Clinton and the Western Hemisphere

Johanna Mendelson Forman
Ronald Cox

The Drug War Revisited

Peter Andreas and Kate Doyle
Sewall Menzel

Raúl Benítez Manaút on Life After NAFTA
Darío Moreno on Cuban-Americans and Presidential Politics
Carlos Parodi on the Peruvian Dilemma
Tricia Juhn on the Resurrection of El Salvador
Alicia Frohman on Chile’s Gambit
Subscribe now to *Hemisphere*—and give as a gift!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscription Period</th>
<th>1 Year (3 Issues)</th>
<th>2 Years (6 Issues)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$20 US, PR, USVI</td>
<td>$36 US, PR, USVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$27 elsewhere</td>
<td>$50 elsewhere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subscription for (check one): □ 1 Year □ 2 Years

**Your Name**

**Address**

City/State/Province/Zip

Country

Telephone Number

Subscription for (check one): □ 1 Year □ 2 Years

**Gift Name**

**Address**

City/State/Province/Zip

Country

Mail this form with payment to: *Hemisphere*, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199. Or call (305) 348-2894 or fax (305) 348-3593 and charge it to your credit card.
LETTER TO THE EDITOR

COMMENTS

Summit Madness
Fault Lines

REPORTS

Afta NAFTA
Calling the Shots
Democracy and Debris
Update: US Assistance
Between Scylla and Charybdis
Hegemony and Partnership
Chile Forecast

FAXFILE

FEATURES

Clinton and the Western Hemisphere
“Continuismo” or Convergence?
All for One, One for All

The Drug War Revisited
The Drug War is Dead...
Southcom in the Andes

REVIEW FORUM

Politics of Perception

Hemisphere (ISSN 0898-3038) is published three times a year by the Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University. Copyright © 1994 by the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University. All rights reserved.

Hemisphere is dedicated to provoking debate on the problems, initiatives, and achievements of Latin America and the Caribbean. Responsibility for the views expressed lies solely with the authors.

EDITORIAL, CIRCULATION, AND ADVERTISING OFFICES: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199. Tel: (305) 348-2894. Fax: (305) 348-3593. E-mail: HEMIS@SERVAX.FIU.EDU.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: US, USVI, PR and Canada: $20 a year; $36 for two years. Elsewhere: $27 a year; $50 for two years. Please make check payable to Hemisphere. Credit card orders (MC/VISA only) are also acceptable.
Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress
Edited by Jorge F. Pérez-López
"Extremely useful to scholars and readers interested in Latin America, socialist countries in transition, U.S. foreign policy, comparative political and economic systems, [and] revolutionary change."
—Camilo Mese-Lage, University of Pittsburgh
300 pp. Tables, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth, $39.95

The Beinecke Lesser Antilles Collection at Hamilton College
A Catalogue of Books, Manuscripts, Prints, Maps, and Drawings, 1521-1860
Prepared by Samuel J. Hough and Penelope R. O. Hough, Foreword by Walter Beinecke, Jr.
"A classic reference book... The Beinecke Collection is renowned for its importance and thoroughness, for including major early rarities as well as modern ephemera. This description of the collection is accurate in detail and thorough in coverage."—Roger E. Stoddard, Curator of Rare Books, Harvard College Library
216 pp. 52 b&w, 8 color plates, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth, $34.95

Reinaldo Arenas: The Pentagónia
Francisco Soto
"A major contribution to the field of contemporary Cuban narrative... Soto brings a solid knowledge of Arenas’s work and a demonstrated aptitude to write with clarity and originality on a most difficult and extraordinary novelist."—Reinaldo Sanchez, Florida International University
216 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. Cloth, $24.95

Historic Architecture in the Caribbean Islands
Edward E. Crain
“A comprehensive, panoramic vision of architecture in this important geographic region.”
—Efrain E. Perez-Chanis, architect and former dean, School of Architecture, University of Puerto Rico
504 pp. 7 X 10. 64 color, 450 b&w photographs and maps, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth, $90.00

Antonín Nechoda, Architect, 1877-1928: The Prairie School in the Caribbean
Thomas S. Marvel
Foreword by H. Allen Brooks
“Adds a fascinating new dimension to our knowledge of the history of modern architecture in the Americas.”
252 pp. 7 X 9 1/2. 195 b/w photos and drawings, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth $44.95

The Rise of Protestant Evangelism in Ecuador, 1895-1990
Alvin M. Goffin
“Sheds new light on those 3 Fs of Ecuador’s historical development and experience: race, regionalism, and religion.”—Frank MacDonald Spindler, George Mason University
213 pp. 15 b/w photos, 3 maps, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth $29.95

Angel Cuadra: The Poet in Socialist Cuba
Edited with an Introduction by Warren Hampton
“Angel Cuadra gives insight into the first stirrings of the Cuban intelligentsia itself.”—Dionisio D. Martinez, Miami Herald
158 pp. 10 b/w photos. Cloth $19.95

Crónicas Brasileiras: Nova Fase
Edited by Richard A. Preto-Rodas, Alfred Howar, and Charles A. Perrone
In this second edition, one-third of the material is new; in most cases new exercises have been added or revised, and all the grammar has been reviewed. The collection introduces readers to the language as it is used in present-day Brazil. The texts are annotated in English and can be used by students who have completed only an introductory study of grammar.
329 pp. 21 illustrations, vocabulary. Paper $24.95

Hostile Acts: U.S. Policy in Costa Rica in the 1980s
Martha Honey
“The definitive account of one of the sorriest chapters of U.S. foreign policy: the cynical efforts of the Reagan and Bush administrations and their Iran-contra operatives to undermine Costa Rica... Honey’s thoroughly documented book details how U.S. policymakers—obsessed with ‘democratizing’ Sandinista Nicaragua—deliberately employed covert action, short-sighted economic policies, and military pressure to undermine Costa Rica.”
—Marc Edelman, Yale University
564 pp. 37 b/w photos, tables, notes bibliography, index. Cloth $49.95 Paper $24.95

The Struggle for Peace in Central America
Dario Moreno,
“Guides the reader through the complex and uneven processes by which the five Central American nations arrived at a commonly acceptable but not uncontested peace agreement... A considerable achievement.”
—Frederick S. Weaver, Hampshire College
Amherst
251 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. Cloth $39.95 Paper $19.95

Voices of Migrants: Rural-Urban Migration in Costa Rica
Paul Kutsche
“Examining migration through life histories puts flesh on analytical bones... Kutsche is an astute interviewer with a real capacity to establish rapport with his informants... Nothing like this book exists in the Latin American migration literature.”—Leigh Binford, University of Connecticut
248 pp. Bibliography, maps, glossary, index. Cloth $39.95 Paper $19.95

Through full-service bookstores or order with VISA or M/C toll free: 1-800-220-3622.

University Press of Florida
Gainesville, Tallahassee, Tampa, Boca Raton, Pensacola, Orlando, Miami, Jacksonville
In Response
to Walter Gillis Peacock’s review in Hemisphere 6:1, David Stoll writes

When I published Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala, I knew it would inflame some readers because it breaks with solidarity interpretations of one of the most oppressive countries in Latin America. The solidarity movement is an international network which identifies the interests of the Guatemalan people with the guerrilla movement and the popular organizations of the left. Exemplified by I, Rigoberta Menchú, the most widely read book on Guatemala, solidarity thinking derives considerable plausibility from the army’s record of brutality. Indeed, having made human rights its main issue, the solidarity movement is easy to confuse with human rights activism. The two communities share many of the same discourses and constituencies. Yet if we want to cut through the tangle of assumptions which keep the last civil war in Central America up and running, it’s important to make the distinction.

That the Guatemalan army has been an egregious violator of human rights, for example, does not mean that its guerrilla opponents are champions of human rights, even if they present themselves as such. Yet while a human rights organization ought to attend to violations by both sides, a solidarity organization will target only government abuses because its priority is supporting the revolutionary movement. A related blind-spot is that the solidarity movement has never acknowledged the guerrilla role in the escalation of political violence.

I believe this is why your reviewer Walter Gillis Peacock (Winter/Spring 1994) is so offended that I blame guerrilla raids for provoking the army’s occupation of northern Quiché Department. He is so offended that he accuses me of laying the entire blame for the violence on the guerrillas and apologizing for the massacres of the Guatemalan army. Outrageous, Walter. Pointing out that the guerrillas fired the first shot, and that the army didn’t show up in northern Quiché until after that, is not the same as justifying the murders the army committed. If I was so concerned to exonerate the army, why does Between Two Armies publicize massacres that never made it into human rights reports?

Walter also objects that Between Two Armies is narrow and decontextualized. This despite the fact that it was a local, fieldwork-based study (for a wider study which comes to the same conclusion—that the guerrillas imposed an alien form of struggle on Mayan Indian communities with disastrous results—see Yvon Le Bot’s La Guerre en Terre Maya, published by Editions Karthala, Paris, 1992). The real problem, I suspect, is that the weary neutralism I found in a supposed bastion of the guerrilla movement contradicts solidarity assumptions that this was a deeply rooted popular uprising.

In any case, my findings are empirical ones that can be tested through further research, without need for rhetorical analogies to the Zapatistas across the border in Mexico. Here I found Walter’s gratitude to the Zapatistas, for giving him a new guerrilla uprising to believe in, both revealing and worrisome. If it is more important to maintain Guatemala as a metaphor for the culture of terror than it is to listen to peasants who are tired of being heaped on the altar of revolutionary miscalculation, then peasant life is cheap even on the academic left.

The question for the future is whether it is still sufficient to assign all the blame for the violence on the Guatemalan army, as the solidarity movement is accustomed to do. Or whether after three decades of civil strife, in which Guatemalans seem almost as disgusted with the guerrillas as they are with the army, it is time to question rationales for violence by both sides. I fear that, because of confusion between solidarity and human rights assumptions, Guatemala’s status as a human rights pariah will justify the guerrillas to keep fighting long after they have lost most of the support they once enjoyed (Contrary to the review, no one ever said there were 17,000 Ixils in the guerrilla-allied Communities of Population Resistance (CPRs) of the Sierra. CPR officials used to claim that there were about 12,000, as reported in my book; now this figure turns out to have been seriously inflated).

Far from apologizing for the Guatemalan army, my analysis of what happened to the guerrilla movement in northern Quiché should be viewed as part of a longstanding debate in Latin America over the wisdom of armed struggle. More such debate is badly needed in Guatemala, where the left faces a difficult struggle to get out from under the shadow of its many martyrs. ■

David Stoll
Davis, California
The announcement that Miami would host the Summit of the Americas (December 9-11) spawned a veritable cottage industry based on the upcoming event. Non-profit organizations, universities, business, and others mobilized expecting that their pre-Summit scurrying could shape the agenda. With similar expectations, private and public institutions around Latin America launched campaigns to assure a presence in December.

Kind words for Latin America from the Florida establishment are normally scarce, but these days, praise for the region’s economic liberalization and erstwhile democratization is legion. The state of Florida has bent over backwards to prepare for the Summit. After personally convincing President Clinton to hold the event in Miami, Governor Lawton Chiles appointed a multiethnic Summit Steering Committee to work with the State Department. Fearing that it would focus solely on Miami, Chiles also appointed a Florida Steering Committee to advocate the local interests of places like Orlando, Tampa, and Jacksonville.

Although the crisis in Cuba and Haiti temporarily disrupted planning, there was never any doubt (given the ailing Florida tourist industry) that the show must go on. In late August, for example, unconfirmed rumors began circulating that the State Department was considering moving the Summit from Miami to de-emphasize the Cuban and Haitian debacles. The Steering committee moved with all due haste to squash the rumors before they could get a toehold. Summit hysteria is so strong in Florida that long-term plans for post Summit events are already afoot.

This autumn, pre-Summit conferences dotted the hemisphere and the state. In addition to summits at the sub-regional level where heads of state are expected to discuss their respective Miami strategies, Florida and several Latin American participants have planned separate meetings on the environment, trade, transportation, and finance and banking. All of this has transpired without an official agenda. Most conference organizers have promised to produce white papers to be delivered to the heads of state during their two day encounter in Miami. At the current rate of production, presidents and prime ministers will have to dedicate the better part of the winter to white paper reading.

President Clinton’s invitation to the Summit outlined a broad agenda, citing democracy and good governance, trade, investment, and sustainable development. With such generous parameters, it has been possible to include nearly every imaginable issue under the sun, from official corruption to NAFTA accession—but not Cuba and not Haiti. To the chagrin and embarrassment of the Summit’s organizers, however, the Haitian and Cuban communities in Miami will not let Summit-hoppers forget. Official plans allow demonstrations and other public expressions of discontent, but demonstrators will have no direct access to the visiting heads of state. Apart from pre-Summit events, the only other item in place is for provision of security to 34 leaders and their delegations.

The other great absentee at the Summit will be the war on drugs, which so dominated the Reagan-Bush era. Officials in the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters note with disappointment that drugs will not appear on anyone’s agenda short list because the Summit organizers in Washington intend to discuss only positive dimensions of US-Western hemisphere ties. For the Andean countries this may be the most welcome news. Their concerns about developing export markets and the like may finally receive redress not conditioned on counternarcotics performance.

Clinton is counting on a much needed opportunity to establish some foreign policy credentials and some legitimacy in his hemispheric policy. Persons close to the President claim that Clinton will use the Summit to unveil the century’s “third most significant US policy initiative toward Latin America,” (the other two being the Good Neighbor Policy and the Alliance for Progress).
This pronouncement has had great resonance throughout the hemisphere. Political leaders have reacted with a marked degree of optimism and most are now expecting something more than yet another declaration of fraternal affection. In other words, Latin Americans, Caribbeans, and Canadians will come to Miami expecting the Clinton administration to deliver something of substance. For the region’s leaders, this would be a promise from Washington to expedite free trade agreements and access to the US market, but the likelihood of serious mid-term electoral setbacks dampen prospects for follow-through. If the past is prologue, the leaders of the region will be disappointed one more time.

In short, Clinton will put a legitimizing seal on what are essentially Republican policies crafted in the waning days of the Cold War. Criticizing Clinton for continuity, especially in his Latin American policy, has become a new national pastime, but to expect this administration to engage in radical departures misses a broader point. Clinton is the first president whose main task has been to dismantle not only the Cold War military arsenal, but the accompanying bureaucratic apparatus. His task is somewhat to the one Harry Truman faced in the aftermath of World War II. Several years elapsed before George Kennan and others crafted the Cold War strategy that guided US foreign policy for over three decades. The Clinton administration has yet to find its George Kennan. So far the Ivy Leaguers who were brought in as Latin American advisors have failed to produce any coherent set of policy recommendations. The Summit of the Americas may be the place and the timing may be correct for the launching of a new post Cold War Strategy vis-à-vis Latin America.

LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CENTER
The Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University unveils SummitNet, an Internet information project for the upcoming Summit of the Americas. On December 9-11, 1994, the democratically elected heads of state of the Western Hemisphere will meet in Miami to discuss trade, governance, and the environment. SummitNet is your one-stop gateway for country profiles, official documents, Miami Herald articles, and independent commentaries. Point your Gopher client software to SUMMIT.FIU.EDU. You can e-mail SUMMIT.FIU.EDU or call (305) 348-2894 for more information.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Fault Lines

Lisandro Pérez

A bittersweet joke circulating in Cuba last year tells of the situation twenty years from now when the island’s development regresses so much that it resembles the Stone Age, with its inhabitants foraging for food in an overgrown wilderness, isolated from the rest of the world. Two Cubans, in their loincloths, are attempting to make a fire by striking stones together, but the stones keep breaking. “I’ll tell you,” says one to the other, “if Fidel does not give us better stones, there’s going to be a lot of trouble in this country.”

The resiliency of the Cuban government in the face of rampant deterioration in the population’s standard of living has baffled observers and frustrated its enemies. The country’s economic crisis (dubbed “the special period” by the government) dates to the loss of subsidized trade and assistance from the former Soviet bloc. The crisis has been deepened by the unwillingness of the regime to institute market-oriented reforms that would increase production and services. The US embargo has not helped matters.

At the household level, the situation is desperate. If there is any hope of having the bare necessities, Cubans must resort to illegal transactions. Access to the US dollar, the only viable currency, is critical. Yet, there has been very little evidence, as the joke reflects, that the economic crisis poses a threat to the stability of the government.

That is, until the start of Cuba’s hot August, featuring several clashes between demonstrators and security forces. For the first time in more than three decades, the streets of Cuba have seen open defiance of the regime by the population. The largest confrontation occurred on August 5 as a crowd estimated in excess of 10,000 persons battled police along Havana’s waterfront.

While street clashes are a new element in the Cuban landscape, they occur within a Cold War context that is as old as the Revolution. Just when it looks as if the developments might take a fresh course, they rapidly become trapped in time, replays of recurrent themes. The events of the past few weeks, both in Washington and Havana, are good examples of those perennial themes.

Migration as a catalyst and escape valve. Migration has been for 35 years the principal manifestation of dissent and discontent. And so it was again this month. The spark for the street demonstrations in Havana August 5 was the rumor that the government would allow anyone to leave. The crowd congregated at the waterfront, not in front of government buildings, its message: we are fed up and we want to leave. When the clamor reaches an unbearable pitch, and the number of illegal departures increases, Fidel Castro allows people to leave. It is then that the US, fearing an exodus, focuses attention on Cuba. Castro successfully alters US migration policy and gets an escape valve for discontent, giving his rule a new lease. Since the day he allowed people to leave, there haven’t been reports of demonstrations in Havana. Everyone in Cuba who is fed up is busy building a raft.

US-Cuba policy is determined primarily by domestic political concerns. With no real national security or strategic issue at stake with Cuba, and with no evident political pressure for a turnaround in policy, US policy towards Cuba becomes a creature of domestic politics. And this time it is not even presidential politics, but merely the reelection of the incumbent Democratic governor of Florida. One evening last week, that governor ushered into the White House a group of Miamians he presumably deemed representative of the Cuban community. The message to Clinton was: the new policy of not accepting rafters must be balanced with punishment for Castro, otherwise Cuban Miami will be unhappy. The President agrees to get tougher with Castro because the Governor believes that otherwise he “and the President would have been in drastic trouble in Florida.”

Limited get-tough options. Having agreed to punish Castro, the President has very few viable options, all of them fairly pusillanimous. One is to increase the hours of transmission of the US radio and television broadcasts beamed to Cuba. The other is to tighten the only loose screw left in the embargo: cash remittances and family visits to Cuba by Cuban Americans. Among the Miamians visiting the White House there was overwhelming support for prohibiting such

Lisandro Pérez is a sociologist and director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University.
Recurrent themes plague US-Cuba issues

The get-tough policy is based on raising the level of suffering and exasperation of the Cuban people. In this last round of decisions, the US in effect collaborates with Castro in keeping a barrier between families and limits critical assistance to family members in Cuba. Presumably, this is justified because that suffering will inexorably lead to an unspecified chain of events (probably chaotic and violent) through which Castro will somehow be ousted and democracy instituted in Cuba. The questionable theory behind this is that economic hardship leads to political change and that fomenting chaos in Cuba is consistent with the national security interests of the US.

The get-tough policies have thus far not been effective. After more than three decades of a policy of hostility and isolation, Castro is still there. The new get-tough measures will undoubtedly reach new heights of ineffectiveness. If people cannot send cash remittances to family members, they will have a greater incentive to travel to Cuba to take the cash themselves. The new restrictions, of course, do not allow direct flights from the US to Cuba, so the solution will be to go through a nearby third country. The happiest person in Havana right now is the manager of Cuba's decrepit national airline. Cubana can fly to those third countries and pick up the visitors and fly them in and out of Havana. If this policy persists, they may yet make enough money to replace their entire fleet of old Soviet planes.

These recurrent themes are getting old and worn, and each time they have been replayed over the past four decades they have taken a considerable toll among the Cuban people, here and in the island. It is time that the US take its Cuba policy seriously, not just react to each successive crisis. The Clinton administration should initiate a process of systematic deliberations and consultations with a broad range of experts and interest groups so as to arrive at a coherent Cuba policy that will truly promote the national security interests of US and democracy in Cuba. Consultations with the Cuban-American community should be broadly based, not limited to a handful of anointed spokespersons. Implementation of that policy should not be influenced by the electoral situation in Florida.

If nothing changes in Washington, why should anyone there expect any changes in Cuba?
President Clinton's support of the North American Free Trade Agreement signaled continuity, but Mexico is marginal to his foreign policy. In 1993, political pressure from domestic constituencies produced NAFTA side agreements on labor and environmental issues. On the Mexican side, President Carlos Salinas's control over his Senate and House of Representatives rendered similar obstacles to approval non-existent. In contrast, NAFTA opponents in the US were important. Among them was the former presidential candidate, Ross Perot.

Gore-Perot

On November 9, 1993 CNN broadcasted a debate between Vice President Al Gore and Ross Perot. Host Larry King's opening remarks honed in on the central question: will NAFTA be good for Americans or not? Much of the debate synthesized American perceptions about Mexico.

Gore defended NAFTA as an opportunity to create the "largest market in the world." Perot criticized the overwhelming poverty of the majority ("85% of the Mexican people work in absolute poverty"), and Mexico's lack of democracy. Defending recent political changes in Mexico, Gore emphasized NAFTA's overwhelming role in that country's future, warning that US Congressional rejection of NAFTA would provoke a nationalist "reaction" in Mexico. The vice president concluded by placing the issue between the "politics of fear" and the "politics of hope".

US opinion on Mexico is polarized: At one extreme, Mexico is seen as a poor, undemocratic country without a future. At the other, it is a country on its way to modernization, overcoming obstacles to make the jump into the first world. Mexican reality is midway between these two opinions, and far more complex.

One can neither hide the social reality of Mexico nor underestimate the accelerated pace of change.

One can neither hide the social reality of Mexico nor underestimate the accelerated pace of change favoring economic modernization and democratization, incomplete though it may be. Mexicans also have a distorted view of the United States. Public opinion is nationalist, anti-imperialist, or favors good relations with the United States.

34 Votes

On November 17, 1993, US House of Representatives approved NAFTA by a margin of 34 votes, a triumph for both Clinton and Salinas. In the US, the winners were the big corporations, who for the most part backed NAFTA from the beginning. Ratification coincided with the favorable conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT. In both countries, non-competitive small and middle sized industries anticipated taking the hardest hit.

There are notable differences in the way NAFTA will affect each country. Because of the US-Canada precedent, NAFTA did not call for changes in federal legislation, nor in the law of the various states that can expect major NAFTA-induced changes. By contrast, Mexican law had to be substantially modified to allow NAFTA; important parts of the Constitution, a product of the revolution, were modified for the same reason.

During bilateral negotiations, the Mexican government succeeded in forestalling reforms to the energy (i.e., petroleum) sector, but did make notable changes in agrarian law (i.e., the repeal of Article 27, the basis of the Mexican ejido system). Anticipated changes in the labor law designed to draw foreign investment are expected to have important political repercussions, since the Mexican political system is predicated on the ruling party's historic control over worker and peasant unions.

The US vision of Mexico continues to be polarized despite NAFTA passage. Large sectors of the "establishment" oppose NAFTA on the grounds that US workers cannot compete with Mexican labor, which is seven times cheaper.

Proponents, including Presidents Clinton and Bush, point to consolidated and working economic reforms in Mexico, and predict that NAFTA will both hasten a political transition toward democracy while fostering a stable framework for it.

Raúl Benítez Manaut is a researcher at the Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Humanidades, Universidad Nacional de México.
Chiapas

The political stability of Mexico was tested on January 1, 1994, the first day of NAFTA implementation and the debut of Zapatista guerrillas in San Cristóbal de las Casas, whose first communiqué read “we have declared war as of January 1st because of the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement.”

Chiapas changed the course of Mexican politics, casting a pall over the Salinas administration and modifying expectations about the future of the Mexican economy. It led important sectors of public opinion to question NAFTA as the best way of joining the first world. In the US, the image of the modern Mexico that helped ratify NAFTA is in doubt.

Prior to Chiapas, a favorable investment climate sent large quantities of dollars into Mexico. At the expense of industry, most of the money went into the stock exchange, which is sensitive to perceptions of political stability. The presidential candidate of the official party Luis Donaldo Colosio led the polls well ahead of his nearest contender, Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas of the Revolutionary Democratic Party, and Diego Fernández of the Authentic National Party.

The immediate effect of Chiapas was to damage the image of President Salinas, and in turn, his candidate Colosio. The Mexican army came under fire for human rights abuses, and then the government called for a cease-fire on January 12. In a radical departure from the traditional response of Latin American governments to insurgents, the Salinas government sought a political close to the conflict. It agreed to major changes in the Cabinet and the establishment of a Commission on Peace and Reconciliation.

Chiapas changed the course of Mexican politics. It led important sectors of public opinion to question NAFTA as the best way of joining the first world.

The US Embassy sent an observer mission to Chiapas to see for itself. National Security Council advisor Richard Feinberg, assigning a very high specific weight to US influence in the Mexican decision making process, and ignoring internal changes, said military maneuvers were restrained, and a repetition of 1968 [Tlateloco Massacre] was avoided because the Mexican government had signed onto NAFTA.

Public opinion in the US was harsh on Salinas, criticizing his handling of Chiapas, his capacity to maintain stability, and the social consequences of economic modernization in general. Mexican instability once again became an issue of US national security. Following the March 23, 1994 assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, Clinton demonstrated US commitment to preventing economic and political crisis in Mexico, moving immediately to extend a $6 billion line of credit to the government.

Early 1994 statements from Clinton administration officials belie a preoccupation with Mexico. They forswear any inclination to intervene in Mexico’s internal matters, and promise to support whoever wins the August 21 presidential election. The Inter-American Dialogue (an organization with close ties to Clinton’s Latin America advisors) pronounced that “free elections are the only course for the stabilization of Mexico.”

Conclusions

Anything beyond NAFTA, Chiapas, stability, and a transition to democracy is secondary to bilateral relations. Evaluations of Mexican anti-narcotics policy have been positive, although discussions over US law enforcement agents abducting Mexican citizens inside Mexico linger. There are border problems arising from the poor treatment of illegal Mexican immigrants, as well as an unresolved dispute over the US embargo on Mexican tuna.

Differences over Central America are gone, and military relations, though not substantial, are good. The principal concern over US national security in Mexico revolves around political stability, and the threat of social decomposition and ungovernability. If NAFTA is to be implemented as envisioned by both Presidents Bush and Clinton, it is critical that the 1994 presidential succession and the Mexican transition to democracy be successful.

Editor’s postscript — As this article went to press, wire services reported the assassination, by an unknown assailant, of Francisco Ruiz Maciel, Secretary General of the PRI.
Calling the Shots

Dario Moreno

The election of William Jefferson Clinton as the first Democratic president in twelve years did not significantly change US policy toward Cuba. The president's policy is still dominated by the perspectives and rhetoric of the Cold War era; it continues the hard-line approach of its Republican predecessors by maintaining the US trade embargo against Cuba, opposing renewal of diplomatic relations, and broadcasting anti-Castro news to Cuba through both Radio and TV Martí. Despite heavy criticism from US allies in Western Europe and Latin America, Clinton remains committed to isolating the island until Castro steps down or meaningfully democratic reforms are initiated.

Clinton's Cuba policy is best understood in the context of domestic US politics and the place that Cuban-Americans hold in them. Cuban-Americans have become the single most important interest group shaping Cuban policy. To woo them away from their traditional alliance with the Republican party, the President has been reluctant to alter the rigid stance of his conservative predecessors.

The Miami Strategy
Cuban communities are concentrated in the important electoral states of Florida and New Jersey, where

Dario Moreno is associate professor of political science at Florida International University. He is the author of The Struggle for Peace in Central America, from University Press of Florida (1994).

the Democrats had a fighting chance for the first time since the 1976 presidential race. Clinton was the first Democratic presidential nominee to actively court the Cuban vote in Florida. His southern electoral base and relatively secure status in most "must win" states presented a rare opportunity for a serious Democratic campaign in Florida. Moreover, Cuban-American voting behavior showed signs of diversifying.

During several visits to Florida, Clinton assured Cuban-Americans that he would lay the groundwork for reversing some of the lingering bitterness of President Kennedy's withdrawal of support for exiles during the Bay of Pigs, and Jimmy Carter's controversial 1977 dialogue with Castro. The Miami strategy of the Democratic presidential candidate was to assure the Cuban-American community that an administration of his party would not lift the economic embargo; ergo his early and highly public endorsement of the Torricelli bill. Soon afterwards, Clinton spent a night raising $125,000 at two separate Miami fundraisers attended predominantly by Cuban-Americans. Follow-up visits by Hillary Clinton (whose sister-in-law María Victoria Arias, a Cuban-American Republican, mobilized fellow Cuban-Americans for Clinton) and Tipper Gore were also successes.

Clinton took his campaign for Cuban-American votes to New Jersey, whose 17 electoral college votes had gone Republican in every presidential race since 1964. With the nation's second largest Cuban-American community, New Jersey, which had given Reagan, Bush, and former Republican Governor Tom Kean wide majorities, figured prominently in the GOP's strategy. To appeal to the state's Cuban-Americans, Clinton stressed his close ties to the Torricelli bill and named Robert Menendez, a Cuban-American Democrat and Congressional candidate, to head the New Jersey Hispanic campaign.

While formally endorsing Bush, Jorge Más Canosa, head of the influential Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) had heavy contact with Clinton. Más Canosa attended a Clinton fundraiser in Miami's Little Havana, displaying a pragmatic streak within an organization often inaccurately depicted as singularly tied to the Republicans. He announced that "although I'm voting for Bush out of loyalty, Clinton's decisive support of the Cuban Democracy Act turned the Cuban-American community around." Beyond opening the lines of communication with the CANF, 13 Cuban-American members of Dade County's 120 member Republican Executive Committee endorsed Clinton in September 1993, expressing their belief that the Democrat would do more than had Bush to rid Cuba of Castro.

