The Latin American Military in the New Millennium
Mexico leads the world in community management of forests for the commercial production of timber. Yet this success story is not widely known, even in Mexico, despite the fact that communities around the globe are increasingly involved in managing their own forest resources. To assess the achievements and shortcomings of Mexico’s community forest management programs and to offer approaches that can be applied in other parts of the world, this book collects fourteen articles that explore community forest management from historical, policy, economic, ecological, sociological and political perspectives.

The contributors to this book are established researchers in the field, as well as many of the important actors in Mexico’s nongovernmental organization sector. Some articles are case studies of community forest management programs in the states of Michoacán, Oaxaca, Durango, Quintana Roo and Guerrero. Others provide broader historical and contemporary overviews of various aspects of community forest management. As a whole, this volume clearly establishes that the community forest sector in Mexico is large, diverse, and has achieved unusual maturity in doing what communities in the rest of the world are only beginning to explore: how to balance community income with forest conservation. In this process, Mexican communities are also managing for sustainable landscapes and livelihoods.

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Félix E. Martín

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FROM THE GUEST EDITOR

The Latin American Military in the New Millennium

On October 26, 1998, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs heralded the formalization of the peace agreement between Ecuador and Peru as the final settlement of the “hemisphere’s last armed territorial dispute.” In effect, the signing of this accord in Brasilia by Presidents Jamil Mahuad of Ecuador and Alberto Fujimori of Peru ended one of the most acrimonious and virulent enmities in the Western Hemisphere since the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in the 1930s. Diplomacy had triumphed over the use of military force as a conflict-solving mechanism.

The immediate result of this resolution was the elimination of the most urgent traditional threat to interstate peace and security in Latin America. More importantly, however, the diplomatic settlement of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian militarized dispute signaled the end of conventional security threats in the region and the completion of a long-evolving process of intraregional, interstate peace. Moreover, it was a clear indication to the region’s decision makers and militaries that a transition in doctrine, posture, strategy, training and mission was not only desirable but necessary. The recognition of these military policy implications became more critical in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, and the emergence and intensification of new security threats, ranging from human contraband and transnational urban gang warfare to biochemical and nuclear terrorism. The convergence of these security trends in the new millennium effectively rendered obsolete the traditional configuration and posture of the Latin American militaries, exposing more overtly the need for a major transformation of the region’s armed forces.

Recognizing the importance of the military institution in Latin American politics and societies, Dr. Eduardo A. Gamarra, editor of Hemisphere, invited me to serve as guest editor of this issue devoted entirely to the military and security in the new millennium. I gladly accepted the honor and proceeded to assemble an international group of civil-military, defense and security experts for the purpose of examining the various aspects of the military institution with respect to its old and new missions, its internal composition, and its potential and actual impact on national, regional and international politics. With these general themes in mind, my own feature essay examines whether the military has become obsolete, given the prevalence of intraregional and the nature of new security threats. I argue that the military in its present form does not serve the socioeconomic and security needs of Latin American polities and, in fact, represents a budgetary drain and potential threat to national political processes. I conclude by advocating the revamping of the military into a smaller, highly mobile, technically sophisticated and totally defensive force under strict civilian control.

Rut Diamint in her feature article points out that, in the current international environment, the quality of democracy is as important in interstate relations as other tools of statecraft, including the military apparatus. But given the present tension between democratic weaknesses and new threats in Latin America, she suggests rethinking the military. She discusses the legitimacy of democratic values, the present military identity crisis, the current budgetary constraints, the internationalization of military missions, and the increased transparency among military establishments in the post-Cold War period as important factors that have affected the military institution. Yet, she explains that many are demanding the return of the military to serve in urban law and order functions. She counsels against bringing the military back to serve in this capacity. Instead, she argues that national and civil security depends on respect for constitutional order.

Michael Collier in his feature article introduces the OAS Declaration of Security (2003) and discusses the expansion of the list of security threats facing the Americas. Based on an analysis of this document, he proceeds to develop a multidimensional security model for organizing the 21st century security forces in the region. He examines the differing organizational cultures, unclear jurisdictions and command and control procedures, failures to share information, and sovereignty concerns. He argues that these are some of the challenges to implementing the model.

Kristina Mani in her contribution analyzes the internationalization of
the military since the 1990s via traditional UN peacekeeping missions and the contracting of former soldiers and police by private military firms for service abroad. She warns that this adds a complex layer to existing concerns over the roles that the military should assume in the environment of electoral democracy. She describes how internationalization provides Latin American militaries with opportunities and resources that they lack in their domestic environment, discusses peacekeeping and contracting trends in the region, and identifies some consequences from involvement in both areas of activity. She concludes that peacekeeping is no longer the solution for military transformation and that while military contracting improves economic conditions for a few countries, it may carry sociopolitical costs.

In his essay, Paul Taylor discusses the failure of policy makers to pay attention to the potential effects of free trade agreements on national security. He examines both NAFTA and CAPTA-DR in reference to their actual and potential effects on national security issues. He discusses how these relate to factors that purportedly foster domestic sociopolitical disruption, strengthen democracy, increase illegal immigration, and improve relations with the United States. The article surmises that each of these factors will play out differently from country to country.

This issue contains several reports on more country-specific military affairs. Miguel Centeno looks into the future of Cuba's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). He reflects on the inevitable scenario of a post-Castro Cuba, where the Maximum Leader's "personal and historic charisma" will no longer serve as a control mechanism and link to the future. Centeno discusses a number of potential crisis situations and sociopolitical anxieties. He underscores the pivotal role the FAR could play in a post-Castro milieu; but he laments the lack of knowledge about the internal affairs of the Cuban armed forces. Comparing the FAR to the Iraqi military in 2003, he hopes that social order could be maintained in Cuba. He concludes that "the only possible way" to guarantee this end is if the FAR, as an institution, remains as a "guarantor of internal peace and defender of the national territory."

Arturo Sotomayor in his report on the Mexican military conceives that US hegemony is rampant in every aspect of Mexican society, except in military affairs. He argues that while the US has emphasized military and strategic affairs in Latin America, Mexico has de-emphasized these foreign policy goals. He considers the important and comprehensive institutional changes that have taken place in Mexico during the recent transition to democracy, but maintains that the Mexican military has not kept pace with these transformations. In fact, he argues that presently the Mexican military is "probably less modern and effective and far more politicized and nationalist than 10 years ago."

Accordingly, he examines the evolutionary process in Mexico and its effect on the military. He concludes that political liberalization in Mexico "has made the armed forces even more inward-looking, nationalist and xenophobic."

Héctor Saint-Pierre and Érica Winand examine Brazil's defense policy under the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. They claim that in its relations with the military, Lula's administration is committing mistakes similar to those of previous governments. It has allowed the armed forces to take on greater secondary domestic missions, transgressing their constitutionally defined functions. The authors examine how this policy has come to pass and its implications for democratic consolidation. Moreover, they concede—as Diamint and others have alluded to in this issue—that the lack of domestic security has permitted many Brazilians "to knock on the doors of military barracks looking for a solution to their plight." They advise against this practice and argue that it may produce greater politicization of the military in Brazil. They conclude that the use of the military for political and law and order functions increases the risks to democracy.

This issue of Hemisphere features a photo essay entitled "Promoting Security Cooperation" by José Ruiz from the Public Affairs Office of the US Southern Command in Miami, Florida. As the title reveals, it highlights the role of the US military in humanitarian and collaborative security functions in the Americas. Finally, Marian Goslinga wraps up the issue with a bibliography of new and recent titles on civil-military relations, new security threats, and the Latin American military institution.

In closing, I would like to extend my appreciation to Dr. Eduardo Gamarra for trusting my editorial ideas and skills. I would also like to underscore the crucial behind-the-scenes contributions to the successful publication of this issue of managing editor Pedro Botta, Dr. Michael Collier, Eloisa López, Liesl Picard and Jorge Gómez. Finally, I extend to the authors my most sincere appreciation for adhering diligently to all deadlines and for putting aside their own work in order to share graciously with us the fruits of their research, analyses and ideas.

FÉLIX E. MARTÍN
Founded in 1979, LACC is a leader in the field of Latin American and Caribbean studies. As a federally funded Title VI National Resource Center for Language and Area studies, LACC has a mandate to promote graduate and undergraduate education, faculty research and public education on Latin American and Caribbean affairs.

Florida International University has one of the largest concentrations of Latin American and Caribbean studies scholars of any university in the United States. LACC’s faculty associates range across many fields and have produced important works on such topics as migration, US-Latin American relations, trade and integration in the Americas, indigenous cultures, economic stabilization and democratization, sustainable development and environmental technology. FIU Latin Americanists include highly regarded social scientists, humanists, artists, business experts and engineers.

LACC’s base in Miami also provides the center with certain unique assets. As its programs have grown, LACC has become in many ways a microcosm of the city itself: a mosaic of Caribbean, Mexican, Central American and South American influences. This inter-American setting provides an ideal field-like environment for research and study. LACC’s partnerships with a long list of universities and research centers in the Americas also bring the region closer to home. Through these networks, LACC co-sponsors research projects, major conferences, and faculty and student exchanges.

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Internal political violence, military coups, dictatorships, counterinsurgency campaigns and low-intensity warfare have plagued the history of Latin American states. Less evident is the fact that these countries have engaged in traditional intraregional war only once since 1935. In 189 years (1816-2005), Latin American countries waged only six major wars (i.e., military conflicts netting at least 1000 battlefield fatalities): four in the 19th century, one in the first half of the 20th century, and only one since the end of the Chaco War in 1935 (the 1969 Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras). Yet Latin America's militaries have continued to arm and train for traditional warfare against regional threats. Even in the current environment of relative peace and intraregional cooperation, the armed forces' existential justification, configuration and power are based on the presumption of a conventional threat to state sovereignty from a neighboring enemy.

This article takes the Militarist Peace argument as the basis for an inquiry into the symbolic and functional needs of the Latin American military in its traditional posture. It argues that the military in its present form represents a budgetary drain and a potential threat to national political processes. It concludes by advocating the revamping of the military into a smaller, highly mobile, technically sophisticated and wholly defensive force under strict civilian control.

The Militarist Peace
The Militarist Peace argument advances the notion of the transnationalization of the Latin American military; in other words, that members of the armed forces develop shared socioeconomic values, beliefs and principles that foster increasing identification with the interests and success of other military institutions across intraregional boundaries. In societies without effective civilian control over the armed forces, the military institution is a pivotal, organized and disciplined national political actor. Latin America's militaries have been at the center (or have been the gatekeepers) of the war-making decision process in each state, with the power to influence decisively whether to pursue national political objectives via the external use of force. Understandably, social power can produce a desired outcome—in this case, intraregional, interstate peace—only if the actor in a position of power decides to pursue such an objective. In the post-Chaco War period, Latin America's military institutions have lacked the motivation or interest to wage external wars. Instead, the sizable stake of the military in the national political process has made the armed forces inward-looking and profoundly concerned with internal threats to their institutional interests. This evolutionary dynamic leads directly to the paradox of external peace and internal political violence in Latin America.

Latin American states with long democratic traditions and lingering territorial disputes have experienced internal political violence in an environment of intraregional, interstate peace. For example, the period of intense political violence in Colombian history known as La Violencia caused more than 200,000 deaths from 1946 to 1964, and the country's current domestic insurgency has been going on for the last 30 years. In 1973, Chile experienced the most brutal and violent military coup in South American history. The political repression left a toll of close to 2000 dead and hundreds disappeared, ending four decades of internal political peace and uninterrupted democratic rule. Finally, since 1958 Venezuelan democracy has been shaken several times by intense political violence and insurgency, including El Caracazo, the intense street protests in Caracas in February 1989; the foiled coup attempt against President Carlos Andrés Pérez in February 1992; and the protests and brief military coup against President Hugo Chávez Frías in April 2002. None of these countries, however, resorted to military means to settle bilateral disputes with their neighbors, despite conflicts between, for instance, Colombia and Venezuela, and Chile and Peru.

