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Drug-War Psychology

I read with keen interest Raul Barrios Moron's article, "Bolivia: The Psychology of Drug War" (Hemisphere, Fall 1991). He indicates that at least one side of the "drug war" is implementing an important part of low-intensity conflict doctrine—psychological warfare. I am careful to say one side because I suspect that the "other side" is also using techniques that could be defined as psychological warfare tactics. Indeed, using Barrios Moron's own definition of psychological warfare, his article would constitute a psychological warfare operation, an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the readers by manipulation of the information.

Barrios Moron's manipulation of the information is obviously slanted against the Bolivian military's involvement in the drug war. This is not, however, a condemnation of the author's view. Given Bolivia's authoritarian history, a concern for the continuation of Bolivian democracy against the backdrop of increased militarization is certainly valid.

Of even greater concern, though, is the ossification of viewpoints into two distinct camps. This is precisely what the author is accusing the Bolivian military of doing, creating an either/or attitude by manipulating information. He shows his bias by his contradictory statements concerning who is responsible for the military's antidrug role, his failure to include the plethora of military literature that cautions against the exclusive use of the military in such a role, and by not following through with a suggested alternative course of action even after identifying an institutional weakness that he cites as a contributing cause of the militarization.

Barrios Moron states that the poster "conveys an unequivocal understanding of the military's self-appointed role." Self-appointed? On page 14 he cites the US government's financial support and technical backing for the Bolivian army's psychological warfare operations. On page 16 he alludes to the US role in the militarization effort: "the poster asserts the Bolivian—as opposed to US—origins of the antidrug campaign," and refers to the "strategic impositions of the US drug war." In addition, on page 15, he cites the signing of the US-Bolivian bilateral drug agreement, "under which President Jaime Paz Zamora agreed to order the Bolivian army into the war on drugs." How could Barrios Moron argue that the military is “appointing” itself when he writes in the same article that they were ordered into the "war" by their democratically elected leader, who is heavily influenced by the US.

The author also believes the poster warns "that Bolivia's current rural development program, Desarrollo Alternativo, seems to have become a mere complement for an incipient campaign of low-intensity warfare." A mere complement? Or a matter of perspective? A plethora of literature in the military/low-intensity conflict field strongly argues for alternative development programs as part of the overall strategy and strongly cautions against using the military instrument as the sole instrument to address insurgencies—the category under which drug operations are included.

This is not a "Western" doctrine. It can be seen in the writings of Mao Tse-tung (Protracted War, Guerilla War) and Che Guevara (Guerilla Warfare), even though it is not specifically labeled "psychological warfare." Some of the most prolific writers urging that social development be made the major thrust in counterinsurgency operations are members of the military.

There is far too much literature in the field to review here, but a recent article by US Army Captain Michael Ligon, a special forces-qualified military intelligence officer, addresses this professional concern. He cites US Army Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, which identifies the integrated approach of political, economic, and military operations necessary for counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations to be successful. Captain
Ligon expresses the concern that this coordinated approach, while current in the US, is not being addressed in the overseas counternarcotics strategy. “The weak link lies in not having an economic alternative to offer drug producing nations. . . . In the war on drugs, a purely military approach is not the answer” ("LIC, Counternarcotics and Small-Scale Agriculture," Special Warfare: The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Winter 1991).

Captain Ligon offers a two-pronged economic strategy to address this problem. The first is a program of the Benson Institute for Small-Scale Agriculture that allocates a certain amount of land to crops that provide a well-balanced diet while still raising the farmer’s average annual income. Captain Ligon states that this program has already proved to be successful in Ecuador. The second strategy is based on a program of the Foundation for the Promotion and Development of Microenterprise that distributes low-interest loans to market vendors in the “informal sector” of La Paz, Bolivia.

Finally, Barrios Morón states that “contributing to the military’s renewed sense of mission and indispensability has been the institutional breakdown of the police, caused by widespread drug-related corruption.” Despite his identification of the role the police are playing in the changing role of the military, no where does Barrios Morón call for the reconstitution of the police force. He is not alone in this. There appears to be a great deal of research on the military and numerous calls for a reduction in the military’s role in civil affairs, but little research and support for the institution that is the most likely to replace the vacuum left should the military return to a purely external defense role: the police.

