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Globalizing Governmentality: Sites of Neoliberal Assemblage in the Americas

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FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Miami, Florida

GLOBALIZING GOVERNMENTALITY: SITES OF NEOLIBERAL
ASSEMBLAGE IN THE AMERICAS

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

Jason R. Weidner

2010
To: Dean Kenneth Furton  
College of Arts and Sciences

This dissertation, written by Jason R. Weidner, and entitled Globalizing Governmentality: Sites of Neoliberal Assemblage in the Americas, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

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Gail Hollander

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Ronald W. Cox

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Francois Debrix, Major Professor

Date of Defense: June 3, 2010

The dissertation of Jason R. Weidner is approved.

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Dean Kenneth Furton  
College of Arts and Sciences

________________________________
Interim Dean Kevin O'Shea  
University Graduate School
DEDICATION

In memory of my father, Frederic Clinton Weidner

(1942 – 2002)
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

GLOBALIZING GOVERNMENTALITY: SITES OF NEOLIBERAL ASSEMBLAGE IN THE AMERICAS

by

Jason R. Weidner

Florida International University, 2010

Miami, Florida

Professor Francois Debrix, Major Professor

This dissertation analyzes processes of globalization, through a critical examination of the dynamics of neoliberalism in the Americas. It employs and also develops a Foucauldian governmentality analytical framework, demonstrating how such a framework contributes to our understanding of world politics. This dissertation also develops the concept of a liberal political imaginary—consisting of the market, society, and the state—and utilizes this as an analytical framework for understanding the globalization of neoliberal forms of governance. The research suggests that discourses and practices of globalization, global civil society, and global governance represent a fundamental transformation in the way that contemporary social and political reality is understood, and that this has significant consequences for the kinds of political practices and relations that are possible. Moreover, the research suggests the globalization of a neoliberal form of competitive subjectivity that can be applied to a broad range of actors—from individuals to nation-states and international organizations—is reshaping contemporary world politics. The dissertation concludes
by suggesting how Foucauldian IR can move forward by incorporating studies of contemporary transformations in capitalism into their analyses.
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CHAPTER ONE: THEORIZING THE GLOBAL

Introduction

The aim of the present study is to contribute toward a better understanding of the structures and dynamics of contemporary world order. The general issue area that the present study addresses is the problem of understanding how neoliberal globalization is shaping contemporary social and political reality. This general issue area has been studied by scholars in a range of disciplines, including international relations and international studies, international political sociology, anthropology, and human geography. Consequently, the approach adopted in the present study is multidisciplinary and draws on theoretical and empirical work in a number of different academic fields. The geographic focus of the study is the Americas. It is hoped that by exploring the dynamics of neoliberalism in the hemisphere—including projects that are themselves constitutive of spatial imaginaries such as the Americas—the present study will enhance our understanding of contemporary globalization.

The study takes as its analytical starting point the social and political thought of Michel Foucault, a thinker whose work has become profoundly influential in the human and social sciences. More specifically, Foucault’s notion of “governmentality” will serve as an organizing conceptual framework for studying the varied and complex ways that neoliberalism is currently ordering social and political life today (Foucault 1991a). Since Foucault never produced a fully developed conceptualization of governmentality as a method for political inquiry, the present study will draw on a
large body of theoretical work that has further elaborated a governmentality approach (Barry, Osborne, & Rose 1996b; Burchell, Gordon, & Miller 1991; Dean 1999; Rose 1999). At the same time, this study will offer a critical appraisal of this theoretical body, with the aim of contributing toward its further development. The discussion of a governmentality approach offered in this study will be centered on how such an approach can provide a better critical understanding of some of the key debates within international relations and international studies regarding the nature and implications of a range of phenomena often associated with the notion of globalization. These debates involve questions about the role of the state in contemporary world politics, how to characterize current structures of governance at the global level, and the functioning of political power and authority at the global or transnational level. Building upon work done in a number of disciplines and fields of study, the present study seeks to demonstrate the utility of a governmentality approach for addressing these questions regarding the nature of contemporary world politics.¹

The question of neoliberalism has also been examined from various different perspectives and within a number of fields of study. Within international relations and international studies, political economy scholars have produced the largest amount of research into neoliberalism—investigating among other things the origins of neoliberalism, its connection with the United States and the latter’s role in shaping contemporary world order, the political processes involved in the adoption of neoliberal restructuring in developing countries, and the social and political  

¹ For a helpful survey of governmentality literature in international relations, see Merlingen (2006).
consequences of neoliberal restructurings of state, society, and economy (Brenner & Theodore 2002b; J. L. Campbell & Pedersen 2001; Ronald W. Cox 2008; Gill 1995; Harris & Seid 2000; Harvey 2005; Klak 1998; Roy, Denzau, & Willett 2006; Soederberg, Menz, & Cerny 2005). In general, political economy studies of neoliberalism tend to equate the latter with a set of policies, such as privatization, trade liberalization, and a reduced role for the state, although some critical studies of neoliberalism also examine the ideology that provides the justification for these policies. In contrast, following Foucault, the present study examines neoliberalism as a form of governmentality, or a complex combination of different types of knowledge, subjectivities, political rationalities, and techniques aimed at governing human subjects. In this regard the approach adopted here is in a sense complementary to many political economy approaches to studying neoliberalism, in that it offers a more expansive account of the operation of neoliberal governance. Thus, rather than focusing on the policies associated with neoliberalism, the present study examines what will be argued are the conditions of possibility for the latter. At the same time, the governmentality approach elaborated in the present study challenges some of the ways that neoliberalism is conceptualized in much of the recent research done in this field. It does so by examining neoliberalism in terms of what Foucault called the “micropolitical,” including forms of knowledge and subjectivities that are both produced by and productive of neoliberalism.

Furthermore, this study examines what will be argued is a crucial element in various forms of neoliberal governance, namely the discursive constitution of the global. Discourses of the global, it will be argued—including discourses of
globalization, global governance, and global civil society—are transforming what the political philosopher Charles Taylor (2004) has called the “social imaginaries” of our political present. In order to make this argument, this study critically examines the different ways that discourses of the global intersect with neoliberal projects for governing the imagined space of the Americas, thereby producing a neoliberal political imaginary in which the global provides a grid of intelligibility for forms of social and political regulation that operate on different scales.

Empirically, the study focuses on neoliberal discourses of the global produced within the academic field, although popular representations of the global will also figure into the analysis. Focusing on these sources has a dual function. Firstly, an examination of academic knowledge production can help shed light on the dynamics of expert knowledge and can thus provide a better understanding of the logics that underpin specific governance projects. Secondly, an examination of academic discourses of the global introduces an element of reflexivity into the analysis, which in turn is important for constructing a critical theoretical understanding of the relationship between knowledge production and forms of social and political order. By taking this approach, the study aims to provide critical purchase on different theoretical perspectives and analytical approaches to questions of globalization and world politics. Finally, a governmentality approach that calls attention to the “power/knowledge” complex that Foucault (1980c) described (however here in

2 Although there are obvious differences in the intellectual projects of Taylor and Foucault (see for example, Taylor 1984), Taylor’s employment of the concept of the social imaginary resonates in certain ways with Foucault’s notion of the discursive. Much in the same way that Foucault rejected the view that his emphasis on the discursive foundations of the social relied on privileging ideas over ‘material’ factors, Taylor stresses that the notion of the social imaginary “is not a set of ideas: rather, it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society” (Taylor 2004: 2).
relation to discourses of the global) makes it possible to apprehend the ways that academic theories of globalization are intimately connected with specific techniques, mechanisms, and projects that seek to govern human subjects.

The present chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical issues involved in the study. The following section will outline the basic contours of a governmentality approach to the study of world politics, locating it in relation to other prominent theoretical perspectives and discussing how a governmentality approach can be applied to some of the major debates regarding the nature of contemporary world politics. The subsequent section provides a theoretical discussion of the global as a form of governmentality and the implications of this idea for understanding some of the ways that political power operates today. The final section discusses how the conceptual and theoretical issues examined in the previous sections will be operationalized in the rest of the study and will suggest how these issues can aid in our understanding of the structure and dynamics of contemporary world order.

**Foucault, Governmentality, and World Politics**

The political thought of Michel Foucault has provided the inspiration for an increasingly large body of work in the study of world politics and in the discipline of International Relations (Merlingen 2006). Initial Foucault-inspired work in IR drew primarily on the French philosopher’s archaeology of knowledge and the human sciences (Foucault 1970, 1972a). In these works, Foucault was deployed along with a number of “poststructural” political thinkers (most prominently Jacques Derrida) in order to

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3 Following conventional usage, the academic discipline International Relations will be capitalized, or abbreviated as IR, whereas the phenomena that is studied by the discipline will be in lower case letters—international relations.
challenge many of the basic assumptions that lie at the heart of mainstream realist and neorealist accounts of world politics (Ashley 1987, 1988; Ashley & Walker 1990; George & Campbell 1990).

In recent years, a number of scholars have studied world politics from an explicitly Foucauldian perspective. Somewhat schematically, we can identify two different ways that students of world politics are drawing on Foucault. One approach takes its inspiration from Foucault’s development of the notions of biopower and biopolitics, and draws heavily on the last chapter of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, “Right of Death and Power over Life”, and also on Foucault’s 1976 lectures, “Society Must Be Defended” (Foucault 1976, 2003b). International Relations scholars working within what some have called a “biopolitics of security” approach⁴ build upon the idea that “biopolitics arrives with the historical transformation in waging war from the defense of the sovereign to securing the existence of a population...[T]his historical shift means that decisions to fight are made in terms of collective survival, and killing is justified by the necessity of preserving life” (D. Campbell 2005: 949). This reading of the biopolitical and biopower, often times in conjunction with a revised conceptualization of biopolitics provided by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, has provided a powerful tool for analyzing contemporary modes of war and practices of security, most notably those that have arisen within the context of the so-called Global War on Terror (M. Dillon & Neal 2008; M. Dillon & Reid 2009; Reid 2007).

The second Foucauldian approach to world politics draws its primary inspiration from Foucault’s notion of governmentality developed first in his lectures at the Collège

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⁴ See the Biopolitics of Security Network website hosted by the University of Keele: <http://www.keele.ac.uk/research/ljp/bos/>
de France in 1978 and 1979. However, it was really later in the 1980s that governmentality studies were first developed by some of the scholars who had collaborated with Foucault and/or participated in his seminars and research projects of the late 1970s (e.g.-Jacques Donzelot, Pascale Pasquino) as well as by a group of mainly British social theorists for whom Foucault’s notion of governmentality offered an attractive alternative to Marxist understandings of the social and political transformations associated with the dismantling of the Welfare State (Donzelot & Gordon 2008; Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde 2006). Not satisfied with attempts to apprehend those transformations in terms of “ideology” or “hegemony” by Marxist and Gramscian approaches, a number of scholars drew on Foucault to analyze the phenomena associated with neoliberalism and Thatcherism in terms of rationalities and technologies of government that were irreducible to what were argued to be static categories such as class or the state (Rose, et al. 2006). This approach produced two influential edited volumes—The Foucault Effect and Foucault and Political Reason—that helped give impetus to the development of an “analytics of government” throughout a range of disciplines and fields of study (Barry, et al. 1996b; Burchell, et al. 1991).

Initially, however, these studies were oriented to problems and forms of government that were located within national societies. This is perhaps not surprising given that the principal political problem with regards to which governmentality studies were formulated—the rise of neoliberalism—seemed to have developed within a limited number of national societies: initially Great Britain and the United States. Of course the social and political restructuring that took place first in Chile and later in a number of developing countries would seem to make this understanding of the development of
neoliberalism problematic. On the one hand, the formulation of “advanced liberalism” by Rose and others clearly, and problematically, presents the development of neoliberalism as necessarily emerging as challenges to the Welfare State within “post-industrial” societies, thus ignoring the relationship between neo-colonialism, development, and governmentality (Escobar 1995). On the other hand, the recent publications of Foucault’s 1978 and 1979 lecture series should make it clear that, despite the view of some that Foucault focused solely on the domestic arts of governance (e.g. Selby 2007), he in fact understood the constitution of international relations as being inextricably related to the development of modern forms of governmentality (Foucault 2007a: 285-332).

With a few early exceptions (Debrix 1999; M. Dillon 1995), it is only relatively recently that scholars have begun to employ a governmentality analytical framework to study various aspects of world politics (Larner & Walters; Perry & Maurer 2003; Walters & Haahr 2005). In fact, much of the work being done from a governmentality perspective and dealing with issues of an international or transnational nature is taking place outside of the discipline of IR, for example, anthropology (Ferguson & Gupta 2005; Inda 2005; Murray Li 2007; Ong 2006; Ong & Collier 2005), geography (Crampton & Elden 2007; Margo 2008; Ó Tuathail 1996; Peck 2004; Rose-Redwood 2006; Sparke 2006), and management and organization studies (McKinlay & Starkey 1998). At the same time, the multi- or trans-disciplinarity of governmentality studies is one of the chief strengths of this approach. So too is the fact that, from a governmentality perspective, many of the conceptual categories that have divided and organized social scientific inquiry—the state, society, the market; the local, the national, the global—are viewed less
as static and more as fluid categories that in themselves are complexly interconnected
with governmental rationalities and technologies.

Despite the broad diversity of governmentality studies and their application to a
wide range of phenomena, both contemporary and historical, we can identify two
intersecting axes along which most governmentality work operates. These two axes are
related, in turn, to what Gordon has identified as two levels of meaning that can be found
in Foucault’s own writings and lectures on governmentality (Gordon 1991). On a very
general level, Foucault used the term “government” to refer to “the conduct of conduct”,
or “the government of the self and of others”. Thus governmentality can refer to any
programmatic attempt to govern subjects either directly or indirectly by structuring the
field of possibilities for subjects and/or influencing the shape of subjectivity itself. This
meaning of governmentality is inextricably connected with the notion of ‘technologies of
power’ that Foucault developed. Thus any form of government can be analyzed “from the
perspective of a genealogy of technologies of power…according to its objectives, the
strategies that govern it, and the program of political action it proposes” (Foucault 2007a:
36).

There is a second, more specific level of meaning of government and
governmentality (Foucault often used these two terms indistinguishably). Here
government refers to a specific form of political power or technology of power, one that
Foucault contrasts with sovereign power. Whereas sovereign power had as its end the
strength of the state and thus of the sovereign himself or herself, government, Foucault
says, is concerned with an object external to the sovereign: the population. Thus,
Foucault argues, “it is thanks to the perception of the specific problems of the population,
and thanks to the isolation of the level of reality that we call the economy, that is was possible to think, reflect, and calculate the problem of government outside the juridical framework of sovereignty” (2007a: 104). At this level of meaning, governmentality refers to the historical development of a technology/rationality of government that emerges first with the development of *Polizeiwissenschaft* in the seventeenth century, and is then radically transformed within the liberal art of government in the eighteenth century. Here governmentality as a technology/rationality of government is associated with the “discoveries” of political economy and the population:

The constitution of a knowledge (savoir) of government is absolutely inseparable from the constitution of a knowledge of all the processes revolving around population in the wider sense of what we now call “the economy”…the constitution of political economy was made possible when population emerged as a new subject...a new science called “political economy” and, at the same time, a characteristic form of governmental intervention, that is, intervention in the field of the economy and population, will be brought into being by reference to this continuous and multiple network of relationships between the population, the territory, and wealth. In short...the transition in the eighteenth century from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime dominated by techniques of government revolves around population, and consequently around the birth of political economy. (2007a: 106)

Like most of the concepts Foucault developed in his work, government and governmentality are not static categories; their meanings shifted in tandem with the kind of problems—political and analytical—to which they were put. In fact, for Foucault governmentality was above all a methodological term, a heuristic device that sought to provide an analytical grid for relations of power. To be more precise, the “grid of governmentality” is meant to open up a conceptual space within which specific aspects
and elements of relations of power can be analyzed. Thus, in his lecture of March 7 1979, Foucault proposes governmentality as a framework within which his previous analyses of technologies of power can be integrated. We can assume, Foucault argues, that “this notion of governmentality…is valid for the analysis of ways of conducting the conduct of mad people, patients, and children [and is equally valid] when we are dealing with phenomena of a completely different scale, such as an economic policy…or the management of a whole social body” (2008: 186).  

Thus the concept of governmentality is bivalent, or operates on two registers. On the one hand, it serves as a conceptual framework for analyzing dispositifs of power regardless of the domain (madness, delinquency, sexuality, urban planning) or scale (the body, the community, the nation, the global) by focusing on the strategic and programmatic dimensions of power—the forms of knowledge, technologies, rationalities, and subjectivities that are assembled in order to shape and direct the relationships and activities of subjects. On the other hand, it deals with a specific form of political technology or art of government – liberalism or neoliberalism – which constitutes, broadly speaking, the overall horizon of political thought and action of “our modernity”, for which, Foucault argues, “the problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have…become the only political stake and the only real space of political struggle and contestation” (2007a: 109).

In the present study the term governmentality will be used in both a methodological and a historical sense. From a methodological perspective, governmentality will refer to the strategic and calculated dimensions of practices aimed at

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5 Giorgio Agamben (2009) argues that the same applies to Foucault’s concept of the dispositif.
governing human subjects. From a historical perspective, governmentality will also refer to the rise of this form of political power that Foucault detailed in his analyses of cameralism and the development of a specifically statist political rationality. However, governmentality will not be viewed as synonymous with liberalism or neoliberalism, rather the latter will be considered as specific forms of governmentality. Although the focus in this study is neoliberalism, this is an important distinction because it leaves open the possibility of non-liberal forms of governmentality.

Thus, governmentality functions in this study as a general conceptual framework for analyzing technologies and relations of power. Following Gordon (1991: 2), we can think of governmentality in general as “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it is practiced.” It is precisely in this sense that Foucault and other scholars who have built on his work understood the development of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality. The present study seeks to contribute to our understanding of neoliberalism and its relationship with the structures and dynamics of contemporary world order by examining the complex relationship between the constitution of social reality as a global reality and neoliberal forms of governmentality. This complex relationship is best captured by the term global governmentality.

Globalization and Governmentality

There are two overlapping dimensions of world politics that have been the objects of investigations by governmentality approaches. The first is the set of political actors that are understood by many IR scholars to form the elements of “global governance”
These include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that operate in a transnational manner.

Merlingen, for example, articulates a governmentality framework for studying IGOs that takes a fundamentally different approach to the subject than the bulk of scholarship in this area. The latter, Merlingen (2003) argues, are concerned with understanding the role of IGOs in terms of international structures and relations of power, where power is understood along the lines originally articulated by Lasswell (1958): “who gets what, when, and how.” From this perspective, IGOs are understood “either as arenas in which states act out their power relations, as service providers enabling states to overcome collective action problems, or as socializing agents involved in international policy transfer and norm diffusion” (Merlingen 2003: 362). These approaches, Merlingen argues, thus fail to capture the ways that IGOs “exercise a molecular form of power that evades and undermines the material, juridical and diplomatic limitations on their influence and enables them to shape member governments, their civil societies and even individuals in unspectacular ways” (362).6

The other dimension of world politics that governmentality scholars have been investigating is that of the specific “technologies of power” that are employed to govern international spaces and subjects. Although not exhaustive, a list of these technologies would include competitiveness indexing and country benchmarking (Fougner 2008), public-private partnerships and best practice schemes (Hansen & Salskov-Iversen 2005), accounting techniques (Neu, et. al., In press), public opinion (Jaeger 2008), regionalism (Donegan 2006), and risk management strategies (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, & Munster

6 See also Zanotti (2005, 2008).
In this respect, governmentality approaches to world politics can be seen as applying to the international domain the insights and methodologies developed previously to study the rationalities, arts and techniques of government of liberal and “advanced liberal” societies (Rose 1993). At the same time, these studies of the ‘how’ of political power often overlap those studies that privilege certain types of international actors such as IGOs and NGOs inasmuch as the latter often employ these technologies of power in their governmental projects.

Here it might be helpful to clarify a point that seems to have been the subject of confusion in discussions regarding the role of language and the concept of discourse within Foucauldian IR. Like post-structuralist theoretical frameworks in general, most Foucauldian approaches to world politics stress the importance of language, broadly understood, in the operations of political power. Thus, for example, Walters and Haahr (2005: 6) stress that they understand “governmentality to be continuous with, and indeed inconceivable without post-structuralist discourse analysis…As theorists of discourse have emphasized, we need to understand language not as a mere reflection of an underlying “real” world, but as a constitutive dimension of reality. Political struggles are also struggles over meaning.” At the same time, they point out that where some strands of discourse analysis emphasize semiotic practices of signification, or the slippages and the indeterminacy of meaning, governmentality has focuses on the materiality of discourse. It draws our attention to the much neglected world of inscription, the eminently technical ways in which the world is represented by means of little things like charts, tables, graphs, numbers,
diagrams, and reports…materials through which the world is made visible, calculable, and amenable to practices of rule.\(^7\)\(^{(7)}\)

From a governmentality perspective, the materiality of discourse is related to the idea that it is impossible to separate a purely discursive realm from its material conditions of possibility.\(^8\)\(^{(8)}\) Furthermore, a governmentality approach focuses on discursive practices, on different ways knowing and acting (Rose 1999). Discursive practices, from this perspective, are inextricably tied up with “particular ‘regimes of truth’ concerning the conduct of conduct...[and with] the invention and assemblage of particular apparatuses and devices for exercising power and intervening upon particular problems” (Rose 1999: 19). The aim of a governmentality analysis, then, is to shed light on these (discursive) regimes of truth, to detail the logics and rationalities that inform them, and to apprehend the ways that they act to govern social reality.

The term global governmentality suggests two mutually implicated ways for understanding recent transformations in the exercise of power. The first implication is that there exists a form of governmentality—i.e. neoliberalism—that has increasingly ‘gone global’; that is, from a governmental rationality that operated primarily on a domestic level, within certain societies, it has expanded to the point that it is the

\(^7\) Henriques, et. al. (1998,., pp. 106-106) make a similar point: “The analysis which we propose regards every discourse as the result of a practice of production which is at once material, discursive and complex, always inscribed in relation to other practices of production of discourse. Every discourse is part of a discursive complex; it is locked in an intricate web of practices, bearing in mind that every practice is by definition both discursive and material.” See also Foucault’s 1970 inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, reprinted as an appendix in Foucault (1972b).

\(^8\) Some historical materialist scholars have argued that post-structural accounts of world politics are limited to describing “how a particular discourse can gain dominance at a specific point in time...[and not] why a certain discourse and not another is successful (...)” The problem, it is argued, is that post-structuralist accounts overlook “[t]he underlying power structures promoting individual discourses (...)(Bieler & Morton 2008: 105) From a Foucauldian perspective, the idea that there exists an a priori explanation for the success of certain discourses and that there exist “underlying power structures” outside and independent of discursive practices and formations are both problematic.
dominant political rationality not only in the majority of national societies but also within the various structures and institutions of ‘international’ or ‘global society’. The second implication is that the global itself represents a form of governmentality. Following Larner and Walters, we can apprehend the global not as a naturally existing spatiality or scale, but rather as an assemblage of elements or what Foucault called a dispositif.

Foucault used this term to refer to the various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and discursive/knowledge structures that enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social body. From this perspective, the global is produced through heterogeneous dispositifs or assemblages that in turn shape human conduct and social relations. In order to see the significance of these two understandings of global governmentality, we can contrast them with other perspectives on globalization.

The Globalization of (Neo) Liberal Governmentality

At first glance, the first dimension of global governmentality—the global extension of liberal forms of government—would seem to have much in common with a number of other bodies of scholarship, including critical globalization studies that frame

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9 Foucault defined a dispositif in the following terms: “What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus [dispositif] is precisely the nature of the connections that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thirdly, I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ [dispositif] a sort of—shall we say—formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need.” (Foucault 1980b: 194-195; original emphasis)

10 The terms “dispositif” and “assemblage” will be used more or less synonymously. While most English translations of Foucault’s work use the term “apparatus” for “dispositif” in the original French, I follow Valverde (2007) in using the term “assemblage” to highlight the connection and deployment of heterogeneous elements. See also Gilles Deleuze’s (1992) discussion of Foucault’s concept of dispositif. It should also be pointed out that Deleuze also employed the term “assemblage” in a fashion which, while resonating with the Foucauldian notion of dispositif, has also been put to use in fashions quite distinct from the former. On this point, see also Deleuze (1988).
the latter in terms of neoliberal globalization (Appelbaum & Robinson 2005; Scholte 2000) and the “Stanford” or “world society” school that focuses on the global diffusion of the institutional and organizational underpinnings of the liberal polity (Meyer 2007; Meyer, et al. 1997). However, despite the fact that they take a similar set of phenomena as the object of their analysis, there are important differences between a global governmentality framework and other critical approaches to globalization.

To begin with, let us look at a prominent historical materialist understanding of neoliberal globalization. For many critical scholars of globalization who work from some form of Marxian theoretical framework, neoliberalism is understood as both a set of policies favorable to global capital and also an ideology that works to justify those policies. Thus, for example, Stephen Gill argues that the present world order has entered a stage where the expansion of capital on a global scale occurs at the same time as—and is in fact predicated on—“a restructuring of prevailing ideas, institutions, and material capacities” that Gill (1995) describes both in terms of “disciplinary neoliberalism” and “market civilization”. Neoliberalism, then, operates on two complementary levels. On one level, neoliberalism refers to the set of policies—privatization, deregulation, fiscal discipline, etc.—that are promoted by a global state-society complex, “a transnational historical bloc…with its nucleus largely comprising elements of the G-7 state apparatuses and transnational capital…and associated privileged workers and smaller firms” (1995:

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11 Gill uses these two terms in ways that overlap but do not appear to be synonymous—in fact, their precise relationship is never clearly articulated. Nevertheless, it seems that “market civilization” refers in a general sense to the culture of capital and market-based relations, while “disciplinary neoliberalism” refers to both the specific policies that are associated with neoliberalism as well as the ideology behind those policies.
400). On another level, based on the Gramscian concept of hegemony, neoliberalism is viewed as an ideology that produces consent for and justifies these sets of policies and restructurings of state-society relations.

In general, historical materialist approaches view neoliberalism as (1) a coherent political program, that (2) serves the interests of a transnational capitalist and managerial class, (3) that is imposed on the world from above by an alliance of leading capitalist states and international institutions, and (4) acquires legitimacy through the dissemination of a kind of “false consciousness.” While this perspective captures certain aspects of neoliberalism, it also fails to apprehend many others. To begin with, the historical materialist perspective fails to account for the complex origins of neoliberalism—both intellectually and practically. While entities such as the World Bank and the IMF play important roles in its dissemination, processes of neoliberalization are also carried out by complex assemblages that include a number of local or “micro” actors and organizations. Furthermore, rather than speak of neoliberalism in the singular, it would perhaps be better to speak of neoliberalisms. For, as Foucault demonstrates in his genealogy of liberalism, the latter is a dynamic political technology—one that has a built-in self-critiquing aspect and which is therefore constantly mutating into different forms. Thus, for example, the neoliberalism that emerged in post-world war II Germany is not only quite different from the classical liberalism of Adam Smith, but also from the American version of neoliberalism that came to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s (Foucault 2008: 79-266).

12 Gramsci developed the idea of a historical bloc—basically an hegemonic alliance of different social groups within state and society—in a national context; the idea has been extended and applied to world politics by neo-Gramscian IR scholars. See Gill (1993).
The world society approach to globalization is, in certain respects, closer to a global governmentality approach. Whereas historical materialist approaches tend to reduce the complex political relations and processes involved with the spread of neoliberalism to the functional needs of a transnational capitalist class and the international institutions it has captured, the world society approach calls attention to the increasing “isomorphism of social structural and organizational forms across world societies” (Buttel 2000: 117) that cannot be explained either by functional necessity or by the logics of global capitalism. Thus, as Buttel points out, world society scholars point towards the global diffusion of a Western, Weberian form of rationality or political culture that entails “particular organizational forms, such as bureaucratic states and bureaucratic organization generally, constitutions and citizenship, market institutions, and so on” (117). Within this broad set of phenomena there are a number of social and political norms (environmental protection, state-promoted education, citizens’ rights), organizational forms (central banks, ministries of science and health) and rituals of statecraft (military parades, national holidays, census taking) that are said to be shaped by a global political culture.13

Clearly, the notion of the diffusion of Western political culture and related organizational forms resonates with the idea of the spread of a liberal or neoliberal governmentality. Indeed, for some world society scholars, the overlap is strong enough that they in fact describe the way that world politics is increasingly predicated on a

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13 For a discussion of how a world society approach relates to other IR approaches, particularly the English School, see Brown (2001). For a discussion of how the world society approach relates to the historical sociological tradition of Marx, Weber, Elias and, more recently Bourdieu, Habermas, and Giddens, see Jung (2001). Similarly, it is worth noting that this problématique has been explored from a number of perspectives, including Anderson’s interrogation of the puzzle of the state’s enduring character as a “modular” form that is both “serialized and serializable” (B. Anderson 1991: 195).
Weberian form of instrumental rationality in terms of the spread of different forms of
governmentality (Drori, et al. 2003). However, a Foucauldian perspective diverges from
the neo-institutionalism of the world society school in several important respects.\textsuperscript{14} To
begin with, world society scholars analyze the global spread of a liberal political culture
from a “macro-sociological, structural and long-term” perspective (Barry 2003: 566),
thereby reproducing many of the deterministic elements of social science which
Foucauldian scholars have rejected. One of the strengths of a governmentality approach
is its focus on the ‘capillary’ forms of power that lie at the base of more generalized
phenomena such as those detailed by the Stanford school.\textsuperscript{15}

This leads to what is perhaps the most fundamental difference between the neo-
institutionalism of world society approaches and a governmentality perspective, namely
power. Whereas for world society scholars the role of power in the global diffusion of
Western political forms is either implicit or absent altogether, it is a central focus for a
global governmentality approach. For global governmentality scholars, rather than the
inevitable outcome of the cultural hegemony of Western social and political norms, the
diverse phenomena associated with the term globalization are viewed instead as the
product not only of various forms of knowledge, technologies, and practices but also of
disparate struggles, often between asymmetrical actors and social forces. In this regard,
the intersection of Foucauldian perspectives and post-colonial scholarship has been quite
productive for examining the continuities, as well as transformations, between colonial

\textsuperscript{14} Curiously, there has been no engagement on the part of Foucauldian scholars with the large body of
world society scholarship.

\textsuperscript{15} An example of a work that effectively combines both the attentiveness to political technologies and
micropower with the broader, indeed world-wide, spread of these technologies is Torpey’s study of the
passport (2000).
forms of rule and the new mechanisms and institutions of what some term ‘global governance’. Thus, for example, Kalpagam (2000: 420) details how the colonial state in India utilized both pastoral and disciplinary forms of power in order to constitute the economy as a sphere of commercial exchange and also to constitute a subject that was not an individual bearer of rights, but “an individual who by being forced into a new sphere of commercial exchange would become the *Homo economicus* of the market economy.”

For Barry Hindess, the occlusion of relations of power and states of domination in the expansion of liberal and neoliberal forms of governmentality has to do at least in part with the self-representation of liberalism as a political doctrine concerned primarily with governing populations within particular societies and with the defense of liberty and private property. As to the first part, Hindess argues that liberalism has always been concerned not only with governing domestic society, but also

with regulating the conduct of the aggregate population encompassed within the system of states, and that it addresses this task by allocating responsibility for the government of specific populations to individual states, using treaties, trade and other devices to regulate the conduct of states themselves, and promoting within states appropriate means of governing the populations under their control. (2004: 33)

Thus, from this perspective, the argument by world society scholars that liberal government first was developed in response to domestic conditions in the societies that first underwent processes of modernization and only later spread to the international arena ignores the fact that “liberalism has always had a significant cosmopolitan and governmental character” (Hindess 2004: 35).
With regard to the second element of the common understanding of liberalism, namely its concern with promoting and governing through freedom, Hindess argues that in fact “[w]hat is required for the liberal government of populations…is a capacity to distinguish between what can be governed through the promotion of liberty and what must be governed in other ways” (2004: 28). The latter can be segments of a population within a liberal society, or it can be a colonial or post-colonial society either directly governed through imperial relations or indirectly through post-colonial modes of government. For Hindess, it is important to view liberalism not only or even primarily as a political theory or philosophy but rather as a complex assemblage of political rationalities and calculations that have always been involved in the mundane tasks of governing populations—a task which always requires the distinction between subjects amenable to government through freedom and those for whom “illiberal” or authoritarian forms of rule are more suitable. Thus, from this perspective, there is no contradiction to be found in liberal involvement in imperial rule; rather, historically liberalism as a form of governmental reason has always had as one of its preoccupations the government of non-liberal subjects (2004: 28).

Furthermore, many post-colonial scholars have also challenged the idea that political modernity in non-Western spaces is either “the normalized telos of a developmental process” or “the mere historical reiteration of a single political rationality” (Scott 1995: 204). Rather, as David Scott argues, colonial modernity represents “a discontinuity in the organization of colonial rule characterized by the emergence of a distinctive political rationality—that is, a colonial governmentality—in which power comes to be directed at the destruction and reconstruction of colonial space so as to
produce not so much extractive-effects on colonial bodies as governing-effects on colonial conduct” (1995: 204).

Finally, as many scholars of the colonial and post-colonial have demonstrated, the assumption of a pre-existing “Western” culture independent and outside of other “non-Western” cultures is not only historically problematic, but the distinction itself as well as a whole range of discourses, identities, and apparatuses of power in fact emerged within the context of what Ann Laura Stoler (1995) calls “a colonial order of things.” Thus, rather than emerging in autonomous fashion within a neatly circumscribed “Western” culture and later being exported to other places, post-colonial scholars have shown how the colonial world was a sort of “laboratory of modernity” (Rabinow 1989), where disciplinary techniques and governmental practices were developed, refined, imported and exported (T. Mitchell 1991). At the same time, as will be discussed below, while the notion of a Western culture or civilization that can be clearly delineated from non-Western cultures is problematic, this does not mean that the various forms of governmental rule and projects for ordering social reality that emerged within the so-called “West” cannot be identified and their logics interrogated. In fact, as will be highlighted below, one of the socio-spatial logics that emerged within “Western” imperial projects is that of imagining the planet as a single, unitary global space.

**The Global as Governmentality**

The second implication of the concept of global governmentality is that the global itself is a form of governmentality. While some scholars in the field of international studies have advanced this idea, it has not yet been fully developed. The strongest articulation of a Foucauldian perspective on the global as a form of
governmentality was provided by Larner and Walters (2004a), who seek to decenter and defamiliarize discourses of the global and globalization. Larner and Walters build upon Foucault’s notion of the connection between power and knowledge, refined through the concept of governmentality as having to do with the way that “governing always involves particular representations, knowledges, and expertise regarding that which is to be governed” (2004a: 496). A global governmentality approach to the problem of globalization, therefore,

entails a move of ‘bracketing’ the world of underlying forces and causes, and instead examining the different ways in which the real has been inscribed in thought. In this context, globalization becomes one particular political imagination amongst many, rather than the underlying logic of an epoch or the outcome of global pressures such as international competitiveness. (Larner & Walters 2004b: 16)

In this sense, the global can be considered as a dispositif, or assemblage of elements, that contributes to the constitution of social reality. Thus, from this perspective, a global governmentality approach “focuses attention on the conditions of truth and practice” through which the global acquires its “positivity” (2004a: 499). Although not necessarily the primary source of elements that contribute to a global assemblage, the academic and expert fields of knowledge production certainly play an important role: “the ceaseless work of conferences, books, speeches, commissions, measurements, the founding of research centers, and much else plays an active, not merely reflective, role in fixing globalization, speaking in its name, giving it presence and durability” (2004a: 505).
The problem of the constitution of the global as part of our contemporary socio-spatial imaginary is also related to a number of discussions within the field of human geography regarding the social construction of space and scale (Jones 1998; Kelly 1999; Marston 2000). One perspective within human geography is that scale—i.e. the local, the national or the global—has no ontological reality: it does not refer to some set of naturally existing, extra-discursive spatial properties, but is instead constituted through different discourses, practices, and materialities. This perspective clearly resonates with a global governmentality approach that views the global as being enacted through a complex assemblage of often times heterogeneous elements. In fact, Foucault serves as an important resource, for some poststructural geographers in their effort to conduct a “political genealogy of scale ontologies”, or “an historically contextualized study of the naturalizing and sedimenting production of scaled knowledge, in order to expose the power relationships lying behind the truth claims about scales and scalar hierarchies” (Kaiser & Nikiforova 2008: 538).16

It should be noted that a global governmentality approach also suggests the importance of a genealogy of the global, which seeks to shed light on the historical conditions and the emergence of the global as a socio-spatial imaginary. Two common, related themes that have emerged from genealogical accounts of the global are the idea that the global is the product of a specifically Western mode of thought and that the latter is inextricably connected with the various Western projects for subjugating and dominating other non-Western places and peoples. In the first case,

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scholars in diverse fields of study have examined the connection between the history of Western reason and the imagination of the world as a unified, global space. Thus, for example, the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk expands on Heidegger’s (1977) claim that the conquest of the world as picture is the fundamental event of modernity, by arguing that “the representation of the world with the globe is the decisive deed of the early European enlightenment” (Sloterdijk 2009: 31). On this account, the roots of globalization can be found in “the cosmological enlightenment of the Greek thinkers who, combining ontology with geometry” constructed the sphere as a representation of “the unity, totality, and roundness of existence… a logical and cosmological construction form of timeless validity” (31). The geographer Denis Cosgrove also links current visions of the global to a “Western inheritance of global meanings, from the Ciceronian *somnium* and Senecan moral reflection, through Christian discourse of mission and redemption, to ideals of unity and harmony” (2001: 257). However, unlike Sloterdijk, Cosgrove also highlights the multivalent nature of images and discourses of the global—how the latter can be employed by projects of conquest and dominion as well as liberation and revolution.

