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ON THE COVER

“Nena” by Conrado W. Massaguer, courtesy of Lynn Stoner.
Florida International University, a public institution of higher education in South Florida, has devoted resources and effort to the study of Latin America and the Caribbean. From the resulting synergy, the Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) came into existence in 1979. As a federally supported National Resource Center for Language and Area Studies, LACC has a mandate to promote graduate and undergraduate education, faculty research, and public education on Latin American and Caribbean affairs.

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Dear friends, colleagues and subscribers,

In early March of this year, Bolivia's only former female president, Lydia Gueiler Tejada, was honored at a reception to launch the release of her autobiography. Much has been written about Gueiler's brief period as president (November 1979-July 1980) and the brutal coup that replaced her, led by her cousin General Luis García Meza Tejada. Yet, not many published accounts have bothered to ask the former president for her version of events. Indeed, few historians and political scientists have said much at all about Gueiler's prominent role in twentieth-century Bolivian history and her important contribution to that country's transition to democracy. Her exclusion from the history books is a problem typical of many women, prominent and otherwise, whose proper place in Latin American history and politics has gone unrecognized. This is the broad theme that Hemisphere explores in this issue.

Several articles address the problem of crime and other abuses against women in Latin America and the Caribbean. Such offenses often go unreported and are therefore excluded from historical and statistical records. Andrew Morrison and María Beatriz Orlando study the economic impact of domestic violence in Latin America, while Korey Capozza discusses the illegality of abortion in the region. The methodology of writing the history of women and other traditionally marginalized groups is addressed in the insightful piece by Rachel Sara O'Toole, who looks back to the case of a slave woman in colonial Peru to discuss the limitations of written sources for this task.

Other authors in this issue question whether the process of reform and democratization in Latin America has been a good thing for women. Noting the uneven impact of reforms in the region, Christina Ewig argues that gender should be a key component of social policy. Julie Cupples questions the Nicaraguan government's concept of women's rights; she asks whether state programs that target women operate out of legitimate concern for their interests or are merely a cynical attempt at co-optation.

Lynn Stoner, a former Rockefeller Fellow at FIU's Cuban Research Institute and a professor of history at Arizona State University, has provided a magnificent photo essay for this issue. Her collection of caricatures by Cuban artist Conrado Massaguer provides important insights into the psychology of Cuba's elite at the beginning of the century and the ways female beauty was used to transmit notions of nation, class and citizenship.

Our reports section touches on a range of topics important to Latin America today. Peggy Scranton's essay on the 1998 referendum on re-election in Panama gives essential background for understanding that nation's upcoming presidential race. Richard Reed discusses the plight of Paraguay's Guarani Indians, who are being driven off their lands as a consequence of the expansion of commercial agriculture and clashes with peasant farmers. Finally, Lowell Gudmundson provides a very welcome defense of area studies at a time when they have come under assault from a number of different quarters.

We hope you enjoy reading this issue. In future editions we will examine the role of the media in Latin America and the Caribbean and questions of racial and ethnic identity in the region. Our thanks go to the authors who contributed essays to this issue and to all of you who have sent us your feedback.

Eduardo A. Gamarra
COMMENTARY

Split Visions

Kathleen R. Martín

The woman at the airport counter is screaming. Her angry words shouted in English with a Dominican Spanish accent. Her body tense but shaking as though an electrical current were charging through her. The woman's words are almost unintelligible but it is clear that she feels herself to have been wronged by the airline personnel.

My fellow passengers turn to watch, some even moving their seats to get a clear view of the commotion. The airline agents look down at their computer screens, too embarrassed to deal with this upset woman standing in front of them, yelling. And then it is over, just before security arrives. The woman stumps off and disappears into the airport crowd. Her crown of hair the last glimpse before her absorption into the throng.

The other passengers at the gate waiting area chuckle and return to their conversations. "Did you see that?" "You just never know!" "It takes all kinds!" The show is over. The "lunatic" gone.

My own reaction is instant. I side with her. My mind flashes images of the circumstances that could have led her to such a despairing anger. I react as though I were from the same place as she. As though I were a member of her community, where one either absorbs the pain of circumstance or resists. Yelling because no one hears you unless you do. And yelling does get results—sometimes—even though it carries the risk of being labeled as just another "crazy" woman of a Latin American under-class. Split visions, again.

When I began my career as an anthropologist working in Latin America, I never intended to focus on women particularly. Yet there they were and there they remain, right at the center of my work: urbanization, household economies, health care and politics. As I have become engaged in their lives, they have become participants in mine, directing my career and ultimately helping to define the contours of my life. As they share their ideas, experiences and emotions with me, I have come to view many things as they do while not yet losing my own perspective. I call this "split visions."

So when I read about David Stoll's book, Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans, in which he repudiates certain aspects of the account given by the Guatemalan Maya 1992 Nobel Peace Prize winner in her "as told to" autobiography, I...Rigoberta Menchú, split visions again came into play.

I can understand how a North American anthropologist with a commitment to a fact-based, literal truth could investigate the life story of someone so important in his field of study, especially since he had doubts about the accuracy of Menchú's account based on his own experiences in Guatemala. As anthropologists, we are trained to be accurate and straightforward. We are trained to report sometimes uncomfortable truths. And Stoll's painstakingly researched book is very uncomfortable to those of us who work with and care greatly about the indigenous peoples of Latin America, particularly indigenous women.

Yet, despite the discomfort Stoll's book causes me, I can understand why a then very young and inexperienced Rigoberta Menchú could shape her account as she did. As a spokesperson for her indigenous community and culture, she told the story of I...Rigoberta Menchú to encompass the life experiences of her Guatemalan Maya community, even though some of these experiences she herself as an individual did not necessarily have. I can understand how she simplified aspects of her account to make it more starkly clear and compelling. As an activist whose cause only the truly ignorant could doubt, Rigoberta Menchú took on the role of spokesperson because of her commitment to ending the injustices suffered by the Guatemalan Maya. Part of her activism was to tell the story of her Guatemalan Maya community so that others could recognize and understand its suffering through the more vivid and accessible perspective of a personal life history.

Although Stoll has repudiated aspects of her account as written in I...Rigoberta Menchú, no one questions that the author suffered greatly as a Maya woman or that her cause on behalf of indigenous peoples is just. Rigoberta Menchú has been brought to task in David Stoll's Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans. I wonder if those who caused her suffering and that of other Guatemalan Maya and their supporters will ever be subject to such close scrutiny and accountability for their actions.
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Latitud is an on-line publication seeking to address the hopes and experiences of a rising Latin American and Caribbean generation.
Panama Votes No
Margaret E. Scranton

On August 30, 1998, Panama's voters soundly defeated the government's proposal to allow presidential re-election. Mireya Moscoso, president of the Arnulfista party and candidate for president in 1994 and 1999, triumphantly claimed victory. Flanked by allied party leaders, holding bullfighter's banderillas aloft, she relished the conquest of "El Toro" (the president's nickname). The vote was 63.8% "No," with a relatively high turnout of 65.4%.

Other presidents in the region have been more fortunate. Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1998), Carlos Menem in Argentina (1994) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil (1997) all achieved constitutional changes allowing re-election. In those countries, much of the impetus for re-election arose from a desire to maintain current economic policies. In Panama, too, President Ernesto Pérez Balladares promised to maintain his economic program if re-elected in 1999; many No votes were cast precisely on that basis. The referendum failed by the largest margins in areas hardest hit by structural readjustment policies. Another reason that Pérez Balladares lost his bid was fear of continuismo. Voters suspected that he, like other presidents, was trying to perpetuate his incumbency through a relatively quick and highly politicized constitutional change. Panama's presidential term is five years; had it passed, the reform would have allowed a re-elected president to serve for an entire decade, two years longer than two-term Brazilian and Argentine presidents.

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PÉREZ BALLADARES: WHAT'S THE VERDICT?

Without a doubt, part of the No victory was a rejection of Pérez Balladares as a president-candidate and of his economic policies. The idea of presidential re-election was more popular among voters than the proposed reform, which was associated intimately with Pérez Balladares. When asked before the referendum how they would respond to re-election if the reform were to go into effect for the 2004 election instead of in 1999, about 40% of respondents favored the measure, 3-7% more than favored its enactment in 1999 and 6% more than actually voted for the reforms on referendum day.

Throughout the campaign it was impossible to separate the issue of presidential re-election from the president-candidate himself. August polls revealed that an average of 53.5% of respondents thought the reforms favored the president, while an average of 37% thought they favored democracy. Voters' inability to separate the reforms from Pérez Balladares raised a disturbing question: When was the president acting as president versus acting as a candidate for re-election?

Some of this blurring is inherent to Panama's political system, in which elected officials also hold office in party hierarchies. The president doubles as secretary-general of the governing Partido Democritico Revolucionario (PRD), and several cabinet ministers also hold party offices. Opponents asserted that Pérez Balladares should have resigned from office, a step the constitution requires ministers and legislators to take six months before an election in which they plan to run.

Once the reform was defeated, editorial commentators and interviewees mentioned numerous reasons for the two-to-one No majority: the president's arrogant manner, privatization of the telephone company, weak Yes arguments, unemployment, generalized economic discontent, fear of political change, opposition to the PRD, fear of strengthening the presidency, and a historical tendency for Panamanians to reject constitutional reforms. Ultimately, the cumulative weight of these concerns, rather than one overwhelming issue, defeated the measures.

Despite these results, Pérez Balladares continues to receive generally positive assessments among political analysts. Few count him out...
A landmark referendum raises hopes of transparent elections in May

Presidential candidate Mireya Moscoso basks in the opposition coalition's victory over "El Toro," President Ernesto Pérez Balladares, in Panama's August 1996 referendum. Photo courtesy of La Prensa/Alvaro Reyes Nunez.

of politics altogether; he is still young and could run again in 2009, at the age of 62. "El Toro" is by no means a has-been in Panamanian politics.

**Panama's Next Election**

Since the anti-PRD bloc won the referendum with a sweeping 64%, its prospects for 1999 look somewhat better than in 1994, when the Arnulfista-led coalition gained only 29.1% of the vote. It would be wrong, however, to translate a No victory into an easy win for the opposition in 1999. The current anti-government coalition includes one strong party, the Arnulfistas, plus three small parties: Molirena, Morena and the Christian Democrats. Many No votes were votes against the government, its policies, or the president rather than votes for the opposition. When asked about their presidential preferences in one August poll, only 27.7% selected Mireya Moscoso; 57.5% opted for "another candidate." When asked about other presidential candidates on the opposition side, 32.3% chose "don't know/no response" rather than any named candidate.

Their united effort to block the government enabled opposition parties to maintain a solid front in the referendum and ultimately to win by a large margin. Immediately after the referendum, however, factional infighting resumed with a vengeance. Struggles intensified within each party to select a nominee. Even in the Arnulfista Party, which held an early primary in March, Mireya Moscoso's main rival, Alberto Vallarino, continued to campaign for a presidential nomination by another party. Other aspirants began jockeying for vice-presidential slots. In October, Vallarino formed a coalition with Christian Democrats to head a third presidential slate.

Pro-government hopefuls are in even worse shape than the opposition. About 51.2% of respondents polled selected "don't know/no response" rather than any candidate named in this group. In polls that asked about governing coalition candidates (excluding Pérez Balladares), the top choice was Alfredo Oranges, Pérez Balladares's rival for the PRD nomination in 1994, with 28.7%; the next most popular choice received only 8.3%. However, Oranges lost the October PRD primary to a relative newcomer, Martín Torrijos, a son of the general who ruled the country from 1968-1980.

Complicating the political horizon even further were calls for
another force, an alternative to the PRD or either group of Arnulfistas. While local experts disparage this option, public opinion is receptive to a new political force. In polls taken during July and August 1998, support for a third force consistently averaged in the 50th percentile, with 57.1% preferring this option in one poll. Splitter groups from almost every aligned party advertised their availability to join an "other" coalition or Vallarino's slate.

Although the opposition won the day on August 30, prospects for 1999 remain murky. Two victory caravans paraded through Panama's streets on referendum night: one for the Arnulfista-led coalition and one for the independents. A winning opposition coalition could fail to materialize; too many slates could split the opposition vote and produce a PRD margin in a three-way race in May.

More time must pass before the coalition structure of the campaign gels.

An additional unknown factor concerns the preferences of voters who stayed home on referendum day. The abstention rate was only 34.6%, much lower than the 59.9% who did not vote in the 1992 referendum, but not as low as the 27.2% who abstained in the last national elections. Even a fraction of this 34.6% could provide the crucial margin in a three-way race in May.

Much depends on Martin Torrijos's appeal as the head of the PRD slate. As a young lawyer and economist who is relatively unknown in national politics, he brings excitement to the race. His victory margin of 56% was impressive, but turnout for the primary was only slightly above 50%. Torrijos has strong ties to the PRD youth organization and can count on the powerful support of the party's hierarchy.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL CULTURE

In 1999, Panama will hold its second national election since the US invasion. The first, in 1994, was a model of transparency; all the actors were on their best behavior, determined to demonstrate their ability to hold a free and fair campaign and election. The 1998 referendum campaign was less civil and more shrill, and mutual suspicions between the Yes and No blocs ran high. Each side was hypersensitive to any slight advantage gained by the other and quick to denounce any apparent imbalance as fraud.

