1992

Volume 5 Number 1, Fall 1992

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere

Part of the Latin American Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
(1992) "Volume 5 Number 1, Fall 1992," Hemisphere: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere/vol5/iss1/1

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) Publications Network at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hemisphere by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Gendered Injustice: Law, Society and Prostitution
Tina Rosenberg, Howard W. French, John M. McClintock, Aliana González

Free Markets or Protectionism? The EC and Bananas
Brent Borrell, Sandy Cuthbertson, Cresencio Arcos, Michael A. Samuels, Canute James, Eben Shapiro

A Greek or an Aztec?
Rodolfo J. Cortina

Rodríguez Rabanal on the Peruvian Extreme
Maingot on Half Measures in Haiti
Taylor Valdés on GATT and Patents
Vega on the Impact of Post-Castro Cuba
Swafford on the Stale Coffee Market
Kyle on the Ecuadoran-New York Circuit
COMMENTARY

The Roots of Peru's Deterioration  by César Rodríguez Rabanal  2
Haiti: The Futility of Half Measures  by Anthony P. Maingot  4

REPORTS

Patient Pressures  by Mia Taylor Valdés  6
If Castro Should Fall . . .  by Bernardo Vega  10
Awash in Coffee  by David Swafford  12
The Ecuadoran-New York Nexus  by David Kyle  15

FAXFILE

FEATURES

Gendered Injustice
Women and the Law  by Tina Rosenberg  20
Exporting Daughters  by Howard W. French  25
Sex and Tourism in Cuba  by John M. McClintock  27
Venezuela's New Trade Commodity  by Aliana González  29
Profile: Prostitutes in Bogotá  31

Free Markets or Protectionism?
EC Banana Policies  by Brent Borrell and Sandy Cuthbertson  32
Hey Mister Tallyman . . .  by Cresencio Aros  35
Creating a Banana Fortress  by Michael A. Samuels  38
Banana Splits  by Canute James  40
The Great Banana War  by Eben Shapiro  42

REVIEW FORUM

Narcissus Gazes in the Fountain  by Rodolfo J. Cortina  44

PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

Street People in Latin America  by Marian Goslinga  46
The Roots of Peru’s Deterioration

by César Rodríguez Rabanal

The profound deterioration of Peruvian society—an extreme example of a more general Latin American trend—is rooted in the structure and culture of pre-Columbian society. This assertion does not imply that contemporary manifestations of Peruvian and regional deterioration are homogeneous, inevitable, and irreversible. Nevertheless, it does provide us with a framework both for untangling the roots of deterioration and for planting the seeds of an alternative society based on participatory democracy, equitable development, and the nurturing of human capabilities in multiethnic settings.

The Pre-Columbian Heritage

In the historical civilizations based in modern-day Peru and Mexico, conflicts between cultivators and the state predated the arrival of the Spaniards; authoritarian forms of compulsion were imbedded in native culture. Be that as it may, one of the central functions of the precolonial state—the carrying out of redistributionist policies—changed drastically with the arrival of the Europeans, giving way to arbitrariness and violence.

To be sure, violence played a fundamental part in the pre-Columbian social system of reciprocity. As such, violence represented socially recognized norms and was part of customary law. Within this framework, infractions were regarded as actions against the collectivity that had to be countered by similarly violent actions.

The installation of Spanish rule introduced new rules to the system. These rules contrasted dramatically with the existing principle of equity, centering rather on the domination of one group over the other, justified not only on economic but also cultural and ethnic grounds. Scholar Alberto Flores Galindo documents the fact that, far from coming to an end with the achievement of national independence from Spain, culture and ethnicity became even more decisive factors in Latin American social stratification.

It is within these historically rooted social and cultural structures so conducive to violence that the psychic structure of the Latin American individual tends to be shaped. While the weight of violence varies across Latin America, violence is more or less an intrinsic part of the process of personality formation throughout the region. To the degree that a child grows up in a violent environment, he or she becomes an adult whose personality is scarred by violence. The manifestations are many, such as apathy, psychosomatic ills, depression, and, of course, physical violence itself. Most basically, violent practices consolidate impulses that are not only destructive but self-destructive as well. Thus, in addition to the physical destruction it causes, violence blocks the development of human capabilities.

The Peruvian Extreme

The Peruvian case represents an extreme example of the general deterioration occurring in Latin America. Contemporary Peru is in the second decade of an internal war that began in the Southern Andes but now encompasses virtually the entire country. The war has claimed more than 20,000 lives. Eyewitness accounts describe a terrifying world in which extreme poverty becomes interwoven with both preindustrial and postindustrial forms of violence.

Because Peruvian society is multiethnic and multicultural, its members live within a rigidly defined hierarchy of social strata with minimal and highly distorted channels of interstratum communication. Peruvian society’s combination of heterogeneity and rigidity permits the coexistence of certain democratic freedoms, such as press and speech, with a large-scale dirty war. In this war nearly all the dead and missing belong to the mestizo and Indian populations that constitute the low end of the socioeconomic hierarchy.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the notion of human rights has little resonance in public opinion. Those who shape public opinion in Peru are the privileged groups—the social elite that orchestrates the state’s policies and actions, rather than the vast majority that absorbs the powerful impact of its social and racial discrimination.

Against this backdrop, societal values appear to be devoid of content. Most persons come to feel as though they do not take an active part in making their histories, but rather are passive entities in a world of torment. In compensation they commonly develop paradisiacal fantasies and expectations of messianic redemption. The “nation” becomes not an integrating symbol but rather an abstract entity charged with sentimentalism. Official Peru comes to be seen through a lens of illusions and conflicts—a distant, diffuse, and distorted image from which a person expects everything or nothing.

This psychic poverty transcends the borders of the impoverished and marginalized ghettos. The deepening chasm that divides the rich from the poor leads the former to hide behind ever-higher walls. This process has reduced Peruvian society to two polarized and compartmentalized groups: the massive group of the excluded sector and the relatively small group of the “walled-in” sector. The spaces that allow multisector contact and socialization have nearly all disappeared. So has the incipient middle class, whose social descent makes it increasingly a part of the world of the poor.

Among the consequences of this crisis has been the decomposition of academic and intellectual life and a large-scale exodus of the population’s best educated and most talented. This process has greatly weakened Peru’s potential for political and economic reconstruction. The hemorrhaging of existing talent, combined with obstacles to the development of new human capability posed by the deepening poverty and misery of today’s children (i.e., tomorrow’s adults), has grave implications for Peru’s future social, economic, and political development.

Peru’s massive deterioration demands much more than “structural adjustment” policies and the reininsertion of the country into the international financial community. Peruvian society must transcend the reigning technocratic perspectives, recognizing that state policies must not disregard the interests of the very people for whom they are ostensibly designed. For this to happen, the state’s policies must be based on the politics of inclusion, not exclusion. The notion of a multiethnic, multicultural Peru must be embraced, not destroyed. ■

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
Haiti: The Futility of Half Measures

by Anthony P. Maingot

Alain Tournier, in his refreshingly original book, Quand la nation demande des comptes (1989), reviews the recurring cycle of reprisals and confiscations that have followed each period of dictatorship in Haiti. Noting that Haitians occasionally—and non-Haitian observers nearly always—tend to think of the most recent crisis in ahistorical terms, Tournier asks: "Is the present political reality merely the rebeginning of history?"

Haiti, more than any other country in the hemisphere, stands as testament to the verity of George Santayana's admonition that those who forget or disregard history will be forced to relive it. While this generally holds true, it is especially relevant in understanding the failure of both the US and the inter-American system to force political changes on the island. Specifically, the failed economic embargo, originally designed to force a return of democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power, has to be understood in long-term as well as short-term perspectives.

Long-Term Analysis

A long-term interpretation of recent events has to include, at a minimum, three essential features of Haitian history. First and foremost is the unique nature of Haiti's struggle for independence. While the struggle for individual freedom certainly reflected a commonly shared sentiment, there was unity on pitifully little else. Independence—so heroically achieved at a great cost in blood—did not bring about a sense of unity. Haitians opted variously for republicanism (both democratic and authoritarian), monarchy, empire, and presidencies for life under different institutional arrangements. Regardless of the form chosen, the outside world considered the island an outpost and kept it in tight political isolation.

With no unity of purpose, a historical aversion to third-party involvement, and with the sources of wealth shrinking, struggles for control of the government have been constant and increasingly destructive.

That external pressure certainly contributed to the second important feature of Haitian history: the evolution of a fierce sense of independence and autonomy among Haitian elites. This obstinate determination to safeguard independence of action was a blend of pride, resignation (to a world they could not change), and a logical resentment of those who refused to acknowledge the debts they owed Haiti.

A consequence of this attitude was and is the historical capacity of Haitian political elites—of whatever persuasion—to successfully utilize every known technique of negotiation with foreigners attempting to dictate Haitian affairs: from avoidance to procrastination, and, if felt necessary, even a suicidal "scorched-earth" approach. If they ever enter into negotiations, they are grandmasters of stall-and-outlive tactics. History tells them that the rest of the world has little staying power when faced with the intractability of Haitian problems.

The third feature that in many ways not only made the first two possible but, indeed, intensified their inflexibility, was the nature of the post-plantation economy. Since independence the radically reformed landholding system has been characterized by generalized peasant ownership and subsistence agriculture. This system certainly spared the Haitian peasant the horrors of the typical Latin American latifundia. It was, however, harsh on the ecology and not conducive to creating surpluses that could be invested elsewhere.

The Haitian economy was characterized by a very few pockets of tightly (i.e., family) controlled wealth based on coffee or commerce. Opportunities for employment were largely in government, governments that, crucially, were sustained and financed by squeezing the peasants and the few concentrations of wealth. With no unity of purpose, a historical aversion to third-party involvement, and with the sources of wealth shrinking, struggles for control of the government have been constant and increasingly destructive. Each cycle of dictatorship has been...
followed by a settling of accounts, which, by increasing the rancor and vindictiveness of the affected parties, begot the inevitable next crisis.

Among the various ways in which this political history has shaped Haitian political culture are two fundamental paradoxes particularly relevant to the present situation. The first paradox is that the very features we so admire about the Haitians—their heroic struggle for independence, their love of the land and relatively egalitarian distribution of that land—are the ones that make their political attitudes not only implacable but also stubbornly resistant to third-party involvements. This paradox engenders an opportunistic selectivity that is based on the myth of the "true" and the "false" Haitian. Today, Duvalier is the latter, Aristide the former. In fact, in terms of political culture they are both "true" Haitians.

The second paradox is that, given the incessant struggle-without-quarter for possession of the government, any form of authority in Haiti—democratic or authoritarian—requires the protection of an armed force. The built-in problem is that the armed forces have never been neutral in struggles for power, and seldom sympathetic towards democratic government.

In light of this history and these paradoxes, how can third parties intervene in such a political system? The answer has to be: forcefully or not at all. No half measure, embargo or otherwise, has ever worked to bring about a desired course of events in Haiti.

**Short-Term Analysis**

If this is what the long-term analysis of Haitian history tells us, more immediate history shows how the US and the inter-American system ignored this record. Their response to the criminal sabotage of the 1987 elections were timid to the point of being pusillanimous. The US Senate's resolution of December 7, 1987, noted that it "deplores" the failure of Haitian government to bring about democratic elections and supported the US government's decision to embargo the Haitian government.

The response to the 1987 crisis laid the foundations for the response to the 1991 crisis: statements of regret but reassertions of the principles of state sovereignty as an absolute prohibitor of effective international action. Effectiveness in this case has to be defined in terms of the political culture of Haiti, which, as already noted, is not susceptible to half measures, certainly not verbal threats and futile embargoes.

Where, then, does all this leave us? First and already patently evident, the present incapacity to move the usurpers in Haiti has dealt a very severe blow to the credibility of the inter-American system. Second, the US will not intervene unilaterally since there are no perceived vital national security interests involved. Third, the Haitian diaspora in the US has more influence on the US than on Haitian politicians. The ultimate irony of this crisis is that Aristide, whose charisma was based largely on his anti-elections, anti-US, and anti-foreign involvement stances, should now make the US his main stomping grounds.

The issue will be settled only in Haiti and within the parameters of Haitian political culture. The outcome will surely not satisfy those who wish to promote democracy with high-sounding phrases and halfhearted measures, but it will surely be Haitian. History tells us that most probably the next crisis is already gestating.

---

**Effectiveness in this case has to be defined in terms of the political culture of Haiti, which is not susceptible to half measures such as verbal threats and futile embargoes.**

The Organization of American States (OAS) also "deplored" the acts of violence and disorder and expressed its "solidarity" with the Haitian people. In the same breath, however, the OAS telegraphed its irresolution to the enemies of democracy in Haiti by stating that they reaffirmed the principle "that states have the fundamental duty to abstain from intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter."

---

**Hemisphere welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be typed double-spaced, and are subject to editing for clarity and length.**

*Please address letters to: The Deputy Editor, Hemisphere, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199; FAX (305) 348-3593.*
Patent Pressures

by Mia Taylor Valdés

In Costa Rica a Polo dress shirt sells for $25. The same shirt costs $60 or more in the US. A stylish Benetton knit top that sells for $40 at a US mall can be had for a mere $12. On closer inspection, however, the discerning consumer might notice that Ralph Lauren's upscale emblem looks more like a camel than an elegant polo player and the Benetton shirt has the feel of—horror!—synthetic fabric. Neither Mr. Lauren nor Benetton receive a penny from the sale of these shirts because they are part of a wide range of articles and services, from running shoes to computer software to cable TV, that are copied for sale daily in Costa Rica and much of the Third World.

Costa Ricans who buy and sell counterfeit goods may not even know they are breaking the law; the country's copyright and patent laws, while fairly comprehensive on paper, are seldom enforced. In 1990 a large US food company tried to market its products in Costa Rica only to discover that its brand name was already well known, having been appropriated by a local firm some 15 years before. The case is still winding its way through the courts with no end in sight. The distributors of Mongol pencils, while also mired in the legal process, opted for swifter justice by denouncing the fake Mongol products in full-page ads in the daily papers.

A US Intellectual Property Code for All

Cases such as these have led multinational corporations to clamor for stronger intellectual property rights worldwide. They claim Third World "pirates" deprive them of billions of dollars a year by violating their patents and copyrights.

If developing countries adopt US-style patent laws, there will be a huge transfer of resources to the North.

The US government, ever the champion of big business, has taken on the global battle for uniform and stronger intellectual property laws. The US Trade Representative (USTR), in cooperation with the Intellectual Property Committee (composed of 13 corporate giants such as General Motors, IBM, Merck, and Dupont), has come up with new standards for the rest of the world. The standards include: lengthening the life span of patents, ensuring that countries prohibit copies of trademark, and removing restrictions on the manufacture of patented goods (e.g., some governments require that a product sold in its country also be produced there). The proposal would also extend patents to "all products and processes which are new, useful and unobvious," including genetic material.

The US is working in several arenas to promote its intellectual property code. The proposals are part of the mandate of the current round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a treaty regulating 80% of world trade for 108 countries. They are also a precondition for Latin American governments seeking to renegotiate their bilateral debt with the US. Strict intellectual property laws are required as well for nations wishing to participate in President George Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, a plan promising free access to US markets and generous debt forgiveness in exchange for re-structuring one's economy in the neoliberal mode.

If the "carrot" of trade benefit does not entice countries to tighten their laws, then the US is prepared to brandish the "stick" of trade sanctions. In 1988 the USTR imposed sanctions on Brazil for not protecting the patents of US pharmaceutical companies; the sanctions were removed only when Brazil promised to enact stricter laws. Currently, Guatemala and El Salvador are scrambling to regulate the dissemination of cable TV and records and tapes. Their loose laws have landed them on the USTR's annual list of countries with barriers to LTS exports: the final warning before sanctions are applied.

Copycat Industrialization

There are clear benefits to the industrialized world if developing countries adopt US-style patent laws. There will be a huge transfer of resources to the North. Third World consumers will have to buy the imported "genuine article"
rather than the cheap locally made facsimile. Royalties from licensing agreements could add billions to corporate coffers. But what advantage is there in all this for the developing world?