The difference between the military's regional and national behaviors is primarily the consequence of institutional interests and motivations that have evolved consistently throughout the post-Chaco War period. This social process redirected the focus of the military mission from protecting the state against external threats to seeking internal...
The obsolescence of the Latin American military

Delegates at the signing of the Chaco Treaty in Buenos Aires, 1938. The treaty formalized the 1935 ceasefire that ended one of the bloodiest interstate conflicts in Latin American history. The Chaco War stands as the turning point in the collective mentality and attitude of the Latin American military.

security and political control of the government. In the long term, it has generated a universal disinterest among Latin America's military establishments in pursuing political and strategic objectives via the external use of force.

The Process of Military Socialization

Four historical factors have shaped the evolution of the Latin American military. First, the professionalization of the armed forces in the late 19th century took control away from the armed bands that served the interests of local caudillos, who disregarded national boundary lines and sparked bilateral armed conflicts for personal gain, and shifted it to an officer corps made up of better educated and less adventurous individuals with more respect for their institutional obligations, neighboring military establishments and international borders. Military professionalization reduced dramatically the level of intraregional, interstate violence prevalent prior to 1886. In a continuation of this process, the “new” professionalism in the 1950s increased the internal political role of the military. Alfred Stepan draws a distinction between the old professionalism of external warfare and the new professionalism of internal security and national development. The success of revolutionary warfare against conventional armies in the 1950s and 1960s, he argues, led the armed forces to focus on military and political strategies to combat or prevent domestic insurrection, shifting their...
mission from external to internal warfare. Ultimately, these twin processes of military professionalization decreased the level of intraregional, interstate violence and increased domestic violence and military politicization.

Second, the fratricidal Chaco War stands as the turning point in the collective mentality and attitude of the Latin American military. In contrast to the intraregional, interstate wars of the 19th century, which were fought between unprofessional caudillo armies, remnants of the wars of independence, local militia bands, adventurers and soldiers-statesmen, the war between Bolivia and Paraguay was the first major conflict since the professionalization of the armed forces began in 1886. The high number of casualties and the material and moral costs sustained by both military establishments represent the first clear evidence for the regional militarization that during times of war, officers and soldiers bear the brunt of the suffering. The most significant lesson of the war, however, was the political discredit of the military in both countries for permitting foreign commercial interests to manipulate them and drive them to battle. The Chaco War sensitized the military to the institutional, socioeconomic, political and human costs of intraregional, interstate wars. Within two years of its conclusion, Bolivia and Paraguay underwent political upheaval, succession of governments and social unrest. This episode may have taught Latin America's militaries that they did not need an external war to increase their domestic political power and, perhaps, made them realize that war was not only very costly, but could eventually lead to national unrest and loss of political power—a lesson the Argentine military was forced to relearn decades later after the South Atlantic fiasco. Less than two years after the Anglo-Argentine conflict, the military not only had to surrender control of the government to civilian authorities but, more important, many officers lost their individual freedom when they were incarcerated at home and sought abroad by other countries' justice systems for abuses committed while in power. In addition to the political and human costs, the military institution in Argentina was reduced considerably (in its budget, equipment, personnel and political role) by successive civilian governments after 1984.

Third, the process of socialization continued its course and acquired added strength during and after the Second World War. The effort by the United States to organize a hemispheric defense pact against an extracontinental power in the postwar period brought Latin America's militaries closer together. Officers from around the region attended military training schools together and met at conferences and social-political functions that allowed them to mingle in a more relaxed social setting than in their respective governmental positions. The end of World War II also ushered in a greater politicization of the military. Latin America's armed forces began to perceive one another as members of a loosely organized supranational structure engaged mostly in political competition for control over the governments of their respective states. As a result, they began to see other socioeconomic groups, political factions and organizations in their own countries as their true enemies rather than their military counterparts across national borders.

Finally, the politicization and gradual amalgamation of all military sectors in Latin America into an overarching regional socioeconomic and political institution gained further momentum after the Costa Rican Civil War of 1948 and the Cuban Revolution of 1959. The immediate and permanent dissolution of the Costa Rican armed forces after 1948 and the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista's military dictatorship in Cuba demonstrated that socioeconomic and political discontent at home, properly channeled by urban political opposition groups and armed guerrillas in the countryside, could seriously undermine the socioeconomic, political and institutional interests of the military in any country in the region. The dismantling of the old military institution in Costa Rica and Cuba, the new Cuban leadership's subsequent turn toward the Soviet orbit, and Cuba's active promotion and support of leftist guerrillas in Latin America during the 1960s instilled great fear and distrust in the military. It became clear to armed forces everywhere that they had to stand together and address the economic needs and socioeconomic and political discontent of their people. Their response was a two-pronged approach: first, to engage actively in economic development projects and, second, to control all national socioeconomic and political groups and organizations in their respective polities.

The Incongruity of Military Posture and Function

Paradoxically, while interstate peace has matured in Latin America and a stronger spirit of cooperation and understanding has set in, the region's militaries continue to spend, arm and train in preparation for traditional security threats. A look at military expenditures as reported in the SIPRI Yearbook for 2004 reveals that in the period from
Despite some reductions in the demand for arms in Latin America, how can we explain this behavior? The rest of the countries in the region actually increased their respective shares, with Colombia leading the pack at 1.6 percent; Ecuador, 1.0; Chile, 0.6; Paraguay and Peru, 0.5 each; and Brazil, 0.4. These figures may rise even more if an arms race breaks out in South America as a result of Venezuela's proposed purchase of 100,000 AK-47 assault rifles, 24 Super Tucano Brazilian multipurpose aircraft, 40 Mig-29 fighters and possibly even submarines from Russia, as well as its deal to acquire 12 military transport and surveillance aircrafts and 10 coastal patrol naval vessels from Spain. In addition, according to The Military Balance for the period 2004-2005, all of the countries in the region, with the exception of Argentina, have maintained a consistent level of active-duty forces. Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela have invested in or are considering the upgrade of their conventional forces. If the risk of conventional interstate war is remote in Latin America, how can we explain this behavior?

One possible explanation is that despite some reductions in the political autonomy and influence of the military in some countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, the military as an institution remains an important political actor in most of Latin America. This political legitimacy stems from the military's role as the protector of the country, leading it to justify its sizable existence and spend its monetary resources—and, in some cases, seek to expand its budget—to purchase expensive conventional equipment.

The Solution: Revamping the Military

Given the high levels of poverty in most Latin American states and the changed nature of threats in the region, the current pace of military expenditure and procurement is fiscally irresponsible and functionally superfluous. Latin American states should work to transition their militaries to a defense role better suited to the threats and realities of the new millennium. On the one hand, internal threats—such as extreme poverty, urban gangs and drug trafficking—call for a domestic-focused special force under strict civilian control. On the other hand, external threats such as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and porous borders demand a force with greater intelligence-gathering capabilities and sophisticated technology to monitor sea and land borders. Since the threat is no longer another standing army or blue-water navy, Latin America's militaries should transform into technically advanced, highly mobile and lightly armed special-defense forces under the absolute and strict control of elected civilians. The time to squander financial resources on traditional armed forces for internal political purposes and nationalistic symbolism is over. The possibility of intraregional, interstate wars in the coming decades is close to zero, and other nationalistic symbols can easily supplant the military in that capacity. Costa Rica, for example, has remained an independent, well-respected sovereign state without the added expenditure of a traditional military establishment. Finally, in the current regional environment of relative interstate peace, Latin American decision makers should avoid bellicose language and military procurement policies that may trigger arms races, intense animosities and even armed conflict. One solution is to transform the armed forces from a traditional military posture to a small defensive force under strict civilian control.

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Democracy and Defense

by Rut Diamint

The processes of consolidating and increasing democracy have changed expectations about the elements that constitute state security. During the Cold War the majority consensus was that military power and technological developments guaranteed greater influence and ensured better capacity for international negotiation. This view has changed, and other principles now appear to determine a country's position among nations. Control over communications, technological advances, transportation and production flexibility are as crucial as having a well-trained army, as is the quality of democracy in any given state.

The tension between democratic weaknesses and new threats makes it necessary to rethink the nature of the military, the ultimate means of power in relations between states. The armed forces are the military branch of foreign policy, complementing the objectives that a government establishes, but they should in no way act as a factor that obstructs government interests and decisions.

The Military in a Democracy

The renewed legitimacy of the values associated with democracy is essential in discussing the role of the military. In Latin America, military missions are influenced by human rights policy, an international value that affects national policy decisions. The Pinochet case, for example, shows that civilian governments now have an ability to sanc-

Brazilian soldiers search through a Rio favela looking for suspected drug traffickers. Some observers argue that such law and order functions should be left to civilian police units and not the armed forces.
The democratic management of defense and the challenges of defining the military's new role

tion that they did not have 20 years ago. To some degree, this has changed the ability of states to adopt authoritarian policies by limiting the ability of military officers to carry out actions against civilians.

Democracy has expanded on the continent at an uneven rate, however. Some nations are moving toward processes of democratic consolidation while accepting military prerogatives that create imbalances between the decisions of military institutions and other government bodies. To mention a few cases, the Mexican military rejects government interference; the government of Paraguay cannot control the corrosive relationship between the military and former coup leader Lino Oviedo; and Brazil, as Jorge Zaverucha, João Martins and Daniel Zirker document in recent articles, entrusts the military with handling defense and government intelligence.

The military has undergone an identity crisis as it has lost its traditional enemies and the operational and doctrinal criteria of the past have become outdated in terms of offering solutions to an agenda now determined by subregional integration. In addition, the majority of Latin American nations made the shift to democracy due to both internal crises and conditions imposed by international organizations. Democratization, therefore, has been accompanied by reform, which assumes strengthening institutions and adapting them to the new determining factors of the international market. The armed forces do not play a central role at

the national level in this environment and because of this, they cannot go hunting for missions for which they are neither prepared nor have the appropriate tools. The inclusion of the army in urban operations carries the perception of repressing crime. The military is not trained to be on the street nor does it have the appropriate tools to control citizens. The weapons of war are not suitable for patrol activities; moreover, the military is accustomed to a highly hierarchical chain of command that is inappropriate for handling civilian violations. Each institution has a different purpose and in order for democracy to function correctly, it is necessary to avoid overlapping roles that could jeopardize human rights. The armed forces' role is to be an arm of foreign policy, not a domestic police force.

The Armed Forces and the Economy

Government reforms create a financial ceiling for the modernization of government jurisdictions, including those related to updating military equipment. International financial organizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank lend money to revitalize ministries and decrease the quantity of public employees, but they exclude from these loans agencies linked to defense and security. The conditionalities package established by international financial entities is accompanied by indirect or informal pressures exercised by powerful countries to influence the Latin American armed forces to adopt a predetermined agenda.

Even given these budgetary limitations, the arms race continues to some extent in the region. Plans to equip the Chilean Air Force have created demands for modernization in other countries. The Cardoso government in Brazil sparked several internal crises after it announced plans to build a nuclear submarine. Peru was able to equip itself by using war with Ecuador as a justification and via a corrupt alliance between the Fujimori government and military groups. Equipping the Colombian armed forces to fight guerrillas, as various Foreign Policy in Focus documents assert, generates a regional imbalance whose consequences will be revealed over the long term. In the absence of specific defense policies and effective regional accords, these trends revitalize military power.

Military Missions and Foreign Policy

The post-Cold War context has been a window of opportunity for Latin American civilian governments to reformulate past conflicts between neighboring nations. The region's militaries have intensified training with institutions from other countries and increased their combined operations in missions under the mandate of the United Nations. Such combined operations require transparent criteria, doctrines and organizational modes by obliging defense ministries to reveal their weapons, equipment and level of performance to other nations.
This transparency undermines the perceived threats that justified earlier defense plans. Whereas past cooperative military efforts—in particular, “Operation Condor,” an agreement between military governments in Argentina, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil to pursue guerrillas across national borders—were developed under authoritarian governments, joint operations are now coordinated by civil service employees. These regional processes produce security; neighbors are no longer the enemy and in some cases can even be partners against a specific threat, as well as environmental problems or rescue missions. Measures to promote trust, meetings of the hemisphere’s defense ministers and operations between different nations are part of a framework in which each state organizes its military activities supported by democratic criteria.