Polls showed that a sizable portion of respondents believed that there would be fraud in the referendum. A popular rumor asserted that one side had distributed pens for marking the ballot with a special disappearing ink, so that an unsuspecting voter would end up casting a blank ballot. Experts expressed serious concerns that the PRD and Arnulfistas might not be willing or able to control their "thugs" on referendum day. As it turned out, very few irregularities occurred. The Justice and Peace Commission observers present at some 1,700 voting centers filed only about 50 complaints for the entire country. The electoral prosecutor, Raúl López, received only five official charges of electoral violations, and these were for minor offenses. Most domestic and international observers concluded that the referendum was a model of transparency. The verdict was unanimous: Panamanians had held another free and fair election.

Some opponents criticized the referendum as an unnecessary expense that wasted time and money that could have been devoted to more pressing national problems. Critics pointed to the $5 million put up by the PRD's Business Group, but realistically speaking, this money would not have been used, by the party or by business leaders themselves, for any social purpose. The critique did, however, raise the right question: Was the referendum worth its nearly $8 million cost?

In terms of its impact on the consolidation of Panama's democracy, the referendum was a windfall with unintended positive consequences. Just before the vote, experts assessing the scene worried that "anything could happen." Actions belied these fears. Routine prevailed as voters cast their ballots and throughout the count. At 6:30 p.m., only hours after the polls closed and with 22% of the vote tables reporting, the presidents of the governing parties held a press conference to concede defeat. Their speeches were measured and conciliatory. Next to address the nation was the No coalition, headed by Mireya Moscoso; with unrestrained glee, opposition leaders claimed victory. The president addressed the nation at 7:30 p.m., humbly accepting the defeat of his government's proposals and affirming that the 1999 elections would be equally transparent.

The referendum allowed the political class to demonstrate to itself—through actions—that all of its members were committed to playing by the rules. Without it, the hostile political climate would have worsened throughout the 1999 campaign. Those tensions will reassert themselves as the presidential race progresses, but they will arise in the context of a strengthened, if still emerging, political culture. While the opposition may feel that the rules of the game favor the parties in power, the "out" parties can be more confident that the rules will be followed on May 2, and that they have a stake in playing by those rules. To face the 1999 election without the referendum experience would have been to face a high-stakes national election in an atmosphere of ever-mounting distrust. The referendum cleared the air and set a more solid, virtuous base line for the suspicions that are bound to surface in the period leading up to the elections.
Panama is immensely better off for having held the August referendum. Not only are voters and the political class reassured about the electoral process, but the process itself has been “test-driven.” The electoral rolls have been issued and used, so that all parties can check their own members and can challenge any deceased or invalid voters on other parties’ lists. A huge staff of volunteer electoral delegates was trained and, more important, carried out its duties on referendum day. This experience will serve the country well in May, when more complicated ballots and counting procedures will be introduced.

All the parties had more volunteers working on referendum day, as poll watchers and transportation providers, than they had in 1994. In that election, the PRD alone staffed most vote centers throughout the country. The Arnulfistas were better prepared for the referendum, ensuring that Yes and No representatives were present at most of the 5,000-odd vote tables. This presence indicates that both major parties recognize that the new rules of the electoral game ensure transparency through vigilance of the voting process. Equally important are the nonpartisan electoral workers trained by the Electoral Tribunal to staff vote centers, organize and oversee the proceedings, and resolve any minor conflicts that arise.

Politics in Panama is changing. The new game involves mobilizing voters whose votes really count and party representatives who scrutinize the process. The old game of crying fraud and filing the maximum legal challenges possible—valid or not—is over. In this emerging context, the most important lesson of the 1998 referendum is that, irrespective of massive spending and special promotions, if voters do not want a given product, that campaign will lose.
Paraguay’s Guaraní Indians are killing themselves at an alarming rate, 25 times more frequently than the rest of the rural population. Most suicides have been reported in a cluster of Guaraní communities near the Brazilian border. In one town, nine suicides were reported among 450 residents last year; in another, with a population of only 115, seven Guaraní killed themselves in the same period. Four suicides occurred in May 1994 in three other communities.

The deaths in Paraguay are part of a wave of suicides in Guaraní communities throughout South America’s southern cone. The Conselho Indigenista Missionário, a Brazilian Catholic relief agency, reports high rates of suicide among Guaraní in Brazil as well. In 1995 alone, 56 suicides occurred among the 21,000 Guaraní and closely related Kaiowá near the Paraguayan border. Suicide rates in these communities have increased sixfold, from a yearly average of 5.3 in the 1980s to 33 in the 1990s. Today, the annual rate of suicide among all Guaraní is over 1.5 per 1000. In contrast, the rate among non-Indians is one in 25,000.

The suicides follow a clear pattern. Most occur among young people; almost half the suicides reported were adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18. Two-thirds of the deaths were young men and women between 12 and 24. The rate declined with age, with adults over 36

Richard Reed is an associate professor of sociology and anthropology at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas.
Paraguay’s indigenous people are engaged in a life-or-death struggle for land

accounting for only a tenth of the deaths. Almost three-quarters of the Guarani and Kaiowá killed themselves by hanging. The majority of the remaining deaths were accomplished by ingesting poison, primarily herbicides and pesticides used in commercial agriculture.

BACKGROUND TO TRAGEDY

What is causing this devastating plague of self-annihilation among indigenous people? The clearest reason behind the deaths is the grinding poverty and alienation suffered by the Guarani and Kaiowá, caused in turn by land loss and deforestation.

The 50,000 Guarani live on small plots scattered throughout the border region of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. At the time of the Iberian conquest, over a million Guarani dominated the forests from the Atlantic coast to the Paraná River; however, European disease soon decimated the Guarani population.

Military campaigns reduced the population even further. In the last decades, the area’s forests have been cleared for the burgeoning agricultural economy. Agribusinesses expanded across the Paraná plateau in the 1980s, clearing Guarani land for cattle pasture and soybeans for the thriving export economy. The privatization of land forced hundreds of small Guarani hamlets onto the few parcels that remained.

The Paraguayan government attempted to find land for indigenous communities, but reservations were invariably too small and infertile for traditional production. National law gives all indigenous families rights to at least 20 hectares, but the amount of land actually acquired rarely meets this ideal. The small acreages force Guarani out of hunting and subsistence production into intensive and unsustainable commercial agriculture. Moreover, the land they receive has usually been cleared and abandoned by loggers or farmers. Shorn of its wealth, the soil produces little.

Guarani in Brazil fare even worse. The government there has recognized only 12 of the 61 Guarani communities in Brazil and, in total, the 25,000 Guarani and Kaiowá of that country control only 44,000 hectares. This leaves the average family less than two hectares for houses, crops and domestic animals, far less than the 50 hectares needed for farming.

As Guarani communities lose their land, they become dependent on a market economy over which they have little power. Guarani who previously supplemented their farming with hunting and fishing are forced to cultivate cotton and tobacco in the tired soil. When profits are insufficient, they turn to labor on nearby ranches and cane farms; men work as field hands, women as prostitutes. They work for whatever employers will offer and pay the high prices charged by company stores.

This pattern of employment disrupts Guarani communities. Migrant workers abandon their families to seek work, while indigenous leaders lose influence over their communities to non-Indian employers. Individuals and families are pulled away from reservations to live tenuously on the edges of nearby towns.

Social disruption of Guarani communities is at the root of the high suicide rates. Anomie manifests itself in a chain of drinking, fighting, homicide and suicide in any of the small market towns where Guarani collect their wages. Alcohol may be limited, even rare, on cash-poor Guarani reservations, but before returning to their communities laborers get drunk on the rough cane liquor that is often a portion of their pay. Problems are never far behind. On the Dourados reservation, a young man named André Paulo got drunk with his friends one night and complained about how hard life was without a job. He was found hanging from a tree the next morning.

In addition to the social problems created by poverty, political and religious groups disrupt Guarani communities. In a series of oral histories of Guarani in Dourados, Bom Meihy points out that in addition to land, indigenous groups need social and political space to manage their own affairs. Government bureaucrats and rural police interfere in the community, undermining the indigenous institutions that give Guarani life structure and meaning.

Evangelical missionaries may be another cause of suicide. Missionaries purchase land badly needed by Guarani groups, then exhort the residents with claims that indigenous beliefs are demonic. Austrian anthropologist Georg Grunberg notes that missionaries have a strong presence in three of the four Paraguayan Guarani communities with the highest rates of suicide. Grunberg reports, “These missionaries know that the disorder

Guarani youths in Rincón Uno, Paraguay. Young people account for most suicides in Guarani communities. Photos courtesy of Tammy Bowers.
Guarani communities that lose their land are forced into a market economy in which they have little power. Here, a woman rolls cigars as part of a church-sponsored microenterprise project.

caused by the presence of Christians increases alcoholism and suicide, but consider it the price to be paid for salvation.

Newspaper and government reports imply that Guarani suicide is a unique, quasi-religious phenomenon. For example, an article in London's The Guardian a few years ago was entitled, “Guarani Die to Keep Faith with the Great Father.” In fact, the demographics of Guarani suicide suggest a pattern similar to suicide epidemics in other areas of the world, including American suburban society. Psychologists point out that suicide seems to have a contagious quality among teens. The suicide of one frustrated, fearful and impulsive young person sets off a chain reaction among others. As already noted, Guarani suicides strike adolescents and young adults most severely, with the average victim between the ages of 16 and 23. These youths are suffering the difficulties and anxieties of finding their way in the world. Their task is made more difficult by the bleak situation of most Guarani communities.

**THE STATE RESPONSE**

After world attention focused on the Guarani suicide rate in 1995, the international community and the Brazilian government moved quickly to define the problem. The Interamerican Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS) paid a highly publicized visit to the Guarani along the Paraguay-Brazil border. In addition, the Brazilian Indian agency FUNI began an intensive survey of health and welfare among the five Guarani communities in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul.

The Paraguayan government has shown less concern for the suicides and has done little to improve conditions for the Guarani. The national office of indigenous affairs, the Instituto Nacional del Indigena (INDI), has neither studied the situation nor made an effort to secure additional land in the most affected areas. The lack of response can be attributed at least in part to the nation's current political situation. The Paraguayan government is fraught by internecine warfare and beset by growing conflicts over land redistribution.

Paraguay's government has been in crisis since it enacted a new democratic constitution in 1992. Former
case in 1994, the Guarani denounced 30 peasant families inside the Guayrapare reservation. The campesinos in turn requested that the Instituto de Bienestar Rural expropriate the parcel for their colony. By 1995, peasants had built 200 houses on the land. The struggle continues.

A Culture of Resistance

Outsiders’ responses to Guarani suicide often draw on common stereotypes of indigenous peoples. The larger world tends to believe that Indians are fatalistic and acquiesce quietly to their disenfranchisement. Few Guarani, however, resign themselves passively to their fate; in fact, many Guarani communities have taken direct action to reclaim their lands. In several recent cases, their struggle has been successful.

In 1992, the closing of the floodgates of the Itaipú Dam on the Paraná River inundated the lands of adjacent Guarani communities. In response to Guarani complaints, the binational corporation that owns the dam provided the 60 families with a mere 240 hectares, without potable water. In June 1995, the community lost patience with the endless negotiations and occupied an additional 623 hectares. The Brazilian director of the power plant finally promised to provide 1,500 hectares suitable for the establishment of a community, as well as farm land and drinking water until the new land is cleared. The Guarani are hopeful, but cautious. Previous promises have gone unfulfilled.

In a second recent case, a Guarani community in southern Brazil occupied 2,850 hectares owned by the Zaffari corporation, a major marketing firm. The Guarani of Barro do Ouro were evicted from their land earlier in this century, although the corporation never legitimized its claim to the area. That didn’t stop Zaffari from expelling Guarani residents with threats and violence.

Without land, the Guarani of Barro do Ouro were forced to live precariously in urban areas. In 1988, the Office of the Attorney General and the Human Rights Commission of the state of Rio Grande do Sul took up the case, but eight years of negotiation failed to resolve it. In November 1996, Guarani calling themselves Nemboaty Guassu (The Great Gathering) began a highly publicized occupation of the territory. They surveyed its borders, opened new trails and planted crops. According to the group’s leader, Manoel Wera, this was the only way to ensure their tenure to the land. “Since FUNAI and the government have not demarcated the area, we’re going to do it,” he explained.

Guarani throughout the region continue to occupy disputed land, often at great personal risk. In one recent case in Paraguay, 136 Mbya-Guarani families chose to return to their traditional lands in the Department of Caaguazu, despite the fact that a latifundista held title to the 34,340 hectares in question. The communities requested recognition by INDI, but as their petition foundered in the national bureaucracy the titleholders responded brutally. The Guarani were threatened, their houses were burned, their goods stolen and their men beaten. They still await INDI’s decision.