Advocates of strong intellectual property regulations claim the protection provided by these laws will mean more foreign investment leading to increased innovation and technology transfer to the Third World. Not so, say critics, who claim the stronger laws will lead instead to a monopoly of technology by those who already have it. Innovation, they declare, results from loose patent laws that allow a developing country to copy technology, leapfrogging over many steps in the industrialization process. Proponents of liberal laws point to the US itself and Asia where industrialization took place in a climate of lax intellectual property laws. Japan is the supreme example of a technology copycat. After World War II it began duplicating Western products and underselling the originals. As the technology was mastered and disseminated, local brands became competitive. In one generation it went from master counterfeiter to the world's high-tech leader.

In the 1960s Hong Kong followed Japan along this path to rapid development. Hong Kong, in turn, was followed by Taiwan and Korea in the 1970s, and Thailand in the 1980s; all copying Western and, later, Japanese products. Modernization was hastened by copying. Now the process is decried as "piracy." "This is a historic problem between the developed countries that try to maintain control over technology and the poor countries that try to appropriate it," says Roberto Rojas, Costa Rican foreign trade minister.

Law Puts Wealth before Health

Even developing countries that support stricter intellectual property rights question some of the aspects of the US proposals—especially the patent coverage of medicine, which the US wants to observe for 17 years. Costa Rica, like most small developing countries, has few resources to devote to research and development. But in Costa Rica drug patents last for only one year. After that, medicines can be reproduced by private firms or in the labs of the country's socialized medicine program.

Prices of locally made drugs tend to be much cheaper than the originals. This is one reason why Costa Rica has one of the healthiest populations in the developing world. A law that would require importing expensive brand-name drugs would cause severe public health consequences. It would also cripple the local pharmaceutical industry while securing a monopoly for multinational pharmaceutical companies.

Other developing countries, such as India, observe patents of manufacturing processes but not products. Under such a system a domestic drug firm can duplicate a patent medicine if it develops a new technique for doing so. Under the Indian law the government may require patent holders to manufacture their product under license in India if they are not providing enough of a certain medicine at a reasonable price. These innovative laws, which benefit Third World consumers and their fledgling pharmaceutical industries, would be prohibited under the new intellectual property code.

Patenting the Rain Forest

The most ominous feature of the new intellectual property regulations is a proposal to allow the patenting of life forms, a practice already in effect in the US. This would permit companies to collect genetic material to be later transformed through biotechnological wizardry into new patentable products.

The recent cracking of the gene, as revolutionary as the splitting of the atom, has spawned a rapidly evolving form of industrial engineering that uses genetic information as its raw material. Controversy stems from the fact that the technology-rich North is also gene-poor. The Third World, however, while lacking in technological expertise, is a genetic treasure trove possessing 80% of the planet's species and almost all its unexplored life forms. "We are now entering an age in which genetic wealth, especially in tropical areas such as rain forests...is becoming a currency with high immediate value," says biotechnology company executive Winston Brill.

The tropical countries, however, cannot demand compensation for
the exploration and exploitation of their genetic resources because these “naturally occurring organisms” have already been classified “universal common heritage.” Unlike minerals, species cannot be considered assets of the country in which they are found. Many fear the race is on to control the world’s genetic wealth. Multinational pharmaceutical, food, and chemical companies have their eyes on countries such as tiny Costa Rica—a mere 0.1% of the world’s land mass that is home to 5% of the planet’s biodiversity.

A recent contract between Costa Rica and drug giant Merck and Company to inventory life forms and split the profits from any useful products derived from them has divided environmentalists. Some feel it is a novel and mutually beneficial arrangement; others accuse the country of selling its “patrimony” for a pittance. Suspicion abounds because the technology is so new and the monetary value of the raw materials and the end products is unknown. For its part, the US government is putting enormous pressure on countries to adopt US-style patent laws that will give legal backing to the multinationals’ pursuit of the tropics’ treasures. Critics fear that some countries, in their eagerness to renegotiate their debt or get more favorable trade deals, will adopt new patent laws without realizing the ramifications.

Critics of the new laws urge a wait-and-see approach. It is too soon to tell whether the Third World’s biodiversity will be a marketable resource like oil that could sustain long-term development. Genetic abundance may be the asset that will provide some tropical countries with their last chance out of perpetual poverty. And the poor countries of the South need time to develop their own technologies in order to break out of their traditional role as suppliers of cheap raw materials.

All This Work for Nothing?

In exchange for restructuring their economies and adopting strict patent laws—measures that are short-term losers for poor countries—the industrialized world promises to provide long-term gains by dropping its trade barriers to agricultural and textile products from the South. But while the developing world is carrying out its end of the bargain and eliminating trade barriers, wealthy nations hold fast to protectionist tariffs and quotas. And free-trade plans with so much promise, such as the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, have yielded precious few rewards for countries enduring structural adjustment sacrifices.

After complying with US demands to liberalize its economy and receiving little in return, Costa Rica now faces the reform of its intellectual property laws. According to Luis Guinot, US ambassador to Costa Rica, “Heading the list for any possible negotiations (of free-trade pacts) would be countries whose legal systems give protection to copyright and accept international standards.”

Whether in regional trade talks, debt refinancing, or international agreements, intellectual property rights is an issue that won’t go away. Costa Rica and other Third World countries should be wary of who will profit and who will lose in adopting US-style laws. Before signing their rights away they would be wise to examine carefully what lurks between the lines.
The Pearl Necklace
Toward An Archaeology of Brazilian Transition Discourse
Roberto Reis
1991 Alfred Hower Prize

Miami Now
Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change
Edited by Guillermo J. Grenier
Cloth $34.95 Paper $16.95

Miami Now
Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change
Edited by Guillermo J. Grenier
Cloth $34.95 Paper $16.95

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN NICARAGUA
September. Cloth $34.95

INDEPENDENCE
Fighting Conflict in Bolivia
August. Cloth $29.95

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS
Provoking debate on the region's problems, initiatives and achievements . . .
Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Miami Now
Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change
Edited by Guillermo J. Grenier
Cloth $34.95 Paper $16.95

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN NICARAGUA
September. Cloth $34.95

INDEPENDENCE
Fighting Conflict in Bolivia
August. Cloth $29.95

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS
Provoking debate on the region's problems, initiatives and achievements . . .
Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN NICARAGUA
September. Cloth $34.95

INDEPENDENCE
Fighting Conflict in Bolivia
August. Cloth $29.95

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS
Provoking debate on the region's problems, initiatives and achievements . . .
Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Miami Now
Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change
Edited by Guillermo J. Grenier
Cloth $34.95 Paper $16.95

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN NICARAGUA
September. Cloth $34.95

INDEPENDENCE
Fighting Conflict in Bolivia
August. Cloth $29.95

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS
Provoking debate on the region's problems, initiatives and achievements . . .
Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.
the exploration and exploitation of their genetic resources because these "naturally occurring organisms" have already been classified "universal common heritage." Unlike minerals, species cannot be considered assets of the country in which they are found. Many fear the race is on to control the world's genetic wealth. Multinational pharmaceutical, food, and chemical companies have eyes on countries such as Rica—a mere 0.1% of the land mass that is home to the planet's biodiversity.

A recent contract between Rica and drug giant Merck Company to inventory life and split the profits from useful products derived from divided environmentalists feel it is a novel and mutually beneficial arrangement; others accuse the country of selling its "patrimony" for a pittance. Suspicion abounds because the technology is so new and the monetary value of the raw materials and the end products is unknown. For its part, the US government is putting enormous pressure on countries to adopt US-style patent laws that will World's biodiversity will be a marketable resource like oil that could sustain long-term development. Genetic abundance may be the asset that will provide some tropical countries with their last chance out of perpetual poverty. And the poor countries of the South need time to develop their own technologies in order to break out of their traditional role as sup...
The Pearl Necklace
Toward An Archaeology of Brazilian Transition Discourse
Roberto Reis
1991 Alfred Hower Prize
"His conclusions are brilliant. Reis considers most of the text discussed herein to constitute an enormous self-portrait of the ruling classes produced by writers who in their great majority have come from these classes and have refused or been unable to go beyond them." —Bobby J. Chamberlain,
University of Pittsburgh
Cloth $22.95

Amazon Conservation in the Age of Development
The Limits of Providence
Ronald A. Foresta
Forest’s detailed study of Brazilian Amazonia places international biological conservation in the context of late 20th century ideology, economics, and political practice and offers an informative guide to the pitfalls of conservation policy making in the Third World. "Successfully blends excellent scholarship with field-based reporting. I strongly recommend this book." —Kent Redford, University of Florida
Cloth $49.95

Capitalism in Colonial Puerto Rico
Central San Vicente in the Late Nineteenth Century
Teresita Martinez-Vergne
"An extraordinarily important contribution to the historiography not only of Puerto Rico but also of the Caribbean... both in its examination of the impact of capitalism on the island during the nineteenth century and its enormous contribution to the study of the processes of social change in the critical period after the abolition of slavery." —Franklin W. Knight, Johns Hopkins University
Cloth $27.95

Cuban Studies Since the Revolution
Edited by Damián Fernández
"Its scope is very impressive and the scholarship of very high quality. It not only documents the intellectual debates that still highlight unresolved issues, but it also provides the first holistic assessment of the field." —Juan M. del Aguila, Emory University
Cloth $39.95

Space-Time of the Bororo of Brazil
Stephen Michael Fabian
"Fabian shows how concepts of time and space are patterned into village layouts and repeated in the organization of clans and moieties in much the same way as charts and lists are devised by literate societies. In a very precise and engaging manner, he has confirmed once again that literacy is not a prerequisite for rational or scientific thought." —Allyn MacLean Stearman, University of Central Florida
Cloth $39.95

Miami Now
Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change
Edited by Guillermo J. Grenier and Alex Stepick III
September. Cloth $34.95 Paper $16.95

Politics and the Catholic Church in Nicaragua
John M. Kirk
September. Cloth $34.95

Debt Politics after Independence
The Funding Conflict in Bolivia
Thomas Millington
August. Cloth $29.95

The People who Discovered Columbus
The Prehistory of the Bahamas
William F. Keegan
September. Cloth $39.95

High Jungles and Low Hemisphere
Archie Carr $16.95

The Imperative Call
A Naturalist’s Quest in Temperate and Tropical America
Alexander F. Skutch $16.95

A Naturalist in Costa Rica
Alexander F. Skutch $16.95

Through full-service bookstores or order with M/C or Visa toll free:
1-800-226-3822

—NEW PAPERBACKS IN JULY

—AND COMING THIS FALL

Miami Now
Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change
Edited by Guillermo J. Grenier and Alex Stepick III
September. Cloth $34.95 Paper $16.95

Politics and the Catholic Church in Nicaragua
John M. Kirk
September. Cloth $34.95

Debt Politics after Independence
The Funding Conflict in Bolivia
Thomas Millington
August. Cloth $29.95

The People who Discovered Columbus
The Prehistory of the Bahamas
William F. Keegan
September. Cloth $39.95

High Jungles and Low Hemisphere
Archie Carr $16.95

The Imperative Call
A Naturalist’s Quest in Temperate and Tropical America
Alexander F. Skutch $16.95

A Naturalist in Costa Rica
Alexander F. Skutch $16.95

Through full-service bookstores or order with M/C or Visa toll free:
1-800-226-3822

—UNIVERSITY PRESS OF FLORIDA
Gainesville, Tallahassee, Tampa, Boca Raton, Pensacola, Orlando, Miami, Jacksonville
If Castro Should Fall . . .

by Bernardo Vega

What would be the impact of Fidel Castro's political demise, the reestablishment of US-Cuban political and commercial relations, and the economic opening of Cuba on the economy of the Dominican Republic? Let's make the highly speculative and risky assumption that such changes will occur in Cuba as they did in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, that is, with a minimum of violence but with a difficult transition towards a market economy.

Exports and Tourism

The Dominican Republic gained access to the US preferential sugar quota only because of the Cuban revolution. Should democracy be established in Cuba, it is logical to assume that Cuba's quota will be reinstated (as US legislation still mandates), which implies that the Dominican quota will be eliminated. This will not, however, have the enormous negative impact it would have had during the 1960s and 1970s. Today the loss would amount to $59 million a year, a mere 2.6% reduction in the total value of the Dominican Republic's export of goods and services.

Keep in mind as well that Dominican consumers themselves are paying 16 cents per pound for sugar produced in the country, instead of the 8.7 cents received in the world market. This differential has probably made local production profitable—if barely so—even without the US quota. The fact is especially true for the private mills, which receive only one-third of the US quota. As far as the state-owned mills are concerned, the elimination of the quota would probably accelerate the inevitable diversification away from sugar. The question here is not whether diversification will take place, but whether it will occur in a logical, planned way, and whether it will prove successful.

Other Dominican commodity exports may also suffer. While it is true that Dominican cigars have been gaining in popularity—partly because of the decline in quality of Cuban cigars—the gain in Dominican cigar exports could be reversed if the quality of Cuba's product improves. Similarly the Dominican economy stands to lose if Cuba increases its production of nickel, thereby depressing the mineral's international price.

It may well be in tourism and free-trade zones, however, that the Dominican Republic would experience the most negative impact. To be sure, it is unclear that increased tourism in Cuba would come at the expense of the Dominican Republic since tourism in the latter country is composed mainly of European "package" charters rather than individual US visitors. Indeed, there are already a number of initiatives to sell packages that include stays in both Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Jamaica, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, and Bermuda would probably be the major losers in the event that US tourists are diverted to Cuba.

Nevertheless, the opening of the Cuban economy would likely undercut free-trade zones in the Dominican Republic in several ways. First, the US would surely open its door to goods assembled in Cuba, if for no other reason than to slow down the exodus of Cubans to Miami. Second, it is no secret that Cuba's work force is more disciplined, educated, and healthy than the Dominican work force. Third, transport costs from Cuba to the US are less than from the Dominican Republic. Fourth, if the new Cuban government sets its curreny at a realistic rate of exchange, then Cuban exports would be all the more competitive with Dominican exports. And finally, due to strong US-based political pressure, Cuba would probably follow Mexico as the second Latin American country to enter into a free-trade agreement with the US.

There is, however, a window of optimism for free-trade zones in the Dominican Republic. A US-Cuba free-trade agreement could lay the groundwork for the widening of the existing Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM)—to include Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti—and the establishment of a US-CARICOM free-trade agreement.

Capital and Migratory Flows

Unquestionably the powerful Cuban lobby in the US would insure massive US assistance to Cuba. Such resources would come at the expense of US aid to other countries, such as the Dominican Republic (although the latter's current assistance from the US is already quite low). Meanwhile, the return of US private investment to Cuba would probably also take place at the expense of the Dominican Republic, though, again, with
the exception of investments in free zones and some agroindustries, US private investment in the Dominican Republic has not been substantial during the past decade.

The greatest effect of political and economic liberalization in Cuba on the Dominican Republic will probably be in the sphere of migration. Unwilling to face uncertainties in Cuba, and possessing a new freedom to emigrate, a significant number of Cubans will leave for the Dominican Republic. Something similar is occurring in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where persons opt to migrate rather than confront local uncertainties. In Cuba the professional segment is most likely to emigrate because they know they can find work elsewhere. Contributing to the flow of people from Cuba to the Dominican Republic will be the hostility of Cuban exiles in Miami and the US government. Having received the anticommunists with open arms, they will hardly do the same for the Cubans who stayed behind.

The impact of an arriving wave of agronomists, engineers, biochemists, physicians, and others on the Dominican Republic would be extraordinary. Indeed, it promises to be more beneficial than the Cuban immigration of the 1960s, which energized the country’s entrepreneurial class, or the Cuban immigration of the late nineteenth century, which opened up the country’s modern sugar industry. The key variable would be the size of influx that the Dominican government would be willing to accept.

**Political Aspects**

Would the fall of the Castro dictatorship repeat what occurred with the fall of the Machado dictatorship in 1934 and the Batista dictatorship in 1959? Both Machado and Batista fled to the Dominican Republic. Would the leadership of the Cuban revolution do the same? Their planes cannot take them directly to North Korea or China, the only places where they would be completely safe from the revenge of the exiles. As has occurred with the currently exiled Haitian generals and politicians in Santo Domingo, would an exiled Cuban hierarchy in the Dominican Republic make the new authorities in Cuba nervous?