At the same time, Sloterdijk’s genealogical study of the global is particularly relevant to the present study in that it calls attention to the fact that representations of the globe have always involved questions of power and rule: “as soon as the form of the sphere could be constructed in geometrical abstraction and gazed upon in cosmological contemplation, there arose forcefully the question of who should rule over the represented and produced sphere” (2009: 33). Different eras have produced different figures to rule over the global sphere: goddesses of victory, kings and
emperors, the Christ of the missionaries. Later, “scientists collected their instruments around themselves to trace out tropics and meridians, to draw the equator… Finally, in the 20th century the globe was integrated in the logos and advertisements of innumerable worldwide enterprises” (2009: 34-35). For the critical geographer John Agnew (2003), this particularly Western form of spatialized power/knowledge contains a duality. On the one hand, the visualization of the world as an ordered, structured whole presupposes an epistemological vantage point, a “view from nowhere”, from which the knowing subject can apprehend the world in its totality. On the other hand, Agnew argues, visions of the global have also historically been based on a binary geographical imagination where the Western identity is constructed on the basis of some foreign “other” space, characterized as primitive, backward, or undeveloped.

The other, complementary, side of a genealogy of the global examines the different apparatuses, technologies, subjectivities and forms of knowledge that have produced and also employed certain socio-spatial imaginaries in concert with colonial and imperial projects. For example, Edward Said’s influential theorization of Western “Orientalism” places the “spatial strategies” inherent in imperial practices at the center of his analysis (Said 2003). In tracing the shifting discursive modalities of the Western construction of the Orient, Said argues that there was a key transformation

17 It should be noted that this last vision of the global is also central to a recent influential account of the world and its politics—the global as a network of postmodern Empire. See Hardt & Negri (2000).

18 For a critical review, see (Ó Tuathail 1998) It should be noted, as Ó Tuathail (1996, p. 1) points out, that the struggle “over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space” is an inherent element of imperial systems, not only Western imperial projects but also non-Western empires such as ancient China and the Arab empire. However, that insight is not developed any further, and the rest of Ó Tuathail’s analysis focuses on the specifically Western origins of geopolitics (although the practice has become truly international).
from the Orient as an object of a “textual and contemplative” awareness, to the Orient as an object of “administrative, economic, and even military” control (2003: p.210)

Said claims:

The fundamental change was a spatial and geographical one, or rather it was a change in the quality of geographical and spatial apprehension….The centuries-old designation of geographical space to the east of Europe as ‘Oriental’ was partly political, partly doctrinal, and partly imaginative….In the classical and often temporarily remote form in which it was reconstructed by the Orientalist, in the precisely actual form in which the modern Orient was lived in, studied, or imagined, the geographical space of the Orient was penetrated, worked over, taken hold of. (210-211, original emphasis)

At the same time, many scholars have pointed out that the specific modality of colonial practices and institutions were, in turn, shaped by the particular techniques and understandings employed by the Western colonizers. As Benedict Anderson (1991) points out in talking about the effects of western classificatory techniques,

European-style maps worked on the basis of a totalizing classification, and led their bureaucratic producers and consumers toward policies with revolutionary consequences. Ever since John Harrison’s 1761 invention of the chronometer, which made possible the precise calculation of longitudes, the entire planet’s curved surface had been subjected to a geometrical grid which squared off empty seas and unexplored regions in measured boxes. The task of, as it were, ‘filling in’ the boxes was to be accomplished by explorers, surveyors, and military forces. (173)

Ultimately, these critical accounts of imperial geopolitical imaginaries and practices emphasize that a certain modality of apprehending the world as a single, solitary space—a space that is essentially empty, static, quantifiable, homogeneous,
and passive—is present in different forms of knowledge that “encode and legitimate the aspirations of… expansion and empire” (Pratt 1992: 5).

The question of spatialized forms of knowledge and practice also are at the heart of Foucault’s analysis of modern forms of social and political power. For example, in his study of the development of disciplinary forms of power, Foucault noted how the latter often operated through spatial arrangements, classifications and distributions as well as modifications in subjects’ environments. Foucault wrote that

the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical…spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and gesture. (1995: 148).

Foucault theorized that it was the creation of classificatory schemes such as different kinds of “tables” (which he euphemistically refers to as “tableaux vivants”) that enabled the transformation of “the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities” (148). Thus, whether it was the classification of living beings; the observation, supervision, and regularization of the circulation of commodities and money; the inspection and surveillance of bodies composing an armed forces; the classification and distribution of patients in a hospital; and so on, Foucault argues that it is the combination of “analysis, supervision and intelligibility” that constitute “a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge” (148).

When Foucault turned his attention from the study of disciplinary power toward a genealogy of liberal government and rationalities of rule, the role of spatial logics and practices remained crucial. If the former—the “anatomo-politics” of
disciplinary power—focused on the management and control of the individual subjects of society, Foucault’s later analyses focused on the more macro or “bio-political” forms of power that sought to manage and control populations.\footnote{Foucault first distinguishes between these two “poles” of modern power in a lecture given in Brazil in 1976. See Foucault (2007b). He further elaborates on this distinction in Foucault (1990: 139-140).} In these governmentality studies, the organization and politics of space are crucial for understanding the technologies of government associated with the modern, administrative state (Foucault 2007a). As Stuart Elden (2007: 30) puts it, in the governmentality lectures,

Foucault’s concern is … not with discipline, as his earlier works of the mid-1970s had looked at, but with the spaces of security, of the government of a polity. He is concerned with the way in which sovereignty, discipline and security are each connected to a particular spatial distribution [répartition]. The question of circulation of goods, people and wealth emerges as a particular concern in terms of commerce within and between states, but also for health and hygiene, and surveillance.

Foucault identifies the development of a new modality of power—what he calls “apparatuses of security”—that do not replace but rather complement and is grafted upon disciplinary forms of power. Whereas the latter operates through the enclosure and circumscription of space, security requires the opening up and release of spaces, to enable circulation and passage. Although circulation and passage will require some regulation, this should be minimal. Discipline seeks to regulate everything while security seeks to regulate as little as possible, but in order to enable: discipline is isolating, working on measures of segmentation, while security seeks to incorporate, and distribute more widely. (Elden 2007: 30; Foucault 2007a: 9-21, 29-49)
Thus, the rise of the administrative state (or what Foucault (2007a: 109) calls the “governmentalization of the state”) was accompanied by a shift in the operations of power in general but also with the way that spatial technologies were deployed within overall apparatuses of power. As John Pickles (2004: 131) observes, “mapping, social statistics, public health, moral education, and the institutions of urban planning and administration were from the beginning thoroughly spatialized practices of identity construction and social engineering.”

However, as with much of the early governmentality literature, most of the research into the spatial elements of governmentality has focused on governmental rationalities and programs within national spaces. In general this is also true of Foucault's analysis in the governmentality lectures, with one important exception. The exception is Foucault’s analysis of what he terms a set of “new diplomatic-military techniques” that emerged some time in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and was one of the cornerstones of the governmentalization of the state (2007a: 296). Foucault’s argument is that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there occurred two fundamental transformations to the way the state was understood. First, with the emergence of a new raison d’état, the state—its stability, preservation, and power—is considered the ultimate finality of politics (2007a: 286-290). Secondly, there is what Foucault describes as the decline of “the old forms of universality” offered by visions of Empire and a unified Christian ecumene (291). Taken together, these two transformations in political reason, along with a number of other historical developments such as the conquest of the Americas and the Protestant
revolution, provide the basis for what has since been conceptualized as the Westphalian state-based order:

We are now dealing with absolute units, as it were, with no subordination or dependence between them, at least for the major states, and...these units assert themselves, in a space of increased, extended, and intensified economic exchange. They seek to assert themselves in a space of commercial competition and domination, in a space of monetary circulation, colonial conquest, and control of the seas, and all this gives each state’s self-assertion not just the form of each being its own end...but also this form of competition.\(^{20}\) (291-292)

Foucault argues that the new diplomatic-military techniques associated with the modern state form one of two poles of the modern political order. The other pole is a science of police, or Polizeiwissenschaft, that seeks to ensure the wealth and happiness of the inhabitants of a state in order to maintain or increase the state’s power. Taken together, these two poles constitute a new form of governmentality whose common aim is the preservation of a dynamic set of forces.

On the one hand, the diplomatic-military apparatus seeks to stabilize the set of forces external to the state, which is to say, the relations between European states in terms of territorial frontiers, commercial trading, military power, etc. The objective here, as Foucault tells us, is “the balance of Europe.” On the other hand, the apparatus

\(^{20}\) While Foucault’s description here of the Westphalian political order resembles in some senses both realist and neo-realist descriptions of the international order, there are of course crucial differences. Most obviously, whereas realist and neo-realist accounts of the international system construe the latter as timeless, Foucault historicizes its emergence. Secondly, Foucault also historicizes the emergence of the modern state itself, arguing that this development is inextricably connected with the constitution of an inter-state system. Finally, Foucault’s historical analysis calls attention to the role of a major transformation in political thought and political strategy in the construction of both the modern state and the modern state system. Thus, it might be said that anarchy is not “what states make of it” (Wendt 1992), but rather is made possible by shifting discursive practices and diagrams of power. I will take up this idea again in Chapter Four.
of police seeks to stabilize the set of forces internal to the state, which is to say, the maintenance of “good order” within a state in terms of the productivity, health and growth of its population (Foucault: 296-306; 323-326).

However, Foucault claims that the unity of these two forms of governmental power is displaced by the eighteenth century with the development of apparatuses of security, which have as their primary target a new object of political reason—the population, or “society.” The key development, Foucault argues, is the rise of a new form of political reason that understands the population, or society, as a natural phenomenon with its own internal logics and processes which must be allowed a certain degree of autonomy and the exercise of a different type of political power—more management and less direct, coercive control (2007a: 348-354). The result is that

the unitary project of police in the classical seventeenth and eighteenth century sense of the term—increasing the state’s power while respecting the general order—will now be dismantled, or rather will be embodied in different institutions or mechanisms. On one side will be the great mechanisms of incentive-regulation: the economy, management of the population, etcetera. Then, with simply negative functions, there will be the institution of police in the modern sense of the term, which will simply be the instrument by which one prevents the occurrence of certain disorders. (2007a: 353-354)

So far, Foucault’s insights into the connection between the changing nature of the exercise of political power and the different ways that governmental projects and practices work through and actively produce different spatialities have been employed primarily in the analysis of phenomena within national spaces. Important exceptions
include Larner and Walters’ (2004a) outline of a governmentality approach to globalization and Hindess’ (2001, 2004, 2005, 2008) analysis of the connection between liberal governmentality and the constitution of an international space made up of self-governing polities, both discussed above.21

Furthermore, in addition to applying a governmentality analytics to the international or global “level” of analysis, a few studies have also examined how other supra- or trans-national spaces have been constructed as part of governmental projects. The main focus in this literature has been on the construction of geographic regions as part of neoliberal governmental projects (Donegan 2006; Larner & Walters 2002; Newstead 2009; Sparke 2002; Sparke, et al. 2004; Walters & Haahr 2005). Regional spaces can vary from cross-border zones that include parts of the territory of two adjacent countries, to small multi-country regions such as the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle, and to larger geographic zones such as those of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). Of course the phenomena of transnational regions is not new; what is new is the language of ‘regionalism’ and how it has been inscribed within a specifically neoliberal rationality. For the most part, then, governmentality scholars have focused on regions that have a primarily economic logic, although most studies are careful to follow a Foucauldian methodology and take the economic as an element of an overall

21 While Neumann and Sending (2007) argue for analyzing the international as a form of governmentality, their paper does not offer much in the way of a substantive discussion of how to actually carry out such research—not surprising since much of the paper is devoted to comparing and contrasting Foucault with Weber and Hans Morgenthau. See also Leira (2009) for a discussion of how a governmentality approach can provide a more thorough account of the development of the inter-state system in early modernity. In Neumann and Sending (forthcoming 2010) the authors aim to provide an in-depth analysis of both the historical developments and contemporary forms of governmentality at work in constituting the international system.
political reason and not a description of the “true” nature of these projects. Thus, for example, Matthew Sparke and Victoria Lawson (2003) speak of “geoeconomics” as a new form of political rationality for representing and remapping political communities.

One important implication of the study of these “geoeconomic” regions is the way they complicate discourses of globalization that rely on a local-global binary and that describe the contemporary world in terms of processes of de-territorialization. Neoliberal regionalism offers, instead, a concrete example of how much of the phenomena associated with globalization involves processes of re-territorialization and the construction of new spaces of governance (Sparke 2005: chapter 2). This lack of foundation for territoriality and the dynamic of de- and reterritorialization connected with contemporary capitalism has an important implication, namely that the different phenomena associated with globalization contribute to the production not only of the global but also a range of “scales”—from the continental to the sub-individual (or dividual).

A possible way to better understand some of the broader dynamics and structures associated with “globalization” is to examine them in their actualities—in the ways that complex assemblages of governmentality emerge, function and collide—some times producing resonance (Connolly 2005), other times friction (Tsing 2005). Importantly, this also means attending to the ways these governmental assemblages attempt to (re)inscribe certain spatialities—not only the global, but also a

22 Although working from a different theoretical register, Deleuze and Guattari’s examination of the connection between capitalism and processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization still provides a powerful theoretical vocabulary and framework. See (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 222-262, 1987: 453-456)
whole host of spatialities including the individual, the national, and the hemispheric. However, a governmentality perspective also looks at the possible transformation of the various logics and rationalities that are productive of and produced by specific spatial imaginaries. Thus, for example, the production of national space or scale, while it reproduces and reinforces a certain spatial imaginary, similar in many ways to what Foucault describes in terms of juridico-sovereign and “racial” logics (2003b), is also a form of governmentality, or a way of ordering social reality (2007a). While the production of a national socio-spatial governmental logic may have been one of “territory, authority, and rights” (Sassen 2006), the present study will show that today it is also governed according to a logic of entrepreneurialism, where competition is to be managed through technologies such as country branding and the marketing of the national space.

These transformations of contemporary social imaginaries and rationalities of government also raise the question of how the meaning and aims of political action are being redefined and re-imagined. In the present study, the focus is on a loose assemblage of different political rationalities and technologies, subjectivities, knowledges and practices that operates on the basis of a global, neoliberal logic, but that have the Americas as their object. The history of the Americas as a socio-spatial imaginary is complex, and in fact there exist and have existed multiple imaginings of the Americas—either as unitary or as divided between different, even opposed, Americas (Mignolo 2005). The empirical focus of the present study is on various discourses and projects that imagine the Americas as a liberal space of commerce and economic competition, composed of entrepreneurial actors along a variety of scales—
the individual, the local, the national, the regional, the hemispheric—but all of which exist in relation to and must operate on the basis of a global reality. Thus, rather than spatial “scales,” I will refer in the present study to various “sites” of neoliberal assemblage (Schatzki 2002, 2005).

Within this global imaginary, the present study examines three complementary and overlapping modalities, or “sites” of the global social and political imaginary: globalization, global governance, and global civil society. A central premise of the study is that these represent three core elements of a neoliberal political imaginary: the market, the state, and civil society. A related premise is that the social processes and phenomena associated with the term globalization are producing “new geographies of governmentality” (Appadurai 2002: 24) Thus the present study examines some of the specific elements of a project that aims to construct a global polity on the basis a liberal political imaginary—as well as the difficulties inherent in such an endeavor when the principal categories of the liberal political imaginary are applied outside of what has traditionally been their locus in the nation-state. At the same time, the empirical focus of the study is on the constitution of the Americas as a multilayered neoliberal political space. Thus the analysis will attend to the different ways that three basic sites of the global liberal political imaginary—globalization, global governance, and global civil society—are connected with specific projects for constructing neoliberal subjects and spaces in the Americas.
CHAPTER TWO: GLOBALIZATION

The public and leaders of most countries continue to live in a mental universe that no longer exists—a world of separate nations—and have great difficulties thinking in terms of global perspectives and interdependence. The liberal premise of a separation between the political and economic realm is obsolete: issues related to economics are at the heart of modern politics.

—Toward a Renovated International System
(Trilateral Task Force Report: 1977)

Introduction

Globalization has become a central element in the contemporary social imaginary, both enacted by as well as framing the different ways in which social space and contemporary politico-cultural dynamics are understood. Within the academic field it has been installed as an increasingly formalized object for study and investigation. Originally a term used within the field of business management to describe the increasing homogenization and integration of markets throughout the world, by the 1990s globalization had become a major object of study and theoretical elaboration within the social sciences. Thus, for example, in the introductory chapter of an edited volume on Global Modernities, Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (1995: 1) wrote that “‘Globalization’ has become an increasingly influential paradigm in the human sciences since the beginning of the 1990s [and has emerged] as the central thematic for social theory.” Similarly, social theorist Anthony Giddens has argued that globalization “is a term which must have a key position in the lexicon of the social sciences” (1990: 52). The proliferation of texts written on the subject of globalization led Douglas Kellner (1997) to observe that “the ubiquity of the term
‘globalization’ suggests that it is part of a reconfiguring and rethinking of contemporary social theory and politics that is caught up in some of the central debates and conflicts of the present age.”

Within the discipline of International Relations (IR), globalization has also become a major object of study as well as a paradigm for understanding recent transformations in world politics. IR scholar Robert Keohane has been extremely influential in articulating concepts that describe, within a liberal institutionalist framework, the changing nature of world politics. The latter has been described in terms of “transnationalism” (Keohane & Nye 1971), “complex interdependence” (Keohane & Nye 1977), and “international regimes” (Keohane 1984). More recently, Keohane has turned to the concept of globalization to describe contemporary world politics. He explains the shift in terminology in the introduction to a volume of his collected essays:

When globalization became the buzzword of the 1990s, my first reaction was to regard it as journalistic hype: interdependence in flashier but less revealing garb…But it is frustrating to try to row against a strong tide or sail directly into the wind. To be heard, the scholar has to speak to the concerns of his era in the language of his era. Doing so gets people hooked; then one can proceed to the analysis that may increase their understanding or at least raise questions about their preconceptions.

At one level, then, “interdependence” was simply overtaken by “globalization” as the fashionable language to describe increases in economic openness and integration. But at a deeper level, changes in terminology reflect changes in reality…Globalization moves beyond linkages between separate societies to the reorganization of life on a transnational basis…globalization is
to interdependence as Federal Express is to the exchange of letters between national post offices.\(^2\) (2002: 14-15)

We can see here a strong ambivalence on the part of Keohane regarding the reasons for adopting the language of the global: on the one hand, it is merely a matter of following current convention; on the other hand, the term points to a fundamental change in social reality, a deepening and intensifying of what liberal theorists had studied in terms of complex interdependence and the increased importance of international institutions and regimes to world politics. In fact, Keohane (2002) argues that the changes referred to by the concepts of globalization (the process) and globalism (the result) have produced a qualitative shift in that we can now genuinely speak of the existence of a global social, economic, and political system.

At the same time that the idea of globalization has become paradigmatic within the academic and intellectual fields, it has also become a powerful concept within popular discourses and the languages of everyday life. Consider, for example, U.S. President Bill Clinton’s comment in the 2000 State of the Union address that globalization is “the central reality of our time” (Clinton 2000). Similarly, we can point to the recurrent deployment of the idea that we live in an increasingly globalized world in a recent encyclical by Pope Benedict XVI (2009) as further evidence that not only for secular but also spiritual authorities, globalization has become foundational for shared understandings of our social and political present.

\(^2\) It is worth noting that Fed Ex is not only an example of the role of global transportation networks in promoting globalization. The company is also a major supporter of the World Economic Forum and the latter’s Global Competitiveness Report. In touting their contribution to this work, Fed Ex states that “[i]t is committed to advancing free trade and driving global commerce and economic development. We support the World Economic Forum’s dedication to improving the state of the world by engaging leaders in regulatory, industry, and economic cooperation” (World Economic Forum 2009: 479).
The central premise of the present study is that one of the central features of contemporary world politics is the production of a global liberal imaginary. This global liberal imaginary takes up and reworks the liberal notion of three separate sites of human existence – the state, society, and the market – and transposes them onto an imagined global space. However, projecting these sites onto a global space also entails a reconceptualization of the sites and their relation to each other. Furthermore, the re-imagination of the state, society, and the market as global is also intimately connected with novel formulations of governmental rationalities and technologies. As outlined in the previous chapter, the notion of governmentality posits a domain of analysis that focuses on the strategic and programmatic dimensions of power—the forms of knowledge, technologies, rationalities, and subjectivities that are assembled in order to shape and direct the relationships and activities of subjects. In this chapter, the concern is to better understand how discourses of globalization and the global market/economy function as a form of governmentality.

Drawing on Foucault’s lectures on liberalism and neoliberalism, this chapter examines how discourses of globalization and of the global economy are related to a transformation from a liberal to a neoliberal governmentality. Far from being a static category, the idea of the market has undergone profound transformations within liberal rationalities of government. From a naturally existing space of free circulation and exchange in eighteenth century liberal thought, the market has become in contemporary neoliberal governmentality a site of inequality and competition that needs to be developed and fostered. This chapter explores some of the implications that this shift in governmental rationalities has for contemporary world politics by
examining projects for regional economic integration in the Western hemisphere. Free trade, it will be suggested, has undergone a change in signification from liberal to neoliberal governmentality.

**Globalization as the Global Market**

The idea of globalization—as contained in expert, academic, and popular discourse—is decidedly multivalent. It can refer to a variety of phenomena: the spread of American popular culture, increasing social interconnectedness produced by new information and communication technologies, and the global expansion of a capitalist economic system. The focus of the present analysis will be on discourses of globalization that understand the latter in primarily economic terms, although the analysis will also be attentive to the various ways that social, cultural, and political elements often slip into economic understandings of globalization.

Jagdish Bhagwati provides an example of this understanding of globalization in his book *In Defense of Globalization*. Bhagwati notes that the term globalization has multiple meanings, but states that his work will focus on *economic* globalization, which he will simply call “globalization.” This, in turn, is defined as the “economic integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology” (Bhagwati 2004: 3). Similarly, author and *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman, in his best-selling description of globalization, defines the latter as “the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before—in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-
states to reach around the world faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before” (1999: 9).

This economistic understanding of globalization is not limited to globalization boosters such as Bhagwati and Friedman. Marxist geographer David Harvey (1995), for example, identifies globalization with the spatial and geographical dynamics of capitalist development and class struggle. Susan Strange offered one of the strongest articulations of the idea that the global economy was increasingly achieving a degree of autonomy and power that exceeded the ability of states to regulate or control:

The impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the postwar period more by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the cooperative decisions of governments, are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong. Where states were once masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states. (1996: 4)

Strange’s “retreat of the state” thesis has been challenged on the left by thinkers such as Leo Panitch (Panitch 2000; Panitch & Konings 2009) who argue that the current international economic order is the product of deliberate decisions made by states and their political leaders, particularly in the core G-8 countries and especially the US.24 However, even though Panitch argues that “states, and above all the world’s most powerful state, have played an active and often crucial role in making globalization happen,” the latter is still understood in terms of “untrammeled financial speculation, export competition and capital accumulation” (Panitch 2000: 5)

24 A similar point regarding the role of states in promoting globalization is made by Robert W. Cox (1996) and Saskia Sassen (1996).
In other words, whether considered a force for good or ill, and whether possessing a power above and beyond the capacity for control by nation-states or the product of the latter, the existence of a global economy is a fundamental, taken-for-granted premise of most articulations of the idea of globalization. Following Foucault, however, the approach taken here is to not take for granted the existence of something like a global economy, but rather to interrogate how this the “reality” of a global economy has been produced and, crucially, how that reality has been put to use in governing subjects and spaces. This theoretical point is connected to what some commentators have called Foucault’s “historical nominalism” (Balibar 1992; Flynn 1997: Ch. 2; Lemke 2002; Veyne 1997) and which I call a “critical nominalism.” Foucault himself described this in terms of a specific methodology, one that does not take as a primary, original, and already given object, notions such as the sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state, and civil society, that is to say, all those universals employed by sociological analysis, historical analysis, and political philosophy in order to account for real governmental practice. For my part, I would like to do exactly the opposite and, starting from this practice as it is given, but at the same time as it reflects on itself and is rationalized, show how certain things—state and society, sovereign and subjects, etcetera—were actually able to be formed, and the status of which should obviously be questioned. In other words, instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices. (2008: 2-3)
In describing this methodological or critical nominalism, Foucault also developed the concept of “problematization” (Foucault 1991b). This form of analysis, Foucault observes, consists of analyzing the way institutions, practices, habits, and behavior become a problem for people who behave in certain sorts of ways, who have certain types of habits, who engage in certain kinds of practices, and who put to work specific kinds of institutions…[It] is the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience or a set of practices, which were accepted without question, which were familiar and “silent,” out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habits, practices and institutions. (Foucault & Pearson 2001: 74)

Thus, for example, madness, crime, sexuality can all be analyzed not in terms of whether they actually exist or not, nor in terms of their origin and development, but instead in terms of how they are constituted as objects of knowledge and, crucially, how this enables certain practices and disables others (2008: 115). In other words, Foucault analyzes ideas not in order to determine their origins and thus better understand the historical context in which they emerged, but instead to better grasp how they are put to work—to what ends they are applied. Nor is Foucault interested

25 In the same lecture series, Foucault later comments:

When I say that I am studying the “problematization” of madness, crime, or sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existential in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. The question I raise is this one: How and why were very different things in the world gathered together, characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, “mental illness”? What are the elements which are relevant for a given “problematization”? And even if I won’t say that what is characterized as “schizophrenia” corresponds to something real in the world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The problematization is an “answer” to a concrete situation which is real (2008: 115).
in any forms of knowledge; his analysis focuses on those that seem crucial for understanding particular modes of social regulation and of social power.

Furthermore, this analytical perspective examines how transformations in forms of knowledge and associated ‘regimes of truth’ produce reconfigurations in other, oftentimes unrelated, domains. For example, in his lectures on biopolitics and the birth of liberalism, Foucault shows how the government of populations (i.e. biopolitics) “produces specific dilemmas for liberalism as a principle for the rationalization and exercise of government based on a conception of autonomous legal subjects endowed with rights and free enterprise of individuals” (Rabinow & Rose 2003: xi). Reframed in the context of biopolitics, the manner of presenting and dealing with specific issues—for example, “the management of racial difference in the colonies, the management of public health, the design of hospitals and sewage systems, concerns about the falling birth rate, female fecundity or the location of cemeteries” (xi)—are transformed. “New relations, dangers, promises, apparatuses, stakes, and quandaries come into view and we can see how our present took shape through successive attempts to resolve them” (xii). The job of the “historian of the present,” then, is to map out “the complex circuits and relations between our knowledges of ourselves as living beings and the practices that made these knowledges possible and which they have engendered” (xii).

The Introduction of Political Economy in the Art of Governing

The implications of this analytical perspective can be seen when we consider the problem of the constitution of the market. Most theoretical perspectives take the existence of the market for granted—not only liberal theories of world politics, but
also those inspired by Marxist critical theory. While the market is a source of opportunities and challenges for states and institutions for the former, for the latter it is a domain that needs to be submitted to the democratic and egalitarian control of society. Even those critical perspectives that draw on Karl Polanyi’s insights regarding the artificial nature of the market still conceive of the latter in terms of the interests of certain sectors of society, whether national or transnational (Robinson & Harris 2000).

From a Foucauldian governmentality perspective, however, there is no transhistorical social category that is the market. Indeed, what we call the market has referred to phenomena that are historically quite different. For example, Foucault points out that from at least the Middle Ages until some time in the eighteenth century, the market was viewed as “a site of justice” (2008: 30). What Foucault means is that for various historical reasons, the market was constituted as a social space that was strictly regulated and that ultimately these regulations had as a primary concern ensuring that, as far as it was possible, the market operated “fairly”— i.e. fraud, crime, and other abuses were curtailed (30-31).

However, some time in the eighteenth century, due to a number of historical factors, the “reality” of the market became inscribed with a different logic.26

26 Foucault is at pains to make clear that he does not offer a causal explanation for “this absolutely fundamental phenomenon in the history of Western governmentality, this irruption of the market as a principle of veridiction…” While he notes a number of factors that contributed to this phenomenon—“the particular monetary situation of the eighteenth century, with a new influx of gold on the one hand, and a relative consistency of currencies on the other; a continuous economic and demographic growth in the same period; an intensification of agricultural production; the access to governmental practice of a number of technicians who brought with them both methods and instruments of reflection; and finally a number of economic problems being given a theoretical form”—Foucault argues that genealogical analysis consists only in establishing “the intelligibility of this process” (2008: 33) Foucault further elaborates on this notion of making intelligible different ‘regimes of veridiction’ by comparing previous studies on madness, crime, and sexuality (2008: 34-36) See also the editors’ note
Beginning with the Physiocrats, the market came to be viewed as a “naturally” occurring phenomenon that obeyed its own “natural” logic (2008: 30-35). In this context, the market becomes integral to a new ‘regime of truth’, one in which prices are no longer linked to fairness, but instead obey a natural logic that must be respected and allowed to operate without interference (i.e. one must _laisser faire_).

Foucault argues that what takes place is a profound transformation in the constitution of the market, from a site of jurisdiction to a “principle of veridiction” (2008: 140). That is, the “natural” operation of the market, of the price mechanism determined by the interaction between supply and demand, reveals a truth that can be employed to “define the limit of governmental competence and the sphere of individual autonomy in terms of utility” (Senellart 2008: 328)

It is there that we can see the application of Foucault’s notion of problematization. For the idea of the market as a site of truth for discerning the limits of governmentality emerges not as an ideology masking the interests of a social class, nor as an “objective” discovery or truth, but as a result of efforts to respond to specific problems, including a crucial one: the problem of the periodic scarcity of grain, and thus food shortages and hunger. (2008: 32-56). And whereas mercantilist government

had worked for the protection of the wealth of the state by preventing scarcity from occurring by various disciplinary restrictions on the cultivation, pricing, storage and export of grain, the Physiocrats advocated for an opposite strategy that was based on the free circulation of grain, both within and between

(8), p. 49 and passages in the 1978 lectures where Foucault elaborates the same theme (2007: 116-117; 238-239; 244).
nations. Instead of working to prevent the one singular event of scarcity, this new approach allowed for spontaneous fluctuations in a free circulation, being composed of various series of plural events—of pricing, supply, demand, and production; of the behavior of producers, consumers, buyers, importers, and exporters; of weather conditions; and of the world market—which were now all being analyzed as processes not to bring under control but to grant their natural course. (Gudmand-Høyer & Hjorth 2009: 107)

With the Physiocrats, an old concept (the economy) is transformed, applied to a pre-existing “problem space” (the population) producing a new form of knowledge (political economy) and ultimately operating on the basis of what Foucault calls a dispositif de sécurité (2007a: 21). For Foucault, this “security assemblage” represents a new technology of government. The Physiocrats propose a different way of conceiving of problems such as the supply of food, locating these problems within a logic of government that views the commerce that occurs within and between populations as obeying a specific, natural logic that escapes, and poses a boundary for, sovereign control. At the same time, while the Physiocrats pose the market and the processes internal to the population as operating on the basis of natural laws, and thus requiring an absence of direct control by the sovereign, they still operate within a logic of government that seeks to strengthen of the overall power of the sovereign. This was because the different components of the territory were in a sense the property or at least subjects of the sovereign (2008: 284-285).

Thus, while the Physiocrats formed a critique of an already existing governmental reason—cameralism and raison d’état—that had sought for the

27 See Chapter One, footnote 9, of this study regarding the translation of dispositif as “assemblage,” and also Valverde (2007).
sovereign to have direct control over the smallest detail of the population, the form of
governmentality they constructed would itself be the object of a critique by liberal
political economists who would completely reject “a political reason indexed to the
state and its sovereignty” (2008: 284). The crucial development in the technology of
liberal political economy is the transformation of the site of the economy into a limit
to sovereign knowledge and control, and the transformation of the population from a
source of power for the sovereign to the object, justification, and ultimately subject of
government. This new site, according to Foucault, is civil society, society, or the
country (296, 295-311, and passim).

**Neoliberalism and the Market**

A crucial point, then, is that these categories do not refer to some pre-existing
reality that they merely identify and call attention to. Nor are they static; the market
that forms part of the governmentality is different in important ways to the market of
liberal political economists such as Adam Smith. And, crucially, the mechanisms and
assemblages of government, the political techniques and technologies, and the
domains of knowledge and objects of government also change in relation both in their
relation to each other and within more general regimes of truth. This also means that
something such as a “free trade” treaty between nations does not exist as a natural,
transhistorical phenomenon, since the basic categories of which it is composed—free
trade and the nation, for example—have themselves undergone significant
transformations and occupy different positions within shifting regimes of truth and
political rationalities.

In fact, an important dimension of Foucault’s genealogy of liberal
governmentality has to do with the mutations in political reason represented by more
recent neo-liberal modes of governmentality. Just as liberal governmentality emerged as a series of problematizations of already existing forms of government, so too neoliberalism emerges in the twentieth century in the midst of what Foucault calls a “crisis of governmentality” (2008: 76). A common theme, then, in Foucault’s analysis is that novel forms of governmentality find their ‘conditions of possibility’ amid instability and upheaval, when already existing truth regimes lose their coherence and their legitimacy.

Furthermore, the technologies of power associated with different forms of governmentality involve taking up elements of previous governmental technologies, reshaping and recombining them in addition to novel elements, ultimately producing something that did not exist before. It is thus important, following Foucault, to not view specific governmental rationalities and technologies as embodying the essence of some more general regime of power. Thus, as Stephen Collier (2009) points out, Foucault does not present the Physiocrats as representative of an emerging biopolitics. Instead he calls attention to the ways they “maneuver between a persistent sovereignty and a technology of power based on a figure of population that cannot be subject to sovereign law. They are actively engaged in recombining elements of sovereign power and security, and adapting them to the problems of population growth, expanded trade and urbanization in the 18th century” (95).

Similarly, the German neoliberals, or “Ordoliberals”28 draw on elements of classical liberalism, including the idea of the free market as a site of veridiction for

28 The German neoliberals are also referred to as “Ordoliberals” due to their role in directing and publishing important texts in the journal Ordo (Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, usually translated as The Ordo Yearbook of Economic and Social Order).
governmental power. However, they are dealing with different ‘problems’ than their liberal predecessors, and thus construct new spaces of problematization as part of their critique of government. Specifically, there emerges a powerful critique of governmental reason that is framed in anti-statist terms, representing a kind of “state phobia” (2008: 76-78, 187-191). For Foucault, it is this reaction to the governmental crises of the first half of the twentieth century—the disasters of two world wars and great depression, the rise of different forms of totalitarianism (fascist and state socialist)—that marks the neoliberalism that emerges from the 1930s to 1950s both a novel and important form of governmentality.

This “state phobia” or anti-statist discourse is, Foucault argues, the glue that binds together the many heterogeneous elements of post-war neoliberalism. The role that anti-statist discourse plays within neoliberal forms of governmentality can be better understood by referring again to Foucault’s notion of problematization. Foucault argues that “for a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it. These elements result from social, economic, or political processes. But here, their only role is that of integration” (2003a: 23). Thus the neoliberalism that emerges in the first half of the twentieth century is able to bring together what might seem like disparate phenomena—Soviet totalitarianism, German fascism, and English post-war state planning—and integrate them within a form of problematization that posits an

29 The German neoliberals are also referred to as “ordoliberals” due to their role in directing and publishing important texts in the journal Ordo (or “order”).
intrinsic tendency of the state to expand its powers at the expense of society and individual freedom (2008: 76).

For Foucault, this integration function within the neoliberal problematization of the state is crucial, for as soon as the “genetic continuity” is established between different forms of state (administrative, bureaucratic, welfare, fascist, and totalitarian) and there is attributed to the state an intrinsic expansionary drive, “it then becomes possible not only to use different analyses to support each other, but also to refer them back to each other and so deprive them of their specificity” (2008: 187). Thus, for example, European neoliberals argued that state planning in wartime and post-war England would produce similar conditions to those that gave rise to Nazism in Germany (190).  

Again, an important point is that the different historical actualizations of a liberal form of governmentality are not dealing with the same ‘reality’. As Nils Goldschmidt and Hermann Rauchenschwandtner comment, “The considerable differences that are to be found within the liberal discourse, from the modern founding fathers of economics (David Hume, Adam Smith) to the ordoliberal, American, and Austrian versions of liberalism, affect the relation between nature and … order, between the market and competition, as well as the structure of the economic subject” (2007: 7).