Money Talks
Though Clinton carried New Jersey, his Florida campaign fell short of cutting into Bush's two percent margin of victory there. Despite the loss, the new ties forged with Miami's Cuban elite were unprecedented, and continued into the presidency. The Democratic National Committee raised over $500,000 from Cuban contributors in a 1994 Miami presidential
Cuban-Americans politics drives presidential foreign policy

Alexander Watson, Assistant White House event to honor Cuban will be no softening of US policy both parties that he would maintain the embargo. Six months later, Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, echoed these sentiments at a CANF-sponsored fundraiser in Miami, promising that the Clinton team would “continue to pursue those issues that successive administrations have determined to be in our national interest. [The possibility of softening the Cuba policy] is false. Let there be no confusion; our commitment to human rights and democracy for the Cuban people is unshakable.”

The political influence of the Cuban-American community in shaping Cuban policy has been underscored during the recent immigration crisis. Over the summer of 1994, Cuban citizens, sometimes on homemade rafts, began trying to cross the Straits of Florida to reach Key West. By August, the US Coast Guard was rescuing upwards of 2000 rafters a day. Clinton, facing a flood of fleeing Cubans, reversed long-standing US immigration policy and ordered that Cubans without US visas no longer be automatically admitted into the US. Cuban-American political leaders seized this opportunity to induce further tightening of the embargo. After an August 19 meeting with Governor Lawton Chiles (D-FL), Jorge Mas Canosa, and other South Florida community leaders, the President imposed four new restrictions on US-Cuban commercial transaction: (1) The Treasury Department announced that sending money to Cuba would be against the law in most cases. (2) Travel from the US to Cuba became illegal except for “humanitarian reasons.” (3) Gift parcels to Cuba would be limited to “humanitarian items:” food, vitamins, seeds, medicine and medical supplies, clothing and other products specified by the US Department of Commerce; and (4) the US would begin pressuring the United Nations to condemn the state of human rights in Cuba. Moreover, while the Clinton administration agreed to open talks with the Cuban government on migration, it has promised not to discuss broader political and economic issues with the Castro regime without evidence of serious democratic opening.

Cuban-American voters demonstrated that their vote must be courted, and the rising prominence of this voting bloc in presidential campaigns will keep Cuba on the foreign policy agenda for the foreseeable future. Republicans and Democrats alike have displayed a willingness, if not an eagerness, to grant Cuban-Americans veto power over US policy toward Cuba. In the post-Cold War period, decision-makers confront a domestic arena with a wide array of politically influential groups. The absence of a hegemonic foreign policy paradigm broadens opportunities for divergent domestic interests to shape specific areas of policy. Cuban-Americans have taken advantage of this situation to become far more influential in the US political system than mere numbers might suggest. There are approximately one million people of Cuban descent in the US—barely seven percent of the total Latino population. These numbers, however, do not reflect the rapid mobilization of the Cuban-American community in US politics, where it has converted its influence in presidential electoral politics into direct influence on Clinton’s foreign policy.

Hemisphere • Summer 1994 11
Democracy and Debris

Tricia Juhn

Since the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN)’s first major offensive in January 1981, US administrations have sought simultaneously to prevent a leftist takeover and to create space for democratic institutions. During the Salvadoran civil war (1979-1992), the US government provided over $6 billion in material assistance, over a third of which went directly to security forces while supporting the political programs of the governing Christian Democrats (PDC).

Each of the US presidents who held office during the Salvadoran war left his mark. The human rights emphasis of the Carter administration gave way to security priorities in El Salvador. By continually escalating military assistance while ignoring death squad activity, Ronald Reagan helped to turn El Salvador into a volatile partisan issue in Congress. When Bush became president, he sought methodically to disengage the United States from El Salvador.

Events abroad cooperated with President Bush, whose inauguration came only two months before the election of Alfredo Cristiani, an oligarch from the “practical” wing of the rightist ARENA (National Republican Alliance) party. In November 1989, during the guerrillas’ largest coordinated siege of the capital city, the Berlin Wall came down, heralding the close of the Cold War era. Subsequently, negotiating teams representing the government of El Salvador and the FMLN spent 22 months in United Nations sponsored peace talks. These culminated in the December 31, 1991 New York Agreement, and the ensuing cease-fire signed January 16, 1992, in Mexico City.

Once the agenda toward reconciliation had been set, American officials maneuvered deftly to keep it moving, receiving ex-guerrilla leaders in the hallowed halls of the Capitol and exclusive Washington dinner clubs. Although US officials monitored the negotiations, the official contribution came in the form of cash. The US government donated $209 million of the estimated $1.8 billion needed over three years for a wide range of social reforms stressing cooperation with multilateral organizations, particularly ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador) and international finance agencies. Bush’s strategy of diminishing the US profile in Salvadoran politics was made possible by the activism of the two UN secretaries general, under whom the reforms were negotiated (Javier Pérez de Cuellar) and then implemented (Boutros Boutros Ghali).

By the time Clinton took office in January 1993, the Salvadoran peace accords were almost one year into formal implementation, and the cease-fire was holding beyond anyone’s best expectation. Clinton loaded up his inter-American staff with experienced Latin Americanists (see article by Johanna Mendelson Forman) whose principal concerns in El Salvador were to provide material and political support for the post-war reconstruction, culminating in the 1994 elections. Beyond that, Clinton seized the opportunity presented by the satisfactory progress of the peace accords to downplay the Salvadoran role in US politics, so much so that one long time development professional in El Salvador characterized the Clinton policy as “rupture with benign neglect.”

The US embassy staff in-country was turned over, so that few, if any, have been in-country more than a year; a move which indicates that little of what has gone on before is relevant now. Former Deputy Chief of Mission Peter Romero was appointed to Ecuador. He was replaced in April 1993 by Ambassador Alan Flanigan, the former Chief of the Havana Interests Section. An accomplished career diplomat, Flanigan’s appointment is noteworthy because he has no regional experience, another sign that the Clinton administration is not seeking to up our ante in-country.

Clinton has maintained US support of democratic programs in El Salvador, but unlike his three predecessors, has not launched any major political initiatives. In the post-war era, El Salvador has gotten attention proportionate to its role in the inter-American system; and anything less than the obsessive attention it received over the last ten years must feel like benign neglect. Contributing to this perception is that, like the rest of the President’s foreign policy, problems arising out of Salvador are now resolved on a crisis management basis. The long delay in confirming assistant secretary of inter-American affairs

Tricia Juhn is deputy editor of Hemisphere and a doctoral student at the University of Miami. She is writing her dissertation on the demilitarization of public security in El Salvador.
Alexander Watson, for example, hints at a lack of coordination at intermediate levels.

Central American fatigue on the Hill is credited with having created an essentially short-sighted attitude best summarized as “the peace process is far enough along, the elections were clean enough, we’re out.” Such attitudes reflect a general downplaying of all Latin American resource commitment, although El Salvador did relatively well, principally because of individuals in the administration with longstanding commitments to Salvadoran outcomes.

Nevertheless, the oft-lauded “peace dividend” has been less than magnanimous: $69.1 million in US aid for FY 1995, as compared to $230 million in FY 1993 and $94 million in FY 1994. US support for the Salvadoran reconstruction is principally disbursed through the revamped and re-focused USAID, whose country strategy targets poverty alleviation, economic development, family planning, health care, and environmental conservation. In an about-face from previous years, AID is emphasizing bottom up growth through microenterprise, targeting single female heads of households and their dependents as principal beneficiaries of income and employment generating projects. Development officials are now less circumscribed by policy or security in their choice of beneficiaries and Salvadoran national counterparts. Some non-government organizations (NGOs) and grassroots associations have retained a partisan tinge, but aid is now awarded more on performance than politics. After a hiatus of more than ten years, the Peace Corps was to deploy its first group of volunteers in this year, mostly over the central and eastern parts of the country.

The peace accords call for a new civilian police force and academy, a land transfer program, and a National Reconstruction Plan to reintegrate ex-guerrillas into civil society. These programs, particularly the evolution of the new police force and its relations with the armed forces, progressed under minute multilateral scrutiny.

Here too, the contribution of the Clinton Latin American team has been to allow Salvadorans and the UN to take the lead. Rather than taking control of Salvadoran political processes, the US has remained a cheerful and important sideline supporter. For example, US personnel in-country provide technical and material assistance to the under-trained, under-equipped National Civilian Police (PNC).

In a country with El Salvador’s grim past, Clinton’s most valuable contribution has been to signal his preference for transparency in politics. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has published no less than three reports tracking the progress of the new civilian police force in particular, and the peace accords in general, but the US has not dominated the remedial process. The Clinton administration also supported potentially delicate UN initiatives like the July 1993 release of the Report of the Truth Commission, which led to the resignation of the army high command. In the spring of 1994, Clinton declassified embassy cable traffic from the Reagan and Bush years, which confirmed that the US government knew about former Minister of Defense René Emilio Ponce’s involvement in the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests, and that President Armando Calderón Sol had provided at least financial support for death squads during the war.

In the 1994 elections, ARENA and a leftist coalition (of the FMLN, the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, and the Convergencia Democrática), placed first and second respectively. The Christian Democrats dropped to third place, succumbing definitively and publicly to intra-party factionalism. A runoff in the following month gave ARENA candidate Calderón Sol (the former mayor of San Salvador) 68% of the vote to Rubén Zamora’s 32%.

Among the 3900 foreign observers was a US delegation headed by US AID director Brian Atwood. On a National Public Radio interview following the first round, Atwood refused charges that ARENA had a calculated strategy to commit fraud, but did gently admonish the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to correct (for the run-off) the undelivered carnets, names missing from registration lists, 2-3 hour waits, cast-
ing of ballots without secrecy, and the “ratón loco” (crazy rat)—voters running around looking for the correct voting center. While these elections were a marked improvement over a state of civil war, it is widely accepted that some 70-100,000 citizens, many illiterate, were deprived of their right to vote. The official US delegation made an effort to put the most optimistic face on the elections, but others were more forthright in their criticism. One journalist noted that the “carelessness with which these elections were organized and then implemented belied the political class’s true and deep disdain of the average Salvadoran.”

By acceding to elections and a package of procedural reforms hammered out in post-war negotiations, the outer limits of extremist politics moved inward, principally by forsaking the institutionalized application of violence as an arbiter of conflict. This was a clear victory for both Salvadoran democracy and US foreign policy. Nonetheless, El Salvador is living testament to the limited ability of the United States to control events, even in the smallest, weakest states. If peace and prosperity are not forthcoming here—and, in the short run, they certainly will not be—then how to proceed in Haiti, Cuba, or Mexico?

Reconstruction in a democratic context is more difficult because of the deaths from illness of three Salvadorans who, regardless of their ideologies, had the virtue of being skilled politicians: Napoleón Duarte, Guillermo Ungó, and Roberto D’Aubuisson. Few equal to their verve have emerged to lead El Salvador. Neither Calderón Sol’s commitment to democratic reform nor his general competence enjoys widespread confidence. The FMLN has already begun to fragment, and the PDC must identify a more competitive presidential candidate (Fidel Chávez Mena has now lost two races).

Although President Clinton has been widely criticized for his timid and tentative approach to foreign policy challenges, this attitude may have fomented democratization in El Salvador as much as the activism of his predecessors. Clinton’s contribution to US-Salvadoran relations has offered the resources and good offices of the United States in support of Salvadoran and multilateral initiatives. “Our task is to help Salvadorans construct the kind of society they want during an era of scarce resources. This is a big job,” says the new regional director of the Peace Corps in Central America, Vic Johnson. “But Salvadorans themselves have to decide what kind of society they want, and work for it.”

Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships at the University of Florida

The Center for Latin American Studies and the Center for African Studies invite junior and senior scholars to participate in an interdisciplinary program on Afro-American identity and cultural diversity in the Americas, including the Caribbean, Brazil, the US, and the sending areas of Africa. Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, the program will enable visiting scholars in the humanities to spend a year or a semester at the University of Florida to do research in this area.

The program will focus on three interrelated issues in the following sequence: 1) 1993-94 on the intersection of race, class and gender; 2) 1994-95 on literature, religion and popular culture; 3) 1995-96 on historical processes of adaptation to the physical environment through research on material culture, ecological systems and the built environment.

By February 3, 1995, candidates should submit (1) a 100 word abstract, (2) an essay of approximately 1500 words detailing the proposed research, (3) a full curriculum vita, and (4) two letters of recommendation.

Inquiries and completed applications should be addressed to Dr. Helen I. Safa, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611-2037, Fax (904) 392-7682, Telephone (904) 392-0375. Fellows will be announced about April 1, and will be expected to take up residence for the Fall semester by the end of the following August.
## Update: US Assistance

Compiled by Joseph Rogers

### Overall US Assistance to Select Latin American Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOLIVIA</td>
<td>46,550</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>37,448</td>
<td>99,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57,634</td>
<td>39,726</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>35,616</td>
<td>148,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100,532</td>
<td>35,899</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>50,650</td>
<td>202,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>127,561</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>51,117</td>
<td>220,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93,033</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>48,874</td>
<td>159,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,066</td>
<td>4,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>1,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,298</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14,191</td>
<td>17,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>3,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLOMBIA</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>25,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,107</td>
<td>73,224</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>96,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24,250</td>
<td>49,593</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>94,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>49,296</td>
<td>23,383</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>147,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26,379</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>54,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL SALVADOR</td>
<td>247,288</td>
<td>81,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54,791</td>
<td>383,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>198,159</td>
<td>81,029</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48,161</td>
<td>327,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>182,178</td>
<td>66,989</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40,215</td>
<td>280,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>245,719</td>
<td>22,634</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35,527</td>
<td>303,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>198,055</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32,302</td>
<td>242,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXICO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>56,745</td>
<td>70,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>5,043</td>
<td>20,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>19,300</td>
<td>3,913</td>
<td>23,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>7,044</td>
<td>27,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,945</td>
<td>4,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERU</td>
<td>16,498</td>
<td>3,020</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>32,610</td>
<td>62,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,315</td>
<td>1,523</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>51,762</td>
<td>92,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68,827</td>
<td>24,474</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>87,286</td>
<td>199,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,956</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>96,779</td>
<td>129,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>154,556</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>88,844</td>
<td>261,640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Economic data includes Development Assistance and Economic Support Funds.

**Other category includes PL480(a), Inter-American Foundation, Trade Development Program and Peace Corps expenditures.
n the past decade, US-Peru relations have been tested repeatedly by four issues: the emergence of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrilla movement; the proliferation of drug trafficking; Peru’s foreign debt and economic crisis; and the consolidation of democracy, especially human rights violations by security forces. Linkages among these issues were particularly evident in the co-evolution of narcotrafficking and the Sendero movement. More recently, the US government suspended economic aid to Peru until human rights and democracy issues were resolved in keeping with US government expectations.

Drugs and US Policy

During the Reagan/Bush years, Peru became a major target of US anti-drug policies. In the US counter-narcotics scheme, Peru fell on the supply side of the policy formula as the world’s largest producer of coca leaves, the raw material for cocaine. While cocaine consumption was addressed through education campaigns (Nancy Reagan’s well publicized “Just Say No” campaign, for example), the supply side was targeted through coca eradication and interdiction campaigns. The fallout from this ineffective strategy—i.e., the Peruvian perception that the livelihood of thousands of peasant families was threatened—led international observers to note that US policy inadvertently strengthened support for Sendero. As Peruvian and US drug agents stepped up their eradication campaigns, coca growers, mostly peasants, fled into the arms of the guerrillas for protection.