Finally, even though change in Cuba might damage certain sectors of the Dominican economy, the Dominican Republic should welcome that change. When Trujillo fell, the Dominican Republic received a sugar quota, donations, and grants, which to some extent came at the expense of other countries in the Caribbean. Those countries did not complain. A neighbor’s freedom is above everything.

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
In April 1992 the International Coffee Council agreed that a global consensus exists for the negotiation of a new International Coffee Agreement (ICA), which would be different from its 1983 predecessor in two ways. First, export quotas would be allowed to fluctuate according to market conditions. And second, there would be no separation between the regulated market and the unregulated market; only one universal market would be recognized.

Since July 1989, when the economic clauses of the 1983 ICA were suspended and the global coffee market was liberalized, prices that coffee producers receive have fallen to their lowest levels in decades. In May 1989 the composite market price was $1.15 per pound. By August 1992 the composite price had dropped by 61% to $.45 per pound. Some free-market proponents argued that exporting nations would be able to make up the price difference with volume increases. While some countries have boosted the volume of their coffee exports above their old quota limits, the net increase in coffee exports worldwide has been 13% per year, which is nowhere near enough to offset the fall in prices. Latin American coffee producers have lost $5-10 billion since ICA was suspended. Plunging market prices have compounded the economic woes of countries that depend on coffee production as a key source of foreign exchange and employment.

There are basic differences of interest not only between coffee-producing and consuming countries, but among producing countries as well.

Under the 1983 ICA, export quotas were assigned to producing countries participating in the agreement and were meant to control the amounts and types of coffee entering the world market. All coffee produced beyond those quotas had to be stored to prevent natural disasters like drought from causing shortages and consequently destabilizing prices. The prescribed separation of markets, however, created the opportunity for the participating countries to “dump” all coffee that exceeded their export quotas on buyer nations outside the ICA, to whom the quotas did not apply. Virtually all surplus coffee could be sold in this way. To avoid future dumping on the unregulated market, the International Coffee Council decided that there would be only one universal market.

The council’s decisions gave coffee producers throughout Latin America and other regions of the world hope that a new agreement could indeed be reached. In spite of their optimism, however, World Bank economists and other observers predict that a new agreement satisfying the array of political interests involved will not be reached in the 1990s.

Political Forces

The political forces at play in the coffee trade negotiations are varied. There are basic differences of interest not only between producing countries and consuming countries, but also among the producing countries themselves.

Regarding the revision of export quotas, a US Trade Representative (USTR) report says the US delegation to the International Coffee Organization began pushing for a revision in the total amount of Mild Arabica coffee being exported in the early 1980s. The US delegation wanted to increase the total amount from 43% of the world market share to 48%, which meant that countries growing Mild Arabicas would benefit at the expense of other coffee-producing nations. Europe also supported the idea of increasing the share of Mild Arabicas available. The demand for Mild Arabicas has grown even in France and Italy, the two largest European-continental importers of Robusta beans. According to a World Bank study, in 1986-88 the share of Mild Arabicas in the French market grew from 39% to 45%.

One reason the producing nations in the ICA began selling their surplus coffee to nonmember countries at cheaper prices is that it had become too large and unwieldy to store. The very existence of the ICA mechanism gave an increasing number of small farmers in Third World countries an incentive to...
grow coffee, while at the same time, demand in consuming nations declined steadily each year. The forces eventually led to a world “awash in coffee beans” (Barron’s, September 4, 1989).

The USTR reports that in 1988 alone about 12 million bags had been traded on this secondary market for 20-40% less per bag than consuming nations participating in the ICA were paying. According to the US Department of Agriculture, major producers Costa Rica and Guatemala were selling roughly 35% of their coffee crop, and smaller producer Honduras about 40% of its crop, on the secondary market. Not surprisingly, Brazil, the world’s largest coffee producer, was selling the highest volume of all on the secondary market. In the face of the fact that the rest of the ICA coffee-producing nations had accepted the idea of one universal market, Brazil continued to favor two separate markets.

Buying nations went on record objecting to the two-tier system because of the unequal prices being paid for coffee in the two markets. But the real reason they objected to the system was that the producing nations controlled the surplus. Whoever controls the surplus can also control the price through the amount of coffee being released onto the retail market. If the coffee supply is in the hands of the roasters, they can boost their profits by keeping wholesale prices low and retail prices high. Thus, in spite of the world-market coffee surplus, by the end of 1989 average retail coffee prices in the US had increased by 12% and continued to rise. Although both the US and Europe have expressed willingness to participate in a new agreement, they have done little to ensure that a new agreement will be reached.

The USTR says that on several occasions during the mid-1980s the US delegation urged producing nations to stop the two-tier market system, eventually issuing an ultimatum. When it was clear that the ultimatum would not be met, the US withdrew from further negotiations. In July 1989, when the US delegation to the International Coffee Organization informed Capitol Hill of the continued deadlock between producers and buyers concerning the export quota system, Congress decided by a quick, unanimous voice-count not to enter the US in further economic commitments to the ICA.

In any case, according to the USTR report, any attempt to extend the life of the export quotas and to continue negotiating would
have been “doomed” for the same reason it would be doomed in 1992: commodity agreements are a form of price control, which free-market proponents are inclined to disfavor. In fact, Myles Frechette, assistant US trade representative for Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, says the US will not actively seek a new ICA because free-market proponents in Congress and the White House favor the interests of US coffee roasters. At the time Congress was due to vote on further US participation in ICA negotiations, the New York-based National Coffee Association sent a memorandum to Capitol Hill saying: “... be it resolved that the NCA advises the appropriate United States Government officials of its views that ... the interests of the United States Coffee Consumer and Industry are best accommodated by free and unrestricted trade in coffee.”

US resistance was not the only factor leading to the suspension of quotas. Coffee-producing nations themselves could never agree on a revision of the export limits. For example, while most other coffee-producing nations favored some kind of revision, Brazil, the largest producer and exporter of Robusta beans, favored no change at all. Moreover, Mexico favored increasing its own export quota at the expense of Brazil’s, arguing that, in light of current world demand, it was unfair that Mexico could export only 40% of its Mild Arabica crop while Brazil could export 90% of its Robusta crop.

At this point the Robusta-producing countries of Africa were also opposed to Brazil’s large share of the Robusta market. They favored increasing their percentage of the Robusta market while decreasing either Brazil’s percentage or the percentage of Mild Arabica producers like Mexico, Colombia, and Central America.

Adding to the swirling pools of dissension in the mid-1980s was Colombia. Wary of alienating its powerful neighbor, Brazil, Colombia refused to support a Costa Rican proposal for across-the-board increases in Mild Arabica exports at Brazil’s expense, despite the fact that it stood to gain economically by supporting the proposal. Nonetheless, pressure on Brazil’s delegation to lower its share of the export market and support a universal quota system began to swell on all sides.

The fact that Brazil came forward in April 1992 with a compromising spirit and endorsed the idea of a universal, flexible quota system stirred hope in many coffee-producing nations. At that meeting the head of the Brazilian delegation, Dorothea Werneck, said: “The Brazilian government has shown itself sensitive to the frequently expressed views of other developing countries highly dependent on coffee exports and did not lose sight of this important political factor in reaching its final decision.”

Still, market prices continue to spiral downward as world production continues its unbridled increase. The International Coffee Organization estimated last year’s world production at 10 billion bags, up from 1990-91’s level of 9.5 billion bags. Although market conditions are worsening yearly, an international compromise is a long way off. That Brazil says it agrees with the idea of a universal quota is just the beginning of what will surely by a lengthy process. Brazil’s claim, moreover, could be a mere ploy. According to a former ICA official, there are three options for the future: the status quo, i.e., a continuation of the ICA framework under a liberalized market; the adoption of a new ICA with a revised export quota system; or, least likely of all, the cancellation of the entire ICA mechanism. Given the political clout of US and European roasters, and that the producing nations themselves are so splintered, the status quo is likely to continue for quite some time.
The Ecuadoran-New York Nexus

by David Kyle

It is a scene typical of Sunday gatherings in Ecuador—the men are playing soccer and ecuavoly (volleyball played with three-men teams and a net twice as tall as the players) or just taking it all in while the women prepare traditional dishes such as roasted cuyes (guinea pigs). Yet this description applies to any weekend in Flushing Meadow Park, Queens, where thousands of Ecuadoran immigrants come together to temporarily forget the drudgery of their work and the loneliness of separation from their families.

Back in Ecuador their families go to urban centers to buy and sell goods, produce, and livestock at the Sunday market, just as they have done for hundreds of years. The high point, however, may now be an early morning visit to a travel agency to retrieve a letter, package, or simply a money order sent from New York City. The remittance from the family member abroad, typically a couple of hundred dollars, is then cashed or deposited at the bank. Dollars can also be exchanged at the various casas de cambio, usually found in international tourist centers or airports, thus allowing easier conversion at the best rates. This can all be completed before Sunday mass begins at 11:00 a.m.

After returning home in the evening, the wives may watch a home video tape sent along with the remittance by their sons and husbands, showing off their New York apartments or the good times at Flushing Meadow Park. The wives will need to start thinking about the instructions included in the letter for the construction of their future homes in town, often simply in the form of photographs of desired homes taken in New York City suburbs.

The Ecuadoran community in the New York City area now represents the third largest concentration of Ecuadorans in the world, after those of Guayaquil and Quito. While New York’s Ecuadoran community is merely one of numerous immigrant communities in the area, its remittances amount to millions of dollars per year and represent one of Ecuador’s largest sources of hard currency. The social impact of the migration has been significant as well, distorting the demographic make-up and social values of those Ecuadoran communities left behind.

The Northward Flow

Migration from Ecuador to the US has occurred in two waves. The first sizable Ecuadoran migration to the US—about 4,000 persons annually—came mostly from the port city of Guayaquil during the 1950s banana boom. The principal destination for some 80% of these immigrants was New York City, where in 1980 an estimated 45,000 Ecuadorans lived.

There is evidence, however, of a new migratory flow comprised mostly of undocumented immigrants. This second wave gained momentum in the early 1980s and originated in the south-central region of the Ecuadoran highlands.
centering on Cuenca—Ecuador’s third largest city with a population of 200,000. This US-bound exodus of people from the provinces of Azuay and Cañar is widely based: 39% of surveyed households have at least one member living in the US. Moreover, computerized data from Ecuador Travel—a leading Ecuadoran travel agency and courier service in the New York City area—confirms a sharp increase in migration from the south-central region. During 1991 well over twice as many letters were sent from the New York area to Cuenca as to Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest city. The owner of Ecuador Travel observes that as recently as 1983 his agency was sending very few letters to Cuenca.

Most of the migrants from south-central Ecuador are undocumented and use a variety of strategies to enter the US. Some of these strategies for leaving the area exhibit tragicomic levels: in 1991 a tour bus from Cuenca to Caracas had to be retrieved by the tour operator after everyone—including the driver—“jumped ship” in Venezuela.

Most would-be emigrants use an informal but highly organized network of moneylenders and false-document providers controlled by a handful of families, often borrowing $6-8,000 at 12% interest rates (compounded monthly). The money is then used to pay a “coyote” who will take them from Ecuador to the Mexican border. A more expensive but less grueling route is simply to buy a false resident visa, which often comes with the necessary guidance to illegals on how to maintain the façade of a seasoned visitor to the US. Those who can afford this route are able to arrive in New York within 24 hours after departure from their village or town.

Social Origins

The origins of new migration stem from both economic crisis, which arrived with a vengeance in the early 1980s, and a tradition of intra-Ecuador migration from specific regions. Ecuador’s rural areas have been especially hard hit by economic crisis. Not only did employment in agriculture steadily decline during the 1980s, but real wages dropped by 45%. While such economic factors are important, they fail to fully explain why Cuenca and neighboring towns are sending so many compared to other areas of Ecuador.

New York Life

Consistent with the pattern of other undocumented Latin American immigrants in the US, most of the undocumented Ecuadorans find an initial, low-paid job as, say, a seamstress, a dishwasher, or in semiskilled manufacturing, with the assistance of family and friends. Others coming from wealthier families are more likely to have advantages of education, knowledge of English, and high-placed contacts to find decent administrative or service jobs, while some from the city of Cuenca bring jewelry-making skills that allow them to work in a Manhattan jewelry factory. Increasingly, however, Ecuadorians in New York are having difficulty finding even the most menial jobs, a problem leading to defaults on loans made in Ecuador.

Most of New York’s Ecuadorians live in Queens alongside Colombians and Dominicans in the Jackson Heights area. Large numbers of them also live in Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Newark. There are more than 100 Ecuadoran social clubs and civic associations in the New York area and several restaurants serving comida típica. Ecuador’s main government institution dedicated to arts and sciences, La Casa de la Cultura, now extends to the US through its “Núcleo de Nueva York.”

Back Home

To any observer traveling through the rural areas of Ecuador’s south-central highlands, the first evidence of the migration and the remittances being sent home is the explosive construction of new homes, which are considerably more extravagant than those in other comparably sized towns in
Ecuador. A widespread rumor circulating in the area describes a three-story house with an elevator—built in a zone still awaiting the introduction of power lines. Whether true or not, the rumor epitomizes the boom nature of the migration.

An economist from the Banco Central of Ecuador estimates that in 1990 emigrants remitted $120 million to the Cuenca area. Yet the common perception is that capital gained from the migration goes into consumption and construction, not investment in productive enterprises. While a few Ecuadorians have returned to open restaurants or drive new taxis, money sent home goes more to social than economic investments. That is, the purchase of land and the construction of large homes in Ecuador is driven mainly by the desire for upward social mobility; true economic investment has a better return in the US.

The boom nature of the exodus to New York has led to some social and cultural changes in towns that have high levels of international migration. Changes that have alarmed migrants and non-migrants alike range from broad concerns of cultural alienation and consumerism to an increasing rate of divorce. The migration to New York has raised concerns within traditional communities over the local economic conditions that seemingly force workers out, promote US values, and impose new roles that women must now play in the absence of men. In a place where men have traditionally dominated, women left behind must not only take charge of economic decisions but also rear children alone—an especially difficult task with sons who become surrogate adult males.

US culture has been promoted in south-central Ecuador by returning migrants, known locally as “residentes” or “YANYS” (for “Yo amo Nueva York”). Whether new values associated with US culture are a cause or a consequence of the population outflow, the immigrants themselves have been transformed by the experience of living abroad. When asked whether they will ever resettle in Ecuador, most express a desire to return “some day,” but add that it would be difficult to permanently return to Ecuador. This is understandable in that the conditions that forced them abroad still persist; to this, however, must be added the cultural impact of living in New York City.

There are few signs of recovery from the Ecuadorian recession that began in the early 1980s. For the foreseeable future, the only escape valve for the region’s traditional migratory activity will probably continue to be the journey north to the US. The Ecuadorian impact of this northward stream will continue to increase as it transforms traditional communities through the flow of US dollars and the creation of transnational families.

THE FACES OF THE GODS
Vodou and Roman Catholicism in Haiti
Leslie C. Desmangles
Leslie Desmangles analyzes the mythology and rituals of Vodou, focusing on both West African and European influences. He sees Vodou not simply as a grafting of European religious traditions onto African stock, but as a true creole phenomenon.
approx. 260 pp., $32.50 cloth, $12.95 paper

AN UNWANTED WAR
The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895–1898
John L. Offner
John Offner clarifies the complex relations between the U.S., Spain, and Cuba and argues that the war was not wanted by any of the parties.
“Replace[s] all previous treatments about the coming of the war and its impact on the history of the United States.”
—Lewis L. Gould
320 pp., $39.95 cloth, $14.95 paper

The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill
Phone (800) 848-6224 FAX (800) 272-6817
Insider briefs on people and institutions shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

10,000 Years of Solitude

Time magazine (Special Issue, Fall 1992) asked notables “what should humankind aim to accomplish in the coming decades?” The response by Gabriel García Márquez was uncharacteristically direct: “The only new idea that could save humanity in the 21st century is for women to take over the management of the world. I believe that male hegemony has squandered an opportunity of 10,000 years. . . . The masculine power structure has proved that it cannot impede the destruction of the environment because it is incapable of overcoming its own interests. For women . . . preservation of the environment is a genetic vocation . . .”

