Hemisphere Volume 9 Number 3, Winter 2001

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Canada's Nunavut Territory

Defining Race in Brazil...

...and the Dominican Republic

Education and Indigenous Identity in Mexico

Also in this issue:

Democracy and Civic Participation

The Vote in Mexico

Local Government in Latin America

Photographs by Indigenous Children

The Works of Maryse Condé
The next Summer Dance Institute is scheduled for June 25-July 1, 2001 and will feature Grupo Cultural Uk'ux Pop Wuj of Chichicastenango, Guatemala. Formed in 1991 with the mission of rescuing and fostering Mayan cultural traditions through a blend of dance and music, the company's signature work, the Creation of Man, is based on the sacred book of the Maya Quiché, the Pop (time) Wuj (book). The piece follows the four stages of creation in accordance with Mayan belief—man of mud or clay, man of wood, monkey man and human beings. Other dances include the Deer Dance, the Courtship and Maize Sowing. The group has performed in New York, Mexico and throughout Guatemala.

In conjunction with the performance, Jan Hanvik, executive director of Pan American Musical Art Research in New York City and a Fulbright senior scholar in dance, will lecture on Mayan ritual and culture. Hanvik has conducted field research in Guatemala and other Central and South American countries and is the author of many articles on Latin American dance.

The program also includes: 1) Technique classes in indigenous Bolivian folkloric dance, Haitian, Afro-Cuban, capoeira, and Caribbean dance and drumming with internationally recognized teachers and artists, including Ecuadorian choreographer Susanna Reyes; Caribbean choreographer Peter London, formerly of the Martha Graham Dance Company; Brazilian choreographer Giovanni Luquini; Bolivia Mágica; and Louines Louinis of the Jean Leon Destine Haitian Dance Company. 2) Interdisciplinary, team-taught academic seminars in “Cultural Crosscurrents and Hybridity: Amerindians and Africans in the New World” and “Amerindian and African Dance and Culture in the New World” with FIU humanities and social science scholars. 3) Panel discussions with distinguished artists and scholars in the field, including Allegra Fuller Snyder, Professor Emerita, University of California-Los Angeles. Courses may be taken for academic credit.

Produced in collaboration with the Florida Dance Association and the Florida Dance Festival, the Summer Dance Institute is co-sponsored by FIU’s Department of Theatre and Dance, African-New World Studies Program and Latin American and Caribbean Center. The Institute is a component of the “Dancing Across Disciplines” project funded by the US Department of Education’s Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education.

To find out more about Summer Dance Institute 2001 or other INDAMI programs, please contact: Niurca Márquez, Program Coordinator, Intercultural Dance and Music Institute, Florida International University, Latin American and Caribbean Center, University Park, DM 353, Miami, Florida 33199, Phone: (305) 348-2894, Fax: (305) 348-3593, E mail: indami@fiu.edu.

Grupo Cultural Uk’ux Pop Wuj was formed in 1991 with the mission of rescuing and fostering Mayan cultural traditions through a blend of dance and music. The company’s signature work is based on the sacred book of the Maya Quiché.
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An Inuit man inside a traditional igloo dwelling in Nunavut, Canada's newest territorial jurisdiction. Photo: Yvette Cardozo.
Leadership in the Field of Latin American and Caribbean Studies

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Florida International University, a public institution of higher education in South Florida, created the Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) in 1979. As a federally supported National Resource Center for Language and Area Studies, LACC has a mandate to promote graduate and undergraduate education, faculty research and public education on Latin American and Caribbean affairs. LACC faculty span a broad range of academic disciplines, including the social and natural sciences, humanities and business.

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More than 500 years after the great wave of European colonization of the Americas began, race remains a charged issue in many parts of the hemisphere. From the northern reaches of Canada to the tip of South America, modern societies struggle with the legacy of conquered indigenous populations and African slavery. Resolving these internal tensions has taken on a new urgency as the region’s economies move closer toward integration and globalization, putting new strains on marginalized communities and raising new questions about national identities.

The Iberian colonizers used a range of terms to describe every possible combination and degree of racial mixture. As David Howard shows in his article on the Dominican Republic, such distinctions continue there in somewhat different form today. Dominicans use a long list of terms to describe shades of skin color and avoid the still derogatory word, negro. Kathleen Bond and Andrew J. de Groot Fernandes document a similar situation in Brazil, where the ideal of “racial democracy” remains a myth to many Afro-Brazilians. Pan-black movements are working to instill a sense of pride and common identity in this community.

Marian Goslinga picks up this theme in her review of the works of Maryse Conde, an important Caribbean author. Goslinga traces the efforts of Caribbean intellectuals to develop theories of identity to encompass their legacy of slavery and colonization. As a black woman in a geographically, culturally and politically marginal world, Conde tackles interrelated issues of race, gender and class.

In Mexico, Ileana Schmidt-Díaz de León discusses the government’s publication of free textbooks in indigenous languages and their implications for Indian identity. This issue’s photo essay also examines cultural survival in a Mexican indigenous community. Children in an isolated Huichol Indian village in the mountains of Jalisco offer us a glimpse of their world through their own photographs.

The United States and Canada continue to come to terms with their own racial histories. In the spring of 1999, Canada took a pioneering step toward autonomous government by indigenous peoples with the creation of the Nunavut Territory in the Arctic northeast. Two articles discuss the issues involved in this decision and the challenges the territory’s Inuit inhabitants face in the years ahead.

This issue also includes several reports on other topics with important consequences for the hemisphere. Canadian researchers Jean F. Mayer and Thomas Legler share their observations as “international visitors” during the summer 2000 Mexican elections. In the midst of widespread praise for the process that allowed an opposition figure to defeat the decades-old hegemony of the PRI, they raise some significant questions about Mexico’s electoral practices and their implications for democratic government. Democracy in Brazil is the main focus of Mariano Magalhães’s article on civic participation and the role played by civil society in consolidating new democracies. Finally, FIU’s Allan Rosenbaum and Cristina Rodríguez-Acosta discuss the importance of strengthening local government in Latin America and the reasons why commitment to this goal has been fading in the last few years.

Thanks to all of the contributors who helped us put together this issue, sending us their work from as far away as Scotland, Brazil and the Canadian Arctic. The wide scope of the articles reflects Hemisphere’s commitment to covering issues of importance throughout the Americas. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to Alisa Newman, managing editor, and Pedro Botta, publications coordinator at LACC, for their never-ending commitment to Hemisphere over the years. This issue, in particular, carries the imprint of their dedication to this magazine and the intellectual curiosity that drives them to produce each issue.

Eduardo A. Gamarra
A Partial Victory

The July 2000 victory of Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) was a watershed in Mexican politics, ending 71 years of government by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Both in Mexico and abroad, politicians, journalists and civil society representatives were quick to proclaim this contest the most free and fair Mexican suffrage ever. But the historic outcome of the election seems to have led most Mexican and foreign observers to forget about—or worse, to ignore—the various difficulties that characterized this latest electoral process. The prevailing attitude seems to be that Fox's victory and the relative cleanliness of the voting process are enough to complete Mexico's transition to democracy.

While we share much of the enthusiasm surrounding the elections, we believe that the aggregate electoral trends and outcome at the national level hide significant and more substantive problems that are profoundly anchored in the country's political regime and socioeconomic system. These problems emerge most clearly in the Mexican countryside, especially in remote areas with a high concentration of indigenous population. In these zones, pre-electoral reports by such groups as Alianza Cívica, the National Democratic Institute, the Mexico Working Group and Global Exchange indicated that the months preceding Election Day were generally characterized by "business as usual": a continuation of decades-old methods of intimidation and vote buying.

The months preceding Election Day were generally characterized by "business as usual": a continuation of decades-old methods of intimidation and vote buying.

Our own experience as international visitors on hand for the elections in the state of Puebla allowed us to verify these observations and add to them. In particular, we were struck by the extent of confusion among polling officials and the resulting disorder at many of the voting stations we visited. Ignorance of voting procedures appeared widespread among both polling officials and the electorate, contributing to a large number of irregularities in the voting process and compromising the secrecy of the vote. We were also able to witness firsthand indications of alleged vote buying and coercion before and during the process. These findings lead us to conclude that, while the 2000 elections represented an important advance over previous electoral contests, Mexico still faces significant challenges in its path toward electoral democracy.

The Vote in Puebla

Our group was comprised of five academics from Southern Ontario, Canada. We attended the 2000 elections as international visitors invited by Alianza Cívica—a Mexican non-governmental organization dedicated to promoting freedom and secrecy in the voting process as well as civic education—and duly accredited with the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). We stayed in Mexico for 10 days, focusing our observation effort on two mountainous areas of the central state of Puebla: the Sierra Norte and the Zone of the Volcanoes, the communities around the Popocatépetl and Iztaccíhuatl peaks. We observed the elections in a select group of predominantly indigenous and rural communities, including Tahitic in the Sierra Norte, and San Nicolás de los Ranchos, Santiago Xalitzintla, San Pedro Yancuitlapan and San Mateo Ozolco in the Zone of the Volcanoes. In both areas we visited, the voting was characterized by numerous irregularities and a general lack of understanding of the electoral process, from both casilla (voting station) officials and voters at large. Voting secrecy was repeatedly compromised as a result.

On Election Day, none of the voting stations we observed opened on time—8:00 a.m., as stipulated by electoral law—because of organizational problems. In fact, the first few hours of voting were marked by near pandemonium.
Mexicans voted the PRI out of office, but electoral irregularities persist

Casilla officials were nervous and uncertain of the proper procedure for beginning the electoral process, and long lines of voters crowded the voting stations. Officials encountered many difficulties in assembling the voting booths and ballot boxes, as well as in unpacking and preparing voting materials. In some cases they allowed voting to begin even though the casilla was clearly not ready to receive voters.

Many illiterate or semi-literate voters were unsure how to vote and often did not receive proper instructions from casilla officials. After leaving the voting booth and before depositing their ballots, many people either openly exhibited their votes or left their ballots unfolded in clear view of bystanders. Generally, PRI party representatives were the closest to the ballot boxes and made note of voters’ choices. On numerous occasions, two people entered the voting booth at the same time and communicated with each other. In several other instances, people outside the booths conversed at will with voters inside, sometimes instructing them directly on how to vote.

Such irregularities may be attributed to a lack of civic education or cultural elements, but they can also be interpreted as being part of a process of vote buying or intimidation. We estimate that more than half of the ballots cast in the Sierra Norte and close to 20% in the Zone of the Volcanoes were visible to onlookers. In all cases, voting station officials or district IFE representatives—when the latter were present—made little attempt to enforce voting secrecy. Confidentiality was also compromised when strong winds lifted the protective curtain on flimsy voting booths located outside. On one occasion, the wind blew an entire booth away.

Many voting officials were clearly following directions and suggestions from PRI party representatives. Often, a PRI representative, instead of IFE officials, instructed voters to fold their ballots and put them in the ballot boxes. The effect was to cast doubt on the integrity of the voting process.

Despite the legal limit of two political party representatives per voting station, the PRI often had many more affiliates in and around the casillas. We noticed PRI members and sympathizers sitting much too close to both the voting booths and ballot boxes, making it possible for them to see inside the booth and observe how people voted. These individuals were supervised by a PRI official who coordinated the activities of the party’s representatives at voting stations in the area. In the Sierra Norte, this person claimed to be part of Antorchia Campesina, a hard-line faction of the Mexican Peasant Confederation, itself a sector of the PRI. Against this commanding local prista presence, there was generally only one PAN representative at each voting station, and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) had only a sporadic presence. Other parties were not represented.

The counting of the ballots was generally disorganized but fair, although in Santiago Xalitzintla serious errors occurred in the tabulation of the vote. There, PRI and PAN party representatives were allowed to participate in the counting of ballots as well as handle them and instruct casilla officials about the process—a practice strictly forbidden by electoral law. Only the timely arrival of an IFE district official allowed the vote count to conclude.

Two incidents confirmed that the elections in these communities occurred in a context of pressure and intimidation. First, in an age-old practice dubbed operación tamal, PRI supporters in Santiago Xalitzintla and San Nicolás de los Ranchos passed out free breakfasts and lunches to casilla officials and voters. Second, and of even more concern, we received compelling evidence of coacción y compra, or vote buying and coercion. Three peasants approached us in Santiago Xalitzintla to make a formal denunciation, alleging that in 250 cases they knew of (roughly a third of the electorate in that municipality), benefits from the government social assistance program PROGRESA had been conditioned on voting for the PRI. They complained that local PROGRESA officials had removed voter identification cards two weeks earlier and returned them just before Election Day, after telling their owners that their names and voter numbers had been recorded to keep track of how they voted.

In addition to the troubling issues it raises, this episode confirms the
The irregularities we witnessed in Puebla were replicated in other regions of Mexico, where they were sometimes much worse. In the state of Chiapas, for example, delegations from US and Canadian NGOs were forcibly prevented from entering villages, received threats to their personal security, and were harassed by local police and paramilitary forces.

usefulness of international observers—a subject of much debate lately. At the beginning of our trip to Mexico, one high-ranking Canadian official stated that foreign observers would have little impact on the elections and that their presence was hardly necessary in the light of the tremendous procedural improvements recorded by the IFE in recent years. Our experience, however, suggests the contrary. In the case of the alleged PROGRESA abuses, the men who approached us clearly did not trust the local PRI-controlled authorities. They would probably never have reported this serious irregularity without our presence.

