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The Temptation to Intervene

Richard Millett

Abraham Lowenthal of the Inter-American Dialogue once suggested that United States policy toward Latin America could be summed up in two popular slogans: Arpege’s “promise them anything,” and Hallmark’s “when you care enough to send the very best.” By the latter, Lowenthal was referring to our repeated tendency to dispatch the Marines and/or other elements of our armed forces to Latin America, ostensibly to promote the region’s own best interests.

The temptation to use military force, directly or indirectly, in an effort to resolve our problems in the Western Hemisphere has afflicted most 20th century presidents. Theodore Roosevelt used military force to reoccupy Cuba and to secure Panama’s separation from Colombia. Taft sent the Marines to Nicaragua. Wilson occupied Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and sent troops to Cuba, Panama, and twice into Mexico. Coolidge launched the second US occupation of Nicaragua and embroiled the Marines in a prolonged guerrilla struggle with the forces of General Augusto César Sandino.

Beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, the United States regularly promised to end the use of military intervention, but these promises have been honored more in their breach than in their observance.

FDR himself used the threat of overwhelming military force to promote the ouster of Cuban dictator Gerardo Machado. Truman considered sending troops into Colombia during the 1948 Bogotá riots, but wisely refrained from such action. Eisenhower turned to proxy forces supported by the CIA to oust the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. Kennedy used the threat of force to pressure the Trujillo family out of the Dominican Republic, launched an unsuccessful exile invasion of Cuba, and barely avoided armed intervention in Haiti. Lyndon Johnson sent the military into the Dominican Republic and dispatched naval units to the coast of Brazil to encourage a military coup in that nation. Nixon preferred a covert style in operations as demonstrated in his promotion of the 1973 coup in Chile. Carter actually opposed military intervention, although he did lobby for the dispatch of OAS force to Nicaragua. Reagan suffered from no such inhibitions, intervening in Grenada, promoting the Contra war in Nicaragua, and sending massive military aid to El Salvador. Bush invaded Panama and Clinton, of course, sent US troops into Haiti.

What is perhaps most notable about this dreary list is that direct, unilateral intervention has become increasingly unpalatable and recent presidents have increasingly turned to thinly veiled covert operations or have sought multilateral support for US operations. Enthusiasm for any prolonged military presence has also waned, especially in Congress, which has frequently sought to place limits on the use of military force. The American public also seems increasingly disenchanted with military intervention as an instrument of foreign policy, especially since the unhappy outcome of US involvement in Somalia. There may now be even less enthusiasm for multilateral interventions than for unilateral operations, a tone reflected in the policy pronouncements of some congressional leaders.

One factor in this may be the pervasive power of television, what Ambassador Clovis Maksoud of The American University has described as the “CNNization of the world.” The defects and dangers of military operations are graphically presented in a way that overwhelms any abstract arguments as to their potential long range benefits. Combined with this is the impact of the Cold War’s end. Interventions were justified for decades as being necessary to combat some international menace to US security. Today, such menaces seem largely absent from the hemisphere. President Bush invoked fear of narcotics trafficking as a justification for invading Panama, but the failure of that operation to produce any impact on America’s domestic drug problem has undermined future use of that rationale.

The military is also less than enthusiastic about such operations. Fearing involvement in unpopular and prolonged missions and viewing the Western Hemisphere as a minor area in their global responsibilities, the overwhelming majority of senior commanders do whatever they can do to discourage the political leadership from direct interventions. While searching for new missions in the post-Cold War world, most officers remain unconvinced that...
Old habits die hard

nation-building in small, poor countries is a desirable one.
Like many contemporary issues, military intervention produces much stronger negative than positive reactions. Critics find it easy to organize opposition, elicit public fears and, often, set the terms of the public policy debate. Apprehensive over offending any major ethnic or other pressure group, most politicians hesitate to call for the use of military force, preferring to let the potential onus for any such decisions fall on the executive branch.

Despite such inhibitions, the temptation to intervene endures. While fearing negative public reactions to the use of force, most presidents are equally concerned about appearing unable to respond to upheavals in what is still widely perceived as America’s backyard. While most recognize that Latin Americans have both the right and the capacity to manage their own affairs, the emotional force of American paternalism has not disappeared. Many on the right still see Latin America as a mixture of Desi Arnaz, Carmen Miranda, and assorted baseball players, emotionally unstable and in need of US tutelage, by force if necessary, in order to handle their own affairs. On the left, opposition to intervention is stronger, but can almost disappear in situations where past US policies are cited as the cause of current oppression. Haiti provided a clear example of the capacity of guilt to overcome much of the opposition to intervention.

Despite growing criticism over the results of such operations, Haiti is unlikely to be the last armed US intervention. Force remains a ready alternative to frustrated leaders, especially when measures such as economic sanctions fail to produce the desired results. Indeed, reliance on such measures, which are deceptively easy to initiate, but are rarely successful and can be abandoned only at considerable political cost, may actually increase the chances of an ultimate resort to force. The refrain of Tom Lehrer’s satirical song from the 1960s, “when in doubt, send the Marines,” remains an apt expression of the temptation to intervene.

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As the Rio Grande Wanes

Aaron Segal

The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has resulted in an impressive increase in trade between Mexico and the US. New jobs are being generated—in the US, primarily in high technology exports; in Mexico, mainly in assembly plants and services—reflecting the fact that at the onset of NAFTA, average Mexican tariffs had come down to a level slightly below those of the US. At the same time, jobs, mostly of the unskilled and semi-skilled variety, are being lost on both sides of the border because labor is a significant portion of total production cost.

NAFTA, however, opens banking, insurance, trucking, and other highly protected sectors in Mexico for the first time. Responding to these new opportunities, US firms are making new investments, mergers, and acquisitions. A few Mexican companies, like Vidrios de Monterrey, have invested in the US to acquire technology and sales networks.

The risks from NAFTA are much greater in Mexico than in the US, yet no significant opposition has emerged. Mexican trade agreements with Central and South America have brought few concrete benefits. Mexican trade with Japan consists largely of selling petroleum for manufactured products, and trade with the European Community follows a similar pattern.

Mexico’s long-term challenge is to provide employment for the one million citizens who join the workforce each year, most of whom have less than a fourth grade education. Currently, 18-25 year-olds suffer from massive unemployment and underemployment. NAFTA is regarded by many Mexicans as the only option for generating investment, technology transfers, and jobs.

Although immigrants may be friends and relatives, Mexican-Americans of all social strata are increasingly supportive of tough border policing.

NAFTA reverses the historic relationship between the US and Mexico while creating what economist Sidney Weintraub calls a “marriage of convenience.” What NAFTA portends for relations between Mexicans and Mexican-Americans has yet to be examined.

The key issue dividing Mexicans and Mexican-Americans will continue to be migration. Both Mexico City and Washington agreed in advance to exclude it from the NAFTA negotiations, but NAFTA is likely to increase Mexican expectations and awareness of wage and job opportunities in the US. Meanwhile, immigration from Mexico is changing in response to a decade of economic stagnation at home and an American economy which continues to grow at a modest pace. Undocumented and legal Mexican immigrants are more and more reuniting their families with the intention of staying in the US. The practice of young Mexican men entering the US as temporary workers and sending substantial remittances to their families across the border is declining.

Emigration to the US is important to Mexico as an escape hatch for an estimated five per cent of the total Mexican labor force. It also accounts for well over one billion dollars a year in remittances, much of it to distressed rural areas. Even with NAFTA’s increased trade, Mexico has no alternative to these US jobs and dollars. Scholars of Mexican immigration argue that Mexican immigrants fill low-wage jobs which few Americans consider accepting. They also cite the hardships endured by Mexican immigrants as further proof that they are filling a vacuum in the US economy.

Mexican-Americans, especially in the border areas, view legal and undocumented immigrants as direct competitors for scarce and low-paying unskilled jobs in construction, farm labor, and the service sector. Although immigrants may be friends and relatives, Mexican-Americans of all social strata are increasingly supportive of tough border policing measures. Social mobility among low-income Mexican-Americans is so slow that they are bound to regard new immigrants as an economic threat.

There are few good ideas about what to do in regard to immigra-
What integration means for Mexicans and Mexican-Americans

tion from Mexico. The proponents of temporary Mexican migrant worker schemes along the lines of the 1942-54 Bracero Agreement face intense anti-immigration sentiment in the US and deep ambivalence in Mexico. The European Community and the Japanese have experienced temporary guest-worker programs and have found that preventing these guest workers from staying is extremely difficult. Measures to tighten US border controls and require US identity cards as a condition of obtaining employment are expensive, cumbersome to enforce, and unlikely to be effective.

Environmental problems along the US-Mexico border are building up as another important and divisive issue. In spite of commitments made by the NAFTA add-on agreements, i.e., the establishment of a bilateral environmental commission, little is likely to be accomplished. Mexico lacks the public funds, trained staff, and political will to tackle the immense problems on its side of the border. These problems worsen on a daily basis as poor migrants from the interior pour into Mexico’s border cities. Mexican officials give the highest priority to the more expensive and complex water, air pollution, sewage, and other environmental problems of Mexico City.

The population on the US side of the border lacks political clout in Washington and state capitals. Though public spending on environmental clean-ups could boost the border economies, the money is more likely to be a trickle than a flood. The prospects are slim for cross-border coalitions of poor people who are the most hurt by burgeoning environmental crises.

There are scores of other issues—from monetary policy and exchange rates to civil aviation and tourism—but none impact on relations between Mexicans and Mexican-Americans like the environment and immigration. Like everything else, attitudes of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans are changing. Mexicans increasingly view their northerly compatriots as a potential consumer market and political ally. Mexican-Americans are beginning to take pride in an industrialized, urban Mexico which values its culture, as opposed to feeling sadness for a land of poverty, repression, and injustice. By accelerating contact of all kinds, NAFTA accelerates these attitudinal changes.

**PROPOSITION 187**

Ballot initiative 187’s overwhelming victory in the November 1994 California elections was also a shocking defeat for the de facto coalition of Mexican-American organizations and the Mexican government. Fierce statements by Mexican officials, organized demonstrations in Mexico, vivid coverage of the bitter campaign in the Mexican media, and mass rallies by Hispanic high school students failed to produce a high Mexican-American voter turnout. Large numbers of them did not register to vote or stayed at home. Those who did vote evinced support for Proposition 187, which would deny non-emergency social services to persons found to be in the US illegally.

While US courts adjudicate the constitutionality of Proposition 187, the Mexican government of Ernesto Zedillo is also being challenged on its own immigration laws and practices, which fall most heavily on Guatemalan and Salvadoran illegals. Meanwhile there appears to be insufficient political support in Florida or Texas—two other states with high immigrant populations—to introduce 187-type initiatives.

**Hemisphere’s reportage on Mexico continues with...**

Jennifer L. McCoy
E lecting Ernesto page 20

Kathleen Logan
Juan’s Light page 24
Press coverage of Latin America has been notoriously poor in the twentieth century. For decades the US media condescendingly portrayed the region through stereotypes. News of crises dominated. While the information revolution, the end of the Cold War, and the December 1994 Summit of the Americas have not changed the quality of that coverage, there has been a change in its focus. Less driven by crisis, today's coverage of the region has entered the new era of drug news.

The US press's short-sighted view of Latin America has not changed much. Many newspaper editors still feel that the region is not worthy of serious press coverage.

Contrary to FDR's wishes, US investors were in no mood to share anything with Latin America. In a letter to Josephus Daniels, then US ambassador to Mexico, Wall Street pundit Bernard Baruch voiced the investors' concern. "I think we ought to help the poor peons of Mexico," Baruch wrote, "but I am sure that the taking away of the American markets by the sweated labor of the Nazi and Fascist countries will destroy the labor standards in this country."

It is unlikely that Baruch's unkind reference to the people of Mexico—had journalists been aware of it—would have made it into the newspapers. The US press in those days was largely oblivious, if not contemptuous, of anything or anybody south of the border. In fact, the press was often the source of negative publicity surrounding Latin America.

The Press and the Summit

Over five decades, the US press's short-sighted view of Latin America has not changed much. Many newspaper editors still feel that the region is not worthy of serious press coverage. The Summit of the Americas held in Miami (December 9-11, 1994) is a case in point. Of the 5,000 journalists covering the event, only a few were from the US; and while that handful included the entire White House press corps, few major newspapers mentioned the event. Moreover, none of the television networks made a serious effort to cover the Summit. Brit Hume of ABC News, for example, broadcast from the Summit’s International Media Center and reported about events in Bosnia. It is not surprising then, that there are as many myths, stereotypes, and half-truths about Latin America in the pages of US newspapers today, as there were four, six, even eight decades ago.

Of course, one could argue that, historically, the US press has tended to ignore Latin America. Unable to understand and unwilling to learn about the complex tapestry of peoples, cultures, and character that make up the Americas, the US press has often resorted to the stereotype, the catchy phrase, or superficial analysis of events in the region.

US newspaper reportage of the other Americas has always had a sensationalist slant. Until a decade ago, the region's earthquakes, floods, and revolutions were the

standard news fare that readers got from the US press. Crisis news, as these stories are called, featured colorful descriptions of the region's poverty, its unhealthy living conditions, or its tendency to civil unrest. More current coverage dwells on the war on drugs, cocaine, and drug trafficking. Regardless, this type of news coverage has the unfortunate tendency to reinforce stereotypes that readers hold about the region.