Who Speaks for the Victims?

The Berkeley-based Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru is now distributing an urgent circular calling upon the international community to Defend the Life of Abimael Guzmán [sic], leader of the Peruvian revolution. According to the September 18, 1992, document, “bold action is needed immediately to mobilize prominent figures around the world to help shine a spotlight on the treacherous manipulations already being planned against Abimael Guzmán.” Among those signing the circular endorsing these efforts are John Gerassi, author of The Great Fear in Latin America, and William Kunstler, an attorney associated with the Center for Constitutional Rights.

Winners and Losers I

The National Labor Committee Education Fund in Support of Worker and Human Rights in Central America has published Paying to Lose Our Jobs, a stinging critique of US foreign policy toward Central America. The report charges that “American workers, as taxpayers, are paying to lose their jobs.” According to the study, the Reagan and Bush administrations have “channeled over one billion dollars of taxpayer money” through programs of the US Agency for International Development to establish “export processing zones” throughout Central America and the Caribbean. The two administrations’ largess included efforts to promote the offshore relocation of US business activities. Amply documented with tables, charts, and statistical information, the report provides a country-by-country list of AID’s investment, trade, and related program support efforts in Central America since 1980. It can be obtained by calling (212) 242-0700.

Winners and Losers II

A September 30, 1992, ABC “Nightline” program featured a debate between Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin and Democratic vice-presidential candidate Al Gore on the findings of Paying to Lose Our Jobs. According to Gore, “programs such as the CBI [Caribbean Basin Initiative] were a mistake then and are a mistake now” because “it is an outrage to ask US taxpayers to throw Americans out of work.” By now Central America and the Caribbean should be used to such negative rhetoric emanating from US policymakers. Nonetheless, in the face of anticipated diversion of investment to Mexico as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Gore’s negative sentiments will make it even harder to promote new investment for the Caribbean and Central America.

Nicaragua Today, Cuba Tomorrow

The Republican staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has issued a report blasting the management and governance of Nicaragua’s democratically elected government. Innocuously titled “Nicaragua Today,” the report states that the country is controlled by General Humberto Ortega and the Sandinistas through President Violeta Chamorro’s son-in-law and minister of the presidency, Antonio Lacayo. It also states that dozens of Chamorro’s relatives have been appointed to “the most prestigious posts.” The document is highly critical of the government’s failure to return “tens of thousands” of confiscated properties to rightful owners, including 450 Americans. “Nicaragua Today” sent shock waves through senior government circles in Nicaragua, particularly because it serves as the basis for a cutoff of US development aid for the beleaguered country. The difficulties encountered in US-Nicaraguan relations are but a harbinger of things to come with Cuba, once US relations with that country are normalized.
A Long Time Coming

Eleven Latin American and Caribbean ministers of finance and economy met in Washington, DC, with US secretary of the treasury Nicholas Brady, June 24-25, 1992, to exchange views on regional economic reform and integration. This meeting was convened prior to the G-7 Summit of Industrial Countries, held July 6-9, 1992, in Munich. Although the meeting addressed a range of issues, the real concern may have been equitable economic growth. A US treasury official summarized the US motivation for the meeting: "Obviously in order to keep the people of Latin America convinced that this is something good for them, the economic fruits of these reforms can’t all be in the stock market: they have to flow down to the people" (The Financial Times, June 26, 1992). The Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue played a major role in organizing the meeting, which may become an annual affair.

Raúl Juliá Narrates "Americas"

Actor Raúl Juliá—"one of the busiest actors in America" according to Hispanic Business (July 1992)—will narrate the ten-part PBS series "Americas," focusing on Latin American politics and culture, which is scheduled to air in January 1993. Juliá, a Puerto Rican by birth, has starred in numerous movies set in Latin America, including Romero and Kiss of the Spider Woman. Adding to the star quality of "Americas" is that its theme music was composed and performed by Juan Luis Guerra and his 4.40 band.

Play by the Rules

Another nail has been driven into Cuba’s economic coffin. In July 1992 a French court banned the import of three leading brands of Cuban cigars because of a trademark violation. Monte Cristo, H. Upmann, and Por Larranga can no longer enter the French market because of a dispute over who owns the three famous brands. When their owners left Cuba in 1959, the government continued their production under the control of Cubatabaco. The suit was settled in favor of Tabacalera, a Spanish company that now controls the brand names for all non-US business. The three brands comprise about 50% of all Cuban cigar imports to France.

The Fruits of Trade

The Port of Philadelphia and the Port of Wilmington (Delaware) are vying for the growing Latin American export market in fruit. According to the Journal of Commerce (September 29, 1992), both ports are aggressively marketing their facilities throughout the region, particularly in Chile. In a potentially lucrative coincidence of geography, Chile’s summer coincides with the US winter, when demand for imported fruit is at its highest. During 1991 Chile shipped 33.5 million cases of grapes, nectarines, and other fruit to the US through Philadelphia. On the West Coast, the Port of Los Angeles continues to dominate in imports of Chilean fruit.

Will He or Won’t He?

Oscar Arias, whose Central American peace efforts earned him the Nobel and Martin Luther King Peace Prizes, may now be positioning himself for another major negotiation. According to La Opinión (June 1992), a publication of Cuban-American Social Democrats, Don Oscar is quoted as stating that Central America’s ex-presidents should work to convince Fidel Castro of the need for a peaceful, democratic opening. Arias states “we have to work to persuade authorities from that government that it is necessary, in a new world, to bury dogmatisms, [and] stop living in the past. . . . Today the task is to convince, not vanquish.”

One Year After

September 1992 marked the one-year anniversary of the ouster of Haiti’s elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide’s ouster has had the by-product of generating renewed interest in Haiti. The latest example is Haiti Info, published by the Haitian Information Bureau (67 Pleasant Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139). The lead article in a recent issue focuses on the “rampant corruption” in the country. According to the article, “within days of the violent coup [against Aristide], corruption and black market activities escalated to levels higher than under the Duvalier regime. Ministers, military and middle managers quickly vied for control of various staples such as sugar, rice and gasoline. One of the most flagrant abuses is the waste and thievery of humanitarian food aid.”
Women and the Law

by Tina Rosenberg

In a regional context of struggles for democracy and human rights, the Latin American women's movement is growing momentum. While feminists have registered initial gains at some levels, the dynamics of structural adjustment are a source of profound new setbacks.

Rosemary Correa had been a police officer in São Paulo for 20 years when she was given an unusual assignment: to head the world's first police station staffed entirely by women. It was 1985, and democracy had returned to Brazil after 21 years of military rule. Women's groups in the state of São Paulo were demanding that the new government take action to reduce what they maintained was a widespread problem: domestic violence. The state's interior minister hit on the idea of a women's police station, both to make women more comfortable reporting abuse and to provide them with officers more likely to treat abuse seriously.

Correa and 12 other officers were drafted for the job. "I was not a feminist," she recalls. "I thought that if this really were a problem, why weren't women bringing charges in the regular police stations?"

The government announced in the press that on August 6, 1985, the first Delegacia de Defesa da Mulher would open in a brick castle surrounded by palm trees in São Paulo's downtown Parque Dom Pedro. "We were scheduled to open our doors at 8:00," says Correa. "I arrived with my staff at 7:30. We encountered a line of about 500 women with all kinds of bruises: black eyes, broken arms and legs, burned faces. Many just wanted to know that we existed. Most had never been to a police station, I was shocked. At that moment we began to realize that there was a problem here."

Today, Correa is a São Paulo state legislator and there are close to 200 delegacias in Brazil, their hallways usually filled with women, holding babies, nervously waiting to make a complaint or ask about their rights. The delegacias have helped raise awareness of women's rights and the problems of domestic violence, sexual harassment, and rape; tens of thousands of women who might have suffered in silence have instead taken action to stop their abuse.

Delegacias are a creative and important step forward in reducing violence against women, a widespread problem among all social classes in Latin America. One Bolivian expert estimates that domestic violence occurs in 70% to 80% of all Bolivian families. But the delegacias' limitations also show why women's most basic rights still remain largely unprotected in Latin America, both in the law and in everyday life. Delegacias are still assigned a low priority within the police, are short of money, and have no specialized staff. Most complaints go uninvestigated. Only a handful of cases ever result in convictions. The female officers receive no special training and are sometimes just as insensitive to women's problems as their male counterparts; even some female police chiefs have said publicly that it is a man's right to beat his wife.

To help change this reality, women's rights activists from all over Latin America met for four days in São Paulo in April 1992 to discuss penal law concerning women. At the conference, sponsored by the Comité Latinoamericano para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer (CLADEM), and funded by the Ford Foundation, over 50 lawyers, activists, and scholars from 14 Latin American countries—many of which are contemplating reforming their penal codes—debated the issues of domestic violence, rape, sexual abuse, incest, sterilization, abortion, and prostitution.

Although the meeting focused on these issues, there was a sense that the inequality of women was hardly an isolated problem—that the current push for women's rights was very much a part of a broader campaign to bring back democracy and ensure respect for human rights throughout the re-
Most delegates were also aware that they were not alone, that their work in Latin America was intrinsically linked to the work of similar groups in the US and Europe as well as in many other developing countries.

Legal Roots

The most obvious problem, conference participants agreed, is that the law itself is often archaic and discriminatory. Article 176 of the Bolivian penal code, for example, states that lesions caused in the home are punishable only if they incapacitate a woman for more than 30 days. "But even if a woman goes to a doctor with broken arms, ribs, and a bruised face," says Julieta Montano, a lawyer with Bolivia's nonprofit Oficina Juridica para la Mujer, "a doctor will rarely certify more than five days' incapacitation. I know of one woman whose husband threw boiling oil on her as she slept. She had third-degree burns all over her body. The doctor certified that she would be incapacitated for 15 days. I have not heard of a single conviction for battery in Bolivia."

The legal standards for proving cases are also unreasonably high in many Latin American countries. In most countries, a man can be convicted of rape only if witnesses exist or the woman is visibly bruised. In Brazil some forms of sexual abuse are treated as crimes only if the victim is an "honest woman."

"Typically a man can be convicted of rape only if witnesses exist or the woman is visibly bruised. In Brazil some forms of sexual abuse are treated as crimes only if the victim is an "honest woman.""

Enforcing Rights

But bad law, conference participants said, is not the real problem. "We are wonderful at writing laws," said Montano of Bolivia. "What we're not so good at is following them." Most of the constitutions in Latin America are model documents filled with eloquent statements of rights, including women's rights. "Brazil's 1988 constitution was our biggest conquest," said Norma Kyriakos, São Paulo's state attorney general at the time. "It contains almost everything the women's movement wanted. But specific laws to guarantee those rights do not exist, or are ignored in practice.

One reason is lack of information, which hides the problem from public view. In Brazil there is no central registry of crimes, not even of murders. "It's not just crimes against women," said Luiza Eluf, head of São Paulo's Conselho para Defesa de Cidadania. "I couldn't even find out how many people committed suicide, or died of drug overdose." No one even knows how many women vote. Eva Blay, a sociology professor who was one of Brazil's feminist pioneers, said that to find the number of female mayors in Brazil, she had to call every mayor.

There is also lack of money. In April 1992 greater São Paulo, with 20 million people the third largest city in the world, had only one shelter where women could go to escape an abusive husband. The shelter has 18 beds, and was full with just three women and their children. Other shelters are waiting for financing to open their doors—and São Paulo is the wealthiest and most developed metropolis in Latin America. "Even when women go to the police station, few cases end up in court because we don't have the human resources to collect evidence," said Augusti of the Conselho Estadual da Condiição Feminina.

Reporting a crime or bringing a suit is not only fruitless in many cases, often it is risky as well. One illustration is Brazil's problem with sterilization. Brazilian law provides women with 120 days maternity leave. But businesses often attempt
to avoid the expense by hiring women only with proof of sterilization, or by requiring female employees to take a pregnancy test each month. "This is completely illegal, but it is widely done," said Dr. Maria Jose de Araujo, who runs Sao Paulo's nonprofit Coletivo da Sexualidade e Faude da Mulher. "If you denounce this practice, you are likely to lose your job. In a recession like we have now, losing your job is a very serious matter."

**Machismo**

But the most important reason the law is not enforced—a reason that underlies all the others—is that public attitudes in Latin America frequently allow men to do as they wish with female members of their families. This is firmly embedded in the legal histories of most countries in the region. For example, Brazil's first civil code, drawn up in 1914, considered women perpetual wards of men. Even today, the civil code does not grant women equality. As a consequence, many police, judges, juries, and ordinary Brazilian men and women believe it is a man's right to beat his wife.

"One day I was looking out the window of my seventh-floor apartment," said Heleith Saffioti, a Brazilian sociologist and early feminist, "and I saw a man beating a woman in the street. I ran downstairs. A policeman walked by and kept on walking. I chased after him and he told me, 'I'm not going to interfere. This is a thing between a man and his wife.'" I quoted to him Article 226, Paragraph 8 of the constitution—'the state has the obligation to guarantee the harmony of family relations'—but he just stood there with his arms crossed."

In Brazil many people still believe that not only may a man beat his wife, he may also kill her. Men often respond to adultery—or the mere suspicion of adultery—with murder. Brazilian women told the CLADEM conference that in the month before the meeting, the press in the city of Belo Horizonte reported 11 murders of women in which the husband or boyfriend was the prime suspect. In Recife 10 women were killed in such circumstances in the 15 days before the conference.

If these men are brought to trial, they will likely be acquitted on the grounds that they were defending their honor. Brazilian law is currently unclear on whether this is a permitted defense, but juries treat it as such, even when the victim's "crime" is simply to have departed from the traditional notion of a woman's role. A report on violence against women in Brazil by the Women's Rights Project of Human Rights Watch lists a 1972 case in which a man killed his wife because she got a job, began coming home late, and refused to pay her "conjugal debt." He was acquitted on the grounds that the killing was the legitimate defense of his honor; a higher court upheld the decision. In March 1991 the Brazilian supreme court struck down the honor defense, but as many Brazilian observers have noted, a jury's decisionmaking process is often guided more by deep-rooted social norms than by the rule of law. A prosecutor in Pernambuco state told Human Rights Watch that in rural areas the honor defense is successful 80% of the time.

**First Steps**

Several of the conference participants brought good news. In Puerto Rico, said lawyer Esther Vicente, who works both for the government and a nonprofit organization, a 1989 law on domestic violence prompted a direct improvement in the situation of women. The law instructs police to intervene immediately in cases of suspected battery; now police must arrest a suspect instead of merely walking him around the block to cool down. It establishes strong penalties for mistreatment and allows judges to use temporary restraining orders to protect women.

Finally, it sets up a variety of shelters, counseling offices, and legal advisory centers to help prevent violence and shield victims.

"We have seen some problems," said Vicente. "We have to educate judges, and the prosecutors have been horrible. But the temporary restraining orders have been useful, even though some judges don't take this as seriously as they should, and we have had many convictions." Vicente said that the law was the fruit of years of feminist activism in Puerto Rico. Others at the conference mentioned that Puerto Rico's links with the mainland US may have helped bring about the change.

In Chile a new democratic congress is likely to pass a similar law soon, said Nelly González, director of the nonprofit Oficina Legal de la Mujer in Santiago. The law would establish family courts with judges who are trained in family law. "This will bring about a total change," González said. "Chile is a very legalistic country and the courts have historically functioned well for nonpolitical crimes."

It was also reported that a women's legal advocacy group in Peru, the Estudio para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer, succeeded in winning the first divorce case on the grounds of mental cruelty—an important precedent for Peruvian jurisprudence on domestic abuse. And in Brazil a congressional committee is currently investigating violence against women, a sign that the phenomenon is increasingly being questioned.

