Fragile Democracies
Luis Pásara, Carina Perelli, Jennifer McCoy

Guyana in Transition
Cheddi Jagan, Anthony P. Maingot, Gary Brana-Shute

After the Cold War
Vladimir P. Sudarev, Viola Dad, Douglas Murphy

Peluso on Conservation and Indigenismo
Rosenberg on Whither the Caribbean? Whither Florida?
Chaffee on Haitian Women in Miami: A Photo Essay
Fernández on the Theater of Cuban Politics
Subscribe now to *Hemisphere*!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscription</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>1 Year</th>
<th>2 Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$20 US, PR, USVI</td>
<td>$27 elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$36 US, PR, USVI</td>
<td>$50 elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Name: ____________________________
Address: ____________________________
City/State/Province/Zip: ____________________________
Country: ____________________________
Telephone Number: ____________________________

Mail this form with payment to: *Hemisphere*, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199.

Or call (305) 348-2894 or fax (305) 348-3593 and charge it to your credit card.

Subscribe now to *Hemisphere*—and give as a gift!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscription</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>1 Year</th>
<th>2 Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$20 US, PR, USVI</td>
<td>$27 elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$36 US, PR, USVI</td>
<td>$50 elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subscription for (check one): □ 1 Year □ 2 Years

Your Name: ____________________________
Address: ____________________________
City/State/Province/Zip: ____________________________
Country: ____________________________
Telephone Number: ____________________________

Mail this form with payment to: *Hemisphere*, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199. Or call (305) 348-2894 or fax (305) 348-3593 and charge it to your credit card.

---

**REVIEW FORUM**

The Theater of Cuban Politics  *by Damián Fernández*

**PUBLICATIONS UPDATE**

Guyana  *by Marian Goslinga*
Provoking debate on the region's problems, initiatives and achievements.

Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

COMMENTARY

Conservation and Indigenismo  by Daniela Peluso  6
Whither the Caribbean? Whither Florida?  by Mark B. Rosenberg  9

REPORTS

Russia and Latin America  by Vladimir P. Sudarev  12
Germany and Latin America  by Violanda Botet  16
Teeing Off: Dwight, JFK, and Fidel  by Douglas Murphy  18
Haitian Women in Miami (A Photo Essay)  by Sue Chaffee  22

FAXFILE

FEATURES

Fragile Democracies

Peru: Into a Black Hole  by Luis Pásara  26
Corruption and Democracy  by Carina Perelli  31
Venezuelan Alternatives  by Jennifer McCoy  33

Guyana in Transition

Cheddi Jagan and Democracy

An Interview by Anthony P. Maingot  36
Schlesinger’s Apology

Guyana '92: It’s About Time  by Gary Brana-Shute  40

REVIEW FORUM

The Theater of Cuban Politics  by Damián Fernández  46

PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

Guyana  by Marian Goslinga  50
Costa Rica’s Export Strategy: The Real Problem

If Costa Rica’s export profile is non-sustainable, it is not for the reasons detailed by Mary A. Clark in “Costa Rica’s Export Strategy” (Hemisphere, Summer 1992).

First, the Certificado de Abono Tributario (CAT) is not part of the new government’s export strategy. Rather, it is an old instrument that tried to neutralize the export-inhibiting effects of the former import-substitution regimen. CATs are incompatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that Costa Rica has joined; although beneficiaries obviously do not want to see them disappear, external pressure to eliminate them will continue.

Second, the implication that rising imports accompanied by rising exports is bad does not conform to economic theory. Indeed, the main benefit of increased exports is that they allow increased imports of goods and services that can be obtained from foreign sources at better prices and/or quality. A more appropriate criticism of the maquila industry is that it does not foster the technical development of a country and that it is relatively footloose in the pursuit of low wages.

Third, if nontraditional agricultural exports favor large foreign firms, the economic damage is not obvious. It is not self-evident that a farmer working his own land exclusively is better off than a farmer who is employed by a large farm and works his own land part-time. Employers have to pay the workers social benefits that may not accrue to someone who is working his own land full-time. Wages may also be better under employment than the implied wage in self-employment.

Fourth, there is no evidence that nontraditional agricultural exports are more intensive in pesticide than are other crops. Indeed, increasing evidence is being published on the detrimental environmental impact of traditional banana production. Further, the climatic conditions required for a given crop are the same in Costa Rica as anywhere else; increased pesticide use is not perforce more necessary in Costa Rica than elsewhere. Environmental degradation is a problem of agricultural production in general, not of nontraditional export crops or Costa Rica in particular.

Finally, deforestation was occurring in Costa Rica long before the emphasis on nontraditional exports. Indeed, currently logged areas are generally not suited for export crops and are far away from the transportation links that are critical to exports.

Perhaps the weakest point of the current Costa Rican export program is that it does not foster the technical development of its people. Alas, the author does not mention it.

Ed Canler
Chattanooga, Tennessee

Reply: Yes, and No

The following is my response to Ed Canler’s letter regarding my article on Costa Rica in Hemisphere (Summer 1992).

CATs

Mr. Canler is wrong to assert that the export-tax credit known as the Certificado de Abono Tributario (CAT) was not a critical element of the nontraditional export push of the 1980s. The CAT was created in 1972 as part of an effort to promote extraregional exports, but they grew very slowly. Central government expenditures on CATs boomed after legislation was passed in 1984 incorporating them into a newly created package of benefits awarded to nontraditional exporters. As the main incentive offered in these export contracts, the fiscal cost of CAT subsidies increased rapidly to the levels I report in the article.

In the late 1980s, the Arias administration, as well as the World Bank, recognized the nonsustainability of these subsidies and initiated negotiations with exporters to reduce them. These efforts carried over into the Rafael Calderón government, which took office in May 1990. Only on December 1, 1992, did the Consejo Nacional de Inversiones, acting on orders from President Calderón, make the politically bold move of eliminating future CAT contracts. But because the government will honor preexisting agreements to pay CAT subsidies, the system will constitute a considerable burden on the fiscal budget for some time.

Import Costs

Granted, a primary benefit of added exports is the ability to increase imports and my article should not be understood to suggest otherwise. Rather, in the discussion concerning the cost of
imported inputs associated with export production, I sought mainly to encourage debate about the merits of continuing tax-free entry of these components and consideration of stiffer local content requirements for exports, as the first implies forgone tax revenue and the second might foster greater national vertical integration in the new industries. I make clear in the article that I share Mr. Canler’s concern with the footloose nature of assembly industries.

Nontraditional Agricultural Exports and Small Farmers

Here Mr. Canler’s objection really only deals with the size of producer that might be most propitious for nontraditional agricultural export (NTAE) industries, not with the nationality of such firms. In the last paragraph of this letter, I will relate nationality to the problem of technical development in agriculture. Mr. Canler also limits himself to debate over the potential indirect effects of NTAE’s marginalization of small farming units. I will begin my discussion on this level and then review the direct economic, social, and political impacts felt in Costa Rica as a result of the transition to a new set of agricultural policies begun in the 1980s.

It is conceivable that individual farmers might gain higher wages by abandoning their own land and working on a larger operation or finding nonagricultural employment. But it would appear equally probable that families’ welfare could decline as they lose access to land. There is evidence that larger NTAE operations absorb proportionately less labor than smaller units. In addition, employment on these large farms is often seasonal and working conditions can be poor, although we would expect labor legislation to be more effective in Costa Rica than in other Central American countries.

To date, we don’t have the information required to show that either of these possibilities dominates in reality and we may have to measure how the characteristics of each crop affect key variables such as labor intensity before drawing conclusions. Meanwhile, we should consider that the best option may be to help small agriculturalists grow NTAE crops on their own farms because the smaller production units often absorb more labor. Moreover, these families could then hold on to their chief source of wealth and security, land.

We know quite a bit about what did happen to farmers during Costa Rica’s transition toward NTAE in the 1980s. Agricultural policy changes, driven more by governments’ efforts at crisis containment than by a coherent development plan, created a situation in which many farmers, especially small ones, were forced to choose between growing unfamiliar crops or finding alternative forms of subsistence. Reductions in support prices for basic grains and reformulation of the Sistema Bancario Nacional’s agricultural credit toward export crops, particularly nontraditional ones, encouraged some farmers to grow tropical fruits, spices, and ornamental plants without adequate risk assessment or insurance programs. Others were pushed off their land or out of agriculture altogether without any kind of assistance in making the transition to alternative employment.

The ensuing economic catastrophe and social dislocation in the countryside provoked huge protests by Costa Rica’s farmers in the late 1980s. In turn, the Arias government found itself spending substantial time and money seeking a solution to the political disruption. Pesticide Use and NTAE

Pesticides used in previous rounds of export promotion in Costa Rica and other Central American countries, particularly in bananas and cotton, increased the resistance of some pests, poisoned humans, and harmed the environment. Such chemicals are clearly employed more intensively in the newest agricultural exports than in the production of food crops such as corn and beans. Researchers have already documented problems related to pesticide use and NTAE crops in several regional nations, particularly in winter vegetables and...
Letters to the Editor

Monocultural production patterns, overuse stemming from a variety of causes (including the cultivation of temperate-zone crops in the tropics where they encounter new pest threats and the natural predators of the original climate may be absent), and poor government regulation of pesticides have led to a vicious circle of heightened pest resistance and stepped-up application in several countries.

For example, an explosion of pests virtually collapsed the winter vegetable industry and damaged melon exports in the Dominican Republic in the late 1980s. The same outcome plagues the same crops in Guatemala and Honduras. During the last six years, the US Food and Drug Administration rejected thousands of nontraditional produce shipments from the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Costa Rica for pesticide residue violations. Costa Rican authorities, the US Agency for International Development, and multinational exporters view this issue as serious enough to warrant their effort in increased control over pesticide use and educational programs for growers.

Another worrisome aspect of the problem, at least in the short term, is that severe NTAE crop losses due to pest outbreaks seem to affect growers differentially. We have evidence that large growers and foreign firms often adjust production techniques or relocate, while smaller farmers, often already heavily indebted, are more likely to lose their land when faced with massive crop failure. Again, at least in this transitional stage, difficulties associated with the relative risk assumed by different sizes of NTAE growers, as well as the health and environmental impacts of increased pesticide use, need to be better addressed.

Deforestation

Deforestation in Costa Rica is largely a post-World War II phenomenon resulting in great part from the previous round of NTAE expansion, especially in beef cattle. As ranchers cleared the land for pasture and displaced peasants burned down trees in their efforts to eke out a living in the countryside, much of Costa Rica's forests literally went up in smoke. Thus, logging has not been the main cause of deforestation. Costa Rica's remaining forests are highly endangered as an increasing landless population seeks access to these areas in order to survive and those engaged in slash-and-burn agriculture must move on every few years after exhausting fragile tropical soils. The current expansion in banana and NTAE cultivation only aggravates the problem although the new crops do not appear to be as land intensive as cattle ranching.

Nontraditional Exports and Technological Transfer

Finally, I couldn’t agree more with Mr. Canler that too little attention has been directed toward evaluation of the potential contribution of Costa Rica’s current export drive to the nation’s technical development. For this reason, I point out in my article that Costa Rica’s assembly industries tend to offer low-skill jobs and remain disarticulated from the rest of the economy. One could also argue that the national-ity of nontraditional agricultural export firms operating in Costa Rica is relevant to this issue. Because foreign firms are not obliged to meet any technological transfer requirements, it is unclear how much production and marketing expertise Costa Ricans will gain from their presence.

Mary A. Clark
Department of Political Science
University of Wisconsin at Madison
HAITI
Photographs by Gary Monroe

Taken between 1984 and 1987, Monroe's Haiti photographs are radiant with the spirit of discovery. Powerful and evocative, they are stripped bare of artifice and traditional documentary narrative. Their meaning is elusive.

ISBN 0-9618986-2-3 Paperbound, $15.00 (S/H, add $2.00 per book).

Signed copies upon request.

Order direct from:

FOREST + TREES
711 Pinetree Court, Deland, Florida 32724
A NON-PROFIT VISUAL ARTS CONCERN
When visiting native federations in Amazonia today, it is no longer uncommon to find some of their members attending conferences in Europe or the US. In recent years, many indigenous Amazonian leaders have gained considerable international recognition working with foreign environmentalists, largely due to growing acknowledgement of the potential role of indigenous peoples in the conservation of tropical forests.

The international conservation movement has indeed played a valuable role in promoting the development of native Amazonian federations. Nevertheless, basic political and pragmatic problems arise from the interplay of conservationist discourse with the construction of ethnic identity by indigenous peoples.

Environmentalists, development workers, and anthropologists commonly associate the concept of “native people” with the stereotype of the “ecologically noble savage” who lives in perfect harmony with nature. Although Amazonian cultures do possess elaborate systems of ecological knowledge, these do not automatically translate into Western notions of conservation with sustainability at the top of their agenda. Still, this stereotype has informed the policies of foreign environmental agencies and consequently become an important influence in the construction of ethnic identity by indigenous peoples. If environmentalists grasped the ironies between the cultural values attributed to indigenous peoples and the way those people actually live, then environmental projects would stand a better chance of succeeding after the development professionals have left the local sites.

Environmentalists commonly associate the concept of “native people” with the stereotype of the “ecologically noble savage” who lives in perfect harmony with nature.

The Power of Imitation

Imitation is an important process in the interactions between Euro-American, Latin American, mestizo, and indigenous cultures. For example, indigenous groups entering the regional market economy typically imitate the tastes and practices of the dominant local mestizo culture in order to gain social acceptance. Likewise, the mestizos typically adopt the tastes and practices of the “whites,” who control the supralocal flow of credit, goods, services, and profits that shapes mestizo opportunities in the local area. Thus mestizo settlers in the Amazon have adopted single-crop agriculture over that of crop diversification—in spite of higher costs and reduced nutrition—because they have been encouraged to do so through the social incentives of national economic and political policies. The mestizo example, then, leads native communities to adopt monocropping as well.

The process of culture change for Amazonian peoples has been largely one of imitating mestizo culture, but a new element has been introduced as foreigners become increasingly active in native communities. Indigenous people now often imitate what the conservationists want to see in them: an idealized image of the Indian past. In this regard, the native peoples may not actually practice past customs, but may merely appear as if they were doing so. The focus, then, is on the image of their cultural past as the likeness of the ecologically noble savage.

Why is this projection of the past so powerful? Perhaps the reason lies within the conservation agenda, which has provided an alternative discourse for native people in their subordinate national positions. Since the mid-1980s foreign environmental organizations have targeted native peoples and their federations as beneficiaries of funds for programs of sustainable development. The funds tend to be channeled to those native peoples who employ sustainable practices that the environmentalists regard as involving community-based conservation with potential market value. When such native people do not exist, the environmentalists in-
vent them—or the native people invent themselves as "traditionalists."

The following scenario is an example of how the desire to promote sustainable development influences the response of native people to simulate their cultural past. In many areas of Amazonia, indigenous communities have overcollected turtle eggs despite bodies of traditional knowledge that warn against this ecologically unsound behavior. When the representatives of a turtle conservation project approach a native community looking for local models of preservation, community leaders may respond by reciting the teachings of their elders and/or by claiming to still employ nonexploitative practices of both egg collection and hunting—which, in some cases, have actually not been practiced for generations. The local leaders thereby satisfy the outsiders' search for "pristine," "traditional" knowledge and enhance their own access to First World resources. The process of embracing their "Indianness" is also a means of bolstering the political leverage of native leaders in relation to the mestizo population, which dominates the local Amazonian economies.

Not all members of a given indigenous community are equally interested in, or adept at, the political strategy of miming their group's cultural past. The most inclined to this strategy are those persons whose activities and identities are least bound up with their group's ethnic heritage. As articulation with the state ensues, native communities perceive leadership positions as best suited for those members who know how to speak the language of mestizos, are most like them, and know how to deal with them. Those members of native communities who have these characteristics are the very ones that conservationists tend to adopt as local project leaders.

The resulting community dynamics contain a basic irony. On the one hand, the most locally oriented of the native people tend to seek equal footing with mestizos by adopting the tastes and customs of mestizo culture. On the other hand, the least locally oriented of the natives tend to seek equal footing with the mestizos by miming the tastes and customs of Indian culture. The foreign environmentalists who promote what they assume are pristine indigenous practices are rarely aware of these dynamics and their own key role as outsiders in setting them in motion.

In sum, as environmental conservation becomes a vital objective of development professionals, Amazonia's native peoples are coming to regard their past as a resource for altering their current identity and enhancing their future prospects. Though they may currently be subordinated to the local mestizos, Amazonia's native people are discovering that Indian practices and identity can give them access to strategic political and economic resources from the outside world.

Policy Consequences and Options

How does this option jeopardize the success of conservation projects in Amazonia? Basically it does so by strengthening the hand of those segments of indigenous populations that are least attached to practices of sustainable tropical management, such as diversified agriculture and reforestation. In fact, these groups are the most likely to engage in what, from an environmental standpoint, are undesirable practices, such as monocropping, cattle ranching, and pig ownership. Given the local and extralocal web of discourse and power, the native people who do practice sustainable management are the least likely to possess the knowledge of Western language and culture that is necessary to obtain resources from environmental organizations.

