time of the subsidy decision (Dugger 1985). Additionally, Robbie was active in the community as chair of the Dade Public Health Trust, an organization that oversees Jackson Memorial Hospital, and by serving for two years as chairman of the Dade Community Relations Board. He served as a board member at St. Jude's Hospital,

working with actor Danny Thomas, an initial Dolphin franchise co-owner, and was also a benefactor of several private universities (Merzer 1987).

As early as 1975, Robbie voiced interest in a new stadium (*Miami Herald* 1985). The matter became more important as the Orange Bowl literally began crumbling in 1977. City leaders tried to renovate the old stadium, but Robbie set his sights on an unincorporated county location. The issue ultimately became whether Robbie would seek a stadium somewhere in Miami-Dade or whether he would attempt to move the team elsewhere in the state or country.

A committee appointed by county mayor Clark, in March 1978, initially recommended the building of a new Orange Bowl next to the old one at a cost of \$40 million. They planned to finance it with the resort tax and a \$1 Dolphin ticket surcharge. That idea died in early 1979 when County Attorney Stuart Simon ruled that resort tax money could not be used to build a stadium. At the 1979 NFL owners meeting, Robbie attacked the Orange Bowl and the city as the owners voted on the site of the next three Super Bowls without even considering Miami (Merzer 1987). Mayor Clark claimed that Robbie's remarks could hurt his chances of getting county support for a new stadium. Robbie went to Los Angeles that June for tentative talks about moving his football team (Merzer 1987; *Miami Herald* 1985).

Broward County, Miami-Dade's northern neighbor, was also an early possible source of stadium support. In October 1979, a land-development company named Arvida offered 150 acres in south Broward County for a professional football stadium. This prompted Broward commissioners to order their own feasibility study on subsidizing a stadium using a resort tax, but that idea faded when county officials failed to find a funding source (*Miami Herald* 1985).

Sensing a Broward threat, Miami-Dade officials hired a consultant in December 1979, to examine Commissioner Bill Oliver's proposal for a privately financed sports facility. Finch Heery, the Atlanta-based consulting firm retained by the county, recommended a \$150 to \$200 million multi-sport complex on one of three sites: the Orange Bowl, Opa-locka Airport, or on land in northwest Dade County south of Calder Race Course. County leaders could not reach a consensus on a location preference and, once again, a funding source was not identified.

In May 1981, Miami-Dade commissioners created a nine-member Dade County Sports Authority charged with bringing professional sports to South Florida and overseeing the construction of new facilities. Miami Beach developer Stephen Muss was selected to chair the committee that recommended building a new football stadium and sports complex. Another Finch Heery study ranked Opa-locka Airport as the top spot, but Muss preferred 55 acres off Northeast 36th Street in Miami on a site known as the Buena Vista freight yard. Finch Heery reported the county could save \$9 million by building a domed, multipurpose stadium rather than a separate football stadium and basketball arena. This idea prompted commissioners to find a funding source and, in November, they designated a tourist tax with money for sports facilities. A month later, Finch Heery reversed their opinion on the Opa-locka location, telling sports authority members that Buena Vista would be a better site. After seven hours of contentious debate, the authority members voted 6-3 to build the complex at Buena Vista. Robbie opposed the decision, citing parking problems and high crime in the neighborhood. Seven days later, Muss resigned from the authority because of criticism and complaints from other members that he influenced Finch Heery to change its report (*Miami Herald* 1985; Plaisted 1981).

The failure of the Dade Sports Authority to successfully negotiate with Robbie about the terms for any possible stadium soured the deal. The negotiations became a political game of egos between Robbie and members of the sports authority to decide the outcome of the stadium deal. Sports authority officials disregarded public opinion and the preferences of franchise management by proposing to build a domed stadium on the Buena Vista site. "Anyone who thinks these two formidable opponents can be beaten is wrong," a team supporter reported (Curtis 1981, 3).

Two weeks later, on December 22, 1981, Robbie held a press conference and announced he was negotiating with Emil and Lawrence Morton to privately develop a stadium on land located south of the Calder horseracing track. The plan called for the Mortons to donate 160-acres of land in the area known as Lake Lucerne, near the Broward County border, 14 miles from downtown Miami and the Orange Bowl. The Mortons agreed to give the land to the county, which would then lease it to Robbie at a subsidized rate. Robbie said more details about plans for a stadium, shopping center, and housing district would be announced later. With the land seemingly secure, the financing plan remained.

In January 1982, some Broward officials suggested the two counties split subsidies for a stadium near the county line. If the counties shared the costs, the public burden would be less on each side of the border. Miami-Dade Commissioner Barbara Carey viewed this idea as bizarre and responded by writing to Alaska Gov. Jay Hammond and asking his state to help pay for a \$150 million South Florida sports stadium. In the offer, declined by the governor, Carey suggested that Alaska could cash in on advertising for its state's snow-capped mountains (Sachs 1982).

On February 19, 1982, Broward and Miami-Dade officials established a 19-member South Florida Sports Authority for purposes of building a jointly financed stadium. The nine members of the Dade Sports Authority would serve on the new committee with nine Broward-based members and one member appointed by Governor Bob Graham. Creation of the bi-county sports authority ratified the Lake Lucerne site as the top choice for the new stadium and replaced Robbie's threat to leave with a promise to county officials that the team would play in North Dade (Sachs and Ray 1982). But the bi-county sports authority was ineffective, and seven months later, it was disbanded. Officials in both counties did place a proposal for a sales tax increase to subsidize the stadium before voters, but the idea of bi-county stadium financing died on November 2 when Dade and Broward voters both rejected the measures (CITE).

After the lack of public subsidy support, Robbie decided to resort to his own measures to privately fund a new facility. "Let them second guess me all they want. I'll show them," said Robbie (Cohen 1990). In early 1983, Robbie hired Donald Poss as vice president in charge of special projects and development. Poss had been executive director of the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission in Minneapolis where the publicly funded Metrodome was generating revenue to cover operating costs and half the annual debt payments (Klobuchar 1982). Poss was skeptical about Robbie's private financing plans but supported the proposed Lake Lucerne site. Robbie and Poss also had discussions with Norman Braman, a Miami businessman who opposed using sales taxes for the stadium in previous referenda<sup>3</sup>. Brahman suggested they raise construction money by selling seating and luxury skyboxes instead of seeking public subsidies (Sachs 1983).

---

<sup>3</sup> Braman bought the Philadelphia Eagles in April 1985 for \$65 million and sold them in 1994 for \$185 million (<http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2000/01/10/story8.html>. 27 July 2003)

In a surprise announcement on March 5, 1984, more than two years after identifying a preference for the Lake Lucerne site, and eight days before Miami voters voted on a \$55 million Orange Bowl repair bond issue, Robbie said he would privately construct a \$90 million football stadium. Luxury suites would generate revenue to pay for the facility and Robbie could court a broader range of sports fans from West Palm Beach and Fort Lauderdale to join Miami loyalists at the convenient northwestern Miami-Dade spot.

On July 3, 1984, Dade County Commissioners voted to accept the 160 acres donated by the Mortons and lease it to Robbie at \$1 a year for 99 years. The Dade County School Board agreed to donate another 28 acres after stadium plans rendered unfeasible building a previously planned school on the site (Kleinberg 1999). The county also agreed to reimburse Robbie for money spent on roads, and the Florida Department of Transportation put more than \$20 million toward turnpike intersections to facilitate traffic to the Lake Lucerne site.

Robbie and the Mortons planned additional development with multiple commercial and housing units, requiring additional county approvals to revise zoning laws. These plans, however, raised the ire of residents in neighborhoods around Lake Lucerne. Opposition mobilized quickly over re-zoning applications and the proposed environmental impact of stadium development. Opponents stormed the commission meetings at which the applications were considered, but commissioners approved the re-zoning and ratified the stadium construction plans.

### **Subsidy Opponents**

The opponents to Robbie's plans for a new stadium were varied and motivated by different interests. The major opposition initially came from two distinct sources. One was the City of Miami and Mayor Maurice Ferré, who desperately wanted the professional sports franchise to remain in their city either at the Orange Bowl or at a new stadium. The other source of opposition was the residents in and around Lake Lucerne who were concerned with the potential negative impact of a sports stadium on their property values and neighborhood aesthetics. What is significant is that the early opposition from the city became moot once Robbie identified a location outside of the city limits.

As the Orange Bowl started deteriorating in the 1970s, Mayor Ferré hoped to revamp the stadium and persuade Robbie to stay there at least for the short term. Ferré calculated he could sell the public on the idea of a one percent sales tax increase and have the city issue a bond to subsidize Orange Bowl renovations. But Robbie was determined to leave the Orange Bowl and visibly campaigned against the bond proposal. Claiming the city bond issue was aimed at torpedoing his plans for a private stadium, Robbie sent a one-page letter to some 3,000-4,000 Dolphin season-ticket holders, reprinted in the *Herald*, urging "...all fans and all supporters of the Miami Dolphins to join with all other oppressed taxpayers to vote 'No' on the bond issue" (Hirsch 1984b). City voters dismissed that plan by a 4-to-1 margin in December 1982.

In further efforts to keep the team in Miami, Ferré threatened to invoke eminent domain and seize control of the Dolphins franchise if they attempted to leave the Orange Bowl. The mayor claimed the team owed \$135,00 in back rent and \$250,000 for a liability insurance policy (Zaldivar 1983). By leaving the Orange Bowl with a debt, city officials argued Robbie would deprive the city an estimated \$1.2 million in tax revenue.

Despite Ferré's eminent domain threat, Robbie vowed to leave the Orange Bowl when his lease expired after the 1986 season. Ferré, as much as he would have liked to seize the team and place it under community ownership, acknowledged that his plan stood little chance for success. He conceded that he understood Robbie's objections to the Orange Bowl. "He (Robbie) thought it was an obsolete facility, and he was right. There was no way to patch it up" (Ferré, interview, 2001). The mayor wanted to add box seats and retrofit the stadium for baseball. "It would have keep the team and brought in baseball but eventually a new stadium would need to be built" (Ferré, interview, 2001).

The failure of the bi-county sports authority to identify a site and funding source prompted Ferré to persuade city commissioners to try again. The result was five single-issue referenda for Miami residents to consider as part of the largest bond proposal in city history. It called for a one-cent increase for two years and included proposals to fund police, sanitation, parks, community development, and building sports facilities in the city.<sup>4</sup> Mayor Ferré and downtown development proponents including the Orange Bowl

---

<sup>4</sup> Totalling \$150 million, it called for \$55 million for the Orange Bowl, \$35 million for parks, \$30

Committee, the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce executive committee, Miami Board of Realtors and Dade Heritage Trust supported the bond issues (Hirsch 1984a). The city spent about \$30,000 mailing informational fliers detailing potential benefits to city residents. They also tried to counter Robbie's threats to move by announcing that the rival United States Football League (USFL) would lease the Orange Bowl and put a new franchise in Miami, claiming a three-year deal with a yet-to-be-granted USFL franchise. City leaders planned to renovate the Orange Bowl with or without the Dolphins.

Robbie campaigned against the bond issue and held a news conference the day before the vote further denouncing the city plan. On March 13, 1984, the bond issue for the stadium subsidy lost by a 2-1 margin. "It was a tragic mistake. I did not have the support of Joe Robbie. He was totally opposed to it. He wanted out of there (Orange Bowl)" (Ferré, interview, 2001). Miami voters also defeated the parks and the Overtown/Park West issues while the police and sanitation plans were accepted.<sup>5</sup> Voters rejected outright a public subsidy to patch the stadium. "It would have extended the life of the Orange Bowl for 10-20 years, then we would have to build. But then we could have done it right, been ready for it" (Ferré, interview, 2001).

Now resigned to the possibility of the city losing the Dolphins, Ferré was quick to admit defeat and throw his support behind Robbie. "I'll certainly do everything I can to help him. He has to do something now that has been almost impossible to do: build a stadium with private funds. I hope he does it" (Fisher 1984, 3B). Ferré then turned his attention to getting an arena built in the city as part of efforts to lure an NBA franchise while Robbie focused on the Lake Lucerne stadium site. "It was a great loss for the community," commented Ferré. "In the early 1980s was the whole perception of the Cuban takeover. (But) it isn't Cuban, Black, Jewish; It is the same everywhere. The same logic that urban planners call 'White Flight.' It is the nature of people. So what happened was that Joe Robbie was moving the same time people were leaving Miami," said Ferré in comparing the migration of professional sports facilities to the movement of citizens from the central city to the suburbs (Ferré, interview, 2001).

---

million for storm-sewer improvement, \$20 million for police and \$10 million for the Overtown-Park West redevelopment plan.

<sup>5</sup> Miami's police chief criticized the police-spending plan as a political ploy that did not do enough for real department needs.

The Dolphins fled to Lake Lucerne. Though not one of the three sites in the sports authority report for the county, the Morton's land offer made it attractive for both Robbie and county leaders. Despite nearly two years of planning, there was little public knowledge about the stadium development proposal that would significantly alter the newly-developed Crestview and Rolling Oaks housing complexes. When Robbie announced his Lake Lucerne plan, initial reaction from citizens living around the proposed stadium site was mixed. Some residents felt it would bring economic opportunities to the area. Others expected it would only mean crime and traffic in their neighborhood.

One common opinion was that if Joe Robbie wanted to put his stadium in Lake Lucerne, he certainly had enough money to be able to do it (Nelson 1984). It was this attitude that initially stymied local opposition to the stadium. "Nobody took the lead to oppose it, not to our knowledge. Not at the state level, or the local level," said Betty Ferguson, a local resident who became a leader of the Rolling Oaks Homeowners Association.<sup>6</sup> "There was no one that I can remember saying anything about it. It was kind of 'This is Joe Robbie. He deserves a new stadium and we are going to build it.' So I didn't really hear any opposition from anyone" (Ferguson, interview, 2002).

The greatest organized opposition eventually came from groups of homeowners concerned about the impact that the stadium plan would have on their property value and aesthetics. The Crestview and Rolling Oaks Homeowners Associations filed lawsuits attempting to alter the deal or even halt stadium construction in their community. These mainly middle-class African-American homeowners found some support from other grassroots neighborhood and civil rights activists as they protested county decisions and raised legal opposition to the stadium zoning plans in the courts.

The northwestern part of the county encompassed a growing middle class black community population. Betty and Wilkie Ferguson, a federal judge, had many ties with their neighbors and people knew that Wilkie Ferguson was prominent in the legal community. "I think that is why we were approached in my house," said Betty Ferguson, a Miami-Dade Community College professor at the time

---

<sup>6</sup> Ferguson, later helped initiate a lawsuit with black and Hispanic leaders against the county that mandated changing the at-large voting to individual districts (*Meek et. al. vs. Dade County* 1992). She lost county commission races in 1986 and 1990 (Grenier et.al. 1994), and then won election in 1993 as District One Miami-Dade County Commissioner. Ferguson was reelected in both 1998 and 2000 without opposition. She has been a Speech and English-as-a-Second Language professor at Miami-Dade

(Ferguson, interview, 2002). One day a county worker and family friend visited the Fergusons with a map showing the proposal filed by the Robbies and Mortons. It awakened neighborhood interests. The plans included extensive commercial development that would seemingly disrupt the residential areas.

The Fergusons were familiar with the politics of displacement by public policy. Their families had experienced moves from Overtown to Brownsville and Liberty City area then to Opa-locka because of development. They or their families had experienced dislocation and hardship in the past, stemming from the development of Interstate 95 and other projects that pushed their families north of the downtown area (Mohl 1989). “My husband and I took this pretty hard. (It was) ‘Are we going to pack up and leave, or stay and fight?’” said Betty Ferguson. “This time we are going to stay and fight” (Ferguson, interview, 2002). The Fergusons helped neighbors discuss strategies of opposition and organization. Volunteers donated food and cooked weekly chicken dinners to sell in the neighborhood in order to raise money for a legal defense. These activities built community unity while raising resources for a costly battle.

County commissioners approved the Morton land transfer and lease agreement on July 3, 1984 with little debate. Two weeks later, at a commission meeting on the rezoning issue about 50 residents from the Crestview and Rolling Oaks Homeowners Associations urged commissioners not to approve plans that would disrupt their family-oriented subdivision. They feared the planned stadium and surrounding development would destroy their community and devalue their property. “There were some people who thought we could just stop the stadium, period. But most of us knew that we couldn’t,” said Ferguson. “We knew it would be just about impossible to stop construction on a project like this with somebody like Joe Robbie behind it. We knew that. But we felt that if we didn’t go out there and fight in that fashion we wouldn’t get anything in place to protect the community” (Ferguson, interview, 2002).

The associations filed suit along with residents Mildred Harris and Barry Young on November 15, 1984, in order to frustrate stadium construction. Undeterred by the lawsuits county commissioners voted unanimously in December to allow Robbie access to \$85 million in tax-exempt government development bonds for stadium finance. In early January 1985, Robbie said he would spend \$2 million on stadium blueprints and studies and promised to announce financial details of his Dolphin Center project in two

---

Community College, North campus since 1971 (<http://www.co.miami-dade.fl.us/district1>.22 August 2002).

weeks. Nine months later, he still had not presented those plans. The legal fight with the homeowners temporarily diverted stadium development plans.

While the Mortons gave the 160-acres surrounding Lake Lucerne to the county, they still owned 270 adjacent acres that they planned to develop. Some of the legal challenges Robbie faced from local homeowners were brought on by clauses the Mortons had earlier supported concerning residential growth. One was based on a land-use restrictive covenant against commercial development. In the 1970s when the Mortons had initially proposed rezoning their land from agricultural to residential use, they agreed to prevent commercial development unless a majority of homeowners living within 350 feet of development gave permission. Robbie averted a legal conflict by planning the stadium project at least 351 feet from most homes (Brown 1985b; Glick 1987). Proponents of the Dolphin Center also needed to gain consent from a majority of the adjacent property landowners under the covenants. Fortunately for Robbie's proponents, the largest landowning neighbors were public entities: Miami-Dade County, the South Florida Water Management District and the Florida Department of Transportation. The county commission allowed landowners one vote per acre owned so those who owned more than one parcel had more than one vote. All of the entities agreed to the plan. Homeowners argued this concept was undemocratic, but the courts disagreed (*Norwood-Norland Homeowners' Association, Inc. vs. Dade County* 1987).

Stadium opponents felt overwhelmed by the better-financed stadium supporters. "We're fighting a giant and sometimes we feel like we only have a slingshot," Ferguson said (Glick 1987). In February 1985, the neighborhood groups complained about \$18,000 in political contributions to six commissioners who would decide on the zoning for the site. The homeowners used the revelation of the campaign contributions to show that fair zoning hearings were not possible especially after the land lease deal had already been approved. They circulated a report to local media claiming commissioners were bought and paid for and had already agreed to the stadium lease before their public meeting. They pointed to two commissioners serving as Robbie's guests for the Super Bowl a few weeks earlier leading people "...to believe that minds have already been made up," said Elbert Waters, president of the Crestview homeowners' group (Brown 1985a).

“I believe the county commissioners were approached by Robbie or lobbyists and they were sold on the idea of how this could be done. He probably orchestrated a lobbying approach that convinced the commissioners at that time that this was doable,” said Ferguson (Ferguson, interview, 2002). The homeowners’ research showed contributions from stadium interests to County Mayor Steve Clark and Commissioners Clara Oesterle, James Redford, Beverly Phillips, Sherman Winn and Harvey Ruvin in the previous year’s campaigns. Each of the six officials heartily denied their votes were influenced. Robbie gave \$4,250 in campaign contributions, including \$2,000 to Redford and \$1,000 to Phillips. Emil Morton, a regular contributor to political campaigns, contributed \$3,500, including \$1,000 contributions to Oesterle, Phillips and Clark. "All anyone buys is an ear," Redford said. "That's all they get. And they only get to use it when it's not in use otherwise" Added Oesterle, "I cannot be bought for any amount of money. I don't need it. I have a conscience. I have to look at myself in the mirror every morning after I take a vote" (Brown 1985a). Greenberg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel and Wolf, one of Miami’s largest law firms specializing in land-use, represented Robbie, and some of its members contributed \$7,250, including \$2,500 to Winn and \$1,000 each to Clark, Redford, Oesterle and Phillips. Robbie’s law firm, Sparber, Shevin, Shapo and Heilbronner, gave \$2,500, including \$1,900 to Clark, according to the report (Brown 1985a).

Days before the county commission vote on the zoning issue, about 500 stadium opponents attended a neighborhood rally and heard Reverend Jesse Jackson provide rhetoric to fuel the homeowners’ plight. Jackson, the nationally known civil rights leader, compared the case of stadium opponents to the struggle of civil rights workers in the 1960s and to the Israelites of biblical Egypt (Oricchio 1985). Jackson noted several abuses to the black community in Miami including the routing of Metrorail and Interstate 95 that displaced black neighborhoods, and announced he would hold another rally and attend the commission meeting later that week.

After an eight-hour meeting running past midnight, on the morning of September 27, 1985, county commissioners approved the stadium zoning changes by a 7-1 vote. Harvey Ruvin voted no and Jim Redford was absent. While a majority of commissioners expressed their intention to support the measure prior to the start of the 5 p.m. meeting, both sides presented spirited arguments. County chambers were

packed with more than 600 citizens, some in color-coded clothing. Lake Lucerne homeowners and stadium opponents wore green T-shirts with the words “Save our Community” printed on the back, while proponent members of the North Dade Chamber of Commerce and allied groups of retired condominium owners who favored development wore red clothing (Brown 1985c). More than 50 people signed up to speak including Rev. Jackson, who reiterated his argument that the project violated the homeowners’ civil rights. He noted that the opposition was not to the Miami Dolphins or the stadium, but to the terms of the development proposal (Dade County BOCC 1985).

“When we got around to asking the questions we thought were being asked, we found commissioners not very much help. All of the commissioners supported it. The only one to vote against it was Harvey Ruvin, a commissioner at the time.<sup>7</sup> The rest of them were for it,” said Ferguson (Ferguson, interview, 2002).

The homeowners stayed in court for several years even as they heard unfavorable rulings from judges. Ultimately their lawsuit was settled, though homeowners did not agree to the specific terms of the settlement (Ferguson, interview, 2002).<sup>8</sup> The homeowners gained some key concessions, including the widening of the main roads around the stadium, an exit ramp from the turnpike directly to the stadium, a wall separating the stadium from the community, and a monetary fund for community upkeep.

Those were not even on the radar screen until we insisted on a lot of those types of things. So when people think of the homeowners as losing the fight, we didn’t lose as far as I’m concerned. Had we not been fighting there were a lot of things that would not have ever happened because the developers had to pay for some of those improvements and they had to set up special taxing districts surrounding the stadium. (A lot of people) have no idea that the only way it happened, as far as I am concerned, is because we filed a lawsuit (Ferguson, interview, 2002).

The homeowners were not able to stop the stadium, but they did succeed in delaying its development. Their lawsuits delayed issuance of the tax-exempt bonds for stadium construction. Pending litigation kept financing agencies Citibank of New York, Marine Midland Bank of Buffalo, NY, and Southeast Bank of Miami from releasing bond money for the project. With the delay, Robbie was forced to put up the Dolphin franchise and its entire possessions as collateral on a loan of nearly \$25 million from

---

<sup>7</sup> Ruvin was elected Miami-Dade County Clerk in 1992 and reelected in 1996 and 2000.

CenTrust Savings Bank of Miami in May 1986 (Glick 1987). The loan carried a higher interest rate than the tax-exempt Industrial Revenue Bonds. Construction progressed as planned and the loan was repaid when the public bonds were ultimately issued.

### **Public Policy Options**

Joe Robbie is credited for accomplishing a rarity in recent times in the professional sports industry by building the \$115 million stadium without tax subsidies (Cohen 1990; Ifill 1987; Keating 1999). Four attempts to raise revenue through municipal bonds were defeated by city and county voters. In reality, however, the project received significant public subsidy requiring public policy input at the county, state, and national levels. Robbie privately financed stadium construction, but he also received support in securing land and a favorable lease, providing infrastructure, and securing the Industrial Revenue Bonds (IRBS). Support for these policies came from the Miami-Dade County Commission, the Dade County School Board, the State of Florida, and Congressman Claude Pepper (Ifill 1987; Kleinberg 1992; 1999).

The Miami-Dade Commission endorsed Robbie's plan for a Lake Lucerne stadium when, on July 3, 1984, they voted to accept the 160 acres of land donated by the Mortons and then lease it to the Dolphin Stadium Corporation for 99 years. There was brief discussion of the resolution before the 8-0 decision. None of the commissioners spoke against the project, though one taxpayer, who favored remodeling the Orange Bowl, appeared in opposition. Commissioner Ruth Shack urged that jobs and supplies for the proposed stadium come from the Northwest Dade community, and Commissioner Barbara Carey moved the Board to assure an affirmative inclusion of the Lake Lucerne Development Authority in plans for development of the area (Dade County BOCC, 1984).

The county also spent funds for roads, parking, and community improvements and the State of Florida allocated more than \$200 million over 10 years toward turnpike intersections and a connection between Interstate 95 and the stadium site (Ifill 1987). The Dade County school board donated another 28 acres of land after stadium plans rendered building a previously planned school on the site unfeasible (Kleinberg 1999). These subsidies eased traffic flow to and from the newly developing territory.

---

<sup>8</sup> The settlement money sat in an escrow account through 2002 (Ferguson, interview, 2002).

Securing Industrial Revenue Bonds (IRBs) allowed Robbie to finance the project through the Metro Industrial Development Authority with bonds carrying a much lower interest rate than traditional bonds. IRBs were a common source of entrepreneurial public development used to support innovative private projects throughout the twentieth-century and these federal tax-exempt municipal bonds are another type of substantial financial subsidy for stadium builders (Eisenger 1988; Keating 1999; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1988). Robbie's project almost failed to qualify for tax-exempt status until U.S. Representative Pepper (D), chairman of the House Rules Committee, held a federal tax reform bill that included provisions to eliminate sports stadiums from tax-exempt status hostage in committee until an exemption was granted for Robbie's stadium. When a Republican lawmaker questioned Pepper's efforts, the powerful chairman reportedly said, "I don't think my position on the Rules Committee was a liability. But that influence is what we strive for when we come to Congress" (Kleinberg 1999). County commissioners voted unanimously on December 6, 1984, to allow Robbie access to \$85 million in IRBs as a financial subsidy toward stadium construction.

Robbie had announced ambitious plans to privately pay for the stadium in May 1984 and launched a campaign to lease the luxury skyboxes and preferred stadium seating. Throughout the legal battles, Robbie sold stadium suites and seats to generate revenue for construction. The modern luxury suites were an important funding source for securing the private loans needed to start construction. But early sales fell below Robbie's expectations and he had to borrow more than anticipated to build the stadium. The situation pressed Robbie to use innovative tactics including traveling in a custom Dolphin van to sell the stadium to civic groups and community investors, and to eventually meet his target in less than two years (Glick 1987). While sales still lagged behind expectations, Robbie was able to generate enough revenue to start stadium construction despite the legal challenges from homeowners.

### **Public Opinion**

Public opinion supporting stadium subsidies was low as measured by the lack of support for referenda to raise revenue for stadium renovation or construction. All told, there were four failed votes on

stadium support: two in the City of Miami to raise money to renovate the Orange Bowl and two in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties to fund a stadium at the northwestern Dade County site.

“Nobody wants to spend tax dollars on sports facilities. That is abundantly clear,” said Mayor Ferré, after the failed votes (Hirsch 1984c). Robbie was undeterred by public opinion and pursued private funding options and county decisions that circumvented public dissent. The impact of negative public opinion was virtually eliminated when Robbie moved forward without public support for financial subsidies. As long as people bought tickets and suites for the new stadium, Robbie would have the popular support he needed. But ultimately he did not get that support and eventually had to sell the stadium.

The opposition of the homeowners through their lawsuits became the main measure of public opinion against stadium development. The legal actions were a reaction to the stadium plan hatched by the commission approval of the land deal. When the county commission ratified the Lake Lucerne site despite public protests by the local residents, the opponents were left with little recourse except the legal route. Several lawsuits were filed in state and federal courts. One claimed that the homeowners’ civil rights were being violated and asked for \$100 million in damages (Glick 1987). Another suit was based on the restrictive deed the Mortons had instituted years earlier when they had planned for only single-family residential developments on the land.

Although the legal opposition was able to hold up distribution of the IRBs and hamstring Robbie’s plans for a period of time, they did not derail the overall project. Eventually the claims were dismissed and the construction of the stadium went forward. The stadium was ultimately constructed in the face of general opposition from the community surrounding the sports facility.

## **Summary**

The new Dolphin Stadium was selected to host the 1989 Super Bowl nearly nine months before ground had even been broken for its construction. Despite the legal challenges from homeowners, plans went forward and stadium construction diligently met Robbie’s stated deadline. “If he had flunked the marketing test or the private financing test, the project would have been Joe Robbie’s folly. So why not Joe

Robbie Stadium?” said son Tim Robbie, onetime Dolphin vice president for public affairs, and one of four Robbie offspring on the franchise staff (Glick 1987).

When it opened in August 1987, Joe Robbie Stadium had a comfortable atmosphere, unobstructed views, exotic foods, palm trees, and quality seating. “The Orange Bowl has 75,000 seats of equal quality - none of them is any good,” said Robbie. “I maintain that any seat in the new stadium is better than every seat in the Orange Bowl” (Glick 1987). But attendance levels at the new facility fell below expectations and placed the Robbie family in debt. Robbie soon needed an investor in his stadium.

Robbie had been negotiating with H. Wayne Huizenga to take over a minority stake in the stadium when his health halted the talks and his death altered the deal (DeGeorge 1996). Huizenga, builder of Blockbuster Video and Waste Management, hoped to gain control of the stadium and fill it with 82 more events a year by bringing Major League Baseball to Miami. When Robbie passed away in January 1990, the Robbie family was pressured to sell a 50 percent stake in the facility and 15 percent of the franchise to Huizenga (DeGeorge 1996).

Joe Robbie had placed the South Florida Sports Corporation in a trust fund for his family to administer, but his death saddled them with debt and estate taxes. Interest on the loans for the franchise alone cost about \$4.5 million a year. The Robbie family essentially split into two camps quarreling over a solution to the financial crisis: those who wanted to keep the team and those who wanted to sell. Since Huizenga already owned a stake, the Blockbuster chairman also had right of first refusal and the chance to match any sale offer. In June 1993, the Robbie family announced an agreement to sell the franchise to a pair of real-estate investors who had made an earlier attempt to buy the Dolphins. That deal collapsed and Huizenga ultimately bought complete control of the stadium and the Dolphin franchise (DeGeorge 1996).

Voter rejection, litigation by homeowners, and decentralized political leadership, forced Robbie to privately raise money for stadium construction and seek subsidies from the county through government-backed bonds, a favorable land lease, and infrastructure support. Broward County incurred no financial outlays but benefited from the stadium location, and by the franchise’s decision to build a training facility in Broward. Broward’s interest in professional sports was piqued and this would stimulate further policy alternatives when Miami-Dade’s basketball and hockey franchises sought subsidies for new facilities.

## Chapter IV

### Case 2: Miami-Dade and American Airlines Arena

Miami Heat owner Micky Arison sought a new arena for his Miami Heat professional basketball team when he gained control of the franchise in 1995 from the partners of his father, Ted, a main Heat investor. The Heat played in the Miami Arena built in an urban neighborhood in 1986 for about \$53 million with public subsidies. Arison wanted a waterfront arena with luxury suites and commercial space wrapped in an appealing architectural design. To secure public subsidies and a bay front arena location he faced several battles. They included Miami sports authority officials and private interests that stood to lose from a competing arena, opposition groups interested in protecting public space and taxpayer interests, and the election of Miami-Dade County's first executive mayor. A change in formal political structure around the same time as a referendum impacted the public policy outcomes. The American Airlines Arena opened in 1999, the result of a subsidy decision where Arison paid arena construction with bonds sold on corporate markets and the county subsidized operations at the facility on waterfront land it bought from the city.

#### **Background**

In the early 1980s, a group of local professional sports boosters and prospective team owners persuaded Greek cruise tycoon, Ted Arison, that his fortune was needed to finance an NBA team in Miami. Arison entered into a partnership to own the franchise with investors Lewis Schaffel and Billy Cunningham, two men with professional basketball experience (Reed and Goodman 1996). As part of the expansion deal, the Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority (MSEA) agreed to finance 75 percent of the Miami Arena construction with a \$38 million bond backed by a tourist tax. Arena developers Decoma Ventures contributed \$15 million to the public-private venture. City officials empowered a MSEA to administer funds and own the facility while Decoma and another group would be arena operators. More troublesome for Arison was MSEA's 1986 contract with Decoma that stated the city "...shall not sponsor in any manner a facility that shall compete with the arena..." which brought political and legal opposition from both MSEA officials and Decoma executives (Yanez, Friedberg, and Strouse 1996).

The Miami Arena was placed in the Overtown neighborhood as part of a promise to aid that section of inner city Miami. Like many public works projects, political battles caused the arena to be designed to minimum standards. Coupled with the rapidly changing economics of the NBA, some argued that the arena lacked amenities needed for sports teams to generate competitive revenue and that it was economically obsolete from the time it opened (Brady 1996; DeFede 1996a). The plans for a Miami Arena were scaled back when \$10 million was cut from the original arena budget after arena proponent Miami Mayor Maurice Ferré was defeated by Xavier Suarez in 1985. Some city council members including long time member J.L. Plummer proposed diverting arena funds to other projects in Miami. “This arena was being built with money from the Sports and Exhibition Authority, and my contention was that you had to give some of that money for exhibition space,” Plummer later said (DeFede 1996b).

Another view is that the arena was built to the approval of team owners and most city officials at the time and that these cuts were not the crucial difference in a project that was already short on budget. The original plan, modeled after the recently opened Houston Summit, containing more luxury boxes would have cost around \$80 million. The scaled-back Miami Arena cost \$53 million and adding the \$10 million that Plummer cut did not leave enough money for the desired design. Heat managing partners Schaffel and Cunningham agreed to those alterations with the idea an expansion franchise would have trouble filling a bigger building (Korge, interview, 2001). “That arena was built exactly the way Schaffel wanted it,” former mayor Suarez recalled. “He always used the word cozy. He wanted to fill the arena” (DeFede 1996b).

With 14,696 seats and 18 skyboxes the arena was unprepared for changing league dynamics and economic growth as national popularity of the NBA leaped during the 1980s (LaFeber 1999). The cozy setting in the Miami Arena no longer fit the NBA model. The lack of luxury seating disadvantaged the franchise in their ability to compete economically. As a result when Micky Arison took over the team in 1995 he said he would not renew the Heat lease and wanted public subsidy for a new facility. Arison claimed the Miami Arena was unable to ever generate the revenue needed to sustain an NBA team.

Chris Korge, former legal council for the MSEA, disagreed saying the team made money “hand over fist” in the old arena. Korge referred to NBA Commissioner David Stern’s letter praising the Miami

Arena soon after it was built and saying it was one of the best three arenas in the U.S. “So with everything you ever heard or read about the Miami Arena being an ill-conceived arena, at that time the conventional wisdom with the NBA, professional teams, and with local governments was that it was the ideal arena to build” (Korge, interview, 2001).

By the time Arison made his demands, the Miami Arena also hosted a second professional team, the NHL Florida Panthers. Businessman H. Wayne Huizenga, the builder of Blockbuster Entertainment, lured the expansion hockey team to South Florida. Though the Miami Arena was not his preference it was the only South Florida arena ready to accommodate an NHL franchise in 1993 and Huizenga decided the team would play there until they could get another facility built (DeGeorge 1996). Huizenga’s influence soon increased as he bought into Decoma and arena managers Leisure Management Industries (LMI) (DeFede 1996a). As leader of the arena management and operations companies Huizenga could control contracts and leases. The Heat hoped not to renew their lease after it expired in 1995, and when they began negotiating a new two-year deal, the Huizenga-run LMI substantially changed the terms furthering Arison’s desire to leave the Miami Arena.

Arison’s desire to build a waterfront arena and bolster the Port of Miami collided with Huizenga’s desire to control the spectator sports industry in South Florida. Arison hoped for a new Miami arena, but was listening to lucrative offers from Broward officials. Beyond the arena, Arison and Huizenga competed for control over the sports, tourism and entertainment markets in South Florida. Huizenga planned to move the Panthers to Broward County where studies showed the strongest concentration of South Florida’s hockey fan base. Huizenga had the blockbuster idea of a mega-sports theme park with a two-sport arena and a baseball park straddling Miami-Dade and Broward counties.<sup>1</sup> As progress was made in state and local governments toward approving Blockbuster Park it looked like Huizenga would soon dominate the South Florida sports market, allowing him to alter ticket and concession prices of the local teams and venues

---

<sup>1</sup> Huizenga had already acquired part ownership of Joe Robbie Stadium and the Miami Dolphins and funded the expansion of the Florida Marlins and Panthers. When the NFL made an exception to its rules and the NHL followed suit by approving multiple sports team ownership, Huizenga’s name was being linked with talk of a sports monopoly.

unchecked. They did not want to also lose the Heat to Broward. Huizenga's plans for a Blockbuster Park included basketball.<sup>2</sup>

Then Huizenga focused on owning the Heat, or at least to have them playing in a venue he controlled (DeGeorge 1996). In January 1994, Huizenga offered \$130 million for the franchise to Micky Arison, who was representing his father. The entity that owned the Heat, Florida Basketball Associates, had three voting shares: Ted's wife, Marilyn Arison, Schaffel and Cunningham, who as managing partners, had to agree to any sale arranged by Arison (Conrad 1995a). Schaffel and Cunningham wanted to cash out of the team ownership and not enter a partnership with Huizenga. They declined the offer. When his first attempt failed, Huizenga tried an alternate plan. Huizenga held a press conference with his brother-in-law, Whit Hudson, from Colorado, to announce Hudson was buying the team. When pressed by reporters for background on the deal, Hudson said, "This is a complete surprise to me," and admitted he had not even talked to Schaffel and Cunningham (DeGeorge 1996, 248-249). Although many suspected that Huizenga was financing the deal, Hudson denied it. That sale ended with both Hudson and the Arisons contending the other side was not acting in good faith. In January 1995, Hudson filed suit in Broward Circuit Court but later dropped it as the Arisons threatened to counter sue. All parties were aware of the potential public relations problems from lawsuits naming Arison and Carnival, and Huizenga and Blockbuster, around the time a Super Bowl would be played in Miami-Dade's Joe Robbie Stadium (Conrad 1995a). The sides soon settled, "...with Hudson getting an unsold skybox and Heat tickets, a fraction of the \$1 million in compensation Hudson had sought" (DeGeorge 1996, 249). Arison eventually became sole owner by buying Schaffel and Cunningham's shares.

Arison's claim to the tourism market comes through Carnival Cruise Lines, a hugely profitable company in a multi-billion dollar industry. As owner of Carnival, Arison had interests in the Port of Miami territory where his luxury ships set sail to various Caribbean destinations. Heat officials studied several potential Miami arena sites, but Bicentennial Park was the clear choice because of its proximity to the port. (Tanfani 1996a). Anywhere else did not provide the same linkages, and might as well have been in northern

---

<sup>2</sup> Huizenga gained support for Blockbuster Park from state and local officials but when he sold Blockbuster to Viacom corporate leaders scrapped the sports entertainment park idea. Huizenga continued to pursue other public funding options for an arena complex in Broward County (DeGeorge 1996).

Broward County, if not directly on Miami's Biscayne Bay because the waterfront location could compliment Arison's cruise ship empire.

When Arison looked for public support he did not initially find it from Miami-Dade officials so he negotiated with neighboring Broward County. Arison used a Broward offer and subtle threats to move some cruise ships to Port Everglades in Ft. Lauderdale to awaken Miami-Dade's civic and political community about the stakes of the game. This worried Miami-Dade seaport director Carmen Lunetta who was aggressively pursuing port expansion. Like Arison, Lunetta wanted the bay front arena to expand business for both the port and the waterfront tract (Tanfani 1996a). Lunetta needed to keep Arison's cruise business and the more port space he could get for Carnival, the more large ships they could launch from Miami. Lose the team, however, and Miami-Dade stood to also lose port business.

Eventually county officials asked someone from the civic community, Anthony Ridder, a Non-Group member, to facilitate a deal with the Heat, and Miami-Dade commissioners approved an arena subsidy proposal at an emergency meeting in March 1996. That plan was challenged by a citizen's initiative placing the issue of building an arena on the waterfront land on the ballot. The timing of the referendum campaign coincided with a significant change in Miami-Dade's formal political structure. After a new executive mayor was elected in October, the popular new mayor summoned his personal advisors to rework the arena subsidy plan with the franchise in order to provide a better deal for the public and to gain his support in defeating the November referendum.

The modified formal political structure coupled with the looming referendum produced the change in public policy. Alex Penelas, the new county executive mayor who had been an early opponent of the Ridder plan as a commissioner, used the circumstances to propose a new arrangement that seemingly made better sense for the county taxpayers. He used his electoral mandate and a team of trusted negotiators to rework the subsidy plan with the Heat, and then sell it to voters to defeat the opposition referendum in November and clear the way for a new arena to be built.

## **Formal Political Structure**

The American Airlines Arena deal was impacted by the sports authority, city, county, and state structures. First, Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority (MSEA) and city officials needed to resolve the Decoma contract issue to allow a new Miami-Dade arena to be built on city owned land. Miami-Dade County officials and representatives primarily worked the arena finance deal and the county provided the main financial subsidy toward the project. The state was involved in that a sales tax rebate was pursued as a revenue stream for the new basketball arena.

The City of Miami political structure remained unchanged from the JRS case. There were four commissioners and the mayor elected at large for four-year terms, although commissioners had to reside in districts. The City Manager was the main city administrator. While the Miami mayor's position is structurally weak its powers can be increased through charismatic leadership. Maurice Ferré and Xavier Suarez held symbolic power that Joe Carollo also demonstrated upon becoming mayor in 1995. He was able to increase the bargaining position of the cash-strapped city in the land deal with the county through his personality and political calculations on the issue (DeFede 1996a).

Council members also sit on city boards including the MSEA, a special district sports authority established in 1983. The agency was created as an "independent and autonomous agency" and instrument of the city to coordinate with state and county legislation designating county tourism taxes toward promoting sports facilities ([www.msea.org](http://www.msea.org). 2003). But a commissioner sitting on the sports authority board could wield greater influence over sports authority policies and arena decisions. Upon election to city council prior to becoming mayor, Joe Carollo used his position on the sports authority to fire MSEA officials and to eliminate the legal threat to the new arena. "Carollo was like the 800-pound gorilla in this thing," said county commissioner Art Teele (Tanfani 1996a). While Carollo was a key figure in negotiating the land deal with the county, city participation was secondary to county actions for planning and implementation of the new arena policies.

City politics, like at the county level, was dominated for years by alliances between elected officials with members of the non-Hispanic white private sector (Mohl 1983; Stowers and Vogel 1994; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren and Moreno 2003). By the time Arison sought to leave the city-owned

facility in the 1990s, Hispanic and black political leaders held predominant public positions. While these leaders maintained similar connections with the civic and commercial sector they also gained support from the rising set of Hispanic business leaders interested in downtown development.

The Miami-Dade County commission from the 1960s through the 1980s consisted of eight commissioners elected at-large plus a county mayor presiding essentially as a ninth voting commissioner. Though the commissioners had to reside in particular districts, the countywide races primarily benefited Anglos allied with the business community (Banfield 1965; Mohl 1983; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren 1997; Warren and Moreno 2003). Under the original county charter the mayor was one among equals with the commissioners while the County Manager served as chief administrator (Banfield 1965).

The impetus behind creation of the Metro-Dade charter in 1957 was to promote business interests rather than an organized effort to discriminate against residents based on race or ethnicity (Sofen 1968; Warren 1997). At the time the charter was written there was not a significant Hispanic population base relative to Non-Hispanic whites, and Miami's blacks had few civil or political rights (Mohl 1989, 1993; Portes and Stepick 1993; Stack and Warren 1992). Even with the drastic demographic shift in South Florida during this time the formal political structure did not reflect these changes. Only five blacks and two Hispanics served on the Miami-Dade commission from 1957-1992 and at no time did more than one Hispanic or black representative sit on the county commission at once (Warren 1997). Hispanic leaders had gained influence in city politics during the 1970s but it was more difficult to crack the county's at-large electoral system. Blacks faced difficulty in mobilizing politically in both county and city elected politics (Mohl 1989, 1993; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren 1997; Warren and Stack 1992).

As the population changed throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there were numerous calls for reform like a defeated 1972 referendum proposal to abandon the council-manager system in favor of a strong mayor, and a 1981 charter commission that revisited the issue (Koenig et. al. 1990). A 1984 study conducted by the University of Miami and commissioned by the business community advocated a strong-mayor government and single member districts. At the time the county commission, dominated by Anglos and influenced by the Non-Group, exercising the power of non-decision making, refused to put the item on

the agenda (Vogel and Stowers 1991). The Anglo-backed county commissioners were unwilling to introduce reforms to open political opportunities so minority leaders took the battle to the courts.

In the early 1990s, several local black and Hispanic community leaders including State Representative Carrie Meek and Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez brought a federal class action lawsuit against Miami-Dade County claiming the current county structure was unfair. The plaintiffs based their case on the equal representation clause under Section II of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, a law written to outlaw the intentional electoral discrimination that existed in many Southern cities (Warren 1997). In *Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County* (1992) Judge Donald Graham ruled that Miami-Dade's at-large election system produced bias and should be restructured. He found the effect of countywide elections to be discriminatory against Hispanics and African Americans even though the charter was not intentionally designed that way. The court ruled that the effects of ethnic or racial discrimination only need to be shown in voting patterns to justify redrawing districts; demonstrating intent to discriminate against minority voters in the design of political structures was not necessary (Warren 1997).

As a result the county commission was redesigned from nine at-large seats to 13 representatives elected from single-member districts. The ensuing April 1993 elections changed the face of the county commission significantly. Hispanic candidates won six seats, blacks four seats, and non-Hispanic whites (Anglos) three seats (Warren 1997). The changing demographics of public officials altered county governance and introduced the need for new ethnic and racial composition coalitions in policy making. Cultural and ideological divisions between the Cuban and black communities in Miami-Dade have prevented these groups from forming governing coalitions (Grenier and Castro 2001; Moreno and Warren 1992; Warren and Moreno 2003). The predominant influence in county and city politics has been Hispanics as a voting group electing Latino politicians from various roots that form the traditional coalitions in city politics with civic and commercial institutions.