30 Friedrich von Hayek (1944) makes this argument. It is tempting to view the current political discourse in the United States, in which President Obama is simultaneously accused of being a socialist and a fascist as an example of this form of anti-statist discourse that conflates state socialism and fascism. See, for example, Reynolds (2009), where he argues that we are experiencing a “drift toward a socialist/fascist state.”
Thus, out of the space of problematization posed by the German ordoliberals, there emerges a different understanding of the market from the classical liberal conceptualization. If for the latter, the market and competition were naturally occurring phenomena, for the German ordoliberals these were not natural phenomena but instead needed to be produced. Again, the specific, historical problems faced by the ordoliberals, as well as the different “material” at their disposal (intellectual, institutional, cultural) helped shape the direction that their problematization took. In the wake of the National Socialist regime and all its consequences, a crucial question was “whether the societal foundations for the existence of capitalism remain[ed] the same” (Goldschmitt & Rauchenschwandtner 2007: 8).

The response to this question was that Nazism had severely impaired the social basis necessary for the functioning of a market economy. The solution that the German ordoliberals proposed was a “social market economy” (Peacock & Willgerodt 1989). This formulation involved a unique manner of conceiving of the relationship between state, society and market. Rather than locating the market within society and posing these two overlapping domains as the limit for the state, as with the classical liberals, the German ordoliberals saw the need for strengthening both the institutions of civil society—particularly the Church and small-sized civic associations—and the institutions of the state in order to make possible the functioning of the market. The crucial idea is that the competitive market is not, as classical liberals thought, a naturally occurring phenomenon but instead requires certain conditions to exist—most importantly a strong ethical basis (which the ordoliberals anchored in the Christian church), strong social bonds (the existence of a
Volksgemeinschaft), and a strong state, that is, one that provides the Rule of Law, or Rechtsstaat (Streit & Wohlgemuth 2000).

It is in this last element, the role of the state and its relationship to the market that we can see the novelty of German neoliberalism as a form of liberal governmentality. If for the classical liberals the role of the state was to help maintain social order and to guarantee private property and the enforcement of contracts, the German neoliberals see the state as crucial in constituting the market as a competitive order (Streit & Wohlgemuth 2000: 230). The central concern of the ordoliberals “was to establish ‘order’ as a set of legal rules for a society of essentially self-reliant decision makers whose actions are controlled and coordinated by market competition” (230).

Thus, the “strong state” that the ordoliberals propose is not an end in itself, but rather a narrowly limited means used to achieving a functioning economic order, one based on the principle of competition. (Goldschmitt & Rauchenschwandtner 2007). Furthermore, Foucault argues that it is in this concept of a “competitive order” that a whole new terrain of governmentality is composed:

Government must not form a counterpoint or a screen, as it were, between society and economic processes. It has to intervene on society as such, in its fabric and depth. Basically, it has to intervene on society so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way its objective will become possible, that is to say, a general regulation of society by the market.31 (2008: 145)

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31 Foucault goes on to say, “So this will not be the kind of economic government imagined by the physiocrats, that is to say, a government which only has to recognize and observe economic laws; it is not an economic government, it is a government of society” (145-146).
Note that this represents a fundamental transformation in liberal thought: competition is not a naturally occurring fact of socio-economic reality; it needs to be produced. Thus, not only does it make little sense to present neoliberalism as a return to the *laissez faire*, free market philosophy of classical liberalism, since neoliberalism proposes a great deal of governmental action in order to produce the conditions that make market competition possible; but also because, as mentioned above, there is no trans-historical reality that is the market to which both eighteenth century liberalism and twentieth century liberalism could refer. The market of the German neoliberals is not the same as the market of Adam Smith; the latter is a naturally occurring site of exchange, the former is a realm of competition that must be produced.

Clearly there are many factors that made possible this understanding of the market and competition, including those associated with the rise of industrial capitalist society, mass social and political movements, and the expansion of the state in Western societies (Goldschmidt n.d.). However, none of these factors, or their interconnection, pre-determines the kind of problematization offered by the German neoliberals. Rather, the latter take up different elements of liberal thought and diverse institutional and political ideas that had already existed in Germany and other countries, recombine and rework these elements, and assemble a new form of governmental reason. And, as Foucault argues, the results have a profound importance for the forms of government and social regulation that exist today.

The most important legacy of this formulation of neoliberal governmentality is that, in posing the market and competition as a principle of social regulation, it makes possible a governmental technology that is both “lighter” and more extensive
and intensive. It is “lighter” in the sense that it relies increasingly less on sovereign as well as disciplinary modes of power—that is, less on the law and the norm—and operates more through the mobilization of certain types of subjectivity. At the same time, this new form of power—neoliberal governmentality—is more extensive and intensive in that it seeks to “have the greatest possible surface and depth and…also the greatest possible volume in society” (Foucault 2008: 147). As already mentioned, this is made possible by a shift in the understanding of the market, from a site of production and exchange to an all-pervasive reality of competition. By extending the principle of competition throughout society, the goal is that “individuals should not only realize their desires on the market, but also actually desire a competitive market” (Goldschmitt & Rauchenschwandner 2007: 23). Thus, at the level of society, the aim is to produce “an enterprise society”; at the level of the subject, the aim is to produce what Foucault calls *homo oeconomicus* (2008: 147, 173, 225-226, 276-278, 291-294).

It is this logic of competition, of an “ethic of enterprise” (2008: 175) that, for Foucault, is the most important element of neoliberal forms of governmentality. This insight also opens up a perspective on neoliberalism that is quite different from the understanding of the latter as entailing a reduction in government in favor of the market. The idea of the “retreat of the state” (Strange 1996) associated with neoliberalism is in a certain sense misleading. For, as Foucault demonstrates, neoliberalism actually entails an extension of government, that is, a partial replacement of the direct government of society by the state with a form of government at a distance conducted by myriad social actors, organizations, and
institutions (including the state). As Jacques Donzelot (2008: 54) argues, what takes place is

a destatification of government which goes in hand with the appearance of social technologies which delegate responsibility for individuals to other autonomous entities: enterprises, communities, professional organizations, individuals themselves. The use of contractual agreements, defined of objectives, measures of performance, combined with local autonomy, allows this shift of responsibility to governmental action at a distance.

Of course, the ethos of competition and responsibility that is part of neoliberal forms of governmentality does not only operate at the individual level—it is also applied to organizations and institutions, including state agencies, the state, countries, as well as international organizations and institutions. It is here that we can see how Foucault’s analysis of governmentality provides a powerful conceptual framework for studying “global” forms of governmentality. In the following section, I examine how the constitution of the global market as a site of competition operates as part of a more general, neoliberal technology of government. The example of the project for a Free Trade of the Americas is used to illustrate some of the different elements associated with this neoliberal governmental assemblage.

**Neoliberalism and Globalization**

The problem of free trade was a central one within the process of constructing an international economic order undertaken by the victors of the Second World War and their allies, an order that came to be called the Bretton Woods system (Hoekman & Kostecki 1995). However, as John Ruggie (1982) has pointed out, the Bretton Woods economic order represented a different kind of liberalism than the liberalism
of the 19th century international economic order under British hegemony. The post-
World War II order, Ruggie famously argued, was characterized instead by a kind of
“embedded liberalism.” The latter was based on Keynesian principles rather than the
“laissez-faire” principles of classical liberalism, as capitalist countries attempted to
“reconcile the efficiency of markets with the values of social community that markets
themselves require in order to survive and thrive” (Ruggie 2008: 231). As Ruggie
explains, “the underlying idea was…a grand social bargain whereby all sectors of
society agreed to open markets, which in some sectors had become heavily
administered if not autarchic in the 1930s, but also to contain and share the social
adjustment costs that open markets inevitably produce” (2008: 231).

The last two decades, however, have witnessed a dramatic change in the
international economic order which, if we stay within the neo-Polanyian framework
employed by Ruggie, is characterized by a “disembedding” of the market from
society.32 Ruggie follows many other scholars and commentators in attributing this
transformation to the forces associated with economic globalization. He argues that
the

grand social bargain [contained within] … embedded liberalism presupposed
an international world. It presupposed the existence of national economies,
engaged in external transactions, conducted at arm’s length, which
governments could mediate at the border by tariffs and exchange rates, among
other tools. The globalization of financial markets and production chains,
however, challenges each of these premises and threatens to leave behind
merely national social bargains. (232, original emphasis)

32 The notion of the “embeddedness” or “disembeddedness” of the market from society was formulated
by Karl Polanyi (1944).
The transformation from the embedded liberalism of the Bretton Woods era to the current international, or rather global, economic order has been analyzed and discussed across a range of disciplines and from a variety of theoretical perspectives. The idea that this transformation is being driven by changes within the nature of capitalist production and capitalist society and related technological developments is not new, emerging first in the 1970s, for example in Ernest Mandel’s (1975) conceptualization of “late capitalism,” and Daniel Bell’s (1976) theorization of “post-industrial society.” This, in turn, has provided a major conceptual basis for those who have theorized the ways that state sovereignty in general and, more specifically, the social compromise represented by the welfare state, have been challenged by the forces of globalization. Ultimately, it is argued, the emergence of a fully global market economy and the related need for global competitiveness have limited the options available to states and policymakers at the national level, forcing them to open up their economies and more fully integrate into the global economy (Mishra 1999).

This understanding of the impact of globalization on states and national societies is shared alike by those who see this as a positive change and those who are critical of it. For the former, globalization is seen as “a welcome loosening of political constraints on economic production and exchange and as a force leading to greater political and economic integration worldwide” (Yeates 2002: 71). For the latter, the

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33 More recent variations on this theme include Manuel Castells’s “network society.” In fact, Castells represents an interesting figure within this line of thought, since he has explicitly drawn on and further developed earlier notions of a shift from an industrial to an information-based economy and society, while also theorizing the connection between these developments, globalization, and the impact on domestic institutional structures, particularly the demise of the welfare state. Cf. Castells (1996, 2005).
results are viewed in generally negative terms. However, the general understanding of
the impact of economic globalization on national societies is similar. Thus, for
example, Yeats argues:

Buffeted by the winds of global competition, states are expected to pursue
social and economic policies which are most attractive to transnational capital
and foreign investment. Governments will increasingly stay clear of programs
of redistribution, renationalization or other forms of intervention of which
capital and markets do not “approve.” Those which stray too far outside these
parameters will be punished electorally and economically, rendering
themselves vulnerable to lower credit ratings, higher interest rates and
currency speculation. (2002: 72)

As another example, Robert W. Cox, one of the more prominent critics of the
contemporary global economic order in IR, argues that the global organization of
production and the globalization of financial markets “together constitute a global
economy”, and that “states must become the instruments for adjusting national
economic activities to the exigencies of the global economy” (1993: 259-260, 262,
original emphasis). Similarly, if a bit more dramatically, Ulrich Beck claims that “the
premises of the welfare state and pension system, of income support, local
government and infrastructural policies, the power of organized labour, industry-wide
free collective bargaining, state expenditure, the fiscal system and ‘fair’ taxation: all
this melts under the withering sun of globalization and becomes susceptible to
(demands for) political molding” (2000: 1).

However, for most critics of globalization, the latter is not the result of
material factors alone but is also related to a complex of beliefs, ideas or even an
ideology. This set of beliefs or ideology is most commonly associated with
neoliberalism. In some versions, neoliberalism is seen as primarily an ideology that seeks to both justify and make seem necessary, unavoidable and inevitable the various social, economic, and political transformations associated with the decline of the welfare state, the liberalization of finance and trade, deeper integration into the world economy, etc. In most accounts of neoliberalism, however, the latter is seen in terms of both an ideology as well as a set of policy preferences. Human geographers James McCarthy and Scott Prudham argue that “neoliberalism is the most powerful ideological and political project in global governance to arise in the wake of Keynesianism, a status conveyed by triumphalist phrases such as ‘the Washington consensus’ and the ‘end of history’” (2004: 275). Similarly, Kim Moody describes neoliberalism as “a mixture of neoclassical economic fundamentalism, market regulation in place of state guidance, economic redistribution in favor of capital (known as supply-side economics), moral authoritarianism with an idealized family at its center, international free trade principles (sometimes inconsistently applied), and a thorough intolerance of trade unionism” (1997: 119-120).

It is worth highlighting Moody’s comment that, while neoliberalism favors free trade in principle, this is often not the case in practice. This raises the question of the relationship between neoliberalism as ideology and what some scholars call the specific policies and programs of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner & Theodore 2002a). For some scholars, it is important to differentiate between a general neoliberal ideology, and the specific programs and policies put in place as responses to different contexts and situations. The result, Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore argue, is
a blatant disjuncture between the ideology of neoliberalism and its everyday political operations and societal effects. On the one hand, while neoliberalism aspires to create a ‘utopia’ of free markets liberated from all forms of state interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose market rule upon all aspects of social life…On the other hand, whereas neoliberal ideology implies that self-regulating markets will generate an optimal allocation of investments and resources, neoliberal political practice has generated pervasive market failures, new forms of social polarization, and a dramatic intensification of uneven development at all spatial scales. (2002: 5)

According to this view, the hypocrisy inherent in the gap between neoliberal utopian ideology and the reality of neoliberal governmental policies can be seen in the fact that the latter “has tended to subject the majority to the power of market forces while preserving social protection for the strong” (Gill 1995: 407). Furthermore, this understanding of neoliberalism, prevalent among scholars whose work is informed by Marxian political thought, presents a straightforward and unidirectional relationship between neoliberalism. Neoliberalism represents both an ideology that justifies the expansion and intensification of a global capitalist system, and also set of policies that seek to bring about the latter. In other words, from this perspective neoliberalism is “the dominant political and ideological form of capitalist globalization” (Brenner & Theodore 2002a: 3).

However, the argument advanced here is that neoliberalism cannot be adequately understood if posed as epiphenomenal to the interests of a global capitalist class (as argued, for example by Leslie Sklair (2001) and William I. Robinson (Robinson 2007). In order for this to be true, neoliberalism could only achieve its effects through pure coercion, by “duping” the majority of people, or some
combination of both. Foucault’s point about the centrality of the anti-state discourse to neoliberalism, however, is to show that this discourse was not unique among the political right. The left too, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, denounced the totalitarian nature of the state (Foucault 2008: 117). Thus, while the state was problematized by both the left and the right, it has been the latter which, on the basis of this problematization, has proposed making the market the basis for social and political organization. And while this objective may be advanced by specific actors and sectors of society with an interest in curtailing the activities of the state and expanding the reach of market relations, there are a number of phenomena which are often subsumed under the general category of neoliberalism which cannot be explained as mere tools for the advancement of the interests of a certain social group or class. In the following section, I examine Free Trade Agreements and, particularly, Regional Free Trade Agreements, to illustrate how such phenomena are best explained by a framework that views neoliberalism as an assemblage of governmental rationalities and technologies, rather than the legitimizing discourse of a global capitalist class.

**Free Trade and Regional Trade Agreements**

The 1990s saw a massive growth in international trade agreements. In 1994, the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was concluded, creating the World Trade Organization (WTO)—the first comprehensive, formal organization governing international trade (Karns & Mingst 2004: 381). With 153 current members, the WTO presides over a broad spectrum of rules on trade in goods and services, and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs). It also
promotes trade liberalization throughout the world (World Trade Organization, n.d.). In addition to the WTO, there has been a major proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements since the 1990s. According to the WTO, over 400 regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been notified to that organization—the majority of these agreements have been finalized within the last fifteen years.

The question of the proliferation of trade agreements in the last two decades has been addressed from a number of theoretical perspectives. For most liberal institutionalist scholars, these agreements represent attempts by countries to deal with the exigencies of globalization, particularly the demand of attracting foreign capital and investment. Thus, free trade agreements are supposed to be a way for states to become more competitive within the context of a global economy (Cerny 1997; Prakash & Hart 2000). Some liberal scholars also study the interaction of variables at the domestic and international levels of analysis, or what Robert Putnam (1988) has called “two-level games.” However, even this approach, which focuses on “both the strategic interaction between politicians and interest groups at the domestic arena and strategic interaction between governments in the international arena” (Grossman & Helpman 1995: 676), still treats economic globalization as an exogenous factor.

Furthermore, it is very much state-centric in that its principal focus is on the

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36 One perspective does center on the impact of globalization, particularly on developing countries. For example, Haggard (1995) argues that the economic transformations of the 1980s, mainly undertaken in response to economic crises in developing countries, altered the domestic political-economic balance of power away from firms benefiting from protectionism and in favor of firms benefiting from liberalization of foreign trade.
processes by which state action is determined—domestically through the strategic interaction of different actors, and internationally through the strategic interaction of states.

For many scholars who are critical of neoliberal globalization, the creation of the WTO and the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements represent a far-reaching attempt to reorganize world trade along neoliberal lines and to constitute a single global economy (McCarthy 2004). While these accounts offer important insights on the attendant social inequalities and forms of domination involved in the liberalization of trade on a global level, there is all too often an assumption that there exists a monolithic ideological formation that is neoliberalism. Essentially, many critical Marxian-inspired studies of neoliberal globalization begin by identifying neoliberalism as a distinctive ideology and set of policy proposals, then subsume specific instances of neoliberalism within that general framework. In the process, disparate phenomena such as international trade agreements are treated as mere examples of the more general category of neoliberalism (Plehwe, Walpen, & Neunhöffer 2005).

A governmentality perspective, on the other hand, begins with specific governmental practices and their related rationalities, forms of knowledge, and subjectivity. Rather than assuming *a priori* that they all share some essence of neoliberal forms of governance, it also interrogates the ways that these practices seek to govern subjects and spaces by making the latter knowable and calculable. In fact, as will be discussed in further detail below, the problem of free trade agreements and regionalism, far from representing unproblematic characteristics of neoliberalism,
have instead been the object of a great deal of problematization within governmental rationalities and technologies. Attending to the different ways that putatively neoliberal forms of governance such as free trade agreements have been problematized thus helps us to understand not only the complex ways that concrete forms of governance are assembled, but also brings into view their dynamic properties and the possibility for the emergence of novel modes of governmentality.

**The Problem-Space of Regionalism**

While both apologists and critics of free trade focus on recent international agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it is often forgotten that, for most of modern history, commercial agreements between different societies were organized within colonial and imperial structures (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson 2005; Mitchener & Weidenmier 2008; P. O'Brien 1999). In fact, it was in large part a reaction to the competitive logic of international trade that was at the heart of colonialism and imperialism that liberal thinkers argued for a different understanding of commerce between nations, one that emphasized its cooperative and pacifying qualities (Hont 2005; Silberman 1946). This problem was also central to the post-World War II plans for constructing an international order that would promote international cooperation and minimize conflict. Reducing the overall barriers to trade between countries, in addition to enhancing economic growth, was seen as one means for promoting a logic of cooperation in international trade instead of one of competition (Irwin 1993).

For most of the post-war period, due to a number of factors including an extended period of international economic growth, international institutions, and the role of American hegemony, the international economic system was characterized by
an absence of trade wars and major forms of protectionism among the advanced industrial countries (Keohane 1990). The Bretton Woods system and the GATT promoted the open markets and non-discriminatory trade. In principle, the GATT was meant to function on a multilateral basis, meaning that the lowering of barriers to international trade would be negotiated by and applicable to all its member states. At the same time, the GATT also recognized the reality of already existing customs unions and free trade agreements among its members, and the likelihood that more would come into existence (Trakman 2008: 369-370).

In the late 1980s, however, as negotiations of the Uruguay round of the GATT stalled and popular political discourses in the United States regarding that country’s declining position in the world economy, particularly vis-à-vis Japan, became common, many observers feared a return to protectionism and a retreat from previous commitments to further liberalize the international trading system (Dhar 1992). Liberal scholars and commentators feared that, as Jagdish N. Bhagwati put it, the entire world trading system was “at risk” (Bhagwati 1991), while others predicted the outbreak of a US – Japan trade war (G. Friedman & LeBard 1991). The status of the international economic order that had dominated since the establishment of the Bretton Woods system was uncertain. Commenting on this uncertainty, economic geographers John O’Loughlin and Luc Anselin wrote:

The post-World War II geopolitical order was shattered with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991…The geoeconomic order, built on a foundation of United States hegemony, a liberal international trade regime, and a Fordist mode of production, is also challenged, not with the finality of a military coup but through the actions of multinational corporations and the policies of governments. The GATT, promoted and dominated by the United States as a
way of linking the capitalist economies and promoting international growth, is no longer unquestioned by America’s partners or even within the United States itself. (1996: 131)

It was in this context that the relationship between the formation of regional trading blocs and regional trade agreements, and the status of the world trading system came to be problematized. Regions and regionalism became the object of expert knowledge and were submitted to the scrutiny of governmental rationalities. O’Loughlin and Anselin were among many who interrogated the nature of the “new world order” that was emerging after the fall of the Soviet bloc, wondering if “the GATT world of global commerce is being gradually replaced by a tripartite division into trade blocs, each dominated by the respective superpowers” (1996: 132). As economic geographer Detlef Lorenz put it: “one of the important questions of the 1990s is the juxtaposition of a universal GATT and the centers of gravity of naturally regionalized world economy: will these trilateral regions of East Asia, Europe, and North America become substitutes or complements to the GATT?” (1992: 84) Thus, a major concern for many experts, policymakers, and politicians was that “the world would return to the problems of the 1930s: open multilateralism would give way to rival geo-economic regions…Markets would become more political, trade conflict would rise, and the three major regions [North America, Europe, and East Asia] would compete for supremacy” (Ikenberry 2002: 23).

Of course the notion of a tripartite or trilateral division of global economic/political power was not a new one; it was reflected in the formation of the
Trilateral Commission in 1973. However, in reality, the geographic imaginary of the Trilateral Commission was, as the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter illustrates, a global one that was not significantly different from the vision of cooperation among the leading capitalist countries that was at the heart of the post-World War II international order. Regional economic agreements and organizations such as those which were created in Western Europe and which eventually led to the creation of the European Union (EU) had been viewed as exceptions to the rule of open multilateralism, and had been rationalized in terms of the anti-communist logic of the Cold War (Irwin 1993). With the end of the Cold War, the logic and rationale for the existence of “geo-economic regions” were problematized within governmental thought. While fears of the resurgence of geopolitical reason were mobilized, combined with other discourses (for example, the fear of social and economic decline in the US and concerns about the vitality of the Anglo-Saxon economic model compared with, for example, the Japanese model (Freeman 1987; Vogel 1979)), and put to different cultural and political uses, more technocratic governmental technologies were taken up and developed in response to the problem of the growth of regional trade agreements.

Econometric Models and Governmental Technologies

One governmental technology for assessing regional trade had actually been around for some time. This is the model developed by the economist Jacob Viner (1950), which proposed to evaluate customs unions in terms of the “trade-creating” or “trade-diverting” effects they produced.38 “Trade creation occurs when new trade arises between member countries because of the reduction in internal trade barriers. Trade diversion exists when imports from a low-cost outside country are replaced by imports from a higher-cost partner country because the partner has preferential access to the market and does not have to pay tariffs” (Kendall & Gaisford 2007: 120).

The trade-creation vs. trade-diversion model provided a tool for evaluating free trade areas and customs unions within an overall framework that poses the flows and volumes of trade as the overall goal. In this regard, the Viner model more closely resembles the classical political economy approach in its emphasis on exchange and

38 The economist R. G. Lipsey explained the theory as follows:

Viner's analysis leads to the following classification of the possibilities that arise from a customs union between two countries, A and B:

1. Neither A nor B may be producing a given commodity. In this case they will both be importing this commodity from some third country, and the removal of tariffs on trade between A and B can cause no change in the pattern of trade in this commodity; both countries will continue to import it from the cheapest possible source outside of the union.

2. One of the two countries may be producing the commodity inefficiently under tariff protection while the second country is a non-producer. If country A is producing commodity X under tariff protection this means that her tariff is sufficient to eliminate competition from the cheapest possible source. Thus if A's tariff on X is adopted by the union the tariff will be high enough to secure B's market for A's inefficient industry.

3. Both countries may be producing the commodity inefficiently under tariff protection. In this case the customs union removes tariffs between country A and B and ensures that the least inefficient of the two will capture the union market.

In case 2 above any change must be a trade-diverting one, while in case 3 any change must be a trade-creating one. If one wishes to predict the welfare effects of a customs union it is necessary to predict the relative strengths of the forces causing trade creation and trade diversion. This analysis leads to the conclusion that customs unions are likely to cause losses when the countries involved are complementary in the range of commodities that are protected by tariffs (Lipsey 1960: 498, original emphasis).
circulation (2008: 31-32). Viner’s notion of trade-creation and trade-diversion, however, has provided the conceptual basis for a number of econometric models that have attempted to incorporate various other factors that could affect ultimate outcomes of trade arrangements. Finally, the question of trade creation or diversion has been incorporated into the concept of “general world welfare,” thereby making it possible to extend the original concept to a wide number of phenomena and to provide what seems like a technical solution to the problem.

At the same time, there is no consensus among the various experts\textsuperscript{39} regarding regional trade agreements. On the one hand, the complexity of determining the effects of such agreements with regard to trade creation or diversion, including the wide diversity of such trade arrangements, has meant that different economic studies have arrived at different conclusions (Ghosh & Yamarik 2004; Koo, Kennedy, & Skripnitchenko 2006; Magee 2008). One response to this has been to seek to further develop the formal econometric models used to measure the trade effects of RTAs. The most commonly used model is the “gravity model.” In general, gravity models are mathematical models based on an analogy with Newton’s gravitational law and used to account for aggregate human behaviors related to spatial interaction such as migration and traffic flows (Deardorff 1998). In regards to trade, the gravity model states that the volume of trade can be estimated as an increasing function of the national incomes of trading partners, and a decreasing function of the distance between them (Bergstrand 1985). The application of a gravity model to international trade arrangements has thus been a topic of considerable interest in recent years.

\textsuperscript{39} The term “expert” is used here to mean any producer of a mode of knowledge that is considered to be expert in the sense that it is grounded in a rationalistic epistemology and part of a wider discursive structure associated with modern, Western forms of knowledge production. Cf. Mitchell (2002).
trade first occurred in the context of the problematization of the effects of planned European economic integration (Linneman 1966; Pöyhönen 1963; Pulliainen 1963; Tinbergen 1962). Since then, the model has been refined and the variables which it includes have been modified and expanded in the attempt to provide an objective, technical tool for measuring the impact of a wide range of trade agreements (J. E. Anderson & Wincoop 2003; Bergstrand 1985; Carrère 2006; Deardorff 1998; Feenstra, Markusen, & Rose 2001; Helpman & Krugman 1985; Matyas 1997).

For proponents of the gravity model, one of its purported benefits is that it incorporates the ‘geographic dimension’ into the analysis of regional trade. Indeed, as Harvard economist Jeffrey Frankel explains, without incorporating geographical elements into the analysis, “one can hardly claim to be studying regionalism” (1998: 1). However, despite Frankel’s claim, incorporating ‘geography’ into the analysis has not produced consensus among economists regarding the ability of the gravity model to provide an unequivocal tool for evaluating the trade effects of RTAs.

Part of the problem with gravity models is that a number of factors—such as common language, culture, or colonial ties—that are not readily amenable to quantification are often important variables included (usually post hoc) in the analysis. A perhaps more important problem is that gravity models really only calculate one result of trade agreements—their impact on the overall levels of trade. Granted, this can be a powerful tool within governmental technologies that seek to submit international trade arrangements to a calculus that is indexed to overall net volumes of trade. With this governmental technology, it is possible to evaluate specific trading agreements with regard to the amount of trade that will be created.
within the trade zone, as well as possible reductions outside that zone. This, indeed, has been one of the most important uses to which gravity models and similar econometric tools for analyzing international trade have been put to use.

However, as mentioned above, the logic of a quantum of trade flows largely hews to a classical liberal governmentality, in which free flows and circulations of trade are equated with a general utility. The assumption is that increased trade is positively related to economic growth, which in turn is a major—indeed, perhaps the most important (from a liberal governmental perspective)—contributor to the overall welfare of a population. And yet, econometric models such as the gravity model do not by themselves demonstrate the correlations between increased trade, free trade, and the ultimate goal of increased welfare.\(^{40}\) In order to calculate the latter, different models are required, the most commonly utilized being applied general equilibrium (AGE) models (Ginsburgh & Keyzer 1997; Shoven & Whalley 1984).

The AGE models of international trade make it possible to calculate the impact of trade agreements on a number of macroeconomic indices, including production, wages, and employment by industrial sector and nationally. The AGE models, in fact, played an important role in providing policymakers deliberating the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement with calculations regarding the positive economic effects of NAFTA (Francois & Shiells 1994). As Joseph F. Francois and Clinton R. Shiells (at the time, GATT and IMF officials respectively) observe, “Mexican Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development Jaime Serra-

\(^{40}\) To be clear, I do not take a position regarding the accuracy or desirability of calculations that link economic growth to the welfare of a population, but rather, following Foucault (2007a, 2009), view this calculation as a crucial and integral element within liberal governmentality.
Puche wrote his Ph.D. dissertation in economics at Yale University on an AGE model of Mexico and made a big push at the outset of negotiations for development of AGE models of NAFTA, based on his academic connections” (1994: 4).41

Likewise, the authors note that the role that this form of expert knowledge played in US debates over NAFTA marked the emergence of “the AGE trade policy-modeling community”—“a truly novel phenomenon” (7).

From a governmentality perspective, what is striking about these kinds of econometric models is not the degree of formalization they have achieved, the amount of complexity they are able to incorporate, or the degree to which they are able to capture certain features of social reality. In fact, from a brief examination of the record of projections of the impacts of trade agreements on different aspects of national welfare and macroeconomic indicators, their record is mixed. The field of economics, however, is founded on the assumption that it is possible to model complexity and that any flaws in actually existing models only provide opportunities for improvement.

This leads to a second, important aspect of economic models and economics more generally—what some scholars call their “performativity” (Callon 1998b; MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu 2007). Timothy Mitchell, for example, has argued that the idea of “the economy” is a surprisingly recent product of socio-technical practice, emerging only in the mid-twentieth century. Before then, economists did not use the word “economy” in its modern sense. From around the 1930s, new forms of consumption, marketing, business management, government

41 For an excellent analysis of the important role played by the diffusion of specific, neoliberal forms of expertise—particularly in the fields of economics and law—in the transformation of state fields in Latin America, see Dezalay & Garth (2002).
planning, financial flows, colonial administration, and statistical work brought into being a world that for the first time could be measured and calculated as though it were a free-standing object, the economy. Economics claimed only to describe this object, but in fact it participated in producing it. Its contribution was to help devise the forms of calculation in terms of which socio-technical practice was increasingly organized. (2005: 298)

An important implication of this view of the performativity of economics—indeed, of forms of expertise and knowledge in general—is that one of the ways that economics has an impact in the world is through “[the organization of] agents, goods, information, and other things into economic projects and experiments (…) [drawing] others into their calculative arrangements, setting them in play as producers, consumers, owners, or investors” (298). In other words, economics and economic knowledge often take the form of governmental technologies—technical methods of governing spaces and subjects. In fact, the connection between economy and government goes at least as far back to the emergence of the concept of political economy, which Foucault points out really meant two things. First, a political rationality based on the idea of an “economic” form of government: government whose potential actions and interventions are pegged to the latter’s social, political, and especially economic costs (2008: 94-95). Second, a governmental reason whose aim “is not the State anymore, or its wealth…but the society, its economic progress” (Donzelot 2009: 29).

42 “Quesnay speaks of good government as economic government (…) which is basically tautological since the art of government is precisely to exercise power in the form, and according to the model, of economy. But if Quesnay says ‘economic government,’ the reason is that the word ‘economy’ (…) is already beginning to acquire its modern meaning, and it is becoming apparent at this moment that the essence of this government, that is to say, of the art of exercising power in the form of economy, will have what we now call the economy as its principal object” (Foucault 2008: 95).
The economic models employed to analyze trade agreements function as governmental technologies in a number of ways. First, as already indicated, they provide “technical” criteria to evaluate the effects of trade agreements, despite the fact that both models discussed (AGE and gravity models) have a built-in bias for assuming that the minimum constraints on international trade will produce the greatest overall benefits. Second, and related to the former, these models are at least partially constitutive of objects of knowledge, such as “barriers of trade” (Traub-Werner 2007), that are essential to a number of concrete forms of governance. Essentially, economic analyses take up terms and concepts that are part of the reality which they study—in the case of international trade, concepts such as “rules of origin” and “investment regimes”—and are able to insert them into a complex model that forms part of a general calculus of “free trade.” Finally, these technologies operate as forms of representation and intervention (Hacking 1999) that help constitute and reconfigure major aspects of social reality—including political spaces such as sub- and supra-national regions, as well as the “space” of a global economy (Larner & Walters 2002). Indeed, it is worth noting that other such technologies in other domains and sites also often end up taking on the shape and appearance of economic modeling and econometric forms of calculation (Larner & Le Heron 2004).

These functions of governmental technologies are crucial to understanding the relationship between neoliberal governmentality, discourses of globalization, and phenomena associated with both, including free trade agreements. Markets, including the global market, are shaped by calculative rationalities and techniques (Callon 1998a). Typologies, classificatory devices, and other forms of calculation make
possible and sustain specific forms of governmental ordering. In the final section, I examine the roles played by some of these political technologies in projects that have sought to create a free trade zone in the Western hemisphere.

**Governmentality and Free Trade in the Americas**

The vision of a hemisphere-wide free trade area of the Americas received its first significant articulation in the idea of an “Enterprise for the Americas Initiative” (EAI) promoted by US President George H.W. Bush at the end of his term. The goal was to create “a free trade zone stretching from the port of Anchorage to the Tierra del Fuego” (Bush 1990: 49). The project rested on a dual geographical imaginary: the Americas as a single space, and the Americas as divided between the United States, on the one hand, and Latin America and the Caribbean, on the other.43

With regard to the Americas as a single space, this was seen as being united by a common heritage of European colonization, Western culture, and the post-Cold War embrace of democracy and market-based economies. President Bush made clear in his comments that the proposed EAI was only conceivable against a backdrop of “a rising tide of democracy never before witnessed in the history of this beloved hemisphere” accompanied by a “turning away from the statist economic policies that stifle growth” and a renewed embrace of “the power of the free market to help this hemisphere realize its untapped potential for progress” (1990: 48). The vision of the Americas as divided between an “advanced” North America and a “developing” Latin America and the Caribbean is articulated in terms of a “partnership” between the two,

43 Within this imaginary, Canada implicitly forms, with the US, North America, which is distinct from Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite the creation of a “North American” free trade area, Mexico nevertheless is located within the imagined space of “Latin America”.

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in which the US would take a lead role in “[creating] incentives to reinforce Latin America’s growing recognition that free market reform is the key to sustained economic growth and political stability” (49). This “growing recognition,” Bush argued, is exemplified by “Colombia’s courageous leader,” President Virgilio Barco, who argued that “‘The long-running match between Karl Marx and Adam Smith is finally coming to an end’ with the ‘recognition that open economies with access to markets can lead to social progress’” (1990: 48).

The geospatial imaginaries productive of and produced by the EAI are of course not *sui generis*—they draw upon and rework already existing spatialized discourses that have been produced by numerous governing rationalities in the history of the Americas. While a thorough discussion of the history of spatial imaginaries in the Americas is beyond the scope of the present study, it is worth mentioning a few important theses related to the subject. To begin with, a number of scholars, mainly working from some form of postcolonial theory, have called attention to the relationship between the “discovery” or “invention” of the Americas and the emergence and consolidation of capitalism and colonialism or, as Enrique Dussel (1995, 1996) has it, “modernity.” Thus images of America and the Americas have

44 For Dussel, the “invention of the Americas” represents “a constitutive moment of modernity.” Modernity, Dussel argues, came to birth in Europe’s confrontation with the Other: by controlling, conquering, and violating the Other, Europe defined itself as discoverer, conquistador, and colonizer of an alterity that was likewise constitutive of modernity” (1995: 26). Dussel argues that although most empires in the past considered themselves as centers of a certain geographical context, the situation is changed in modernity because of the latter’s global reach: “Only modern European culture, from 1492 onwards, became the center of a world system, of a global or universal history that confronts (with various forms of subsumption and exteriority) all the other cultures of the world—cultures that now will be militarily dominated as its periphery” (1996: 51-52).

In a similar vein, Aníbal Quijano (2000: 533) argues that “America was constituted as the first time/space of a new model of power of global vocation”, namely “colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism.”
been intimately connected with imperial projects and related forms of knowledge, as well as with diverse forms of resistance to the latter—in short, with colonial relations of power, or the “coloniality of power” (Mignolo 2001).

Racialized discourses have also been at the heart of the idea of a difference between “Anglo-American” (or, later, simply “American”) and “Latin American” cultures in the Americas. The idea of Latin America has been commonly attributed to “pan-Latinist intellectuals close to Napoleon III, including Michel Chevalier, who sought to justify French intervention in Mexico in 1860s by asserting solidarity between France and Mexico based on shared belonging to the ‘Latin race’” (McGuinness 2003: 88). However, historian Aims McGuinness has found “numerous instances of the geopolitical designations ‘América Latina’ and ‘latinomericano’ in the writings of important intellectuals from the Americas…in the decade before the French intervened in Mexico” (2203: 88). McGuinness attributes the increasing importance of the concepts of “América Latina” and a “Latin race” for Spanish speaking intellectuals to “the intensely violent struggles over the forging of international trade routes, the expansion of U.S. capital, and conflicting racial practices…in the late 1840s and 1850s” (88-89).