CONTINUING OBSTACLES

In many ways, what we saw in Puebla contrasted with the national context. For example, voter turnout was less than 50% at the casillas we visited—an abstention rate much higher than the 35% national average. Also, in the voting stations we observed, the PRI candidates for the presidency, Senate and Chamber of Deputies won by a margin of at least 2:1, whereas at the national level, the PAN decisively won the presidency and made a strong showing in both houses of Congress. (The IFE’s final results showed the PAN-led coalition with 39.5% of the congressional vote, the PRI with 37.4%, and the PRD-led alliance with 19.2%).

However, the irregularities we witnessed in Puebla were replicated in other regions of Mexico, where they were sometimes much worse. In the state of Chiapas, for example, delegations from US and Canadian NGOs were forcibly prevented from entering villages, received threats to their personal security, and were harassed by local police and paramilitary forces.

Based on our observations during this and previous stays, as well as on the pre-electoral reports mentioned above, we have identified three main concerns regarding the Mexican electoral process. The first involves vote buying and coercion. The traditional practice of using public funds to support the electoral campaigns of political parties in power continues and appears to involve all three major political formations. A special commission of the Chamber of Deputies formed to investigate the problem received 145 documented denunciations of alleged misuse of public monies. In addition, an Alianza Cívica survey corroborated pre-electoral coercive practices that targeted public employees, obliging them to participate in PRI campaign events.

A second concern is the lack of basic and civic education in many rural areas. Inadequate training of casilla officials, widespread ignorance of voting procedures among both polling officials and the electorate, and the low level of basic literacy in many indigenous and/or rural communities contributed to produce confusion, disorder and numerous procedural irregularities.

Finally, access to the media remains an important issue. Studies by the IFE and Alianza Cívica found national media coverage to be imbalanced, denying equal access and objective coverage to all parties.

Underscoring these irregularities and procedural problems is not meant to detract from the significant advances made in Mexico’s transition to democracy. Beginning in 1977, and especially during the 1990s, numerous electoral reforms facilitated the development of political pluralism and improved the conditions conducive to free and fair elections. Since 1996, when it became fully autonomous and operational, the IFE’s role in promoting free and fair elections has been widely recognized in and outside Mexico, and polls show that most Mexicans today believe that elections are an important mechanism for democratic development.

The 2000 electoral process highlighted the tremendous work accomplished in the past few years by the IFE, as well as by the numerous Mexican NGOs devoted to the cause of free and fair voting, civic education and citizen participation in the political process.
Clearly, Mexico's electoral process has undergone significant improvements since the controversial 1988 elections. Voter registration, the impartiality of electoral institutions, the counting of votes, pluralism of political groups, and alternation among political parties have all become generally reliable and effective. Nonetheless, numerous elements still require improvement for Mexico to have truly free, fair and transparent elections.

**Remarks and Recommendations**

Fox's victory has already generated significant political change in Mexico, not least the painful and much-debated restructuring of the PRI and PRD. Nevertheless, the country's transition to a reliable, effective electoral democracy remains to be completed. Important deficiencies in the Mexican electoral process persist, despite significant improvements over the past 20 years. We believe that the government, political parties, electoral authorities and civil society must address such deficiencies before future elections for Mexico truly to accomplish its transition to an electoral democracy.

In particular, our observations confirmed the persistent urban/rural divide in Mexico. Elections in Mexico's cities generally have become routine and reliable exercises in suffrage. In the countryside, however, especially in marginal, indigenous zones, election procedures are less dependable. Problems range from poorly trained and educated voting officials and voters to vote buying and intimidation.

For electoral democracy to extend adequately to rural Mexico, significant changes must be made on two fronts. First, improvements in education and training are crucial. Current civic and political education programs, such as the ones undertaken by the IFE and Alianza Civilica, should be extended to rural and indigenous communities, where this type of training is particularly lacking. Greater efforts must be made to ensure that basic general and civic education reaches rural and/or indigenous communities, and the communication gap between indigenous languages and the current IFE training programs, which are predominantly in Spanish, must be breached. On the one hand, the IFE must reorient its spending priorities toward rural civic education and election training. We were struck, for example, by the contrast between the resources the IFE dedicated to such activities as hosting international visitors or launching ad campaigns and its weak presence in rural zones. On the other hand, the Secretariat of Public Education must renew efforts to expand literacy in Mexico's poorer rural zones.

Second, advances in electoral democracy in the countryside are impeded by persistent and unacceptable high levels of poverty. Poverty, ultimately, is the feeding ground of an anti-democratic political culture of clientelism manifested in fear, vote buying and intimidation. During the 71 years of PRI rule, voting in poor areas became a question of survival. Election time represented a periodic opportunity for impoverished voters to exchange their votes for concrete material benefits from the ruling party, ranging from cash, agricultural credit and debt forgiveness to building supplies and rural electrification. In the 2000 election, the PROGRESA and PROCAMPO social assistance programs continued the tradition of exchanging votes for goods and services.

The PRI will relinquish the presidency in December 2000, but the party retains much of its strength at the state and local levels. In addition, both the PAN and PRD have recently come under allegations of manipulating state-run programs and public monies in the states and municipalities under their control. One of the most important challenges for Fox's administration will be to thwart the use of state patronage and coercion by political parties and caciques (local bosses). To achieve these goals, basic and civic education must be improved dramatically and poverty alleviated substantially, especially in rural areas.

These problems are complex and will require long-term strategies and commitment on the part of the federal government. Unless the social and economic condition of Mexico's poor population is improved significantly in the next few years, the irregularities we observed in the July 2000 elections are likely to reoccur in the future. Much work remains to be done before electoral democracy is effectively consolidated in Mexico.

Jean E. Mayer is assistant professor of political science at the University of Guelph, Ontario. Thomas Legler is assistant professor of political science at the University of Victoria, British Columbia. This article is based on a report originally prepared with the help of Nibaldo Galleguillos, Mark Juhasz, Marie-José Massicotte and Erin McCaughan.
Building Partnerships

by Allan Rosenbaum and Cristina Rodriguez-Acosta

A mong the many issues under discussion at the 1998 Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, local governance was high on the agenda. The Plan of Action signed by the leaders of the 34 participating countries included several objectives designed to strengthen local government, reflecting the Summit’s recognition of the growing significance of local government in Latin America and the important role it can play in development. In the past few years, however, this growth has shown signs of reversing, or at least slowing down. Across the hemisphere, countries are witnessing a decline in commitment to strong, efficient and productive subnational governments.

Ironically, this trend comes in the aftermath of widespread praise for Latin America’s progress in the area of local governance, an example that has been emulated in other parts of the world. Eastern Europe, Africa and even China are turning their attention to questions of decentralization and building the capacity of their subnational governments. In so doing, they are drawing inspiration from a Latin American model that, at least for the moment, appears to be running out of steam. Some critics, especially those in national governments, seem to believe that stronger local governments come at the expense of weaker national governments. This argument fails to understand that strengthening one or another level of government does not represent a zero sum game, in the sense that if one level of government is enhanced, another will inevitably become weaker. Rather, contemporary experience demonstrates clearly that when one level of government becomes institutionally stronger and more competent, other existing levels of government will inevitably do the same.

One of the most important benefits of stronger subnational governments is their ability to generate economic development at the local level. Successful economic development requires locally focused and targeted support to establish necessary infrastructure and create an environment conducive to economic development. This is achieved much more readily by officials on the scene, who are located in the community and possess the autonomy and the resources to respond to the legitimate development needs of the private sector.

This relationship becomes clear if one examines the data on levels of subnational expenditure and employment on a regional basis around the world. In Europe, Japan and North America—the most economically developed regions of the world—56% of all governmental expenditure and public employment occurs at the subnational level. In contrast, in Africa—the least economically developed region of the world—only 6% to 10% of government employment and expenditure occurs at the subnational level. The figures are approximately 20% for Latin America and 30% for Asia. Thus, it is not surprising that the country in Eastern Europe credited with the most successful economic transition is the same one that has devoted the most attention to building and strengthening the capacity of its subnational governments: Poland. Nor is it surprising that when the now vibrant Swedish economy began to take a downturn a decade ago, a main focus of reform efforts was enhancing the capacity of Sweden’s already strong subnational governments.

Of special importance for developing countries, the strengthening of subnational governments (and, by extension, local economic development capacity) may also be a significant step in dealing with the growing problem of income inequality, which the Inter-American Development Bank’s 1999 annual development report identified as among the most potentially destabilizing forces in Latin America and the Caribbean. Locally elected officials, who are dependent upon local voters, must, of necessity, be responsive to the most basic needs of their communities.

Despite these clear benefits, reformers who support the movement toward stronger subnational government in the hemisphere recently have encountered a growing disinclination on the part of national governments to adequately and effectively support the strengthening of government at this level. In fact, national officials seem to have been a good deal more committed to strengthening local government a decade ago than they are today. One possible reason for this trend is the recent tendency of reformers concerned about these matters to focus almost exclusively on the activities of local officials in encouraging the development of subnational governments, instead of working jointly at
the local and national levels. In most cases, one cannot build subnational governments simply by working in the subnational context. This is especially true in countries with long traditions of centralism, where political, economic and administrative power is concentrated at the national level.

The growing tendency of reformers to ignore the need for an active role for the national government, and the growing inclination of national governments to lessen their commitment to strengthening administration at the local level, is in part a result of prior success and its political consequences. Many local governments—especially, large capital city governments—have become important political bases in their own right. In some cases, most recently Argentina, the mayors of capital cities have successfully run for president as opposition candidates.

Those realities should not encourage reformers to neglect efforts to maintain a partnership between local and national officials. In most instances, the national government not only establishes the policy framework within which local governments must function, but also exercises overwhelming control over the fiscal resources available to government at all levels. If progress in the development of subnational governments is to continue, a renewed effort must be made to encourage and engage national leadership. An important part of these efforts is stressing the economic development role of local governments.

Efforts to strengthen local government have also failed to focus adequately on issues of sustainability. International organizations and donors must bear some portion of the responsibility. All too often, donors tend to support short-term reform projects that can produce quick results. Our personal experience as advisors to the local government of one Latin American city is a case in point. Two separate mayors attempted to reform that city's budgetary and financial management procedures. In each case, the effort was supported by a different international donor, and in each instance the results were the same: Short-term assistance was provided for major reforms that rapidly enhanced management capacity and dramatically tightened executive control over agency spending. The donor then ended assistance. Shortly thereafter, the reforms put in place evaporated amidst political and fiscal pressures on the municipal government. A short-term focus fails to recognize that serious systemic reform requires a great deal of time. In the United States, for example, systematic efforts at encouraging local government reform and professionalization began in the 1880s, but real success was not achieved on a broad basis until the 1950s. Attempts to professionalize the civil service and eliminate patronage in the US have taken at least as long to achieve.

A related problem is the tendency of donors and international assistance agencies to provide mostly short-term training for local officials. Less support is granted for longer-term professionalization, such as the development of university-based programs in local government management. Longer-term programs are essential for the development of a permanent culture of professionalism.

Finally, those who support reform efforts (in particular, international organizations and donors) tend to forget that the kind of change that is needed goes well beyond administrative and fiscal concerns but is, in fact, political as well. It is necessary to work with the political leadership both nationally and locally to bring about important, meaningful and sustainable change. Perhaps because so much international technical assistance and support is overseen by mid-level administrators and managers, technical assistance efforts tend to work at similar levels in the countries where activities are supported.

In many cases there is, below the surface, a very real antagonism toward working with political officials—even at the local level. Often, donor officials will publicly heap praise on the results of projects that support local government, while at the same time privately criticizing the projects for having too much contact with high-level political officials and, as a consequence, assuming too high a profile.

Especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, the kind of long-term changes that are necessary to implement the goals of the Summit Plan of Action require the full involvement of top-level political officials. This involvement cannot be obtained by ignoring or avoiding these officials in the process of seeking meaningful institutionalized reform. Rather, efforts must be made to engage political leadership at all levels in not only supporting, but being a part of—and indeed, even leading—this process.

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A decade and a half after the massive popular uprising in favor of direct presidential elections (the diretas já movement), and despite the impressive “March of 100,000” on Brasília in August 1999, Brazilian citizens have a low rate of participation in political life. The strength of civil society will not make or break democracy in Brazil, but anemic popular participation in associations, movements and organizations lessens the quality of representative democracy there.

Many scholars have argued that a strong civil society makes for a strong democracy. In countries around the world, civil society often provides the force behind the initial decision of authoritarian regimes to move toward democracy or pick up the pace of democratic reform. Brazil is only one example of this trend. Popular uprisings in Indonesia in early 1998 led to the fall of the Suharto regime; grass-roots movements in the early 1990s pressured the Mexican government to make elections more open and competitive; the Eastern European democratic transitions were in part spurred by social forces; and in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo kept the heat on Argentina’s military government to come clean on its deadly campaign to wipe out subversive movements during that country’s “dirty war.”