Perhaps some of the best news was the CLADEM conference itself. Participants seized the chance to brainstorm with each other on their shared concerns—often working through the scheduled lunch or dinner hour. All over Latin America, more women know their rights, more report abuses, and judges and police are more likely to treat such abuses as crimes. This progress is the result of public education, conference participants said. "You have to keep proposing
strong laws,” said Angela Alvarado, the president of CLADEM in Panama and a professor of humanities at the Universidad de Panama. “Even when you know you can’t get what you want, proposing laws is a method of public education. It further public discussion.”

But conversations in São Paulo with those touched by violence against women show how far there is yet to go in most of Latin America, countries where machismo still reigns and the gap between law and life is a wide one.

**Poor Women, Rich Women**

Paraisopolos (City of Paradise) is a favela of about 8,000 people, its shacks rigged of cardboard, cement, wood, and prayer, set in a gully in the shadow of one of São Paulo’s richest neighborhoods. When it rains the electricity goes out. But one Saturday night after a rainstorm residents filled the mud streets—women chatting, children playing ball, and men drinking beer—the streets lit up by the bright 20-story luxury apartment complexes towering above.

Most of the women in Paraisopolos work in the high-rise apartments as maids, and earn the equivalent of $50 a month. But when asked about their troubles, money is not always what comes to mind. “Here a lot of the men beat their wives,” said 19-year-old Elly, as she set her small daughter on a concrete shop windowsill. “We know because we see women being beaten, but we don’t talk about it.” They do not talk about it in the high rises, either, although the problem is also common in wealthy families. Domestic violence is prevalent in all social classes in Latin America.

In the slums of Paraisopolos, Elly said she knew of only one woman who ever went to the police. Neva, who is 18, said most women are afraid to report beatings—it will anger their men. “The men can even kill you,” said her friend, Celine, 15.

At the Jabaquara Municipal Hospital on the outskirts of southern São Paulo, dozens of people—mostly darker-skinned and poor—wait outside the emergency room. Medical care is free here, and, compared to other parts of the region, the equipment is excellent and the wait for attention is short. For many female victims of violence or sexual abuse, going to the hospital will be their only contact with official Brazil. “Of every 10 victims of sexual abuse I see, I’d say that not even one case gets reported to the police,” says Marco Antonio Evangelista, a gynecologist. “Women tell me they’ve been raped, but when I explain about legal procedures they stop right there. A woman can hesitate for social reasons—her shame will be public. And it’s very hard to prove.”

Onivaldo Cervantes, a surgeon, says he treated a woman who had been beaten by her husband and had lesions all over her head. “Even before her X-ray had come in, we all knew she had been attacked,” he says. “But it’s hard to prove.”

When it rains the electricity goes out. But one Saturday night after a rainstorm residents filled the mud streets—women chatting, children playing ball, and men drinking beer—the streets lit up by the bright 20-story luxury apartment complexes towering above.

Most of the women in Paraisopolos work in the high-rise apartments as maids, and earn the equivalent of $50 a month. But when asked about their troubles, money is not always what comes to mind. “Here a lot of the men beat their wives,” said 19-year-old Elly, as she set her small daughter on a concrete shop windowsill. “We know because we see women being beaten, but we don’t talk about it.” They do not talk about it in the high rises, either, although the problem is also common in wealthy families. Domestic violence is prevalent in all social classes in Latin America.

In the slums of Paraisopolos, Elly said she knew of only one woman who ever went to the police. Neva, who is 18, said most women are afraid to report beatings—it will anger their men. “The men can even kill you,” said her friend, Celine, 15.

**“Generally the aggressors are well-liked, nice people, good workers—and they beat up their wives,” says the chief of police. “The courts consider them ‘good men’ and so usually acquit them or give them suspended sentences.”**
THE TIGER AND THE CHILDREN
Fidel Castro and the Judgment of History
Roberto Luque Escalona
Fidel Castro has long claimed that he would be absolved by history. This volume tests Castro’s claim against fact and finds that history will condemn the long-standing dictator of Cuba. Escalona’s work is filled with a level of intimate detail unrivaled in any other analysis.
ISBN: 1-56000-027-9 (cloth) 212pp. $29.95

POVERTY, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
U.S.-Third World Policy Perspective Series, No. 17
Sheldon Annis, editor
Rural poverty and environmental degradation are steadily worsening in Central America, undercutting the prospects for regional peace and economic recovery. This volume analyzes strategies that aim to reduce poverty and protect the environment in the region.
ISBN: 1-56000-577-7 (paper) 280pp. $15.95

REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY
A Handbook for Practitioners
Ernesto Betancourt
Betancourt shows how to evaluate the politics and actions of leaderships in different revolutionary contexts (totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic), using the Cuban and Uruguayan experiences as case studies.
ISBN: 0-88738-411-0 (cloth) 196pp. $29.95

ENVIRONMENT AND LABOR IN THE CARIBBEAN
Caribbean Perspectives, Volume 2
Joseph Lisowski, editor
This volume focuses on the eastern Caribbean, exploring aspects of management and climate; social, literary, and educational concerns; and includes an extended study of the labor situation in the U.S. Virgin Islands.

CURA ANNUAL REPORT: 1989
Office of Research and Policy, Voice of America-Radio Marti Program
United States Information Agency
This annual statistical handbook provides fundamental data on Cuba, including in-depth reviews of Cuban foreign policy, the national economy, military allocations and manpower, political control, cultural developments, and ideological shifts.
Exporting Daughters

by Howard W. French

By nine o'clock each night, two dozen or more young women arrive at the La Herminia Night Club, where they exchange stories and perform their final primping before the start of a long evening of blaring merengues, copious amounts of beer, and, they hope, a client or two for sex.

“If I earn 1,000 pesos, I’ve done pretty well,” said Arele Díaz, a striking 20-year-old in a tiny, shrink-wrap black dress, of her hoped-for nightly purse of just under $100. “Five hundred pesos or less, and it’s really been a bust for me.” As a domestic or factory worker, Díaz said, she couldn’t earn even a tenth of her nightly income in a week. In interviews many of the prostitutes expressed similar sentiments.

Driven in part by such harsh economic realities, vast stretches of Santo Domingo have come to be blanketed with prostitution establishments running the gamut from the “Casas de Cita,” literally rendezvous houses, where elegantly attired young women await a relatively affluent mix of locals and tourists, to drive-in car washes, which offer quick and cheap sex.

The Dominican authorities and sociologists who study this mushroombing demimonde estimate that in a city whose population is nearly two million, there are at least 20,000 prostitutes. This number consists mostly of young women, ranging in age from 16 to 25, they say, but it also includes many men who cater to both sexes and much younger girls as well. Estimates for the number of prostitutes in the country as a whole run as high as 60,000.

The Dominican Republic is acquiring an unsavory reputation as a major supplier for the sex traffic in countries as far-flung as the Netherlands, Greece, Suriname, and neighboring Haiti.

The Export Boom

But, for all the magnitude of the phenomenon, some officials concede that prostitution has only recently begun to be taken seriously as a national problem. And when attention has come at all, it has often focused on concerns that the Dominican Republic is acquiring an unsavory reputation as a major supplier for the sex traffic in countries as far-flung as the Netherlands, Greece, Suriname, and neighboring Haiti. One expert said that in the tiny, tourism-rich Caribbean island of Antigua, there are now 4,000 Dominican prostitutes among a total of 80,000 people on the island. About 7,000 Dominicans are estimated to work in the sex business in Amsterdam.

Almost weekly now, newspapers in Santo Domingo are filled with articles chronicling the woes of these young women abroad, including the frequent deportation of scores of them for the offense of plying their trade. “How long are we going to accept the sad reality that the Dominican Republic has become one of the largest exporters of prostitution in the world?” asked an angry editorial in the Dominican daily Hoy.

Intellectuals, feminists, sociologists, health-care professionals, and others say that despite the concern over public image shown by this country largely dependent upon tourism, there has been little serious introspection about the causes of prostitution in the Dominican Republic and even less determination to discourage it. “No one can deny we are a major exporter of prostitutes now, but nevertheless, people deny there is a problem here,” said one editor who has sought to bring attention to the issue in his newspaper, but insisted on anonymity. “There is an enormous indifference. We can’t call it a national crisis. For many, it wouldn’t even be considered a problem.”

Although several officials agreed with that observation, they said that since the advent of the AIDS epidemic, which has left about 1% of the population infected with the HIV virus, energetic attempts to control the spread of that disease have increasingly been accompanied by quieter efforts to understand and slow the growth of prostitution.

“There has long been a notion that sex costs money and that sex produces money in our society,” said E. Antonio de Moya, a senior...
public health official involved in the control of AIDS and studies of prostitution. “Diversion in the Dominican Republic almost doesn’t exist without sex and alcohol, and the industries of tobacco, liquor and music have become deeply entwined with our sex industry.”

Others have placed more emphasis on the influence of tourism, an industry they say was built in part around the sturdy myth, still promoted in advertisement and song, of the hot-blooded and available women of the islands. “We have been famous as a place for a sex holiday since the 1960s,” said Santo Rosario, a sociologist who directs a private, nonprofit group that works with prostitutes to prevent the spread of AIDS. “There is still a sector of the tourism industry which thrives by servicing foreigners sexually, both hetero- and homosexual.”

“Opportunities for women here are very limited,” said Rosario. “Then you have the whole macho culture which is still very dominant in the Dominican Republic. Seen through this prism, the woman is reduced to an object, bought and sold as easily as a cigarette.”

Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission from the New York Times, April 20, 1992.

---

**Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships at the University of Florida**

The Center for Latin American Studies and the Center for African Studies invite junior and senior scholars to participate in an interdisciplinary program on Afro-American identity and cultural diversity in the Americas, including the Caribbean, Brazil, and the US, as well as the sending areas of Africa. Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, the program will enable visiting scholars in the area of the humanities to spend a year or a semester at the University of Florida to do research in this area. It will focus on three interrelated issues, each of which will be emphasized in a different year, in the following sequence:

- **(1993-94)** the intersection of race, class, and gender as seen in research on women and the family, slavery, and race relations, social movements, and migration;
- **(1994-95)** studies in literature, religion, and popular culture that reveal the ways in which Afro-American culture has transcended national boundaries and brought together people living in different regions;
- **(1995-96)** studies on historical processes of adaptation to the physical environment through research on material culture, ecological systems, and the built environment.

Each fellow will receive a maximum stipend of $35,000 for the academic year, or half that for the semester. Applicants will be selected on a competitive basis related to their expertise and research in these areas. By **February 3, 1993**, candidates should submit (1) a 100-word abstract, (2) an essay of approximately 1,500 words detailing the proposed research, (3) a full curriculum vita, and (4) two letters of recommendation.

Inquiries and completed applications should be addressed to Dr. Helen I. Safa, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611-2037; Fax (904) 392-7682, Telephone (904) 392-0375. Fellows will be announced about April 1.
Sex and Tourism in Cuba

by John M. McClintock

It's early evening on the Malecón, Havana's beautiful seaside boulevard. The young miniskirted girls are out in the moist pink-blue air, tugging at the male tourists, flirting, offering to spend the night with men old enough to be their grandfathers in exchange for a six-pack of Coke, entry to a discotheque, and $6.

Lisa, a pretty, 13-year-old bleached blond, personifies this city's return to the decadence that Fidel Castro's revolution was supposed to eliminate more than three decades ago. She is barely five feet tall, weighs less than 100 pounds, and is dressed in lemon hot pants and a black halter top. Her merry eyes are rimmed by thick mascara as though she were a child experimenting with her mother's makeup. "What country are you from?" she asks a foreigner, tugging at his sleeve. Flirting in her childlike way, she tells the foreigner he is handsome, intelligent. She wants to be with him.

Lisa is not an aberration in the current phase of Castro's troubled revolution. She is an important handmaiden in the service of attracting desperately needed currency to her bankrupt country. She is one of the hundreds of pretty young Cuban girls and women who have turned Havana into an attractive fleshpot for foreign tourists.

During a two-hour stroll down the Malecón on a Friday night, one foreign visitor was propositioned 43 times by pimps and prostitutes (male and female).

Cuban men are resentful of what has happened. But the government does not seem bothered. Indeed, there are ways in which the authorities seem to be encouraging it. Every day, dozens of men arrive at Havana's Jose Martí International Airport to begin their sex vacations with girls like Lisa.

Lisa has advantages over other fleshpots, such as Thailand or the Philippines. It is cheap, relatively free of AIDS, and the women have an innocent quality.

Cuba has advantages over other fleshpots, such as Thailand's Bangkok and Manila in the Philippines. The country is relatively free of AIDS, with only about 700 reported cases, all of them quickly isolated. It is also cheap, and the women themselves have an innocent quality. "This place is a paradise," says Ernesto Lara, 48, a Mexican engineer on his third vacation to Cuba. "The women here are among the most beautiful in the world. They are completely open, almost naive."

Lisa has a carefree attitude about what she is doing. She is driven partly by the desire to obtain cash in a place where $6 is a lot, but also by a desire just to have fun in a country that offers little entertainment outside places that are closed to her unless she is on the arm of a foreigner. "I don't think I am doing anything wrong. I just want to have a good time," she says. "Life here is so hard, so serious."

The financially hard-pressed Cuban government, facing an anticipated $4 billion trade deficit by the end of the year, has turned a blind eye to the prostitution in hopes the dollars the prostitutes earn will help overcome the island's worst economic crisis in this century. It encourages prostitution by requiring foreigners to have "a date" before entering state-owned discos. At the Tasca disco in the Marina Hemingway resort, foreigners are told to pick a date from the young Cuban women outside. The women are prostitutes allowed into the guarded resort only for this purpose. A nearby store sells perfumes, lingerie, and other wares that the foreigners are expected to buy for dates. The store is open until 4:00 a.m. An executive at a hotel in the Varadero resort area noted that his liquor sales increased 300% after the government permitted Cuban "hostesses" and "dates" to enter his disco.

The government's acquiescence is at odds with one of the principal aims of the revolution: ridding the country of the vice that had turned Havana into the sin capital of the Western Hemisphere, back in the days when casinos, cheap rum, and sex attracted thousands of Americans to the Caribbean island. Now there are more prostitutes than before Castro took power in 1959, says Elizardo Sánchez, a prominent human rights activist.

Ironically the moral decay symbolized by burgeoning prostitution in Cuba has reincarnated another former enemy of the socialist state. A religious revival has taken hold,
especially among Cubans who feel the revolution has betrayed its ideals. A Cuban couple talks with concern about the possibility their daughter is among those hustling on the Malecón and elsewhere. "She is only 15 years old, but she lives a life of her own and dresses better that we can afford. We hardly ever see her," says Elena Maldanado, who earns $6 a month as a factory worker—the same amount that Lisa earns in a night. Mrs. Maldanado and her husband, Luis, recently welcomed a Roman Catholic priest who made a "clandestine" visit to their apartment. "I nearly fell off my chair," Mr. Maldanado said. "We had a chance to talk about our lives, about how the Malecón has become a place of prostitution. Here in Cuba, the family is disintegrating, and nothing is a bigger symbol of that than the whores."

For the first time since the Marxist government's bloody anti-Church crackdown in 1961, the Havana archdiocese has begun making pastoral visits to homes—and the priests have been warmly received. One prominent Catholic official here noted that only 7,500 people were baptized in the Havana archdiocese in 1978. The figure increased to 33,474 last year.

But the Church is working against the consequences of desperate economic conditions. The Castro government—in what is known as "legalizing reality"—is using the dollars earned from prostitution and other illicit business to help overcome the economic catastrophe caused by its own mismanagement, the demise of its Soviet ally, and the US trade embargo. Prostitution seems to be one of the more successful aspects of that policy, judging from the number of Latin Americans and Spaniards cruising the Malecón. "I would say the majority of my clients going to Cuba are Mexican men who want a sex vacation," says Alicia Terán, a Mexico City travel agent. "I think it's sad that so many girls are being exploited because of the desperate times," she adds. "A bunch of single guys coming in from Canada are not here just to work on their tans. They want sex," says the Varadero hotel executive. "You can't have a tourist business without sex."