Many anthropologists involved with Amazonia's native federations are aware of the contradiction between the ethnic image and the ethnic way of life of local leaders. Nonetheless, in light of the existing local inequalities of wealth and power—which underlie the limited capacity of true practitioners of
sustainable management to gain recognition and resources from international environmentalists—such anthropologists tend to overlook viable alternatives. What must environmentalists do to mitigate or eliminate the problem?

First, they must recognize that native federations are not "indigenous" entities; rather, the federations are modeled after Western hierarchical structures and do not represent all native people on equal terms. In many cases it would be appropriate for environmentalists to combine work through native federations with direct support to communities, clusters of households, or individual families. For example, a project on turtle conservation could work with a community elder who, though illiterate and unprepared for the tasks of bureaucratic administration, could give workshops on methods of turtle preservation.

Second, environmentalists must expand their definition of "indigenous." For instance, the Ribareños, who live on the Amazonian flood plains of Peru because of displacement during the rubber boom of the nineteenth century, are not considered "pure" native people, even though their culture has distinctly local features that include sophisticated methods of sustainable tropical agriculture. As native groups intermarry among each other and with mestizos and as the native mimes the mestizo who is miming the native, local ethnic boundaries become increasingly blurred. Do we incarcerate the term "indigenous" by book-ending it with the polarized and flawed criteria of genetics on the one extreme and politically based miming of the ethnic cultural past on the other?

The boundaries of "indigenous" culture change as cultural boundaries change in general. Recognition of the fluidity of such boundaries is vital in our quest to formulate and implement effective, culturally appropriate models of environmental conservation.

---

**Are you interested in Central America?**

If so, you will want to have a copy of the only media directory covering Central America and Panama, the 1993 *Guía de medios centroamericanos de comunicación*. This 220-page pocket-sized book contains details on:

- Over 300 media organizations
- More than 200 advertising agencies and public relations firms
- Nearly 4,000 journalists
- 17 journalism schools and their faculties
- Government and embassy press spokespersons

As well, there is useful information, including statistics and maps of the countries and major cities.

The price is $45 per copy, postage and handling included.

---

**Yes, send me ___ copies of the Guía de medios centroamericanos de comunicación**

Name: _____________________________________________
Address: ____________________________________________
City/State: __________________________________________
Country: ____________________________________________

Make your check payable to CAJP Endowment Fund and mail along with this coupon to:
Central American Journalism Program
Florida International University
3000 N.E. 145 Street
Miami, Florida 33181-3600
Whither the Caribbean? Whither Florida?

by Mark B. Rosenberg

In Hemisphere's very first commentary in the fall of 1988, editor Anthony P. Maingot called attention to critical issues facing the Caribbean. He then warned that "... this region of sovereign but balkanized and fragile states might be reaching the limits of its privileged bargaining with the US and the EEC. ... the Caribbean states will have to compete economically like everyone else, or at least create new noneconomic rationales for additional attention."

The collapse of the socialist system, the demise of the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the Third World as a political reality, and rapid advances in information technology and economic globalization signal that the post-Cold War realignment of the world has begun. Now that a new twenty-first century agenda is imminent, however, the Caribbean runs an acute risk of irrelevance due to its difficulty in adapting to this rapidly changing international environment.

Threats on All Sides

A glance at Caribbean Basin economic output is all that is required to realize the precarious position the region holds in the global arena. The sum of the basin's gross domestic product is but 20% of the state of Florida's output. This figure reveals the region's principal challenge: to construct a rationale for continued economic involvement in the area by the industrialized world.

Past interest and involvement in the Caribbean Basin by industrialized countries has been based on colonial ties and security concerns, neither of which is compelling in a post-Cold War era. Even though the end of the Cold War has brought with it a decline in conflict between the Great Powers, the struggle among nations and regions for improved economic well-being has only intensified.

Now that a new twenty-first century agenda is imminent, the Caribbean runs an acute risk of irrelevance in a rapidly changing world.

For the Caribbean, this new world framework has created five basic problems, the most immediate of which is the Clinton administration. Even before the Democratic Party captured the US presidency in the 1992 election, the Caribbean came under blistering and unprecedented attacks from both Al Gore and Bill Clinton. Listen to Gore on the popular television news program "Nightline" before a national audience: "I voted against the Caribbean Basin Initiative when it was created. I thought it was a mistake then, I think it's a mistake now. ... you have the Bush administration opposing activist policies to create jobs here at home, but supporting an industrial policy for other countries to steal jobs from the United States and take them overseas" (September 30, 1992).

Days later, Clinton echoed Gore's attacks, when he declared on Phil Donahue's television talk show that "... Reagan did that [established the Caribbean Basin Initiative] to prop up right-wing governments that he agreed with politically. ... They used our tax dollars to drive wages down in America and to drive wages down in Central America ..." (October 6, 1992).

What better indication for the Caribbean that a new era had arrived? In a presidential campaign that was remarkably devoid of debate about international issues and foreign policy, one of the few international topics to emerge in the discourse was the Caribbean, and it did so negatively. Coupled with the prevailing anti-Caribbean feelings among many Washington bureaucrats, this anti-Caribbean sentiment has created a crew of hardened hearts in the key trade-related agencies of the US government such as the Latin America offices of the US Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of State.

These currents of anti-Caribbean sentiment in the US government parallel and are reinforced by a new US approach to trade policy, which had already begun to surface in the latter days of the Bush presidency. Casting aside the Cold War-oriented "preferential access" approaches to international trade, the Clinton administration is
clearly favoring trade arrangements based on "comparable access" or "reciprocity." Thus, few interests in Washington these days are disposed to promote or maintain trade agreements that are one-way in nature. CBI-style arrangements are relics of the past, a new era of hard-ball trade politics has begun.

Evidence of these threats is the prospect of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As US tariffs on Mexican products, such as textiles, are eliminated, NAFTA is expected to divert the flow of both trade and investment away from the Caribbean to Mexico, thereby diminishing the value of Caribbean-privileged access to the US market through the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The prospect of NAFTA at first demoralized Caribbean leadership. Now there is a certain resignation to its inevitability.

Another potential threat to the Caribbean is a capitalist Cuba. When the island nation shifts to a market economy, it will first seek to export sugar to the US and then seek foreign investment to develop an assembly-manufacturing capacity. Both of these sectors in Cuba are already competitive by any standard. Which Caribbean Basin countries will be asked to give up a portion of their diminishing sugar quota? Which assembly plants will relocate from one Caribbean export platform to another? Of course, Cuba will also appeal greatly to US tourists seeking new and more exotic Caribbean beaches. Hence, the re-entry of Cuba into the capitalist world market—hardly a decimal point in global economic statistics—will have profound implications for Caribbean market relations and competitiveness.

Beyond the hemisphere, the historical trading patterns between Europe and the Caribbean—preserved for the past 20 years by the Lomé Conventions and the non-reciprocal guaranteed access to European markets they provided—are threatened by the consolida-

**NAFTA would threaten both the principal export markets of the Caribbean and Florida's role as the hub of North-South trade.**

Current negotiations of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade include a much debated proposal to phase out the quota system—the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA)—that has managed to restrain Asian textile and apparel producers from furthering their dominance of the world market. Elimination of the MFA over the 10-year period under consideration would expose an increasingly vital economic sector of the Caribbean region to intensified global competition.

The Caribbean, NAFTA, and the Florida Connection

The immediate dilemma, however, revolves around the likely impact of NAFTA on the Caribbean as well as the possibility of crafting a response that can be supported in both Washington and the Caribbean. Erosion of preferential access to the US market and diversification of investment are the principal short-term NAFTA challenges to the Caribbean Basin. The benefits gained through the CBI would not be reduced per se, but the competitive position of CBI countries would deteriorate because of Mexico's increased access to the US market.

The size of Mexico's market, its proximity to the US, and its lower production costs and abundant natural resources constitute an inherent competitive advantage over the Caribbean Basin countries. These advantages, coupled with the elimination of tariffs and quotas on Mexican products entering the US market, create the potential for a general reorientation of trade away from the Caribbean towards Mexico. This shift would threaten both the principal export markets of the Caribbean and Florida's role as the hub of North-South trade in the hemisphere.

In response to this new set of challenges, Congressman Sam Gibbons (D-FL) has proposed legislation (HR 1403) to assure NAFTA parity for CBI countries. The purpose of the bill is to ensure that the CBI is not adversely affected by the implementation of NAFTA and to apply fast-track approval to free trade agreements between the US and certain Caribbean Basin countries. This legislation is important for Florida because it will help to protect jobs in both the Caribbean and Florida. An estimated 80,000 jobs in the state are directly linked to CBI-related trade. Given that CBI countries account for more than 30% of Florida exports and 20% of Florida imports, and given that Florida's economic welfare in general is intimately tied to Caribbean prosperity, passage of this bill could be as important to Florida as it is to the Caribbean.

Although the destinies of Florida and the Caribbean are tightly intertwined through trade and commerce, there have been few systematic efforts by either side to embrace the other as a strategy for enhancing their common international competitiveness and economic well-being. This embrace
must occur if Florida and the Caribbean are to benefit from the shifting international forces that are driving economies and peoples together throughout the globe.

At a minimum, a strategic consensus between Florida and the Caribbean should identify and promote common linkages and interests. While such a consensus must be grounded in self-interest, its premise would be the notion that interdependence and transnational politics are now realities of the global landscape.

To move from rhetoric to action, recognition of the numerous obstacles to the development of a broader strategic consensus and action plan for Florida and the Caribbean is necessary. What are these obstacles?

The First Obstacle

To begin with, Florida possesses only a nascent capacity to articulate and implement a strategic vision of the state’s stake in the world economy and the specific regional arrangements that can promote Florida’s competitive advantages. There has been little serious attention to the international linkages that could improve Florida’s global competitiveness, in large part a reflection of the grip that traditional protectionist interests hold on the machinery of the state’s government. The problem also reflects the limited understanding that Florida’s private-sector leaders have of the world’s dramatic economic transformations, and the fact that the Caribbean constituency in Florida is diffuse and weak.

The absence of a strong Caribbean constituency in Florida is striking in view of the state’s position as the Caribbean’s leading US export partner (about $4 billion in 1990). In the coming years, Texas (in second place at $1.2 billion) will be totally focused on trade with Mexico. Despite its rhetoric, Louisiana (in third place at $1 billion) is essentially a protectionist state and is directly competitive with the Caribbean in the production of strategic commodities such as sugar. Other states, such as Georgia, now export as much to Mexico as they do to the entire basin. In short, there are few jurisdictions in the US with deep trade connections to the Caribbean.

The Second Obstacle

Another Florida-Caribbean problem is that the Caribbean has been tardy in grasping the regional implications of the end of the Cold War. Now that the spur of national security no longer motivates US policy in the region, the Caribbean faces the indifferent attitude that has periodically characterized US foreign policy toward Latin America. In this setting, however, the Caribbean region and Central America have yet to orchestrate an effective, common agenda in Washington. This problem is not new, but under current conditions any Caribbean Basin agenda in Washington will be particularly difficult to sustain. Caribbean Basin efforts have been oriented to the world’s trade capitals—Washington, Geneva, London, even San Juan. Although Florida essentially serves as the trade capital of the Caribbean, Caribbean leaders have done little to integrate Florida into the alliances necessary to advance their common interests in the global market.

In the task of reorienting the Caribbean’s vision and alliances, there is little time to waste. The Cuban time bomb is ticking, and the Caribbean and Florida must act together, not only to minimize the negative impact of US-Mexican free trade on the Caribbean Basin, but also to prepare to compete in a world of open markets. Mexico is first in the free trade line but will certainly not be the last. Both the Caribbean and Florida must recognize and adapt to this changing environment.

The Changing Hemispheric Trade Environment: Opportunities and Obstacles

Mark B. Rosenberg, Editor

Leading international trade specialists analyze options for hemispheric trade, including the likely impact of a North American free trade agreement and a single European market and the roles of Japan and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Contributors: Luis Abugattas, Myles Frechette, Marian Goslinga, Wolf Grabendorff, Gary C. Hufbauer, Tetsuro Iino, Carolyn Lamm, Henry Nau, Riordan Roett, Mark B. Rosenberg, Jeffrey J. Schott, Barbara Stallings.


Order direct from: Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199. Visa and MasterCard orders: (305) 348-2894 or fax (305) 348-3593.
An Russia replace the USSR in Latin America? Although the answer is apparently negative, the matter is far from simple. With respect not only to Cuba but to Latin America in general, Russia is the USSR's foreign-policy successor. The building of Russian-Latin American relations requires a new design, though some of the old Soviet structures remain useful.

Latin America's importance to the USSR was largely based on the quest for strategic balance with the US and in the Cold War setting of political and ideological rivalry. Cuba and Nicaragua were the aces in this game, in which the Soviet leadership tried to avoid open confrontation and its concomitant risks. The principal long-term objectives of Soviet strategy were the creation of low-intensity security problems for the US in its own backyard, the creation of a showcase for "real" socialism in Cuba, and the support of leftist movements throughout Latin America.

Latin America itself, however, was of little interest to the USSR. After all, how much did the superpower of the East have in common with fragile democracies situated in the backyard of the superpower of the West? The margins for Soviet-Latin American cooperation were very narrow indeed, a fact of which the Soviets were well aware.

Vladimir P. Sudarev is director of the Department of International Relations at the Institute of Latin American Studies in Moscow. His recent publications include Russia and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership (Moscow, 1992).

Still, from the 1960s to the 1980s the USSR created a diversified structure of presence in Latin America, which included diplomatic and economic missions, as well as programs of technical assistance and cultural exchange.

Now that the East-West confrontation has ended, Russia—in many respects, quite a different state from that of the former Soviet Union—is searching to redefine its international role.

Among other things, the USSR managed to penetrate Latin America's regional weapons market, becoming, for instance, the key supplier of aircraft and tanks to Peru. Though Soviet-Latin American trade rarely exceeded $500 million and usually carried a negative balance for the Soviets, it did, at times, assume strategic importance. So it was in the early 1980s, when Jimmy Carter imposed an embargo on the sale of US cereals to the Soviet Union. Argentina became the USSR's major cereals supplier and the value of Soviet-Latin American trade escalated.

The Next Step?

Now that the East-West confrontation has ended, Russia—in many respects, quite a different state from that of the former Soviet Union—is searching to define its role in the emerging post-Cold War order. Russian leadership is clearly interested in establishing partnerships with the Western democracies. This interest is part of the obsession, as often declared by foreign minister Andrei Koziyev, that Russia must become a "normal great power"—fully integrated with the industrialized North of the new global order. Such integration is hardly possible, at least for the foreseeable future.

Why is it unlikely that Russia will become a member of the northern industrial club? To begin with, Russian foreign policy must not only adapt itself to the country's historical, territorial, and demographic dimensions and its Euro-Asian geostrategic position. In addition, its foreign policy must acknowledge the country's current phase of socioeconomic transition and crisis.

It would be illusory to suppose that the only solution to Russia's socioeconomic transition and crisis would be to integrate with the West, even if this means taking the role of a weak partner. Such integration is today hardly realistic, given the fundamental differences between Russian and western stages of industrial development, a disadvantage not taken into account by former prime minister Egor Gaidar's attempt to jump-start a Russian open-market economy. In a headlong dive into the economic seas of the West, Russia could well sink to the depths of long-term
subordination, relegating itself to the semiperiphery of the post-Cold War order. In light of this vulnerability, a more desirable option for Russian policy today would be to map out an open, multifaceted course of action that leaves behind the former Soviet obsession with establishing a worldwide superpower presence. Russia's relations with the West would become more open and multifaceted if they were to embrace not only the western industrial powers but the reinvigorated economies and fledgling democracies of Latin America as well.

Against this backdrop, Russia and much of Latin America surprisingly converge on a number of issues. At the core of these is the intermediate position of both Russia and a substantial portion of Latin America in the new world hierarchy. Thus, as Russia becomes the "South" of the North, the majority of Latin American countries are striving to become the "North" of the South. Russia is just now entering the path toward a democratic polity and a market economy, upon which Latin American countries such as Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil have already traveled a considerable distance.

What, then, can Russia learn from Latin America's "state capitalism," a stage that Russian reformists tried to leap over in 1992? What can Russia learn from Latin America about the social costs of neoliberal reforms, strategies for managing the foreign debt problem, and the pitfalls of democratization? Latin America's track record in these and other spheres is more germane to the formulation of Russian policy than are the past and present track records of Western Europe or the Asian dragons.

In short, Russia and much of Latin America face the same basic challenges in the emerging new global order. Among these are the threats of marginalization in the world economy, technological dependence, and foreign debt. In many respects, Russia and Latin America are becoming "natural partners."

Russia and much of Latin America face the same basic global challenges, such as the threats of economic marginalization, technological dependence, and foreign debt.

For example, with the possible exception of Chile, the Latin American countries of the Southern Cone and the Andes could well remain outside of the emerging North American megabloc for the foreseeable future. Although Mercosur was formally included in the Bush administration's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, it appears that for the time being this bloc has virtually no chance of grafting itself onto the North American Free Trade Agreement, which in the coming decade will revolve around the absorption of Mexico. This scenario parallels that of Europe, where, in spite of a Russian vision of a new political and economic space "from the Atlantic to the Urals," it is unlikely that even Eastern Europe will become integrated with the European Community (EC) during the 1990s.