In another case in May 1997, Amnesty International reported that the Guarani community of Jarara won rights to its land after a decade of litigation. Soon after, however, the Brazilian government reversed the court decision and ordered the residents to cede the land to a cattle rancher. One Guarani leader responded in a voice that speaks for indigenous people throughout this conflicted region: “The government’s decision could lead to conflict, mortal violence, or suicide of those who choose to die rather than leave their primordial lands.”
For nearly a decade now in the post-Cold War world of the End of History, with its economics-derived social science, we have witnessed the growth of a global financial system powerfully intertwined with so-called “emerging markets” (Russia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and, more unevenly, Asia). At the same time, the average US citizen has been bombarded with a withering assault of simultaneously hopeful and authoritative prescriptions for both economic and political development in this no-longer bipolar world economy. In its more low-brow versions (“one size fits all,” “the market knows best,” “shrink the state” or “investor confidence above all else”), this recycling of a triumphalist political economy made by and for the business classes in Thatcher’s England and Reagan’s America represents the culmination of two decades of abandonment and even repudiation of social democratic and welfare-state policies. The same two decades have witnessed the collapse of the Soviet empire and complex processes of (re) democratization amid challenges to authoritarian and military regimes in many corners of the world.

In this context, scholars have debated the relevance of area studies and place-specific scholarship, often dismissed as a quaint legacy of Cold War-era bipolarism and the resulting competition for client states. For at least a decade now, discussions comparing East Asian and Latin American economic performance have been almost ritualistically re-enacted in academic and policy-relevant forums. The purpose of these discussions is to highlight the wisdom of the policies followed by the East Asian countries in contrast to the interventionist and protectionist follies characteristic of Latin America. To be sure, there is a lot of truth to such a formulaic comparison: East Asian GDP, productivity measures and per capita income grew much faster than did comparable figures for Latin America, especially from about 1965 to 1990. After this point, virtually all Latin American national economic policies were reoriented toward what was understood, rightly or wrongly, as the “Asian miracle” formula of export-led, open economies. These changes were embraced despite a traumatic decade of debt crises in the region, and in stark contrast to a nearly half-century tradition of public-sector oriented, interventionist and protectionist economic policies throughout the region.

It is more than a little ironic, then, that Latin American stock markets and economies today are frantically seeking to insulate themselves from the so-called Asian contagion and Russian collapse or, failing that, to be rescued by the IMF, World Bank or US Treasury Department. In what some swore would be the “last days” of the End of History, it appears that area-specific and historically grounded knowledge may yet prove relevant. The repeatedly mistaken and shortsighted declarations of financial gurus (this generation’s “Money Doctors,” comparable to the US “experts” sent round the world, particularly to Latin America, in the 1920s), for whom open markets equal democracy, might better lead to a search for secular, less apocalyptic solutions than to any celebratory wake for the End of History. As observers of the more corrupt and authoritarian Asian regimes have discovered, “crony capitalism” can have a problematic relationship with the democratic strengthening of civil society, whatever the economic performance indicators. Similarly, the emergence of so-called oligarchies and organized crime in control of recently privatized state properties in the former Soviet Union, tied to a banking system as closed as it is corrupt, as politically favored as it is insolvent, make a mockery of words such as “reform,” “private sector” and “competitive.”

While general theoretical models no doubt prove useful for everything from relative prices to democratic elections, they offer only tools for the analysis of concrete historical circumstances, not an a priori justification for its avoidance. Let us consider some cautionary tales based on the Latin American historical experience that may prove provocative, especially as regards the so-called Russian collapse. What other region of the world has ever opened itself more fully to foreign investment and export-led growth than Latin America after roughly 1880 (up until the crash of the 1930s and the half-century backlash of inward-looking, protectionist policies)? What other region so fully supported policies to boost (not always successfully, of course) investor confidence with open-door economics and revolving-door politics, as often as not insured by military or strong-man rule? And what other region so typically suf-
Cautionary tales from Latin America

followed from a recurrent inability to develop domestic political coalitions capable of expanding civil society and insuring the rule of law and democratic succession by civilian authorities? Free trade was not only not synonymous with democratic development in many Latin American countries; the two concepts often proved mortal enemies. This was not owing to any intrinsic incompatibility, but rather to the lack of a broad domestic social base for the policies needed to promote exports and the patterns of power and income distribution resulting from them.

Rather than consulting yet another international Money Doctor on how to "get the prices right," how to downsize the state, or how to restore investor confidence and a stable exchange rate, Russian policy makers might want to consider some cautionary tales from their former friends and comrades-in-arms in Latin America. As a Sandinista riddle asked in the early 1980s, why is it that Latin American nations suffer from so much political instability and the US enjoys so much stability? The answer: There is no US Embassy in Washington! Policy advice from those who will not directly suffer the consequences of its implementation is advice one takes at a certain risk. When one hears that Russia’s so-called reformers must merely stay the course, or adopt yet more radical approaches to privatization while continuing to use banking subsidies to support those relative few who have benefited from the reforms to date, one wonders whether any thought at all is being given to the sort of political and social support base necessary for policies to succeed in the longer term.

Two chilling examples from Latin America may drive this point home. The first deals with the privatization of land ownership, a major source of tension in Russia and Eastern Europe. The many theoreticians who puzzle over the negative effects on economic performance of a truncated land market incapable of attracting private bank credit to expand production and increase productivity should recall the socially polarizing resolution of this problem in vast regions of Latin America in the late nineteenth century. In countries such as Mexico and Guatemala, for example, despite a radical and often bloody commitment by increasingly dictatorial regimes to “investor confidence above all else,” revolutionary violence at different points in the twentieth century wiped out far more than just the economic gains made in the name of clarity of property rights and export-led growth.

Simply entrusting land reform to the market or to the tender mercies of Russia’s new “oligarchies” is no more certain to lead to long-term stability or democratic development than it did in Latin America’s indigenous highlands a century ago. Today’s Money Doctors, whose only medicine is a watered-down mixture of demonizing the state and sanctifying an equally abstract market, have no magic formula with which to resolve the difficult questions involved in creating a socially sustainable support base for whatever system of property rights and politics emerges from these conflicts.

Guatemala provides a second example of a more overtly political nature. The most alarming descriptions of Mafia-style political intimidation and influence peddling in Russia today should lead all but the most committed true believer to question any easy equivalency between market reform and democracy. Extreme concentrations of economic or political power rarely persist for long without becoming intertwined wherever one may look in the world, and certainly in both Russia and Latin America. Guatemala’s military-backed governments practiced an officially sanctioned repression and butchery with few peers in the modern world, routinely intimidating the citizenry with kidnapping, torture and murder. It would be well to remember that the United States consistently supported and even intervened to help re-establish this type of regime, committed above all else to international trade and investor confidence.

When stability and investor confidence are cards that can consistently trump those of democratic process and citizenship amid the rule of law, no amount of special pleading can change the fact that so-called market reforms and democracy have permanently parted company. This was Guatemala’s tragic fate for most of the twentieth century, despite its vehement membership in the “Free World” during the Cold War. Averting a similar tragedy in Russia will require more than just contemporary theoretical orthodoxy or financial stability. It may even require the re-emergence, rather than the submergence, of historically grounded thinking, a decade or more into the perversely premature celebration of its irrelevance by End of History types and post-Cold War globalists alike.
According to a 1996 report by the World Health Organization, Latin America has the highest incidence of illegal abortions of any other region on the planet. The report, which received very little media coverage, pointed to the dire state of women's health in the Third World. In Latin America, the numbers are shocking—41 of every 1,000 women undergo unsafe abortions, compared to 26 in Africa, 12 in Asia and two in Europe. Despite the gravity of the situation, abortion remains a taboo topic that receives little public discussion. But for Latin American women, the time for hushed debates is running out: Each year, four million women undergo abortions and 6,000 die as a direct result of the practice.

Marta, a 19-year-old from Cochabamba, Bolivia, is among the millions of casualties of the clandestine abortion system. Four years ago, Marta fell in love with her first boyfriend. That same year she became pregnant by him. With no means to support a baby, and basically a child herself, Marta went to La Paz, Bolivia's capital, to undergo an abortion. She had been referred to the doctor by a friend of a friend. When she arrived at the clandestine clinic in La Paz's seedy market neighborhood, the doctor asked her boyfriend to leave and come back in a few hours. Once the "abortion doctor" had Marta alone in the operating room, he raped her.

Marta's story is tragic but not uncommon. Every year, Bolivian women's sexual and reproductive rights are violated in the maze of unregulated "medical clinics" that perform clandestine abortions throughout the country. Despite the gravity of the abuse that Marta suffered, she had no legal recourse against the abortion doctor. In Bolivia—as in every Latin American country with the exceptions of Cuba, Puerto Rico and Guyana—abortion is illegal. The social taboo that surrounds the issue and the illegality of the practice has insulated abortion clinics from scrutiny and denied women who have been abused by them any possibility of legal recourse.

**THE BOLIVIAN EXAMPLE**

Bolivian women have one of the highest fertility rates in Latin America and one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. At the same time, one-half of Bolivian families live in poverty. The economic squeeze caused by demographic changes that are driving poor families into cities has increased the numbers of abortions in recent years, resulting in a serious public health issue for Bolivia. The Bolivian example provides an instructive look at what is wrong with reproductive health care in Latin America.

Dangerous abortion procedures are widely practiced in Bolivia. According to a recent United Nations study, Bolivian women bear between four and five children during their reproductive lifecycle. The abortion epidemic in Bolivia stems largely from the fact that of these five children, only two or three are wanted. With the ongoing pressures of...
poverty and migration to urban slums, Bolivian women are faced with the difficult decision of having a child that they cannot provide for or seeking an abortion procedure that is illegal, expensive, not always successful and sometimes lethal.

One of the few ways to measure the magnitude of the "abortion problem" is through the internment statistics of Bolivia's public hospitals, which register the number of deaths caused by abortion complications. Given that many of the women who undergo abortions are never officially registered and die in obscurity, most estimates probably represent a fraction of the actual number of deaths. According to data from Obrero Hospital, La Paz's largest emergency health care provider, 50.6% of the beds in the gynecology ward between 1977 and 1987 were occupied by patients with abortion trauma. Considering that each bed costs $74 per day, these statistics represent an astronomical cost to the Bolivian health care system.

Internment due to abortion complications is not covered by the public health care system, but because most of the women who undergo clandestine abortion procedures are poor and simply cannot pay the cost of emergency care, the state generally picks up the cost.

As Bolivia's hospitals feel the squeeze of government budget cutbacks, the abortion epidemic has exacerbated their already inadequate resources. Dr. Gustavo Mendoza Ríos, executive director of La Paz's Women's Hospital, has seen the disturbing increase in women with complications from botched abortions transform his hospital's service strategy. "Of every three women that come through here, one is an abortion case," he said. Many of these women arrive with hemorrhages, punctured uteruses and generalized septicemia as a result of desperate attempts at self-induced abortion.

Some hospitals simply refuse to attend to abortion patients. "Many women are practically condemned to die, because when they arrive with intense bleeding in the emergency rooms the doctors say, 'This is an abortionist. I won't help her,"' said Juana Martínez of the Federation of Popular Women's Organizations, a grass-roots group in La Paz.

The women who arrive at Bolivia's public hospitals often come out of desperation. Many of them die there. Today, Bolivia has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in Latin America (second only to Haiti). A 1980 study conducted by the National Division of Maternal and Infant Health found that three of every 10 maternal deaths was directly caused by abortion complications. According to the Bolivian Society of Gynecologists and Obstetricians, 450-500 women die from induced abortions every year.

**THE DEBATE**

Abortion in Latin America has always been a contentious issue. The Catholic Church, women's rights groups and the state health departments have all launched powerful lobbying efforts. Caught in the middle of this heated debate are Latin American women, who struggle to weigh their religious and personal beliefs against the mandates of their difficult reality.

For the region's feminists, abortion is a central issue in the struggle for...
women's rights. At the Fifth Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Conference in 1990, delegates decided to designate September 28 as Latin American Women's Right to Abortion Day. "We are fighting so that women are given a dignified treatment in the health centers and receive clear and accurate information about how to avoid having to resort to an abortion in the future," said Romanet Zárate, coordinator of the September 28 campaign for the Women's Information and Development Center (CIDEM) in Bolivia.

Often viewed locally as a radical group, CIDEM's demands are actually quite conservative. The campaign has never called for the outright legalization of abortion; instead, it concentrates on improving existing laws. In most Latin American countries, including Bolivia, abortion is illegal under all circumstances except in cases of pregnancy by incest or rape, fetal deformity, or when carrying the baby to term poses a threat to the woman's life. In practice, however, these exceptions are rarely invoked. This summer, for the first time in Bolivian history, a woman who brought her claim to court received a verdict in her favor. Given the strength of public disapproval regarding the issue, few women brave the financial and emotional demands of the court system to pursue legal grounds for an abortion.

Bolivian law also makes it illegal to compel a woman to have an abortion, but this provision has been difficult to enforce. Several years ago, a minor in the state of Chuquisaca was kidnapped, abused and made to abort her pregnancy by her boyfriend. The teenager filed charges and a trial was brought to the state Supreme Court. A judge ruled that the boyfriend and the doctor who performed the abortion were guilty of kidnapping and abuse of a minor, but not of the crime of abortion itself. If a woman chooses to prosecute the perpetrators of a forced abortion, she must produce medical records to prove that she was actually pregnant at the time, that the pregnancy was interrupted, and that the fetus subsequently died. The burden of proof rests overwhelmingly on the victim.