Certainly, by the time the US emerged as a “great power” internationally with its defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War (Laó-Montes 2008), the transformation of the geopolitical imaginary of the Monroe Doctrine and the idea of the Americas as a sphere of US influence acquired new meanings within the context of US imperial practices and relations with the rest of the region. In fact, it is only

two years after the Spanish-American war that the Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodó (1988) would publish his essay *Ariel*, in which he writes:

> As fast as the utilitarian genius of that nation [the United States] takes on a more defined character, franker, narrower yet, with intoxication of material prosperity, so increases the impatience of its sons to spread it abroad by propaganda, and thinks it predestined for all humanity. Today they openly aspire to the primacy of the world’s civilization, the direction of its ideas, and think themselves the forerunners of all culture that is to prevail.

It is also around the time of the rise of American imperialism that pan-Americanism emerges—in part out of the “softer” side of US hegemonic aspirations, in part as a reaction by other countries to the latter. In fact, we can identify many vectors of this relationship between pan-Americanism and the idea of the difference between Anglo-America and Latin America, from the existence of inter-American institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the influence of Latin America in the creation of the United Nations, to discourses and practices of development that attempt to submit Latin America to mainly US expert knowledge and governmental reason (Escobar 1995).

The proposal for an Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which would become the Free Trade Area of the Americas under President Clinton, drew on different elements of a geopolitical imaginary that was shaped by the Cold War (e.g., the Alliance for Progress) and also by the end of the Cold War and visions of the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992) or the triumph of the “American model” of liberal, capitalist democracy. However, while the developmentalist geopolitical imaginary of the Cold War was shaped by a logic of national security and fears of the global spread
of communism (G. M. Joseph & Spenser 2008; T. F. O'Brien 2007: Ch. 6; Westad 2007), the post-Cold War geopolitical imaginary of Latin America locates the latter within a broader global perspective. Thus, for example, whereas statist developmental policies were to be opposed during the Cold War since they might lead to state socialism, by the 1990s statism came to be represented as an anachronism that was increasingly recognized as being an impediment to development and progress.

In other words, the idea of a transformation of Latin America involving the embrace of liberal democracy and free markets saw this transformation as confirmation of the “truth” that was being experienced all across the world. Thus the vision of the political and economic liberalization of Latin America is connected with the emergence of a new “regime of truth” (2008: 18-20, 29, 33, 37), which was being revealed on a global scale. As Roger B. Porter, Assistant to the President for Economic and Domestic Policy, put it, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative was being proposed at a historical conjuncture marked by “a fresh, dynamic attitude around the world that views change optimistically, not fearfully” (1990: 1). He adds:

The global transformation of the last decade symbolizes the triumph of two ideals the United States has championed during the 20th century. In country after country, the verdict is clear: a preference for governments based on democratic political institutions and market-oriented economic arrangements. The intellectual debates of the 1960s and 1970s centered on whether capitalism or socialism provided the more efficient means for producing prosperity. While the “end of history” may not have arrived yet, the terms of international debate over politics and economics have certainly changed. (2)

Porter’s comments on the EAI also bring to light the shift in the regime of truth connected with discourses of development. Porter compares the EAI to the
Alliance for Progress program initiated under President Kennedy, noting that the latter, “reflecting the spirit of the times,” has as its underlying premise “the importance of governments” (5). “By contrast, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative focuses on markets. It is built on the premise that no amount of official resources can offset inappropriate economic policies” (6). Consistent with the “truth-telling” nature of his discourse, Porter makes clear exactly what kind of economic policies would be “appropriate”: “exchange rate maintenance, stabilized inflation rates, open trade policies, and sound fiscal policies,” all of which “should create a favorable climate for both domestic and foreign investors” (6). Finally, the foundation of this particular regime of truth is clearly stated: “to remove obstacles to efficiently functioning markets, and to create a climate for entrepreneurship” (8). In a similar fashion, US Trade Representative under President Clinton, Charlene Barshefsky, located the FTAA within the context of a paradigm shift that emerged at the end of the Cold War.

Since the end of the Cold War, the permanent factors of interest and geography which make the FTAA logical have been joined by a third which makes it possible—a consensus of the citizen rather than the state as the source of law and policy…Most governments in the hemisphere now agree in principle that economic development is best achieved through freedom, open markets and entrepreneurialism rather than detailed guidance by a state in favor of one group or another. (1999: 3)

The formal declaration of a plan for a Free Trade Area of the Americas was made at the December 1994 meeting of Western Hemisphere Presidents in Miami—the First Summit of the Americas. In the “Declaration of Principles” at the Miami Summit, it was stated that
Our continued economic progress depends on sound economic policies, sustainable development, and dynamic private sectors. A key to prosperity is trade without barriers, without subsidies, without unfair practices, and with an increasing stream of productive investments. Eliminating impediments to market access for goods and services among our countries will foster our economic growth… Free trade and increased economic integration are key factors for raising standards of living, improving the working conditions of people in the Americas and better protecting the environment. (FTAA 1994).

The participating heads of state thereby resolved “to begin immediately to construct the ‘Free Trade Area of the Americas’ (FTAA), in which barriers to trade and investment will be progressively eliminated” (Kennedy 2004b: 121). The ultimate goal was to finalize negotiations by 2005.

After a number of ministerial-level meetings, negotiations for the FTAA were officially launched at the Second Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile in April 1998. The principle guiding the negotiations was that the FTAA would “comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and a single undertaking, i.e. an all-or-nothing, package deal” (Kennedy 2004b: 127). This vision of the FTAA, however, fell apart by the time of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in Miami in November 2003. At that

46 “We reaffirm the principles and objectives that have guided our work since Miami, including inter alia that the agreement will be balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and will constitute a single undertaking.” (FTAA 1999);

“We reaffirm the principles and objectives that have guided our work since the First Summit of the Americas, in particular, the basic principle of consensus in decision making within the FTAA process and the achievement of a balanced, comprehensive agreement that is consistent with the rules and disciplines of the World Trade Organization. We reaffirm that the result of the FTAA negotiations shall constitute a comprehensive single undertaking, that incorporates the rights and obligations that are mutually agreed for all member countries.” (FTA 2001);

“We reaffirm the principles and objectives that have guided our work since the First Summit of the Americas, in particular, the basic principle of consensus in decision making within the FTAA process and the achievement of a balanced and comprehensive agreement that is also consistent with the rules and disciplines of the World Trade Organization (WTO). We reaffirm that the result of the FTAA negotiations shall constitute a comprehensive single undertaking that incorporates the rights and obligations that are mutually agreed for all member countries” (FTA 2002).
meeting, opposition by Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela to the goal of a “WTO-plus” comprehensive agreement became manifest. Since then, despite subsequent meetings, FTAA negotiations have largely been stalled. Partially as a result of the impasse in FTAA negotiations, the US has aggressively pursued numerous trade agreements mainly with developing countries individually or in sub-regional groupings. In the Americas, the US has concluded trade agreements with Chile, Colombia, Panama, and Peru, as well as the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) which includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic (USTR"Free Trade Agreements").

The pursuit of multiple trade agreements in the hemisphere and beyond has been termed “competitive liberalization” (Bergsten 1996). The concept refers to a strategy of using preferential trade agreements (PTAs) as “building blocks” for multilateral agreements. The idea is that free trade agreements would have a sort of “domino effect” (Baldwin 1992), creating momentum not only for more PTAs but, crucially, to advance in the areas under negotiation in the latest Doha Round of the WTO. Whether PTAs lead to greater global trade and increased liberalization is the subject of much debate.47 What is striking, though, from the perspective of the present study is the way that the various aspects of trade agreements have been subjected to different forms of governmental reason and technologies. As already mentioned, a number of econometric tools have been developed that attempt to discover the “truth” about trade agreements. Furthermore, international organizations

47 The literature is too large to include all the different studies done on this issue. For work that sees PTAs as “stumbling blocks” to increased liberalization of trade, see Bhagwati (1991), Bhagwati & Kreuger (1995), Wonnacott (1990). Works that view PTAs as “building blocks” to a more liberal global trading order include Bergsten (1996) and Hufbauer (2008).
such as the WTO and academic institutions like Purdue University’s Center for Global Trade Analysis have developed extensive databases to provide the data, which can be analyzed by the various economic models. The Center for Global Trade Analysis coordinates the Global Trade Analysis Project, which is described as “a global network of researchers and policy makers conducting quantitative analysis of international policy issues” (Global Trade Analysis Project). The Center states that it aims to provide a “common language” for scholars, analysts, and officials conducting global economic analysis.

For some scholars, the trend of competitive liberalization and PTAs between the US and developing countries reflects the preferences and influence of a “transnational interest bloc” led by transnational firms based in the US, EU, and Japan (Ronald W. Cox 2008). Interestingly, many analysts who favor increased liberalization of international trade come to a similar conclusion. For the latter, the proliferation of PTAs represents the capitulation of states to sectoral interests. Vinod Aggarwal (2009: 1-2), for instance, argues that

the U.S. strategy of competitive liberalization—by which it has pursued piecemeal liberalization through open sectoral agreements such as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), bilateral PTAs, and calls for transregional accords such as the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP)—has fractured the domestic coalition for free trade. By giving specific industries what they wanted, this policy has left protectionists in agriculture, steel, textiles, and others in control of the trade policy agenda.

As an example of the former, Aggarwal points to arguments made by the US Business Roundtable in favor of the US pursuing increased bilateral and regional trade agreements. In their report, the Business Roundtable claims:
From the end of World War II until a few years ago, there was an unwritten rule of trade negotiations: the U.S. is the indispensable country—the one country that has to be involved in a trade negotiation for that negotiation to succeed...But today, the rules have changed profoundly, and irrevocably. The U.S. still is a major player, but it is no longer indispensable. Our trading partners are cutting deals without us, gradually surrounding the U.S. with a network of preferential trade agreements.48

Written in 2001, before the US had successfully negotiated a number of PTAs, the exhortation of the Business Council follows a logic that is feared by many liberals—that trade agreements would be the source of international competition. Ironically, it is the same competitive logic that has been advocated by those who seek to deepen the liberalization of the international trade regime. However, the latter have envisioned the competition being generated by the desire to complete a trade agreement with the US. Thus, the logic of competition can point in multiple directions.

**Conclusion**

The move to liberalize international trade took a dramatic turn in the 1990s, with the establishment of the WTO, the completion of EU integration, and the signing of numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements. In order to situate these various projects and policies within a broader governmental logic, it is useful to return to Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism. In this regard, Porter’s description of the imperative of what would become the FTAA is illustrative: “remove obstacles to efficiently functioning markets, and create a climate for entrepreneurship.” Or, in

Ambassador Barshefsky’s words “open markets and entrepreneurialism.” The analysis presented here suggests that it is difficult to take phenomena such as the proliferation of free trade agreements and explain them in terms of the interests of transnational capital or the hegemonic intentions of a world power, although these may certainly play a role. Neither is there a univocal neoliberal ideology which political phenomena such as trade agreements automatically follow. Instead, the latter emerge not only out of the interaction of various actors (government leaders and officials, business interests, various interest groups), but also from a process of problematization in which questions regarding the appropriate way of governing subjects and spaces are always present.

What we have seen is that the transformation of the international trading system and the policies pursued by different states with regard to international trade agreements have been the result of different governmental rationalities and technologies—for example, econometric models, trading regimes, and logics of competition—that have at times overlapped and resonated, while other times diverging and causing friction. What has been consistent is the attempt by various experts to submit the various policies and projects to a technical form of calculation that could produce an objective measure of their utility. Additionally, the spatial imaginary of the global market has provided what Foucault terms a “grid of intelligibility” for the various governmental rationalities and technologies. Thus, it is the discourse of globalization and the demands of a global market that provide a conceptual horizon for envisioning a global order of competitive, entrepreneurial subjects—whether individuals, governmental agencies, or nation-states.
In fact, the global political imaginary contained in visions of global free trade depends and builds on, while at the same time reconfiguring, the imagined space of the nation-state. In this global political imaginary, national states are analogous to individuals in the liberal political imaginary; the global market and global political institutions are justified and legitimated largely in terms of a kind of social contract in which nation-states are ‘member-states’ who seek global cooperation in order to advance the welfare of their own societies. Indeed, global institutions are quite clear that their ultimate objective is the increased well-being of the various societies of the world, and that the nation-state is the ultimate authority vis-à-vis each and every society. Thus, the various global organizations and institutions see their role as helping each and every state adapt to the challenges and demands of a global reality.  

Finally, the imperatives to be competitive and adopt an entrepreneurial subjectivity find their support in a complex and diffuse assemblage of forms of expert and common knowledge, techniques and technologies, and institutional practices and arrangements. The proliferation of trade agreements is accompanied by a proliferation of tools, such as econometric models, for evaluating their usefulness. Likewise, there is a continual process of identification of elements of social reality that are classified as “obstacles to efficiently functioning markets,” and a constant effort to formulate governmental strategies to foster and encourage competitive entrepreneurialism.

Discourses of globalization and the global market help provide a language for fostering competition between various subjects. At the national level, globalization is

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49 It is this *each and every* that suggests a “pastoral” form of care and power, something Foucault detailed in his later research and writings. See especially Foucault (1981).
portrayed by neoliberal governmentality as a disciplining force that compels states to improve their governance. As the World Bank argues, “Globalization is a threat to weak or capriciously governed states. But it also opens the way for effective, disciplined states to foster development and economic well-being, and it sharpens the need for effective international cooperation in pursuit of global collective action” (World Bank 1997: 11). In other words, competition is salutary in that it encourages improvement and, at the state level, “good governance”: “involvement in the global economy tightens constraints on arbitrary state action, reduces the state’s ability to tax capital, and brings much closer financial market scrutiny of monetary and fiscal policies.” States are thus urged to “embrace external competition” (World Bank 1997: 12).

In light of the recent global financial crisis and economic downturn, it is tempting to forecast the end of a neoliberal governmentality that must have contained within it the seeds of its demise. However, as Foucault reminds us, governmentalities are produced through problematization, and crisis is, in a sense, the crucible of governmentality. Indeed, Foucault argues that taken together, all the various technologies, rationalities and programs associated with liberalism—free trade regimes, econometric models, and programs for increasing competition—are “devices intended to produce freedom which potentially risk producing exactly the opposite.” Thus Foucault speaks of a “consciousness of crisis” that grounds the project of neoliberal global governmentality, arguing that neoliberalism “has a consciousness of itself as a theory which seeks to incite entrepreneurialism to the point of crisis” (Kiersey 2009: 363) Speaking in 1979, Foucault said, “This is precisely the present
visions of the global market will continue to shape the neoliberal political imaginary. Nevertheless, however the present crisis comes to be problematized within neoliberal governmental reason, it is likely that the visions of the global market will continue to shape the neoliberal political imaginary.
CHAPTER THREE: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

The idea that there exists a “global civil society” has become common in the international public policy domain as well as in the academic field (Batliwala & Brown 2006; Braman & Sreberny 1996; Eberly 2008; Florini 2000; Frost 2002; Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003; Lipschutz & Mayer 1996; Richter, Berking, & Müller-Schmid 2006; Salamon, Sokolowski, & List 2003; R. Taylor 2004; J. W. S. G. Walker & Thompson 2008; Walzer 1995b; Warkentin 2001). In most regards, global civil society is understood in similar terms as domestic civil society, namely as “the broad range of institutions that occupy the social space between the market and the state” (Salamon, et al. 2003: 1). In other words, civil society exists as part of the tridimensional liberal political imaginary, and is defined in part by its relation to, and difference from, the state and the market. Thus, despite the diversity of organizations and institutions that make up civil society, grouping them together under one category is justified in that collectively they exist outside both state and market, while providing important points of articulation between the two. In a fairly typical account, civil society organizations and institutions are seen as private in character and not part of the governmental apparatus. But unlike other private institutions, these entities are expected to serve some public or community purpose and not simply to generate profits for those involved in them. They therefore embody two seemingly contradictory impulses: first, a commitment to freedom and personal initiative, to the idea that people have the right to act on their own authority to improve the quality of their own lives or the lives of persons they care about; and second, an emphasis on solidarity,
on the idea that people have responsibilities not only to themselves but also to the communities of which they are a part. Uniquely among social institutions, the institutions of the nonprofit or civil society sector merge these two impulses, producing a set of private institutions serving essentially public purposes. (Salamon, et al. 2003: 1)

The liberal idea/ideal of civil society as a blend of the public and private, existing in a relationship of both interiority and exteriority vis-à-vis the domains of the state and the market, is retained when it is applied to a global framework. Here global civil society is seen as both product and agent of globalization. And yet constituting civil society on a global scale entails many problems. An obvious problem is that historically the collective identity and sense of belonging associated with civil society has been inextricably linked to a relationship between governed and government, as articulated through the mechanisms of citizenship and rights (Sassen 2006). In the absence of clearly visible authoritative institutions and structures of government at the transnational or global level, it is unclear on what basis the relationship between governed and government can be articulated.

And yet, the argument to be developed in this chapter is that it is precisely this problem that the various efforts to construct transnational or even global domains of civil society seek to overcome. In other words, the central claim advanced here is that at the heart of various projects for transnational or global forms of civil society there can be found an attempt to solve the problem of integrating subjects within institutions and structures of transnational or global governance. Here Foucault’s insights regarding the relationship between the development of civil society and modern forms of governance offer a number of productive insights for apprehending
the shifting governmental logics and technologies at work in contemporary projects for constructing transnational or global civil society.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section offers a critical examination of some of the more influential scholarly accounts of civil society that were produced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These accounts are important for the development of a discourse of global civil society, in that they provided much of the conceptual and normative foundations for the latter. The second section presents a Foucauldian perspective on civil society, based primarily on Foucault’s 1978 and 1979 governmentality lectures. In this section the critical understanding of both the idea and practice of civil society, and how these are connected with concrete forms of governance, will be elaborated. In the third section, specific discourses of global civil society will be critically examined, with special emphasis on the implications for the liberal political imaginary and related forms of governance for this transposition of civil society from the national to the global sphere. In the fourth section, I examine some specific projects, and their associated rationalities, for constructing civil society within the Americas. Finally, the concluding section will analyze the implications that these projects have for understanding the shifting nature of contemporary forms of governance. A crucial question that will be addressed is whether the ‘going global’ of the discourse of civil society represents a significant transformation in (neo) liberal technologies of government, and how this development can aid us in “understanding some of the contingencies of the systems of power that we inhabit – and which inhabit us – today” (Barry, Osborne, & Rose 1996a: 4).
The Discourse of Global Civil Society

Beginning in the late 1980s, an increasing number of social and political theorists began addressing the issue of civil society. Following Robert Fine (1997), we can refer to this body of literature as civil society theory. There are four, interrelated, elements of civil society theory which are of interest for the present analysis: (1) the explanation for a renewed interest in civil society, (2) the treatment of civil society as a trans-historical universal, (3) the normative justifications for civil society, and (4) the vision of civil society as a sphere of peaceful interaction free from relations of domination and structures of violence. These elements are important not only to understand contemporary discourses of civil society but, as I will argue in the final section, to apprehend their connection with projects that seek to regulate and govern subjects and spaces.

To begin with, most theories of civil society make a strong connection between the renewal of interest in the concept and the historical context. In general, theorists of civil society tend to explain the increased attention to the concept in terms of a resurgence of the object of analysis—that is, of civil society itself. For example, for Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992: 29), the “revival” of the idea of civil society that took place in the 1980s was in fact the result of “citizen initiatives, associations, and movements” trying to reclaim the autonomy of a public, social realm against different forms of statism—either the welfare state of liberal democracies, the militarized state of right-wing authoritarian governments, or the socialist state of the (now mostly formerly) communist countries. Thus, in their account, political action by social groups and movements that in many cases view
themselves in terms of an autonomous social sphere is the underlying reason why the notion of civil society has re-entered the political (and scholarly) discourse.

The explanation of the rise in interest in the concept of civil society in terms of an increase in civil society activity itself also takes on an added, slightly modified meaning when located within the discourse of democracy and democratization. ⁵⁰ In this account, the resurgence of the idea of civil society is connected with what Samuel Huntington famously labeled the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991). As Marc Plattner and Larry Diamond write,

Since the inception of the third wave of global democratization in the mid-1970s, one of the most dramatic developments in both intellectual and policy circles has been the vast increase in attention to “civil society.” The rediscovery of civil society can be traced back to the late 1970s in Poland, when the intellectual fathers of Solidarity applied the term to their efforts to organize people independently of the totalitarian state. The subsequent popularity of the term has been fueled by the pivotal contributions that autonomous organizations and movements have made to democratic transitions not only in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. (1994: 3)

Next, civil society theory often treats the object of analysis as if it were a trans-historical universal—that is, as a category of human existence that has existed in some form since the earliest time (Inayatullah & Blaney 1997) and to which humankind allegedly wishes to return. More specifically, most scholarly treatments of civil society view both the concept and the phenomenon as having originated in

⁵⁰ In fact, the way that it has become a key theme in major issue areas related to democracy and democratization, such as the issue of development, is perhaps revealing of the central place that the idea of civil society has come to occupy in the contemporary political imaginary. Cf. Howell & Pearce (2001).
Ancient Greek political thought and practice, having then undergone a number of transformations, ultimately producing the modern idea and reality of civil society. Thus, for example, Cohen and Arato argue that “[t]he first version of the concept of civil society appears in Aristotle under the heading of politike koinonia…” which would later be translated in Latin as societas civilis (1992: 84). From politike koinonia in Ancient Greece to societas civilis in Ancient Rome, Cohen and Arato claim, the concept eventually is taken up by political thinkers to describe the system of city states then emerging in medieval Europe (84). In a similar fashion, political theorist Adam B. Seligman locates the origins of the idea of civil society in the political thought of Aristotle and traces its development from “the idea of a universal law of nature” that emerged first with the Stoics, to its incorporation into and transformation of Christian thought, and its transformation into the natural law tradition exemplified by Hugo Grotius (1992: 17; 18-21).

In a slightly different register, Charles Taylor (1990) emphasizes a number of historical transformations that the idea of political community has undergone. The first was the idea that emerged in the Middle Ages “that society is not identical with its political organization”— a development which, Taylor argues, represents a break from the classical Greek and Roman understanding that “the identity of society was defined by its politeia, its political constitution” (102). Furthering this trend, in Taylor’s account, was “the development of an idea of the Church as an independent society” and the corresponding idea that there were two sources of authority—“one temporal, one spiritual…” (102). Furthermore, Taylor points to “the development of a legal notion of subjective rights” that emerged out of “the peculiar nature of feudal
relations of authority” together with the complex political structure of medieval polities (e.g. “the existence of relatively independent, self-governing cities; and the semi-dependent relationship between monarch, on the one hand, and feudal lords and the body of Estates, on the other”) as providing the basis for the development of the notion of a civil society that exists alongside but separately from the State (102-103).

In accounts of the origins and development of civil society—both as idea and practice—the period of time in Europe from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries is seen as crucial. For it is at this time that many of the main elements that, it is argued, provide the basis for the idea of civil society today, become prominent. These include the distinction between civil society and the state, the idea of a public sphere and the somewhat related distinction between the public and the private, and the idea of a nascent commercial society that is related to the development of civil society (Keane 1988; Seligman 1992; Taylor 1990). For Taylor (1990) the two thinkers who provide the conceptual basis for the modern idea of civil society are John Locke and Charles Montesquieu. In most theories of civil society, Adam Ferguson, Alexis de Tocqueville, and G.W.F. Hegel are also seen as providing foundational accounts of the idea of civil society (C. Calhoun 1993; Cohen & Arato 1992; Fine 1997; Kaldor 2003; Seligman 1992).

Despite recognizing differences in the accounts of civil society provided by these different thinkers, many civil society theorists nonetheless assume that these accounts share some common foundation or refer to some universally describable human phenomenon. In other words, something like civil society has always existed, and although historical developments and intellectual changes have caused both the
idea and practice of civil society to undergo important transformations, the essential
components of civil society came into place by the time of the early nineteenth
century and have endured up until the present time. As will be argued at greater
length in the third section of this chapter, it is this kind of non-genealogical form of
thought to which, among other things, a Foucauldian analytical perspective offers a
productive alternative.

The third element of civil society theories which is relevant to the present
analysis has to do with the strong normative arguments offered to justify a renewed
focus on the importance of civil society for contemporary political life. As Fine
argues, “civil society theory is not just a theory of civil society, but a theory which
privileges civil society” (Fine 1997: 9; emphasis added). The principal normative
justification for civil society is the argument that a strong democracy requires a robust
civil society and civic participation in the political domain. In fact, there are two, very
much related, strands of this argument. The first was already mentioned above—
namely that the revival of an autonomous sphere of civic activity and associations is
crucial for transitions to and consolidations of democracy (Plattner & Diamond
1994). In this account, “emergent civil societies in Latin America and Eastern Europe
are credited with effective resistance to authoritarian regimes, democratizing society
from below” while pressuring authoritarian states for change above (Foley &

The second, related strand of normative justification for a renewed emphasis
on civil society is the need for strengthening already established democratic societies.
For some, it is in part the fear that norms of civility and civic association are in
decline in their own Western societies that prompts the “return” to the language of civil society. Thus, for example, Michael Walzer justifies his attempt to re-theorize civil society by noting that “increasingly, associational life in the ‘advanced’ capitalist and social democratic societies seems at risk” (1995a: 8). Similarly, it is this fear of the disintegration of civil society that has prompted scholars such as Robert Putnam (1995, 2000) to examine related concepts such as social capital, in order to find why, for example, Americans are increasingly “bowling alone.”

However, the performance of these normative tasks to which civil society has been assigned requires a certain understanding of what civil society is (or is meant to be) and how it operates. While there is no agreed upon definition of civil society among civil society theorists, a crucial element in its conceptualization is that it is imagined as a domain of freedom; it is free of relations of power, of coercion, of structures of domination and violence. In large part, this understanding of civil society is made possible by locating civil society outside both the state and the economy.

For liberal theorists, the state is seen as the, at least potential, site of coercion and domination. For many critical theorists, most notably Jürgen Habermas and others who have taken up his work, both the state and the economy are potential sites of coercion and domination. However, despite this understanding of the dangers the economy as well as, (but not only, as for the liberals) the state present for an autonomous civil sphere, critical theorists of civil society still see the latter as a space

51 The now classic work by the German philosopher is Habermas (1989). Cohen and Arato (1992) seek to provide an updated vision of civil society within the framework Habermas constructed. See also the discussions in Calhoun (1992).
for social groups to formulate, express, and promote their interests and identities in a manner that is free from coercion, domination, and violence. Whether the emphasis is placed on a “pragmatics of communication” (Habermas 1998) or shared cultural norms (Alexander 2006), civil society is still seen as a sphere of human life and activity with the potential to penetrate and *civilize* “the economy, the state and the other subsystems of society” (Vandenberghe 2008: 423).

In this sense, most theories of civil society, while providing a fuller account of the history of ideas that contributed to different articulations of the notion of civil society, tend to remain locked within a liberal political imaginary which posits civil society as site of (at least potential) freedom. Even those critical accounts of civil society that draw upon the Marxist political tradition (particularly those influenced by the political thought of Antonio Gramsci), while rejecting the close linking of the market and society (and the dependence of the latter on the former) in liberal thought, still tend to pose civil society or the sphere of the social as a potential domain of freedom (Cox 1999; Gill 2000).

**Civil Society as a Technology of Government**

In his 1978-1979 lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault identifies a novel rationality and technology of government that emerges in the eighteenth century. This new form of governmentality, Foucault argues, can best be understood as a liberal technology and rationality of government (2007a, 2009). In other words, what Foucault is analyzing is the emergence of liberalism—but not as a political theory or philosophy. Rather he analyzes liberalism “as a practice, that is to say, a ‘way of doing things’ directed towards objectives and regulating itself by continuous reflection” (2008: 318).
One of the principal characteristics that Foucault identifies in a liberal art of government is that it contains a logic of internal limitation. Other modes of government, of course, confronted the problem of limitations on governmental power. However, Foucault argues, these limitations were ultimately exterior to the underlying logic and rationalities of government itself. For the centralized states that operated on the basis of *raison d’État*, the problem of the limitation of political power revolved around the problem of sovereignty, of the constitution, and of the relationship between political subjects and political authority. Ultimately, Foucault suggests, this problematic was framed within the parameters of the law and the juridical field (2008: 9).

On the other hand, liberal government, Foucault suggests, is based on a principle of internal limitation that is to be found within the underlying rationality, or finality, of government itself. And this governmental reason, Foucault argues, is based on: (1) the “discovery” of the population and the economy as relatively autonomous spheres, distinct from the state, and containing their own internal logics and characteristics; and (2) the “discovery” of political economy as a principle or form of knowledge that can provide governmental reason with a relatively coherent framework for gauging the rationality of government. This is why Foucault at one point describes liberal governmentality in terms of

the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. (2008: 108)
The development of political economy, as Lemke suggests, means that the “art of government” need not be “limited to the field of politics as separated from the economy; instead the constitution of a conceptually and practically distinguished space, governed by autonomous laws and a proper rationality is itself an element of ‘economic government’” (2000: 10). At the same time, it is the discovery of the population that, Foucault argues, allows political economy to function as a technology of liberal government. So these two developments are interconnected: “the transition in the eighteenth century from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime dominated by techniques of government revolves around population, and consequently the birth of political economy” (2008: 106).

However, Foucault argues that while political economy and the new economic sciences of the eighteenth century provide a form of knowledge which can inform governmental reason, principally by providing the principle that good government must be economic government, economic science cannot itself provide the foundation for governmental rationality. Political economy, Foucault suggests, is both a specific type of knowledge (savoir) and a general modality of knowledge (connaissance), and indeed in a liberal art of government,

one must govern with economics, one must govern alongside economists, one must govern by listening to economists, but economics must not be and there is no question that it can be the governmental rationality itself…So, a problem arises: what will government be concerned with if the economic process…is not in principle its object? I think it is the theory of civil society (2008, p. 286).
Foucault’s provocative claim—that it is the theory of civil society that provides the basis for a liberal governmental rationality—relies on another theoretical argument he makes about the political subject typical of liberal government. Under a regime dominated by the logic of sovereignty, the relationship between the subject and the sovereign is regulated by the juridical sphere—by the law. The political subject is therefore the subject of right and rights, and it is the law that provides the basis for the limitation of sovereign power (2008: 37-39). Some time around the eighteenth century, with the Physiocrats, not only is the economy “discovered,” with its own natural laws and dynamics, providing a new form of limitation to sovereign power. There also emerges a new political subject that is located within “the economy”: *homo oeconomicus* (2008: 296-297).

The emergence of the economy as an autonomous field and of *homo oeconomicus* as political subject however, presents a problem to the sovereign and the exercise of power. While the subject of rights is integrated into the political system through a regime of rights—renouncing certain rights or transferring them to the sovereign—*homo oeconomicus* is integrated into the economic system as an autonomous agent seeking to maximize his own utility. Furthermore, the proper functioning of the economic sphere—a sphere with which, since the rise of political economy, a sovereign must be concerned—requires that this economic agent be free to pursue his personal interest. To make things more difficult, political economy as a governmental knowledge tells the sovereign that he must not, and indeed cannot, have complete knowledge of the economy. The economy, and the multiplicity of subjects

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52 See Chapter Two, pp. 49-52.
that make up the economy, exist at the limit of sovereign power. Thus, Foucault argues,

the economic subject and the subject of right have an essentially different relationship with political power. Or, if you like, with regard to the question of the foundation and exercise of power, the question posed by the problematic of economic man is completely different from that which could be posed by the figure and element of juridical man, the legal subject. (2008: 276)

Furthermore, Foucault points out that the discovery of the economy as an autonomous realm inhabited by economic agents with their own, private logic does not mean that the logic of sovereignty and the problem of sovereign authority disappear. For the economic subject still has a juridical relationship to sovereign authority. So the crucial problem posed is how, on the basis of what logic or rationality, can “these individuals, who inhabit the space of sovereignty as subject of right and, at the same time, as economic men” be governed? (2008: 294-295)

Foucault suggests that the basis for the government of the subject who is both a subject or right and an economic subject can only be assured “by the emergence of a new object, a new domain or field which is…the correlate of the art of government being constructed at this time in terms of the problem of the relation between the subject of right and the economic subject” (295).

It is in relation to this problem, Foucault claims, that “a new plane of reference” emerges, a “new ensemble” which will integrate both the subject of right and the economic subject, thereby “preserving the unity and generality of the art of governing over the whole sphere of sovereignty” (295). The answer, Foucault suggests, is civil society. Civil society, according to Foucault, provides a rational
principle for limiting government, without relying exclusively on either the principle of right or the total autonomy of the market. Thus, Foucault argues, civil society is not best understood as a philosophical idea. Instead, it is best understood as “a concept of governmental technology, or rather, it is the correlate of a technology of government the rational measure of which must be juridically pegged to an economy understood as a process of production and exchange” (296).

The construction of civil society makes possible the exercise of governmental power, one that simultaneously respects the principles of right as well as the laws of the economy. As Foucault observes, “an omnipresent government, a government which nothing escapes, a government which conforms to the rules of right, and a government which nevertheless respects the specificity of the economy, will be a government that manages civil society, the nation, society, the social” (296). Civil society, then, presents a solution to the problem that the autonomy of the economy and the economic subject posed to government. Foucault writes,

*Homo oeconomicus* is…the abstract, ideal, purely economic point that inhabits the dense, full, and complex reality of civil society. Or alternatively, civil society is the concrete ensemble within which these ideal points, economic men, must be placed so that they can be properly managed. (2008: 296)

Finally, Foucault suggests that civil society carries out another crucial function within a liberal art of government; it offers a domain for not only the integration of the subject of rights and the economic subject of interest, but also for the incorporation of logics and assemblages of security.\(^\text{53}\) Under the previous

\(^{53}\) See Chapter 2, pp. 51-52.
governmental regimes such as raison d’état, security was preoccupied with defeating—through violence, coercion, or domination—enemies that existed in a relation of exteriority to the sovereign power; whether they were foreign enemies, or rebellious or seditious subjects. Ultimately, the objective was to secure the sovereign power of the state itself (2008: 318-319). With the introduction of civil society, and within the framework of a liberal art of government, the object of government is the security not of the sovereign but civil society. Because civil society is understood as a domain “constituted by quasi-natural but relatively opaque processes of the economy, of population and of society itself”, it is these natural processes that needed to be protected, managed, and taken care of (Dean 2007: 26). As Foucault points out, “these processes, in turn, depended on the ‘natural liberty’ of individuals to pursue their own interests and better their own condition” (Dean 2007: 27).

An important corollary to the integration of apparatuses of security within a liberal art of government is the potential that always exists for what Dean calls “authoritarian liberalism”: the eruption of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power within a liberal art of government (2007a: 108-129). Ostensibly, liberalism is concerned with managing the freedom of the population and the subjects that make up the latter. However as Foucault reminds us, freedom is not a natural quality of a universal subject—it must be defined and produced.

The new art of government [i.e. liberalism] therefore appears as the management of freedom, not in the sense of the imperative: “be free,” with the immediate contradiction that this imperative may contain…Liberalism formulates simply the following: I am going to produce what you need to be free. I am going to see to it that you are free to be free. (2008: 63).
However, it is here in the need to produce freedom that Foucault identifies one of the central paradoxes of liberalism:

at the heart of this liberal practice is an always different and mobile problematic between the production of freedom and that which in the production of freedom risks limiting and destroying it…Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etc. (2008: 64)

Dean further develops this idea in relation to the new understanding of government that results from a liberal political technology with society as its object and rationale. He argues that

authoritarian measures follow not simply from the liberal government of free persons, but also from the liberal understanding of the sphere of government itself, and the implications of that understanding. That is to say, that the liberal reliance on authoritarian techniques is a consequence of the understanding of government as a limited sphere that must operate through the forms of regulation that exist outside itself, i.e. through those forms of regulation that obtain within…“civil society.” (2007: 110).

Moreover, since the domain that must be governed becomes coextensive with all of social (and natural) life itself, an art of government that is ostensibly limited becomes both more extensive and intensive. That is, as governmental logic is tied to the well-being of the population, every aspect of the “social body” is potentially of concern to an expanding governmentality. Population, civil society, society, the nation—these are sites which become the principal concern of governmental reason.54

54 For many scholars, (neo) liberal governmentality is ultimately biopolitical—the latter understood as the government of life itself (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero 2009; Dillon & Reid 2001; Reid 2007).
At this point, the significant analytical innovations present in Foucault’s treatment of civil society, as well as the serious differences between his account and the theories of civil society discussed in the first section, should be clear. While most civil society theories deal with the idea of civil society, they also refer to the reality of civil society. For Foucault, on the other hand, there is no fundamental difference between ideas and practices of civil society—and there is certainly no such thing as civil society independent of the discursive practices that constitute it. I referred to this in chapter two as Foucault’s “critical nominalism.” This method of analysis in turn makes possible a different way of interrogating civil society. For Foucault, since civil society is a historical, discursive construction, it is possible—indeed, necessary—to inquire into the conditions of possibility for its emergence. The framework of governmentality also highlights how civil society operates as a technology of government—one that transforms the field of governmental power and produces not only the freedom with which it is ostensibly concerned, but also significant degrees of unfreedom. Finally, a governmentality approach provides a powerful critical perspective for apprehending the political processes and implications in the shift from a national to a transnational or global civil society within the liberal political imaginary. It asks how transnational or global civil society functions as a governmental technology, to what kinds of problematizations it responds or produces, and what kinds of political subjectivities it invokes. In other words, what happens when the liberal political imaginary “goes global”?