Another parallel exists in the realm of technology. For instance, in view of the growing importance of advanced technologies of communication, Argentina and Brazil could consume a wide array of Russian products and expertise, which the Argentines and Brazilians could obtain on more favorable terms from Russia than from the West. Likewise, Russia badly needs access to the intermediate technologies involved in light industry, which it can potentially acquire from Latin America on more favorable terms than from the West. At both levels, moreover, there are possibilities not only for "technological barter," but also for joint ventures in assimilating and producing new technologies.

Does this equation leave out Mexico? Not at all, since Russia's long-term policy planning must somehow incorporate the emergence of the huge new economic space that encompasses the American and Asian sides of the Pacific Rim, within which Mexico is poised to assume a greatly enlarged role. Hence, conditions may be favorable for the establishment of a "Pacific bridge" between Russia and Mexico, which previously had insignificant economic ties with the Soviet Union. The Russian region of the Far East, which remains practically unexplored by Latin
American business interests, could emerge as a significant market for Latin America's traditional and nontraditional exports, especially from Mexico.

Problems and Solutions

To be sure, even with recognition of such potential bilateral gains, Russian-Latin American trade faces obstacles such as comparatively high transportation costs and difficult financing. More important, however, is that Russia's new leadership has assumed the Soviet leadership's marginal interest in Latin America. Indeed, only through his participation in the June 1992 UN Environmental Summit in Brazil and side trips to Venezuela and Argentina did Russian vice president Alexander Rutskoi discover where Latin America is heading and its relevance to Russian options. And Russia's trade delegations and economic missions, inherited as they are from the Soviet bureaucracy, continue to reflect the inefficiencies of a state-controlled economy whose trade with Latin America, outside of Cuba, was minuscule.

But times change. Many Latin American countries are opening their markets and pursuing aggressive export policies. To some extent the same is taking place in Russia. Nonetheless, Russia and Latin America continue to know little about each other's economies and the trade opportunities they contain. A starting point would be the establishment of small, bilateral initiatives that lay the foundation for Russian-Latin American business links.

One possible bridge for Russian trade with Latin America is the US, by way of Florida, with its highly developed network of Latin American contacts. The utilization of this potential bridge is contingent on the solution of the “Cuban problem.” As a successor to the USSR, Russia is deeply enmeshed in Cuba. Incoherent, even clumsy, attempts to adjust Russia’s relations with Fidel Castro in 1991-92 did nothing positive for Russian diplomacy and led to Russian economic losses.

Nevertheless, the Russian-Cuban trade agreement of November 1992 reflects a movement toward more balanced long-term relations. Given its new relations with the US and the EC, as well as its continuing economic, technical, and cultural links with Cuba, Russia may become a major player in the process of redefining Cuba’s relations with the world in general. The beneficiaries would include not only Cuba and the US, but also Russia through the expansion and deepening of its participation in the post-Cold War world economy.
The Pearl Necklace
Toward An Archaeology of Brazilian Transition Discourse
Roberto Reis
1991 Alfred Hower Prize
"His conclusions are brilliant. Reis considers most of the text discussed herein to constitute an enormous self-portrait of the ruling classes produced by writers who in their great majority have come from these classes and have refused or been unable to go beyond them." — Bobby J. Chamberlain, University of Pittsburgh
Cloth $22.95

Amazon Conservation in the Age of Development
The Limits of Providence
Ronald A. Foresta
Forestas detailed study of Brazilian Amazonia places international biological conservation in the context of late 20th century ideology, economics, and political practice and offers an informative guide to the pitfalls of conservation policy making in the Third World. "Successfully blends excellent scholarship with field-based reporting. I strongly recommend this book."
— Kent Redford, University of Florida
Cloth $49.95

Capitalism in Colonial Puerto Rico
Central San Vicente in the Late Nineteenth Century
Teresita Martinez-Vergne
"An extraordinarily important contribution to the historiography not only of Puerto Rico but also of the Caribbean... both in its examination of the impact of capitalism on the island during the nineteenth century and its enormous contribution to the study of the processes of social change in the critical period after the abolition of slavery."
— Franklin W. Knight, Johns Hopkins University
Cloth $27.95

Cuban Studies Since the Revolution
Edited by Damián Fernández
"Its scope is very impressive and the scholarship of very high quality. It not only documents the intellectual debates that still highlight unresolved issues, but it also provides the first holistic assessment of the field."
— Juan M. del Aguila, Emory University
Cloth $39.95

Space-Time of the Bororo of Brazil
Stephen Michael Fabian
"Fabian shows how concepts of time and space are patterned into village layouts and repeated in the organization of clans and moieties in much the same way as charts and lists are devised by literate societies. In a very precise and engaging manner, he has confirmed once again that literacy is not a prerequisite for rational or scientific thought."
— Allyn MacLean Stearman, University of Central Florida
Cloth $39.95

Illustration taken from photograph of Rio de Janeiro courtesy of Museu da Imagem e do Som.

—AND COMING THIS FALL

Miami Now
Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change
Edited by Guillermo J. Grenier and Alex Stepick Ill
September. Cloth $34.95 Paper $16.95

Politics and the Catholic Church in Nicaragua
John M. Kirk
September. Cloth $34.95

Debt Politics after Independence
The Funding Conflict in Bolivia
Thomas Millington
August. Cloth $29.95

The People who Discovered Columbus
The Prehistory of the Bahamas
William F. Keegan
September. Cloth $39.95

High Jungles and Low
Archie Carr
$16.95

The Imperative Call
A Naturalist's Quest in Temperate and Tropical America
Alexander F. Skutch
$16.95

A Naturalist in Costa Rica
Alexander F. Skutch
$16.95

Through full-service bookstores or order with M/C or Visa toll free: 1-800-226-3822

—UNIVERSITY PRESS OF FLORIDA
Gainesville, Tallahassee, Tampa, Boca Raton, Pensacola, Orlando, Miami, Jacksonville

Hemisphere • Winter/Spring 1993 15
In October 1991 German chancellor Helmut Kohl took his first extended foreign trip following German reunification to, of all places, Brazil and Chile. The 12-day tour was one of Kohl’s longest trips abroad and the first trip by a German chancellor to Latin America since Helmut Schmidt visited the region in 1979. In speeches and private talks Kohl made clear the political significance of his trip: Germany is not self-absorbed and the new, reunified Germany intends to remain actively engaged in Latin America and the Third World.

The chancellor made two significant statements during the trip. The first was that the reunified Germany recognized a “growing responsibility” in the world and that he hoped Latin America, and particularly the countries of Brazil and Chile, would become its “privileged” partners. The second was his confirmation of an earlier pledge to donate a quarter of a billion Deutsche marks to Brazil to protect its tropical rain forests.

Kohl’s pledge to pursue and expand Germany’s ties to Latin America attracted surprisingly little criticism in the German press, given that the German government had assumed tremendous new financial obligations and that domestic economic growth was slowing. To be sure, Germany’s foreign priorities remain the Western alliance and Eastern Europe. The push for expanded German-Latin American relations, however, is partly a response to Latin America’s improved economic and political situation in the 1990s.

More broadly, Germany is selectively strengthening its political ties in regions such as Latin America, provided that the financial costs are moderate and that the German government gains the opportunity to take a more prominent role on political issues it regards as falling within its particular areas of expertise. Among these issues are the environment, trade, and the transition from planned to market economies.

How Much Is Too Much?

After the US, Germany is the Western power with the strongest interest in Latin America. Of all the European countries, Germany conducts the largest volume of trade and invests the most money in Latin America, as well as contributing the most development aid to the region. Germany’s cultural links are strong as well. More than five million Latin American citizens are of German descent. In addition, German political foundations, political parties, churches, and trade unions are active in the region.

Even so, Germany has been criticized since World War II for lacking a clear foreign policy agenda in Latin America. Some observers have discerned an overemphasis on foreign trade, cultural exchange, and development aid at the expense of a broader and more meaningful political dialogue. Following Chancellor Schmidt’s visit to Latin America in 1979, Germany’s interest in the region was especially high and the relationship seemed poised for a takeoff. The launch never occurred, however, the principal reason being the deterioration of the Latin American economies in the 1980s.

In recent years, though, Latin America’s process of democratization and adoption of free-market reforms have reawakened German interest. Further, the German experience of managing the transition from a planned economy to a market economy in the country’s new eastern states has sensitized its policymakers to the painful choices that Latin America’s democratizing regimes face. By the same token, Latin American leaders are soberly reassessing the need to make their industries more competitive in light of the threat that the formation of the European Community (EC) and the opening of Eastern Europe may divert foreign trade and investment away from Latin America.

Over the past three decades, Latin America’s share of Western European imports and exports declined by half. And since 80% of Latin American exports to the EC consist of primary commodities such as agricultural products and...
minerals, Latin America's balance of trade with Europe is becoming more vulnerable than ever. The key factors are the possibility of new EC agricultural preferences for Eastern Europe; of a more protected agricultural market in the EC if the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade fails; and of increased competition and stricter regulations with the EC's consolidation.

Kohl's 1991 trip to Latin America reflects Germany's attempt to carve out for itself a new extra-European role in the post-Cold War order. Within Europe, German foreign policy has moved dramatically from the "West" orientation of the Cold War to a more balanced "West/East" orientation. The emerging question is, what interest does Germany have in the rest of the world?

Chancellor Kohl's pledge to increase cooperation with and aid to Latin America appears, to some observers, out of sync given the current strains in the German economy and the preoccupation of the German political establishment with Eastern Europe and the new Soviet republics. Still, there are other factors that prompt the German government to expand its relations with Latin America. To begin with, Latin American democratization is a fragile process and Germany has a long-term tangible interest in keeping the region stable. It is not inconceivable that Latin America could revert to the festering trouble spot that it was for years, heightening the myriad problems like the debt crisis, drug trafficking, social and political strife, militarization, and human-rights abuse. In a world in which transnational problems increasingly originate in countries where governments are too weak to control domestic problems, analysts in the German foreign ministry argue that, over the long term, it makes sense for Germany to make at least some minimal economic concessions now to promote Latin America's democratization process. They maintain that view despite the feeling that Germany's own resources are overextended in Europe.

Likewise, the German government recognizes that the US is increasingly reluctant, or unable, to play a leading geostrategic role in multiple areas of the world simultaneously. This recognition is altering the assumption that the US has the exclusive responsibility of stabilizing Latin America. In the future, there will be increasing pressure on the EC to aid Latin America. In this context, the US government is looking increasingly to wealthy allies such as Germany and the EC to increase their regional assistance to Latin America, particularly in regard to the region's debt problem.

Whether Europe will commit itself to meeting the challenge in the Americas is a basic question. The Europeans, however, are not insensitive to a certain sense of diplomatic justice, since they are calling for US help in stopping the very same categories of threats—political instability, massive international immigration, and lost economic opportunities—in Eastern Europe. The urgency of the reforms being undertaken simultaneously in Eastern Europe and Latin America may provide incentives for Western Europe and the US to diversify their traditional spheres of geostrategic interest.

On a bilateral level, Germany's principal goals in Latin America are going beyond the reinforcement of economic and cultural ties to encompass a concerted effort to encourage democratization. The Germans see their role as that of providing political support to fledgling democracies struggling to carry out painful economic reforms. The German government and German political foundations (e.g., the Konrad Adenauer and Frederick Ebert Foundations) will also step up their efforts to help Latin American regimes to "technocratize" their democratic structures through political education and civil-administration reform. Germany's own democratization since World War II and its current participation in the political reforms of Eastern Europe give it a certain nuts-and-bolts approach to democracy. In Latin America—which traditionally has been long on theory but short on implementation—the Germans can serve a potentially useful role.

In the economic arena, Germany wants to increase its trade with Latin America and offer technical assistance in debt and tax restructuring. With regard to trade, the post-World War II development of an export-driven German economy is also widely admired in Latin America and serves as a social-market economy model. This model is particularly significant today since, in view of the social dislocations, economic problems, and political threats associated with structural adjustment policies in Latin America, the German social-market economy, as opposed to the US free-market economy, is an attractive option to many Latin Americans.

The core theme of German-Latin American relations in the coming decade will be that of stabilizing the new democracies in the region and bolstering mutually advantageous trade relations. Increasingly, German relations with Latin America will also be shaped by decisions made at both the EC and bilateral levels. The main threat to German-Latin American relations comes not so much from a potential loss of interest on either side, but from events in Latin America itself. Political regression in Latin America or its failure to compete successfully in trade and investment markets in Western Europe, North America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia would derail Germany's recent initiative and once again pull the two sides apart.

Editor's Note: Abridged version of an article originally published in the German relations journal Aussenpolitik (January 1993).
Reports: Remembering the Cold War

Teeing Off: Dwight, JFK, and Fidel

by Douglas Murphy

In the opening months of 1961 relations between the US and Cuba rapidly deteriorated. A brazen revolutionary leader seized prized US possessions on his island. Two US presidents, staunch defenders of these assets, angrily watched his moves. Tensions flared. Political ties strained, then snapped. And at last, on March 31, a small band of soldiers, poorly trained for the task at hand, stormed onto a beachfront area near Havana to challenge an overwhelming opponent. After hours of fierce combat, the mismatched skirmish mercifully ended and analysis immediately began. Most experts concluded that it was an ill-fated mission from the start. Even the caddy agreed that, when it came to golf, Fidel Castro was no John F. Kennedy.

This scenario was not, of course, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, which unfolded several weeks later. Instead it was a series of political maneuvers that centered on the game of golf. For more than three months US and Cuban leaders waged an all-out turf war with the sport. While the Bay of Pigs assault demonstrated the intensity of US-Cuban animosity, golf revealed some of the "grass roots" activities behind the event.

Political Links

As Fidel Castro's revolution swept through Cuba in the 1950s, golf underwent its own radical changes to the north. In earlier years few Americans possessed the extra money and leisure time necessary to support the golf habit, a pastime previously confined to exclusive country clubs.

As US industries boomed after World War II, however, more and more workers rose to join the blossoming middle class, seeking out the perks and pleasures that came with higher income and a shorter work week. One of the most popular of these was golf, a game that enticed enthusiasts with more courses, cheaper equipment, and all the innovations of modern technology. In a little more than a decade, repatriated soldiers and former guardians of the home front became an army of civilian golfers—dressed in new uniforms, armed with mass-produced clubs, and firing ever more aerodynamic projectiles.

Dwight D. Eisenhower—war hero, president, and real general—led the march by honing his duffer skills as often as his high office permitted. By 1960, with his second term winding to a disturbing close, he took to the course more and more frequently to get a brief respite from Cold War pressures. Photographs of the president in golfing attire, club in hand, became such a frequent sight that Fidel Castro—one of the main irritations of Eisenhower's final days—criticized him as an incapable manager who could only chase the little white ball (Time, April 7, 1961).

Of course Castro hardly represented an impartial critic of either Eisenhower or his sport. Since the revolutionary seized power, he constantly challenged the US president, charging him with imperialist motive, confiscating US industries and property, and seeking ties with Eisenhower's other great nemesis, the USSR.

Likewise, Castro already had expressed ill will towards the game of golf. In contrast to his support of other sports, he denounced golf as a "game of the idle rich and exploiters of the people" (New York Times, March 31, 1961).

The links between these two disputes touched the heart of Castro's...
revolutionary goals. After gaining control of Cuba in 1958, Castro immediately set about toppling the elites and foreigners who controlled the island's agriculture, industry, and politics. In a parallel thrust, he attacked the social trappings of this influence. On the one hand, he tried to abolish the drinking, gambling, and debauchery that had become a drawing card for foreigners. On the other, he determined that, once free from oppression and vice, all Cubans would have equal access to the remaining social, cultural, and sporting facilities.

Golf fell prey to this program on all fronts. Two of the island's largest landowners, the sugar giants United Fruit and Hershey, owned several courses for use by their managers. When these companies and the Eisenhower administration protested Cuba's expropriation of property, Castro responded by setting his sights on their land-rich leisure areas.

Some golfers also attracted attention under new programs to eliminate vice. Previously foreign tourists entertained themselves with some daytime swinging before descending on the casinos and cabarets for an evening of rum, roulette, and prostitution. Castro made it clear that this type of visitor was no longer welcome in the new Cuba.

But it was the exclusive, private clubs of the island that incurred the most outrage and sealed the case against the game. At the time of the revolution, most Cubans lived in squalor. For these impoverished masses, places like the Biltmore Yacht and Country Club and the Havana Country Club—with their grand houses, finely groomed grounds, and wealthy clienteles—shone as beacons of excess amidst the island's general malaise.

More directly, country club membership lists bore the names of many premier enemies of the revolution, including deposed president Fulgencio Batista. And it was in the carefully landscaped country club neighborhoods, behind the closed curtains of darkened mansions, that the last serious resistance to revolution held forth as Castro's forces stormed into Havana. If he allowed clubs to remain intact, Castro only invited plots against his power.