In reality it is drug trafficking that is the threat to Bolivian national security and the consolidation of their democracy. It is drug trafficking that the people have turned to because of their extreme poverty and it is drug trafficking that has resulted in the US “strategic impositions.” It now appears that the psychological warfare operations of both sides have been a success. There is no serious talk of economic and agricultural programs, nor talks to address what institution has the strength to enforce any democratically enacted law should the military leave the internal security arena. Failure to comprehend the desperation felt by both sides in this escalating “war,” as well as the resultant lack of negotiations, are the real threats to Bolivian democracy.

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Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed are those of the author alone, and not necessarily those of the Metro-Dade Police Department.

Regarding Sovereignty

Irving Louis Horowitz’s “Shadow of a Nation” (Hemisphere, Winter/Spring 1992) provides an excellent analysis of why Panama is an exceptional and atypical Latin American nation. Indeed, in many respects, it is an artificial nation. But when he ventures into policy recommendations that follow from his characterizations, he falls into all sorts of perceptual traps. That the Reagan and Bush administrations followed the same logic makes it no less regrettable.

The Carter-Torrijos treaties at least held out the promise that the bitterness and enmity of US-Panamanian relations could be ended, that the US would withdraw gradually from Panama, and that the long-sought Panamanian control over the canal would be achieved. Although the withdrawal has been a reluctant process, and its spirit violently devastated by the US invasion of 1989, at least the timetable has been observed. Horowitz’s view of US vital interests—which he did recognize might be “real or presumed”—calls into question the whole strategic concept on which the treaties were based. And his arguments that certain Panamanian postures cannot be tolerated by the US are the thinnest kind of ration-
Letters to the Editor

alization for whatever blatant violations of Panamanian sovereignty this country might carry out. Horowitz is saying, in effect, we really didn’t mean it when we signed those treaties. Too bad, but we’re big and you’re small.

We did take Panama, as Teddy Roosevelt liked to boast. But surely that sort of power politics in US-Latin American relations has outlived its usefulness. Violent and extraordinarily destructive invasions of sovereign states, like the 1989 invasion of Panama, coupled with the forcible kidnapping of a head of state—legitimate or not—set dangerous precedents that will haunt us in the future. To hold that US law applies anywhere and that we will enforce it anywhere is an outrageous extension of sovereignty, the very sovereignty that Horowitz wants to deny to small countries like Panama.

Horowitz appears to base much of his argument on the strategic necessity of the Panama Canal—a waterway whose strategic and economic value has steadily declined—and extends the logic to the right of the US to fix the neutrality of Panama. That logic, perfectly consistent with the Reagan-Bush view of the world, is a perverse justification for an endless series of mischievous follies and police-like interventions around the continent and the globe. If Panama is indeed a “shadow of a nation,” much of the blame for that lies on the US. For most of Panama’s history as an “independent” state, it has been caught in the shadow of the US, subjected to the worst sort of subjugation, split down its middle by a zone where foreign law ruled, and corrupted by constant interference in its politics by US proconsuls. That the country became a “political shadow without state substance” should be no surprise. Even a reasonable chance at enduring political development was precluded by the relationship between the two countries.

“In a world of strategic considerations,” Horowitz argues, “those of sovereignty are at times preempted.” Indeed, they are, and therein lies the tragedy of recent US foreign policy. That policy has been characterized by a sort of politics of the bully, in which the US flexes its muscle and applies its military power only in safe situations. Grenada, Panama, Nicaragua, and Iraq are the most recent examples. Doing so does not legitimate it, and the disregard of national sovereignty in favor of a blatant hegemonic role for this country is a two-edged sword. A nation, superpower or not, that ignores long-standing principles of international law, the Rio treaty, and the UN Charter, simply cannot have it both ways. When we disregard sovereignty, we weaken the very foundation of orderly international relations. We cannot argue for world order at the same time we are ignoring world institutions like the International Court of Justice (as in the Nicaraguan case).