Amanda, an 18-year-old University of Havana student, comes to the illicit arrangement with an astonishing air of practicality. One night, as the beautiful teenager awaits her "date"—a paunchy 64-year-old Spanish executive who has promised to take her to the Havana Club disco—she coolly measures her advantages. "I can earn more in one night than my mother can in five months," she says, smoothing her sequined minidress that the Spanish executive paid for. "If it wasn't for the dollars I earn this way, I couldn't afford to continue my studies," she said. "I can make about $35 a night, eat a good meal and have a swell time." What does her boyfriend think? "He knows what I am doing. But we look upon this as an opportunity to get ahead, as a phase in our lives. It's no big deal."

Lisa and Amanda confront a choice between the glittery world of hard currency against the drab world of the average Cuban. The hard-currency world of cars, tourist shops, restaurants, swanky discos, and resorts is off-limits to 99% of the Cuban population—even though Article 42 of the Constitution specifically forbids such a segregated arrangement. But a pretty Cuban girl can break the barrier with a foreign tourist and briefly escape the harsh living conditions of her mother, who earns practically nothing and endures a monotonous diet of beans and rice. The government gets its reward as practically anything worth buying—from jeans to shampoo—can be found only in state-owned stores reserved for foreigners.

Cuba's economic crisis is particularly troubling for young people who cannot afford to have a good time or buy a pair of running shoes without resorting to illegal activities that bring them dollars. With 46% of Cuba's 11 million people under the age of 25, the nation has a substantial pool of disenchanted young people thirsting for the material goods enjoyed by relatives in the US. While criminal statistics are scarce, a statement by the Third Option, a group of mostly young intellectuals, noted the country has 20 juvenile reformatories: 35 years ago it had only one. The illegal activities include selling bootlegged cigars, money-changing, purse-snatching, and sex.

Not all Cuban men are as tolerant as Amanda's boyfriend. It is a source of resentment among Cuban males, who cannot compete for attention without dollars, a University of Havana professor says. "Maybe it was OK when people couldn't buy anything at the tourist dollar shops, but when women are essentially becoming part of the wares for sale, then it's a different matter," he says. José Hernández, a 19-year-old University of Havana student, says he "feels powerless and worthless because I have nothing to offer a girl. Even if I could get dollars, the law forbids me from having them. Despite the official rhetoric, the dollar is king and a king always has a harem."

Another swing around the nightclub puts the conflict in focus. René, Jorge, and their childhood friend, Berta, a stunning 17-year-old girl, have been invited by foreign visitors to make the rounds. By the end of the evening, René is offering the sexual services of Berta, who, he said, "was saddened you don't like her." During the ride home, the taxi driver, a young veteran of the Cuban forces who fought in Angola, angrily slammed his fist into the roof of the cab. "I didn't fight for my country to be banned from some lousy disco, so that we would be treated like second-class citizens and our women reduced to whores," he said.

Editor's Note: Adapted with permission from the Baltimore Sun (July 12, 1992).
In Amsterdam I met two Venezuelan women, both professionals, who had been contracted for prostitution without their knowledge. Since they were undocumented, they were practically shut in and their movements were carefully watched by those who brought them. It was almost a kidnapping. When I found them, they had already adapted to the new profession, but were still somewhat rebellious against what they were doing. They told me that the worst thing for them was writing to their families and telling lies about what they were doing in that country.

This painful story comes from Zoraida Ramírez, a Venezuelan economist, who was chosen to participate in an exchange program focusing on women, poverty, and prostitution. Sixteen women from the Third World participated in the research, which examined Chile, Thailand, and Sweden.

One of the study’s most important findings is alarming: in addition to the transnationalization of capital, there has been a transnationalization of the sex industry in which “both demand and supply for female prostitutes bypasses national boundaries.” The majority of demand is generated by males from the North and a growing portion of the supply is provided by women from underdeveloped countries.

Prostitution is a new form of neocolonialism, in which the North exploits a non-renewable resource from the South. Trafficking involves a complex web of multinational enterprises.

Numerous countries in Latin America are involved in this business, including the Dominican Republic—which leads the field—followed by Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela. In Venezuela even unemployed professional women are now entering the business of prostitution. About 12 years ago, as part of this process, the country became an international bridge for sexual tourism. According to Ramírez’s research, funds that enter the country through prostitution do not appear registered in the national accounts.

Once You’re In, It’s Difficult to Get Out

Escape from the complex world of prostitution is difficult. That difficulty reflects factors such as social and family rejection, commitments to others involved in the business, the establishment of affective ties with the so-called “chulos” (“pimps”), and even the hardening of personal sentiments. Another factor is the possibility of earning a high income and an accompanying attachment to consumable goods that take on the status of “necessities.”

The world of international prostitution is even more complex. The prostitutes sign deceptive contracts, often written in foreign languages that the contracted women do not understand, that are very difficult to break. Moreover, the contracted women are typically illegal aliens. Many women are sent to a foreign market with a one-way ticket; if they want to leave they have to obtain the money on their own.

Prostitution is a new form of neocolonialism, in which the North exploits a nonrenewable resource from the South. According to Ramírez, one aspect of North-South prostitution is unequal access to the feminine condom, “which is utilized by prostitutes from the North while those from the South don’t have enough money to buy it.” Another form of discrimination suffered by prostitutes from the
South has to do with labor organizations that unionize developed-country prostitutes but that refuse prostitutes of other nationalities. These problems, along with the North’s growing racist tendencies, worsen the situation of prostitutes from the South.

Ramírez points out that India announced its interest in pursuing such tourism because of international businesses that seek to promote tourist developments linked to the transnational sex market.

"The same thing occurs in Venezuela, where there are groups that develop tourist plans that include this modality. The Resort group, for example, offers a tourist package that includes an attending girl," she says.

**Recruiting Personnel**

Ramírez adds that transnational recruitment is simple. The agents come from abroad and visit upper-class sex houses, where they select attractive and sophisticated women who communicate well and can handle credit cards as a form of payment. Such women are sent to luxury hotels in sites such as Miami, where they attend to select clients.

Less-sophisticated women are also sought after by these businesses. They are given indefinite contracts and sent as illegals with one-way tickets to faraway countries. Some of these women are falsely contracted and then forcefully introduced to prostitution, Ramírez comments.

This research should alert national authorities who supervise tourist projects, particularly in those countries where conditions of national economic crisis exist. Under such conditions, women in less-developed nations are especially vulnerable to being preyed upon by an array of interests engaged in the business of transnational sex.

---

**Editor’s Note:** Adapted with permission from El Nacional (Caracas), April 28, 1992.

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
Profile: Prostitutes in Bogotá

**AGE PROFILE**

- 9-10 (2.6%)
- 11-14 (5.2%)
- 15-20 (20.0%)
- 21-30 (37.7%)
- 31-40 (24.7%)
- 41-50 (7.7%)
- 51-60 (1.5%)

Source: Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (September 1990)

**EDUCATIONAL PROFILE**

- None (17.9%)
- Completed primary (19.0%)
- Attended secondary (16.9%)
- Attended college (2.2%)
- No response (0.4%)

Attended primary (41.8%)

Source: Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (September 1990)

**WHY THEY BECAME PROSTITUTES (Percentages by Age Group)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>9-10</th>
<th>11-20</th>
<th>21-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of income</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No skills</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence in the home</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other employment</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (September 1990)
EC Banana Policies

by Brent Borrell and Sandy Cuthbertson

The world economy appears to be moving not toward free trade but toward regional blocs of managed trade. The articulation of EC banana policies is a case in point. What are the implications for Latin America and the Caribbean?

Most citizens of the European Community (EC) take bananas for granted. Some may know that bananas are cheaper in Germany than anywhere else in the EC and wonder why. Some may also have noticed quality differences in bananas available in different EC countries and have asked why. But few people in the EC would know what complicated trading arrangements apply to banana imports and how costly these arrangements are to provide aid to former colonies of EC countries and EC territories.

Most EC countries pursue independent and quite different national banana policies within the present EC regime. These policies give preferences to some developing countries—preferred suppliers—at the expense of other developing countries and give monopoly privileges to some local importers and wholesalers of bananas. A study conducted at the World Bank by Brent Borrell and Maw-Cheng Yang (1990) shows that many of the national policies are inefficient in providing aid and distort trade, having perverse effects on developing countries—Germany’s policy being the exception.

In completing the EC common market in 1992, the disparate national banana policies must be unified. This unification provides a unique opportunity to eliminate the inefficiencies of present policies. But it also provides the worrying prospect that the least efficient features of existing policies may be extended to all countries, making intervention worse than it is now. The policy option the EC chooses could have a huge impact on how much EC consumers pay for bananas and on the quality of the fruit available. It could also have a huge impact on the incomes of some small developing countries.

PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY

Unit cost of production; includes the cost of storage, merchandising, and export taxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Unit Cost of Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaie and Guadeloupe</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinique</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadeloupe</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Latin America: Somalia

ACP countries and overseas EC territories

Source: Centre for International Economics (1991)
Making the best choice will be hard. The EC Commission and the ministers face competing obligations: policy changes must be consistent with all aspects of the Single European Act 1986; commitments to African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries (signatories to the Lome IV Convention), which include giving special access to bananas, must be honored; policy changes must be compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); and the EC is committed to liberalizing imports of tropical products (which include bananas) in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. The EC must also consider the interests of banana producers in overseas EC territories (Guadeloupe, Martinique, the Canary Islands, and Madeira) and the welfare of EC consumers.

Only if stakeholders are made fully aware of the efficiency of the various policy options available to the EC can there be any chance of the best policy being chosen. This report is about what the opinions are, how they will affect the various stakeholders and what the best option is. It turns out that EC consumers could be made better off and the interests of supplying countries—preferred and nonpreferred—could be safeguarded and improved.

In the wider process of EC market unification, bananas may seem unimportant. But if that is the case, why hasn't the banana policy decision been made and why are developing countries and some wholesalers, retailers, and consumers so worried about the decision?

Although accounting for only a tiny share of merchandise imports into the EC, trade in bananas illustrates the discrimination and inefficiency that EC trade policies can produce. For developing countries not benefiting from the Lome Convention, EC actions on banana imports will indicate whether the EC is serious about liberalizing trade in tropical products and assisting them in their development. More generally, EC actions on bananas will be an indicator of EC market openness after 1992.

**National Banana Policies**

The EC has a common tariff on banana imports of 20% ad valorem. Only Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg apply this tariff exclusively. Other EC countries except for Germany apply other restrictions as well as the 20% tariff on banana imports from nonpreferred suppliers.

The Lomé Convention provides for bananas to be imported into EC countries from former colonies—preferred suppliers—in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific free of duties. The high cost and often low quality bananas from these countries go only to the traditional markets of the UK, France, and Italy, and not to the relatively open markets of Germany, the Benelux countries, Denmark, and Ireland. In 1990 bananas from Latin America sold in Italy at the retail
Lomé IV Convention (1990-2000): Protocol 5 on Bananas

The Community and the ACP States agree to the objectives of improving the conditions under which the ACP States' bananas are produced and marketed and of continuing the advantages enjoyed by traditional suppliers in accordance with the undertakings of Article 1 of this Protocol and agree that appropriate measures shall be taken for their implementation.

Article 1
In respect of its banana exports to the Community markets, no ACP State shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less favourable situation than in the past or at present.

Article 2
In respect of its banana exports to the Community markets, no ACP State shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less favourable situation than in the past or at present.

Source: Centre for International Economics

level at a 20% premium to ACP bananas.

Germany, under a special protocol of the Treaty of Rome, has a zero tariff and an unlimiting quota on bananas. By increasing its quota in line with demand, Germany maintains virtually a free market in bananas. As a result its retail prices are close to world prices (represented by US prices), the differential being transport costs.

The UK imports unrestricted quantities of bananas from preferred suppliers such as Jamaica, the Windward Islands, Surinam, and Belize. Almost all bananas exported from these countries go to the UK. Imports from nonpreferred suppliers are subject to the EC common tariff and licenses that are granted on a monthly basis to fill shortfalls in preferred supplies to the UK market. The licenses restrict supplies and allow retail prices to be held considerably above retail prices in Germany. Wholesale-retail margins in the UK are around double those in Germany and the US-$805 per ton compared with $412 per ton in Germany. Which interests within the marketing chain receive the monopoly profits is difficult to determine, but in the main they are probably importers and wholesalers. The licensing arrangements allow the producer prices of preferred suppliers to be well above the corresponding prices of nonpreferred suppliers.

France manages its own banana market, with two-thirds of it reserved for imports from French "overseas departments" and one-third from African "franc" countries such as Cameroon and the Ivory Coast. (Madagascar is also an ACP exporter to France, but it currently exports few or no bananas to that country.) Limited imports come from other areas when prices exceed a certain level. Like the UK, France holds retail prices well above comparable prices in Germany, and these prices allow importers and wholesalers and preferred suppliers to earn monopoly profits. The tariff applies to bananas from nonpreferred suppliers.

Italy grants free access to banana imports from overseas EC territories and ACP countries within a global quota. This quota has been increased slowly since the 1970s. Somalia is a traditional supplier to Italy and has preferential status. But production difficulties in this strife-torn country have reduced Somalia's share of the Italian market to only about 10%. Other ACP countries supplied around 3% of the market in the period 1985-88, while Latin American countries provided the remainder. Quota restrictions maintain high retail prices and quota holders are able to charge high margins—monopoly profits—on imported fruit.

Portugal and Spain restrict imports to protect producers in their overseas territories. This is permitted under their treaties of accession to the EC until 1995. Portugal has opened up its market considerably under a tender system but gives preference to bananas from Madeira. Spain gets virtually all of its bananas from the Canary Islands. Greece has a high tax on bananas, which curtails consumption and therefore restricts imports. Like the UK, France, and Italy, restricted access to these countries keeps retail prices high and raises returns to preferred suppliers and importers and wholesalers.

Editor's Note: Adapted with permission from EC Banana Policy 1992: Picking the Best Option (Canberra, Australia: Centre for International Economics, 1991).
Hey Mister Tallyman . . .

by Cresencio Arcos

For years, the US, western European nations, and international assistance organizations have been telling developing nations that the only path to development is through free-market economic systems. More recently, economic assistance, whether funneled through international organizations or given as bilateral aid, has been conditioned on market-oriented economic reforms. Countries will not receive assistance dollars unless they reduce deficits and government spending, do away with import-substitution strategies (i.e., high tariffs or non-tariff barriers to protect inefficient local industries), liberalize foreign-exchange regimes, and otherwise open their economies to international trade and investment. Once their economies are open, the argument goes, they can produce those goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage and trade freely with other nations for whatever other goods and services they might need, improving their own economic condition, and making a bigger economic pie for all.

The countries of Central America are now heeding this advice and are poised to take advantage of the open market. In Europe, however, the door to the market is slamming shut in 1992.

Following the lead of countries such as Chile and Mexico, Central American countries have instituted significant free-market reforms. Honduras, for example, has lowered its tariffs from a maximum of well over 100% to a more modest 5-20% range. Other reforms have included controlling deficit spending, establishing and maintaining a realistic exchange rate, securing land tenure rights, and enacting an investment reform law. In the face of considerable opposition, the government of Rafael Callejas has courageously continued these reforms, many of which are economically painful in the short term.

Just as Honduras and its Central American neighbors are ready to reap the rewards of market-oriented economic reforms, they find themselves victims of the EC's restrictionist trade practices.

Having taken the difficult steps to create the proper environment, Honduras is implementing a two-pronged strategy to institute export-driven growth. The first is expansion of traditional export industries, such as bananas, other tropical fruits, and coffee. The second is diversification into other goods and services in which Honduras will be competitive. The diversification process has already begun. Cultivated shrimp, winter melons, tropical nuts, and assembly and light manufacturing plants now contribute substantially to Honduras's export earnings.

Honduras is no longer a monoculture economy dependent solely on bananas. Bananas, however, remain Honduras's number one export and account for 40% of all foreign-exchange earnings. Following the recent free fall of world coffee prices, the banana industry has become Honduras's best engine for rapid export-driven economic growth. There is a ready supply of labor, technical expertise, and suitable land for immediate expansion of Honduras's banana production capability. So, while diversification remains Honduras's long-term goal, expansion of the banana industry (in which Honduras, with its high-quality, low-cost production, has an obvious comparative advantage) is seen as the kick-start needed to get the economy growing at an acceptable rate.