A second case illuminates the difficulties facing women who invoke the abortion legislation. Two adolescents aged 14 and 18 became pregnant after their father raped them repeatedly over a period of several years. Their mother finally denounced her husband to the authorities and sought legal abortions for the two girls, who underwent medical and legal examinations to support their case. The process was delayed when the judge in charge withdrew from the trial, declaring that he was "incompetent to preside." He transferred the case to a "family matters" judge, who in turn deferred responsibility to a third judge, claiming that prior knowledge of the case disqualified him as well. The third judge ruled that an abortion should be permitted; however, after deciding that he lacked the authority to order the procedure, he referred the case back to the original judge. By this point, the girls were five and eight months pregnant, making an abortion practically impossible.

Finally, a third case in August 1998 demonstrated the impotency of Bolivia's existing legal code. In the central city of Sucre, a 14-year-old was raped by her father. The girl's mother got a judge to approve an abortion, but doctors at the local hospital refused to interrupt the pregnancy. The situation was brought to the attention of the Centro Juana Azurduy, a Bolivian NGO, whose lawyers secured a judicial order requiring the hospital to perform an abortion within the next 24 hours. The order stated that if the doctor charged with the task refused to carry it out, he would be arrested. The director of the hospital eventually performed the abortion and has since been the target of widespread criticism, including a public denunciation from the National Association of Doctors.

All of these precedents illustrate the weakness of the Bolivian legal system in protecting women in the arena of reproductive rights. Because the issue is religiously and politically charged, judges are reluctant to grant an abortion, even in cases in which it is clearly legal. The courts render the legislation ineffectual by simply ignoring charges that relate to abortion or by enmeshing court cases in an endless web of bureaucracy. The loosely defined law also allows medical professionals to challenge court decisions when legal abortions have been granted.

**Church and State: A Blurred Boundary**

Many myths prevail in Latin America about the type of women who have abortions. The stereotype of an abortion patient is a libertine woman who is young, single or unfaithful. Statistical studies suggest just the opposite. In 1990, the Latin American Federation of Obstetricians and Gynecologists found that in four countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela—79% of hospitalized abortion patients were married, 51% had two or more children, and 86% were aged 20 or older.

Despite these figures, the Catholic Church maintains that abortion is a result of widespread immorality and ignorance. This attitude is important, since the overwhelming majority of Latin Americans identify themselves as Catholics; indeed, the Church is the single most powerful influence on public opinion concerning reproductive issues. In 1989, Bolivia's secretary of health tried to treat abortion as a public health concern. The backlash from the Church was so powerful that the effort was...
abandoned and the minister's job was called into question. "It is unjust that the Catholic Church can influence public policy. Not all Bolivians are Catholic, and even within the Church there is dissidence about the issue," said Zárate.

In many countries, the Church has effectively shut down the debate on abortion by framing it as a religious issue. "Abortion is murder and we condemn it under all circumstances," said the secretary to the Archbishop of La Paz, who would identify herself only as Sister Rosío. Yet, the Church also refuses to support family planning or the use of contraceptive methods to prevent pregnancies, arguing that any form of contraception that isn't "natural" is immoral. Some Bolivian Church officials even condemn abortion in cases of rape or incest. "I will not deny that incest occurs in this country, but I also can't ignore the fact that many women provoke incest and rape by the way they behave and dress," said Sister Rosío.

Increasingly, women are affirming their Catholic beliefs while demanding the right to use contraception. Theresa Lanza, coordinator of the international group Catholics for the Right to Choose, thinks the two points of view are compatible. "The church needs to realize that we can be good Catholics while at the same time looking out for our interests as women," she said.

TALKING THROUGH TABOOS

Although the warring sides in the abortion debate rarely find common ground, they all agree that education is the most important step toward eradicating this dangerous practice. One of the most consistent indicators in abortion statistics is the fact that women with less education are much more likely to undergo the procedure.

An issue that is rarely discussed by either side of the debate is how to change the mentality of Bolivian men, who often pressure their wives and girlfriends into having sex while forbidding the use of contraception. "Part of the problem is that in our country, machismo dictates that a man must have as many children as possible in order to be valued," Zárate lamented.

In Bolivia, the Church and state have both launched ambitious efforts to combat the alarming frequency of abortions. The government, with funding from The Population Council, has implemented a comprehensive sexual and reproductive health education program beginning at the primary school level. The Church, for its part, has committed itself to educating young women to make more informed decisions about pregnancy and parenthood.

On September 28, 1998—Latin American Women's Right to Abortion Day—Bolivian women's rights organizations launched a comprehensive education campaign. The day began with a press conference at which women's rights lobbyists presented a blueprint for a revised abortion law. The proposed law outlines the exact legal process that a woman must follow to seek a legal abortion. In an effort to raise public awareness of the abortion issue, campaign organizers led a series of workshops with directors of women's health and welfare programs. "Eventually, we will lobby parliament members to change the law," said Cecilia Olivares, director of this year's CIDEM campaign.

Amidst all the controversy surrounding abortion, one thing is clear: Latin American women are dying needlessly as a result of unsafe and clandestine procedures. Open dialogue is the only way to begin to address the issue. ■

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The University of North Carolina Press CHAPEL HILL

Domestic violence is a serious social problem in Latin America, as it is in most parts of the world. According to a series of surveys commissioned by the Women's Development Unit of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 1997, more than 40% of married women in Chile suffer from some type of domestic violence, including physical, psychological or sexual abuse. In Managua, Nicaragua, more than 52% of women reported abuse. Other studies reveal that 20% of Colombian women complain of physical abuse and 60% of women in poor neighborhoods of Quito, Ecuador report being hit by their husbands.

The health impacts of domestic violence on abused women can be devastating, ranging from physical injury and mental illness to increased incidence of suicide and homicide. Domestic violence also affects the self-esteem of women, as well as the educational performance and future behavior of children in the household. Many studies have focused on these effects and the human rights aspect of domestic violence. In this article, we argue that domestic violence also has a socioeconomic dimension. The hidden costs of domestic violence imply an economic drain on society as a whole. These costs include the value of goods and services used in treating or preventing domestic violence (especially medical resources), and abused women's productivity losses in the labor market. In addition, witnessing violent episodes at home has a negative impact on children's health and school performance—factors which increase the likelihood that as adults they will live in poverty.

TREATMENT AND PREVENTION COSTS
Are women who suffer from domestic violence more intensive users of health services? The 1997 IDB survey in Santiago, Chile produced little evidence to this effect. However, abused women in Managua were far more likely to make use of health services than nonabused women. Among the Nicaraguan women who were victims of domestic violence, 26% were hospitalized during that year, compared to only 12% of women who were not abused. Fifteen percent of the abused women needed surgery, versus only 7% of the nonabused women. In sum, abused women seem to use health services about twice as frequently as nonabused women. Obviously, these health services represent real resource costs to abused women and society.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE
Domestic violence lowers a woman's productivity in the workplace, which in turn is reflected in lower potential wages. Lower potential wages make working less attractive; consequently, women who are victims of domestic violence may have a lower probability of participating in the labor market. Domestic violence also may be used by the male partner in a relationship as a mechanism to limit the female's power and control over economic resources. Hence, women who are victims of domestic violence may be prevented from working because their husbands are afraid to lose control over household resources.

According to the IDB survey in Santiago, women who experience any type of domestic violence are less likely to work and earn income outside the home. Only 32.4% of women in the survey who suffered severe physical violence worked outside the home, compared to 36.8% of women who did not suffer severe physical violence. The largest gap in participation rates (6.7%) was between women who were psychologically abused and those who were not. Assuming that women who were victims of domestic violence and did not work would have earned the average monthly wage, the forgone national income from their lost earnings amounts to approximately $1.2 billion at current exchange rates.

In Managua, there was no significant difference in the percentage of women who worked outside the home, whether they suffered physical and sexual abuse or not. An explanation for the relatively high rates of labor force participation among abused women is the level of poverty in Nicaragua. Poor households need women's earnings to satisfy basic necessities such as food and shelter. Nicaraguan women often work in spite of a low expected wage, and their husbands are more likely to approve of their employment.
The socioeconomic costs of domestic violence in Latin America

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WOMEN'S EARNINGS

Compelling evidence indicates that female workers who suffer from domestic violence have substantially lower productivity and wages than their nonabused counterparts. Victims of domestic violence have difficulty concentrating on their tasks and present high levels of absenteeism due to health problems. Being a victim of domestic violence severely affects an individual's self-esteem, and low self-esteem in turn has a negative impact on productivity and work remuneration.

In Santiago, the IDB survey found that domestic violence reduced wages by 34%, after controlling for education and experience. The aggregate wage loss for Chilean women during 1997 due to episodes of domestic violence was close to $1.6 billion, or 2% of 1996 GDP. In Managua, women who were victims of domestic violence also had significantly lower earnings. After controlling for other factors, the survey there showed that domestic violence lowered earnings by 46%. The aggregate wage reduction for female victims of domestic violence in Managua was approximately $29.5 million during 1997, or 1.6% of 1996 GDP.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND EDUCATION

Domestic violence against women has many pernicious impacts on the children who witness it. Researchers have shown that seeing such acts tends to convert male children into future perpetrators and female children into future victims of domestic violence. Children who themselves are abused and neglected are at greater risk of becoming delinquent, criminal or violent. It is likely that witnessing abuse has similar consequences.

One of the immediate effects of domestic violence on children is a decline in school performance. In the Santiago study, parents in homes with domestic violence were much more likely to be notified that their child is having academic problems than were parents in nonviolent households. The biggest difference in school performance concerned disciplinary problems. For children from homes reporting any type of domestic violence in the 1997 survey, the probability of disciplinary problems in school was between 33% and 40%. In contrast, the rate for children from homes without domestic violence was between 13% and 21%.

CONCLUSIONS

Domestic violence against women is more than a private drama or human rights issue. The health and productivity consequences of such violence for women and their children have significant social costs. According to the IDB's surveys in Chile and Nicaragua in 1997, the negative impact of domestic violence on women's productivity (through reduced wages and/or lower labor force participation) amounts to a significant aggregate loss in national income. In addition, children who live in households with episodes of domestic violence against the female partner perform poorly in school, limiting their future prospects and potential.

In the long term, the most important socioeconomic cost of domestic violence is its contribution to the intergenerational transmission of poverty and violence. Women who live with violent partners and have few economic resources of their own may find it impossible to leave their households, even at the cost of their own health and personal development. Children who live in violent households are more likely to be poor and repeat the violent patterns observed at home, whether as aggressor or victim.

Domestic violence must be recognized as an important human rights issue and economic development problem in Latin America. Policies and programs to reduce the prevalence of domestic violence and to provide treatment for abused women should be a priority for national, state and municipal governments, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations.
If a man has relationships with three different women and children with all of them, whom then should he marry? This is a difficult question and one which left Luis González, Nicaragua's designated minister of the family, speechless. It also neatly underscores the gap between the gender ideologies promoted by the Nicaraguan government and the social realities of one of Latin America's most impoverished countries.

In March 1998, Nicaragua's National Assembly passed a bill sponsored by the Liberal Alliance government, led by President Arnoldo Alemán, advocating the creation of a new Ministry of the Family. This entity replaces and merges three existing institutions: the Institute for Women (INIM), the Nicaraguan Fund for the Family (FONIF), and the National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Children's Rights. The government explained the motivation behind it as stemming from the belief that the Nicaraguan family, "for reasons known to us all, is in a chaotic state of disunion and loss of moral values." The new ministry's purpose is to guide and coordinate all governmental and nongovernmental organizations working with children, women, young people, the family, the elderly and the disabled. Women, along with other social groups, are constructed as vulnerable, a definition which denies both their agency and their right to autonomy.

The bill further establishes that the basis of the family is the couple, a man and a woman who are legally married with procreation as their principal mission. One look at Nicaragua's social indicators reveals the unrealistic nature of this statement and its irrelevance for present-day Nicaragua. Only 47% of Nicaraguans presently live in what could be described as nuclear families. Most couples do not legally marry but cohabit informally. Nicaragua is characterized by large numbers of female-headed households; three out of every 10 Nicaraguan women are both mothers and heads of households. Extended family structures are also common, with children raised by grandmothers or other female relatives. Paternal irresponsibility is widespread, and many men have children with two or more women. As well as having the highest birth rate in Latin America—Nicaraguan women have an average of 4.6 children—the country also has high rates of teenage pregnancy. More than 15% of all pregnant women in Nicaragua are under 18. In Managua, the capital, teenage girls have a 30% probability of becoming pregnant, a figure which rises to 41% in rural areas. At the same time, the country's economic profile remains disheartening. While exports have increased over the last few years, nearly one million Nicaraguans are unemployed. Four out of 10 urban families and eight out of 10 rural ones live in extreme poverty, unable to meet basic needs.

The Nicaraguan women's movement was quick to condemn what it perceived as the government's attempt to crush the advances achieved by women over the last 20 years. Feminist leaders criticized the
Engendering public discourse in Nicaragua

legislation not only for its incompatibility with reality, but also for its moralistic tone and its drive to confine women to domesticity. The government has failed to define the role of the new ministry or to formulate concrete policies. Its most recent proposals do not recognize women's multiple roles in society and are ominously silent on the high incidence of domestic violence within the family. They also violate various articles of the Nicaraguan Constitution, including those concerning the legality of de facto relationships and the right of civil society and NGOs to autonomy. The Ministry of the Family would swallow up $79,000 that Spain has promised to donate to INIM and $309,000 that the European Union has earmarked for the children's rights commission. In addition, it contravenes many international agreements on women's rights that Nicaragua has ratified. These include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which states that women have the right to decide how many children to have and when, and the UN principle that women and children are separate areas of attention and should not be treated as a single entity.