I fear that Horowitz’s logic is only a thinly veiled and weakly argued rationalization and apology for foreign policies that insult other states, weaken respect for international law, and do a great disservice to any hopes that the US might stand for something noble in the world. The people of Panama, and the rest of Latin America, deserve better.

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The stated purpose of Congressman Robert Toricelli’s (D-NJ) “Cuban Democracy Act of 1992,” introduced in the House of Representatives on February 5, 1992, is the promotion of “a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.” It is more likely, however, that the proposed bill will undermine the good relations that exist between the US and its democratic friends in the hemisphere and Europe while falling far short of its stated goal.

The authors of the so-called Toricelli bill admit that “events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have dramatically reduced Cuba’s external support and threaten Cuba’s food and oil supplies.” They also acknowledge that Cuba’s economy will not “survive current trends.” The problem, as they see it, is that Fidel Castro’s “intransigence” makes it more likely that “there could be a collapse of the Cuban economy, social upheaval, or widespread suffering.” They imply that their bill would prevent that unhappy outcome and allow the Cuban people a peaceful transition to democratic rule, and they propose to achieve this end with a combination of sanctions and incentives.

The chosen incentives are the least problematic as they include some policies already in effect. This is the case regarding their recommendation that telecommunications between the US and Cuba be permitted, along with payments to Cuba for the services it provides. This is also true regarding the provision for the US president to provide aid through nongovernmental organizations for individuals and groups promoting peaceful democratic change in Cuba. New policies proposed in the bill would allow donations of food and the export of medicines to Cuba. (At present, medicines can be donated, but not exported.)

The Toricelli bill would scuttle current negotiations to establish a North American free-trade area and could undermine antidrug programs in the Andean countries. The Toricelli bill, however, would change this situation by broadening the embargo. Specifically it would prohibit ships that enter Cuban ports to trade with Cuba from loading and unloading cargo in US ports within 180 days of visiting Cuba. In addition, it would deny tax deductions to US subsidiaries for otherwise deductible expenses on the portion of their income that is based on trade with Cuba.

The authors of the bill, however, consider incentives alone insufficient to guarantee a peaceful transition to democracy. Among other measures, they advocate a tightening of the sanctions already in place against Cuba. The current embargo only prohibits trade between the US and Cuba, not between third countries or even subsidiaries of US companies located in third countries and Cuba. The Toricelli bill, however, would change this situation by broadening the embargo. Specifically it would prohibit ships that enter Cuban ports to trade with Cuba from loading and unloading cargo in US ports within 180 days of visiting Cuba. In addition, it would deny tax deductions to US subsidiaries for otherwise deductible expenses on the portion of their income that is based on trade with Cuba.

The Toricelli bill would also penalize countries providing assistance to Cuba in any form, including trade subsidies and grants, by making them ineligible for US aid, inclusion in free-trade agreements and debt-reduction programs, or participation in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. This section of the bill seems to be aimed at Latin America and, if implemented, would seriously undermine current US policy toward the region. For one thing, it would scuttle current negotiations to establish a North American free-trade area, since Mexico would refuse to let Washington dictate the nature of its relationship with third countries. For another, it could undermine drug-eradication programs in the Andean countries and prevent new accords patterned on the Brady Plan from being signed with important debtor countries like Brazil and Argentina.

The sponsors of the bill seem to believe that the US has more to gain than to lose by offering Latin American countries a choice between going along with a tougher US policy toward Cuba or going their own way and foregoing US aid. They are wrong. A North American free-trade agreement,
new debt-relief plans, and US aid to Latin American countries to curtail drug production and trafficking are not examples of US charity or sacrifice. Instead they are policies that ultimately will benefit the US at least as much as Latin America. Consequently, sanctions that risk destroying such programs are irrational and self-defeating.

Of course, these tougher sanctions would come into play only if the Latin American countries chose to continue trading or providing assistance to Castro’s Cuba. In theory they could decide to change their current policies in order to avoid triggering the new sanctions. The reality, however, is more complicated. Latin America does not like to be told what to do by Washington. It is very sensitive to US threats to its sovereignty, for well-known historical reasons. The end of the Cold War has produced a welcome improvement in US-Latin American relations and the reduction of anti-US sentiments, but nothing could better guarantee a resurgence of the old distrust and animosity than an effort by Washington to force Latin America to adopt its Cuba policy.