EC Obstacles

Just as Honduras and its Central American neighbors are ready to reap the rewards of their economic reforms, they find themselves victims of restrictionist trade practices. In a meeting held April 7, 1992, the EC Commission recommended that bananas be subject to special restrictions when the EC integrates its economies in January 1993. The proposal would set a quota limiting imports of bananas from Latin America (primarily Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama) to just below the current access level.
These imports would be subject to a duty, possibly as high as 20%. Meanwhile, former EC colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP countries), which produce lower quality bananas at two to three times the cost of Latin American bananas, would continue to have unlimited duty-free access.

This decision was made under intense lobbying pressure and doubtless with the best of intentions on the part of the commissioners. They felt bound by the letter of the Lomé IV Convention, Protocol 5, which states that... no ACP State shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional markets [for bananas] and its advantages on those markets, in a less favorable situation than in the past or at present.” The intent of the Lomé IV Convention and of the commission’s proposal is to provide indirect financial aid to the ACP countries through preferential trade treatment. Despite these good intentions, almost no one will gain under this scheme.

In 1991 Brent Borrell and Sandy Cuthbertson of the Centre for International Economics (CIE) published a study of the effects of Europe’s current system of quotas and tariffs versus a free market, EC Banana Policy 1992: Picking the Best Option. Their model, based on an earlier World Bank study, is the source for the following cost figures. (It should be noted that the proposed EC plan would extend the banana tariff to Germany, now essentially a free trader, and would therefore have even more adverse effects than the current system.)

The most obvious losers under the commission’s plan are Latin America’s banana-producing countries. The current system costs them $82 million per year. This figure represents not lost gross sales, but lost net income.

A less obvious but far more substantial loser is the European consumer. The 20% tariff currently found in most EC countries is, of course, passed on to the consumer. The quotas artificially inflate the price of bananas and pervert the balance between supply and demand. These costs taken together are a staggering $1.4 billion.

The world economy is another loser. Once the tally of all the costs and benefits is done, there is a loss of $238 million. The authors of the CIE report acknowledge that this is probably an underestimate. Their model is “comparative static” and compares one fixed situation against another. It does not take into account the synergistic effects of free trade that result from more efficient use of resources and the interplay of competitive forces.

With all these losers—Latin America’s banana producers, European consumers, and the world economy in general—who are the winners? The banana-producing countries that are former EC colonies come out ahead on paper, but their’s is a pyrrhic victory.

Non-EC banana consumers (primarily the US, Japan, and northern Europe) benefit by $61 million. This is because the EC quotas artificially limit demand and cause a slightly lower world price for bananas. Again, this figure represents the comparative static nature of the model. In the real world, supply is not limited (fallow arable land suitable for banana production exists in many countries), and true free trade would result in both greater demand and greater supply, eventually lowering the price for all to roughly the current US price plus additional transportation costs if any. In short, because of its dynamic nature, free trade in bananas would not raise costs to non-EC consumers in the long run.

The biggest, and (in absolute terms) only, winners under both the current bilateral quota system and the planned EC system are the monopolistic European-based importers. The CIE study lists their excess profits at nearly $1 billion. Certainly these companies have an enormous stake in the outcome.

Dispassionate economic analysis shows that the lofty goal of providing indirect aid to the ACP countries through tariffs and quotas is very expensive. European consumers pay $1.4 billion above and beyond what they would pay in a free-trade environment, yet only...
$220 million finds its way to the intended recipient nations.

A much more efficient method of meeting the EC’s Lomé IV commitment to the ACP countries would be through direct aid. Such direct aid could be aimed at improving banana production and diversifying the economics of the recipient nations, then phased out as it becomes less necessary. Ideally such aid should be carried on the national budget of the donor nation, but political expediency argues against that. Direct aid could, however, be financed by an EC-wide tariff of 20% (possibly less) with no other restrictions. Their imperfect solution would have German and Dutch consumers financing former British and French colonies, but it would do away with much of the waste under the current system, and provide a more level playing field for Latin America’s efficient and high-quality producers.

As of mid-1992 the full EC Council of Ministers has not ruled on the commission plan, and there are some encouraging signs that reason will prevail. The day after the commission decision, the German government issued a public statement opposing the commission plan and supporting freer trade. The presidents of Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama went to Europe to meet with their counterparts and champion the cause of free trade.

Free entry of bananas into the European market is part of a larger economic picture that includes farm subsidies, price supports, and the success or failure of the process of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We are at a crucial moment in the development of the global trading system. The time has come for the West to practice what we have been preaching, even when that means ending entrenched entitlements and opening up historical monopolies to competition. The alternative of trade blocs and trade wars will benefit no one.

As of mid-1992 the full EC Council of Ministers has not ruled on the commission plan, and there are some encouraging signs that reason will prevail. The day after the commission decision, the German government issued a public statement opposing the commission plan and supporting freer trade. The presidents of Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama went to Europe to meet with their counterparts and champion the cause of free trade.

Free entry of bananas into the European market is part of a larger economic picture that includes farm subsidies, price supports, and the success or failure of the process of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We are at a crucial moment in the development of the global trading system. The time has come for the West to practice what we have been preaching, even when that means ending entrenched entitlements and opening up historical monopolies to competition. The alternative of trade blocs and trade wars will benefit no one.
Features: Europe and the Americas

Creating a Banana Fortress

by Michael A. Samuels

Since 1990 the European Community (EC) has been struggling with the task of unifying the seven different banana import regimes that currently exist among its member-states. It is a task complicated by international commitments, emotional attachments, and a variety of conflicting domestic economic interests. Unfortunately the EC Commission—the bureaucracy that conducts the EC's daily affairs—has chosen a path that justifies past fears that the EC might produce a "Fortress Europe." Unless the commission's proposed policy is changed, the losers will be the banana growers and the economies of the banana-producing countries of Latin America.

Fundamental to the EC's dilemma is the conflict between two sets of commitments. On the one side is a commitment to protect the preferred access to the European banana market enjoyed by several former colonies—now independent countries—as part of the Lome Agreement, and by those former colonies that are still administered by European capitals. On the other side are commitments to avoid certain kinds of trade protection as part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to liberalize international market access, especially for tropical products such as bananas, as part of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.

Chief among those are France (Guadeloupe and Martinique), Spain (the Canary Islands), and Portugal (Madeira). Greece (Crete) is also part of this group. A second group of member-states is concerned with independent former colonies, toward which assistance of various kinds is funneled under the Lome Agreement. Lome signatories are known as African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. The member-state most concerned with ACP countries is the UK (the Windward Islands, Jamaica, and Belize), followed by France (the Ivory Coast and Cameroon) and Italy (Somalia).

The bananas from all former colonies (often referred to as "preferred suppliers") enter the corresponding member-states without tariffs and without quota restrictions. A good part of the dilemma (and a textbook case of the consequences of protectionism) is that many of these bananas are higher priced and of lower quality than the bananas that are produced in, and exported from, the unprotected Latin American countries. Furthermore, particularly within France, Spain, and the UK, entrenched import and distribution interests have maximized profits by means of their monopoly positions. These monopolists have become important political supporters of the banana-trade status quo. By contrast, the markets of several other EC countries are open or relatively open to banana imports. Germany is the most open of all, having no quota and no tariff.

For its part the EC Commission has a major role to play. It is responsible for devising the basic regime to unify the currently diverse import arrangements. On an issue such as this, where deep French sensibilities are involved, Jacques Delors, the president of the commission, would not be a passive, unimportant actor. To the contrary, Delors, who hopes to run for election to replace Francois Mitterrand as president of France, is known to have twisted the arms of several of his colleagues to gain a majority in the commission in order to influence the final banana policy decision.

Among the mid-level bureaucrats in the office responsible for agricultural affairs (DG-6), there is a proclivity for managing the market by licensing and for resisting free-market initiatives. Furthermore, the interests of the EC's so-called "development" office (DG-8) are highly skewed in support of the protectionists.

Unless the EC Commission changes its proposed policy, the losers will be the banana growers and the economies of banana-producing countries in Latin America.

Michael A. Samuels, former deputy US trade representative and ambassador to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is president of the Washington, DC-based business consulting firm of Samuels International Associates, Inc.
ACP countries, which are beneficiaries under Lomé. Such interests tend to oppose the so-called “multinationals”—particularly if their ownership is US-based. Therefore, DG-8 has constantly sought a solution that would be detrimental to the two largest international banana companies, Chiquita and Dole, both of which are US owned. This attitude has been so strong that many in DG-8 have been unwilling to give appropriate credibility to the employment, revenue, and development arguments made by the Latin American banana-exporting countries. Similar anti-US thinking has been found throughout the commission’s debate on this subject.

GATT Obligations

On the other side of this issue are the GATT and Uruguay Round commitments of the EC and the interests of European consumers. The GATT issues are clear. The current import regimes of the member-states violate the GATT in ways that may be worsened by the policies proposed by the commission. The violations include the following:

- Article I requires that countries extend the same import access conditions unconditionally to all GATT-member countries.
- Articles XI and XIII prohibit the use of quotas because of their restrictive effect on trade volume and because they lead to increased transactional costs and marketplace uncertainties.
- The GATT does not permit countries to exempt certain foreign suppliers from quotas while subjecting others to rigorous quantitative regulation.
- Indications are that the commission favors a new regime to be administered through a complex, GATT-illegal licensing system.
- Certain versions of the proposed EC regulations are based on a linkage whereby importers of Latin American bananas must show that they have imported bananas from preferred suppliers. This may be the most blatantly GATT-illegal provision.
- Certain internal regulations envisioned by the commission give preference to EC-grown bananas.

Why have the Latin American producers allowed these GATT violations to exist for so long? Until recently, only Colombia and Nicaragua among the Latin American banana producers were members of the GATT. For a small country to take on the EC in the GATT is not an easy task, particularly since the EC has been known to retaliate by threatening to withdraw other preferences previously granted (such as for coffee or cut flowers). Furthermore, the EC market’s recent growth has accommodated the interests of many Latin American producers. Nonetheless, expanded trade expectations were one of the major factors leading to the rise in GATT membership among Latin American countries since 1990. The opportunities promised by the EC and the hopes shared by Latin American governments with other GATT members that the Uruguay Round would liberalize and expand trade led several Latin American countries to make new investments to increase banana production. Little did anyone expect the EC might use the creation of a regional bloc as a tool for restricting the market’s growth or for worsening the terms of access.

Latin American expectations were also fueled by the GATT trade negotiations that have been taking place since September 1986, known as the Uruguay Round. These negotiations aim to expand and liberalize world trade and to extend the GATT’s coverage to items such as intellectual property, investment, services, and agriculture. Bananas are included within these negotiations both as a tropical product and as an agricultural product.

Concerning tropical products, trade in most commodities has been significantly liberalized during the Round as part of an agreement among trade ministers to achieve “the fullest liberalization of trade in tropical products.” This commitment was reaffirmed in the “Dunkel Text” of December 1991, the “final” negotiating text. As for agriculture, the Dunkel Text calls for all agricultural trade barriers to be expressed through tariffs and eventually phased out. The extent to which the commission’s banana position is a recalcitrant one is shown by its unwillingness to abide by the Dunkel Text’s proscription to not exempt any agricultural product from this process.

This unwillingness flies in the face of the EC’s separate bilateral agreement with the US not to allow exemption, and runs the risk of allowing other countries to exempt their own politically sensitive commodities. Most frequently mentioned are Japan (rice), Korea (rice), and Canada (dairy products). An exemption for the EC, however, would affect the domestic politics of agriculture support for the Uruguay Round in the US, too. That is, allowing an exemption for bananas in the EC would make it impossible for the US government to say no to the demands of the protected US peanut industry, which has sought to be exempted from the rules of the Uruguay Round since its inception. Protected producers of a few other commodities, such as sugar and dairy products, feel similarly.

How the EC resolves its banana dilemma will tell much about the Europe of the future. Will it seek to open its borders to all? Will it abide by its international obligations? Will it encourage competition or insist on the maintenance of protection? The answer to these questions will significantly affect the extent to which the Latin American banana-producing countries will be able to depend on the marketplace for their growth and development. It will seriously test the economic foundation on which their tender democracies must be built. Unfortunately, few in Europe seem to care.
In an increasingly desperate battle to hold on to their preferential access to the European market, Caribbean banana producers have tried, but apparently failed, to recruit to their cause one pivotal player in international trade. In recent weeks the prime ministers of several banana producing countries in the Caribbean have visited Washington, asking President George Bush and other key figures in the administration to throw their weight behind proposals that would continue protection for Caribbean bananas marketed in Europe.

After the meetings several were left confused by what they said were “mixed signals” from the US administration. “At one level, the United States administration is aware of the problems we face with bananas, and is sympathetic to the fact that we face potentially serious damage from free trade in the fruit,” said P. J. Patterson, Jamaica’s prime minister. “At another level in the administration, however, there is a move to have bananas brought under the GATT and be freely traded.”

The division is between the White House, on the one hand, and the Office of the Trade Representative and the State Department, on the other. While Patterson declined to elaborate on which was the “sympathetic” part of the administration, Dame Eugenia Charles, the prime minister of Dominica, did not. “President Bush is sympathetic, but Mr. James Baker, the secretary of state, is adamant that there should be no exemptions,” Dame Eugenia said. “The argument is that if there is an exception for bananas, then there will have to be for rice, for dairy products and all other arm products. The United States is dead against us on this.”

The African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group, which supplies one-fifth of the bananas consumed in the European Community (EC), had been worried by the proposals made in the text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations that trading conditions for current export volumes be maintained for all sources until 1999. Anything above this would be subject to tariffication, with tariffs being reduced progressively by an average of 36% between 1993 and 1999.

The banana producers are hoping for relief from three sources. One is the undertaking, “the legal commitment,” says Patterson, of the EC to ensure that changes in the marketing of bananas will not leave the ACP states “in a less favourable situation than in the past or at present.” The second is the proposal by the European Commission earlier this year to impose quotas on fruit from non-ACP sources, mainly the Latin American countries whose fruit is more competitive than that of the ACP exporters.

The third area of solace for the ACP producers would have been US support for the use of quotas rather than tariffs. Officials in the Caribbean say the White House, preoccupied with an election, will hardly be in a position to redirect those parts of the government that are unwilling to consider bananas as a special case. Yet, they say, US support is important if there is to be any success with efforts for a derogation to the rules of international trade.

“There is also the fact that US companies are heavily involved in banana production in the Latin American countries,” explained one St. Lucian official. “It is unlikely that the US position will be one which will ignore the desires of those companies, and the Latin American governments, to open up the market.”

Caribbean bananas, which cost about 30% more to produce than do Latin American fruit, could not...
compete on an open market. “The Latin American producers have virtually declared war on us,” said John Compton, the prime minister of St. Lucia. “They are trying to drive us out of the European market.”

In June 1992 Caribbean representatives met with President Bush in Washington to seek his support for the use of quotas rather than

---

**The Time of the Generals**

**Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective**

Frederick M. Nunn

“One of the most important works ever written on the subject... It will be the standard against which all future studies will be measured and will become required reading for everyone even marginally concerned with the military in society.” - Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Director, Center for Latin American Studies, San Diego State University. $50.00

---

**Between Civilization and Barbarism**

**Women, Nation, and Literary Culture in Modern Argentina**

Francine Masiello

Masiello’s book "sheds light on a relatively little-known group of extremely interesting women in a formative period of a major literature. [It] breaks new ground and will be a standard reference for the subject.” - Margaret Sayers Peden. Engendering Latin America series. October. $37.50

---

**The Heritage of the Conquistadors**

**Ruling Classes in Central America from Conquest to the Sandinistas**

Samuel Z. Stone

Foreword by Richard E. Greenleaf

“Anyone interested in Central America, and especially what Central Americans think about their own societies, will profit from reading this work... The wide-ranging discussion touches on just about any contemporary topic of interest.” - The Americas. $12.95
The Great Banana War
by Eben Shapiro

All it the great banana war of 1992. It broke out when the European market did not open as expected, saddling the big growers, newly expanded for the cause, with surpluses. Prices in Europe—and to a lesser degree in the US—dropped along with the profits of the big brand companies like Del Monte, Dole, and Chiquita. Investors have stampeded out of fruit stocks.