**Global Civil Society as Governmentality**

Since the 1990s there has been a growing discourse regarding the existence of a global civil society (GCS). The concept has been invoked by scholars and policy
practitioners, and it has become integral to discourses of global governance (which will be explored in Chapter 4). Very schematically, we can say that there are two general positions that students of global civil society have taken. The first position, which I call the “advocate” position, promotes the existence of a global civil society, highlighting its potential for making global politics more democratic, representative, and accountable. The second, or what I call the “progressive,” position is skeptical of the use of the term global civil society by the main institutions of global governance, yet believes in the possibility of global social movements to offer an “alternative globalization” or “globalization from below.” However, employing a Foucauldian governmentality framework, we can see that both positions share a number of crucial elements that form the discourse of civil society as a technology of government.

One of the earliest, and most prominent, articulations of the notion of a global civil society came not from the academic field, but rather from within the United Nations system. In 1995 Report of the Commission on Global Governance (1995) argued that “To be an effective instrument of global governance in the modern world, the United Nations must…take greater account of the emergence of global civil society.” During the second half of the 1990s, the idea that there existed a global civil society became more prevalent both in policy and academic fields, and by 2001 the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics (LSE), with funding from the MacArthur and Rockefeller Foundations, began producing a series of Global Civil Society yearbooks (Anheier, Glasius, & Kaldor 2001b, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007). The yearbooks are part of an overall objective for the Centre to research globalization and global governance and “to increase
understanding and knowledge of global issues, to encourage interaction between academics, policy makers, journalists and activists, and to propose solutions [to global problems].”

One theme that is commonly found in the growing literature on global civil society is the connection between the latter and the idea of global governance. Indeed, global civil society is presented, both by scholars and policymakers, as having a crucial role in the overall structures and processes of global governance. While the issue of global governance will be discussed in the following chapter, an important element of the discourse of global civil society has to do with what is argued to be both the decreasing capacity of national states to deal with and, therefore, the increasing necessity for transnational non-state actors to respond to, what are viewed as fundamentally transnational or global problems. Thus, for example, GCS scholar Ann Florini describes a number of transnational, or global, problems (transnational crime and terrorism, environmental problems, global trade and economic issues, etc.) and then calls attention to the “increasing disjunction between [these problems] and the (mostly national) systems and procedures available to solve them” (2003: 3-10). It is this disjunction between existing forms of largely national state-based institutions and global problems that requires, as the subtitle of Florini’s book (2003) calls for, “new rules for running a new world.” Within these new forms of global governance, a global civil society is crucial.

Similarly, many commentators have been impressed by the massive growth in the transnational non-state sector. As Lester M. Salamon puts it,
A striking upsurge is under way around the globe in organized voluntary activity and the creation of private, nonprofit or non-governmental organizations. . . . The scope and scale of this phenomenon are immense. Indeed, we are in the midst of a global ‘associational revolution’ that may prove to be as significant to the later twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the later nineteenth. (1994: 109)

Like Florini, Salamon also argues that this “associational revolution” fills a necessary governance gap produced by the increasing inability of national states to solve global problems. Indeed, Salamon argues that in addition to “[reflecting] a distinct set of social and technological changes”, the rise of GCS also reflects

a long-simmering crisis of confidence in the capability of the state. Broad historical changes have thus opened the way for alternative institutions that can respond more effectively to human needs. With their small scale, flexibility and capacity to engage grass-roots energies, private nonprofit organizations have been ideally suited to fill the resulting gap. (110)

From this perspective, GCS can fill two important, complementary, roles in terms of global governance: it can provide mechanisms of governance and rule outside of official state organs and institutions (including intergovernmental organizations), and it can also provide input into and hold accountable the latter, ultimately, it is hoped, making the more formalized structures of global governance more legitimate and democratic. Thus an overall list of the functions of civil society actors in global governance includes: “agenda setting, developing usable knowledge, monitoring, rule-making (through principled standards), policy verification, enforcement and capacity building” (Haas, Kanie, & Murphy 2004, cited in Green 2007: 75).
Furthermore and importantly, it is not only international governmental institutions that, it is argued, are increasingly being held more accountable by transnational non-state actors; states themselves are also seen as being subject to the “civilizing effect” of global civil society—“civilizing” in the sense that states supposedly hew more closely to a Western norm/ideal of the liberal, democratic state (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; Risse & Sikkink 1999; Warkentin & Mingst 2000). In much of the GCS literature, the emphasis is on the role of transnational NGOs and networks that promote desirable ends such as the banning of land-mines; environmental protection; and the promotion and protection of the rights of minorities, women, children and human rights more generally (Clark 2003, 2008; Evans 1997; Grigorescu 2007; Imber 1997; McGrew 1997; Payne & Samhat 2004). In most cases, the targets of this political action are governments of societies considered underdeveloped or in the process of development. Thus, GCS is seen as a means to “civilize” non-liberal states by forming transnational links between private actors within lesser developed societies and NGO networks based in more “advanced” societies in order to help the former transform their national governments along more “developed” and, ultimately, liberal lines (Hopgood 2000; Tvedt 2002).

This civilizing, or disciplining, role of GCS is typically not subjected to critical analysis by liberal scholars of global civil society. Indeed, the central assumptions contained within liberal analyses of GCS regarding the proper role and function of political authority are, as has been presented above, fundamental elements in the overall discourse of global civil society and its role in helping produce a more civilized—that is, democratic and accountable—form of world politics. For their part,
more critical, Marxian-inspired, analyses of global civil society, call attention to the fact that the attempt to produce a global civil society has been largely an attempt to reproduce a liberal political culture on a global scale, and that such a project necessarily entails uneven relationships of power (Gill 2003). However, many of these scholars still see the emergence of a global civil society as a development with potentially liberating results. From a Gramscian perspective, for example, global civil society can be seen as a terrain within which the contest between oppressive and emancipatory forces is being played out—in other words, as a battlefield over hegemony (Cox 1999; Gill 2000).

It is here that a Foucauldian governmentality approach offers an alternative and potentially productive conceptualization of global civil society. As pioneering scholars in the field of Foucauldian IR have argued, critically apprehending the functioning of power in world politics entails not only challenging mainstream perspectives which ignore and/or are complicit with the dominant structures of power, but also paying attention to the ways that power operates in and through the very categories of knowledge that in turn constitute political subjects and objects of intervention (Debrix 1999; M. Dillon 1995). Consequently, a Foucauldian governmentality perspective on global civil society highlights the specific logics, rationalities, and technologies employed in producing the subject of global civil society and in involving this subject in mechanisms of governance (an issue to which I return in Chapter Four). Thus it is useful to briefly look at some elements of this “political repertoire” (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 1996) of global civil society that have been developed over the past few decades. Here a number of interconnected
aspects of the relationship between the sites of global governance and civil society actors are particularly relevant for understanding how the overall governmental logics and relationships of power operate.

To begin with, it is important to apprehend the process of constituting transnational or global civil society actors as political subjects. While most analyses of GCS take for granted the existence of these political subjects, from a Foucauldian perspective it is the mechanisms, discourses, and relations of power involved in their constitution that are of critical importance. For example, the very definition of global civil society and its actors and legitimate functions is a crucial factor in understanding its deployment within different forms of governmentality. Within the scholarly literature, there is no consensus on how to define transnational or global civil society. However, the authors of the *Global Civil Society Yearbook* offer a definition which is also consistent with the majority of discourses of civil society produced by the official sites of global governance: GCS is a combination of “transnational, national and local non-governmental actors who are engaged in negotiations and discussion about civil matters with governmental, intergovernmental, and other transnational actors at various levels and the business sphere” (Anheier, Glasius, & Kaldor 2001a: 4). Similarly, international legal scholar Anna-Karin Lindblom (2005: 46-52) defines civil society organizations as non-governmental, not-for-profit organizations that do not use or promote violence and that have some form of formal existence and representative structures and processes.

Needless to say, the act of defining who counts as civil society actors, and is thus endowed with the legitimacy to represent others by engaging with transnational
political authority, is a powerfully political act. Indeed, it is here where one of the major fault lines between liberal and critical theories (particularly those in the Marxian intellectual/political tradition) can be seen: for the former, GCS is comprised almost exclusively of NGOs making claims on political authority (E. J. Friedman, Hochstetler, & Clark 2005); for the latter it is broader social movements such as the World Social Forum which are privileged for their potential to produce counter-hegemonic resistance to neoliberal hegemony (e.g. Gill 2000). When global governance actors define GCS along largely liberal lines, they attempt to legitimize some political subjects while delegitimizing others; at the same time they also attempt to circumscribe the field of political action to conform to a liberal vision of the political as being based on a “process of competition and aggregation of private preferences” (Baynes 2001: 162; Sunstein 1991).

Second, in addition to how GCS is defined, it also matters who provides the definition. In this regard, the role played by the institutions of international or global governance in the constitution of a transnational or global civil society subject is significant. In fact the term “non-governmental organization” seems to have been coined by the United Nations, stipulating in Article 71 of its Charter that these organizations “could be accredited to the UN for consulting purposes” (Martens 2002: 271). More recently, the United Nations system has also played a key role in identifying a global civil society that mainly consists of a “NGO community” whose identity emerges primarily in their interaction with the various sites of political authority.56 Similarly, other global governance actors have contributed to the

invocation and definition of transnational or global civil society actors. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, defines global civil society in terms of civil society organizations (CSOs), which in turn are defined as:

the wide range of citizens' associations that exists in virtually all member countries to provide benefits, services, or political influence to specific groups within society. CSOs include: business forums, faith-based associations, labor unions, local community groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), philanthropic foundations, and think tanks.57

Likewise, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has followed the precedent of UN Charter Article 71 by recognizing NGO involvement in the WTO in the Marrakech Agreement establishing the WTO. Article V § 2 provides that “the General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO”.58

In fact, a brief survey of the websites of all the major intergovernmental organizations shows that all have identified the existence of transnational civil society actors, provided working definitions for the latter, and established mechanisms for interacting and working with those groups. Here again we can see the “governmentalization” of global civil society at work by examining the various

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mechanisms—Foucault’s “political technologies” (2003c)—used to involve civil society actors in the structures and sites of global governance.

One such political technology, mentioned above, is the use of juridical tools to establish a formal, legalized basis for civil society organizations’ involvement in the activities of international organizations (Ripinsky & Bossche 2007). Another political technology is the use of tools such as metrics, benchmarks, best practices and other techniques for normalizing the participation of civil society actors in global governance. More generally, these political technologies make civil society the object of expert knowledge, thereby inscribing the role of the constituted civil society within normalized frameworks for political action.

Finally, the development of transnational forms of civil society are connected with projects for governing transnational spaces by constituting political subjects that can perform a number of functions in relation to transnational sites of governance. This role of transnational civil society can perhaps be seen most clearly in projects that aim at regional integration. Here, transnational non-governmental actors are viewed as potential “key contributors to a convergence of social and cultural norms able to support processes of regional and international integration” (Keck & Sikkink 1999: 89). Transnational civil society, in this regard, is seen as “both a process and a goal: it is through the development of civil society that [regional] political and economic frameworks…can be made more democratic, and it is the presence of a

59 The group of academics that run the annual Washington Model Organization of American States, have spent years trying to get accredited as a non-governmental organization by the OAS. This year they finally had their status as a non-profit certified, so their NGO status may finally be approved. However, this anecdote provides a telling example of the ways that international organizations make it difficult for potential “civil society” interlocutors to engage with them.
strong and effervescent civil society which will, in the end, be proof of the success of
that enterprise” (Lizee 2000: 550). Regional integration, supported by national and
regional civil society organizations, could then form an integral part of a “‘good’
global governance” that is produced through the “partnerships” formed between state
and non-state actors at the national, regional, and global levels (Thakur & Van
Langenhove 2006: 234). In this regard, civil society organizations (CSOs) could “act
as a conduit for linking the local to the global” (239).

However, lurking in the background of this view of transnational civil society
is a significant problem, one that constantly surfaces when civil society is asked to
function as a support for transnational governance—the problem of the relationship
between political subjectivity and political authority. This problem has perhaps been
most visible in the attempts to deepen the level of political integration within the
European Union, wherein numerous (and for the most part unsuccessful) attempts
have been made to constitute a European political identity and European civil society
(Armstrong 2002; Curtin 2003; Eriksen & Fossum 2005). In the case of the EU, one
strategy for dealing with this problem is to try to take advantage of the apparent
connection between citizenship rights and collective identity and belonging, by
constructing various mechanisms and institutional arrangements that produce EU
community-wide citizenship rights (Painter 2002; Prentoulis 2001; Rumford 2003).
This strategy, however, raises questions regarding the basis for the connection
between rights and collective identity, since the former are also connected with
political institutional structures and authority. That is, citizenship and rights are
seemingly inextricably connected with the relationship between governed and
governors, including the ability of the former to make claims on the latter (Bellamy & Warleigh 2001). And yet, despite the emerging and evolving complex of governance structures in the EU, authority at the EU level is restricted and fractured, and mechanisms for citizens to make claims on political authority are quite limited (Wiener & Sala 1997).

The problem of constructing a regional civil society to provide legitimacy for regional structures of governance and integration and to act as an interlocutor for regional sites of power and authority is certainly not restricted to the EU zone; it is present in some form or other in all projects for regional, transnational governance. Indeed, all of these elements of what was analyzed above and which I refer to as the “governmentalization” of civil society can be found in attempts to construct, mobilize, and deploy civil society as a political subject of transnational governance.

In the final section, I take a look at how this problem has been posed in the context of projects to integrate the Americas. I argue that what Foucault discussed in terms of a ‘crisis of government’ can be seen in the ways that the problem of the relationship between political subjectivity, on the one hand, and political power and authority, on the other, has been problematized in the space of the Americas.

**Civil Society of the Americas**

The idea of civil society has been invoked in the context of various projects that seek to construct some form of supranational geopolitical imaginary in the Americas. In this section, the focus is on the various forms of political practice that have coalesced around the project to construct a hemispheric space of economic exchange and enterprise in the Americas. This project has been promoted through a variety of institutional structures, most importantly the process of multilateral
negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, discussed in the final section of chapter two), and the related series of hemispheric Summits of the Americas.

Under President Bill Clinton, the EAI was renamed the FTAA, and a Summit of the Americas was convened in Miami in 1994. A second Summit of the Americas was held in Santiago, Chile in 1998 to formally launch FTAA negotiations and to ultimately serve as the political framework for hemispheric integration (Kennedy 2004a). At both the Miami and Santiago Summits, the US vision of hemispheric integration, as consisting primarily in economic integration based on the liberalization of markets in the Americas, was generally supported by the majority of governments participating in the process (Kennedy 2004a).

However, by the time of the 1998 Santiago Summit, popular opposition and resistance to neoliberal transformations in Latin America in general, and to the FTAA project specifically, were becoming more widespread throughout the region (Harris 2003; Seoane & Taddei 2002). In part to address these concerns about public opposition to the proposed project, the nascent institutional structures of the FTAA made civil society participation in the negotiation process a priority. In promoting civil society participation, the various political actors both drew on and further developed the political rationalities and technologies involved with the construction of a transnational civil society subject and its insertion into mechanisms of governance that were discussed in the previous section. In the Joint Declaration produced at the Fourth Trade Ministerial of the Summit of the Americas, held in San
José, Costa Rica in March 1998, the importance of civil society participation was affirmed. The declaration stated:

We recognize and welcome the interests and concerns that different sectors of society have expressed in relation to the FTAA. Business and other sectors of production, labor, environmental and academic groups have been particularly active in this matter. We encourage these and other sectors of civil societies to present their views on trade matters in a constructive manner. (FTAA 1998)

Furthermore, at the San José ministerial meeting, a Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society (with the acronym SOC) was established, with a mandate to “receive inputs, analyze them and present the range of views for consideration by Ministers” (FTAA 1999). The SOC established mechanisms for soliciting and receiving “input” from civil society organizations, including classifying the latter based on sector: “Business Associations and Other Sectors of Production (including professional associations),” “Labor Organizations,” “Environmental Organizations,” “Academics (including students);” and “other organizations and individuals” (FTAA 1999). However, initially the mechanism for input was limited to written submissions by recognized civil society organizations.

Subsequent meetings of the SOC produced minor changes designed to increase civil society participation without altering the fundamentally restrictive nature of the FTAA process. At the same time, the SOC recognized that civil society input into the FTAA negotiations and meetings was very limited. However, rather than changing the basis for civil society participation, new political technologies were adopted that had the governance of participating states as their principal objective. That is, within the context of the problematization of insufficient civil society
participation, the focus came to be on the role of individual states and their responsibility for producing civil society participation. Thus techniques such as best practices and benchmarks were established in order to provide standards for individual states to take the necessary actions to enable participation by civil society groups and to measure how successful the different states were in achieving the goal of civil society participation.

From this perspective, the ability of individual states to produce civil society participation in the process of hemispheric integration is seen as an important indicator of the ‘good governance’ of those states. Indeed, the role of civil society has been prominent within discourses of good governance in a number of sites and contexts, especially in relation to developing and post-colonial polities. Beginning in the 1990s, “civil society [has] emerged as the prime political force in the policy agenda of the major lenders and development agencies. An active civil society, it was believed, would enable choice, scrutinize errant governments, and ultimately lead to regularized, plural democracy (Mohan 2002: 125)”60 Various global governance actors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have used the quantity of civil society organizations as an “objective indicator of governance” within individual countries. Indeed, the UNDP actually measures this indicator of good governance on the basis of the quantity of NGOs within a country (UNDP 2002; Willis 2005). Likewise, the European Commission locates the existence of civil society as one of the factors in the overall political development of a country: “As the concepts of human rights, democratisation and democracy, the rule of law, civil

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60 See also Fisher (1998) and McIlwaine (1998).
society, decentralised power sharing, and sound public administration, gain importance and relevance as a society develops into a more sophisticated political system, governance evolves into good governance” (European Commission 2003).

The FTAA process sought to deploy some of these political technologies of civil society by instructing the SOC to “strengthen and deepen their consultations with civil society at the national level,” and “identify and foster the use of best practices for outreach and consultation with civil society” (FTAA 2002). Furthermore, countries participating in the FTAA process were instructed to create “Governmental Points of Contact,” located within a governmental agency (usually ministries of trade or the exterior) for each of a defined list of issue areas that can be contacted by societal groups or individuals. The result can probably be seen as mixed, given that some countries did not provide any “Points of Contact,” many countries provided only a single contact for all issue areas, and only a few countries have a special FTAA/Hemispheric/North American division with a number of different individual contacts within the particular state agency.

In addition to action on individual states in the region from the FTAA organizations, a network of non-state organizations has also been formed to promote civil society participation in the Summits of the Americas. More specifically, this network of organizations has taken on the task of “supporting and promoting democratic governance throughout the Americas,” primarily by evaluating “the level

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62 In this latter category, both Canada and Chile stand out.
of Government compliance with the mandates issued during the Summits of the Americas” in four areas: “access to public information; freedom of expression; local government and decentralization; and support for civil society participation in governance” (Active Democracy 2007).

The Active Democracy Network consists of twenty-one organizations, each one located in a different participating state in the Summit of the Americas process (although obviously not all thirty-four countries have organizations in the network). The three principal organizations that coordinate the Citizen Network for the Implementation of Summit Mandates are PARTICIPA in Chile, which acts as General Administrator of the project; the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) in Canada; and Instituto Venezolano de Estudios Sociales y Políticos (INVESP) of Venezuela. According to the FOCAL website, “These organizations compose the Hemispheric Coordination Team sharing the responsibility of coordinating the work of, and administering support to, the CSO’s implementing the project locally, designated National Coordinators” (FOCAL 2010).

This Active Democracy Network also employs a number of techniques to help ensure that participating countries comply with the Summit mandates for strengthening democratic governance in the hemisphere. To begin with, it has identified five areas for governmental action:

1. Access to Public Information
2. Freedom of Expression
3. Access to Justice and the Independence of the Judiciary
4. Local Governments and Decentralization
5. Strengthening of Civil Society Participation
Furthermore, between May 2002 and October 2005, civil society organizations in the twenty-one countries in the region received training in how to apply the follow-up instruments comprised of questionnaires and indicators used to collect information on each of the five themes. In each of the 21 countries, a baseline of progress was generated for each of the themes being monitored. The results were elaborated in national reports and were the basis of a series of proposals to address the deficiencies in implementation uncovered by the monitoring exercise. (FOCAL 2010)

The image presented by this network of organizations is that its membership consists only of non-state organizations that are also largely representative of the countries in which they are located. However, all of the organizations receive significant financial support from both governments and private companies and foundations, most of which are located in the US, Canada, or the EU. In fact, a closer look at the different affiliated organizations and sponsors of the different groups involved in the Active Democracy Network, reveals a network of US foundations, US government agencies, US corporations, international corporations, and international organizations that seek, among other things, to strengthen (or constitute) civil society in a number of sites and at different scales—from the “local” to the “hemispheric”—in the Americas.63

Furthermore, while the various groups associated with this network are active in Canada and the United States, the bulk of their activities are directed at countries in

63 As has been mentioned above (and in previous chapters), and will be further explicated below, the perspective adopted here is a nominalist one regarding the existence of geographical/spatial scale. That is to say, it is not assumed that different scales exist independent of their discursive constitution; at the same time, the discursive constitution of scale is itself both a significant “social fact” and also has important implications for relationships of power.
Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, there is a marked geographical unevenness to the project for promoting the idea/ideal of civil society in the Americas, where it is largely the “underdeveloped” societies of Latin America and the Caribbean which are the principal targets for governmental intervention. Similarly, the neoliberal logic that informs the project for civil society development in the Americas is closely related to, and draws on elements of, earlier discourses of modernization and development. Indeed, projects for developing civil society as part of an overall strategy of good governance and regional integration, such as those promoted by the Active Democracy Network, operate on the basis of what Sheppard and Leitner call a “developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary” (Sheppard & Leitner 2010).

Sheppard and Leitner’s focus is on the shifting logics and rationalities contained within discourses of development, especially in the recent transformation from the “Washington Consensus” of the 1980s and 1990s to some kind of “Post-Washington Consensus” (2010). What these authors highlight is the way that, despite shifts regarding the specific policies that are promoted, there exist a number of deep continuities within the developmentalist projects. One underlying element that is particularly relevant to the present study is the way that, despite changes in preferred policies, developmentalist projects (re)produce a spatiality of difference based on a developed/underdeveloped binary and, especially, the legitimacy of knowledge and expertise produced within the “first world.” It is here that the importance of civil society for neoliberal governmentality becomes central, for it both serves as an indicator of a particular country’s level of development, while at the same time it offers the promise of increased development if it can be effectively mobilized.
The importance of civil society for developmentalist discourses and projects finds its expression in a number of different ways. One example is the way that the discourse and project of participatory development (PD) that became prominent in the 1990s has increasingly emphasized the importance of civil society in developing countries (Nelson & Wright 1995). However, when international organizations such as the World Bank have promoted the role of civil society as part of an overall project of participatory development, civil society is understood largely in neoliberal terms—as a collection of “stakeholders” in developmental projects whose role is limited to providing increased transparency and accountability, rather than being able to decide on the more fundamental meaning and shape of “development” in general. From a Foucauldian perspective, participatory development can be seen as a political technology, one which seeks to incite and mobilize political subjects such as ‘civil society’ in order to shape the conduct of other subjects, including countries which are the object of governmental intervention in the form of development. Thus, for example, PD is connected with the idea of country “ownership” of development programs, where the state and/or international development agency seeks civil society involvement for policy development and agenda setting (Kapoor 2005).

This raises another important point about civil society and the role it is called upon to play within the neoliberal political imaginary—namely that while civil society is seen as distinct from the state and formal political institutions, it is at the same time envisioned as helping produce governance. This can be seen clearly within the discourse of participatory development, in which development organizations construct what I call a “development-participation-governance” assemblage. Indeed,
this linkage between development, participation and governance is made quite explicit. Thus, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) lists the following as one of its general conclusions regarding participatory development:

The development-participation-governance linkages can only be strengthened if civil society…and the private sector are able to advocate for needed reforms in the political and economic systems. Technocratic approaches to institutional change and legal reform fail without effective local demand for change, expressed through local constituencies and locally-based skills for building grassroots and national participation. Through policy dialogue and capacity building, donors can effectively support the strategic role of civil society. (OECD 1997)

Notice that, far from rejecting “technocratic approaches,” the OECD instead envisions civil society as producing demand for and supporting technocratic approaches that include “institutional change and legal reform.” One of those “reforms” involves the privatization of public services, described by development agencies in terms of creating “public-private-civil society partnerships in public service provision” (Hanna 2000). Again, within this political imaginary, civil society is viewed as acting not only as a buffer between the state and the market, but also as a site where demand for an increased marketization of social existence can be generated and put to work. In other words, civil society is envisioned as a site where “good governance” can be demanded; however the latter is defined in strictly neoliberal terms of making the state more efficient, productive, and competitive—that is, more entrepreneurial.
Furthermore, within various neoliberal forms of governmentality, civil society is seen as not only as a relay within a generalized governmental network, but also as an asset that can be employed for diverse governmental objectives—from the provision of public services to the provision of security against terrorism. With regard to the latter, civil society is often portrayed as a critical resource—indeed, as one of the overall “elements of national power”—that can be mobilized within a public-private partnership to counter terrorism, for example (OSCE 2009). In fact, the potential fungibility of civil society as a governmental resource is implicit in the concept of “social capital” which is increasingly employed as a governmental technology for measuring social capacity.

However, the effort to make civil society both a benchmark for measuring, and resource for increasing, a given country’s governance and overall level of development reveals a profound contradiction within liberal forms of governmentality, namely that this mode of civil society is hard to find in developing countries (at least as envisioned by the international actors promoting a liberal version of civil society). The contradiction is that civil society is meant to be a naturally occurring phenomenon, yet liberal discourses and projects of civil society clearly have in mind a particular form of social organization that they wish to promote—or produce. Thus, within the framework of development, the need to construct civil society, to increase, harness, and put to work a country’s social capital, becomes an important governmental aim.

The perceived problems and potentials of the project of mobilizing civil society were a source of discussion at the seminar “Good Practices on Social Inclusion: A Dialogue between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean” sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2003. In one paper presented at the seminar, Alicia Forhmann, an official from Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shared her country’s experience in generating civil society participation with regard to negotiations for the FTAA (2003). She noted that, in Chile, “the citizens know that, for better or for worse, globalization is here to stay. In the future, the economy and society will develop within this context” (2003: 2). In fact, Frohmann claims that this acceptance of the reality of globalization is one of the reasons why “public opinion in Chile has generally favored trade negotiations” (2003: 3). However, she goes on to comment that an engagement with civil society is crucial in order to maintain that high level of support for Chile’s negotiation of free trade agreements. Frohmann’s comments present civil society as both an opportunity and a challenge—an opportunity to provide legitimacy for the government’s strategy of increased economic liberalization, and a challenge in that this political subject that is civil society does not automatically appear but rather needs to be produced.

Indeed, much of Frohmann’s paper details the various mechanisms and techniques employed in Chile in order to produce the object of a complex governmental intervention—a political actor named civil society whose role would be to legitimate the deepening of the country’s neoliberal transformation. This role would be carried out by providing the consent of the governed, and also by providing the justification in terms of the well-being of the governed that would be secured
through increased neoliberalization. The problem of producing civil society also involves providing it with a certain amount of *savoir* necessary to carry out its role. Here Frohmann speaks of how various mechanisms were designed in order to produce “trained, informed civil society dialogue participants who provide input for international trade negotiations” (2003: 10). Despite the difficulties, Frohmann reports that Chile was able to successfully establish a competent interlocutor. However, she notes that in general this is not the case with the rest of Latin America: “Many Latin American countries have yet to *train* many sectors of civil society to be informed participants in dialogue on matters related to trade negotiations, and we believe that this dialogue mechanism can be an important contribution toward the creation of these abilities” (2003: 10, emphasis added).

**Conclusion**

As this previous example illustrates, civil society has become a privileged site within various neoliberal modes of governance, and of intervention on behalf of the promotion of (“good”) governance. Civil society is constructed as a site for producing the subjects of neoliberal governance—that is, subjects who are ready to accept or, better, demand neoliberal globalization. In this sense, then, the promotion of “partnerships”, “participation”, and local “empowerment” are often seen as ways to generate and guarantee political support for neoliberal policies and programs such as those associated with “structural adjustment” (Paley 2001b; Schild 1998). That is to say, neoliberal globalization is produced in part through a form of governmentality that presents globalization as necessary and/or inevitable. As Foucault suggested in his analysis of neoliberalism, the neoliberal subject is one that is “eminently governable” on the basis of its “rationality,” “rational conduct [being] any conduct
which is sensitive to modifications in the variables of the environment and which responds to this in a non-random way, in a systematic way” (2008: 269). In other words, the neoliberal subject is one who “accepts reality”. Of course, how that “reality” is defined and understood is crucial. Thus, the production of a “global reality”—of globalization as an unavoidable fact (as, for example, Frohmann claims is the case in Chile)—is an important element in a governmental assemblage that produces and governs subjects.

Indeed, this novel and evolving form of governmental power does more than simply generate acceptance and/or support for neoliberal policies; it also seeks to operate at the level of subjectivity by producing entrepreneurial subjects. The deployment of political technologies such as micro-enterprises, as well as the generation of “civic projects” which are guided by a managerial ethos, have among their aims the transformation of citizens into “social entrepreneurs” (Boschee 1998; Fowler 2000; Peredo & McLean 2006) who are thoroughly invested in neoliberal capitalism (Paley 2001a). Thus, for example, the “reality” of globalization is seen as entailing and making necessary a competitive and entrepreneurial subjectivity. Ultimately, then, neoliberalism is based on and productive of a certain understanding of human nature and social reality. “It claims to present not an ideal, but a reality; human nature” (Read 2009: 26). And that human nature is a competitive one. In fact, the human subject, within neoliberalism, is viewed as a form of capital, a human capital. And as the bearer and source of human capital, the neoliberal subject can and should work on itself in order to achieve the best return on its own investment. That is, the neoliberal subject “is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself” (2008: 226).
However, it is not only individual subjectivity that is targeted in order to produce more socially entrepreneurial subjects; countries themselves are increasingly interpellated as political subjects that should be driven by an entrepreneurial ethos. Thus, for example, countries that are the target of development discourses and programs are exhorted to take “ownership” of their development, and encouraged to produce their own objectives and strategies for achieving those objectives.65 Furthermore, as discussed above, civil society becomes an important political technology in that it can be used as a benchmark for measuring and evaluating the manner in which individual states are following the “best practices” for development, and are producing “good governance.”

Furthermore, as argued in the preceding sections of this chapter, it is also at the global level that civil society is posited as an important element of a general form of *global governance*. Within what I have been describing as a *global liberal political imaginary*, civil society is seen as one of three fundamental sites, the other two being made up of the state and the market. At the global level, what is envisioned are “multistakeholder partnerships between governments (…), civil society organizations, and businesses (…)” that will together provide more effective and accountable global governance (Lehtomäki 2005: 2). In fact, it becomes clear that what are supposedly distinct sites—market, society, and state—interpenetrate each other and overlap to such a degree that it is difficult, or impossible, to locate the boundaries that separate them. At the same time, perhaps the most fundamental quality shared by all three domains is that, within the global liberal political imaginary they are all connected

65 See, for example, OECD (2005).
with governance—with the government of subjects and their relations to self and others. Thus, in the next chapter, I will examine how discourses and practices of global governance draw on and reproduce neoliberal forms of governmentality.
CHAPTER FOUR: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Introduction

Global governance represents the third domain of the global liberal political imaginary. In the previous two chapters, the “scaling up” of the other two domains of the liberal political imaginary – the market and civil society – were examined, as were the problems and implications associated with the discourses of globalization and global civil society. The analysis up to this point has also highlighted the way that the boundaries separating the three domains of the liberal political imaginary, while already containing numerous ambiguities at the domestic level, are often difficult to distinguish at the global level. The global market and global society interpenetrate each other and their boundaries become blurred. However, an important underlying element to both is the way they function as a form of governmentality—as a way of governing subjects and spaces.

The idea of global governance, therefore, is particularly ambiguous. On the one hand, within the liberal political imaginary both the market and society are viewed as sources of order and governance. The market operates on the basis of a competitive logic that disciplines subjects by compelling them to behave in a competitive manner. Society is seen as having a civilizing function, as providing a check on the official sites of government, and networks of civil actors are seen as sources of authoritative rule making. However, a second source of ambiguity in the notion of global governance has to do with the difficulty in translating the traditional site of political authority – the state – to the global level. Indeed, it is precisely the absence of a world state, combined with the existence of mechanisms and structures
of political order and authority, which have prompted scholars and experts to speak of
global governance rather than global government. 66

This chapter develops a critical examination of discourses and practices of
global governance. This critical analysis operates on two “levels,” or focuses on two
dimensions of “global governance.” In the first instance, the analysis focuses on
doctrines and discourses of global governance, especially the logics and rationales on
which they are based and also which they in turn help produce. In this regard, the
analysis centers on global governance as a form of power/knowledge. In the second
instance, and also very much related to the first, the chapter utilizes the Foucauldian
governamentality framework to shed light on attempts at ordering social and political
reality which do not appear in, or are occluded by, the “global governance” paradigm.
These attempts at ordering social and political reality include, crucially, techniques
and technologies of power that are productive of a specifically neoliberal form of
subjectivity. This form of subjectivity can be extended to individual subjects, as well
as to collective political actors such as nation-states. Following Foucault (Foucault
1988b), I view the various assemblages of political rationalities, technologies, and
forms of knowledge involved in producing modes of subjectivity as also involving
operations and relations of power. In other words, the production of subjectivity
represents a key element of governmentality. Thus, the second dimension of the
critical analysis of global governance examines the production of nation-states as

66 The shift in language from government to governance is a significant one, and will be discussed in
more detail below. At the national level, this shift is often associated with the idea of ‘policy
networks.’ See, for example, Rhodes (1997). In IR, Rosenau’s notion of “governance without
neoliberal subjects, arguing that this represents a form of “global governmentality” that is left out of mainstream accounts of global governance.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section locates the notion of global governance within the broader *problematique* of order in International Relations theory. The second section examines discourses of “governance,” contrasting accounts of the rise of “government without government” with a Foucauldian governmentality approach. This section also critically analyzes discourses of governance for the ways that they help shape social and political reality. Further developing this idea, the third section examines modes of neoliberal “subjectivation,” or subject-formation, drawing on Foucault’s analysis of the connection between ethics and subjectivity. This section focuses on how discourses of governance are connected with notions of competitiveness, which in turn, are increasingly the basis for understanding and framing social and political reality. As an example of this kind of neoliberal subjectivation, the fourth section looks at the phenomenon of “nation branding”. The focus of the analysis will be on how nation branding operates as a governmental rationality and also as a technology of governance. Here the connection between subjectivity and governmentality will be elucidated. The concluding section will explore some of the implications that the examples of governmental rationalities discussed in this chapter have for our theoretical understanding of global governance and contemporary world order.

**Global Governance and the Problem of Order**

The problem of how order is produced has been central to modern political thought, from Thomas Hobbes’s (1991) theorization of a state of nature that can only
be overcome through the constitution of sovereign power and authority, to the sociological perspective of Talcott Parsons (1937), which emphasizes the way that order is produced in part through subjects’ embeddedness in social institutions and structures. The problem of order has also been central to the discipline of International Relations (IR), and has likewise been addressed from a number of different theoretical perspectives. Indeed, the problem of order in IR is closely related to the question that is said to be foundational for the discipline, namely: Why do wars occur and what are the conditions for peace? Furthermore, one of the central premises of IR as a discipline is that the problem of order is fundamentally different within national societies than between them, giving rise to the notion of the international system as an anarchical one.

This position is perhaps best exemplified by Hedley Bull’s statement:

“Whereas men within each state are subject to a common government, sovereign states in their mutual relations are not. This anarchy it is possible to regard as the central fact of international life and the starting-point of theorizing about it” (1966: 35). The result is a picture of political reality based on a binary of politics within sovereign states vs. politics between them, or between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the sovereign state (R. B. J. Walker 1993). Thus, continuing the legacy of Hobbes, “‘inside’, ‘order’ increasingly became a province of legal regulation within such

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67 In the early history of the discipline, this question was placed at the foundation of the study of world politics and, indeed, retrospectively presented as a question that has been at the heart of international thought since at least the times of Thucydides. Cf. Waltz (1959) The problem of war is also presented as the paradigmatic question for the discipline in a number of college textbooks. See, for example, Viotti and Kauppi (2010: 1).
In his study of international political thought regarding the problem of order, Rengger (2000) offers a helpful schema for categorizing the different responses to this problem. He identifies two broad “families” or groups of responses to the “problem of order”: one “family of responses” who view the primary task as one of “dealing with, solving and/or managing international relations in the light of [the problem of order]; and another “family of responses” which seeks, in different ways, to overcome or “end” the problem of order (22-24). In the first family, Rengger proposes the existence of “three basic sets of responses, each of which concentrates on one aspect…of contemporary world politics and locates in it the effective answer to the ‘problem of order’” (22). The first response, associated with political realism, is to propose the balance of power between sovereign states as the best way to mitigate the problem of order. The second response, associated with the English school of IR, presents international society or a society of states based on rules and norms as a way of managing the problem of order. The third response, associated with liberalism, offers institutions as a way of achieving international or global order through the promotion of cooperation (22-23, and passim).