Small and less developed nations have always received the worst coverage. Editorial cartoons portrayed them as unruly children being suffered by a tolerant and always benevolent Uncle Sam. Central American countries were often referred to as "banana republics" and their leaders as "tin horn dictators." Panama was depicted as a barefoot, mischievous, and heedless child playing with a can of gasoline, ever ready to start a fire. Nicaragua was the gun-toting baby whose cries kept Uncle Sam awake at night.

Though more distant, South America did not fare any better at the hands (or typewriters) of US journalists. Brazil was the place where European and North American villains sought sanctuary. Argentina was a Nazi haven. Bolivia was the amusing little country with two capitals and more attempted coups than years of independence.

**From Crisis to Drugs**
Past and present coverage of Bolivia highlights the brief and superficial nature of US news. Its revolutionary history is rarely mentioned anymore and crisis news is the exception rather than the rule, but the new trends are no better than those they replaced.

An analysis of news stories in *The Atlanta Constitution, The Boston Globe, The Chicago Tribune, the Christian Science Monitor, the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal* suggests that US journalists and their editors have become more aware of Bolivia. While mentions of the country were scarce ten years ago, the analysis shows that Bolivia made the papers on 427 occasions between January 1989 and June 1994 in news stories, editorials, features, or in some other context. The number of appearances places Bolivia ahead of Uruguay, Ecuador, and Paraguay and behind Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela in the US news. If newspaper editors employed demographic criteria, such as population size, to report on a country, Bolivia would be reasonably represented by these numbers.

In fact, editors' criteria for what is news defy quick and easy explanations. Important markets, politics, or issues that directly affect the US stimulate interest in varying degrees. Geographic proximity is important too. Mexico (a major trading partner of the US) made the headlines 8,837 times, more often than any other Latin American country. NAFTA and Chiapas, which have caused a great deal of concern in Washington, are undoubtedly reflected in these numbers. El Salvador and Guatemala were mentioned 2,750 and 694 times respectively, largely as a result of the insurgencies and the unfolding peace processes in both countries. The Haitian crisis, followed by the stampede of refugees to Florida's shores, got Haiti into the press 2,087 times.

The recent increase in coverage of Bolivia can be explained by the US obsession with the war on drugs in source countries. Of the 427 news stories that mentioned Bolivia, 42 percent were about the production and trafficking of cocaine. In roughly half of those stories, the focus was on the effects of cocaine on crime, the economy, and corruption in the US, rather than on Bolivia itself. Each article elaborated, sometimes at length, on the role of Bolivia and its neighbors in producing and distributing cocaine, and on the devastating effects of the drug on US society. Even when the story reported on harmless aspects of the coca leaf, such as its use in the innocuous beverage known as "mate de coca," journalists found a way to work in comments on the dangers of cocaine addiction.

To be sure, Bolivia's connection with drugs is overdone in the US press. Of the 2,200 news stories about Colombia published in the aforementioned eight papers, 40 percent were on cocaine trafficking and production, while only 20 percent of the 1,450 stories about Peru were on the same topic. Yet both of these countries play a greater role in the production, transportation and sale of cocaine than Bolivia does. Bolivia is now the second largest producer of cocaine hydrochloride but has fallen to third place (behind Colombia) in the production of coca leaf.

The overstated connection between Bolivia and drugs is not limited to the papers surveyed above. A quick review of the *Miami Herald*'s 1989-1993 database reveals that drugs and Bolivia appear in 16 percent of the paper's news stories;
drugs and Colombia appear in 14 percent of the news stories; and drugs and Peru appear in only eight percent of the news stories. These trends suggest that when editors assign reporters to write a story on Bolivia, the topic of drugs is implicitly included. Similarly, when the story is about drugs, editors call for an inclusion of Bolivia as one of the principal sources. Either way, the repeated connection of Bolivia with drugs is certain to affect US public opinion.

Who reports on Bolivia and on what topic is also a source of concern. The newspapers mentioning Bolivia most often are *The New York Times*, followed by the *Los Angeles Times*, *The Washington Post*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*. At the bottom of the list are *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Chicago Tribune*, *The Boston Globe*, and *The Atlanta Constitution*. Of these *The Washington Post* published the greatest proportion of stories (70 percent) connecting Bolivia with drugs, followed by *The Boston Globe* (58 percent) and *The Atlanta Constitution* (45 percent). *The Wall Street Journal* linked Bolivia and drugs in only eight percent of its stories. On the other hand, 24 percent of *The New York Times* stories on Bolivia were on politics, while 31 percent of the *Journal’s* were about the economy.

The switch from crisis news to drug news in the reporting practices of US newspapers has several implications for Bolivia and other Latin American countries. As sources of crisis news, these countries were peripheral to US interests and security; as such, they received little attention. Political instability and violence were largely a source of amusement to US readers. As the source of a drug that affects the daily lives of US citizens and their institutions, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru have emerged onto a new and more ominous ground.
Local Boy Makes Good

Maria Teresa Romero

Following an exhaustive purge of the voter rolls, the period for declaring candidacy for the upcoming Peruvian presidential elections ended with a bang. Of the 27 preliminary groups aspiring to take part in the race, twelve were eliminated. The remaining fifteen will square off in the April 9 elections.

The most notable of the excluded parties was Agrupación Siglo XXI, headed by Susana Higuchi, the estranged wife of the incumbent President Alberto Fujimori. Her candidacy was disqualified because she allegedly could not present the requisite number of signatures needed to register her political organization with the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE). Ms. Higuchi appealed the JNE's decision and threatened to organize protest marches all over Peru, but the JNE left her out of the presidential race, and avoided ruling on the legality of her candidacy.

Of the twelve eligible parties, the presidential race is likely to come down to two candidates: President Fujimori of Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría, and the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Movimiento Unión por el Perú. The power of the incumbency has allowed Fujimori, particularly since he began exercising extraordinary executive powers on April 5, 1992, to mount a re-election campaign touting his two major achievements—the economic recovery and the pacification of the country—both of which have encouraged Peruvians to believe that they are headed for a period of some tranquility.

Favoring Javier Pérez de Cuéllar is the generally negative view (held by 60% of the poorest sectors, according to one poll) of official economic adjustment policies, and, to a lesser extent, the perception that the government is not democratic. Pérez de Cuéllar has spent much of his time searching for solutions to poverty, attacking Fujimori's authoritarianism, and advocating decentralization of power.

Toledo seeks to replicate the Fujimori phenomenon.

One other candidate complicates the strategies of the two front runners, muddying the electoral waters. This is Alejandro Toledo Manrique, who heads País Posible, a group of technocrats and entrepreneurs that could fill the political center. "El Cholo" Toledo, as he is popularly known in Peru, entered the competition in a surprising and even suspicious way: unable to come up with enough signatures to make the first cut, he was subsequently drafted by the Coordinadora Democrática de José Barba Caballero, a party that was already registered, to be its presidential candidate. This turn of events stirred rumors that Toledo's candidacy was nothing more than a Fujimori strategy to erode support for Pérez de Cuéllar, whose campaign is the only real challenge to Fujimori.

This interpretation, which has been pushed mainly by Pérez de Cuéllar supporters, is viewed skeptically by many Peruvian political analysts, who see Toledo's candidacy as a threat to Fujimori. Certainly, the political profile of Toledo competes more with Fujimori than with Pérez de Cuéllar. Alejandro Toledo Manrique came from humble origins, but managed to get work and study abroad. A graduate of the University of San Francisco with some postgraduate work at Stanford (although his academic credentials are in some question) Toledo held important posts in international organizations and was a consultant to several governments. In other words, he is the "poor 'cholo' who triumphed abroad." Moreover, he is a young man who is not linked to the political parties and who employs a populist rhetoric in his speeches calling for free education for the poor, better jobs and wages, and decentralization of the state. In short, Toledo seeks to replicate the Fujimori phenomenon.

It is doubtful that Toledo can win the election. Among other factors reducing his chances, he is not well known outside of Lima, and does not have sufficient resources to adequately finance his campaign. However, he could place third in a way that would threaten both Fujimori and Pérez de Cuéllar. A late 1994 poll gave Toledo a 61% favorable rating among Lima residents, where elections are usually decided. Regardless of the outcome, "el Cholo" Toledo adds some spice to the electoral scene in Peru, and has forced each of the twelve candidates to specify the content and message of their programs and proposals.

Maria Teresa Romero is a freelance journalist and teaches international relations at the Universidad Central de Venezuela.
Balseros in Limbo

Carmelo Mesa-Lago

Approximately every 15 years Fidel Castro opens the island’s gates and allows thousands of desperate Cubans to emigrate to the United States: 5,000 from the Port of Camarioca in 1965, 125,000 from Mariel in 1980, and more than 32,000 from Cojimar and many other shores between August and September of 1994. Prior to the latest exodus, Cubans were granted parolee status as political refugees and became eligible for permanent US residence after two years. Clinton dramatically changed the previous policies and interned the emigrants in military camps at Guantanamo Naval Base and in Panama. Only 3 percent of the emigrants in two US camps, having successfully reached American shores, were thereby eligible for parole.

Another important difference is that, in the two previous exoduses, emigrants were picked up in Cuba by Cuban-Americans who had sailed from US shores. In 1994, the emigrants fled in rudimentary rafts (balseras) risking their lives in the Straits of Florida. Ironically, the most heroic emigrants were not rewarded with freedom and entry into the land of honey but imprisoned in detention camps under terrible conditions. The demographic features of these different waves of emigrants diverged as well: balseros were overwhelmingly male (81% of the total) and young (86% under 40 years old). Hence the majority is composed of those who were born and raised under the revolution, a clear indication of the failure of socialism and the alienation of the youth. The 1994 exodus is also important because it took place under the devastating economic crisis that has afflicted Cuba in the 1990s, and followed the massive anti-government riots in Havana which occurred on August 5—the first under the Revolution. Because of these precarious political-economic conditions, it was initially feared that the balsero exodus would surpass all previous records.

In a TV presentation on August 11, Castro rejected any possible negotiations on the exodus unless the US embargo was lifted.

Finally, Cuba’s emigration wave occurred at the worst time for President Clinton and the city of Miami. Popular support for the president was at its lowest ebb, and he was in the midst of preparing a reluctant Congress for an invasion of Haiti. In the November elections, the Democratic governor of Florida faced a powerful challenge from Republican Jeb Bush, who has close ties to the conservative sectors of Miami’s Cuban community. The city of Miami was counting on the December Summit of the Americas, attended by all democratically elected heads of state in the hemisphere, to help erase the adverse effects caused by crime on the lucrative tourist industry. These factors shaped US and Cuban positions vis-a-vis the exodus, the negotiations, the bilateral agreement, and its aftermath.

CASTRO OPENS THE GATES AGAIN

In a shrewd political manipulation, an enraged Castro addressed Cuba on national TV (also broadcast by CNN) and blamed the US for the Havana riots. He accused the US government of backing a “subversive plan” to promote chaos in the island. Tools of that plan were the “blockade” (an economic embargo imposed in 1961, and tightened in 1982 and 1992) and the reduction in legal visas granted to Cubans (the 1984 migration agreement, signed during the Reagan administration, stipulated a maximum of 20,000 annual visas), while stimulating illegal departures and hijackings of vessels.

Figures supplied by Cuba and the US Immigration and Naturalization Service show that, in 1990, 83% of arrivals had legal visas (2,274) while 17% (466) were illegal; such proportions shifted to 31% legal (1,873) and 69% (4,169) illegal in 1993. Between June 4 and August 25, thirteen Cuban vessels were seized by desperate Cubans and taken to the United States; 41 died when their vessel was sunk by gunfire from Cuban coast guards, and two Cuban officers also died in the hijackings. Castro threatened to remove all obstacles to migration
unless the US stopped encouraging illegal departures. He did precisely that, and the number of balseros climbed from 156 on August 13 to a peak of 3,253 on the 23rd. In a TV presentation on August 11, Castro rejected any possible negotiations on the exodus unless the US embargo was lifted.

**Clinton Counters**

Clinton charged that the causes of both the riot and the exodus were Castro's disastrous economic policies combined with the lack of democracy, political freedoms, and human rights. He pledged that Castro would not dictate US immigration policy. US immigration officials argued that the 20,000 visas were not a mandatory quota but a maximum, and that the low number of visas actually granted was due to the fact that few Cuban-Americans requested them for their relatives. Clinton ordered the US Coast Guard to detain any vessel departing from or returning to US shores with Cubans, and set severe sanctions for the violators; both actions effectively impeded another Mariel-type exodus. He also ordered that all rafters be intercepted by the US Coast Guard and taken to Guantánamo detention camps or other “safe havens” (eventually Panama); those detained would never be allowed to enter the US, unless they went back to Cuba and applied for a visa there.

This measure provoked strong opposition from Cuban exiles who claimed that Clinton was penalizing the victims instead of Castro. The president met with the governor of Florida, Miami officials and Jorge Mas Canosa, the chairperson of the powerful Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF). Mas advised Clinton to be tough with Castro: ban all dollar remittances and trips to and from Cuba by exiles and their relatives, and impose a naval blockade of the island. Except for the blockade, Clinton followed that advice, and increased Radio Martí transmissions to Cuba. The day the number of rafters peaked, Leon Panetta declared that the blockade option was under consideration. There were rumors that the Summit would be moved from Miami to Washington DC, and any Clinton initiative on Haiti was paralyzed.