Peace missions deepen civil defense since they are conducted by civilian governments and the United Nations. Those responsible for administering the contribution to peace missions are national government employees who represent their respective governments at UN headquarters. These diplomats receive requests from the Security Council and transmit them to their governments. It is a purely civil process that guarantees political control over the military, reinforcing the institutional concept of democracies and strengthening internal negotiation processes between agencies.

Finally, participation in peace missions changes the criteria of authority by changing chains of command. Missions often include forces from different countries led by an officer from another nation. The militaries that participate must accept directives issued by officials with whom they maintain professional ties but not corporatist loyalties. In Cyprus, for example, the Argentine army shared a mission with British forces who had been their enemies in the Falkland Islands war. This peace mission forced both countries to put their respect for international law ahead of the nationalist ideals that are deeply entrenched in military tradition. The current peacekeeping mission in Haiti unites troops from various Latin American countries under the command of a Brazilian general. Such exercises exert control over the armed forces and promote democratic values, improving the armed forces’ professionalism and contributing to the security of their societies and the international community.

Military Missions and Public Order
States must articulate their power with an international agenda in which a series of public and private players converge to face a set of threats that are not necessarily generated by a government entity and cannot be confronted by the capacities of one nation unilaterally and autonomously. Jorge I. Domínguez calls this situation “intermetrics,” as there is no clear distinction between international and domestic issues.

Just as 20 years ago civilians claimed greater control over the armed forces, today many demand more military intervention in policing duties to improve security conditions. In many countries in the region, police commitment to the law is questionable; beyond failing to protect citizens’ rights, police officers themselves are considered a source of crime. Police forces across the region have been denounced as corrupt and linked to illegal activities such as drug trafficking, smuggling and extortion.

During the period of authoritarian rule, it was common for the police force to depend on the army for its mission and function and to collaborate in internal repression. Democratic governments have reformed the police in an attempt to separate foreign defense from domestic security. Increasing levels of urban violence and civilian insecurity, however, have led to an overlap between military and police functions, a situation that disrupts institutional checks while failing to provide solutions to public insecurity.

In response to the increase in activities related to drug trafficking and organized crime or the need to contain demonstrations expressing discontent with social exclusion, many governments are turning once again to the armed forces when domestic security forces are overwhelmed. Shortcomings in the definition and civil management of defense policies, combined with government requests to carry out actions directed at the civilian population, recreate old traditions of military control over the citizenry that should be eradicated in a democracy.

A Fragile Balance
The expansion of terrorist networks and other organized criminal activities, guerrilla movements financed by drugs and kidnapping, and the misuse of natural resources require a response rooted in social legitimacy. The basis for this legitimacy is society’s express consent that government actions reflect the supremacy of a civilian authority that acts in accordance with institutional norms. This guarantee is essential to consolidate the rule of law and to shore up the nation’s role on the international stage and it must be accompanied by civilian monitoring, whether by parliamen-
tary, administrative, judicial, ombudsman or civil society organizations. The mandate for civil control of the security apparatus is a basic requirement of governability, although lack of transparency and reporting are problems in controlling the budgets for the different branches of the armed forces.

Democracy has created expectations about the international legal elements that grant security to states. National and civil security depends directly on observing constitutional order, the laws and practices agreed upon by consensus. No institution can have authority or fulfill its public duties if it acts outside the law. In Latin America, democratic processes are fragile, government employees continue to display a lack of responsibility, and mechanisms for transparency and accountability are superficial. In a context of public disapproval of political parties, increased civil violence and deep asymmetries, respect for the rules and legality of the political game is still a major challenge for Latin American democracies.

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New from the University of Pittsburgh Press

**POLITICAL (IN)JUSTICE**

*Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile and Argentina*

by Anthony W. Pereira

*Political (In)Justice* compares the legal aspects of political repression in three recent military regimes: Brazil (1964-1985), Chile (1973-1990) and Argentina (1976-1983). By focusing on political trials as a reflection of each regime's overall approach to the law, Anthony Pereira argues that the practice of each regime can be explained by examining the prior relationship between the judiciary and the military. Brazil was marked by a high degree of judicial-military integration and cooperation; Chile's military essentially usurped judicial authority; and in Argentina, the military negated the judiciary altogether. Pereira extends the judicial-military framework to other authoritarian regimes—Salazar's Portugal, Hitler's Germany, and Franco's Spain—and a democracy (the United States) to illuminate historical and contemporary aspects of state coercion and the rule of law.
The Hemispheric Security Agenda

by Michael W. Collier

The Organization of American States Declaration on Security in the Americas (October 2003) greatly expands the scope of the hemispheric security agenda. In addition to traditional security threats of terrorism, organized crime and weapons of mass destruction, it cites such nontraditional threats as extreme poverty and social exclusion; natural and manmade disasters; HIV/AIDS, diseases and other health risks; environmental degradation; human trafficking; and cyber attacks. To address this expanded agenda, the declaration calls for ambitious measures to strengthen bilateral and subregional security and defense agreements and cooperation. This article outlines a model for conceptualizing the OAS’s new multidimensional approach to the problem and discusses several challenges that could easily undermine the goal of improved regional security.

Military and Law Enforcement Roles

Eduardo Gamarra and Douglas Kincaid, in a chapter of Latin America in the World Economy (1996), offer a security model that encompasses three distinct security categories—national security, public security and citizen security. National security is handled by the military and includes preparation for and response to threats to the state’s territory, institutions and sovereignty. Citizen security is the responsibility of law enforcement agencies and includes response to an array of threats to individual citizens. Public security is the gray area between national and citizen security. It involves threats to the public at large that can quickly overwhelm law enforcement agencies and thus require military resources and expertise.

Table 1 adapts Gamarra and Kincaid’s model to include the threats listed in the OAS declaration. It shows the three security categories (national, public and citizen), the general threats associated with each category, and the state security forces most likely to respond. The table does not include several nontraditional factors cited by the OAS—extreme poverty and social exclusion, and HIV/AIDS, diseases and other health risks—which, while recognized as underlying causes of state instability, do not lend themselves to direct response by state security forces and are better left to social agencies.

As Table 1 shows, the hemispheric security agenda is complex. Efforts to address it must involve both a state’s internal security operations and bilateral and subregional security and defense agreements.

Historically, military and law enforcement agencies have developed procedures and trained for missions under the national and citizen security categories outlined in Table 1. Military and law enforcement standard operating procedures are normally well established in these familiar mission areas. Over the past two to three decades, however, the changing regional security situation has forced military and law enforcement agencies to cooperate more closely against the growing public security threat. Joint military-law enforcement operations are still a relatively new concept for Latin American security forces, and few standard interagency procedures exist. Neither military nor law enforcement forces are versed in the capabilities and operating procedures of their new interagency partners and public security missions are often carried out in a disorganized, ad hoc manner.

Challenges to Joint Missions

With intrastate security force cooperation so difficult, the increased interstate security operations proposed by the OAS pose a formidable challenge. The main obstacles to executing not only internal public security missions but also those on a bilateral and subregional scale include issues of organizational culture, jurisdiction, command authority and intelligence sharing. Added to this list for bilateral and subregional operations are sovereignty concerns.

Given the nature of their differing missions, sizes, capabilities and training, military and law enforcement organizations have completely different organizational cultures that can lead to interagency tensions and conflicts. Military cultures tend to be hierarchical with almost religious-like devotion to the rank structure and chain of command. Military personnel are trained to receive and comply with orders and to look to their chain of command for support. They gener-
**Obstacles to cooperation between military and law enforcement agencies**

Table 1: Multidimensional Security Model

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<thead>
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<th>Categories</th>
<th>National Security</th>
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<td><strong>Responses</strong></td>
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ally work in organizations where formal and informal rules limit their discretion while allowing for accountability and successful mission outcomes. Law enforcement agencies have strikingly different organizational cultures. Law enforcement agencies consist of both uniformed police agencies and specialized civilian agencies (customs, immigration, etc.) with the authority to conduct investigations and enforce local and state laws. Law enforcement agencies employ street-level operators who have maximum discretion to act without constant supervisory intervention.

In Latin America, these differing organizational cultures must be placed within the context of widespread abuse of power and corruption in security forces across the region. This is the “elephant in the living room” that US officials usually ignore in their interactions with regional security organizations. Abuse of power and corruption are rampant among both senior and junior security officials across the region. A major challenge of combining military and law enforcement agencies in public security missions is to establish standard operating procedures that accommodate cultural differences and overcome distrust of outside organizations.

Agreement over the jurisdictions of military and law enforcement agencies involved in public security missions is another area of potential interagency conflict. Many regional leaders support the need for strict separation of military and law enforcement duties and point to this as a tenet of liberal-democratic philosophy. Supporters of this view often justify their stance by citing the US *posse comitatus* act. In fact, *posse comitatus* is one of the most misunderstood and misinterpreted
US statutes ever enacted. The original act was passed in 1878 during the post-Civil War Reconstruction era to prevent the US Army from violating the political and civil rights of southern citizens. It specifically allows US military forces to become involved in law enforcement activities “under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress (18 USC 1385).” Citing *posse comitatus* as a justification to separate military and law enforcement powers, therefore, is a misreading of its intent.

Any bilateral and subregional agreements that are created to respond to the OAS declaration must clearly define military and law enforcement jurisdictions. In the United States, the military can provide reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence and investigation, command and control, communication, transportation, medical, personnel and other logistical support to law enforcement agencies both within and outside national borders. In the US, except for cases concerning military property or personnel, search, seizure and arrest activities remain the prerogative of law enforcement. This appears to be a reasonable model for regional states implementing a multidimensional security strategy.

Unity of command is a long-standing security principle and must be clear in both long-term and crisis response missions. When jurisdictional directives and standard operating procedures are not clear on this point, bureaucratic conflict and confusion quickly result. Command authority can be especially difficult to define in public security missions. Military leaders will argue they should have command due to the large numbers of personnel and other capabilities they bring to the mission, as well as their experience in controlling large forces over expansive land and sea areas. Law enforcement officials will argue that since they are usually responsible for the “end game” or final action in the missions, which often consists of search, seizure and arrest activities, they must be in charge. All of these arguments are valid. Legislatures and executive branches have a responsibility to issue clear jurisdictional directives designating command and control authorities in public security missions.

Under the umbrella of command and control activities, one of the most sensitive areas of potential conflict in public security missions is the sharing of intelligence among joint military and law enforcement forces. Information is power, especially in the corrupt security and political systems found in most Latin American states. Military intelligence organizations and law enforcement agencies tend to build nearly impenetrable “stovepipes” to protect their information. Adding to the unwillingness to share information is a frequently misunderstood and misinterpreted web of constitutional articles, legal statutes, executive directives and service/agency regulations establishing intelligence sharing rules. Seldom does one service or agency understand the intelligence sharing rules of other services or agencies. It is easy for those unwilling to share information to stonewall other services and agencies, undermining the mission and feeding mistrust among security forces.