A FORCE FOR CHANGE

These events in Nicaragua come at a time when, as a result of UN initiatives and the articulation of gender-specific interests throughout the 1980s, most Latin American governments are strengthening or creating government agencies for women. The end of military dictatorship in Brazil led to the creation of a National Council of Women's Rights in that country. In 1991, the Chilean government created a national office for women responsible for promoting equal rights. The Bolivian government established a national secretariat for ethnic, gender and generational affairs, as well as a subsecretariat for gender. At an international conference on women in Beijing, China in 1995, Mexico reported progress toward establishing a national program for women to facilitate female participation at all levels of society. Paraguay announced the creation of a program for equal opportunities in education, and Argentina appointed a national commission to follow up on the conference. Peru, which was represented at the conference by President Alberto Fujimori, announced a platform for gender equality and has more recently created a Ministry for Women.

Yet, if we compare the institutionalization of gender in Nicaragua with other Latin American countries in terms of its impact on the women's movement, an interesting paradox emerges. The recent government legislation, so out of kilter with the social landscape, seems to have opened up a space for women. While there is no doubt that the legislation is negative for women's rights in many ways, its inherent contradictions seem to have provided Nicaraguan women with the means to challenge both patriarchal structures and the impact of neoliberal economic policies. In the Ministry of the Family, the government may well have created a force for change, but not necessarily in the direction it had intended.

In some Latin American countries, the increased official attention to “women's issues” has been accompanied by the demobilization of the feminist movement. Agencies for women, in theory at least, increase

Nearly one million Nicaraguans are unemployed and eight out of 10 rural families live in extreme poverty.
The present government’s neoliberal economic policies are arguably as responsible for the disintegration of traditional family structures as the injustices of the Somoza regime or Sandinista policies.

Usually, attention to women’s issues means concentrating on welfare or alleviating poverty, while controversial issues such as reproductive rights or abortion are avoided. The institutionalization of gender in Peru and Chile, for example, is clothed in a rhetoric which appears to promote the rights of women. In Peru, President Fujimori has constructed himself as a champion of women’s rights, speaking out in favor of feminist demands and dropping into poor villages by helicopter to distribute household appliances to women. At the same time, he is pushing ahead with a neoliberal economic program which, critics argue, is incompatible with gender equality.

While gender is becoming a more neutral term in Peru and Chile, in Nicaragua it has been politicized. Curiously enough, the blatant anti-feminist stance of the Nicaraguan government appears to be contributing more to the advance of feminism than its less openly antagonistic counterparts in Peru and Chile. The government’s attempts to reinforce more traditional paradigms of womanhood has unwittingly given an impetus to the feminist movement. The creation of the Ministry of the Family can be exploited by the women’s movement in many different ways. For example, women could adopt the pro-family rhetoric of the government and turn it
around. By making the links
between family stability and emplo-
ment explicit, the ministry could be
used as a focus to demand the cre-
ation of jobs. Similarly, the bill’s
statement that all children have the
right to a loving and stable family
life can only be addressed by forcing
men to assume more responsibility
for the children they help to create.
Civil society can also ensure that the
ministry is not merely a bureaucratic
entity, but can be lobbied to attend
to the material well-being of
Nicaraguan families and other more
specific needs, such as adequate
health care and education, the clar-
ification of land titles, access to agri-
cultural credit and protection from
domestic abuse.

The institutionalization of the
family will mean that household life
is no longer a private and isolated
matter; in this sense, creation of the
ministry will increase expectations
that family needs will be addressed.
Ultimately, the Ministry of the
Family could become a channel
through which to make demands for
greater social protection and further
politicize the private sphere.

ECONOMIC PRESSURES

One of the most effective aspects
of the opposition to the bill to cre-
ate the Ministry of the Family is the
way it has drawn attention to the
real reasons for the disintegration of
more traditional family patterns.
Critics have exposed the govern-
ment for promoting idealistic
notions of cozy nuclear families
while implementing an economic
model which actually contributes to
the disintegration of the family. The
government’s policies, these critics
charge, do nothing to address the
most pressing concerns of
Nicaraguans, in particular poverty
and unemployment.

Nicaragua’s current economic
policies have contributed to make
family life more precarious. Women
are forced to spend more time look-
ing for paid labor in the informal
sector to make ends meet, while cuts
in essential social services, such as
health and education, also threaten
family stability. Prominent
Nicaraguan feminists Sofia
Montenegro and Vilma Castillo have
highlighted the link between family
stability and employment.
Montenegro sees the lack of male
employment as challenging the
patrisonal nuclear family, causing
unemployed men to lose status and
authority within the home. The
frustrations produced by high male
unemployment also manifest them-
sehves in increased alcoholism and
domestic violence. For many
women, it no longer makes sense to
continue living with a man who is
unable to contribute financially to
the household and is often drunk,
violet or both.

Resistance to the bill represents a
new phase in Nicaraguan feminist
politics, demonstrating levels of
maturity and autonomy far beyond
those of the 1980s. During the peri-
od of Sandinista rule, it was imposs-
bile for the women’s movement to
develop an autonomous sphere
of action. Revolutionary movements
and struggles for national liberation
across the globe often postpone gen-
der-specific needs until other forms
of oppression are addressed. In
Nicaragua, AMNLAE, the Sandinista
women’s association, remained sub-
ordinate to the party. It put gender-
specific issues on hold so as not to
jeopardize the revolutionary process.
Despite setbacks to the revolutionary
project since the Sandinistas left
power, the feminist movement is
now much more vocal in articulating
gender-specific issues.

Although the government attrib-
utes the disintegration of the family to
the decade of Sandinista rule, evi-
dence suggests that the crisis has its
origins earlier than that, in the eco-
nomic model adopted by the
Somoza dictatorship. The promo-
tion of agro-exports in the 1950s
and 1960s created irregular and
unstable employment conditions.
Men were often forced to leave their
families to search for work in other
parts of the country. This trend,
coupled with a cult of machismo
which put cultural pressure on males
to father as many children as possi-
ble as proof of virility, meant that
many men set up new families and
abandoned their original ones. In
addition, economic difficulties such
as rising food prices and inadequate
healthcare and housing, as well as
the abuse of human rights, made it
more and more difficult for women
to fulfills their traditional roles as
wives and mothers satisfactorily. It is
debatable whether the nuclear fami-
ly has ever been a dominant model
in Nicaragua, but experience sug-
gests that the present government’s
neoliberal economic policies have
hastened its disintegration as much
as those of the Somoza dictatorship.

The newly created Ministry of the
Family will have trouble implement-
ing its ideological principles without
addressing the precarious situation
of the Nicaraguan family in the face
of neoliberalism and machismo.
The government at present has
shown no political will to attend to
the causes of the crisis. A family
project that does not accept the rea-
lity and diversity of today’s families
coupled with an economic program
which makes family life increasingly
insecure can only be doomed to fail-
ure.

Recent events in Nicaragua have
demonstrated that political inconsis-
tencies within governments do not
always constitute an obstacle to
change but can in fact become a
focus of resistance. The state is not
a monolithic entity, but one full of
gaps and contradictions which can
be exploited as a form of struggle.
In the case of the Ministry of the
Family, the Nicaraguan government
is enabling the feminist movement
to “engage” public discourse and
policy.
The Missing Element

Christina Ewig

Following the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and the economic adjustments required to stem the rampant inflation that resulted, governments across the region are experimenting with state reforms as part of a "second phase" of structural adjustment. Although these reforms vary from country to country, the basic principle is the same: to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of state institutions. The current phase of reform directly affects state social policies such as health and education. These types of reforms, involving long-term institutional and social policy changes, are much more complex than the first round of economically oriented reforms and will have important consequences in the long run for social and economic equity among citizens.

Latin American governments are at a critical juncture. They have the backing of international agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to make sweeping changes to their social policies and social service systems. The decisions they make could have lasting impacts on the citizens of these countries for decades to come. The revision of state social policy can include devising new strategies for development, reducing poverty and improving equity among citizens. At best, the goal of social policy is to alleviate and eliminate economic and social stratification among citizens. At the very least, it is meant to provide a "safety net" for the most vulnerable members of society. The priorities behind the reforms are crucial to the shape of the resulting "welfare state," determining who benefits and under what conditions.

State social policies can have important ramifications for economic and social stratification between women and men. The recent but rich literature on this subject demonstrates that different types of industrial welfare states have widely varying effects on gender equity. In industrial countries, for example, varying rates of female employment and numbers of women in poverty have been correlated to specific state policies. The literature on the "first phase" of adjustment in Latin America and other developing nations provides evidence that this process was male-biased and had more damaging effects on women than on men. In simplified terms, the first phase resulted in a shift of many social welfare responsibilities from the state to women, as the primary social providers within families. The new responsibilities and burdens for women went unrecognized by policy makers.

Statistical comparisons of basic social indicators across Latin America show a significant gap in well-being between males and females. These findings suggest that gender should be a key component of any social reform process, precisely because a major premise of social policies is to increase equity. Gender equity is a significant part of overall equity, and is intertwined with other social and economic factors. Specific policies can either aggravate existing gender inequities, such as the high rate of women in poverty—and thus women's greater reliance on state and community services—or these policies can be attuned to alleviate gender as well as other inequities.

The Peruvian Case

Of all social policy areas, the health sector is perhaps the most likely candidate for gender consciousness in policy making. Women, due to their social positioning in families, play a central role in basic health care provision both at home and in their communities. In addition, women's reproductive functions fall under the health care rubric, since population policy is often a central concern in developing countries. Peru recently established a national Women and Human Development Ministry (known as Promudeh), and both the Ministry of Health and the Peruvian branch of the Pan American Health Organization have "women, health and development" officers. If no thinking about gender takes place in health sector reform in Peru, that thinking is even less likely to occur in other sectors of state reform that lack institutions designed to advocate specifically for women's needs.

Research for this article took into account four separate policy reform processes in the Peruvian health...
Gender and health sector reform in Peru

Even in the case of the family planning program, the concept of gender equity was notably absent from the reforms' conceptual basis. The initial impetus for an active family planning program, pushed heavily by President Alberto Fujimori's administration beginning in 1994, was economic rather than social. Control and reduction of Peru's population growth was viewed as a strategy to combat poverty and unemployment rather than as a means of empowering women through control of their fertility. The government publicly accepted the notion of family planning as a woman's right only after Peru's family planning program received national and international scrutiny for performing poorly executed sterilizations of women. Radio and television ads at the height of the national controversy attempted to deflect opponents of the program through use of messages emphasizing women's "right to decide." This was a change from poster propaganda found in state health centers before the controversy. These posters depicted families with many children living in precarious conditions contrasted with families with just two children living in comfortable, middle-class conditions. While there are real economic dimensions to population policies, the fact that economic priorities predominated over other issues such as equity, gender equity and
possibly even human rights until external pressure came to bear on the program is troubling.

Gender equity is simply not a priority in the reform of the health sector in Peru, even in those programs, such as family planning, where it may seem to be an obvious dimension. The earliest reforms, developed in 1993 and 1994, prioritized basic health care coverage through the targeted health spending policy and the introduction of decentralized community boards for local clinic administration. This priority made sense, since health care spending in Peru had dropped dramatically in the preceding years. The country was economically devastated by rampant inflation, and violent activity by the Shining Path guerrillas forced many public health posts to close. Having overcome this crisis of basic coverage, health care reformers are turning their attention to other concerns, such as equity and efficiency. Their notions of equity, however, usually do not extend to gender.

Their responses to questions regarding gender indicate that Peru’s policy makers think of equity in narrow economic terms with little or no consideration of its social dimensions. These include such issues as how one’s position within society as a woman, a single mother, an orphan or a disabled person may affect access to health care or other state-provided services as much as, or in conjunction with, economic issues. In addition, the reform priorities of equity and efficiency often find themselves in competition with each other. More candid interviewees noted that cost considerations—“putting a price on things,” as one subject put it—took precedence in deciding which health issues to prioritize. The research for this study reveals that Peruvian health reform tends to be economically driven and is implemented on a reform-by-reform basis, with little broad thinking about the implications of these reforms in a larger context with more complex social aspects.

**CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION**

The lack of consideration of gender equity in this particular state reform process should cause us to pause and reconsider the effectiveness of international and national institutions, such as gender offices in international organizations and state ministries, in bringing gender considerations to the forefront of policy decisions. Why were these institutions not effective in this one, but significant instance? Some preliminary hypotheses might include the general weakness of such institutions in Peru. On the national level, the Peruvian government ministry charged with handling women’s issues has a broader mandate involving the “promotion of women and human development.” The ministry is charged with overseeing a wide array of social programs extending from women to children and persons displaced by civil war, and even the national sports institute. While referred to colloquially as the “women’s ministry,” Promudeh’s focus on women is obfuscated by its many other general social welfare responsibilities. The ministry has not taken an active role in the reform of the state and has forged only weak links with the Ministry of Health in addressing women’s health issues. Similarly, the Women, Health and Development Office within the Ministry of Health, while well-intentioned, is not directly involved in the reform process and has been ignored by the policy makers leading it.