Other areas of the world less dependent on US aid than Latin America would be affected by the proposed bill less directly. Canada, Western Europe, and Japan, however, all trade or have financial relations with Cuba and would not take kindly to a law prohibiting their vessels that docked in Cuban ports from loading or unloading cargo in US ports for 180 days.

Is it really worth it for the US to risk seriously damaging its relations with important allies in order to achieve its policy goals in Cuba? The answer might have been “yes” during the Cold War, when Cuba’s alliance with the USSR posed a serious strategic threat, but this is no longer the case. Without the USSR, Cuba reverts to what it was before Castro’s turn to both communism and the Soviet Union—a relatively poor island country with ten million people. It is therefore difficult to argue that a policy of accelerating the collapse of an already collapsing Cuban economy, or even of ensuring a peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy in Cuba, justifies undermining US relations with important friendly democracies that wish to pursue different policies toward Cuba.

Moreover, it is unclear how a policy that would accelerate the economic collapse of Cuba, while simultaneously offering possibilities for increased US-Cuban communication, would be any more successful than the current US policy toward Cuba in bringing about a peaceful transition to democracy. The assumption seems to be that increasing the pressure on Castro will leave him with no alternative but to accept an economic and political opening. Yet the opposite may be the case. Castro is now internationally isolated; his few remaining friends are almost exclusively other dictatorships. By penalizing countries that trade with or provide aid to Cuba, the US could end up causing these countries to defend and possibly help Cuba as a way of punishing the US for encroaching on their sovereign rights.

Changing the current policy by broadening the embargo would also distract world attention from what Castro is doing to his own people and focus it instead on what the US is doing to Cuba. In addition, it would undermine the broad consensus that exists within the US regarding Cuba, and US policy toward Cuba, in ways that would be reminiscent of the unhappy conflict over Central American policy that dominated the 1980s. It is difficult to see how either development would advance US interests in Cuba.

The best US policy toward Cuba is the current US policy. It has broad support within the US, is already accepted by most of our democratic friends abroad, and it is contributing to the collapse of Cuban communism. Admittedly it does not guarantee a peaceful democratic transition in Cuba, but neither does the proposed “Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.”

Editor’s Note: Testimony presented to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 25, 1992.
Stopping Airborne Drug Traffickers

by Richard J. Baum

It is time the US escalated the war against drugs by giving federal drug-interdiction agencies the authority to shoot down drug-traffic king planes. Nothing short of direct force is sufficient to deter the pilots who routinely shuttle their deadly cargo of processed cocaine between the eastern coast of South America and the Caribbean. The US government already possesses the trained personnel and equipment to allow such force to be used without serious risk to the innocent. It may not be long before Congress realizes that appropriating billions of dollars a year for drug interdiction is meaningless if US agencies do not have the authority to use force.

Surely it would be preferable to employ nonviolent means to capture, try, convict, and incarcerate airborne drug traffickers. These days, however, US law enforcement agencies never capture a trafficking pilot. Trafficker tactics, combined with the legal constraints within which US agencies work, have made trafficking pilots the untouchables of the drug trade. Only by altering its approach and encouraging our hemispheric allies to do the same can the US government combat the threat posed to its citizens.

War against Drugs

The phrase “war against drugs” is misleading. It suggests that US agencies are authorized to fight drugs as they would any grave national security threat: by employing all necessary force to protect US lives. The Persian Gulf War, rather than the current battle against drug trafficking, much more accurately reflects what US citizens envision as a true war. During the Gulf War the US armed forces developed the plans and deployed the resources necessary to fulfill the mission outlined by President George Bush and his staff. It then implemented those plans until the mission’s objectives were met.

Compared with the Iraqi army, the enemy in the struggle against drugs is an evasive target indeed. Major cocaine traffickers are not limited to national territories or to particular bases of operation. They are dispersed throughout the Andean region in countries that do not possess the capabilities to eliminate them, even if, as in the case of Colombia, they have the will to fight them aggressively. The “soldiers” of drug organizations are not easily identifiable. The most important personnel in the cartels are more likely to be “business people”—bankers and lawyers toting brief cases—than uniformed soldiers carrying machine guns.

