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Building Regional Security:
Cooperation in the 21st Century:
The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security
System [RSS]

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The views expressed in this research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, Department of Defense, US Southern Command or Florida International University.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs.

- The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation.

- The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly.

- The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware.

- The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material.

- In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism.
• Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same.

• The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox.

• The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM.

• The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives.

• Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space.

• The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration.
• Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century.

• Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region.

• The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes.

• Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states.

• The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean.

• RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment.

• Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.
INTRODUCTION

Many of the factors contributing to crime and violence in the Caribbean—drug and weapons trafficking, money laundering, and deportees—transcend national boundaries. So does the ever present threat of recurring natural disasters. As such, they call for regional or international approaches and interventions that go beyond the local- or national-level responses. This applies to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) region and to the sub-region of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).¹

In the global security environment today, and that of the foreseeable future, small states that lack capacity and act on their own are likely to be marginalized or fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The international security environment is complex and in continuous change. The Caribbean region today, as in the past, is a host to many internal and external actors, both state and non-state, each with its own distinct agenda. The critical issue is not whether Caribbean states should cooperate, but rather in what manner. The challenges are to devise the mechanisms to bring about such cooperation, agree on how they should be implemented and to identify and overcome the obstacles that stand in the way of cooperation.

¹ The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is an organization of 15 Caribbean nations and dependencies to promote economic integration and cooperation among its members and to coordinate regional foreign policy. Its participating members include the seven states of the OECS plus The Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. There are also 5 associate members: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos. The OECS members are: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are associate members.
This paper will look at the Caribbean Regional Security System, and its role and potential in promoting and establishing a more effective regional security system. It also discusses how to structure a more operative RSS and analyzes its significance for the region and its allies.

**THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM (RSS)**

Some of the Caribbean’s regional security institutions were designed to deal with earlier, more traditional threats to national security. In October 1982 four members of the OECS—namely, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Barbados to provide for “mutual assistance on request”. Saint Kitts and Nevis joined following independence in 1983, and Grenada followed two years later, after Operation Urgent Fury, a U.S. intervention (with RSS support) to restore legitimate government to that country. The MOU was updated in 1992 and the system acquired juridical status in March 1996 under the Treaty which was signed at St. Georges, Grenada.

The RSS was conceived as a mutual defense treaty against external aggression or internal coup attempts. Much later, in 1996, the Memorandum of Understanding was upgraded into a treaty. This greatly expanded the scope of issues in which the RSS would be engaged. Today the Eastern Caribbean offers abundant transshipment points for illicit narcotics primarily from Venezuela destined for North American, European and domestic Caribbean markets. The countries of the OECS suffer from dramatic increases in crime rates as more narcotics remain on the streets for local consumption.

and organized gangs take control of distribution in the lucrative drug trade. In addition, manpower resources are scarce, and gaps in the comprehensive and timely vetting of all officers serving in sensitive positions contribute to the vulnerability of narcotics corruption.  

The ability of the RSS alone to deal with this onslaught is limited since its operations are not Caribbean-wide (i.e. in terms of CARICOM). While the RSS’s remit has increased dramatically, its capabilities have increased slowly. Cooperative regional approaches offer a clear advantage for addressing a wider range of security issues such as the preservation of democracy and human rights, and transnational challenges, such as environmental pollution and disaster management. In short, current security challenges in the region require integrated solutions.

**RE-VAMPING THE RSS EFFECTIVENESS**

The RSS could be made more effective but, it has several limitations. Since the late 1960’s proposals to establish a region wide regular army or defense force have failed. During the 1980s, at political levels, it was rejected as too costly an initiative, some political elements charged that the measure was designed by the U.S. to keep conservative pro-U.S. governments in power, and at other times it was

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4 Latest available figures (2008) put the strength of combined police and military personnel from which the RSS can draw down at 5,736. The Air Wing has two C-26 aircraft, capable of surveillance, civil defense operations, logistics, troop transport and search and rescue. From 2002 to 2008 it had flown more than 1500 missions and rates as one of the successful counter drug air operations in the region. For comparison, the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force alone has 5,126 regular forces including Coast Guard and Air Guard units, and a number of modern naval units including OPVs and armed helicopters.
condemned as being an attempt to militarize the Eastern Caribbean. Underlying some of the opposition may be fears that a stronger and larger military organization might in the future not be subordinate to civilian rule, or be used by larger states to encroach on the sovereignty of smaller island nations. Even today the member governments of the RSS are reluctant to make military security a priority or to develop capacity much beyond current levels. Economic and social development takes precedence in the thinking of the political leadership. Furthermore, the military contribution to creating and maintaining stable and democratic societies is perceived by some policy-making elites in the region largely as a constabulary role, fighting crime, providing internal security at the local level or in a neighboring Caribbean country, or as a mechanism to provide disaster relief. These activities, it is argued, require minimal or no investment in military hardware and equipment.  