With its powerful new social and economic base among the peasants, Sendero grew in membership and military power. Its geographic area of influence expanded and, in the perception of many Peruvians and foreign observers, came close to challenging the Peruvian military for control of the country. Sendero’s growth forced the Peruvian military to change its strategy. In 1989, the highest political and military authority of the Upper Huallaga valley, General Alberto Arciniega, opted not to attack the area’s peasants, but to seek alliances with them in an effort to combat Sendero. This put Peruvian policy priorities into direct conflict with Washington’s. For Peru, defeating Sendero had become the number one priority; for the US, the eradication of coca plantations came first. The actions of the Peruvian Army were seen as, at best, uncooperative. As a result, high-ranking US officials have repeatedly accused the Peruvian military of protecting traffickers.

Human Rights under Fujimori

Relations between Peru and the US took a new course with the election of President Alberto Fujimori, who took a strong stance against US drug strategy and turned down $34 million in US military aid for FY 1991 to show his disapproval. Instead of a strategy based on police and military repression, Fujimori stressed the need for crop substitution and alternative economic development for peasant families. In response, the US and Peruvian governments signed a new anti-drug pact in May 1991. Shortly after, however, the US Congress put military and economic aid on hold because of charges of human rights violations brought against Peruvian authorities.

George Bush was initially supportive of Fujimori. After the Peruvian’s official visit to Washington in September 1991, Bush praised Fujimori’s economic reforms and leadership in the fight against drugs, and urged Congress to release funds for economic and military aid. Cordial relations, however, were short-lived. In January 1992, US anti-drug operations were put temporarily on hold after a US helicopter was shot down (apparently by Sendero guerillas) killing three Americans and one Peruvian policeman. Then, at the 1992 San Antonio Summit, President Fujimori said that US plans for crop reduction, under current levels of funding, were unrealistic; and US anti-drug strategy a failure in general.

President Fujimori’s decision on April 5, 1992 to suspend the Peruvian Constitution, close down Congress, and fire the country’s judges led to a clear confrontation with the US. Washington’s reaction to the coup was immediate. In a special meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), Secretary of State James Baker announced the suspension of all economic and mil-
itary aid to Peru until democratic institutions were reestablished. Bilateral relations deteriorated further after Peruvian Air Force fighters shot down a US military transport plane on April 24, leaving one US crewman missing and presumed dead.

OAS opposition to Fujimori had economic costs. Although the Peruvian government was following the orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund, the OAS's decision led to suspension of disbursements from the Interamerican Development Bank, restricting Peru's access to foreign capital. International pressure forced Fujimori to make some concessions. Instead of a constitution written by notables and approved by plebiscite, Fujimori accepted the popular election of a Constitutional Assembly, an idea he had initially dismissed.

The auto-golpe also attracted the attention of human rights organizations. Reports of several cases of human rights violations forced the US Congress to scrutinize the Fujimori government and to delay the renewal of economic assistance. The November elections for the Constitutional Assembly, internationally certified, were applauded by Washington officials, although some raised concerns about Fujimori's excessive influence in that body and the judiciary. The Bush administration showed satisfaction with the fulfillment of Peru's international financial obligations but continued to demand an end to human rights violations.

When Bush left office in January 1993, relations with the US were still tense despite international recognition of Peru's economic and electoral initiatives. Relations were still strained over the issue of the downed transport plane, as well as appropriate compensation for the US serviceman killed. The latter issue was finally settled in December 1993, when the Peruvian government agreed to pay $300,000 in compensation to the sole US victim's family.

---

**Internal difficulties within Peru’s judiciary continue to foster clashes between the Fujimori government and the US.**

---

**Cooling Down**

In this conflictual context, Bill Clinton's first policy statement came shortly after the release of a State Department human rights report. He conditioned the participation of the US in the second “Support Group” on an explicit commitment by the Peruvian government to the protection of human rights. Only after a public statement by Peru's Constitutional Assembly and the Peruvian government’s signing of an agreement with the International Red Cross was the financial contribution of the US to the “Support Group” approved. Nevertheless, the US expressed continued concern over unresolved cases of human rights violations, raising particular concern over the excesses of military patrols and rural self-defense committees ( rondas) with rural villagers and university students.

Under Clinton, US-Peru relations have been a mixture of consensus and conflict. The Peruvian government moved decisively on the economic front to please the international financial community. Foreign debt payments were timely, investment laws were liberalized, and a privatization program was unveiled. By year's end, economic indicators pointed toward an economic recovery. The weakening of Sendero, caused mainly by the October 1992 capture of Abimael Guzmán, was a crucial symbol of Peru's recovery. Critics pointed out, however, that Peru's economic program was still missing two important components: a growing export sector and a social program to address increasing levels of poverty.

Politically, municipal elections held in January 1993, along with the approval of a new constitution in an October referendum, strengthened Peru's international image. Still, reports of gross violations of human rights, expedient military trials for those charged with terrorism, and the authoritarian style of the Fujimori administration inspired doubts about President Fujimori's democratic credentials in Washington. A case that gained special notoriety was the July 1992 assassination of nine La Cantuta university students and a faculty member by security forces. Investigations initiated by the Peruvian Congress the following year had to be dropped after army commander General Nicolás Hermoza sent tanks into the streets to show the Army's disapproval. In May, Rodolfo Robles, the third highest-ranking general in the Peruvian Army, revealed the existence of an army death squad responsible for
the assassinations of the La Cantuta students and other disappearances. This death squad, General Robles announced, was connected to the National Intelligence Service, and operated under the direction of intelligence advisor Vladimiro Montesinos.

**Clinton and Peru**

Although respect for human rights and democratic consolidation remain its central concern, the Clinton administration is willing to cooperate with Peru. In the words of Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and former US Ambassador to Peru, Alexander Watson, “There remains legitimate concerns about Peru’s vigilance in protecting human rights, but we can better advance our interests in human rights by being involved and active rather than by withdrawing.”

Some positive developments seem to indicate improvement in US-Peru relations. Campaigning for Peru’s May 1995 presidential elections has begun. The recently approved Constitution allows the incumbent Fujimori to run for a second term. Although the re-election clause is strongly contested (let us remember the Constitution’s narrow margin of approval), candidates and parties have accepted the new political reality and have either announced their participation in the electoral campaign or are considering it. The press remains free. Imprisoned Sendero leaders are writing letters of reconciliation. With low inflation and a timid but hopeful economic recovery, the political-economic climate in Peru appears to have calmed.

Alexander Watson has played an important role in conveying these developments to the Clinton administration to request $150 million for Peru in the foreign aid proposal recently sent to Congress.

Despite the cooling-off period, the governments of Peru and the US could still easily find themselves on a collision course. The complex nature of their relations makes a confrontation almost inevitable. On the economic front, a foreign debt that exacts a heavy price on the Peruvian economy still generates plenty of potential for conflict.

More recently, Peru’s dependence on the financial support of the US for access to foreign markets and capital—crucial conditions for economic recovery—adds to the level of tension.

On the political front, human rights conditions and internal difficulties within Peru’s judiciary will continue to foster clashes between the Fujimori government and the US. The human rights record of Peru is inextricably linked to the armed confrontation between the army and the Sendero, and judging from recent bombings and Sendero-Army skirmishes, the guerrillas, though weakened, have hardly been eliminated. The expected continuation of this undeclared war will inevitably lead the governments of Peru and the US to conflicting perceptions of what constitutes a human right violation.

Finally, US-Peru relations will continue to be tested by opposing views on drug policies. Washington recognizes Lima’s political will to act against cocaine trafficking but also emphasizes that no significant progress is possible without an effective coca eradication campaign. The Peruvian government, in turn, accepts participation in interdiction operations but will not eradicate coca cultivation without providing alternatives for coca growers.

Funding constraints in both governments do not bode well for the success of alternative development programs, which, in turn, adds to the tension and mitigates against improving bilateral relations in this area.

---

**Caribbean Studies Newsletter**

A Publication of the Caribbean Studies Association

The Caribbean Studies Newsletter provides provocative feature articles, institutional news, book reviews, and conference as well as working group news, across the horizon of Caribbean studies. This unique newsletter is a publication of the Caribbean Studies Association (CSA), and is published by the Latin American and Caribbean Center, as well as the Office of International Education, Programs, and Activities, at Florida International University. The CSA is an independent professional organization, devoted to the promotion of Caribbean Studies. The premier professional organization of its kind, the CSA has 950 members from around the world. Membership is open to anyone interested in sharing its objectives. For membership information, contact Raquel Brafovsky-Cabrera, CSA Secretary-Treasurer, Inter-American University of Puerto Rico, San Germán, Puerto Rico 00683.
Island and Diaspora: Cuban Sovereignty, Identity, and Reconciliation in the 21st Century

For 1995-1998, the Cuban Research Institute (CRI) at Florida International University invites scholars of the humanities to explore the themes of sovereignty, identity, and reconciliation in Cuban intellectual and cultural traditions. The objective of the CRI's Rockefeller Fellowship Program is to advance understanding of these crucial and recurrent national themes at this juncture of Cuban history.

Eligibility. Applications from scholars with research experience on Cuba or the Cuban-American community are especially encouraged. Applications from scholars researching these issues in other societies are welcome and will be evaluated on their potential to provide a comparative perspective on the Cuban experience. Awards cannot be made for graduate study or dissertation research. Applicants need not be affiliated with an academic institution.

Terms. Awards will be made for residences of 3 months to one full academic year. The academic year at FIU extends from mid-August to early May. Applications for periods from 3 months to one semester are especially encouraged. Awards are based on a maximum of $35,000 for a full academic year. Additional support may be provided for relocation expenses and health benefits. Fellows are encouraged to combine these stipends with sabbatical and other support.

Application. Complete applications are due February 1, 1995. Awards will be announced by March 15 for the following academic year. To request information and application materials contact:

ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION RESIDENT FELLOWSHIPS IN THE HUMANITIES
Cuban Research Institute
Florida International University
University Park, DM 363
Miami, Florida 33199
Tel (305)348-1991/Fax (305)348-3593
Hegemony and Partnership
Andés Franco

Assuming that Congress approves President Clinton’s “1994 National Drug Control Strategy” (hereafter “Strategy”) without major changes, this administration’s anti-drug policies promise to have a definite impact on US-Colombia relations. First, Clinton’s moderate shift in emphasis from supply reduction to demand reduction ($94.3 million for interdiction in FY 1995, down 7.3% from FY 1994) will produce some relief in Bogotá by partially transferring the drug war from the streets of Colombia to the US. His strategy recognizes that “demand reduction—including drug treatment, prevention, and education—cannot succeed if drugs are readily available, [but it] rejects the false choice between demand reduction and law enforcement efforts.” The FY 1995 request represents a $1 billion increase over last year, and provides additional resources for both supply reduction and demand reduction programs.

Second, the Clinton strategy proposes to “refocus interdiction’s emphasis from the transit zones to the source countries,” which has led to US demands for more vigorous interdiction by Colombian authorities prior to product transit. This has produced some anxiety in Santafé de Bogotá, which views the new interdiction strategy as a way for the Clinton administration to blame the inevitable shortcomings of the drug war on Colombians.

**Washington objected to the judiciary’s excessive independence, since it severely compromised Washington’s ally, the Colombian executive.**

### Hegemony

Washington’s pressure on the Colombian judiciary to arrest and convict members of the Cali cartel is a major source of conflict between the two governments. The Colombian Constituent Assembly’s 1991 ban on extradition, combined with the government’s unwillingness (despite pressure from the Drug Enforcement Agency) to employ military maneuvers against the essentially non-belligerent Cali cartel, forced the Clinton administration to rely heavily on the prosecutorial zeal of the Colombian judiciary as its main policy tool. As such, the scope and pace of judicial reform in Colombia, much of it financed by US aid, creates some dilemmas for Clinton.

The first of these is the National Tribunals (formerly Courts of Public Order) established in 1988 to handle terrorism and drug trafficking, and later expanded to process political crimes. Conviction rates in these courts approach 70% as opposed to 10% in the regular courts. The system, however, is under severe fire for ignoring Constitutional procedures, especially those involving the rights of defendants. The Clinton administration has chosen to ignore the possibility that US aid is financing a judicial system which achieves high conviction rates by abridging the rights of defendants.

The second of Washington’s problem is the autonomy of the attorney general (fiscal general), a residual effect of the 1991 Constitution, which increased the independence of the judiciary in general. The attorney general may express his legal opinions free of political consideration, and the vocal Gustavo de Greiff, appointed at the tail end of President César Gaviria’s term, favored legalization to prevent traffickers from making obscene profits. He also said that the Cali cartel had succeeded in infiltrating Colombia’s judiciary and other institutions. Not only did Washington oppose de Greiff’s opinions, it objected to the judiciary’s excessive independence in general, since it severely compromised the authority of Washington’s ally, the Colombian executive.

Presumably with the encouragement of US authorities, Gustavo de Greiff was “retired” in the early days of the new president, Ernesto Samper.

The third judicial reform is the advent of plea bargaining in drug-related cases. The procedure falls under the jurisdiction of the attorney general, and as expected, has produced strong reactions in Washington. The Clinton administration considers plea bargaining...
Washington gets its wishes and regrets the consequences

an unhelpful shift in policy and took a dim view of the autonomy of the office of prosecutor general in this matter. The US Department of Justice argued that de Greiff was too lenient on the members of the Cali cartel who proposed to surrender, turn over some goods, and promise to leave the drug business in exchange for minimum sentences, which may not be more than five years. De Greiff countered that to convict, Colombia's judiciary depends almost exclusively on the sharing of evidence with the US, and that the US has withheld such evidence. US Attorney General Janet Reno responded in *El Tiempo*, arguing that the US is not withholding evidence and that it has cooperated in many cases, even when the results in various legal proceedings have not been satisfactory for the United States.

**Partnership**

Apart from anti-drug initiatives, the Clinton administration has been directly involved in three others worth noting: the election of César Gaviria as Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS); Washington's tacit support of Colombia's foreign policy towards Cuba; and the possibility of a Colombia-US free trade agreement.

**The OAS**

The Clinton administration realizes that the inter-American system's laws, procedures and organizations are more visible and arguably more effective than any time since 1945. With the purpose of revitalizing the OAS, and institutionalizing aspects of US-Latin America relations in a framework of democracy, free trade, and human rights, Washington and Santafé de Bogotá launched an unprecedented hemispheric campaign to elect President César Gaviria as Secretary General of the OAS. Gaviria's domestic and foreign policies, and regional leadership skills account for Washington's blessing.

**Cuba**

As a regional economic power (with Mexico and Venezuela), Colombia has tried to consolidate its political sway in the Caribbean. When both Venezuela and Mexico were forced to shift attention from foreign policy to domestic turmoil, Colombia acquired unprecedented political influence in the Caribbean. Unable to leave Cuba out of any Caribbean foreign policy initiative, Colombia proposed a free trade agreement with the English-speaking Caribbean countries, approaching nations such as Jamaica and reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba. The US tacitly supported Gaviria's meetings with Fidel Castro, social and cultural cooperation agreements, and economic transactions with Cuba. Colombia's foreign policy did not produce a protest or a condemnation from Washington, nor did it interfere with Gaviria's candidacy to the OAS.