Making public security missions even more challenging on a bilateral or subregional scale is the issue of state sovereignty. Latin American states treat sovereignty as the equivalent of a natural resource to be protected at all costs. Unfortunately, there is wide disagreement over exactly what the concept of sovereignty entails. International rules concerning state sovereignty have changed dramatically over the last 60-70 years. The creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the end of colonialism after World War II were watershed events in the evolution of state sovereignty. Before World War II, a state had to earn its sovereignty and right to nonintervention by showing it could be a responsible member of the international community. This meant maintaining internal stability, following international norms and providing public goods. As many former colonies became independent in the postwar period, sovereignty and nonintervention were simply bestowed upon states by the international system. As Robert H. Jackson notes in *Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (1990), this new concept of sovereignty did not require any particular substantive condition in the new state, only the observance and forbearance of other members of the international community. Many states, including those in Latin America, used this new approach to sovereignty as a shield to keep the international community from looking closely at illicit internal behaviors such as corruption and human rights abuses. Sovereignty became a favorite excuse for states that lacked the political will or political capacity to comply with international requirements. In the post-Cold War era, the rules of sovereignty are beginning to change back to the pre-World War II concept where states must earn their sovereignty and right to nonintervention. It is easy to understand how conflicts over sovereignty could complicate the coordination of transnational public security missions.
Successful Models of Cooperation

The OAS faces major challenges in its attempts to expand the hemispheric security agenda and strengthen bilateral and subregional security and defense cooperation. Conflicts between military and law enforcement organizational cultures, jurisdictions, command authorities, intelligence sharing and sovereignty pose serious obstacles to such initiatives.

At least two existing regional security organizations have overcome these challenges. The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security Service (RSS) successfully integrates police and defense force units from seven English-speaking states. Since its creation in 1982, the RSS has responded to major natural disasters, political unrest and law enforcement incidents. Discussions are underway to expand the RSS model to several additional Caribbean Community (CARICOM) states.

The US Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF East), based in Key West, Florida, is another highly successful multilateral security force. Since 1989, JIATF East has been responsible for drug intervention operations along the Caribbean, Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central and South America and the Atlantic approaches to Europe. It has been able to overcome most of the jurisdictional, command authority, intelligence sharing and sovereignty issues involved in transnational interagency counterdrug operations and is making record seizures of shipments of illegal drugs to the United States and Western Europe.

The main lesson learned in the RSS and JIATF East success stories is that it takes considerable time to overcome the challenges to strengthening multilateral security forces, both in establishing standard operating procedures and building interagency trust. These regional initiatives could serve as important models for new multilateral security organizations resulting from the OAS’s expanded security agenda.

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Forthcoming from the University of North Carolina Press...

CUBA AND THE TEMPEST
LITERATURE AND CINEMA IN THE TIME OF DIASPORA

by Eduardo González

In a unique analysis of Cuban literature inside and outside the country’s borders, Eduardo González looks closely at the work of three important contemporary Cuban authors: Guillermo Cabrera Infante (1929-2005), who left Cuba for good in 1965 and established himself in London; Antonio Benítez-Rojo (1931-2005), who settled in the United States; and Leonardo Padura Fuentes (b. 1955), who still lives and writes in Cuba. Through the positive experiences of exile and wandering that appear in their work, these three writers exhibit what González calls “Romantic authorship,” a deep connection to the Romantic spirit of irony and complex sublimity crafted in literature by Lord Byron, Thomas De Quincey and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. In González’s view, a writer becomes a belated Romantic by dint of exile adopted creatively with comic or tragic irony. González weaves into his analysis related cinematic elements of myth, folktale and the grotesque that appear in the work of filmmakers such as Alfred Hitchcock and Pedro Almodóvar. Placing the three Cuban writers in conversation with artists and thinkers from British and American literature, anthropology, philosophy, psychoanalysis and cinema, González ultimately provides a space in which Cuba and its literature, inside and outside its borders, are deprovincialized.

“A major work of scholarship and reflection by a uniquely talented critic in his prime. Employing an eclectic approach that blends myth criticism and psychoanalysis, González, at his best, is nothing short of dazzling.”
-Gustavo Pérez Firmat, Columbia University

Eduardo González teaches literature and cinema at The Johns Hopkins University. He is author of three other books, including The Monstered Self: Narratives of Death and Performance in Latin American Fiction.

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Military Internationalism

by Kristina Mani

Since the 1990s, many Latin American soldiers have become internationalized in unprecedented ways. Internationalization does not mean that militaries have renounced either traditional defense concerns, such as territorial defense, disaster relief or even nation-building, or the range of nontraditional security concerns that have garnered attention since the end of the Cold War, such as fighting drug traffickers or popular protesters active within national borders. Rather, internationalization adds a complicating layer to existing concerns over the roles that should be assumed by militaries that now operate in the context of electoral democracy from Central to South America. By internationalization, I mean participation in a dense network of state and nonstate actors that is capable of providing resources and opening new opportunities for its participants, allowing them to achieve goals they could not otherwise effect if they worked only domestically.

In Latin America, two forms of military internationalization stand out. The first, and by far the dominant one, is participation in peacekeeping missions through the United Nations. While the heyday of UN peacekeeping missions subsided toward the end of the 1990s, Latin American participation in ongoing UN missions continues to grow. More troops from Latin American countries are involved now than at any time in the 1990s: 11 countries field forces in 14 of the UN's 16 peacekeeping missions.

The second form of military internationalization is the contracting of former soldiers and police by private military firms (PMFs) for service abroad. The current war in Iraq has drawn attention to the important role that PMFs have assumed in supporting the war efforts of traditional armies, but has raised little awareness of the role that Latin Americans have played in that equation. Although military contracting from Latin America has provided a relatively small percentage of PMF personnel in Iraq, at least one PMF representative confides that such contracting is a new "growth industry" in the region. In what follows, I describe how internationalization provides participants in both peacekeeping and contracting networks with opportunities and resources that they otherwise lack in their domestic environment, discuss peacekeeping and contracting trends in the region, and identify some consequences for Latin American countries from involvement in both areas of activity.

International Opportunities and Domestic Interests

Social movement theorists of late have written much about the internationalization of activists through advocacy networks that bind vertically (e.g., between governments) and horizontally (e.g., between private domestic groups and international organizations) in ways that offer "resources, opportunities, and alternative targets...to make claims against other domestic and external actors," as Sidney Tarrow writes in The New Transnational Activism.

Under this view, internationalization is a complex process through which acting beyond one's borders can dramatically transform conditions at home. Not only activists but also democratic leaders and military officers can participate in such transnational and multilevel networks, with the goal of transforming unfavorable conditions they confront at home.

In the case of peacekeeping, political leaders seeking mechanisms for civilian control of the military encouraged their militaries to participate in UN-organized missions abroad. The most well-known case of this was the Menem government in Argentina in the early 1990s. Through participation in peacekeeping, it sought to downsize and transform one of the region's most aggressive militaries into a respectable and tame institution that could not only showcase Argentina's new constructive international policies, but also expose military officers to important humanitarian tasks with peers from countries where democratic civilian control was an established norm. The large number of officers from the armed forces that served in UN missions (particularly the army, which has fielded over 15,000 officers since 1992) set Argentina apart from other Latin American countries. Yet the positive impact within the forces—including significant professional engagement, an improved reputation at home, and additional pay—was evident, and exportable to other militaries in the region through CAECOPAZ, the...
Latin America’s experience with peacekeeping and military contracting

Argentine training center for joint peacekeeping operations. In short, both civilian leaders and military officers became part of an “international peacekeeping network” involving a range of actors (governments, militaries, international organizations like the UN, humanitarian organizations and advocacy groups) that was able to contribute to the transformation of the Argentine military’s image and institutional interests. Most fundamentally, Argentina’s participation in this network enabled government officials to provide incentives for military compliance with civilian control, and it allowed officers to lay claim to public recognition, better pay, and expertise in the pacific applications of military force.

Like peacekeeping, military contracting also involves a clear network dynamic, but one that includes a different set of actors (contracting governments or defense ministries, private firms, and the individuals they hire) and appeals to different sets of individuals from country to country in Latin America. The draw of this “private military network” is evident in two examples of Salvadoran and Chilean ex-soldiers contracting with firms for work in Iraq.

In El Salvador, according to reports in the Christian Science Monitor and Washington Post, more

Chilean soldiers board a military transport plane bound for Haiti. In 2004, they formed part of the UN’s international peacekeeping force in the troubled Caribbean nation.
than 600 men and women with prior military or police experience were working in Iraq in early 2005. Recruited by subsidiaries of US-based PMFs, such as Triple Canopy, they assume jobs primarily as security guards, drivers and custodians. Recruits are drawn to exceptional pay levels: a security guard can earn between $1,500 and $3,200 in Iraq, about three times as much as police salaries in El Salvador, depending on rank. Hiring firms are particularly drawn to the background Salvadoran ex-soldiers or police can bring. Many recruits were battle-hardened during the country's long civil war. Facing poor employment and pay opportunities at home, and familiar with the violence of war, many are not frightened by daunting conditions in Iraq. As one noted to a reporter, “I thank God for this opportunity to go to Iraq.” Some Salvadoran officials have expressed concern for the safety of the private recruits, but have done little otherwise (El Salvador was the last coalition member from Latin America still to field regular troops in Iraq; they were withdrawn in August 2005).

In Chile, economic incentives also play a significant role in private contracting for Iraq, but in the Chilean case, a more sophisticated set of skills is on the market. Blackwater USA initially hired in 2003 several dozen English-speaking former commandos for half- or full-year employment in work such as guarding oil facilities from insurgent attack. Blackwater’s president told the British Guardian in 2004 that “the Chilean commandos are very, very professional and they fit within the Blackwater system.” Former Chilean officers are drawn to high pay ($3,000 to $5,000 per month, plus benefits like life insurance) compared with salaries only half to one-third as much back home. In Chile, this trend aroused significant concern among civilian politicians and military leaders. Michelle Bachelet, Chile’s defense minister at the time, noted publicly in 2004 that Chilean “mercenaries” in Iraq might be subject to arrest or detention in third countries, suggesting that some of the more senior commandos, retired in recent years and now working in Iraq, may have been involved in Pinochet-era human rights violations. Others, particularly in the military itself, are concerned that private firms are recruiting Chile’s military elite away from national service.

As the examples above reflect, the trends in both peacekeeping and contracting can be seen as the product of two big-ticket impacts affecting the region: democratization and marketization within the region, and the shift in great power (especially US) concerns outside the region, from humanitarian issues in the 1990s to counterterrorism in the 2000s. These structural conditions guide the opportunities and constraints facing current and former soldiers in the region today.

Democratization has made achieving civilian control of the military a key goal of political leaders and civil society groups in the region; it is also one that military leaders can live with if properly conditioned and incentivized to the concept. Marketization of economies in the region have required budget cutting, including reducing defense spending, which has led to military downsizing for economic as well as political reasons. The contemporary introduction of democracy and the market make peacekeeping an attractive alternative mission for militaries in the region. Yet it also makes private contracting attractive for some soldiers—those who buck at the idea of civilian control at home, and especially those who can now reap greater payoffs through the introduction of market dynamics into the military service “industry.”

Shifts in great power concerns also have worked to promote both of these internationalizing trends. The fact that major industrialized powers, notably the US, embraced humanitarian-based missions during the early 1990s created a significant opportunity for Latin American countries on the peacekeeping front—precisely at the moment when the window for that opportunity was most needed, as several key states in the region were beginning to consolidate democracy (Argentina and Brazil stand out in this respect). Several of those same great powers, with the US as the obvious leader, have since shifted concern and support away from humanitarian missions and focused instead on counterterrorism operations. Interestingly, this shift encourages the prospects for both Latin American contracting and peacekeeping. US attention to counterterrorism quite obviously feeds the contractor phenomenon, as any “global war” that cannot be fully staffed by national forces will require outside help. So long as demand continues and the market price for hires is right, supply will be available from Latin America and elsewhere. The impact on peacekeeping is more complex. More than ever, peacekeepers come from regional powers in the developing world (India, Pakistan, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil) with expertise in the field and the desire to stabilize their corners of the world. These countries fill a vacuum of attention to crises that require multilateral peace-building efforts. Because the downgrading of regional humanitarian crises is not universally accepted, either by these regional leaders or by smaller
powers in the industrialized world, Latin American forces are likely to continue to play an important role in UN missions, even if those missions may now be even less well funded and more prone to setbacks than before.