Today the larger CARICOM countries do invest in defense while the OECS countries in the RSS have tended not to do so. The result is that budgets for defense are low in the RSS member countries and there is constant dependence on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus

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5 For detailed discussions and analyses of attempts and failures to promote a region wide defense force see the scholarly work by Caribbean military personnel: Bostic (1995), Dillon (2001), Bishop (2002), and Ogilvie (2007). The body of work by Ivelaw Griffith provides the most complete insight and analysis into the quest for security in the Caribbean. He treats the perceptions of regional political elites toward security in (Griffith 1991).

6 The RSS budget for fiscal year 2009-2010 was US$ 4,780,848, provided by member states.
is not likely in the foreseeable future. It will also be difficult to create a formal military security arrangement in the CARICOM region and in the OECS sub-region based on either the “collective” or “cooperative” security concepts because there is no agreement on a common military threat perception nor is there a real capacity to employ decisive military force without the cooperation of external friendly powers. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism.

**SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY**

Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security. Security cooperation to achieve this end must be the result of a systemic process that identifies common interests and threats and a coherent approach to deal with the issues. Regional security cooperation should be based on the reality that it would embrace the wider elements of traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century.

Fortunately, there is a history of operational level coordination among the CARICOM militaries as seen in times of crisis situations in Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago and Haiti. Operational arrangements also permit individual member governments to be included in the planning and decision-making, while also allowing them to control their

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7 See above Bostic, Dillon, Bishop, and Olgivie for countervailing arguments.
8 Bailes and Cottey (2006) provide cogent arguments for both cooperative and collective security arrangements in several regions of the world.
9 See APPENDIX RSS: MOBILIZATIONS SINCE INCEPTION.
military forces and its assets and reserve the decision over whether to participate in any military activity. It is the view of several civilian and military analysts that over time, such arrangements increase the ability of the participating military and Special Service Units (SSU) to build standard operating procedures (SOPs) for interaction with larger forces in international duty. Nevertheless, the Caribbean militaries will have to structure military capacity from their own resources and become more responsible for their own security. While larger CARICOM economies such as Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados (an RSS Member) are already managing to do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same.

A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with its traditional external partners in devising a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional cooperation in combating transnational organized crime and drug trafficking requires a standardized legal regime. The internationally accepted vehicle for this standardization is the United Nations system of drugs and crime conventions, namely the three drug conventions (the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances), the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (including the protocols on Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, and Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms), and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACC). While nearly every country in the region has ratified the drug

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conventions, compliance is much less in the case of the crime conventions, particularly the firearms protocol and IACC. However, in the CARICOM region even more direct regional initiatives have been undertaken and they hold the keys to such collaboration.

**First**, the 2002 recommendations of the *Regional Task Force on Crime and Security* (RTFCS) identified the major challenges to security and recommended approaches to deal with related problems such as drugs and weapons trafficking, and crime and violence reduction. The report of the RTFCS shied away from making strong recommendations at the national level since the region is regarded as far too heterogeneous for one-size-fits-all recommendations for interventions at the national level. But the RSS cooperated fully in its deliberations and implementation.

**Second**, the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of *Cricket World Cup* (CWC 2007), some of them mandated by international agencies and governments, gave way to an unprecedented level of cooperation with the result that many mechanisms and institutions were created. The Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), based in Trinidad and Tobago, became the main agency for the regional security implementation during CWC 2007. An unprecedented confidence building measure was the creation of a Single Domestic Space encompassing all OECS countries and Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The Space implied that citizens of these countries and the nationals of other countries visiting from other parts of the world were free to move within the Space after completing migration formalities in the first port of entry. IMPACS spawned two permanent sub-agencies: the Joint Regional Communications Center (JRCC) and the Regional

Intelligence Fusion Center (RIFC) that are now permanent legacy institutions and a testimony to improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean.\(^\text{12}\)

Clearly, security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be on the creation of new agencies but rather focus on generating new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes.