The conversations were held in New York from September 1-9 in the midst of significant polarization. Conservative groups of Cuban exiles (but not the CANF) demonstrated against the talks and in support of the embargo, and demanded a naval blockade of the island. Conversely, the US liberal press, top Democrat congresspersons, a few groups of Cuban exiles, and Cuba's Catholic bishops along with some dissident groups requested the embargo either be lifted or included as an issue in the negotiations. There were a few surprises: Bernard Aronson, President Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and conservative columnist William Buckley joined the second group.

The US team, led by Michael Skol, offered to effectively grant 20,000 visas annually (a key point in Castro's criticism) but Ricardo Alarcón, head of the Cuban team, demanded 100,000. Alarcón also pushed for both the US embargo
and Clinton's economic sanctions to be included in the talks, but he was rebuffed by Skol. The Cuban chief negotiator then reduced his demand to 28,000 visas and US recognition that the embargo was a major cause of the exodus, but none of these requests was granted. With no immediate settlement in sight, Alarcón flew back to Havana for what was predicted would be several days of consultations with Castro. Surprisingly, he returned to New York in less than 24 hours and signed the agreement on September 9.

According to the bilateral agreement, Cuba would take effective measures, using mainly "persuasive methods," to stop "unsafe departures." The US, in turn, agreed to impede entrance to (a) rafters already in or going to camps outside the US (who would then have to return to Cuba in order to apply for a US visa); and (b) emigrants who depart through other "irregular" (illegal) ways. In addition, the US would grant a minimum of 20,000 visas to Cubans without relatives in the US, plus an additional number of visas to those with immediate relatives or who were currently on waiting lists. Both countries agreed to cooperate to prevent illegal migration and hijacking of vessels, and to arrange a return for the voluntary return of balseros.

The Cuban government effectively halted the exodus, which declined from 1,000 on September 11 to zero in four days. The US enacted rules on October 12 for granting visas to five categories of Cubans. They included broader definitions of political refugees or eligibility for family reunification, and a lottery for those who do not qualify for other categories.

**Balseros: The Big Losers**

The awful conditions in Guantánamo's camps have been confirmed by the Catholic Church, human rights organizations, Cuban exiles, and the news media. The camps are surrounded by barbed wire (although the MPs do not carry guns); many of the detained children are sick; there is no running water in some camps and what water is available is always warm; and the migrants are crowded in tents with dirt floors, dusty and lacking in privacy. Worse than the physical conditions is the sense of impotence and loss of hope. By mid-October, some 1,000 Cubans had expressed a desire to return and about 50 had done so. Thousands escaped briefly and a couple died in the attempt. These conditions led to severe criticism and protests from the migrants and many groups outside, particularly Cuban-Americans. Conditions in the Panamanian camps were considerably improved; nonetheless, a riot and escape attempts resulted in some casualties.

To improve conditions in Guantánamo, an ombudsman (a Cuban-American) was appointed, and a timetable for specific improvements was publicized. Several of those measures materialized but the ombudsman stepped down after three months on the job. Clinton eventually yielded (at least partially) to the pressure and criticism and announced that unaccompanied children, those over 70 years of age, and the chronically sick would be granted admission to the United States. These three groups represented less than 1 percent of the total migrants in the camps, but this step raised hope that the door might be open for others to be freed.

The impact of the exodus on both the government and people of the United States and Cuba is summarized in the inset. Clinton was able to stop the exodus and get political support at home but at the cost of significant ethical and political concessions. Castro scored some important political points (US support to impede illegal departures and hijackings), but suffered economically and got additional sanctions. He also lost face by settling for considerably less than he initially demanded (including the lifting of the embargo). US taxpayers paid the cost of rescues at sea and will foot the bill for the detention camps and forthcoming legal immigrants. The balseros were the big losers; they risked their lives only to end up in detention camps under awful living conditions. A trickle of Cubans will be lucky to leave their tragic island with US visas in the future, but the overwhelming majority will be worse off than before the exodus due to Clinton's economic sanctions.

**Lingering Problems**

The agreement touches sensitive issues and leaves some points unanswered. The US hopes that Cubans who try to escape through "irregular" ways will be "persuaded" not to leave and treated in a humane manner. What is the US going to do if Castro uses force and incarcerates the violators?

Yielding to pressure, Clinton has already infringed on the agreement by freeing some of the rafters detained in Guantánamo's camps and he has promised Cuban exiles that other groups will be allowed to enter the US in the future. Such a breach could provide an incentive for Cubans to leave illegally (as detention in Guantánamo would cease to be a deterrent) or provide Castro with an excuse to suspend
the agreement and open the gates for another wave of emigration. On the other hand, if the bulk of rafters is maintained in detention in Guantánamo, an increasing number of them will ask to return home, and the likelihood of riots will increase. The Cuban government has already said it cannot re-absorb all the detainees, and has reserved the right to authorize each case individually. Those who manage to return will have neither a house nor a job, and the government or zealous militants might treat them harshly: actions which would provoke irritation and protests in the US.

The US has enacted regulations for the implementation of the agreement and created new and broader categories of eligible Cubans (including a lottery) for immigration visas; the US Interest Section in Havana has also increased its personnel. Despite these facilitations, the minimum quota of 20,000 annual visas might not be met, giving Castro a chance to charge the US with violating the agreement.

If the economic deterioration continues and other riots or hijackings occur, Castro might open the safety valve again to export the discontent and divert attention from domestic trouble. It is true that he would pay a costly economic price for another exodus, but he might extract additional political concessions. In spite of his weakness, the aging autocrat is remarkably resilient and the 1994 exodus may not be the last, unless the regime is overthrown and the direction of the migratory wave is reversed.

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This article is a partial version of a much larger work in progress. The author acknowledges the valuable aid of Francisco Santeiro.

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IMPACT OF THE EXODUS ON THE UNITED STATES

Positive for the government. Clinton reacted firmly and ultimately stopped the exodus, freeing him to occupy Haiti. He successfully supported Governor Lawton Chiles’ (D-FL) November re-election bid and avoided moving the Summit to Washington. Neither Latin American heads of state nor Cuban-Americans created problems during the Summit. Clinton did not reverse economic sanctions against Castro, and rejected a discussion on non-migration issues (e.g. the embargo). His policies were approved by a majority of the American people (including many in Florida) who are increasingly opposed to illegal immigration. Clinton also got the support of the conservative and powerful CANF.

Negative for the government. In spite of Clinton’s claim that Castro wouldn’t dictate immigration policy, he ended up doing so. The naval blockade of Cuba was threatened and then swiftly withdrawn. Clinton stopped treating rafters as heroes, and joined Castro to stop them from leaving. He also began prosecuting hijackers. He yielded to Castro’s request for increased legal immigration. He became the target of human rights groups inside and outside Cuba for sending balseros to Guantánamo and collaborating with Castro. Cubans in Panamanian camps have rioted, and those in Guantánamo are a risk for rebellion and showcase of discontent.

Positive for US taxpayers. Residents of Miami and Florida avoided massive, rapid, and unscreened immigration similar to that of Mariel.

Negative for US taxpayers. Inflow of future legal immigrants will increase pressure on Florida’s crowded schools and hospitals. After a period of federal aid, the state and the city of Miami will have to keep immigrants who are neither self-supporting nor have relatives. Taxpayers will continue to finance camps in Guantánamo and other safe havens.

IMPACT OF THE EXODUS ON CUBA

Positive for the government. Castro shifted world attention from the economic crisis and political riots in Havana to the US embargo as the cause of the exodus. He forced the US to change a 28-year-old Cuban immigration policy and support him in repressing illegal departures and hijacking. He opened a safety valve for 31,500 malcontents and will expand it by at least 20,000 legal migrants annually. He divided the exile community on two issues: the admission of rafters into the US and the question of US-Cuban talks.

Negative for the government. The US embargo is still on and new sanctions are causing economic and political damage, at least temporarily. The crisis also harmed tourism and investment. Castro and Alarcón drastically reduced initial demands and settled for considerably less, e.g., 20,000 instead of 100,000 visas, no lifting of Clinton’s sanctions, and no discussion of the embargo. The Revolution’s image was further damaged by the spectacle of 31,500 people, mostly young, leaving Cuba regardless of enormous risks (revealing that, in spite of dire conditions, detention in Guantánamo was preferable to staying in Cuba).

Positive for Cuban population. 31,500 were able to leave Cuba and at least 20,000 more should receive legal visas annually in the future, with broader definitions of who is eligible for political refugee status, a visa, or for family unification.

Negative for Cuban population. Many rafters died at sea; those who survived are detained in camps in Guantánamo and Panama, and can’t apply for entry to the US, but must return to Cuba and apply for a legal visa there. The 28-year-old policy of special treatment that allowed refugees to enter the US and become residents was terminated. Cubans on the island lost remittances and visits from exiled relatives. Rafters’ wives and children left behind in Cuba are in a worse situation than before the exodus.
Moving Beyond Personalism

Orlando J. Pérez

On May 8, 1994, Panamanians elected a new president, two vice presidents, 71 legislators, 511 community representatives, and 67 mayors. For Panama, these elections constituted an important step toward building a democratic system of government. They were the first in the history of Panama to be held under a political context promoting free and competitive elections.

Panama's structure of government and its political party system offer obstacles to the development and consolidation of pluralistic institutions. The nation still operates under the 1972 Constitution, reformed in 1978 and 1983, which was the product and instrument of the military regimes. To bring the Constitution more in line with the needs of a democratic government, a set of reforms was submitted to the electorate in 1992. Eventually defeated at the polls, the package included a prohibition on the raising of an army; revisions to the electoral procedures for members of Congress; increased autonomy for the Electoral Tribunal; and curbs on the power of the Controller General. Consequently, there has been a growing movement to convene a Constituent Assembly to draft an entirely new document. While this may ultimately occur, the 1994 elections took place under the existing charter. The Constitution requires only a simple plurality for election as president. With seven candidates, this allowed the candidate with a third of the votes to win.

The political context may be conducive to free and competitive elections, but the weakness of the political party system is an obstacle to democratic consolidation. Political parties in Panama represent narrow economic interests rather than broad popular sectors. Given the unrepresentative nature of political parties, political competition revolves around personalities.

The Constitution requires that all candidates for the Legislative Assembly be on a list of approved parties. In districts having only one legislator, a simple plurality is enough to win, but in others, such as metropolitan Panama City, which elects several legislators, the final result is based on a complicated formula involving party lists and modified proportional representation. The result is virtually to guarantee a divided Assembly in which the party that wins the executive has a minority in the legislature. The Constitution was designed to inhibit the independence of all branches of government, leaving the military and its party allies as the ultimate moderating powers.

But with the elimination of the military, there is no final arbiter, so the system is characterized by gridlock, partisanship, and instability. The ability of the new government to reduce these tendencies will determine if the 1994 elections were an opportunity, or an opportunity lost. Moreover, this administration will be responsible for managing the transfer of the Panama Canal and the military bases from the United States to Panama. Most Panamanians recognize that their success or failure in dealing with this will play a determinant role in shaping the nation's economic and political future.

**The Electoral Tribunal**

The institution empowered by the Constitution to set up the electoral process is the Electoral Tribunal. The Tribunal is composed of three magistrates, one appointed by the Executive, one by the Supreme Court, and a third by the National Legislative Assembly. Members serve 10-year terms, and are charged with regulating the activities of political parties and candidates. They set up the timetable for the registration of political parties, candidates, and voters. The Tribunal was also given authority over the Fuerza Pública (the police force) six days before the elections and up to the official proclamation of the President-Elect.

The voting process was organized around five ballots: one for president and vice president, one for the legislature, one for mayor, one for community representative, and one for councilmen (only a few districts elect councilmen). The Electoral Tribunal has the authority to appoint all electoral corporations for the purpose of counting the votes. At the polling place, each "mesa" is organized with three officials. From each individual polling place the ballots are then distributed to the various Counting Boards. The National Counting Board counts the votes for president and vice president. The Legislative District ("Circuito") Counting Board counts the votes for the legislature.

Orlando J. Pérez is visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Kansas at Lawrence.
Panama inches toward electoral democracy

The District Counting Board is responsible for the votes for mayor, and the Community Counting Board does the same for Councilmen and Community representative.

Parties and Alliances

Twenty-two political parties initially requested legal recognition from the Electoral Tribunal in order to participate in the 1994 elections. The Electoral Code requires those who want to register as political parties to present 18,500 signatures to the Tribunal. By the beginning of the electoral process in November of 1993, the Tribunal had recognized 16 of them as political parties (see inset). The law requires each party to receive at least five percent of the valid votes for president, legislator, or community representative in order to survive as a legal political entity.

Of these, only the Revolutionary Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Authentic Liberal, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Republican Nationalist Movement, and the Nationalist Popular Party had previously been involved in an electoral process. The Arnulfista Party had participated before but under a different name and leadership.

Panamanian law allows political parties to form alliances in order to contest national elections. In fact, Panamanian electoral politics have traditionally been structured around such alliances. Seldom have these electoral alliances, however, been constructed on the basis of political ideology or even programmatic agreement. The contestation of the election and the partition of power afterwards have been the raison d'être of Panamanian electoral alliances. The 1994 elections were no exception. Four such alliances were formed for the 1994 elections (see inset).