Recent Trends in Peacekeeping and Contracting

As noted above, peacekeeping has become a mission of growing importance to militaries across Latin America. With 2,435 troops and police involved in UN missions by the middle of 2005, Uruguay has replaced Argentina as the region’s number one provider of peacekeeping troops; it also fields the UN force commander in Cyprus, a post once held by an Argentine. Brazil and Chile, too, have joined the peacekeeping network in a significant way. Brazil leads the peacekeeping mission in Haiti, and earlier this year hosted more than 500 commanding officers from 16 Latin American countries and the US for peacekeeping operations exercises. With the strong support of its current army chief, Chile’s military, once loath to sign on for missions beyond its borders, now fields 585 troops in four UN missions. Argentine forces still remain prominent; they organize six other Latin American countries’ troops in Cyprus, and contribute paramilitary police forces to the elite multinational Special Police Units in Kosovo. Peacekeeping is winning adherent forces from other countries as well, as Table 1 on page 22 shows.

With respect to contracting, the notion of “growth industry” aptly captures recent trends. All told, the number of former soldiers and officers hired from Latin American countries to work abroad remains a relatively small percentage of the 20,000 military contractors working in Iraq. Probably 1000-1500 are Latin Americans, based on the estimates of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and various media estimates, as there are no official statistics. It is still early to assess the impact of foreign contracting on individuals or their (former) military institutions, but one trend is clear: To date, contracting in Latin America has been quite successful, evidenced by a steady increase in both recruits and the number of countries being sourced in the region by US PMFs. The economic benefits or “claims-making” for all parties involved are even clearer: Latin American ex-soldiers earn more abroad than at home, and firms like Blackwater can hire them more cheaply than if they recruit at home (in Iraq, a former US Special Forces hire can earn $700 a day, while a former Chilean Black Beret will make about $150).

If to date PMFs have recruited most heavily from El Salvador and Chile, they are also looking at other countries, including Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru. It is worth noting that as early as 1996, the Colombian government authorized the “subcontracting” of military units to private oil companies operating in country in an effort to enhance the protection of pipelines at risk from sabotage and insurgent attack. What is new is subcontracting abroad. The Central American and Andean countries, of course, all experienced civil wars where militaries were actively engaged in counterinsurgency work. Yet Colombia presents a particularly keen recruitment base. Along with counterinsurgency veterans from wars in Chechnya and Algeria that have found work in Iraq, Colombians have not only been recruited but apparently are organized and ready to go. As the Los Angeles Times reported in July 2005, an American who once worked for Dyncorp International (a major US PMF operating in Colombia) has already assembled a “private army” of 1,000 US-trained ex-soldiers and police officers able to work in Iraq. He argues that their long experience and top-notch training make the Colombian commandos ideal for counterror operations. Already about 120 Colombians are contracted to Iraq, about the same number as Chileans now in Iraq; according to the Times, all of these commandos have been recruited by Blackwater. Again, economic incentives drive much of the supply, as early retirement for specially trained Colombian officers yields few subsequent job opportunities at home. As Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution notes about Colombian officers, despite the ongoing counterdrug and counterinsurgency at home, “the global demand is far higher.”

Consequences Worth Considering

It is easy to see in Latin America’s peacekeeping involvement only positive developments, and in contracting only debilitating or nefarious ones. Yet the picture is more complicated. While peacekeeping missions keep troops professionally engaged to the benefit of international security and self-image, much depends on whether the mission can provide a positive experience for both the military in the field and policy makers back home, and whether it can ultimately succeed at restoring peace and stability in the affected country. The current mission in Haiti is instructive. Latin America fields the lion’s share of the troops in Haiti, in one of the UN’s biggest current operations. Latin American leadership in the Haiti mission is a clear test of Brazil and the Southern Cone countries to
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Source: UN Department of Public Information  
mil=military troops  pol=civilian police
manage the region’s international security concerns on their own. If the Haiti mission is successful, they have the opportunity potentially to displace at least some of the legitimacy the US has long assumed as the main “solver” of security problems in the region.

Still, the Haiti mission is fraught with peril. Short of manpower and funds from the start, the blue helmets in Haiti have struggled for the upper hand over armed gangs since the mission began in June 2004. As in several UN missions in Africa, UN forces in Haiti have in the last months adopted more aggressive tactics, involving heavy firepower to root out gang leaders by force in targeted searches. In the process civilian bystanders have been injured, triggering investigation by UN officials. It is no stretch to say that the future course of Latin American peacekeeping on its own regional turf hangs in the balance with the success or failure of the Haiti mission. The experience will also influence whether some of the relative newcomers to such missions (Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru) will want to continue their involvement if the mission is deemed a failure.

Critics of Latin American contracting to Iraq have raised a host of concerns over that trend. One concern is that developing countries are again providing cheap labor to serve great power designs. Geoff Thale of WOLA sees the process as a poverty draft, in which a lack of alternative job opportunities drives Latin Americans to jobs in overseas war zones; at the same time, hired foreigners are a bargain expense for their US-based employers. Along with Thale, Singer holds that with much dirty and dangerous work outsourced to foreign nationals, there are fewer political costs for leaders of contracting countries, like the US, when contractors are killed or injured (by early 2005, over 175 contractors had been killed and 900 wounded, but these numbers are rarely figured into publicized tallies of dead or wounded). Some speculate that former Dirty Warriors from the Southern Cone are now working in Iraq, notably a handful from Argentina and Chile, according to media sources in those countries. Yet with no clear public record of who has been hired abroad, these claims are hard to confirm or refute. Last but not least is the concern that PMFs are draining the best trained and most motivated soldiers, commanders and police officers out of regular service to their own societies.

Under this view, even if recruitment remains limited, it can have an important effect on the ability of militaries in the region to retain and build capable senior officer corps.

There are ways to address some of these concerns, at least in part, through the regulation of private contracting. In South Africa, for instance, South African security firms contracting outside of national territory must register and report on their overseas work to a special committee that advises the defense ministry. Many PMFs (including ones like Blackwater that recruit in Latin America) ensure that recruits are vetted for prior human rights violations. However, the problem is that violations are not always recorded and might therefore be overlooked. Moreover, regulation involves greater oversight by state officials into contracting activities, yet such efforts require resources, dedication and political will, all of which are frequently scarce in countries facing broader crises of economic dislocation, public security and poverty.

For Latin America, it seems that both peacekeeping and private contracting are here to stay indefinitely, providing opportunities for military engagement abroad that can transform a soldier’s domestic condition in ways that are not always immediately apparent. Ultimately, democratic policy makers in the region must consider and assess the impact of these two forms of internationalization on their militaries and on their societies. Whereas peacekeeping was once seen as a panacea for military transformation, it now requires even greater dedication and careful commitment to generate comparable positive effects. Similarly, military contracting may ameliorate economic hardships for a few, but its potential costs are far from clear. Policy makers, both military and civilian, will be wise not to take these trends for granted, or ignore them as they develop.

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LOOK FOR THE NEXT ISSUE OF

Hemisphere

“The New Old Cuba”

Guest Edited by
Damián J. Fernández
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Hemisphere... dedicated to provoking debate on the problems, initiatives and achievements of the Americas.
Charting New Waters

by Paul D. Taylor

No feature of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere has been more prominent in the last two decades than the drive to liberalize trade and investment. This emphasis has been intended to foster economic development and strengthen relations between the United States and Latin America. Policy makers have paid relatively little attention to the effect of free trade agreements on national security, which we can define here as reasonable freedom from danger to the nation's territory, citizens, institutions and interests.

These issues came to the fore late in the debate in Congress over the free trade agreement with Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR). As senators sparred over whether or not to approve CAFTA-DR, they moved beyond familiar arguments about the economic effects of free trade agreements to include a greater emphasis on security.

Security Issues in the Debate over CAFTA-DR

Arguing in favor of the agreement, Senator John McCain asserted that CAFTA-DR was “important because at stake is the future of Central America in its economic and political dimensions and, hence, its security dimensions.” He and other proponents reasoned that the agreement would strengthen democracy by producing tangible benefits from free market economics and partnership with the United States.

Among the opponents to CAFTA-DR, Senator Hillary Clinton coun-tered flatly that “this agreement will not promote democracy and stability in these nations.” In addition, Senator Richard Durbin predicted that relatively cheap corn from the United States would undermine subsistence farmers in the region and lead to increased illegal immigration. “As we assault economies of Central America,” he argued, “we create economic instability which moves families into cities first, and finally, in desperation, to anyplace they can go to find any job to survive.”

Proponents argued that by improving economies in the region, CAFTA-DR would help reduce the flow of migrants. Senator McCain commented, “If there is one lesson we have learned in the challenge of illegal immigration in this country, it is that if people cannot feed themselves and their families where they are, they will go to places where they think they can.” He suggested that if CAFTA-DR were rejected, “thousands of apparel jobs would be lost as [investors] moved production facilities from Central America to China, further exacerbating illegal immigration to the United States.” Senator Richard Burr joined McCain in predicting that without CAFTA, more and more garment manufacturing would move to China. “As Central American manufacturers were forced out by Chinese manufacturers,” he said, “more American jobs would be at risk for the simple fact that Chinese manufacturers do not use American yarn, they do not use American fabric, and they do not use American cotton.”

Senator Bill Frist saw CAFTA-DR as an opportunity to convey political support: “Fidel Castro still oppresses the Cuban people and denies them precious human freedoms. Hugo Chávez moves Venezuela closer and closer to Castro every day. These regimes tend to work to spread their brutal methods and totalitarian philosophies, trying to infect the rest of Latin America, and we simply cannot let them succeed. The free nations of Latin America need our support.”

The Senate passed the agreement by a comfortable but highly partisan 54-45 margin. Nearly four Republican senators in five voted to pass CAFTA-DR; more than three-quarters of Democrats who voted were opposed. In the House of Representatives, it passed by a razor-thin vote of 217-215.

Security Insights from NAFTA

Congress debated CAFTA-DR as though it were the first US free trade agreement with poor countries in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, the United States already has more than a decade of experience with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This treaty with Mexico and Canada provides a wealth of insights that could be relevant to the working of an agreement with Central America and the Dominican Republic.

Economic Results. During the CAFTA-DR debates, senators frequently referred to the economic results of NAFTA, described variously as a dismal failure or a solid success. The record shows that merchandise trade among the three NAFTA countries during the first 10 years of the agreement grew 106%
The security implications of free trade agreements

President Bush signs CAFTA-DR during an event at the White House on August 2, 2005. Proponents of the trade agreement argue that it will bolster hemispheric security by strengthening democracy and creating economic opportunities.

compared to 42% for their trade with the rest of the world. Foreign direct investment in Mexico, which had never exceeded $5 billion a year before 1993, burgeoned to an annual average of $13 billion from 1994 through 2002, with 63% coming from the United States. In December 1994, however, the peso crisis forced Mexican leaders to adopt austerity policies that depressed their economy just as NAFTA took effect and as a result, trade and investment performance did not meet the expectations of NAFTA proponents.

The Need for Complementary Efforts. Since then, Mexico has failed to make the investments in education and infrastructure that, together with judicial reform, could have added another 2% annually to the country's growth, estimates Sidney Weintraub, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In a recent study of CAFTA-DR, World Bank analysts judged that economic gains from this agreement "would depend critically on the ability of the Central American economies to pursue a complementary policy agenda, as the agreement by itself is unlikely to lead to substantial developmental gains without parallel efforts in areas like trade facilitation (e.g., ports, roads, customs), institutional and regulatory reforms, and innovation and education."

Immigration. A trade agreement's effect on immigration derives directly from its effect on economic growth. If it stimulates growth, it will create jobs and thereby reduce the economic incentive for migration. Under NAFTA, unauthorized immigration from Mexico to the United States continued its high pace as disap-
pointing economic growth rates in Mexico coincided with strong activity in the US economy during the 1990s. In Mexico and Central America, government attitudes toward out-migration have been colored by the more than $16 billion that Mexican workers in the United States sent home in 2004 and remittances as high as 34% and 48% of export earnings in the cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador in the year 2000.