The weakness of these national institutions is perhaps not surprising in the context of the overall weakness of democratic institutions in Peru. However, the gender experts employed by international institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank also fail to reach national-level policy makers in Peru, despite the strong role played by these agencies in supporting the broader health reform process. The lack of gender follow-through from the international to the national level could indicate that gender issues are a lower priority for international agencies. Perhaps fewer resources are dedicated to gender, thereby limiting the impact that staff gender experts can make. Alternatively, the lack of communication on gender issues between the international and national levels could indicate an absence of mechanisms for connecting international gender experts with state policy makers.

These findings suggest a need to develop clear and accessible arguments to convince Latin American policy makers of the importance of taking gender equity into consideration in the state reform process. Policies that include gender equity among other equity factors need to be conceptualized for Latin America and individual country settings. This can be done either from the international level by gender policy experts or by intellectuals and active members of organizations in civil society who are concerned with gender issues. These arguments and alternative policy proposals will be heard only if dependable and transparent channels of communication are constructed between government policy makers and those organizations concerned with gender equity.

Finally, if institutions designed to deal with women’s issues are to be effective, they not only need increased resources but also real policy-making power in “mainstream” social policy decisions. These institutions must be given the possibility to move beyond separate programming for women to become advocates for gender equity in settings in which traditional policy makers may be blind to an issue’s gender dimensions.
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Who Betrays Ana Negra?

Rachel Sarah O'Toole

Historians continue to debate the necessary directions and commitments of the women's, feminist and gender histories of Latin America. This article joins the discussion by looking at three tensions in the field of Latin American women's history: recovering women from the silences of history, analyzing their agency, and whether either of these projects is promising, necessary or relevant. More to spark discussion than to declare findings, it explores the use of empirical sources and the possibility of multiple allegiances in conjunction with the enigmatic case of Ana Negra, an African-descent slave who was born in the Americas in the sixteenth century. Ana Negra was sold from Panama to a carpenter in Lima, the capital of the Viceroyalty of Peru. Her case illuminates both the difficulty of an African-descent slave woman's life in colonial Lima and the challenges faced by historians in telling her story accurately.

The Story—Part I

In 1582, the Inquisition accused and punished Ana Negra for the heretical act of destroying a holy altarpiece, or retablo, built by her owner, Juan de Lotero. One evening, Juan de Lotero asked Ana Negra to get a knife for him from the kitchen. Ana Negra testified to the inquisitors that the altarpiece was fine when she passed it. Days later, Juan de Lotero discovered damage and accused Ana Negra of slashing the images of the crucified Christ, the Virgin Mary and Saint John.

Limits of Empirical Sources

Spanish courts—secular and ecclesiastical—presumed the accused to be guilty until proven innocent. Inquisitors especially were interested in eradicating crimes against the faith, and employed guilt and shame to extract the truth from their subjects. The primary goal was for the accused to feel remorse for committing a crime. If a person confessed to a crime—even if she did not commit it—then half her punishment was complete. Therefore, the best course of action for Ana Negra was to negotiate with the judges for a more lenient sentence. She went against this logic by insisting that she did not damage the altarpiece, when she probably would have received a lesser punishment for simply admitting the crime.

The record of Ana Negra's case in the Inquisition files at Spain's Archivo Histórico de la Nación fails to suggest possible motivations for the act, if Ana Negra did indeed commit it. If she was guilty of cutting the altarpiece to shreds, did she do it as an act of vengeance against a cruel or unfair master? Or did he do it and blame her? There are many questions regarding whether or not Ana Negra destroyed the altarpiece. Without more evidence, is asking questions the only way to recount Ana Negra's story? Or should the historian shift attachment from the sources to write a history that is undocumented?

Perhaps the nature of twentieth-century historical inquiry is an obstacle to telling and analyzing the past. As historian Carlo Ginzburg explains, historical rules are human inventions designed primarily to facilitate political, ecclesiastical, institutional, diplomatic and military history. Since history from below (including gender and women's history) has a different set of objectives, Ginzburg insists that not only do researchers need to start with different questions, they also need to change "the rules of historical methods." Perhaps this is why historians are increasingly turning to documentable exploration rather than empirical assertions. Still, while scholars have developed methods to find women in history, the question remains how to deal with parts of their lives that are not on the record to explore the nature of their agency.

The Story—Part II

According to the Inquisition's records, once Juan de Lotero discovered the damaged altarpiece Ana Negra fled the household. As she later testified, Juan de Lotero threatened to beat her as punishment for her disobedience. He then brought her before the Inquisition, either through force or because she wanted to clear her name. There, witnesses testified as to Ana Negra's "cunning and devious" character. She remained imprisoned throughout numerous hearings in which inquisitors asked her to recount her story. Each time Ana Negra asserted that she had not damaged the altarpiece. At this point, she was advised to plead guilty. Instead, Ana Negra insisted that, like Juan de Lotero and the other carpenters who worked on the altarpiece, she did not know it was ruined until days after she supposedly committed the crime.

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RECOVERING AGENCY

When Ana Negra escaped from her owner's control (by fleeing the household), she defied Juan de Lotero's authority. Rather than signifying her guilt, her flight could have been an effort to distance herself from his rage and beatings. Conversely, the inquisitors argued that Ana Negra was angry with her owner and vandalized the holy painting to avenge herself. In both cases, Ana Negra's agency is recoverable, even within the parameters of the historical interpretation of sources. Her actions were directed specifically against the recognizable authority of her owner within the system of slavery. Still, how do we avoid having our conceptualization of structures or systems of oppression define what we see as agency or resistance?

One exploration could be that Ana Negra was resisting a class or occupational hierarchy. Many Spanish artisans either bought or accepted African-descent slaves as apprentices to train in their craft. This practice produced a large artisan community of color in colonial Lima. Although craft professions were confined to men, women in an artisan household were relied upon as assistants in the production of goods and services. If the accusation of heretical vandalism was true, perhaps Ana Negra was angered by her owner's use of her labor coupled with his subsequent denial of her skill as a craftswoman in a male-dominated field. Witnesses stressed Ana Negra's cunning character and her willingness to take extreme measures. These characteristics could also describe an intelligent woman who was cognizant of the inequalities of her everyday life. As Robin Kelley urges us to under-

(Drawings from Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, Nueva corónica y buen gobierno [1615].)
stand, "these daily, unorganized, evasive, seemingly spontaneous actions" are clues as to how power operated. Viewed this way, Ana Negra's actions become articulated critiques of male domination within colonial labor organization.

Inspired by Kelley's expansive definition of agency, we can also understand Ana Negra's plight as part of a household struggle. The Inquisition trial summary only records the interactions between Ana Negra and Juan de Lotero. While a few minor figures are mentioned (a mulato who taught Ana Negra the catechism, two other slaves in the household who knew about her theft of a black skirt, and seven unnamed witnesses), Juan de Lotero's family was not involved in the incident. This could be an accident of the record, but it is possible that Ana Negra was Juan de Lotero's mistress. Like many African-descent slave (and free) women, domestic workers were often pressured to engage in sexual relations with their masters. Ana Negra may have been unable to refuse Juan de Lotero's advances and therefore damaged the altarpiece out of anger and defiance. Likewise, even if she did not slash the holy images, Juan de Lotero may have falsely accused her after she rejected his advances.

At this point, our efforts to define Ana Negra's agency have taken us well beyond the parameters of the text. We are forced to hypothesize in part because of the paucity of documentation, and in part because these types of resistance were not publicly discussed: the first—class resistance—because women were not recognized as contributing members of artisan households, even when they did provide labor; and the second—intimate and household power struggles between master and slave—because such conflicts were part of the fabric of everyday life. Furthermore, Juan de Lotero controlled the initial framing of the crime, and he would not welcome public discussion of a lack of control within his own household. What then should historians do, when the master controls the basis of historical interpretations? To find agency and depth, is the researcher pushed outside the text and into fiction or speculation? Or does this drive to recover women's agency represent a transformation of historical methods?

THE STORY—PART III

After Ana Negra refused to confess her crime, her inquisitors "put the question to torture." They told her that she needed only to say that she had committed the crime and they would stop. The Inquisition's technique was not to accuse prisoners of a particular crime; rather, prisoners were questioned until they declared the proper crime. In her first testimony, Ana Negra confessed to learning the catechism from a mulato, not from her master (who was charged by the Catholic Church and the Spanish state to perform this function). She also confessed that she had stolen a black skirt. We can see that Ana Negra was either unaware of the
crime she was accused of or was avoiding confession.

The torture produced results. In the last torture session, Ana Negra repeatedly swore that she had committed the crime. She explained that she had torn the image of Christ with a nail to avenge herself against her owner. She claimed that she had damaged the altarpiece not on the eve of the feast of Santiago, when she brought Juan de Lotero the knife from the kitchen, but two days before her owner and his fellow carpenters discovered the slashed image. She thought that no one would suspect her, as she had distanced herself from the altarpiece and any association with the damage.

MULTIPLE ALLEGIANCES

How can we illuminate Ana Negra’s agency in the Inquisition’s torture chamber? Perhaps she acted for her own survival by eventually admitting her guilt. She asserted her agency and will to survive by confessing to the crime, but her admission reinforced the efficacy of Inquisition torture. She did not resist the colonial religious and racial order that categorized her as a vandal of holy images and a cunning blasphemer. In any case, if we define resistance and agency in this manner, looking for agency in the Inquisition’s torture chamber is stretching the possible actions available to colonial peoples, in this case an African-descent slave woman.

The search for agency or resistance tends to lead to a binary view of whether an action does or does not articulate a subject’s agency. Exploration of multiple allegiances illuminates the many ways that colonial peoples such as Ana Negra expressed or acted with agency. If subalterns accepted and resisted colonial power because of different interests and alliances, perhaps Ana Negra interpreted her actions in relation to her multiple identities. Besides her status as a slave, a worker and a woman, Ana Negra also had an important religious identity. If she did commit the crime, as a practicing Catholic Ana Negra may have been afraid that she had offended the divine with her actions. If she did not destroy the holy image, then perhaps she acquiesced to the inquisitors, whom she took as her religious superiors. Alternatively, she may have had more allegiance to a patron saint, ancestor or guardian spirit whom she believed guided and protected her. As the trial progressed and her torture began, Ana Negra may have opted for confession out of the belief that she had offended her spiritual guardian and thus been condemned to punishment.

Attention to a subject’s multiple identities is part of what Elsa Barkely Brown calls “jazz” as historical method. Brown urges historians to understand that historical subjects have multiple identities and allegiances that correspond to a variety of hierarchies. This makes it possible to abandon the sometimes rewarding but occasionally frustrating search for agency. In its place comes a recognition that analyzing women’s agency and resistance against oppressive structures of their particular situation can help reveal that oppressive systems are not foolproof, but porous and changeable. The challenge of the jazz historical method opens up larger questions. How are people influenced by their multiple allegiances? Which allegiance do they call on and when? If we start to play jazz on our computers, then how do we describe the very real structures that oppress?

CONCLUSIONS

Ana Negra was sentenced to 200 lashes and exile from Lima for two years. Her punishment was comparable in severity to the penalties applied to other African-descent slaves and freed people who committed heresy and bigamy. The last sentence of the trial summary, however, is unusual. The inquisitors ordered that Ana Negra not be punished because she was incapacitated. Slave women in Lima were routinely mistreated and abused; if the inquisitors thought that Ana Negra was too weak to withstand her punishment, she must have been near death. In this way, perhaps, Ana Negra’s fate was similar to that of other victims of the Inquisition’s torture chambers and secret jails. Ana Negra may have died in prison or in the Jesuit hospital for slaves. Or she may have become a slave of the Inquisition, since Juan de Lotero probably would not have taken her back into his household.

Ana Negra’s story raises some fascinating questions. Chief among these is, to what extent is historical empiricism necessary in recovering the history of marginalized peoples? Ana Negra was allowed representation as she answered the judges’ questions. However, the only information about her case is contained in two pages of the Peruvian inquisitors’ report to the Supreme Tribunal in Spain. It seems unlikely that more information about this particular woman will ever come to light. Working within the paradigm of empirical sources such as court cases, parish records and other Inquisition cases, it is possible to obtain both quantitative and qualitative data on other African-descent women working in artisan households. But although these sources are useful in their own right, generalized histories of African-descent slave women do not do justice to this story. Ana Negra (and others like her) serve as inspiration for historians to alter their methods to incorporate more histories and historical subjects. Doing so will help us to rescue individuals from oblivion and avoid betraying their memories. Such cases, though based on scanty evidence, may help us to move towards a more inclusive body of history defined at times by questions more than answers.
Before and after Cuba's independence from Spain, politics and popular literature were inextricably joined in journalistic essays and cartoons. Popular literary traditions espoused and criticized competing views of national purpose. They are excellent sources for understanding the complex nuances of what Cubans meant when they described national sovereignty and the culture of national identity. At first glance, the debate seems to be limited to the educated and the wealthy. A second look at the rich artwork and emergent photojournalism in the magazines of the early republic tells a different story. The illiterate could look at these pictures (and did, according to anecdotal testimonies) and pick up the intended messages about leadership, national identity and culture. Not all Cubans agreed with these messages, as evidenced by the numerous revolts throughout the period. And yet, the popular literature of the time reveals the elite leadership's efforts to impose itself as the legitimate governing class.