The level at which the population participates in organized collective action greatly impacts the quality of democracy. Although levels of popular participation can be expected to shift over time in response to changes in the substance and intensity of societal conflict, as well as the stage of democratization, widespread participation in a rich set of associations and organizations enables people to advance their interests in the political arena. The process of democratic consolidation, however, marks the point at which the political system begins to settle into more routinized patterns of conflict that encourage individuals to “free-ride” on the efforts of others. Scholars expect to find decreased popular participation in associational life in most newly democratic states, and that is certainly the case in Brazil.

Membership in Associations

Brazilian associations have experienced a general decline in membership since the mid 1980s, the high point of political participation. In 1985, a survey conducted by the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul found that almost 40% of adult residents of that Brazilian state were members of at least one association. Nine years later, the number had declined to less than 30%.

Although the sample came from a single state, the results have mostly been confirmed across the country. The major reason for the weakness of civil society in Brazil is the inability of the vast number of uneducated poor to articulate their demands effectively. In northeastern Brazil, especially, the level of participation of poor residents in neighborhood and church-based organizations has declined significantly since the 1970s. The northeast is the poorest region in Brazil and has suffered tremendously since market reforms were introduced in the early 1990s. Income distribution, already skewed in favor of the rich, grew even more unequal in the first half of that decade. The educational level also declined, making it easy to understand decreased participation in politics in general, and associations in particular.

More surprising are the survey data from Rio Grande do Sul, one of Brazil’s most developed states. Although it also suffered the negative short-term consequences of national economic reforms, Rio Grande do Sul saw its share of the national economic wealth increase from 10% in 1985 to 12% in 1995. Educational levels have remained constant since the 1980s. The decline in associational life in this state seems to fit the prediction that after the euphoria of the transition to civilian government, people in neodemocracies begin to settle into their new lives and are less likely to join associations.

Aside from the importance of political participation for democratic governance, many scholars argue that membership in associations fosters democratic attitudes. According to this logic, strengthening civil society is tantamount to deepening democratic political culture. We can test this theory by examining whether Brazilians who are members of associations exhibit more democratic attitudes than Brazilians who are not affiliated with any association.

The sample of interviews from Rio Grande do Sul provides some evidence for the positive connection between membership in associations...
Effective and stable democratic government hinges in part on the level of confidence in state institutions. The lack of trust in the Brazilian judicial system reported in the Rio Grande do Sul survey by both members and nonmembers of associations should come as no surprise. Historically, the judicial branch in Brazil has enjoyed very little public support. More often than not, the politically well placed and economically well off receive a slap on the wrist, if they are brought to justice at all. The absence of the rule of law in Brazil is a key obstacle to democratic consolidation. Citizens need to know that they can turn to the courts to defend themselves against the state, its officials and other powerful actors. The survey found even lower levels of public trust in the police: 15% and 12%, respectively, for members and nonmembers. This lack of confidence in public institutions at the local and national levels threatens the quality of democracy in Brazil.

Preference for a multiparty system varied between the two groups of respondents. Less than half of gaúchos who were members of associations felt that the country would be better served by a one-party system, compared to more than half of nonmembers. The preference for more parties among members of associations may be explained in part by the fact that associational life produces awareness of the importance of open competition for public power and the proper functioning of democratic government. Of the entire sample, 50% supported a one-party system.

In a study published in the American Political Science Review in September 1994, Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson found that public support for gradual reform has a greater positive impact on change in democracy than does support for revolutionary change or intransigent defense of the status quo. They also found that public support for gradual reform is positively correlated with other democratic attitudes. Therefore, associational life should have a negative impact on support for violent change. In Rio Grande do Sul, this was not the case. Associational membership in the sample was correlated (albeit not significantly) with greater support for political change through violent means. The data suggest that participation in civil society does not influence whether individuals will prefer incremental change over revolutionary change or defense of the status quo.

In an earlier round of interviews in Rio Grande do Sul in 1985, respondents were asked whether quebra-quebras (activities such as overturning vehicles and arson) were acceptable...
means for confronting public authorities. Almost 90% answered no. How can the difference between 1985 and 1994 be explained? One possibility is that the expectations and euphoria associated with the transition to democracy convinced most people that these actions were unnecessary. A second potential explanation for the change between 1985 and 1994 is the wording of the question. In the later questionnaire, respondents were not provided with examples of violent methods for seeking political change. Without visualizing the options, respondents may have been more likely to condone violent upheaval. A third possibility that follows the chronological logic of the first is that the inept government of José Sarney, the corruption of Fernando Collor de Melo and the incompetence of Itamar Franco—not to mention the generalized perception that democracy, mainly elections, had not done much to improve most people’s lives—could have fueled the belief that positive change would only be possible through “nondemocratic” means. These explanations are not mutually exclusive and may in fact have worked together to account for the change between surveys.

A further concern in consolidating democracy is a healthy attitude toward voting. If public regard for voting reaches very low levels, voting will decline to the point that the ability of society to hold elected officials accountable is seriously undermined. In Brazil, voting is mandatory. This may account for the results in the table above, in which both members and nonmembers considered voting to be very important (although the rate was higher among members than nonmembers). To dismiss this hypothesis, respondents in Rio Grande do Sul were asked if they would vote even if they were not required to do so. More than 70% of members said yes, compared to 63% of nonmembers. The results underline the importance of voting in the eyes of the public, as well as confirming the difference between members and nonmembers.

The survey also looked at public support for military rule; specifically, whether the country was better or worse off during this period. This question captures Samuel Huntington’s notion of “authoritarian nostalgia,” which he claims actually increases the prospects for democratic consolidation. One can argue that longing for a nondemocratic regime is not good for democratic political socialization. If citizens do not perceive democracy as the most appropriate form of government before “procedural” legitimacy sets in, antidemocratic forces—the military, in most Latin American countries—are likely to take this cue and perhaps intervene more openly in politics, to the detriment of the democratic allocation of public values. Members could be expected to have a more negative evaluation of military rule than nonmembers, and in fact, 40% of members reported that the country was better off under the military, compared to almost half of nonmembers.

Two factors stand out in the data. First, although this information was not included in the table, one-fifth of nonmembers were unsure about which regime was better for the country, compared to less than 10% of members. This finding may be spurious; lack of education may contribute to the uncertainty of nonmembers, while conversely, membership in associational life is highly correlated with education.

The second outstanding factor is the high level of agreement that the country was better off under military rule. Although it would be a leap to imply that the respondents preferred military rule to democracy, the survey’s findings corroborate the conclusions of other studies. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan found that in the early 1990s, Brazilians supported democracy at a frighteningly lower rate than citizens of other countries studied. Forty percent of Brazilians preferred democracy to any other form of government, compared to 73% of Uruguayans, 70% of Spaniards, 61% of Portuguese and 87% of Greeks.

**CIVIL SOCIETY**

Civil society in Brazil is weak. The lack of associational life in Rio Grande do Sul is particularly telling; given this state’s characteristics, we could expect it to have higher rates of participation. In a presentation at a conference in Brasilia in December 1998, political scientist Philip Oxhorn told the audience that the key to the health of Brazilian democracy was a strong civil society. In practice, however, civil society organizations in Brazil are constrained by a lack of available resources. The situation will not improve significantly without a helping hand from the government.

Strengthening civil society in Brazil will require a more serious commitment on the part of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the help of a national legislature that has been reluctant to go along with the president’s proposals since his re-election in October 1998. The challenge for Brazil’s leaders is to overcome partisan squabbles to create a legal and social environment more conducive to citizen participation.

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In 1997, Margarida Pereira da Silva was the leading candidate for mayor of Pombal, a city in the interior of the northeastern Brazilian state of Paraíba. Pereira da Silva, beloved for her community work with youth, decided to run for office to offer an alternative to corrupt, special interest politics. She had little money, so she ran the campaign from her home. One week before Election Day, two strangers offered her the equivalent of $75,000 as a donation for her youth program. There was just one condition—she had to drop out of the race. She politely but firmly refused, telling the visitors, “I’m running for my people, not for money.”

Days after she refused the bribe, all of Pereira da Silva’s campaign posters were painted over with the words nega feia (ugly black woman). Unable to discredit her honesty or merits, her opponents orchestrated a smear campaign that focused solely on race. Long-time friends and even some relatives, who she believes were paid off, suddenly turned against her. Her nephew caught his girlfriend tearing down Pereira da Silva’s posters. When he confronted her, the girl replied, “I’m not going to waste my vote on that ugly black thing.” Pereira da Silva lost by a landslide.

Stories of racial discrimination like this one are not confined to the rural northeast. Millions of Afro-Brazilians experience racism every day. From the family living room, where lighter-skinned children are often favored over their darker siblings, to church pews, barbershops, the lack of educational materials about Afro-Brazilian history and culture reinforces negative images of blackness among school children. Photo: Kathleen Bond.
The battle over racial identity in Brazil

Brazil is often described as a “racial democracy” because of the high number of interracial marriages and easy banter between the races in everyday life. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

classrooms and the halls of Congress, racism gnaws at the fabric of Brazilian society. The country is often described by foreigners and Brazilians as a “racial democracy” because of the high number of interracial marriages and seemingly easy banter between the races in everyday life. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

A LEGACY OF DISCRIMINATION

Racial democracy, a term coined by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre in the early twentieth century, is the theory that Brazil's history of extended miscegenation has resulted in a cultural melange in which all races are equally valued. In reality, however, race in Brazil is a complex and difficult issue. Although most Brazilians claim a mixed African, European and indigenous ancestry, the weight of racism causes many to “whiten” themselves. Many morenos straighten their hair and search for lighter-skinned marriage partners. They often identify themselves and each other with terms that indicate a lighter skin tone, such as moreninho, café, mulato, bronzeado and escurinho. Rarely will they describe themselves as negro. Even those who call themselves black often have a hard time convincing other Brazilians not to identify them as moreno or mulato. For many people, to be called black is still an insult.

Skin color profoundly influences life chances. According to a 1992 study by Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva, nonwhite Brazilian are three times more likely than whites to be illiterate. The numbers deteriorate even further at higher educational levels: Whites are five times more likely than people of mixed ancestry and nine times more likely than blacks to obtain university degrees. The pattern repeats itself in the work force, where, according to government statistics, whites have access to the highest-paying jobs, earning up to 75% more than blacks and 50% more than people of mixed ancestry. Other socioeconomic indicators are no less grim. Infant mortality statistics are almost twice as high for nonwhite children, and the vast majority of detainees in the country's crowded prison system are nonwhites.

Not all of the consequences of racism can be neatly packaged into statistics and charts. Effects on self-esteem are not so easily measured. At a recent reflection group of Afro-Brazilian women in João Pessoa, a woman named Cida painfully recounted the end of her relationship with Chico, a lighter-skinned black. The two had dated for several years without their color difference seeming to create any difficulties. When they got engaged, however, Chico's family exploded.

"This little blackie is going to pollute our blood. Go and find someone who will purify it," Chico's mother raged. Chico caved in and broke off the engagement within days. Two years later, Cida painfully asked the group, "How can you tell me not to feel inferior because of my color?"

RECLAIMING IDENTITIES

Brazil’s black movement struggles to address this question by introducing positive images of black identity and fighting racism at all levels of society. Anthropologist John Burdick traces the movement's momentum to the 1970s, when a generation of nonwhite students was caught in the contradiction between the promise of upward mobility and the reality of labor and educational barriers. Around the world, revolutionaries in the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola and militants in the Black Power movement in the United States offered encouraging symbols of self-confidence for the fledgling Afro-Brazilian movement.

Over the past 25 years, the black movement in Brazil has developed
Paraíba Black Movement participants celebrate the many shades of their African heritage. Photo: Kathleen Bond.

in different directions. Some groups dedicate their energy to judicial and legislative arenas, such as the enforcement of the 1989 Cão law that makes racism a crime. Other organizations—including the internationally acclaimed percussion band Olodum—focus on cultural programs. Various research institutes, primarily in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, cater to the middle class, while Catholic church groups, most notably the Agentes de Pastoral Negro (Black Pastoral Church Workers), offer educational courses for the economically disadvantaged.

The black movement in Paraíba reflects this diversity. Participating organizations include Caiana dos Crioulos, a black community of descendants of runaway slaves; Banda Ylé Odara and other musical, martial arts and dance groups; Afro-Brazilian religious groups, including Candomblé and Umbanda centers; women's reflection groups; coalition and organizing entities, including the Agentes de Pastoral Negro; and educational groups that focus on literacy programs, training and school curriculum development. These groups gather every year for the annual Paraíba Black Movement Conference.

In addition to gaining new insights into cultural, religious and political resistance, coming together in solidarity is an important aspect of the conference. In rural regions of Brazil, blacks are often isolated. They suffer intense discrimination, especially in the school system. Paulo Cesar, a 26-year-old community activist, told a story that echoed the childhood experiences of many participants. His junior high school in rural Paraíba had only three or four black students. When he was called negão besta (big, stupid black), his teacher refused to intervene. His mother, lacking formal education and self-confidence, did nothing when he came home from school crying.

"That experience left a profound mark," Cesar stated. "My involvement with the black movement reinforces in me that being black is not horrible, it's being human like any other person." He now directs a capoeira group (a combination of
martial arts and dance practiced by slaves to train for escapes) and holds workshops on racism in local schools.