Thus US forces cannot enter foreign nations to capture and kill the soldiers of the drug cartels. Yet, when a plane load of the cartel’s deadly product enters international airspace destined for the US, the question becomes altogether different.

The US does not have to continue its struggle with international drug traffickers in a manner that makes the struggle impossible to win. Obviously the US government cannot send its air force on a few thousand sorties to destroy the Latin American cocaine cartels. Still, there is no reason why US air-interdiction agencies cannot be instructed to adjust their rules of engagement to include the prudent application of force against airborne drug traffickers. The rules of engagement can, and should, be altered.

Every conflict has its rules of engagement. Even in the Persian Gulf War—a seemingly all-out effort—US forces were instructed to attack only what were classified as military targets in order to minimize civilian casualties. The use of force is a continuum, the level employed being dependent on political and military objectives as well as the capabilities of the enemy. In the case of fighting airborne drug traffickers, it is imperative the continuum be shifted towards greater use of force because the current level has proved to be insufficient.

The network of planes and pilots controlled by a drug cartel is perhaps its greatest vulnerability. The entire drug-cartel enterprise is heavily dependent on air transportation. In the coca-growing regions of Peru and Bolivia, traffickers fly in the critical chemicals and supplies used in coca processing and then fly out the cocaine paste or base to processing sites. Once the cocaine is fully processed, most of it is flown out of the Andes, occasionally to US territorial waters, or, more commonly, to the Caribbean, northern Guatemala, or southern Mexico for transport across the US-Mexico border. Though a significant amount of cocaine is transported on cargo ships, traffickers much prefer the speed and control provided by air transport.

Richard J. Baum is a Republican staff member of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. The views expressed in the article are his alone, and not those of the House Select Committee.
A Shoot-Down Policy

If the US government initiates a "shoot-down" policy against trafficking planes in international airspace, then other governments will likely take similar action within their own borders. Strategically key governments, such as those of Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, have already shown interest in, as well as limited capability of, forcing down or shooting down trafficking aircraft. With the US government leading by example while providing technical and intelligence assistance to other governments and air-interdiction agencies, drug traffickers would have to be aware of the potential for interception. Another safety measure, it could be required that the drugs be recovered and tested by US personnel positioned on land or sea, who would quickly communicate the results to the US plane. Finally, continual efforts to communicate with the trafficking plane, in order to convince the pilot to land, would also have to be required. Trafficking pilots who wanted to avoid being shot down would turn themselves in and face charges in the US. Such pilots would serve as excellent sources for US intelligence.

Implementing such safeguards, especially that of testing the suspected cargo, would be time consuming and on the ground, and targets would be chosen only if intelligence reports had suggested when and where the drugs were to be dropped. Perhaps US antidrug forces would not shoot down a plane every day, but even a handful of "examples" would serve as a potent deterrent. Moreover, costs to traffickers would rise as pilots demanded escalating fees. If enough planes were shot down, it could even become difficult for traffickers to find pilots with the appropriate training and lack of regard for personal safety to transport their drugs. And if the Andean and Mexican governments were to join such efforts, the balance of power in the hemisphere would substantially tip towards US efforts, aimed at airborne smugglers would be heard in every trafficker that had truly

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Surely it would be preferable to employ nonviolent measures, try, convict, and imprison drug-trafficking pilots. But for days, however, US law enforcement agencies never capture a single trafficker or even a trafficking pilot. Trafficker tactics, combined with the legal constraints within which US agencies have made trafficking pilots untouchables of the drug war. Only by altering its approach, encouraging our hemisphere to do the same can the US government combat the threat to its citizens.

War against Drugs

The phrase "war against drugs" is misleading. It suggests that the US is at war in the traditional sense, with soldiers, tanks, and missiles. The war against drugs is not a military conflict. It is a battle against a shadowy enemy, drug traffickers, who operate in the shadows of the drug trade.

Richard J. Baum is a Representative of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. The views expressed in the article are his own, and not those of the Committee.