In the second “family,” Rengger locates two general sets of responses. The first includes Frankfurt school critical theory, some forms of feminist thought, neo-Gramscian and “Western Marxist” approaches, is ultimately concerned with overcoming the problem of order—that is, with some kind of “emancipation.” For this group, contemporary forms of order are seen as oppressive, and a radical
transformation of the structures and arrangements of social and political life are called for (23-24; 143-172). The second group of responses includes post-structural and some varieties of feminist thought, as well as some forms of constructivism. Rengger argues that for this group, the problem of order is itself problematized. That is, the problem of order is not seen as one that can be managed, solved, or overcome. Rather, what is often crucial for a critical understanding of contemporary politics is the way that this problem is itself conceptualized—the basis on which the problem is made intelligible, the ideas and concepts which are mobilized in its construction, and the kinds of “solutions” which the problem in turn makes thinkable and thus possible (24, 173-188).

As Rengger himself recognizes, this schema is far from unproblematic. Many of the various self-identified theoretical perspectives in IR do not map neatly onto his different categories. Also, Rengger’s description of post-structural responses to the ‘problem of order’ is somewhat limited (a point which will be discussed further below) and at times reproduces the problematic notion that post-structural perspectives are limited in their effects to “tracing hidden meanings, untying false unities, and unsettling established discourses,” instead of being able to provide the basis for any kind of “ethico-political imperative” (184-185). Still, Rengger’s schema does offer a useful starting point for distinguishing among different conceptualizations of global governance, and for apprehending some of the

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68 Rengger quotes David Campbell (1998: 4 and chapter 1 in general) who, Rengger states, claims “that the interventions he practices have an ethico-political imperative to them.” However, Rengger argues that Campbell (and, by extension post-structural or non-foundational thinkers in general) is unable to offer any philosophical justification for their particular ethico-political position. Here Rengger appears to be repeating the well-rehearsed critique of post-Nietzschean perspectives made by the likes of Jürgen Habermas (1987) and Charles Taylor (1984).
implications those differences might hold for our understanding of potential practices of world politics.

**Theories and Discourses of Governance**

Although the word “governance” has existed for many centuries in English, it is only relatively recently that it has resurfaced and entered into common parlance.\(^{69}\) In the social sciences, this has given rise to “governance theory,” which has become prominent in political science, international relations, and political sociology. One influential source for this trend has been the “Anglo-governance” model developed by political scientists such as R.W. Rhodes, which details “a shift that has taken place in government, from a hierarchical organization to a fragmented and decentralized entity that is heavily reliant on a range of complex and independent policy networks” (Marinetto 2003: 592; Marsh & Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 1996, 1997). As Rhodes notes, the term ‘governance’ has been put to diverse uses, referring at different times to: “the minimal state, corporate governance, the new public management, ‘good governance’, socio-cybernetic systems, and self-organizing networks” (1996: 652). For his part, Rhodes defines governance as “self-organizing, inter-organizational

\(^{69}\) Indeed, while there exist texts containing the verb “govern” from the late 13th century, the earliest noun form of “govern” seems to have been “governance,” which was only later superseded by the word “government.” See “govern”, “governance”, and “government” in *The Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd ed. 1989. *OED Online*. Oxford University Press. 4 Apr. 2000, last accessed April 19, 2010. An interesting history of the term “governance” is provided by the European Commission as part of its *White Paper on Governance*. The text, “*Étymologie du terme ‘gouvernance’*” (only available in French), points out that “governance” is derived from the Greek word *kubernân*, which refers to the control of a ship or a cart, and which Plato employed metaphorically to talk about the government of men (de oliveira Barata n.d.). As we will see below, Foucault argues that in fact Plato and the ancient Greeks did not contemplate the government of men, but rather of the city or polis—a distinction which Foucault believes is important for understanding modern political reason and modes of government (Foucault 2007a).
networks…that complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination.”

Whereas Rhodes has applied this conceptual framework to the changing operations of government at the national and sub-national level, the concept of “governance” has also been utilized to understand forms of authoritative decision-making that occur at the supra-national, international, and global levels of analysis. For example, studies of the European Union began to understand the latter as “a unique system of non-hierarchical, regulatory and deliberate governance” (Hix 1998: 38). Similarly, within IR, the sub-field of international organization, which inquired into the conditions under which cooperation is possible within an anarchic system, and which earlier had witnessed a shift in its conceptual vocabulary from “transnationalism” and “complex interdependence” to international “regimes,” has seen the concept of “global governance” become its dominant organizing concept.

Despite some important differences among them, one common theme in these different conceptualizations of “governance” is that the term is being used to describe something that is fundamentally new in contemporary socio-political reality. And while the basis for this novelty is understood in different ways, another common theme is that a fundamental aspect of this new mode of order and rule is that it exists

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70 It should be noted that in different versions of social systems theory, particularly prominent in German scholarship, ‘governance’ is understood in terms of the steering and co-ordination of interdependent actors within complex rule systems. Cf. Kooiman (1993) and Mayntz (2003).

71 See also Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch & Eising.

72 One of the earliest advocates of the notion of “global governance” was James Rosenau (1992, 1995). This shift towards an emphasis on global governance in IR is perhaps best illustrated by the recent works of Robert Keohane, who has consistently had a major role in shaping the conceptual vocabulary of IR. See, for example, Keohane (2002).
outside of the traditional site of political authority, the state. That is, governance assumes its identity in large part based on the fact that it is not government.\textsuperscript{73} Or, to be more precise, “governance” is meant to describe forms of control and coordination that can be “distinguished from both the hierarchical and bureaucratic form of the state and the anarchical form of market organization” (Dean 2007: 48).

At first glance, the governance approach, with its emphasis on “governance beyond the state,” (Wiener 2007) seems to have much in common with a governmentality approach (described in chapter one), with its emphasis on “political power beyond the state” (Rose & Miller 1992). Indeed, both governance theory, especially explorations of global governance, and Foucauldian governmentality studies came to prominence in the 1990s, a time when notions of government and governance were being problematized in diverse arenas. However, despite the fact that both governance theory and governmentality approaches focus on sources of authoritative rule outside the state, there are a number of key differences.

To begin with, as was noted above, political studies that focus on governance tend to see the latter as a novel phenomenon, understood primarily in terms of a multitude of forces and processes that together have eroded the centrality of the national state as the primary locus of political power and authority (Rosenau 1999). However, this understanding of the diminished political capacity of the state in the face of multiple non-state sources of authoritative rule making (Hall & Biersteker 2002) only makes sense if we accept the “statist political imaginary” (Neocleous

\textsuperscript{73} As Rhodes points out, “governance…[is not] a synonym for government. Rather governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed.” (1996: 652-653, original emphasis.)
2003) that supposedly characterized the previous political landscape. In this regard, contemporary theories of governance are, paradoxically, state-centric in that the novelty and analytical salience of the concept of governance is predicated on an understanding of the political that sees the state as the template for political power and authority, and all other forms as existing in opposition to the central political category of the state.\footnote{A similar point is made in Sending & Neumann (2006).} In this sense, governance theory provides a perfect example of what Foucault famously referred to as the inability of political thought to “cut off the King’s head” (Foucault 1980a). A Foucauldian governmentality approach, on the other hand, does not operate on the basis of a perceived radical rupture in the locus and operation of political power. On the contrary, a governmentality approach argues that strategies of political rule, from the earliest moments of the modern nation state, entailed complex and variable relations between the calculations and actions of those seeking to exercise rule over a territory, a population, a nation and a microphysics of power acting at a capillary level within a multitude of practices of control that proliferate across a territory. (Rose 1999: 17)

Thus, the notion of governmentality posits a complex imbrication of political technologies and rationalities, invented and assembled both within and without the state, which produced multiple, overlapping projects for governing subjects and their relations. Indeed, Foucault’s argument regarding the “governmentalization of the state”, which he traces to the eighteenth century, is based on the idea that the modern state has been shaped by a liberal governmentality “that is at the same time both external and internal to the state, since it...[allows] the continual definition of what
should or should not fall within the state’s domain, what is public and private, what is and what is not within the state’s competence” (Foucault 2007a: 109). Therefore, not only does a governmentality perspective make problematic the idea of a radical rupture in the forms of social and political order claimed by theories of governance, but the conceptual categories which make those claims intelligible—binaries such as state/society, public/private, and domestic/international—are themselves treated as the outcome of historical processes and, crucially, of political contestation and struggle.

The last point brings to the fore another important aspect of a Foucauldian governmentality perspective which distinguishes it not only from governance theories, but also from the majority of mainstream, positivist social science—namely, what I have described in previous chapters of this study as Foucault’s “critical nominalism.” From a critical nominalist perspective, the important issue is not so much whether the phenomena referred to in terms of “governance” is fundamentally novel, but rather what kinds of practices and subjectivities it enables and/or constrains—in other words, how “governance” operates as a form of governmentality. A critical nominalist approach historicizes and de-essentializes conceptual categories such as “the state,” “society,” “sovereignty,” and so on (Foucault 2008). The task, then, is to examine the authoritative statements and projects for governing subjects and spaces that employ these notions and their related vocabularies in order to better understand how our world is rendered thinkable and actionable (Dean 2007: 24-25).

Furthermore, a Foucauldian governmentality approach offers a set of critical analytical tools to examine how discourses of governance impact our present reality.
Further developing this approach as it has been discussed in previous chapters, we can identify three, interconnected, analytical dimensions through which the governance discourse seeks to achieve an effect in the world: (1) the domain of truth, through which heterogeneous elements of reality are constituted as objects and subjects of knowledge; (2) the domain of power, through which subjects and objects are governed; and (3) the domain of subjectivity, “in which the subject experiences itself in a truth game in which it has a relation to itself” and to others (Foucault 1994: 316; Foucault 1998c). In fact, it is these three dimensions that Foucault sought to bring together with the concept of governmentality, at least as he employed this concept in his later work (Foucault 1988b, 1988c, 1993, 2000a, 2005). Applying these three analytical dimensions to discourses of governance means focusing on, first, how they describe, and thus help shape, social reality—that is, the kind of social ontology they produce and the “regime of truth” (Foucault 2008: 17-19) to which they contribute. Second, the “truth effects” that are produced by discourses of governance are linked to “power effects,” as far as they suggest different construct specific problems, describe practices and invest them with purposes, propose specific kinds of solutions, and authorize certain forms of political practice and relations (Dean 2007: 74). Third, the constitution of subjects is related to the domains of truth and power. The discursive production of truth suggests and often produces certain forms of practices and relations between subjects. These “truth effects” can also provide the basis for subjects’ self-understanding—that is, what they take to be

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75 As Foucault put it in 1977, “My problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth...[through] the establishment of domains in which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent” (1991: 79).
the truth with regard to their nature, their mode of being, and their purpose (Foucault 1988d). While Foucault’s focus was on individual human subjects, in this chapter I will examine the way that discourses of truth and relations and technologies of power are productive of a specific form of the political subject that has traditionally been understood as the main actor in world politics—the nation-state. Finally, I will look at how discourses of governance, the emergence of the contemporary neoliberal subject, and the “truth” of the global intersect to form a potent form of “global governmentality.”

One powerful truth effect of the discourse of governance is the way that it (re)produces a certain social ontology—the ontology of the network. As others have pointed out, the network has become a common metaphor, or “metanarrative,” for describing contemporary forms social organization or society (Walters 2004). Thus, for example, at the same time that social scientists were discovering “governance networks,” business management experts and scholars were arguing that “the concept of a network, both as a metaphor and in terms of the tools and techniques of analysis it provides, reflects the nature and complexity of the multinational organization” (Bartlett & Ghoshal 1993). In fact, more recently, transnational corporations have been conceptualized as “networks of governance structures” (Yeung 1998).

In their analysis of discourses of the network, geographers Helga Leitner and Eric Sheppard (2002: 150) highlight five qualities that are ascribed to networks, and which are particularly relevant to the present analysis. The authors show how various discourses of the network portray the latter as: “self organizing,” that is, “[evolving] a relational structure that is bottom-up rather than externally imposed”; “collaborative,”
that is, involving forms of cooperation and mutual orientation; “flexible,” that is, “continually subject to change” and with easy entrance and exit by the participants; and “topological,” which means that “networks evolve by creating linkages between participants who were not previously connected, thereby constructing mutuality between previously isolated actors.” Thus, an important “truth effect” of the network discourse is the way the network is portrayed as the ideal form of social organization, neither hierarchic nor anarchic, conducive to learning and innovation, more efficient and less bureaucratic than governments, and more cooperative and mutually oriented than markets (Leitner & Sheppard 2002: 150). Furthermore, these putative properties of networks are mobilized within discourses of governance, particularly as the network offers a powerful metaphor for both business and government, and provides a point of articulation for normative and ethical conduct in both domains.

Another “truth effect” of the governance discourse is reflected in the notion that the changes in the forms of governmental action, represented by the end of “the governmental monopoly on the resolution of public problems,” calls for “a new paradigm”—for example, a paradigm of “new governance” and a “tools of government” approach (Salamon 2002). This truth effect is produced in part through the way that this discourse simultaneously describes, in an apparently neutral and “technical” manner, transformations in the functioning of government as if they were both inevitable and natural—that is, free of political struggle and contestation (Dean 2007). Thus, when Lester Salamon writes that “the task of public problem solving has become a team sport that has spilled well beyond the borders of government agencies and now engages a far more extensive network of social actors—public as well as
private, for-profit as well as nonprofit,” (600, original emphasis), there is no indication given of the political struggles involved in this transformation of government. Neither is there any recognition of the role played by expert knowledge in bringing about this transformation (Mitchell 2002).

At the same time, the truth effect of the discourse of governance is closely connected with the power effect. Thus, it is not only the “truth” that government increasingly is carried out by a network of public and private actors but also, as Salamon argues, that the participation of these diverse actors “must often be coaxed and coached, not commandeered and controlled.” In other words, the truth effect of describing the current state of affairs—the proliferation of governance by non-state actors—yields a power effect: it suggests a mode of directing the conduct of subjects that is indirect, in which the role of government is to “steer,” and not to “row” (Osborne & Gaebler 1992). Indeed, one significant “power effect” of the discourse of governance is the way that it has helped generate a range of conceptual and practical “tools,” or political technologies, such as the “New Public Management,” “Public-Private Partnerships,” “benchmarking,” and so on (Osborne & Gaebler 1992; M. E. Porter 1990; Reinicke 1998). In fact, the power effect of this version of the governance discourse is perhaps most clearly illustrated by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler’s “Ten Principles” for “reinventing government,” a concept which was made the centerpiece of the Clinton administration’s proposed public sector “reforms” and which has spawned an entire industry of “tools” for government “reinvention,” including fieldbooks, workbooks, and report cards (Kettl 1998; Osborne & Colon Rivera 1998; Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Osborne & Plastrik 2000).
Finally, the discourse of governance is related to the constitution of a certain type of subject, specifically a neoliberal subject, which in turn is amenable to specific types of governmental intervention. Indeed, the discourse of governance, with its emphasis on the “steering” of subjects and their relations (with themselves and others) through multiple mechanisms and sites (both inside and outside of official state apparatuses), can be applied to a wide range of subjects, including individuals, organizations, and even nation-states. In other words, the governance discourse is intimately connected with the constitution and management of neoliberal subjects. In order to further develop this claim, the following section introduces Foucault’s conceptualization of the relationship between ethics and subjectivity. This, in turn, will provide the analytical framework for examining what I argue represents a significant transformation in what has long been considered the principal actor in world politics, the nation-state.

**Neoliberalism, Subjectivity and Ethics**

The discourse of governance both presupposes and helps constitute a specific form of political subject, a neoliberal subject that is governable on the basis of what Foucault described as “technologies of the self,” or the relationship between subjectivity and ethics (Foucault 1988b, 1997). However, it should be pointed out that Foucault’s conceptualization of ethics is not the standard one, either in traditional philosophy or in common parlance. Foucault defined ethics as “the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport à soi, …which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions” (Foucault 1997: 263). Ethics, in turn, is connected with truth and subjectivity. This
can be seen in Foucault’s analysis of four aspects of ethical being, or the self’s relationship to itself: (1) the *ethical substance*, or that part of oneself that is taken to be the relevant domain for ethical judgment; (2) the *mode of subjectivation* (*mode d’assujettissement*)\(^{76}\), or the way in which subjects establish their relation to moral obligations and rules and recognize themselves as obliged to put them into practice; (3) the *ethical work* (*travail éthique*) that subjects perform on themselves, not only to bring their conduct into compliance with a given rule, but also to transform themselves into ethical subjects; and, finally, (4) the *telos* of the ethical subject, or the mode of being that will serve as the subject’s moral goal (Davidson 1994: 118; Foucault 1988c: 26-28).

Foucault’s concern with the ethics of subjectivity and subject-formation was also linked to his reformulation of the concept of governmentality, where the latter is understood as “the surface of contact on which the way of conducting individuals and the way they conduct themselves are intertwined” (Foucault 1981a, quoted in Gros 2005: 548 n.30),\(^{77}\) or as the “‘contact point’ where techniques of domination – or power – and *techniques of the self* ‘interact,’ where ‘technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself and, conversely,…where techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion’” (Burchell 1996, quoting Foucault 1980b, original emphasis).

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\(^{76}\) Foucault’s term, *mode d’assujettissement*, is often translated as mode of subjection. However, I feel that “‘subjectivation’ is a more appropriate translation of *assujettissement*, since it more easily connotes forms of subject self-formation than does “subjection,” which gives the impression of purely external forces at work.

\(^{77}\) In the “Course Context” appended to Foucault’s 1982 lecture series, Frédéric Gros cites an early, unpublished draft of a lecture Foucault gave in New York in 1981. A later version of the lecture was published in the *London Review of Books* (Foucault & Sennett 1981).
Foucault’s examination of the relationship between ethics and subjectivity was for the most part restricted to the formation of individual, human subjects. However, the analytical grid of governmentality, understood as having to do with a domain of power relations implicated in the constitution of subjects that exist in ethical relations with themselves and others, offers a unique perspective on the problem of “global governance.” This is because subject formation need not apply only to individuals, but can also apply to collectivities—businesses, social groups, even nation-states and international, supranational, and “global” actors. Thus, a final and crucial difference between a governmentality approach and governance theory (including global governance) is that the latter takes the existence of these actors and the various “scales” in which they exist as given, while governmentality is concerned precisely with the ways subjects are formed within relations of power and games of truth that attempt to define the subject’s ethical nature and thus direct its conduct. For example, as discussed above, theories of global governance are intelligible largely through the understanding that the nation-state is losing its salience as the locus of political power and authority. However, this understanding is based on the idea that the state, while its power may wax or wane historically, exists as a fixed political subject. A global governmentality perspective, on the other hand, makes it possible to study the historically specific formation of the nation-state as a political subject, and to locate this in relation to broader general dynamics and structures of power in world politics, rather than attributing it to a vague notion of “globalization,” as do most theories of global governance.
Furthermore, a governmentality framework makes it possible to trace the connection between the shifting modes of subject formation and the governmental rationalities and technologies implicated in those transformations. In other words, a governmentality perspective helps shed light on the way that neoliberalism, as a rationality and technology of government, is implicated in the transformation of political subjectivity, including the political subject of the nation-state. This, in turn, represents not only a profoundly different perspective on the idea of “global governance,” but also, as discussed in the previous chapters, a unique perspective on the political phenomenon of neoliberalism. For example, the majority of political studies of neoliberalism understand the latter primarily in terms of a set of policies or “reforms”—trade and financial liberalization, privatization, deregulation, openness to foreign direct investment, a competitive exchange rate, fiscal discipline, lower taxes, and smaller government—or a political ideology that supports those policies and whose ultimate aim is to create a “market society.” The contribution of a Foucauldian governmentality perspective on neoliberalism is that it approaches the latter not as primarily a set of policies or an ideology that seeks to justify those policies, but instead as a complex assemblage that is based on, and also works to produce, a specific socio-political ethos, a particular image or theory of society, and a specific form of subjectivity. Of course, a great deal of social and political thought has investigated the connection between capitalist society and subjectivity (Althusser

78 See, for example, Gill (1995), Harvey (2005), Peck (2004). Market society, as idea and ideal, can be traced back to early, or “classical,” liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith, who argued that it produced not only economic harmony, but also private virtue: “[W]hen commerce is introduced into any country, probity and punctuality always accompany it.... Of all the nations of Europe, the Dutch, the most commercial, are the most faithful to their word.” (A. Smith 1978) Of course, liberal thinkers like Smith were also concerned with the potentially negative effects of commercial society. For a discussion of Smith’s thinking in this regard, see Rosenberg (1990).
1971; Burawoy 1979; Deleuze & Guattari 1983; Marx 1977; Weber 1958). However, from a governmentality perspective, the relationship between liberal subjectivity and capitalism is not a direct or functional one, but rather has its own internal dynamics (Weidner 2009).

Moreover, an important contribution of governmentality studies is their identification of significant transformations of subjectivity that have taken place within liberalism, such that neoliberalism can be seen as a fundamentally novel way of constituting, working on, and governing subjects. As noted in the second chapter of this study, Foucault argued that neoliberalism imagines the market and its subjects in a way that is quite different from classical liberalism. For the latter, the market is primarily a site of exchange between formally equal subjects. For classical liberalism, the primary task of government is to “supervise the smooth running of the market, that is to say…[to] ensure respect for the freedom of those involved in exchange” (Foucault 2008: 118). This follows from the assumption that the market is a naturally occurring domain of social reality, so that the main role of government, the prevailing governmental rationality, is laissez-faire. However, after a century that witnessed the rise of labor unions, business cartels and trusts, and state planning, neoliberal thinkers in the twentieth century came to the conclusion that the free market was not a naturally occurring phenomenon, but instead had to be produced. Furthermore, they emphasized the regulatory effects of market competition, and noted that it too was not, as eighteenth century liberals believed, “a natural given that must be respected,” but rather, as Foucault says, “an historical objective of governmental art” (2008: 120).
Foucault locates two radical and crucial transformations in governmental reason that take place in the context of twentieth century neoliberalism. First, as discussed in chapter two, German Ordoliberals displace the classical liberal delimitation of separate domains of the state and the market, and instead insist that the market, or rather the principle of competition, must “[constitute] the general index in which one must place the rule for defining all governmental action” (2008: 121). In fact, the neoliberals argued that the market form is prior to the political sphere, and that the market should be placed at the center of analysis, subsuming all political questions underneath it. Foucault describes this as a reversal of the relationship between state and market, in which the market itself becomes the foundation of the state (121). Thus, as Lemke (2001: 200) points out, “For the neoliberals the state does not define and monitor market freedom, for the market is itself the organizing and regulative principle underlying the state.... Neo-liberalism removes the limiting, external principle and puts a regulatory and inner principle in its place: it is the market form which serves as the organizational principle for the state and society.”

Under this re-articulation of state and economy, the classic concept of 
*laissez-faire* itself undergoes a similar transformation. The theory of state and economy does not call for a retraction of the state in order to secure a space of negative liberty in which one can act freely. Rather it becomes the purpose for government itself and a “permanent economic tribunal” (Foucault 2008: 247) against which all governmental activity is judged. Thus, as William Davies points out, “[whereas] liberalism sought to rationalize sovereignty as a condition of the economy, the jump made by neo-
liberalism was to bring sovereignty within the scientific purview of economics” (Davies 2010: 65).

American neoliberalism, Foucault points out, takes this “generalization of the economic form of the market” one radical step further, “generalizing [the principle of market competition] throughout the social body and including the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges” (2008: 243). At the same time, Foucault argues, American neoliberalism produces a radical epistemological shift, in which not only is the social, society, conceived of and apprehended in economic terms, but the unit of analysis, as developed by “Chicago School” economists (such as D. Gale Johnson (1960), Theodore W. Schultz (1961) and Gary S. Becker (1964)), “is not so much the individual, or processes and mechanisms, but enterprises” (Foucault 2008: 225, emphasis added). The result is “an economy made up of enterprise-units, a society made up of enterprise units” (225). Or, put differently, American neoliberal economics “is no longer the analysis of the historical logic of processes; it is the analysis of the internal rationality, the strategic programming of individuals’ activity” (223).

This, in turn, makes possible the second major transformation in a liberal art of government: the postulation of the subject as a source of capital, as human capital. With this invention, the subject exists no longer as one merely pursuing some interest, but rather as a potential source of capital that can and should work on itself in order to achieve the best return on its own investment. In American neoliberalism, “homo oeconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself” (2008: 226, emphasis added). Furthermore, Foucault suggests, homo oeconomicus
is someone who accepts reality. Rational conduct is any conduct which is sensitive to modifications in the variables of the environment and which responds to this in a non-random way, in a systematic way, and economics can therefore be defined as the science of the systematic nature of responses to environmental variables. (2008: 269)

This aspect of the neoliberal subject—one “who accepts reality or who responds systematically to modifications in the variables in the environment”—makes possible a profound transformation in the art of government, for, as was mentioned in the previous chapter of this study, this new neoliberal subject “appears precisely as someone manageable . . . [as] someone who is eminently governable” (270). The consequence, Foucault argues, is that “[f]rom being the intangible partner of laissez-faire, homo oeconomicus now becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environment and systematically modify its variables” (270-271). In other words, this new neoliberal subject makes possible the development of new forms of “governance.” Indeed, here we can see how Foucault’s analysis of neoliberal governmentality provides critical purchase for apprehending contemporary discourses and practices of “governance,” in that the latter are based on ways of directing the conduct of subjects that, as much as possible, are indirect, working through incentives and modifications in the subject’s environment.

Returning to Foucault’s schema of the constitution of ethical subjects, outlined above, we can see how this new form of neoliberal political reason, based on the figure of homo oeconomicus, provides a “surface contact” between the subject and the power exercised on it, enabling novel forms of “governance” (2008: 252-

79 I return to this idea in Chapter Five.
253). Thus, with regard to the first element of ethical subjectivity, we can say that the “ethical substance” or *prima material* of neoliberalism is capital—human, or social capital. Second, the “mode of subjectivation”, or the mode of being that the subject must embrace or appeal to in orienting its conduct, is the competitive enterprise. This requires that the subject adopt an entrepreneurial—i.e., competitive, calculating, strategic—attitude towards its own ethical substance, its own capital. Next, this mode of subjectivation, the subject as an entrepreneur of itself, calls for specific kinds of “ethical work”—in the case of neoliberal ethical subjectivity, the work of increasing the value of one’s capital, of discerning which factors that can be understood as ‘inputs’ into the subject’s stock of capital are or can be made to be productive. Finally, the “telos” of neoliberal subjectivity can be understood as the maximization of the subject’s value, or “self-worth” (Feher 2009).80

Formulating neoliberal governmentality in this fashion allows us, then, to look more closely at the relationship between power and the subject, specifically the unstable and fluctuating “contact point” between techniques of domination (or subjection), and the actual practices of subjectivation by which neoliberal subjects govern themselves (Foucault 1993). In fact, there is a growing body of research that investigates the very specific forms of practice involved in the (self) government of neoliberal subjectivity (Binkley 2009a, 2009b; Cruikshank 1999; Gökarıksel & Mitchell 2005; 80 This elaboration of the different elements of neoliberal ethical subjectivity draws on, but is in some respects different from, the analysis of “the ‘business ethics’ of entrepreneurial self-government” in Simon and Masschelein (2006). The authors identify four components: “The material or (moral) ‘substance’ of this form of self-government is human (and social) capital, and, in particular, knowledge or competencies. The ‘mode of subjection’ of entrepreneurial autonomy is the ‘permanent economic tribunal’…the ‘work upon the self’ that is needed…[is to] invest in human capital…[and the] teleology…is…the production of satisfaction (through permanently looking for a suitable market position in life and investing in social relations) (297).
Hamman 2009; Laurie & Bondi 2005; MacLeavy 2008; K. Mitchell 2006; Ong 2006; Petersen & O'Flynn 2007; Read 2009). An important insight offered by this body of research is how discourses and practices of governance are closely bound up with rationalities and political technologies that are both productive of and brought to bear on neoliberal subjectivity.

However, while much of this research program is interested in the transnational, or global, aspect of neoliberal subjectivity, the majority of the work focuses on individual subjects—e.g., workers, consumers, students and teachers. Yet, one of the “power effects” of this form of neoliberal subjectivity is that it is generalizable across a spectrum of actors and scales: individual persons; businesses; universities; non-governmental organizations; networks; local, regional, national and supranational governments can all be understood as entrepreneurial subjects, as bearers of some kind of value that can (and must) be properly managed. In this sense, neoliberal subjectivity and associated governmental technologies are both mobile and labile. Most importantly these neoliberal “technologies of the self” can also be applied to what has long been considered the principal actor in world politics—the nation-state. In the following section, I present an example of one such neoliberal governmental technology – nation branding – that, I argue, represents not only a novel form of “global governance,” but also marks an important shift in the configuration of contemporary world politics.

**Nation Branding as Neoliberal Governmentality**

An important condition of possibility for the development of the practice of nation branding was a problematization of the idea of competition and
competitiveness—principally with regard to multinational corporations and nation-states—that took place in the 1980s and early 1990s. One of the most influential thinkers in this regard is Michael E. Porter, now a world-renowned management consultant and Director of Harvard University’s Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness. Beginning in the 1980s, Porter problematized the notion of international competitiveness, arguing that the competitiveness of international firms and nation-states could no longer be considered in isolation, but rather had to be understood as forming part of a global field of competitiveness, with the nation-state acting as a “global platform” that helps determine a firm’s global competitive advantage (Porter 1985, 1986). This shift in thinking about the nature of competition in a globalizing economy, and the role of nations-states as platforms for firms to succeed in a globally competitive environment, formed the conceptual basis that Porter later applied to the problem of national economic development and productivity. The resulting book, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations* (1990, revised and updated in 1998), has been enormously influential.81

One of the key concepts that Porter helped to develop and circulate is “the competitiveness of locations,” which argues that “as competition has spread and intensified… the prosperity of both companies and entire countries is dependent on the local environment in which competition takes place” (2008: xii). Significantly, Porter argues that the new nature of competition demands new forms of governance, and a rethinking of the traditional roles of government, business, and other social actors: “The new model of competitiveness reveals unfamiliar roles for companies in

81 As Porter’s Harvard Business School biography states, “the book has guided economic policy in countless nations and regions” (Porter n.d.).
shaping their competitive context; the need for a new type of relationship between business, government, and other local institutions; and entirely new ways of thinking about government policy” (pp. xii-xiii).

Furthermore, the idea that we have entered a “new era of global competition” (Drache & Gertler 1991), in which the state (and all other private and public actors) must act in a strategic and competitive fashion, has become wide-spread in various domains of expert knowledge. In IR and the related field of International Political Economy, the idea of the “competition state” (Cerny 1990, 1997)\(^{82}\) has increasingly gained currency, even as some have attempted to problematize the notion that forces of globalization provide little room for states to act other than in a competitive fashion (Cameron & Palan 1999; Fougner 2006; Palan 1998). One of the more powerful articulations of this notion is Phillip Bobbitt’s idea of the advent of the “market-state.” Bobbitt argues that, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization, the form of the nation-state, whose legitimacy was based primarily on “its promise to provide the material well-being of the nation,” is being superseded by a market-state that “promises instead to maximize the opportunity of the people” (2002: 240, 211). Thus, “the market-state is, above all, a mechanism for enhancing opportunity” (p. 232), which is to say, that the role of the state is to help guarantee that society is governed by the rules of competition. In other words, there is a discursive field produced by discourses such as the competitive advantage of nations, the competition state, and the market-state that resonates with and helps reproduce the

\(^{82}\) It should be noted that Cerny does not celebrate the transformation of the nation-state into the competition state, and that he offers a sophisticated and nuanced view of the factors contributing to this transformation. Nevertheless, in his analysis it is the pressures of globalization that, in the last instance, pressure states to conform to the competition model.
idea that there exist (or should exist) logics and mechanisms of governing subjects that are ultimately pegged to a logic of competition.

Another important implication of this discourse of the transformation of the nation-state, whether in terms of the competition state or the market-state, is that it forms part of a reconfiguration of the political imaginary (Kantola 2006), one characterized by a shift from the “government” provided by the “traditional” form of the state, to the “governance” that is produced by a range of (public and private) actors. Within this political imaginary, the privileged subject is the entrepreneur, the one who embraces competition and is, as Bobbitt says, “a consumer of opportunity” (9. 230). Furthermore, on the basis of this form of subjectivity, neoliberal governmentality deploys a variety of “governmental technologies”, or mechanisms of “governance,” to encourage entrepreneurial conduct and thus ensure that competition functions as the overriding regulatory principle (Jaeger 2010: 58; Rose 1996). These mechanisms of governance include forms of expert knowledge as well as technologies of agency and performance, such as contractual devices and various forms of auditing and measuring performance (e.g. “benchmarking” and “best practices) (Burchell 1996; Dean 1999; Fougner 2008; Gleadle, Cornelius, & Pezet 2008; Larner & Le Heron 2004; Shore & Wright 1999).

This assemblage of forms of knowledge, techniques and technologies is often put to work in the context of discourses of governance that seek to transform the subject through a certain “mode of subjectivation” in which the subject recognizes its true ethical substance as consisting in a (potential) form of value, that can (should) be maximized. In the case of the nation-state, the maximization of its value is ultimately
to be undertaken with the view of enhancing the well-being of its population—most importantly, by providing the conditions for competitive growth to occur. One of the governmental rationalities that is connected with this mode of subjectivation is that of “good governance,” a discourse regarding the ethical organization and conduct of political actors who are, in its own language, “providers” of some form of “public good.” Although commonly used to refer only to collective actors (and not individuals), like other neoliberal technologies of the self, “good governance” is flexible regarding the subject it targets: any subject that can be considered an enterprise falls within its domain. A business, a charity organization, a nation-state, an international organization can all be the subjects of “good governance.” In international, or “global” governance, “good governance” has become a central element within an overall “development assemblage” that targets “under-developed,” “lesser developed,” and “developing” nation-states (Smith 2007). A work published by the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations is illustrative of how the discourse of good governance has become integral to an overall “development assemblage” that targets (primarily) post-colonial societies:

Good governance is a concept that has recently come into regular use in political science, public administration and, more particularly, development management. It appears alongside such concepts and terms as democracy, civil society, popular participation, human rights and social and sustainable development. In the last decade, it has been closely associated with public sector reform. Within…public management…it has been regarded as an aspect of the New Paradigm in Public Administration which emphasizes the role of public managers in providing high quality services that citizens value; advocates increasing managerial autonomy, particularly by reducing central agency controls; demands, measures and rewards both organizational and
individual performance; recognizes the importance of providing the human and technological resources that managers require to meet their performance targets; and is receptive to competition and open-minded about which public purposes should be performed by public servants as opposed to the private sector. (Agere 2000: 1)

As this example illustrates, “good governance” is combined with discourses of democracy, civil society, and development to form an overall governmental assemblage that targets nation-states, particularly “developing,” or “post-colonial” nation-states, and that seeks to govern the latter by providing a model which they are meant to emulate, as well as a number of technologies for achieving that goal. Crucially, the latter include various mechanisms for “measuring” and “rewarding” “performance,” which are ultimately based on a logic of competitiveness. In fact, as others have observed, “good governance” operates as a form of “indirect rule” (Hindess 2004: 34), or “global governmentality,” directed principally by wealthy countries and various international organizations that “assist, advise and constrain the conduct of post-colonial states, through international financial institutions and also, of course, through that fundamental liberal instrument of civilization, the market” (Hindess 2004: 34).

Furthermore, “good governance” has been integrated within broader assemblages of development, forming what some have called a kind of “global developmentality,” that seeks to “[steer] the conduct of persons, activities, and spaces through diverse authorities, knowledge expertise, and arenas of calculation” in conformity with the constantly shifting “development agenda” (Ilcan & Phillips 2006: 1-2). Moreover, the “developmentality” of good governance is also connected
with discourses of the global, in that the various “reforms” of the state contemplated by good governance programs are justified in large measure as being necessary in the face of the “globalization of the economy” and the “special problems” these present to developing countries (S. Joseph 2001: 1011).

However, while the connection between “good governance” as a technology of government and the various “reforms” or “structural adjustment” programs that have targeted post-colonial nation-states, has been the object of a fair amount of critical analysis (Abrahamsen 2000, 2004; Mercer 2003; Morison 2000; Orlandini 2003), relatively little attention has been paid to the recently emerging governmental technology of nation branding. Indeed, what I seek to shed light on are the ways that previously existing discourses of “development” and “good governance” are reconfigured within the evolving domain of nation branding, and consequently, how the latter functions as a form of global governance or, more precisely, of “global governmentality,” in that its aim is to direct the conduct of individuals and populations.