Activists have reached out to the interior of the state, where Tanzanian Maryknoll Sister Efuma Nyaki and her Brazilian colleagues travel extensively throughout the drought-stricken, poor countryside offering two-day formation courses in identity, self-esteem and empowerment. During these visits, Nyaki discovered an abysmally low educational level among most blacks in the interior. “We’ve been to all-black rural communities where only one or two people are literate, which has led us to seek funding to begin small literacy programs,” she commented.

Lagoa Raça, 10 hours from the state capital, is one of those communities. Five years ago, when Nyaki’s team first visited the community, it had no school within walking distance. Only one of the 200 residents could read and write. With help from outside, that man was trained to offer adult literacy courses, and eventually a school was built to serve the community. “There are Lagoa Raças all over the northeast,” Nyaki lamented. “The government has simply abandoned these people.”

Educational work is also underway in urban areas of Paraíba, where activists such as Nyaki offer programs on racism and Afro-Brazilian identity in the schools. Very few children admit to being black when the question is posed at the beginning of the sessions. The complete lack of educational material about Afro-Brazilian history and culture reinforces negative images of blackness among school children. Nyaki’s team is working with black university professors to develop a primary school curriculum that includes the history and achievements of black Brazilians.

**Religious Dialogue**

Black activism has also affected the church, bringing black members of religious orders together for reflection. Paraíba’s GRENI (Group of Black and Indigenous Religious) is one such group. These small clusters of Catholic priests and nuns are beginning the process of reclaiming their black and indigenous identities. Many participants find strength in the groups to face racism in their own religious communities.

Catholics are not just talking to each other about racial issues. Over the last decade, some have attempted a dialogue with Afro-Brazilian religious groups. Many of these groups have suffered discrimination throughout Brazilian history, much of it condoned by the Catholic Church. For example, until the 1950s, acts of destruction against Candomblé houses of worship by either the police or common citizens were never punished by law. Long after the practice of Afro-Brazilian religions was legalized in the early 1970s, participants were required to request permission from local authorities on the day of worship. To this day, many people dismiss Afro-Brazilian religious symbols such as drums and colorful vestments as coisas do diabo (the devil’s things).

One of the first Catholics involved in this inter-religious effort was the late Combonian Fr. Hector Frissoti, who began his ministry by visiting the terreiros (sacred Afro-Brazilian places of worship). Frissoti published his reflections, sharing his experiences first with his own Comboni community and later with the larger Brazilian Catholic Church. The issue reached the agenda of the ninth annual meeting of Inter-Ecclesiastical Base Community Leaders in 1997, which brought together 8000 participants, including 67 bishops, in São Luiz, Maranhão. Supporters argued that inter-religious dialogue and celebrations would be more inclusive of the many Catholics who also engage in Afro-Brazilian religious practices. However, Frissoti and others involved in the outreach effort met resistance on both sides. On the one hand, the bishops feared that such contact would tarnish the image of the Catholic Church. On the other, some practitioners of Afro-Brazilian religions also opposed the discussion, largely because of their historic distrust of the church.

As Ana Rita Santiago, a Candomblé religious leader from Bahia, noted, “I am wary of a process that is limited to taking some of our symbols and simply incorporating them into the Catholic Mass.”

Despite these concerns, Frissoti’s spirit of reconciliation has had an impact in Brazil. In April 2000, during the commemorations of five hundred years of Portuguese colonization in Brazil, the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops sought public forgiveness from indigenous and black peoples for not speaking out against injustices committed against them. For Nyaki, who has followed the emerging dialogue for the last six years, this is only the beginning. “Public statements from church leaders are a step,” she said, “but we also ask that Brazilian Catholics open their hearts and minds.”

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The Mulatto Myth

Andrew J. de Groot Fernandes

Afro-Brazilian activists are struggling to change how blacks identify themselves. In a culture that uses a range of racial designations to describe hair types and skin tones, they are urging Brazilians of African descent to embrace a pan-black identity. Noting that blacks of all shades suffer similar obstacles in a white-dominated society, the campaigns attack the practice of auto-embranquecimento (self-whitening), encouraging those who classify themselves as mulato, pardo or moreno to identify as negro instead.

These efforts challenge much of the conventional scholarship on race in Brazil. From the 1930s to the 1970s, in particular, Brazilian and foreign academics argued that Afro-Brazilians of different colors experienced markedly different socioeconomic realities. Lighter-skinned blacks, they claimed, held a status intermediate between their disadvantaged darker-skinned compatriots (pretos) and more privileged whites. This situation was said to contrast with the United States, where anyone with a trace of African heritage was assigned to the dispossessed "black" group.

Thus far, the campaign to challenge these notions has met with limited success. Despite occasional bursts of unity, significant color-based cleavages continue to hinder pan-black mobilization in Brazil. Some observers cite the earlier arguments and attribute the divisions to socioeconomic gaps among blacks themselves. According to this view, better-off pardos would have little to gain from political unity with pretos. Closer examination of the country's history suggests an alternative explanation: that the weakness of Afro-Brazilian unity derives in part from elite efforts to divide and dominate the black masses, exaggerating preto and pardo divisions to undermine the threat of pan-black union.

Racial Democracy

Powerful Brazilians have long understood the benefits of disunity among blacks. Luis dos Santos Vilhena, a keen observer of late eighteenth-century Brazilian society, argued that "if African slaves are treacherous, creoles [Brazilian-born pretos] and mulatos are even more so ... if not for the rivalry between the former and the latter, all political power and social order would crumble before a servile revolt." Persistent fear of such a revolt and recognition of the usefulness (to elite dominance) of inter-black rivalries contributed to the development of a "mulatto myth" as a key component of twentieth-century Brazilian racial identity.

According to this myth, because of their phenotypic and cultural approximation to whites, pardos hold themselves jealously above darker-skinned blacks and are able to secure for themselves a special place within Brazil's racial hierarchy. The mulatto myth has been repeated so often that it may now be impossible to determine its exact origins, although the writings of Gilberto Freyre, Arthur Ramos and other Euro-Brazilian authors in the 1930s certainly lent the idea greater currency. A key moment in its acceptance was the first Afro-Brazilian Congress in 1934, the aim of which, according to Ramos, was to grant Brazilian blacks "the scientific and human vindication which could no longer be delayed." Two central ideas dominated the proceedings: greater recognition (by whites) of positive black contributions to Brazil, and modification of Brazilian attitudes toward black-white miscegenation.

Controversial as it was then, this "vindication" of blacks did not fundamentally challenge old attitudes about their proper "place" in society. Instead, it can be interpreted as a skillful effort to foster national harmony by an elite forced to abandon slavery and the dream of building a "white" society in the Americas. Like their contemporaries in other Latin American countries, Brazilian intellectuals of the early twentieth century sought to redeem their nation's image. They searched for an ideology that would boost confidence in their largely nonwhite population without disturbing the balance of power. The ingenious result was "racial democracy"—the notion that, unlike other societies founded on race-based slavery, Brazil had almost magically escaped the grip of prejudice.

The mulatto myth was a critical component of this ideology. Pardos—hitherto despised—suddenly became treasured symbols of national identity. Brazilian intellectuals pointed to them as evi-
Historical lessons for contemporary Afro-Brazilian identity

dence that, despite considerable differences, Europeans and Africans (and, less crucially by now, indigenous peoples) had blended to form a nation perfectly suited to a unique, tropical, European civilization. This world view included no proposals to improve blacks' social condition; instead, it was assumed that the liberal Luso-Brazilian attitude toward race had already brought many improvements—at least for those blacks who were light-skinned and well-behaved enough. Because of racial amalgamation and pardo mobility, Freyre argued, "perhaps in no other country is it possible to rise so quickly from one social class to another."

Mulatto women were an essential element of the myth. A cornerstone of the ideology of racial democracy was their attractiveness to white males. Supposedly possessing stronger libidos and weaker racial prejudices than other European men, Luso-Brazilian males were said to idealize mulattas as sexual partners. Even today, popular books and movies reinforce these images, as does the annual Carnaval jubilation, attracting hordes of sex-seeking tourists from Europe and elsewhere.

Miscegenation—preferably between white men and black women—thus became the prescribed route to socioeconomic ascent, condemning Afro-Brazilians to a deceptively inclusive but fiercely patriarchal, sexist and racist doctrine.

Comparative scholars from abroad embraced the mulatto myth. Over decades, it was restated and reformulated by, among others, US sociologist Donald Pierson, Swedish anthropologist Magnus Mörner, Dutch historian Harmannus Hoetink and US anthropologist Marvin Harris. In their writings, it became the critical factor for understanding differences in race relations between Brazil and the United States. Ironically, even scholars who attacked the notion of racial democracy supported the myth. In the 1970s, US historian Carl Degler published one of the most celebrated comparative works on Brazilian racial classification, in which he argued that "the presence of a separate place for the mulatto in Brazil and its absence in the United States define remarkably well the heart of the difference."

Degler maintained that Brazilian pardos were engaged in a "flight from blackness," abandoning black causes and ascending the socioeconomic hierarchy by bleaching their family lines through procreation with light-complexioned partners. Little evidence was available to support these assertions. Many authors relied for proof on the very architects of racial democracy. For instance, in *Negroes in Brazil*—which many later writers cited as a classic—Pierson noted that his chapter on pardos was "greatly indebted" to Freyre's *Sabrados e Mucambas*, one of the founding works on racial democracy.

The Historical Evidence

In reality, aside from a handful of exceptional cases, white Brazilians made few real distinctions between pardos and pretos during the nation's early history. It is true that during the slave era pardos comprised a large portion of the free colored population, but freedom was often tenuous for blacks. In many cases, the law mandated similar restrictions for all people of African descent—whether slave or free. Whatever their skin tone, free blacks were popularly referred to as escravos livres, or free slaves. The vast majority of pardos lived humble lives. Judging from the repeated complaints of observers and officials, even those born to wealthy slaveholders were routinely abandoned by their white fathers.

Left to fend for themselves in a harsh economic environment, many subsisted through risky, irregular and unrewarding toil or resorted to begging and theft. Perhaps because so many pardos were forced to live outside the law, slave-era reports regularly condemned them in harsher terms than pretos themselves. Pardos the "mulatto myth" argued that Europeans, Africans and indigenous peoples had blended to form a nation perfectly suited to a unique, tropical, European civilization.
were often denounced as immoral, lazy drunks who—unless enslaved—contributed nothing to society but a string of social ills. Alternatively, they were depicted in popular literature as presumptuous and vain, involved in ridiculous schemes to escape their cursed black blood.

In contrast to their mythical haughtiness, at least some pardos identified with pretos and dedicated themselves to black causes. Joao Fernandes Vieira and Vicente Ferreira de Paula are but two examples of pardos who led black rebellions against white dominance. Among the free pardos who played a prominent role in the struggle to end slavery was Luis Gama, who was sold into slavery by his white father. Eventually securing his freedom, Gama worked as a lawyer for escaped slaves, preaching the "right of insurrection." Other pardos active in the anti-slavery struggles included Jose do Patricio, who has been called "the heart and soul of the entire abolitionist campaign," and Andre Rebocas, whose earnings as one of Brazil's top engineers helped fund abolitionist publications and societies.

The abolition of slavery in 1888 proved a bitter disappointment, even for the Afro-Brazilians who had fought hardest to secure it. With the fall of the Brazilian monarchy the following year, the former slave-owners secured their hold on national policy making. They displayed little regard for former slaves, seeing them as incapable of an unchained existence. From the 1890s through the 1920s, certain prominent Brazilian intellectuals promoted "whitening" as the solution to the nation's perceived inferiority. They enthused that Brazil was becoming steadily whiter as the black population fell victim to its own social discord, disease and low birth rates. Through miscegenation, they argued, blacks who reproduced with lighter-skinned partners allowed "stronger" white genes to dominate in their mixed-race offspring. In part to bolster the whitening effort, Brazil's leaders actively recruited European immigrants. Until the nationalistic regime changes of the 1930s, white immigrants routinely enjoyed hiring and pay advantages over blacks with comparable skills. Whatever tenuous positions some pardos had enjoyed as free workers during the slave era were sharply undermined during this period.

Some pardos continued to fight for black dignity after abolition. Manoel Querino (1851-1923) was the first Brazilian of any color to undertake a serious study of Afro-Brazilian history. He set out to prove that blacks were essential members of Brazilian society, not only as laborers, but also as defenders and architects of national unity. Other middle-class pardos established so-called "mulatto presses," producing periodicals whose chief aim was to foster pan-black unity. Employing all-encompassing terms such as gente de cor—people of color—they protested white discrimination against blacks of all colors.

**TACKLING THE STEREOTYPES**

More scholars have begun to question the mulatto myth. As more studies are completed, it is increasingly obvious that Brazilians who classify themselves as pardo share much in economic terms with those who prefer the label preto. Studies by Brazilian and foreign researchers, including Nelson do Valle Silva, Carlos Hasenbalg, George Reid Andrews and Peggy Webster, suggest that, if anything, pardos enjoy only minimal advantages over pretos. As a group, blacks are considerably worse off than whites.

In light of these findings, many researchers have chosen to examine Brazilian racial conditions along white versus nonwhite lines. Major Brazilian institutes, including the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatisticas (equivalent to the US Census Bureau), have also opted for bimodal classifications when dealing with socioeconomic data on race. This trend supports the efforts of many Afro-Brazilian activist groups, such as the Movimento Negro Unificado, to redefine as negro "all those who possess in the color of their skins, in their faces or in their hair, features characteristic of that race."