The ruling in the *Meek* case also eliminated the mayor's position leaving no elected leader to serve the entire county. Under the new system there were 13 district-based commissioners while the county manager continued as the top administrator accountable to the commission. The move from countywide to district-based elections and the abolition of the mayor's position created a political void further

decentralizing county leadership (Warren 1997; Hill, Moreno and Cue 1997). Though primarily ceremonial, the mayor served as the countywide representative and had potential political leadership.

Prior to the switch to single member districts, Alex Penelas, a Cuban American elected to the county commission in 1990, proposed establishing an executive mayor position. An executive mayor would act as a voice for the entire county and balance the neighborhood-minded tendencies of the district-based commissioners against the interests of the county as a whole (Hill, Moreno and Cue 1997). Creation of a county executive mayor required changing the county's Home Rule charter and would need voter approval. Penelas argued that the new position would establish an elected executive who would be accountable to county residents, as opposed to the manager who answered only to the commission and the mayor would also have influence with the county commission (Hill, Moreno and Cue 1997).

Two panels, including a group of community activists with County Commissioner Art Teele, had also suggested an executive mayor. Steve Clark (1970-72, 1974-92) the longest serving and last county mayor supported the idea. He noted that the job of running the county had changed since the initial charter created the weak mayor structure (Strouse 1992). The downtown civic and business community also liked the idea of centralized leadership and white non-Hispanic voters, still a sizable countywide voting block at the time, were comfortable with the proposal given the alternatives (Hill, Moreno and Cue 1997).

The October 1, 1992, referendum establishing an executive mayor generated little public attention; residents were still recovering from Hurricane Andrew that had devastated the southern part of the county less than six weeks earlier. With only 13 percent turnout, voters approved the proposal for an executive county mayor by 57 percent to 43 percent (Hill, Moreno and Cue 1997). The charter change gave the mayor the power to veto commission ordinances, appoint the commission chair and other committee chairs, appoint the County Manager with commission approval, submit a budget, and control daily county operations. The mayor would serve to check and counter the commission, the manager, and the decentralization of power that had opened doors to corruption in the county government. It was also hoped that the executive mayor would provide leadership in times of a costly and deadly natural disaster like Hurricane Andrew, or in negotiating with corporate bullies like owners of professional sports franchises wanting new sports facilities.

The first election for mayor coincided with Arison's search for new arena subsidies. In early 1996, four prominent politicians vied to become county executive mayor in the nonpartisan race. Alex Penelas, was born in Hialeah to parents of Cuban origin, and had been a county commissioner since 1990, serving previously as a Hialeah City Commissioner (Grenier et. al. 1994). Arthur Teele, the county commission chair since 1993, was a former member of the Reagan Administration. Former Miami Mayor Maurice Ferré, of Puerto Rican descent, was also serving as a county commissioner. Xavier Suarez, a Cuban-American, was mayor of Miami from 1985-1994.

Not surprisingly, Arison's demand for a new arena became a hot topic on the campaign trail. Suarez, who was not an elected official at the time, was an early arena proponent. Teele and Ferré were both proponents of the Ridder deal the commission had approved in March but wanted to rework it if elected. Ferré was concerned about the financial subsidy plan (Clerk's Summary 1996); Teele wanted to move the proposed waterfront location to west of Biscayne Boulevard in hopes of helping his Overtown constituency that never realized the benefits promised from the first Miami Arena.

Penelas made opposition to the Ridder plan a theme of his campaign. "This plan stinks, and every day it stinks more," said Penelas, who was running for mayor (Finefrock, 1996d). He said he would fight for a better deal if elected and he would not support using public money to pay for construction of the arena. His case was strengthened during the course of the campaign when a citizen's referendum opposing the proposed arena site was successfully placed on the November ballot.

As the mayoral campaign progressed, polls showed Penelas move from fourth to first place. Penelas raised and spent more money than the other candidates, and gained the support of two powerful political voting machines, the Hialeah Hispanic voters and the North Dade Jewish condominium voters (Fiedler 1996b; Hill, Moreno and Cue 1997). Penelas and Teele finished in first and second place in the primary election and faced each other in a run-off election (Tanfani and Branch 1996). With fundraising and media advantages, support from the county's majority Hispanic population and an edge with the non-Hispanic White voters, Penelas defeated Teele by 60 to 40 percent on October 1, 1996 to become Miami-Dade's first executive mayor (Hill, Moreno and Cue 1997).<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> In a political twist, Penelas, a registered Democrat, pulled a large majority of the primarily

During the campaign Penelas instructed Raul Masvidal, a member of both the Non-Group and *Mesa Redondo*, and an administrator on earlier Miami-Dade sports authorities, to write a strategy memo on the arena policy issue. On the day of the election, the media reported that Arison was strongly considering moving or selling the franchise if the upcoming referendum to block arena construction passed (Shipley 1996). While Arison cited no specific threat and said he had not been speaking with representatives from other cities, the implications were clear. Penelas was challenged with working a deal satisfactory to his own political calculus, the demands of the Heat franchise, and the voting public. If the upcoming referenda to block arena construction passed then Penelas would have to spend time and political energy negotiating a new deal or risk possibly losing the team to another city.

His concern was that he did not want, as a result of him making the arena an issue, for the Heat to move out of Miami. He felt that would have been bad. He did not want to start his term having the albatross on his back that he drove away the Heat. It would have meant another major factor in an already depressed downtown Miami (Masvidal, interview, 2001).

The new position Penelas assumed had some budgetary and veto authority over the commission and the county manager but did not result in a “strong mayor” position (Warren and Moreno 2003). He did have the ability to alter or stall arena subsidies, or more importantly, to sway public opinion against the Heat in the referendum. Penelas still needed to draw on informal sectors of power that also were in transition with continued population changes and political changes in the region. Penelas drew on key allies with links to Miami-Dade’s old and new civic communities to work a deal with Arison that he could support, and then get the support of commissioners and voters for the new plan.

### **Informal Sector**

As Miami-Dade’s demographics changed so did the constitution of its informal political sector. During the 1970s and 1980s political influence in the at-large county commission was guided by economic interests represented through formal and informal institutions especially the Non-Group, the Beacon Council (a public-private economic development agency), and various committees of the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce usually dominated by Anglos (Koenig et. al. 1990; Vogel and Stowers 1991;

---

Republican-registered Hispanic vote, while Teele, a Republican was mainly supported by Blacks who are

Warren 1997). By the 1990s, the influence of the Non-Group had waned and power began shifting to Hispanic economic and political leaders. Hispanic business and civic leaders formed groups like the Latin Builders Association, *Mesa Redondo* (round table), and the Miami Business Forum as organizations through which they could exercise informal power (Brierly and Moon. 1991. Warren and Moreno 2003).

The Non-Group, a self-selected group of business leaders had been the primary vehicle for policy influence in the 1970s acting like a “shadow government” (Dugger 1985; Slevin 1994; Warren 1997). The small group of corporate leaders led by Knight-Ridder executive Alvah Chapman shaped the community agenda and influenced local and state policy decisions (Dugger 1985; Koenig et. al. 1990; Vogel and Stowers 1991). Reflecting the region’s demographic transformation, by the 1980s the Non-Group had expanded its membership to about 50 members and was more inclusive of minority representation but less effective in influencing policy. By the time Chapman retired from Knight-Ridder in 1989 many of his cohorts had relocated to jobs in other cities or also retired (Koenig et. al. 1990).

The decline of the Non-Group’s grip on county politics can be traced to a failed attempt to gain support for an occupational tax necessary to finance a county orchestra (Vogel and Stowers 1991).

It no longer is clear which individuals and institutions are willing or able to provide direction in Miami. The power structure that has guided this community for decades is fading from the picture. Old leaders are retiring, some newer ones are transferring out of town, and a few of the city’s most visible executives are preoccupied with corporate problems of their own (Koenig et. al. 1990, 42).

Without community activists to replace Chapman and banker Henry Hood Bassett as leaders of the informal sector, participation in Non-Group meetings declined and the group eventually dissolved.

As the influence of the Non-Group declined opportunities for other groups to form coalitions and to gain influence opened (Brierly and Moon 1991). The informal power of Hispanics increased with the growing influence of Spanish-language radio, television and newspapers in Miami-Dade. By the early 1990s there were 10 radio stations exclusively broadcast in Spanish and two daily newspapers, including Knight-Ridder’s *El Herald* edition and *Diario Las Americas* (Abrahamson 1996; Garcia 1996; Olson and Olson 1995). The use of Spanish-language media sources would become important campaign tools for those seeking elective office and in special issue elections.

---

registered Democrats (Hill, Moreno and Cue 1997).

Raul Masvidal and Armando Codina were two Hispanic Non-Group members who bridged the Anglo and Hispanic business communities. Masvidal, a banker and unsuccessful Miami mayoral candidate in 1986, was considered the most influential Cuban American by both Cubans and non-Cubans in a 1983 *Herald* poll (Didion 1987). By 1996, this position was held by Codina, a developer who was the first Cuban American to chair the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce (Croucher 1997). Codina was unique in that through his Codina Group he held influence in both the traditional business sector and also and with Hispanic groups (Koenig et. al. 1990).

Membership in the Greater Miami Chamber grew in the 1980s and also underwent demographic changes. Many new Chamber members were of Hispanic origin and had overlapping memberships with new influential groups like the Cuban American National Foundation, Kiwanis Club of Little Havana, Latin Chamber of Commerce, the Latin Builders Association (LBA), and the Black Lawyers Association (Brierly and Moon 1991; Gonzalez-Pando 1998; Grenier and Stepick 1992; Grenier et.al. 1994; Koenig et. al. 1990; Portes and Stepick 1993; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren 1997; Warren and Moreno 2003). Emblematic of their concentration on construction and development projects, one of the first and most influential Hispanic commercial groups, the LBA was Cuban Americans “first attempt to use the political system to advance their economic interests. The Latin Builders made significant contributions to the consolidation of the exile community and ultimately emerged as a formidable power broker” (Gonzalez-Pando 1998 56). Other civic institutions like the Miami Business Forum, a group of about 40 corporate leaders, and *Mesa Redondo*, a group co-founded by Florida International University President Modesto “Mitch” Madique, comprised of prominent Hispanics from the public and private sectors, were formed to serve as successors to the Non-Group for advancing policy agendas (Warren and Moreno 2003).

During the 1980s, political control began to shift from Miami’s business elite to the newly developing Hispanic political institutions and leaders (Croucher 1997; Koenig et. al.1990; Vogel and Stowers 1991). Hispanics filled the leadership vacuum that existed in Miami politics with the decline of the Non-Group and the changes in political structure. The rapid political incorporation of Miami Hispanics was fueled by an interest in growth politics complementary to traditional business interests. As a result, the primary governing coalition has been Hispanic politicians ruling with the support of the Hispanic

commercial class pursuing growth interests similar to that of traditional the downtown business elite (Brierly and Moon 1991; Moreno and Warren 1992; Stowers and Vogel 1994; Warren and Moreno 2003).

Meanwhile, blacks in Miami were plagued with the inability to gain political power in Miami (Croucher 1997; Grenier and Castro 2001; Mohl 1989; Portes and Stepick 1993; Stack and Warren 1992). Miami's racial divide deepened, and by the 1980s there was an outbreak of rage as Miami witnessed three separate riots in response to Hispanic or white police officers shooting black men. The 1989 disturbance was an ill-timed event for civic boosters as Miami hosted the NFL Super Bowl that same weekend (Gale 1999; Grenier and Stepick 1992). These occurrences fueled dissent in the black community leading to legal strategies that resulted in the changed formal political structure as discussed earlier.

With these transformations taking place in the informal sector in flux, Miami-Dade leaders turned to the traditional business elite when Arison asked for new arena subsidies. County commissioners selected Anthony Ridder, chairman of Knight-Ridder, to serve as a community facilitator. This resembled the role of civic leadership seen during the Chapman era. But critics on local talk radio shows and in Broward County contended that Ridder's role compromised the ability of the Miami-based newspaper, which was then promoting a new Broward edition, to objectively cover the arena issue and the competition between the two counties (DeFade 1996b).

Representing the interests of the civic community, Ridder followed the familiar civic role in Miami's informal political structure. "There are many community things that need to be done and the heads of companies should do their share," said Chapman about Ridder's role in arena negotiations (Merzer 1996). Ridder formed a link with Arison to Miami's traditional elite power structure that bridged the gap in leadership on the county commission. He was able to broker a deal with county administrators and city officials that gained formal approval from both governments. Ultimately the county mayor reworked the finances of the Ridder plan in the days prior to a citizen initiative to block the waterfront arena location.

### **Subsidy Proponents**

Micky Arison assumed control of the Heat franchise in 1995 and immediately asked for public subsidies to support construction of a new arena. Arison and the Heat franchise representatives were the

lead arena proponents. Heat coach and general manager Pat Riley and Heat players acted as public spokesmen for an arena. Riley publicly stated that he joined the Heat because he wanted to be the coach in Miami, not Broward County.

The Heat found support from some Miami-Dade County commissioners, especially Teele and Ferré, who were more connected to the Non-Group and traditional civic leaders than to *Mesa Redondo* and the emerging Hispanic institutions, and suggested subsidy plans in late 1995. Arison had allies among members of the civic community that helped advance these plans in early 1996. There were also proponents in the city government whose support was essential for overcoming the no-compete clause in the Miami Arena contract and securing the waterfront land for the project.

Soon after buying out his father's partners, Arison invoked threats to move or sell the team if a new arena were not publicly subsidized. Initially, Arison found little support for a new arena because the Miami Arena was less than 10 years old. Many officials were reluctant even to engage in discussions about subsidy policy options with Arison, and the team owned was frustrated by the lack of public leadership:

When we think about Miami losing the Dolphins to Joe Robbie Stadium, losing the Orange Bowl game (to JRS), the Panthers not renewing for next year and the potential for losing the Heat, it's amazing to me that nobody seems to react. There doesn't seem to be any outrage. The potential for Miami to be without a professional sports franchise because the political leadership doesn't want to do anything is just astounding to me (Cavanaugh and Reed 1995).

Still, Miami-Dade leaders did not want to be responsible for losing the franchise. Commissioners Teele and Ferré and many civic leaders viewed the team as vital to the city's image and wanted to form a plan for a new arena (DeFede 1996b). One analysis suggests that due to a weak political structure, no clear charismatic leadership in the community, the cautious mood of taxpayers, and the no compete clause in the old arena contract translated into an overall lack of political will to finance a new arena in Miami-Dade County (Tanfani 1996a). It took the threat of losing the Heat to move county leaders to action.

Officials in Miami-Dade's northern neighbor, Broward County, proposed building an arena for Huizenga's Panthers and wanted to also lure the Heat to it. With a chance for Broward to capitalize on Miami-Dade's loss, they moved forward on planning a two-sport facility. But Arison's public threats to move were measured against his private preference for a waterfront facility. "We want to be in downtown Miami. But the only place we've seen progress on a new arena is in Broward. And if the only new arena is

in Broward, that's where we're going to be playing," said Arison in November 1995 (Cavanaugh and Reed 1995).

In January 1996, Broward commissioners seized the opportunity to gain at least one professional franchise when they voted 5-1 to increase the county's hotel bed tax from three to five percent to subsidize about \$185 million of their proposed \$212 million arena. Additional funding would come from the legislature's state sales tax rebate. But some Broward officials would not support a one-sport facility, claiming they would walk away from the proposed \$212 million project if both teams did not agree to play there (Finefrock and Tanfani 1996; Rafinski and Finefrock 1996). Broward Commissioner Gerald Thompson doubted the financial wisdom of investing in a single sport facility (Reyna 1996). Others were still eager to land at least one professional franchise to raise the county's status nationally. "This arena, we feel, will indeed bring Broward County out of the shadow of (Miami) Dade," said Fort Lauderdale City Manager George Hanbury (Schultz 1996). Broward officials needed a quick decision from the Heat. Arena construction had to begin in order to meet a 1998 deadline for completion when both the Panthers and Heat leases expired at the Miami Arena.

Fearful of the public relations damage if both the Panthers and Heat left Miami-Dade, the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce formed an ad hoc arena committee to explore options. Along with the Beacon Council, a private economic development group, and the Greater Miami Conventions and Visitors Bureau, the Chamber recommended the county empower Knight-Ridder chairman J. Anthony Ridder to mediate a deal. The civic committee said the county desperately needed someone to act as a "lightning rod" and lead negotiations between county, city, Heat, Panthers, MSEA, Dade County Sport Facility Financing Authority, Decoma, and LMI Miami representatives (Dade County BOCC 1996a). Ridder, acting on behalf of the civic community, became an arena proponent.

At their February 8 meeting, Miami-Dade commissioners enlisted Ridder to work an arena deal with the team in a 12-0 vote (Dade County BOCC 1996b). The County Manager's report mentioned the need for cooperation between the county, city, and sports authority and he encouraged city participation in the process. The city commission and MSEA, whose position on Decoma's no compete contract was reversed after Joe Carollo became MSEA chair and replaced its members, also endorsed Ridder's role.

Negotiations between Ridder and Arison and some local officials began behind closed doors while the Heat continued their discussions with Broward officials.

Arison wanted to stay away from a potentially Huizenga-operated building in Broward even if some arena profits were to be equally shared (Finefrock and Rafinski 1996; Yanez, Friedberg, and Strouse 1996). Claiming financial losses, Huizenga put the Panthers up for sale in November 1995 even as he sought public subsidies for an arena. Sharing a building with the Panthers was more palpable to Arison if Huizenga sold the team. Then Huizenga reported he would retain majority stake in the hockey team through the arena-building process. Arison did not want a business partnership or a lease with Huizenga, especially when there was the possibility of having his own Miami waterfront arena. "It seems like we've kind of separated geographically, based on perceived community interests," said Arison (Conrad 1995b). Broward officials set a March 29 deadline in a letter to the Heat for them to accept an offer to play in the new facility with reasonable rent payments. NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman urged arena approval regardless of the basketball outcome offering to hold an All-Star game and hockey draft at a new Broward arena (Hanlry 1996; Skolnick 1996).

Arison continued negotiating with Miami-Dade officials. Aboard one of his ships docked at the Port of Miami, Arison met with Dade County Manager Armando Vidal, Port of Miami Director Carmen Lunetta, Miami Commissioner Carollo, community facilitator Ridder and others to sketch out a framework for keeping the Heat in Miami (Reed and Goodman 1996). On March 21, the commission voted to allow Ridder to continue talks with the Heat based on the preliminary funding plan worked out on Arison's ship. When Vidal heard that Broward officials were close to signing the Heat, he called Arison to gauge his seriousness about staying in Miami. Vidal and Lunetta also urged Ridder to increase his shuttle diplomacy between the team and local officials to finalize the plan. Within days a deal was brokered for a Miami-Dade arena. Few details of the plan were initially made public and Ridder's secretive approach was criticized in the media. Ridder claimed that as a civic facilitator he was not a public official and therefore not subject to Florida's Sunshine Laws.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> The *Miami Herald* and the *Miami New Times* later scrutinized Ridder's role when he refused to turn over public records from his dealings. The *New Times*, a free weekly newspaper, took Ridder to court when he claimed not to be subject to the Florida Sunshine Law, and therefore not obliged to turn over the

With the looming Broward deadline, the county and city commissions both called emergency meetings for March 29 to approve the Ridder plan. While the plan called for more than \$200 million in public subsidies to be used in securing land and subsidizing arena construction, commissioners were given little notice or information before a rushed vote that morning (Tanfani 1996a; DeFede 1996b). The county meeting began at 9:27 a.m. and adjourned at 11:33 a.m. After two hours of discussion county commissioners agreed by an 8-4 vote to subsidize construction of the new arena and build it on the waterfront Maritime Park site (Dade County BOCC 1996c).

The Ridder plan called for the county to sell bonds for the arena construction and pay them back with about \$87 million from a hotel bed tax, \$75 million from a state fund for port improvement, and \$27 million from the state sales tax refund. The county also agreed to pay \$35 million for infrastructure costs. The Heat would pay about one-fourth of the construction costs, sign a 30-year lease, and be guaranteed about \$5.5 million a year in profits (Yanez, Friedberg, and Strouse 1996).

The Ridder deal produced sub optimal outcomes for the county and the franchise. "If you look purely at numbers, the Broward location was financially a better deal for the Miami Heat. But we were able to get the deal done (in Miami-Dade)," said Arison (Yanez, Friedberg, and Strouse 1996).

Commission proponents included Teele, Ferré, Margolis, James Burke, Natacha Millan, Dennis Moss, Pedro Reboledo and Javier Souto. Commissioners Penelas, Katy Sorenson, Miguel Diaz de la Portilla and Betty Ferguson voted against the proposal while Bruce Kaplan, an arena opponent, was absent (Dade County BOCC 1996c). Some Miami-Dade commissioners were satisfied they could claim the new arena would be built without enacting any new taxes. "I am going to be very delighted to see the Heat stay in Miami," said Commissioner Margolis. "I think community pride is what it's all about" (Finefrock and Rafinski 1996). When members of the media accused Teele, whose district encompassed the old arena, of acting to save the Heat due to personal ego he said, "This is about ego, community ego" (DeFede 1996b).

Commissioner Ferré, who was unable to attend the emergency meeting, expressed mixed feelings in a memo to the commission for the record. "I believe that a new Arena for the Heat is not popular in Miami-Dade or Broward Counties, and that it would probably be voted down if it were to be put to a public

---

documents (DeFede 1996d; Mullin 1996). The *New Times* eventually lost the suit and Ridder turned over

referendum,” he wrote. “Further, if it would take any monies from our operating budget, backed by ad valorem taxes, I am sure it would be even more strongly opposed” (Dade County BOCC 1996c). Ferré noted that locating the arena on the waterfront was probably even more unpopular but stated:

In the past, Metropolitan Dade County has had to make decisions contrary to public will. For example, the building that we currently occupy was voted down by the electorate; yet, the County proceeded with construction on the Stephen P. Clark Government Center. In a republican form of democracy, there are occasions wherein elected officials have to demonstrate leadership and take on unpopular positions that are for the good of the whole. I am of the opinion, however, that although the proposed Arena will greatly benefit the Heat and its owners financially, it will do more for Dade County than it will for the Heat (Dade County BOCC 1996c).

The City of Miami commission easily approved the deal by a 5-0 vote after a discussion and vote took a total of six minutes (Finefrock and Rafinski 1996). Miami officials were eager to keep the Heat downtown. The Carollo-chaired sports authority voted 11-1 to approve the deal and provide arena subsidies. With endorsements from three government structures, it seemed that the campaign to save Miami’s Heat was complete. But some important issues remained. One was the non-compete clause in the MSEA-Decoma contract. Part of the funds from the Ridder deal included hotel bed taxes from the sports authority budget so MSEA cooperation was needed. Although Carollo gutted the leadership of MSEA, Decoma filed a legal suit against the city. Another issue was the future of the soon to be vacant Miami Arena with millions of dollars in operating deficit that the city would have to cover. The city also owned the land on which the proposed arena would be built; so county officials would have to negotiate with the cash-strapped city for the rights to that land. Finally, the waterfront land required environmental permits before construction could proceed and opponents of development on the waterfront site would surface to challenge the details of the Ridder-negotiated plan.

### **Subsidy Opponents**

After Miami-Dade commissioners quickly approved the Ridder plan opposition began to organize. On the county commission there was a block of four commissioners opposed to the Ridder plan but they lacked the formal ability to alter the arena. Within the city, people associated with MSEA and those connected to the Miami Arena through Decoma and LMI were opponents to the new plan. The greatest

---

all relevant materials with no secrets found in his previously concealed documents.

opposition came from the citizen initiative headed by Dan Paul and the coalition of public interest groups that supported his vision to protect public lands from large development projects like the arena proposal.

In city politics, supporters of the Miami Arena were the opponents to a new arena. After Carollo defeated DeYurre in the city commission race, Carollo was successful in being appointed as chair of the sports authority and used his position to gut MSEA of the opponents to the new arena (DeFede 1996a; Korge, interview, 2001). The next year Carollo was elected Miami mayor, furthering his influence over the fate of the waterfront arena. Carollo was a key figure in negotiating the land deal with the county. He also pushed for the city to reach a financial settlement with Decoma to nullify to no compete contract clause.

Opponents at the county level included the four commissioners who voted against the Ridder plan, Diaz de la Portilla, Ferguson, Sorenson and Penelas. Their dissent was based primarily on their opposition to publicly subsidizing sports facilities but each had their own individual concerns (Sorenson, interview, 2001; Penelas, interview, 2001). Penelas asked about the fate of the existing Miami Arena and disliked the funding details as they became known. Sorenson and Ferguson also pointed to the need for more social services in conjunction with sports facility subsidies. Diaz de la Portilla, on the other hand, felt that the arena was not in the public interest, and feared the county would help construct the facility and then lose control over the project (Dade County BOCC 1996c).

Public opposition to the Ridder plan was immediate as awareness of the details emerged. A week after the commission's March 29 vote, local lawyer and civic activist Dan Paul suggested he would circulate a petition in opposition to the proposed arena site. Paul led the 1972 Miami's Parks for People referendum that approved the bonds for the city to purchase the FEC tract and Bicentennial Park and actively supported local public parks (Robertson 1996). He claimed that the bay front lands were reserved for public purposes. According to Paul, the influential lawyer, any proposed use of those tracts of land for an arena needed taxpayer approval.

At the April 16 commission meeting, Commissioner Kaplan called for a non-binding straw poll on the arena issue to be held September 3, the day voters would vote for the county mayor and some county commissioners. Kaplan, who was absent from the votes to appoint Ridder on February 5 and approve his plan on March 29, decried the Ridder deal for being negotiated in secret. "Yet the taxpayer, one way or

another, will be stuck with a quarter-billion dollar bill to support one of the richest men on the face of the earth,” Kaplan said, referring to Arison (Tanfani 1996b). Commission Chair Margolis killed the referendum idea with a parliamentary maneuver and she stressed the need for arena construction to stay on schedule. Kaplan vowed to raise the issue again.

When commissioners met June 18 to vote on final terms of the financing deal, further opposition was raised. Commissioner Ferguson noted her concern about Heat control of concession sales. She unsuccessfully suggested the team consider providing 30% of the concessions to community-based organizations. Commissioner Sorenson introduced an amendment that would require the fundraising resolution to be approved by county voters. Penelas seconded the motion, but only Diaz de la Portilla joined them in the 9-3 vote as Kaplan was again absent from the meeting (Clerk’s Summary 1996d).

Commissioner Diaz de la Portilla presented an amendment that provided ten percent of the net arena profits to be designated for county parks. After the County Attorney advised that this amendment would eliminate the tax-exempt status of the subsidy bonds and require a reworking of the agreement, Diaz de la Portilla withdraw the potentially troubling motion. Commissioner Souto then suggested the Heat publicly commit money to county parks saying he felt that any company doing business in the county had a corporate responsibility to put money back in the community (Dade County BOCC 1996d). Heat representative Howard Frank agreed; the team would commit \$100,000 per year for five years to county parks. Following a discussion of other amendments dealing with construction contingencies, the County Attorney noted that the Heat had guaranteed the county that no ad valorem taxes would be at risk and that no sales taxes would be used. The commission then voted to affirm the management portion of the resolution by an 8-4 vote that mirrored the March 29 vote on the deal. Diaz de la Portilla, Ferguson, Penelas, and Sorenson voted no, and Kaplan was again absent. The proposed arena now had financial support despite strong minority opposition on the commission.

Enter Dan Paul, who launched a petition drive on July 16 to challenge the arena project location. Paul needed to collect 30,414 signatures, or four percent of the county's registered voters, and set a goal of getting 35,000 signatures to ensure success since some ineligible signatures would be tossed out of the statistical sample. Paul had less than the legally allotted 60 days to collect the signatures because they

needed to be certified by the county Elections Department before the commission could approve the election. This had to be done by September 10 to get the question on the November ballot. “It’s a lot of work - even the 4 percent. It’s tough getting petition signatures, unless you are real well financed,” said Miami-Dade elections supervisor David Leahy (Finefrock 1996e). Paul’s group met their goal. “This is my fourth petition drive, and I’ve never had such active participation this early,” said Paul (Park 1996).

The referendum sought to prohibit the county from using public money to build an arena or parking garage in Bicentennial Park or in the adjacent Florida East Coast Railway property known as the FEC Tract. Lunetta and Port of Miami officials worried this opposition could derail other plans for seaport expansion. Ridder and Lunetta tried talking Paul out of the referendum and proposed a compromise by offering to create new public park land west of Biscayne Boulevard, but Paul refused. While Paul opposed the proposed arena he suggested the port could still be expanded as long as it did not obstruct the public’s view of the bay (Finefrock 1996b).

The core of Paul’s opposition coalition included urban reformers, local environmentalists, and intellectuals with time to devote to the issue (Park 1996). Paul mainly used his personal resources to fund the opposition organization. He created a political action committee named Stop New Arena Committee with Frec Baggs, the widow of William “Bill” Baggs, the late public parks proponent and *Miami News* editor. Former Miami Commissioner Athalie Range Miami architects Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, a pioneer of New Urbanism and dean at the University of Miami School of Architecture, and architect Jorge Espinel, and Greg Bush, a University of Miami history professor, were also key committee members.

The Stop New Arena Committee appealed to anti-growth public opinion to force the referendum. “When you, as a private citizen with limited resources, fight a battle against the establishment, you must be dedicated and persistent,” Paul’s long-time friend Leonard Turkell said. “Because when you’re tired and done and going about your business, that machine is still going. That steamroller never stops. Unless you are dedicated, and clear in your objective, and persistent, you will not win your battles” (Park 1996). The referendum was a vehicle behind which both financial and land-based opposition could rally. “The one very positive thing is that people will have a chance to debate the arena, whatever the outcome,” said Espinel (Finefrock 1996f). Some believed the public would prefer not to use public funds for the Heat

arena in Bicentennial Park and would join with those opposed to the use of scarce public space for the project. “If it’s on the ballot, my guess is the arena proposal will go down,” said Commissioner Penelas (Park 1996).

Another battle occurred over ballot language. Arena proponents on the commission introduced confusing wording biased to favor the Heat. The question asked:

Shall Dade County be prohibited from using County taxes, leased lands, moneys, or bonds to construct a new arena and related facilities in Bicentennial Park or the FEC Tract and also be prohibited unless approved by the voters, from any construction in Bicentennial Park or the FEC Tract which obstructs or impedes the view of Biscayne Bay or which is leased or used by for-profit business entities?

If one opposed the use of county funds on these public lands, then they would vote “yes.” But the referendum was commonly seen as being designed to stop the arena construction. Conventional wisdom suggested that people opposed to the arena would vote “no,” but in this case a “no” vote would actually give the county permission to move forward with the arena.

Opponents felt this confusion worked against them but it was the Heat that challenged that the legality of the referendum by filing suit. The franchise charged the question violated the county charter because two separate issues were being asked, one on funding the arena and another on the idea of waterfront development. The team also contended that the ballot question was misleading, and argument rejected by the Third District Court of Appeals (Finefrock 1996i). With 10 days left until the vote there was not enough time to appeal to the State Supreme Court and the Heat decided to compete for popular support for their arena plan. To rally public opinion for the November vote, the Heat spent up to \$3 million on a public relations campaign and through their Coalition for a Greater Miami political committee while the opponents Stop New Arena Committee spent about \$10,000 (Finefrock 1996k). In order to secure arena subsidies the Heat took their case to the public in hopes of support in defeating the referendum.

### **Public Policy Options**

Public policy alternatives were limited when Arison first made arena subsidy demands in 1995. When Miami-Dade commissioners could not agree on a plan and faced the threat of a Broward arena offer to the Heat, they enlisted a member of the civic community to work a deal with the franchise. The proposal

approved by county commissioners in March 1996 called for subsidizing arena construction. Opposition to the arena location brought an electoral challenge to this plan, and a change in political structure created the terms for a reworking of the arena public policy decisions.

The finance structure for the American Airlines Arena changed significantly from the first deal to the second. Ridder acting as a community facilitator on behalf of the county commission formulated the first deal (DeFede 1996d). The Ridder plan called for the county to pay to construct the new arena, and absorb many additional costs, and involved city and state support to a lesser extent (Finefrock 1996c).

After the election of Penelas, a commission opponent of the Ridder plan, as executive county mayor the financial plan was reworked prior to the referendum. The Penelas plan included county subsidies with city and state support. The big difference was in the type of county subsidies and the greater financial input from the team. Under the Penelas plan the franchise would privately finance arena construction while the county would work to secure the land, pay to operate and manage the facility, and to provide for infrastructure support.

Ridder Plan. The Ridder plan, discussed earlier, called for the county to subsidize arena construction and support waterfront land acquisition. Under this plan the county would own and manage the arena while the Heat would get a majority of the profits and control over valuable naming rights. The county and the team would have jointly paid to operate the facility using arena profits and rent payments. The county subsidy would come from bonds supported by hotel tax money and state grants. Officials on the county commission, City of Miami commission, and MSEA voting board approved this plan. Some members of the public spoke in opposition at commission meetings, but there were but there were no public forums to discuss or debate arena construction or location. Five county commissioners opposed the Ridder plan, but they were unable to stop its approval. Efforts to block or defeat its passage or to introduce an opposition referendum through formal political structures also failed.

Discussions leading to the Ridder plan began in late 1995. Officials commissioned an Arena Financing Review Team through the county manager's office to compile a report on sports subsidy options. The report from the county General Services Administration recommended hiring a community facilitator

and professional sports facility development consultants secured with \$250,000 in general county funds. The report also supported continued efforts to make the Heat eligible for the state tax rebate (Dade County BOCC 1996a). Finally, the GSA report suggested Maritime Park as a possible arena site. Commissioner Diaz de la Portilla endorsed this idea, but also encouraged alternate bids from private property owners. Allowing property owners to submit suitable development proposals concerned Chairman Teele, who thought this could stall the process. Ultimately, the County Attorney reworked the language on the location matter to limit confusion (Dade County BOCC 1996d).

The Ridder plan that resulted conformed to the recommendations of the GSA proposal. It called for about \$87 million from a hotel bed tax, \$75 million from a state fund for port improvement, and \$27 million from the state sales tax refund to fund arena construction. The county also agreed to allocate \$35 million for infrastructure costs. The Heat would pay about one-fourth of the construction costs, sign a 30-year lease, and be guaranteed about \$5.5 million a year in profits (Yanez, Friedberg and Strouse 1996). Under this plan the county would pay some \$253 million to cover bond payments for arena construction and also be responsible for cost overruns and emergency revenue streams. The county was not slated to earn revenue in return for its investments and the team would retain potentially lucrative naming rights of the arena.

Though a majority on the county commission agreed to these terms, Paul's organized opposition helped to reshape this plan. The proposed referendum gave opponents of the Ridder plan a vehicle to rally support for their side. Although the ballot issue was narrowly based on opposition to building the arena on waterfront land, in effect it also allowed voters to implicitly approve the proposed financing plan. When Penelas won the mayoral election, he was in a position to orchestrate a reworking of this public policy and play a role in shaping the outcome of the upcoming referendum.

The Penelas Plan. Penelas was elected county mayor on October 15 while making opposition to the Ridder plan a campaign issue. The mayor saw a philosophical problem with public subsidies for sports facilities even as he believed they could bring benefits to a community. "It is just plain wrong for taxpayers to foot the bill for hundreds of millions of dollars for a new arena when the average working family can't even

afford tickets to a game,” Penelas said as his inauguration. “We can and will forge a new plan to keep the Heat here in Miami without asking taxpayers to open their wallets again” (Finefrock 1996k). He also opposed the waterfront location and wanted to renegotiate with Arison.

Penelas and his aides interpreted his election as a popular mandate and used his opposition to the Ridder plan to make a statement about the powers of the new office. “The mayor had a mandate based on the campaign. The current deal on the table was bad for the taxpayers and that was a part of his campaign,” said Brian May. “It was not a good sign to the team. A mayor with a bully pulpit, he held their destiny in his hands. They realized it. They were running TV ads trying to turn the numbers, but the team realized they needed a paradigm shift to get approval on the site” (May, interview, 2001).

Ten days after the election, Penelas and Arison met for the first and only time for about 30 minutes. Penelas pushed his position to renovate the Miami Arena, and Arison reiterated his refusal to this plan. They agreed on little more than their desire to keep the Heat in Miami and to dispatch negotiators to forge a new agreement. The Heat faced the possibility that the popular mayor would campaign against them in the referendum. They needed his support and Penelas needed to work a better deal for the county while keeping his campaign promise. Arison wanted the county to abide by the original deal. “We negotiated an arrangement - I think a fair arrangement considering what was negotiated in Broward County - and we would hope the county would meet its commitment,” said Arison (Finefrock 1996h). Any deal Penelas and Arison’s associates could negotiate needed to also be acceptable to the commission and the voters in the referendum.

The day after Penelas was elected State Senator Mario Diaz-Balart received a phone call “out of the blue” from Arison (Diaz-Balart, interview, 2001). Diaz-Balart knew Arison from his role as a state legislator from Miami-Dade where Arison’s cruise business is located. Arison called Diaz-Balart to contact Penelas. Diaz-Balart set a meeting between the franchise owner and the mayor along with Penelas’ advisor and Vice Mayor of Hialeah at the time, Herman Echevarría. Penelas asked them to help him work a politically acceptable deal with the Heat without the glare of media coverage. “It would be best to set up people one degree removed from the mayor and his direct staff to negotiate with the team,” explained May

(May, interview, 2001). This way Penelas could tell the press that he was not meeting with team and not have the spotlight of the media.

Diaz-Balart and Echevarría, two elected politicians who worked with different Miami public relations firms, agreed to work pro-bono on this issue as friends and advisors to the mayor. The group also needed a financial expert and someone with professional arena experience. Through his friend and former chief of staff, lawyer Jorge Luis Lopez, Penelas was introduced to Raul Masvidal, a banker and prominent member of the Miami business community who had chaired previous sports authorities (Lopez, interview, 2001). Penelas had a level of trust with each of them to negotiate on his behalf. "Each brought something different. Mario brought the political savvy and how to maneuver, Raul brought the analysis and the numbers, and Herman (Echevarría) was the enforcer," said Penelas (interview, 2001). Echevarría, a political mentor to Penelas, was the one who understood the mayor's position on issues and who would negotiate based on that behalf.

Masvidal had financial expertise and, more importantly, he was a personal friend of Ted Arison, Micky's father, who was now retired to Tel Aviv. Masvidal did not have the same personal relationship with Micky as he did with Ted, but the Arison family trusted him. The Arisons, established in Miami's old civic culture, did not know Penelas or Diaz-Balart well enough to openly negotiate. "The guy who really did most of the work was Raul Masvidal, he was the number-crunchers guy. Herman and I were the bad guys. To say politically the mayor cannot do this. To be the tight guys. To protect the interests of the mayor, therefore protect interests of the people. And Raul's job was the numbers" (Diaz-Balart, interview, 2001). Thus, Masvidal provided a level of comfort for Arison, while Diaz-Balart and Echevarría provided assurance to the mayor he could trust Masvidal as well (Masvidal, interview, 2001).

Arison knew from his polling that the referendum was in trouble and he needed to work with the mayor's team. He delegated authority to Jay Cross, a Heat executive who was new to Miami. Cross was hired more for architectural knowledge than for political savvy. He needed both and quickly learned the local politics. "Jay turned out to be not only a technocrat, he turned out to be a guy who understood the way forces in the community were going, and what ingredients were missing, which were more important than anything from the technical standpoint," said Masvidal. "At the end of the day we are talking about a site

where the architects could deliver something decent, but he is the one who read from a distance, after not being involved in Miami, and not knowing a lot about Miami politics, he came in with a fresh look and decided how Micky Arison needed to play the game and started putting together the various alliances they would need, and I think that is what really made it happen” (Masvidal, interview, 2001). Cross assembled the Heat political and legal teams, hiring Lopez, Penelas’ former chief of staff and close personal friend, and Lopez’ Shutts and Bowen law firm to represent the team on rezoning issues.

Cross, Lopez, Arison attorney Howard Frank and team representatives negotiated with Echevarría, Diaz-Balart and Masvidal to work out a deal that would be acceptable to Arison and Penelas. Each side had a trump card. The mayor had the ability to influence the referendum through public opinion, and Arison held leverage through threats to move the team, some of Carnival’s cruise ships, or both out of Miami-Dade County. Even a hint by Arison he may move some ships to Broward would put Penelas at risk for being blamed for losing the Heat and cruise business. Meanwhile, Penelas could use the pending referendum to get further financial commitment. When negotiations began, Echevarría relayed the mayor’s main message to Arison. “Basically I told Arison you do not have \$160 million anymore and I am here to find a new formula acceptable to taxpayers, to the mayor, and to his advisors” (Echevarría, interview, 2001).

The negotiations hinged on several points. Penelas favored keeping the Heat in the old arena. He pitched the MSEA plan to bring the Miami Arena up to league standards with about \$90 million. The Heat were completely against it. Construction would bring major inconveniences while the Heat played there. Moreover, the Heat already had a deal with the county for a new waterfront property. They could take their chances at the ballot box and in the courts because they already had a strong claim to the park site. When one adds the animosity between MSEA, Decoma, LMI, and the Heat over lease negotiations, it was clear there was no way Arison was staying in the Miami Arena. The Heat would play in Broward before they would stay in the Overtown building. “If I had my way, I’d have them playing in the current Miami Arena for 30 years, but it didn’t happen,” said Penelas. “We had to give in somewhere” (Tanfani 1996c).

Where Penelas compromised was over land issue. Arison really wanted the Miami waterfront location and downtown development advocates backed him. Penelas stuck to his guns on the promise of no public financing of arena construction but was willing to reconsider his opposition to the waterfront

location. As Echevarría later explained, the land was not a big concession for the mayor (Echevarría, interview, 2001). While Penelas was not a fan of the waterfront site, he had no major objection to it and figured that if an arena was going to be built it might as well be done right. Penelas campaigned against the original subsidy plan more than he did against the site but still referendum supporters were energized by his anti-arena rhetoric. Now he was conceding the site so he could accomplish his own political goal of not subsidizing direct arena construction, while keeping the team in Miami.

Ultimately, Arison agreed to both privately finance the \$165 million arena construction costs and to engage in profit sharing. The franchise raised funds by selling municipal-backed bonds with Arison putting up \$80 million of his own money to begin construction. Arena profits would be used to pay the bonds and the team was placed as collateral on a bank loan. The county agreed to pay \$6.5 million annually for operating costs, improve local infrastructure and pay to acquire the land from the city. This deal was negotiated in two weeks in the face of the pending referendum.

Until the end, the mayor wavered on his decision. When negotiators worked the final deal, they wanted to announce it on the Friday prior to Tuesday election. Brian May called Penelas who was New Orleans to secure Miami-Dade's bid to host the 1999 Super Bowl at Joe Robbie Stadium. Penelas asked May what he should do and his advisor told him, "You will be remembered for things that you do and not things that you oppose, so my recommendation is that you support this new deal" (Penelas, interview, 2001). Penelas agreed and gave his approval to the arena plan.

The *Miami Herald* recommended that its readers vote against the opposition referendum and allow arena development to go forward under the newly-negotiated agreement. "This issue puts Dade voters at a crossroads. One route leads to progress and the rejuvenation of a blighted area, the other to a real risk of economic decline. So on the question effectively prohibiting Dade from doing anything beneficial with Bicentennial Park, the Herald recommends voting NO" (*Miami Herald* 1996). The referendum was held the day as the 1996 presidential general election, generating high turnout especially from Penelas' Cuban American base. When the referendum was defeated, Penelas publicly thanked his triumvirate for their negotiations on behalf the county. They declined accolades stating they simply acted on the mayor's guidelines to them (Branch 1996).

The Penelas plan in 1996 initially called for a \$235 million subsidy. By 1999, the public cost of the arena was projected to reach \$296 million including the operating subsidy, land purchase, and other infrastructure projects (Finefrock 1999). While the subsidy was higher, the public risk was lowered by the franchise assuming construction costs. This also allowed Penelas to maintain his pledge that no public money would be used to build the arena. The old deal called for the county to pay \$8.5 million and to assume risk for constructing the arena. Under the new deal, the county would subsidize arena operations at \$6.4 million for 30 years, but not technically build it. Instead, the Heat paid for the arena construction, through bonds issued on Wall Street to private investors and with arena revenue. While Basketball Properties, a Heat-owned company manages the facility, the county will eventually own the arena. Under the new deal, the county could also gain a share of revenue from arena profits and gained control over naming rights which were sold to American Airlines.

While the negotiation focused on county government, the City of Miami was also involved in public policy decisions and alternatives. First, the no compete clause between Decoma and MSEA contractually bound Miami officials initially from aiding the pursuit of a new arena. Second, an important part of the agreement involved the county buying waterfront land from the city.

Joe Carollo was crucial to alteration of arena policies. From the time he was elected to city council in 1995, Carollo was an arena proponent and an opponent of plans to keep the Heat in the existing arena. When Carollo was appointed chair of MSEA, he changed its membership and its position on the non-compete clause. He removed MSEA as an obstacle when he “neutered” the sports authority by removing legal counsel Chris Korge and executive director William Perry (Korge, interview, 2001). Korge claimed that his opposition to a new arena was a lawyer’s tactic to support proposed expansion of the current arena. As owners of the Miami Arena, MSEA stood to lose both of its professional sport tenants, as well as concerts, shows, and special events, if a competing facility were built just blocks away.

In 1996, Carollo succeeded Steve Clark, the former county mayor who became mayor of the City of Miami. Carollo negotiated tough with the county over the price of the land for months. When county officials thought a deal was struck for the county to buy the land, they realized they did not have the anticipated money to purchase the entire FEC tract. Carollo put forward a second proposal that they could

buy just the 17 acres needed for the arena project. “Carollo actually came up with the idea of just buying the 17 acres where the arena is now,” said Penelas. “So it was really his idea” (Penelas, interview, 2001). That enabled the city to cooperate in the county’s efforts to keep Miami’s Heat.

An early public policy obstacle was the initial reluctance of state legislators to approve the sales tax rebate for the Heat even though the subsidy had been previously granted for other Florida arena and stadium projects. In 1995, the state legislature failed to grant the sales tax rebate to the Heat, seeing little need to get involved until Miami-Dade leaders started thinking seriously about a new arena. The issue pitted Miami-Dade and Broward legislators against each other during the 1996 legislative session. Broward delegates supported the sales tax rebate in hopes of luring both the Panthers and the Heat to their county, but not for Miami-Dade’s plans. State officials outside of the two counties were not ready to subsidize any arenas until Miami-Dade and Broward legislators cooperated.