**Hemispheric and Global Initiatives**

A viable RSS will also have to build on operational level cooperation with other Caribbean militaries, with the United States, Canada, France and Holland; the “Atlantic Powers” that have maintained traditional interests in the region, and a new player in the region--China.\(^\text{13}\) Hemispheric and global

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\(^\text{13}\) China has in place an agreement for the free provision of military assistance with Barbados (an RSS member), and an agreement for the provision of military training and equipment to Guyana and Jamaica. For an in depth study of China’s military engagement in Latin America, see Ellis (2011). The author suggests that Chinese military engagement with the region may be understood in terms of five interrelated types of activities: (1) meetings between senior military officials, (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions, (3) military sales, (4) military-relevant commercial interactions, and (5) Chinese physical presence within Latin America with military-strategic implications. Canada has been active in the region in the area of security cooperation since the 1960’s. Its Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP) is widely respected among the Caribbean military. In 2011 Money from a CAN$15 million Anti-Crime Capacity Building Fund has been disbursed to support RSS Air Surveillance Program. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in partnership with the RSS is developing new police training modules.
implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the member states. Therefore, building regional security cooperation will result only from a long-term cooperative, multilateral civil-military effort.

**The Role of the United States**

An important tier of regional security relationships for the region is the U.S, in particular USSOUTHCOM. Independently, the Eastern Caribbean countries have bilateral maritime counternarcotic agreements with the United States. The U.S. Coast Guard provides technical and logistical support for over 40 maritime police and security vessels in the region. The U.S has trained militarized SSUs in each member state of the RSS. Programs such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) provide valuable assistance by increasing military force capabilities and professional training. The RSS participates in the TRADEWINDS exercises that serve to enhance cooperation, interoperability and familiarity between the forces and in Peacekeeping exercises conducted in Central America (FAHUM and PKO NORTH). However, law enforcement capacity in the OECS continues to be under-resourced and plagued with antiquated legal codes and corruption in the ranks. Collectively, the RSS members also struggle with communication and coordination of effort despite their relative close proximity to each other.

Unfortunately, the regional perception is that the United States still accords the Caribbean a low priority in its global security interests. The Caribbean countries can no longer play the “Cuban card” as they did in the 1970s and 1980s as an argument for military assistance from the U.S. The positive aspect is that the continued peacetime engagement for the Caribbean. The United Kingdom and the Caribbean have also had a wide ranging Security Cooperation Plan since 2003.
mission for USSOUTHCOM is what will signify the operational relationship between the U.S. and the Caribbean. The continuing USSOUTHCOM mandate to building military cooperation in the region under its purview is critical for the operational relationship between the U.S. and the RSS for the entire Caribbean region. There should not be any radical shift in the USSOUTHCOM approach.

**Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)**
The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] launched on May 27, 2010, in which the countries of the RSS participate, is a useful tool to strengthen the capabilities of Caribbean countries. The objectives of U.S. policy as outlined in the CBSI are to substantially reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and security, and promote social justice. CBSI programs in support of these objectives will develop and strengthen the capacity of regional defense, law enforcement, and justice sector institutions to detect, interdict, and successfully prosecute criminal elements operating in the region. CBSI will directly address rising crime and violence through demand reduction and crime prevention programs while concurrently developing national and regional capacities to provide greater socio-economic alternatives for vulnerable populations. To enhance the collective capacity of the Eastern Caribbean to combat trafficking and transnational crime, CBSI will provide support for information sharing networks, joint interagency operations and regional training initiatives to promote interoperability. The definition of “security” under the CBSI is a broad mandate that goes beyond assistance for security forces and anti-trafficking efforts.14

The United States is committed to working with its Caribbean neighbors to combat threats that endanger mutual

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14 On CBSI details see:  
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/158556.pdf
security. CBSI signals the beginning of this collaborative approach—one that identifies and provides appropriate and sufficient resources to institutions and communities in a common effort to support their efforts and define mutual strategic priorities. For example, under the U.S. Embassy’s Narcotic Affairs Section (NAS) in Barbados and as part of the long-term U.S. commitment to support and build the capacity of the RSS, the RSS Air Wing is receiving operational support for flight hours and upgrades and maintenance on key equipment.  