Social, a journal dedicated to the careful scrutiny of Cuba's upper-class leadership (known as El Gran Mundo), made its debut in 1916. Conrado W. Massaguer, the magazine's young editor, had already gained a reputation as a caricaturist in the post-independence journal of political comedy Gráficas, and he dedicated Social to observing and parodying the lives and habits of the elite. The journal circulated for over 40 years with a brief hiatus between 1933 and 1936, when political instability convinced the daring editorial staff of the wisdom of silence. During its early years, Social showcased and parodied the pampered leadership using the levity and self-criticism characteristic of Cuban humor. From his editorial desk, Massaguer projected his and El Gran Mundo's ideals of nationalism and national identity. These were the first messages to be circulated with the intent of creating a unified nation. Although rebuked by progressive forces, they opened the omnipresent debate into the meaning of cubanidad, or Cuban national identity.

Massaguer was born into an elite and patriotic family in 1889, before Cuba's last war of independence. To protect him from the horrors of war, his father sent him and his brother to Mexico and then to New York, where they were educated at a military academy. Back in independent Cuba, Massaguer ignored his training in architecture and began cartooning for Gráficas. He rose to international prominence as he traveled throughout the world drawing caricatures of presidents, royalty, great actors and artists, infamous villains, powerful industrialists and humble peasants. He drew not only for Social, but also for El Figaro, El Mercurio, Letras, El Hogar, Bohemia, El Tiempo, Cartes and Cuba y América.

Massaguer's fixation was with women, beautiful women, and his passion was cubanidad. His work depicted national accomplishments and failures, with the female figure as the site of his incisive commentary: Beauty and ugliness represented good and evil, and burlesque irony communicated both criticism and indulgence of the Cuban sense of self. The covers of nearly every issue of Social for the first 19 years of its publication—almost 228, to be exact—were in color, featuring art deco portraits with women as the central figure. Many issues also included editorial caricatures of current events and trends that featured female beauty.

Massaguer's work captures the sense of arrogance, narcissism, grandiosity and insecurity of Cuba's early leadership. He conveys the conceit of a male patriarchy that was incompetent and corrupt in its direction of a nation and in its treatment of women. His drawings also warn of the dangers of modernization to the Cuban sense of self and demonstrate that racial brotherhood and anti-Americanism, two prominent aspects of Cuban national identity by 1927, were not powerful determinants of elite nationalism at the beginning of the republican period.

These drawings are an optic through which the viewer can enjoy the simple beauty of Massaguer's art while gaining insights into the psychological state of the bourgeoisie along with its vision of a nation and a culture. Massaguer's use of female beauty as a trope through which to convey lessons of social order, human relations, culture, political weakness and international relations symbolized cubanidad among the elites.
Female beauty and images of Cuban national identity, 1908-1940

Along with national sovereignty came the test of modern nationhood. Within 15 years of the birth of its constitutional government, Cuba joined other countries in declaring war against the Axis powers during World War I. But Cuba committed limited material resources and no soldiers to the cause. Mobilization for the war effort came mostly from Cuba's elite women, who joined the Red Cross and rolled bandages for the soldiers on the front. The embodiment of Cuba's loyalty during this horrific war is a Cuban woman, dressed in a military uniform, saluting the audience and presenting the Cuban flag. The work of the Red Cross volunteers legitimated Cuban attendance at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.
Revolutionary heroes became mythological figures in their day. It soon became clear, however, that they were only mortals; veterans of Cuba's independence wars began to die and left a nation to grieve. A common metaphor for the nation was La Patria, a woman wearing the French revolutionary cap and serving as the embodiment of liberty, fraternity and equality. Here she buries the dead hero (in this case, Máximo Gómez) with the reverence of a nation grieving for one of its founders.

Photo Essay: Massa-girls
Choosing independence from Spain was not merely a political affair. Independence in the twentieth century meant modernization and wrenching change from a colonial, Hispanic past. Here, the nation is represented as a young lady who chooses her suitor, modernization and quite possibly the United States model (her beloved is blond, like most “Yankees” in drawings of the time). She rejects her Spanish suitor, who angrily eyes the Yankee. The angel with crossed swords at the bottom indicates that preferring the North American was a mistake. The crossed swords infer that the outcome of the Spanish-American War should have been different.
Cuba suffered the corruption, lack of vision and incompetence of its first leaders. Massaguer’s most frequent analogy of the nation was an innocent girl at the mercy of grasping, avaricious politicians. The 1920 election—the first after the United States withdrew so that Cubans could elect a new president—is depicted here as a tragedy. Presidential contender Alfredo Zayas Bazán leers at the innocent nation, a debutante, while former President Mario Menocal peeks through the bushes. Massaguer implies that the nation, with all its potential and natural beauty, is helpless before the failures of corrupt men.
The real challenge for the Cuban leadership was the rapid move from colonial controls and isolation to modernization. For the elite, this meant the acquisition of newly invented technology. Massaguer quickly identified the superficial nature of Cuban modernization. In this issue of Social he depicts a wealthy young woman being chauffeured by her black driver. Only 25 years earlier he would have been a calesero, or coachman, and the vehicle a volante, or carriage. The implied meaning is that only the machine has changed, not the racial stratification that permeated Cuban society.
Between 1921 and 1928, Massaguer drew no fewer than 35 caricatures entitled "Massa-girls." The title alone demonstrated Massaguer's chic association with the United States. Nearly all of these caricatures were beautiful to behold, but they warned that modernization could be the nemesis of Cuban cultural identity. Women's liberation, for example, sent Massaguer's patriarchal self-righteousness into spasms of fear. Hispanic order would be derailed, and confusion and debauchery would result. Images of the denigration of a Hispanic ideal include "La Santita," a young woman educated in a convent. Even the walls of the convent and the supervision of a nun cannot remove her from the promiscuity of modern society. Her admirer has scaled the convent wall, and she has received a love letter. Although she holds a religious medallion, her wink indicates insubordination.
Another of the Massa-girls, "Boy" symbolizes the ultimate fear of the Cuban male that women's liberation would create boys of girls. Such a state of affairs would teeter on the verge of homosexuality and lead to bare competition between the sexes. Along with feminism, the short haircuts and fashions of the 1920s threatened the patriarchal Hispanic home.
To men, modernization and liberation meant sexual liberation, not women's self-definition. Here, the free-loving flapper scandalizes the classical nude on the wallpaper. Although the flapper is clothed, she is engaged in physical intimacy with a man. The nude is pristine and untouched. Even the butler is shocked by the flapper's loose behavior, but evidently he is sworn to silence. Female sexuality was a threat to proper society, but it seemed to come with the modern spirit.
Massaguer used art nouveau and art deco to express his own visions of beauty, cubanidad and nationalism. To Cubans, Massaguer was a combination of Norman Rockwell and Garry Trudeau. His public—people of all classes—eagerly awaited his contributions to popular magazines.
José Martí, Cuba's father of independence, declared that in Cuba Libre black and white men were brothers. Both had suffered for independence, and both would be citizens. Although this dream resonated in the hearts of most Cubans, real brotherhood was not a part of popular images produced by the upper-class leadership. No drawings of black people appeared in Social until the late 1920s. Racial blending was acceptable in certain areas of Cuban life: music, dance, food, sexual affairs and mistresses, and religion. Politics, social class, business and marriage were areas in which segregation prevailed. In 1925, Massaguer acknowledged racial admixture with this drawing of a mulata dancing with a black man. Music and dance were acceptable arenas for the races to come together, but Massaguer could not depict a white woman dancing intimately with a black man. He preferred not to comment on white men with women of color.
In 1927, the first drawing of a black woman appeared on the editorial page. Drawn by an artist named Botet, not Massaguer; this woman differs from the Massa-girls. Her face is reduced to a grotesque caricature and her body is that of a post-partum female. She has no personality; only her body has been used.
The American presence in Cuba began to rub even the elite the wrong way by 1926. Massaguer began drawing cartoons with a more direct bite than the softer caricatures of the earlier period. In the meantime, Coca-Cola was all the rage in high society, of course.
By 1936, when Social published angry editorials about American interventionism and imperialism, Massaguer explored the idea of ugliness as a text for repelling the undesirable. Here, a homely American tourist asks a ship captain if Cuban men are aggressive, implying that even though she is meek and unattractive, Cuban men, members of the subaltern society, will naturally pursue her. She is both apprehensive and expectant. The look on the captain's face expresses rebellion and distaste.

—Oh, Captain. Just the last question before we land... Are Cubans very aggressive?
Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America by Lars Schoultz

Spread the news! Serious books about US-Latin American relations are again in vogue. In recent years, prominent scholars including Lester Langley, Fredrick B. Pike, Peter H. Smith and now Lars Schoultz have published important studies. The volume under review may be the best of the group.

Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America is a labor of love, possessing an abundance of virtues despite several notable defects. Above all else, it is a delight to read. In nearly 200 years of relations with Latin America, US officials have said many foolish things. Schoultz records numerous such statements with great verve. It makes for compelling history.

In 1854, for example, the US Navy sloop Cyane bombarded the village of San Juan del Norte (Greytown) at the Caribbean outlet of Nicaragua's San Juan River. President Franklin Pierce defended the assault against local residents who had failed to make amends for unspecified attacks upon the honor of the United States: "By their obstinate silence, they seem rather desirous to provoke chastisement than to escape it."

Somewhat better known, but typical of the attitudes Schoultz captures throughout the book, are the words of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes at the 1928 Havana Conference. Hughes defended the right of the United States to intervene on behalf of its enterprising citizens with these words: "Are we to stand by and see them butchered in the jungle...?"

These examples suggest the several themes of Beneath the United States. They include the attitude that Latin Americans are an inferior people, largely because of their mixed racial heritage, who deserve the treatment they receive from the United States; that the United States is entitled, because of security concerns and domestic political needs, to decide what is best for its neighbors; and that Latin America has no standing to question the economic objectives of US foreign policy.

Schoultz does his readers a service by commencing his story in the earliest days of the US-Latin American relationship. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the bête noire of Latin America in Schoultz's account, may have warned that there was "no community of interest or principles" between his country and its neighbors. Still, he and his less able successors were unable to refrain from meddling in a region they defined as their natural sphere of influence, however unproductive their efforts were likely to be.

For Schoultz, the quest for hegemony is a persistent theme in the history of US policy toward Latin America. Just as often, however, the objects of North American desire appear ungrateful. Theodore Roosevelt's exasperation with Cuba, US anger at Argentina's challenge to Washington's leadership in the hemisphere, and Henry Kissinger's denunciation of Chileans for irresponsibly exercising the franchise on behalf of Salvador Allende reflect the constancy of hegemony as a decisive factor in US policy.

Schoultz is far too good a storyteller and scholar, though, to cast this policy in crass, two-dimensional terms. Some US officials made a point of acknowledging the limits of foreign policy. His heroes, it seems, are Elihu Root, Herbert Hoover and Jimmy Carter.

As secretary of state, Root had the arduous task of keeping in check the worst impulses of the Republican Roosevelt. That Root succeeded as well as he did in preventing his nation from becoming an imperial power in the European fashion paved the way for President Hoover to address the liabilities of military intervention. In the late 1970s, Carter resuscitated Hoover's loathing of militarism and raised the issue of human rights to a prominent place in hemispheric relations.

This story will appeal greatly to undergraduates and to those teachers seeking an exciting text or supplementary reading for their courses. It is a cautionary tale about the exercise of power and a lesson in its limits. In that way it is also, for those with a long memory, a welcome corrective to Samuel Flagg Bemis's 1943 book, The Latin-American Policy of the United States, in which the United States served as a wise mentor to its neighbors throughout the history of hemispheric affairs.
Despite its passion and frequent insights, *Beneath the United States* is not an unqualified success. Scholars will find its methodology peculiar. Schoultz neither cites the work of historians—except for that of Piero Gleijeses—who have written on the very topics he addresses, nor engages the interpretations contained in their scholarship. His fellow political scientists may wonder at his imprecise definition of the concept of hegemony, which is used interchangeably with empire and to indicate a less formally structured relationship. Also, we learn little about the application of this loose analytical framework to more contemporary events.

Readers will justly wonder, therefore, what became of the last 30 years. Why does the pre-1898 era get 125 pages of text and the period since the 1960s barely 25? Even familiar details all but disappear in an uncritical tribute to Carter’s Central American and human rights policies. *Inevitable Revolutions* by Walter LaFeber is analytically more satisfying on these subjects.

As in any work so large in scope, there are bound to be some omissions. General Smedley Butler is regularly portrayed as a buffoon. Yet, this is the same Marine officer who later denounced his role as an agent of capitalist imperialism. Could such an unusual transformation serve as an indicator of the possibility of positive change in hemispheric relations? By leaving Butler’s story incomplete, Schoultz cannot even ask the question.

Also, the treatment of the 1920s is notably weak. Schoultz never mentions Hoover’s work as commerce secretary, his assistant Julius Klein, or Edwin W. Kemmerer—the Jeffrey Sachs of his day. These men tried with some success until the onset of the Depression to create a climate conducive to economic growth and development in the hemisphere.

Moreover, Schoultz’s eye for the appropriate quotation fails him in his assessment of Franklin Roosevelt. True, FDR said that Argentines should be treated like “children.” But in 1940 he also said about Latin Americans in general: “Give them a share; they think they are as good as we are, and many of them are.” It is conceivable that more is going on here than an iteration of historical paternalism or hegemony.