Broward officials were able to secure the sales tax rebate for their Sunrise hockey arena, but Heat lobbyists still had to work for their subsidy. An attempt to stop Heat arena funding at the state level came when Rep. Anne Mackenzie (D-Fort Lauderdale) introduced an amendment to the House budget banning state money for port projects on anything but maritime use. That put a wrench in Port Director Lunetta’s plan to use this pot of money for a portion of the county arena contribution. It took a major lobbying effort by the Heat and some South Florida leaders before the state moved to approve the rebate. Broward State Sen. Ken Jenne’s last-minute committee amendment, pushed by Heat lobbyist, Bill Rubin, helped win the team its \$60 million sales tax rebate for the waterfront arena (*Herald*, 5/12/96). When in August 1997, Miami-Dade reached an agreement to buy 17 acres of land for the project instead of the whole parcel, the cruise ship and retail projects were put on hold and the state subsidy was eventually granted.

The main difference between the Penelas plan and the Ridder plan is in Arison’s contribution of \$160 million to cover the construction costs in the final scheme. Under the Penelas plan, the county payments were slightly higher than projected in the first deal, but the subsidy is dedicated to managing and operating the facility rather than constructing it. And, in the end, the county would own the building when the 30-year lease expires.

## Public Opinion

The organized opposition behind the referendum was based on disagreements over locating the arena on waterfront public land dedicated for parks. The voice of opposition members based on the land issue came from circles of activist in support of public parks. But this land use issue was of less concern to the broader public and referendum voters. While county taxpayers were reluctant to support arena subsidy even if these funds were raised from a tax on South Florida tourists, voters approved the revised arena subsidy plan worked by Penelas and Heat representatives in the November 1995 referendum.

Prior to the referendum polls showed a lack of public support for arena subsidies. A *Miami Herald*/NBC 6 poll released in mid-August found about 6 out of 10 voters opposed using tourist taxes to fund an arena. It showed that 62.1% of 613 respondents polled were opposed to arena subsidizes from county tax on hotel rooms with 24.6% in support and 13.2 percent surveyed undecided (Finefrock 1996g).

Another *Herald*/NBC poll in October asked opinions about support for the upcoming referendum question. They found support at 48% and opposition at 36% with 16% undecided. It also found 71% favored a waterfront arena paid with private funds while 20% were opposed and 9% undecided on that issue. Opinions on the land use issue leaned against the waterfront arena. Voters were less opposed to public funding if the arena were built on another site with 46% saying yes, 41% no and 13% unsure (Finefrock 1996j).

The land issue was crucial enough for *Herald* editor Jim Hampton to write a column explaining the newspaper's shift in policy to support port expansion and park development (Hampton 1996). Some speculated that the *Herald* conveniently shifted what had been its policy stance against development on that site since Hampton became editor in 1978 because of Ridder's involvement in the deal and *Herald* real estate interests near the area.<sup>5</sup> Hampton claimed the policy change preceded Ridder's negotiating role. He insisted the newspaper's reasoning was based on the realism that the need to do something to improve the conditions of downtown Miami and the waterfront area outweighed the desire to preserve the open park space which had attracted crime, poverty, and vandals over the years. Hampton argued that at least the arena plan and port expansion would create some public benefit for the city, rather than the status quo

---

<sup>5</sup> The *Miami Herald* headquarter building is located in downtown Miami along Biscayne Boulevard less

which had been neglect for public parks. “Idealism is admirable, but it won’t return this public space to public use. Only realism will” (Hampton 1996).

One month before the referendum the formal political structure changed. Penelas won the executive mayor’s race and was in a position to influence the upcoming referendum. The new mayor had campaigned against the Ridder deal, claiming it was unfair to the county, and Penelas threatened to unleash his media machine against the Heat if Arison did not agree to a new arena deal. “The mayor had a mandate based on the campaign. The current deal on the table was bad for the taxpayers and that was a part of his campaign,” said Brian May. “It was not a good sign to the team. A mayor with the bully pulpit, he held their destiny in his hands. They realized it” (May, interview, 2001). If Arison reworked a deal with Penelas’ support then the mayor could use his electoral momentum to defeat the referendum. Support from Penelas was crucial as the polls were showing the public to be against arena subsidies.

While Penelas’ team worked out a deal with the Heat behind the scenes, the franchise was engaged in a public campaign to sway public opinion. The Heat claimed support was turning their way from the poll they conducted in October. When asked “Should we build a new downtown park with a new arena or not?” the poll of 529 voters showed 45 percent respond no and 43 percent respond yes, with a margin of error of 4.3 percent. David B. Hill, the team’s pollster, stated in a memo that this was evidence the Heat media campaign had made an impact on public opinion<sup>6</sup> (Finefrock 1996i).

Public sentiment was divided on the referendum by the time Penelas’ team worked a deal with the Heat. Prior to the massive media blitz by Penelas and the franchise the final weekend before the vote, the referendum appeared headed for defeat despite the *Herald’s* endorsement and the Heat’s massive public relations campaign. In fact, Diaz-Balart, Penelas and Echevarria recall gathering at Echevarria’s house to watch the referendum results. It was there that they learned that the absentee ballots were coming in at about 60% for the initiative and 40% against it (Echevarria, interview, 2001). After a barrage of media appearances and radio announcements by Penelas and his supporters over the weekend prior to the vote the

---

than a mile north of the proposed arena site.

<sup>6</sup> Some criticized the wording of the questions asked in this poll. The poll did find that nine out of ten respondents reported hearing or seeing something about the Heat arena issue recently but did not ask the question that was actually before the voters about prohibiting the county from spending public money to construct the arena on the waterfront site (Finefrock 1996i).

which had been neglect for public parks. “Idealism is admirable, but it won’t return this public space to public use. Only realism will” (Hampton 1996).

One month before the referendum the formal political structure changed. Penelas won the executive mayor’s race and was in a position to influence the upcoming referendum. The new mayor had campaigned against the Ridder deal, claiming it was unfair to the county, and Penelas threatened to unleash his media machine against the Heat if Arison did not agree to a new arena deal. “The mayor had a mandate based on the campaign. The current deal on the table was bad for the taxpayers and that was a part of his campaign,” said Brian May. “It was not a good sign to the team. A mayor with the bully pulpit, he held their destiny in his hands. They realized it” (May, interview, 2001). If Arison reworked a deal with Penelas’ support then the mayor could use his electoral momentum to defeat the referendum. Support from Penelas was crucial as the polls were showing the public to be against arena subsidies.

While Penelas’ team worked out a deal with the Heat behind the scenes, the franchise was engaged in a public campaign to sway public opinion. The Heat claimed support was turning their way from the poll they conducted in October. When asked “Should we build a new downtown park with a new arena or not?” the poll of 529 voters showed 45 percent respond no and 43 percent respond yes, with a margin of error of 4.3 percent. David B. Hill, the team’s pollster, stated in a memo that this was evidence the Heat media campaign had made an impact on public opinion<sup>6</sup> (Finefrock 1996i).

Public sentiment was divided on the referendum by the time Penelas’ team worked a deal with the Heat. Prior to the massive media blitz by Penelas and the franchise the final weekend before the vote, the referendum appeared headed for defeat despite the *Herald’s* endorsement and the Heat’s massive public relations campaign. In fact, Diaz-Balart, Penelas and Echevarría recall gathering at Echevarría’s house to watch the referendum results. It was there that they learned that the absentee ballots were coming in at about 60% for the initiative and 40% against it (Echevarría, interview, 2001). After a barrage of media appearances and radio announcements by Penelas and his supporters over the weekend prior to the vote the

---

than a mile north of the proposed arena site.

<sup>6</sup> Some criticized the wording of the questions asked in this poll. The poll did find that nine out of ten respondents reported hearing or seeing something about the Heat arena issue recently but did not ask the question that was actually before the voters about prohibiting the county from spending public money to construct the arena on the waterfront site (Finefrock 1996i).

opposition initiative was defeated by 59 percent to 41 percent. It lost among all three major ethnic groups and in all voting areas of the county (Finefrock 1996).

Defeat of the anti-arena referendum ended popular opposition to the deal. Remaining issues dealt with the details of public policy concerning the county land purchase from the city and the environmental studies on the arena site location before arena construction could begin. Those issues were resolved during the policy implementation stage and negotiated mainly by public officials.

### **Summary**

A convergence of circumstances brought about the political conditions for the deal to construct the American Airlines Arena and subsidize its operations. First was the threat by Arison to move the Miami Heat to another area. Then there was the Broward County arena offer that heightened the threat to Miami-Dade leaders. With the Miami-Dade Commission unable to work a subsidy deal they commissioned a community facilitator. Knight-Ridder chairman Ridder crafted a plan with public officials and franchise representatives that was favorable to the Heat and a majority of the Miami-Dade County commissioners who approved in it March 1996.

That deal would have sufficed except for two significant events during the summer of 1996: the referendum put on the ballot by citizen initiative and led by Dan Paul opposed to the arena location; and the election of the new county executive mayor Alex Penelas. The October change in formal political structure coupled with the November referendum produced the change in public policy. Penelas used the circumstances and his electoral mandate to propose a new arrangement that fit his political calculus and made better sense for the county taxpayers.

The difference between how the Ridder plan was negotiated and the reworking of the Penelas plan reflects changing patterns of influence in Miami-Dade policy making. During the 1990s the Hispanic civic and business class came to dominate social and economic institutions in the community while more and more Hispanic political leaders took office. But while there was a “Latinization” of the faces and names of influential community members, their policy goals reflected those of previous power brokers and showed a preference for policies that promote local economic growth (Warren and Moreno 2003). In order to get

arena subsidy support, Arison needed to form a coalition with members of the traditional civic elite and the new Hispanic leadership, and also work to gain public support in the referendum from Hispanic voters throughout the county.

## Chapter V

### Case 3: Tampa-Hillsborough and Ice Palace<sup>1</sup>

The NHL granted the Tampa Bay region an expansion hockey team in December 1990 despite the lack of a professional sports arena ready to host a franchise. Plans were forming for a primarily privately funded arena to be located on land in unincorporated Hillsborough County near the Tampa football stadium. That plan was unsuccessful after a private development group failed to gain public subsidy support from county commissioners. This triggered a policy window for local business leaders to work with county and city officials to create plans for a downtown Tampa arena and to secure public subsidies for carrying out their policy decisions. The Ice Palace arena opened in 1996 as home to the Tampa Bay Lightning. It was the outcome of progressive policy decisions and significant cooperation between local government officials and commercial sector leaders.

#### Background

On the Florida Gulf Coast rests the Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg-Clearwater metropolitan area. The Tampa Bay area consists of core cities Tampa and St. Petersburg and their respective counties, Hillsborough and Pinellas. The Tampa-Hillsborough region enjoyed great economic and population growth through the twentieth century. Tampa's early economic, political and cultural development was influenced by the cigar industry. Further industrial growth fueled the area. Florida's west coast along the Gulf of Mexico benefited from federal funding throughout the twentieth century especially with ship building contracts, use of the McDill Air Force Base, and federal subsidies for housing and other development projects after World War II (Kerstein 2001). Growth politics turned the fortunes of the Tampa metropolitan region. This translated into business influence in local politics and the establishment of elite rule during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s more progressive politics and creative public policy making emerged. Two examples of innovative public policy processes are demonstrated in the political

---

<sup>1</sup> The downtown Tampa arena was originally known as the Ice Palace. The naming rights were purchased by the company that owns the *St. Petersburg Times* and the facility was renamed St. Pete Times

circumstances surrounding the decision to subsidize an arena, the Tampa Ice Palace, and later a new stadium, Raymond James Stadium.

Growth in the U.S. Sunbelt brought people, jobs, and ice to the southern states. In December 1989, the National Hockey League (NHL) announced a strategy to expand from 21 to 28 teams by 2000 and a goal of opening in southern and western markets. The chance to land another professional team for the Tampa Bay metropolitan area appealed to some civic and political leaders seeing an opportunity to raise the region's profile through sports growth especially with the failure to bring baseball to the area. Two main groups of investors competed: the Tampa Bay Hockey Group, represented by NHL Hall of Fame player Phil Esposito and including local attorney Henry Paul and former hockey executive Mel Lowell, and a group of Detroit-based investors with Jim Rutherford, a former NHL goalie, representing the Compuware Computer Corp. (Stanley 1998).

The granting of an NHL expansion franchise was typically linked to a host region having a place to play hockey, or at least an agreement for arena construction. The Tampa-St. Petersburg area lacked an arena dedicated to hosting professional hockey. The existing football stadium, built by county, city, state and sports authority officials in the 1960s, sat near Dale Mabry Highway, a main road intersecting the Tampa Bay area in unincorporated Hillsborough County just miles from downtown Tampa. In the 1980s, St. Petersburg leaders built a domed stadium facility to attract baseball to their city, pre-empting efforts by a private group trying to lure professional baseball to Tampa (Adelman 1992). Professional basketball was awarded to Orlando in 1989, leaving hockey as the last chance for Tampa-Hillsborough sports proponents. Tampa Coliseum Inc. (TCI), consisting of some of the people that previously tried to build a baseball park on land near the football stadium site, proposed privately financing an arena at the same location on land owned by the Tampa Sports Authority (TSA) in October 1990. The focus of TCI representatives shifted to hockey after the St. Petersburg facility was built and they proposed partially financing an arena at Dale Mabry Highway stadium site. Lacking subsidy support from county officials, TCI's plan eventually failed.

---

Forum in 2000. For purposes of this study I refer to the Ice Palace (IP), the arena name during my research.

Needing a place to play if they won expansion teams, both Esposito and Rutherford negotiated temporary leases at St. Petersburg's Suncoast Dome in May 1990. That facility sat empty while leaders tried to lure Major League Baseball to town. Fortunately for St. Petersburg officials the multipurpose facility they built could be converted to ice and court surfaces. But Esposito's talks with city officials stopped in June and the legendary hockey player stated that baseball was the priority for the St. Petersburg dome (Wilson 1990). St. Petersburg city leaders continued pursuing hockey and reached a lease agreement in August with the representatives of Compuware and facility officials prior to an NHL team being awarded.

The NHL granted Tampa Bay and Ottawa expansion franchises in December 1990. League officials selected the Tampa Bay Hockey Group based on Esposito's presentation, strong backing by Mayor Sandy Freedman and her endorsement of Tampa's enthusiasm for hockey and the region's demographic base (Stanley 1998). "Hockey was a fluke," recalled Freedman, who spoke to the expansion panel on Tampa's behalf. "I never dreamed we would get it," (Freedman, interview, 2001). Tampa did not have a new arena in place, just TCI's stadium site arena plan and three days earlier county commissioners had voted against granting financial subsidies to the TCI plan. Lacking a new arena or solid plans for one, Esposito's Tampa Bay Lightning played their first season in Tampa's 10,400-seat Exposition Hall, an old fairgrounds facility, before playing the next three seasons in St Petersburg's 28,000-seat temporarily renamed ThunderDome while seeking subsidies for building a new facility.

TCI tried to secure private financing for a stadium site arena but their lease expired in May 1993. This placed the arena subsidy issue on the agenda of local public and private leaders if they wanted to bring the team to the Tampa side of the metropolitan region, and ultimately keep the struggling franchise from moving to another area. Also, a policy path opened for county and city officials and commercial leaders to proceed with an alternative plan for an arena located in downtown Tampa. Political and civic leaders were planning policy options for a downtown-based arena in private meetings for months. County and city officials negotiated a subsidy agreement and plan to secure downtown land with significant input from the commercial and civic sector. In November 1993, Lightning officials announced an agreement for the downtown Ice Palace plan with county, city, and state financial subsidies and commercial support in land acquisition.

About 66% of the \$153 million arena costs were publicly supported with a variety of city, county, and state subsidies. “At the time it was a way to get it accomplished without taxing the people,” said former Hillsborough County commissioner Joe Chillura, a county representative to the Tampa Sports Authority at the time (Chillura, interview, 2002). Less than three years later, on October 20, 1996, the 19,500-seat arena opened centered between the Florida Aquarium and Tampa Convention Center on the Garrison Channel. Under the public-private partnership, Lightning Partners, Ltd., the entity that owns the team, funded the remaining arena costs.

Examination of the interaction between the variables in the failed TCI stadium site arena plan and the successful downtown Ice Palace subsidy decision provides insight into significance of each variable in this case. This provides data for a case analysis on the politics of sports facility subsidy decisions, in general, and the structure of power and political influence, more specifically, in Tampa Bay politics.

### **Formal Political Structure**

Hillsborough County and the City of Tampa were the two primary political structures involved in both the Tampa Bay arena subsidy decisions. The Tampa Sports Authority (TSA) owned the stadium site land leased to TCI. Given the charge of the sports authority, TSA officials were involved in planning for both the TCI plan and the Ice Palace policies. The legislature also awarded the state sales tax rebate and issued bonds to subsidize some downtown arena construction costs. Under the Ice Palace plan, the arena is located in city limits and is owned by the sports authority.

The sports authority is an independent special district created in 1965 by the Florida Legislature and governed by an 11-member Board. These seats are filled by four City of Tampa residents appointed by the mayor and city council, four Hillsborough County residents selected by the BOCC, one county resident appointed by the governor, and two ex-officio members, one each from the city council and the county commission. A professional administrative staff handles the day-to-day operations of the TSA (<http://www.tampasportsauthority.com/tsa/board.htm>, May 8, 2002).

The formal political structures of Hillsborough County and the City of Tampa most impacted the stadium site and the Ice Palace arena subsidy decision outcomes. Hillsborough County includes three

municipalities, Plant City, Temple Terrace, and Tampa, the central city of the Hillsborough-Tampa area in addition to CC square miles of unincorporated land. County government consists of a seven member Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) with four seats elected from single-member districts and three elected at-large countywide. Individual county commissioners serve on various boards, authorities, and commissions including the sports authority. (<http://www.hillsboroughcounty.org/bocc/home.html>, 4May2000). Commissioners select a chair who votes as a members of the commission, but enjoys others resources that can wield influence with colleagues on the board as well as with civic and commercial leaders.

The BOCC legislates county policy, which is implemented by a Board-appointed professional County Administrator and 4200 administrative staff. The administrator is the chief executive officer of the county and is responsible for carrying out the Board's actions (<http://www.hillsboroughcounty.org/administrator/home.html>, 4May2000). Dan Kleman has served as County Administrator since November 1994. Prior to Kleman, Fred Karl was the administrator since 1990. Karl was a lead county negotiator for the downtown hockey arena.

A mayor and a seven-member city council govern the City of Tampa. The 1974 Revised Charter of the City of Tampa created seven City Council seats elected for four-year terms. The mayor, with a two term limit, is elected at-large separately from the Council whose members for Districts #1, #2, and #3 are elected at-large and those from Districts #4 through #7 are elected in individual districts. Council members serve individually on a number of local boards and agencies including the sports authority (<http://www.ci.tampa.fl.us/>, 4May 2000).

Tampa has a strong mayor-council political structure where the mayor has veto power over the city council. The city's chief executive officer guides and approves the annual budget, fulfills administrative functions, directs department heads, and acts as a public spokesman for the city (<http://www.ci.tampa.fl.us/>, 4May 2000). As a city ambassador, the Tampa mayor can expand their influence over issues before the city and county by advocating certain issues and increasing public support for initiatives they back. Tampa's mayors have actively advocated both downtown development and regional growth projects over the years

often in concert with local business interests (Kerstein 2001). Similar to other Sunbelt city mayors they are civic boosters and actively pursue commercial and civic investments for their cities (Mormino 1983).

Tampa politics and city government was dominated in the early twentieth century by white, male politicians aligned with downtown business interests (Kerstein 2001; Mormino 1983). By mid-century, a shifting population provided access for Hispanic political leaders as evidenced by the election of Nick Nuccio (1956-59; 1963-67) as Tampa's first Hispanic mayor in 1955. Nuccio, a charismatic career politician, ruled Tampa with an interest in growth. He worked with business leaders in the civic Committee of 100 to spur urban renewal by using federal money to buy downtown land and help fund a convention center, parking facilities and a library. Other growth initiatives during this period of growth focused on developing education, tourism and sports. Local leaders established the University of South Florida (USF), expanded the airport, and constructed a community football stadium. The stadium, initially proposed by a state legislator to be home to the University of Tampa team, also attracted professional football to Tampa Bay (Kerstein, 2001; Mormino 1983).

Nuccio was defeated by Dick Greco, Jr. (1968-73; 1996-2003), a young, ambitious mayor with big ideas. "Greco exemplified the new mood of city hall: Tampa would be governed by businessmen; what was good for business was good for Tampa" (Mormino 1983, 146). Greco was a spokesman and a salesman for Tampa at a time of rapid population growth in the metropolitan area which brought increased federal funding. Greco promoted projects against opponents of growth and development. "There are always people for and against any major project no matter what it is," said Greco. "When we built the airport 30-some years ago, people thought that was a frivolous project. They were afraid to do it. When we built the Crosstown expressway, some said it would never be used; that it was ridiculous," recalled the mayor about these major projects during his first administration (Greco, interview, 2002).

The business-friendly mood created at city hall under Greco continued in to the next decade. "His successors, William Poe (1974-1979) and Roberto Martinez (1979-86), both fit the business-professional image cast by Greco" (Mormino 1983, 146). Poe, a wealthy local lawyer who won a seven-candidate race for mayor, presided over a loosely organized growth-oriented regime linked to the business and civic communities. His successor, Bob Martinez, also formed alliances with local economic elites. The Spanish-

American mayor and future Florida governor patterned his administration after a corporate regime, as he and local officials worked closely with business interests and supported downtown development projects including a performing arts facility and a convention center project (Kerstein 2001).

Historically city politics and the benefits of growth policies excluded part of the Tampa community, most particularly the African-American community. The Black population in Tampa was less successful in political mobilization and electoral incorporation than Hispanics, but continuing change in the demographics of Tampa-Hillsborough gave rise to groups interested in social policies to challenge the pro-growth agenda. Neighborhood-based interests, anti-growth groups and pro-environment groups became more viable actors through the 1980s. Women's groups also played a more prominent role after decades of being denied participation in Tampa politics. One outcome of the shifting demographics was the election of Sandy Freedman (1986-1995) as Tampa's first female mayor.

This changing political environment impacted the relationship between the mayor's office and members of the local business elite. From the 1950s through the 1970s, analysts could identify certain power brokers as members of Tampa's governing coalitions, and they tended to come from the business and corporate sectors (Koenig 1990; Mormino 1983). In the 1980s, however, the commercial elite ceased to form a cohesive governing coalition and there was no identifiable regime governing Tampa politics (Kerstein 2001). Anti-growth and environmental groups surfaced to challenge development policy decisions, placing limits on the ability of city and county leaders to exhibit leadership on large public works projects. As a result, Tampa's corporate regime seen in previous administrations was replaced by one accommodating issues beyond growth interests. Freedman's administration, for example, confronted issues of racial, gender and neighborhood inclusion in politics.

This also increased competition between city and county politics following a pattern seen in other Sunbelt communities that shifted from rule by a commercial-elite regime to a more progressive regime. As the county population and tax base grew, so did the clout of county politicians. The increase in the political influence of administrators and commissioners in the 1970s and 1980s created conflicts with Tampa mayors (Kerstein 2001). But Mayor Freedman retained a high level of influence during her time in office despite the increase in county influence, a testament to the structural power of the office. "The leadership in the

community and the region is coming from the city. Part of that is structural,” said City Council Member Linda Saul-Sena, who served with Freedman and Greco. “We have a strong-mayor form of government which allows for a crisper, clearer voice, where they (BOCC) have seven people and competing interests who all have different takes on things” (Saul-Sena, interview, 2002).

Mayor Freedman played a valuable role in advocating downtown development and solidifying agreement on the arena deal. Initially, she publicly supported the TCI stadium site plan and the city formally approved the stadium site agreement between TCI and the TSA. But county commissioners voted against subsidizing TCI’s plan in December 1993. After TCI’s time expired a path opened for support of a downtown arena. But cooperation was needed between county and city officials, as well as from civic and business leaders to develop and implement an arena subsidy plan. Hillsborough commissioner Ed Turanchik initially proposed the arena idea with proponents of downtown development, but he lacked the mayor’s political influence to pursue negotiations with multiple parties.

When negotiations hit an impasse, Freedman called together county officials, commercial leaders, and franchise representatives to finalize the arena land and financing plans. She could do so not by the formal strength of her strong mayor’s office, but through her informal clout as Tampa’s mayor. Her influence was remarkable given the lack of empowerment of women in Tampa Bay through most of the twentieth century (Kerstein 2001). The ability of the mayor to rally support from the informal power sector was based on a formula similar to that employed by previous Tampa mayors, an alliance with leaders of the downtown commercial and corporate community.

### **Informal Sector**

Business and civic community members played an important role in the Tampa Coliseum Inc. (TCI) stadium site plan and the planning of the downtown arena. The business community supported Tampa’s bid to bring professional hockey to Tampa Bay and the first arena plans emerged from a private sector group that wanted to develop an arena on the stadium site, but lacked support from members of the greater business community. After the failure of TCI’s plans, representatives of prominent downtown

business formulated the downtown arena alternative and Tampa Bay corporate interests lent significant support to the urban arena subsidy plan.

A tradition of informal sector involvement in governing regimes can be traced to the early days of Tampa politics but commercial-elite influence peaked in the post-World War II period (Mormino 1983). In the 1950s, Tampa civic leaders sensing that they were losing the race to recruit business and industry to cities like Atlanta, Birmingham, Chattanooga, and Jacksonville, created through the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce a Committee of 100 - members would pay an additional \$100 in dues - to raise marketing and recruitment money and pursue growth policies (Kerstein 2001). The significant private interests during the 1950s and 1960s linked to the Committee of 100 were associated with the banking industry, especially with Lykes Brothers, the *Tampa Tribune* and the utility companies (Kerstein 2001; Mormino 1983).

During the 1970s and 1980s members of Tampa's informal sector consisted of executives representing downtown business interests like Tampa Electric Company's (TECO) H.L. Culbreath, GTE executives, and developers with the Beneficial Corporation, the company that produced the billion dollar Harbour Island downtown development project in the 1980s (Koenig et. al.1990; Mormino 1983). In the 1970s Chamber activists formed a task force to pursue an NHL franchise. Its steering committee included Mayor Greco, sports authority officials, banking executives, and *Tampa Tribune* sports editor, Tom McEwen. By the 1980s, developers interested in Tampa's suburban West Shore business district shifted the focus of civic institutions, splitting Tampa Bay's informal power structure and decreasing the influence of the business community. While Tampa's traditional governing coalition focused on the city and downtown development, the suburban developers gained influence with the county government and benefited from public expenditures on development projects (Kerstein 2001).

By the 1990s, when the arena issue surfaced on the policy agenda, there was a decentralization of influence within the informal power structure. The suburban stadium site arena was proposed by TCI, the private sports-based group that included local legal, civic, and commercial interests that first tried to lure professional baseball and then hockey to Tampa Bay. After St. Petersburg built a ballpark to attract baseball, TCI's focus shifted to privately financing an arena to support a hockey bid (Andelman 1992).

When TCI's plan failed, another faction of business leaders participated in talks with city and county officials to secure downtown land and subsidy policies for the Ice Palace. This second group of civic players included members of the Tampa Development Partnership, a non-profit group dedicated to downtown projects, the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce, and successors to the old guard commercial leaders at TECO and Beneficial Corporation. These downtown development advocates were influential in planning and implementing subsidy policy decisions for the Ice Palace arena.

Tampa-Hillsborough's local political culture is partly shaped by the history of its founding population of whites and African Americans rooted in the culture of the U.S. south. "A traditionalist social class colored Tampa's political environment from the Civil War until World War II" (Mormino 1983, 142). Some of the Black population that suffered from the elite white, male dominance of Tampa Bay politics descended from slaves families. As earlier noted women also lacked political and social incorporation for much of Tampa's history (Kerstein 2001; Koenig et. al. 1990).

From about the 1880s to 1920s, a commercial-elite regime consisting of Anglo males dominated Tampa as the city and surrounding Hillsborough area experienced rapid growth. Much of this growth came from waves of Italian, Spanish and Cuban immigrants, three groups referred to collectively in Tampa as Latinos, who migrated to invest and work in the cigar industry and other ventures. As a result, the established white business elite were outnumbered in society. "By 1900, three-quarters of Tampa's 15,839 inhabitants claimed Latin status or Afro-American background" (Mormino, 1983, 139). As the Latino population increased, they made electoral gains on the city council. Since many Latinos were not citizens or failed to register to vote, their opportunities for political incorporation were limited.

Still, various rival commercial elite factions informally ruled Tampa politics for most of the twentieth century (Kerstein 2001). These business interests benefited from the opportunities in a growing metropolitan area, and secured their place as a privileged class of rulers through involvement in civic affairs. At times, reformers emerged to challenge this system, and one reform effort led to charter changes in 1927 that switched the five member at-large City Commission to a nine member Board of Representatives. Yet no coherent reform movement mobilized to challenge Tampa's ruling commercial interests through the post-World War II period (Kerstein 1999; Mormino 1983).

In the 1950s and 1960s, a relatively stable development-oriented regime of political and business leaders formed (Kerstein 1999). Some factors accounting for the emergence of a commercial-elite regime include rapid population growth especially in the Hillsborough unincorporated areas, a revived Chamber of Commerce, the rise of new influential community leaders, the civic and political maturity of second and third generation Latinos, and an increase in federal funds for downtown development (Mormino 1983; Kerstein 2001). As Latinos were elected to more seats on the city and county boards the dominance of the commercial governing coalition was challenged. The election of Nuccio brought a growth-oriented regime in coalition with commercial interests but not a cohesive alliance with the business community due to broader political conflicts within city politics (Kerstein 1999).

While the Tampa Bay area grew economically, it lacked a major source of the perceived big league city image: professional sports. In 1965, state officials established the Tampa Sports Authority (TSA) to help local leaders pursue football and other professional and amateur sports teams and events for the Tampa Bay region. The TSA built Tampa Stadium with public subsidies from the county, city and state within two years. The original stadium, popularly referred to as “The Sombrero” due to its shape, hosted the USF college football team until the NFL granted Tampa Bay an expansion franchise and the Tampa Bay Buccaneers began playing there in 1976.

One study of Sunbelt cities suggests Tampa citizens lacked a common identity and a community image before professional football. “What finally generated both local pride and national identity, both sociologists and businessmen agree, was big-league sports” (Mormino 1983, 151). Landing the Buccaneers was a major accomplishment for Tampa Bay civic boosters. Business leaders realized an enhanced city image provided chances to capitalize on additional economic development. The metropolitan area grew as a tourist destination, entertainment district, and television market, and it was generally agreed that professional sports enhanced that portfolio. “As evidence of Tampa’s arrival as a Sunbelt power, the NFL selected Tampa as the 1984 Super Bowl site” (Mormino 1983, 151). With professional football, Tampa emerged as a major American city (Greco, interview, 2002; Levy, interview, 2002).

Though the Buccaneers frequently lost on the field in their first two decades of existence, Tampa and St. Petersburg civic leaders hoped to host additional professional sports franchises and further enhance

the Tampa Bay region's profile. St. Petersburg city commissioners took the next step when they decided in 1982 to build a baseball park despite warnings from the commissioner of Major League Baseball (MLB) that building the facility would not guarantee an expansion franchise. St. Petersburg's political and civic leaders sought to outshine its more popular neighbor, Tampa, another candidate city for baseball, and officials proceeded to subsidize financial costs of construction for the Florida Suncoast Dome, completed in 1990. A year later, professional baseball instead selected Miami and Denver for expansion. Subsequently, several MLB teams pondered moving to St. Petersburg and actually used the Florida facility to threaten officials in their own cities for publicly subsidized ballparks (Cagen and DeMuse; Rosentraub 1999).<sup>2</sup> St. Petersburg ultimately landed a franchise in 1996, ironically the team was named the Tampa Bay Devil Rays (Andelman 1992).

After securing stadium sports, football and baseball, Tampa Bay civic community professional sports proponents turned their attention to arena-based sports. Tampa leaders pursued professional basketball, but the National Basketball Association (NBA) expanded to Miami and Orlando where arena plans were already in place. That left ice hockey, an unusual sport for the sunshine state, but many northerners have migrated from the Frostbelt to Florida and economics convinced NHL commissioner Gary Bettman to pursue Sunbelt markets in the 1990s. Civic boosters and Tampa's mayor convincingly touted Tampa Bay's demographics as fit for professional hockey. "The South has been very supportive of hockey," Bettman said while attending a groundbreaking ceremony for TCI's unsuccessful stadium site arena plan. "The attendance numbers in this market have proved hockey will work here" (Clark 1994).

Having plans for building an arena was one way to convince NHL officials to select Tampa Bay, but competition over both the location and financing plans plagued arena subsidy policy discussions from the outset. When Tampa Bay was awarded the Lightning despite the absence of a professional quality arena or a solid plan for one, the team initially played in the Exposition Hall, and then in St. Petersburg's domed facility, as franchise officials sought subsidy support from private and public leaders for a new arena. Competition over the arena location served as an obstacle to arena proponents in forming a solid coalition

---

<sup>2</sup> MLB teams from Chicago, San Francisco and Seattle each public announced intentions to move

and securing arena construction subsidies. A Lightning consultant study found that eight of 15 Tampa Bay population centers were closer to downtown Tampa than to the stadium site or to downtown St. Petersburg. Some team executives alternatively favored a St. Petersburg facility that would likely be built quicker and cost less than a downtown Tampa arena (Danielson 1996).

There was initial civic community support for or at least low opposition to TCI's proposal to build an arena on the stadium site. "In general, there was a big push to go to the (Tampa Sports Authority) site," said Lightning Governor David LeFevre. "The underlying philosophy was at that time that if you're going to build a sports building, build it near the other big sports building" (Danielson 1996). TCI and TSA agreed to a 40-year lease on the property and franchise officials gave support for a stadium site arena in late 1989. But Lightning owners and the team representatives lacked commercial ties to the Tampa Bay area. The owners were unknown to the civic community and lacked influence with the county commission. Without county subsidy support, or the backing of local banking interests, TCI's failure by March 1993 to implement the stadium site plan placed the possibility of a downtown arena on the policy agenda.

An opportunity window opened for downtown Tampa business interests and political leaders to advocate a downtown arena that would serve as a catalyst for urban development. Downtown site proponents included interests similar to earlier Tampa commercial-elite regimes. Members of the Tampa Downtown Development Partnership (DDP) and the Chamber of Commerce's Committee of 100 cooperated with executives from major local companies in support of a downtown arena plan that could be quickly implemented. DDP president Jim Cloar steered support from TECO executives Tim Guzzle and Jim Kostoryz, and Finn Casperson, CEO of Beneficial Corporation to work with public officials (Danielson 1996; Freedman, interview, 2001). These business and community leaders provided an informal sector from planning arena policy that the mayor and county manager could then present to their constituencies and formal political structures to support subsidy decisions. The informal leaders provided the base for gathering the land from various owners to facilitate the zoning process. The private-public partnership

---

to St. Petersburg before officials in those cities supported subsidy policies for new ballparks.

efforts of Tampa Bay commercial and civic leaders benefited the interests of arena proponents, including the Lightning owners that lacked connections in the Tampa-Hillsborough political community.

### **Subsidy Proponents**

The two main investment groups that competed for a professional hockey franchise were the primary proponents for an arena in the Tampa Bay area. Phil Esposito and Jim Rutherford, former NHL players and the two group representatives knew their expansion applications would be strengthened with a solid plan for building a new place to play hockey in Tampa Bay. They needed to enlist support from public and private officials for policies producing a new arena in the metropolitan area. Initially, Esposito's group agreed with the TSA to TCI's stadium site plan, while Rutherford's people preferred a St. Petersburg location. After Esposito's group was awarded the team, and the TCI plan failed to materialize, members of the business establishment worked with franchise representatives and city and county officials to craft the plan for a majority publicly-subsidized arena to permanently locate the Lightning in downtown Tampa.

The Tampa Bay Hockey Group (TBHG) included Esposito, Tampa attorney Henry Paul, and Mel Lowell, a Tampa businessman and former NHL New York Rangers executive. During the summer of 1990 TBHG announced an arena plan based on agreements with the sports authority and private developers, Spectacor Management Group, a noted Philadelphia-based sports facility development firm, that committed to fund \$60 million, or about two-thirds of arena construction costs. Another \$30 million in public sector subsidies was needed to support their plan. But when the TBHG lost support from their main investor, the Pritzker family, the owners of Hyatt Hotels, they also lost interest from Spectacor Management (Stanley 1998).

Esposito and Paul found new financial backers for the franchise through a chance meeting with Paul's father, baseball executive Gabe Paul, and New York Yankee owner and businessman George Steinbrenner at a Tampa hotel owned by Steinbrenner. It was suggested they invite Japanese businessman Tak Kojima to the upcoming hockey exhibition during his Tampa visit. Efforts to market hockey to the Tampa Bay community flourished as a result of the exhibition game, sponsored by TBHG on September 19, 1990. A game between the Pittsburgh Penguins and Los Angeles Kings drew an NHL-record crowd,

25,581, to St. Petersburg's Suncoast Dome (Mayer 1998). The spectacle so impressed Kojima, the owner of Nippon Meat Packers, a Japanese baseball team, that he invested \$2 million in the TBHG. "His eyes just about popped out of his head," said Lowell (Stanley 1998). But more sources were needed to replace the Pritzker's planned investment. Kojima asked his New York-based attorney, David LeFevre, to find support. LeFevre contacted his clients and found additional Japanese-based business interests to invest in TBHG upon a visit to Japan with Esposito and Lowell.

Other early arena proponents included sports authority members who wanted to facilitate an arena deal to ensure NHL expansion to Tampa Bay. The sports authority passed a resolution vigorously supporting the pursuit of professional sports for the region, and they already owned the stadium site land on which TCI planned to build the arena. "We're not far enough along to see if it makes economic sense," TSA vice chairman Johnny Adcock said. "But if it does, we're going to bend over backward to bring professional hockey to the area" (Wilson 1990).

TCI, headed by Tampa lawyer Jim Cusack and Chicago sports consultant Marc Ganis, announced a plan on October 31, 1990 to privately fund an arena near the Tampa football stadium. Similar to the Spectacor plan, TCI would finance two-thirds of construction costs and seek public subsidies for the remaining costs. In June 1991, Lightning officials signed a 40-year lease with TCI for an arena on the TSA stadium site. TCI hoped to secure a \$60 million loan from Fuji Bank and lobby county, city and state officials for another \$30 million in subsidies (Mayer 1998). TCI also held the first of several construction groundbreaking and collected seat deposits in advance of Tampa Bay being awarded a franchise. TCI appeared to have allies on the sports authority and with the Lightning, but they lacked support from county officials for the subsidy plan.

County commissioners lacked confidence in the arena project and sacked TCI's plans. They were reluctant to support a group that lacked experience in building sports facilities. Some including newly-elected commissioners Ed Turanchik and Joe Chillura preferred a downtown arena and were dissatisfied with the proposed stadium site location. TSA representatives pressured the BOCC to support an arena subsidy bond proposal but county officials were skeptical of a deal perceived as not being worth "the risk-to-reward ratio," according to an assistant county administrator (Orsi and Stevenson 1990).

On December 3, 1990, Hillsborough commissioners refused by a 5-2 vote to subsidize \$30 million of the arena costs. Commissioners Turanchik, Pam Iorio, Sylvia Kimbell, Jan Platt and Jim Selvey opposed the measure. Phyllis Busanky and Joe Chillura supported the subsidy plan, citing the ability of hockey to help the economy. Opponents criticized the plan as being hastily arranged and not based on a thorough analysis of the Tampa Bay hockey market. Turanchik disputed the wisdom of locating the arena at the stadium site. The Monday night special meeting lasted nearly five hours, as many of the 40 residents present spoke against arena subsidies (Stevenson, Duryea, and Tobin 1990).

The next day, TCI announced that Fuji Bank agreed to finance the entire project. Cusak and Ganis later claimed the bank was always willing to fund the full project, but TCI tried for public subsidies in order to qualify for government bonds with favorable interest rates. They suggested public subsidies would be a signal to NHL officials of credible community support for a Tampa Bay team. After hearing this news, Turanchik said, "I think it has doomed any prospect in the near future of any sports group ever having a ghost of a chance for public assistance for any future sports facility" (Orsi, Stevenson, and Tobin 1990).

Three days after the commission vote against TCI subsidies, NHL officials announced that Tampa Bay was granted an NHL franchise. The TBHG, aided by Esposito's personal reputation around the league and his professional presentation skills, was awarded the expansion team. Mayor Freedman, who spoke to league officials about Tampa's local demographics and enthusiasm for hockey, welcomed the news. She held an impromptu party in her office and wore a Lightning jersey. "This is a great Christmas present for the community. And I have every confidence our new team will prove to be a great success," she said (Stanley 1998). Tampa Bay boosters welcomed hockey but the team still needed a place to play. The mayor preferred a downtown arena but initially supported TCI's stadium site plan. She did not think there was enough time for zoning reviews and infrastructure improvements downtown to meet the Lightning timetable for a new arena (Freedman, interview, 2001).

The TBHG won the bid but their foreign ownership group faced turmoil and missed repeated payment deadlines for installments of the \$50 million expansion fee. There was little public knowledge about the Japanese-based investors. The principal owners neither visited Tampa nor met with NHL officials prior to the team being awarded. Esposito's personal credit rating with league officials and a basic business

background check on the Japanese owners satisfied the other league owners (Stanley 1998). “I met a number of the Japanese folks, but only met the big guy once,” said Freedman. “I actually was concerned about their ability at one point. One of the big accounting firms sent someone to Japan and checked them out” (Freedman, interview, 2001).

Ground was ceremonially broken on the stadium site with NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman in March 1991, despite TCI’s problems in securing financing. Although the Lightning signed a 40-year lease agreement with TCI they did not help the private group secure arena financing. With uncertainty surrounding TCI’s proposal, Esposito negotiated with officials from both Exposition Hall and the Suncoast Dome for the Lightning opening season. Team officials had hoped to be in a new arena when the franchise debuted in 1996. Instead, the team played its inaugural season at the old fairgrounds, referred to by one team official as a “livestock pavilion” (Stanley 1998).

Two years later in March 1993, TCI’s deadline to secure a financial plan passed. The Lightning lacked plans for a permanent home when in July 1993 they announced a two-year deal with St. Petersburg officials for the team to play in the Suncoast Dome and to rename it the ThunderDome. This presented a potential policy problem for Tampa and Hillsborough officials facing the threat of permanently losing the Lightning to St. Petersburg. The passing of the TCI deadline and the lack of an alternative arena plan placed uncertainty over the future of the Tampa Bay franchise from March through November 1993 (Danielson 1996).

Previously, public and private leaders had quietly begun building support for a downtown arena partnership with public subsidies. County commissioner Turanchik was an early proponent for placing the arena downtown. “This all started in October 1991 when I took a little map of downtown to lunch with Ted DeLaVergne,” Turanchik said (Scherberger and Danielson 1993). DeLaVergne was the outgoing chairman of the DDP. He directed Turanchik to the incoming chairman, Jim Kostoryz, president of TECO Properties and Jim Cloar, the new president. Turanchik also called LeFevre in New York, attempting to convince the Lightning representative to buy in to the plan and raise support for a downtown arena. Two years of talks produced the Ice Palace decision.

With the absence of team owners from the local community it was important for franchise representatives to develop a good rapport with the local leaders. LeFevre and Esposito remained the main proponents and public spokesmen for team interests. LeFevre led negotiations for the Lightning and acted as liaison between the local community and the Japanese investors. “Phil (Esposito) was always great to deal with, but he was pushed aside when LeFavre came in,” Freedman recalled. “He (LeFavre) was difficult to deal with, although he became a friend. He is a good business man and negotiator” (Freedman, interview, 2001).

Mayor Freedman initially supported the stadium site plan and Tampa’s city council endorsed the TCI subsidy proposal that county commissioners rejected in December 1990. As TCI’s deadline for finding financing neared, Freedman appointed Dr. James Pappas, Dean of the University of South Florida College of Business Administration, to mediate negotiations between TCI and team officials. The mayor set an April 10, 1992 deadline that passed without an agreement. “I think I’ve certainly been patient and, most especially, this community has been patient,” she said that June. “Now, we’re at the end of the line with patience” (Cutter et. al. 1992). City support for TCI ended. “But finally their contract ended, and the Downtown Partnership people got involved to bring it downtown,” said Freedman (Freedman, interview, 2001).

Prompted by proponents of a downtown arena plan Freedman turned attention to promoting policy in support of the Ice Palace. “Historically, if the mayor stands up and does something, the county takes a hands-off approach,” Freedman said (Scherberger and Danielson 1993). The mayor and budget director were willing to commit about \$20 million to an arena, revenue that would come from a parking tax. Freedman lowered expectations for city participation early in the negotiations in order to get greater county involvement in the project.

As support from county officials for the downtown plan increased so did the mayor’s participation. Her leadership was needed to shepherd the arena subsidy policy plans. “One of my main goals at the very onset was to get the county involved because the city could not do it alone, and couldn’t do very much in the first place,” recalled Freedman. “Plus it was time for the county - because most of the people who would

attend live in Hillsborough County, outside the incorporated area - I thought it was time for them to get involved” (Freedman, interview, 2001).

To spur negotiations Mayor Freedman arranged a strategy session on August 11, 1993 at the Harbour Island Hotel. The dinner meeting brought LeFevre and Lightning Vice President Chris Phillips together with Beneficial Corporation’s Casperson, DDP President Cloar, Florida NationsBank President Gene Taylor, former TECO Chairman H.L. Culbreath, lawyer C.G. David Kerr, TSA Chairman Mandell Shimberg, County Administrator Fred Karl and city staff members to discuss the details of downtown arena subsidy policies (Scherberger 1993b). This method of policy leadership through private meetings followed the pattern of growth-oriented regimes where the mayor summons local business and public leaders for private meetings on major development projects (Kerstein 2001).

There were just a million things flying around and we were just spinning our wheels. So I decided that the only way we could ever get something going was if I brought all of the interested parties together. And breaking bread is often a good way to get people to let their hair down a little bit. So I invited everybody to that dinner at Harbor Island, at Mr. Casperson’s hotel actually. I did not invite (Commissioner) Turanchik because the county representative is the County Administrator. Turanchik was very interested in a downtown arena, and was upset, but he was technically not invited, or else you would have (to have invited) other people (Freedman, interview, 2001).

The downtown arena proponents faced two main obstacles. The first was to assemble ownership of several adjacent land parcels at the proposed downtown site. The second concerned financing the arena within a tight construction timetable. The team wanted the arena ready for the 1995-96 season. The key proponent for securing the land was developer Casperson (Stanley 1998). An earlier dinner meeting at the Harbour Island hotel between Casperson and LeFevre set the stage for a greater commitment from Casperson to help assemble the land. Casperson arranged to buy all of the tracts of land needed for the arena project and resell them to the city so that the city and team did not have to negotiate with multiple land owners. “He was interested in revitalization of downtown. And he is a good citizen even though he didn’t live there,” said Freedman. “So I asked Mr. Casperson if he would help to aggregate the land, because with so many multiple ownership parcels, if government got involved, it would never happen. Plus we did not have the money to do it. He really was the critical player in the whole thing, I don’t think we could have put it together if Finn didn’t get the land together” (Freedman, interview, 2001).