But the task of transforming racial identity in Brazil will take more than the statistical union of pardos and pretos in textbooks and government records. An important first step is the deconstruction of the myths that scholars have helped create. Many academics in the past perceived racial classifications as the politically neutral products of cultural, demographic or historical circumstances. Afro-Brazilian activists, by contrast, are painfully aware that these definitions can be manipulated by the powerful to reinforce their positions of dominance. Equally important is the realization that racial identities can be embraced by the subjugated to strengthen their political positions. ■

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Dominicans describe race with color-coded terms ranging from coffee, chocolate, cinnamon and wheat to indio, nomenclature which avoids using mulato or negro.
Acutely aware of his own nonelite ethnic and social origins, Trujillo chose to deny his country’s Haitian and African ancestry, even resorting to lightening his own skin with cosmetic powders. Another. Racial terms are highly specific to person and place. Dominicans describe race with color-coded terms ranging from coffee, chocolate, cinnamon and wheat to indio, nomenclature which avoids using mulato or negro.

Indio is an ambiguous term, not least because the entire indigenous population of Hispaniola died or was killed within 50 years of Columbus’s arrival. Historically, the term has been used to describe brown skin color. It was not until the dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930 to 1961) that it was popularized as an official description of Dominican ethnicity. The use of indio is another instance of denial of African ancestry and rejection of Haiti. It creates a racial category that cannot claim to be white, but distances itself from blackness.

Acutely aware of his own nonelite ethnic and social origins, Trujillo chose to deny his country’s Haitian and African ancestry, even resorting to lightening his own skin with cosmetic powders. Trujillo’s grandparents were dark-skinned, but commissioned biographies declared his parentage to be ‘pure’ European and traced his bloodlines to a Spanish officer and a French marquis. The massacre of 1937, during which the Dominican military murdered over 12,000 dark-skinned Haitians and Dominicans, was part of Trujillo’s ‘lightening’ project to distance the Dominican nation from its Haitian neighbor and African heritage.

The bias toward lighter skin color in the Dominican Republic is often expressed in terms of aesthetics. Racial descriptions frequently focus on perceptions of ugliness and beauty. Job advertisements that call for employees of ‘good appearance,’ for example, may use a coded term for race. Color prejudice is often seen in Dominican banks, as well. Until recently it was rare for the public spaces of major banks to be staffed by dark-skinned cashiers. The aesthetics of racism were also evident in a study of university students who were asked if they would marry a darker-skinned partner. Fifty-five percent replied that they would not, expressing concern for the ‘corruption’ of physical appearance through ‘race mixing.’

A range of terms used in everyday speech avoid the implication of African ancestry. Trigüeño, rosadito, destenido, rubio and cenizo respectively refer to skin color as wheat-colored, rosy, faded, blond/fair and dark/ashen. These terms are regularly applied to the slightest variation of color and tend to be wholly inconsistent and variable in their usage. The latter two, rubio and cenizo, are located at opposite ends of the color spectrum, but differentiation may be slight according to the context of their usage.

Haitians and Dominicans
In contrast to this great variation of color terminology, the attitude toward Haitians, and especially their presence in the Dominican Republic, is often bluntly discriminatory. The number of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic is a highly contentious issue. Estimates vary widely; some suggest up to 1.5 million, but there are probably around 500,000 Haitians and Dominicans of recent Haitian descent in Dominican territory. The size of this population is said to have doubled in the past 10 to 15 years. Particularly since the 1920s, Haitians have migrated to work in the Dominican sugar industry and have established rural communities, often under conditions that have provoked concern among international human rights organizations. Many Haitians now work in urban areas as retailers and domestic workers or in the construction industry.

Significant numbers of Haitians stay on in the Dominican Republic after their seasonal contracts expire. Their continuing residence in the country, the indeterminate nationality of their offspring (who have neither Dominican nor Haitian citizenship) and the scale of undocumented Haitian immigration are emotive issues. Despite a history of annual labor contracts between the two countries, the Dominican military regularly deport Haitian workers, often without regard for their legal status. Proposed changes to the current migration law may remove the longstanding right to citizenship for those born in Dominican territory, further marginalizing the Haitian-Dominican population. Even those who can claim Dominican citizenship face strict documentation requirements or the threat of harassment.

Dominicans have traditionally scorned work in the cane fields, which is seen almost exclusively as Haitian labor. The rural Haitian
population is segregated physically as a racial labor enclave, and socially by racism and popular opposition to assimilation. Dominicans recognize their need for Haitians as units of labor, but condemn them to conditions of marginalization and inferiority.

Is prejudice against Haiti functional to the Dominican state? Haitian migrants provide low-cost, essentially malleable labor. It could be argued that wages are depressed and conditions worsened for Dominican workers, who then vilify the darker-skinned Haitian laborers. Even restrictions on immigration and residency, imposed by the Dominican government, deliberately place Haitian labor in a vulnerable, servile position of illegality in the context of widespread racial prejudice.

Anti-Haitian sentiment extends well beyond the workplace to common derogatory slurs on the street and in presidential campaign rhetoric. Dominican electioneering during the 1990s was a hotbed of racist politics. In the 1994 elections, defamatory campaigns against dark-skinned presidential candidate José Francisco Peña Gómez concentrated on his suspected Haitian parentage. Videos broadcast on Dominican television portrayed the late Peña Gómez as hot-headed and irrational, shouting and arguing at political meetings—connote negative stereotypes of Haitians as savage and uncivilized. The media linked him closely with vodoun, and one video showed him attending a ceremony with a Brazilian faith healer. Political opponents faxed cartoons depicting the supposed threat of Peña Gómez’s Haitian ancestry to the Dominican people to all numbers in Santo Domingo.

The potency of racism lies in its embeddedness as a perceived natural phenomenon. Dominicans often excuse their anti-Haitian sentiment as harmless, or refer to it as “common sense” traditional rivalry. Yet, although Haitians bear the brunt of Dominican aggression, dark-skinned Dominicans suffer similar racist insults or are treated as lower-status citizens, somatically sidelined from authentic dominicana
dad.

Racist ideology portrays Haitians and dark-skinned Dominicans as victims of their own racial fate; both are trapped by the color of their skin and their genetic history. Sympathy for the victim is muted by the racist argument that Haitians induce antipathy towards themselves via allegedly innate cultural practices, such as vodoun, which are incompatible with Dominican society. The concept of la raza dominicana unites Dominicans against Haitians, but when perceived in terms of race, the same idea relegates dark-skinned Dominicans to the margins of an imaginary racial heartland. La raza inclusively combines race and nation, and the prejudices of overt and inferential racism.

**MIGRATING IDENTITIES AND RACE**

The Dominican Republic has changed dramatically during the last four decades, when the end of the trujillato opened the island to external cultural and economic influences. The reality or hope of international migration has become part of many Dominicans’ lives.

The vast reach of international relations, through migration, telecommunications, travel, business links, mass media and the arts, provides an intense and frequent interchange of economic and cultural experiences. Dominican migrants share family, friends and business contacts between two or more countries, while maintaining strong social and cultural links with their country of origin. The perception and awareness of race, however, are among the few aspects yet to be transformed by transnational developments.

Dominicans living in the US face different challenges of racial and ethnic determination. Those born outside the island relate less to racialized concepts of dominicanidad as they grow up in a society that promotes more abrupt notions of black, white or Hispanic. Even the well-worn antagonism toward Haiti confronts problems of legitimacy on the streets of upper Manhattan. Several writers have suggested that the discrimination experienced by Dominicans in New York has the potential to change perceptions of race in the Dominican Republic. Yet, the very success of the Dominican regenerative experience has to some extent reproduced racial norms rather than dispelled them. Dominicans born in the United States, although less attached to the traditional, highly racialized concept of dominicanidad, continue to use terms such as indio, trigueño or rubio. In the 1990 census, only 26% of New York’s Dominicans classified themselves as black. Most listed themselves as white or ‘other.’ US society at large was not made privy to the ‘other’ category of indio.

Dominicans both in and outside of the Dominican Republic are having to constantly realreadress their attitudes toward race. The challenge of this adjustment will take time to unfold. Meanwhile, the impact of migratory experience on la raza dominicana remains uncertain.

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Since the Mexican Revolution, the Mexican government has encouraged an educational policy designed to assimilate Indians into national life. Assimilation has implied the loss of Indian identity as a condition of the process of forging Mexican national identity. For the last 20 years, however, the Mexican educational system has offered specialized teaching materials in Indian languages. These materials include free textbooks created especially for Indian children by Indian teachers, emphasizing indigenous cultural values. The textbooks are a new tool for Indian teachers to promote ethnic identity within formal institutions, contributing an added dimension to the struggle of indigenous peoples to defend and redefine their identity within the Mexican national context. They have empowered Indian teachers and promoted the use of Indian languages, changing the techniques used for Indian education.

This study is based on an analytical description of first- and second-grade textbooks in the Nahuatl language, used in the Huasteca region of Mexico (which includes portions of the states of Veracruz, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosi, Hidalgo and Querétaro) and the northern highlands of Puebla. It analyzes the discourse of texts and images to identify elements that promote ethnic and national identity among Indian children. As an institutional program, indigenous free textbooks are an element of national educational policy. The participation of indigenous teachers in their
Mexico’s indigenous free textbooks

creation suggests that Indians in Mexico are not simply engaged in a process of acculturation. Using state institutions to redefine ethnic identity, Indians participate in the mestizo world not only to be changed, but also to continue being themselves.

**Mexico’s Free Textbooks**

At the heart of the curriculum in Mexican schools are government-issued textbooks, the use of which is mandatory in all of the country’s classrooms. Free textbooks have been an element of state educational policy since a special commission to organize their production was created in 1959. The books’ content reflected a new emphasis on national unity, in contrast to the revolution’s emphasis on class struggle. In the context of education, national unity meant cultural homogeneity as the ultimate expression of *mexicanidad*. Mexico could only become a nation when every Mexican was united by a set of common values and feelings. The national free textbooks have been reviewed and changed several times. The most recent revision was in 1992, when the curriculum was reformed and special textbooks introduced for regional history and geography. Each state now has its own edition in 56 different languages. These textbooks in addition to the national surveys of these topics.

Mexico’s Indian communities have always represented a challenge to national educators. Modern educational materials for teaching Indian children in 1936, when *cartillas de alfabetización* (literacy primers) sought to teach Indian children Spanish by first making them literate in their own languages. In 1979, the First National Seminar of Bilingual-Bicultural Education in Oaxtepec, Morelos produced the idea of providing free textbooks to Indian children. The seminar was organized by the Alianza Nacional de Profesionales Indígenas Bilingües A.C. (ANPIBAC), members of which went on to work at the newly formed Dirección General de Educación Indígena (DGEI) at the Ministry of Public Education. The DGEI was incorporated as a formal branch of the ministry, replacing the former Dirección General de Educación Extraescolar en el Medio Indígena. In contrast to its predecessor, the DGEI was not relegated to extracurricular or “special” education; instead, Indian education was legally recognized as an integral part of the Mexican educational system. Through the DGEI and the Ministry of Public Education, the Indian teachers of ANPIBAC negotiated and defined the goals, means and orientation of formal Indian education. The ministry issued the first free textbooks for Indian children in 1980, and to date it has produced editions in 56 different indigenous languages. These textbooks are part of a national program and their general content is directed by a common national objective; however, they are not mere “translations” or “copies” of the national Spanish-language textbooks. In general, the indigenous free textbooks focus on content related to Indian cultures, whereas the national textbooks focus on mestizo national ideals.

**Indigenous Free Textbooks and Ethnic Identity**

Mexico’s indigenous free textbooks are saturated with cultural values. They express the way of life, beliefs and customs of Mexico’s indigenous groups. Many of these values are expressed in the way men, women and children are depicted conducting their daily life and work. Through these activities, indigenous people preserve and redefine their ethnic identity in terms of their relationships within the community and with the national society. Each gender and age group is shown performing specific tasks appropriate to Indian cultural values.

In the Indian free textbooks, these values include family, community, collective work, land, corn and knowledge. The extended family is the preferred kinship structure, and membership in it is emblematic of belonging to the wider social group. Individual life is subjected to social life and family maintenance; the failure of an individual to carry out his or her responsibilities affects the entire family nucleus.

In the books, the family and the home are strongly linked. The man is the provider and the woman is the housekeeper. Among children, too, many activities are distributed by gender, typically according to the physical space in which the children carry them out. Usually, boys perform their tasks outside the home, while girls perform them inside, although the activities may in fact be the same. The family’s equilibrium appears to reside in the relationship between it and the home. The individual, the family and the home are
Features: Mexico

integrated elements of nature, and nature is an integrated element of life. Each family member has a responsibility to fulfill in order to maintain this equilibrium.

The Nahuatl textbooks present the family as a patriarchal structure in which the man has clearly defined social functions. Women's functions are sometimes ambiguous; at times women are portrayed as advisors to their children, but this capacity is often obscured by the grandfather's role as the main transmitter of cultural values. He ensures that family members carry out their responsibilities and maintain the people's customs. The grandfather is responsible for transmitting tradition and history, whereas the mother teaches children how to behave and perform certain tasks. The mother advises only her own children, while the grandfather teaches all children in the community.