**CUFTA**

CUFTA is the ultimate objective of Colombia's foreign economic policy, and President Clinton has admitted that Colombia is an alluring candidate to join NAFTA in the near future in spite of the drug industry. If CUFTA is instituted, it would become a more permanent, aggressive and comprehensive extension of Washington's unilateral Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). Approved by Congress in 1991 to reward the Andean countries for their efforts in the drug war, the ATPA reduced tariff barriers to many Colombian products and established relatively low rules of origin (35%), but maintained tariff barriers to sensitive items such as textiles, apparel, footwear and sugar, and non-tariff barriers such as sanitary and ecological controls, anti-dumping and compensatory rights, and additional custom procedures linked to drug-trafficking. According to Colombian government statistics 18.5% of Colombian 1990 exports to the US were subject to non-tariff barriers, and over 50% of these were applied to agricultural products (mainly flowers), processed food (sugar and shrimp), textiles, apparel, and leather manufactures.

**Cooperation**

Although US-Colombian relations under Clinton have established some channels for cooperation, Washington's obsession with the prosecution of the members of the Cali cartel makes Colombia's foreign policy dependent and conditional upon total compliance with US policy and objectives in the drug war. The authority of the Colombian state appears to be as hostage to US imperatives as to narco-violence, and in spite of Colombia's political and economic achievements, Clinton retains many features of the Reagan and Bush anti-drug policies.
Chile Forecast

Alicia Frohman

In a flurry of economic, political, social, and cultural exchanges, Chilean-US relations have doubtlessly intensified in the 1990s. Areas of concurrence and cooperation include democracy, human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, the political resolution of regional conflicts, and the convergence of market economies with free trade.

All Lined Up

A couple of years ago, former interior minister Alejandro Foxley told an interviewer that the problems in Chile-US relations resembled those between the US and France or Germany; that is, that they consisted fundamentally of trade matters. At the time, the statement seemed exaggerated. However, a review of 1990-94 bilateral issues basically confirms the truth of Foxley’s assertion. Many of these issues (investment, intellectual property, the environment, air traffic, agriculture, textiles) await resolution, pending inclusion in negotiations toward a free-trade agreement (FTA). The specter of this future negotiation, which has not yet materialized because of bureaucratic tie-ups and uncertainties in Washington, has hovered over Chile-US relations for four years, preventing substantial advances on any other matters.

Most of the knots in bilateral relations during the last days of the Pinochet government began to unwind with Chile’s return to democratic rule in 1990. Chile regained the benefits of the General System of Preferences, US military arms sales became possible once again, and US investment in Chile returned to the fold of OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation). Such initiatives were the direct result of the return to democracy, improvements in human rights and labor issues, as well as the efforts of the Aylwin government to resolve the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffit. In 1976, a hit squad dispatched by Chilean intelligence killed the two (a Chilean and a US citizen, respectively), in Washington, DC.

President Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, particularly its hemispheric free-trade component, received an early and enthusiastic reception in Chile. Democratization and economic reform seemed to make Chile an obvious partner to enter free trade negotiations soon. Since then, most of the bilateral agenda has been viewed with an eye toward an eventual free trade agreement. While Washington’s proposals for hemispheric-wide trade integration languished in favor of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the insistence of Chilean authorities helped keep alive the idea of a broader integration scheme. Washington gave assurances and reiterated its interest in negotiating with Chile and eventually other Latin American countries, but postponed all other initiatives until after NAFTA approval. Latin American governments, particularly Chile’s, confronted the then-recently installed Clinton administration, demanding the free trade plan promised on many different occasions by successive US administrations. Despite innumerable declarations of good intentions, in mid-1994, there were no formal negotiations. The United States has not even defined with whom it intends to negotiate, and whether the chosen path will be NAFTA accession or bilateral negotiations.

Clinton and Chile

Clinton’s policy toward Chile and delays in starting free-trade negotiations are a good example of how, despite the good will of all parties and a lack of contentious issues, bureaucratic tie-ups persist when there are no strong interest groups intent upon eliminating them. The result is that for Chile, a small country of relative economic insignificance to the US, inertia turns out to be more powerful than political commitment.

In Latin America, many believed that a Democratic administration would be more protectionist than its Republican predecessors. In discourse, at least, this has not been the case. The Clinton administration has confirmed its commitment to the democratic political process, free trade, and open markets. Gambling its prestige and political capital to get NAFTA approval constitutes an initial pass at commercial integration south of the Rio Grande. A certain haziness regarding the next steps remains.

Washington has yet to cement its four-year old offer to create a hemispheric free trade area, for which Chile would be a decidedly obvious candidate.

Alicia Frohman is a research associate at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales in Santiago de Chile.
Santiago wants to be the next player in the FTA game

**Accession**

Despite the considerable geographic diversification of Chilean export destinations, the US remains Chile's main trading partner, accounting for approximately 20% of all trade flows. This situation explains both Chile's interest in reaching an agreement with the US, and puts it into comparative perspective, since Chilean trade interests in other places (Latin America, the European Community, Asia), are also significant.

An FTA or NAFTA accession is an interesting possibility for a number of reasons:
- to serve as a guarantee of the stability and credibility of the Chilean economy;
- to create the dispute settlement mechanisms that a small country like Chile needs;
- to protect Chile from arbitrary US trade measures or increased protectionism; and
- to increase exports of processed Chilean goods by eliminating tariff escalation in the US.

The negotiation of a trade agreement with the US is complementary to, not exclusive of, Chile's activist policy of open markets worldwide. Chile is aware that free trade negotiations with the US would have domestic as well as international costs, but is also convinced that in the medium run, the benefits outweigh the adverse effects.

As for the US, the incentives to negotiate with Chile are almost exclusively political. Chile is its 36th largest trading partner, representing less than 1% of US foreign trade. However, to enter negotiations would be a signal that the US is in fact developing a coherent policy toward Latin America that includes rewarding — at least symbolically — democratic and economic reforms. There are no foreseeable insurmountable obstacles in the negotiations, and it seems obvious that an open market like Chile's would not be a problem for the US. The perception that Chile is only the first of many to gain NAFTA accession, however, could become a threat to those fearing competition from the larger Latin American countries. At the same time, its relatively small economy also means that there is no great incentive to negotiate.

**Pending issues**

Most bilateral issues awaiting resolution will probably be sidelined to give free reign to trade negotiations. Certain themes stand out, like intellectual property protection, foreign investment protection and taxation, environmental protection, and international air traffic. Chile has recently passed legislation on all of these topics, not entirely to the satisfaction of the US.

On the subject of counter-narcotics, the US has raised three concerns. In descending order, they are money laundering, export controls on input chemicals to cocaine producing countries, and drug trafficking (although Chile is not currently considered a high risk country). US authorities have indicated that even these subjects could be peripheral to free-trade negotiations. Chile is processing legislation on controlled substances and is interested in greater cooperation with Washington on anti-drug initiatives, conditioned on US respect for sovereignty.

Many of these matters will proceed in a relatively expeditious manner once the Clinton administration overcomes its inertia on Latin America and unclogs the hemispheric free trade negotiations. This will not magically resolve all the problems of the hemisphere, but it will help revitalize the region's economies. Perhaps as never before, in this less ideological and more pragmatic era, Latin America will not only endure, but also derive benefits from the hegemonic proximity of the United States.
Walmart in the Southern Cone

According to a report in Argentina's Trade and Investment News, Walmart plans to open two "supercenters,"—oversized stores that sell retail food and merchandise—and two Sam's Club membership warehouses in Buenos Aires in 1995. Walmart, the US's largest retailer, already has a vast presence throughout Mexico.

Out but Not Down

Rumors of the imminent departure of Colombia's controversial Attorney General (fiscal general de la nación) Gustavo de Greiff, had been circulating in Bogotá even before President Ernesto Samper was sworn into office on August 7. De Greiff became persona non grata after suggesting that the legalization of drugs should be studied, but since leaving office he has become a candidate for nearly every prominent post available. According to Semana, de Greiff is being considered for the post of Colombian ambassador to the Court of St. James.

Marital Woes, Martial Law

When Susana Higuchi, the wife of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, announced her intention to challenge a law forbidding presidential spouses from seeking high office, reaction from the chief executive was swift. Her husband promptly fired her as first lady, deployed an armed contingent to secure her office, and installed iron bars to prevent Ms. Higuchi from re-entering it. Asked if the incident meant conjugal trouble, both Fujimoris called it "merely a difference in ideas."

Brazil Tops Mexico

According to International Data Corporation's (IDC) Latin America Personal Computer Markets, 1994, regional shipments of personal computers to Latin America increased 22% from 1992-1993. IDC projects that unit shipments of PCs will grow at a compound annual rate of 19.5% over five years (1993-1998). Total PC sales in Latin America, estimated last year at more than US$2.4 billion, are projected to double over the same period. In 1993, Brazil's PC market grew by more than 34%, or 480,000 units, making it the region's largest national market for PC sales.

Coca Is It

Once outspoken opponents of US counternarcotics policies in Bolivia, Vice President Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, the first Aymara to reach high office, and Foreign Minister Antonio Aranibar of the leftist Movimiento Bolivia Libre have found themselves in a difficult position lately. In September, thousands of peasants from the coca growing regions of the country—mainly indigenous people—marched on La Paz demanding that the government respect their right to grow coca and that security agencies be held responsible for alleged human rights violations in the Chapare Valley. The government was unsuccessful in disbanding the marchers groups, the US Department of Transportation released the names of nine countries identified as having inadequate government supervision of air safety. Airlines from Belize, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay are barred from landing at US airports. Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Dutch Antilles were granted conditional approval only.

A Monument to Corruption

On September 3, 1994, Argentine president Carlos Menem inaugurated the first of the Yacyreta hydroelectric dam's twenty turbines. Yacyreta, which Menem once described as Argentina's "monument to corruption," is running over six times the initial budget and remains unfinished after eleven years of construction.

Going Somewhere?

Any travel plans to Latin America and the Caribbean in the near future may warrant some modification. In late August, following heavy pressure from consumer
and was forced to negotiate in order to forestall a violent confrontation with security forces. As high ranking government officials, Cárdenas and Aranibar have been forced to defend the official policy of ordering the army into coca growing regions and supporting the eradication of the bush.

24-Hour News Boom

Once the only 24-hour news show in Latin America, CNN faces stiff competition these days. SUR provides a round-the-clock relay of local newscasts from Argentina to Mexico. The regional headquarters of both ECO (Mexico) and NBC are now in Miami. Telenoticias is the new kid on the block; a consortium of Miami-based Telemundo Group Inc., Reuters, Artear (Argentina), Antena 3 Internacional (Spain), and Productora y Comercializadora de Televisión (Mexico). Telenoticias plans to be up in time for the Summit of the Americas, and will broadcast to Spain, Latin America, and a few select regions of the United States.

Fighting Corruption

South American presidents of late have had a very difficult time keeping the lid on corruption scandals. Three former presidents Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil), Alan García (Peru) and Jaime Paz Zamora (Bolivia) have seen their political careers cut short by allegations of embezzlement and connections to drug cartels. Former president Carlos Andrés Pérez (Venezuela) has been fighting for his political life, also against corruption charges. Ecuadoran president Sixto Durán Ballén, has had to defend himself from accusations of nepotism. Fighting corruption has become fashionable in the region. Former government officials from every country have been eagerly signing up as members of Transparency International, an international agency modeled on Amnesty International, to monitor charges of corruption in Latin America and elsewhere.

No Surprises Here

According to the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA/CEPAL), Latin America as a region has grown at a moderate three percent rate for the past four years, kept inflation in check, but has been incapable of dealing with unemployment. Peru leads the region with eight percent growth followed by Argentina at six, and Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica at about four percent. The news is less optimistic about Venezuela, Haiti, and Honduras, whose gross domestic products are expected to fall in 1994.

Below the Belt

Former superflyweight world champion, Colombian Baby Sugar Rojas, took a low blow from the US Customs at Miami International Airport last September. Encouraged by the return of so many aging boxers, Rojas decided to travel to Miami to begin training for a possible comeback. His plans were postponed, however, when Customs inspectors held him for hours on suspicion of having swallowed several bags of cocaine. After searching his bags he was handcuffed and taken to Jackson Memorial Hospital for x-rays, which confirmed his innocence. Rojas’s story, broadcast by Radio Caracol, struck a familiar chord with several Colombian nationals who claimed similar treatment by Customs inspectors at the Miami International airport. Customs officials defend their actions and claim a “low” 25 percent rate of error.

Gallup Arrives in Miami

Citing quick access to growing demand in Latin America, the international firm of Gallup América Latina recently moved its regional headquarters to Miami. The public opinion pollster arrived in August, and is expected to play a major forecasting role in several upcoming elections. The firm’s regional president is Gabriel González Molina. Requests for information can be faxed to (305) 594-9272.

Detective Story

Kroll Associates Inc., the world’s largest corporate investigative firm, has also moved its regional headquarters to Miami. Kroll’s investigators are reputed to have tracked down the hidden fortune of Jean Claude Duvalier, uncovered the link between (former Peruvian president) Alan García and BCCI, and recovered monies smuggled out of Brazil by an aide to (ousted president) Fernando Collor de Mello. The firm has expanded into resolving kidnappings and identifying the sources of illicit fortunes.
“Continuismo” or Convergence?

Johanna Mendelson Forman

Foreign policy will play almost no role in the 1996 re-election campaign. A strong economy, low inflation, and delivering on domestic campaign promises like health care will determine the success of the country’s first Democratic administration in twelve years. Barring military invasion or coup, Latin America and the Caribbean fall off the radar screen to all but the most fervent junkies of hemispheric affairs. Fortunately for Clinton, the region, save Haiti and Cuba, has never been so democratic.

Gnawing problems of human rights violations in Haiti, Colombia, Peru, and Guatemala, and the unabated narcotics trade persist, but even the more skeptical pundits, while questioning the merits of a “new partnership”, admit that Washington’s relationship with its Latin American neighbors is no longer business as usual (See Abraham Lowenthal, “Latin America: Ready for Partnership?” Foreign Affairs, v72, n1 (1993), pp. 74-92). Over the long term, however, the implications for a less activist role may be more troublesome.

Democracy and Human Rights

At mid-term, what has the Clinton administration done to carve out its own policy niche in the hemisphere? In one of his first presidential foreign policy addresses, Clinton stated that “our security and prosperity will be greatly affected in the years ahead by how many of these nations can become and stay democracies.” The administration etched out a tripartite policy embracing democracy and respect for human rights, regional security, and free trade as the bases on which the United States will engage other nations: democratization is the ticket to northern markets. In just under two years, foreign policy terminology has shifted from such cold war concepts as “threats” and “wars against drugs” to “partnership”, “reform”, “symmetry”, “good governance”, and a “substantive symmetry” that Richard Feinberg, Special Assistant to the President at the National Security Council, defines as “a similar agenda rooted in the[ir] common participation in the one-world economy.” Early on, former Deputy Secretary of State Clifton Wharton suggested “Too often in our history, we have turned our attention to Latin America in times of crisis, and we have turned our back when the crisis passes. That is short-sighted and self-defeating. This Administration will not make that mistake. President Clinton is committed to forging a true partnership of the Americas—a Western Hemisphere community of democracies—to strengthen democratic institutions, to defend human rights, to fight for social justice, to support economic reform and free markets, and to protect the environment. And let there be no doubt: We will build a hemisphere of free trade.”