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Of course, the most important drawback of using force against airborne drug traffickers is the chance of making a mistake—of shooting down and possibly killing individuals who are not involved in drug trade. Though a degree of risk is inevitable, it must be remembered that such risk is always involved in serious operations of law enforcement and national security. Most certainly the risk must be minimized. Hence, if US agencies do receive shoot-down authority, they must be allowed to operate only within narrow confines that minimize the use of force to the most appropriate circumstances.

Sorting the good guys from the bad guys can be difficult for air-interdiction agencies because drug traffickers are able to mix in with hundreds of other small aircraft on legitimate flights. Fortunately traffickers give themselves away when they drop drugs from the hold of their planes, since they generally do not land during delivery operations. Considering US surveillance and intelligence capabilities, it would not be difficult to require that, prior to the use of force, the drug drop be witnessed by an airborne law-enforcement officer. As another safety measure, it could be required that the drugs be recovered and tested by US personnel positioned on land or sea, who would quickly communicate the results to the US plane. Finally, continual efforts to communicate with the trafficking plane, in order to convince the pilot to land, would also have to be required. Trafficking pilots who wanted to avoid being shot down would turn themselves in and face charges in the US. Such pilots would serve as excellent sources for US intelligence.

Implementing such safeguards, especially that of testing the suspected cargo, would be time consuming. Nonetheless, if shoot-down authority were granted, the US government would alter its interdiction operations. Instead of dispersing resources in an effort to patrol an entire area where traffickers might be, it would focus on single trafficking planes. Multiple assets would be deployed in the air and on the ground, and targets would be chosen only if intelligence reports had suggested when and where the drugs were to be dropped.

Perhaps US antidrug forces would not shoot down a plane every day, but even a handful of "examples" would serve as a potent deterrent. Moreover, costs to traffickers would rise as pilots demanded escalating fees. If enough planes were shot down, it could even become difficult for traffickers to find pilots with the appropriate training and lack of regard for personal safety to transport their drugs. And if the Andean and Mexican governments were to join such an effort, the balance of power in the drug war would substantially shift. The shots aimed at airborne drug traffickers would be heard around the world, sending the message to every trafficker that the war against drugs had truly commenced. ■
Costa Rica is widely regarded as the success story of the Caribbean Basin, rebounding as it did from economic crisis in the early 1980s to its current position as a regional leader in export-led growth strategies. The country fought its way back from rock-bottom statistics in 1982: a debt-service ratio of more than 50%, nearly 100% inflation, and a 40% drop in real wages, not to mention a three-year record of sinking per capita GDP. To make matters worse, Costa Rica defaulted on its foreign debt in 1981—months before Mexico did so—and eventually accumulated one of the world’s highest per capita external debts. For the first time since 1949, there was serious concern about the possibility of social unrest threatening the regime.

Changes in the world economy and regional geopolitics had abruptly closed off some development options and presented others. The old model—based on import substitution and externally financed state investment—ran out of steam. In this setting the Costa Rican government fell under intense domestic and foreign pressure to adopt a new strategy, based on deregulating the economy and reorienting production toward markets outside of Central America. This new strategy promised Costa Rica the benefits of new opportunities—the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the globalization of production, and plenty of foreign aid to smooth the transition.

In spite of Costa Rica’s short-term success, several problems call into question the sustainability of its nontraditional export strategy. Perhaps the most serious and immediate problem is the sheer cost of promoting nontraditional exports. The expense exacts a heavy toll on both the fiscal budget and the balance of trade. The most pressing issue involves the main fiscal incentive to nontraditional exporters: an export-tax credit known as the Certificado de Abono Tributario (CAT). CATs were originally awarded to firms exporting nontraditional commodities regardless of the company’s nationality, size, geographic location, or product line, with the provision that the exports must contain a minimum of 35% national value-added. The tax-credit certificate equals up to 20% of the FOB value of a firm’s nontraditional exports and is negotiable on the Costa Rican stock exchange.