**Domestic Disruption.** NAFTA broke new ground by removing barriers to trade and investment between a relatively poor country and two prosperous industrialized economies. The most difficult adjustments for Mexico have been in agriculture, an area in which more efficient US producers often outperform Mexican farmers. The prospect of increased corn imports from the United States, for example, was a factor in the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas. Mexico's agricultural problems reflect two realities. First, Mexico has not succeeded as promised in creating urban employment to offset the displacement of inefficient rural workers. A second factor applies to all trade liberalization efforts: It is far easier to identify the losers than the winners. People are more likely to know individuals who lost their jobs because their plants moved or closed as a result of NAFTA than to realize that others owe their jobs to the trade-creating effects of the treaty. Furthermore, most consumers accept the improvements in purchasing power that derive from the efficiencies of freer trade without consciously linking them to trade agreements.

**Effects on Democracy.** Partly as a result of liberalizing trends under way before NAFTA, Mexico has become a more democratic country over the past decade. The agreement has contributed directly to the strengthening of democracy in two ways. One is the increased contact Mexicans now have with outsiders, especially in the United States. The heightened interest of the foreign press, foreign investors and non-governmental groups of all kinds has given Mexicans a sense that what happens politically in their country is noticed elsewhere. In addition, after six decades of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the deregulated world of NAFTA allowed the Mexican government a smaller role to play relative to the private sector.

**Relations with the United States.** When President Carlos Salinas de Gortari decided to pursue NAFTA as a way to stimulate foreign investment and economic growth, his government expanded its consular operations in all areas of the United States that had significant Mexican populations. Mexico's 45 consulates came to comprise the largest network of any foreign government in the United States. At the same time, Mexico adopted a highly pro-active diplomacy with an enhanced embassy staff in Washington and retained professional lobbyists and public relations experts. Although this effort was mounted initially to build support for NAFTA, its ongoing consequences have been active engagement across a range of issues and the most productive bilateral cooperation in the history of the two countries. Politically important businesses have become partisans of resolving issues and avoiding interruptions of trade and investment. In the aftermath of 9/11, they have emerged as advocates of border controls that enhance security without hampering trade flows, such as the expedited passage of pre-approved trucks.

**Commerce as a Target.** Some security specialists in both Mexico and the United States worry that increased interdependence between their two countries could provide an incentive for terrorists to injure the US economy by attacking Mexico. One possible target is the Mexican petroleum industry. Mexico supplies more than 15% of US petroleum imports, second only to Canada among foreign sources. There is no evidence that the terrorist threat to NAFTA commerce is more than hypothetical, but increased trade produces vulnerability. Globalization provides both a target and a vehicle for terrorism: A successful attack against commerce would likely bring about a reduction in trade and tourism, a decline in foreign direct investment and lending, and a downturn in economic activity and employment in the countries involved.

**Differences between NAFTA and CAFTA-DR**

All of these results hint at CAFTA-DR's potential security effects, but there are some differences between it and the Mexican case. The most obvious, perhaps, is the influence of Mexican history. Mexico lost half of its territory to the United States in the 19th century; although past US interventions are also a fact of life in Central America and the Dominican Republic, they did not lead to territorial losses. These differences may explain a 2005 *Latinobarómetro* poll which showed that positive opinion of the United States among Mexicans just barely exceeded negative opinion while net Central American opinion was more than 60% positive, the highest in Latin America. Troops from the Dominican Republic and three Central American countries participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and most citizens of the region look to the United States more for solutions to their problems than as the cause. Many Central Americans rec-
recognize the tremendous effort that President Bush and other supporters expended to win passage of CAFTA-DR. A rejection of the agreement could have profoundly demoralized citizens of Central America and the Dominican Republic and shaken their confidence in the reliability of the United States.

A second difference has to do with size. Central American and Dominican leaders will likely be eager to receive financial and technical assistance from the United States to accomplish the ancillary improvements needed to assure the developmental potential of the free trade agreement. Because their economies are far smaller than Mexico’s, their needs are more manageable within the capacity of international donor organizations.

Another way in which NAFTA differs from other free trade agreements is the fact that the United States and its contiguous NAFTA partners conduct 90% of their trade by truck, rail or pipeline. By contrast, terrestrial conveyance to the United States is not an option for the Dominican Republic, and less than 3% of Central American commerce with the United States moves by land. Maritime and air transport involve a different set of security issues.

Trade Agreements and US Hemispheric Policy

The Bush administration has given trade agreements pride of place in its overall Latin America and Caribbean policy. Had two members of the House of Representatives voted differently on CAFTA-DR, however, the United States would have had nothing to reinforce the trade liberalization that has characterized US policy in the Western Hemisphere since the late 1980s.

The closeness of the vote on CAFTA-DR could be an omen of more difficulties to come.

Congressional partisans on both sides acknowledged that as they voted they had in mind the precedent that CAFTA-DR could create for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Doha Round of global trade negotiations. Absent new developments, this legislative outcome adds little momentum to an aggressive trade strategy.

At the time of the CAFTA-DR vote, negotiations for the FTAA, first proposed by George H. W. Bush and pressed again by George W. Bush, had already missed the deadline for completion of negotiations in 2005. The talks were essentially deadlocked over the treatment of agriculture, with Brazil leading the forces demanding termination of production subsidies and an increase in market access. While favoring these objectives in principle, the United States has been unable to concede these points without first winning agreement from the European Union and Japan, a result which could be accomplished only at the Doha Round. A further complication is the 2006 mid-term congressional elections in the United States. Judging from the degree of partisanship displayed in the CAFTA-DR vote, the outcome of these elections could affect both the FTAA and Doha negotiations. At the same time, talks are quietly under way for bilateral US free trade agreements with Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. If they are completed, free trade agreements—including NAFTA, CAFTA-DR and the US-Chile agreement that entered into effect in January 2004—will cover more than 80% of US trade with Latin America and the Caribbean even if no FTAA is concluded.

Conclusion

During the debate over CAFTA-DR, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote, “I consider CAFTA to be as much a security issue as it is an economic issue—for them and for us.” Whether achieved through the FTAA or additional subregional free trade agreements, closer trade and investment relations could imply security consequences in the areas of domestic disruption, support for democracy, immigration and relations with the United States. Each of these factors could be affected by circumstances unique to particular countries. First, recent events in such countries as Bolivia, for example, demonstrate a particular sensitivity to foreign investment, especially where natural resources are involved. Second, although NAFTA had an impact on governance in Mexico, the prospect for improvements in this area is far less likely in several of the Andean countries.

Third, for a trade agreement to affect the rate of migration it has to affect the rate of economic growth and employment, which, in turn, may depend on domestic policy changes to complement the opportunities created by a reduction in barriers to trade and investment. Finally, it is hard to imagine that closer trade and investment relations with the United States would not contribute to closer relations on other matters. The increase in trade disputes that inevitably accompanies an increase in the volume of trade may suggest otherwise, but greater trade weaves a fabric of interdependence that usually produces positive results beyond commerce.

Paul D. Taylor is a senior strategic researcher at the US Naval War College. As a Foreign Service officer, his assignments included Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for economic relations with Latin America and ambassador to the Dominican Republic.
It is biologically certain that on some future morning, Cubans will wake up to a world without Fidel. Despite the obvious significance of that moment, we lack much of the information necessary to prepare for it. We don't know Fidel's health, no one has any idea of the real state of popular legitimacy of the revolutionary regime, and we can only guess at how Miami and Washington will react. Perhaps most importantly, we do not know how much violence will accompany the start of the new era, how we may control it, or who will do so and how. Despite the vehemence of most disagreements about Cuba, most can agree on a few things.

First, beginning in the late 1980s, Fidel reversed the "bureaucratization" of control and made the regime more personalistic than at any time since its early years. While Raul Castro has long been designated the official successor, his age and limited base outside of the armed forces (FAR) make him an unlikely bridge to the future. This means that the nature of the regime will need to change. Specifically, post-Fidel Cuba will not be able to rely on his particular personal and historic charisma nor the network of control established through the Castro brothers. Second, whatever government is in charge will have to deal with at least a short-term crisis of expectations, not only in Havana, but across the Straits of Florida. Whether seen as a "crisis of confidence" or, alternatively, as a "moment of opportunity," the first few days of the transition will be critical.

Over and above longer-term concerns, the problem of maintaining social and political order will be of critical importance not only to Cubans on the island, but to many in the US, particularly in Florida. Therefore, the Cuban military (FAR) will no doubt play a critical role in either permitting the survival of the regime, establishing a new order, or merely serving as a referee of a transition. Unfortunately, we probably know less about the internal affairs of the Cuban military than we did about its Iraqi equivalent in 2003. The parallels between the two armies go beyond our ignorance. In both cases, the extent of ideological commitment to regime values is uncertain. Both have been dominated at the top by a core devoted to family and personal loyalty. Like the Iraqi armed forces, the FAR has rapidly degenerated from arguably the most powerful military in Latin America—uniquely able to project its power across an ocean—to an almost exclusively infantry-based force of reduced size, with little operational capacity beyond the brigade level. As was the case with the Iraqi army, there is no longer any doubt about the Cuban military's inability to resist even a relatively limited invasion force. But, as in the case of Iraq, that institutional capacity may no longer be relevant. What should concern us in the case of Cuba (as we have seen in Iraq) is a parallel set of questions:

Could the Cuban FAR retain enough institutional stability to guarantee order during any period of transition? Whom or what alternatives would it support? Could it frustrate the imposition of a new regime no matter its ideological coloration?

All reports indicate that the FAR has retained a strong professional coherence in the face of drastic challenges over the past 15 years. Despite its deep involvement with the marketization of the Cuban economy, on which it has relied to maintain minimum operational balance, the military has not developed into a kleptocracy; military discipline has been maintained up and down the hierarchy. There are no indications of particularized allegiances to regional commanders (though, of course, control of the Western Army with responsibility for Havana is critical). Even when faced with difficult tasks of popular control or natural disaster relief, the army has maintained its organizational coherence. The FAR is not the army of Batista, literally disintegrating in the face of a threat. Would the armed forces be willing to take active control of the island if ordered to do so? In light of what happened in Baghdad in 2003, no one should dispute the critical importance of this question. Guessing the intentions and feelings of conscripts is impossible, but all indications point to a positive answer. Does the military have the capacity to maintain order? If it were to be distracted in repelling some external actor, the
The role of Cuba's armed forces in the country's inevitable transition

answer would be no. If outlawed by dictate, obviously not. But if it were allowed to continue its institutional existence and if it could concentrate on maintaining control of major cities and transport and communication links, even its limited resources should be adequate to maintain order. Thus, the FAR represents a potential cornerstone for a transition.

The real question is whether in a fight for power, the loyalties of those owing allegiance to Raul Castro—who has been personally responsible for the career fate of practically any military officer of even semisemior rank—would conflict with those seeking regime change. After the Ochoa trial of 1989, there has been no sign of a perestroika wing in the army. No other government institutions exert significant influence on soldiers (just the opposite) and civilian leaders such as Felipe Perez Roque or Carlos Lage do not appear to have developed any kind of network within the FAR. The real threat to military coherence may be the general disposition of the members of the officer corps toward their social and professional future. On the one hand, if many in the FAR feel that they can survive a transition with their positions intact and even with continued links to the business they have developed, then the loyalty to the old order may be fragile. On the other hand, if the FAR feels that it will be punished and its soldiers become part of a stigmatized unemployed class, then its willingness to obey orders leading to its own liquidation should be in doubt.

The example of Iraq obviously brings to mind the ability of elements of the FAR to go beyond merely resisting a transition and actively fighting a new regime. Again, we are dealing with speculation based on skimpy knowledge regarding uncertain futures, so no guarantees are possible; but nothing that has been written about the FAR in the past decade would indicate that we are dealing with a group of dedicated fanatics willing to continue with a campaign of violence. Given the shift in government rhetoric over the past decade from a socialist ideology toward a more nationalist one, it is much more likely that the military would do its constitutional or institutional duty and not purposefully make life a living hell for ordinary Cubans.