The term “nation branding” is relatively new, having received public and scholarly attention in the 1990s, largely as a result of the “Cool Britannia” campaign associated with the new Labour government that came to power under Prime Minister Tony Blair (van Ham 2002). Within the last decade, the use of “brand consultants” and “branding techniques” by nation-states has become increasingly common, although there are no precise indicators for measuring this activity (van Ham 2008). As van Ham (2002, p. 250) points out, the spread of branding from the field of business marketing to “all aspects of public and private life” (if the distinction is even
valid) is becoming increasingly common, with numerous “self-help” experts exhorting their audience to “build your own life brand!” (e.g., Graham 2001; Peters 1999, cited in van Ham, 2002, p. 250). Indeed, the idea of the individual as a brand is a logical extension of the kind of entrepreneurial subjectivity examined above. And of course, this kind of subjectivity makes possible specific governmental technologies, or forms of “governance,” for directing its conduct. In fact, it is precisely in this regard that the intersection of the truth – power effects becomes visible, in that the universal applicability of the enterprise form to a wide range of actors makes possible their reconfiguration as “brands” to be managed and governed.

A number of questions, therefore, arise. What happens when the nation-state is imagined as a brand? How is a “place” imagined as a (potential) source of value and also as a modality or locality of governance? What kinds of practices and relations are made possible or, alternatively, precluded, within this transformed political imaginary? Finally, how is the field of world politics transformed when the nation-state is reconfigured as a “brand-state”? Interestingly, these questions lay at the heart of a recent problematization of the question of nation branding that has been performed both by those who practice its arts and those who challenge its validity or normative desirability. In the following, I will examine two, interconnected, aspects of nation branding: (1) How it operates as a discursive practice and form of expert knowledge, and (2) How the issue of nation branding has been problematized both as a form of knowledge and as political practice. Ultimately, both these aspects of nation branding help to shed light on how it functions as a fairly novel governmental technology whose aim is to shape the conduct of states and their populations.
In order to analyze the way that the discourse of nation branding function as a form of expert knowledge, I draw upon Foucault’s framework for analyzing how discursive practices are transformed into scientific knowledge (1972b). Foucault described four different “thresholds” for the emergence of scientific knowledge. First, is the *threshold of positivity*, or “the moment at which a discursive practice achieves individuality and autonomy,” therefore forming a “discursive formation” that is distinctive from other “discursive formations” (p. 186, original emphasis for this and subsequent quotes). Second, “when in the operation of a discursive formation, a group of statements is articulated, claims to validate (even un成功fully) norms of verification and coherence, and when it exercises a dominant function (as a model, a critique, or a verification) over knowledge…the discursive formation crosses a *threshold of epistemologization*” (pp. 186-187). Third, when the statements of a discursive formation begin to obey a certain number of formal criteria and “laws for the construction of propositions…[the discursive formation] has crossed a *threshold of scientificity*. Finally, “when this scientific discourse is able, in turn, to define the axioms necessary to it, the elements that it uses, the propositional structures that are legitimate to it, and the transformations that it accepts…it has crossed the *threshold of formalization*” (187).

Applying this analytical framework to nation branding, we can see that this form of knowledge aspires to “scientific status”, yet is still in a “pre-scientific” mode.⁸³ That is to say, nation branding has clearly crossed Foucault’s first

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⁸³ Although the term is also employed by Thomas Kuhn (1962), there are significant differences (as well as similarities) between Kuhn’s study of scientific knowledge and Foucault’s analysis. For a good overview, see Gutting (2003).
“threshold”, and possibly the second one as well, by constituting itself as a domain of expert knowledge, yet has not crossed the third and fourth thresholds. The first part, nation branding’s aspiration of scientific status, is evidenced by the existence of a number of texts—e.g., journal articles and monographs—that position nation branding as a unique form of technical knowledge, with its own terminology and related forms of expert practice. In fact, the launching of the scholarly journal *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* in 2004, offers strong evidence of the formation of place branding, and the sub-category of nation branding\(^{84}\), as distinct field of knowledge. Moreover, the goal (whether or not it is achieved) of crossing Foucault’s second “threshold of epistemologization,” is clearly attested to in the publisher’s description of the “aims and scope” of the journal:

> To date the ways in which countries, cities and regions manage their reputations - or fail to do so - have been discussed in a fragmented way across a range of disciplines: from political philosophy to public relations, by way of public diplomacy, destination marketing, economics, social and cultural policy, international relations, public affairs, brand strategy, tourism promotion, inward investment promotion and export branding. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* provides a comprehensive, coherent forum with which to drive the subject forward by publishing authoritative, peer-reviewed articles as well as news, debates, interviews, literature reviews, case studies and special features. It provides an international forum where practitioners, academic researchers, consultants, students, governments and

\(^{84}\) It should be pointed out that nation branding has been formulated as a sub-field of the more general field of place branding. However, while there are clearly aspects which make nation branding a unique form of place branding (aspects which will be discussed further below), it will be assumed that, with regard to their status as expert forms of knowledge, what holds true for nation branding will also apply for place branding and vice-versa (except where noted).
Similarly, the goal of advancing place branding across the thresholds of “scientificity” and “formalization” can be clearly seen in the editor’s forward to the first issue of *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*. Thus, in his forward to the first issue, Simon Anholt (the self-described inventor of “place branding” and “nation branding”), lists the following aims of the journal:

— to start a debate leading to a definition and a theory or theories of place branding
— to create a body of knowledge about place branding and share best practice worldwide
— to encourage more cross-fertilisation between the component fields of place branding
— to create a set of ethical and professional standards for the field of place branding
— to promote and disseminate the value of place branding for economic, social and cultural development. (Anholt 2004: 11)

Here it is interesting to contrast place branding as a form of expert knowledge with the discourse of “brand management.” The concept of brand management—preceding, and likely providing a condition of possibility for, the emergence of place branding—was first developed within the field of business management and marketing. It has since become a normalized branch of study and professionalization within this field, with the majority (if not all) major MBA programs offering specialized courses in brand management. Similarly, the main scholarly journal for the field, *Journal of Brand Management*, was launched in 1992, twelve years prior to place branding’s journal. In fact, it may be, at least in part, due to the newness of
place branding that it has not yet achieved (if in fact it ever does) the more
normalized status of a domain of expert knowledge as has corporate brand
management. Indeed, part of the challenge for the discourse of place management is
establishing itself as a domain of expert knowledge that is separate and autonomous
from business marketing and advertising. Thus, for example, Anholt describes two
fundamental challenges that emerge from the need to distinguish place branding from
business marketing and advertising. First of all, there is the danger that government
officials, “[hearing] that ‘having a brand’ is the latest thing…[will be] forgivably
confused about the distinction between its outward signs (such as new slogans and
logos) and the complex underlying strategy and long-term behavioural change which
ought to underpin such ephemera; and thus…fall easily into the hands of one sort of
marketing firm or another” (Anholt 2004: 5). Moreover, Anholt explains, since
business marketing and place branding are different forms of expert knowledge,
governments that fail to appreciate the distinction and hire regular business marketing
firms will likely get

- a slogan and a logo, with nothing much behind it, and probably very little
  connection between it and the nation’s long-term development plans, too little
  political will or clout for it to be sustained or taken seriously, too little
  investment for it to become properly established in the minds of the
  ‘audience’, little understanding of who this audience actually are or what their
  current perceptions of the place brand are and very little real coordination or
  common purpose between the various stakeholders. (2004: 4-5).

Consequently, one of the goals of establishing place branding as a distinctive
form of expert knowledge is to establish “standards” and “best practices”. That is to
say, achieving the status of expert knowledge requires the formalization of the rules
which govern the production of true statements within the expert field (Foucault 1972b). At the same time, this enhances the ability of this form of expert knowledge to function as a form of “governance,” or governmentality, by providing the technical “know-how” that informs governmental practices. However, there is another, more fundamental problem involved in establishing place branding as an expert form of knowledge—specifically, an ethical problem—“ethical” in the colloquial sense of right-vs-wrong, and not exactly in the Foucauldian sense of the subject’s relation to itself, although as we shall see, this is also implicit in the problematizations of place and nation branding. The question, as Anholt succinctly puts it, is “whether it is right to do place branding” (2004: 6, original emphasis).

Part of the answer that place branding experts such as Anholt have offered can be found in the second half of the journal’s title: place branding and public diplomacy. Formulating place branding, and more specifically nation branding, as a form of public diplomacy is one strategy for addressing both the specificity of this domain of expert knowledge, and also its desirability. Although not a new term, recent discourses of public diplomacy define the latter in terms of a transformation in world politics, where “soft power,” communication, and persuasion become increasingly important, and conversely, “hard power” and military might become less so (Keohane & Nye 1998; Nye 2004, 2008; Potter 2002). Thus, for example, echoing many of the utopian visions of the impact of the Internet and the “information revolution,” Keohane and Nye argue: “The ability to disseminate free information increases the potential for persuasion in world politics” (1998: 94). Other versions of this discourse locate the increased importance of the “new public diplomacy” in
relation to the “communication revolution” and “the rise of a more activist [global] civil society” (Melissen 2005: 4). Thus, for example, Evan Potter argues: “In a globalized world, public opinion matters more than ever. With publics more distrustful of government, demanding greater transparency and input into policy making, governments can no longer count on ‘spin’ to overcome communication challenges” (2002: 48-49).

In other words, with the onset of globalization and the information revolution, the soft power of branding becomes more important, as the ability of states and other actors to control information declines and the need for credibility rises. Indeed, it is an informed and politically active civil society that is envisioned as “governing,” in a sense, the governments of the world by demanding greater transparency and accountability.\(^{85}\) Indeed, the relationship between idea of public diplomacy as the expression of a global civil society and the liberal dream of the civilizing effect of public opinion is perhaps best expressed by Manuel Castells, who argues that the “new public diplomacy” is not about advancing the national interest by employing a form of “soft power,” but rather is a way of “[harnessing] the dialogue between different social collectives and their cultures in the hope of sharing meaning and understanding,” or in other words, an element in the constitution of a “global public sphere” (2008: 91).

\(^{85}\) It is worth noting that this discourse echoes the eighteenth century liberal vision of the central role of social trust (or “natural sympathy,” in Adam Smith’s terminology) in commercial society (Silver 1990), early twentieth century liberal visions of the power of public opinion to deter war (Angell 1910), and visions of the positive impact of global civil society in world politics discussed in the previous chapter.
The second way that the political technology of place branding has been presented as normatively desirable is by framing it as a tool for the economic development of poor countries. Thus, for example, Anholt describes place branding as “a means of ‘hacking’ one of the first world’s most potent and effective tools of wealth creation (after all, brand value, according to some accounts, may represent as much as one-third of all the wealth on the planet) and pressing it into the service of the countries which most need growth” (2006: 1). Place branding is thus presented as a powerful “tool” for development that, “like any other tool, is itself ethically neutral: it is the use to which the tool is put that determines whether it complies with [normative ideals] or not” (2006: 2). Moreover, Anholt claims, in reality nations are being branded all the time, whether they like it or not. Thus, Anholt argues:

The alternative to ‘doing’ nation branding is not not doing nation branding: the alternative is allowing others to do the branding for you. As long as public opinion matters — and it matters terribly, because the public is the market — then it is not only legitimate but also vital for countries to do whatever is in their power to ensure that public opinion is as fair, as accurate and as positive as it possibly can be. Countries which do not do this run the risk of being saddled with a brand which does not suit their aims or interests at all, and which is very likely based on ignorance, hearsay, confusion or long-past events. (2006: 2, original emphasis).

In other words, a nation is always already a brand. This, in turn, offers a powerful response to those who object to the very idea that a nation can be considered as a kind of product to be marketed and “branded.” Thus, for example, Michel Girard argues that, in a country like France, “the idea of re-branding the country would be widely unacceptable because the popular feeling is that France is something that has a
nature and a substance other than that of a corporation… A country carries specific dignity unlike a marketed product” (Girard 1999, cited in Olins, 2002, p. 241). The response to this critique by nation branding expert Wally Olins illustrates the lability of the notion of branding, which allows it to integrate a number of heterogeneous elements:

The France of the Revolution was a completely different entity from the France of the Bourbons. Not only was the traditional nobility exiled and dispersed, the royal family executed, a republic proclaimed, religion excoriated, and an entire social and cultural system turned on its head but every little detail changed too. The tricolour replaced the fleur de lys, the Marseilles became the new anthem, the traditional weights were replaced by the metric system, a new calendar was introduced, God was replaced by the Supreme Being and the whole lot was exported through military triumphs all over Europe. In other words the entire French package was changed. You may not like the term, you may prefer to talk about a new or reinvented nation or state, but if revolutionary France was not a new brand I do not know what is. (Olins 2002: 243)

While comparing the French revolution to an exercise in re-branding may seem fanciful, the more general claim that is reflected in Olins’s argument is fundamental for the discourse of nation branding—namely, that like it or not, what Girard refers to as basically the “essence” of the nation—its history, heritage, and culture—are in fact strategic components that form the “value” of a nation, i.e. its “brand” (Ying 2005). Again, the central claim is that, while the term “branding” has a commercial and marketing origin, the reality that the term refers to is essentially a trans-historical reality. This, in turn, is connected with the way that proponents and practitioners of nation branding respond to a different kind of critique, one that is
aimed at the more phenomenon of branding *tout court*. The most prominent example is Naomi Klein, whose written work (Klein 2000) and political activism has offered a powerful critique of corporate branding practices. Klein’s critique is in fact an indirect one, since her target is really the kinds of business practices associated with the rise of corporate branding, and the consequences of those practices.

For the most part, the response to this critique, and Klein is often cited in the nation branding literature, is to reframe the issue that is at the heart of Klein’s critique, namely the issue of social justice. Thus, for example, Anholt’s response is to reframe the issue, first by agreeing with Klein that for the majority of large, successful corporations,

their real expertise is in product design and marketing and this is where they invest most heavily. The less profitable parts of their enterprise, such as sourcing the basic raw materials, manufacturing and finishing the products, are farmed out to wherever they can get the required quality for the lowest price—and it’s almost invariably in the second or third world. (Anholt 2005a: 14)

However, Anholt argues, while Klein and others have rightly identified a source of injustice, they have failed to realize that the best solution is not to eliminate branding, but rather to recognize it as a powerful tool that needs to be made available to poor, developing countries in order to more successfully compete with the wealthier countries (14-18). The solution offered is branding as a tool for achieving a “brand new justice” (Anholt 2005a). Thus, Anholt argues, nation branding “is a vital technique for…governments in the developing world to learn if they wish to use the forces of globalization to their advantage rather than remain perennially its victims”
According to the discourse of nation branding, the solution for underdevelopment and poverty, for global inequality, is to first recognize that each nation-state exists in a global environment marked by competition (Anholt 2005a). Next, nation-states need to act strategically in order to succeed. Success is defined in terms of attracting capital and increasing economic growth.

Moreover, success depends on adopting a global (both in the sense of “comprehensive” as well as “planetary”) strategy that takes into account all of a nation’s (potential or actual) assets, and leverages these so that they can be translated into value for the nation. Thus, while it is important—indeed, crucial—for the businesses located in developing countries to utilize the technology of branding to compete against the more dominant businesses (in both local and export markets), this is not sufficient (Anholt 2005a: 16-17). What is required is “a consistent, imaginative and well-managed national brand strategy” (2005a: 17, original emphasis). Furthermore, nation branding experts argue, critics like Klein, while they are correct to reject branding as a form of “spin” that attempts to manipulate consumers, fail to realize that nation branding is not, ultimately, about marketing a country, but rather revealing and highlighting the truth of a country. This is a crucial element in the discursive assemblage of nation branding, and requires further explication.

According to Anholt, there are six fundamental elements that form the basis of people’s perception of a country: (1) “the things the country does, and the way it does them”; (2) “the things the country makes, and the way it makes them”; (3) “the way the country looks — or people think it looks”; (4) “the way other people talk about
it”; (5) “the company it keeps”; and (6) “the way the country talks about itself” (2005b: 345). Anholt argues that “[t]here is a common misconception that nation branding is mainly about the last item in the list — in other words, that the image of a country can be built through paid-for communications, through attractive logos and clever slogans” (2005b: 345-346). However, Anholt stresses, communicating the image of a nation is only a small part of building its brand:

Just as advertising cannot sell a product which does not deliver on its promises or which people do not need, so a country cannot build its reputation by singing its own praises or spewing out endless information about its wonderful products, investment opportunities, people, places and achievements. In today’s world, information is virtually valueless because there is so much of it… In the end, if a nation wants to change its brand image, it must learn to behave differently. (2005b: 346, emphasis added)

As the last sentence makes clear, nation branding is a way of governing nation-states, of inciting them to behave differently. This becomes even more evident when we look at the specific technologies developed within the nation branding assemblage. Not surprisingly, one such technique is a metric, originally called the Anholt-GMI Nation Brands Index, now the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (or NBI). The NBI, Anholt explains, calculates the value of a nation-brand as “the sum of people’s perceptions of a country across six areas of national competence”: Tourism, Exports, Governance, Investment and Immigration, Culture and Heritage, and People (see Figure 1).
The Nations Brand Index functions as a governmental technology, or mechanism of “governance,” in two ways: by constructing a ranking of the overall “value” of nation brands; and by suggesting the domains or elements of a nation’s brand value, which are thus areas where nations need to “perform” as well as they can. Thus the NBI helps operationalize nation branding as a mode of governmentality which, as D. Asher Ghertner points out (and as has been outlined in previous chapters and above), “functions by constructing and making intelligible categories of knowledge,” authorizing these categories through expert “truths,” “investing… [them] with significance and problematizing them such that they appear to require improvement via technical intervention,” and making them the basis on which the diverse desires of subjects can be recruited into a shared normative framework (2010: 186). Furthermore, as Ghertner argues, governmental programs such as nation
branding “are effective to the extent that they produce governable subjects—
[subjects] who evaluate and act upon the social world through lenses provided by
government. An essential component of guiding the interests of target population
groups is thus the joint exercise of crafting intelligible fields for governmental
intervention and problematizing such fields so as to make certain ‘deficiencies’
emerge as improvable” (2010: 186).

In constructing an index, or ranking, of nation brands, Anholt is thereby able
to offer a general model for “what kind of country tends to have powerful brand
values: a stable, liberal, democratic Western state with a tendency to neutrality, often
producing several well-known branded products and with a strong international
presence in the media” (Anholt 2005b: 344). Thus, this form of governmentality
seeks to govern nation-states by providing a “technical” measure of the “value” of
nations, and suggesting what specific qualities are necessary for a country to improve
this “value”. Like Anholt-GfK, the marketing firm FutureBrand produces a “Country
Brand Index” and, although it employs a somewhat different methodology, it also
makes the claim that “globalization is redefining the way a country brand is
established and maintained” (FutureBrand 2009: 17). FutureBrand also argues that “a
country’s reputation is defined not just by its attractiveness as a travel destination or
the efforts of its tourism marketing but also by its governance, its economic policies,
its role in global diplomacy and the quality of its export products” (2009: 17).

Thus, as both the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index and FutureBrand
Country Brand Index illustrate, nation branding operates as a form of governmentality
that suggests to the subject various forms of (self) governance with the aim of self-
improvement. Indeed, the internal governance of a country emerges as a crucial element for determining the value of a nation’s brand. Thus, for example, FutureBrand suggests that

Countries seeking to expand their exports or attract inward investment today need to be concerned about a variety of reputational factors beyond geographic location and the quality and cost of their labor forces. These include adopting acceptable labor standards and the rule of law, supporting sound environmental practices, tackling corruption and transnational crime, protecting intellectual property, promoting open trade regimes, and offering transparency and sound political governance. (2009: 17)

Similarly, branding consultant Keith Dinnie argues that nation branding “should be treated as a component of national policy, never as a ‘campaign’ that is separate from planning, governance, or economic development” (2008: 23). Dinnie goes on to explain that his nation branding consultancy work “now involves building and training teams consisting of head of state or government, cabinet ministers and CEOs of key corporations, in the principles of competitive identity…If brand management is put into a silo of ‘communications’ or ‘public affairs’, there is little it can do. But when it informs policy-making and becomes implicit in the way a country is run, it can dramatically accelerate change” (2008: 23, emphasis added).

What is more, just as every element of a subject has the potential to affect that subject’s value, behaving strategically—managing the brand—requires taking all of these elements into account. In terms of managing the brand of a nation, this means that everything that makes up a nation is potentially a source of (increased or decreased) value:
A national brand strategy determines the most realistic, most competitive and most compelling strategic vision for the country, and ensures that this vision is supported, reinforced and enriched by every act of communication between the country and the rest of the world. Those acts of communication include the kinds of brands which the country exports; the way it promotes itself for trade, tourism, inward investment and inward recruitment; the way it behaves in acts of domestic and foreign policy and the ways in which these acts are communicated; the way it promotes and represents and shares its culture; the way its citizens behave when abroad and how they treat strangers at home; the way it features in the world’s media; the bodies and organizations it belongs to; the countries it associates with; the way it competes with other countries in sport and entertainment; what it gives to the world and what it takes back. (Anholt 2005a: 17, original emphasis)

In other words, nation branding, as a form of governmentality, offers a comprehensive vision within which potentially every aspect of a nation can be governed on the basis of a logic of competitive advantage. It provides a grid of intelligibility within which potentially each and every element that makes up a nation-state can be evaluated in terms of its contribution to (or deduction from) the competitive value of the nation. Furthermore, this form of political technology, in combination with related discourses and practices of development, good governance, and civil society, opens up “a relatively open-ended and experimental problem-space of how to govern”: that is, of finding the appropriate techniques for a government oriented by a problematic of competitive advantage (Burchell 1991: 141, original emphasis).\textsuperscript{86} And, as has been mentioned above, the success of this mode of

\textsuperscript{86} This quote, from Burchell, has been modified. The original, commenting on Foucault’s discussion of the development of the concept of civil society within a liberal technology of government, reads “…oriented by a problematic of security.”
governmentality can be measured by the degree to which diverse subjects can be integrated into the general governmental assemblage—that is, their desires, actions, and relations can be integrated within a general system for producing value.

This would certainly seem to be the goal of nation branding: to provide an overall governmental logic for directing the conduct of subjects. This is illustrated by the idea that nation branding should be a point of reference for modifying both the behavior of the internal elements of a country and the country’s perception in the eyes of the outside world. As Jeff Swystun, the former Global Director of Interbrand (one of the world’s leading branding firms) observed, “Brands should be both inspirational and aspirational. Inspirational to the internal audience, so you are motivating them to behave along the brand’s values and guidelines. Aspirational so it takes you to a future point” (Shikoh 2006). Or, as Swystun says, “Place Branding is actually a misnomer, it’s actually about people branding” (Shikoh 2006). As Melissa Aronczyk, in her interviews with place branding experts, points out:

the primary responsibility for the success of the nation brand lies with individuals: the nation’s citizens, members of the diaspora, or even non-citizens in distant locations who may find cause to engage with the nation and therefore wish to have a stake in its success. For national citizens in particular, the key function is to “live the brand” – that is, to perform attitudes and behaviors that are compatible with the brand strategy. By “immers[ing]” themselves in the brand identity, citizens carry “the microbes of the brand” and “infect” those with whom they come into contact. This role is described variously as a “brand ambassador,” “brand champion,” “brand exemplar,” or “brand carrier”…. As respondents continually took pains to convey, the nation brand may be augmented and made visible through its logos, slogans and promotional campaigns, but these are not effective forms of communication
without the wholehearted participation of its representatives. Nation branding is, at its core, a concerted and comprehensive strategy by national citizens of all strata of society to assimilate and communicate this new national identity on an ongoing basis. (2008: 54)

In Latin America, the country that seems to have gone the furthest in developing and adopting a fairly comprehensive nation branding strategy is Chile. In fact, Chile has much in common with what is perceived by branding experts as one of the more successful examples of nation branding—the re-branding of Spain in the 1990s (Dinnie 2008: 29). For Spain, the problem, for which nation branding was the proposed solution, was to overcome its image, inherited from the long period under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, as an “isolated, autarkic, poverty-stricken, authoritarian anachronism” (Preston 1999). The “re-branding” of Spain, branding experts point out, was the product of more than just an advertizing campaign: it was also “the result of fundamental changes in its political, economic and social systems” (Ying 2005: 14). Like Spain, Chile too in the 1990s was a country seeking to shed the image of its authoritarian past and re-insert itself into the “community of nations” (Morandé 2003).

One of the most important symbolic moments in the re-branding of Chile came in 1992, just three years after the transition from the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet to a democratically elected government, when Chile participated in the Universal Exposition of Seville, Spain. To mark its re-emergence within the international community, Chile chose as its symbol an iceberg, taken from Antarctica and shipped to the Expo in Seville. One of the messages that came from this choice of symbolic representation was that Chile is “a cold, businesslike country unlike its
informal and less modern neighbors” (S. Dillon 1992). As Eugenio Garcia, director of the Santiago marketing firm that conceived the project, commented, “We form part of an imprecise thing that is called Latin America, and there are negative judgments about that. We are trying to shed that image” (quoted in S. Dillon 1992). At the time, however, this image of Chile provoked internal debate, with some arguing that rather than a symbol of modernity, the iceberg recalled the absurdity of the character in Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude (1998) who manufactures ice in the remote swamps of Macondo (Pinedo 1996). Nevertheless, despite the dissenting voices, the message was unmistakable: Chile was showing the world that it had entered the circle of economically stable and productive nations. As one of the organizer’s of Chile’s pavilion at the Expo commented, “We are not arriving with the attitude of a Second- or Third World nation, rather Chile is arriving under maximum conditions of equality” (quoted in Valle 1992, my translation). Or, as the Chilean newspaper La Tercera put it, the iceberg and Chile’s Expo pavilion show the world the “Chile of today, with citizens that create, that use technology, and are capable of having an attractive life” ("Chile Estará En La Expo Sevilla '92" 1991).

More recently, the government of Chile began a more comprehensive nation branding campaign, hiring Interbrand to develop a comprehensive branding strategy (ProChile 2005). After extensive research and planning, Interbrand came up with the slogan “Chile, All Ways Surprising,” (Chile sorprende, siempre) with an

87 Chilean sociologist Tomás Moulian locates the symbolism of the iceberg in relation to what he calls, following Jean Baudrillard (1994) the “whitewashing” (blanqueo) of Chile: “Like a gigantic petrified whale, the iceberg was brought from the seas of the Antarctic to serve in Seville as the representation of Chile Today (Chile Actual). The iceberg was the sculpture of our metamorphosis…[it] established before the eyes of the world the transparency of Chile Today…. In the iceberg there was no trace at all of blood, of the disappeared…not even the shadow of Pinochet. It was as if Chile had just been born” (1997: 34-35, my translation).
accompanying logotype in shades of purple, violet, and ochre (meant to convey the image of Chile’s geographical and ecological diversity) (ProChile 2005). Furthermore, Interbrand suggested a strategy that was based on a matrix of three central concepts to be communicated to Chile’s diverse audience:

1. An overwhelming geography, diverse and transparent

2. Warm, efficient and enterprising people and

3. A stable country, open to the world, with solid institutions where people keep their word. (ProChile 2005)\(^{88}\)

As the ProChile (a sub-ministry of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is in charge of promoting Chilean exports) website explained, the branding campaign led by Interbrand “is part of a strategy of international insertion which the country has embarked upon and complements all the public and private initiatives and activities that take place at the global level, including international trade agreements, scientific and technological exchanges, promoting exports, attracting investment, and promoting the arts and culture” (ProChile 2005). Furthermore, the slogan and graphic image, it is argued, “reflect a modern and enterprising country that is always on the go, a country that is inserted in the world and that innovates without breaking with its traditions” (ProChile 2005). Importantly, the branding initiative is seen as having both an external and internal dimension. With regard to the latter, the expectation is “to generate an identification and appropriation strategy of the Country Image, communicating the ‘why’ and the ‘what for’ of a Brand for Chile, producing unity surrounding a message and a unique image, and permitting institutions, associations

\(^{88}\) All translations from ProChile are mine.
and representatives of the public and private world and the civil society to be part of the Brand Chile, adopting it and using it in a committed way” (Abarca Lucero 2009).

Conclusion

As the example of Chile demonstrates, the political technology of nation branding functions as a form of governmentality: it constructs a domain of knowledge, suggests appropriate modes of subjectivity and behavior, and employs a number of calculative practices to produce the desired governmental objectives. It is also flexible and can be employed in tandem with any number of “ethical imperatives”: sustainable development, environmental protection, gender equality, and so on (Dinnie 2008: 170-176). At the same time, as Aronczyk points out, “The field of nation branding is still in its infancy. Very few nation-states are deemed to have successfully implemented a coherent and functional brand and recorded measurable results for branding initiatives” (2008: 57).89 Chile seems to meet the first set of requirements, having implemented a coherent branding strategy. However, I am not aware of any data that measures the results of that campaign. Furthermore, the degree to Chile is typical of other nation branding experiences is not clear, and calls for further research.

At the same time, we must be careful to distinguish between the programmatic statements of those involved in promoting nation branding and the actual impact of those programs. In this regard, it is useful to recall some of the critiques made of Foucault’s analyses, particularly of those technologies of power he described in terms

89 Although we can easily speculate that this will soon change if nation branding and the governance/governmentality on which it is predicated continues its present trajectory.
of a “disciplinary society” in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1977). The charge made against Foucault was that his description of the various disciplinary technologies of power in general, and Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon in particular, were never fully implemented and put into effect, and that the historical reality does not match the programmatic statements that are the objects of Foucault’s analysis (Giddens 1982; Habermas 1987). This critique is also based on the mistaken idea that for Foucault the prison is the model of social control in modern, disciplinary societies (to which scholars such as Giddens then object, “but the prison is not the same as the factory and the school” (1982: 222-223)). However, the prison is decidedly *not*, in Foucault’s analysis, “the exemplar of power as discipline,” as Giddens would have it (223). Rather, as Foucault has pointed out, he first encounters Bentham’s Panopticon in his studies of architectural plans for hospitals in 18th Century France. Indeed, it is the birth of social medicine and social hygiene, largely directed at the problems of the plague and epidemic disease which, Foucault argues, provide many of the techniques—strict spatial partitioning, careful surveillance, detailed inspection and order—that form the basis of the “disciplinary diagrams of power” (Elden 2003: 243; Foucault 1977: 231). Indeed, as Gilles Deleuze points out, Foucault’s studies of madness, crime and sexuality have taught us how to think about power in terms of its “dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings” (Foucault, cited in Deleuze 1988: 25).

It is in this sense that we can apprehend the political technology of nation branding as an element in a more generalized diagram of power, one that Deleuze (1992a) described in terms of a “society of control.” While the term “control” seems
to suggest something along the lines of Foucault’s “disciplinary society.” Deleuze actually describes the gradual breakdown of disciplinary mechanisms, and their replacement by more fluid, de-centered, mechanisms of power that are increasingly immanent to the social body. Crucially, these power mechanisms operate through variable combinations and productions of desire, lifestyle, anxiety and fear, and have the market as their ultimate paradigm (Deleuze 1992a). I will elaborate on this further in my discussion of neoliberal subjectivity and capitalism in the concluding chapter. However, here I want to conclude with some observations regarding the implications that nation branding as a governmental technology has for understanding power and the question of order in contemporary world politics.

My claim is that the political subject that is the nation-state is being transformed within a discursive field and a field of political technologies and rationalities in which all subjects are (potentially) constituted as competitive, enterprising subjects. Moreover, I wish to argue that the brand-nation is itself symptomatic of a more generalized transformation of our political present, one that is increasingly characterized by a neoliberal mode of governance in which the conduct of subjects is directed through technologies of the self that elicit a strategic and competitive comportment and ethos. The analysis presented here, therefore, lends support to the theoretical position developed by a number of scholars of world politics that prevailing notions of global governance fail to capture a significant aspect of the functioning of power in contemporary world politics, namely how neoliberal modes of governmentality structure the field of world politics in part through “technologies of the self” that help shape the subjectivity of international
actors. Thus, for example, Alexander Wendt’s (1992) formulation of how the international system is structured by (and in turn structures) states through the latter’s intersubjective understandings of the international political environment in which states find themselves (i.e. his claim that “anarchy is what states make of it”) requires reformulation. The reformulation suggested here is “nation-states [and political subjects in general] are what technologies of power make them.”

To be clear, when speaking of subjectivity in the Foucauldian sense, I am not speaking of forms of identity—especially “state” or “national” identity—in the sense used within certain types of constructivist IR analysis (Adler 1997; Hopf 1998; Kowert 1998). While identity might be applied to a particular, individual subject—or, conceivably, a nation-state—subjectivity instead refers to the multiple, contingent, shifting discourses and practices through which subjects are constituted (Strozier 2002). Moreover, the emphasis is on the emergence of the subject through “power-knowledge” relations. It is in this sense that the discourse and practice of nation branding acquires its significance, for it suggests not only a reformulation of the principal subject of modern politics, the nation-state, but also of the related technologies for governing the subjects of contemporary world politics.

Thus, rather than speaking of global governance, I believe it makes more sense to speak of global governmentality. The latter does not presuppose the existence of something—a scale, level of analysis, or place—called the global, but rather recognizes the constitution of the global through a number of discursive practices, and critically examines the ways that this “global” space is put to work as part of governmental technologies that aim to direct the conduct of subjects. In this
regard, the notion of global governmentality shares some common elements with another critical conceptualization of contemporary world order, namely Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s description of “Empire” (Hardt & Negri 2000). However, whereas the analytical framework of global governmentality suggests the existence of technologies and rationalities of power that, on the one hand, draw on and reproduce discourses of the global, and on the other hand, are “global” in scope or ambition, insofar as they target all of social reality, Hardt and Negri’s thesis is that there has emerged a new form of global sovereignty that is fundamentally different from that of the nation-state. Moreover, their argument, resting as it does on a revolutionary Marxist praxis, sees this global form of sovereignty – Empire – as containing a number of (necessary) contradictions which will (necessarily) result in a global communist subject who will ultimately create a post-Empire social reality (Hardt & Negri 2000).

The vision of world order advanced by the kind of global governmentality framework developed in this study, in contrast, is more skeptical of the possibility for actually achieving the kind of global sovereignty imagined by Hardt and Negri—or, for that matter, by the proponents of global governance. This is because, ultimately, within the political ontology on which the notion of global governmentality rests, the various governmental projects that are observed appear not as the inevitable outcome of macro-historical processes, but rather as the contingent, contested outcomes of numerous struggles and forms of problematization. Furthermore, the various political technologies and rationalities that are developed within governmental programs are not univocal and do not lead to only one kind of social and political arrangement.
Rather, governmental technologies can be put to various uses, can be problematized within different contexts. Thus, far from representing a new form of global sovereignty, neoliberalism, as Aihwa Ong suggests, should be “conceptualized not as a fixed set of attributes with predetermined outcomes, but as a logic of governing that migrates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts” (2007: 3).

Consequently, and as Foucault suggested, rather than beginning with an assumption of order and stability, the production of order—the arrangement of the elements that constitute social reality—must be seen as processual, the result of countless actions, reactions, and interactions, a never-ending stabilizing and destabilizing of the components and contours of the social realm. When various elements of social reality are more or less stabilized, this is the result of power. This is the productive aspect of power that Foucault described. Seen in this light, neoliberalism and the global political imaginary are forms of power. As they operate in the world, novel forms of meaning and being are produced: connections among certain elements are made while others are cut off; new possibilities are created and others are foreclosed—at least in certain sites and for a while.

Ultimately, the challenge is to apprehend globalism and neoliberalism—assemblages that are not quite two sides of the same coin and yet which, in different contexts, overlap and become blurred together—as projects that strive towards universality, without actually attributing universality to them. Refusing to accept at face value the totalizing claims made by the discourses of globalization and neoliberalism does not necessarily require a focus on the specific, contingent, and local to the exclusion of broader dynamics and structures. Rather, what are required
are modes of analysis that “undo the naturalization of dominant perspectives of aggregate processes by offering more concrete and inclusive, though also decidedly open, accounts of large-scale transformations, paying heed to the unevenness of geohistorical change” (Pederson 2003: 245). In this way we might “take on the challenge of freeing critical imaginations from the specter of neoliberal conquest—singular, universal, global”. By paying attention to “the effectiveness, and the fragility, of emergent capitalist—and globalist—forms”, new political terrains can be imagined, creating “new sources of hope, and, of course, new nightmares” (Tsing 2005: 77).
CHAPTER FIVE: GOVERNMENTALITY, CAPITALISM, SUBJECTIVITY

In the present study I have examined how neoliberalism functions as a form of governmentality—as a way of governing subjects and spaces. The governmentality framework was employed to address some of what I have argued are significant shortcomings of the majority of studies of neoliberalism. The latter tend to treat neoliberalism as either a set of policies (privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation, and so on) or an ideology that seeks to justify or generate support for those policies (Harvey 2005). Drawing on Foucault’s analysis of the post-World War II transformations in liberalism (2008), I have suggested instead that neoliberalism is better understood as a governmental “assemblage,” or a complex combination of various forms of knowledge, subjectivities, political rationalities, and techniques. Throughout this study, I have sought to show that these assemblages of governmentality provide the conditions of possibility for the various policies and ideologies associated with neoliberalism.

At the same time, in this dissertation I have sought not only to apply a governmentality framework to international relations and the question of how neoliberal globalization is transforming the world we live in, but also to refine and reformulate a Foucauldian approach to world politics. One area where I sought to further advance a Foucauldian framework has to do with the constitution of the global as a fundamental part of the contemporary political imaginary. I proposed the concept of a neoliberal global political imaginary in order to capture some of the ways that neoliberalism is constitutive of the way that social and political reality is understood and experienced. The idea of a neoliberal global political imaginary thus functions as a heuristic device that opens up an analysis of the relationship between various
neoliberal governmental assemblages and the constitution of a global space and
global subjects. Moreover, in this study I analyzed three “sites” that I claim form the
basis of the neoliberal global political imaginary: the global market, global civil
society, and global governance. I have argued that this represents a transformation
and transposition of the liberal political imaginary, based on the three domains of the
state, society, and the market, onto a “global” space.