Under the CBSI the maritime capabilities of the RSS are being strengthened both on the surface and sub-surface. As the CBSI is implemented, the U.S. expects to strengthen its capacity building efforts in the region through the delivery of new state-of-the-art maritime interdiction platforms as well as command, control, communication and information systems in order to counter illicit trafficking in the Eastern Caribbean.  

Regional collaboration for the RSS should build on the process of operational level cooperation with traditional military partners. In this context the United States should be regarded as a true partner with shared interests and assist the RSS to aspire to a high degree of professionalism. Experience demonstrates that simply training and providing troops with equipment is not entirely effective. The military leadership should also be upgraded at all levels. The concept of multiple centers of gravity, to include public opinion and leadership, must be taught and applied in the RSS. The

15 In November 2010 a ground power unit (GPU) and an aircraft TUG to replace older units that support operations of the two RSS C-26 aircraft. The total value was US 79,000. In 2010 two go-fast interceptor vessels were delivered to each RSS member country. In addition, 35 sets (5 sets to each member state) of diving gear (valued at US$70,000) were provided increasing the ability to conduct sub-surface counter-terrorist searches of critical port infrastructure. Source: US Embassy Bridgetown, Barbados.

16 INCSR (2011)
power of information and public diplomacy and the penalties that are paid when these instruments of power are not used, channeled, or harnessed must be emphasized. Similarly, the notion that inaction can be as much of a threat to stability and security as any other destabilizing factor must be accepted and internalized.

**FUTURE TRENDS IN THE RSS AND THE CARIBBEAN MILITARY**

Facing pressure from governments, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and drug cartels are taking their criminality and violence away from Mexico and Colombia into Central America and the CARICOM region. TCOs will go to the point of least resistance in a “balloon effect” with types of technology in advance of regional law enforcement.17 The RSS members are even less equipped than their larger Caribbean neighbors to combat these problems. Lack of U.S. support is not an option. Proactive RSS participation in the CBSI, and allowing the RSS to take a leading role in establishing strategic and operational priorities regarding law enforcement and counternarcotics program needs provides an efficient and effective means to accomplish security goals under CBSI.18

The need to fight crime in a collaborative approach rather than as separate entities was emphasized by participants at the Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC) in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago in February 2011, which

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17 Estimates are that the RSS is only catching five percent of the total volume of drugs that is being shipped. http://www.barbadosadvocate.com/newsitem.asp?NewsID=12798.
18 The commitment of the Government of Barbados in securing resources to complete the integrated coastal radar system and invest in both maritime and air assets will achieve a new level of domain awareness that will benefit the Eastern Caribbean.
brought together 15 chiefs of defense from the region. The sentiment was echoed by General Douglas Fraser, USSOUTHCOM commander at the same conference.\textsuperscript{19}

Under discussion by Caribbean military chiefs is the evolving role of the military into nontraditional roles to combat illicit trafficking and crime. Traditionally defense forces have had primary responsibility for national defense and the police for internal security. A sea change in this division of labor will lead to closer relationships between the military and corresponding law enforcement agencies. There is general consensus that the region is at the point where the armed forces should be granted law enforcement authority. Also under discussion (in March 2011) by National Security Ministers from countries represented on the RSS were proposals for the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space.\textsuperscript{20}

**CONCLUSION**

The institutional mechanisms to confront dangers to national and public security in the member states of the RSS exist and the efforts are commendable. Limitations of capability have not stifled initiatives or the will to do better. The reliance on external support is a necessity, because realistically regional resources are limited. Security challenges are fluid demanding constant upgrades of institutions and materiel to meet them. Consequently, there are implications, both

\textsuperscript{19} Diálogo (2011)