The Campaign

During the first few months after the official opening of campaign season (November 8, 1993), the concern of most political parties was to find a presidential candidate and to build a viable electoral alliance. According to the electoral code, parties had until February 8, 1994 to nominate candidates. It therefore became vital for all alliances to be settled by that date.

The official campaign began on February 8, 1994. Both Change '94 and the Democratic Alliance (representing candidates who had served in the Endara government and had vigorously opposed the Noriega regime) attempted to re-play the 1989 elections—that elections were a choice between a return to the militarist past or the consolidation of a democratic system. Groups that had been involved in the National Civic Crusade made much of the links between Pérez Balladares and the Noriega regime and, until the very last, attempted to build a “Grand Civilian Alliance” to defeat the PRD (Revolutionary Democratic Party). Those efforts failed partly because of the intransigence of the various actors involved in those negotiations, and partly because the “civilian vs. militarist” dichotomy no longer mobilized the electorate. The voters were more concerned with their immediate problems of unemployment and poverty. Labels and attacks that had succeeded in 1989 in the midst of an economic crisis and a repressive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1994 Political Parties</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arnulfista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentic Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Renewal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrinaire Panamenista Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Mission of Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Popular Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Renovation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papa Egoró</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1994 Electoral Alliances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United People's Alliance:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnulfista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentic Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change '94:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalist Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Renewal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Renovation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Concertation Alliance:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Mission of Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The remaining parties did not participate in formal alliances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION

While the post-invasion government has made significant progress toward institutionalizing a democratic regime, many problems remain. The 1994 elections may well be the most important in the nation's history. That they were free, honest and peaceful, and not subject to significant degrees of foreign influence, represents a step forward in the nation's evolution towards a more democratic state and society. At the same time, the continuation of social fragmentation and high levels of public cynicism cloud prospects for the new government. In some ways, Panama's problems pale when compared to those of such nearby states as Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, or even Colombia. But, in another sense, historical patterns of behavior and beliefs could deal away Panama's best hopes for a prosperous and peaceful future; this should be the subject of concern inside and outside Panama.

TABLE 1: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ernesto Pérez Balladares (United People's Alliance)</td>
<td>355,307</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mireya de Gruber (Democratic Alliance)</td>
<td>310,372</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubén Blades (Papa Egoró)</td>
<td>182,405</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubén Carles (Change '94)</td>
<td>171,192</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Vallarino (Christian Democrat)</td>
<td>25,476</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel L. Galindo (National Concertation Alliance)</td>
<td>18,424</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José S. Muñoz (Doctrinaire Panamanian Party)</td>
<td>3,668</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** ....................................................................................................................1,066,844 100.0

Source: Electoral Tribunal

TABLE 2: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RESULTS BY POLITICAL PARTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnulfista</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papa Egoró</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI IRENA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentic Liberal</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Renewal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Liberal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrat</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORENA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** ....................................................................................................................72

Source: Electoral Tribunal
Numbers may vary as legal challenges are resolved by the Electoral Tribunal.
DANCE, MYTH, AND RITUAL: THE AMERICAS

AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CELEBRATING THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONGRESS ON RESEARCH IN DANCE

November 2-5, 1995

Hosted by

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New World School of the Arts
Miami, Florida

INDAMI
Intercultural Dance and Music Institute
Florida International University

The conference will bring together artists, educators, and scholars who will address dance, myth, and ritual from a variety of perspectives, including anthropology, sociology, history, literature, ethnomusicology, popular culture, gender studies, aesthetics, and criticism.

Keynote Speakers Include:

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Allegra Fuller-Snyder, Professor Emeritus and Director, Graduate Program in Dance Ethnology, UCLA, Director of “Bayaniha,” an award-winning documentary on Filipino dance.

JoAnn Kealihonohomoku, Executive Director of Cross-Cultural Dance Resources, dance anthropologist, and author of numerous publications on Pacific, Native and African American dance cultures.

Rex Nettleford, Full Professor, University of the West Indies, Artistic Director of National Dance Theatre Company of Jamaica, author of Dance Jamaica, Roots and Rhythms.

Sally Price, Social Anthropologist, author of Primitive Art in Civilized Places, Caribbean Contours.

Edith Turner, Professor of Anthropology, University of Virginia, author of The Spirit and the Drum, Experiencing Ritual.

For more information, contact:

Dr. Andrea Mantell-Seidel, Director or Suzanne T. Duncan, Program Coordinator
Intercultural Dance and Music Institute • Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199
(305) 348-2894/FAX (305) 348-3593
Insider briefs on people and institutions shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Drugs and Kisses
While it all appeared to be hugs and kisses at the Summit of the Americas, the drug issue still divides the United States and Latin America. Weeks before the Summit, the US tried to get Andean delegations to sign a controversial 40 page addendum (to the Plan of Action) on anti-narcotics strategy. When faced with the prospect of a hotly contested Summit agenda, Washington pulled back and agreed to the watered down anti-narcotics declaration released on December 11. Bolivian sources claim that Washington wanted to condition trade agreements in progress with anti-narcotics initiatives.

Cuba Looks Down Under
On October 10, Spanish news services reported that Australia’s Western Mining Corporation will invest approximately US$500 million in a joint enterprise with Cuba’s Commercial Caribbean Nickel S.A. to prospect, explore, and exploit nickel deposits in Cuba’s Oriente province. The Australian firm will have a 65% share in the project versus Cuba’s 35%. The joint enterprise expects to explore and exploit the Pinares del Mayari region, where it is estimated that 37% of the world’s nickel reserves are located. This is the second such deal signed by the Cubans; in June the Compañía General de Niquel S.A. and the Sherritt Incorporated signed a similar agreement.

Huizenga on the Move
Long before renting videos became popular in the United States, Latin Americans were spending their weekends in front of VCRs. This Latin American preference will now enjoy a more competitive atmosphere. According to a report in the Miami Herald (October 11, 1994), Blockbuster Entertainment Group, owned by Viacom, licensed Video Chile S.A. to open 75 video outlets in Argentina in 1995. According to Ramón Martín Busitill, the move was prompted by Blockbuster’s success in Chile and Venezuela and the potential video market in Argentina.

Sorry Charlie
Colombia is again attempting to decipher free market messages from the United States. Pressure from US flower distributors led the US Department of Commerce to levy a 22.7% tariff on cut flowers from Colombia. Colombian tuna was recently excluded from the US market because that country’s fishermen are not doing enough to prevent the killing of dolphins. In 1992, similar restrictions were imposed only to be lifted a year later. According to the Colombian Chamber of Fisheries, the US should develop norms that are not based on “false ecological criteria that only shelter US economic interests.”

War of the Pacific, Part II
Bolivians and Chileans appear to be re-fighting the War of the Pacific via the information superhighway. Throughout October, newsgroup users on the Internet engaged in a nationalistic free for all over the scheduled performance of two Chilean musical groups (“Bafochi” and “Inti Illimani”) at Lisner Auditorium in Washington, DC. According to Bolivian Internet users, Bafochi was playing Bolivian folklore ranging from Aymara to Guarani Indian music without recognizing its origin. On the Internet, Chilean nationals claimed that the music and dances—diabla-da, llamerada, taquirari, cullawada, among others—were from Northern Chile. Threatened with the prospect of a picket line of Bolivian residents at their residence in the DC area, Bafochi withdrew those pieces from their performance. Inti Illimani, on the other hand, recognized the Bolivian origin of the music they performed and noted that one of its founding members is a Bolivian.

Highway Robbery?
The New York Times Business Day (November 12, 1994) reports that private contractors are building highways across South America at an unprecedented rate and scale. With funding from multilateral agencies continually falling, governments are turning to the private sector to build transportation infrastructure. In return, the contractors retain the right to levy tolls. Mexico’s new 3,000 mile toll road system is a prime example of such projects. At the end of 1994, the Brazilian government began entertaining bids for a 265 mile highway to run between Rio and São Paulo—an estimated $1 billion investment. On November 20, the
Times published a response from one individual who was less than enthusiastic about private companies profiting from national infrastructure projects. The irate reader labeled it simple “highway robbery.”

Mercosur v. NAFTA
Timed to coincide with the December 1994 Summit of the Americas, Arthur Andersen & Co. released an important survey of future hemispheric business trends. Among the findings: most business executives in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela still think the US is their most important market, but expect this to change shortly. A significant portion of those interviewed predicted that trade among South American countries would soon be more important than trade between their countries and members of NAFTA. Starting January 1, 1995, 90% of trade between the four Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay)—which account for two-thirds of South America’s economic activity—became duty-free.

Un Whopper o Dos?
Burger King, owned by the British company Grand Met, has unveiled franchising as its principal strategy for taking on the Latin American market. At present, the Home of the Whopper runs about 12 restaurants in metropolitan Mexico City. The rest of the region is served through a network of independent franchises. Business Latin America (September 5, 1994) reports the standardization of franchising procedures, including the granting of exclusive rights, territorial reservations, standard royalties and fees, and reserving the right to approve all new contracts on an individual basis. Burger King’s entry into Latin America was the focus of a case study in the monthly publication Finance Director Latin America. Copies may be obtained by calling 1-800-938-4685.

City of Knowledge
The Panamanian government of Ernesto Pérez Balladares wants to put together an ambitious plan to exploit the Panama Canal and its 500-square mile corridor when they revert to Panamanian control in 1999. Foreign Minister Gabriel Lewis is reportedly heading a campaign promoting a Panamanian “City of Knowledge” which would entail converting the bases into universities and training centers. Such an institution would be modelled on the American University in Cairo and Beirut, which is accredited by professional associations in the US. The project requires $50 million in seed money and tens of millions in maintenance thereafter.

Law and Order
The October 1994 commando-style slaying of Paraguayan anti-drug chief Ramón Rosa Rodríguez is far from resolved. After denying his guilt before the investigating magistrate, the main suspect, Captain Juan Emiliano Ruiz Díaz, went on to say that Paraguay was home to three “mini-cartels” headed by prominent politicians and officers of the armed forces. One of the accused, Admiral Eduardo González Petit, promised to sue Ruiz Díaz for slander. The allegations sparked a national debate over the extent of drug trafficking and its influence in the country.

Pizza with Champagne
In Buenos Aires, a sociologist’s account of Carlos Menem’s spending habits sold 10,000 copies in two days. According to Silvina Wagner’s Pizza with Champagne, the lowest-income groups in Argentina (arguably the segment most affected by the government’s austerity policies) still demonstrate strong electoral support for President Menem thanks to his successful bid to end hyper-inflation. The author alleges that a facade of macroeconomic stability obscured growing unemployment, the deterioration of the educational system, worsening income distribution, and a spectacular increase in consumerism. Wagner claims that her objective in writing the book was to profile the amorality and impunity of the politicians in late twentieth-century Argentina.

Pelé Shuffle
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidential appointments are getting a lot of ink. The appointment of former president Itamar Franco as ambassador to Portugal was overshadowed by the naming of soccer superstar Pelé (whose real name is Edson Arantes do Nascimento) to head the newly created Ministry of Sports. Pelé’s precedent-setting achievements are not limited to athletics: he will be the only black man in Cardoso’s cabinet.
Electing Ernesto

Jennifer L. McCoy

When given the chance for change, Mexicans opted for the status quo. After questions over the authenticity of Carlos Salinas’s 1988 presidential victory, the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) and opposition political parties negotiated a series of reforms to open up the electoral process. Mexican authorities then accredited 88,000 nationals and nearly 1,000 foreigners to observe the August 21, 1994 elections. With new rules and new electoral authorities, the groundwork was laid for the freest election in Mexican history.

Conventional wisdom and pollsters’ predictions indicated that the higher the voter turn-out, the better the opposition would fare. Instead, with voters going to the polls in record-breaking numbers, the incumbent PRI won both the presidency (with a twenty-point margin over the runner-up), and large majorities in both houses of Mexico’s Congress.

What did the August 21 vote mean? Was it, as the winning party claimed, an expression of confidence in the government’s performance and its promise of a newly democratic system? Or was it the product of unfair campaign conditions, as the second place candidate, Diego Fernández de Cevallos of the Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, PAN), argued? Could it have been the result of massive fraud, as charged by the third-place candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Revolutionary Democratic Party, PRD)?

The same numbers have been used to support different interpretations of the outcome: those who wish to emphasize a mandate for change use the percentage of total votes cast (a minority of 48.77 percent for the winner, Ernesto Zedillo of the PRI), while those who wish to emphasize that the PRI still commands a majority of public support use the percentage of valid votes cast (50.18 percent for Zedillo), which excludes blank, mismarked, and write-in votes.

The vote for the three major parties indicates that the country is almost evenly split between a desire for continuity and a yearning for change in the ruling party: 44 percent of the voters chose the main opposition parties, while 48 percent chose the incumbent. On the other hand, 75 percent chose the two conservative parties proposing almost identical economic programs—the PRI and PAN—over the leftist PRD, raising questions about the future for a democratic left in Mexico.

The popular congressional balloting mirrored the presidential vote, indicating that, contrary to some expectations, voters did not split their vote in the presidential and legislative elections. However, because of the formulas for electing representatives, the PRI obtained substantial majorities in both houses: 75 percent of the Senate and 60 percent of the Chamber of Deputies (the maximum allowed by the new election rules). Although they are still in the minority, opposition parties now have more congressional representation than at any time in the past other than the 1988-91 session of the Chamber of Deputies, when the PRI had only 52 percent representation.