One of the findings of this study is that the boundaries that separate the
market, civil society, and the state—already problematic at the national level—
become blurred and increasingly overlap at the “global” level. Indeed, it is the
“global” itself that functions as something of a “master signifier” (J.K. Gibson-
Graham 2000: 98) by stabilizing the various relations of difference that exist among
the sites and scales of the neoliberal political imaginary. Thus, the present study has
demonstrated how the global functions as a form of governmentality—a mode of
governance that suggests and normalizes a certain understanding of social and
political reality. Furthermore, consistent with a Foucauldian mode of analysis, the
idea of the global, while lending itself to certain governmental practices and projects,
has no clear-cut essence. Indeed, it can be mobilized for such diverse purposes as
global environmentalism, global humanitarianism, or the subjection of all social
relations to the logic of a global market. Thus, as I have argued throughout the
present study, it is the intersection of discourses and practices of the global with
neoliberal governmental assemblages that must be apprehended in order to better
understand our political present.
More specifically, a key finding of the present study is that neoliberal governmentality contributes to and draws upon discourses of the global in a way that reproduces and amplifies what I claim is the central logic of contemporary neoliberalism, namely a logic of competition. Put differently, neoliberal governmental assemblages mobilize the idea of a global reality, suggest that this global reality is characterized by competition, and offer a number of techniques and strategies by which the subjects of this global space can behave in an appropriately competitive fashion. Moreover, this framing of the global as a space of competition makes possible a wide range of governmental interventions, both direct and indirect. That is, there exist a number of neoliberal governmental technologies that are predicated on the existence of a global, competitive social reality, and which mobilize this “reality” in order to shape and direct the conduct of subjects and/or to incite subjects to govern themselves.

Furthermore, this brings to the fore another key finding of the present study, namely that among the various elements of neoliberal governmental assemblages, the production of subjectivity plays a crucial role. This finding, in turn, suggests an important area for future governmentality studies of world politics: investigating the production of neoliberal subjectivities as forms of “global” governmentality. As the preceding chapter on global governance sought to demonstrate, subjectivity as a conceptual category need not be applied only to individual persons; it can also be applied to “collective subjects” such as the nation-state. Indeed, as the case of nation branding illustrates, the production of the nation-state as a competitive, entrepreneurial subject involves a number of governmental techniques and
technologies. Thus governmentality studies can contribute to our understanding of the functioning of mechanisms of power in world politics by analyzing the various governmental assemblages that seek to direct the conduct of others—or for subjects to direct their own conduct—through the production of competitive, entrepreneurial forms of subjectivity.

While an analysis of modes of subjectivation, or the production of subjectivity, can strengthen governmentality studies and aid our overall understanding of contemporary world politics, it also raises another question—one that has been largely ignored by Foucauldian scholars. This is the question of the relationship between capitalism and subjectivity, particularly as the former relates to structures and relations of power. This may seem to contradict the argument made throughout this study that one of the strengths of governmentality accounts of neoliberalism, including neoliberal modes of subjectivation, is that a governmentality framework does not reduce the latter to the requirements of capital. However, it is possible that, in eschewing the kinds of analysis often associated with Marxian political thought and which treat neoliberalism as epiphenomenal or secondary to the underlying reality of global capitalism, governmentality scholars have avoided any consideration of the ways that capitalism is productive of forms of governmentality and of subjectivity. Thus, I wish to argue that an engagement with some of the theoretically innovative research programs that are investigating the connections between capitalism, neoliberalism, and subjectivity, without reducing the question of neoliberalism to a function of capitalism, can further advance a Foucauldian
perspective on world politics and help shed light on of the fundamental dynamics and structures of power in the world today.

In the following section, I examine one theoretical framework that has offered innovative and productive accounts of the connection between capitalism, neoliberalism and subjectivity: Italian post-post-autonomist thought. One reason I feel this is important is because, despite the strong resonances between this theoretical “school of thought” and post-structuralist and Foucauldian approaches, the latter have largely ignored the contributions of the former. The other reason for focusing on Italian post-post-autonomist thought is that there are some potentially productive complementarities between the latter and Foucauldian governmentality studies. Indeed, as I will show, a great deal of the work being done by younger theorists draws freely on both post-structural and Marxian theoretical/political traditions, thereby ignoring and breaking down some of the walls that have been erected between them. However, I wish to be clear that I am not arguing for a wholesale incorporation of Italian post-post-autonomist thought into a Foucauldian governmentality framework. There are some fundamental divergences, which I will also mention in what follows. This is also one more reason for a critical engagement with this largely ignored perspective—to illuminate possible areas of convergence, but also to be aware of the difficulties that any simple combination of different theoretical approaches might entail.

**Italian Post-Marxist Thought: Subjectivity and Capitalism**

For the most part, scholars working from some kind of Foucauldian framework—whether from a biopolitical or governmentality perspective—have not
made capitalism a central part of their analysis. What is more, their work has often reproduced the idea that there is a fundamental opposition between Foucault’s work and Marxist thought. What is often ignored is that there already exists a group of thinkers who have drawn on Foucault’s work in order to formulate theoretical and political responses to the current capitalist order. Beginning in the 1970s, Foucault’s work inspired a number of critical Italian theorists to rethink the nature of capitalist development and capitalist social relations, leading some to speak of an “Italian Foucault” (Coté 2003). The most prominent of these thinkers is Antonio Negri, whose work together with Michael Hardt (2000, 2004) has generated a great deal of discussion in a number of fields, including International Relations (Barkawi & Laffey 2002; Callinicos 2002; Passavant & Dean 2004; Shaw 2002; R. B. J. Walker 2002). Hardt and Negri’s thesis regarding the emergence of a new form of global sovereignty – “Empire” – is by now quite well-known and needs no further elaboration. Less well known, however, is the large body of critical theoretical work that has provided innovative accounts of contemporary capitalism through a re-reading of the Foucauldian concepts of biopower and biopolitics. While a thorough review and discussion of this work is beyond the scope of the present study, I do wish to highlight a couple of elements of this area of scholarship in order to suggest how it can enrich already existing Foucauldian accounts of world politics—particularly by incorporating capitalism and its connection with subjectivity into the analytical framework.

90 There is in fact a substantial literature in Italian social and political thought that engages with Foucault. Unfortunately, as of the time of writing, most of it remains un-translated.
The body of political thought I discuss here has been referred to variously as post-Marxist, Workerist, post-Workerist, Post-autonomist, and post-Post-autonomist Marxism. The thinkers mentioned I discuss below all have connections to the Workerist political movement (Potere Operaio) that was active in the 1960s and early 1970s in Italy, and out of which was born the autonomia movement of Italian workers, students, and feminists. 91 Here I will use the terms “post-Marxist” and “post-post-autonomist Marxism” synonymously to describe critical thinkers that have been associated with these movements in Italy and have also sought to move beyond traditional Marxist political thought in trying to apprehend recent transformations in capitalism.

One of the foundational premises for post-post-autonomist Marxism is the inversion of the idea found in many Western accounts of capitalism that emphasize “only the dominant and inexorable logic of capital. Its accumulative logic, unfolding according to ineluctable (even if finally self-destructive) laws, figures as the unilateral force shaping the contemporary world” (Dyer-Witheford 1999: 65). Against this idea, post-post-autonomist Marxists have emphasized the creative power of labor and the reactionary nature of capital.

Far from being a passive object of capitalist design, the worker is in fact the active subject of production, the wellspring of the skills, innovation, and cooperation on which capital depends. Capital attempts to incorporate labor as an object, a component in its cycle of value extraction, so much labor power. But this inclusion is always partial, never fully achieved. Laboring subjects

91 Many of the issues related to workerist and post-autonomist thought are discussed in the special issue “Italian Post-Workerist Thought” in SubStance 36, no.1 (2007). For a history of this political and intellectual movement, see Wright (2002). Many of the political and theoretical debates that surrounded this movement are discussed in Hardt (1996) and Lotringer and Marazzi (2007).
resist capital’s reduction. Labor is for capital always a problematic ‘other’ that must constantly be controlled and subdued, and that, as persistently, circumvents or challenges this command. (Dyer-Witheford 1999: 65)

Related to this is the idea that the struggle by workers to escape the command of capital and achieve autonomy provokes capital to restructure the production process and the division of labor in order to reassert its command. This is captured by the notion of class composition, which “addresses both the “technical” organization of the working class within the capitalist mode of production and the forms of “political” subjectivity that emerge within the working class” (Mecchia & Henninger 2007: 3). This reworking, or inversion, of the notion of the composition of class and its relation to the composition of capital, has led to the argument that given a certain level of capitalist development, transformations in political composition precede and determine transformations in technical composition. This means that the labor struggles accompanying the emergence of a new political subject force entrepreneurs to implement processes of economic restructuring. In the workerist interpretation, such economic restructuring constitutes an attempt to contain the revolutionary transformations that capitalist development produces and depends on, even as these transformations continually call into question capitalism’s material foundations, private ownership of the means of production, and entrepreneurial command over alienated labor. (Mecchia & Henninger 2007: 3)

The importance of the notion of class composition came to be felt by the Italian workerist movement when the struggles that had been largely organized around the large industrial factories in the 1960s gave way to new strategies by capital such as the introduction of technological innovations and organizational
restructuring in order to lessen capital’s dependence on organized labor. At the same time, “student struggles and the emergence of both a highly combative feminist movement and new, strongly politicized youth cultures had shifted the terrain of struggle away from the factory” (Mecchia & Henninger 2007: 4). Taken together, these two developments—the reorganization of capitalist production understood as a shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist capitalist regime, and the emergence of new social movements and subjectivities—provided the political impetus for post-post-autonomist Marxists to reconsider both the changing political configuration of capitalism and its related means of domination, as well as the potential sites and subjectivities of resistance to that domination (Toscano 2004: 200-201).

Some of the main concepts that have been developed by Italian post-post-autonomist thinkers to apprehend the changing nature of capitalist production and control, and the political possibilities associated with the latter are the concepts of **immaterial labor, general intellect, and the real subsumption of labor under capitalism**. Immaterial labor can be understood as “the kind of labor that produces ‘the informational and cultural content of the commodity’… [and] which, by its very nature, foregrounds the ability to activate and manage cooperation, in all of its affective, communicational and informational senses, for the sake of intensified productivity” (Lazzarato 1996: 133, cited in Toscano 2007: 73). Thus, under contemporary post-Fordist global capitalism, the production of value increasingly depends on the properties of human being: language, communication, creativity, knowledge, affect, cooperation, and so on. Note that while the concept was originally developed to describe both the technological changes—computerisation and
informatization—and the kind of labor associated with the informational or cultural worker (Lazzarato 1996). Feminist thought has also called attention the ‘other side’ of immaterial labor—‘affective labor’ that “covers a vast terrain of human interaction and trafficking, actual or virtual: health service, child care, domestic work, online dating, correspondence marriage, immigrant sex work, entertainment, tourism, digital information, and so on’ (Lu 2007: 4).92

Furthermore, and related to the previous point, under conditions of post-Fordist capitalism, the labor power that capital attempts to exploit is increasingly based on the human capacity for language, communication, and cooperation. For post-post-autonomist Marxists, this form of labor power is represented by the term general intellect.93 The hypothesis is that the communicative and cooperative potential of human subjects are increasingly central to both capitalist production and reproduction (Virno 1996). Thus, the notion of general intellect highlights the fact that under contemporary capitalism “wealth is no longer the immediate work of the individual, but a general productivity of the social body—dispersed through technologies and human bodies, connected in new, shifting assemblages” (Terranova 2006: 29). This, in turn, points towards the final key conceptual category, the real

92 See also Hardt (1999) and Weeks (2007).
93 The term is taken from the “Fragment on Machines” in Notebook VII of Marx’s Grundrisse: “Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it.” (Marx 1973: 706)
subsumption of labor under capitalism—again, a term introduced by Marx\textsuperscript{94} and refashioned by post-autonomist Marxism. Initially theorized by Marx as a tendency within capitalism to subsume the social factors of production, post-autonomist Marxists have analyzed contemporary capitalism as presenting conditions of an “actually existing real subsumption” (Read 2003: 127), where increasingly “the creation of wealth no longer depends on working time narrowly defined, but coincides with the whole time of life… it is the whole of social life – from child rearing to new forms of sexuality, from making music or videos on one’s home computer to watching TV, from inventing new ways of dressing to making up a new way of speaking – that produces wealth” (Terranova 2006: 29).

Finally, these concepts—immaterial labor, general intellect, and real subsumption—map out a new social and political terrain of command and control as well as contestation and resistance. It is in this context that the argument has been made that “capitalism has become biopolitical” (Toscano 2007: 82, emphasis added). Of course Hardt and Negri’s argument regarding the biopolitical nature of production under global capitalism is by now well known. However, it is less commonly understood that this idea is not unique to Hardt and Negri, and it is increasingly informing a number of critical studies into the changing nature of contemporary capitalism (Cooper 2008; Lu 2007; Nadesan 2008; Read 2003). Nor is there any necessary connection between biopolitical capitalism and Hardt and Negri’s claims

\textsuperscript{94} Marx contrasts the real subsumption of labor by capital with the merely formal subsumption in the first volume of Capital. He fleshed out in more detail the concepts of formal and real subsumption in the appendix to Capital titled “Results of the Immediate Process of Production”. See Marx (1990: 1019-1038).
regarding the new imperial nature of sovereignty and the immanence of the multitude to the new terrains of biopolitical production.95

It is also important to note that all of these concepts and their deployment within critical thought and political action are very much contested, not only by different forms of Marxian political thought, but also within the Italian post-workerist tradition. Obviously this very brief discussion of some central elements of post-autonomist Marxist thought cannot do justice to the complexity of the theoretical and political issues involved or the debates they have generated within radical leftist thought. However, there are two implications regarding subjectivity and power that we can discern from this Italian “school” of Marxist though which might resonate with and help strengthen Foucauldian accounts of contemporary social and political life.

The first implication that can be drawn from post-autonomist theorizations of real subsumption under contemporary capitalism has to do with, on the one hand, the processes and mechanisms involved in subjectivation and, on the other hand, the nature of subjectivity itself. More specifically, one of the insights of post-autonomist thought is that under contemporary capitalist production and reproduction, power acts on subjects in ways that work directly on pre- or sub-individual elements, such as the affective and libidinal structures of the subject (Lazzarato 2004; Virno 2003: 82-95)

95 Note that while for thinkers such as Negri and Lazzarato, conditions of real subsumption mark a biopolitical phase of capital, for Virno capitalism was biopolitical from the very beginning. See Virno (2003: 81-84). Note also that Negri distinguishes between the biopower of capital and the potential biopolitics of the multitude—a distinction that parallels the difference between potenza (potentiality) and potere (power) (Neilson 2004).
This can be seen both in the realms of work as well as consumption. In the former, Virno highlights the ways that three dimensions of the contemporary worker—the self-employer, the professional, and the possessive individual—are produced through the mobilization of affective dispositions and “linguistic-relational capacities” (Virno 2007: 45). Crucial for Virno is the fact that the nature of work under contemporary capitalism requires not so much a certain set of skills or knowledges but rather the cultivation of certain personal traits and dispositions, qualities—most importantly, the capacity for directing one’s life as an enterprise—which are learned not in the spaces of work (or at least not primarily there) but in the extra-work spaces of social life. To put it differently, the place where the subject learns a relationship to itself that is homologous to the relationship between an entrepreneur and her business is not the work place. Or it might be more accurate to say that the work place is no longer confined to the factory or the office but is now diffused throughout social space.

While Virno emphasizes the fact that the contemporary working subject needs to be constructed, Lazzarato points out that the consumer is also not a naturally existing subject but also must be constructed. This also represents a shift in the dynamics of capitalism. Whereas under industrial capitalism the business created products and then tried to market and sell them, businesses nowadays are concerned

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96 For a discussion of the “affective turn” in social theory in general, see the essays collected in Clough & Halley (2007).

97 See also Virno (2003: 84-93).

98 “Economy cannot be conceived within the time or place of the ‘factory-office’. It has rather become spatially boundless and temporally endless: it is impossible to make the distinction between working time and free time, it is difficult to say where or when the actual act of production is being carried out, what is work and what is not, what creates value and what does not” (Virtanen 2004: 209).
less with the production and marketing of particular *products* than with the cultivation of a *brand*. In this regard, we can note the connection with the analysis of nation branding in the preceding chapter, particularly the ways that nation branding experts (and branding experts in general) substitute the notion of the brand for the idea of the product to be marketed or the nation whose international image needs to be enhanced. For Lazzarato the company that best represents this shift is Benetton, whose publicity campaigns famously produce images not so much of commodities but of social *subjects* (“the AIDS patient, the newborn infant, the ship filled with Albanian refugees”) whose relation to the company brand is left to the viewer’s imagination (Lazzarato 2007: 91). What we are witnessing, Lazzarato argues (2007: 91), is that publicity does not serve merely to provide information about markets, but to constitute them. It enters into an “interactive” relationship with the consumer, addressing itself not only to her needs but above all to her desires. It addresses itself not only to her passions and emotions, but also directly interpellates “political” rationality. It produces not just the consumer but the “individual” of immaterial capitalism. It engages in dialogue with her convictions, values, and opinions, and has the courage to interpellate her where the political fears to go. Publicity is one of the most important forms of social and political communication at this turn of the century. Publicity as such increasingly occupies “public space,” animates it, provokes it, arouses it. The enterprise produces “meaning” directly.

Under these conditions of capitalist production of value, Lazzarato argues, the distinction between consumption and production become problematic since the actions of the consumer (her desires and values) are directly integrated, as a creative moment, into the social network of the enterprise…[Marketing] constructs the product and solicits forms of subjectification. The consumer is
no longer the passive mass-consumer of standardized commodities, but the active individual involved with the totality of her persona: to this end, it is necessary to “know” and solicit her ideology, lifestyle and conception of the world…Capitalism is no longer the capitalism of production, but of the product. Marketing is no longer merely a technique for selling, but a mechanism that is constitutive of social relations, information and values for the market—one that integrates the techniques and “responsibility” of the political. (91)

It is not difficult to think of other examples where the “consumer” is put to work in the creation of value: from the participants in reality television shows to social networking websites such as MySpace and Facebook. In short, within this tendency towards immaterial labor, “our communication and our cultural practices are not only constitutive of social relations but are also a new form of labor increasingly integral to capital relations” (Côté & Pybus 2007: 92)99 Furthermore, as the concept of enterprise becomes attached not only to businesses but also to the whole range of social entities, from the individual to the nation to the international organization, so too is the concept of the brand and the concern for its management increasingly applied to all social actors (du Gay 2000; Salzer-Mörling & Strannegård 2004). Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter Four, within the discourse of nation branding, all subjects can be viewed as potential sources of value for the nation’s brand. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind the crucial role of the different forms of communications media in the process of subjectivation described above. For Lazzarato, the subject who engages in the activity of consumption “is not reduced to

99 In this regard, Deleuze’s comment that “Marketing has become the center or ‘soul’ of the corporation” seems prescient (1992a: 6).
the act of buying and carrying out a service or a product,” but instead is incited to identify with and belong to a certain social imaginary. This imaginary, in turn, is constructed in part through advertising, which produces “a prompt to assume a form of living, i.e. a way of dressing, having a body, eating, communicating, residing, moving, having a gender, speaking, etc.” (Lazzarato 2003)

A second implication we can draw from post-autonomist theorizations of recent transformations in capitalism has to do with the functioning of power and its relation to subjectivity. With the notions of immaterial labor and real subsumption, we are already contemplating a shift from Fordist production where capitalist command is centered on the factory, to a post-Fordist form of capitalism where “laboring processes have moved outside of the factory to invest the entire society”, producing in effect a “social factory” (Hardt & Negri 1994: 9). Moreover, as capitalist production becomes more dispersed, likewise the accompanying mechanisms of control extend throughout the social body; thus regulation is increasingly “cultural” or, in Foucault’s terminology micropolitical. Here again, subjectivity is a crucial terrain for the operation of power. The dispositifs or assemblages of power that have emerged with contemporary capitalism rely less on the techniques that Foucault described in terms of disciplinary power; rather they operate increasingly through self-regulation, through the “technologies of the self” (Foucault 1988b), including those associated with nation branding that were discussed in the previous chapter.

Finally, it is striking to notice how Foucault’s critical reading of neoliberalism resonates with post-autonomist analyses of the new dispositifs of power and
mechanisms of control associated with contemporary capitalism as well as with Deleuze’s theorization of “post-disciplinary society” or a “society of control.” Let us take, for example, a moment from Foucault’s May 21, 1979 lecture, in which he seems to slip into an almost Deleuzian language in an attempt to find the conceptual vocabulary for describing the implications of the novel forms of power associated with what was then a novel form of neoliberalism:

You can see that what appears on the horizon of this kind of analysis is not at all the ideal or project of an exhaustively disciplinary society in which the legal network hemming in individuals is taken over and extended internally by, let’s say, normative mechanisms. Nor is it a society in which a mechanism of general normalization and the exclusion of those who cannot be normalized is needed. On the horizon of this analysis we see instead the image, idea, or theme-program of a society in which there is an optimization of systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than the players, and finally in which there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the subjugation of individuals. (2008: 259-260)

In the written manuscript for the lecture quoted above, Foucault elaborates further the new configuration of power as it relates to what he describes in terms of a new “human technology.” Here Foucault identifies

a massive withdrawal with regard to the normative-disciplinary system. The correlate of the system formed by a capitalist type of economy and political institutions indexed to the law was a technology of human behavior, an “individualizing” governmentality comprising: disciplinary control

100 Briefly mentioned in Chapter Four, pp. 190-191.
(quadrillage), unlimited regulation, subordination/classification, the norm. Considered overall, liberal governmentality was both legalistic and normalizing, disciplinary regulation being the switch-point between the two aspects...[complicated by] the ultimate incompatibility between legal forms and normalization. This system no longer seems to be indispensable. Why? Because the great idea that the law was the principle of governmental frugality turns out to be inadequate (…) (260)

Foucault continues by observing that within neoliberal governmentality the law cannot function as the ultimate principle of governmental rationality. The law, therefore, needs to be reconceptualized; it needs to be understood as having a distinct form and function. The form is prohibition and constraint. The function is to establish the rules of the game in order to “[enable] everybody to be a rational subject, i.e., to maximize the functions of utility” (260, emphasis added). This then raises the problem, Foucault suggests, of “[h]ow to remain within [a system of the] Rule of law? How to rationalize this enforcement, it being understood that the law itself cannot be a principle of rationalization?” The answer that neoliberal thought comes up with, Foucault suggests, is “through the calculation of costs, the utility of the law and the cost of its enforcement, and by the fact that if you do not want to get out of the law and you do not want to divert its true function as rule of the game, the technology to be employed is not discipline-normalization but action on the environment. Modifying the terms of the game, not the players’ mentality” (2008: 260).

Remarkably, Foucault here seems to anticipate what Deleuze a decade later will describe as the shift from disciplinary society to a society of control, an account of transformations in the operations of power that, as was mentioned above, has had a
major impact on many post-autonomist Marxist thinkers. The picture that emerges from this theorization of the shift from disciplinary society to a society of control involves a complex relationship between mechanisms of control and subjectivity. At the end of the May 21, 1979 lecture, we can see Foucault grapple with this problem. In the written text of the lecture, after he discusses the argument made by American neoliberalism in favor of regulation through environmental techniques – especially the manipulation of supplies and demands – Foucault asks: “But does this mean that we are dealing with natural subjects?” (261) In other words, what are the qualities specific to the subject that neoliberalism must assume to exist in order to formulate technologies which aim to govern the subject? Or, alternatively, is it that rather than starting from a given conceptualization of the subject, neoliberalism institutes a “fictional” subject—fictional in the sense that there does not exist a natural subject to be worked upon, but rather the subject is the result of a combination of factors, including the governmental technologies proposed by neoliberal thought.

Whether Foucault himself reached the latter conclusion, this would seem the correct one; the neoliberal subject is not a natural subject, at least not the natural subject of classical liberalism. The constitution of calculation as a comprehensive grid of intelligibility for all human action and interaction does away with the need for the kind of “anthropological categories and frameworks developed by the human and social sciences” (Gordon 1991: 43). The only characteristic that is ascribed to

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101 This argument is made most forcefully in Becker (1976: 8): “The economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behavior, be it behavior involving money prices, or imputed shadow prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, large or minor decisions, emotional or mechanical ends, rich or poor persons, men or women, adults or children, brilliant or stupid persons, patients or therapists, businessmen or politicians, teachers or students.”
human subjects is the ability to make choices that take into account the reality in which the subject finds herself. This is the subject of rational choice. However, in the writings of Becker and other neoliberal thinkers, reason is understood not as a universal category that could under ideal circumstances be determined by, for example, determining whether the optimal choice was made with regard to the desired outcome and the given conditions. The quality of the decision will vary according to the value of the human capital available; behaving rationally is defined in a minimal sense as acting in a non-random way in light of a given reality. “Homo oeconomicus is someone who accepts reality” (2008: 269).102 Or, as Becker writes, “Even irrational decision units must accept reality and could not, for example, maintain a choice that was no longer within their opportunity set. And these sets are not fixed or dominated by erratic variation, but are systematically changed by different economic variable (...)” (1962: 167).

What is crucial, however, for neoliberal governmentality is that the subject not only exercise her capacity for rational choice, but that this choice be made within a social setting where she alone is responsible for, and bears the consequences of, the outcomes of that decision. This is made clear in Becker’s recent discussion of the attempt by some to shift blame for the so-called “sub-prime” loans from the borrowers to the lenders. Becker is quite explicit that individual responsibility is a crucial foundation for a liberal, market society:

Successful attempts to shift the responsibility for bad decisions toward others and to society more generally create a “moral hazard” in behavior. If

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102 See also the conclusion of Chapter Two (p. 133) and Chapter Three of this study (pp. 157-158).
individuals are not held accountable for decisions and actions that harm themselves or others, they have less incentive to act responsibly in the first place since they will escape some or all of the bad consequences of their actions. It does not matter greatly whether this moral hazard resulted from the shifting of blame for unsuccessful actions to the “mall print” in a contract, to an abused childhood, to a mental state, or to many other efforts to shift responsibility away from oneself.

An important foundation of the philosophy behind the arguments for private enterprise, free economies, and free societies more generally, is that these societies rely on and require individual decision-making and responsibility. This philosophy not only emphasizes the moral hazard reasons to require individual responsibility, but also “the use it or lose it principle,” a colloquial expression indicating that various mental and physical capacities wear down and erode if they are not used on a regular basis. This principle implies that people who are accustomed to having other persons or governments make their decisions for them lose the ability to make good decisions for themselves. Free societies lead to better decision-making partly because men and women accumulate more experience at making decisions that affect their well-being and that of others. (Becker, n.d.)

We can see here a profound ambivalence within neoliberalism. On the one hand human nature is assumed to be that of the rational, calculating subject. On the other hand, there is also the fear that this natural capacity needs to be instilled, fostered, protected against outside forces that could erode it, such as paternal protection from the state: with regard to human capital, one must “use it or lose it.” Thus, as has been indicated throughout the present study, much of neoliberal governance is about creating the conditions that encourage, and indeed make

103 I thank Nicholas Kiersey for calling this article to my attention.
possible, the rational, calculating subject. Here we can find an imperative for government—to make sure that individuals are responsible for their actions, that they are rewarded for good decisions and punished for bad ones. Indeed, as Lazzarato (n.d.) argues,

Liberalism is first and foremost neither an economic theory nor a political theory; it is rather an art of government that assumes the market as the test and means of intelligibility, as the truth and the measure of society... By market we do not mean “commodification”. According to Foucault... the market is not defined by the human instinct to exchange... by market we must always understand competition and inequality, rather than equality of exchange. Here, the subjects are not merchants but entrepreneurs. The market is therefore the market of enterprises and of their differential and non-egalitarian logic.

Finally, recalling Foucault’s comment that the neoliberal subject is defined as one who “accepts reality” (and Becker’s related observation that this subject must accept its “opportunity set”) it thus becomes crucial to better apprehend the nature of this “reality”—a reality which provides the terrain and grid of intelligibility for governing the neoliberal subject. As the analysis presented here has already suggested, an important element of this “reality” is that it is a “global” one, characterized by the need for subjects to act in an entrepreneurial, competitive fashion. Related to this is the idea that each subject is the bearer of capital who must seek to maximize its own self-value and, as a consequence, must take into account the “rules of the game.” As was discussed in the previous chapter, the neoliberal subject is not only potentially a human individual, but can also be a “collective subject” such as a nation-state. Thus, for example, a nation-state can be imagined as the bearer of a capital that must be managed the same way a brand is managed. This, in turn, makes
possible a whole range of governmental technologies and strategies for governing those subjects who accept this “reality” as self-evident, as an implicit “order of things” (Foucault 1973).

**Conclusion: Bringing Capitalism Back In**

The governmentality approach to studying social and political life is perhaps best understood not as a full-blown theory but rather as a certain methodology for approaching a specific problem-space, namely: how, on the basis of what rationalities, and through what kind of techniques and practices are subjects governed? For the most part, governmentality scholars have focused on neoliberal forms of governmentality. In their analyses of neoliberalism, governmentality studies have avoided what are seen as a problematic reduction of neoliberalism to the interests of an easily identifiable class or group of institutions, as might be seen in some forms of Marxian analysis. The understanding of neoliberalism within governmentality scholarship is based on the assumption that whatever connection may exist between, on the one hand, particular rationalities and techniques of government and, on the other hand, capitalist modes and relations of production, we cannot deduce the ways that the former are formed and operate from the latter. In this regard, governmentality scholars have followed, in a certain sense, Foucault who detailed the emergence of disciplinary forms of power that, while clearly interconnected with capitalist production and social relations, could not be explained solely in those terms:

104 However, see Merlingen (2006) for an argument in favor of describing governmentality in terms of a theory.
[Capitalism], as it was established in the nineteenth century, was obliged to elaborate a set of political techniques, techniques of power, by which man was tied to something like labor—a set of techniques by which people’s bodies and their time would become labor power and labor time so as to be effectively used and thereby transformed into hyperprofit. But in order for there to be hyperprofit, there had to be an infrapower. A web of microscopic, capillary political power had to be established at the level of man’s very existence, attaching men to the production apparatus, while making them into agents of production, into workers. (2000b: 86)\(^{105}\)

Thus, Foucault’s work has often been viewed as “a radical departure from or even as a critique of many of the methodological and political assumptions” “of both Marxist analysis and socialist strategy” (Smart 1994: 208).

However, it is important to keep in mind the intellectual and political context in which Foucault was working—one where leftist thought was dominated by a certain form of Marxism, which aspired to provide a general theory of social and political reality in which capitalism functioned as a kind of general explanatory grid for all historical developments. At least this is the way Foucault has described the context for his complex and ambiguous relationship with Marxist thought (Foucault 1980c, 1988a, 1991c), leaving aside the accuracy of this portrayal of Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s. Coincidentally, some of the concerns and critiques Foucault had about Marxist thought were shared by many of the post-workerist and post-autonomist thinkers discussed here. Furthermore, these thinkers have found Foucault’s concept of biopolitics to offer a powerful analytical lens for apprehending recent transformations in global capitalism. What is more, a number of elements

\(^{105}\) See also Foucault (1990: 141).
found within Foucault’s analysis of contemporary neoliberalism seem to parallel many of the descriptions of the forms of power and subjectivity immanent to global capitalism as described by autonomist Marxist thought. Finally, governmentality as a general approach to political analysis has proved flexible enough to develop in tandem with other compatible theoretical approaches such as actor network theory.106

As I see it, there are two possible ways that governmentality approaches could take on board the treatments of contemporary capitalism presented by autonomist Marxist thought. One way would be to integrate a Foucauldian approach within a more general Marxist political problematic of a critical investigation of capitalism, as scholar such as Jan Selby (2007) have called for. I find this move problematic, however. To begin with, contrary to what some have argued, the idea of incorporating Foucauldian analyses of the “how” of power into broader Marxist questions of the “why” of power (“the ceaseless accumulation of capital, and attendant conflicts amongst capitalists, classes and states” (Selby 2007: 339)) is premised on a dubious assumption: namely that there necessarily exists an objective “how” of power that can be discerned a priori and independent of the analysis we carry out. For Foucauldian scholars who find value in the French philosopher’s historical nominalism, the idea that capitalism predetermines the “why” of power is unlikely to be very convincing.

Just as problematic is the idea that Foucauldian analyses can offer fruitful investigations of the “ascending” forms of micropower, while Marxist theory can usefully detail “how power also “descends” from the state in the form of interests, strategies and decisions” (Selby 2007: 339-340). This ignores Foucault’s argument

106 See for example Kendall (2004).
that rather than “taking as a primary, original, and already given object notions such as the sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state, and civil society,” we should start with the different discursive and material practices that both make it possible to speak of “the state” and also for the state to achieve a degree of discursive and material “reality” (2008: 2-3). In fact, it is precisely in part as a response to this methodological challenge, Foucault argues, that he felt the need to invent the concept of governmentality—a notion, he stresses, that is meant to serve as an analytical grid for examining a diverse array of power relations regardless of the particular site or scale. Thus, he argues, “the analysis of micro-powers, or of procedures of governmentality, is not confined by definition to a precise domain determined by a sector or the scale, but should be considered simply as a point of view, a method of decipherment which may be valid for the whole scale, whatever its size” (2008: 186). Or, as Lazzarato (n.d.) argues, “Liberal macro-governmentality is only possible because it exerts its micropowers upon a multiplicity. These two levels are inseparable.”

In fact, herein lays one of the strengths of a governmentality approach—the way it “brackets the world of underlying forces and causes, and instead [examines] the different ways in which the real has been inscribed in thought” (Larner & Walters 2004a: 16). Thus, for example, rather than taking for granted the existence of something called “the global” that forms the basis for ideas such as globalization, a

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107 In a later lecture Foucault (BB: 77) claims, “the state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual stratification (étatisation).”

108 While Foucault here speaks of scale, his methodological argument resonates with the proposal by some human geographers (for example, Marston, Jones III & Woodward 2005, 2007) to abandon the notion of scale in favor of a “flat ontology.” See the discussion in chapter one of this dissertation.
governmentality approach instead views globalization as “one particular political imagination amongst many, rather than the underlying logic of an epoch or the outcome of global pressures such as international competitiveness” (Larner & Walters 2004a: 18). This means that discourses of the global—globalisation, global governance, global civil society—are thus seen as a particular form of power/knowledge that makes possible and also forecloses different kinds of political practices and arrangements.109

For a number of reasons, these incompatibilities would unlikely be resolved if the type of Marxist framework into which a governmentality perspective were to be integrated is autonomist rather than, say, neo-Gramsican. Trying to work within such overly broad conceptual categories as Empire and Multitude, as Hardt and Negri do, would likely strip a governmentality approach of much of what it has to offer to social and political analysis, particularly its nominalist methodology (as discussed in previous chapters of this study).

For this reason, a second possible way for governmentality studies to take seriously autonomist Marxism’s analysis of contemporary capitalism seems preferable. This could consist of a critical engagement with many of the theoretical claims made by autonomist Marxist thinkers regarding the changing nature of capitalism and related changes in the operations of power and its relation to subjectivity. This need not take the form of a wholesale importation of the conceptual apparatus of autonomist Marxism. Indeed, as Nigel Thrift (2007: 48) argues, terms

109 The idea that space is not a natural, but rather a socially constructed, phenomenon is not unique to a Foucauldian perspective. See for example (Lefebvre 1991; Soja 1989) For a critical genealogy of the global, see (Cosgrove 2001)
such as “immaterial labor” are dispensable. The phenomena and trends they point towards—for example the way that capital increasingly seeks to draw on and make productive the various components of human subjectivity—are areas that easily lend themselves to investigation from a governmentality framework. Indeed, there are already a number of scholars in diverse disciplines who draw inspiration from Foucault and autonomist Marxist thought—as well as from other theoretical traditions and schools of thought (Cooper 2008; Nadesan 2008; Nealon 2008; Read 2003, 2009).

In conclusion, what is being proposed here is to widen the space of inquiry to which governmentality studies are directed. So far this research program has produced a number of richly empirical studies, in a range of disciplines and fields of study, regarding the different governmental projects that seek to shape and directing social reality. However, if we consider the basic notion of governmentality—the conduct of conduct and the structuring of the field of action for possible conduct—then it becomes clear that by failing to incorporate capitalism into our analyses, we leave out a wide range of social and political phenomena that are directly concerned with governing subjects and their relations today. There are obviously a wide range of theoretical resources available for expanding the domain of analysis of governmentality to the contemporary forms of capitalist power and subjectivity, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of the present study (Amin & Thrift 2003; Bayart 2008; R. H. Brown 2003; Comaroff & Comaroff 2001; J. K. Gibson-Graham 2006; Thrift 2005). The aim of this concluding chapter has been to open up a critical
engagement with one such theoretical body—autonomist Marxist thought—and hopefully push governmentality studies in new directions.
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