In light of the game's multifaceted disfavor, Castro's first blows against golf appear restrained. He nationalized several clubs, declaring them the property of all the Cuban people. The formerly US-owned Biltmore Club, for example, opened its expropriated grounds and beach to any citizen who cared to enter. Avid golfers were welcome to continue their pastime on the now unkempt and dirty fairways. Though few chose to do so, even former members could pay a fee to use the turf.

If Castro ever considered maintaining golf as an acceptable Cuban sport, activity to the north probably changed his mind. On January 3, 1961, just days before Kennedy assumed the presidency, Eisenhower severed relations with Cuba. Already frustrated by Castro's continued intransigence, the president drew the line when the revolutionary leader demanded a reduction of the US embassy staff in Havana. Eisenhower kept the event in perspective, though, by completing 18 holes before dropping the axe (Time, January 13, 1961).
In the following weeks, despite the worst rift ever in US-Cuban relations, golf again seized the American spotlight. As their nation moved towards armed conflict with their next-door neighbor, inquiring minds wanted to know who played better, Jack or Ike? News magazines recalled Kennedy's history as a freshman golfer at Harvard. Photographers scrambled for snapshots of the president-elect's scorecard. Reporters asked leaders of politics, business, and industry for opinions on how the new leader of the free world might uphold Eisenhower's legacy on the links.

Even when Castro broke into the news, the national craze engulfed him. One political cartoon portrayed the change of White House occupancy as an exchange of membership at the “Burning Problems Country Club” (Time, January 27, 1961). There, in addition to the arms race, the Cold War, and assorted other issues, new player Jack faced Nikita Khrushchev’s cigar-smoking “Caddy Castro” with his bag of clubs and sickles.

Despite the challenging course before him and lingering doubts about his skills, Kennedy asserted himself on both the country club and political turfs. As Eisenhower bid the nation farewell, with a speech at the Augusta Country Club, Kennedy quickly took up the game, the “Presidential Game.”

Kennedy also matched his predecessor at handling golf and Castro in the same stroke. Even before taking the oath of office, reporters spied the youthful president teeing off while in deep discussion with the former US ambassador to Cuba. When Eisenhower severed ties with Cuba and political turfs. As Eisenhower bid the nation farewell, with a speech at the Augusta Country Club, Kennedy quickly took up the game, the “Presidential Game.”

Kennedy also matched his predecessor at handling golf and Castro in the same stroke. Even before taking the oath of office, reporters spied the youthful president teeing off while in deep discussion with the former US ambassador to Cuba. When Eisenhower severed ties with Cuba and political turfs. As Eisenhower bid the nation farewell, with a speech at the Augusta Country Club, Kennedy quickly took up the game, the “Presidential Game.”

For Castro and his supporters, who saw their demands for respect taking a back seat to presidential play, the US obsession with golf suggested a lack of concern with Cuban relations. At the same time it offered itself as a source of revolutionary symbolism. In the magazine Bohemia (January 15, 1961), for example, a cartoonist sketched “Golf Latinoamericano,” Here a smiling man swung a sledge hammer to drive away the severed ball and chain of “Yankee Aggression.”

For Castro and his supporters, the US obsession with golf suggested a lack of concern with Cuban relations and offered itself as a source of revolutionary symbolism.

The game’s refuges in Cuba also attracted more aggressive interest. The Havana Country Club, once famous for its annual “Red Ball”—a formal event where guests and members decked themselves in crimson and scarlet—now saw the color in a new light. Members, who had always insisted that Castro was Communist, received word that he had confiscated their entire neighborhood. The club became an academy of arts while the luxurious surrounding homes were pressed into service as barracks for revolutionary youth.

Other golfing centers also fell. The Cubanican recreation center, once a formal event where guests and members decked themselves in crimson and scarlet—now saw the color in a new light. Members, who had always insisted that Castro was Communist, received word that he had confiscated their entire neighborhood. The club became an academy of arts while the luxurious surrounding homes were pressed into service as barracks for revolutionary youth.

Other golfing centers also fell. The Cubanican recreation center, once a formal event where guests and members decked themselves in crimson and scarlet—now saw the color in a new light. Members, who had always insisted that Castro was Communist, received word that he had confiscated their entire neighborhood. The club became an academy of arts while the luxurious surrounding homes were pressed into service as barracks for revolutionary youth.

The game’s refuges in Cuba also attracted more aggressive interest. The Havana Country Club, once famous for its annual “Red Ball”—a formal event where guests and members decked themselves in crimson and scarlet—now saw the color in a new light. Members, who had always insisted that Castro was Communist, received word that he had confiscated their entire neighborhood. The club became an academy of arts while the luxurious surrounding homes were pressed into service as barracks for revolutionary youth.

The once beautiful greens and fairways already bore scars from antiaircraft batteries positioned to ward off an expected US attack.

Finally, attention came to rest upon the Colinas de Villarreal Golf Club, across from Havana. Castro nationalized this site, planning to make it an additional workers’ social center. But first he saw a chance to swipe the golfing initiative from US politicians.

Tee Time, Revolutionary Style

On March 31, 1961, decked out in military fatigue, boots, and beret, and armed only with golf clubs and his trademark cigar, the Cuban leader played his first and only round of golf. Industry minister Ernesto “Che” Guevara and agrarian reform director Antonio Nuñez Jiménez arrived in similar style to complete a sporting triumvirate. With crowds of reporters on hand to record the moment, the trio took up positions on the first tee.

Any weekend golfer could have predicted the ensuing rout. Even with one quarter of the manpower involved in the first battle of the revolution, Castro could not pull out a victory. Che, who had cad­died as a teenager in Argentina, won with a passable 127 score on the par 70 course. Nuñez logged a 180 total. Castro, the rebel who once took refuge in the rugged Cuban mountains, found that the rolling fairways hid little but his ball. At the end of his round, the soldier retreated from the field with a tally of more than 150 strokes (Newsweek, April 10, 1961).

Despite this humbling Revolutionary Open, the duffers maintained high spirits. After beating his partners on the first hole, Castro boasted he could easily beat Kennedy. In a similar position on the second green, Che swore he could steal a match from Eisenhower. Not to be outdone, Nuñez expressed confidence he could prevail in head-to-head competition with the president of United Fruit Company. All this in contradiction...
of their caddy’s claim that they could not even top the reporters covering the occasion.

Castro, no doubt, secretly agreed with the caddy, but he had reason to portray his round as a political coup. In less than 200 fell swoops, he managed to ridicule two US presidents, foreign business interests in Cuba, and a large portion of the US population, while mimicking the lack of serious attention paid to Cuba by golfing politicians. With the real threat of a US invasion hanging over his island, Castro scoffed at the peril with an outing on the links.

Castro’s round received a mixed reception in the US. Neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy grace the event with a comment. The *New York Times* (March 31, 1961) assured its readers that Kennedy and Eisenhower shot in the 70s and 80s respectively and faced no real threat from the revolutionaries. And Thomas Sunderland, who headed the United Fruit Company, accepted the jibe in good humor. He issued a press release stating that, based upon his typical displays on the course, he would not be surprised to lose to Núñez.

If Kennedy hoped to retake the golfing high ground, his next move failed entirely. The week following Castro’s round, the president flew off for a holiday at the Kennedy estate in Palm Beach, Florida. While he consulted with his advisers, he allowed the press to photograph him on the golf course for the first time in his presidency (*Time*, April 14, 1961). The occasion proved disastrous, however, as his first tee shot hooked wide onto an adjacent fairway. A second attempt bounced off the head of a Secret Service agent. Luckily for all present, Kennedy staffers had already restricted press coverage to the first tee and any further mishaps escaped public scrutiny.

As Kennedy forced analysts to revise their opinions of his golfing prowess, Castro continued to revel in his own round. In a speech to university students in Havana, he announced that at last he had done enough to “deprestige” the game of golf (*Bohemia*, April 16, 1961). But he also noted new possibilities for the sport. “Now,” he added, “when Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Eisenhower want to discuss their problems with us, we’ll play a game of golf.” He also assured his audience that, with a few days of practice, he could guarantee a victory.

In less than 200 fell swoops, Castro managed to ridicule two US presidents, foreign business interests in Cuba, and a large portion of the US population, while mimicking the lack of serious attention paid to Cuba by golfing politicians.

Of course, the fairways and greens could not contain the conflict. Even as Castro proposed his power summit on the links, ships, warplanes, and diplomats from both countries challenged each other and the two nations rushed towards armed conflict. Just days after Castro’s speech reached the press, US-backed Cuban rebels landed at Playa Girón in an attempt to establish a beachhead for counterrevolution.

Faced with the old, familiar hazards, Castro again proved to be a better politician and soldier than golfer. With little difficulty, he rallied the support of Cuban citizens while his forces crushed the attackers huddled at the shoreline. Castro finished the day firmly in control of his island.

Delinking and Relinking

The Bay of Pigs operation effectively drew the union of golf and US-Cuban politics to a bloody close. To the north, US officials and citizens continued their fascination with the links. In Cuba several courses remained open, with the Cuban press occasionally photographing campesinos and workers perfecting their swings. Yet Castro never dabbled in the sport again. He had demonstrated his true skills before a much larger gallery. And since Cuba had now asserted itself as a country that demanded more than a few words between golf swings, the game fell from the political forefront.

From the standpoint of the 1990s, however, Castro may have won a round, but lost the match. As the Cold War puts to a halt, a new generation of Americans watches the Cuban government drift into political and economic isolation. In defiance of this drift, Castro now offers a green revolution. In a city of limited social pleasures, the few foreign diplomats and investors who venture to Havana are encouraged to enjoy its remaining clubs and links. Western tourists, with pockets full of money, are invited to try Cuban golf as part of a Caribbean holiday. Three decades after condemning the game and jeering its enthusiasts, Castro is trying to use golf to prop up his regime and to assert Cuban independence from its northern neighbor.

Nonetheless, most Caribbean countries have found that the success of golf resorts and other tourist ventures depends on a steady flow of guests from the US. Cuba, though attracting its share of visitors, remains off limits to Americans—a policy unlikely to change as long as Castro remains in power. Golf holidays for Canadians and Europeans may help Cuba to delay the return of US influence, but it is the golfing colossus to the north that seems destined to determine the island’s future course.
Haitian Women in Miami
by Sue Chaffee

"Oooh, God is taking care of me today. Yeah, my God send me here. He show me the way and now I have to do my part. That's how God works. That man might act crazy for selling me all this material for little money, but it was God that made him do it. When God see me walking by the man table, he tell the man, 'sell all this to her.' Oh, I have so many things to be thankful for because of my God."

“Everyday I’ll do this. Get up in the morning and cut material. When I have a pile like this I’ll sew them. Sew them, put elastic on the waist, little snaps because I don’t have money for buttons, so I’ll make little snaps. And then I can sell them. God find me something good to do.”

Sue Chaffee is a graduate student in comparative sociology and anthropology at Florida International University. She is currently researching the economic strategies of Haitian women and the role of networking in their survival.
"I'm so happy Jesula rents my little apartment. When she was in Haiti, I miss her so much. Everyday I cry for her. Now she's back and my heart feels kontan (happy)."

"When I was in Haiti I feel bad because my Mom doesn't have good hat for her church. I want to send her something like this in the box I send next week."

"My mother always told me when it's Mother's Day and you are a mother, you are supposed to make something nice for your children so they feel special. I have to do that even if I have only a little money. They need a new wob (dress) so they don't feel bored. If they go to church and see the other children in new clothes and they don't have them then they might feel bad. I want them to feel special. My mother did that for me when I was a little girl in Haiti. She always made me feel special."

"Sè Ben passed by my house yesterday. She bring many things—turkey, milk, tomato paste, bread—many things. The day before that she was in my house and saw that I didn't have these things in my refrigerator. She's my friend. Thank God I have her in my life."

"When I was in Haiti I feel bad because my Mom doesn't have good hat for her church. I want to send her something like this in the box I send next week."
Insider briefs on people and institutions shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Where Logic Defies Politics
The April 1993 appointment of Roberto Robaina to head Cuba's Foreign Ministry set off a wave of reactions from Cuba observers. As the youngest member of the Communist Party's Politburo, the 37-year-old's experience is limited to rising through party ranks within the Union of Young Communists. Even a Radio Havana commentator, Miguel de la Guardia, noted that "the diplomatic community in Havana received the appointment with surprise." What is perhaps even more surprising is that Robaina replaced career diplomat Ricardo Alarcon, who earlier had been named to the largely ceremonial position of president of Cuba's legislature—the National Assembly. Some observers interpret Robaina's appointment as an attempt to signal the start of a renewal process within the government through the arrival of a new generation of leaders.

Watch Out!
Jamaica continues to lose ground in its struggle against violence. According to an Americas Watch report (April 1993), "the fear of crime continues to deepen... particularly vexing for the population is the theft of crops and livestock... giving rise to fits, vigilante justice and sometimes police violence." But the issue of civil violence extends to a deeper concern—state violence. The report states that the "level of police violence is extremely high; killings by police [in the last four years] have constituted 22 percent of all homicides in Jamaica (the number of killings by police that are justified is unknown)."

Sing Along
Inspired by the success and technology of "Unforgettable"—the recent musical hit in which Natalie Cole sings with her long deceased father, Nat "King" Cole—Cuban singer and composer Pablo Milanés will also try recording with the dead. It is a bold and, some will no doubt say, pretentious move by "Pablito," for he has picked as singing partners two of the most venerated figures of the Cuban musical pantheon: Benny More and Miguelito Cuni. Milanés has selected ten recordings (five by each of the two legendary singers) and will be adding his own voice in a sophisticated sound studio in the Dominican Republic. The album will be distributed internationally by Polygram Records in mid-1993. The production launches the Pablo Milanés Foundation, a nongovernmental, nonprofit, self-financed institution designed to promote cultural and artistic events. Since it is apparently not officially tied to the Cuban government, it would seem to be an entity with few precedents in Cuba's recent history.

Where Politics Defies Logic
When Bill Clinton was elected president, he promised a different "look" for his administration. One of his more novel attempts to fulfill this campaign promise was the half-hearted and ill-fated effort to name Mario Baeza, a New York lawyer, as assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs. Even before the likely nominee could get to Washington to display his credentials, a chorus of opposition developed in Miami and Washington. Apparently Baeza was not well-known to Miami's Cuban-Americans, especially Democrats. At issue were the lawyer's sympathies toward Castro, his connections with companies seeking business on the island, and his absence of familiarity with "the Cuban-American agenda." Many also believe that race played a subtle factor—Baeza is black. After weeks of delay and ambivalence, the Baeza nomination was dropped by Clinton and his advisers, who were not eager to fight for a position that, at most, has symbolic importance in White House decisionmaking.

US Policy Is Working... or Is It?
Before the US trade embargo on Haiti, merchandise trade between the two countries totaled $820 million (1990). By 1992, however, trade had dropped by more than half to only $322 million. Of this amount, US exports were largely composed of rice, wheat, and sugar, while imports were mainly comprised of finished textile products. Haiti's GDP fell 10% in 1992. The Haitian assembly industry has been hardest hit, with employment in that key industry falling from a pre-embargo high of nearly 32,000 workers to only 12,000.
Watch Out II

Many of your favorite Amway products are now available in Argentina. The company, based in Michigan, recently opened Amway centers in Buenos Aires, Rosario, Córdoba, and Mendoza. The direct-sales consumer products company is already operating in Mexico, Central America, and Brazil, and expects to sell more than $10 million worth of its products in Argentina during 1993.

The Caribbean Connection

The Miami-based Caribbean Satellite Network (CSN) had its debut in December 1992. The first and only television network to deliver Caribbean programming 24 hours a day, its programs focus on Caribbean news, sports such as cricket and soccer, and Caribbean music videos, with emphasis on reggae, soca, calypso, and Latin and other roots music. Although well-received in the Caribbean, CSN has not yet been picked up by any US cable companies.

Good Analysis

Some of the best analyses on the potential plight of the Caribbean in the face of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) come from Manchester Trade, a Washington-based international business advisory group. Directed by Stephen Lande, a lawyer and former official in the office of the US Trade Representative, Manchester has organized a “Friends of the Caribbean” network to lobby for the new Caribbean Basin Free Trade Agreements Act. The legislation would provide some guarantees for Caribbean countries against the trade and investment diversion that NAFTA, if and when it is signed, may bring.

Worth Reading


Fiber Optics Frenzy?

A $1 billion fiber optics network will link Latin America, the US, and the European Community by late 1994, according to an article in the Journal of Commerce (May 19, 1993). The article quotes an AT&T official: “There will be a double digit compounding increase in traffic over the next couple of years once we deploy fiber optics to the whole region. . . . The growth will be a self-feeding situation.” The main obstacle to the network is, of course, financing. While many Latin American countries are modernizing their phone systems, about $30 billion will need to be invested annually in telecommunications in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to be competitive in the global economy.

Check It Out

The Revista Bigott focuses its entire October-December 1992 issue on tobacco in the Americas. Published in Caracas, the slick magazine has 10 articles on the origins and uses of tobacco in the Americas. Among the authors is Guillermo Cabrera Infante, whose article “Puro humo” is framed by multicolor replications of the world’s most intricate cigar wrapper bands. For those who love cigars, this issue is a collector’s item.