Thus, the grandfather guides the performance of tradition, the mother runs the household and the father provides food. Women give life, and men work to maintain and preserve it in a certain way. These roles are presented in the context of an overall image of the Indian as a poor, hard-working peasant, a producer and consumer of maize who from childhood on is responsible for the family's sustenance.

The poor Indian is a constant in the textbooks, in which the routine of daily activities is presented as necessary for survival. In this context, any change in women's roles could jeopardize the family and the larger community. The main value the textbooks teach is that the family is the nucleus of community and the central element in defining ethnicity. Questioning this order implies a threat to the organization of survival and Indian identity itself.

The family may be the center of survival, but it cannot exist outside the community. The two are linked through specific ways of life, language, land and commerce. The family's relationship to the community is like the individual's relationship to the family; neither can be conceived of as separate from the other. Ethnic identity is transmitted to the community through rites, ceremonies and the fulfillment of cultural values supported by the family.

Land links families and is an element of spatial and cultural belonging. Images in the textbooks of men sowing the land in the traditional manner imply possession of the knowledge needed to cultivate and harvest food, including mastering the agricultural calendar, tools, rituals and the organization of labor. Corn itself is the staple source of nourishment for Indian peoples, and is linked to identity through its production and transformation as food. In the Nahuatl textbooks, corn production is associated with male labor, whereas corn transformation is associated with female work. Maize is presented as the legacy of the ancestors and Centeotl, the god of corn. It is an element of tradition and the life cycle, providing sustenance and the reason to work. Moreover, working the family's milpa, or corn plot, requires the participation of several people. Corn thus brings individuals together in the collective responsibility to work for the survival of family and community.

Work helps define relationships among family members and between them and the community. Women relate to the family primarily through food processing and preparation, while men relate to the community through collective work and rituals. In turn, all community members are linked to each other through a common history originating in Aztec times. The textbooks express these values as traditional knowledge that is both a product of experience and a legacy passed on from generation to generation.

The textbooks present two kinds of knowledge: traditional knowledge and school knowledge. The elders are the source of the former and teachers of the latter. Teachers are portrayed as organizers and guides, with the peculiarity of being able to fail at the performance of tradition. Older men are presented as sages because they have traditional knowledge and speak the native language. Reading and writing are related only to school; these are the schoolteacher's tasks and knowledge.

When the school is involved in the relation between the individual and the community, gender- and age-based activities are modified by values ascribed only to the school. This is the only place where women are shown performing nontraditional activities, characterized as being performed outside the home, that include teaching children to read and write. The school is a kind of neutral ground where boys and girls acquire the universal student ethos.

School plays a dual role in cultural change and continuity. On the one hand, it gives Indian children opportunities that their parents did not have before. On the other hand, it teaches Indian language, history, cultural values and traditions. School also plays a role in adult gender dynamics, representing a space where men and women can change their relationship with the community and their social role within it. A woman may make tortillas at home, but she can also teach the alphabet at school.

The Indigenous Free Textbook and National Identity

The Mexican free textbook is an agent of socialization. Its contents are intended to become part of a student's values and beliefs. Topics...
included in the textbooks are set by the Ministry of Public Education and involve not only educational goals, but also the orientation of national educational policy. Because the main interest of Mexican educational policy is the promotion of nationality via the education of all citizens, learning the values included in the free textbooks is necessary for maintaining the national society. The indigenous free textbooks, therefore, are official educational tools for promoting both nationality and Indianess.

The Nahuatl free textbooks present three levels of identity: Indian, Nahuatl and Mexican. Being Indian means being poor, rural, a producer and consumer of corn, technologically unsophisticated, a hard worker responsible for the family's survival, a preserver of ethnic identity, and a possessor of values that should be preserved. Nahuatl identity is conveyed primarily through language, community and regional origin. National identity is represented by national symbols and the Mexican Constitution.

One way in which national identity is related to Nahuatl identity is through Mexico's national symbols, many of which originate in the Aztec past. The symbols represent the history of the Nahuatl people transformed into national mythology. For example, the Mexican flag, which shows an eagle standing on a cactus and devouring a serpent, borrows an image from Aztec history. Citizenship is therefore not an assigned condition, but belongs to the Nahuatl people for historic reasons. The sense one gets from the textbooks is that being Mexican does not mean living according to the values of the national society; rather, it is a state acquired naturally by virtue of history.

From a Nahuatl point of view, therefore, Mexican national symbols are not necessarily associated with schools or other state institutions. Schools in the Nahuatl textbooks are associated more with the process of learning to read and write than with a sense of nationhood. Although the official role of the Indian schools is to promote national identity, in practice they serve as a formal means of ethnic redefinition. The indigenous free textbooks do not deny national identity; rather, they promote respect for law and portray the state as an abstract authority from which Indians receive protection. The books give a sense of Indians attempting not only to be tolerated by non-Indians, but also to have their differences recognized and accepted.

**Belonging and Difference**

Can Indians be part of the nation while maintaining their unique cultures and ethnic identities? The experience of the indigenous free textbooks suggests that Indians can work within the state's institutions to influence indigenista policy-making; that is, they can live according to the rules of the mestizo while protecting Indian culture. Indian teachers have accomplished this duality by using institutionalized educational material that promotes Indian identity and culture in Indian languages.

The existence of free textbooks for Indian children in their own languages has a special meaning. It implies conscious action by Indian teachers and communities to direct the formal education of Indian youth. Indian teachers have gained an arena in formal education to promote their cultural objectives. Their role is protected by the acceptance of Indian languages as legitimate routes of learning. The textbooks are an example of Indian participation in institutions that directly pressure Indian cultures.

The presence of individuals with a recognized ethnic identity in national institutions does not necessarily mean a loss of identity; rather, it can be a strategy to achieve protection and benefits from the state. Indians in Mexico are struggling within the boundaries of the state to influence political decisions that affect their sense of identity. The indigenous free textbooks offer a world view in which the principal desire is to continue being Indian. The books teach children to preserve a way of life without questioning the status quo of either Indian or national society; even rural poverty is justified as a condition for preserving Indian culture. Nevertheless, the books themselves have made Indians participants in the national educational program. Indian teachers have defined the content of the textbooks based on their own cultural values, making the books a forum for Indians to manifest their inclusion within the Mexican nation.

The indigenous free textbooks also empower Indians to be literate in their own languages. Indians now have not only a written language, but also the means to learn it in an institutionalized framework. This situation benefits Indians as well as the state: The former gain a political forum from which they cannot be excluded, and the latter is legitimized by including Indians in its development programs.

Indians want to be recognized and respected for their cultural differences while participating actively in the modern state. In other words, they seek recognition as members of the nation and actors in the national program. After all, Mexico was founded on the land of their ancestors.

* Ileana Schmidt-Díez de León is a doctoral candidate in the Latin American Studies program at Tulane University.
Our Land

by André Légaré

On April 1, 1999, the Canadian government officially proclaimed the Nunavut Territory and government. Nunavut, an Inuktitut word which means “our land,” was carved out of the Northwest Territories to become the most recent member of the Canadian federation. It is also Canada’s largest political unit, covering one-fifth of the country’s land mass (2.1 million square km). This vast geographic area is inhabited by only 25,000 people, more than 80% of whom are Inuit.

The Nunavut territorial government enjoys the same political powers as other territorial governments in Canada. These powers and jurisdictions are similar to those held by Canadian provinces, except that the Canadian federal government owns and manages public crown lands in Nunavut, the Yukon and Northwest Territories. Like the other territories, Nunavut is a non-ethnic public jurisdiction; however, since Inuit comprise the majority population, Nunavut has become a de facto Inuit government.

BACKGROUND

The idea of creating a new political jurisdiction in Canada’s north stemmed from a proposal submitted by Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (a pan-Canadian Inuit organization) to the federal government in February 1976. The Nunavut Proposal was put forth as part of federal policy on native comprehensive land claims. The basic idea of the proposal was to create a territory with a majority Inuit population to better reflect Inuit values and perspectives than was the case in the Northwest Territories.

After 15 years of arduous negotiations between the Canadian government, the Northwest Territories and Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (an umbrella group of organizations representing the interests of the Inuit of the central and eastern Canadian Arctic), a final land claims agreement was approved by the federal government in June 1993. This agreement recognized the need to establish a new territorial government in the central and eastern Canadian Arctic, a goal realized in 1999.
The challenges of an Inuit government in Nunavut

For the Canadian government, the reasons for establishing the new territory were largely political. The measure attracted favorable media coverage and represented an opportunity to improve Canada's standing in the international community. It was also an effective means of reinforcing Canadian sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago, an issue the United States has been reluctant to recognize.

The Nunavut Territory gives the Inuit control over 353,610 square km, with mineral rights in a 36,257 square km area. Co-management agencies, equally composed of Inuit and federal government representatives, manage land resources. Federal funds in the amount of 1.15 billion Canadian dollars will be disbursed in Nunavut over a 14-year period, and the Inuit are entitled to a percentage of royalties from resource development projects.

Political Questions

Despite these gains, however, political administration of the Nunavut Territory faces important challenges. Six areas seem likely to have an impact on Nunavut's political future: (1) Inuit employment and the Nunavut public sector; (2) language policy; (3) the territory's finances; (4) traditional knowledge and Nunavut government policies; (5) coexistence between co-management agencies and government institutions; and (6) the inherent Inuit right to self-government.

Among the most pressing of these problems is Inuit representation in public sector employment. For Nunavut residents, the vast majority of whom are Inuit, to evolve a positive feeling of identity with Nunavut political institutions, it would be important for Inuit not only to control the legislative assembly (15 of the 19 members are Inuit), but also public sector administration. To reach this crucial goal it is imperative to have a representative proportion of Inuit civil servants (i.e., approximately 80% of public employees) in the territorial government.

The Nunavut Implementation Commission has predicted that the territory's public sector will employ 1200 people by January 1, 2002. Before Nunavut was established, 550 civil servants in the Northwest Territories administration lived in the Nunavut region. About half of these employees (300) were Inuit. They generally filled subordinate positions, and all were transferred to the new Nunavut government. With only 300 Inuit currently in the Nunavut public sector, is it realistic to believe that the goal of 1000 Inuit civil servants will be met in the next two years? This question is even more acute when one considers that less than 200 Inuit in Nunavut have completed a high school education and only 10 have a university degree (one of them is the Premier of Nunavut, Paul Okalik). In view of the lack of training of Inuit job candidates, those who are hired will most likely continue to occupy subordinate positions within Nunavut's administration.

A second essential challenge facing the new territory is language policy. Today, about 85% of the Inuit population in Nunavut speaks Inuktitut. However, the risk of linguistic assimilation in favor of the English language remains high, particularly among the younger Inuit generation. Already, close to half of Inuit under the age of 15 cannot speak Inuktitut. In its role as protector of Inuit culture and language, the territorial government must enact a language policy aimed at safeguarding and promoting the Inuit language in Nunavut.

A third concern facing Nunavut's political leaders is financial. Nunavut's weak tax base, the fact that its natural resources are mostly owned by the federal government, and the territory's remoteness from southern markets make it almost entirely dependent on federal funds. The annual budget of the Nunavut government was fixed at 640 million Canadian dollars, (fiscal year 2000/2001), of which $580 million will be provided by Ottawa. This economic reliance on the federal government may limit Nunavut's political autonomy.
Fourth, Nunavut's government faces the challenge of incorporating Inuit traditional knowledge into the territory's administration. The Inuit people have roots firmly anchored in the Arctic landscape and a world view that encompasses particular relationships with the natural and spirit worlds. Most Inuit, and in particular the community’s elders, believe that government laws, institutions and programs should reflect Inuit traditional knowledge. They want to see Nunavut government policies incorporate some Inuit values and customs into the decision-making process. Among Nunavut’s 10 government ministries, however, the Department of Culture, Elders and Youth, which is responsible for the implementation of a traditional knowledge policy, was allocated the lowest annual budget ($4 million). Under these circumstances, can Nunavut’s legislators be expected to formulate and enact an Inuit traditional knowledge policy?

The implementation of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement created five co-management agencies, equally composed of native and non-native representatives, have a mandate to protect the environment and manage the development of natural resources within the Nunavut settlement area. These responsibilities overlap with those of the Nunavut Department of Sustainable Development. To avoid potential conflict, it will be important to implement close cooperation between the co-management agencies and this government department.

Finally, unresolved issues remain with regard to the Inuit right to self-
government. For Ottawa, the establishment of the Nunavut Territory answers the traditional demands of Inuit leaders. The federal government argues that the Inuit of Nunavut, through their majority ratio, enjoy de facto self-government. By this logic, there is so need for official legislation regarding Inuit self-government since, for all practical purposes, this goal has already been attained. In addition, as we have seen, Ottawa has committed a considerable amount of money to create the new territory and contributes largely to its yearly budget. The federal government is not interested in investing additional sums of money to create some sort of as yet undefined Inuit self-government in Nunavut.

For Inuit leaders, however, the establishment of Nunavut has nothing to do with Inuit self-government. Without defining precisely what shape Inuit self-government would take in the context of Nunavut, Inuit are adamant on the fact that one must distinguish between a non-ethnic public government such as the one presently administering the territory and a system of Inuit self-government based on ethnicity, in which only Inuit could vote and be represented.