The public and private leaders negotiated a package to take to their colleagues in the county and city formal political structures for subsidy support. The county dedicated a hotel bed tax and the city pledged a subsidy raised from a tax on arena parking. Freedman and LeFevre negotiated parking revenue in the final stage of the deal. The team was set to get \$2-2.5 million per year from a parking tax at the stadium site so they wanted a similar amount in a downtown deal, but Freedman was only willing to commit \$1 million annually from the city parking fees. The issue seemed like a deal breaker to Freedman until the two sides compromised that the city's contribution from the parking tax would depend on how much revenue was generated from the surcharge on arena parking (Danielson 1996; Freedman, interview, 2001).

On November 23, LeFevre announced Lightning plans for a downtown arena financed with county, city, and state subsidies and with private sector support. Proponents for the downtown arena secured both a site and the financial subsidies to proceed with construction. Similar to other major public works projects, opposition soon formed. Not surprisingly, TCI, the proponents of the early plan for a stadium site arena, provided the main opposition after the Ice Palace subsidy decisions were announced.

### **Subsidy Opponents**

To understand the nature of the opposition in the development of a Tampa Bay arena, one must consider the temporal development of the decision as opponents varied along the way. The failed stadium site arena plan and the downtown Ice Palace decision generated two different sets of opponents. The main opponents of the downtown deal were members of TCI, the private group that proposed the stadium site plan. The fatal opposition to TCI plan came from taxpayers as expressed through the decision by BOCC commissioners not to support the stadium site arena. There was also latent opposition to a Tampa Bay arena at either location from St. Petersburg leaders and the threat that the Lightning could move across the bay.

St. Petersburg and Pinellas County leaders, on the peninsula across Tampa Bay to the west, waited for Tampa and Hillsborough officials to fail to produce an arena policy decision. They were pleased that the Lightning were playing in the city's ThunderDome and hoped to lure the Lightning to St. Petersburg permanently. There was further speculation that Pinellas County officials might subsidize an arena near the dome (Stanley 1998). Leaders listened to ideas for a new arena but found financing plans difficult. Until a

Tampa arena was built, St. Petersburg boosters benefited from the Tampa Bay franchise playing in the ThunderDome.

The credibility of the St. Petersburg threat increased the incentives for Tampa policy makers to bid for a downtown arena (Cutter et. al. 1992). Lightning research on potential arena locations suggested downtown Tampa, Tampa Stadium, and St. Petersburg as the top three sites. Hillsborough and Tampa leaders worried that St. Petersburg was favored while the team played in that city. Lightning lobbyist, Mary Repper, who had helped elect the St. Petersburg mayor as well as some Hillsborough County commissioners, said that the selection of these three sites showed the team was committed to the Tampa Bay area. When St. Petersburg officials realized that an arena deal was not financially feasible, downtown Tampa and the Hillsborough stadium sites remained the top choices.

The TCI plan announced in October 1990 called for an arena at the stadium site to be about two-thirds privately subsidized and require public subsidies for the remainder. TCI's stadium site proposal faced serious opposition with Hillsborough commissioners lacking confidence in the private group's ability to build the arena. Some commissioners doubted TCI's ability to secure the remaining arena finances. As a result, they voted against subsidies for the stadium site arena despite support from the mayor and city council for TCI's plan.

Arena subsidy discussions commenced at a bad time for the county; it was facing a negative financial forecast. "There probably couldn't be a worse time for any private entity to ask county government for money," said Commissioner Pam Iorio (Orsi 1990). Elected officials, sensitive to their own polling results, were unwilling to grant arena subsidies in this political climate without public approval (Chillura, interview, 2002). County and city leaders also wanted a long-term lease commitment from the team in return for any arena subsidies and needed more information about the franchise's financial standing to feel comfortable with financing plans. Without support from the county, the franchise, or private sector leaders, TCI's deal failed.

In November 1992, Turanchik called LeFevre and told him TCI would not succeed. The county commissioner and the Lightning Governor discussed alternate arena plans (Stanley 1998). A year earlier Turanchik had suggested the idea of a downtown arena to LeFevre and advocates of downtown

development. When TCI missed the March 1993 deadline to present a final financial plan, local leaders were free to pursue the downtown site. TCI blamed their failure to secure private financing for the arena on the franchise owners, and in lawsuits filed after the Ice Palace opened they claimed that the Lightning owners tanked TCI's efforts to build an arena on the TSA stadium site land. Thus, when TCI's role as proponents of a stadium site arena ended they became the main opponents to any alternate plan.

In a final effort to salvage their arena deal, TCI filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. A judge rejected that claim freeing the sports authority and franchise to pursue a new arena deal (Stanley 1998). TCI eventually collapsed in 1993. In March 1997, six months after the Ice Palace opened, TCI filed a federal lawsuit against the Lightning claiming that the Japanese ownership group sabotaged the stadium site deal. According to TCI executive vice president Mark Ganis, the foreign owners were absentee, secretive, and non-cooperative on the arena project. He argued that the actions of the ownership group hurt TCI's ability to secure funding and sunk their chances for the stadium site deal to gain financial support and initially sought \$25 million in compensatory damages (Wexler 1997). The price raised to \$123 million in the civil lawsuit by the time a federal judge dismissed the case in March 1999, ruling that Ganis, a Chicago resident, lacked legal standing in federal court (Miller 1999).

Five Lightning partners were eventually charged with defrauding banks and team creditors for \$25 million. The franchise's financial woes became publicly known through articles in *Forbes*, *New York Times*, and *Sports Illustrated* that described turmoil in the team ownership. *Forbes* reported that the Lightning had the worst debt-to-ratio of any professional sports franchise. Ganis reportedly provided much of the information to media sources (Kaufman 1998). In March 1998, the Lightning counter-sued Ganis for breach of contract, theft of \$400,000 in seat deposit funds, and misappropriation of funds (Mayer 1998).

Other than TCI's last-ditch late legal tactics, there was no significant opposition to the downtown arena deal. The greatest opposition to the Ice Palace plan was posed by TCI's lawsuits. The downtown arena proposal also faced limited opposition from citizens concerned with the crowds and traffic that would accompany downtown development (Saul-Sena, interview, 2002). Some taxpayers opposed public subsidies for sports facilities but lacked the ability to counter the private-public deal crafted in private meetings. Citizens at city and county meetings criticized the decision to locate the arena downtown but there was no

identifiable organized opposition to arena subsidy plans. “There was no big groundswell of public support one way or another, frankly,” said Freedman (Freedman, interview, 2001).

“There was very little public discussion,” said Saul-Sena. “But it was primarily because they weren’t asking for big public dollars” (Saul-Sena, interview, 2002). Some small business owners like Charlie Miranda were concerned about the impact of arena traffic and the ability to deal with adjustments to downtown transportation patterns. “That’s where Miranda’s opposition comes from: land and crowds. It was less about money and more about neighborhood concerns. The few business opponents lacked the political resources to alter arena plans” (Saul-Sena, interview, 2002).

Opposition to a Tampa Bay arena varied through the early 1990s. The main opposition to the downtown arena came from the group with a competing interest in building an arena. There was some citizen and small business opposition to the Ice Palace, but there was a lack of a local organized citizen opposition to the arena subsidy plan.

### **Public Policy Options**

Two main public policy alternatives were proposed for building a professional hockey arena in the Tampa Bay area. The TCI stadium site plan for an arena called for around two-thirds private sector financing combined with about one-third public sector subsidies. This idea was supported by the Tampa City Council but was defeated by Hillsborough County Commissioners. On the other hand, the Ice Palace plan consisted of a public-private partnership between county and city officials, downtown business interests, and the team. This downtown plan required a greater portion of public subsidies than the TCI plan and also required a financial contribution from the Lightning franchise.

Sports facility development group Spectacor Management, an initial investor in Esposito’s ownership group, first proposed a privately financed Tampa Bay arena. When Spectacor stepped out of the picture, Tampa Coliseum Inc. (TCI) revived this plan calling for two-thirds private financing and about a third of the costs from public subsidies. The Tampa City Council approved the TCI plan in December 1990 in which the city would have subsidized about \$10 million of the \$96 million arena on the stadium site. Mayor Freedman and other city leaders supported plans for a stadium site arena even though it was not in

city territory. While they may have preferred a downtown arena, they felt the Lightning timeline was too tight for zoning and construction at a downtown site to be a reality (Freedman, interview, 2001).

Doubting the financial viability of the plan and the wisdom of the stadium site location, the Hillsborough BOCC voted 5-2 in December 1990 against the TCI subsidy proposal despite heavy lobbying by the private investment group. Surprisingly, the following day TCI executives announced they would privately finance the full cost of arena construction backed with loans from Fuji Bank. TCI Vice President Ganis said the group had access to private financing even while they were pursuing public subsidies. This revelation angered some commissioners who felt that the atmosphere to find public financing for any future sports facilities was poisoned. Turanchik commented that it would be hard to believe future venture capitalists who asked for public support when there was in fact private support available (Orsi, Stevenson and Tobin 1990).

TCI struggled to secure its financing despite a lack of cooperation from the Lightning ownership group. Fuji Bank provided a letter promising \$96 million credit for the arena with a list of 32 conditions attached. Despite a land lease and sports authority support, in March 1993 TCI failed to meet the county deadline for securing the arena deal. The Lightning promptly notified TCI that their lease contract was dissolved. TCI continued to try to find financing, but lost public support. Team executives proceeded to negotiate with local leaders about alternate subsidy policies and to craft a downtown arena plan incorporating sources of public and private support.

By contrast, the Ice Palace plan was also a public-private partnership funded by a combination of city, county and state subsidies and a contribution from the franchise. Arena construction cost \$153 million in 1996 dollars and was 66% publicly financed. Under the plan, primarily devised in private, the arena is subsidized with \$6.5 million in public money annually for thirty years. This includes \$3.5 million from the county tourism tax, \$2 million in tax rebates from the state, and \$1 million from the city collected through downtown parking fees. The sports authority issued \$87 million in six different bond issues to support the project (Walker and Koehn 1994).

The Hillsborough BOCC pledged the \$3.5 million annual subsidy for thirty years in late 1993 without identifying a specific revenue source. The county asked state legislators to support a measure

allowing Hillsborough officials to issue a one percent hotel room tax. They agreed, and the county enacted this legislation. As a meeting neared for county commissioners to vote on the subsidy plan the following summer, County Administrator Karl sent a five-page letter to the Lightning stating that the county had not received satisfactory responses from team officials on several remaining key financial points. Some of these concerns included the balance of taxable and tax-exempt bonds to be used, the lack of an arena financial feasibility study, failure to disclose franchise financial information, and the amount of ticket surcharge the county could issue (Danielson 1994). Arena proponents including sports authority executives and downtown business leaders spoke before the commission in support of the plan at the July 14 meeting (BOCC minutes, July 14, 1994).

Hillsborough's portion was eventually subsidized by two separate bond issues, one annual obligation of \$2 million over 30 years to be paid with the tourist lodging tax, and a second \$1.5 million annual payment from a mix of tourist taxes and ticket surcharges on all Ice Palace event tickets. It was settled that the ticket surcharge would start at 50 cents a ticket and the amount could be increased after five years, though the team opposed this provision that could cost them future revenue. In November 1994, the BOCC voted 6-1 to approve the subsidy plan. Commissioner Jan Platt was the lone dissenter, questioning the decision for the county to subsidize an arena, especially one located downtown rather than in unincorporated county territory (Dougherty 1994).

The city parking surcharge plan was derived by the City Budget Director Bob Hill and supported by Mayor Freedman and the city council. "I think we got more out than we may have expected going in" (Freedman, interview, 2001). With the mayor's recommendation, city council voted to allocate the parking money and waive an entertainment rights fee in return for a downtown arena.

The city council spent little time on the downtown arena funding issue since the plan was privately negotiated and the county's financial involvement was greater. Tampa Council member Linda Saul-Sena did not even recall being lobbied by anyone on the issue. She said there was very little public discussion on the issue because the team was looking for a relatively small financial subsidy. Just as each council member consults their own political calculus to justify supporting arena subsidies, Saul-Sena viewed the deal from an urban development perspective. "My interest in supporting public financing for sports was really from

another vantage point and that was economic development and what it could bring to our community as a point of energy,” she said.

It was an opportunity to bring people to a part of town that maybe they have not experienced before. We looked at it selfishly in that at least they were not putting this way out by the fairgrounds in the county. At least it is going to be downtown, it is going to generate a lot of activity for us with restaurants and bars and enliven the area. I was looking at it as an economic development tool and as a rationale for transit (Saul-Sena, interview, 2002).

The Ice Palace project also benefited from a state statute that grants a \$2 million annual tax rebate for professional sports facilities for up to 30 years. First granted for the St. Petersburg domed facility, the tax abatement was later granted for new arena and stadium projects throughout Florida. Both TCI and Lightning representatives lobbied legislators to secure this subsidy. Initially state officials approved TCI's request for the subsidy but they lost access to it when their local deadline passed. Hillsborough legislators were subsequently able to gather support for use of the tax abatement as part of the downtown subsidy plan (Scherberger 1993a).

Ultimately, the Lightning franchise contributed about \$50 million of the total cost of arena construction. But soon after the arena opened, financial problems forced the Lightning owners to sell the franchise the following year, to William Davidson, who benefited from the public policy decision crafted by civic and political leaders to subsidize a downtown arena and keep the hockey team in Tampa Bay.

## **Public Opinion**

Public opinion was not a significant factor in the Tampa Bay arena subsidy cases. Under the TCI deal, the private developers sought a relatively small arena subsidy, which resulted in low public opposition. Newspaper polls showed general countywide support for the stadium site as TCI proceeded with their attempts to gain private financing (*Tampa Tribune* 1993a). When the plans shifted to the downtown site, there was little change in the public's eye on the overall issue of arena subsidies. This may be because the downtown arena deal was largely crafted in private meetings. Few details of the discussions were made public so opposition to the subsidy policy was slow to emerge. Also, the Ice Palace plan relied on a variety

of relatively low subsidy sources, minimizing opposition and the need for proponents to gather mass public support for their proposal.

“Public opinion was for an arena. It was a non-issue,” said city council member Saul-Sena. She described indifference in public opinion toward arena policy. ““Would you like an arena? Sure. Is it gonna cost anything? Not really,”” she remarked. “The stadium (subsidy issue) was more volatile” (Saul-Sena, interview, 2002).

Still, there was general public support for an arena near the stadium site even after TCI failed to meet its deadline. One poll in November 1993 showed Hillsborough County residents preferred placing a hockey arena by the football stadium rather than downtown. The *Tampa Tribune* poll of more than 380 county residents found that 56 percent preferred the stadium site compared to 28 percent support for a downtown arena and 16 percent with no opinion on location (*Tampa Tribune* 1993a). A common reason cited for the stadium site preference was the easier access than a downtown site.

The same poll showed less public opinion support for the county’s decision to grant downtown arena subsidies. About 40 percent of 562 county residents favored the commission’s decision to pledge \$3.5 million per year to pay toward the arena debt while 47 percent opposed the county subsidy (*Tampa Tribune* 1993b). Several county residents spoke against the subsidy plan at a public hearing days before commissioners approved the final financial deal. They complained about the secrecy behind arena meetings but lacked the ability to alter the policy outcomes.

Since both Tampa Bay arena plans were primarily plotted by private actors and brought to public officials for action, public opinion on the issue had little direct impact in actually shaping policy alternatives. While initially there was general support for building a Tampa Bay arena, there was low public opinion pressure on the deal. But two years later, as the public became more aware of the subsidy decisions made for the Ice Palace arena, and the main policy options for subsidizing sports facilities more generally, public opinion began to shift to oppose sports facility subsidies. The timing of this public awareness posed difficulties for Tampa’s professional football team to gain support for a new stadium (MacManus and Johnson 1996).

## Summary

Despite NHL expectations to select expansion sites with existing professional arenas or significant progress in building one, Tampa Bay was awarded a team in December 1990 without a solid arena plan in place and the team initially played in the St. Petersburg Suncoast Dome. A group of private investors planned to finance about 66% of arena construction costs on land near the football stadium, but TCI was unable to gain county support for the remaining 33% of funding and their lease with the sports authority on the stadium site land expired in March 1993.

That freed proponents of downtown development to work with city and county officials to devise the Ice Palace subsidy decisions. Leaders in the business and civic community helped craft a deal with the team executives, the mayor, county administrator, and their city and county staff members. Under this arrangement the public subsidized about 66% of the construction costs and the franchise provided about 33% of the financing. Hillsborough County provides the greatest subsidy burden supported by the city parking tax and state sales tax rebate.

Members of the downtown development community played key roles in securing land for the Ice Palace and facilitating a process for cooperation between the city and county governments. In this way, the downtown arena deal resembled a pattern of Tampa politics from previous decades (Chick 1998; Kerstein 2001; Sherberger and Danielson 1993). But the secretive nature of this decision process poisoned the environment for sports facility policies as the new owner of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers found out after he asked for financial subsidies to support a new Tampa Bay football stadium.

## Chapter VI

### Case 4: Tampa-Hillsborough and Raymond James Stadium<sup>1</sup>

The Tampa Bay Buccaneers' new stadium opened in 1998 next to the original Tampa community stadium on Dale Mabry Highway in unincorporated Hillsborough County. The new stadium's \$168 million construction costs were primarily paid by a public subsidy allocated from revenues raised through a 30-year, half-cent county sales tax increase. Hillsborough County voters approved the multipurpose sales tax increase, called the Community Investment Tax (CIT) in a September 3, 1996, referendum by a 53% to 47% margin. The CIT plan to fund a new stadium along with schools, public safety, and infrastructure emerged from several policy options raised by local public officials after more than a year of debate. The stadium subsidy plan gained support from the Hillsborough Board of County Commissioners, Tampa City Council, Tampa Sports Authority (TSA), state legislature, and the voting public. After the referendum passed, a former Tampa mayor challenged the constitutionality of using bond revenue funded by the sales tax to subsidize the stadium. While one court agreed with this logic, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the arguments. The new franchise owners and sports authority officials kept to a tight time schedule to quickly complete stadium construction. Tampa Bay's new stadium hosted the NFL Super Bowl in 2001 and the Buccaneers franchise won the league championship title game in 2003.

#### Background

When Palm Beach financier Malcolm Glazer bought the Tampa Bay Buccaneers professional football franchise in January 1995 he immediately demanded a public subsidy to finance a new stadium or else he would move the team to another area (Kenyon 1995a). Glazer's threat initially generated low public support in the Tampa-Hillsborough region and elected officials doubted the viability of stadium subsidy plans. County commissioners hesitated to act without express public support, and the city was not financially positioned to contribute to subsidies for a suburban stadium plan.

---

<sup>1</sup> The naming rights to the Tampa community stadium were bought by Raymond James Financial, a financial services company based in St. Petersburg, in June 1998 prior to the opening of the facility.

Some county officials supported early TSA plans to renovate the old stadium (Chillura, interview, 2002; Saavedra, interview, 2002). Glazer, however, was not interested in a refurbished facility when several other cities were likely to issue stadium subsidies to lure an NFL team. Many civic and political leaders realized that without a new or upgraded stadium the team would leave and Tampa's image could be damaged. "It's almost a stigma when you lose a sports franchise. Consequently that's why you see communities trying to get it done because they know what is going to happen if they don't," said Tampa civic leader George Levy (Levy, interview, 2002). The proponents for a new stadium wanted to avoid losing the Buccaneer franchise only to have higher future costs by later building a stadium to bring the NFL back to Tampa Bay.

The original Tampa Stadium was built in 1967 by the Tampa Sports Authority for \$4.6 million with subsidies from Hillsborough County and the city of Tampa. The state legislator who introduced legislation in 1965 to create the sports authority initially wanted a stadium to be built for college football. Other politicians and civic boosters hoped for more and created a Chamber of Commerce task force to pursue professional football for Tampa Bay (Kerstein 2001). Another \$10 million was spent to expand seating from 47,000 to 72,000, add sky suites, and enclose the end zones when an NFL expansion franchise was granted to Jacksonville attorney Hugh Culverhouse Sr. in 1974. The arrival of professional football helped form a Tampa Bay area community identity and attract national attention as a major entertainment and tourism metropolitan center (Chillura 1996; Kerstein 2001; Mormino 1983).

The first stadium, known as "the Big Sombrero" in reference to its shape, initially hosted college football, attracted an NCAA bowl game in 1987, and hosted Super Bowls XVII in 1982 and XXV in January 1991. Soccer games, concerts, festivals, motor sports shows, sales seminars, equestrian events, and dog shows also filled the stadium. Despite its utility as a sporting facility, the stadium lacked club seating and luxury suites, the greatest revenue generators for NFL franchise owners.

Tampa Bay's Buccaneers began play in 1976 and lost their first 26 games. The franchise highlight of playing in the conference championship in their fourth season was followed by an NFL record 11 consecutive seasons with at least 10 losses during the 1980s. After Culverhouse Sr. died from cancer in August 1994 at age 75, his son, Hugh Culverhouse Jr., realized he could not both keep the team and try to

make it competitive. He put them on the market and, to appease the local community, the Culverhouse estate built into the sale a provision that would have raised the purchase price to more than \$200 million if the buyer moved the franchise from Tampa Bay to another area.<sup>2</sup>

Glazer and his family lacked civic connections in the Tampa Bay area and faced formidable odds in their goal of securing stadium subsidies. There was general public frustration and suspicion over sports subsidies concerning the policy plans and process surrounding the construction of the downtown arena. The feud between TCI and TSA provided negative media attention on sports facility subsidy policies while the Lightning were playing in St. Petersburg and not in Tampa. Glazer's task appeared even more difficult after Hillsborough voters defeated two sales tax initiatives in September 1995 for education and public safety. The defeat of the two referenda issues, the public perception of the TCI-TSA stadium-site hockey arena deal as a fiasco, and low public opinion toward the Glazers and the Buccaneers decreased public support for stadium subsidies (MacManus and Johnson 1996). The polling data of individual elected officials showed that stadium subsidies were not popular with county voters (Chillura, interview, 2002).

Several subsidy plans were proposed over the next year and debated at the city, county and state government levels. Hillsborough County commissioners expressed clear intentions to put any proposed stadium subsidy plans before the voters. Eventually a plan evolved from one commissioner's idea to subsidize the stadium as part of a package with other community needs. The half-cent sales tax increase, later called a community investment tax (CIT), paired the franchise owners' demands for stadium subsidies with the county's pressing needs for school construction, police and fire equipment, and infrastructure. By combining these items in the CIT referendum, proponents forged a broad base of support for the stadium subsidy plan in coalition with large voting constituencies from the public schools and the police department. County, city, and sports authority officials along with private sector leaders, the Glazers, and NFL officials formed the stadium subsidy plan. Stadium construction was subsidized with the community tax, revenue from a parking surcharge and a state tax rebate. The new community stadium, later renamed

---

<sup>2</sup> Contingencies called for a \$35 million relocation fee to the Culverhouse trust if they move outside a 75 mile radius and \$20 million if they moved within a 75 mile radius, due on the date of the move (Chillura, interview, 2002).

Raymond James Stadium by the financial company of that name, opened September 20, 1998, two years after approval of the CIT referendum.

### **Formal Political Structure**

Similar to the case of the Tampa arena, policy decisions concerning Tampa Bay stadium subsidies primarily involved the Tampa Sports Authority (TSA), Hillsborough County, City of Tampa, and the state legislature. Appointed and elected county and city officials played significant roles in shaping subsidy policy outcomes. The framework for the CIT emerged from ideas by Hillsborough commissioners. County administrators along with the Tampa mayor, TSA officials, civic leaders, and franchise representatives negotiated the stadium lease agreement. County commissioners, city council members in the three Hillsborough municipalities, and school board members went on the record and voted to support the multi-purpose tax. The mayor provided political leadership in gaining popular support for the referendum. State officials defeated initial subsidy tax plans, but eventually granted stadium subsidies through a sales tax rebate.

The first formal political structure confronted with Glazer's demand was the TSA. The sports authority owned the original Tampa Stadium and operated out of offices located at the site. State and local leaders established the TSA in 1965 with the goal of building a football stadium and legislation designed the sports authority to be a special taxing government district for purposes of developing and maintaining additional sports facilities and helping to attract professional and amateur sporting events (<http://www.tampasportsauthority.com/tsa/index.htm>, May 8, 2002). An 11-member Board governs the sports authority. These seats are filled by four City of Tampa residents appointed by the mayor and city council, four Hillsborough County residents selected by the BOCC, one county resident appointed by the governor, and two ex-officio members, one each from the city council and the county commission. A professional administrative staff handles the day-to-day operations of the TSA (<http://www.tampasportsauthority.com/tsa/board.htm>, May 8, 2002).

Tampa attorney H. Vincent Thornton, the authority's first chairman, and 10 elected officials and businessmen oversaw the construction and financing of the first stadium in the 1960s. Thornton recalls

bringing sports authority members together with Mayor Nuccio and Hillsborough County Commission Chairman Ellsworth Simmons over lunch at a hotel. The discussions at that meeting convinced Simmons of the value in building a Tampa stadium. The influential commission chairman decided the county should back stadium construction bonds and provided leadership for the policies to subsidize stadium costs (Wilborn 1995).

In keeping with the organizations mission of the sports authority, officials were involved with the new stadium planning and construction policy processes. Steve Anderson, TSA chairman, Rick Nafe executive director, and attorney Mandell “Hinks” Shimberg, participated in stadium talks and appeared before county officials to discuss lease options with the team. Anderson, a lawyer who was also a member of the Chamber of Commerce stadium task force, lobbied for a stadium deal in the timeframe originally demanded by the Glazers (Hillsborough County BOCC 1995b, 1996a).

Since the stadium is located in unincorporated Hillsborough County the Glazers demand for a new stadium also necessitated the involvement of Hillsborough officials. There are seven seats on the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC). Under the 1985 charter, four commissioners are elected from single-member districts and three seats are elected at-large county wide. Commission peers select the chair. The commission runs county government with an appointed professional County Administrator and county staff. As population increased in unincorporated Hillsborough, so did the size and scope of county government, which assumed greater roles and responsibilities. The decentralized county political structure provided low capacity for the exercise of strong leadership. But an influential chairman, like Simmons in the 1950s and 1960s, could form and lead a coalition of commissioners toward specific policy goals. Even as the influence of county government in growth politics increased, Tampa mayors still held higher political profiles than county politicians, and the support of the mayor was needed to meet metropolitan goals (Kerstein 2001).

When the Glazers made their subsidy demand in January 1995 the county faced budget shortfalls and was seeking new revenues. Commissioners proposed two half-cent sales tax referendums to subsidize school construction and public safety, but county voters rejected the initiatives by 60 percent to 40 percent on September 12, 1995. The results made commissioners skeptical about taxpayers support for stadium

subsidies. “If I were Malcolm Glazer, my view would be that the taxpayers don’t want to pay any more,” said Commission Chair Jim Norman after the failed referenda (Testerman 1995a). After those failed vote, the position of Norman and Commissioner Ed Turanchik was to not support any tax increases for stadium subsidies without voter approval (Testerman 1995a, 1995b). TSA chair Anderson said the team could not wait for the voters to act and that without a plan by the end of the year the team would be forced to move. Yet county officials stuck to their word in requiring voter approval of subsidy plans.

County Administrator Dan Kleman presented a report to the BOCC outlining plans for the policy process a few days after Glazer purchased the Buccaneers. Kleman discussed the need to begin substantive discussions with the Glazers to determine their possible financial involvement in a new stadium, and he suggested a continuation of discussions with members of the business community to find private sources of stadium support. The administrator also noted Norman’s request for a report back to the board within 30 days because subsidy proposals needed to be placed before county voters in a timely manner (Hillsborough County BOCC 1995a).

One early policy idea was to introduce a referendum for a half-cent sales tax to subsidize stadium construction and several other community projects (Craig 1998). Norman reported to the board on conversations he had with community leaders about delaying discussion on this option while support for greater participation from the private sector could be garnered. He noted that members of the business community had assured him there would be strong efforts to fund stadium costs through the private sector (Hillsborough County BOCC 1995a). Commissioner Turanchik suggested that any specific stadium negotiations be handled by the County Administrator and the County Attorney rather than by members of the BOCC, Tampa City Council, or TSA. Turanchik urged his colleagues on the BOCC to delegate responsibility for dealing with the Glazers to the administrator, and to authorize the administrator’s office to work with the Tampa Mayor, sports authority executives, members of the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce, and pro-sports civic groups to form a stadium plan. Communication would be channeled through the administrator’s office and Kleman would report to the board as needed, but individual commissioners could still be lobbied about the stadium. Commissioners unanimously agreed to a motion

that identified the administrator as “the person in charge” of negotiations (Hillsborough County BOCC 1995a).

Several potential subsidies were introduced, debated, and dismissed over the next year by the county commission, city council, and state legislature (Craig 1998; MacManus and Johnson 1996). First, county officials asked the Hillsborough state delegation to support proposals allowing the county to levy either a one penny per check restaurant tax, or a five percent rental car tax. Both plans faced opposition from industry groups lobbying in the state legislature. A bill proposed in the Senate on a local rental car tax option never passed nor did an amendment that would have raised the county hotel room tax from 11.5% to 15.5% (MacManus and Johnson 1996). Other options raised by the county budget office included ideas to fund the stadium with “sin taxes” on items like liquor and cigarettes, or a lottery surcharge (Chillura, interview, 2002; MacManus and Johnson 1996; (Hillsborough County BOCC, 1995b). None of these ideas gained wide support. Commissioners were weary of levying taxes that singled out a specific industry. “The restaurant people went bonkers because they said you are singling out one industry and that’s not fair, and I agree with them because why should people in restaurants pay a tax that is going to help only a stadium” (Chillura, interview, 2002).

While any new stadium would be built in county territory next to the old facility, cooperation was needed from city officials to broaden community support. The eventual CIT plan required approval from Plant City, Temple Terrace, and Tampa officials. The first two cities were less significant for designing and implementing the subsidy policy, but Tampa city officials played a greater role. Downtown Tampa, the largest of three cities in Hillsborough, sits at the political center of the metropolitan region, and as if to symbolically note their mutual dependence, the county government building on East Kennedy Street is adjacent to the Tampa city government offices.

As discussed previously in Chapter 5, Tampa has a strong mayor-council system. The seven-member Tampa City Council consists of four district-based representatives and three members elected at-large to four year terms. A mayor is elected separately from council to four year terms with a limit of two terms. This strong-mayor system grants the mayor veto power over the council. The mayor can also exercise powers of persuasion in civic and legislative affairs.

When Dick Greco was elected Tampa mayor in 1995 he inherited the ongoing stadium subsidy policy issue. Greco, who was mayor in the early 1970s when Tampa leaders pursued and landed professional football, believed the Buccaneers franchise was valuable to the Tampa Bay community. But the city was not in a position to subsidize a stadium, placing the mayor and city leaders in the situation of supporting a stadium without being in a direct position to negotiate between the various parties involved.

During the 1995 mayoral campaign, however, Greco was not initially convinced of the need to publicly support a stadium, according to his campaign manager, George Levy. Levy remembers telling Greco about how other cities faced similar situations (Levy, interview, 2002). But by the time he took office in early 1996, Greco was convinced of the need to support stadium subsidies to keep Tampa Bay's NFL franchise. "Some cities let them leave like Houston and Cleveland, and they paid dearly to get them back. They paid a fortune," said Greco. "I knew this was going to happen. It was the dilemma of, are they going to stay or are they going to leave" (Greco, interview, 2002).

The county-initiated CIT plan provided incentives for the cities to support the proposal. Under the plan, only about 12% of the revenue was allocated to a stadium while the remainder would be used for schools construction, police and fire equipment, and infrastructure projects. "From my standpoint, when I took over as mayor eight years ago, we needed money for police and fire, and we needed money for the school system and roads," said Greco. "Somebody came up with the idea if you add a new stadium and put it all together it will pass. I thought that was a pretty sad commentary on people. But the more I heard about it, the more people talked about it, the more I became convinced that maybe they were right" (Greco, interview, 2002).

Greco, a popular politician and skilled communicator, helped negotiations between county officials and team and league representatives over the terms of the stadium subsidy and lease agreement. Under the state Sunshine Laws, the mayor and county administrator could participate in private discussions while county commissioners and city council members could not. Whenever the negotiators agreed to something in the private sessions, Greco was charged with contacting the various other parties to gain support. "You have a stadium authority with eleven members, seven county commissioners, seven city council, and everyone under government in the Sunshine," explained the mayor. "When we tried to make a

major change and when we thought we had consensus, I had to get on the telephone and call all of the people I just mentioned because they couldn't be part of the meeting together because of government in the Sunshine. So it was really a pain to put it together" (Greco, interview, 2002).

With Greco's endorsement, the city council approved the CIT plan. Council member Charlie Miranda opposed public subsidies for a stadium but lacked the ability to block or defeat the plan. "There were a couple of commissioners who didn't like it, and one or two city councilors," said Greco. "We had the support of the others, thank goodness" (Greco, interview, 2002). After gaining formal support, the mayor used his informal influence to increase civic and community support for the referendum.

At the state level, members of the Hillsborough delegation took suggestions for stadium subsidy sources to the legislature. Ideas to give local officials the authority to raise a rental car or hotel bed tax were opposed as were taxes on cigarettes or on lottery ticket sales. State politicians suggested that Tampa Bay leaders would need to find other local revenue sources to subsidize the stadium. In 1997, the legislature did grant the state sales tax rebate, worth about \$2 million per year for 30 years, for use in the stadium project.

### **Informal Sector**

The Tampa Bay informal political sector during the time of the stadium subsidy discussions was also similar to that of the Ice Palace case. Influential members of the civic community included members of the Tampa-Hillsborough business community connected to the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber's Group of 100, and its stadium subcommittee. Sports subsidy proponents were also found among activists in the established civic community.

While the seeds for a coalition with members of the commercial sector were present, the Glazers were slow to cultivate ties to the informal power structure. Moreover, the Tampa Bay business community did not have the same influence that earlier business leaders had in shaping the political agenda. The interests of Tampa Bay commercial leaders had been split between downtown interest and suburban development especially with the West Shore business district (Kerstein 2001). The emergence of competing business factions within the metropolitan region fragmented the influence of non-elected officials over the political agenda.

The Glazers lacked civic, personal and political attachments to the Tampa Bay informal power sector when they bought the Buccaneers that could have increased their ability to get subsidy policy support. To gain support for stadium subsidies the Glazers needed to enlist allies in the commercial community and professional sports boosters like local business owners Leonard and George Levy. Leonard Levy chaired the Chamber's task force and had been a lead negotiator for the community with the NFL when the expansion franchise was awarded (Kerstein 2001). He was also influential in bringing the first two Super Bowls to the city (Chick 1998). When the Buccaneers threatened to leave Tampa, Leonard was selected to head the Chamber's task force trying to keep the team in town, and his brother, George, a successful trophy shop owner, chaired the Chamber's new stadium steering committee and managed the campaign in support of the CIT.

Sports facility subsidies stand a greater chance of gaining support in Tampa Bay politics with the backing of the Levy brothers. "You can't do it (move ahead) without the Levy brothers (George and Leonard)," said Buccaneers General Manager Rich McKay, a stadium proponent who represented the team's interests. "There are not two better and more committed guys in this market" (Chick 1998). The Levy brothers were at the center of an earlier informal Tampa sports development coalition along with people like Thornton, the lawyer who headed efforts in 1965 to build Tampa Stadium and served on the TSA, longtime *Tampa Tribune* Sports Editor Tom McEwen, New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, a Tampa resident and investor, allied community members affiliated with the TSA or Chamber, and Greco, who between his stints as mayor served as a government liaison on development projects with the Edward DeBartolo Corporation.

Greco, who initially was not convinced of the wisdom of stadium spending, recognized professional football as one of the ingredients of a well-rounded community. "Strangely enough, football is a habit of the American people," Greco noted. Professional sports, cultural arts and family entertainment facilities provide world-class opportunities for people who live in the area and build city recognition. "If these things did not exist, your community wouldn't grow," said Greco. "All of these things have become more important today than they were years ago" (Greco, interview, 2002).

Greco's mayoral campaign manager, George Levy, advised the candidate to support efforts to secure stadium subsidies. "Let me tell you something," recalled Levy. "A large corporation, Solomon Brothers or something, they can move from Tampa. USAA (Realty Co.) can move from Tampa. They can move to Charlotte. Now the people in Tampa will know we lost that big business, and the people of Charlotte will know they got it," Levy said.

But when you lose a professional sports franchise, the whole world knows it, and they never forget it. How many people slip and say Baltimore Colts or New York Giants or Brooklyn Dodgers, and that's been 50 years. Nobody ever forgets it, they always remember. It's almost a stigma when you lose a sports franchise. Consequently that's why you see communities trying to get it done because they know what is going to happen if they don't. If you want a franchise, you are going to have to play the game. It is as simple as that (Levy, interview, 2002).

Levy did not want Tampa Bay boosters to experience what leaders in other cities faced after standing up to football franchise demands. "When Houston said we're not going to be held hostage to the National Football League, all these people around the country were patting that mayor on the back. (But) within two years, Houston wanted an NFL franchise back," said George Levy. "In Tampa we didn't want to be held hostage by the NFL. I didn't want that. Nobody did. However, that is how the game's being played. You have to decide if you want to play the game or you don't want to play the game, whether you like it or not" (Levy, interview, 2002).

Having an NFL team adds to the image that civic community leaders work to create. "Everywhere you go people are talking about the Buccaneers. In Europe and elsewhere they know them more than they know our community," said Greco. "So it's meaningful to be known like cities like New York. It all makes people rally behind you and gives something for people to believe in. That's why you have to have football" (Greco, interview, 2002).

"Why do these cities when they lose a franchise, within a year or two, want it back? They make an impact, but more than that it is about the image of the city. When Cleveland lost that franchise, all of a sudden people thought that Cleveland was a loser" (Levy interview, 2002). Leaders in the Tampa-Hillsborough business and civic communities wanted to avoid this perception. They needed to form a coalition of public and private sector proponents for stadium subsidies and negotiate with the Buccaneers a

deal that was acceptable to those serving on the formal political structures and ultimately to a majority of county voters.

### **Subsidy Proponents**

Malcolm Glazer, a Palm Beach-based millionaire with investments including oil wells and mobile home parks, bought the Tampa Bay Buccaneers for \$192 million on January 16, 1995, from the estate of the late, Hugh Culverhouse, Sr. (Kenyon 1995a). Glazer and his sons, Bryan and Joel, were the main proponents for a new Tampa Bay professional football stadium. The Glazers eventually found support from officials in the formal political structures in the City of Tampa and Hillsborough County as well as from members of the Chamber of Commerce and the civic community. That support allowed the Glazers to negotiate the stadium subsidy proposal using revenue from the community investment tax.

The CIT plan that emerged from intergovernmental cooperation forged a broad constituency of potential voters to support the proposal. Specific proponents that pushed the CIT plan to the public included County Commissioner Joe Chillura, Mayor Greco, TSA executive and local attorney Mandell “Hinks” Shimberg, and developer Jack Wilson, the Chamber president at the time. Because the CIT included funds for schools, police and fire departments, a coalition was forged between stadium proponents and some of the largest and most organized voting constituencies in the county: the school board, the police departments and the firefighters. Additional support for the CIT plan came from teachers, school administrators, and the superintendent of schools, all of whom stood to prosper from the passage of the sales tax increase.

As noted earlier, the Glazers did not wait long after buying the franchise to seek support for a new stadium to be built with public subsidies. “The ownership - when the Glazers bought it - made it pretty well known that if we didn’t build a new stadium they were going to move” (Levy, interview, 2002). Malcolm Glazer announced that he would “absolutely not” be involved in financing the new stadium (Kenyon 1995a). He wanted to focus on investing in players for the team and he expected to get public funding like NFL owners in other cities were getting for new stadiums.

The lack of attachment to the local community and the Tampa-Hillsborough power brokers was a disadvantage for the Glazers (Danielson 1995a). They had been forced to outbid some local suitors to

purchase the team, including the owners of the Outback restaurant chain that is based in Tampa. The new owners needed political support for subsidies, but they made their demand without laying sufficient groundwork with government or civic leaders and thus, they alienated some citizens.

“Fortunately, the Glazers wanted to stay in Tampa. They felt they had a commitment here. But at the same time they were business people,” said Chillura. “When every other community gets a new stadium and the NFL gets behind that drive to get a new stadium, then their attitude was, ‘Why not? If we are going to get a new stadium in Baltimore why should we stay here and play in the old stadium’ which was going to cost in excess of \$150 million to upgrade” (Chillura, interview, 2002).

The Glazers pledged to save the team for the Tampa Bay area, but they needed support from additional proponents to persuade the public to pledge money for a place to play. Claiming they wanted to stay in Tampa Bay, Bryan Glazer said “...there are three stadiums and a number of cities just sitting there waiting to hand you the key, and we’re not willing to do that” (Danielson 1995b). Orlando and some central Florida counties along the I-75 corridor were serious candidates, while Cleveland, Los Angeles, Baltimore and Harford were possible suitors (Testerman 1995d, 1995e, 1996a).

After Hillsborough voters defeated the school construction and public safety referendums in September 1995, the Glazers eased their demand and announced a plan to pay about \$6.5 to \$7.5 million of stadium costs annually. Another \$3 to 4 million in public subsidies was still needed. “We’re making a 30-year commitment, and we’re asking the fans to make a long-term commitment, too,” said Malcolm Glazer. “It’s going to be a true partnership between us, the fans and local government” (Testerman, 1995c).

The franchise planned to raise its share of the revenue through the sale of 50,000 Personal Seat License (PSL) deposits. The PSL method, which requires season ticket holders to first buy the license to their seats and then purchase their individual game tickets, helped to finance construction of stadiums in Charlotte and St. Louis. Mayor Greco and more than 200 employees of prominent Tampa Bay companies volunteered with the Chamber Stadium Task Force to call former season ticket holders who had not bought their seat licenses yet. They contacted prospects in Hillsborough and surrounding counties. But proponents were disappointed when they only sold about 25,000 PSL’s through the end of October (Danielson and Testerman 1995).

With slow seat license sales by November, the Glazers once again threatened to move. They visited Hartford, Los Angeles, and Baltimore.<sup>3</sup> The central Florida area also remained a strong possibility. The \$35 million penalty that the Glazers agreed to pay to the Culverhouse estate if they relocated was significantly lower if they moved to Orlando. Officials from the Orlando Area Sports Commission, Orange County, and neighboring Osceola County had positioned their districts to offer subsidies to the Buccaneers to move to central Florida. “Our first preference is here (Tampa Bay),” said Joel Glazer. “What’s the next best option? It’s Orlando, because our fans could still go to games” (Testerman 1995d).

Early specific revenue proposals failed. Mayor Greco supported and the city council endorsed a proposed restaurant tax that some area officials suggested state lawmakers pass to help pay for the stadium. “Whatever the shortfall is, we will do everything we can do to find something to meet it,” Greco said at the time (Danielson 1995b). But Glazer wanted a plan in place by December 1995 to meet construction deadlines, and the state legislature did not meet until the following spring to discuss support for any local subsidy ideas. The restaurant tax, opposed by the Florida Restaurant Association, was defeated in the legislature. No stadium subsidies were granted by that legislative session and the Glazers’ self-imposed March 1996 deadline for a plan passed.

County commissioners agreed they would put any subsidy proposal before the voting public. The two main plans that emerged were a three-year sales tax increase to raise money solely for the stadium, and a 30-year sales tax increase to subsidize a stadium, school construction, and other community projects. The first idea, a solo stadium tax, did not seem viable to commissioners. The second idea, raising money for a variety of community projects, appeared to be a better option for gathering popular support.

A multipurpose sales tax idea that benefited several projects was initially raised in the January 1995 BOCC meeting, but faded from the agenda while private funding options were explored (Craig 1998). The idea to package the stadium with other community needs reemerged the following year supported by at-large Commissioner Joe Chillura. One evening while eating dinner with his family at a buffet restaurant, Chillura looked at the different items in the buffet bar and realized that out of the dozens of items available there was something offered for everyone. While no one person may like or even try all of the items in the

---

<sup>3</sup> The Glazers were one of three groups that had unsuccessfully bid for a Baltimore NFL

buffet, they all paid one reasonable price to be able to select as much or as little food as they wanted.

Chillura figured that if the Buccaneers wanted a new stadium it could be part of a package where everyone in the county benefited in one way or another while each paid a reasonable price (Washington 1998). As Chillura explained, people “only pick and choose what they want even though they pay for it all, but everyone gets what they want for their payment” (Chillura, interview, 2002).

Chillura began writing on a napkin all of the community needs that could be addressed in this plan. With a multifaceted community investment tax, revenue could be raised for schools, jails, parks, police equipment and the stadium. While demand for most of these public goods was high, the public was less interested in subsidizing a stadium. Chillura found the stadium subsidy could be used to sweeten the plan and pull people together in support of raising the county sales tax. “If we have all those things on the ballot, we can solicit the help of the school system, which is an empire of people, teachers, bureaucrats, and administrators. If we have police and fire, that’s another massive number of political types that would go door-to-door and help campaign. And, of course, the fans were in frenzy because they didn’t want to lose the team. So they were the most obvious source of camaraderie we could develop for the community investment concept” (Chillura, interview, 2002).

Chillura reintroduced the multipurpose tax idea at a May 1996 commission meeting, but found little support. BOCC members, reluctant to ask voters to support a subsidy plan without public input on the details of the policy proposal, held a public hearing in early June to gain popular feedback. Commissioners endorsed a 15-year multipurpose sales tax increase, but the city council rejected this idea, countering that 15 years was not enough time to meet their policy objectives. They asked Mayor Greco to take the 30-year plan to the BOCC for support. He did, and commissioners passed that plan and placed it on the September 3, 1996, ballot. “We had a winner conceptually,” said Chillura.

So I started looking at demographics and I found that the percentage of (primary election) voters was extremely small. If I could solicit the help of these various groups, then we would have a winner. It took about a month to convince everyone on the school board, the municipalities in Temple Terrace, Plant City and Tampa, and my colleagues on the Board of County Commissioners that if we didn’t do this together as a team that we would never make it happen. They didn’t want the Bucs to leave either, even though they would not publicly admit it, so I ended up carrying the banner saying this is what we need

---

expansion team before they purchased the Buccaneers.

to do. We need to put it on the ballot and let the public vote it up or down (Chillura, interview, 2002).