The Bush Legacy

Also evident at mid-term is an element of “continuismo,” most obviously regarding US immigration policy toward Haiti and the Bush counternarcotics strategy (although Congress is no longer willing to fund eradication programs with Cadillac price tags) and the incorporation of sustainable development, a concept more friendly to such constituencies as environmental groups and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Another manifestation of continuismo is the renewed focus on human rights, a throwback to the Carter years. Many foreign policy makers, from the Secretary of State down, served under President Carter, and lessons learned then take on new meaning in a world where democracy is no longer pitted against a communist enemy. A pragmatic approach to human rights has given the subject more consistent policy guidance. Moreover, Clinton’s messengers are people who have earned high credibility as advocates. They include a former ACLU legislative counsel, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, John Shattuck, and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, Mark Schneider,

Lessons learned take on new meaning in a world where democracy is no longer pitted against a communist enemy.

Johanna Mendelson Forman is currently serving as a senior advisor to the Office of Democratic Initiatives in the US Agency for International Development. The views expressed in this article are the personal opinions of the author and not those of the Agency for International Development.
Clinton's Latin America policy at mid-term

Haiti

Nowhere more than in Haiti has Clinton failed. Clinton, the candidate, campaigned against the Bush administration's policy of forced repatriation of boat people. Clinton, the president, immediately did an about-face on this policy once the realities of a massive influx of indigent Haitians hit the consciousness of the US electorate. Haiti was an opportunity to undergird democracy, economic security, and respect for human rights by unilateral action. Now the options are limited and one possible outcome, a multilateral occupation gone awry, could force our new partnership with the region to unravel.

Counternarcotics

In this area, more is less. The Andean Initiative of the Bush administration, the war on drugs enshrined in the Declaration of San Antonio, has become only one of the 'new determinants of global security.' After peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation and sustainable development, and ahead of terrorism, the international drug trade ranks among the new post-cold war security threats, at least according to US State Department Counselor Tim Wirth. The implications of this for regional security are troublesome, given the undue emphasis Bush allowed the Department of Defense to place on the drug war as a key regional military mission. While the Clinton administration's approach to this subject is more complex, there is much room for creativity. Ironically, one of the most successful of alternative development products to emerge as a replacement to coca has been tobacco, a situation that could pit the anti-smoking, anti-tobacco Clinton against the forces of counternarcotics policy.

NAFTA

Having pledged his support for NAFTA passage late in the presidential campaign, the Clinton White House geared up for a down-to-the-finish-line battle for ratification. NAFTA cost Clinton lots of political capital with traditional Democratic allies in labor. Much to the credit of Vice President Al Gore, the public debate over NAFTA probably constituted Latin America's fifteen minutes of fame. Clinton made NAFTA into a political test, not only of his muscle in Congress, but also his ability to translate domestic concerns into substantive foreign policy. For Latin Americans, NAFTA's ratification reinforced the Clinton administration's commitment to support progress in expanding free trade and reducing tariffs, while also promoting regional integration.

At the April inauguration of President Eduardo Frei of Chile, it was no coincidence that United States Trade Commissioner, Ambassador Mickey Kantor, led the US delegation to Santiago. The signals for fast-track trade treaties are sounding loud and clear. Clinton may very well expand the NAFTA to the Southern Cone before the end of 1994. This is no longer the empty rhetoric of the Bush administration's Enterprise for the America's initiative, but rather the pragmatic push of a new approach to regional development.

New Actors and New Visions

The personnel issue within the new administration's Latin America shop started with a tremendous battle which brought Cuba to the fore. Clinton nominated Mario Baeza, a Cuban-American lawyer from New York as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. For weeks the new administration faced the wrath of the Cuban-American lobby, as it cranked up its political machine to show a young president who really ran the show in this area. The administration withdrew Baeza, as it seemed that no Hispanic-American, or even a liberal with academic credentials, could meet the test of the Cuban-American National Foundation. In the end, cold warriors accepted Alexander F. Watson as a compromise candidate. A skilled career diplomat, Watson has helped to bridge the gap between continuismo and convergence.

Part of the administration's Latin American policy comes from Convergence and Community: The Americas in 1993, a report of the
Inter-American Dialogue produced months before the inauguration. Its language became the mantra months before the inauguration. In a lofty series of policy recommendations, the report envisioned its three main areas of interest to create a guiding light for the president-elect by pushing hemispheric economic integration, the collective defense of democracy, and poverty alleviation as the principle objectives of a new policy dialogue with regional leaders. The multilateral nature of the proposals reflected the approach of many of the more liberal scholars and policy makers who had developed these themes in publications and research of their own. The new administration also drew some of its key personnel from the Dialogue’s staff and board, most notably former Dialogue president Richard E. Feinberg, and Sally Shelton, now the new Assistant Administrator of USAID’s Global Bureau.

Other personnel choices include Arturo Valenzuela, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, who manages democracy and Mexican issues. Valenzuela, an accomplished scholar of democratic transitions, is invaluable to the US government in the face of the ongoing Mexican drama. The January uprising in Chiapas and the March murder of the PRI’s presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, combined with expanding pressures for authentic pluralism, make a cool head and an understanding of political change critical at this juncture.

Personnel changes at the Organization of American States also reflect the new multilateralism. The OAS has been repeatedly tested as a new tool in regional diplomacy. Beginning in the Bush administration, and even more so under Clinton’s lead, the OAS has been given a mission which will make it an ever more important tool in our options. The selection of Harriet Babbitt as US Ambassador provided a signal of the administration’s desire to put political muscle behind its appointment. An attorney, Babbitt has translated an interest in the region and friendship with the Clintons into an advantage for the institution. US support of Colombian President César Gaviria over Costa Rica’s former foreign minister Bernard Niehaus marked a turning point in the US approach to OAS leadership, signaling a new commitment to strong hemispheric leadership at a once moribund organization. During attempts to undermine freely elected governments, such as the autogolpe in Peru, the Serranazo in Guatemala and the rumors of a restive military in Venezuela, the Clinton administration used the OAS to signal that such actions can no longer be tolerated in a “community of democracies.”

Old Issues, New Challenges

Central America, the festering wound of US foreign policy during the Reagan years, is healing, thanks to the benign neglect of the Bush administration, the end of cast-aside rivalries, and continuing commitment from a Democratic president to close this sad chapter of hemispheric relations. Foreign aid levels are declining but target Salvador peace accords and support for Guatemalan negotiations. Despite elections, Nicaragua remains a diplomatic nightmare because of continuing political factionalism and predominance of Sandinistas in the state security apparatus. In Panama, the presidential assumption by Manuel Noriega’s political heirs presents the Clinton administration with a test of our commitment to the process.

What is different about Clinton’s approach to the region? The changes are subtle: a distinct change in the tone and feel of foreign policy; a new role for NGOs in the decision-making process. Human rights policy is discussed with mutual respect rather than mutual hostility. Clinton’s trials will ultimately center on a few issues: our ability to remain cool as events unfold in Mexico, preparing a post-Cold War Cuba policy constrained by domestic politics, and developing a new relationship with the region’s military which bolsters civilian control without jeopardizing regional security.

Clinton’s reaction to the political instability in Mexico above all demonstrated respect for the Salinas government, dramatically underscored when minutes after the March assassination of PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, Clinton ordered the Treasury Department to provide an emergency short term loan guarantee to support the peso to prevent disruption of Mexican financial markets. Post-cold war relations with Cuba have been more troublesome. Even a hint of a shift in policy, such as the recent overturning of the US trade embargo toward Vietnam, churned up the waters in the Cuban American community, though the fissures in solidarity are becoming more apparent.

How Clinton directs the missions of the US military toward the hemisphere will indicate whether we approach our neighbors as partner or hegemon. Whether we aid and
abet Latin American militaries in their quest for new missions will certainly be influenced by US approaches to counternarcotics initiatives and Latin American enthusiasm for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The removal of the Southern Command from Panama will be the final symbol of US military domination yielding to the more important trading partnership that will shape US-Latin American relations well into the 21st century.

The Summit of the Americas, scheduled for December 9-10, 1994 in Miami, will mirror the ones already familiar to those following the administration's "newspeak": good governance, democracy and free trade. An important departure of this administration is its willingness to address corruption, a propitious decision since, following the departures of Carlos Andrés Pérez and Fernando Collor, Latin American governments appear to be more sensitive to demands for clean government.

A convergence of interests between the US and Latin America will ultimately help distinguish this administration's approach to the region. Its success will be measured by the continued proliferation of elected democratic governments, the accession of additional members into NAFTA, and the improved enfranchisement of Latin Americans in their own lands. This will take extraordinary commitment, not only from the US but also from the international financial institutions, to develop programs that address the alleviation of extreme poverty, while simultaneously promoting structural reform. Whether an unimperial president can lead the way both at home and abroad will be tested by the stability of our hemisphere, both in economics and politics. Certainly, Clinton's ability to succeed in the hemisphere begins with his ability to remain a leader at home.
The end of the Cold War and the occurrence of recessions in Japan and the European Community (EC) provide the context for understanding the Clinton Administration's economic policies in Latin America. Like President Bush, Clinton is looking toward the Western Hemisphere to bolster the competitive position of the US in the global economy. Both administrations placed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) at the center of their Latin American agenda.

With NAFTA as the base, the Clinton team is drafting a plan to create a Western Hemisphere free-trade zone, with Chile intended as the next member. The plan, which has a timetable of 10-15 years, seeks to lower trade barriers and dismantle governmental regulations blocking foreign investment and trade in the hemisphere. One possible scenario for the trade plan is for the US to negotiate one at a time with each prospective member of the free-trade zone. Another is for the administration to organize the trade pact "cluster by cluster," with regional free-trade groups such as Mercosur, which consists of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, negotiating to enter all at once in exchange for eliminating trade and investment restrictions.

In launching its hemispheric free-trade zone, the Clinton administration hopes to build on its perception of favorable recent trends. First, with lower tariffs, US exports to Latin America rose 27 percent in 1992. Second, Latin America and Europe were the only two regions of the world where the US had trade surpluses last year. These developments have emerged on the heels of the difficult conditions that Latin American countries faced in the 1980s, when capital and resources flowed outward from the region, resulting in negative economic growth rates.

Clinton's policy statements focus on trade and investment to the exclusion of any discussion on the increasing maldistribution of wealth in the region.

In fact, the economic circumstances of the 1980s made Latin American governments—increasingly dominated by a new group of market-oriented economists and finance ministers—more willing to proceed with severe austerity measures to pay off their debts. What some have called the "lost decade of the 1980s" led to moves to liberalize trade and privatize industries, which gave the US greater leverage in promoting exports and foreign investment. At the same time, social programs, including education and health care, were gutted while malnutrition and hunger increased. The number of people living in poverty increased by 39%, or 71 million people, over the 1980s.

The striking aspect of Clinton's policy statements is that they focus on trade and investment to the exclusion of any discussion on the increasing maldistribution of wealth in the region. Like Bush, Clinton's emphasis has to promote NAFTA and hemispheric free-trade as the centerpiece for economic recovery. This is evident from a recent report issued by the Inter-American Dialogue, a moderate think tank founded in the early 1980s to analyze Latin American affairs by a number of the administration's key personnel on Latin American issues (See article by Johanna Mendelson Forman).

The 1993 report, Convergence and Continuity: The Americas in 1993, places first priority on the ratification of NAFTA and on progress toward a hemispheric trade agreement. Furthermore, the report stresses continuity in foreign economic policy by emphasizing the importance of keeping government spending low and minimizing government intervention in the Latin American economies. These measures are regarded as the best way to deal with poverty in the region.

The report argues for a "collective defense of democracy," but offers little new in the way of proposals for advancing democratic institutions in the hemisphere. In fact, Richard Feinberg has argued that the opening of trade and investment and the prospects for democratic consolidation are tied together: "If a society fundamentally disagrees on fundamental issues—the nature of prop-
To improve US competitiveness in a global economy, Clinton turns to Latin America

---

Business supporters of NAFTA disagree on the reasons for pursuing it, which could pose difficulties for a Clinton plan to promote a hemispheric trade agreement.

---

Features: Clinton and the Western Hemisphere
Features: Clinton and the Western Hemisphere

disputes with Japan and Western Europe. In a recent internal White House memo obtained by the New York Times, there was even some concern that Mexico would ally itself with the next entrant into the free-trade pact in an effort to prevent the US and Canada from proceeding with their plans for a giant free-trade area. Although Mexican officials denied this, the White House has already suggested ways to get around future objections by giving the US, Mexico and Canada equal votes on decisions to expand the pact, while future entrants would merely receive votes based on the volume of their trade.

Another obstacle to the Clinton agenda is the potential opposition of organized labor and environmental groups, both at home and abroad, to US plans for increased trade and investment opportunities. The Clinton team felt obligated to attach labor and environmental side agreements to NAFTA in an effort to appease domestic critics. The side agreement on labor provides for the creation of a US-Mexican-Canadian commission based in Dallas, with an executive director and staff of about 15. The panel’s budget for 1995 will be about $3 million and will be devoted to retraining and income support for workers at companies that have moved their operations to Mexico since NAFTA went into effect on January 1, 1994.

Many critics within the US labor movement, however, see the side agreements as woefully deficient in protecting US workers hurt by the agreement. Furthermore, most Mexican unions opposed NAFTA even with the side agreements, arguing that it would do nothing to improve the conditions faced by Mexican workers, whose wages declined steadily in US owned assembly plants during the 1980s. Mexican workers in the auto sector have been attempting to form democratic unions by breaking away from the government-controlled Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM). At the same time, US firms have worked with the Mexican state to control and, at times, to prohibit democratic union organization in Mexico.

For example, Ford, General Motors (GM), and Chrysler have shifted the principal location of automobile production from Mexico City to export-oriented manufacturing facilities in central and northern Mexico. The relocation was based on three interrelated factors: the export incentives promoted by the Mexican government, the virtual absence of independent labor organizations in the new locations, and the opportunities to restructure capital-labor relations on terms more favorable to capital. Where possible, firms preferred to deal with the relatively conservative CTM.

The actions of US auto firms have resulted in increasing conflict between the Big Three and democratic unions in Mexico. GM used its political leverage to ensure that its engine and automobile plants at Ramos Arizpe were closed to democratic unions. In 1980, the democratic union at GM’s Federal District plant fought a 106-day strike (the longest in Mexican history) for the right to represent workers at the northern GM plants. According to political scientist Kevin Middlebrook, GM management, with the cooperation of CTM unions and the Mexican government, won the battle, ensuring that the unions at Ramos Arizpe would be controlled by the CTM.

The international labor conflicts around NAFTA could be repeated in other contexts, as the Clinton administration prepares to expand the free-trade agreement on a hemispheric basis. Along the way, expect US labor groups to insist, at a minimum, upon protection for their membership in future trade agreements. The extent to which US labor groups form alliances with their international counterparts abroad is key to how much leverage they will eventually have over the future of labor and management. ■

In the next issue of Hemisphere...