As in the case of Iraq, it may not be Cubans we have to worry about, however, but external actors. The likeliest sources of violence in a transition regime are not dissatisfied soldiers (again, unless they have been made to feel that they have no future in the new establishment), but a variety of economic and political gangsters. The appeal of Cuba as the perfect transshipment point for drugs into the ever-hungry US market cannot be overestimated. If the US and Mexico have not been able to control the Rio Grande, a Cuba in chaos certainly will not be able to guarantee the policing of its territorial waters. Equally worrisome, the collapse of order in Cuba would invite the creation of a semimafia state similar to that experienced in Russia in the 1990s. Precisely because of the ambiguities of property rights and other contentious issues, there will be a clear social role for those who can provide nonofficial force. Combined with the less than savory practices of some of the anti-Castro groups, this does not make for a happy transition.

In the end, again as in Iraq, the most we can hope for in a post-Fidel world is that social order is maintained and that Cuba can proceed with a transition to whatever future awaits it without the distraction and chaos we have seen in Iraq. The only possible way to do this is to provide all possible assurance that the FAR, as an institution, can continue in its basic role as a guarantor of internal peace and defender of national territory. As tempting as it may be to settle scores, or alternatively, as enticing it may be to use the army to deny the inevitable, we can only hope that the FAR will be around and functioning on the morning after.

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For decades, political scientists have told us that hegemony exercises an important political influence on countries and the international system. An easy case for hegemonic theory should be Mexico, where the influence of the United States is evident in almost every social, political and economic dimension, except for military affairs. While the US gives high priority to strategic and military considerations, and even awards allies for their military contributions against terrorism, Mexico has gone precisely in the opposite direction, ignoring military affairs and disregarding security matters. True, the country has experienced domestic changes that have modified the nature and structure of its foreign policy. To a certain extent, the transition to democracy brought with it important institutional changes, including a more active role for Congress in national politics. Not all institutions have followed the same path of change, however; the armed forces, among many other actors, have lagged behind. In fact, many Mexican specialists argue that the transition to democracy has weakened civilian institutions, shaking the foundations of the barriers once built to prevent military involvement in politics. Today, the Mexican military is probably less modern and effective and far more politicized and nationalist than it was 10 years ago.

The Collapse of Consensus Under the PRI

For almost 70 years, the stability of civilian supremacy in Mexico was based on the legacy of the Mexican Revolution and the hegemonic party system. In 1929, when the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was founded, soldiers and civilians agreed to a pact committing the former to accept the demilitarization of politics and the latter to concede institutional autonomy. To counterbalance and politically neutralize the power of the military in the PRI, peasant and labor sectors were incorporated into the party itself in 1938. By 1946, when the first civilian president was elected, the military had not only been unified and disciplined but had also been successfully subordinated to civilian power. To ensure that the armed forces would remain loyal to the hegemonic party, the PRI limited its budget, reorganized military zones and imposed an educational agenda that focused explicitly on developing loyalty and discipline toward the party and civilian leadership. In other words, as Roderic Camp and Mónica Serrano argue, military-party links regulated, managed and co-opted the military's political behavior. In exchange, the armed forces were given institutional autonomy to decide promotions, doctrine, operations and strategy. (Camp 1992, Serrano 1995).

The collapse of the PRI's hegemony in 2000 and the political instability that has followed have disturbed relations between civilians and soldiers. Some observers even believe the transition has upset the military institution itself. (Serrano 2003). The problem Mexico faces today is quite different than the civil-military challenge of most South American countries when they redemocratized in the mid 1980s. Mexico had a system of civilian control but lacked democratic forms of accountability. The
military did not represent the main obstacle to political liberalization; consequently, there have been fewer incentives for military reform and modernization, since the armed forces are not perceived as a hindrance to competitive party politics.

Nevertheless, serious pathologies have been unleashed by the democratization process that affect civil-military relations and foreign policy. The lack of interest in military affairs among civilians has opened a window of opportunity for the armed forces to shape doctrine without civilian intervention. Congress exercises weak civilian oversight; most politicians know very little about the military and tend to be more interested in economic and social issues. As an institution, the military maintains an important degree of independence and autonomy. The absence of a unified, civilian-led ministry of defense has been a constant feature of Mexican politics and a sign of the weakness of civilian control. The armed forces are opposed to the establishment of a defense ministry under civilian control, a position motivated by their desire to preserve direct political representation and access to the presidential cabinet.

The civil-military balance of power has serious policy implications for US-Mexican relations. Under the current status quo, Washington does not have civilian co-partners with whom to discuss bilateral military and defense matters. Strictly speaking, the US should not have problems dealing with foreign militaries; it did so effectively during the 1960s and 70s, when bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes were the common political feature in Latin America. However, Mexico is no longer considered authoritarian and in a democracy one expects civilian elected officers, not generals, to be in charge of security policies.

A Growing Role in Politics
As a result of these trends, the military has gone from having a primary role as the agent of the hegemonic party to being the agent of its own self-generated desires. This does not necessarily mean that the armed forces are oriented toward regime overthrow but it does reflect their preoccupation with retaining some influence within the new democracy. In the absence of clear democratic civilian control, the military leadership has assumed a more outspoken position toward government policies. The Minister of Defense, General Gerardo Vega García, for example, recently expressed strong public criticism of the judicial system and civil government, an indication that the military is becoming more politicized as the country attempts to democratize. For Roderic Camp, the politicization of the armed forces appears to reflect the pattern that as the press and other groups take more active interest in military affairs, the military, in turn, has taken more open interest in government decision-making. (Camp 2005, 6).

One area where the armed forces, in general, and the Army, in particular, are resistant to change is in their participation in peacekeeping operations. In the past two years, diplomats in the Cancillería (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) have more actively sought to involve the armed forces in such missions. Reaction among the military has been divided. The Navy, which has more international exposure and is smaller than the Army, has already devised a plan to allow its personnel to join a peacekeeping force by 2006. The Army has led the opposition to this type of engagement, arguing that peacekeeping is not a part of its domestic mission. Some Army officials also point out that joining a force abroad might make Mexican soldiers more vulnerable to accusations of human rights violations by the international media and non-governmental organizations.

In June 2005, Patricia Olamendi, the deputy foreign secretary for multilateral affairs and human rights, resigned in protest after presidential spokesman Rubén Aguilar flatly contradicted her statement that Mexico might someday contribute personnel to peacekeeping missions. Apparently, the Defense Ministry had complained that a civilian in a non-military bureaucracy was meddling in the affairs of the armed forces, which have traditionally opposed any engagement abroad. Soon after the military commanders complained, President Vicente Fox made it clear that his administration would never authorize sending Mexican troops on United Nations missions.

The reasons advanced by Army generals to abstain from joining a UN force are multiple. First, it is argued that most Mexican soldiers do not fulfill the foreign language requirements established by the UN for observational posts, since English courses have never been part of the mandatory military curriculum. Second, there is a serious concern about over-stretching missions when the military is already engaged in multiple operations at home. Third, the military has shown anxiety about an increased involvement of US military forces in UN peace operations and regards diplomatic efforts as attempts to denationalize Mexico’s defense strategy and geopolitical thinking. Finally, there are questions about budgets and costs associated with
Focus on Domestic Affairs

Theoretically, most military institutions respond to external imperatives, such as defending the nation against external threats. The different branches of the Mexican armed forces, in contrast, have traditionally focused on their internal roles. As Fredrick M. Nunn writes, "in the absence of police capabilities they have responded to the internal imperative by participating directly or indirectly in internal affairs. Riots, strikes, rebellions, long-term insurgency, and rescue missions—these all bring armies into conflict with civilians and force officers to confront socioeconomic and political realities, to take sides." (Nunn 1984, 43). The rationale that drives the Mexican armed forces is their role in national development, which consists essentially of maintaining control over the intelligence community, providing public services in rural communities, containing insurgencies and halting transnational organized crime.

Externally, the armed forces have never had the appetite to project power abroad, in part because since World War II Mexican soldiers have not dealt with any real military enemies. Mexico is too small to fight a war against the United States and too big to battle the small and weak states to its south. Even along the border with the United States—where efforts to control drug trafficking and, now, terrorism are a priority—the peril is not armed invasion but daily socioeconomic interaction with a powerful neighbor. The armed forces' external role, as a result, has been limited to safeguarding coasts.

The armed forces' domestic missions (antinarcotics, antiguerilla, police training and humanitarian relief) reinforce their newly politicized attitude and resistance to assuming an external role. In the past three years, the Mexican authorities have replaced almost the entire law enforcement apparatus to combat drug trafficking with soldiers, and generals and colonels have assumed numerous key political appointments and governmental positions. In addition, the military's internal role and the associated effects of transnational drug trafficking have led to pervasive corruption among soldiers and officers. Accusations of human rights violations are common but rarely penalized, and soldiers rarely face civilian trials if accused of committing a crime.

Against the conventional wisdom, therefore, the liberalization of politics in Mexico has made the armed forces even more inward-looking, nationalist and xenophobic. The absence of democratic civilian control and accountability means that civilian leaders are not responsible for designing or shaping military missions and defense policy. Although the country is located next to the largest military power in the world, its defense policy is simply not integrated into its foreign policy, nor does it reflect its new democratic status. This may have negative domestic and international consequences. The absence of civilian control may jeopardize attempts to consolidate the incipient democratic process. Likewise, while Mexico is the United States' third largest trading partner, its inability to provide military support to Washington makes it a less than reliable neighbor and ally, particu-
Faced with growing domestic security issues and the government's inability to overcome them, Brazilians seek a reliable and effective form of defense. Without understanding the constitutional limitations, lack of experience, specific training or capabilities, or for that matter the different moral doctrines of the armed forces, many people look to military barracks for a solution to their plight. The use of the armed forces as police backup or to contain and repress drug trafficking and organized crime has become one of the most controversial topics in the nation's political debate.

The Lula administration's approach to defense policy is based on past mistakes that reinforce historical ambiguities related to the armed forces' mission. Current defense strategy exacerbates problems inherited from previous governments, including lack of transparency and an inconsistent relationship between civilian administrators and the military. It also allows for the gradual increase of secondary roles for the armed forces that surpass their constitutionally attributed functions.

Greater Involvement in Domestic Security

Addressing the Military Club in his first speech after Lula's inauguration, then Defense Minister José Viegas argued that in the post-Cold War period the Brazilian armed forces have shifted their emphasis away from national security to citizen security. The military's new mission, he continued, "substitutes an excessive preoccupation with the security of the state's apparatus with an emphasis on the security of the nation that prioritizes citizens and their choice of the country's political future." This is a worrisome declaration since it confirms the armed forces' participation in missions for which they have neither adequate training nor a constitutional mandate.

Viegas suggested employing the armed forces in secondary roles to respond to more broadly defined security threats, including drug trafficking, organized crime and environmental violations. Such missions increase military autonomy, perpetuating dangerous prerogatives that pose a potential threat to democracy. The way Viegas made his proposals only increased this perception. Any changes to the military's role require constitutional amendments adopted only after extensive legislative and social debate. The minister restricted his comments to members of the military, however, allowing them to deliberate alone about the armed forces' involvement in tasks that extend beyond their constitutional role.

Viegas defended the armed forces' participation in social programs as an opportunity to give them a role in supporting social development. Among the potential areas for their involvement he cited the Zero Hunger program, repair and expansion of the nation's highways, and health and education. While acknowledging that Brazilian society has historically limited the armed forces' mission to defending national sovereignty and territory, he argued that current security threats represent a different set of circumstances that demand a multidimensional response, including a more diverse role for the armed forces.

The arguments used by Viegas and others to justify these operations are insufficient. By failing to define a chain of command, they prevent an effective distribution of responsibility, a potential problem in the case of casualties. Proponents of involving the armed forces in the battle against organized crime argue that the military brings logistical support and intelligence to such missions, as if these could substitute for appropriate judicial or political experience.