The multipurpose subsidy plan drew proponents from multiple jurisdictions. “People in Temple Terrace and Plant City, they knew they were going to get money out of it. The school board and the people in the school system supported it. The firefighters union supported it. The police supported it because they knew what it was going to do for them. You had a good base there,” (Levy, interview, 2002).

The CIT proponents organized a public relations campaign and established a stadium steering committee headed by George Levy, who managed the grassroots level door-to-door and bumper sticker campaigns. The committee hired professional political consultants and a Washington D.C.-based polling firm to market the proposal. A massive media campaign launched by proponents in October 1995 included a promotional video about the stadium called “Home Field Advantage” that aired on a local station and also discounted advertisements in local newspapers (Danielson 1995c).

The need for positive publicity increased after the Glazers announced that the restaurant chain they owned would pay \$2-million a year for the right to rename Tampa Stadium to Houlihan's Stadium. Some suggested this move could harm the Glazers in the upcoming referendum. To detractors, support for stadium subsidies and the Glazers symbolized corporate welfare (Washington 1998). Although the CIT revenue would also be used for schools, police, roads, and other local services, some citizens suspected that delivery on those items was a sham and the real motive was to publicly fund the stadium (Chillura, interview, 2002; Greco, interview, 2002; MacManus and Johnson 1996).

One year after the failed school and public safety referenda, Hillsborough voters were again asked to endorse a half-cent sales tax increase. While the plan enjoyed a broad base of popular support, the CIT proposal also faced opposition. The opponents of stadium subsidies became more active during the months prior to the referendum but were unable to defeat the initiative. Even after county voters passed the CIT proposal, opposition forces strengthened and pursued a legal strategy to challenge the use of the tax revenue to subsidize a professional sports stadium.

## Subsidy Opponents

Opposition to stadium subsidy plans was varied and came from disparate sources. Opponents to early plans included representatives of the hotel, rental car, and restaurant groups whose industries were targeted as potential tax sources. These subsidy ideas died under the influence of industry pressure groups protecting their respective interests. Civic boosters in other cities trying to attract professional football to their regions also rooted against Tampa Bay's attempts to secure subsidy plans but took little substantive action. A few county and city representatives opposed stadium subsidy plans in their respective chambers, but the opposition was not significant enough to block policy adoption. A former Tampa mayor, William Poe, who challenged the legality of using the community tax revenue to subsidize a sports stadium, presented the most significant opposition.

Though there was no significant identifiable community opposition movement, local citizens generally against higher taxes, and specifically sour on sports subsidies, campaigned and voted against the multipurpose tax (*St. Petersburg Times* 1995, 1996). "There is a certain segment of people in every community that are against everything. They are against government, against politicians, against taxes. They are just "anti's" - not in my backyard. They are NIMBYs," said Chillura. "Unfortunately that's the bulk of voters. They are not civic minded" (Chillura, interview, 2002).

Civic leaders in other cities that may have wanted to lure the Buccaneers enhanced the credibility of the Glazers' threat to move. When seat license sales were low in November 1995, the Glazers said they were considering moving, possibly to Orlando. Malcolm Glazer and team representatives met with Orlando city officials, and the Orlando Area Sports Commission task force supported their efforts (Testerman 1995d, 1995e). But by December, the Orange County Commission stated that it would not be using any tax money to renovate the existing Citrus Bowl or to build a new facility in the Orlando area. Commissioners from Central Florida's Osceola County, south of Orange, stood ready to pursue stadium subsidies if Hillsborough leaders stumbled (Testerman 1996b).

Other possible sites included Los Angeles, the largest U.S. media market lacking an NFL team, and Baltimore.<sup>4</sup> While the Buccaneer owners publicly expressed a commitment to stay in Tampa Bay, the

---

<sup>4</sup> Baltimore officials lured the former Cleveland Browns to a publicly subsidized stadium in 1996.

Glazers may have privately wanted the efforts of Tampa-Hillsborough leaders to fail so they could pursue greater public subsidies in Baltimore. “The Glazers had ties to Baltimore. They gave away too much here (Tampa), said George Levy. “The Glazers probably would not admit it, but they hoped it would not pass. But once it did they were on the hook for 30 years” (Levy, interview, 2002). While competitors in other metropolitan regions may have opposed Tampa Bay’s stadium subsidy efforts, they did not interfere with the local policy process.

Initially, there was little support for subsidies from BOCC members. Norman, the commission chairman and representative on the sports authority, analyzed the mood for public subsidies after the two proposed sales tax increases were defeated in September 1995, acknowledging the importance of the Buccaneers to the community while noting that public safety was his first concern. “My priority is we have a new jail to build, under court order, and a new morgue to build,” said Norman (Testerman 1995b). Hillsborough commissioners defeated the restaurant tax plan and many of Norman’s colleagues echoed his views during the months before the CIT plan emerged (Craig 1998).

The CIT plan also had its commission opponents. Turanchik initially opposed the idea of coupling stadium construction with other government goals. But he was one of five commissioners who voted for the stadium lease agreement negotiated in conjunction with the CIT plan at a March 29 meeting. Commissioners Hart and Wilson voted against the motion. Hart acknowledged that people wanted to keep the Buccaneers in town, but noted that there were limits to what the public should pay (Hillsborough County BOCC 29 March 1996).

On the city council, Charlie Miranda was the main opponent of stadium subsidies. Miranda, a local restaurant owner, opposed the efforts to raise a restaurant tax to subsidize the stadium prior to his election to the council. After the restaurant tax idea died, Miranda continued to be critical of public subsidy plans. The councilman especially took offense at the “Home Field Advantage” video and additional media coverage proponents attracted (Danielson 1995c). The 30-minute show with local television station participation, and released in conjunction with the plan to sell seat licenses, featured elected politicians and local boosters. Miranda publicly criticized proponents in a two-page letter noting that the stadium issue received major television coverage and discounted full-page newspaper advertisements while other

community needs did not receive similar attention. Miranda, who demonstrated his opposition by wearing black clothing to city council meetings when stadium subsidies were discussed, publicly expressed the frustration of voiceless community members. His opposition was muted by the louder voices of stadium proponents. Over Miranda's opposition, the city council endorsed the CIT stadium subsidy plan.

During the summer leading to the vote on the multipurpose tax plan, polls found Hillsborough residents evenly divided on the plan that coupled the sports facility with education and public safety but by two to one there was opposition to a proposal for stadium subsidies alone (Henderson 1996a; McEwen 1996; *Tampa Tribune* 1996). Public opposition was evident from the steady flow of letters to the editor printed in the *Tampa Tribune* and at times a section full of them in the *St. Petersburg Times* (1995, 1996). The voices of opposition were clear and consistent in their concern over what was viewed as a burdensome tax levied at the expense of the poorer people in the county to subsidize a stadium for a wealthy stranger. Their source of opposition was rooted in a disagreement over sports subsidies in general but also because many viewed the log rolled tax as a tactic to personally enrich the Glazer family at the expense of a myriad of community needs. Ultimately, the decision was left for voters to decide at the ballot box.

The greatest opposition to implementation of the stadium subsidy plan came from former Tampa Mayor William F. Poe, who challenged the referendum's legality. In an attempt to block the vote, Poe filed a suit on August 19, 1996, claiming the stadium subsidy would be an unconstitutional use of taxpayer money. The basis of his argument was that the Florida constitution prohibited using public subsidies to support a private company like a professional football franchise. Poe opposed the stadium subsidy but did not challenge the other portions of the CIT. On August 26, a week before voters went to the polls, the district judge rejected Poe's suit, but the former mayor continued to argue publicly that voters were being asked to support an unconstitutional use of public subsidies.

Despite the legal challenge, popular opposition in the polls, and negative feelings toward both stadium subsidies and the Glazers, county voters approved the CIT referendum on September 3 by a 53% to 47% margin (Henderson 1996e; MacManus and Johnson 1996). Seeking to stop stadium construction, Poe filed a lawsuit in Hillsborough County's circuit court claiming that the use of government bonds to subsidize the stadium violated Article VII, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution (*Poe vs. Hillsborough*

County, City of Tampa, Florida and Tampa Sports Authority 1997a). Poe maintained that the subsidy unconstitutionally used public money to pay a private organization through building of the stadium.

Filing of the lawsuit hindered the sports authority from using public funding to begin stadium construction until the courts settled the issue. Stadium proponents protested that this legal opposition could cost Tampa Bay area businesses billions of dollars by not hosting a Super Bowl and might ultimately cost Tampa Bay the franchise.<sup>5</sup> County and city officials filed a counter-lawsuit with the TSA against Poe and the state to validate several bond issues to support stadium construction. Sports authority officials financed and managed early stadium contacts through cash resources while county attorneys hustled to resolve the Poe case (Dougherty 1996d). In October 1996 ground was broken on the facility and NFL officials announced that Tampa Bay would host the 2001 Super Bowl championship game.

The trial opened March 3, 1997. Hillsborough Circuit Court Judge Sam D. Pendino heard testimony over five days from city and county officials, franchise and football league representatives, stadium finance experts, representatives of Poe's opposition group and local taxpayers. City Councilman Miranda spoke as a taxpayer in opposition to stadium subsidies. On the final day, Poe took the stand for 40 minutes and explained his opposition to the stadium subsidy. He testified that through the CIT plan officials had conned the public into supporting the stadium subsidy and he argued that the poorly crafted public policy provided financial benefits for a private entity (Dougherty 1997).

In his March 21 ruling, Judge Pendino agreed with Poe's private benefit argument on narrow constitutional grounds, while not denying the use of public funds to subsidize sports facilities. The judge cited Florida statutes that endorsed the use of public subsidies for sports facilities if they serve a "paramount public purpose" in retaining a professional sports franchise. He also noted the Tampa city and TSA resolutions stating a valid public purpose in their deliberations to support the subsidy plan. Pendino wrote that what constitutes a valid public purpose is for legislatures to decide, not courts, unless the decision was "so clearly erroneous" as to be beyond legislative power (*Poe vs. Hillsborough County, et. al.* 1997a).

---

<sup>5</sup> An NFL Senior Vice President testified in the case that without a new stadium Tampa would not have been selected to host the 2001 game, and with a new facility he would recommend it host future Super Bowls (*Poe vs. Hillsborough County, et. al.* 1997a).

Pendino examined details of the lease agreement between the TSA and the Buccaneers, and pointed to the clause that the sports authority would pay the franchise the first \$2 million annually for all non-Buccaneer events held at the stadium. TSA finance director Henry Saavedra testified that this source of stadium revenue was expected to be less than \$2 million annually for the first three to five years. The judge acknowledged the financial importance of keeping the team to the Tampa Bay community, but wrote that the stadium's paramount public purpose was defeated by the private revenue benefit granted to the Buccaneers. Contrary to state law, the Buccaneers, a private business, would receive a majority of the revenue, and not the TSA, a public entity. Since the Glazer family would be the primary beneficiary of non-football revenue collected at the stadium, the judge concluded this would be unconstitutional. "For this reason only, the paramount public purpose of the project is defeated," Pendino ruled (*Poe vs. Hillsborough County, et. al.* 1997a).

The ruling appeared to favor stadium subsidy opponents, but both sides declared victory. Stadium opponents claimed the invalidation of bonds could cancel the use of public subsidies for the stadium while stadium proponents felt they would only need to renegotiate the lease with the Buccaneers in order to conform to the court ruling. Ultimately, the narrow ruling displeased both sides and each made public their intentions to appeal the decision (Dougherty 1997). As county attorneys met with franchise representatives to rework the agreement to satisfy Pendino's ruling, Poe agreed to skip the appeals court and asked the state supreme court to review the decision (Chillura, interview, 2002).

In May, the state high court ruled against Poe's argument that the use of bonds would amount to a subsidy for a private venture removing the obstacles to public funds for the Tampa stadium (Washington 1998; *Poe vs. Hillsborough County, et. al.* 1997b). While the state constitution limits subsidies for private business, the use of subsidies has been approved for sports facilities in other Florida cases. Justices noted that the legislature and county commission both declared sports facilities to serve a paramount public purpose and that the trial court had even acknowledged a positive economic impact the Buccaneers would have of at least \$3 billion on the Tampa Bay area over the next 30 years from building the facility. The Supreme Court found that "the trial court went beyond its narrow task" of deciding on the validity of bond use and in doing so, denied the right of local officials and voters to make this policy decision. "Although

reasonable people might differ on the concessions that should be offered to keep a professional sports franchise from relocating, the wisdom of public officials as they make these difficult and controversial decisions is a matter for the voters, not the courts, to decide” (*Poe vs. Hillsborough County, et. al.* 1997b).

The high court further acknowledged that local officials faced a difficult situation in dealing with the potential loss of professional football-related business, and the courts should not invalidate their efforts simply because they were dissatisfied with the lease negotiated between the local community and the franchise.

### **Public Policy Options**

Stadium subsidies became a policy issue for Tampa-Hillsborough leaders after the Glazer family purchase of the Buccaneers in January 1995, and their immediate threat to move the franchise without public support for a new stadium. Public and private officials needed to find a revenue source while facing budget shortfalls. In this case, financial subsidies for stadium construction were the main issue. Land subsidies were not a policy issue since the sports authority owned the land parcel next to old Tampa Stadium, and there was little discussion about building a stadium elsewhere.<sup>6</sup>

Several public policy options emerged prior to the multipurpose plan. In December 1995, stadium proponents in city and county government came up with a proposal to cover the costs of stadium construction with user fees. The plan called for a surcharge on user fees through tickets, parking, and concessions and an additional “sports entertainment fee” assessed to goods and products purchased at the facility. This plan was estimated to have the potential to raise \$4.8 million a year for 30 years (Testerman 1995f). The Buccaneers flatly rejected the proposal. General Manager Rich McKay said the deal was conceived without the input of the team or the TSA. The proposal listed naming rights as a revenue source for the stadium while an earlier deal had the team keeping control of naming rights. McKay released a statement saying the plan “...does not take into account any of the modern components of stadium deals and therefore would put the Glazers at a tremendously financially competitive disadvantage with the rest of the National Football League” (Testerman 1995f).

---

<sup>6</sup> Notwithstanding one state legislator’s plan for location a stadium in Ybor City, an idea that was

Some local officials supported issuing either a restaurant or rental car tax ideas and asked state representatives to pursue these or other taxes on hotel beds, cigarettes and alcohol. A five-percent rental car tax was projected to raise \$10.9 million and draw more from tourists than from local residents. The one-percent restaurant tax idea had divided support. Some proponents, including TSA executive and restaurant owner Shimberg, supported putting this tax idea to county voters (Testerman 1996a). County commissioners asked the state legislative delegation to pursue authority for Hillsborough officials to present a plan to county voters. Senator John Grant carried the restaurant and rental car tax ideas to Tallahassee and assessed potential support for them. "It's fair to say the mood there is not conducive to any new tax," Grant said, prior to the session when lawmakers learned that they faced a reported billion-dollar state budget shortfall in 1996. "Frankly, I'm of the opinion the Buccaneer situation is going to have to be resolved, at least in the short term, without help from the Legislature" (Testerman 1996a). Both the restaurant tax and rental car ideas were raised in the 1996 legislative session but failed to be reported out of committee (Craig 1998; MacManus and Johnson 1996).

Another proposal for Hillsborough commissioners to allow voters to decide on the rental car tax increase in a September referenda with mixed support stalled. "If the members that are immediately affected by the Tampa Bay area show support, it'll pass," said House Speaker Peter Wallace, a bill supporter. "Most of the other members won't be real engaged in a fight unless the local members draw them into it" (Wallsten 1996). Senate President Jim Scott who worked for the Ft. Lauderdale law firm that represented Alamo-Rent-Car said he would remove himself from the rental car tax policy process, something he ultimately did not need to do as the measure was defeated in a Senate committee.

Meanwhile, County Administrator Kleman, County Attorney Emeline Acton, and their staffs were working with Mayor Greco, TSA officials, and members of the civic community and Chamber stadium task force to forge a plan with Buccaneer franchise representatives. Months of negotiations produced a proposal for subsidizing construction of a \$168 million football stadium and a \$12 million practice facility. Kleman outlined the plan at a March 27, 1996, county workshop session. It relied on a \$20 million cash contribution by TSA from a land sale to Tampa International Airport, and four annual revenue sources requiring

---

not significantly discussed or debated (Testerman 1995e).

significant state support. The finance plan called for \$8 million annually from a state supported rental car or restaurant tax, use of \$2 million from a state sales tax rebate, \$1.9 million in surcharges and user fees on stadium tickets, parking and concessions, and a \$5.9 million payment from the team that could be reduced over time (Hillsborough County BOCC 1996a). Comments and questions raised at the workshop produced twelve amendments to the term sheet to which the team was asked to respond.

An emergency meeting was called for Friday, March 29, at which proponents asked the BOCC to approve the lease agreed to by county administrators, the mayor, private sector leaders, and Buccaneer General Manager McKay. Kleman presented those twelve concerns and the responses to them to board members item by item. After discussion on these issues, Chillura moved that the board approve the deal and authorize the administrator to proceed with the Buccaneers lease agreement despite the lack of an identified subsidy source. Turanchik seconded the motion and praised the policy process that produced the proposal, adding that the current plan protected county property owners and taxpayers. Five commissioners voted to accept the agreement, while Chris Hart, citing limits to the amount the public should pay for a stadium, and Sandra Wilson, opposed it (Hillsborough County BOCC 1996c).

Finding a specific financial subsidy plan was the subject of a May 8, 1996, county workshop. Several policy options were discussed including the use of a general obligation bond that would be repaid either by raising the *ad valorem* millage, or by issuing a one-half percent sales tax increase for a period of 36 months. Another idea was to endorse a sales tax increase to subsidize multiple community projects. Each of these options required citizen approval through a referendum under the county charter. Kleman highlighted terms of the county's agreement with the team including a 25-day window for developing an alternate funding plan if no action were taken by the legislature (Hillsborough County BOCC 1996c). When the legislative session ended without stadium subsidy support, negotiators from all parties were sent scrambling to save their stadium plan.

Commissioners ruled out the *ad valorem* idea and decided to concentrate on the sales tax increase proposal. At issue was whether to propose a single-issue tax or a multipurpose tax to county voters. Commissioner Chillura presented the advantages of a multipurpose community investment tax that would raise revenue for several policy needs from a single sales tax increase. He suggested that 42 percent of the

tax support education, 24 percent be allocated to public safety, and 34 percent be used for community infrastructure including stadium construction. This idea had few supporters. Commissioner Turanchik voiced concern against coupling stadium subsidies, a non-essential function of government, with the core government items of education and public safety. Hart suggested putting a single-issue tax increase dealing with the stadium only before the voters, an idea Turanchik supported. Chillura responded that getting public approval for any tax increase would be difficult, but he felt that the multipurpose tax idea had a better chance of gaining support than the single-issue proposal. By the end of the workshop commissioners agreed to move the referendum process forward to meet deadlines for a September referendum and to decide on the specific subsidy plan later. They set another public workshop for June 5 to solicit input on whether to place a single-issue tax or a multipurpose tax proposal before voters (Hillsborough County BOCC 1996c; Dougherty 1996a).

On June 5, the audience exceeded the 250 seats in county chambers during a four-hour hearing over the two tax proposals. Commissioners and members of the public discussed various county needs, sometimes disagreeing on priorities. Support for the multipurpose tax idea increased as additional projects were identified that could be funded from this source, and the debate eventually boiled down to the term of the tax. Kleman and Chillura suggested a 30-year tax was needed to raise enough money for the list of county projects estimated to cost around \$900 million. But commissioners Dottie Berger and Norman said they could not support a tax that lasted that long. Chillura agreed to a compromise on a 15-year plan in order to get commission approval. A proposal to let voters decide on a 15-year multipurpose tax issue was ultimately passed by a 4-2 vote. Turanchik and Hart supported the 30-year plan and voted against the 15-year idea arguing that the shorter term did not provide enough money for other county projects (Henderson 1996b).

The Hillsborough County School Board and Plant City and Temple Terrace City Councils also endorsed the 15-year multipurpose tax idea. But Tampa officials supported a 30-year multipurpose tax and rejected the 15-year plan claiming it did not provide enough money for city public works and safety projects. Some members of the city council even supported a 15-year, single-issue stadium tax and asked Mayor Greco to take that idea back to county officials.

Knowing the city needed an infusion of revenue for general services, public safety, and educational facilities, Greco advocated that the city continue to pursue support for a 30-year multipurpose tax plan. While proposals for funding schools, police or a stadium were not likely to pass on their own, the combined community tax found greater support. “From my standpoint, when I took over as mayor eight years ago we needed money for police and fire, and we needed money for the school system and roads,” said Greco. “Somebody came up with the idea if you add a new stadium put it all together it will pass. I thought that was a pretty sad commentary on people. But the more I heard about it, the more people talked about it, the more I became convinced that maybe they were right” (Greco, interview, 2002).

The City Council endorsed that idea. Charlie Miranda was the lone dissenter. He argued that voters should be able to decide about the stadium separate from decisions on education and public safety. “I am not against the stadium,” Miranda said. “I am against the way it’s being presented” (Henderson 1996c). Symbolically he wore black clothing to council meetings but structurally he was not able to alter the subsidy plan.

The stadium lease agreement, supported by Greco, also passed the Tampa Council by a 4-2 vote. Councilman Rudy Fernandez joined Miranda in voting against the stadium plan. Council member Scott Paine voted for it, even though he did not like the plan, but felt that it should ultimately be up to the voters to decide the issue (Henderson 1996d).

The county commission, the other two city councils, and the school board also approved the 30-year multipurpose tax plan. Local leaders collaborated to place the policy alternative of a half-cent sales tax increase before county voters and offered, in exchange, a buffet of public works projects to be subsidized from the resulting revenue.

### **Public Opinion**

Public support for professional sports facility subsidies was low in the Tampa-Hillsborough area prior to the time the Glazers purchased the Buccaneers. The public opinion polls commissioned by the Chamber of Commerce, local newspapers, and private interest groups showed little support for the various public policy options floated prior to the CIT. And public opinion was even split on the issue through the

week of the referendum. While the affirmative outcome of the CIT vote was secured by an outstanding voter turnout for football fans, exit polls show significant disapproval of the stadium subsidy plan. Exit polling showed that 52% of those asked felt the Glazers had repeatedly insulted the citizens of the community and 56% felt the Glazers would get richer as common people could not keep up with their current bills (MacManus and Johnson 1996).

One poll of 3000 residents released in December 1994 by a private firm found 54 percent of the respondents willing to pay an extra \$50 a year in taxes and 65% willing to accept a \$25 increase to renovate the old stadium. Another survey conducted at that time by the *Tampa Tribune* newspaper of 546 Hillsborough County residents found that about half of those asked favored renovating Tampa Stadium using tax money, but 70% opposed granting large public subsidies for building a new stadium (Stebbins, Kenyon and Koehn 1995). The poll also found 84 percent of the respondents supported the team staying in the area while 14 percent said it did not matter, and 2 percent preferred the Buccaneers leave Tampa Bay (Kenyon 1995c).

A private interest group poll of 516 Hillsborough County adults conducted by the Florida Research Group for the *Tribune* and released in October 1995 on the restaurant tax idea found that 65 percent of respondents supported some small addition to their dining bill to subsidize a stadium. The level of support increased to 68 percent when a plan for a cultural arts project was included with the stadium (Koehn and Henderson 1995). The restaurant tax idea had support from some public and private officials. City council approved it while the county commission rejected it before interest group opposition in the state legislature finally defeated it.

Another Florida Research Group poll of 643 randomly selected Hillsborough County adults in May 1996 found 49 percent of those polled opposing tax subsidies for an improved stadium and 40 percent supporting it. About three-fourths of the respondents indicated that keeping the Buccaneers in Tampa was important while 15 percent said it was not. The poll conducted for the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce also found 49% of respondents against paying for half of the stadium cost. Still, 75% felt it was important to keep the Buccaneers in town, and 15% said it was not important (Kenyon 1995b).

As commissioners contemplated which subsidy policy to present to the voters, the Chamber commissioned yet another poll of 500 registered voters in Hillsborough County at the suggestion of NFL officials. It found that 66 percent of those asked were opposed to a half-cent tax increase for three years to fund a new stadium, while 32 percent supported the idea and two percent were undecided. A question that combined using tax money for a stadium subsidy and for funding construction of schools and jails was opposed 52 to 43 percent with five percent undecided. Another plan lumping increased police personnel budgets with subsidies for jail, school and stadium construction in a 30-year half-cent sales tax increase found 50 percent in favor, 46 percent opposed, and four percent undecided with a 4.4 percent margin of error (Henderson 1996a). Pollsters did not release the wording of the questions to the public, leading to suspicion from subsidy opponents that stadium backers were masking their results that found low support in the community (Dougherty 1996b).

Public opinion varied on the issue and there were extensive letters to the editor printed in the *Tampa Tribune* and *St. Petersburg Times* (1995, 1996). The general opinion opposed sports subsidies in general and many despised what was essentially a threat to move by the Glazers. While opposition existed and was publicly widespread, their voices were drowned by the opinion of sports fans backed by the political leadership and the team of public relations specialists enlisted by the Buccaneers.

Ultimately, the true measure of public opinion was gauged on election day. The ballot question asked Hillsborough voters to vote the entire tax package up or down. In the voting booth, they could not separate support or dissent for the stadium subsidy from the other elements in the plan. "Some people said you are forcing us to vote for it because we want some of those things, but we don't want all of them," said Chillura. "But then you can't have your cake and eat it, too" (Chillura, interview, 2002). In essence, this strategy proved successful for the proponents. By logrolling several pressing community needs with the proposal for the stadium subsidy, proponents placed a Christmas tree bill before voters, holding support for schools and infrastructure hostage to the demand for stadium subsidies.

According to CIT exit polls, inclusion of the stadium subsidy along with education and public safety insured that the referendum passed, though it was, perhaps, the measure with the least solid public support. A comparison of exit polls from the successful CIT referendum and the two referenda defeated a

year earlier found that those people who voted in 1996, but did not vote in 1995, helped pass the CIT. “The major differences in the profiles and support patterns of the new voters were in their income, education, and attitudes about the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. New voters who supported the CIT were more educated, more affluent, and more positive about the Bucs than opponents” (MacManus and Johnson, 1996, ii).

Only nine percent of voters polled linked their support of the CIT exclusively to the inclusion of the stadium in the plan and 50% said they would not have supported it without schools included. Forty percent said their support was tied to support for the police and firefighters. What is clear is that voters would have rejected single issue taxes in 1996 had the referenda been split into three different questions (MacManus and Johnson, 1996, iv). The composition of the high voter turnout aided CIT supporters. “Had the timing not been what it was this may not have passed. Schools were overcrowded, an old police helicopter crashed, infrastructure was deteriorating, and the Bucs were leaving” (Chillura, interview, 2002). Greco shared similar views.

I was rather surprised that (the stadium) meant so much to people. More people got out to vote that were the ones that wanted to keep the football team. So basically it was a godsend to the community. Although the other things in my view were more important, the honest to God truth to it is that voting for schools, fire, and police failed, and you add the stadium and it passed. Again, the deals you have to make with the owners and so forth are not always the most sensible business decisions in the world. But what is it worth to your community? Everyone that has ever left if they got them back they paid dearly for it. So we didn't do bad. It's going very well and there will always be a handful of people against it. Whether I liked it or not, personally I think it is good for the community (Greco, interview, 2002).

Public opinion was not in support of the stadium issue on its own and polled slightly higher coupled with other issues. The CIT combination served to raise enough votes to support the entire package, and the stadium subsidy rode on the back of the needs in county schools and police protection.

## **Summary**

The Buccaneers were not an elite NFL commodity in 1995 when Malcolm Glazer bought the team, but the franchise formed an important part of Tampa Bay's community image (Mormino 1983). Glazer's threat to move the Buccaneers if he was not granted public subsidies posed a policy problem for local leaders. Hillsborough commissioners determined early in the process that they would place any

funding proposal before county voters due in part to public perceptions over the handling of the recent arena deal and the general regional mood on sports subsidies. Local leaders needed a solution that appeased both team interests and the voters. Several public policy proposals were introduced and then defeated before the idea for a multipurpose community tax emerged and gained support.

The CIT provided leaders with a vehicle to accomplish their policy goals of financing several pressing public projects while also subsidizing stadium costs. The stadium subsidy plan faced little opposition in the formal political structures and benefited from finding community proponents with informal influence. Organized opposition arose to challenge the legality of this plan but the state supreme court ultimately rejected the lawsuits.

The Buccaneers have enjoyed increased attendance and generated profits at the new 72,000-plus-seat stadium. The value of the franchise increased, the Glazers profited, and the team enhanced both its image and winning percentage. “The Glazers came along and bought this team for nearly \$200 million, just under that. Nobody could have ever dreamed the franchise would cost that much. Frankly, they thought the Glazers were a little nuts, nobody had ever paid \$200 million for a team before,” said Greco. “Of the 30 NFL teams, the average profit was \$6 million. From a business standpoint it really didn’t make any sense. They really didn’t know it was going to appreciate to where it did. But it did. Now some people are resentful of the fact they are making money. They could have lost everything they had” (Greco, interview, 2002).

While support for the stadium subsidy was linked to the other issues, in reality the stadium subsidy is a small portion of the overall use of CIT revenue. The CIT helped fund 15 new schools and buy needed police cars and equipment. “Those funds made that possible,” said the mayor (Greco, interview, 2002). From this perspective, the coupling of the stadium subsidy with other policy needs provided a winning decision. The multipurpose tax plan placed before voters to accomplish several community needs provides an innovative way for sports facility proponents to secure scarce public subsidies. It also provided a vehicle for lawmakers to logroll the stadium subsidy past voters by tying support for it to assistance for education and public safety.

## Chapter VII

### Case Analysis

Professional sports facilities are major projects that present public policy challenges. Studying the policy process behind the adoption of sports facility subsidy decisions permits yet another view on who governs in urban communities. Decisions to subsidize these facilities involve formal and informal power arrangements, and elected and non-elected community members as policy makers. The proponents and opponents shape the particular policy outcomes. These outcomes are also tied to the policy options available and to public opinion.

The cases of Joe Robbie Stadium (JRS), American Airlines Arena (AAA), Ice Palace (IP), and Raymond James Stadium (RJS) provide us with some insight on local government and coalition building in support of or in opposition to controversial public policies. By employing a public policy process framework in examining these four cases of sports subsidy decisions, we can better understand how local government makes decisions and determine which theory of community power best describes why those decisions are made.

In this chapter, I provide an in-depth examination of the policy process framework used to study the four sports facility subsidy decisions by analyzing each variable independently. I also consider potential interactions between the individual components of the framework. Following this analysis, I return to my hypothesis and conclude this chapter by arguing that coalition theory best describes the exercise of power in metropolitan areas on these sports policy issues.

#### **Decision to Subsidize**

Policy decisions to grant professional sports facility subsidies differ from case to case in terms of both the quantity and quality of subsidy. In these four cases, the two most common categories of sports facility subsidies were financial and land-based. In some cases, facility proponents sought both financial and land-based subsidies, while in other scenarios proponents primarily attempted to secure one or the other subsidy type (see Table 3).

**Table 3. Subsidies Requested and Subsidies Received**

Case Study	Action	Financial Subsidy	Land-based Subsidy
Pre-JRS plan	Requested	Stadium support from city or sports authority	Land support from city or sports authority
	Received	None	None
JRS decision	Requested	Access to IRBs	Access to 160 acres and rezoning
	Received	Access to \$80 million in IRBs 99 year lease \$1/year	Access to 160 acres and rezoning Turnpike access road and extensions
Pre-AAA plan	Requested	Full arena construction subsidy	Waterfront location
	Received	Full arena construction subsidy (Ridder Plan)	Waterfront location
AAA decision	Requested	Substantial public involvement	60 acres waterfront location
	Received	Full arena operating costs (Penelas Plan) \$3.5 million/year county subsidy	18 acres waterfront location
Pre-IP plan	Requested	\$60 million in construction subsidies (TCI plan)	Land and lease on stadium site location
	Received	Tampa city and sports authority approval; Rejected by Hillsborough Commission	None
IP decision	Requested	County, city, and state subsidy	Downtown support for arena location
	Received	\$3.5 million county funds over 30 years; \$1 million/year from city from parking tax; \$2 million/year state sales tax rebate	18 acres of downtown land acquired and cleared for project; 6 acres for the arena
Pre RJS plan	Requested	Full stadium construction subsidy	N/A
	Received	None	N/A
RJS decision	Requested	Full stadium construction subsidy	N/A
	Received	Full stadium construction subsidy (\$168 million) from 12% of CIT revenue \$2 million/year state sales tax rebate	N/A

Financial subsidies included dedicating revenue sources to make bond payments or issuing government-backed bonds to support a facility. Land-based public subsidies included assistance in land acquisition and approval of zoning rules.

With the building of JRS, Joe Robbie initially sought financial subsidies to support new stadium construction. When support for this did not surface Robbie chose to privately finance the stadium especially after land-based subsidies became an option. Robbie succeeded in getting land-based subsidies from Miami-Dade County officials who agreed to buy the Lake Lucerne land from private developers and lease it to the Dolphins for \$1 annually. County commissioners also approved re-zoning policies against the will of local residents and court decisions upheld these decisions. Additional support came from county and state agencies that provided infrastructure subsidies or assistance in securing environmental clearances, and the use of the tax-exempt Industrial Revenue Bonds with federal support.

The AAA case presents a different strategy where Micky Arison sought both financial subsidy for arena construction and land-based subsidies for a waterfront location in building a new Miami Heat arena. Initially, county officials agreed to the Ridder plan under which the franchise stood to receive both types of subsidies. But two events altered the subsidy decision. The citizen initiative put the issue on the ballot and the election of Alex Penelas as executive mayor challenged the Ridder plan. The Penelas plan negotiated between the mayor's advisors and Arison representatives ultimately included the land subsidy but trimmed the public financial burden with the Heat agreeing to privately finance construction of the facility while the county would subsidize the cost of operating the arena. The compromise helped the Heat save their land subsidy by gaining the support of the mayor to campaign against and defeat the grassroots referendum.

Like Arison and the Heat, Lightning executives sought both financial and land-based subsidies for a new arena. Under the initial TCI stadium site plan they would have received both types of support. Land for an arena on the stadium location was secured through TCI's long-term lease with the sports authority but county officials rejected the financial subsidies and effectively ended the group's ability to build the stadium site arena. The subsequent and successful Ice Palace plan tapped into both financial and land-based subsidies. Distinctively, members of the private sector and key public officials forged support for a public-private partnership. County tourism taxes, city parking surcharges, and state subsidies ultimately financed

about two-thirds of IP costs and the franchise was responsible for the remaining cost. The city waived an entertainment fee on the facility and subsidized land transactions and zonings with private investors to streamline the process. Members of the business community committed to buy multiple tracts of land and make it available for the arena to expedite the process.

Malcolm Glazer and his sons initiated the building of RJS with a demand for financial subsidies. Land subsidies were moot since the primary proposed stadium location was on TSA-owned land adjacent to the existing stadium. Gaining support for financial subsidies proved difficult for the Glazers and they eventually pledged to commit a share of the financial costs for stadium construction. Still, county commissioners struggled to find a policy solution for months before proposing the Community Investment Tax. The multipurpose tax won support from area voters by a 53% to 47% margin, and dedicated about 12% of the revenue from the half-cent sales tax increase to stadium subsidies with the remaining funds going to education, public safety, and infrastructure.

It appears that stadium proponents may have an easier time securing land-based subsidies than financial subsidies. In each case where land was sought for a stadium or arena site, the developers were successful (JRS, AAA, IP). The ability to sell plans for larger development projects that can bring economic benefits to a community bolsters the case to support land-based subsidies for public officials. Land-based subsidies and zoning policies do not generate the perception of a large public sacrifice in exchange for their potential to stimulate commercial development.

On the other hand, securing direct financial support was more difficult and required some form of public approval either through a referendum (RJS) or through strong private sector support (IP), or with both (AAA). In securing subsidy support, sports facility proponents must show significant investment of their own (JRS, AAA, RJS). Financial subsidies appear to have a direct cost to the public in terms of the dollar amounts as well as the perceived trade-off in spending on sports facilities as opposed to other community needs. Moreover, knowledge about the wealth of team owners and the potential revenues from professional sports events raises concerns over the granting of corporate welfare.

In each case, proponents of sports subsidies ultimately needed to form coalitions to support their subsidy demands. The speed with which a coalition was formed and the ability to draw support from public

officials and members of the informal sector impacted its chances of achieving desired outcomes. The following analysis of each element of the policy framework provides a view of coalition formation and some general conclusions about when, why, and how much public subsidy will be available to sports arena and stadium developers.

### **Formal Political Structure**

Formal political structure refers to the design of legal authority in local governments of which numerous mayor-council and council-manager systems exist. The design of formal city and county government structures can shape the rules of the political game and set the parameters for participants competing in the policy process as local governments are often structured with biases that favor certain community interests over others (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Harrigan 1993; Harrigan and Vogel 2003; Shattschneider 1960).

With respect to this study, counties, cities, and special government districts (sports authorities) shaped the strategies for pursuing subsidies and helped determine the ultimate decisions (see Table 4). The JRS and AAA cases involved the City of Miami, Miami-Dade County, and to a lesser extent, the Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority (MSEA) and the Dade-Broward Sports Authority. The subsidy decisions for the IP and RJS primarily involved the City of Tampa, Hillsborough County, and the Tampa Sports Authority (TSA). Miami-Dade County experienced a structural change between the JRS and AAA cases and again during the formation of AAA subsidy decisions while Hillsborough County and the cities concerned retained the same structure through both cases.

Robbie's search for stadium subsidies involved Miami-Dade County, the City of Miami, and to a lesser extent, the local sports authorities. The actions of several sports authorities had a negligible impact on shaping the stadium deal. A sports authority jointly created by Miami-Dade and Broward County officials in January 1985 failed to produce public support for a stadium plan. Other Dade Sports Authority officials preferred a downtown stadium site and failed to agree with Robbie on location. The sports authorities were ineffective in shaping the stadium policy outcome and ultimately worked at odds with Robbie's interests, prompting him to pursue the private finance option.

**Table 4. Formal Sector (FS) and Informal Sector (IS) Political Influences**

<b>Level of Influence</b>	<b>Joe Robbie Stadium</b>	<b>American Airlines Arena</b>	<b>Ice Palace</b>	<b>Raymond James Stadium</b>
<b>High</b>	<p>Joe Robbie and Dolphin Center Task Force (IS)</p> <p>Morton Properties (land suppliers) (IS)</p>	<p>Micky Arison (IS)</p> <p>Anthony Ridder (IS)</p> <p>Miami-Dade County Mayor Penelas (FS)</p> <p>Mayor Penelas' advisors (IS)</p>	<p>Hillsborough County Admin. Karl and some commissioners (FS)</p> <p>Downtown Development Parts. (IS)</p> <p>Tampa Mayor Freedman (FS)</p>	<p>Glazer family (IS)</p> <p>Chamber Stadium Task Force (IS)</p> <p>County Administrator Kleman County Commissioner Chillura (FS)</p>
<b>Medium</b>	<p><i>Norland and Rolling Oaks Homeowner Associations (IS)</i></p> <p>Dade County Commissioners (FS)</p> <p>North Dade Chamber of Commerce (IS)</p>	<p><i>Dan Paul and Save our Parks Committee (IS)</i></p> <p>County Manager Vidal (FS)</p> <p>City Councilman Joe Carollo (FS)</p>	<p>Lightning representatives (IS)</p> <p>Chamber of Commerce Committee of 100 (IS)</p> <p>Tampa Sports Authority officials (FS)</p>	<p><i>William Poe (IS)</i></p> <p>City of Tampa Mayor Greco (FS)</p> <p>Tampa Sports Authority officials (FS)</p>
<b>Low/None</b>	<p>Non-Group (IS)</p> <p><i>City of Miami Mayor Ferre (FS)</i></p> <p><i>Dade Sports Authority (FS)</i></p>	<p><i>Broward County Commission (FS)</i></p> <p><i>Dade County Commission Opponents (FS)</i></p>	<p><i>TCI executives (IS)</i></p> <p><i>Small Business owner Charlie Miranda (IS)</i></p>	<p><i>Tampa Councilman Charlie Miranda (FS)</i></p> <p><i>Orange and Osceola County officials (FS)</i></p>

Note: Subsidy Proponents in regular type; *Subsidy Opponents in italics*

The City of Miami focused mainly on keeping the Dolphins in the Orange Bowl, as well as some proposals to build a new stadium downtown. Mayor Maurice Ferre and city commissioners placed initiatives before the voters to raise revenue for keeping the Dolphins in a renovated Orange Bowl but voters rejected them, and even Robbie campaigned against them because he was determined to leave the city stadium. Despite Ferre's charisma, popularity, and his threats to invoke eminent domain, his office wielded little formal power and he was unsuccessful in keeping the Dolphins in the City of Miami.

Decisions by Miami-Dade County officials had the greatest impact on the JRS subsidy outcomes. But the "Metro" political system with at-large elections, a mainly symbolic mayor, and a commission-appointed county manager decentralized political power and left a leadership vacuum when it came to advancing major policy agenda items (Koenig et. al. 1990; Moreno, Hill and Cue 1997; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren 1997). Though the county mayor's position was administratively weak, Steve Clark wielded political influence as a long time office occupant. Robbie allied with Clark and a coalition of commissioners who favored his land-based subsidy. While there was low leadership exerted from Mayor Clark or any single commissioner, the commission came to a consensus in support of the plan to purchase land from private investors and lease it to Robbie at a favorable rate. They also approved a financial subsidy through the use of IRBs, tax-exempt government bonds, to ease Robbie's private financing burden (Keating 1999; Kleinberg 1999). There was low political risk to the mayor and county commissioners who were elected at-large. The commissioner who lived in the stadium's district was subsequently reelected under the at-large system despite an electoral challenge by the homeowners' opposition leader, Betty Ferguson.

In the AAA case, Micky Arison and his Miami Heat franchise representatives worked with Miami-Dade County, the City of Miami, and the Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority (MSEA) in an attempt to gain support for public subsidies to build a new basketball arena. Broward County also made significant, but unsuccessful, attempts to lure the Heat to that county north of Miami-Dade. Actions by the city and sports authority ultimately put the arena decision in the hands of county officials, and a competition between Miami-Dade and Broward favored the franchise and increased their bargaining position.

An initial concern when Heat executives sought a new arena was the contract clause in the MSEA's Miami Arena agreement with Decoma that prohibited the building of a competing county arena. MSEA officials filed lawsuits attempting to keep the Heat from building another arena in Miami-Dade and sports authority opposition to a new Miami-Dade arena was formidable until Joe Carollo was elected to the city commission and became MSEA chair. Carollo wanted the Heat to stay in downtown Miami and he replaced MSEA officials who opposed a new arena. Ultimately, the city settled with MSEA and Decoma, thus ending the legal threat. Carollo was a significant player in allowing the arena decision to take shape due to his formal power as a commissioner chairing the sports authority.

Carollo was elected mayor in 1997 and played a crucial role in negotiations over terms of the county land purchase from the city. The county planned to lease about 50 acres from the city for the project but when the county could not afford it, Carollo suggested that the city sell 17 acres needed for the arena and worked to get city approval. As mayor, his role in working the land deal was important and a result of charismatic leadership more than formal authority.

Ultimately, Miami-Dade County government was the primary political structure under which both the community facilitator Anthony Ridder's plan and the executive Mayor Alex Penelas' plan for arena subsidy policies were formulated. Heat franchise executives confronted an evolving county government system that had changed from nine at-large commissioners to 13 single member district seats in the decade since Robbie sought stadium support in Miami-Dade. This structural change also eliminated the mayor's office further leaving a leadership vacuum in county policymaking. With a decentralized system no single commissioner could easily forge a plan and form a coalition to support stadium subsidies. The Heat negotiated with neighboring Broward County officials and the threat of the Heat moving to the neighboring county spurred Miami-Dade administrators in January 1996 to enlist a member of the civic community to facilitate negotiations with the Heat. The resulting policy proposal was negotiated in meetings in informal settings and then voted upon by the commission at an emergency meeting. It called for using the county tourism tax and revenue generated from the arena to pay for facility construction. The county manager supported the Ridder plan and an 8-5 commission majority approved it.

Penelas was one of five commissioners opposed to the Ridder plan. These opposition commissioners were unable to block the Ridder plan or to place the issue on a ballot referendum through the formal structure. The citizen initiative opposed to the use of public waterfront land for an arena was successful that summer in placing the question on the November ballot. In early October, Penelas became the new executive county mayor, and since the financial subsidy policy was still subject to final county approval, he could have potentially derailed the Ridder plan either through the powers of his new office or by supporting the citizen campaign against the arena location. Given his perceived popularity, his base of support from the Hispanic community, and his new formal powers, Penelas felt he held a mandate to modify Ridder's deal with the Heat. The mayor delegated the task of reworking the arena subsidy policy to his private consultants, not county staff, thus placing the issue outside formal channels. Without leadership from Penelas and his consultants, the arena plan could have been sabotaged; with their support, a subsidy plan came to fruition.

The Tampa arena decisions were also shaped by city, county and sports authority actions. TSA and city officials initially supported the TCI plan for a public-private finance plan but county commissioners rejected it in December 1990. Without county support TCI ultimately failed in their attempt to privately finance an arena despite a deal with the sports authority for use of the stadium site location. TCI's failure triggered county and city officials in favor of a downtown arena to act. Hillsborough Commissioners turned to the County Administrator to lead negotiations, and in December 1993, agreed to pledge \$3.5 million annually. County officials and Tampa mayoral staff faced the threat that without a new arena the franchise would leave Tampa Bay. County commissioners in a 6-1 vote approved the plan crafted in private meetings in November 1994.

Formation of the IP plan benefited from mayoral leadership at a key time in the negotiation process. Sandy Freedman's major contribution was in linking the parties together when she convened the main players for a dinner meeting to spur discussions (Scherberger 1993b). The mayor encouraged and supported private efforts to secure land for the arena, provided city support for an arena initiative, and also jockeyed for county government to take a greater stake in developing downtown Tampa.

I played both sides, primarily because I thought it was the only way to get the county involved. Because if the city wanted it downtown, just like everything they would say 'fine, do it, and you pay for it, too.' We could not have done it. The city was tapped out. The economy was poor. We could not have done it, and I did not think we should do it (Freedman, interview, 2001).

Freedman directed an atmosphere that promoted communication and policy formation based on larger strategic growth-oriented goals (Svara 1999). The formal mayoral authority was less a factor than the ability to foster an agreement based on the charismatic direction of negotiations at an important time in the process of coalition formation.