For now, the Inuit feel confident that, because of their demographic majority, they will control Nunavut's economic, social and political agenda. However, what would happen if in the future Inuit were to become a minority within Nunavut?

**A MODEL FOR AUTONOMY**

Nunavut's legislators must come to terms with these and other issues in the months and years ahead. Nunavut has marked nearly two years of existence, but the questions raised here remain unanswered. Nunavut will not be a panacea for the socioeconomic malaise affecting today's Inuit society; at best, the new territorial government will allow Inuit to take into their own hands their social, economic and political destinies, enabling them to better stand up to tomorrow's challenges.

The establishment of the Nunavut Territory gives the Inuit of the central and eastern Canadian Arctic a unique opportunity to create policies and institutions based on Inuit traditions and customs. The territory also gives the Inuit a greater voice within the broader Canadian agenda, especially in cases in which Canada is involved in negotiating international conventions that might affect Inuit interests. For example, Canada would be hard pressed to negotiate any international accord that could affect Inuit harvesting rights in the Arctic without prior consultations with the Nunavut government.

Finally, the regional political autonomy enjoyed by the citizens of Nunavut could inspire other Inuit groups to seek similar political powers. Like today's Greenland, Nunavut could come to symbolize a form of Inuit government arrangement within nation-states that may serve as a political model for other Inuit groups in Russia and in Alaska, as well as minority ethnic groups in other countries.

*André Légaré is completing his Ph.D. in the Department of Geography at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario.*

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**The Association for Canadian Studies in the United States**

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The Nunavut Act and Nunavut Land Claims Agreement of 1993 was the largest land claim settlement in Canadian history. Along with the Nunavut Political Accord, it marked the beginning of the development of Canada's third territory, Nunavut, officially established in April 1999. These events are remarkable not only for the quantities of land they involve and the flexibility they allow within the political organization of the Canadian federation, but also for the lessons they provide for other culturally distinct regions seeking to obtain greater political autonomy. The creation of new institutions allows for attempts to correct the biases and unpopular practices of former structures and rebuild the often negative relationship between citizens and the state. The approach toward political development in Nunavut is an example of how one federation has attempted to adapt to the diverse cultural populations within its borders.

The Nunavut Territory does not offer aboriginal self-government in strict terms, but to many observers, it adds up to de facto self-determination for the Inuit population. The Land Claim Agreement and the Political Accord, and the institutions established to ensure their implementation, must come to terms with the particular demands of political life in a northern, geographically extended region. They must also take into account Inuit cultural demands, which may conflict with the interests of other resi-

An inukshuk adorns Nunavut's landscape. These stone cairns, in the form of a human being, are built by the Inuit as landmarks on a treeless landscape. Photo: André Légaré.
Government structures in Nunavut

The flag of Nunavut features the inukshuk and the North Star.

The residents of Nunavut. The resulting tensions will dictate much of the future success of the territorial government and of Nunavut itself.

Assigning Jurisdiction

Situated in the eastern portion of Canada's north, Nunavut represents approximately 20% of Canada's land mass and 60% of the former Northwest Territories. It contains two-thirds of Canada's coastline and four time zones (although only three are used). These vast reaches are home to less than 30,000 inhabitants, more than 80% of whom are Inuit. The territory is defined by three regions—Qikiqtaaluk-Baffin (east and north), Kivalliq-Keewatin (south and central, near Hudson Bay) and Kitikmeot (central and western)—which in turn contain 28 communities. The largest of these is the capital, Iqaluit, with a population of 4,500. Due to the large proportion of Inuit inhabitants, Inuktitut is one of the official languages of the new territory, along with English and French.

According to the 1996 Canadian census, the rate of population growth in Nunavut far outstrips that of the Northwest Territories and the rest of Canada. At the same time, education levels are significantly lower. Well over half the Nunavut population is under 25 and lacks a high school diploma. High levels of unemployment and demand for services for younger people were a persistent obstacle to development in the Yellowknife-centered Northwest Territories. Such demographic demands, in addition to the geographic expanse of the region and the cultural particularity of the Inuit, dictated many of the provisions of the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement, which covers Inuit title to land, and the Nunavut Act, which establishes the structure of government in the new territory.

The structure of the Nunavut government does not differ significantly from that of the Yukon and Northwest Territories, and constitutionally the division of power is similar. This resemblance is not surprising, given that the Nunavut Act was modeled on the Northwest Territories Act. Despite the resemblance, however, Nunavut, by virtue of its origins as a land claims settlement, occupies a unique place in the Canadian federation. Through the Land Claims Agreement, Nunavut gained decision-making capacity in areas of jurisdiction normally reserved for the federal government.

Ottawa began to heed demands for self determination and develop strategies for dealing with the vast distances within the Northwest Territories in the 1970s. Efforts to address the issues of aboriginal land titles and cultural and linguistic protection for the Inuit sparked an interest in resolving the land disputes in the area. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement was the product of decades of negotiations. Among other provisions, it recognized Inuit title to approximately 350,000 square km of land and earmarked close to US$1.5 billion in federal money for the area over a period of 14 years. It also granted the Inuit royalties from oil, gas and mineral development on Crown land, hunting and fishing rights, and a role in environmental protection. The deal acknowledged the goal of greater participation of Inuit
firms in the Nunavut economy and the need for training and education of Inuit peoples, as well as hiring practices that would reflect the majority Inuit proportion of the population. In exchange, the Inuit signed away future claims to rights and title on the land.

The Land Claims Agreement, which contains limited provisions for the future political development of the territory, was created in conjunction with the Nunavut Act, a political accord which governs all individuals within the boundaries of Nunavut, not just the Inuit. In addition to the goal of proportional representation within the civil service, the Nunavut Act included representation for the Inuit, territorial and federal governments in institutions dealing with federal jurisdiction in the territories.

The legislation further provided for the creation of two bodies, the Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) and a remodeled Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI). Granted the power to make by-laws and temporarily in charge of the Nunavut Consolidated Revenue Fund, the NIC eased the transition phase between the political agreement and the first elected government. The NTI has a slightly different mission; a private corporation designed to ensure that the land claims agreement is carried out in a manner that best represents the interests of the Inuit, it attempts to protect community principles of self-reliance and cultural and social well-being. The distinction between the NIC and NTI is between a public body and an ethnic one, mirroring the distinction between the political accord and the land claims agreement.

**Political Provisions**

Under the Nunavut Act, the territory maintains control over matters that relate to the working of the legislature, the licensing and importing of intoxicants, local and municipal matters, direct taxation, language, hospitals, land, property and agriculture, and justice (both civil and criminal), including courts and prisons. The territory is not permitted to restrict the rights of First Nations peoples or Inuit with respect to hunting or trapping. Nothing within the act is to be interpreted as granting the legislature greater powers than those provided in the Canadian Constitution.

By virtue of its role as a territory and former shared jurisdiction with the Northwest Territories, Nunavut displays a considerable overlap of institutions. Some bodies, such as the Water Management Board, contain members from both territories. In other cases, membership is shared among three different territories. For example, members of the Supreme Court of the Yukon and Northwest Territories are automatically members of the Nunavut Supreme Court. There is also a degree of overlap with the Canadian government. The Auditor General of Canada, for example, is also the Auditor General of Nunavut. But it is the way in which the areas of jurisdiction and limitations have been interpreted in Nunavut that stands as a testament to the NIC’s efforts to respond to the cultural and geographic demands of the territory. A new, "single-level trial court system" will affect the administration and dispensing of justice in the territory. The government also boasts streamlined structures that eliminate the regional councils of education and Board of Health.

These structural influences co-exist within the broader political culture of the north. The current Nunavut legislature, and its previous incarnation as the Northwest Territories legislature, are the only assemblies without political parties.
Candidates run as independents, a fact with significant ramifications not only for cost and ease of campaigning, but also for the degree of consensus exercised in the daily working culture of the assembly. During the campaign, one of the candidates for premier, Goo Arlooktoo, complained that the lack of political parties made it difficult to distinguish political preferences among candidates. According to the Northwest Territories government, the consensus form of government is closer to traditional aboriginal ways of arriving at decisions. It was in this institutional and cultural context that Nunavut voters elected their new government.

Residents of Nunavut have been to the polls frequently in the last 10 years. Voting has decided three plebiscites on the Land Claims Agreement, the offer of twinned constituencies to ensure gender parity, and the location of the territory's capital. Elections in February 1999 selected the 19 members of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly. Voter turnout was 88%, and the choice was between 71 candidates, 11 of whom were women. The redrawing of electoral boundaries in the neighboring Northwest Territories, a formal apology for past injustices from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and plans to ensure a continued market for the seal hunt were among the political issues raised during the campaign. Following the election, the members of the legislative assembly (18 men and one woman) elected Paul Okalik as premier.

The new government has 10 departments that address issues ranging from sustainable development to culture, language, elders and youth. Seven men, including the premier, share the burden of these portfolios. In an effort to adapt to the needs of a vast and diverse territory, departments and agencies of the government will be established throughout Nunavut in addition to occupying offices in Iqaluit. In accordance with the principles of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, NTI, Arctic College, the Department of Indian Affairs and the government of the Northwest Territories have all been involved in training personnel for the demands of government and business in the new territory.

CHALLENGES AHEAD

In its first report, entitled Footprints in New Snow, the NIC highlighted some of the issues facing the people of Nunavut. While reiterating the goals that the new government and its civil service be representative and cost efficient while maintaining the territory's cultural distinctiveness, the report noted that popular expectations—whether unrealistically high or low—could damage the ability of the new legislature to perform effectively.

Many key issues involve the geographic and cultural particularity of the new territory. Voters and candidates in the 1999 elections identified the high unemployment rate, economic regeneration and opportunities for youth as particular areas of concern. Poor housing and service infrastructure, a cost of living one and a half times higher than in Canada's southern provinces, and high levels of suicide and substance abuse are also worthy of special attention. At the local level, complaints about poor sidewalks and litter in Iqaluit co-exist with concern over the centralization of power in Rankin Inlet and the capital. Other issues presented themselves after the election. New commissioner Helen Maksagak, for example, pledged in her throne speech to make Nunavut a single time zone.

Among the major areas of concern, and one highlighted consistently by the NTI, is protection of the cornerstones of Inuit identity: culture and language. Recent data from Statistics Canada show that almost half of the population has engaged in what are broadly defined as traditional activities, but that most of this involvement is limited to hunting. Twenty-three percent report some participation in traditional crafts, and only 7.6% in trapping. In addition, one-quarter of Nunavut's population speaks English at home. In an effort to strengthen the indigenous language's place in society, the legislative assembly voted to conduct much of the government's work in Inuktut.

Self-determination and political autonomy are powerful goals and popular phrases. Asymmetrical federations such as Spain and recent constitutional developments in Great Britain highlight the efforts being made in many parts of the world to ensure that political institutions are responsive to the populations closest to them. These examples not only suggest that the goal of political renewal is a popular one, but that culturally or ethnically distinct populations are able to gain greater control over their political destinies than regions lacking markers of distinction. By attempting to create political institutions more responsive to the needs of its Inuit residents, the government of Nunavut must balance the cultural needs of the majority while meeting the political needs of all residents. The ability to navigate this dual mandate will determine much of the future success of Nunavut.

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San Miguel Huaixtita is a mountain village in the Sierra Madre Occidental, in the northern part of the Mexican state of Jalisco. It has a population of approximately 710 Huichol Indians. The village has no electricity, advertising, billboards, newspapers or even full-length mirrors. Inside and out, the walls of the houses are usually left blank; ordinary decorations, such as calendars and photographs, are rare. The same is true of the village’s schools and kaliguey, or holy places, which are unadorned by images. The only Western images San Miguel Huaixtita’s residents see are the illustrations in children’s school books, photographs brought by the occasional visitor, or the labels on the few packaged goods for sale in the village store.

What happens to the act of seeing in a community where there are no images? Do people look at each other differently? What is the relationship between the a-iconic glance and the universe that surrounds the Huichol?

These were some of the questions I hoped to answer in San Miguel Huaixtita. The following photos are the product of a research project undertaken at the Tatusi Maxakwaxi (Our Grandfather Deer Tail) secondary school. The school’s 100 students were each given a disposable camera with enough film to take 27 pictures. They were briefly instructed in the use of the camera, including such tips as the importance of keeping the lens clean and not pointing directly at the sun.

After one week, the film was developed and returned to the students. Some participated in one-on-one interviews in which they were asked to classify and comment on a selection of photographs. Their responses, along with observations made during the author’s extended stay in the community, yield some clues about how the Huichol of San Miguel Huaixtita view each other and the world.

As a form of communication, images reflect trends in contemporary society. We live in the era of the close-up, a point of view that privileges the human face. In Western culture, the face has become the locus of all drama. This emphasis has produced a certain stereotyping of emotional expression, a sentimentalism and an aesthetic in which images manipulate our moods. In contrast, the Huichol photographs are rarely close-ups. They contain a wealth of minute and varied detail. Their austere poses and panoramic views allow us to see complete worlds instead of being made to feel subjective impressions.