The role of the armed forces is established in the constitution and does not include participation in crime fighting missions. Article 144 of the Brazilian Constitution assigns such actions to the police force: "National security, the state's duty and the right and responsibility of all, is executed with the intent to preserve public order and the integrity of the population and their assets through the work of the following institutions: I- federal police; II- federal highway police; III- federal railway police; IV- civilian police; V- military police and military firefighters."

A Problematic History

Several times in recent Brazilian history, the armed forces have been called out to support the local police in operations for which they
Proposals to expand the role of the Brazilian armed forces

were neither prepared nor equipped. In Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 35,000 troops were charged with the security of foreign and national authorities who attended the World Environmental Conference. Also in Rio, the Army and Marines were deployed on the streets and entered the favelas (shantytowns) in 1994. This time the troops stayed for two months, and despite overall consent that security had increased, crime levels remained the same. In 2003, following a request by Rio de Janeiro Governor Rosinha Matheus, President Lula authorized the use of an armed forces contingent to beef up security during Carnival. Finally, the armed forces were called in as reinforcement during the presidential election in 2002 and two years later during the 2004 local elections.

In all of these operations, collateral civilian deaths occurred, a fact that is not surprising given that the role, mission, training and equipment of the armed forces prepare them to annihilate the enemy. Military intelligence and operations are not geared toward compiling legal evidence to aid in the capture of criminals and delinquents. In contrast, the police force has a constitutional mandate to combat crime as the armed branch of the judicial system. Police officers are trained and equipped with this objective in mind, and police intelligence is specialized in dismantling criminal networks and fighting delinquency. If the police cannot accomplish these tasks efficiently, then the state should focus on improving their capabilities instead of relying on the armed forces to make up for their shortcomings. In any event, calling out the armed forces has more of a psychological effect than a real impact on crime. As in the case of Rio in 1994, the population may feel safer with the troops on the streets but organized crime remains firmly in control.

More ominously, granting the armed forces nonspecific state functions can lead to military intervention in national political affairs. Minister Viegas's experiences hint at this danger. In 2004, he was forced to resign, a step that may have been related, among other things, to his deviation from his functions. Viegas had already irritated the armed forces by neglecting their request for salary increases and failing to address the problem of obsolete military equipment. His comments about employing the armed forces in domestic missions, particularly against organized crime, brought to the forefront the constitutional and doctrinal limitations of such actions. After his resignation, the position of defense minister was assumed by Vice President José Alencar, who, Lula promised, would not tolerate miscommunication between the military and the government.

Lula clearly understands the risks that civilian authorities run when they knock on the military's door. Alencar is less involved in ministerial functions than his predecessor, a position that is more in tune with the military's preferences. In June 2005, the government articulated a new defense policy for Brazil that attempts to reconcile the nation's defense agenda with foreign ministry objectives. At the domestic level, however, some of Viegas's proposals have been implemented, and the armed forces continue to be used in an auxiliary role in such tasks as combating organized crime and maintaining highways. This reality not only reflects the state's impotence but also distorts the essential function of the armed forces. By encouraging the militarization of law enforcement and other efforts to expand the armed forces' domestic role, the Lula administration runs the risk of allowing potential threats to democracy and the civilian order.

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Promoting Security Cooperation

by José Ruiz

The United States Southern Command, headquartered in Miami, Florida, is one of the Department of Defense’s unified commands, with responsibility for US military activities in an area of operation that spans over one-sixth of the earth’s surface and includes 30 nations and 11 territories across Central America, South America and the Caribbean.

Mission. With more than 6,000 military and civilian personnel, SOUTHCOM conducts military operations and security cooperation activities to promote hemispheric stability and security, establish regional partnerships and support democratic institutions. From SOUTHCOM’s perspective, regional challenges such as poverty, inequality, natural disasters and corruption create conditions that foster unconventional and transnational threats. These threats, which include narcoterrorism, illicit trafficking and criminal gang activity, place the stability, security and prosperity of the democracies within Western Hemisphere at risk.

To address these challenges, SOUTHCOM sponsors annual exercises with partner nations that include scenarios ranging from peacekeeping to disaster relief, and from counterdrug to counterterror. In 2005, SOUTHCOM conducted nine major multinational exercises with 33 countries and territories focused on multilateral approaches to foreseeable contingencies.

Peacekeeping. Some examples of regional cooperation are clearly evident throughout the world. Thirteen partner nations from the region currently contribute more than 6,100 security personnel to 16 United Nations peacekeeping operations in places such as Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Multinational cooperation is also ongoing in Central America, where security forces are working together to counter cross-border illicit activities and establish a combined Central American peacekeeping battalion.

Humanitarian Assistance. To assist partner nations with providing aid and improving social conditions in the region, SOUTHCOM sponsors an engineering and medical assistance program known as New Horizons. In 2005, the Command sponsored New Horizons exercises in Haiti, Panama, El Salvador and Nicaragua, investing millions of dollars to construct schools, clinics, community centers and water wells, and providing outpatient medical care and health services. New Horizons exercises also provide US military engineering and medical personnel an opportunity to practice their skills in a forward environment, enhancing their capability to operate as mobile teams. In 2006, SOUTHCOM is projected to sponsor New Horizons exercises in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and Peru.

Medical teams also deploy independently from New Horizons, providing both general and specialized medical care to the populations as part of stand-alone Medical Readiness Training Exercises. In 2005, SOUTHCOM sponsored 70 such activities, providing medical services such as pediatrics and general surgery to more than 200,000 patients from 21 nations. Military veterinarians also participated in these exercises, inoculating more than 60,000 livestock to mitigate the potential human health hazards that can result from the population’s direct contact with animals. In 2006, 70 additional medical exercises are scheduled to take place in 18 countries across the region.

Disaster Preparedness. SOUTHCOM sponsors exercises, seminars and conferences to improve the collective ability to respond effectively and expeditiously to disasters. In 2005, SOUTHCOM sponsored Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias in Trinidad and Tobago, a disaster preparedness planning seminar that included the participation of 27 nations. A 21-nation, disaster response exercise is scheduled to take place in Honduras in 2006.

Because logistical sustainment and coordination is critical to ensuring the success of any future disaster relief operation, SOUTHCOM has also supported the construction or improvement of three Emergency Operations Centers, 13 Disaster Relief Warehouses and prepositioned relief supplies across the region. Construction of eight additional Emergency Operation Centers and seven additional warehouses is ongoing across the region.

Counter Illicit Trafficking. SOUTHCOM’s Joint Interagency Task Force-South, oversees counter illicit trafficking operations with the support of liaison officers from 11
The role of the United States Southern Command in humanitarian and collaborative security functions

nations and 10 federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Through an elaborate intelligence network that includes Cooperative Security Locations in Aruba/Curacao, Ecuador and El Salvador, JIATF-South detects, tracks and monitors suspected traffickers in the region. In 2005, the Task Force contributed to the seizure of 217 metric tons of cocaine.

War on Terrorism. Also among SOUTHCOM's priorities is the war on terrorism. Terrorist groups operate globally with apathy for human life, contempt for international law and reverence for the sovereignty of nations. As part of the ongoing war, SOUTHCOM conducts detention and interrogation operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where more than 500 enemy combatants are currently detained. Additionally, SOUTHCOM works in cooperation with security forces from partner nations to prevent terrorist groups from using their territories as sanctuaries to prepare, stage, finance or conduct terrorist operations against the US, its allies or vital interests in the region.

In Colombia, where narcoterrorists have killed and kidnapped thousands of citizens, SOUTHCOM provides support to the country's security forces in the form of training, equipment and logistics. Thanks in part to this support, Colombian security forces have become an effective instrument for their national defense, recently retaking 11 villages formally under the control of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), destroying 400 FARC camps and reducing terrorist attacks nationwide by more than 40 percent.

The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua have all contributed forces to support the global war on terror, and El Salvador recently deployed its fifth contingent to support coalition operations in Iraq.

Military-to-Military Activities. SOUTHCOM’s other engagement activities in 2005 included 78 conferences, 76 subject matter expert exchanges, nine senior level visits and 24 unit exchange programs. Through these activities, the Command secured professional development training for more than 3,000 military and security personnel from the region. Additionally, through the Department of State, SOUTHCOM secured foreign military financing in excess of $100 million for countries in the region to assist them with equipping and modernizing their security forces.

SOUTHCOM's cooperation initiatives are rooted in its vision to be the recognized partner of choice and center of excellence for regional security affairs in the Western Hemisphere. US long-term interests are best served by a hemisphere of stable, secure and democratic nations. Through its continued cooperation with partner nations, SOUTHCOM will continue to seek ways to enhance security and stability in the region and extend the benefits of freedom and economic prosperity to all the citizens who call our community of nations home.

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Over the Pacific Ocean—An E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control systems aircraft refuels off the western coast of Ecuador before patrolling the skies over South America as part of combined counterdrug operations in cooperation with regional security forces. (Photo by US Air Force Master Sgt. Efrain Gonzalez)

Babil Province, Iraq—Salvadoran Coalition Military Assistance Team soldiers meet with the sheik of a small village for a ribbon cutting ceremony in July 2005 celebrating the completion of a road connecting several villages in the province. (Photo by US Army. Sgt. Arthur Hamilton)

Port-au-Prince, Haiti—Peacekeepers from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, France and Peru stand in formation during the transfer of responsibility to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti on June 25, 2004. More than 3,500 security personnel from 10 Latin American nations are currently serving in MINSUTAH. (Photo by US Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Christopher Sherwood)

Guantanamo Naval Station, Cuba—A marine guards detention operation facilities from a security tower at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo. (Department of Defense photo)
Tepetitan, El Salvador—US airmen and Salvadoran soldiers build a new medical clinic during a New Horizons project, February 2005. This exercise provided two new schools and three medical clinics previously affected by earthquakes. (Photo by US Air Force Staff Sgt. Reynaldo Ramon)

Palo Grande, Nicaragua—Navy Nurse Lt. William Jansak (left) applies eye drops to a young Nicaraguan boy during a Medical Readiness Training Exercise in March 2005. A joint-combined services engineering and humanitarian aid mission built four schools and two medical clinics. (Photo by US Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Brian Brannon)
Chimborazo and Tungurahua Provinces, Ecuador—A local girl enjoys fresh water following the drilling of a water well as part of a humanitarian assistance project. (Department of Defense photo)


Fuerte Lautaro, Chile—Multinational soldiers show their countries' colors after parachuting into the closing ceremonies for Cabañas, a peacekeeping exercise conducted in 2002. More than 1,300 military and civilian personnel from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and the US participated in the exercise. (Photo by US Air Force Senior Airman Stacy L. Pearsall)
Latin America's history of military intervention has brought to the fore the need to re-examine the region's civil-military relations. While military dictatorships were the norm in the 1960s and 1970s—only Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela avoided authoritarian rule—today an elected government rules in every Latin American country with the exception of Cuba and Haiti. As David Scott Palmer notes in his 2004 article “Peru: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere” (in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas, edited by Tom Farer and published by Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), between 1930 and 1980, the 37 countries of Latin America underwent 277 changes of government, 104 of which (or 37.5%) were military coups. From 1980 to 1990, by contrast, only seven changes of government in the region took place through military intervention.

Today, the euphoria that accompanied this dramatic decline in military influence has begun to wane as the continuing pattern of instability, poverty and violence plaguing the region threatens to undermine democracy. The bibliography below looks at some of the issues pertaining to contemporary civil-military relations and presents viewpoints from the North as well as from the South.


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Sánchez D., Rubén [et al.]. Seguridades en Construcción en América Latina. Bogotá: Centro Editorial, Universidad del Rosario, 2005. (Only vol. 1 has been published so far, dealing with military policy in Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela.)


Spoiling Security in Haiti. Port-au-Prince; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005. 25 pp. (Discusses the need to neutralize the military.)


Webb, Maurice. Rethinking Democratic Consolidation and Civilian Control: Toward a Conceptual Model. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Riverside, 2005. 223 leaves. (Focuses on civil control over the military in Peru and Uruguay.)


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