The size of the PRI victory surprised many analysts, even though several public opinion polls prior to the elections predicted very similar margins. Some pollsters had predicted an outcome similar to Nicaragua’s in 1990, where contrary to most polls, large blocs of undeclared voters gave the victory to the opposition coalition over the ruling Sandinistas. Instead, Mexico seemed to follow Bulgaria’s example, where, in their first competitive elections after the Communist collapse, voters kept the (renamed) Communist party in power, apparently out of fear of the unknown.

EXPLAINING THE VOTE

The debate over the meaning of the vote will likely continue to rage in Mexico for some time, and cannot be definitively answered without in-depth public opinion analysis, an exhaustive study of electoral complaints, and imprecise socio-psychological analysis. We can offer some preliminary interpretations, however, and assess the claims made by the three major presidential candidates.

PERFORMANCE

Government performance during Salinas’s sexenio (the six-year term of the Mexican executive) very likely recovered the middle class vote because it managed a massive reduction in inflation (from 157 percent in 1988 to less than 7 percent in 1993), despite a stagnant economy in the last two years of the administration. Moreover, although the poor
remained poor, the Solidarity program targeted potential voters in poverty-stricken areas, bringing visible improvements in infrastructure and transportation.

On the other hand, the PAN may have suffered from negative reactions to its own performance in government. In each of the three states with a PAN governor (Baja California Norte, Chihuahua and Guanajuato), the PRI swept both the congressional and presidential races. Alternatively, PAN may have suffered in those states because of voter tendency not to split the vote between congressional and presidential races. This behavior may have hurt PAN congressional candidates with those voters who preferred the PRI at the executive level but who would have supported PAN in the Congress.

**CAMPAIGN CONDITIONS**

A lukewarm commitment to electoral reform by the Salinas government eventually brought about significant changes in election rules and personnel in 1990, 1993, and 1994. However, some of the changes came very late in the game, especially the change in the governing board of the Instituto Federal Electoral (Federal Elections Institute, IFE), limiting their impact on the 1994 elections.

Attempts to redress very unequal campaign conditions were hardly effective. Studies of media coverage during the campaign showed that the two television agencies, Televisa and TV Azteca, exhibited considerable bias in their news reporting. In June, the PRI candidate received three times as much coverage as the PRD candidate and 4.5 times more coverage than the PAN candidate. When value judgments about candidates were injected into stories on Televisa, the PRI candidate was disproportionately praised at a rate of twelve to one over his competitors. Fairness in news coverage improved in July, and then deteriorated again in August. Access to paid television time for opposition parties was severely limited by its high cost and by network resistance to offering prime-time slots to opposition candidates.

Attempts to regulate campaign revenues and spending were similarly constrained. New policies set campaign spending limits at US$42 million per party for presidential campaigns and up to US$9 million for Senate races. Only the PRI had the resources to spend anywhere near these generous limits. New limits on individual contributions and requirements to make party finances public were difficult to enforce.

**FRAUD?**

The most promising electoral reforms were the new voter registration lists and the tamper-proof voter ID card, new election-day procedures to minimize fraud, increased political autonomy of the Electoral Institute’s governing board, provisions for Mexican and foreign observers, and a new criminal code with a special prosecutor to investigate complaints. Did they prevent fraud on election day?

Skepticism about the PRI’s willingness to permit a clean election was widespread before the elections. A variety of polls conducted in June 1994 showed that 35-45 percent of the electorate expected fraud, while between 25 and 50 percent thought there would be clean elections (Market Opinion and Research International/MOR; La Reforma; and the main electoral watchdog, Alianza Civica (Civic Alliance)). Even more alarming, 65 percent expected violence in the event of electoral fraud (Alianza). Yet, the day after the elections, when early results showed a commanding 20 percent lead for the PRI, the streets were quiet, with neither jubilant victory celebrations nor massive protest.

New safeguards and 89,000 observers contributed to the peace. Perhaps most important, parallel vote tabulations, or “quick counts” done by several independent groups confirmed the official results, which otherwise might have been disbelieved. Alianza Civica, a Mexican NGO fielding 11,000 observers and known to include many critics of the PRI, was the last to release its quick count, but the most important in lending credibility to the official results.

Considering the lack of public confidence in the government’s commitment to transparent elections, and the thousands of accredited observers representing many different organizations and perspectives, it is not surprising that a multitude of views regarding electoral conduct surfaced after the fact. In addition, many observer groups concentrated their efforts in limited geographic areas, giving rise to different pictures depending on the locale.

The Zapatista insurgents charged that eight million PRI votes—one-quarter of those cast for the ruling party—were fraudulent (La Jornada, September 4, 1994). On the other hand, the US ambassador commented that the elections represented “a major advance for democracy in Mexico” (New York Times, August 25, 1994). My delegation, organized by the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute,
and The Carter Center of Emory University, concluded that election-day irregularities were not sufficiently serious or widespread to have affected the outcome of the presidential race, but that further reforms were needed to raise credibility and address grossly unequal campaign conditions.

The opposition parties held sharply differing evaluations of the electoral process and its outcome. The PRD National Council concluded that "the official results cannot be trusted, nor are they the result of free and impartial elections. Therefore, these results are illegal, and we do not know who won or who lost" (La Jornada, September 13, 1994). On the other hand, the PAN National Council accepted the results, arguing that, despite the inequities, the official results "are the expression of the electorate" (El Financiero, September 6, 1994).

The Mexican population's cynicism and lack of trust in the process was not entirely assuaged by the outcome, but greater faith in electoral authorities seems to have been achieved. A poll published in La Reforma and El Norte newspapers in the last week of August showed that 61 percent thought the elections were clean, while 24 percent did not (15% claimed not to know). Likewise, 64 percent thought the IFE performed very well (The News, September 3, 1994).

Nevertheless, a number of irregularities were observed that may have had an effect on congressional or local results. The two most serious irregularities found in their statistical sample of 1,810 voting stations were pressure by party representatives to influence voters, and violation of the secrecy of the vote. Alianza noted that these problems were much more widespread in the rural and southern areas of the country.

One of the most controversial aspects of the election was the accuracy of the voter registration lists. Alianza initially reported that in 70 percent of the stations, some voters with valid identification cards were turned away because their names did not appear on the lists. This raised suspicions that opposition sympathizers were deliberately "shaved" from the lists. The subsequent Alianza report, however, found that the number of voters potentially affected by this problem was not large—an average of four voters per station, comprising less than one percent of the registered voters.

Over 1,800 electoral complaints were submitted by the political parties to the Electoral Tribunal. The PRD filed the most, but PAN cited irregularities in almost 15 percent of the polling stations, and questioned the outcome of five congressional races and some local races. In addition, the election of the governor of Chiapas (one of a few statewide contests coinciding with the national elections) was contested by the PRD. Subsequently, election authorities overturned two congressional seats initially won by the PRI, called for new elections in two additional congressional races, and overturned the PRI victory in the Monterrey mayoral race.

VOTE OF FEAR

A fourth interpretation of the electoral outcome is a socio-psychological one: that it was a vote cast out of fear of changing ships in a year of trauma. The Chiapas rebellion, the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, and economic uncertainty in the wake of NAFTA and a recession all fed into the PRI's campaign message that it was the only party capable of steering the country into the future. Was a "vote of fear" the result of biased media campaigns that distorted perceptions about opposition candidates, or was it a product of an ingrained conservative political culture? Carlos Fuentes writes that "Mexico voted for its mother and father (the PRI)" in a "parthenogenetic need for parental protection." The divided vote also reflected the country's division between "its conservative, dynastic, patriarchal drive and its dwindling patience, its mustang instinct, and its political ideals" (La Jornada, August 27, 1994).

Assessing the "fear of change factor" with any precision is practically impossible. It is particularly difficult to distinguish between the negative aspects of the electoral process, which can be changed in the future, and factors outside the control of the parties or government—the contextual factors of the campaign or cultural factors. Nevertheless, post-election public opinion surveys should allow an initial assessment of how these factors affected the Mexican vote.

**OPPOSITION STRATEGIC ERRORS**

A fifth explanation of the vote is the campaign strategy followed by the opposition parties. A divided opposition rarely defeats a long-term or hegemonic party, unless that party itself fragments or decays from within. For instance, the Unión Nacional Opositora (National Opposition Union) coalition in Nicaragua defeated the Sandinistas only after uniting fourteen political parties from the left to the right on the political spectrum. The Chilean Convergencia (Convergence) united the left and the center against a divided right to defeat Pinochet's allies in 1989. In contrast, Panama's Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) won in May...
1994 with only 33 percent of the vote against a field of six candidates; and in Paraguay, the incumbent Colorado party defeated a divided opposition with 40 percent of the vote in 1993.

The Mexican opposition utilized campaign strategies that at times seemed designed to lose rather than gain votes. PAN candidate Diego Fernández seemed to drop out of sight for a time after a spectacular rise in the polls following the May 12 televised debate. Cárdenas eschewed media appearances in favor of rallies, thus limiting his potential audience. The PRD also had difficulty modifying its image as a confrontational and even violent party because it persistently predicted fraud without producing very convincing evidence, and because Cárdenas met with Zapatista commander Marcos.

**Move Toward Democracy?**

The 1994 elections were a step toward a future of free, competitive elections—one element of a democratic system. The high voter turnout indicated a desire to participate in electoral politics, and perhaps reflected a renewed confidence in electoral institutions. The maturing of civil society is another positive result of this electoral process. The Mexican civic groups that organized to promote democratic reforms and observe the elections are unlikely to disappear.

But after 65 years of a single ruling party and the symbiotic relationship this situation has forged between party and state, change is not easy and much remains to be done. The new government has an opportunity to promote democratic change and enhance its own legitimacy. To do so, it will have to avoid the temptation of triumphalism—a return to old practices of unilateral rule—and instead reach out to the opposition and embrace more political reform. If President Zedillo fulfills his promises of ending the dedazo (the selection of the next president by the incumbent one), opening up internal party elections, and listening to the opposition while furthering political reform, progress will be more likely.

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**The 1994 National Elections in Mexico**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>President (%)</th>
<th>Senate (# of seats)</th>
<th>Chamber of Deputies (# of seats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)</td>
<td>48.77</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Acción Nacional (PAN)</td>
<td>25.94</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD)</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido del Trabajo (PT)</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM)</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional (PFCRN)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Popular Socialista (PPS)</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null votes</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto Federal Electoral

**NOTE:** The Chamber of Deputies has 300 seats representing single-member districts, and 200 seats by proportional representation. A single party can receive no more than 300 total seats in the Chamber unless it wins 60% of the vote, which raises the maximum seats to 315.
Juan’s Light
Kathleen Logan

Street vendor Juan de Dios Hoil lives with his wife and two daughters in a working class neighborhood of Mérida, the historic capital city of Yucatán state in southern Mexico. Juan’s actions during recent elections exemplify a major trend in Mexican politics—the deep grassroots support for democratic reform.

After voting in the November 1993 Yucatán state elections, Juan returned to the polling place with his taco cart to sell food to the crowd gathered outside. At five in the afternoon the voting ended and the vote count began. At 6:15 P.M. the electricity suddenly went off—not only at the poll but all over Yucatán. The crowd outside the polling station immediately began shouting and whistling. No one believed that the power outage was accidental. Most attributed it to an effort by the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) to sabotage the election in order to continue its 65-year rule.

After a few minutes of darkness, a spot of light appeared, moving through the crowd. Juan de Dios Hoil was bringing the kerosene lamp from his cart to the vote counters inside the poll. As he gave them his lamp, Juan became an instant hero to his cheering neighbors. With Juan’s light, the vote count continued.

Citizen Mobilization
Juan de Dios Hoil defended his nation’s democratic reform in a simple, spontaneous act. In the presidential elections of August 21, 1994 millions of other Mexicans also defended democratic reform by voting in a record setting turnout—nearly 80% of Mexico’s voters went to the polls. Their high turnout was perhaps the single most important feature of the 1994 political year because it demonstrated the citizenry’s commitment to political reform.

In the presidential elections of August 21, 1994, millions of Mexicans defended democratic reform by voting in a record setting turnout.

For most Mexicans reforming democracy means holding honest elections, establishing a multi-party system, and ending the PRI’s dominance of their government. For others, democratic reform also includes economic issues and indigenous rights.

Since the first hint of a democratic opening in the 1960s, Mexicans have mobilized politically with a depth and sophistication greater than at any time in their history. Some of their organization has taken place within the structure of political parties; some in grassroots organizations. In either case, Mexicans are now positioned to act politically as never before.

Millions of Mexicans have joined the eight political parties that have emerged from the PRI’s retreating shadow. Several of these opposition parties have become true political forces contesting the PRI’s hegemony particularly at the regional level. The right-of-center PAN (Partido de Acción Nacional) is strong in Yucatán and some western and northern states while the left-of-center PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) draws its support from the Mexico City metropolis and various central and southern states. The PT (Partido de Trabajo), as Mexico’s fourth party, shows strength in areas that overlap with both PAN and PRD strongholds.

In addition to citizen mobilization within major opposition political parties, Mexicans have also formed smaller, single issue parties such as the ecology (Partido Verde Ecologista) party. While such parties represent only a small minority of voters, they do serve to keep compelling issues in front of the public eye and engage a small sector of dedicated activists in the political process.