The financial subsidy required significant cooperation between city and county governments and the land decisions included important private input from Beneficial Corp. and downtown development advocates. The mayor with the county administrator coordinated collaborative discussions that resulted in quick policy formation and implementation. Even as her efforts were essential for the development of a downtown arena, Freedman was still viewed by some business leaders as not being a strong growth advocate (Kerstein 2001).

The RJS decision also involved both the Tampa and Hillsborough governments along with the TSA (and to a lesser extent Plant City and Temple Terrace and Hillsborough School Board). Local and state leaders suggested several tax plans after the Glazers demand for stadium subsidies, but none were adopted (Craig 1998; MacManus and Johnson 1996). The inability of county commissioners to find a revenue source for a stadium subsidy that they could support broadened the scope of the policy issue and included public input to a large extent in shaping the financial plan. Eventually a plan was proposed to use a multipurpose sales tax increase to fund a stadium as well as education, police and fire projects. The multipurpose tax plan also needed and received support from the councils of three Hillsborough municipalities, the school board and the sports authority.

Tampa Mayor Dick Greco assumed a key leadership role even though the stadium site is located in unincorporated territory. Greco also had personal experience in professional sports facility negotiations and served as liaison to the civic community. The mayor helped negotiate the stadium agreement with county administrators, sports authority executives, and franchise and league representatives. He also acted as a spokesman in efforts to sell seats through the chamber task force to raise funds for stadium financing and

gave many speeches in support of the closely divided issue. “The leadership in the community and the region is coming from the city. Part of that is structural. We have a strong mayor form of government which allows for a crisper, clearer voice, where they (the BOCC) have seven people and competing interests who all have different takes on things,” said one city council member (Saul-Sena, interview, 2002).

The decentralized Hillsborough County structure placed barriers before Glazer’s wish for a publicly financed facility. Political leadership in support of stadium subsidies was lacking with no county mayor to champion the issue and the commission chairman opposed to using subsidies without taxpayer approval. The county commission held the keys to a new stadium and they were not opening the public purse without voter approval. Commissioners held several public forums to discuss financing the stadium and community projects. Eventually the multipurpose tax idea emerged and gained support for a broad coalition of public interests.

Prior to that initiative, and even now after the initiative, there has never been an issue that brought the community together in terms of its governmental entities, and it took a lot of effort. Can you imagine getting three municipalities, the unincorporated area and the school board to all agree on anything? The community investment tax was a catalyst to bring consensus to the community and the needs of the community. So I think that was a very positive political spin off of this that hasn’t occurred since (Chillura, interview, 2002).

In this case the lack of strong leadership on the county commission forestalled subsidies until a plan emerged that met the community’s willingness to support a stadium. The omnibus bill that resulted from the open discussion and debate of policy options gave voters a voice on the stadium subsidy, but it was tied to their support for education and public safety priorities, similar to a logrolling strategy used in Chicago for stadium subsidy support (Rich 2000; Sidlow and Henschen 1998).

In each of the cases studied, county governments were at the center of shaping subsidy decisions. The two stadium cases were located in growing unincorporated areas and were under the purview of county authority. Both arena facilities were located in the downtown area and within Miami and Tampa city limits, yet the involvement of county officials and the percentage of county contributions in overall decisions placed a greater need for subsidy coalitions to include county administrators and commissioners. The structure of large urban county governments often decentralizes leadership and places power in the hands

of administrators over commissioners. In each of these cases, county government structure was decentralized except for the reworking of the Ridder Plan in to the AAA plan negotiated by the Penelas team following the election of a Miami-Dade executive mayor. The lack of strong leadership for coalition building within these county governments meant that subsidy proponents had to find ways to mobilize support beyond simply shaping a majority of decision makers. Often this required garnering support from members of the informal sector.

In Miami-Dade, under the old at-large system, county officials were unwilling to subsidize the stadium but did agree to subsidize its location and facilitate in development. The at-large electoral system allowed commissioners to approve the land subsidy without serious recourse from the homeowner groups or from county voters. Robbie needed county participation in his coalition with Morton Properties and development-minded interests for the land rezoning plan to be approved. Leadership in Miami-Dade was further decentralized under the district-based system imposed by the 1993 court decision. When faced with the threat of the Heat moving to Broward, Miami-Dade commissioners appointed a community facilitator to negotiate on their behalf. The Ridder plan was approved but the county experienced a countervailing change in 1996 when an executive mayor scuttled it and developed an alternative subsidy plan.

The decentralization of county power also impacted the process by which subsidies were approved in Hillsborough. The arena deal resulted from the coalition of county and city proponents and private leaders. While stadium subsidies were approved for RJS, Hillsborough commissioners were sensitive to public opinion against financial subsidies so they solicited citizen input at several workshop sessions resulting in formation of the CIT plan. Commissioners delegated responsibility for negotiations to the county administrator who forged a coalition with franchise officials, sports authority administrators, the mayor and members of the Chamber-sponsored stadium task force. By itself this pro-stadium coalition could not secure subsidies at the state or county level. With the inclusion of the School Board and county public safety officials subsidy proponents mustered enough of an electoral coalition to secure sales tax dollars for stadium construction.

In each case, city mayors visibly attempted to shape subsidy decision outcomes. In three cases, mayors were subsidy coalition members and provided city support for projects. In the JRS case, Ferre

lacked formal power as mayor to keep the Dolphins in Miami, but he also was working at odds with Robbie's preference for a suburban stadium. After voters defeated his plan to expand the Orange Bowl Ferre did not become a member of the Robbie's subsidy coalition and he also did not oppose it. Carollo cleared the competition to a new arena from MSEA as a city commissioner, then as mayor he negotiated the land deal with the county for the AAA location that city officials approved through regular channels. Freedman helped direct discussions in the IP deal using her informal influence rather than executive authority and Greco was significant in the RJS case, but again, this was less due to the strong mayor structure than it was to the charisma and communication skills of the mayor.

A main difference between the RJS case and the others is that the eventual subsidy policy was shaped partly by public participation in county workshop meetings and through citizen voting on the referendum. By contrast, public participation was limited in shaping the IP, JRS and AAA plans. These plans were crafted in private and then presented to commissioners for approval, or in the case of the Penelas plan, shared with the public just days before a referendum to block arena development.

The involvement of the sports authorities was less significant than anticipated in shaping the policy alternatives. Two sports authorities were unsuccessful in attempts to support a new Dolphins' stadium. Members of the Dade Sports Authority were more interested in downtown development than in cooperating with Robbie's desire to build a state-of-the-art facility. Dade and Broward created a joint sports authority, but voters rejected their proposed tax increase to fund a stadium and county leaders let the entity expire. In the AAA case, the Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority (MSEA) presented an obstacle to new arena development because of the non-compete clause in the Miami Arena lease. That opposition was strong until city council member Joe Carollo replaced MSEA executives and pushed for a legal settlement with the arena developers.

Across the state, the Tampa Sports Authority (TSA) supported the plans of private developers for an arena at the Tampa stadium location. When TCI was unsuccessful in securing funding, TSA extended their lease agreement but this arena plan ultimately failed. TSA officials were less significant in shaping IP plans although the sports authority owns and operates the downtown facility. In the Tampa stadium case, TSA initially supported renovation to the original Tampa Stadium. When this plan was seen as too costly

they abandoned it and joined the coalition in support of finding a funding source for a new stadium. Sports authority officials helped negotiate financial and land-based agreements for the new facility located on the stadium complex land that they own.

Sports authorities played a different role depending on the case. Because the TSA is charged with a broad mission of enhancing sports in the region and is not strictly tied to particular facilities, it enjoyed more flexibility in the policy formulation stage than the MSEA. While TSA became a proponent for a new Tampa stadium, MSEA was a leading opponent of a new Miami-Dade arena. Even as the TSA initially supported a stadium site arena, it eventually compromised and supported the downtown Tampa arena. But the interests of the Dade Sports Authority that favored a downtown stadium conflicted with Robbie's goal for a suburban location and worked at cross-purposes with the subsidy proponents.

Political structure outlines the conditions under which coalitions are formed and policy options are formulated. The political structure can tell us what obstacles proponents are likely to face and provide insight to the types of strategies they may pursue. My analysis of the formal political government also highlights the leadership roles that public officials may play in the agenda setting, policy formulation, and adoption stages of decision making. The informal sector, subsidy proponents and opponents, the public policy options, and public opinion refine and further shape the formation of a subsidy plan.

### **Informal Sector**

The role of elites in exercising community power and the ability of business interests to influence urban policies suggest that the informal local political sector should be significant in shaping sports subsidy policies (Bachelor 1998; Dye 1966; Domhoff 1980; Hunter 1957; Keating 1999; Lindbloom 1977; Logan and Molotch 1987; Reiss 1998; Rosentraub 1988, 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998; Vogel 1997; Warner 1968; Waste 1980, 1987). There is often an identifiable group of civic and commercial leaders in a metropolitan area from which team owners can draw support for subsidy policies. Members of Chambers of Commerce, pro-growth groups, and civic community boosters are often part of the informal power structure (See Table 7-2).

Access to informal channels of political influence does not, however, guarantee that large subsidies will be granted. For example, Robbie was tied to Miami-Dade's informal inner circle and had political and social connections to decision makers as a member of the exclusive Non-Group (Dugger 1985). Though he had powerful friends, Robbie was fiercely independent and opted to plan on his own for the facility (Merzer 1987). While members of the Greater Miami and the North Dade's Chamber of Commerce were generally supportive of the idea, they were not significant in securing stadium subsidies. Ultimately, Robbie decided to finance stadium construction with private funds while securing a significant land and lease subsidy and infrastructure support.

An examination of the informal sector in the AAA case shows that it was significant in shaping both the Ridder plan and the Penelas plan. Initially, county officials turned to the informal sector to negotiate with the Heat and there was a willingness to work with Arison, who through his father was linked to the traditional power base of the Non-Group (Koenig et. al. 1990; Dugger 1985). But with the demographic transformation of Miami-Dade's formal political structure, its decentralization, and the input of Hispanic influence, relations of county leaders to the downtown business and civic leaders was weakened. Under a district-based commission-manager system, county leaders could not effectively negotiate with the Heat and asked for informal sector leadership through a community facilitator. Also of significance was the legitimization of the Hispanic power circle as the source of informal influence.

The evolution of the Ridder plan is an example where a civic leader from a traditional power base was asked to work a deal that public officials were unable to do individually or collectively. A special negotiator was required to devise the arena deal between the county, city and Heat executives because of flaws in the formal structure of local government. Because no single entity was able to pull off the arena project by itself, the plan needed approval from the three government bodies, "...not to mention the votes of 19 separately elected politicians, none of whom had greater political standing than any other. Only an outsider like Ridder could balance and harmonize all those pieces" (Fiedler 1996). This analysis illustrates the difficulties of producing local political leadership in a decentralized "hyper plural" political environment (Koenig et. al. 1990; Vogel and Stowers 1989; Warren 1997).

The election of an executive mayor in October 1996 reduced the public leadership gap and further altered the influence of members of the informal power structure. Mayor Penelas, who campaigned against arena subsidies, delegated authority to renegotiate the Ridder plan to three advisors: Mario Diaz-Balart and Herman Echevarria, who were members of the Hispanic civic and political community, and Raul Masvidal, a Non-Group member and old friend of Ted Arison. The mayor's three advisors could negotiate, as Ridder had, without media attention and outside the confines of the state's Sunshine Laws. Penelas and his links to the new informal sources of power through his electoral machine, his use of the Spanish-language media, and his support through the involvement of the civic community helped the arena subsidy plan. The Penelas plan was shaped by a Hispanic caucus rather than by interests representing traditional commercial and civic leaders. With the shift to the election of district-based commissioners reflecting Hispanic and black political interests and the election of an Hispanic executive mayor, the old power structure in Miami-Dade County yielded to an evolving structure of Latin leadership in the civic, economic, and social power structures (Warren and Moreno 2003). While it was a change in the formal structure that allowed for the reworking of the subsidy plan, the representatives of the executive mayor played an important informal role in the process and set the foundation for the emergence of a new governing coalition.

Informal leaders were also significant in the Ice Palace case. The initial proposal by TCI for their stadium site plan did not get county support even though this group had ties to Tampa's traditional elite institutions. Where members of Tampa's informal sector were significant was in forging the downtown arena plan. The Ice Palace deal reflects the way growth politics had been traditionally practiced in Tampa Bay: a coalition of commercial leaders with the mayor and a commission official making decisions to craft a policy behind closed doors (Kerstein 2001; Morimino 1983). Historically, the *Tampa Tribune* Sports Editor Tom McEwen (1961-92) could shape public opinion while a charismatic mayor like Nuccio or Greco guided the political structure, and community members like Vince Thornton (the first TSA chair) and George and Leonard Levy (community sports proponents who helped bring the Buccaneers to town) would work the civic side of a deal (Chick 1998; Wilborn 1995).

"This reminded me of how Tampa used to operate many years ago," said David Kerr, a lawyer with MacFarlane Ferguson, a Tampa firm. "If something had to get done, you'd get a few community

leaders together and get the job done” (Scherberger and Danielson 1993). But not all the old players were in coalition and there was even opposition from the *Tribune* on the Garrison Channel location for the downtown area. According to one account, ultimately the Ice Palace deal needed “...a shove from a county commissioner, an infusion of cash from the mayor and the last-minute intervention of a millionaire businessman with a big stake downtown” (Scherberger and Danielson 1993).

When the first Tampa stadium was built in the 1960s, Tampa Bay sports leaders envisioned what they wanted, and went out and did it. They were united and results-oriented (Chick 1998). Getting support for a new stadium was not that easy for Tampa Bay’s civic boosters who had helped earlier secure the Buccaneers and NFL Super Bowls. A *Tampa Tribune* writer likened the stadium debate to a symbol of the shifting power structure, from a few heavy-hitters who directed the public agenda to a new group of competing interests whose power is based solely on the money it has to participate in the debate (Chick 1998).

The politics behind Tampa’s new football stadium, RJS, strayed from the traditional model of policy making in Tampa. Successful public funding in this case required cooperation from the county commission as well the support of voters. Glazer and sons were not part of the Tampa Bay commercial elite and lacked significant connections to it when they bought the Buccaneers. Even with help from the establishment (Chamber, mayor and supporters, and some business interests) in selling advance seat tickets, they fell short of their financial goals. To draw on the public coffers Hillsborough officials, who represented suburban developers rather than the old guard, required any public funding venture to be put to county voters (Kerstein 2001). The CIT reflected innovative policy and practical politics rather than the sheer will and power of commercial elites. Glazer eventually found support for his new coliseum when political leaders log rolled the stadium subsidy along with other significant community needs. This strategy allowed them to draw on leaders from the informal sector.

With the Tampa arena and stadium, a major shift in the power structure was evidenced by the fact that it was no longer just a few committed individuals working to get things done, but that it took many more people to carry the load (Chick 1998). The emerging new leaders in Tampa Bay civic life included, for example, the group organized to guide the (failed) Florida 2012 Olympic Bid. Glazer, the Lightning,

and baseball Devil Rays owners were not involved as each of these ownership groups have other interests, and owners with multiple businesses are usually consumed by their own business dealings and have little time for other community activities. They are not part of the overall growth machine or a governing regime. Instead, their interest in the public agenda was limited to the sports facility subsidy issue. What is significant in the two Tampa-Hillsborough cases is the cooperation between the city and county working together in a way that they had not previously done (Chillura, interview, 2002; Freedman, interview 2001; Scherberger and Danielson 1993).

Public influence and decision making occurs at two levels. One level is occupied by elected officials pursuing one set of agendas on the public stage, and another level of players are the lawyer-lobbyists seeking subsidies from public officials in their dealings over policy issues. Local government officials may not always be the key figures in deals that can be shaped by forces that are beyond the scope of formal government. Interest groups, lobbyists and influential elites can alter the terms of political outcomes with significant consequences for government officials and the people. Thus, a proponent of facility subsidies would want to enlist members of the informal sector to increase their chances for success. Informal influence impacted the AAA and IP arena cases where members of the informal sector directly assisted in negotiating the subsidy outcome. In the JRS and RJS cases, informal actors also played a role in shaping the deal but were not the most significant for the coalition molding the decision.

### **Subsidy Proponents**

The role of proponents is significant because they are the ones that appear to have the greatest at stake in sports facility subsidy debates. The franchise owners usually initiate subsidy demands and place the issue on the public agenda (Bachelor 1998; Keating 1999; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1999; Sidlow and Henschen 1998). The greater ability of owners to draw proponent allies from the formal structure and the informal sector, the more likely it is that they will formulate favorable policy alternatives. Proponents need to form coalitions and gain support from those individuals who have access to decision-making channels (see Table 5).

**Table 5. Proponents and Opponents of Sports Facility Subsidies**

<b>CASE STUDY</b>	<b>PROPONENTS</b>	<b>OPPONENTS</b>
<b>Joe Robbie Stadium</b>	Joe Robbie Private land developers Miami-Dade County officials North Dade Chamber of Commerce	Lake Lucerne homeowners Miami city mayor (Ferre) South Florida Planning Council
<b>American Airlines Arena</b>	Micky Arison Downtown development interests County officials (Teele, Vidal) Chamber of Commerce Mayor Penelas and his advisors	MSEA Broward County officials Dan Paul Public space advocates Commissioner and Mayoral candidate Penelas
<b>Ice Palace</b>	Downtown development interests Lightning representatives (Tampa Bay Hockey Group) Some county officials (Karl and Turanchik) Tampa mayor (Freedman)	TCI Urban planners Fiscal conservatives
<b>Raymond James Stadium</b>	Glazer family NFL officials Some county officials (Chillura) Tampa mayor (Greco) Tampa Sports Authority	William Poe Public opinion Competing locales (Orlando and Osceola County) Charlie Miranda

Proponents can shape the debate to the extent that demand for their product (the franchise) exists (Euchner 1983; Keating 1999; Quirk and Fort 1992; Rosentraub 1999). Since a cost-benefit analysis of the economic value of the franchise itself may not be a sufficient threat to the local economy, a team owner's significant investments in the local area beyond the franchise can tilt the balance (Johnson and Sack 1996; Swindell and Rosentraub 1998). A team owner who has other financial links to the community can increase their politico-economic leverage and their ability to secure subsidies. For example, although Arison did not get the amount of subsidy that he initially desired, he could use his cruise business as a bargaining chip with county leaders to ultimately secure the waterfront location he desired. With JRS, IP, and RJS, the franchise owners did not have this type of influence, and had to increase their proponent base through other means such as the formation of alliances with key public and private officials.

Joe Robbie did not have other business interests in the community to leverage his ability to gain support for public subsidies but he increased his political leverage through alliances and campaign contributions to county commissioners. Robbie could threaten to move the Dolphins from Miami and while some football fans and local leaders would be sad, it would have a marginal impact on the local economy. Thus, Robbie found little support for financial subsidies from elected officials and the voting public, and decided to privately finance stadium construction. "I think Robbie was very proud, very headstrong, and opinionated. He kept succeeding when people told him he would fail," said Ferre. "Successful men with the Midas touch think they are invincible. People like Robbie think they don't make mistakes" (Ferre, interview, 2001). Robbie also sought support from county officials in securing the land subsidy. A majority of the growth-oriented commission approved the land purchase and rezoning requests. But the growth initiative was not strong enough to create the environment for direct financial outlays toward stadium construction.

Arison, on the other hand, owned Carnival Cruise, a large company in a major South Florida industry. When it came time to bargain for a new arena Arison used the threat of moving a couple of cruise ships from the Port of Miami to Port Everglades in Fort Lauderdale to impact negotiations. The threat was heightened when Broward County officials attempted to lure the Heat to a publicly financed two-sport

arena in their county. The cruise ship linkage initially helped in the negotiations, but ultimately may have been a liability because it simply did not make sense for the team or the ships to leave Miami.

Ultimately, despite the leverage Arison held he still paid \$160 million for arena construction on his preferred location. “The real hero in this story is Arison. This was his way to do something big for Miami and be proud, and he should be. He is the hero. He came up with \$160 million in cash. There are very few people who are big enough to do that. You or I can’t do that. (Former Florida Marlins owner) John Henry can’t do that,” said Mario Diaz-Balart, in reference to a franchise owner who failed to get public funding for a baseball park in downtown Miami (Diaz-Balart, interview, 2001).

The Lightning owners in the Tampa arena case present a unique example of proponents. The absentee Japanese ownership group hindered the ability of franchise supporters to rally proponent support. The team owners did not have additional Tampa Bay business interests to use as a threat. TCI’s initial attempts to privately finance an arena received franchise approval but little support, and eventually failed. Lightning representatives Phil Esposito and David LeFevre led arena negotiations for the team, but neither of them was linked to the traditional civic elite. Yet they worked to gain allies in the Tampa civic and business communities. Ultimately, however, it was members of the commercial sector who were pursuing their own interests in downtown development that shaped the Ice Palace deal. The private developers who purchased land facilitated the process and made a downtown arena possible. And support from downtown development advocates aided in the process by which a decision was quickly reached once downtown was identified as the location.

In the RJS case, the Glazer family’s introduction to the Tampa Bay community was accompanied by their demand for stadium subsidies. While Glazer and his sons owned various Florida businesses, they were not civic players in Tampa and they did not lay sufficient groundwork in the community before they made their demands. Glazer’s other major business interest, a restaurant chain, was not significant enough to use as a threat like Arison’s cruise industry. Thus, the Glazers were not popular with Hillsborough residents and many of the people who voted against the tax cited contempt for the Glazers and their methods. Exit polls found that of those voting “no” on the CIT, 73% said they hated the Buccaneers and 56% said they never attended Buccaneers games. Overall, some major reasons for voting against the

subsidy cited that ‘The NFL and teams holding communities hostage’ (69%); ‘Tampa Stadium was good enough for a Super Bowl’ (64%); ‘The Glazers get richer when I can not even pay my bills’ (56%); and ‘The Glazers have repeatedly insulted the citizens of this community, they are insensitive people’ (52%) as reasons for voting against the CIT (MacManus and Johnson 1996). But the franchise ultimately received its subsidy despite the negative impression people had of Glazer.

The Glazers ultimate success was tied to the introduction of the CIT, an alternative that allowed stadium subsidy supporters to recruit policy proponents from the school board, police and fire departments. “The school board jumped on board because they were getting 25% of the revenue and it wasn’t even their tax. It was the county’s half-penny tax and we were going to share it with them if they helped us to get it,” said Chillura (Chillura, interview, 2002). The formation of an initiative that appealed to several interest groups and their voting constituencies allowed proponents to increase their base of supporters.

Proponents consist of team owners, civic boosters, and public officials that pursue subsidy policies. The number of proponents and the relative amount of resources they bring to negotiations impact their ability to secure subsidies. When franchise owners have additional business interests in a community like in the AAA case, their case for subsidies is strengthened. But even in this case, the change in political structure served to trump the significance of Arison’s cruise business interests on the financial subsidy proposal for the arena. Proponents will be most successful when they can build a broad base of support from among public and private leaders as was done in the IP and RJS cases although in different ways.

### **Subsidy Opponents**

Most public policies will evoke opposition at some level. The effectiveness of the opposition is dependent upon its size, visibility, and resource availability of its members (Schattschneider 1960; Truman 1951). The speed at which opposition emerges depends on public awareness of subsidy plans and available base of people to mobilize. More importantly, as opposition groups form and begin to shape the tone of the debate, proponents are forced to raise and spend political capital to get public support for their proposals. Opposition groups to public policy initiatives will generally either emerge from an anti-growth or anti-regime coalition, or they will form from an ad-hoc, piecemeal group generally tied to a particular issue

(Adranovich, Burbank, and Heying 2001; Burbank, Heying, and Andranovich 2000; Ferman 1996; Vogel and Swanson 1989). Often the composition of competing groups supporting and opposing policy conflicts reflects traditional lines of social, racial, or ethnic tensions within a metropolitan area and sports subsidy opposition politics follows a similar pattern (Adranovich, Burbank, and Heying 2001; Burbank, Heying, and Andranovich 2000). What is clear from these case studies is that there is no ready-made opposition to public subsidies for sports facilities (see Table 7-3).

The opposition might be a key to understanding stadium and arena subsidy decisions. If opposition presence is low, then growth advocates can formulate policy alternatives that political officials will support since they face little recourse for their decisions to spend public funds. The ability to effectively oppose a particular subsidy option early increases the likelihood of blocking or altering the deal. The slower the formation of opposition groups, the less chance for success. The ability of proponents to set the agenda with a well-formulated plan hinders the formation of opposition groups. But if there is no set plan to present for formal approval then a policy debate evolves in public, resulting in an increased potential for opponents to organize and significantly impact the outcome.

In each of these cases, the deals worked behind closed doors negatively impacted opposition group formation. In Robbie's case, his decision to privately finance the facility allowed him to shield his plans from public view. While environmental issues are a standing concern in the Miami-Dade community due to its proximate location to the ecologically sensitive Everglades and its dependence upon what is perceived to be a limited natural water resource, no significant anti-growth movement developed in opposition to Robbie's plans. Only when the land zoning issue came before the county for support did opponents begin to mobilize among homeowners surrounding the stadium site. The Lake Lucerne neighbors gathered significant numbers and gained support from civil rights leader Jesse Jackson, but stadium opponents were outdone by a majority of the commission that had already formed to support Robbie (Brown 1985c). The Lake Lucerne legal strategy was more successful. Through the courts the homeowners gained some concessions that they otherwise would not have received (Ferguson, interview, 2002). But the slow development of the opposition, the quiet nature of the policy development, and the opponents' lack of economic and political resources limited their ability to shape Robbie's plans.

With the AAA, opposition arose based on both the financial subsidy and the land subsidy to the initial Ridder plan that was negotiated in private meetings. Miami-Dade County Commissioners were asked to vote on a \$160 million subsidy package that was rushed to an emergency meeting with little discussion or information. The five commissioners who voted against the plan lacked the ability to either alter or block the plan. Instead, the opposition to the Ridder plan was rooted in the citizen initiative. The change in formal structure and the mayoral election of Penelas acted as a containment mechanism in that it permitted a reworking of the deal. When Penelas secured a more favorable deal for the county, the level of opposition subsided. Only staunch environmentalists and public space advocates continued to support the initiative. County voters ultimately sided with the team to defeat the initiative to block arena development.

From the mayor's perspective, the referendum was "the hammer" that placed urgency on the situation and allowed Penelas to force the Heat to concede ground (Diaz-Balart, interview, 2001; Echevarria, interview, 2001). On the other hand, the looming initiative meant the new mayor had to hurry to make a deal that he could sell to the public or risk losing the team (Korge, interview, 2001). Polls showing the referendum gaining support despite the public relation campaigns pushed Arison to make a deal. "He had no choice. He was not going get an arena. If we did not have a deal a week before the election we were going to go public against it. Alex was very popular and (had) just got elected fighting that (Ridder plan)" (Echevarria, interview, 2001).

In Miami-Dade County there was not a politically viable opposition to growth politics during the 1970s and 1980s. Even into the 1990s, cleavages in the community were rooted largely in ethnic and racial divisions that revolved around economic opportunity. When opposition arose to the location to the new Heat arena the coalition that formed had little to do with ethnic and racial politics and more to do with preserving public space. When Dan Paul pursued the citizen initiative he had to start from scratch to form an opposition group (Park 1996; Robinson 1996). The group was not well-financed, politically-connected or publicly visible but gained in strength as the election neared.

The Tampa Bay arena case study saw two different types of opposition form. County commissioners who formally rejected financial subsidies for TCI despite support from the city and the sports authority primarily opposed the stadium site plan. Private and public officials outside of public

view, on the other hand, negotiated the Ice Palace plan. With the threat of losing the Lightning, county officials, the mayor, and Tampa Bay civic leaders worked behind the scenes to produce a quick plan of action. Identification of acceptable financial subsidies limited public discussion and debate of the plan, and the involvement of key politicians forestalled the chances that an effective opposition would have an impact. Members of TCI later sued the Lightning for sabotaging the initial plan but their legal strategy did not disturb plans for the downtown arena.

In the final case, opposition to the stadium played a significant role in shaping the public policy decision. After details of the arena deal became public, county leaders were hesitant to grant further subsidies without public support, but agreed to place the issue before voters and to hold several public meetings to gather community input on the stadium issue in the context of other county costs (Craig 1998; MacManus and Johnson 1996). After several stalled plans, the multipurpose tax alternative evolved with the support of county officials, city councils, and school board members who formed a coalition with civic leaders and police and fire departments. They literally drowned out the opposition. The single city council member who opposed the stadium represented a minority voice and served merely as leader of a symbolic opposition with little impact on the decision. While exit polls showed that most people voted for the tax despite the stadium being included, rather than because of it (MacManus and Johnson 1996). Coupling the sports facility with education and public safety - essentially logrolling it with greater community needs - minimized electoral opposition to the stadium subsidy.

The Tampa stadium plan also faced opposition from a significant legal challenge posed by a former mayor. A lower court decision could have delayed construction except that the sports authority was positioned to finance initial stages of the project before issuing new bonds with CIT money. Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the legal claim ending all opposition to the stadium subsidy (*Poe vs. Hillsborough County et. al.* 1997).

If opposition to facility subsidies is quick to form at the policy formulation stage there is a greater chance that it may alter and influence policy outcomes. Plans developed in secret serve to slow the pace at which opposition can become formidable. Support from established anti-growth groups or interest groups opposed to spending policies bolster the base for opposition. Where these do not exist, opponents face

greater challenges in mobilizing and raising resources to fight facility advocates. Legal strategies, which are containment mechanisms, provide another option for opponents, but this route also involves the need for substantial financial resources and has not generally proven effective for halting sports facility subsidy policy decisions.

Opponents attempted to employ legal strategies in the JRS and RJS cases. The legal challenges earned some concessions for opponents, but facilities were ultimately constructed and subsidized. It appears that opposition groups need to follow a variety of strategies through ballot initiatives, legal action, and elite leadership and financing in order to alter or block subsidy decisions.

### **Public Policy Options**

The formulation stage of the public policy process depends upon participants having knowledge of the potential options for subsidizing sports facilities. While those options include a null decision --- a decision not to provide public support --- my case selection specifically includes only instances where some level of public subsidy was secured. In all four cases, the issue of facility subsidies was placed on the policy agenda by the demands of franchise owners. While support for proponent demands was not initially strong in each case, officials were eventually forced to form a policy plan for keeping the professional teams in town particularly when faced with the threat that the franchise may move.

Decision makers can choose from a range of public policy options when spending public dollars and facilitating the development of arena and stadium projects (Anderson 1994; Brown and Paul 2000; Cagan and deMause 1998; Danielson 1997; Eisenger 2000; Euchner 1993; Howard and Crompton 1995; Johnson 1993, 1998; Judd and Swanstrom 1994; Keating 1999; Noll 1974; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Peterman 2000; Quirk and Fort 1992; Shropshire 1995; Sidlow and Henschen 1998; Sullivan 1998; Riess 1989, 1998; Rosentraub 1988, 1999; Rosentraub et. al. 1984; Zimbalist 1998). They can decide to use existing funding sources or to raise new revenues. Funding could come from bond issues, tourism taxes, or taxes on stadium related activities. Subsidy policies may also be in the form of tax rebates to sports facilities, land purchases and development, and expedited approval of zoning and environmental clearances. The subsidy policies in these four cases ranged from significant financial subsidies in the AAA,

IP, and RJS cases to low public financial support for JRS. Significant land subsidies were granted in the JRS, AAA, and IP cases, and to a lesser extent in the RJS case (see Table 7-1).

The public policies with JRS include Miami-Dade County's land purchase and lease agreement with Robbie, and the approval of zoning changes. Robbie's stadium construction also benefited from the use of the Industrial Revenue Bonds, additional land that the school board forfeited, and county and state infrastructure support (Keating 1999; Kleinberg 1999). Other public policy alternatives that were discussed but not enacted include attempts to raise general tax revenue in the City of Miami for Orange Bowl renovations and similar proposals to fund a new downtown stadium. The Miami mayor tried to keep the team in the city and proposed bond issues for stadium revenue that voters refused. "They called it a tax increase, but it was one cent for two years. It would have extended the life of the Orange Bowl for 10 to 20 years, then we would have to build, but we could have done it right, been ready for it," said Ferre (interview, 2001). Voters in Miami-Dade and Broward dismissed plans designed by the sports authority for an increase in the tourism tax to subsidize a stadium on land near the county border.

Robbie decided to personally shoulder the financial costs of the stadium and added subsidized land agreements and loans to build it (Ifill 1987). For the county, the policy options were beneficial, but not for Robbie. "He made a tactical error. He chose the right location, but it came out of his pocket. There is no way in this community for the private sector to put up that stadium. It damn near went broke. In fact, it forced the family to sell the team and the stadium. It was a fatal mistake for him, and bad for us," said Ferre (interview, 2001).

A different set of policy options were considered in the development of the AAA. When Miami-Dade officials considered arena subsidies in late 1995, the natural source of revenue was to draw from the Convention Development Tax (CDT), a county hotel-bed tax dedicated to sports facility development. County commissioners, however, could not formulate a policy solution through formal mechanisms and turned to informal channels through the community facilitator. The resulting Ridder plan called for the county to finance full arena construction costs and to provide a land subsidy.

With the introduction of the voter initiative and the election of the new mayor, the Penelas plan trumped the public land-based opposition by keeping the waterfront location but reworked the finances of

the deal to benefit the public. Penelas understood the Heat's desire to retain their bay front dream and also believed that a downtown arena was potentially profitable for downtown Miami-Dade County. "I did not like that site. I did not want to see it built there. It was one of the things I had to concede on. In politics you don't get everything you want, you go in with a laundry list and sometimes you have to make concessions," said Penelas (interview, 2001). On the other hand, Arison funded the arena construction and was thus responsible for cost overruns and long term financing. He also conceded naming rights to the county. The Heat was able to sell bonds backed by municipalities securing a lower interest rate and had the ability to attract solid investors and pay for the arena with the revenues generated by the facility. The county continues to finance operations with tourism tax revenue and will ultimately become the arena owner.

In the case of the Tampa Bay arena, the two main public policy options were the TCI plan based on a lease for the stadium site property with TSA, and the public-private downtown arena plan that resulted in the Ice Palace. Initially, TCI proposed making a two-thirds investment in an arena and asked for public subsidies for the remaining costs. Both the city and sports authority approved this plan but county commissioners defeated it because of their opposition to TCI's financial status and to the proposed stadium site location. TCI attempted to privately finance an arena at the suburban spot without public support but ultimately failed. The Lightning was playing in St. Petersburg and entertained offers from competing cities. The threat that the team would move without arena subsidies triggered Tampa community leaders to action.

This motivated county leaders to pursue plans for a downtown arena and additional development along the Garrison Channel. In connection with members of the private sector, the mayor and county leaders organized key elements of the financial and land-based policy decisions. The financing plan uses a combination of tourism and parking taxes and a tax rebate along with private contributions. Support through the significant private land purchase and city approval of development plans helped smooth land clearance and speed arena construction.

The formal political structures of the city, county, and sports authority from the Tampa Bay arena case were the same when the Glazers bought the Buccaneers but new policy alternatives were needed. Early ideas to fund the stadium through single issue tax increases failed (Craig 1998). Hillsborough Commissioners were unwilling to pass a new tax solely to subsidize a new stadium and the public was

skeptical about public funding. The probable threat that the team would move without a subsidized stadium pushed policy makers and members of the business community to craft and market support for the CIT plan to keep the team in Tampa Bay. The multipurpose tax presented an alternative to using existing revenues like property taxes.

In the minds of the “anti’s” they will always remember this as a tax that was shoved down their throat. But would I do it again? Yes. I’d do it again. Knowing what I know now. We were about to lose the team and we needed the money and I wasn’t about to pay for it out of my property taxes. At least now you pay in accordance with your purchasing power (Chillura, interview, 2002).

Under the CIT taxpayers will contribute more than \$300 million over the next 30 years to help pay for the stadium while the rent paid by the team and a ticket surcharge pays to operate the facility.

While some groups may have benefited disproportionately from the multipurpose tax, the results suggest an effective strategy for policy adoption.

From my standpoint - when I took over as mayor 8 years ago - we needed money for police and fire, and we needed money for the school system and roads. Somebody came up with the idea if you add a new stadium, put it all together, it will pass. I thought that was a pretty sad commentary on people. But the more I heard about it, the more people talked about it, the more I became convinced that maybe they were right. At least we have a football team, it’s doing pretty well, and there is a waiting list for the tickets. The amount of money put in for it from the CIT is a small portion of it. Truth is that 12% of the tax goes to stadium. I think it helped bring awareness to the whole bond issue and bring people out to vote, and if not for the stadium, it would have probably failed the second time. We opened 15 new schools. Those funds made that possible (Greco, interview, 2002).

Greco's perception may seem at odds with the findings of the MacManus and Johnson (1996) study of exit polling that showed that voters approved the tax despite the stadium rather than because of its inclusion on the ballot. However, citizens had rejected tax plans for education and police in previous elections. Greco's observation suggests that the stadium may have merely provided the margin necessary for approval.

I was rather surprised that that meant so much to people. More people got out to vote who were the ones that wanted to keep the football team. So basically it (the CIT) was a godsend to the community. Although the other things, in my view, were more important, but the honest to God truth to it is that voting for schools, fire, police failed, and you add the stadium, and it passed (Greco, interview, 2002).

Financial subsidies were granted from tourism taxes for the AAA and IP while the multipurpose tax was used for RJS. Use of IRBs subsidized part of the investment in JRS while some bonds for AAA were sold on the public market. Land purchases and zoning changes were granted for JRS, AAA, and IP,

while RJS benefited from its location on the stadium site. Policy options were often crafted over a period of time and involved various actors meaning that subsidy decisions ultimately rely on a process of bargaining and compromise. In each case the ultimate subsidy decisions emerged after other options had been debated and dismissed showing that subsidy proponents must be persistent in their quest to secure subsidy policy decisions in order to gain favorable outcomes.

### **Public Opinion**

Public opinion can be a powerful element in the public policy process particularly as alternatives are proposed and debated. Attitudes form as public awareness increases about the subsidy options. Local media sources frequently conduct polls and find that there is usually little distinctive opinion trend either in favor of or opposed to the abstract idea of subsidizing a sports facility. However, as owner demands and plans for a new facility are announced, public opinion can be measured in terms of general support for stadium subsidies and on particular plans for subsidizing a facility. Opinions on specific policy proposals can only be gauged as specific subsidy ideas are publicized and discussed. If subsidy plans result from private meetings, public opinion will be slow to form until there is further knowledge of the proposal.

Defeat of the city bond proposals and the county vote affirmed a lack of support by the electorate to subsidize a stadium for the Dolphins. After the Lake Lucerne plan emerged, public opinion countywide generally supported Robbie's plans although neighbors surrounding the proposed stadium site opposed the plan. They attended commission meetings and held public protests to rally opinion to their side, but with little avail as the county approved the land purchase and zoning change. In this case, public opinion was less significant in shaping the subsidy decision outcome than the legal actions of the small but strong opponent group.

Public opinion played an even more significant role with the Heat arena case. There was little support for subsidizing a new arena when the issue hit the public agenda in late 1995. The Ridder plan that commissioners approved in March 1996 called for a large subsidy, but since it was negotiated in private meetings there was little time for public opinion to form on the issue. As details became known, the opposition emerged and gained momentum over time. This was seen by the more than 30,000 signatures

gathered to put the question on the ballot. Placing a question on the ballot that could derail the Ridder plan raised the significance of public opinion, at least as measured through voter decisions on the issue.

But opinion in general was less concerned about the location of the new arena and more about the finances. Newspaper polls during the summer of 1996 indicate that public opinion remained opposed to arena subsidies all the way up to referendum day (Finefrock 1996j). The election of Penelas, who stated during the mayoral campaign that he opposed the public subsidy for the arena, shifted the political dynamics of the situation, and he used the looming referendum to force a new deal from the Heat. The Penelas team then embarked on a public campaign especially in Spanish media to increase public knowledge on the vote. With Penelas' endorsement, the referendum was defeated and the waterfront arena constructed. The mayor tapped into a potent voting block that he was able to mobilize through appeals on Spanish-language radio and in the Hispanic community.

Public opinion seems to have in part kept Hillsborough officials from backing the TCI plan. Polls showed general public preference for an arena at the stadium site rather than downtown. The Ice Palace plan was negotiated quickly and in private meetings, which minimized the potential for public opinion to shape the decision. City and county officials approved the IP subsidy policies with no significant public opposition. However, awareness about the IP decision process weakened public support for subsequent stadium subsidies. As a result, commissioners vowed to put any future plan to voters.

Opposition to subsidies for a Tampa Bay stadium was more prominent. Media polls found general public disapproval for stadium subsidies following the Glazers' demands and county leaders were unwilling to commit funds for a stadium without voter approval. The issue was placed on the agenda and county leaders explored policy alternatives in neighborhood forums. The policy options that were discussed and the multipurpose tax that was ultimately proposed to voters were in part shaped out of concern for public opinion toward the subsidy issue.

Public opinion can impact both the strategies and the relative success of subsidy proponents and opponents in the policy process. A relationship between strong opponents and public opinion cannot determine causality but the two variables are probably directly correlated. Strong effective leadership as in the case of the Penelas plan or the Ice Palace plan, or creative policy and crafty coalition building like with

the CIT for RJS, can dissuade public opinion from siding with subsidy opponents. Planning subsidy policies in private meetings like with JRS, AAA, and the IP deflects public opinion until details become widely known. Public opinion is most significant when issues are placed on the ballot and when officials are concerned about reelection. Even so, subsidy decisions generally do not hinge on public opinion.

### **Reexamining the Framework**

Using the framework of these six variables provides a greater understanding of the political processes in the four public subsidy decisions. The variables allow for an examination of the formal and informal structures of power, the main interests involved, the policy options, and public opinion and how these factors interact in the decision making process. The categories are not exclusive; in fact, there is some overlap in the components that provides for a rich description of the policy process in each case. An analysis of the case data leads to some general observations on sports facility subsidy policy formulation.

In metropolitan areas with a decentralized political structure subsidy proponents will face a challenge in achieving their desired policy outcomes. In these cases, the formation of a coalition with informal power brokers becomes more critical to securing a favorable subsidy outcome. In areas where an identifiable governing regime exists, members of the alliance provide a convenient alliance for proponents. Where a cohesive regime does not exist, forming a coalition with leaders from both formal and informal power institutions is important.

In a decentralized political system, politicians sometimes delegate the job of negotiating the terms of a subsidy to civic and commercial leaders because they have the ability to operate under informal channels and can negotiate outside the public view. Often elected officials recruit influential community members with ties to high profile, powerful boards and organizations. These folks can meet to debate subsidy options and construct policy proposals in private and then present solid plans to the public. The role that the informal structure plays in shaping the outcome can be low as it was in the JRS case or high as it was in shaping the decision for a downtown Tampa arena.

Analyzing the formation of opponents is important to understanding subsidy decisions. If opposition presence is low, then subsidy proponents can shape a deal that political officials will support

since they face little recourse for their decisions to spend public funds. The ability to form opposition to a particular subsidy option early increases the chances to block it or to alter the deal. The longer it takes for the opposition to form, the less chance for success. The ability of proponents to present a well-formulated plan hinders the ability of opposition groups to form. It also defines the policy agenda by providing a substantive proposal rather than raising a request or making a demand for subsidies. If there is no set plan to present for formal approval, then the debate takes place in public, increasing the scope of conflict and the ability of opponents to shape the decision outcome (Shattschneider 1960).

As many metropolitan areas deal with sports facility subsidy issues for the second and third time in recent years, there is the likelihood that opposition groups may mobilize more quickly. If there are repeat players for the opponent groups, they can bring experience to the subsidy debate. As future sports proponents attempt to secure subsidies, opponents may be better prepared to face them and stand a better chance of limiting or even blocking the success of grant coalitions.

Opposition based on issues of land and facility location matter as much as those opposed to financial subsidies. Battles are not over downtown versus suburban growth; rather, land ownership, zoning, and land-use issues are significant. The Dolphins' move from downtown to a suburban location raised the opposition of Lake Lucerne homeowners. The Heat moved from a downtown location to another on coveted waterfront land. The Lightning located in the downtown Ice Palace and the new Tampa stadium was built at the same suburban spot as the old facility. In the first three cases, the acquisition and use of land was a significant issue and decisions were made to either subsidize or aid in land acquisition and clearance. In the end, the location of stadium and arena facilities matters because these are enormous buildings with surrounding facilities that significantly impact neighborhoods both positively and negatively.

Another area of significance is the role voters play in subsidy decisions. In dozens of cities voters have been asked to decide subsidy issues. In some cases they approve, and in several they have disapproved, though subsidies are sometimes still granted through alternative plans (Brown and Paul 2000). Miami voters twice rejected a bond issue for a stadium, and Miami-Dade and Broward voters denied another plan to subsidize a football stadium before Robbie decided to privately finance the facility. Voters

played significant roles in ratifying the AAA location and in approving the CIT to subsidize the stadium and must not be overlooked in the study of subsidy decisions.

The differing role of the sports authority in each metropolitan area was notable. In South Florida, several sports authority groups failed to produce a stadium plan and were allowed to disband. The remaining group, MSEA, succeeded in building the first Miami Arena for the Heat and presented an initial obstacle to plans for the American Airlines Arena. The election of a city commissioner who then served on the MSEA and replaced its executives eliminated opposition to the AAA. In Tampa Bay, the TSA was created in the mid-1960s by state and local leaders and plays a vital role in Tampa Bay sports facility development. TSA built the first football stadium and helped attract professional football to the area. They were a key ally of TCI and the failed stadium site arena. While TSA officials played a less significant role in shaping the Ice Palace plan, the sports authority owns the downtown facility. And TSA was significant in the stadium subsidy plan. Though initially in favor of renovating the old facility, TSA officials helped county and city leaders negotiate complex funding and lease agreements with the Glazers and the NFL, and the sports authority operates the new stadium.

Sport facilities deals encompass a combination of public and private funding sources since they are expensive and necessarily entail decisions over the usage of large tracts of land. Their construction impacts neighborhoods from the automobile traffic patterns to the persistent overhead droning of the blimp as it televises an afternoon football game. As long as there is a market demand for hosting professional sports teams, communities and policy makers will have to confront facility subsidy decisions. Government does not have the option to remain uninvolved.