Música Caliente

MTV Music Television has announced that it will initiate a 24-hour Spanish-language network, based in Miami. The new network will be marketed to 12 to 34-year-old Hispanics and will also be offered to cable operators throughout Latin America and some parts of the Caribbean. The network will debut in October 1993.

Free Fall

Ricardo Arias Calderón, formerly Panama’s vice president and now leader of the opposition to President Guillermo Endara, should have thought twice before resigning his government position. Since he left the government in December 1992, the Christian Democrat’s popularity has plummeted from 18.7% in April 1992 to 7.5% in April 1993. The poll, conducted by the Dichter and Neira Company of Panama City, was based on interviews with 1,200 Panamanians.
Peru: Into a Black Hole
by Luis Pásara

Is Peru the most tragic exception to an emerging profile of Latin American democratic consolidation? Or is it, in extreme form, a portent of a regional future of social polarization and political violence?

The popular election of a constituent assembly in November 1992 created the impression that Peru had returned to a state of political calm and stability. In fact, Peru is still painfully dragging itself through the worst stage in its history. The proposed new constitution—which would be drafted by a congressional majority loyal to the dictates of President Alberto Fujimori—does not represent a way out of the current imbroglio.

Unlike Chile—where the success of democratization reflects the chance convergence of the military’s withdrawal from power and an economic upturn—contemporary Peru’s experience with the operation of chance has been entirely negative. Natural disasters, such as the two-year drought currently afflicting the country, contribute to Peru’s bad fortune. Most of its current problems, however, are distinctly human in origin.

Since the mid-1970s Peru has suffered an economic collapse that places its current GDP per capita at 1950 levels. The government’s failure to handle the economic situation has exacerbated a very grave process of deinstitutionalization by which the effective authority of the state is greatly reduced and the effective authority of guerrillas (i.e., Sendero Luminoso) expands to fill the gap. In this setting, Fujimori has emerged as a caudillo who enjoys the approval of a significant portion of the electorate. In short, Peru finds that it has a state whose effective authority is fast eroding.

The military government of Morales Bermúdez (1975-80), Alán García (1985-90), and Alberto Fujimori (1990-) imposed drastic adjustment programs that failed to eliminate inflation, clean up public finances, or reestablish the underpinnings of sustainable economic growth. This sequence of administrations has created a disturbing profile of the Peruvian economy: chronically high inflation; a tremendous decline in the value of economic output; a huge increase in the share that drug revenues represent in the national economy and in its exports; a massive debt burden; and a fiscally bankrupt state. In 1992—after more than two years of Fujimori’s shock treatment—the value of Peru’s GDP fell for the fourth consecutive time and the rate of inflation hovered around 60%. As a result, 17.6 million of Peru’s 22 million people currently live in poverty and, of those, nearly 11 million are indigent.

Not surprisingly, then, popular disaffection with political parties is massive, fueled by the perception that they serve only a narrow band of interests.

Luis Pásara is a research associate at the Centro Latinoamericano para el Análisis de la Democracia, in Buenos Aires, Argentina. His publications include “El rol del parlamento: Argentina y Perú,” Desarrollo Económico (January-March 1993).

Popular disaffection with political parties is massive, fueled by the perception that they serve only a narrow band of interests.
Political opposition, especially on the left, used the economic difficulties of the country to exert multiple demands without considering what is possible. These demands have mainly been for higher salaries and the preservation of government spending programs. The rejection of any government initiative, the systematic and premature denial of any positive result from the policies adopted, and the increase in social conflict have become useful tools for those who hope to take over the government in the next electoral round. Such strategies and political resources were employed by the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) to challenge Belaunde and by the left to undermine Garcia. Although the APRA won the 1985 election, the Izquierda Unida (IU) failed to gain power by using similar tactics in 1990. IU’s failure was largely because its strategy of strikes, stoppages, and blockades simply wore out the patience of the electorate.

Under the Garcia presidency in the late 1980s, popular disaffection with both the administration’s methods of governing and APRA’s stalemated relation with opposition parties affected the attitude of the electorate. While “turning their back” on those whom they had elected could generate a feeling of treason among the voters, the opposition’s activities left the impression that social protest, such as marches and strikes, was incapable of modifying policies adopted from the “top.” As a result, the ineffectiveness of an exhausted left was evidenced by the decline in voter support, from nearly a third in 1975-85 to its extremely low current level.

One apparent expression of voter disapproval was the high proportion of citizens who supported the pursuit of anticorruption charges against former president Garcia. After the Peruvian supreme court ruled in 1991 that the congressional accusations were groundless, a poll found that 60% of those surveyed disagreed with the decision, a finding that was virtually constant across all social classes. Only 24% of those surveyed agreed with the court’s ruling. Effectively shaping public opinion was the strong and widely held belief that Garcia had misappropriated public funds and otherwise mismanaged the public sector.

The intensification of citizen disaffection with both political parties and individual politicians seems to have had two principal beneficiaries. The first is the Sendero insurgency, which was able to present itself as a viable opposition movement by inflicting material damage on both the political authorities and those social groups deemed responsible for the implementation of failed government economic policies. The “independents,” people who lack previous political experience or links with traditional political parties, are also reaping the benefits. Exemplary of this phenomenon was the November 1989 election of television personality Ricardo Belmont as mayor of Lima. A much more significant indication of this trend was the 1990 election of Fujimori as president.

**Short-Term Winner #1: Sendero Luminoso**

A 1991 survey in Lima found that 17% of those polled believed terrorist actions were justified. Among the poorest sectors—which comprise close to half of Lima’s population—support for terrorism reached 23%. Combined with the state’s crumbling effective presence, such sentiment forms the urban foundation upon which the Sendero insurgency has spread since 1980. More than a decade later, the horrible scenario of Sendero terrorism and the “dirty war” of government repression has resulted in more than 25,000 deaths and material losses that are almost
Features: Fragile Democracies

the equivalent of Peru’s $20 billion foreign debt. The Sendero movement does not appeal to the majority of Peruvians. Even so, it has managed to recruit thousands of persons who believe in the possibility of rebuilding the country’s state and society along the same lines advocated by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The political impact of the September 1992 arrest and conviction of Sendero founder Abimael Guzmán is not yet clear. In any case, however, it is difficult to imagine the end of the subversive movement in the near future. Indeed, even if the Sendero movement itself were to fall apart, Peru’s growing poverty, increasing social polarization, and progressively ineffective government probably ensures that mutant versions of the Sendero would take its place. According to the previously noted 1991 poll in Lima, while 75% of those surveyed responded that democracy was their preferred form of government, 81% of them said they would support a “government that is not elected by the people but that is just and improves the situation.” The substantial popular support of both the April 1992 coup and the subsequent closure of congress fall into this same category. Hence, the eventual rise of an alternative subversive option—less violent than Sendero and more appealing to the prolonged dissatisfaction of Peruvians—is a distinct possibility.

Short-Term Winner #2: Alberto Fujimori

Peruvian voters have experienced two democratically elected governments—those of Belaunde and García—that restricted political participation by controlling a rubber-stamp congressional majority while simultaneously displaying considerable inefficiency in managing the economy. Against this backdrop, Alberto Fujimori—virtually unknown on the national political scene—placed second in the presidential primaries of 1990, before ultimately defeating the favorite, novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, in the run-off. The key reasons for Vargas Llosa’s surprising defeat were his membership in the discredited “white” elite, his bulwark of support within the equally discredited traditional political parties (Partido Popular Cristiano and Acción Popular), and his intention to appoint members of these parties to positions of power.

Fujimori, in building his political future, revealed his unequivocal rejection of the traditional role of political parties in Peru’s government machinery. After his inauguration in July 1990, he provoked a confrontation with opposition parties that controlled both houses of congress, launching a systematic campaign of unfounded accusations against them. For example, without presenting proof, he accused the parties of corruption, especially narcotrafficking. Since then he has continued this strategy with the knowledge that a vast sector of the population rejects the traditional parties and supports his maneuvers.

The popularity of this strategy is indicated by the fact that, following the coup of April 5, 1992—which closed down the congress and the courts—public opinion sided overwhelmingly with a “presidential dictatorship” and against a

### APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL OF GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION (August 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Approve</th>
<th>% Disapprove</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government as a whole</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic policy</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antisubversion strategy</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambio 90</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente Independiente Moralizador</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertad</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acción Popular</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Popular Cristiano</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRENATRACA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidaridad y Democracia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Unificado Mariateguista</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: APOYO S.A. Survey in metropolitan Lima, sample size 500, age 18 and older.
PERU: ECONOMIC INDICATORS

GDP Growth Rate

Debt Service

As percentage of exports

Consumer Prices

Real Wages

GDP per Capita

Source: Inter-American Development Bank
Features: Fragile Democracies

regime in which political parties exercise power through the legislature. Thus, according to an August 1992 survey in Lima, 62% of those polled approved of Fujimori while 28% disapproved of him. Fujimori’s party, Cambio 90, received only a 46% approval versus a 38% disapproval rate, but no other political party scored more than 25%.

New Image, Old Style
Contrary to his cultivated image as a president determined to chart a radically new political course for Peru, Fujimori’s governing style is not much different from that of past Peruvian political leadership. Reminiscent of that tradition in Peru is his highly personal handling of the political movement, Cambio 90, that served as his vehicle to reach the presidency, his capricious manipulation of the rules during the electoral process of creating a new constituent assembly, and his intention to change the constitution mainly to make his reelection legally possible. Like his predecessors, Fujimori eschews institution-building in favor of free-wheeling maneuvering, appealing to the populace for support only when necessary to break political stalemates with powerful blocs of elites. Even so, under Fujimori, Peru is undergoing a basic political shift: a growing rupture between the upper classes and, on the one hand, their political parties, and on the other hand, the increasingly impoverished citizenry. As a consequence, electoral outcomes have become more erratic and democratic governance less legitimate than ever.

The victors in the November 1992 election for the constituent assembly were pro-Fujimori “independents.” These new legislators are without previous experience in government and have no record of commitment to public service. It is a parliamentary majority that will do whatever Fujimori requests as long as he enjoys popular support. If Peru fails to register recovery in the economy and social welfare, however, this fragile coalition is likely to unravel.

Are there any grounds for optimism? Apparently not. On the one hand, the Peruvian elite is rejected by most of the lower social strata; the armed forces are afflicted by narcotrafficking, corruption, and government manipulation; and the Catholic Church is torn between conservative and revolutionary forces. On the other hand, the Peruvian left is in disarray. It is difficult, then, to identify any source for positive change in Peru. If Peru does not receive serious infusions of external aid to reconstruct its institutions, the country will continue its free fall into a social, economic, and political black hole. ■

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)

Rediscovering America/Redescubriendo América

Readings and teaching ideas in English and Spanish on the conquest and its legacy

Poetry and prose by Latin American and Caribbean authors such as Claribel Alegría, Manlio Argueta, Pedro Albizu Campos, Ernesto Cardenal, Rubén Dario, Eduardo Galeano, Nicolás Guillén, Pablo Neruda, Gabriel García Márquez, Rigoberta Menchú, César Vallejo, and more.

For K-Adult Spanish, Bilingual, English and Social Studies classes.
Edited by Arnoldo Ramos, Gioconda Belli, et al.


Send check, purchase order or inquiries to NECA, 1118 22nd St, NW Washington, DC 20037 202-429-0137, Fax: 202-429-9766.

The Network of Educators on the Americas (NECA) distributes additional titles for teaching about the Americas. Request a catalogue. For example the Caribbean Connections series includes titles on Puerto Rico ($12), Jamaica ($12) and Overview of Regional History ($15.95) (+ $3 postage for each book). "Here are the voices of Puerto Rican workers, women, activists, writers and musicians. Puerto Rican students will find their heritage presented here with knowledge and dignity. Students and teachers of other backgrounds will enjoy a wonderful and informed introduction to Puerto Rican life today." - Dr. Rina Benmayor, Center for Puerto Rican Studies, Hunter College.
Since the nineteenth century, accusations of corruption have been a recurring excuse for deposing, or attempting to depose, governing authorities in Latin America. While those accusations have been, on the whole, valid ones, it is almost inevitable that the subsequent regimes are guilty of the very same practices. Not surprisingly, therefore, Latin Americans tend to regard power and corruption as inextricably intertwined.

Given its constancy, when does corruption actually rise to the fore of public consciousness? Within the framework of this question, the details of popular attitudes toward corruption vary across the countries of Latin America. For example, according to recent surveys, 50% of urban Argentineans and Brazilians polled view corruption as the principal political problem of their countries. In Argentina, however, corruption has been tolerated politically because the government appears to be relatively successful in managing the economy, whereas in economically unstable Brazil, it led to one of the rare cases in which a president was indicted and tried for corruption.

In Argentina, tolerance is indeed high for the questionable actions and utterances of ministers, such as former labor minister Luis Barrionuevo, who once said that "nobody has ever earned money working." Consider also the statement of the highly praised minister of economics Antonio Cavallo, who declared that he requires $10,000 monthly to live but earns only $2,100 monthly in his official capacity, receiving the rest in the form of payments from a private foundation. Another example of public tolerance is the case of Gerardo Sofovich, who resigned as a state-appointed manager of a television station in December 1992, following accusations that he had mixed his activities as a private producer with his government role. Only 55% of those surveyed in Buenos Aires condemned his actions while 37% thought they should not have led to his resignation. Behind this ambiguity is the perception that Argentina has successfully changed its course, and that, despite a very high social cost, the road has been paved towards a better future.

In Brazil, on the other hand, Fernando Collor de Mello—who was elected president on the grounds that he would end the flagrant corruption of public functionaries—ended his term in January 1993 by resigning to avoid trial in the senate, which nevertheless imposed on Collor sanctions identical with impeachment. Still, comparing Collor's case with examples of government corruption in other Latin American countries, Collor's transgressions seem to lack originality. To be sure, the house that President Collor resided in was extravagant indeed, but this pales in comparison to the case of Argentine president Carlos Menem, who remodeled his summer home on the Atlantic coast, bought a $60 million jet, and is currently building an expensive third home. Argentine magazines are filled with stories about the residences of Menem's relatives and political associates, reporting that the costs of their homes far exceed their salaries. In contrast, César Macri, Collor's former labor minister, was accused of taking a $4,000 check—pocket money compared to Argentina, where few misdeeds involving less than a million dollars merit public accusation.

Commonly in Latin America, corruption can be covered up or politically expunged if a functionary resigns, even if the offenses are serious. A political machine acts to protect itself by complying with and motivating such maneuvers. Such action, however, is rarely enough. In a society like Argentina, where television is one of the principal shapers of public opinion and where prominent journalists like Bernardo Neudstadt shout "paren de robar" ("stop stealing"), a
potential crisis is at hand if for any reason confidence is lost in the current economic program. In that event Argentina could face the same shock wave that is rippling through Italy today: a profound discrediting, not only of politicians and political parties, but of the entire political system as well.

In Brazil, government leadership sought to clear itself by denouncing Collor. After all, Collor was an easy target—a “new caudillo” who gained entry to the elite circles of decisionmaking without a political party base and with a party machinery whose economic programs proved disastrous. In this context, the blame for the country’s profound problems was simply cast upon “arribista” individuals like Collor who failed in their task to save the nation. Perhaps Collor did not commit offenses graver than those of many other politicians and officials in Latin America. A basic difference, though, is that he failed to build adequate political coalitions and thus could not erase the footprints of his actions. Proof of this point is that another government accused of large-scale corruption, that of Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela, survived as long as the entire political class supported Pérez in the face of attempted coups launched by an alliance of military factions and leftist groups.

What to Do?

Realistically, Latin Americans cannot hope to eradicate corruption, but they can curtail it within reasonable limits. To do so, however, all punishable acts must be prosecuted. Indictments that are not accompanied by evidence, and which fail to lead to convictions, can be extremely dangerous for the stability of political regimes if no such sanctions are imposed. The limitations on corruption must be set by those who influence public opinion and must be enforced on the actions of the political class.

Recent events suggest that the “new caudillos,” such as Collor and Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori, could quickly fall from power if they do not have the support of the traditional political machines or if they fail to impose limits on the trappings of political office. Ironically, in the cases of Venezuela and Peru, it seems that the violent actions of extremist groups are provoking a reactive solidarity among otherwise splintered political elites. This, in turn, may be providing the glue that keeps those democratic regimes formally intact. If this is true, then the situation shouts all the more loudly for the renovation and deepening of democratic arrangements. ■
Venezuelan Alternatives

by Jennifer McCoy

After more than three decades of being a "model" Latin American democracy, why is Venezuela now suffering a crisis of political legitimacy? Venezuelans have experienced crises before—attempted military coups, intense guerrilla warfare, party turmoil, and wildly fluctuating oil prices. Yet these crises were overcome, and in some cases they actually strengthened Venezuela's approach to democracy. How, then, do we explain the paradox that a country with one of the world's highest economic growth rates in 1991 was undergoing serious political and social upheaval in 1992?