While the activities of opposition parties are widely reported in the media, less well known but equally influential are the asociaciones civiles (civil associations). Since the late 1960s, Mexicans have organized at the grassroots by forming citizen watchdog groups, human rights organizations, campesino collectives, urban neighborhood associations, and ecology, women’s and indigenous people’s groups. These civil associations have sought political reform and redress of their particular grievances. Although many such groups are organized locally or regionally, some are linked together nationally and are becoming politically skilled on the national scene.

**Kathleen Logan is an associate professor of anthropology at Florida International University. Her current research projects include studies of women’s participation in the democratic transformation of Mexico.**
Mexican politics into the 21st century

The Frente Cívico Familiar, a right of center coalition with a pro-business, pro-democracy and conservative social values agenda, is one such organization.

At times, the PRI-dominated state’s mishandling of catastrophic events has spurred grassroots organizing. The state’s violent suppression of the 1968 student movement and its inadequate response to the devastation of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake provoked a serious examination of the PRI’s rule by many Mexicans. Citizens, especially in the Mexico City metropolis, responded by forming grassroots organizations to bring political change. More recently, the rebellion by the Chiapas Maya in January 1994 has led many Mexicans to ponder their government’s handling of indigenous affairs.

Within both political parties and civil associations, space has opened for new political actors, most notably women. Some observers think that the emergence of women in Mexican politics can be partly explained by culturally perceived ideas of gender. Women politicians are often thought to be more responsible, honest, and service-oriented than men. They are seen as more likely to represent the people’s interest to the state rather than the state’s interest to the people. Among the most notable women leaders who have become important political figures are Cecilia Soto of the PT, Ana Rosa Payán Cervera of the PAN, and Rosario Ibarra de Piedra, a human rights activist.

Throughout the political campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s, opposition political parties and citizen’s grassroots organizations have galvanized the Mexican populace to push for democratic reform. Since the PRI, however, still controls the pace and direction of reform, political parties and citizen groups will need to continue their efforts if Mexico is to transform its political system.

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The PRI is not now, nor ever has been, a monolith. Today, the fissures within the PRI are deeper than at any time since its founding.

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The Dinosaurs

Equally important to citizen mobilization as a transformative force in Mexican politics is the PRI itself. In August, Mexican voters elected the PRI candidate—Dr. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León—as president by a narrow margin. While the vote count represented a victory for the PRI, it was not a mandate.

The PRI’s critics call the party’s leaders los dinosaurios in reference to the party’s 65-year rule and the advanced age of some of its leaders. Critics often voice their opposition to the PRI as if it were a single, cohesive entity.

But the PRI is not now, nor ever has been, a monolith. The PRI is a political party long divided by ideological currents, regional differences, and contesting leaders. Today, however, the fissures within the PRI are deeper than at any time since its founding.

As issue within the PRI, as within the nation, is the party’s control of the path and pace of democratic reform. Although ideology, region, and leadership differences continue to be forces that divide the PRI, a more basic fissure has developed between those who favor reform and those who resist it.

Many who resist reform efforts do so to protect their perceived self-interest. The PRI has controlled the Mexican state and consequently all its resources for more than six decades, successfully employing a patron-client model to garner support. As a result, many of those affiliated with the PRI receive state subsidies or are state employees. PRI supporters fear losing their benefits or jobs if an opposition party were to win control of the state.

Other PRI members resist reform out of party loyalty. They believe that the PRI has done much good for Mexico, can continue to do so, and should remain in office. PRI loyalists point out that their party is the only one with governing experience and the ability of any opposition party to govern Mexico. Those within the PRI who resist change also predict that violence will accompany political changes that displace the PRI. The underlying theme of these arguments is that what is good for the PRI is also good for Mexico.

Other factions within the PRI seek reform. Such reformers regard political change as inevitable and probably beneficial for Mexico in the long run. They have the difficult task of fighting for reform with those that resist it while simultaneously presenting a united PRI front to the public.

PRI reformers have sought to control the process of political change.
Citizen mobilization, internal debate within the PRI and the political dynamic between these two forces propel Mexico toward democratic reform. Within this context of political change, the emergence of a multi-party democracy at the local level; the separation of the state bureaucracy from the PRI, and the integration of the Mexican south are issues likely to be important.

The signs of a multi-party democracy emerging in Mexico are most obvious at the local and regional level. More and more municipal and state governments consist of elected officials from two political parties. Officials of these town councils and state congresses can rarely afford the luxury of ideological debate. Instead they must confront specific tasks: getting streets paved, schools built, and local disputes resolved. The success of these multi-party governing bodies will depend on how well they can accommodate political plurality. Since many resources come from the PRI controlled central government, a test of the PRI’s commitment to political plurality will be its willingness to give state support to opposition or multi-party local and regional governments.

Equally significant of the PRI’s support of democratic reform will be its willingness to separate itself from the state bureaucracy. There is a need in Mexico to depoliticize public service offices—getting a driver’s license or a pothole filled need not be partisan political acts. Since so many public service offices are appointed, these officials owe their employment to the PRI. The officials’ first loyalty is likely to be to the PRI and not to the public they purportedly serve. A few appointed offices have been removed from the political arena by allowing the same bureaucrats to continue in office from one change in party administration to the next. Nonetheless, the PRI and the state are still too tightly intertwined.

A more difficult issue for the PRI to face than political reform of its bureaucracy is the problem of the south. Mexico’s future is being forecast in its southern states—the nation’s poorest and least politically and economically integrated region. Subject to decades of neglect, the rebellion by the Chiapas Maya has dramatically brought the region to the center of the nation’s attention.

Many Mexicans recognize the legitimacy of Mayan demands for economic and social justice while at the same time decrying violence as a solution to the region’s problems. Because of the Chiapas rebellion, Mexico must confront its indigenous present in addition to its indigenous past. The manner in which the Zedillo administration handles the Chiapas issue will have long range consequences not only for the indigenous peoples of Mexico but also for the southern tier of the country in which many of them live. Mexico cannot continue to pretend that all of Mexico is like the north and center.

With massive citizen mobilization generating a force for political change from the bottom up and internal debate within the PRI creating a force from the inside out, Mexico pushes its democratization into the 21st century.

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The profound changes in Latin America's domestic and international affairs in the last decade have inevitably affected the military establishments and security arrangements of the area. Although the stated basic mission of Latin America's militaries—defense of sovereignty—and the unstated one of self-preservation and protection of privileges has not changed fundamentally, the end of the Cold War has seriously undermined the old roles related to counterinsurgency, hemispheric defense, and geopolitically-based national security doctrines.

In response to the changing world situation, new military roles have been suggested for Latin America's military forces, and in many cases assumed. Among the missions gaining in importance are those linked to the emerging concept of "cooperative security" which stresses preventative actions to avoid conflicts, and multilateral responses to those conflicts that do break out. Cooperative security gives the military responsibility for confidence-building measures (CBMs) designed to make conflict less likely. Another strong contender as a leading role—international peacekeeping— attempts to limit outbreaks of conflict and create space for diplomacy. While the renewed interest in the peacekeeping role has implications for the military's mission—bearing on its professionalism, deployment, and relationship to the civilian political authority—it is not a new role for the Latin American military.

Modest numbers of Latin American military observers have formed part of many United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and peace-observing missions from their first deployments in the late 1940s. On a few occasions, nations such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Panama (and later Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay) have provided 500-700 man battalions in support of UN peacekeeping efforts.

The peacekeeping role is not a new one for the Latin American military. On a few occasions several Latin American nations have provided 500-700 man battalions in support of UN peacekeeping efforts.

Latin American participation in peace-observing activities has hardly been restricted to UN operations. Within the Organization of American States (OAS) there have been numerous small civilian-military peace-observing efforts mounted in response to border tensions and other strains. Unfortunately, the OAS's only attempt to create an Inter-American Peace Force (in the Dominican Republic in 1965) resulted only in profound distrust of such an international force, mainly because it was evident that the IAPF was largely a US operation which employed the multilateral organ as a cover for unilateral political objectives.

Changing Nature of Peacekeeping

What is new today is the dramatic expansion of United Nations peacekeeping activities, and the growing participation of certain Latin American military establishments (most notably Argentina's) in these UN efforts. In a period when civilian leaders are searching for ways to redefine the military's mission, these UN peacekeeping roles are sometimes seen as promising ways to give the military a real role. Civilian governments also hope participation will direct military attention away from internal political issues, and perhaps reduce the military establishment's size and cost. In some cases international peacekeeping is also perceived as a way of regaining a positive image and prestige lost during periods of repression of human rights. Finally, participation in UN peacekeeping can also be a useful bargaining chip in the world arena. In the Argentine case, participation in UN peacekeeping and other multilateral operations such as the Gulf War and the Haiti embargo, has served to strengthen its unusually close current relationship with the United States.

In retrospect, the Central American peacekeeping experience from the late 1980s to date was a key

Argentina finds a future for its armed forces

Latin American Military Expenditures
Francisco Rojas Araujo

- The end of the Cold War has not led to significant changes in Latin American military spending. Despite the peace process in El Salvador and elsewhere, the inertia of the Cold War continues in Central America. In South America, the end of the Cold War did not alter perceptions of threat and notions of national defense in any significant manner. A key determinant of defense spending in South America is the prevalence of border issues.

- Regional military spending is primarily determined by the past; that is, the reiterative process of resource allocation (criterio histórico de asignación). The "personal" line item is the most important factor. Research has demonstrated that the armed forces are able to lobby on behalf of their own bureaucracies and budgets on a yearly basis. Only a profound financial restriction has a meaningful impact on military spending. International agreements appear to be one alternative which will allow the consolidation of stability while reaping the dividends of peace.

- Even considering individual variation among cases, military spending in Latin America is affected by the domestic political conditions in each country. Politically stable countries (such as Argentina and Chile) must be contrasted with those facing problems of governability (Brazil, Venezuela, and the nations of Central America) or open conflicts with either drug traffickers or insurgent forces (Colombia and Peru). These domestic political conditions affect the annual process of lobbying for budget allotments.

- A major factor affecting the stability of spending patterns during the post Cold War period is the lack of a common threat. The absence of an extra-continental enemy has contributed to the inability of the region to define global security policies. This trend, however, has not prevented the acquisition of the new generation of weapons so prominently showcased by the US during the Persian Gulf War.

- The general trend in Latin America has been toward a slight reduction in military spending. There is evidence of a small decrease in Central America; in South America, military spending remained constant at approximately two percent of GDP. In the latter case, the last half of the
“unhelpful human rights backgrounds” earned while engaged in counterinsurgency operations in their own countries. There were charges that these same individuals had a tendency in some cases to side with the Nicaraguan contras and the Salvadoran security forces. There were also criticisms of the propriety of Argentine military officers protecting the human rights of Central Americans, and of Mexican police officials teaching professional integrity to the newly-formed Salvadoran police forces.

**The Argentine Case**

There have been remarkable changes in both the Argentine military and that country’s international relations in the past decade. The starting point for this shift can be traced back to the searing experience of a long and harsh military dictatorship and Argentina’s decisive defeat in 1982 at the hands of Great Britain. The process of change began under the Alfonsin administration, and accelerated under the presidency of Carlos Menem.

As a result, Argentina is now the most active Latin American supporter of UN peacekeeping missions, and also an enthusiastic proponent of CBMs to reduce tensions in the Southern Cone. There is some opposition to these new roles, but in general they seem to be well accepted by both military and civilian sectors. It would be simplistic to conclude that this means that the Argentine military has permanently renounced intervention in politics, but it has resulted in the formal acceptance of international peacekeeping as an Army role, albeit a secondary one. There are also intriguing suggestions that the Argentine “test case” may be transferable to other Latin American military institutions, possibly through the establishment of a regional peacekeeping training center in Argentina. An alternate proposal would give the Inter-American Defense Board a role in planning, analyzing and publicizing Latin American involvement in UN peacekeeping missions and using the Inter-American Defense College as the vehicle for transmitting this knowledge to individuals (civilian as well as military) who might be involved in future such missions.

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**Quotes a captain:** “I was trained to kill. This business about soldiers deployed for the purpose of avoiding war seems foreign to everything I knew...”

Argentina’s support for the UNPROFOR peacekeeping force in Croatia represents a major contribution. The battalion, transported by the Argentine Air Force, went with its own organic vehicles and communications equipment. It was not a typical Argentine Army infantry battalion: it was heavily officered, and deliberately so in order to help insure a high level of professionalism, as well as to rotate the majority of the junior officers in the Argentine Army through a UN peacekeeping experience via 6-month reliefs of personnel. According to Army Chief of Staff General Martin Balza, in June 1993 its composition was 14 field grade officers, 113 junior officers, and 757 NCOs. Overall Argentine participation in UN peacekeeping, he added, has grown from an average of 20 soldiers in the 1983-89 period to 100 in 1991 and 3850 in 1993.