However much it might be appropriate to quibble with Schoultz about detail or interpretation, the larger and perhaps lasting importance of his *Beneath the United States* is beyond question. US policy toward Latin America, he reminds readers in a powerful conclusion, has been fundamentally about one thing since the days of John Quincy Adams: enhancing the prestige of the United States. This fine, if somewhat flawed book makes it clear how difficult will be the adoption of any other policy.
Yvonne Daniel and Deborah Pacini Hernández trace the history of art forms first developed and enjoyed only by the poorer classes of Cuba and the Dominican Republic. While bachata has only recently been accepted into the mainstream of Dominican society, the rumba rose to the level of a national symbol for Cuba after the 1959 revolution. Daniel and Hernández follow the complicated journeys of these genres from their origins as informal entertainment for a small audience to their growing professionalization and commercialization. In both texts, a difficult tension is maintained. The authors argue, on the one hand, that these art forms should not be marginalized and that practitioners should reap the financial benefits. On the other hand, they imply that, once they are accepted by the middle classes, such forms of expression are co-opted by those in power and lose some of their distinctive qualities. The underlying question in both texts—one that both authors expertly keep alive rather than try to answer reductively—is, how can one respect the particular cultural expression of poor people and not try to change it, yet work to transform the destitute material conditions from which the genre emerged?

These broad concerns put Daniel and Hernández in dialogue with intellectuals who investigate the relationships between systems of power, resistance and art. Like Édouard Glissant in Caribbean Discourse and Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau and Rafael Confiant in Éloge de la Créolité, for example, Daniel and Hernández assert the importance of conserving, not preserving, art. As anthropologists, they call for respect and knowledge of tradition, but look for the organic growth and change necessary to sustain a living art form. Preservation, they imply, is for dead things.

DANCE AND IDENTITY

These two books add to our body of knowledge about national identities and how they are formed. Daniel investigates the significance of the fact that Cuba's Ministry of Culture chose rumba—rather than danzón, mambo or cha-cha—as the country's national dance. She looks at how the dance has changed since 1959, examining the way rumba is performed for tourists and official guests as opposed to the form it takes when practiced by amateurs for their own enjoyment. The complex results of Daniel's study emphasize dance's role in the construction of a Cuban national identity as viewed by outsiders, as well as what it means to different groups of Cubans.

Just as Cuba's self-image (as constructed by the Ministry of Culture) has meant the elevation of rumba to the position of national icon, so the self-image of the Dominican Republic (as constructed by its people) has meant the repression of bachata. Hernández carefully traces the factors which, until recently, kept bachata banned from FM radio and outside the mainstream recording industry. Key among these factors are the country's economic and political systems, which have caused increasing class stratification over the past 30 years. By detailing the individual and national histories that affected bachata's growth and trajectory, Hernández reveals the complex of events and decisions that influence the creation of a national identity.
Popular art forms and the construction of national identity

Although national identity and the music industry are gendered, previous studies have devoted little attention to women performers or audiences. Even *Caribbean Currents*, the otherwise excellent study of music by Peter Manuel, only mentions women in passing. This is due in part to the fact that men dominate the industry. In *Rumba*, however, Daniel discusses women rumberos as well as the gendered aspects of Cuban life and dance, especially rumba’s symbolic expression. Similarly, while men play the major roles in Hernández’s narrative, she includes a section on women *bachtarumis*. Sonia Silvestre is central here, as are the lyrics of Mélida Rodríguez. In the chapter titled, “Love, Sex and Gender,” Hernández investigates the relationship of bachata lyrics to women’s changing lives and vice versa.

**DANCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE**

In addition to their dialogues with cultural critics and historians, Daniel and Hernández contribute to the body of research by anthropologists. Daniel agrees with Joyce Aschenbrenner and Judith Hanna, who have argued that dance is capable of effecting social change. Although her book focuses mainly on the ways social change has affected rumba, which in turn reflects changes in Cuban society, Daniel also asserts that rumba has the power to create and sustain *communitas*, defined here as a sense of equanimity and equality: “Cubans and non-Cubans associate pleasurable feelings and sentiments with Rumba, and Rumba is capable of transforming their reality...”

Equanimity is real, experienced bodily, in the liminal world of Rumba, and its extension into the social world seems possible ... the potential [of Rumba] to generate ‘communitas’ is intrinsic and ever present.”

Daniel calls for more spontaneous rumba events to permit the “organic development” of the art form. Otherwise, she warns, the institutionalized and professionalized rumba, seldom seen by the Cuban masses, will become static and die (only to be preserved).

She sees hope for rumba in a variation of the genre called *batarumba*, which combines Yoruba religious chants, rhythms and gestures with rumba and other Cuban dance complexes.

Daniel does not pretend that rumba is a panacea for Cuba’s social ills. Like Anya Peterson Royce in *The Anthropology of Dance*, she readily points out the contradictions inherent to the art form. Chief among these is that while rumba is used by Cuba to show the world its dedication to an egalitarian society, “the notions of [women’s] accommodation and subservience to men which reside deep within Cuban culture are maintained in the rumba dance and event.” Although Cuban women enjoy such advantages as equal pay and excellent child care centers, patriarchal attitudes persist in Cuban society. The use of space in rumba and the attitudes of the partners exemplify the persistence of machismo in Cuba.

Daniel’s book provides an excellent history of rumba in relation to other Cuban dances, as well as an overview of how different members of society view its role in Cuban culture. A few sections lack strong connections between specific points and the book’s overall argument, but these minor weaknesses do not detract from Daniel’s contribution to dance anthropology and the understanding of a central aspect of Cuban culture. Although plenty of popular knowledge about rumba existed before this study (often in the form of Hollywood-facilitated misinformation), a serious investigation of the history and current state of rumba has been missing until now.

**DANCE AND POWER**

While Daniel’s dialogue with dance anthropologists focuses on the potency of dance as a medium of change and the cultural aspects it reflects, Hernández’s text adds to the growing body of works on music from disenfranchised communities. Authors such as Vernon Boggs, Jorge Duany, Fradique Lizardo and Enrique Fernández have published studies of salsa and merengue, but this is the first book-length work on bachata. Hernández’s investigation lays open the systems of power in the Dominican Republic to reveal not only how bachata developed the way it did, but how other art forms are developing within power structures all around us.

Interesting parallels emerge between Hernández’s text and other serious studies of popular music, such as Tricia Rose’s *Black Noise*. Rose’s book is a detailed history of rap music and hip hop culture in the United States that traces the simultaneous marginalization and commercialization of a genre...
that began as a mode of social resistance. The comparison of these detailed analyses of the political, social and economic contexts from which bachata and rap grew provides valuable insights into how music across the African diaspora functions within national power systems. Issues of language use, for example, are important to both genres; both bachateros and rappers express themselves with double-entendre, humor, hyperbole, understatement, exclamations and colloquial diction. The middle and upper classes of the United States and the Dominican Republic have condemned rap and bachata lyrics as vulgar, ungrammatical and even dangerous to impressionable listeners.

These concerns put Hernández in the company of scholars such as James Weldon Johnson, Sterling Brown, John Lovell, Janheinz Jahn and Lawrence Levine, who have constructed the history of the disenfranchised music of African-Americans. While Bachata does not look specifically for “Africanisms,” the book traces the connections between African-descended people and this musical genre. Hernández explains that the history of the Dominican Republic—especially its colonization by Spain, a 22-year occupation by Haiti, and the Trujillo government’s racist policies—has led to utter “rejection of blackness and anything associated with African culture.” In the Dominican Republic, “citizens of unequivocal African descent are referred to (and refer to themselves) as ‘indios’ (Indians) rather than as ‘negros,’ the latter term being reserved only for Haitians.” Denying their African heritage, middle-class Dominicans articulate their rejection of bachata in terms of class, even though “the people who made and listened to bachata were not only the poorest Dominicans, but generally the darkest ones as well.”

Like Simon Frith, who argues that the split between high and low culture in the United States is maintained by intellectuals to “protect” their own interests, Hernández claims that bachata was relegated to relative obscurity due to purposeful maneuvering by powerful people in the radio business, recording industry, media and national government. These individuals had an economic interest in labeling bachata cachivache, or insignificant. The music grew from a specific culture of men who usually could not find work, had little power in a family culture, and desperately looked for relief in alcohol and barstool camaraderie. In this material sense, bachata is “low art”; it comes out of the real experiences of people who make up the Dominican Republic’s hardest-working and/or unemployed class. Yet, Hernández’s work shows that specific individuals’ choices have shaped the music’s history. A great strength of the text comes from vignettes that bring alive the undercurrent of power and tension affecting record store owners and radio stations during the Trujillo years.

**SHIFTING MEANINGS**

Because Rumba and Bachata make new and important contributions to different intellectual dialogues, they would work well as texts for undergraduate and graduate courses in music and dance as well as anthropology, ethnomusicology, sociology and the arts. Both books are readable without oversimplifying and use technical language to the extent that it aids rather than clouds understanding. Daniel and Hernández make significant contributions to the sociocultural histories of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, respectively. Both authors are sympathetic to the common folk, but they do not romanticize their subjects, and neither rich nor poor are presented as homogeneous blocs. A complex picture emerges of art forms originated by a marginalized population, acted upon by many factors and moved beyond the control of the lower classes. The ethnographic histories the authors provide make it clear that art forms change constantly while remaining a specific genre. More important, they show that meaning is never stable, varying over time and place as well as among practitioners, observers, producers and consumers. In realizing this, the authors also understand that the art forms they study and hope to conserve are vulnerable precisely because of such efforts.

Since its environment partly determines its qualities, will bachata change beyond recognition if it becomes mainstream? Does the institutionalization of rumba mean its stagnation? These questions reverberate in many directions. Daniel and Hernández teach us to respect the distinctiveness of a cultural expression while working to promote social justice and living art.
Athough feminism has proven to be one of the most potent forces of the twentieth century, women's rights still lag far behind those of men in all areas of the world. This trend is evident in Latin America and the Caribbean, where the movement's impetus has been compromised by issues of race and social status. Feminist scholars specializing in the region have not lost sight of these complications and have taken into account the variations they may cause in the conventional feminist model.

Yet, the feminist tradition in Latin America is not only deep but enduring. As early as 1691, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, a Mexican nun, voiced her then-heretical opinions about women's rights in her famous Response to Sor Filotea. With that single act, Sor Juana set in motion the idea of the woman as equal, raising the standard for future generations to follow.

Today, women in Latin America are achieving prominence in politics, economics and the arts. The Caribbean in particular has been fertile ground for the feminist movement. In literature, for instance, Caribbean women writers have long been ardent promoters of feminism. Their writing continues to grow in quantity, exposure and appreciation.

Following is a selected listing of recent materials (monographs and periodical articles) testifying to the vitality of the feminist movement in Latin America and the Caribbean and dealing with various contemporary issues of concern to women in the region. For net surfers, http://www.nodo50.org/mujeresred/ is an excellent tool for the Spanish-speaking researcher interested in women's issues. Created in Spain, this database addresses women's issues in various countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.


Bull, Sheana Salyers. Machismo/Marianismo: Attitudes, Employment, Education, and Sexual Behavior among Women in Ecuador and the

Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and Caribbean librarian at Florida International University.
Publications Update


Hernández Bello, Amparo. *Perspectiva de género en la reforma de la seguridad social en Colombia.*


N’Zengou-Tayo, Marie-José. “Fann Se Poto Mitan”: Haitian Women, the Pillar of Society. Feminist Review 59 (Summer 1998): 118-143. [Provides a history of the struggles of Haitian women writers to improve the social and economic status of women in their country.]


Publications Update

tion about women in the English-speaking Caribbean and provides details on their economic, social and political roles and activities. Also explains how the use of gender analysis can influence the understanding of Caribbean history.


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LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN

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The INDAMI Summer Institute offers an exciting week of intensive study opportunities for students, artists, scholars, teachers, and others interested in studying the dance, music, and distinctive cultural traditions of Africa and the diaspora. Two separate and concurrent intensive programs are combined with dance technique classes, seminars, panel discussions, and performances to offer participants the opportunity to engage in an exciting and stimulating dialogue and exchange with artists and scholars of these culturally rich areas of the world. The 1999 Summer Institute unites local, national, and international scholars, artists, students, and educators in a celebration of the dance, music, and culture of Miami, helping to preserve and promote these distinctive traditions. We hope you will join us in singing the songs of the Orishas, dancing the samba and salsa, and celebrating our cultural diversity in a communal street dance and drum fiesta. The program includes:

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- Academic intensive in “Dance and Culture of Africa and the Diaspora”
- Panel discussions with distinguished scholars in the field
- Teacher training intensive in “Critical Issues in Intercultural Arts Education”
- “Fiesta Africana y Caribeña,” a performance at the Colony Theater and street dance and drum party on Lincoln Road, with Chuck Davis and members of the African American Dance Ensemble and Ifé Ilé Afro-Cuban Dance and Music Ensemble
- Informal dance and drumming jams with Institute teachers and musicians

June 19-26, 1999
New World School of the Arts
Miami, Florida

The Summer Dance Institute is co-sponsored by FIU’s Department of Theatre and Dance, African/New World Studies Program and Latin American and Caribbean Center

For further information For detailed information regarding college and in-service credit, or more information on INDAMI and other FIU programs, please contact:

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