### **Sports Development Grant Coalitions**

The public policy process framework provides a nuanced view of the important factors in shaping subsidy decisions and focuses attention on the players involved in the decisions to publicly fund sports stadiums. I now return to my hypothesis that the coalition theory of community power best describes the exercise of political influence and policy making in these four cases. The findings from my case studies provide evidence that political power was not wielded by an elite individual, by interest groups, growth

machines or urban regimes, but was exercised in an ad-hoc and temporary manner characteristic of a grant coalition.

The sports development grant coalition concept evolves from previous theoretical perspectives on power in local politics, but more accurately describes the political process that results in decisions to subsidize large, non-essential public works projects like professional sports facilities (Cochrane, Peck and Tickell 1996; Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999; Pelissero et. al. 1991; Rosentraub 1988; 1999). Most of the time, these decisions are crafted through the bargaining and compromise of various groups employing specific means under circumstances that differ from place to place and time to time. A key connection is that while team owners may or may not be a part of the growth machine in the city power structure, they need to enlist other pro-growth forces as proponents of stadium or arena subsidies in order to be successful. In fact, proponents may need even larger pockets of support today, particularly since public coffers are now being more closely guarded against all forms of corporate welfare.

Sports development coalitions comprise city, county and state government leaders, development interests, financial institutions, urban planners, and, of course, franchise owners, team fans, and sports and stadium related interests (Pelissero et. al. 1991). In some cases, media may be a part of this coalition (Reiss 1998; Rosentraub, 1999; Turner and Marichal 1998). Proponents of a sports development coalition must carve out supporters from amongst city, county, and state officials as well as development-minded interests who have the political capacity to push for stadium subsidies in the face of potential opposition from other elected officials, development interests touting alternative agendas, and opponents protecting the environment, public space or taxpayer monies. Aligning with the governing regime is one way to secure subsidies, but it is not guaranteed nor is it the only way. Some urban planners may actually be against sports based development if it is expected to harm the environment, congest traffic, or cause an increase in crime and disorder in a particular neighborhood.

Grant coalitions have been identified in studies of sports-related policies in the United Kingdom. Cochrane, Peck and Tickell (1996) describe efforts by private actors to win public subsidies for an Olympic bid in Manchester, England and use their grant coalition to leverage public money to encourage further growth and development. Grant coalitions are “formed to maximize the opportunities to access government

monies rather than a growth coalition seeking to foster urban growth by maximizing exchange values of urban resources” (Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999, 644).

The study of the emergence of sports subsidy coalitions draws some elements from the growth machine and some from urban regime analysis, but the demands, duration, and scope of sports related coalitions are different. Sports development coalitions, like grant coalitions, are a collection of interests with the goal of being granted public funding to subsidize private industry and promote related growth. A main determinant of whether a coalition is part of the machine, regime or simply an ad hoc convergence is whether these grant coalitions are united on this issue only or whether they are also united on other issues of economic development. If the grant coalition can be identified as acting to influence policy in another area, then this may actually be part of a systemic machine or local regime. But if these primary proponents and opponents in the stadium wars are not primary players in competition on other policy issues, then a grant coalition more accurately describes the unit being studied.

Professional sports franchise owners are likely to be multi-millionaires who also have other business interests and political clout at the local, state, or national level. Since these team owners are often members of the community elite and have natural ties to civic boosters and public officials, one possibility is that their elite social status will translate into an ability to secure sports subsidies. If the demands of team owners were met simply based on their political connections, this would provide evidence of elite influence over subsidy policy decisions.

The data in these cases suggests that sports franchise owners do not wield such unbridled influence over local government channels of decision making. Subsidies to build professional franchise facilities are a form of what critics call corporate welfare, but in my cases studies the subsidy decisions reflect more than simply elite influence over the agenda setting and policy formulation process. While being a member of the elite community is helpful in gaining access to decision makers it does not insure the ability to unduly influence the policy making process.

In the JRS case, Joe Robbie was a member of the Non-Group and served on various public community boards. Even with Robbie’s connections to elite circles, he still faced hurdles in getting government subsidies and ultimately privately financed stadium construction. The Arisons in the AAA case

were also connected to Miami-Dade's elite community. But by the time Micky Arison approached public officials for arena subsidies the formal and informal power systems were changing in Miami-Dade. The switch from at-large to district-based county elections diversified representation on the commission and brought in new players. Changes in the demographic design of the region ushered in a new generation of leaders led by Hispanic business and civic actors that diluted the traditional white non-Hispanic elite influence in local politics.

The initial subsidy proposal negotiated with the help of a community facilitator benefited from the elite connections between Ridder and Arison and produced a favorable deal for the Heat. But with the rise of a viable opposition, the crafting of the citizen initiative and the subsequent election of Penelas as county mayor, a reworked deal required Arison to provide a greater financial contribution to the arena project. Influential members of the new Hispanic civic leadership structure negotiated the Penelas plan for the mayor. Arison delegated Heat executives to bargain for the team and while they were business savvy, they were not a part of the traditional elite in Miami-Dade.

In the case of the Tampa Bay arena, the Lightning franchise owners were absent from the local community. The team representatives, General Manager Phil Esposito and Lightning Governor David LeFevre, who led negotiations, were both from outside of Tampa Bay. Esposito's partners in the Tampa Bay Hockey Group were connected to Tampa's traditional civic elite, but this group was more concerned with securing the hockey franchise than with pursuing arena subsidies. The stadium site proposal by TCI involved the private sector and while it may have included some of Tampa's elite leaders, they were not able to influence decision makers to support their plan and the stadium site plan died.

The subsequent Ice Palace plan assembled members of Tampa's elite civic community concerned with downtown development to work with city and county officials. They met with team representatives to formulate arena plans in private meetings. In this sense, the IP decision resembled policy making in Tampa Bay during decades past by drawing support from the mayor, county administrator, and private interests for development projects (Kerstein 2001). But the motivation to subsidize an arena was primarily triggered by the threat that the team would leave Tampa Bay if arena subsidies were not granted rather than the political influence of the franchise owners or executives. The subsidy decision was not a response to elite demands

but rather was the result of a coalition of private leaders who saw the arena as a convenient issue around which to rally their interests in downtown development.

Malcolm Glazer and his sons also did not have ties to Tampa Bay's traditional ruling elite when they bought the Buccaneer franchise in January 1995. Their immediate demand for stadium subsidies did not find support. In order to secure subsidies they had to work with public officials through formal channels to formulate subsidy plans. As a result of the multipurpose tax idea they were able to recruit several important voting constituencies from the community and campaign for referendum approval. While the Glazers spent their own money as part of a public relations campaign, it was not their position of wealth that produced a subsidy decision.

In none of the four cases does the elite influence of the franchise owner and/or his ability to work within an established elite community fully explain the policy process by which the subsidy decision outcomes were reached. While being a member of the elite community is helpful for gaining access to decision makers, it does not guarantee influence within the policy making process.

Professional sports facilities are major public works projects that involve several segments of a metropolitan community. The fact that many individuals and interest groups are impacted by subsidy policy decisions suggests the possibility of a pluralist decision making process. Dahl (1961) discovered pluralism in New Haven with three issues that were consistently on the public agenda (party nominations, urban redevelopment, and education), but stadium and arena debates occur less frequently in metropolitan areas. The more regularly that sports subsidies find their way onto the public agenda with multiple stadium or arena plans under consideration within the same decade, the more likely it is that the particular proponent and opponent interest groups will begin to institutionalize. However, in these cases, interest groups representing various segments of the community did not mobilize in support of or in opposition to subsidy policies until they were directly impacted by the policy proposals.

Initial subsidy proposals are often generated in private meetings, as in the cases of JRS, AAA, and the IP, and a substantial amount of policy shaping occurs before there is general public awareness of these plans. The presence of citizen opposition groups, ballot referendum questions that propose or challenge subsidy plans, and neighborhood organizations concerned about the quality of life in their community each

act to democratize the process. Yet broad citizen participation is often a response to policies that have already been formulated by subsidy proponents. In Miami-Dade, the opponents mobilized based on their opposition to particular venue sites while in Tampa Bay the opposition was based on finding the proper type of public subsidy plan. In each case, except that of the RJS, opponents were left to react to concrete proposals in their attempt to alter or delay policy implementation. Interest groups can benefit by forming an opposition coalition, but these coalitions are often weak and like the AAA and RJS cases, they lack resources beyond the funds of an elite opponent backer.

In these cases, subsidy proponent interest groups such as chamber task forces, franchise political action committees (PACs), or prevailing sports authority regimes, and opponent interest groups, whether they be environmental, homeowners, or public interest, were specific to the stadium or arena cases at hand. In the JRS and IP cases, franchise owners did not form interest groups in search of subsidy support, while in the AAA and RJS cases the teams formed PACs to raise campaign funds after it was determined that subsidy policies would be placed before voters. Likewise, opponents in each case did not have existing interest groups from which to draw support. The JRS case provided the impetus for establishing the homeowners' associations around the Lake Lucerne area, but these groups were not politically active beyond the stadium battle. In the AAA case, the citizen referendum led to the mobilization of latent interests in support of preserving public space. These groups continued to exist after the arena battle, and have helped block attempts to build a baseball park in downtown Miami. The Tampa Bay cases did not witness the organization of opposition groups to block subsidy decisions. For these reasons, the pluralism perspective of politics as a process of bargaining and compromise between competing groups does not adequately capture the process of group activity in these cases.

The theoretical underpinnings of the political economy and growth machine models would suggest that urban leaders pursue sports facility subsidies as part of their overall community growth-oriented goals. Real estate, finance, banking and development interests are incorporated in the concept of the growth machine. Professional sports franchise owners are auxiliary members of the growth machine and their industry is an asset for communities to attract investment and tourism (Logan and Molotch 1987; Judd 1999; Judd and Swanstrom 1994). Stadium and arena projects can lead to spillover development appealing

to growth minded groups. These groups, according to Logan and Molotch (1987), will find that their interests are best served by getting organized and staying organized so as to operate in a closed decision making climate and minimize political conflict.

The premise of the growth machine model is that the people who participate in politics are the ones who have the most to gain or lose in land use policy. In the case of sports facility subsidies team owners and real estate developers (land exchange) are set against the public and environmentalists (land use). But simply discovering the existence of a growth machine in a particular city is not sufficient evidence that the machine determines outcomes on sports subsidies. The process framework permits a closer examination of who sets the agenda, who formulates alternatives, and who influences outcomes. In those cities that lack an identifiable growth machine, individual franchise owners must lobby harder for subsidy support from government officials and from the public, and they must ultimately form coalitions with key local leaders around more popular policy options.

While regime analysis is a useful tool for studying the power structure of particular urban areas it is less useful in the study of sports subsidy decisions. The urban regime concept refers to a continuous and fixed governing coalition that uses selective incentives to reward group behavior (Stone 1989). Sports facility policies appear to create more short-term and dynamic coalitions that form for this particular policy cycle and then dissipate after policies are implemented. Stadium and arena policy debates concern non-routine, extra-systemic agenda items that usually result in coalitions being formed on a temporary and ad-hoc basis rather than as part of a more cohesive and permanent governing regime (Cochrane, et al. 1996; Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999). The demands, duration, and scope of sports related coalitions are different. Proponents put the policy process in motion through their demands for subsidies, but they need additional supporters in order to achieve their subsidy goals.

Joe Robbie Stadium was built through the efforts of a subsidy grant coalition. In Miami-Dade, a pro-growth regime dominated by downtown business interests and members of the Non-Group influenced local policy making in the 1970s (Dugger 1985; Vogel and Stowers 1991; Warren 1997). Robbie was a member of this exclusive group, but he ultimately financed his stadium privately. Although there was the semblance of a regional growth machine through the 1980s, there was no clear growth initiative behind the

JRS proposal and the governing regime support for a stadium was low. Robbie had to create his own coalition and ultimately gained the land subsidy because of his willingness to finance the facility on his own.

With the American Airlines Arena, there was not a clear growth initiative or identifiable regime behind the arena proposal. The county growth machine had actually begun to unravel and then the contours of the entire formal and informal governing system changed radically with the 1993-redistricting plan. The ebbing power of the Non-Group over city and county politics suffered with the retirement of its leaders, particularly Alvah Chapman and Henry Hood Bassett. Some characterized the period as Miami-Dade being in a state of hyper pluralism (Koenig et. al. 1990; Vogel and Stowers 1991). This period witnessed weak leadership and the proposal for a county executive mayor served to fill some of this gap. Meanwhile, along the growth of Hispanic wealth and organization and groups like the Latin Builders Association, *Mesa Redondo* and the growing number of registered Hispanic voters, Miami-Dade politics and its power structure was evolving.

Initial attempts at an arena on the Tampa Bay stadium site suffered from the lack of support by the county's governing regime. Meanwhile, the Ice Palace plan drew on the remnants of the traditional Tampa Bay growth coalition between downtown business leaders, the mayor and county officials. The ability to form a grant coalition was weak because of the nebulous Lightning ownership group. Ultimately, it took a broader public-private partnership to get the downtown arena on the drawing board, and to gain support for several levels of public financing. The results were obtained by a grant coalition that resembled the conventional Tampa regime.

In the Tampa stadium case, subsidy proponents forged a coalition with groups that would benefit from the proposed multipurpose tax revenue. County and city leaders allied with education, law enforcement, and stadium proponents in support of the measure helping it to pass. The broad-based coalition behind the CIT deepened the political support when a sports development grant coalition alone could not secure the subsidies.

Only after a sports franchise owner makes demands for facility subsidies will the grant coalition come into formation. It may take a triggering event such as the threat to leave the metropolitan area if

support for a new facility is not forthcoming, a change in political leadership or the introduction of innovative policy ideas to rally formation of a subsidy proponent coalition. The threat that Robbie would move the Dolphins out of Miami-Dade did not reach a high level and political leadership was stable. The innovative idea came from Robbie's plan to privately finance the stadium and the proponent coalition formed around this alternative. In the AAA case, the offer on the table from Broward County combined with a threat that the Heat would move north, prompted Miami-Dade County leaders to appoint a community facilitator. They supported the resulting Ridder plan, but then the change in political leadership with the mayoral election of Penelas, triggered a reworking of the subsidy plan and the formation of a new coalition.

The threat that the Lightning would never play in downtown Tampa without arena subsidies spurred community leaders to action. Two new political leaders on the county commission, Joe Chillura and Ed Turanchik, supported the idea of a downtown arena and asked the county administrator to work with city leaders in pursuance of this alternative. Public and private leaders in support of the IP plan formed a coalition that dissipated after the adoption of downtown arena policies. Initial ideas to fund a new Tampa stadium lacked support and throughout the process the Glazers continually floated the threat to move. Finally the innovative idea of the multipurpose tax to fund several community projects provided the seeds of a strong coalition behind this proposal. The coalition of franchise, education, police and fire safety interests proved solid enough to convince voters to support the CIT, but the alliance ended after election day. The examples from the cases shows that a coalition of supporters for sports facility subsidies is not ready made and instead must be cultivated from a variety of potential interest group allies.

In each of the cases examined, opposition did not form until well after the proponents made their initial inquiry. The opposition groups in each case were temporary alliances. The data suggests that if the opposition has access to resources from an existing organized political bloc like environmental groups or labor union groups, they may be quicker to mobilize and offer a counterproposal or trump the plan that is under consideration. The first time the sports subsidy issue is encountered the anti-grant coalition may be slow to develop and might lack the fiscal resources to put up a viable fight. But if there is a repeat debate on sports subsidies in the same town, be it for the same or a different team, the opposition may be more

prepared. Where opposition groups have been successful in altering or denying subsidies is in cities that have had long or multiple encounters with resisting public spending on sports facilities like in San Francisco. But in my four cases, the opposition forces lacked resources and organizations to effectively challenge subsidy proponent coalitions.

A goal of traditionally underrepresented groups in urban politics is to form a governing coalition as part of a strategy for political incorporation (Browning et. al, 1997; 2003; Rich 2000). The process of minority empowerment includes group mobilization and electoral gains that eventually leads to incorporation within the governing regime or a reshaping of the regime like that seen in Miami-Dade. The struggle for minority empowerment takes place over a period of time and through a number of policy battles. Sports facility development, on the other hand, is about a singular, specific end product: the stadium or arena. It is not about minority groups gaining a seat at the political table for sports franchise owners or their backers. Ultimately, the role of race and ethnicity mattered little to the actual outcomes or decisions on public subsidies. With respect to the Miami-Dade cases, however, understanding racial and ethnic politics provides a more nuanced view of how political decisions get made. In the JRS case, for example, the proposed stadium site was located in a predominantly black middle-class neighborhood. Local homeowners invited a nationally visible leader, Rev. Jesse Jackson, to their community rallies and he even spoke on their behalf at the county commission rezoning meeting. Race was a factor in the policy decisions to the extent that this represented yet another case of black displacement similar to that seen in previous policy decisions that moved black families from downtown Miami to mid-county and north to the suburban Lake Lucerne neighborhood (Mohl 1989). But despite efforts to make the racial politics case, the residents were wholly unsuccessful. To wit, the only black commissioner at the time, Barbara Carey, supported the stadium decision (Stack and Warren 1992).

In the case of AAA, the changing ethnic dynamics of Miami-Dade politics are evident. Private and public leaders negotiated the initial Ridder plan in private meetings. What appears as a continuation of the old Non-Group way of action actually represents Miami-Dade's new ethnic reality. Armando Vidal, the county manager, was Hispanic as was the main city council proponent, Joe Carollo, and key developers. The county commission chair, Art Teele, was black. And the team and civic community were represented

by white non-Hispanics. With the election of Penelas as mayor, he and a Hispanic network of support reworked the arena plan. The public and private actors were now primarily ethnic, but the policy goals were not based on ethnic issues. As Warren and Moreno (2003) have noted, while the names and faces of local leaders may now be of Hispanic origin, their community goals are still oriented toward growth politics.

Racial and ethnic politics played no role in the Tampa Bay arena and stadium decisions. The downtown arena did not directly impact residential areas and the funding decisions were made in private. The one Tampa city council member adamantly opposed to the funding the stadium was of Hispanic descent, but ethnic politics was not driving that opposition. In Tampa Bay agenda debates were more focused on making decisions over the allocation of scarce public funds than on any social group differences. A loosely tied growth-oriented regime was identified in Tampa Bay politics during the 1960s, 70s and 80s (Mormino 1983; Kerstein 2001). By the early 1990s, under Mayor Sandy Freedman, neighborhood-based and social issues surfaced on the public agenda. But there was no evidence of a growth machine or urban regime. Hence, sports subsidy proponents were forced to carve out special coalitions in order to build their arena or stadium.

## **Summary**

In this chapter I analyzed the Miami-Dade and Tampa-Hillsborough cases using the policy process framework. Comparisons and findings were presented using each variable in the framework as an organizational tool. The case studies provide data for applying the subsidy policy decisions to the traditional theories of power in urban politics. Finally, I showed how coalition theory best describes community power relations in terms of these four subsidy policy decisions. Future studies on sports facility decisions in other metropolitan arenas at different times and under varying local political climates can further test my hypothesis that coalition theory best describes the political process behind professional sports subsidy decisions.

## Conclusion

Political scientists are concerned with issues of power and influence in public policy decisions. To contribute to our understanding of urban power and decision making, I have examined four decisions to fund sports facilities with public monies. Funding a sports facility is not a minor commitment by local government as seen by the billions of public dollars spent nationally during the 1980s and 1990s for professional sports arenas and stadiums. Public funding decisions are also important in that they reflect community priorities and provide insight to the struggle over limited resources between economic and corporate interests and the citizen-taxpayer. They also shed light on the urban power struggle between the elite and formal or informal political actors, and just plain folks. These particular policy decisions are potentially controversial in that the public and opponents typically point to them as forms of corporate welfare unworthy of public support. Yet, decisions to subsidize continue to be made by governments across the country.

My examination of the four cases—Joe Robbie Stadium (JRS), American Airlines Arena (AAA), Ice Palace (IP), and Raymond James Stadium (RJS)—suggests that coalition theory best describes the power arrangements under which these decisions are made. The political processes of agenda-setting, formulating policy options, and adopting those options involve government officials, civic and commercial interests, and community sports advocates and opponents. These participants are not necessarily part of a standing regime or growth machine in the community. Nor are the decisions made solely by the elites, either formal or informal, of a community. Rather, sports subsidy decisions come about through the assembly and work of a temporarily formed sports subsidy grant coalition that represents varied interests within the community.

## Observations

Some additional observations and tentative suggestions can be made about the decisions to subsidize a professional sports facility that may be useful in future studies. In cases where a strong mayor took the lead and facilitated negotiations like in the AAA and IP plans, deals seem to be done more

expeditiously, but this is not an indicator of whether sports advocates will get more or less public funding or land-based subsidies. Where there is no strong mayor or executive leadership, commissioners may decide to appoint an external negotiator. This person or group can negotiate outside the glare of media and electoral constituents such as with the community facilitator in the Ridder Plan, the mayor's advisors in the Penelas Plan, and the advocates of downtown development involved in planning the Ice Palace.

With a decentralized political structure there seems to be a better chance that opponents can successfully minimize the amount of public subsidy granted. Team owners did not always get all that they demanded and sometimes it took many months of negotiations to produce subsidy decisions. With JRS, city and county voters withheld their support for bond issues and Joe Robbie ended up primarily financing the stadium with private funds. In Tampa Bay, franchise owners asked for stadium subsidies and local leaders could not agree on a revenue plan until the multipurpose tax idea surfaced where county voters ultimately had a voice in whether the stadium would get a slice of the community tax revenue.

The Miami-Dade commission structure, on the other hand, produced the Ridder Plan that called for generous arena subsidies, but this was reworked for a more favorable public policy under the Penelas Plan. Whether it was the power of the mayor's office or the confluence of events with the voter initiative and the election of the first executive mayor that shaped this outcome is inconclusive. The decentralization of power on the Hillsborough Commission also stirred the need for outside forces to spur arena subsidy plans. The financial and land based subsidy policies for the downtown Tampa arena were discussed in private meetings and negotiations were prodded by the Tampa mayor bringing together county officials and commercial leaders. It was less the mayor's formal authority and more her leadership and inclusion of private officials that influenced the subsidy decisions.

Closer study of subsidy negotiation patterns and the ability of certain players to meet in secrecy reveal part of the likelihood of advocates gaining subsidies. When proposals are worked in private meetings and then presented to the public as policy rather than being negotiated in public forums and with an open flow of information during the policy formation process, opposition will be slower to form and possibly less effective in altering or halting subsidy plans. Public opinion becomes an insignificant factor when deals are formed in private but can become a key variable after plans are made public. It is likely that proponents will

try to secure formal approval for subsidy plans before opposition can mobilize and create a counterstrategy.

Where a coalition is mobilized to support a sports facility, it is typically made up of growth advocates, select interest groups, elites and members of the existing urban regime. If the coalition believes in the positive regional economic contribution of sports teams, creative public policy can make it happen. In the case of RJS a multipurpose tax was put before voters and with the support of various constituencies it passed. The AAA and IP plans were based on public-private proposals to keep teams in their respective areas and to generate overall downtown development projects. These decisions relied on involvement from private interests and ultimately favored business development.

Opposition in the JRS and AAA cases was based on facility location while in the RJS case opposition centered on the financial subsidy. When the opposition from Lake Lucerne homeowners in the JRS case was unable to sway the decision through political channels, they engaged in a legal strategy to draw some concessions in development plans surrounding the stadium. In the AAA case, a citizen initiative was successful in getting placed on the ballot and withstood legal challenges, but was ultimately defeated. County commissioners and city leaders put the RJS subsidy to a vote, and it survived legal challenges.

When team owners threaten to leave the area, their potential for getting subsidies increases. There was no real threat to Miami-Dade leaders that Robbie would leave the region; he was staying in South Florida albeit not in City of Miami. On the other hand, the Heat presented a real threat to move in that they were negotiating with Broward County, and this prompted the hastily arranged Ridder Plan. When opposition formed around the citizen initiative, Micky Arison reintroduced a threat to leave and the election of Alex Penelas forced a renegotiation of the deal with the Heat. The possibility that the Lightning would stay in St. Petersburg or move out of the region pressed private and public leaders to develop a subsidy plan for the downtown Tampa arena. Finally, the lingering threat that the Glazers would move the Buccaneers from Tampa Bay without stadium support provided impetus for crafting the CIT policy decision.

### **Suggestions for Future Research**

My research on professional sports facility subsidies is limited by the fact that I examine only four cases in two metropolitan areas within a single state. Future research should reach beyond state lines and

include a broader comparative analysis of public subsidy decisions that have been made in other mid-sized and large metropolitan areas. Such an approach can broaden our understanding of how professional sports facility subsidy decisions are reached. Atlanta, Charlotte, Dallas, Phoenix, Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco provide cases where city and county governments have faced stadium and arena subsidy decisions that provide avenues for viewing the exercise of political power in other metropolitan professional sports facility subsidy cases (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1988, 1999).

Tests on newer generation and older generation sports facility development experiences from other states provide further avenues for study. The stadium development boom was aided in Florida by the expansion of the professional leagues and the draw of exciting new markets. In part, tourism and high profile that teams are believed to provide to cities feed into that publicity. Cities like Pittsburgh, Cincinnati or Green Bay struggle for subsidy options to keep a team but they are less likely to experience expansions in tourism as a result.

A study of minor league baseball facilities would provide more sports facility cases to examine within the same sport. The role of intergovernmental competition for teams to select spring training sites could also be examined within Florida, where state law dictates what types of financing and land use strategies that local governments can follow. Minor league facilities are less expensive than professional ballparks but team owners are also less willing to spend their own funds on these projects. While the symbolic benefits of housing a minor league or spring training facility pale compared to the big leagues, the economic payoffs could be greater than the costs associated with professional facilities, and thus may provide cases where the political dynamics differ from the cases examined in this study.

Further work also needs to be done to assess the economic and non-economic benefits and costs related to the subsidy decisions in these four cases. Studies on stadium and arena investments in other cities have generally shown that economic returns do not substantiate the costs of facility subsidies. These cases where varying amounts of public revenues were allocated and additional events were hosted may provide more favorable returns for taxpayers in those respective areas.

There is also a need to look at cases where public funding did not result. The Florida Marlins and Montreal Expos have been unsuccessful with several attempts to gain stadium subsidies despite threats that

those teams may relocate or be eliminated from the professional baseball league. Minnesota and Hartford lost their professional hockey teams to southern cities willing to subsidize new arenas. Plans to build a new stadium in Los Angeles to attract an NFL team back to the area have failed to materialize. Studying the failed subsidy attempts in these cases provides additional insight on when facilities will receive support and when they may not.

Subsidy decision outcomes surrounding other large and visible public works projects can also be examined. The amount and type of public subsidies for convention centers, performing and cultural arts centers, and other entertainment and tourism-based projects are possible issues to examine using the policy framework from Chapter 2. These high-profile, nonessential government spending projects, like sports facilities, usually generate more attention than mundane and ongoing policy issues. Policy issues concerning subsidies toward tourism and entertainment projects also provide conditions to further examine the formation of proponent and opponent coalitions and the relative successes of these groups under different local structural conditions.

The true measure of public policy success on sports facility subsidy deals should be the ability of municipalities to negotiate favorable terms over facility ownership, control over concessions, or naming rights, rather than in aggregate numbers of how much money is spent on such projects. Another way to assess the politics of these projects is to determine whether opponents were able to force proponents to alter their policy goals or their strategies for accomplishing them and to find the ways in which opposition was most effective in combating sports subsidy proposals.

## **Summary**

My analysis of political power in these policy decisions shows that sports facility subsidies are not the product of elite influence, interest groups, growth machines, or governing urban regimes. Instead, they result from the successful formation of single-issue alliances that are temporarily crafted by owners, key public officials and private leaders who participate in a process of bargaining and compromise to secure policies that provided subsidy support.

Even though Robbie was a member of the civic elite group and linked to a growth-oriented regime

in Miami-Dade, he did not easily obtain subsidies and had to depend upon county officials and growth supporters to secure his land subsidy. Arison also had ties to this same leadership structure but by the time he sought arena subsidies, their influence was in decline and they were being replaced by a new set of formal and informal Hispanic leaders. The downtown business leaders that helped shape the Ice Palace plan represented traditional power institutions in Tampa politics, but were individuals unaccustomed to working together on other policy issues. And the Lightning's Japanese-based owners and franchise executives were not connected to the existing power base and not likely to be participants in local political issues beyond the arena. When subsidies for a Tampa stadium became an issue, the resulting CIT plan represented a broad electoral coalition of groups from various constituencies allied around this initiative but not necessarily cooperative on other community issues.

In short, none of these cases were solely dependent upon elite influence nor did they include a coalition of interests that joined forces on other policy issues. Rather, these decisions were the result of a policy process wherein a collection of interests formed to support a single issue – subsidizing a sports facility – at a particular moment in time. The coalition of interests that assembles to advocate for public funding of a professional sports facility was issue-directed and unlikely to reassemble around other future policy agendas.

The identification of sports development grant coalitions is useful in describing how public subsidies were secured in the Miami-Dade and Tampa Bay regions in these four cases. Grant coalitions may also be indicators of the temporal nature of political power and influence in American cities, especially during times of limited resources. Replications of this study in other areas and with alternative measurement tools can deepen our understanding of power and influence in today's urban governments. And owners of professional teams seeking future public subsidies for sports facilities might take heed by identifying potential allies to establish a supportive coalition early in their drive to secure public monies. As debates over the public subsidy of sports facilities continue to occur, identifying the formation of coalitions in support of and in opposition to various alternatives provides the analyst with the key to understanding the political processes at play in subsidy policy decisions.

## References

- Abrahamson, Mark. 1996. *Urban Enclaves: Identity and Place in America*. New York. St. Martin's Press.
- Andelman, Bob. 1992. *Stadium for Rent: Tampa Bay's Quest for Major League Baseball*. New York: McFarland and Company.
- Adranovich, Greg, Matthew J. Burbank, and Charles H. Heying. 2001. "Olympic Cities: Lessons Learned from Mega-Event Politics." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 23 (2), 113-131.
- Baade, Robert, and Richard F. Dye. 1988. "Sports Stadiums and Area Development: A Critical Review." *Economic Development Quarterly* (August): 265-275.
- Baade, Robert. 1996a. "Professional Sports as Catalysts for Metropolitan Economic Development." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 18 (1): 1-17.
- Baade, Robert. 1996b. "Stadium Subsidies make little economic sense for cities, a rejoinder." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 18 (1): 33-37.
- Babbie, Earl. 1992. *The Practice of Social Research*. Sixth Edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1970. *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice*. London. Oxford University Press.
- Baim, Dean V. 1994. *The Sports Stadium as a Municipal Investment*. Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Banfield, Edward C. 1965. *Big City Politics*. New York. Random House.
- Banfield, Edward C. and James Q. Wilson. 1963. *City Politics*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Beeh, Jenny E. 1998. "If you remediate it, will they come?" *Brownfield News*.
- Berkley, George E. and Douglas M. Fox. 1980. *80,000 Governments: The Politics of Subnational America*. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
- Berry, Jeffrey M. 1984. *The Interest Group Society*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Berry, Jeffrey M. 2002. "Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing," *PS: Political Science & Politics*. Vol. 35, Number 4. 679-682.
- Berry, Jeffrey M., and Kent E. Portney, and Ken Thomson. 1993. *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Berman, David R. 2000. *State and Local Politics*. Ninth Edition. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Bernard, Richard M., and Bradley R. Rice, eds. 1983. *Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Blair, John P. and David W. Swindell. 1997. "Sports, Politics, and Economics: The Cincinnati Story," *Sports, Jobs and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Development*. Noll, Roger G., and Andrew Zimbalist, eds. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

- Bowman, Ann O'M. 1997. "Urban Government." In *Handbook on Research on Urban Politics and Policy in the United States*, ed. Ronald Vogel. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press.
- Bowers James R. and Wilbur C. Rich. eds. 2000. *Governing Middle-Sized Cities: Studies in Mayoral Leadership*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Brady, Erik. 1996. "Miami weighs in with split decision Heat, Panthers get separate homes," *USA Today*, 6 September, 19C.
- Branch, Karen. 1996. "Strong team assembled to forge arena deal," *Miami Herald*, 2 November, 20A.
- Brierly, Allen Bronson, and David Moon. 1991. "Electoral Coalitions and Institutional Stability: The Case of Metropolitan Reform in Dade County, Florida." *The Journal of Politics* 53 (3) (August): 701-719.
- Brown, Neil. 1985a. "Foes Decry Stadium Backers' Gifts to Commissioners," *Miami Herald*, 6 February, 2B.
- Brown, Neil. 1985b. "Robbie Trims Stadium Project," *Miami Herald*, 23 June, 1D.
- Brown, Neil. 1985c. "Stadium approved on 7-1 vote," *Miami Herald*, 27 February, 1A.
- Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall and David H. Tabb, eds. 2003. *Racial Politics in American Cities*. Third Edition. New York: Longman Press.
- Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall and David H. Tabb, eds. 1997. *Racial Politics in American Cities*. Second Edition. New York: Longman Press.
- Burbank, Matthew J., Charles H. Heying, and Greg Adranovich. 2000. "Antigrowth politics or piecemeal resistance?: Citizen opposition to Olympic-related economic growth." *Urban Affairs Review* 35 (3), January: 334-357.
- Burck, Charles G. 1973. "It's Promoters vs. Taxpayers in the Superstadium Game." *Fortune Magazine*. March.
- Burns, Nancy. 1994. *The Formation of American Local Governments: Private Values and Public Institutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Burstein, Melvin L., and Arthur J. Rolnick. 1995. "Congress Should End the Economic War Among the States," *1994 Annual Report by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis*, March.
- Cagan, Joanna, and Neil deMause, eds. 1998. *Field of Schemes: How the Great Stadium Swindle Turns Public Money into Private Profit*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Cammissa, Anne Marie. 1995. *Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal System*. Westport, CN: Praeger.
- Caplow, Theodore. 1959. "Further Development of a Theory of Coalitions in the Triad," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 44, no. 5, March.
- Cappan, Frank. 1985. "Support for Joe Robbie," *Miami Herald*, 7 September.

- Cavanaugh, Joanne and Ted Reed. 1995. "Miami is hustling to keep the Heat here," *Miami Herald*, 8 November.
- Chapin, Timothy Stewart. 1999. "Urban Revitalization Tools: Assessing the Impacts of Sports Stadia at the Microarea Level." Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Washington.
- Chass, Murray. 2002. "New Parks Lose Magic Quickly," *New York Times*.  
([www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/sports/baseball/07FANS.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/sports/baseball/07FANS.html) May 10, 2002).
- Chema, Thomas V. 1996. "When professional sports justify the subsidy, a reply to Robert A. Baade," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 18(1): 19-22.
- Chick, Bob. 1998. "Changing of the Guard: Tampa Bay's Sports Leadership Has Put on a New Face, But Don't Discard the Old," *Tampa Tribune*, 18 September.
- Chillura, Jr. Joe. 1996. Testimony Before the Judicial Committee of the U.S. House of Representative. 6 February.
- Clark, Cammy. 1994. "Arena site pleases commissioner," *St. Petersburg Times*. 14 April.
- Clarke, Susan E. 1998. Economic Development Roles in American Cities: A Contextual Analysis of Shifting Partnerships Arrangement." In *Public-Private Partnerships for Local Economic Development*. ed. Walzer, Norman and Brian D. Jacobs. Westport, CN: Praeger.
- Clough, Michael. 1996. "The Globalization of American Sports," *Miami Herald*, 7 April.
- Cochran, Charles L. and Eloise F. Malone. 1995. *Public Policy Perspectives and Choices*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Cochrane, Allan, Jamie Peck, and Adam Tickell. 1996. "Manchester Plays Games: Exploring the Local Politics of Globalisation," *Urban Studies* 33 ( 8): 1319-1336.
- Cohen, Andy. 1990. "Robbie: A man who got things done," *Dolphin Digest*. 18 (24): (15 January): 3.
- Colburn David R. and Lance deHaven-Smith. 1999. *Government in the Sunshine State: Florida Since Statehood*. Gainesville, FL. University Press of Florida.
- Conrad, Eric. 1995a. "Heat Ownership Mess Grows: Hudson Sues To Gain Control of Franchise," *Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel*. 7 January.
- Conrad, Eric. 1995b. "South Florida Has a Full House of Arena Proposals," *Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel*. 12 March.
- Cooper, Mary Lou, and Paul Cohan. 1997. "Footing the Bill," *State Government News*, May: 6-8.
- Craig, Timothy E. 1998. "Framing a Tax: a Newspaper Frame Analysis of the Hillsborough County Community Investment Tax." Master's Thesis. University of South Florida.
- Croucher, Sheila L. 1997. *Imagining Miami: Ethnic Politics in a Postmodern World*. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia.
- Curtis, Tom. 1981. "Dolphins are Alive and Well; Sports Authority on Way Out," *Dolphin Digest*. 10 (22) (27 December): 3.

- Cutter, John A., Brian Landman, Richard Danielson, and Mark Bourgeois. 1992. "Time's up in hockey deal, says mayor," *St. Petersburg Times*. 5 June.
- Dade County, Florida, Board of County Commissioners. 1984 Clerk's Summary of Agenda Action and Official Minutes. 3 July.
- Dade County, Florida, Board of County Commissioners. 1985. Official Zoning Agenda. 26 September.
- Dade County, Florida, Board of County Commissioners. 1996a Report of Arena Financing Review Team. 6 February.
- Dade County, Florida, Board of County Commissioners. 1996b. Resolution No. 130-96. 8 February.
- Dade County, Florida, Board of County Commissioners. 1996c. Clerk's Summary of Agenda Action and Official Minutes, Emergency Meeting. 29 March.
- Dade County, Florida, Board of County Commissioners. 1996d. Clerk's Summary of Agenda Action and Official Minutes. 18 June.
- Dahl, Robert. 1961. *Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Danielson, Michael. 1997. *Home Team: Professional Sports and the American Metropolis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Danielson, Richard. 1994. "Arena finances pose a hitch," *St. Petersburg Times*, 4 June.
- Danielson, Richard. 1995a. "Stadium may rise or fall on financial risk," *St. Petersburg Times*, 18 June.
- Danielson, Richard. 1995b. "Stadium still faces financial shortfall," *St. Petersburg Times*, 29 September.
- Danielson, Richard. 1995c. "Bucs blitz doesn't sit well with official," *St. Petersburg Times*, 20 October.
- Danielson, Richard. 1996. "Ice Palace fits downtown dream," *St. Petersburg Times*, 20 October.
- Danielson, Richard and Jeff Testerman. 1995. "Greco becomes latest Bucs ticket salesman," *St. Petersburg Times*, 8 November.
- DeFede, Jim. 1996a "Micky Arison is a Greedy Corporate Pig... and other observations about backroom politics and big-time sports," *Miami New Times*, 1 May.
- DeFede, Jim. 1996b "Micky Arison is a Greedy Corporate Pig... and other observations about big boys and their expensive toys," *Miami New Times*, 8 May.
- DeFede, Jim. 1996c. "The Heat is Off," *Miami New Times*, 23 October.
- DeFede, Jim. 1996d. "Tony Ridder and the Heritage of Arrogance," *Miami New Times*, 31 October.
- DeFede, Jim. 1996e. "Arena Winners and Losers: Alex Shoots, Alex Scores!," *Miami New Times*, 14 November.
- DeGeorge, Gail. 1996. *The Making of A Blockbuster: How Wayne Huizenga Built a Sports and Entertainment Empire from Trash, Grit and Videotape*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

- deLeon, Peter. 1999. "The Stages Approach to the Policy Process: What has it done? Where is it going?" In *Theories of the Policy Process*, ed. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- deHaven-Smith, Lance. 1995. *The Florida Voter*. Tallahassee, FL: The Florida Institute of Government, Florida State University.
- Didion, Joan. 1987. *Miami*. New York: Pocket Books.
- Doig, Jameson W. 1987. "Coalition Building by a Regional Agency." In *The Politics of Urban Development*, ed. Clarence H. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
- Dougherty, Larry. 1997. "Former mayor has his day in court," *St. Petersburg Times*. 13 March.
- Dougherty, Larry. 1996a. "Voters will decide tax for Bucs," *St. Petersburg Times*. 9 May.
- Dougherty, Larry. 1996b. "Questions give poll answers meaning, experts say," *St. Petersburg Times*. 10 June.
- Dougherty, Larry. 1996c. "Major projects rack up debt," *St. Petersburg Times*. 17 November.
- Dougherty, Larry. 1996d. "Bucs stadium's hurdles don't worry planners," *St. Petersburg Times*. 2 December.
- Dugger, Celia. 1985. "The 38 who secretly guide Dade," *Miami Herald*, 1 September.
- Dye, Thomas R. 1966. *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally and Company.
- Dye, Thomas R. 1995. *Who's Running America?: The Clinton Years*, Sixth Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Dye, Thomas R. 1998a. *Politics in Florida*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Dye, Thomas R. 1998b. *Understanding Public Policy*. Ninth Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Dye, Thoams R., Harmon Zeigler and S. Robert Lichter. 1991. *American Politics in the Media Age*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
- Eisenger, Peter. 2000. "The Politics of Bread and Circuses: Building the City for the Visitor Class," *Urban Affairs Review* 35 (3) (January): 316-333.
- Eisenger, Peter. 1997. *Theories of Urban Politics*. University of Wisconsin Press.
- Eisenger, Peter. 1988. *The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State: State and Local Economic Development Policy in the United States*. University of Wisconsin Press.
- Elkin, Stephen. 1987. *City and Regime in the American Republic*. University of Chicago Press.
- Eskridge, Jr., William N. 1991. "Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions," *Yale Law Journal* 101 (November): 331-455.

- Euchner, Charles C. 1993. *Playing the Field: Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Euchner, Charles C. 1999. "Tourism and Sports: The Serious Competition for Play." In *The Tourist City*, ed. Dennis Judd and Susan S. Fainstein. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Fainstein, Susan S., Norman I. Fainstein, Richard Child Hill, Dennis J. Judd, and Michael Peter Smith. 1986. *Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment*. Revised Edition. New York: Longman Press.
- Feagin, Joe R., Anthony M. Orum, and Gideon Sjeberg. 1991. *A Case for the Case Study*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Feiock, R.C. and J. Clingermayer. 1986. "Municipal representation, executive power, and economic development political activity," *Policy Studies Journal*. 15:211-29.
- Ferman, Barbara. 1996. *Governing the Ungovernable City. Political Skill, Leadership, and the Modern Mayor*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Ferman, Barbara. 1996. *Challenging the Growth Machine: Neighborhoods in Chicago and Pittsburgh*. Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press.
- Fiedler, Tom. 1996a. "The Heat and the shortcomings of local government," *Miami Herald*, 7 April.
- Fiedler, Tom. 1996b. "At the peak of power: Next task is making good on promises," *Miami Herald*, 2 October.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996a. "Tourists Pay Tax, Shun Sports," *Miami Herald*, 6 March.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996b. "Lawyer Wants Vote on Arena by the Bay: Heat Site Plan Stirs Opposition," *The Miami Herald*, 2 April.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996c. "Arena's Shaky Financing; Dade Plan Gambles Tourism Won't Fall," *Miami Herald*, 7 April.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996d. "Arena Backers Court Public Approval," *Miami Herald*, 18 May.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996e. "Cheers, Jeers Before Metro Arena Decision," *Miami Herald*, 16 June.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996f. "Dade voters likely to get final say on new arena," *Miami Herald*. 8 September.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996g. "Funding plan for arena may be tough sell," *Miami Herald*, 22 August.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996h. "Heat's owner, Penelas meet but fail to agree on arena," *Miami Herald*, 12 October.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996i. "Arena Ad Campaign Working, Heat Says," *Miami Herald*, 25 October, 2B.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996j. "Public-funded arena on bay lacks support," *Miami Herald*, 30 October, 1A.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996k. "Ad blitz, Penelas aid Heat's comeback," *Miami Herald*, 6 November.
- Finefrock, Don. 1996l. "Commission is sold on arena deal," *Miami Herald*, 7 November.

- Finefrock, Don. 1999. "Public cost in Heat arena reaches \$296 million," *Miami Herald*, 21 March.
- Finefrock, Don, and Mabel Dieppa. 1996. "Arena: "It's a new ballgame: Team, Penelas agree on private financing," *Miami Herald*, 1 November, 1A.
- Finefrock, Don and Joseph Tanfani. 1996. "Dade over Broward at the buzzer," *Miami Herald*. 29 March.
- Finefrock, Don and Karen Rafinski. 1996. "The Heat goes on In Miami; Broward, Panthers still talk as Dade OKs Arena," *Miami Herald*. 30 March.
- Fisher, Marc. 1984. "City Voters Punt On OB; Ball now in Robbie's Hands," *Miami Herald*, 14 March.
- Fort, Rodney. 1997. "Direct Democracy and the Stadium Mess." In *Sports, Jobs & Taxes*, ed. Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.
- Frederickson, H. George and Linda Schuller O'Leary. 1973. *Power, Public Opinion, and Policy in a Metropolitan Community: A Case Study of Syracuse, New York*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Gale, Dennis. 1999. "Miami: The Overtown Neighborhood - A Generation of Revitalization Strategies Gone Awry." In *Rebuilding Urban Neighborhoods*, ed. Dennis Keating and Norman Krumholz. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Garcia, F. Chris and Rudolph O. de la Garza. 1977. *The Chicano Political Experience: Three Perspectives*. North Scituate, MA. Duxbury Press.
- Garcia, F. Chris, ed. 1988. *Latinos and the Political System*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Garcia, Maria Cristina. 1996. *Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994*. Berkeley. University of California Press.
- George, Dave. 1994. "Major League sports fans can thank Robbie and Huizenga," *Palm Beach Post*. 25 January.
- Glazer B.G. and A.L. Strauss. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Glick, Shav. 1987. "Miracle of Miami; They said Joe Robbie could not do it, but his stadium is proof he could - and did," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 August.
- Glynn, Carroll, Susan Herbst, and Garrett J. O'Keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1999. *Public Opinion*. Westview Press.
- Gonzalez-Pando, Miguel. 1998. *The Cuban Americans*. Westport, CN. Greenwood Press.
- Goodman, Cindy Krischer. 1998. "Suite Deal Luxury Seat Sales For Dade's Arena Give Taxpayers Break," *Miami Herald*. 23 May, 1A.
- Gottlieb, Andrew. 1995. *La Saguesera: The Dilemma of the Cuban Political Culture in Miami*. Master's Thesis. Florida International University.
- Grenier, Guillermo J., and Max Castro. 2001. "Blacks and Cubans in Miami: The Negative Consequences of the Cuban Enclave on Ethnic Relations," in *Governing American Cities*, ed. Michael Jones-Coreea. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

- Grenier, Guillermo J. with Fabiana Inverizzi, Ilda Salup, and Jorge Schmidt. 1994. "Los Bravos de Politica: Politics and Cubans in Miami," in *Barrio Ballots. Latino Politics in the 1990 Elections*. Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Marth Menchaca and Louis DeSipio, eds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press
- Grenier, Guillermo J., and Alex Stepick III, eds. 1992. *Miami Now!: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Social Change*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
- Greenberg, Martin J., and James T. Gray. 1996. *The Stadium Game*. Marquette, National Sports Law Institute: Marquette University Law School.
- Hampton, Jim. 1996. "Why We Favor Bayside Development," *Miami Herald*. 23 June.
- Hanlry, Brian. 1996. "In Miami, It's a Tale of 2 Arenas," *Chicago Sun-Times*, 7 April.
- Harrigan, John J. 1993. *Political Change in the Metropolis*. Fifth Edition. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.
- Harrigan, John J. and Ronald K. Vogel. 2000. *Political Change in the Metropolis*. Sixth Edition. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.
- Heartland Policy Study. 1995. "Should Congress Stop the Bidding War for Sports Franchises," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 29 November.
- Herbst, Susan. 1998. *Reading Public Opinion: How Political Actors View the Democratic Process*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Hero, Rodney E. 1992. *Latinos and the U.S. Political System: Two-Tiered Pluralism*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Hero, Rodney E. and Susan E. Clarke. 2003. "Latinos, Blacks, and Multiethnic Politics in Denver: Realigning Power and Influence in the Stuggle for Equality." In *Racial Politics in American Cities*, ed. Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall and David H. Tabb. Third Edition. New York: Longman Press.
- Henderson, Joe. 1996a. "Stadium gets help; study shows support for mixed tax," *Tampa Tribune*, 1 June.
- Henderson, Joe. 1996b. "Voters to decide on tax, Bucs; The money would go toward a stadium and other projects," *Tampa Tribune*, 6 June.
- Henderson, Joe. 1996c. "Tax plan challenges Bucs; Tampa and Hillsborough county agree on a 30-year option and sports authority control of the stadium," *Tampa Tribune*, 21 June.
- Henderson, Joe. 1996d. "Bucs stadium lease gets government OK," *Tampa Tribune*, 30 August.
- Henderson, Joe. 1996e. "Voters say yes to sales tax," *Tampa Tribune*, 4 September.
- Henry, Ian P., and Juan Luis Paramio-Salcines. 1999. "Sport and the Analysis of Symbolic Regimes: A Case Study of the City of Sheffield." *Urban Affairs Review*. 34 (5) (May) 641-666.
- Hill, Kevin, Dario V. Moreno, and Lourdes C. Cue. 1997. "Racial and Partisan Voting in a Tri-Ethnic City: The 1996 Dade County Mayoral Election." Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 10-12.