One measure of Argentina’s experience in Croatia can be seen in newspaper coverage of President Menem’s trip to inspect the Argentine battalion (accompanied by General Balza) in mid-1992. Selected quotes from a 2 August 1992 **Clarin** article illustrate the impact of the mission: “the experience is absolutely atypical for Argentine Army personnel...As well as being an investigation into past and present military conduct, the report is also a reflection on the tools that will be used to build a new Army...Quotes a captain: “I was trained to kill. This business about soldiers deployed for the purpose of avoiding war seems foreign to everything I knew”...the Argentine Blue Helmets are involved in an experiment destined to have a considerable impact on their military culture and change their outlook...they are also learning terms such as “minority rights,” now incorporated into their professional language as keys to the success of their missions.”

**Proponents and Opponents**

Proponents of peacekeeping roles for the Latin American military include those who stress support for the world body, as well as altruistic contributions to the achievement of peace. It is also true that individual soldiers usually profit financially from UN service, as do many of their governments, depending on the arrangements made with UN Headquarters. The military institutions also benefit professionally from the training and experience they derive from such service. From a national perspective, service in UN peacekeeping missions tends to elevate the profile and prestige of the country. Finally, for a military institution like Argentina’s, still laden with the baggage of years of military dictatorship, the “Dirty War,” and the fiasco of the Falklands/Malvinas defeat, involvement in UN peacekeeping offers the opportunity to recover some of the prestige and self-respect lost in that period. The fact that almost 25% of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Argentine Army now have
international peacekeeping experience has profound significance for the institution.

Service in UN peacekeeping missions also reinforces the ties of military transnationalism by building on the camaraderie of shared experiences with soldiers of many nations. As an example, General Balza remarked that he had been deeply moved by a handwritten condolence note sent to him after two Argentine soldiers were killed while on UN duty in Croatia. The note came from retired British General Jeremy Moore—the man who had led the British forces in the Falklands/Malvinas campaign in which General Balza had been an artillery commander.

The new concepts and approaches concerning peacekeeping have not received unanimous approval from the Latin American military. In Central America, the right wing in general, especially in El Salvador, reacted violently to the notion of United Nations involvement in what they perceived as their sovereign internal affairs. A typical extreme view was that UN intervention in the context of peacekeeping and human rights observation was a neo-Marxist plot. According to this view, UN activities in this field would weaken the state and leave it ripe for a takeover by leftist elements within their nation. Those holding this view would also argue that the demise of the Soviet Union did not mean the disappearance of Marxist insurgents in their country.

Others see international peacekeeping missions as an “internationalizing” or “denaturing” of the most basic national institution: the military. By involvement in these outside missions, they argue, the military is diverted from its fundamental mission of defense of national sovereignty and weakens its roots in the national body politic to the point that the nation itself is endangered. Opposition to confidence-building

continued from page 29

1980s witnessed an appreciable decline in military spending relative to central government expenditures (from 6.8% in 1986 to 5.3% in 1991).

- Legislatures throughout Latin America have been notably absent from the decision making process with respect to military spending. National budgets are generally decided by the executive branch behind closed doors with little or no public or legislative scrutiny. It should come as no surprise that military spending would fit the same pattern. This, of course, is not surprising as closed decision making styles are also evident in the making of economic policy.

- Military spending in Latin America in the wake of the Cold War period has not been based on sound defense policies. Given the lack of clear objectives and goals, it is difficult to measure the efficiency of military spending. Moreover, all debate regarding military spending in Latin America tends to be ideological and elitist. This makes the formulation of sound defense policies more difficult. Broader debate on defense matters would increase the transparency and accountability of military spending patterns and generate policy options that could be supported by other socio-political actors.

### MILITARY SPENDING IN SOUTH AMERICA (AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP)

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Material from this inset originally appeared in *Gasto Militar en América Latina: Procesos de Decision y Actores Claves* (Santiago: Cinde/FLACSO, 1994). The author, Francisco Rojas Aravena, is coordinator of the Department of International and Military Relations at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Santiago, Chile.
measures has centered on a similar view which holds that CBMs are nothing more than a thinly-disguised civilian plot to use diminished threats as an excuse to dramatically cut back the military.

Finally, the fact that many of the ideas regarding CBMs and peacekeeping seem to come from the “gringos to the north” (and more recently the “gringos from the far north,” i.e., Canada) stirs up resentment. Opponents recall the years when US academics and policymakers proposed numerous new missions and fanciful schemes to change the roles of the Latin American military in ways that seemed to serve US policy interests more than the needs of Latin Americans themselves.

**Prospects**

Despite objections to peacekeeping roles, confidence-building measures and cooperative security, it seems clear that many of the Latin American military establishments will be considering and implementing these concepts in the years ahead. For the generally small military establishments of Central America the most significant influence will be the impact that peacekeeping and CBMs had (and will continue to have) in the Central American peace process. Because of their size and limited capabilities, it is unlikely that these militaries will be asked to participate significantly in UN peacekeeping operations.

For the larger military establishments of South America, UN peacekeeping represents a significant, although secondary role for them to play on the world scene. The Argentine example is illustrative here in the way its strong participation in UN peacekeeping in the last few years has been an important instrument of Argentina’s foreign policy as well as potentially rehabilitating a military which lost prestige and morale during a dark period of its history. Argentina’s involvement in UN peacekeeping, and its historically unprecedented collaboration with the United States, are being watched carefully by the other military establishments of the hemisphere.

The impact of these new roles on civil-military relations and the process of democratization is a delicate one. Attempts to link these roles too closely to reductions in military budgets and influence are likely to backfire. And yet, there is the obvious implication that CBMs and cooperative security can make interstate conflict in Latin America less likely, and thus permit a more realistic assessment of genuine military needs, as well as permitting a certain amount of military resources to be made available to the UN for peacekeeping missions.

The present moment is also one of reassessment of roles for the multilateral institutions of hemispheric security, especially the Inter-American Defense Board and College. Their continued existence is being seriously questioned, and their survival may well rest on their ability to focus on international peacekeeping. CBMs, and cooperative security as their primary area of interest.

The role of the United States in this process must be a careful one. An over-eager attempt to push these new roles on the Latin American military is likely to be counter-productive. It would be far wiser to allow the Latin American militaries, working closely with their civilian political leadership, to determine the pace and direction of these new approaches. Fortunately, there are other nations with more experience than the United States in these fields which have indicated an interest in working with Latin American militaries. Canada and Spain are in the forefront here, and their considerable involvement in the Central American peace process (as well as in UN missions elsewhere) should be used as a vehicle for showing the advantages of greater participation in UN peacekeeping, confidence-building measures, and cooperative security arrangements with all the nations of the hemisphere. ■
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Forgotten Minority

Martin Edwin Andersen

In the wake of the 1994 revolt in Chiapas, Mexico, Argentine President Carlos S. Menem suddenly put his country’s security services on heightened alert. Although a continent away from the Mexican strife, Menem warned that a “Chiapas-style” rebellion was possible against the government in Buenos Aires. Even Menem’s supporters scoffed at the idea as preposterous— Argentine ambassador to Washington Raul Granillo Ocampo later flatly denied any similarity between events in Mexico and those in his country. Yet, however alarmist or politically calculating, Menem raised a specter ignored by many enconced in the European comforts of Buenos Aires—from La Quiaca in the north to the Straits of Magellan in the south, Argentine Indians still struggle for survival.

As late as 1993, official Argentina pointedly ignored the country’s estimated 100,000 to one million Native Americans. Neither census data nor annual government statistics counted Indians as a distinct category. This disregard was not limited to the bureaucrats in the Rio de la Plata: Edgar Krebs, an Argentine academic teaching at Wolfson College, Oxford, said he was startled to find that World Bank documents were written as if there were no Indians in Argentina.

The lack of precise government information helps to account for the wildly disparate estimates on Indian populations. According to some calculations, 300,000 Native Americans live in their own communities, while as many as 1.5 million have emigrated to urban areas. The National Aboriginal Pastoral Team (Equipo Nacional Pastoral Aborigen) has put the total number at 447,000 people clustered in 13 ethnic groups. Of these, 170,000 are Kollas, 90,000 Mapuches, 80,000 Wichis, and 60,000 Tobas. Other groups include the Chiriguinos, Pilagás, Matacos, Teheulches, and the mixed-race Ona-Criollos and Yamana-Criollos.

“The struggle today is for our own territory. Not just a property title that assures our right to a piece of land...

Although Indian communities dot the length of the country, the problems they face unite them: lack of their own land; illiteracy; unemployment and exploitation in the workplace; and a host of physical maladies ranging from childhood malnutrition to tuberculosis, cholera, alcoholism, and venereal disease. In some communities, infant mortality is estimated to be as high as 40 percent. Argentina’s indigenous peoples are also increasingly united in demanding that the government provide answers to their demands for fair and equitable treatment. Argentine society, however, has been slow to recognize the dramatic conditions facing their Native American compatriots. According to anthropologist Carlos Martínez Sarasola, author of the critically acclaimed book Nuestros paisanos los indios, the attitude of the Menem government is even worse. “A few of its most recent statements,” he told the Buenos Aires daily La Nación shortly after the Chiapas uprising, “show more than a hint of a recurring segregationist attitude.”

The first Native American settlers came to the territory that is now Argentina some 12,000 years ago. By the time the first Spanish conquerors arrived, there were between 500,000 and one million Native Americans divided into 23 distinct ethnic groups. The encomienda system instituted by the Spanish crown gave colonists power over local tribes and allowed them to collect tribute from the Indians. Another colonial institution, the merced, gave the settlers territorial rights; those Indians living in these newly-demarcated areas were forced to work for the land’s new owners. In 1813, an effective— if not formally— independent Argentina abolished the encomienda. The mercedes land grants awarded by the Spanish crown, however, continued to be recognized as property rights by the new government.

Beginning in the mid-16th century, Araucanians from Chile embarked on a process of commercial relationships and intermarriages that extended their influence from the north of Patagonia to a point south of the provincial capital of Córdoba. With the Araucanians came the Mapuche language and customs from the other side of the Andes. Often this cultural penetration came at the expense of Spanish settlers.
pushing inward from the Rio de la Plata. Helping to solidify this new Indian civilization was the fact that by the end of the 17th century, the Chilean Araucania was an independent territory with formal, and largely cordial, relations with colonial administrators. The resulting loyalty of the Native American leadership to the Spanish crown (also due in part to the influence of the royalist-leaning Franciscan Order), and a series of attempts by pro-Independence forces to undermine the tribal chiefs, brought the Indians increasingly into conflict with the emerging nations of Chile and Argentina. As fortunes turned against Spain, Native Americans and royalist whites left Chile for the expanse of Argentina's grasslands and deserts, from whence they could regroup and plot.

Around the time of independence, an effort was made to integrate the Native Americans living in the pampas into Argentina's European society. The attempt foundered, however, on the Indians' illiteracy in Spanish, and the consequent suspension of their citizenship. The debate in criollo society about the role of Indians in the new Argentine nation continued to be shrouded in ambiguity. Notes Krebs: “The predominant theme was the impossibility of our side understanding what the other side is thinking.” Aristotelian concepts about “thinking and unthinking peoples” were offered side-by-side with declarations such as, “An Indian is an Indian, and we cannot force the condition of being an Argentine upon them.” Even the enlightened constitutionalist Juan Bautista Alberdi, pondering the furious division over how to deal with the country's original inhabitants, ventured that Argentines should not leave “islands of barbarism” within their country.

Integrationist hopes, and even the divide-and-conquer paternalism of dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas, were followed with periodic extermination campaigns, such as one led by Colonel Federico Rauch, in which the Unitarian government of Buenos Aires ordered him to “destroy the Chilean Indians.” Native American collaborators were not to be given any quarter: their women, children, cattle, and horses were remanded to the possession of the state. “Animals, jewelry and the tribes' belongings,” it was ordered, “will belong to the troops and the militias.”

...Our cause has to do with our development and a strategy for living.”

—Mapuche leader Jorge Nahuel

In the 1870s and 1880s, while the US wound down its own Indian wars, Argentina undertook a final campaign to wipe out Native American presence in the pampas. General Roca's “Conquest of the Desert” subjugated and occupied northern Patagonia, putting the finishing touches on the domination of Native Americans and reducing the Indians to virtual slaves.

The quandary faced by 19th century Argentine thinkers, about how to deal with the “Other”—the non-criollo compatriot—reemerged with Juan Perón's reign (1946-1955). Although his government lacked a specifically pro-Indian policy, the enactment of a statute regulating rural labor and the incorporation of the working class—its ranks swollen by darker-skinned immigrants from the interior of the country—into Argentina's political and economic life, won Perón a degree of sympathy from the nation's Indian communities. (Those with long memories, however, recalled the events of August 1946: Shortly after Perón took power, a group of Kolla Indians—given the sobriquet of "the Indian raid of Peace" (el malón de la paz)—traveled to Buenos Aires from the northwest province of Salta. Upon their arrival, and after a trip that took almost a month, they were beaten by police and put on a train back to the salteño department of Orán under armed guard. Several died.) Because of the largely favorable treatment, at the end of Perón's nearly decade-long reign, the young novelist Ernesto Sabato wrote:

"While we doctors, farm-owners and writers were noisily rejoicing in the living room over the fall of the tyrant, in the corner of the kitchen I saw how two young Indian women who worked there had their eyes drenched with tears. And although in all those years I had meditated upon the tragic duality that divided the Argentine people, at that moment it appeared to me in its most moving form...Many millions of dispossessed people and workers were shedding tears at that instant, for them a hard and sober moment. Great multitudes of their humble compatriots were symbolized by those two Indian girls who wept in a kitchen in Salta."