JACK CHILD on Peacekeeping and the Latin American militaries

CRISTINA EGUZÁBAL on the State of Civil-Military Relations in the Americas

JENNIFER MCCOY on the Meaning of Mexican Elections

and our commentaries on Intervention and the United States
• TRANSITION IN CUBA •

New Challenges for US Policy

A report by the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University
Sponsored by the US Department of State • Project Director: Lisandro Pérez

Fifteen Cuba specialists report on the limits of and
opportunities for US foreign policy in a post-Castro Cuba:

Jorge Domínguez, Harvard University
Marifeli Pérez-Stable, State University of New York/College at Old Westbury
Gillian Gunn, Georgetown University
Damián J. Fernández, Florida International University
Roberto Cuellar, Inter-American Institute for Human Rights
Rhoda Rabkin, Harvard University
Luis P. Salas, Florida International University
Anthony P. Maingot, Florida International University
Sérgio Díaz Briquets, Casals and Associates
Jorge Pérez-López, US Department of Labor
Rolando H. Castañeda, Inter-American Development Bank
Jorge A. Sanguinetti, Development Technologies
A.R.M. Ritter, Carleton University
Sergio G. Roca, Adelphi University
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, University of Pittsburgh

Order Form - Transition in Cuba

Name
Address
City/State/Province/Zip Code
Country
Telephone/Fax

Number of Copies at $50 each Total: $

☐ Check or Money Order enclosed
☐ Charge: ☐ VISA ☐ MasterCard

Card Number
Expiration Date
Signature

Mail this form with payment to: Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, DM 363, Miami, FL 33199
Or call (305) 348-1991/fax (305) 348-3593 and charge it to your credit card.
Candidate Clinton charged that the Bush war on drugs was "phony," but President Clinton's "new and improved" strategy has proven to be little more than a kinder and gentler replica. This is particularly true for US-sponsored drug control efforts in Latin America. Underneath the softer, more understated packaging is the same basic supply-side drug control approach of years past. But the Clinton anti-drug strategy exists more by default than by design, maintained by institutional inertia and a failure of imagination.

At first glance, Clinton appears to have made some notable changes. Gone is the militaristic and inflated rhetoric of earlier years—references to the "war on drugs," for example, are noticeably missing in recent administration reports and statements. International drug control is presented as merely one piece of a larger foreign policy agenda that includes promoting democracy and free-market economic reforms. Gone is the crusading moralizing tone which so distinguished Republican predecessors. Perhaps most importantly, other pressing issues—health care, crime, the North American Free Trade Agreement—have largely monopolized the political spotlight since Clinton took office.

Signs of potential change in dealing with drugs came early on in Clinton's term. In 1993, he slashed funding for the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) by 80 percent, and then-Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty told the press, "President Clinton believes that resources to fight the drug problem should go to education, to treatment and to enforcement at the state and local level." The ONDCP is the drug czar's office—a bloated institution which had come to symbolize the get-tough, punitive approach to drug control under Republican leadership.

**Latin American leaders, accustomed to having to appease Washington's drug-phobia, wondered if all the fuss about drugs during the Reagan/Bush years was merely a passing fad.**

On its list of priorities, the National Security Council demoted drug control from one of the top three to number 29 of 29. Moreover, the institutional guidance of the international drug control campaign was challenged when Secretary of State Warren Christopher requested that the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters be merged with other missions, including terrorism and crime. Consequently, Latin American leaders, who had grown accustomed to having to appease Washington's drug-phobia in order to secure US economic aid and diplomatic goodwill, rightly wondered if all the fuss about drugs during the Reagan/Bush years was merely a passing fad. US-Latin American trade issues, particularly the negotiations over NAFTA, quickly sidelined the security concerns that had defined relations with the region in the 1980s. Attacking drugs, especially at the source of production, seemed to be relegated to the "back burner" of administration and public concerns. Clinton rarely even mentioned drugs since taking office.

Yet the appearance of a policy shift is deceptive. What is tempting to interpret as a change in policy is perhaps better described as a course of neglect. Drug control has gone from high- to low-profile, but the substance of the international dimensions of the American anti-drug strategy remains largely intact. While Clinton has been less vocal than was Bush in his enthusiasm for foreign anti-drug campaigns, the US strategy in Latin America, along with the institutions that have been mobilized to carry it out, remain firmly in place. Nevertheless, it would be an overstatement to say that this is a carefully designed, deliberate policy decision by the administration. Rather, it is largely the result of bureaucratic momentum and a failure of will—a willingness to let the status quo continue while Clinton wrestles with issues considered to be more important.

Thus, the more things seem to have changed, the more they have remained remarkably the same. Rhetoric aside, Clinton's first drug budget was basically a carbon copy of the Bush plan; in Clinton's FY 1995 $13.2 billion request for anti-drug programs, the main interna-
tional shift was to shave a mere $100 million from the $1.2 billion interdiction budget.

According to Lee Brown, head of the ONDCP, the new strategy announced in February represents a "controlled shift" away from the Pentagon's costly focus on sea and air lanes in Central America and the Caribbean toward "institution-building" and enforcement operations aimed primarily at major drug traffickers in the main producer countries. "Our effort is to try to stop the drugs before they leave the source countries," Brown has noted. He told a congressional committee that "It's easier to stop the drugs there than when they leave." To those who have followed official rationales for foreign drug control campaigns over the years, Brown's words will no doubt spark a feeling of deja-vu. In the late 1980s, it was George Bush who appealed to similar supply-side logic, arguing that "The cheapest and safest way to eradicate narcotics is to destroy them at their source."

Programmatic tinkering in the mix between interdiction and source country efforts is nothing new. In this case, it seems to have been prompted by a September 1993 National Security Council conclusion that interdiction had proven far too costly and ineffective, but in the end, the declared shift in emphasis only reduces the interdiction portion of the budget by seven percent. International drug control programs, on the other hand, are up by 22 percent over last year's budget, from $351 million to almost $428 million. US funds allocated to international drug control are lower now than they were under Bush, but the decrease is a result of last year's congressional cuts, not the administration's. The Executive branch has sought to maintain or raise the level of spending for most programs since then.

The centerpiece of the freemarket campaign may also ease access to the American drug market. As the flow of goods across the border increases under NAFTA, it becomes more and more difficult to "weed out" illegal flows.

Maintaining programs that have proven largely ineffective is often justified on defensive grounds. "We can’t stop our efforts—that would be to doom a number of these countries to even greater attack by narco-traffickers," says Timothy E. Wirth, a State Department official who advises the White House on drug policies. Thus, rather than the gung-ho roll-back philosophy toward drug trafficking of the Reagan/Bush era, the Clinton approach sounds more like a policy of resigned containment. It is basically a kind of holding-action, driven by the belief that is easier to shift into a lower gear than to build an entirely new transmission.

Thus, in practice, operations on the ground continue on in much the same mode as in previous years. The list of drug-related programs is familiar: crop eradication, substitution, destruction of processing labs, targeting of major traffickers, judicial reform, and so on. While the role of the Department of Defense is scheduled to be scaled back slightly on the interdiction front, the Pentagon has asked Congress to approve its participation in training Latin American police forces.

The role of Latin militaries in the drug control effort will presumably be reduced as Pentagon-trained paramilitary police forces become operational. But while de-escalating the involvement of local militaries in the anti-drug campaign is welcomed by many, a greater role for militarized police forces means that the punitive supply-side logic of the strategy persists.

In Colombia, US assistance continues to focus on the twin objectives of counterinsurgency and counternarcotics through support to the country's police and military forces. The US provided intelligence and communications support during the hunt for drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, and US military personnel operate ground-based radars to monitor overflights of potential drug traffickers. American military teams continue to train with their Colombian counterparts, and US troops are helping the Colombians build a series of bases, according to US ambassador Morris Busby, to "increase the battlefronts against the guerrillas and narcotrafficking organizations." Apparently, the administration is not particularly concerned about the continued blurring of the distinction between anti-drug and anti-guerrilla campaigns.
Features: The Drug War Revisited

US Counterdrug Assistance to Selected Countries


US Military Assistance to Selected Countries

Meanwhile, the Colombian drug trade continues to flourish. Escobar is dead and the Medellin drug cartel is crippled, but the Cali cartel has quickly captured Medellin's lost market shares, and is now responsible for some 80 percent of the cocaine exported to the United States. Moreover, both poppy and marijuana crops are expanding as Colombia's drug entrepreneurs continue to diversify their exports. So far, the Colombian government has shown little interest in confronting the Cali traffickers, although this may change as a result of highly visible US pressure on the new Colombian president, Ernesto Samper.

In Peru, the administration has renewed aid to the Fujimori government, with $42 million requested for drug control. The US-funded Santa Lucia anti-drug base in the Upper Huallaga valley has been declared defunct as trafficking operations have moved out of the base's range, but the US will reportedly support new mobile bases in the valley and beyond. US-supported helicopters have been transferred to a facility in Pucallpa, 200 miles to the east, and State Department drug control funds will pay for future changes. Peru continues to produce about two-thirds of the world's supply of coca, the raw material for cocaine, which generates more foreign exchange than any other export.

For drug control operations in Bolivia, the administration requested $68 million. The US is calling joint anti-drug efforts there a great success, noting Bolivia's "political will" to curb the drug trade. The successes—measured numbers of arrests, amount of drugs seized, and laboratories destroyed—have nonetheless barely dented the nation's expansive illicit export industry, which remains Bolivia's single most important source of employment and foreign exchange.

While Bolivia has traditionally specialized in coca production, increasing amounts of cocaine are now being refined as well.

**Prohibiting the movement of some goods (i.e. drugs) while liberalizing virtually everything else is a recipe for policy frustration**

There is more continuity than change in other areas of the administration's foreign drug control strategy as well. In order to assure "progress" abroad, the Clinton administration plans to not only continue to tie economic aid to anti-drug objectives in the region, but promises to toughen the certification process. In the past, critics charged that practicing such "conditionality" failed to promote broader US international development objectives, and fostered mistrust and resentment among recipient nations. While the effectiveness of such a heavy-handed approach remains dubious, Washington officials apparently believe it gives them needed leverage over many drug producing nations.

In a rhetorical move, the administration has also packaged its support for democracies and free-market reforms as contributing to the fight against drugs. According to the administration's most recent National Drug Control Strategy report, "...the growth of democracy and free-market economies presents new international narcotics control opportunities that did not exist a few years ago. The United States finds that democratic, market-oriented governments are much easier to work with and more willing to cooperate with the international community in a common effort against the illicit drug industry. This allows greater international cooperation against the drug trade and...the development of more sophisticated and comprehensive strategies to reduce both the incentive and capacity for international narcotics trafficking."

This sounds reasonable enough, but in practice it is not at all clear that liberalizing markets will make it easier to prohibit illicit drug markets. Since licit and illicit markets are intimately intertwined in many of Latin America's drug producing countries, market deregulation may actually have the effect of making it more difficult to regulate the drug trade. Prohibiting the movement of some goods (i.e. drugs) while liberalizing the movement of virtually everything else is a recipe for policy frustration.

For example, some drug control officials have acknowledged that NAFTA, the centerpiece of their free market campaign, may also ease access to the American drug market. The basic problem is that as the flow of goods across the US-Mexican border increases under NAFTA, it becomes more and more difficult to "weed out" illegal flows. For example, about 1,700 trucks cross over to the United States from Juarez, Mexico every day. One US customs official conceded that "most trucks that go through customs go through almost unimpeded." Under the trade agreement, trucking into the US from Mexico will expand significantly, since Mexican truckers will eventually be able to travel anywhere in the United States and Canada. As an unhappy omen of things to come, US law enforcement officials believe that the biggest cache of cocaine ever seized in the United States (a one ton supply found in a Los Angeles warehouse) belonged to the owner of one of Mexico's biggest trucking companies. The more things change, the more they stay the same.
Features: The Drug War Revisited

Southcom in the Andes

Sewall H. Menzel

One team, one fight! In the Andean drug war, the US military's Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is the Department of Defense's (DOD) lead agency. After roughly one decade of supporting US anti-drug policy in the Andes, the balance of resources expended versus results garnered is causing some frustration for the US Government. Some notable tactical successes in intelligence, operations, training and logistical assistance have contributed to the dismantling of entire narcotics organizations, temporarily disrupted cocaine production and distribution, and led to the capture of drug "kingpins". Despite these partial tactical victories, stemming the tide of cocaine into the US is at best elusive and indeterminate.

Lessons from Bolivia

SOUTHCOM was thrown into counternarcotics operations during the mid-1980s as part of the Reagan administration's militarized approach to suppressing the flow of cocaine into the US. By the end of 1985 the drug war in the Andes was bogged down in a quagmire of socioeconomic and political problems endemic to the cocaine producing countries of Bolivia, Peru and Colombia.

Able to plan, organize, coordinate and deploy Army, Navy, and Air Force components from headquarters in Panama, DOD was a logical candidate to become one of the lead agencies in embassy- and DEA- (Drug Enforcement Administration) sponsored anti-drug operations.

The possibility of the Andean militaries shooting down innocent civilians as a result of US intelligence reports casts an ominous shadow over aerial interdiction.

This capability was clearly demonstrated in 1986 when, with only two weeks notice from the White House, SOUTHCOM deployed the helicopter supported Task Force Janus (160 men and six Blackhawk helicopters) in support of DEA-directed anti-drug forces in the semi-tropical plains of the Bolivian Beni.

"Operation Blast Furnace" propelled the US military into the drug war in no uncertain terms. Ten years and several billions of dollars later, decisive results have yet to be achieved.

In Bolivia, Blast Furnace's initial impact on narcotics trafficking was significant but short-lived, owing to its focus on the laboratory system throughout the Bolivian Amazon. When the US military left, narcotics traffickers immediately resumed production and marketing. By early 1987, they were operating as though nothing had ever happened. US military strategists were convinced that sponsoring similar operations on a sustained basis would resolve the problem.

That same year, under the code name "Red Dragon", the US Embassy in La Paz hosted a series of SOUTHCOM Special Forces (Green Berets) teams, which trained the Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural (UMOPAR), Bolivia's elite rural anti-drug police. UH-1 helicopters and "Piranha" swift boats became part of the plethora of assets that DOD and SOUTHCOM provided in support of the DEA/UMOPAR operations.

At a SOUTHCOM conference in Panama, statements from Ann Wrobleski, then Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), confirmed that the US did not have a sound overall anti-drug strategy: "We just operate!" was the policy in play. In military circles, comparisons to the erstwhile US policy during the Vietnam War were unavoidable. As in Vietnam, successful tactical operations were conducted in the vacuum of a genuine strategy focused on an enemy "center of gravity" (a Clausewitzian term).

In the military, identifying a center of gravity is vital to plan the use of military assets for decisive results. The key question then is: What is the center of gravity in the Andean drug war? Is it the hundreds of thousands of coca farmers spread throughout the Andes? the thousands of laboratories? the air, land, sea, and riverine transportation systems? precursor chemicals involved in the production of cocaine products? the drug lords, or their minions/organizations? While the debate raged, US anti-drug efforts...
Partial tactical victories do little to stem the flow of cocaine

1993 Latin American Cultivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>250,000</th>
<th>200,000</th>
<th>150,000</th>
<th>100,000</th>
<th>50,000</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coca</td>
<td>198,893</td>
<td>195,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana</td>
<td>26,240</td>
<td>16,220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **cultivated**
- **net product**

Data from coca producing countries: Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador

Data from marijuana producing countries: Mexico, Colombia


shifted back and forth over a spectrum of "centers of gravity." SOUTHCOM continued to provide Tactical Assistance Teams (TATs) to the US Embassy in La Paz to assist in the operational planning and targeting of narcotrafficker activities.