\textsuperscript{20} See the interview with Brigadier General Edmund Dillon of the TTDF in Diálogo (2010) and the report of the security ministers meeting: http://www.nationnews.com/articles/view/regional-security-ministers-meeting/
positive and negative, in regional efforts to constantly adjust the architecture of regional security collaboration and cooperation.
### APPENDIX
### RSS MOBILIZATIONS SINCE INCEPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME OF RSS OPERATION</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Grenada Intervention</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Restore a government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Hugo</td>
<td>Antigua, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>Assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Coup</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>Provide additional security in the aftermath of an attempted Coup d’état in Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Internal Security</td>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>Prison Uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Luis, Marilyn</td>
<td>Antigua and St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>Assistance in the aftermath of Hurricanes Luis and Marilyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Georges</td>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>Assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Georges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Weed eater</td>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>Eradication of Cannabis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Bordelais</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>Transfer prisoners to a new prison facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ivan Relief Efforts</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Glendairy</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Restore Peace after Prison Uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>CWC 07</td>
<td>Member States</td>
<td>Security for Cricket World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Vincypac</td>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>Eradication of Cannabis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Assistance in the aftermath of the Haiti 2010 Earthquake</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WORKS CITED


J. Edward Greene, and Timothy M. Shaw, eds. 


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Anthony T. Bryan is a Senior Associate (Non-Resident) of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, the University of the West Indies-St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago. From 1992 to 2004 he was the director of the Caribbean Studies Program at the Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami. Formerly a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., and a tenured Associate Professor of History at the University of Rhode Island, he also served for a decade, as the director of the Institute of International Relations and tenured Professor of International Relations at the University of the West Indies-St. Augustine.

During his career Professor Bryan has held visiting professorial appointments: at Indiana University-Bloomington, The University of Texas-Austin, Georgetown University, and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

From 2001 to 2007 he was one of the principals of a multi-year major research project on Adapting Border Controls to Support Caribbean Trade and Development, funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. He also collaborated on a 3-year research project on Caribbean Trade, Development and Security at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London. Currently, he is a consultant to a project, funded by several Central American foundations, engaged in a strategic security assessment of Central America. Born in Trinidad and Tobago, he received his PhD in Latin American History from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He is the
author/editor of 10 books and more than 100 articles on Caribbean and Latin American themes such as regional security, energy security and energy geopolitics, trade and integration, smaller economies, and small state diplomacy.

A major part of his professional career has been spent in consulting and advisement to the private sector, governments and international organizations. He has been a member of several Cabinet appointed committees in Trinidad and Tobago on foreign relations and has testified on U.S.-Caribbean trade issues before Congressional Committees on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. on several occasions.
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The Applied Research Center advances the research and academic mission of Florida International University. ARC’s focus is to solve real-world problems through multi-disciplinary research collaborations within the University's increasingly talented applied and basic research units. It is uniquely structured and staffed to allow for free-flowing exchange of ideas between the University's applied researchers, academia, government, private sector and industry partners. The ARC's vision is to be the leading international university-based applied research institution providing value-driven, real-world solutions, which will enable FIU to acquire, manage, and execute educationally relevant and economically sound research programs. That vision is based on the Center's core values of respect for the environment, health and safety of all individuals, creativity and innovation, service excellence, and leadership and accountability. The Applied Research Center is organized into three core research units: Environment; Energy, and Security and Development. Under the leadership of its Executive Director, the Center reports to FIU’s Office of Sponsored Research Administration. An External Advisory Board, encompassing leaders from the private and public sectors, participates actively in the Center's growth and development. The Florida International University Applied Research Council, a team of University deans, executives and faculty guide the development of the Center's programs.

Florida International University is Miami’s first and only four-year public research university with a student body of more than 40,000. It is one of the 25 largest universities in the nation. FIU’s colleges and schools offer nearly 200 bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral programs in fields such as international relations, law and engineering. As one of South Florida’s anchor institutions, FIU has been locally and globally engaged for more than four decades finding solutions to the most challenging problems of our time. FIU emphasizes research as a major component of its mission. The opening of the Herbert Wertheim College of Medicine in August 2009 has enhanced the university’s ability to create lasting change through its research initiatives. Overall, sponsored research funding for the university (grants and contracts) from external sources for the year 2008-2009 totaled approximately $101 million.

The United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is one of ten unified Combatant Commands (COCOMs) in the Department of Defense. It is responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean, and their territorial waters; as well as for the force protection of U.S. military resources at these locations.

The National Defense Center for Energy and the Environment (NDCEE) provides reliable and sustainable solutions to the US Department of Defense in areas ranging from contingency operations to global climate change and greenhouse gas reduction to safety and occupational health. These solutions increase mission readiness and improve the health and safety of our Armed Forces both at home and abroad. The NDCEE provides project management and technical support to the WHEMSAC Program.