As the world’s biggest banana marketer and the only one of the Big Three that relies on bananas for its fortunes, Chiquita Brands International has been kicked hardest. While shares of Dole Foods, the other large public company with banana operations, dropped to $27.75 on July 7, 1992, from a high of $48 in 1991, Chiquita’s stock price has plunged to $15.75 from a high of $50.75 in 1991. That brings the company’s stock price below its year-end book value of $19.39 a share.

Chiquita’s hard knocks show the difficulty of dressing up what is essentially a commodity food as a premium brand. The Cincinnati-based company spends about $20 million a year on television and magazine advertising to convince shoppers, grocers, and its stockholders that bananas blessed with the Chiquita seal are somehow worth more than the others. But a banana is just a banana. “Nobody has been successful at putting a brand name on a perishable commodity,” said Michael Kennedy, an analyst at IDS Financial Services in Minneapolis. “They always say, this time it’s going to be different.” Not even the company’s Carmen Miranda-esque logo protected Chiquita from having to sell its bananas at prices within pennies of the lowest on the pier. “Sometimes the premium is pretty narrow,” said David Diver, vice president for produce at Hannaford Brothers, a supermarket chain in Portland, Maine.

Industry executives disagree somewhat about the reason for the weak prices. Dole, which is somewhat cushioned because of its operations in other fresh fruits and in real estate and packaged goods, blamed the “high volumes of shipments in the banana industry, which have depressed prices worldwide” for a 25% decline in second-quarter profits. Yet Keith Lindner, Chiquita’s 32-year-old president and son of the financier Carl H. Lindner, attributes falling prices—and Chiquita’s own 89% plunge in profits in the first quarter—to an industrywide crop of poor-quality fruit as well as to fierce competition in Europe this year. He rejected the criticism by some analysts on Wall Street that the company, which is 46% owned by the Lindners’ American Financial Corporation, was too aggressive in expanding banana production.

Nevertheless, Chiquita, at least temporarily, plans to stop planting more banana trees this year after spending heavily in the previous two years to expand. Financed in part with the proceeds from public offerings that raised $474 million, Chiquita aggressively stepped up spending on land, production operations, and freighters a few years ago, investing $282 million in 1990 and more than $400 million in 1991. In the 1980s it typically spent between $30 million to $78 million a year.

Chiquita is by no means stopping investment. It will spend more than $400 million—the same as in 1991—but mostly on six previously ordered ships for Chiquita’s Great White Fleet of refrigerated freighters.

The company took advantage of a steadily rising stock price in 1990 and 1991 to sell shares, in part to finance the expansion. In early 1990 it sold 7.1 million shares at $19.07 a share. That December it sold 3.3 million shares at $30.625 a share. In the summer of 1991 the company sold 5.6 million shares at $43.625 a share.

American growers had great hopes that a unified European market would bring new selling opportunities. “There was a feeling that the door in Europe would swing wide open,” said John M. McMillin,
an analyst with Prudential Securities. But because of a breakdown in trade talks between the US and the European Community (EC), countries like Spain, France, and Britain were allowed to keep exclusive agreements to buy all their bananas from their former colonies. The EC is also considering a 20% tariff on bananas from Latin America, where the Big Three brands grow most of their produce.

Without explosive demand in Europe, bananas have been left to rot on the piers in Ecuador, banana executives said. Fruit from Latin America is flooding into European countries like Germany and Austria that lack entrenched relationships with banana-growing countries. Banana companies have also tried to increase their market share in the event that quotas are set based on current volumes. As a result, retail prices in parts of Europe dropped in the spring of 1992 by 20% from 1991. They fell a more modest 12% in the US, which also absorbed some of the excesses, and could tumble more here if tariffs are imposed in European markets now open to Latin American fruit. In New York bananas cost about 29 cents a pound retail, down a nickel from 1991.

Profits of the fruit companies have suffered. In April, Chiquita stunned Wall Street when it reported that earnings for the first quarter had plunged 89%, to $5.5 million on sales of $1.16 billion, down 1.8%.

**A Different Image**

Chiquita’s problems are a setback for Keith Lindner. Some analysts said the company was overly optimistic about the prospects for expansion in Europe and that the company had hid from Wall Street just how severely the low prices would hurt it. “I basically feel I’ve been lied to,” said Timothy S. Ramey, an analyst with C. J. Lawrence in New York. Since 1984, when his family purchased a controlling interest in the company, then known as United Fruit, Mr. Lindner deliberately set out to cultivate a more open image than his secretive father, who runs a far-ranging empire with holdings in insurance and broadcasting. Unlike his father, Keith Lindner regularly talks to Wall Street analysts and the news media.

He has also worked to overcome lingering questions about his father’s investment style. In the 1970s Carl Lindner was accused of fraud and stock manipulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the same case as his business associate, Charles H. Keating, Jr. Both men settled the charges without admitting or denying guilt and agreed not to violate securities laws, but the case made some investors wary about investing with the Lindners in Chiquita.

But investors have been disappointed by the company’s sinking market value. Keith Lindner said 1992 would be the company’s first bad year after eight years of rising profits. But for some investors, the certainty of such a punishing bad year was enough to keep them from buying the stock. Mr. Kennedy, the analyst, avoided the stock after getting burned on commodities in the past. “It was a pure commodity play of a perishable item,” he said.

---

**Editor’s Note:** Adapted with permission from the New York Times, July 8, 1992.
The Buried Mirror: Reflections on Spain and the New World

Carlos Fuentes’s The Buried Mirror is the companion volume to the five-part television series by the same name that was produced by Sogetel, a commercial producer, in association with the Smithsonian Institution and the Quinto Centenario España. The series is expensive indeed to purchase (selling for $990, or for an introductory price of $798; the book—a “$35 value,”
as touted in the brochure—is received free when buying the series). Fuentes developed the ideas contained in the series and the book during speaking engagements throughout the US at $10,000 per lecture and during a $40,000 five-day stay at Arizona State University. He then crystallized these ideas and connected his vision of the Spanish-speaking world not only to the old and new empires (Spain and the US) but to a lucrative commercial enterprise. Thus The Buried Mirror is no free-standing book responding to some irresistible intellectual impulse.

Understanding Mexican history may be the exercise of laying out succeeding empires that occupied that geography: Olmecs, Mayas, Toltecs, Aztecs, Spaniards, Iturbide, Maximilian and Carlota, Porfirio, and the PRI. Perhaps that is at the root of Fuentes’s view of the Hispanic tradition within a context of imperial successions (Carthage, Greece, Rome, Goths, Moors, Isabella and Ferdinand, the Carolinian-Phillipine empire—Charles V, Phillip II—and so forth) until the US takeover in 1898 with the Spanish-American War. The focus of this history, however, is not Spain, but Spanish America, and its direction not-so-buried like the mirror.

In his chapter on the Roman conquest of Spain, Fuentes cites that the disunity of the Celt-Iberian population of the peninsula facilitated its defeat. He points out, however, that the very atomization of power, which resided with each chieftain in every village rather than in a centralized authority, made the Roman conquest of Spain an exhaustive process. Each victory signaled nothing, for each village was a fresh battle, and the villains would not frontally assault the Roman legions; instead, they would hit and run, creating the little, or guerrilla, war. According to Fuentes, the Reconquista (literally reconquest) of Spanish territory by the Christians from the Moorish occupation, which lasted some eight centuries, focused the energy of Spain into one enterprise and brought unity to the peninsula. The culmination of that process took place in 1492: Ferdinand’s victory over the Moors at Granada, Torquemada’s expulsion of the Jews, Nebrija’s first grammar of Castilian, and Columbus’s voyage in search of spices.

Thus Fuentes sees in the military strand a line between the factionized territory in ancient times and the unified Spanish main at the end of the medieval period. Is Fuentes suggesting another reconquista? Is Spanish America, the fragmented backyard of the US empire, going to find a rallying point, an arrow pointing north that will unite it? Are we to expect a Spanish-American empire in the future? Fuentes’s treatment of Latin America is contained within the context of that perspective. From the organization of the series, the book takes shape in five parts that comprise its 18 chapters. The names of each part (read: television program) are very significant: “The Virgin and the Bull,” “Conflict of the Gods,” “The Age of Gold,” “The Price of Freedom,” and “Unfinished Business.” Though in all parts Fuentes traverses the Atlantic, moving from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean and vice versa, parts II, IV, and V address Latin America more directly. Part II retraces the Amerindian story by centering Fuentes’s
attention on the pyramids, sculptures, astronomy, and mythology, culminating with the bloody encounter between Spaniards and indigenous peoples. Part III mentions the exportation of Baroque art and architecture to the New World, while part IV concentrates on the story of Latin American independence. Part V turns the attention of the reader to the north, to the story of the largest documented migration in human history: that of Hispanics (primarily Mexicans) to the US, and the challenges that this reality pose within the new empire.

By focusing on established power and by dreaming of having it, Fuentes misses some important strands in the history of the Hispanic world. For instance, the struggle between the nobility and the monarchy that took place in the Middle Ages is fundamental to the understanding of the Hispanic attitude toward power. In Spain, as in France, the monarchy triumphed (hence Charles V and Louis XIV); in England the nobility won (thus the Magna Charta). In Germany and Italy the nobility made it impossible to unify until the nineteenth century.) Another example resides in his superficial reading of Tirso de Molina’s Burlador, the play that introduced the character of Don Juan to the world stage. Fuentes merely sees the seductions of the inexperienced young man (only four women, he says), overlooking first of all who the young man was (the son of the king’s valido, the predecessor of today’s premier) and who his victims were (wives of foreign government officials seduced in their own countries over which Spain held considerable clout, cloistered nuns, country maidens). Tirso defended the divine rights of kings to govern, as long as they did so themselves. By delegating authority to a favorite courtesan, they abrogated that right, and created little monsters like Don Juan, the favorite’s son, who abused his father’s power. Some of Don Juan’s “seductions” would be called rape nowadays.

Finally, let us examine the book’s central metaphor and the choice of art for the cover. Fuentes claims he found this symbol of the buried mirror in the ancient Totonac ruins of El Tajin in Veracruz, Mexico. There the mirrors were found buried facing down in order to guide the dead in their final journey underground. Likewise, he refers to Ramón Xirau’s book L’estil soterrat (The Buried Mirror), to Don Quixote’s adversary, the Knight of the Mirrors, who attempts to cure the mad hidalgo from his folly, and to Goya’s cruel social mirror of the Caprichos. But the mirror Fuentes prefers is the emblematic one buried in the painting Las Meninas by Velasquez, which he chose as the cover for his book. In it almost everyone is looking in the direction of the viewer of the painting. The mirror behind the painter reflects the twin images of the monarchs, yet the canvas is facing the painter and not us, the viewers.

The conclusion at one level is that the painter is painting the king and the queen. For Fuentes we are the subject, but is not the subject both the monarchs and the viewer?

The Erasmian saying vox populi, vox Dei (the voice of the people is the voice of God), and the unification of the monarchy and the populace as reflected in Lope de Vega’s famous play Fuenteovejuna may be at the root of the Velasquez’s labyrinthian view of where the power resides: not in the bourgeois observer of a Prado Museum painting, but in the implied reflection of the common viewer whose gaze takes in that the self-portrait of Velasquez is more imposing than the reflective portrait of the monarchs. Similarly when in his lecture series Fuentes remarked at Stanford University that he preferred to see himself as a Greek rather than an Aztec, his hosts interpreted his statement as a rejection of their view of themselves. They envisioned themselves in a contestable position as oppressed Amerindians before the Spanish conquerors instead of adopting his uninquiring embrace of the European legacy of Greeks and Romans via the cross of the Spaniards. Fuentes had looked in his mirror and had seen an Greek. In the US the power structure still sees an Aztec.

Despite its idiosyncracies, this is a fascinating book to read: it contains information that most American audiences will find surprising, if not unbelievable. The story is richly illustrated in beautiful color plates and the usual difficulties with Spanish onomastics are easily overcome with careful explanations of names.
In recent years, homelessness, prostitution, and the harsh lives of street children have become more common features of urban life in Latin America. These problems are less restricted than previously to major population centers like Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro. The street children of Cali, Colombia, who are the focus of Lewis Aptekar’s study, Street Children of Cali (Duke University Press, 1988), are a case in point. Indeed, within the wider context of growing poverty and social dislocation, the plight of street children has become one of the most pressing issues in child welfare. The following books, periodical literature, and select newspaper articles are a testament to the pervasive nature of the phenomenon of street people in general in Latin American cities and towns.


Brasil: la caza de niños en el país del milagro económico. Ricardo Soca. Esta Semana (San José, Costa Rica), v. 4, no. 167 (March 11-17, 1992), p. 16. [Cites government estimates of 7 million abandoned children living on the streets of Brazil's major cities. These children often turn to prostitution and crime; some become the victims of death squads. According to the Movimento Nacional dos Meninos y Meninas de Rua, in 1991 some 400 street children were murdered.]


Brazil Frees Minors in Brothels. Julia Preston. The Washington Post, February 27, 1992, p. 27A, 28A. [Refers to the February 14 raid by Brazilian police on the gold-mining town of Cuiu-Cuiu in the Amazon, which led to the release of 22 minors who had been kidnapped and forced into prostitution.]


Collor Urges Protection of Brazil’s Street Children. Julia Michaels. The Christian Science Monitor, October 30, 1991, p. 6. [Discusses the initiatives taken by President Fernando Collor de Mello to enforce the child protection law passed by the Brazilian congress in 1990.]

Como e a vida na rua. Mario Simas Filho. Veja (São Paulo, Brazil), v. 24, no. 22 (May 29, 1991), p. 40-41. [Discusses the daily lives of street children in São Paulo, Brazil.]


Decadencia moral tambien reta a Fidel. Lafitte Fernandez. *La Nación* (San José, Costa Rica), February 13, 1992, p. 8A. [Discusses social conditions in today's Cuba and the growing number of Cuban prostitutes.]


Flores en la Quinta Avenida. Antonio Cano. *País* (Madrid, Spain), May 4, 1991, p. 18. [Refers to the words from a song concerning the rebirth of prostitution in Cuba.]


Meninas começam a se prostituir aos 9 anos. *Folha de São Paulo*, February 11, 1992, p. 9. [Cites data from the *Movimento Nacional dos Meninos e Meninas de Rua* about child prostitution in Belem, Brazil.]


El niño de la calle: un adulto prematuro. *Presencia* (La Paz, Bolivia), March 1, 1992, p. 3. [Discusses the measures taken by Bolivia's Dirección Nacional de Menores on behalf of street children.]

Niños problemas. Heraldo (Tegucigalpa, Honduras), September 4, 1991, p. 9. [Editorial suggesting the Honduran government implement a campaign to provide for abandoned children.]


Povos da rua: recenseamento ignorou quem não tem onde morar. Marcos E. Gomes. Estado de Sao Paulo (March 29, 1992), p. 4. [Alleges that the recent Brazilian census ignores the existence of street people.]


Suffer the Little Children. Sam Dillon. The Miami Herald Tropic Magazine (January 5, 1992), p. 8-10. [Alleges that Brazil's street children live in grimy conditions, sniff glue, and frequently resort to prostitution.]


V Kolumbii ubivali bezdomnykh (The Homeless Were Slain in Colombia). Izvestiya (Moscow), March 12, 1992, p. 4. [Discusses the killing of homeless people in Colombia and the sale of the cadavers for medical research.]


Latin America and the Caribbean from a Global Perspective
A Resource Guide for Teachers
Pedro R. Bermúdez and Bárbara C. Cruz

This ten-part resource guide is a self-contained series of lessons on Latin America and the Caribbean based on the Hanvey model of global awareness. The lessons focus upon economic development, human rights, immigration issues, the role of women, and environmental concerns.

Price: $21.00

To order, please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199. (305) 348-2894; FAX (305) 348-3593.