In 1989, the Commander-in-Chief of SOUTHCOM General Maxwell Thurman put forth a strategy constructed on Blast Furnace's lessons. He wanted to put US military forces in the field, pitting them directly against narcotraffickers. While Thurman's proposal did not meet with the approval of the Bush White House, it was instrumental in expanding SOUTHCOM's role in intelligence, training, and operations planning.

Thurman's Operation "Support Justice" placed radars in Santa Cruz and in the Beni (Bolivia), while aerial platforms in the form of AWACs (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft provided information to so-called Joint Tactical Intelligence Coordinating Centers in country. Through Operation "Stone Bridge," US Navy SEALs and Marines trained Bolivian Navy and Police riverine patrols while Green Berets trained infantry battalions in anti-drug functions.

SOUTHCOM's activities did enable the DEA and Bolivian anti-drug police to break up and dismantle the several important drug trafficking organizations, including the infamous Isaac "Oso" Chavarria clan. Despite the success of preventing about a third of Bolivia's cocaine production from reaching US shores, (representing only about 10 percent of the world total), narcotrafficker resilience enabled the cocaine manufacturing process to flourish even under the increased presence of US military support.

Even civic action efforts, used extensively in Vietnam, were brought into play in Bolivia to ameliorate the potentially negative image of a heightened US military
presence. Despite medical facilities, schools, and runway construction projects, civic action became extremely controversial. In 1993, when the Bolivian Congress failed to approve US troop presence, these activities were canceled.

Peruvian Failures

In Peru, SOUTHCOM support operations mirrored activities in Bolivia, but with even more dismal results. Owing largely to a complex alliance between the Shining Path insurgents and the narcotraffickers, the DEA base at Santa Lucia in the Upper Huallaga Valley proved ineffective in stemming the flow of roughly two-thirds of the world’s cocaine supply (about 1,000 metric tons)—not for want of US military support.

SOUTHCOM worked around the problem by implementing an aerial interdiction support campaign using ground based radars along the north Peruvian border with Colombia in conjunction with AWACs aircraft to deal with the reported 70 to 90 narcotrafficker flights per month (interspersed among hundreds of other legitimate commercial flights). US radar on the ground and in the air handed off suspected targets to the Peruvian Air Force which proceeded to force or shoot down suspected narcotraffickers. A two year tally by early 1992 indicated that some 124 aircraft had been reported as shot down (out of an estimated total of some 2,000 flights) and things were thought to be going reasonably well until May 1992, when the Peruvian Air Force shot down one of SOUTHCOM’s C-130s on a clandestine reconnaissance mission. The controversy generated by this incident put US-Peruvian military relations on ice for about a year. Since the narcotraffickers saturated the airways and flew at night, smuggling continued via state-of-the-art narco-aircraft guided on SOUTHCOM radar beams, flying at tree top level to avoid detection.

Narcotraffickers merely write off the losses inflicted by SOUTHCOM and other anti-drug agencies as the cost of doing business.

Colombian Promises

In Colombia, SOUTHCOM focused considerable support and effort beginning in the late 1980s. Multi-service training and support teams work with Colombian Navy, Marines, Army and Air Force units operating in conjunction with the government’s anti-drug police forces. Intelligence, logistics, operations and maintenance trainers, advisors and technicians have been brought into play to enhance the aerial lift support and air surveillance capabilities of the Air Force, the riverine capabilities of the Marine Corps and the ground capabilities of the Army. Green Berets, SEALS and Marines are now allowed to accompany Colombian military and police forces on anti-drug “training” patrols against the narcotraffickers. As in Bolivia, US Army civic action construction projects stirred a huge controversy and were curtailed in 1993.

In terms of intelligence support, the US military’s role is significant. Ground based radars, AWACs and other all-source intelligence gathering systems have assisted in the capture of some key narcotraffickers plying their trade throughout Colombia. In addition, Aerostat radar balloons operating as part of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network have hampered the flow of narco-trafficker aircraft through Central America and the Caribbean.

After spending about $1 billion for the aircraft and ships to detect and monitor drug smuggling, SOUTHCOM estimates that between 1,500 and 3,000 aircraft and some 3,000 to 5,000 drug smuggling ship movements take place each year. Aircraft entering and exiting Colombia alone have a choice of some 497 authorized airports and another roughly 11,000 dirt airstrips. Narcotraffickers have also resorted to fiberglass mini-submarines.

Ironically, the aerial interdiction issue came to a head in early May 1994 when the Pentagon and other government legal authorities persuaded the National Security Council and the president to stop sharing US radar intercept information with the Andean governments. There was an evolving, yet sincere fear, on the part of the US government that the US was inadvertently making itself party to human rights violations. The possibility of the Andean militaries shooting down innocent civilians as a result of US intelligence reports casts an ominous shadow over the aerial interdiction portions of the US anti-drug policy. That the change in the policy was made abruptly with little or no coordination with the governments of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia added considerably to existing tensions that had arisen from the US’s apparent lack of confidence in its dealings with Andean anti-drug allies.

The US military’s intelligence targeting and interdiction support efforts were part of President Bush’s Andean Initiative. This was part of a deliberate “three tier” anti-drug interdiction strategy for the Americas (disrupting narcotrafficking along the US frontier, in Central America and the Caribbean, and the Andes) implemented from 1989 into 1994. Yet all was not well.

A September 1993 report from the General Accounting Office (GAO/NSIAD 93-220:3) concluded “the government’s investment in
Features: The Drug War Revisited

military OPTEMPO (flying hours and naval steaming days) does not appear to be providing a reasonable return. Estimated cocaine flow has not appreciably declined and most drug smugglers are not interdicted.” Reacting to the critical report and its own analysis which indicated that the drug flow from the Andes had not been sufficiently curtailed as to effect its availability on US markets, the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s new strategy for 1994 began a “controlled shift” of interdiction assets to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. President Clinton’s Presidential Directive 14 effectively curtailed the Bush “three tier” strategy to focus principally on the Andes.

DOD worried that overall combat readiness of the SOUTHCOM forces involved in anti-drug operations might be eroded by the expanded military role in the drug war. Using military equipment designed for fighting wars but employed for law enforcement was no longer cost effective. Funding for military anti-drug surveillance grew from $212 million in fiscal year 1989 to $962 million in fiscal year 1992.

Facing the Truth

Why does narcotrafficking flourish in the face of extensive US military anti-drug activity and deadly confrontations with local government police and military forces? The answer lies in the fact that the US military, at the behest of the US government, has seized upon a false center of gravity focused on the supply side structure of the narcotraffickers in the Andes. The key center of gravity, only now beginning to be understood by the US government but not yet properly addressed, lies on the demand side. Strong demand, reinforced by high profits involving thousands of dollars per kilogram of cocaine produced and sold in the United States and Europe, drives and motivates the supply structure of narcotrafficking in the Andes. Narcotraffickers merely write off the losses inflicted by SOUTHCOM and other anti-drug agencies as the cost of doing business. When one narcotrafficker group is brought to bay and forced out of business, another merely rises and continues the former’s place. As in Vietnam, the focus on a false center of gravity in the drug war strategy has stymied the US government and its military, preventing anti-drug policies from achieving decisive results.

Mellon Foundation
Doctoral Fellowships in Caribbean Studies

The Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University (FIU) is offering a limited number of Mellon Foundation Doctoral Fellowships in Caribbean Studies for academic year 1995-96. Candidates must be successful applicants to FIU doctoral programs in economics, international relations, history, or comparative sociology, and demonstrate graduate research potential on or within Caribbean area studies. Fellowships include a two-year stipend, full tuition, and are renewable. Applicants with M.A. degrees will be given priority. Mellon Fellowship applicants should submit the FIU graduation application. In addition, copies of their university application, including transcripts and GRE scores, and the Fellowship application (with attachments) should go to Tricia Juht, Research Coordinator, LACC, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199. Inquiries may be directed to tel. (305) 348-2894/Fax (305) 348-3593 or e-mail JUHNT@SERVAX.FIU.EDU.
Politics of Perception

Jennifer E. Smith

Images & Intervention: US Policies in Latin America
by Martha Cottam
Pitt Latin American Series,
226 pp., bibliography and index.

Drawing on the framework of political psychology, political scientist Martha Cottam analyzes the last half century of US foreign policy in Latin America. Now well into the post-Cold War era, Cottam asserts that North-South relations in the hemisphere have altered little since the bipolar days, and does not anticipate change so long as the US image of Latin America as "dependent" continues to hold.

Across a range of cases, Cottam identifies US policy makers' cognitive image of Latin American countries as dependent—weak, inferior, childlike, inept, and corrupt—as the prime mover of coercive policies characterized by "ordering rather than negotiating, using coercive instruments when none are called for, and expressing contempt for the dependent's people" (p. 63). The shift from coercive behavior into outright coup (intervention) occurs when Latin American governments become associated with the perception of the enemy, as in the cases of Guatemala (1954), post-1960 Cuba, and Chile under Allende (1970-73). Despite the inauguration of radical reform policies in 1952 Bolivia, no such intervention occurred because the government of Victor Paz Estenssoro, by winning the advocacy of then-President Eisenhower's brother Milton, manipulated its image away from associations with the enemy. Similarly, the Peruvian nationalizations of the late 1960s-early 1970s invoked the dependent image, which inspired some medium-range economic sanctions, but forestalled the likelihood of outright US intervention. During the Central American crisis, the perception of the isthmus's association with the enemy explains the intense preoccupation with containment/rollback strategy that began at the tail end of the Carter administration, peaked under Reagan, and diminished as the Eastern bloc began to crumble during the administration of George Bush.

The dependent image of Latin America, however, did not change; and perhaps more menacingly, gunboat diplomacy took on a new unpredictability with the dissolution of containment as a unifying security goal. The December 1989 US invasion of Panama, for example, demonstrated that "the enemy image simply conditions the nature of the intervention...without containment, the manner of interference is less predictable...the perception and evaluation of the dependent [regime]...and US domestic...conditions take on much greater importance. The instruments, on the other hand, still resemble...gunboat diplomacy" (p. 162).

Explorations into the connections among image, perception, and power politics take on new and urgent relevance in this age of the media onslaught. Opinions held by and relations among decision makers are formed not over a series of interactions, but instantaneously, through television and print media. Similarly, the choices of leaders can be narrowed and broadened by constituents' perceptions of public policy issues. For a number of years leading up to the US Congressional vote on the North American Free Trade Agreement, Mexican President Carlos Salinas orchestrated a masterful public relations blitz to sell a new image of his country as the modern civilization of unlimited socio-economic potential (See report by Raul Benitez Manaut). Fidel Castro's successful manipulation of the Imperial Yankee has the net effect of narrowing options for Cuban citizens: no matter how tight things get, it's better than living with the enemy. And most shamelessly, the protagonists in the Haiti drama unfurl one image after another to achieve their separate ends.

But perhaps more than in any other public policy debate, the US government's war on drugs fights a constant battle—which it sometimes wins—with perception and image. US policymakers tend to define anti-drug efforts as an actual or potential security threat. Latin Americans, in contrast, present narco-trafficking more as a problem of public health and law enforcement. Only since the waning days of the Cold War, and presumably motivated by a desire to tap into US resources, have Latin American gov-
ernments been willing to define narcotrafficking principally as a national security threat. In practice, US political hegemony, and its control over valuable external funding resources, has meant that Latin Americans concede to US perceptions and definitions of public policy issues, or face the consequences. A recent example is the highly visible squabble between the Clinton State Department team and the new Colombian president, Ernesto Samper, who, immediately after his electoral victory, was summoned to Washington to "discuss" his pending anti-drug strategies.

Reinforcing important disagreements over public policy issues are the monolithic perceptions touted by Latins and North Americans regarding each other's civilizations. Latin Americans view American demand for drugs as a natural consequence of that society's vice-ridden, excessive consumer mentality. US government anti-drug efforts, therefore, are a placebo as long as demand continues. On the other hand, even among the educated personnel at the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, US perception of Latin Americans is colored by the old myths of the Black Legend and the inherent corruptibility and lawlessness of Spanish colonials. US anti-drug strategy, through less vitriolic under Clinton than under his predecessors (see article by Andreas and Doyle), indicate that the image of being dependent and associated with an enemy continue to influence information processing and strategy selection.

It will be interesting to see if and how this changes as we leave the Cold War era behind.

Clinton's foreign policy team is (for the moment) composed of many former Carter staffers. One test of Cottam's argument may be to see how a modified cold warrior team reacts to Latin American crises during a period of less obvious enemies. Clinton's treatment of Haiti, for example, exhibits most of the characteristics that Cottam identifies with a dependent image in the absence of the enemy. Without the unifying goal of containment, policy has been subject to a wide variety of conflicting domestic concerns, contributing to highly inconsistent strategies which have been assailed from virtually all parts of the political spectrum.

Clinton, while campaigning, stated that he did not agree with Bush's refugee policy of strict repatriation, but did not reverse the policy upon his electoral victory, realizing the political costs of accepting a flood of poor Haitians into Florida. Another key source of support, the African-American political community, denounced the policy as racist, and this too has been an important factor in pushing Clinton's Haiti team in other directions. Indeed, the past two years of policymaking have witnessed a pendular movement, from strict repatriation to the possibility of asylum hearings aboard US ships to no chance of refugee resettlement in the US. Agreements with other countries to accept some refugees have been largely unsuccessful, even Panama reneged on a previous offer. As of this writing, economic sanctions have not been useful and the intransigence of the ruling Haitian military, combined with mounting squabbles here at home, have made the threat of US military intervention practically a political necessity. If military action does take place, Cottam's contention that intervention assumes its most coercive form where the dependent image works without the enemy association will be borne out. ■
More than 200 million people live in the Caribbean Basin. Beginning this year, Caribbean Affairs will be published bi-monthly and will be focusing attention on issues affecting this large population. And from January 1995 we will do so in English, Spanish, French, and Dutch.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad/Tobago</td>
<td>TT$175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Caribbean</td>
<td>US$54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>US$72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>US$56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>US$62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>US$76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bill me</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill my company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Name
Company
Address
City State Zip
Country

All prices include postage

To subscribe, write to: Caribbean Affairs, P.O. Box 527503 Miami, FL 33152-7503; or 93 Frederick Street, Port of Spain, Trinidad, W.I. Our telephone numbers are: (809) 623-6108/624-CISS; Fax (809) 627-3013

Isn't It Time You Subscribe?
More than 200 million people live in the Caribbean. Beginning this year, Caribbean Affairs will be published monthly and will be focusing attention on issues affecting a large population. And from January 1995 we will do so in English, Spanish, French, and Dutch.

To subscribe, write to: Caribbean Affairs, P.O. Box 527503 Miami, FL 33152-7503; or 93 Frederick Street, Port of Spain, Trinidad. Our telephone numbers are: (809) 623-6108/624-CISS; Fax (809) 627-3019.

Isn’t It Time You Subscribed?