- Hillsborough County, Florida , Board of County Commissioners. 1995a. Verbal Status Report Regarding the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. 18 January.
- Hillsborough County, Florida , Board of County Commissioners. 1995b. BOCC Minutes. 22 November.
- Hillsborough County, Florida, Board of County Commissioners. 1996a. WS/Tampa Bay Buccaneers. 27 March.
- Hillsborough County, Florida , Board of County Commissioners. 1996b. Emergency Meeting - Tampa Bay Buccaneers. 29 March.
- Hillsborough County, Florida , Board of County Commissioners. 1996c. WS/Community Investment Tax. 8 May.
- Hirsch, Rick. 1984a. "Good Idea or Waste?" *Miami Herald*, 4 March.
- Hirsch, Rick. 1984b. "Robbie Urges Defeat of OB Bond Issue" *Miami Herald*, 10 March.
- Hirsch, Rick. 1984c. "Voters in Miami Again Team Up to Crush Orange Bowl Renovation," *Miami Herald*. 14 March.
- Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* New York: Knopf.
- Holloway, Harry, with John George. 1986. *Public Opinion: Coalitions, Elites and Masses*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Howard, Dennis R. and John L. Crompton. 1995. *Financing Sport*. Fitness Information Technology, Incorporated.
- Hunter, Floyd. 1953. *Community Power Structure: A Study in Decision Making*. University of North Carolina Press.
- Hudson, Ian. 1999. "Bright Lights, Big City: Do Professional Sports Teams Increase Employment?," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 21 (4) 397-407.
- Imbrascio, David. 1997. *Reconstructing City Politics: Economic Development and Urban Regimes*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Johnson, Arthur. 1993. *Minor League Baseball and Local Economic Development*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Johnson, Arthur, and Allen Sack. 1996. "Assessing the Value of Sports Facilities: The Importance of Noneconomic Factors." *Economic Development Quarterly* 10(4).
- Jonas, Andrew E.G. and David Wilson, eds. 1999. *The Urban Growth Machine*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Jones, Brian. 1983. *Governing Urban America: A Policy Focus*, Boston: Little, Brown.
- Judd, Dennis, and Susan S. Fainstein, eds. 1999. *The Tourist City*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Judd, Dennis, and Todd Swanstrom. 1994. *City Politics: Private Power and Public Policy*. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.

- Judd, Dennis, and Todd Swanstrom. 1998. *City Politics: Private Power and Public Policy*. Second Edition. New York: Longman Press.
- Judge, David, Gerry Stoker and Harold Wolman, eds. 1995. *Theories of Urban Politics*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Kalich, Veronica Z. 1998. "A Public Choice Perspective on the Subsidization of Private Industry: A Case Study of Three Cities and Three Stadiums," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 20 (2) 199-219.
- Kaufman, Ira. 1998. "Lightning's finances draw scrutiny from national media," *Tampa Tribune*. 7 April.
- Keating, W. Dennis. 1996. "Cleveland: The "Comeback City": The Politics of Redevelopment and Sports Stadiums Amidst Urban Decline." In *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy*, ed. Mickey Lauria. Thousand Oaks, CA: Thousand Oaks Press.
- Keating, Raymond J. 1999. "Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship between Major League Sports and Government," *Cato Policy Analysis No. 339*. 5 April.
- Kelley Anne E. and Ella L. Taylor. 1992. "Florida: The Changing Patterns of Power," in *Interest Group Politics in the Southern States*. Ed. Ronald Hrebenar and Clive S. Thomas. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press.
- Kenyon, Jim. 1995a. "Bucs' bid for stadium funding bucks trend; Most new sports facilities are joint public-private efforts," *Tampa Tribune*. 28 January.
- Kenyon, Jim. 1995b. "Stadium tax an underdog, survey shows," *Tampa Tribune*. 24 May.
- Kenyon, Jim. 1995c. "New Bucs stadium is favored; Tampa Sports Authority sets sights on \$168.1 million home for the team," *Tampa Tribune*. 25 May.
- Kingdon, John. 1984. *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy*, Boston: Little, Brown.
- Kleinberg, Howard. 1992. "Field of Dreams? Try Acres of Boxcars," *Miami Herald*. 25 August.
- Kleinberg, Howard. 1995. "A New Arena? We've Heard that One Before," *Miami Herald*. 29 August.
- Kleinberg, Howard. 1999. "Don't be fooled, Robbie had help," *Miami Herald*. 23 November.
- Klobuchar, Amy. 1982. *Uncovering the Dome*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
- Koenig, John, Seth H. Lubove, Susan Aschoff, James R. Hagy, Matt Walsh, and Thomas J. Billitteri. 1990. "Power: A City-by-City- Look," *Florida Trend*. 32:10, 42-46.
- Lasswell, Harold. 1958. *Politics: Who Gets What, When and How?* Cleveland, OH: The New World Publishing Company.
- LaFeber, Walter. 2000. *Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Lavarakas, Paul J. and Michael W. Traugott. 2000. *Election Polls, the News Media, and Democracy*. New York: Chatham House Publishers.
- Levine, Barry. 1985. "The Capital of Latin America," *Wilson Quarterly* (Winter): 46-73.

- Lindbloom, Charles. 1977. *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems*. New York: Basic Books.
- Logan, John R., and Harvey L. Molotch. 1987. *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*. Berkely, CA: University of California Press.
- Lowi, Theodore. 1969. *The End of Liberalism*. New York: W.W. Norton Company.
- Lowitt, Bruce. 1996. "A Stadium by any other name?," *St. Petersburg Times*, 31 August.
- MacManus, Susan. 1999. "The Resurgent City Councils." In *American State and Local Politics: Directions for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, ed. Ronald E. Weber and Paul Brace. New York: Chatham House Publishers.
- MacManus, Susan. 1998. "Financing Government." In *Government and Politics in Florida*. Second Edition, ed. Robert J. Huckshorn. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
- MacManus, Susan, and Alice E. Johnson. 1996. *Hillsborough County Voters Pass Community Investment Tax for Public Infrastructure, Schools, and a Stadium*. Report prepared for The Governor's Commission on Education (December). Tampa, FL: Department of Government and International Affairs, University of South Florida.
- Martin, David L. 1990. *Running City Hall: Municipal Administration in America*, Second Edition. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
- Mayer, Rick. 1998. "Through the Years: Lightning Sold," *Tampa Tribune*. 19 May.
- Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Yale University Press.
- Merzer, Martin. 1987. "The Tyrant with a Heart," *Miami Herald*, 2 August.
- Merzer, Martin. 1996. "The fight for the Heat," *Miami Herald*, 30 March.
- McEwen, Tom. 1996. Poll suggests Bucs' chances about 50-50," *Tampa Tribune*. 2 June.
- McGovern, Stephen. 1998. *The Politics of Downtown Development: Dynamic Political Cultures in San Francisco and Washington, D.C.* Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.
- Miller, Eric. 1999. "Federal Judge Ices Lightning Lawsuit," *Tampa Tribune*. 1 April.
- Miami Herald*. 1984. Editorial. 15 March.
- Miami Herald*. 1985. "Joe Robbie's Stadium," 27 September.
- Miami Herald*. 1996. "Much more than an arena," 25 October.
- Mohl, Raymond A. 1993. "Race and Space in the Modern City: Interstate-95 and the Black Community in Miami," In *Urban Policy in Twentieth Century America*, ed. Arnond R. Hirsch and Raymond A. Mohl. New Brunswick, NJ. Rutgers University Press.
- Mohl, Raymond. A., ed. 1990. *Searching for the Sunbelt: Historical Perspectives on a Region*. Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press.

- Mohl, Raymond A. 1990. "Miami: New Immigrant City," in *Searching for the Sunbelt: Historical Perspectives on a Region*. Ed. By Mohl. Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press.
- Mohl, Raymond A. 1989. "Ethnic Politics in Miami, 1960-1986., In *Shades of the Sunbelt*, ed. R.M. Miller and G.E. Pozzetta. Boca Raton: Florida Atlantic University Press.
- Mohl, Raymond A. 1983. "Miami: The Ethnic Cauldron," In *Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II*, ed. Richard Bernard and Bradley R. Rice. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Molotch, Harvey. 1976. "The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a political economy of place," *American Journal of Sociology*. 82 309-330.
- Molotch, Harvey. 1993. "The Political Economy of Growth Machines," *Journal of Urban Affairs*. 15 (1) 29-53.
- Mollenkopf, John H. 1983. *The Contested City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Moore Joan and Harry Pachon. 1985. *Hispanics in the United States*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Prentice Hall, Inc.
- Moreno, Dario and Christopher L. Warren. 1992. "The Conservative Enclave: Cubans in Florida." In *From Rhetoric to Reality: Latino Politics in the 1988 Elections*, ed. Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Mormino, Gary R. 1983. "Tampa: From Hell Hole to the Good Life," In *Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II*, eds. Bernard, Richard M., and Bradley R. Rice. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Mullin, Jim. 1996. "Tony Ridder and the Heritage of Arrogance," *Miami New Times*. 31 October.
- Municipal Year Book: The Authoritative Source Book of Local Government Data and Developments*. 2001. International City-County Management Association.
- Nelson, James. 1984. "Life just won't be the same with a stadium next door," *Miami Herald*. 12 July.
- Noll, Roger G., and Andrew Zimbalist, eds. 1997. *Sports, Jobs and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Development*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Norwood-Norland Homeowners' Assoc., Inc. et. al. vs. Dade County et. al.* 1987. Court of Appeals of Florida, Third District. No. 86-2309.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Olson, James S. and Judith E. Olson. 1995. *Cuban Americans: From Trauma to Triumph*. New York. Twayne Publishers.
- Oricchio, Michael. 1985. "Fiery Jackson rallies stadium foes," *Miami Herald*, 22 September.
- Orsi, Jennifer. 1990. "Details sought on arena funding," *St. Petersburg Times*, 25 July.
- Orsi, Jennifer and Jennifer Stevenson. 1990. "Hockey site on thin ice," *St. Petersburg Times*, 16 November.

- Orsi, Jennifer, Jennifer Stevenson, and Thomas Tobin. 1990. "Hillsborough officials wary of sports deals," *St. Petersburg Times*, 8 December.
- Ostrom, Vincent, Robert Bish and Elinor Ostrom. 1988. *Local Government in the United States*. San Francisco, CA. Institute for Contemporary Studies.
- Paramio-Salcines, Henry. 1999. "Sport and the Analysis of Symbolic Regimes: A Case Study of the City of Sheffield." *Urban Affairs Review* 34 (5) (May): 641-665.
- Park, Paula. 1996. "Sic 'Em," *Miami New Times Online*. 31 July.
- Park, Paula. 1997. "Miami: See it like a Visionary," *Miami New Times*, 3-9 April.
- Parker, Suzanne Lee. 1998. "Interest Groups and Public Opinion." In *Government and Politics in Florida*. Second Edition, ed. Robert J. Huckshorn. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
- Parks, Kyle. 1998. "The payoff for the county is in pride, not dollars," *St. Petersburg Times*. 18 September.
- Pelissero, John P. and Timothy Krebs. 1997. "City Council Legislative Committees and Policy-making in Large United States Cities," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 2, April. 499-518.
- Pelissero, John P., and Beth Henschen, and Edward Sidlow. 1991. "Urban Regimes, Sports Stadiums, and the Politics of Economic Development Agendas in Chicago," *Policy Studies Review* 10 (2/3) (Spring/Summer).
- Peterman, William. 2000. *Neighborhood Planning and Community-based Development: The Potential and Limits of Grassroots Action*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Peterson, George E, ed. 1994. *Big-City Politics, Governance, and Fiscal Constraints*. Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
- Peterson, Paul E. 1981. *City Limits*. University of Chicago Press.
- Peterson Paul E. and J. David Greenstone. 1976. "Two Competing Models of the Policy-Making Process: The Community Action Controversy as an Empirical Test." In *Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics*, ed. Hawley, Lipsky et. al. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Perez-Stable, Marifeli and Miren Uriate. 1993. "Cubans and the Changing Economy of Miami." In *Latinos in a Changing U.S. Economy*. eds. Rebecca Morales and Frank Bonilla. New York: Sage Publications.
- Plaisted, Ed. 1981. "Robbie Contemplates Plan for Private-Sector Funded Open-Air Stadium," *Dolphin Digest*. 10 (22) (27 December): 12-13.
- Poe vs. Hillsborough County, City of Tampa, Florida and Tampa Sports Authority* 1997a. Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Case No. 96-6515.
- Poe vs. Hillsborough County, City of Tampa, Florida and Tampa Sports Authority* 1997b. Supreme Court of Florida. Case No. 90,223.
- Portes, Alejandro and Robert L. Bach. 1985. *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States*. Berkeley. University of California Press.

- Portes, Alejandro and Alex Stepick. 1993. *City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Posner, Paul L. 1998. *The Politics of Unfunded Mandates: Whither Federalism?*. Washington: D.C. Georgetown University Press.
- Presthus, Robert. 1964. *Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- "Quick Facts on the Miami International Film Festival." 2003.  
[www.miamifilmfestival.com/docs/sponsors\\_factsheet.doc](http://www.miamifilmfestival.com/docs/sponsors_factsheet.doc) (25 July, 2003).
- Quirk, James, and Rodney D. Fort. 1992. *Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Radar, Benjamin G. 1990. *American Sports: From the Age of Folk Games to the Age of Televised Sports*. Second edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Simon and Schuster.
- Rafinski, Karen and Don Finefrock. 1996. "Arena Deal is Close, Leaders Say Dade Still Hopes to Stay in Game," *Miami Herald*. 27 March.
- Rafool, Mandy. 1998. "Playing the Stadium Game. Appendix: Financing Professional Sports Facilities," *National Conference of State Legislatures*. 1 April.
- Riess, Steven. 2000. "Historical Perspectives on Sports and Public Policy," In *The Economics and Politics Sports Facilities*. ed. Wilbur C. Rich. Westport, CN: Quorum Books.
- Reed, Ted and Cindy Krischer Goodman. 1996. "Micky Arison," *Miami Herald*, 24 June.
- Reyna, Patrick. 1996. "Dade County, Miami Officials Approve New Arena to Keep the Miami Heat," *Miami Herald*. 29 March.
- Ricci, David. 1971. *Community Power and Democratic Theory: The Logic of Political Analysis*. New York: Random House.
- Rich, Wilbur C., ed. 2000. *The Economics and Politics of Sports Facilities*. Westport, CN: Quorum Books.
- Rice, Bradley Robert. 1977. *Progressive Cities: The Commission Government Movement in America, 1901-1920*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Ripley, Randall and Grace Franklin. 1986. *Policy Implementation in the United States*, Second Edition, Homewood, IL. Dorsey Press.
- Robbie, Joe. 1985. "The Stadium Debate: Our efforts will multiply the value of all property in the area," *Miami Herald*. 22 September.
- Roberts, Nancy C. 1992. "Public Entrepreneurship and Innovation," *Policy Studies Review*, pps. 55-73.
- Roeder, Phillip W. 1994. *Public Opinion and Policy Leadership in the American States*. Institute for Social Science Research. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press.
- Rolling Oaks Homeowners' Assn., Inc., et. al. vs, Dade County et. al.* 1986. Court of Appeals, Third District. No. 85-1948.

- Rosentraub, Mark S. 1999. *Major League Losers: The Real Cost of Sports and Who's Paying for It*. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books.
- Rosentraub, Mark. 1996. "Does the Emperor have new clothes?, A Reply to Robert J. Baade," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 18(1), 23-31.
- Rosentraub, Mark S. 1988. "Public Investment in Private Business: The Professional Sports Mania." In *Business Elites and Urban Development*, ed. Scott Cummings. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Rosentraub Mark S., David Swindell, Michael Przybylski, and Daniel R. Mullins. 1994. "Sports and Downtown Development Strategy: If You Build It, Will Jobs Come?" *Journal of Urban Affairs* 16 (30), 221-239.
- Sabatier, Paul A, ed. 1999. *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Sabatier, Paul A. and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith. 1999. "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment." In *Theories of the Policy Process*, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Sachs, Susan. 1982a. "Alaska, asked to build Dade a sports complex, passes," *Miami Herald*, 19 February.
- Sachs, Susan. 1982b. "Dade rejects 1-cent sales tax hike; proposal fails in 5 other counties," *Miami Herald*, 3 November.
- Sachs, Susan. 1983. "Metro Refuses to Revive county Sports Authority," *Miami Herald*, 19 January.
- Sachs, Susan, and Dan Ray. 1982. "Dade teams with Broward for stadium," *Miami Herald*, 20 February.
- Sanders, Heywood T. 1992. "Building the Convention City: Politics, Finance, and Public Investment in Urban America," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 14 (2) 135-159.
- Savitch, H.V. 1987. *Post-industrial cities*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Savitch, H.V., and John Clayton Thomas, eds. 1991. *Big City Politics in Transition*. (38), Urban Affairs Annual Reviews. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press.
- Scherberger, Tom. 1993a. "Rule change helps hockey," *St. Petersburg Times*, 6 May.
- Scherberger, Tom. 1993b. "Tampa mayor turns to hockey dealings," *St. Petersburg Times*, 12 August.
- Scherberger, Tom and Richard Danielson. 1993. "How the Lightning arena deal was done," *St. Petersburg Times*, 5 December.
- Schultz, Randy. 1996. "Arena Fight Heats Up Old Rivalry," *Palm Beach Post*, 11 February.
- Shipley, Amy. 1996. "M. Arison threatens to move Heat," *Miami Herald*, 1 October.
- Shropshire, Kenneth L. 1995. *The Sports Franchise Game: Cities in Pursuit of Sports Franchises, Events, Stadiums and Arenas*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

- Slevin, Peter. 1994. "The Non-Group Seeks to Answer, 'What Are We?'" *Miami Herald*, 21 November.
- Sofen, Edward. 1968. "Reflections of the Creation of Metro." In *Government of the Metropolis*, ed. Joseph F. Zimmerman. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
- St. Petersburg Times*. 1995. Readers discuss the need for a new stadium. Letters to the Editor. 24 October.
- St. Petersburg Times*. 1996. Sales tax boost will help everyone in Hillsborough. Letters to the Editor. 8 August.
- Stack, John F. Jr., and Christopher L. Warren. 1992. "The Reform Tradition and Ethnic Politics: Metropolitan Miami Confronts the 1990s." In *Miami Now!: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Social Change*, eds. Guillermo J. Grenier and Alex Stepick III. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
- Stack, John F. Jr., Christopher L. Warren, and Dario V. Moreno. 1998. "Politics and the Challenge of Ethnicity." In *Government and Politics in Florida*, ed. Robert Huckshorn. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
- Stanley, Doug. 1998. "Tradition of turmoil," *Tampa Tribune*, 19 May.
- Stebbins, John, Jim Kenyon and Ken Koehn. 1995. "New stadium; Local taxpayers may have to ante up in some way," *Tampa Tribune*, 17 January.
- Stern, Paul C. and Linda Kalof. 1996. *Evaluating Social Science Research*, Second Edition. Oxford University Press.
- Stevenson, Jennifer, Bill Duryea and Thomas Tobin. 1990. "Tampa hockey proposal rejected," *St. Petersburg Times*, 4 December.
- Stewart, Arnold Maurice. 2000. "Public Funding of large-scale sports arena: The case of Prince George's County, Maryland and the Jack Kent Cooke Stadium from 1989 to 1997." Ph.D. Dissertation. Howard University.
- Stone, Clarence H. 1993. "Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach," in *Journal of Urban Affairs* Volume 15, Number 1, 1-28.
- Stone, Clarence H. 1989. *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
- Stone, Clarence H., and Heywood T. Sanders. 1987. *The Politics of Urban Development*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
- Stone, Deborah. 1997. *Policy Paradox and Political Reason*. Second Edition. New York: Harper Collins.
- Stowers, Genie N.L. and Ronald K. Vogel. 1994. "Racial and Ethnic Voting Patterns in Miami." In *Big-City Politics, Governance, and Fiscal Constraints*, ed. George E. Peterson. Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
- Strauss, A.L. and J.L. Corbin. 1990. *Basics of Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Strouse, 1992. "Does Dade mayor need more power? Dade voters to decide Thursday," *Miami Herald*. 22 September.

- Strom, Elizabeth. 1999. "Let's Put On A Show!: Performing Arts and Urban Revitalization in Newark, New Jersey," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 21 (4) 423-435.
- Sullivan, E. Thomas, and Herbert Hovenkomp. 1994. *Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems*. Third Edition. Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Company.
- Svara, James H. 1999. "The Embattled Mayors and Local Executives." In *American State and Local Politics: Directions for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, ed. Ronald E. Weber and Paul Brace. New York: Chatham House Publishers.
- Svara, James H. 1994. *Facilitative Leadership in Local Government: Lessons from Successful Mayors and Chairpersons*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Svara, James H. 1990. *Official Leadership in the City: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Swanstrom, Todd. 1985. *The Crisis of Growth Politics: Cleveland, Kucinich and the challenge of urban populism*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Swindell, David, and Mark S. Rosentraub. 1998. "Who Benefits from the Presence of Professional Sports Teams? The Implications for Public Funding of Stadiums and Arenas," *Public Administration Review* 58 (1) (January/February) 11-20.
- Tampa Tribune*. 1993a. "Taypayer poll fails to back arena plan," 25 November.
- Tampa Tribune*. 1993b. "The secret of making \$\$\$\$ in Tampa," 29 November.
- Tampa Tribune*. 1996. "Let voters decide on tiny tax hike for schools, jails, police, stadium," 4 June.
- Tribune Business News Staff*. 1996. "We love taxing tourists," *Tampa Tribune*, 16 December.
- Tanfani, Joseph. 1996a. "Anatomy of a deal for an arena: Eleventh-hour success was months in the making," *Miami Herald*, 8 April.
- Tanfani, Joseph. 1996b. "Let Voters have their say," *Miami Herald*, 17 April.
- Tanfani, Joseph. 1996c. "Candidates want new deal on arena," *Miami Herald*, 26 September.
- Tanfani, Joseph. 1996d. "A new deal for arena, and Dade," *Miami Herald*, 3 November.
- Tanfani, Joseph and Karen Branch. 1996. "The Peak of Power: Penelas Hispanic Surge Propels Him to Decisive Win," *Miami Herald*, 2 October.
- Testerman, Jeff. 1995a. "No bucks for the Bucs?: Tuesday's sales tax defeats cast some gloom on stadium plans," *St. Petersburg Times*, 14 September.
- Testerman, Jeff. 1995b. "Bucs want stadium plan by year's end, or else," *St. Petersburg Times*, 19 September.
- Testerman, Jeff. 1995c. "Glazers offer 50-50 deal to build a new stadium," *St. Petersburg Times*, 28 September.
- Testerman, Jeff. 1995d. "Orlando Bucs?: Glazers devastated by poor seat deposit sales," *St. Petersburg Times*, 2 November.

- Testerman, Jeff. 1995e. "Bid for Bucs now, Orlando group urges," *St. Petersburg Times*, 23 November.
- Testerman, Jeff. 1995f. "Bucs balk at stadium finance plan," *St. Petersburg Times*, 14 December.
- Testerman, Jeff. 1996a. "Lawmaker says stadium tax is "just not doable," *St. Petersburg Times*, 3 January.
- Testerman, Jeff. 1996b. "Bucs talks seem to focus on litigation issue," *St. Petersburg Times*, 27 February.
- Torres, Maria de los Angeles. 1999. *In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United States*. Ann Arbor, MI. The University of Michigan Press.
- Turner, Robyne S. and Jose F. Marichal. "Exploring Politics on the Sports Page: The Role of the Local Media in Sports Stadium Developments," *Policy Studies Review*, Spring 1998, 15:1.
- Vogel, Ronald K., and Genie N.L. Stowers. 1991. "Miami: Minority Empowerment and Regime Change." In *Big City Politics in Transition (38) Urban Affairs Annual Reviews*, ed. H.V. Savitch and John Clayton Thomas. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Vogel, Ronald K. and Bert Swanson. 1989. "The Growth Machine Versus the Antigrowth Coalition: The Battle for Our Communities," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* (25) 1. (September) 63-85.
- Vogel, Ronald, ed. 1997. *Handbook on Research on Urban Politics and Policy in the United States*. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press.
- Vincent, Ted. 1981. *Mudville's Revenge: The Rise and Fall of American Sport*. New York: Seaview.
- Yates, Douglas. 1977. *The Ungovernable City: The Politics of Urban Problems and Policy Making*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Yanez, Luise, Ardy Friedberg, and Charles Strouse. 1996. "It's Official: The Heat Belongs to Miami," *Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel*, 30 March.
- Walker, David B. 2000. *The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching toward Washington*. Second Edition. New York: Chatham House Publishers.
- Walker, Kevin and Ken Koehn. 1994. "Arenas move in, bring baggage," *Tampa Tribune*, 3 July.
- Wallsten, Peter. 1996. "Legislative score is 8-4-4 on Buccaneers tax," *St. Petersburg Times*, 4 April.
- Walzer, Norman and Brian D. Jacobs. Eds. 1998. *Public-Private Partnerships for Local Economic Development*. Westport, CN: Praeger.
- Warner, Sam Bass, Jr. 1968. *The Private City. Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Warren, Christopher L. 1997. "Hispanic Incorporation and Structural Reform in Miami." In *Racial Politics in American Cities*, Second Edition. ed. Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. New York: Longman Press.
- Warren, Christopher L., and Dario V. Moreno. 2003. "Power without a Program: Hispanic Incorporation in Miami." In *Racial Politics in American Cities*, Third Edition, ed. Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. New York: Longman Press.

- Wasby, Stephen L. "A Transformed Triangle: Court, Congress, and Presidency in Civil Rights." *Policy Studies Journal* 21 (1993): 565-74.
- Washington, Wayne. 1998. "Stadium rose despite challenges," *St. Petersburg Times*, 18 September.
- Waste, Robert J. 1989. *The Ecology of City Policymaking*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Waste, Robert J. 1986. *Community Power: Directions for Future Research*. Ed. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Waste, Robert J. 1987. *Power and Pluralism in American Cities: Researching the Urban Laboratory*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Wexler, Kathryn. 1997. "Conspiracy alleged in arena plans," *St. Petersburg Times*, 8 March.
- Whelan, Robert K. 1987. "New Orleans: Mayoral Politics and Economic Development Policies in the Postwar Years, 1945-86." In *The Politics of Urban Development*, ed. Clarence H. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
- White, Louise G. 1994. *Political Analysis: Technique and Practice*. Third Edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Wiebe, Robert. 1967. *The Search for Order: 1877-1920*. New York. Hill and Wang.
- Wilborn, Paul. 1995. "One old stadium builder thinks a new generation in Tampa needs to get busy keeping a dream alive," *St. Petersburg Times*, 6 November.
- Williams, Oliver P. and Charles R. Adrian. 1963. *Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Williams, Oliver P. and Charles R. Adrian. 1968. "Community Types and Policy Differences." In *City Politics and Public Policy*, ed. James Q. Wilson. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Wilson, James Q. 1968. "Introduction: City Politics and Public Policy," in *City Politics and Public Policy*, ed. James Q. Wilson. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Wilson, Jon. 1990. "Hockey arena would require public funds," *St. Petersburg Times*, 24 July.
- Wolman, Harold, with David Spitzley. 1999. "The Politics of Local Economic Development." In *Approaches to Economic Development: Readings from Economic Development Quarterly*, ed. John P. Blair and Laura A. Reese. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Zaldivar, R.A. 1983. "Ferre threatens to grab Dolphins; May resort to eminent domain," *Miami Herald*, 29 April.
- <http://quickfacts.census.gov> (July 27, 2003).
- [www.aaarena.com](http://www.aaarena.com) (January 15, 2003).
- [www.leagueoffans.com](http://www.leagueoffans.com) (December 9, 2003)
- [www.ballparks.com](http://www.ballparks.com) (June 4, 2001).
- [www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2000/01/10/story8.html](http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2000/01/10/story8.html) (July 27, 2003).

[www.census.com](http://www.census.com) (May 20, 2003).

[www.leagueoffans.org](http://www.leagueoffans.org) (December 9, 2003).

Appendix A

Public Funding of North American Sports Facilities (in millions), 1987-2003

City	Facility	Team (League)	\$Subsidy	\$Facility	Year
Miami	Pro Player Stadium	Miami Dolphins (NFL)	30	145	1987
Houston	Astrodome (re)	Houston Astros (MLB)	67	67	1987
Miami	Miami Arena	Miami Heat (NBA)/Florida Panthers (NHL)	52	52	1987
Sacramento	ARCO Arena II	Sacramento Kings (NBA)	0	40	1988
Milwaukee	Bradley Center	Milwaukee Bucks (NBA)	53	53	1988
Orlando	Orlando Arena	Orlando Magic (NBA)	110	110	1988
Arizona	Sun Devil Stadium (re)	Arizona Cardinals (NFL)	8.7	11.1	1989
Toronto	Sky Dome	Toronto Blue Jays (MLB)	322	442	1989
St. Petersburg	Tropicana Field	Tampa Bay Devil Rays (MLB)	138	138	1990
Minnesota	Target Center	Minnesota Timberwolves (NBA)	66	104.2	1990
Chicago	New Comisky Park	Chicago White Sox (MLB)	150	150	1991
Utah	Delta Center	Utah Jazz (NBA)	24.6	102.6	1991
New York	Madison Square Garden IV (re)	NY Knicks (NBA)/NY Rangers (NHL)	200	200	1991
Baltimore	Camden Yards	Baltimore Orioles (MLB)	210	210	1992
Atlanta	Georgia Dome	Atlanta Falcons (NFL)	210	210	1992
Phoenix	America West Arena	Phoenix Suns (NBA)/Coyotes (NHL)	45	95	1992
San Jose	San Jose Arena	San Jose Sharks (NHL)	136	168	1993
Anaheim	Arrowhead Pond	Anaheim Mighty Ducks (NHL)	100	100	1993
Dallas	Reunion Arena (re)	Dallas Mavericks (NBA)	5	5	1993
San Antonio	Alamodome	San Antonio Spurs (NBA)	195	195	1993
Chicago	United Center	Chicago Bulls (NBA)/ Black Hawks (NHL)	10	175	1994
St. Louis	Savvis Center	St. Louis Blues (NHL)	36.5	171	1994
Cleveland	Jacobs Field	Cleveland Indians (MLB)	152	173	1994
Cleveland	Gund Arena	Cleveland Cavaliers (NBA)	73	152	1994
Dallas/Arlington	Ballpark in Arlington	Texas Rangers (MLB)	153	191	1994
Houston	The Summit (re)	Houston Rockets (NBA)	6.2	6.2	1994
Edmonton	Edmonton Coliseum	Edmonton Oilers (NHL)	14	14	1994
Jacksonville	Gator Bowl (re)	Jacksonville Jaguars (NFL)	136	136	1995
Tampa	St. Pete Times Forum	Tampa Bay Lightning (NHL)	102	161.8	1995

St. Louis	Edward Jones Dome	St. Louis Rams (NFL)
Boston	Fleet Center	Boston Celtics (NBA)/Bruins (NHL)
Denver	Coors Field	Colorado Rockies (MLB)
Portland	Rose Garden	Portland Trailblazers (NBA)
Seattle	Key Arena II (re)	Seattle Supersonics (NBA)
Vancouver	General Motors Palace	Vancouver Canucks (NHL)
Buffalo	HSBC Arena	Buffalo Sabres (NHL)
Montreal	Molson Centre (Le Centre Bell)	Montreal Canadiens (NHL)
Ottawa	Corel Center	Ottawa Senators (NHL)
Philadelphia	First Union Center	Philadelphia 76ers (NBA)/Flyers (NHL)
Charlotte	Ericsson Stadium	Charlotte Panthers (NFL)
Anaheim	Edison International Field (re)	Anaheim Angels (MLB)
Oakland	Oakland Coliseum (re)	Oakland Raiders (NHL)
Atlanta	Turner Field	Atlanta Braves (MLB)
Rajlon, Md.	Jack Kent Cooke Stadium (Fed Ex)	Washington Redskins (NFL)
Washington, D.C.	MCI Center	Washington Capitols (NHL)
San Diego	Jack Murphy/Qualcomm (re)	San Diego Padres (MLB)
Oakland	Oakland Arena (re)	Golden State Warriors (NBA)
Nashville	Nashville Arena	Nashville Predators (NHL)
Pittsburgh	Civic Arena (re)	Pittsburgh Penguins (NHL)
Phoenix	Bank One Ballpark	Arizona Diamondbacks (MLB)
St. Petersburg	Tropicana Field (re)	Tampa Bay Devil Rays (MLB)
Anaheim	Anaheim Stadium (re)	Anaheim Angels (MLB)
Sunrise, FL	National Car Rental Arena	Florida Panthers (NHL)
Baltimore	M&T Bank Stadium	Baltimore Ravens (NFL)
Tampa	Raymond James Stadium	Tampa Bay Buccaneers (NFL)
Miami	American Airlines Arena	Miami Heat (NBA)
Buffalo	Ralph Wilson Stadium (re)	Buffalo Bills (NFL)
Cleveland	Browns Stadium	Cleveland Browns (NFL)
Nashville	The Coliseum	Tennessee Titans (NFL)

290	290	1995
16	160	1995
200	215	1995
35	262	1995
74.5	199	1995
0	160	1995
55	127.5	1995
0	230	1996
42	200	1996
23	206	1996
50	248	1996
30	117	1996
100	197	1996
0	232	1997
75	255	1997
70	255	1997
60	78	1997
26	130	1997
143	143	1997
13	13	1997
270	355	1998
62	70	1998
30	117	1998
185	212	1998
200	220	1998
190	190	1998
142	241	1999
63	63	1999
216	309	1999
292	292	1999

Jacksonville	Alltel Stadium (re)	Jacksonville Jaguars (NFL)	121	121	1999
Toronto	Air Canada Centre	Toronto Raptor (NBA)/Maple Leafs (NHL)	0	161	1999
Atlanta	Phillips Arena	Atlanta Hawks (NBA)/Thrashers (NHL)	193.25	213.5	1999
Denver	Pepsi Center	Den. Nuggets (NBA)/Col. Avalanche (NHL)	5	160	1999
Indianapolis	Conesco Fieldhouse	Indianapolis Pacers (NBA)	72	175	1999
Los Angeles	Staples Center	Lakers, Clippers (NBA)/Kings (NHL)	71	321	1999
Raleigh	Centennial Arena	Carolina Hurricanes (NHL)	139	160	1999
Seattle	Safeco Field	Seattle Mariners (MLB)	393	517	1999
Detroit	Comerica Park	Detroit Tigers (MLB)	145	190	2000
Houston	Minute Maid Park	Houston Astros (MLB)	180	266	2000
St. Paul	Xcel Energy Center	Minnesota Wild (NBA)	130	130	2000
San Francisco	Pacific Bell Stadium	San Fran Giants (MLB)	15	306	2000
Columbus	Nationwide Arena	Columbus Blue Jackets (NHL)	0	115	2000
Cincinnati	Paul Brown Stadium	Cincinnati Bengals (NFL)	452	452	2000
Milwaukee	Miller Park	Milwaukee Brewers (MLB)	310	400	2001
Pittsburgh	PNC Park	Pittsburgh Pirates (MLB)	193	262	2001
Pittsburgh	Heinz Field	Pittsburgh Steelers (NFL)	156.5	233	2001
Dallas	American Airlines Arena	Dallas Mavericks/ Stars (NHL)	210	420	2001
Denver	Invesco Field	Denver Broncos (NFL)	270	360	2001
Boston	Gillette Stadium	New England Patriots (NFL)	70 <sup>1</sup>	325	2002
Detroit	Ford Field	Detroit Lions (NFL)	150	300	2002
Houston	Reliant Stadium	Houston Texans (NFL)	287	402	2002
Philadelphia	Lincoln Financial Field	Philadelphia Eagles (NFL)	265	520	2002
San Antonio	SBC Arena	San Antonio Spurs (NBA)	93	186	2002
Seattle	Football	Seattle Seahawks (NFL)	323	430	2002
San Francisco	Football	San Francisco (NFL)	100	525 <sup>2</sup>	2002
Cincinnati	Great American Ballpark	Cincinnati Reds (MLB)	300	361	2003
Houston	New Houston Arena	Houston Rockets (NBA)	90	175	2003
Chicago	New Soldier Field	Chicago Bears (NFL)	432	632	2003
Green Bay	New Lambeau Field	Green Bay Packers (NFL)	169	295	2003
Phoenix	Glendale Arena	Phoenix Coyotes (NHL)	180	220	2003
Philadelphia	Lincoln Financial Field	Philadelphia Phillies (MLB)	265	520	2004
San Diego	Baseball	San Diego Padres (MLB)	303	449	2004

<sup>1</sup> Public subsidy for infrastructure necessary to support a privately financed stadium

<sup>2</sup> Cost includes stadium facility and adjacent mall.

Memphis	FedExForum	Memphis Grizzlies (NBA)	250	250	2004
Charlotte	Basketball	Charlotte Bobcats (NBA)	170	265	2006
Phoenix	Football	Phoenix Cardinals (NFL)	246	355	2006

\$Subsidy = millions of nominal dollars for subsidy

\$Facility = millions of nominal dollars total for facility

(re) = refurbished facility

Sources: (Keating 1999; ballparks.com; leagueoffans.org; Rappaport and Wilkerson 2001; Rafool 1997a, 1997b; Rosentraub 1999)

## Appendix B

### Structured Interview Questions

#### Sample of questions asked to public officials:

1. What was your role in the development of this sports stadium/arena?
2. How did you come to assume that role?
3. How did you approach that role?
4. Who were the key proponents for sports facility subsidies in this case?
5. Who were the key opponents to sports facility subsidies in this case?
6. What role did the local political structure of government have to do with the deal?
7. How important to the city/ county is getting the stadium/arena built and why?
8. Would you say the city (government) negotiated a “fair deal” or a “good deal”?
9. Did the team owner/representatives negotiate a fair deal or a good deal?
10. Did the people of local area get a fair deal or a good deal?
11. Are there items in the deal you would like to change? Do you wish it was done differently?
12. How long do you think this facility be used?
13. Would you support another facility being built for this team to play in?
14. Was your support/dissent of building stadium/arena linked to Economic Development? Was your support/dissent of building stadium/arena linked to Increase Tourism?
15. Who do you think were the important people in this deal and why? Who else do I need to talk to about this policy?

#### Sample of questions asked to private leaders:

1. Why was there a need for this stadium/arena?
2. What would have happened if it had not been built?
3. Who do you recall being in support of this venture?
4. Who do you recall being against it?
5. What were the main arguments in support of the project?

6. Was there major opposition to the project? Who do you recall being opposed?
7. What role did the local political structure of government have to do with the deal?
8. Who profited from this decision?
9. Who was hurt by this decision?
10. Is there anyone who had to be persuaded to change their minds?
11. How were they persuaded?
12. What did it take to get the deal done?
13. Was there a "deal breaker" element in the talks?
14. Was there a "deal maker" in the talks?
15. Was the money spent justified by the investment made in the community? in the team?

## Appendix C

### Interview List

Name, Position(s), Date of Interview:

Bush, Greg, Professor of History at University of Miami. President, Miami Urban Environmental League, July 19, 2001.

Chillura, Joe, Hillsborough County Commissioner (1991-98), October 2, 2002.

Diaz-Balart, Mario, State Representative (2000-2002, 1988-1992); State Senator (1992-2000), July 9, 2001.

Echeverria, Herman, Hialeah City Council member and Vice Mayor; BVK/Meka, July 9, 2001.

Espinell, Jorge, Urban Environmental League, August 22, 2001.

Ferguson, Betty, Miami-Dade County Commissioner (1993-present), December 2002.

Ferre, Maurice, City of Miami Mayor (1973-85), Metro Dade County Commissioner (1993-1996), candidate for Miami-Dade Mayor (1996), July 20, 2001.

Freedman, Sandy, City of Tampa Mayor (1986-95), November 14, 2001.

Greco, Dick, City of Tampa Mayor (1967-1974; 1995-2003) , October 1, 2002.

Korge, Chris, attorney, former council for Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority, June 29, 2001

Levy, George, Tampa business owner, October 3, 2002.

Lopez, Jorge Luis, Attorney, July 19, 2001.

Masvidal, Raul, former Dade Sports Authority administrator; Miami businessman, June 22, 2001.

May, Brian, Chief of Staff, Miami-Dade Mayor Alex Penelas (1996-1998), June 20, 2001.

Penelas, Alex, Miami-Dade Mayor (1996-2004); Dade County Commissioner (1990-1996), June 21, 2001.

Saavedra, Henry, TSA Executive Director , October 7, 2002.

Saul-Sena, Linda, Tampa City Council member (1987-1994; 1999-present), October 2, 2002.

Sorenson, Katy. Miami-Dade County Commissioner (1994-present), May 1, 2001.

## VITA

### SEAN D. FOREMAN

#### Education

2003 Doctoral Candidate, Political Science, Florida International University, Miami, FL. Dissertation topic: "The Politics of Professional Sports Stadium and Arena Subsidies in Florida." Major Professor: Dr. Rebecca Mae Salokar. Comprehensive exam fields: American Government and Politics, Comparative Politics and International Politics.

1997 M.A., International Studies, Florida International University. Comprehensive exam fields: Capitalism and Democracy, Western Hemisphere Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy.

1997 Graduate Certificate in Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University.

1993 B.A., Political Science, Clarion University, Clarion, PA. Minor in History.

#### Academic Employment

2001-present Professor and Faculty Advisor, Union Institute & University, Florida Center, North Miami Beach, FL.

2000-present Lecturer, Barry University, Miami Shores, FL. Department of History and Political Science.

1997-2001 Adjunct Professor, Florida International University, Miami, FL. Department of Political Science.

1999-2001 Part-Time Instructor, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL. Department of Political Science.

2000-2002 Adjunct Professor, St. Thomas University, Miami, FL. Department of Social Sciences and Counseling.

2001-2002 Adjunct Professor, Miami-Dade Community College, Miami, FL. Department of Social Sciences.

2003 Textbook Reviewer. Longman Publishers, New York.

1998-2000 Curriculum Consultant, Reindeer Company Educational Network, Boulder, CO.

1999 Research Assistant, Florida International University, Religious Studies Department. Under supervision of Dr. Daniel J. Elazar, Distinguished Visiting Professor.

1994 Research Assistant, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University. Media Supplier, First Summit of the Americas, Miami, FL.

## **Professional Activities**

Guest Speaker. "Election 2002: Analysis and Perspectives." 1199 SEIU Retired Members Division. South Florida Chapter Meetings. November 12-14, 2002.

Distinguished Guest Lecturer. "Economics of Caribbean Tourism" and "Cross-Cultural Communications." Western Hospitality Institute, Negril, Jamaica, December 8-9, 2001.

Paper Presentation. "*The Politics of Professional Sports Subsidies: Studying the Formation of Urban Grant Coalitions.*" Southern Political Science Association 73rd Meeting, November 8-10, 2001, Atlanta, GA.

Paper Presentation. "*The Politics of Professional Sports Subsidies: Testing the Model in Miami.*" Urban Affairs Association 31<sup>st</sup> Meeting, April 25-28, 2001, Detroit, MI.

Paper Presentation. "*The Politics of Professional Sports Subsidies in Sunbelt Regions: Comparing Coalition Building in South Florida and the Tampa Bay Area.*" Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting, March 23-24, 2001, Jacksonville, FL.

Paper Presentation. "*Politics of Public Works Projects: The American Airlines Arena in Miami.*" Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 7, 2000, Miami, FL.

Paper Presentation. "*Technological Revolution in Politics.*" Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 9, 1999, Sarasota, FL.

Speaker. "*Crisis in the Presidency.*" FIU University Campus. January 29, 1998. Miami, FL.

Paper presentation. "*Creative Diplomacy and the Use of Force in Ethnic Conflicts.*" International Studies Association/South Conference, October 1995, Atlanta, GA.

## **Honors and Awards**

Graduate Assistantship, Department of Political Science, FIU, Ph.D. program, 1996-2000.

Graduate Assistantship, Graduate Program in International Studies, FIU, 1993-1995.

Pi Sigma Alpha, The National Political Science Honor Society, April 3, 1997