The division of opinion over what to do about the Indians spanned a
succession of hapless civilian governments and right wing military regimes. In the early 1970s Monsignor Enrique Angelelli, the bishop of Menem’s own province of La Rioja, found himself ministering to a region of large landholders and Indian peons. Angelelli, who was murdered by the military regime in 1976, used parables mixed with local rites and traditions to convince native parishioners to abandon feelings of racial inferiority. Throughout Argentina, land reform advocates, and even orphanages for Indian children, were targets of allegedly independent right-wing death squads working in collusion with the military.

With the return of democracy in 1983, neglect rather than repression characterized the treatment of Indians. A 1985 study by the Parliamentary Information Office (Dirección de Información Parlamentaria) found that, of the 200 pages of statutes and regulations concerning Indians, none offered indigenous causes much support. It was only in 1989, fifteen years after it was presented by Radical Party Senator Fernando de la Rúa, that Parliament passed Law 23302, which established a National Institute of Indigenous Affairs (Instituto Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, INAI). Indian leaders hailed the measure as the first legislative effort which utilized Native American ideas and lacked a heavy overlay of paternalism.

Although their indigenous activism pales in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of Indians who have mobilized to protest in Ecuador and Bolivia, or the peasant insurgencies of Mexico and Guatemala, Argentina’s Native Americans have won increasing attention to their struggle. In 1992, some 200 representatives of the Mapuche in Argentina and Chile met in the central Argentine city of Neuquen to discuss how to create a new nation and recover part of their ancestral territo-

ries. (As a tribal group, the estimated 50-90,000 Mapuches have been one of the most resistant to attempts to destroy their culture. They have made a strong effort to hold onto their traditions and original language as a cornerstone of their own identity.) In 1993, Kolla Indians from Orán in Salta province went to Buenos Aires to demand the return of lands stolen from their ancestors three centuries ago. For three weeks they camped in front of the Congress building while carrying out a hunger strike. Last August, fourteen Indian groups descended on the provincial capital of Santa Fé to make their views known to the Constituent Assembly considering reforms to the Argentine Constitution. For the first time, Indian rights were enshrined in the country’s magna carta under a modification of Article 67. Approved by acclamation, it declared that Argentina:

“Recognizes the ethnic and cultural preexistence of Argentina’s indigenous peoples; guarantees respect for their identity and the right to bilingual and multi-cultural education; recognizes the legal existence of their communities, and the possession and title of the lands they traditionally occupy, and regulates the handing out of others suitable and sufficient for human development, none of which will be alienable, transferrable nor subject to taxes or embargoes; and assures their participation efforts concerning natural resources and other interests that affect them. The provinces can also concurrently exercise these attributes.”

In referring to the “handing out” of other lands, the word “guarantee” was originally used in place of “regulate,” but the initial draft was watered down at the insistence of Menem’s Peronists. They claimed that by “guaranteeing” land, the Assembly was risking multi-million dollar lawsuits by Indians against the state. Oil companies were also reportedly concerned about what the language meant to their interests, particularly regarding subsoil rights. “Everyone will be grappling for a basis for argument,” said Krebs, “and it will likely be quite messy.”

Continued gains by Argentina’s Indians, however, may be threatened by the Menem government’s seeming willingness to make them scapegoats or bogeymen. It was revealed in late 1994 that, shortly after the Chiapas uprising, Argentine military and intelligence services were training Mexican army and police officials in counterinsurgency tactics, both in Buenos Aires and in the field in Chiapas. In both countries—where memories of the misnamed “dirty war” carried out in the mid-1970s to early 1980s by the Argentine military still cut deeply—the move was widely condemned. Similar questions arose about whether the Argentine military was engaged in a reprise in Mexico of activities—the promotion of death squads and brutal interrogation techniques—it used in Central and South America during the period of the “dirty war.”

Following revelations in the Mexican and Argentine press, Menem denied that active-duty Argentine officers were engaged in Chiapas. Still, sources in Buenos Aires familiar with military intelligence say the use of retirees as plausibly-deniable “cut-outs” has been a common practice. In November, Menem appeared to endorse the same repressive methodology that earned several former military commanders prison sentences for crimes against humanity. “It was thanks to the presence of the armed forces,” Menem said, “that we fought and triumphed in that dirty war which took our community to the brink of collapse.” The implications of that message could not be clearer in Mexico and in Indian communities in Argentina.
Island and Diaspora: Cuban Sovereignty, Identity, and Reconciliation in the 21st Century

For 1995-1998, the Cuban Research Institute (CRI) at Florida International University invites scholars of the humanities to explore the themes of sovereignty, identity, and reconciliation in Cuban intellectual and cultural traditions. The objective of the CRI's Rockefeller Fellowship Program is to advance understanding of these crucial and recurrent national themes at this juncture of Cuban history.

Eligibility. Applications from scholars with research experience on Cuba or the Cuban-American community are especially encouraged. Applications from scholars researching these issues in other societies are welcome and will be evaluated on their potential to provide a comparative perspective on the Cuban experience. Awards cannot be made for graduate study or dissertation research. Applicants need not be affiliated with an academic institution.

Terms. Awards will be made for residences of 3 months to one full academic year. The academic year at FIU extends from mid-August to early May. Applications for periods from 3 months to one semester are especially encouraged. Awards are based on a maximum of $35,000 for a full academic year. Additional support may be provided for relocation expenses and health benefits. Fellows are encouraged to combine these stipends with sabbatical and other support.

Application. Complete applications are due February 1, 1996. Awards will be announced by March 15 for the following academic year. To request information and application materials contact:

ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION RESIDENT FELLOWSHIPS IN THE HUMANITIES
Cuban Research Institute
Florida International University
University Park, DM 363
Miami, Florida 33199
Tel (305)348-1991/Fax (305)348-3593
A Portrait of Cuba

Manuel Ruiz-Barrera

Nursing Home (Asilo de Ancianos), Havana, 1994

Manuel Ruiz-Barrera is a student of fine arts and history at Florida International University. He travels and photographs extensively in Cuba.
The Vigilant Mural (El mural vigilante), Havana, 1993
Photo Essay: Cuba

The Trophy (El trofio), Camaguey, 1994
Everything For Sale (Todo se vende), Havana, 1994
Capitolo Games (Juegos en el Capitolio), Havana, 1993
Manolo, Camaguey, 1994
The Heroic Work (El trabajo heroico), Camaguey, 1993
Countryside Family Portrait #11 (Retrato de familia guajira #11), Camagüey, 1994
Yearning for the Sea (Añorando el mar), Havana, 1994
The Viking of El Salvador

Tricia Juhn

Rebel Radio: The Story of El Salvador’s Radio Venceremos
By José Ignacio López Vigil
Translated by Mark Fried

he journalist José Ignacio López Vigil has compiled this oral history of Radio Venceremos (“We shall triumph”), the clandestine radio station of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)—a coalition of insurgents who made war on the Salvadoran government from 1981-1992. Revolving around a cast of a dozen or so principals, the story begins with Comandante Jonas showing up at the first speaker’s home in Mexico to work out the technicalities of an underground guerrilla radio broadcast. Jonas wants an AM station that can be heard in the capital city. The first broadcasts began in 1979, courtesy of an antique sixty-pound transmitter, the “Valiant Viking,” taken from a fishing boat.

During the war, Radio Venceremos’s main accomplishment was to keep broadcasting, despite the Salvadoran army’s attempts to find the transmitter and shut it down. Venceremos’s team was practically a mobile army unit, and, brags one storyteller, it could bug out of a locale in fourteen minutes. From bat caves and trench-missiles, it broadcast an endless stream of lethally dull editorials, live front-line news, and re-enacted battle reports.

Rebel Radio has a great deal of humor in it, particularly when it chronicles the frenetic couplings of Venceremos’s staff (the ratio of men to women was seven to one) and the courting of the raven-haired beauty, contera Marcela. Competition for her tender mercies drives two of the men to “joust like errant knights,” and produces such delightful outbursts as “oh mama, so many curves and me without brakes!” (it does lose something in the translation, otherwise smoothly executed by Mark Fried).

Venceremos’s broadcasts also featured a number of serials spoofing the real-life panorama’s major players. US embassy staff tuned in on a regular basis to hear what was happening to “a gringo marrying a Salvadoran woman” (as US Ambassador Deane Hinton eventually did); or to hear Venceremos’s impression of General Eugenio Vides Casanova—former Minister of Defense—reciting a Shakespearean sonnet.

Even the most elastic definition of broadcast journalism would not encompass Venceremos’s unverified rebel assertions, but sometimes it was the best available facsimile. By the early 1980s, the army and the death squads had effectively shut down the independent and opposition media in El Salvador; Venceremos turned out to be telling the truth about things the government placidly denied. Most notable in this category was the 1981 massacre at El Mozote, where the army killed thousands of peasants in a single counterinsurgency campaign. Venceremos broadcast news of El Mozote immediately, while the US and Salvadoran governments denied it for more than a decade.

Only with the release of the United Nations-sponsored Report of the Truth Commission (1993) and Mark Danner’s flawless profile in the New Yorker (December 5, 1993), was the truth of El Mozote disinterred.

The campaign to shut down Venceremos led to the 1984 death of Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa, whom the FMLN dubbed the “butcher of El Mozote.” Monterrosa’s men seized a “Trojan” version of the Viking, which had been wired with explosives. When the helicopter containing Monterrosa and the transmitter lifted off to head for a press conference, a remote switch ignited eight sticks of dynamite.

The folksy, front-porch delivery of these anecdotes should not, however, obscure the distinctly bellicose raison d’etre of Venceremos. Ideology is only a small part of this volume; which is another way of saying that the ravages of that war are presented in a light-hearted, innocent fashion, as if the FMLN were not also engaged in generating its fair share of slaughtered innocents, betrayals, and aborted peace negotiations. While its deviations from the conventions of war cannot measure up to those of its opponents, neither should one accept this volume’s romantic reminiscences of life during wartime.

Three things contributed to the spectacular success of the FMLN: The first was the intractability of the ruling regimes in El Salvador; the second was the sheer military tenacity of the FMLN; and the third was its propaganda machine, a constant thorn in the side of the counterinsurgents. So impressive was this last element that in 1983, with the Reagan...
administration growing increasingly vitriolic about the communist menace in El Salvador, France and Mexico recognized the FMLN as a “legitimate political force, with all the rights and responsibilities derived therefrom.” The FMLN established networks of sympathizers in the US and Europe, where ordinary citizens gave cash to its cause, entreated their elected representatives in one direction or another, and helped bring the Salvadoran war into the legislative chambers of foreign governments.

By 1987, the government of Napoleón Duarte (1984-1989) was forced to counteract its plummeting international legitimacy by devoting scarce resources to a kind of counter-propaganda network in Europe (in the US, it made do with a high-profile ambassador, Ernesto Rivas Gallont). Likewise, a major turning point on the road to peace came during the presidency of Alfredo Cristiani (1989-1994), who early on directed his European diplomatic staff to cease and desist all anti-FMLN propaganda as a demonstration of his commitment to negotiations without quarter.

The job of propaganda, like social science, is to insist upon a certain version of history. In the final analysis, Rebel Radio is more propaganda, told in a jocular fashion, both self-promoting and self-effacing. With the war over, the stakes of Venceremos’s broadcasts are not quite as lethal as they once were: The momentum toward national reconciliation moves even former combatants to face the future with a selective memory. Venceremos is now a legitimate business operation, playing top 40 in the capital city.
Elections in Latin America

Marian Goslinga

Between November 1993 and the end of 1994, eleven countries in Latin America scheduled elections with centrist candidates claiming victory in the majority of cases. The attached bibliography shows that electoral democracy has made significant gains in the region. Even Haiti, long considered an anomaly, ousted a military dictatorship to return Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office. Nevertheless, the literature also indicates that extremists on the left and right still have the potential to disrupt the democratic process.

ARGENTINA


BOLIVIA


BRAZIL


CHILE


COLOMBIA

Nuevo congreso: curules por herencia. *Semana* (Colombia), n. 621 (March 29-April 5, 1994), pp. 34-37. [Despite constitutional changes designed to eliminate clientelism and nepotism, 22 relatives of former politicians were elected in the congressional elections of March 13, 1994.]

COSTA RICA


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC


ECUADOR

Ecuador: protestas sociales y elecciones. Osvaldo León. *ALAI Servicio Informativo*, v. 18, n. 190 (May 4, 1994), pp. 2-12. [Author argues that the incumbent Partido Social Cristiano won Ecuador’s May 1994 congressional elections despite public disillusionment with the political system.]

EL SALVADOR


GUATEMALA

La mayoría de la minoría. Haroldo Shetemul, Silvio Gramajo. Crónica (Guatemala), v. 7, no. 336 (August 1994), pp. 19-23. [Argues that Guatemala’s newly elected congress is not representative, as scarcely fifteen percent of the population voted.]

HONDURAS


MEXICO

Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy? Alan Knight. Journal of Latin American Studies, v. 26 (Fall 1994), pp. 73-107. [Discusses Lázaro Cárdenas’s legacy in Mexico’s electoral politics.]


Mexico’s Delayed Democratization. Wayne A. Cornelius. Foreign Policy, v. 24, n. 95 (Summer 1994), pp. 53-71. [Examines electoral and political reforms introduced by Carlos Salinas de Gortari.]


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GUATEMALA

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