In 1992 Venezuelans were suffering from more than the Latin American impact of economic scarcity, including cynicism toward the political class. In addition, they were questioning the very direction in which the country may, and should, be heading. These problems can be seen not only in the resistance of vested interests to changes in their accustomed economic and political privileges, but also in the popular tendency to blame scapegoats for the country's ills and to look for saviors to ease the burdens of economic scarcity.

Does the Venezuelan crisis reflect unique national conditions? Or does it reflect patterns common to Latin American countries undergoing similar processes of economic and political liberalization?

Arguably, the Venezuelan crisis reflects broader Latin American trends. Prime among these is the difficulty of gaining support for short-term economic sacrifices in exchange for long-term improvement, particularly without strategies of communication or alliance-building to win that support. Overlooking these two strategies is common to governments undergoing economic liberalization, which tend simply to impose policies of austerity and adjustment on their citizenry.

The Venezuelan case illustrates something else as well: the role of normative legitimacy in sustaining a democratic regime, even when the government in power is unpopular or discredited. So far, at least, Venezuelan public opinion still appears to favor a democratic polity to an authoritarian alternative. This view seems to likewise be true in other Latin American countries, such as Brazil, where disenchantment with the Fernando Collor de Mello government had become widespread.

As has occurred in other Latin American countries, Venezuelans have made political leaders scapegoats for their country's problems. Intriguingly, the popular perception of corruption in Venezuela seems to be higher now than in the 1970s, when real corruption was at its peak. Related to the issue of political scapegoating is a tendency to embrace a "savior"—whether it be rising oil prices for Venezuela, Mercosur for Uruguay, or a charismatic leader in general—rather than face the need to adapt to current realities. In nascent form, these tendencies are reflected in the widespread support among the poor and the increasingly impoverished middle classes in Venezuela for the anticorruption and anti-politician message of antiestablishment personalities such as coup leader Hugo Chaves. These patterns are widespread across Latin America as the region strives to...
adjust to a changing international economy, revise social policies, and restore confidence in political institutions so badly damaged by centralization, presidentialism, and mismanagement.

Venezuela exhibits many of today's general problems of implementing economic reform. These problems are not, however, the primary sources of its current political crisis. Instead, the roots of the crisis lie in Venezuela’s particular solutions to general dilemmas of democracy: an overemphasis on governability, illustrated by tight party discipline and control, at the expense of representation and participation; satisfying demands through oil revenues rather than domestic taxation; and decision-making by an exclusive circle of elite groups. Finally, the Venezuelan crisis reflects the larger limits of a model of capitalist democracy that has proved unable to both promote the market and protect the populace from its negative consequences. What, then, are the prospects for Venezuelan democracy? Three scenarios are possible.

The Optimistic Scenario

The first scenario is an optimistic one. In this scenario, pressures from below lead political parties and governing officials to introduce more decentralized and participatory arrangements. A revised social contract between state and society would minimize citizen expectations of what the state can provide. A more consultative process of making decisions would incorporate a wider array of social and economic interests in the making of policy and would open debate over development strategy to address not only economic growth but social needs as well.

What are the prospects for such a self-generating renewal? Some positive signs are recent electoral reforms allowing for direct elections of governors, mayors, and municipal councils and for single-member district representation for 50% of the municipal council and national legislative seats. These reforms represent a significant step toward decentralized governance and the direct accountability of elected leaders to voters. Already the impact of these changes can be seen in the increased popularity of local leaders over national ones. The December 1992 reelection and expansion of opposition parties, at the cost of the ruling Acción Democrática (AD) party, as well as the surprising victory of the Causa R candidate in the Caracas mayoral race, indicate the potential for healthy multiparty elections, at least at the local and regional levels. The 1992 electoral successes of not only the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), the major opposition party, but also Causa R, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), and Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo reflect this potential. The dominance of the two traditional parties at the national level will be tested in the legislative and presidential elections of December 1993.

This optimistic scenario will not come true, however, unless Venezuelans overcome some major obstacles. It will require the incorporation of new interests in the governing process, new modes of political negotiation and compromise, and new ideas on economic productivity. And it will require political leadership willing to emphasize the long-term, general interests of Venezuelans rather than the short-term, electoral interests of particular parties and individuals.

The Survival Scenario

The second scenario is the “muddling through” or survival scenario. In this scenario, democratic politics will survive in Venezuela but will neither solve nor exacerbate pressing national problems. A first variant of this scenario involves the retaining of power by traditional parties through “el torno” and the bipartisan electoral model of the past. The current economic policy would be maintained, but with some concessions to the demands of particular interest groups. Inflation and deficits would rise, though not to insupportable levels. Gradual change would be possible through modest political and economic reforms, yet would be slow in coming due to the resistance of entrenched political and economic interests. A second variant involves an independent candidate winning the 1993 presidential election, while incorporating the traditional parties into the new government and maintaining the broad lines of current economic reforms.

This scenario requires, however, continued popular support for democratic politics and congressional support for tax reform and...
electoral and political party reform. Whether the first or second variant of the muddling-through scenario comes to pass will depend in large part on the populace's loyalty to the traditional parties and the depths of its general alienation from politics. Although this cannot be predicted before the December 1993 elections, the December 1992 elections give some indications. The turnout rate, though low, showed some improvement over the high abstention rates of 1989, with 55% voting in Caracas (compared to only 30% in 1989) and 54% voting nationwide (compared to 46% in 1989). Still, this relatively low turnout rate reflects continued voter alienation and was a particular blow to President Carlos Andres Perez, who had called for voters to turn out to defend the democratic regime and to repudiate the coup attempt of November 27, 1992.

In addition, the victories of the opposition parties beyond COPEI indicate voter attraction to alternatives to the traditional bipartisan model of AD-COPEI.

The Pessimistic Scenario
The third scenario is a pessimistic one in which the political and economic crisis deepens and either a demagogic autocrat is elected or a military coup succeeds. This scenario could be brought on by inertia and/or social explosion. In terms of inertia, a continued political stalemate prevents the making of the tough choices required to address deepening economic scarcity, corruption, and judicial ineffectiveness. Such inertia is likely to lead to a social explosion, particularly if the grim economic forecasts for 1993 and 1994 come true. With continued weak oil prices, a fiscal deficit of 7-8% is likely in 1993 unless taxes are increased and spending is cut. This situation points to the prospects of higher inflation, social unrest over higher prices and/or cuts in subsidies, and declining investment as uncertainty rises.

The inertia variant could produce a populist or demagogic candidate who wins wide popular support, but who fails to gain legislative support and resorts to autocratic rule. Alternatively, a social explosion in response to economic hardship could lead to the direct intervention of the military to preserve social order. Either way, the pessimistic scenario implies that Venezuela has not reached the depths of its potential crisis, and that the motivation for substantial positive change will occur only after those depths have been reached. Although the violence of the second coup attempt of 1992 may have brought wider repudiation and fear of a military alternative, the deep disillusionment with the current political leadership and practices remains. As a result, there remains the possibility that nondemocratic alternatives will be sought by various social sectors.

In the final analysis, the prospects for Venezuelan democracy depend on several factors:
- the ability of Venezuelan citizens to resist appealing to a "savior" to lift their country out of its current situation;
- the willingness of political and economic elites to sacrifice their own short-term interests for the national, long-term good; and
- the reevaluation of the relevance of past solutions for the democratic dilemmas and choices of today.

Links
HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT

"Links provides the best overview I have seen of critical issues affecting the health of disadvantaged peoples. It is a must for anyone concerned with the links between health and social justice."

—David Werner, author of Where There Is No Doctor

Subscription to Links:
$12 for one year; $25 institutions and foreign;
$3 for individual copies

Send your name and address along with a check to: Links, P.O. Box 202, New York NY 10276.
Cheddi Jagan and Democracy

An Interview by Anthony P. Maingot

Elected for the first time in 1953, Cheddi Jagan returns to the presidency of Guyana with his reputation for honesty and dedication to his people intact. He faces many of the same problems, however, not the least of which are the ethnic cleavages so evident in the 1992 election.

Tell me what first comes to mind when asked to recall your struggle for democracy in Guyana.

Well, somebody asked me after I won: how do you feel? I said I don’t feel any different. In other words, we always accepted the realities of our situation and realized that we had to struggle and stay at it persistently, patiently. We have not made many mistakes as an opposition party and thus we were able to repeatedly win elections. In the context of the Cold War and the strategies and tactics of liberation, we can say that we had a correct approach and that’s what sustained us. For example, we could have taken the route of El Salvador, but we didn’t. We recognized the balance of forces, but mostly we realized that our electoral way was better. The proof of this is that we have obtained power while discussions for power sharing are still going on in El Salvador.

Recently, Professor Arthur Schlesinger apologized for US actions in 1962. How did those actions color your perceptions of US policy back then and have those perceptions changed?

At that time the missile crisis, and before that the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, had clouded all perspectives on the hemisphere. We became the victims of that anti-communist hysteria. Guyana, it was thought, was becoming not only independent but another Cuba; even more dangerous, because Cuba, being an island, could be surrounded and blockaded, not Guyana. Although I made every effort to assuage these perceptions by going directly to the Latin American group at the UN and stating that if that was the major concern of the West, then we were prepared to sign a treaty, like Austria had, making Guyana a neutral country guaranteed by UN powers. I even went beyond that and said that upon independence the governor general would be appointed by the opposition in parliament and that he would have veto powers on questions such as the importation of arms or the leasing of military bases to foreign countries. Despite our democratic behavior and promises of neutrality, nobody was prepared to listen because of the existing hysteria. So we became the victims of indiscriminate anti-communism.

We were, therefore, very glad that the Nation provided Professor Schlesinger the opportunity in 1990 to say that he was sorry for what the Kennedy administration had done 30 years ago (see insert on p. ??). But I had to remark that the injustice was not done just to me, but more seriously to the country and to the people. The consequences were grave for them. When I was head of the government in the 1960s, Guyana’s socioeconomic level was in second place in the Caribbean. It was bracketed with “the big four”—Guyana, Trinidad, Jamaica, and Barbados. Today, 30 years later, Guyana has the lowest developmental status of the whole hemisphere, even lower than Haiti. Fatally, half our population now resides abroad, a massive brain drain from which we will take years to recuperate.

As the most recent elections show, Guyana is quite evidently still polarized on racial grounds. What will you do to minimize this situation?

First of all, let me make a clarification. The analysis of Guyana’s politics is sometimes too simplistic. When one says that politics is all
racial, one should not disregard the issue of social class. Especially in the 28 years since Burnham and the People’s National Congress (PNC) came to power, a new comprador bourgeoisie has emerged. And, therefore, you had, for instance, in the PNC regime not a “black” government ruling in the interest of the black people who are in their majority working class. Rather, it was at the service of the black and Indian elite. That is why during the last campaign we had what we called in Guyana, the Committee for the Re-election of Hoyte (CREEP), made up of wealthy Indians who had planned to raise 35 million Guyana dollars for the reelection of Hoyte and the PNC.

On the other hand, we of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) had multiracial unity. In the opposition Patriotic Alliance for Democracy/PPP grouping, for instance, there were five parties. Also in opposition to the PNC were six trade unions: two in sugar, two in bauxite, one in the civil service, and another in the clerical field. These represented all the races. At the religious level, there were two bishops (one Anglican who was black and one Catholic who was Indian) who played a very big role in the struggle for fair and free elections.

Let me ask you a subsidiary question regarding race and elections. When you first came into power in Guyana in 1953 and then won again in 1957, the electoral system used was the traditional British single-member constituency or “first-past-the-post” system, which divided the country into constituencies that elected, on a simple majority basis, only one candidate each. In this system, there is seldom a relationship between the number of seats won and the overall vote for a particular party. The PPP tended to win many more seats than its overall vote would warrant proportionately. This led the US, as Schlesinger points out in his book, A Thousand Days, to pressure the British into changing the system to one of proportional representation specifically to deny you power. What are your thoughts about the system most suited to Guyana today?

As you know the PNC ran three suspect elections in a row with the proportional representation system. That was the only way to defeat us. Be that as it may, I would still say that there are certain advantages to that system, just like there are with the first-past-the-post one. There are minuses and pluses to both.

Our present system of proportional representation is too com-
Schlesinger’s Apology

Cut now to the Nation office 26 years later. Our guest and speaker at a seminar for the Nation staff and interns is Cheddi Jagan, three times popularly elected prime minister of British Guiana prior to its independence in 1964 and today the leader of Guyana’s largest political party. Jagan wrote in a book, The West on Trial: The Fight for Guyana’s Freedom (Seven Seas Books, 1966), in which he charged but for US intervention, he and his party would have won the Guyanese election of 1964 and ushered the country into its new era of independence (and perhaps, we would add, have avoided some of the bloodshed, racial conflict, misery, and chaos that came in the wake of his party’s defeat). As proof of Kennedy administration intervention, he cited A Thousand Days, in which Arthur Schlesinger said he reported to the president that Jagan’s opponents “would cause us many fewer problems.” Jagan was under suspicion because of his Marxist wife and his leftist politics, as evidenced by his responses during a “Meet the Press” interview, and, writes Schlesinger, there was a way to beat him. Jagan’s parliamentary strength was larger than his popular strength: he had won 57% of the seats on the basis of 42.7% of the vote. An obvious solution would be to establish a system of proportional representation, which on Schlesinger’s recommendation and with the collusion of the British, was finally done. Jagan was out.

Enter Professor Archie Singham, member of the Nation’s editorial board, long-time Caribbeanist and activist-scholar. At Singham’s suggestion, we sent a copy of relevant passages of Jagan’s book to Schlesinger, suggesting that the Pulitzer Prize winner join the seminar. The Cold War must indeed be over: Schlesinger, who has had a long but uneasy history with the Nation, called to say he would accept, with great anticipation.

Those present witnessed a rare thing: a private public apology. Schlesinger was quick to say, “I felt badly about my role 30 years ago.” He conceded that Jagan was right about US intervention, although he said the US was motivated less by a security concern about a communist threat in the hemisphere than by a domestic political concern. “There was a great feeling after the Bay of Pigs, where the impression arose that Eisenhower had prepared an expedition to get rid of Castro, that Kennedy had lacked the resolution to follow through it. It was just politically going to look very bad if the dominoes began to fall in South America... The fear was that Congress might use aid to British Guiana as a means of attacking the whole aid bill then before it... Then of course what really happened was the CIA got involved, got the bit between its teeth and the covert action people thought was a chance to show their stuff... I think a great injustice was done to Cheddi Jagan.”

Editor’s Note: Excerpted with permission from an editorial in the Nation, June 4, 1990.
recently talked about the evils of an unethical capitalism that marginalizes large segments of the population.

You are saying, then, that those ideals are not the exclusive domain of socialism?

That's right.

How about the competition between open economies, a new dogma that some are calling neoliberalism, but which, of course, has very deep roots in capitalist thought?

In the case of Guyana, it is true that we had, in general, a similar ideological, philosophical outlook as the Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union, but our practice was different. They emphasized economic, social, and cultural rights, but they were short on human civil and political rights. We, in Guyana, despite all the problems we faced and now face, intend to emphasize all these rights. So I would say had the West not moved in to destabilize the PPP government in Guyana, today we would have what is called "socialism with a human face." This to us means efficient management, fair wages, good governance, and democracy. PPP administrations demonstrated this capacity very clearly.

The point is that sometimes you may need privatization and this can take different forms. So, I take an inflexible position as to whether it is right or wrong but look at the issues, case by case and in relation to the entire development process. By the way, people now say Guyana has one of the most open economies among CARICOM nations. Isn't this paradoxical?

One of the most intractable problems confronting world leaders is the tension between sovereignty (including the Doctrine of Non-Intervention) and cases of appalling human rights abuses in certain states. How do you feel about humanitarian interventions generally and in this hemisphere specifically?

One has to be very careful about intervention under any rubric. There might be cases, for instance, where one might be intervening in the name of human rights, but the real motivations might be different. And, yet, one cannot ignore the UN Convention on Human Rights. We, in Guyana, certainly subscribe to it. There ought to be a growing realization among state leaders that if they violate rights, any rights, whether they be civil, political, economic, social, or cultural, they are going to have troubles. Remember Gorbachev's famous statement that what obstructed the Soviet economy—hindered economic and productive forces—was the bureaucratic command type of government and administration. That's why we, in Guyana, are insisting that you must have democracy at all levels (central, local, municipal, district, and even in the workplace in terms of worker participation).

But let's take the case of Somalia, for instance, which is heading towards a massive military intervention. How would Guyana vote in cases like that?