Another way in which the Huichol photographs differ from Western images is in the use they make of the horizon. Western culture has compressed its line of vision, influenced largely by the optical illusions and images broadcast on television. Does this new perspective—up close, without a horizon or depth of field—imply an impoverishment of our vision? Feliciano, a Huichol teacher, offered this opinion: “The Huichol have eagle eyes....Eagles are clever and shrewd; they see everything in panorama.”

Unlike Western amateur photographers, the Huichol photographers do not generally use people or objects as their central vantage points. Instead, the camera is adjusted so that people or animals are integrated into the landscape. They may appear to the left or to the right of the center so as not to obscure a house, mountain or stone that forms part of the backdrop. Just as in oral communication, signs are not separated from their origins. Whereas written and electronic forms of communication send us spinning across space and time, the Huichol photographs represent an instance in which the body and the voice—or in this case, the body and the eye—come together to produce a harmonious whole.

The discovery of a symbolic relationship between indigenous peoples and the land should come as no surprise. For centuries, land and the question of its ownership have been the most important factors in the survival of indigenous communities. Conflicts over land have produced violent clashes between Indians, Europeans and mestizos. The disputes have their root in differing concepts of the relationship between nature and culture. For Westerners, nature and culture are separate and exist in opposition to each other; for the Huichol, the two depend on one another.

The Western world’s image-based culture has produced a pathology of perception. In the words of
The act of seeing in a Huichol community

Paul Virilio, “sight is no longer the possibility of seeing, but the impossibility of not seeing.” Among the Huichol, this syndrome is known as nierikarriya, a state in which a person loses the ability to see and believes in a false image of him- or herself. Comparing the worlds of image and vision allows us to glimpse the intersection of different cultural constructs. To do so, we must adopt a critical theory of vision that stands apart from the trend toward globalization and cultural homogenization, emphasizing instead the diversity of visual subjectivities and the points at which glances converge and diverge. ■

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Among Mexican indigenous peoples, the Huichol have one of the lowest rates of Spanish-language proficiency. Twenty-five percent of Huichol speak their own language exclusively. Most also practice other religions besides Christianity. Only 48% of Huichol claim to be Christians, compared to 91% of other Mexican indigenous groups. The community of San Miguel Huaixtita is organized around traditional authorities and religious rituals.
The photographs in the sample reveal a special handling of the concept of space and the human form within the pictures' boundaries. Most of the photos are taken straight on, with almost no close-ups (two out of 2700). The photos make a special effort to show context; in both poses and action shots, the subjects are shown in the midst of their surroundings. The focus shifts to the left or to the right as needed to accommodate a complete image.

When posing subjects in front of their homes, the photographers take care to include the building in its entirety and afford a view of the background scenery. The camera may be pointed upwards to capture mountains in the distance, or subjects are posed at the intersection of walls or fences to take in both sides of the landscape.

When the photographers are inside a dwelling, they open a window to get a view of the outside. If they are outside, they open doors to get a glimpse inside the house.
The posed photographs depict the subject straight on, with the arms at the sides and a serious expression or slight smile. The formal pose is far from the wide grins characteristic of Western media and advertisements.

Most subjects are posed standing or seated on stones or the bare earth. It is no coincidence that this image—with its far more relaxed pose—is of the only mestizo child in the community. The boy’s father, who works as a bricklayer in coastal Nayarit, sent his son to live with relatives in San Miguel Huautita.

The subject almost always gazes directly into the camera. The larger sample of photos reveals some exceptions: Men wearing mestizo clothing often place their hands in their pockets.
Most shots are posed outdoors. The Huichol attach great importance to context and surroundings, which usually take precedence over the action in the foreground.

The human form is always presented as a whole, never fragmented or shot in close-up. "I don't like bits of skirt and pieces of feet," commented one young man. Huichol textiles and handcrafts follow the same convention, except for those that depict the faces of the gods. "This is the way you see the deer, with peyote, only its face," said local resident Daniel Castro, describing a wool panel he designed. The implication is that only the gods appear without form; human beings must always inhabit a body.

The geographical context, forms of economic activity and oral methods of communication all play a part in the messages conveyed by the photographs. This shot shows the setting for San Miguel Huaiexxtita, 2200 meters above sea level in the Sierra Madre Occidental.
The camera is adjusted to integrate people and animals into their surroundings. The resulting image has more weight than the subject itself, who may be posed to the left or right so as not to obscure the landscape.

For the Huichol, nature and culture are a continuum; what affects one affects the other. The community's ancestors are the gods of the earth. Natural phenomena depend on humans and their relationship with these gods. This may explain the care with which the Huichol photographers frame subjects in their surroundings.
Memory and Identity

by Marian Goslinga

At a conference last year at Florida International University, noted Chilean author and human rights activist Marjorie Agosín discussed the concept of memory in the works of Latin American women writers. Agosín pointed out that in the fiction of many of the region’s female authors, the ability to remember the past creates a sense of engagement and continuity. Their works are characterized by a sense that past experience—no matter how traumatic—should be preserved with the same veneration awarded the present. As examples of this contemporary trend, she cited Claribel Alegría (El Salvador) and Elena Poniatowska (Mexico).

In the case of Caribbean women writers, the concept of "memory" is invigorated, to a certain extent, by the issue of race. In all four major language areas of the region—English, Spanish, French and Dutch—women use memory, whether collective or individual, to trace and return to the past in search of their true identity. They go back to the era of slavery, the legacy of an African homeland, and the invisible scars of displacement, captivity and exile to tell their story. Race is a powerful ingredient that is frequently reflected in the use of Creole as the language of choice. Indeed, race and language have become close allies in the quest for cultural identity in the Caribbean.

The Search for Roots

In the first half of the twentieth century, a group of African and
The works of Maryse Condé

Within the context of the complex and traumatic West Indian heritage of slavery, colonization and assimilation, Condé’s fictional characters search for an identity which reflects that of a larger community.

Caribbean students in Paris developed the theory of Négritude. At the core of this theory was the exaltation of an African cultural identity long repressed and despised in the West Indies, where the assumption of white superiority over black was a basic tenet of the institution of slavery. A key proponent of Négritude was Aimé Césaire, a French Caribbean author from Martinique. His seminal 1939 text, Cahier d’un retour au pays natal (Return to My Native Land), gave poetic form to the yearning for reconciliation with ancestral Africa. This searing text became the cornerstone of modern Francophone West Indian literature, and Césaire’s theme of black cultural exile was embraced by writers from all parts of the Caribbean. Within just a few decades, however, critics challenged the privileged position which Césaire accorded to Africa in his works—a step intended as a corrective to Europe’s dismissal of African civilization—on the grounds that it encouraged West Indians to bypass their own countries in their quest for spiritual roots. In 1958, another French Caribbean academic, Edouard Glissant, proposed the concept of Antillanité instead. This theory offered another interpretation of cultural identity, one more attuned to geographical reality and historical truth. Viewing the recovery of African identity as a practical impossibility due to the intervening, alienating centuries of slavery, Glissant preferred to focus his attention not on a distant, imagined continent but on the real country of his birth, Martinique. Instead of an emotional affiliation with Africa, Antillanité sought to incorporate the history of the despised institution of slavery and all its accompanying evils.

Antillanité did not repudiate Négritude; instead, it adapted and adjusted it to conform to Caribbean reality. For Glissant, the real issue became one of authentica­tion rather than denial. In founding the journal Acouma in the early 1970s, he initiated a forum for lively psychological and socioeconomic debate about the new doctrine and its implications for the French Caribbean.

CARIBBEAN COMPLEXITIES

The cultural transition from Négritude to Antillanité can perhaps be traced most clearly in the works of Maryse Condé, an author from Guadeloupe who is one of the Caribbean’s most prolific and complex writers. As a black Caribbean woman novelist, Condé not only highlights the tensions in Caribbean culture between traditional and modern values, but also those existing among ethnic groups and between the sexes. She combines a representative view of a Caribbean writer’s specific concerns with a postmodern view of literature as multicultural, polymorphous intersection. For Condé, the concept of memory—-an integral part of Antillanité—is of the utmost importance as she carefully weaves together personal experiences and meticulous historical documentation to develop plot and style in her fiction. Within the context of the complex and traumatic West Indian heritage of slavery, colonization and assimilation, her fictional characters search for an identity which reflects that of a larger community. From the perspective of a black woman in a geographically, culturally and politically marginal world, Condé self-consciously attempts to represent the interrelated issues of race, gender and class.

Condé’s works may be divided into three distinct stages that chronicle her trajectory from Négritude to Antillanité. In the first stage of her writing, the influence of the former clearly dominates. References to Africa are everywhere, and the return to the past is the main source of inspiration. In Herémakhonon (which ironically means “welcome home”
in Malinke), and Une saison à Rihata (A Season in Rihata), Veronica and Marie-Hélène, the female protagonists (both from Guadeloupe), search for their African roots. Veronica seeks in Africa an elusive sense of belonging, but finds instead a continent torn by violence, ambition, opportunism and lost hope. Marie-Hélène, married to Zek and living in the sleepy African town of Rihata with their six daughters, becomes involved in a variety of intrigues, corruption and power struggles. Mirroring the antinomies of their colonial backgrounds, neither is able to define a role for herself on African soil or break free from a Western frame of reference.

The quest for the African past is also the main focus of Séguo (Segou), the two-volume saga of the mythical eighteenth-century Bambara empire. In this award-winning bestseller, Condé recreates a high civilization in a precolonial Africa that practiced slavery well before the Europeans and had extensive contacts with the Christian and Islamic worlds.

After Séguo, Condé entered the second stage of her writing by resolutely turning to the Americas and the African diaspora. Moi, Tituba, sorcière noire de Salem (I, Tituba, Black Witch of Salem), is the first in a series of fictional works set in the New World. The action takes place in the seventeenth century, in the puritanical society of colonial America and the sugarcane plantations of Barbados. The novel's female protagonist, Tituba, tells the story of her escape from colonial and patriarchal forces. Condé uses this first-person narrative to rewrite the history of the Caribbean from a woman-centered point of view.

In La vie scélérée (The Tree of Life), Condé goes a step further and returns to Guadeloupe where, as she has stated in interviews, she comes to terms with her quest and finds peace with herself. In this stage of her development, she becomes convinced that being black is no longer a historical appendage but an ideological construct. In a critique of Négritude, she writes, "The black man does not exist. A Europe anxious to legitimize its exploitation created him." La vie scélérée, based on the "memories" of Condé's own family, is a multicultural narrative which explores the historical and cultural significance of race, gender and class relationships in different parts of the Americas—Panama, the United States, Jamaica, Haiti—and France. Using "memory" against the backdrop of the slave-like conditions of the building of the Panama canal, Condé raises unrelenting questions of exile, estrangement from the motherland, relations to "others" in the diaspora and to whites, and a return to roots.

In what is perhaps her most celebrated novel, Traversée de la mangrove (Crossing the Mangrove), Condé presents the reader with another vision of her native Guadeloupe, marking the third stage of her quest for a separate identity and the culmination of her affiliation with Antillanité. Set at a wake, the novel explores the diverse voices of the community and suggests the impossibility of retrieving a collective "memory." The mysterious figure of the dead man and the solemn backdrop of the wake provide Condé with the crucial tools to formalize the quest for identity within a typical Caribbean framework.

In La colonie du nouveau monde, published in 1993, Condé returns to the same themes—African heritage, the destructive consequences of colonialism, the concept of alienation—and other aspects that keep the Caribbean locked in a discrete space. In a review of the novel by Bettina Anna Soestwohner, Condé is quoted as saying that her definition of creativity is to wander—both in terms of geography and the exploration of cultural and historical heritage.

**Peripheral Voices**

Marjorie Agosín has argued that women writers are often on the front line of efforts to better women's lives in Latin America. Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in the French Caribbean, where the island of Guadeloupe alone has produced such authors as Maryse Condé and Simone Schwarz-Bart. Given their unique perspectives on questions of race, class, gender and geography, Caribbean women authors can provide invaluable insights into the evolution of a sense of separate identity in a historically peripheral region. The documentation of a controversial and illusionary multidisciplinary concept such as "identity" is rife with contradictions and has not, as yet, been successfully completed for the Caribbean.

Resources are especially scarce when it comes to the Caribbean and women—both subjects traditionally neglected in US academic circles.

Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and Caribbean bibliographer at Florida International University. This article was first presented at the 1999 Seminar on the Acquisition of Latin American Materials (SALAM) in Nashville, Tennessee.
International Trade Negotiation Skills Course

JANUARY 29-FEBRUARY 9, 2001

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS CENTER
Latin American and Caribbean Center

in association with
Centro de Estudios de Integración Económica y Comercio Internacional

The International Trade Negotiation Skills Course, organized by the Summit of the Americas Center at Florida International University and the Centro de Estudios de Integración Económica y Comercio Internacional of Buenos Aires, Argentina, will take place from January 29-February 9, 2001 in Miami, Florida.

The two-phase practical program is taught in Spanish over an intense two-week period. The first week will be an orientation to the theoretical and practical themes involved in multilateral negotiations, with special emphasis on the current Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) hemispheric trade negotiation process. During the second week, course attendees will participate in practical role-playing negotiation exercises based on a real multilateral trade case from the hemisphere.

This course was created in response to the need for greater understanding and better management of the process of hemispheric economic integration. It is designed for official government negotiators from the region, for business and private sector individuals who will be affected by this process, and for academics and other professionals interested in regional integration and international negotiations.

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