That's a very serious situation there because millions are dying from hunger . . . and people are willing to give assistance. It is not up to individual countries, but to the UN to deal with such cases. If there is to be any kind of intervention, it must be through the UN, not a case where some countries move in and then ask the UN to baptize it. I have always believed that there has to be the rule of law, international law governing state behavior. ■

---

**Peru under Fire**

**Human Rights since the Return to Democracy**

Americas Watch

"A gripping and comprehensive summary of that country's multiple crises. ...A detailed analysis of how democracy fails in its fundamental duty to protect the human rights of Peruvian citizens and how U.S. government policy may well exacerbate rather than alleviate this failure."—David Scott Palmer

$23.50

A joint publication of Yale University Press and Human Rights Watch

**The Rich Neighbor Policy**

Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil

Elizabeth A. Cobbs

"The book spells out in greater detail than any other study the complex relationship between public and private sectors in the operations of U.S. capitalism in Latin America after World War II. It should prove useful in the continuing debate over dependency, the nature of the development process, and the role of private investment—domestic and foreign—in stimulating economic growth."—Joseph S. Tulchin Illus. $30.00

Winner of the Allan Nevins Prize given by the Society of American Historians

**Sugarball**

The American Game, the Dominican Dream

Alan M. Klein

This fascinating book evokes the wild enthusiasm that Dominicans have for the game and shows how it mirrors the conflict they feel between allowing and resisting American hegemony in their country.

"Sugarball pleases because of its thoughtful, progressive political readings of baseball's force in a society."

—Eric Solomon, San Francisco Review of Books

Illus. $14.00

**Yale University Press**

92A Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520
Guyana '92: It's About Time

by Gary Brana-Shute

I wouldn't be the first to say that the Caribbean is in a constant process of redefinition. When I went to Guyana in 1983, Forbes Burnham was president, my friends addressed me as comrade, the Pegasus Hotel was a watering hole for Cuban and North Koreans, and I dined on chicken and cheese sandwiches washed down with a soapy-tasting rice-brew called Banks beer.

When I returned to the Pegasus in 1992 to observe the elections as a member of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government led by former US president Jimmy Carter, everything had changed, including the name of the hotel.

At the European-owned Forte Crest née Pegasus, I was greeted by an English manager and serenaded by the Platters over the restaurant speakers while I ate a dinner of pork medallions accompanied by imported beer. The bill was less than US $10. Later that night I adjourned to the Palm Garden nightclub on Main Street to find Georgetown's nouveau yuppie class spending their privatization dollars and scheming to cash in on divestment, the booming gold concessions, the collapse of the parallel exchange rate (US $1=G $134), foreign investment, and the widely conceded fall of the People's National Congress (PNC). On discovering that I was on the Carter team, an Indo-Guyanese patron greeted me by saying, "Boy, are we glad to see you here." Not everybody was.

It is important to keep in mind that in the 28 years of extraordinary corruption preceding the most recent election, a loss at the polls led automatically to charges of electoral fraud. The slightest procedural mistake or oversight, honest or not, was taken by the parties participating as clear and compelling evidence that chicanery was afoot. As for the voters, they wanted absolute perfection and would take any departure from that as proof of massive vote-rigging. Not surprisingly, Georgetown was in a dour mood in the days prior to the election.

Eleven parties would contest the general election, although only four—the People's Progressive Party (PPP)/Civic, the PNC, the Working People's Alliance (WPA), and the United Force (TUF)—stood a chance of capturing votes from the 395,000 voters who would be casting ballots in Guyana's 10 districts.

Certain areas were locked up from the start; the solidly Indo-Guyanese Corentyne was PPP; and
the Afro-Guyanese dominated bauxite areas of Linden and Kwakwani were in the PNC bag, as were such Georgetown neighborhoods as Plaisance, Tiger Bay, and Albouystown. The mixed urban middle class and Amer-Indians in the Rupununi would go over to TUF, reflecting the influence of white cattle herders and Jesuit missionaries (who saw themselves as a bulwark against "socialism" and "communism"). Up for grabs and most likely to see violence were the hotly contested and racially mixed Georgetown neighborhoods of Charlestown, South Ruimveld, South Penitence, Queenstown, and Charity—as well as the coastal towns of New Amsterdam, Berbice, Essequibo, and West Demerara. In sum, 60% of the eligible voters lived within 45 minutes of the political ground zero at Georgetown.

As the rank and file engaged in rioting during and after election day, party leaders exacerbated tensions by refusing to declare whether or not they would accept electoral results—even if they were certified as open and fair.

Suspicion became rife when it was rumored that the South Florida firm contracted to print the ballots had printed an excess of 90,000 over the number of registered voters. Worse, the logo of the East Indian dominated coalition, PPP/Civic, appeared on the ballot only as PPP. Rancorous debate followed as to whether this was a PNC plot to portray the PPP/Civic as a single ethnic group party and thus to undercut its appeal across ethnic lines. Party leaders Cheddi Jagan and Samuel Hinds decided at the last minute to let the logo stand as it was, concluding that any protest would give the ruling PNC a pretext to fatally postpone the elections.

More ominously, the "disciplined forces" (about 6,000 soldiers, police, militia, and prison guards) were allowed to vote a week before the national election so that they could be available on election day to control violence. Violence, however, was very nearly touched off by the process, as a logistical logjam at the one polling station caused long lines of frustrated officers to wait until almost midnight to vote. Tempers flared and more than 300 of those officers never made it into the voting booth. They were later given dispensation to vote with the public on general election day, but the widely asked question was inevitable. Was this a PNC plot to sow fear, arrange another postpone-
ment pretext, or rig the ballot? While the answer remains unclear, the event did not affect the results significantly.

Doubt was also raised about the neutrality of the Elections Commission officials—dubbed presiding officers—who would monitor the polling places as agents of the government along with representatives of each political party. Rank-and-file presiding officers, appointed to those positions during the last two decades of PNC power, were widely suspected of being PNC cat's paws. To ameliorate the fear of presiding officers rigging the election, Rudy Collins, the Elections Commission chair, promised that for every "old timer" there would be a "new" presiding officer appointed to serve at his side. Further, should there be allegations of presiding officers prohibiting persons from voting or simply not showing up to open the polls, a special "rapid deployment force" of nonpartisan officers would be at the ready to drive or fly to any affected polling station.

The neutral Stabroek News and the PPP-aligned Mirror were cranking at full speed, encouraging the public to hang tough. After 20 years the latter paper had been allowed to import a new press and printing materials, although I use the term "new" very loosely, having seen better presses at work printing college newsletters. Pre-election estimates of 30,000 people without national identification cards raised the nightmare of disenfranchisement, despite a voter's presence on the registration list. Mechanisms were put in place to allow anyone on the list with any sort of identification (driver license, passport, medical insurance card) to vote. For those lacking even that, a sworn oath (on a Bible, Koran, or the constitution of Guyana) that they were the person on the list, coupled with the personal identification of two other voters, would suffice.

Stories of government drivers abandoning ballot boxes on their way to polling sites were rampant. Then there was the perennial story about the ink smeared on the fingers to indicate completed voting; it could be easily wiped off with bleach, the rumor went, thus permitting multiple voting. Despite this particular, or perhaps because of it, Guyanese voters had enough ink on their fingers to transcribe Shakespeare for a week. General calm prevailed, however, as everyone knew the outside world was watching. No less an illustrious cast than Jimmy Carter, Belize prime minister George Price, and the US, British, and Canadian embassies made it clear that Guyana's future was riding on a straight-up contest.

By 6:00 a.m. voters, mostly Amerindians, began to line up. Allowing for individual cases, it averaged about 10 minutes for each person to identify him/herself and vote. Most would do so successfully and place a cross or tick adjacent to their party symbol—a cup, palm

---

**Election Day**

I was posted in the town of Lethem on Guyana's border with Brazil. Lethem is a PNC-dominated government outpost surrounded by settlements of Macushi and Wapishiana Amerindians. It can only be reached by land rover over hardscrabble laterite roads. My four polling stations in this rugged town totaled about 1,000 voters.

Our roles as members of the Carter team were many. Prime among them was the vital function of providing a "quick-count" sample. One of those making this initial count, Robert Pastor, executive secretary of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, described the process: "... despite the danger and uncertainty, at 6:00 p.m. as the voting ended, our entire delegation went to polling sites in every region of the country to conduct the 'quick-count.' By 2:00 a.m. the Elections Commission had compiled less than 1% of the vote, but the quick-count had received a scientific sample of about 12% of the vote, which showed that the PPP/Civic had clearly won. Because of reports of stolen or lost ballot boxes and the Elections Commission's slow compilation of the results, there were fears the election could be stolen in the count. The fact that President Carter knew the results and had communicated them in confidence to President [Hugh Desmond] Hoyte and Mr. Jagan provided a base-line from which to measure the actual count. If the final results were at variance from the quick-count, there would be presumption of fraud. The quick-count provided an element of stability on the crucial issue of the count. In fact, the official results of the election fell within the margin of error of the quick-count sample. The delegation visited two-thirds of the voting sites throughout Guyana during the day, filling in detailed observation forms based on fears expressed by the parties of what could go wrong on election day. ... Conditions at all but 2% of the sites visited were found to be satisfactory."

For me, the day's activities began a bit earlier—at 4:00 a.m. I observed the delivery of ballot boxes, witnessed the counting of empty ballots, examined the boxes to see that they were empty and properly locked, and met representatives from the political parties. There was no electricity, and the opening and closing of the station were done by lantern.

By 6:00 a.m. voters, mostly Amerindians, began to line up. Allowing for individual cases, it averaged about 10 minutes for each person to identify him/herself and vote. Most would do so successfully and place a cross or tick adjacent to their party symbol—a cup, palm...
DECLARATION
Under
THE REPRESENTATION OF THE
PEOPLE ACT
(Chapter 1:03)
GENERAL ELECTIONS
DECLARATION OF RESULTS

In accordance with section 99 of the Representation of the People Act, Chapter 1:03, the Elections Commission hereby declares that the results of the General Elections on 5th October, 1992 pursuant to article 60(2) of the Constitution are as follows:

(a) The number of votes cast for each list of candidates is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY/CIVIC</td>
<td>162,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEOPLE'S NATIONAL CONGRESS</td>
<td>128,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE</td>
<td>6,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE UNITED FORCE</td>
<td>3,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC LABOUR MOVEMENT</td>
<td>1,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED REPUBLICAN PARTY</td>
<td>1,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNION OF GUYANESE INTERNATIONAL</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL REPUBLICAN PARTY</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED WORKER'S PARTY</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Number of Valid Votes: 303,186

(b) The number of rejected ballot papers is 5,666

Instructions were provided in English and Macushi, and, in several cases, Portuguese, as the Macushi pay little attention to international borders and generally have family in both Guyana and Brazil. The polls closed at 6:00 p.m. and the counting began. I took my two “quick-count” samples and radioed them to Georgetown via a shortwave transmitter at a Jesuit mission station.

North American and European observers criticized the voting process as “inefficient” and “slow.” I can only reply with bemused wonder at that conclusion. Many of the voters I talked to walked five hours to the polling station, stood in line in the hot sun for several more, and spent five hours after that returning to their residences on foot. The time standards of the industrialized West do not apply in the hinterlands of Guyana.

The tabulations at day’s end were one with great attention to ceremonial detail, allowing each poll watcher to examine the marked ballot at the polling station count. The elections in Lethem proceeded more slowly than they would have in suburban Grosse Point, but they were as clean as a sterilized test tube. The townspeople of Lethem voted PNC, while the Macushi split their ballots between the WPA and TUF. Inefficient, perhaps, but proper.

At the same time, propriety was being roughly handled back in Georgetown. All hell broke loose at the Elections Commission office, as looters 1,000 strong rampaged down Regent and Robb Streets. In addition, the PPP’s Freedom House headquarters came under attack. The police and military were compelled to cordon off the downtown area and stay there on fully-armed alert for a week.

In a well-orchestrated effort to derail the elections, PNC supporters gathered on election-day morning to declare that the registration lists were inaccurate and that they had been disenfranchised. By early afternoon the situation grew uglier still as the commission was attacked with stones and bottles, breaking all the windows in the building. The staff retreated upstairs as the crowd broke into the compound and trashed the bottom floors, while the US ambassador, cut by flying glass, made off for safety.

There were cries of “Judas, Judas,” “We want Hoyte,” and “Japan pay Collins.” Dispersed by the disciplined forces, the crowd surged back to the business district for more “smash and grab”—the Guyanese euphemism for looting—at the major department stores, including the newly opened K-mart.
Amateur pundits suggested that legitimate frustration, plus the fears of PNC supporters that their party was going under, was being wickedly manipulated by PNC thugs. The looting, however, was largely a matter of personal enrichment in a situation of chaos. If there was a time during the election when the military could have stepped in and imposed martial law, it was then. Perhaps they would have, had not former US president Carter, at great personal risk, gone to the Elections Commission to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the Guyanese staff. He personally called Brigadier Joseph Singh of the military and Police Commissioner Laurie Lewis to inform them that they were compelled to protect an ex-president and in so doing had to protect the Elections Commission and the ballot tabulating equipment. It was a close call, but the violence that occurred the following day was nipped in the bud by security forces.

On Tuesday night Georgetown had the somber stillness of the calm before the storm. As I toured the city with two journalists, we were told to stay away from Stabroek market, where an angry crowd was gathering. Two young men, an Afro-Guyanese and an Indo-Guyanese, rode by on bicycles, both sporting huge bread knives in their waistbands. They warned us to stay off the street as "bad people"—who would not accept the elections—were gathering and that they—mixed pals—were the future of Guyana. Senator Ryan Peralto, an observer from the Jamaican Labour Party, asked a young Afro taxi driver if Afro-Guyanese would accept a Jagan government. His answer: "Forget the Afro bullshit, we need an elected government."

Then, in eloquent Guyanese English, he pointed out the virtues of the checks and balances of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. By Wednesday morning Georgetown was quiet, with only an occasional lackluster cry of "We want Hoyte." At a cocktail reception that night an African observer on the Commonwealth team cornered a lame duck PNC minister and coyly asked, "You know, many people seemed frightened of the defense forces. Why do you think that is?" The minister smiled weakly and replied that a new consensus was emerging. Any knots of people left on the streets at this point were only those stranded by lack of transportation.

Perhaps the military would have intervened, had not Jimmy Carter gone to the Elections Commission in support of the Guyanese staff.

The Aftermath

On Wednesday evening President Hoyte spoke on national radio and conceded the presidential election. He appealed for order and peace and promised a legal transfer of power. Although not all the votes were tabulated, it was clear that the uncounted remainder would not compensate for Jagan's lead. The presidential contest, however, was only half the battle. It would have to wait until all the votes were counted before the distribution of parliamentary seats could be announced. For president, the candidate with the majority of votes wins the office. That winner was clear early on. The 65 seats in parliament are another matter, thanks to Guyana's tricky system of proportional representation at the national and regional levels.

Of the 65 members of the National Assembly, 53 are elected in accordance with the proportions each party receives in the presidential election. Jagan's 52% netted the PPP/Civic 28 seats; Hoyte's 44% netted the PNC 23 seats. The WPA with 2% captured one seat and the TUF's 1% allowed them to squeak in with one. Ten of the assembly seats are elected by the 10 Regional Democratic Councils; one seat for each of the 10 districts, with the council membership being voted on at the same time as the president. Finally, two seats are elected by a national meeting of the National Council of Local Democratic Councils. The final totals were PPP/Civic 35, PNC 27, WPA 2, and TUF 1. Although not formally in coalition, the PPP/Civic, WPA, and TUF are collaborating. PPP/Civic also worked deals with WPA region eight and TUF in region nine to bolster the three parties' acquisition of regional seats and thereby enlarge their representation in parliament.

There will be rumblings from such PNC types as former prime minister Hamilton Greene and former director of propaganda and mobilization Robert Corbin issuing threats and bombast from time to time. Hoyte, however, will probably endeavor to secure his place in Guyanese history by becoming the grandfatherly and responsible leader of the PNC. It seems likely that he will pursue rebuilding the party in an equally responsible fashion. After all, the PNC did not lose by that much. Hoyte can also salve the wound of loss by heeding the example of two CARICOM political figures: Jamaica's Edward Seaga and Trinidad and Tobago's Patrick Manning. Both lost elections and offered their assistance in the transition of power. Both survived the experience to return to power, Manning having achieved the goal in a similarly multiethnic state.

The newly self-confident Guyanese people do not want to see a return to the dark and destructive days of Burnhamsim. The outside world is watching and my guess is that the democratic process is irreversible in Guyana. It's about time.
STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES
ANNOUNCES
TWO NEW PUBLICATIONS ON THE CARIBBEAN

Publication No. 41 ($25.00)
Nova Scotia and the Fighting Maroons:
A Documentary History

Guest Editor
Mavis C. Campbell

Preface and Acknowledgement
Introduction
A Documentary History
Notes
Appendix
Note on Author

Publication No. 43 ($25.00)
Resistance and Rebellion in Suriname:
Old and New

Guest Editor
Gary Brana-Shute

Introduction
Gary Brana-Shute

The History of the Suriname Maroons
Wim Hoogbergen

Slave Religion in Suriname
Humphrey Lamur

Legal Resistance to Slavery in Eighteenth Century
Suriname
Rosemary Brana-Shute

The 'Usual Barbarity' of the Asians?
Indenture and Resistance in Suriname
Rosemarijn Hoefte

The Maroon Insurgency: Anthropological
Reflections on the Civil War in Suriname
H. U. E. Thoden Van Velzen

Suriname: Transcending Ethnic Politics the Hard
Way
Edward Dew

Old Shoes and Elephants: Electoral Resistance in
Suriname
Gary Brana-Shute

Preludes to the Exodus: Surinamers in the
Netherlands
Gert Oostindie

A Reluctant Embrace: Suriname's Idle Quest for
Independence
Peter Meel

Dissonance in Discourse: The Politics of Afro-
Surinamese Culture in Netherlands
Wilhelmina van Wetering

To Order, indicate the number of copies for each
issue, providing your name and address, and mail
to the address below:

Publication No. 41 ($25.00)

Publication No. 43 ($25.00)

Add $2.00 for Postage/Handling

For Orders Under 10 Copies
ORDERS OVER 10 WILL BE SHIPPED UPS
AND BILLED ACCORDINGLY

YOUR NAME ________________________________
STREET ADDRESS ____________________________
CITY ____________________________
STATE/ZIP CODE ____________________________

MAIL TO:
Studies in Third World Societies
Department of Anthropology
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, VA 23185
PHONE 804/221-1055/1056
The Theater of Cuban Politics

by Damión Fernández


"Teatro, puro teatro," the late Cuban songstress La Lupe (a.k.a. La Yiyiyi) belted in one of her signature songs. Although she was expressing the theatricality of duplicitous love, as she pranced on the stage, tearing off her clothes, slapping her pianist, and screaming at the audience, her lyrics could just as well have referred to the arena of politics. Politics is theater, if not show business. Like drama, politics has a text and a subtext, a stage and a backstage. As in the plays of Bertolt Brecht, the actors and the audience interact. And as when we enter a playhouse, politics requires us to believe in the possibility of a different world. The tension between the governed and the governing is the dramatic heart of politics. The plot unfolds as the conflicts between the two emerge.

Like La Lupe, Cuban politics have always been theatrical; in fact, they reached operatic dimensions after Fidel Castro's revolutionary ascent to power in 1959. The genre of the performance differs according to the viewer and the reviewer. For some it is epic, for others tragic or comic, and for yet others it is theater of the absurd. Scholars and journalists have differed in their reviews of the Cuban production.

Oppenheimer's book can be summarized in three words: sex, drugs, and rock-and-roll. To be sure, these topics are neglected in political science scholarship, out of either prejudice against the mundane, puritanism, or lack of training on how to incorporate them. Oppenheimer also deals with the role of chance, relajo (horsing around), rumors, and the sweat of everyday life, with which scholars are ill at ease.

Oppenheimer's Castro's Final Hour starts in the middle of the action, with the execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa, one of Cuba's most decorated officers, on July 13, 1989. In sharp contrast, the opening scene of Rabkin's Cuban Politics sets the stage by introducing the theme of objectivity and paradigms in the social sciences: "In the social sciences, objectivity does not mean the complete absence of values and preconceptions. That is impossible. Moreover, it is also undesirable. Without some guiding sense of putative relationships among variables, the social scientist could only record and transmit chaos" (p. 1). Journalists record and transmit chaos, albeit in edited fashion. Scholars crave order and try to construct it, even when the order of things is disorder.

Damián Fernández is associate professor of international relations and director of the Graduate Program in International Studies at Florida International University. He is the editor of Cuban Studies since the Revolution (University Press of Florida, 1992).
Language is as vital in politics as it is in drama. In the streets of Cuba a new language is being created daily, challenging the official discourse of the state through graffiti, slang, double talk, jokes, and music. In Cuban Politics, Rabkin transcribes examples of the emerging alternative vocabulary that captures the new reality (e.g., mayimbe, pinche—buddies in high places who act as intermediaries to get things done). Likewise, in Castro’s Final Hour, Oppenheimer records the lyrics of a hit song, rife with rhythmic double-entendre (p. 265):

“Guillermo Tell/tu hijo creció/quiere tirar la flecha/Le toca a él/probar su valor/using tu ballesta” (“William Tell/your son has grown up/he wants to shoot the arrow/It’s his turn/to prove his valor/using your crossbow”).

Words do not tell the whole story, though. When they become too dangerous to be spoken, the characters resort to gestures, signs, body language, and silence. As characters speak and act their parts, conflicts arise. In Oppenheimer’s portrayal of Cuba, the characters, even when they appear in the limelight, misread their lines. Listen, for instance, to culture minister Armando Hart’s monologue, in reply to Oppenheimer’s comment that Hart is considered to be one of the most open-minded members of Castro’s inner circle: “They told you that? Who told you that? That is crazy! I don’t consider myself tolerant at all! . . . No! No! No! . . . Don’t you dare accuse me of being tolerant, liberal or anything like that . . . ” (p. 512).

Oppenheimer’s cast is as diverse as a Cecil B. De Mille production. The Cuba he presents is peopled by babalao priests, and their oracles (the chorus in a Greek tragedy?); by Che Guevara’s grandson, Canek, who dreams not of the jungles of Bolivia but of becoming a rock star (a Broadway musical?); by Nitza Villapol, the grandame of Cuban cuisine who invents 1,001 ways to eat potatoes and yells at the author as he leaves her apartment, “We are standing up against US aggression. We are proud of that!” (a candidate for production by the Instituto del Cine y Arte Cubano?); by men and women who find ingenious ways to resist, or make do (a version of the picaresque?); by General Ochoa’s widow (a “60 Minutes” segment?); by the Cuban mistress of an international drug trafficker who plays the role of fifth business (a forthcoming Roxanne Pulitzer novel?); by Gabriel García Márquez (with the author seeming to become one of his characters in The Autumn of the Patriarch?); by human-rights activists (a morality play?); and by spics (a esperpento?). All in all, Oppenheimer presents a Cuban carnival, masks included. The result is a view of Cuba that is far from reality, and uncovers is a world that rivals Umberto Eco’s.

As in the works of Brecht, language is one of the central themes of Oppenheimer’s book. On November 2, 1991, when Castro addressed the Primer Congreso de Pioneros, he spent more than two hours lecturing on Che Guevara’s dialectics to an audience of six-year-olds (pp. 403-7). Alina Fernandez, Castro’s daughter by Nati Revuelta, confesses she had to resort to the dictionary to find a word that described her father: “When people tell me he is a tyrant, I tell them that is not the right word . . . strictly speaking, Fidel is a tyrant. I have looked up the two words in the dictionary” (p. 282). Yet Alina is convinced that the majority of Cubans still support the “Revolution,” another misnomer for the country’s current political situation. Reality, and the interpretation of it, is a messy business.

Castro’s Final Hour promises thrills and chills, and it delivers. It is almost a ready-made script for a first-rate television miniseries. Although the book reads like fiction, it isn’t. In politics, as in Pirandello, the margins between the real and the surreal merge, and Oppenheimer has captured that gray area better than any other journalist or scholar before him. To boot, the book grabs the reader like few, if any, others on the subject do.

The power of Castro’s Final Hour is not only of style but of substance as well. This book is investigative reporting at its best. (Eat your hearts out, Geraldo, Oprah, and Jane!) The author goes behind the scenes, backstage, to look at the protagonists sans costumes or make-up. What Oppenheimer discovers and uncovers is a world that rivals Umberto Eco’s.

It is almost a ready-made script for a Cecil B. De Mille production. The Cuba he presents is peopled by babalao priests, and their oracles (the chorus in a Greek tragedy?); by Che Guevara’s grandson, Canek, who dreams not of the jungles of Bolivia but of becoming a rock star (a Broadway musical?); by Nitza Villapol, the grandame of Cuban cuisine who invents 1,001 ways to eat potatoes and yells at the author as he leaves her apartment, “We are standing up against US aggression. We are proud of that!” (a candidate for production by the Instituto del Cine y Arte Cubano?); by men and women who find ingenious ways to resist, or make do (a version of the picaresque?); by General Ochoa’s widow (a “60 Minutes” segment?); by the Cuban mistress of an international drug trafficker who plays the role of fifth business (a forthcoming Roxanne Pulitzer novel?); by Gabriel García Márquez (with the author seeming to become one of his characters in The Autumn of the Patriarch?); by human-rights activists (a morality play?); and by spics (a esperpento?). All in all, Oppenheimer presents a Cuban carnival, masks included. The result is a view of Cuba that is far from reality, and uncovers is a world that rivals Umberto Eco’s.

As in the works of Brecht, language is one of the central themes of Oppenheimer’s book. On November 2, 1991, when Castro addressed the Primer Congreso de Pioneros, he spent more than two hours lecturing on Che Guevara’s dialectics to an audience of six-year-olds (pp. 403-7). Alina Fernandez, Castro’s daughter by Nati Revuelta, confesses she had to resort to the dictionary to find a word that described her father: “When people tell me he is a tyrant, I tell them that is not the right word . . . strictly speaking, Fidel is a tyrant. I have looked up the two words in the dictionary” (p. 282). Yet Alina is convinced that the majority of Cubans still support the “Revolution,” another misnomer for the country’s current political situation. Reality, and the interpretation of it, is a messy business.

It is almost a ready-made script for a Cecil B. De Mille production. The Cuba he presents is peopled by babalao priests, and their oracles (the chorus in a Greek tragedy?); by Che Guevara’s grandson, Canek, who dreams not of the jungles of Bolivia but of becoming a rock star (a Broadway musical?); by Nitza Villapol, the grandame of Cuban cuisine who invents 1,001 ways to eat potatoes and yells at the author as he leaves her apartment, “We are standing up against US aggression. We are proud of that!” (a candidate for production by the Instituto del Cine y Arte Cubano?); by men and women who find ingenious ways to resist, or make do (a version of the picaresque?); by General Ochoa’s widow (a “60 Minutes” segment?); by the Cuban mistress of an international drug trafficker who plays the role of fifth business (a forthcoming Roxanne Pulitzer novel?); by Gabriel García Márquez (with the author seeming to become one of his characters in The Autumn of the Patriarch?); by human-rights activists (a morality play?); and by spics (a esperpento?). All in all, Oppenheimer presents a Cuban carnival, masks included. The result is a view of Cuba that is far from reality, and uncovers is a world that rivals Umberto Eco’s.

As in the works of Brecht, language is one of the central themes of Oppenheimer’s book. On November 2, 1991, when Castro addressed the Primer Congreso de Pioneros, he spent more than two hours lecturing on Che Guevara’s dialectics to an audience of six-year-olds (pp. 403-7). Alina Fernandez, Castro’s daughter by Nati Revuelta, confesses she had to resort to the dictionary to find a word that described her father: “When people tell me he is a tyrant, I tell them that is not the right word . . . strictly speaking, Fidel is a tyrant. I have looked up the two words in the dictionary” (p. 282). Yet Alina is convinced that the majority of Cubans still support the “Revolution,” another misnomer for the country’s current political situation. Reality, and the interpretation of it, is a messy business.
more textured, vibrant, and plural than what Cuban officials and the theory of totalitarianism would have us believe.

Rabkin and Oppenheimer agree that Castro has been the leading man of Cuban politics since 1959. Both of them question whether the show can go on without his commanding performance. Yet, if the men and women in the streets are the supporting cast of Oppenheimer’s book, the cast in Rabkin’s Cuban Politics features not only Castro but also the formal institutions of political power (the Partido Comunista de Cuba and the mass organizations). Making cameo appearances are Marx, Lenin, de Tocqueville, Harvard political scientist Jorge Dominguez, and political writer Carlos Alberto Montaner, among other thinkers whose works the author uses to help us understand Cuban politics since 1959.

Like Oppenheimer, Rabkin goes behind the stage to analyze the ideas, institutions, and actions that have shaped Cuban politics since the advent of the revolution. Unlike other scholars who have written texts on Cuba, Rabkin pays attention not only to the formal expressions of political power, but to the informal, the subjective, the elusive, and the invisible as well (from the role of Fidel Castro and the admiration, “bordering on madness,” of his followers, to the “shrewdness and good luck” that tend to desert him on economic issues). She peppers her discussions of broader issues with anecdotes, rendering palatable an otherwise bland discussion.

Rabkin is sophisticated in her analysis, standing among two or three other Cubanists in this respect. She does not see the revolution as inevitable. She does not exaggerate the power of the US over Cuba (p. 145). She presents contending perspectives (although the work has a unique voice: Rabkin is no wimp). These are uncommon finds in the literature on the politics of the island, and deserve applause.

Cuban Politics focuses on elites. From Rabkin’s perspective, elites make politics. Throughout history, political change, according to her, tends to come from above. Nonetheless, Rabkin, like Oppenheimer, does not envision a deus ex machina that will save the day for Cuban socialism in the 1990s. Both authors argue that the die has been cast, although neither is sure how the power play will unfold.

In spite of the differences between the two books, striking similarities emerge due to the continuity of Cuban politics over time. Corruption was as much a part of the set before Castro as it has been during his regime, and probably will be after his departure. During Fulgencio Batista’s years in power, “the glittering corruption of the capital city was an affront to the middle-class morals and national pride . . .” (p. 24), Rabkin writes, pointing the finger at prostitution, brothels, and casinos. Oppenheimer focuses on the “jineteros and jineteras” (hustlers) that hang around hotels looking to trade sex for dollars or consumer goods, a public affront to the revolutionary (yet equally “bourgeois”) values of the state.

Can the experimental production of Marxism-Leninism continue to be produced on the Cuban stage? What the scholar and the journalist seem to say is that the official performance is attracting less and less of an audience, because fewer and fewer Cubans find the protagonists believable. Theater and politics, at this point, lose their power to convince; in short, they lose their magic. The government might continue performing, but it will be less able to govern as Cubans realize that the entire arrangement is “teatro, puro teatro.”

As to how and when the curtain will come down in this act, both Rabkin and Oppenheimer leave us in suspense. In this regard, the scholar does not fare any better than the journalist, because reality writes itself as it unfolds, outwitting us all. ■
New and Recent Books on Latin America

Order from your bookstore or direct from the publisher. Major credit cards accepted. Call: (908) 932-2280

THE TIGER AND THE CHILDREN
Fidel Castro and the Judgment of History
Roberto Luque Escalona
Fidel Castro has long claimed that he would be absolved by history. This volume tests Castro's claim against fact and finds that history will condemn the long-standing dictator of Cuba. Escalona's work is filled with a level of intimate detail unrivaled in any other analysis.
ISBN: 1-56000-027-9 (cloth) 212pp. $29.95

POVERTY, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
U.S.-Third World Policy Perspective Series, No. 17
Sheldon Annis, editor
Rural poverty and environmental degradation are steadily worsening in Central America, undercutting the prospects for regional peace and economic recovery. This volume analyzes strategies that aim to reduce poverty and protect the environment in the region.
ISBN: 1-56000-577-7 (paper) 280pp. $15.95

REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY
A Handbook for Practitioners
Ernesto Betancourt
Betancourt shows how to evaluate the politics and actions of leaderships in different revolutionary contexts (totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic), using the Cuban and Uruguayan experiences as case studies.
ISBN: 0-88738-411-0 (cloth) 196pp. $29.95

ENVIRONMENT AND LABOR IN THE CARIBBEAN
Caribbean Perspectives, Volume 2
Joseph Lisowski, editor
This volume focuses on the eastern Caribbean, exploring aspects of management and climate; social, literary, and educational concerns; and includes an extended study of the labor situation in the U.S. Virgin Islands.

CUBA ANNUAL REPORT: 1989
Office of Research and Policy, Voice of America-Radio Marti Program
United States Information Agency
This annual statistical handbook provides fundamental data on Cuba, including in-depth reviews of Cuban foreign policy, the national economy, military allocations and manpower, political control, cultural developments, and ideological shifts.

transaction publishers
Guyana
by Marian Goslinga

The Guyanese National Bibliography, issued quarterly by the National Library (Georgetown, Guyana) since 1974, provides a comprehensive record of publishing in the country. In addition, bibliographies such as Frances Chambers’s *Guyana* (Clio Press, 1989) cite works published abroad that deal with the country. Other lists have been printed since that time, usually appended to current publications. The following citations date from 1990 and provide the most recent information available on various aspects of Guyana.


Hemisphere • Winter/Spring 1993


Native Political Networks in Western Guiana and Changes during the 17th-Century and 18th-Century. Simone Dreyfus. Homme, v. 32, nos. 2-4 (April-December 1992), p. 73-90. [Discusses the virtual destruction of native political networks, used since colonial times, in trade and slave-hunting.]


Politics, Race, and Youth in Guyana. Madan M. Gopah. San Francisco, Calif.: Mellen Research University Press, 1992. 289 p. [Examines and interprets the political attitudes of working-class East Indian adolescents within an ethnic framework.]


The Race to Save Guyana’s Rainforests. Fred Pearce. *New Scientist*, v. 133, no. 1813 (March 21, 1992), p. 15-16. [Reviews Guyana’s efforts to relate its educational programs more directly to the work environment.]


A Review and Analysis of Attempts in the West Indies to Relate Education to the Perceived Needs of the Labour Market: With Special Reference to Guyana. M. Kazim Bacchus. *Education with Production*, v. 7, no. 2 (April 1991), p. 53-68. [Reviews Guyana’s efforts to relate its educational programs more directly to the work environment.]


Transition to Democracy in the Caribbean: Haiti, Guyana, and Suriname. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representa-