In the late 1980s the CAT program came under fire from both within the administration of Oscar Arias and from the World Bank for draining the public-sector budget. CAT expenditures were 19 times greater in 1989 than they were in 1984, and by 1990 they were expected to account for 8% of the central government’s budget. Given substantial fiscal deficits, documented cases of corruption in the CAT system, and evidence that a few large companies benefited disproportionately from the program, CATs are being gradually reduced. Investors warn, however, that reducing CATs makes exporting less attractive, especially for domestic firms, and they predict a
consequent serious downturn in the growth of nontraditional exports.

Another problem linked to rising exports is that of rising imports. Many of Costa Rica's nontraditional exports are light manufactures—apparel being the prime example—that are assembled and exported by foreign firms enjoying the tax-free entry of input materials. By subsidizing these imports to the previously mentioned extent, the Costa Rican government is promoting budget deficits by not taking advantage of this potential source of tax revenue. Moreover, it is perpetuating some of the basic problems that neoliberals have stressed in their critiques of the nation's long-standing policy of import-substitution development: local dependence on foreign supplies, trade deficits, and inflation. In the case of nontraditional export firms, dependence on foreign supplies ranges from office supplies to pre-cut fabric and machinery.

Aside from the debate about the economic costs of export promotion, considerable political controversy surrounds the questions of who should direct export-promotion efforts and how the new strategy should be implanted into the country's institutional structure. Several Costa Rican officials feel that external involvement in nontraditional export promotion has cost the country its sovereignty. For example, in 1988 an advisor to the Arias government accused the US of setting up a "parallel state" in Costa Rica consisting of several nongovernment agencies funded by the US Agency for International Development (AID). These AID-funded, nongovernment agencies perform essentially the same functions as those performed by Costa Rican government agencies.

For instance, AID founded the Coalition Costarricense de Iniciativas para el Desarrollo (CINDE) in 1982 to pursue the same objectives as the Costa Rican government's Centro de Promoción de Exportaciones e Inversiones (CENPRO). After years of turf battles, the better-financed CINDE now carries out most of the functions that were performed by CENPRO. Unlike CENPRO, however, CINDE is neither part of the Costa Rican government nor accountable to the Costa Rican public. It appears that CINDE has been more successful in attracting foreign export-oriented investment to Costa Rica than CENPRO ever was. Given the superiority of its AID-backed funding, technical expertise, and determination, CINDE has embarrassed CENPRO's defenders. But CINDE's success is based on macroeconomic policies, principally currency devaluation and market deregulation, that have been orchestrated by the US government, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. In the context of intensifying worldwide competition for, and spatial relocation of, nontraditional export firms—including the formation of regional trade blocs—does Costa Rica's current success in attracting such investment from abroad promise to foster local development?

Although agriculture and seafood are steady contributors to nontraditional exports, the most dramatic growth has occurred in light manufacturing and, more recently, tourism, the focal points of CINDE's efforts. Most of the employment created by these industries is low wage and low skill. According to proponents, however, such employment benefits Costa Rica because it increases family income by absorbing "supplementary" earners—primarily women—in the case of the urban-based garment industry, or provides jobs to regional pockets of high unemployment, as tourism does.

Whatever the role of such employment may be in local labor markets and household economies, there remains a larger, unanswered question: toward what pattern of national development do these jobs contribute? Thus, will Costa Rica progress from offering itself as a light-assembly export platform to building relatively sophisticated, vertically integrated domestic industries? Or will it continue to compete with other less-developed countries for foreign investors seeking low-cost production sites with privileged access to
the US market? The specter of a possible North American free-trade agreement, which could undercut Costa Rica’s current attractiveness to foreign investors, makes the export-platform option increasingly risky.

Compared with tourism and light manufacturing, nontraditional agricultural exports generally contribute more value-added to the local economy. The leading firms in the nontraditional agricultural sector, however, are foreign, not domestic. Superior access to market information, transportation, technological expertise, and credit favor relatively large foreign firms. Since only a small portion of production in the leading nontraditional agricultural export industries is purchased from national growers, small-farmer participation in the new export promotion scheme is quite limited. Where it does exist, small farmers are plagued by problems such as plant diseases, poor technical assistance, lack of knowledge of market conditions, inadequate credit, and a weak bargaining position with exporters.

Large and small growers make intensive use of pesticides in cultivating the new export crops because achieving the flawless appearance crucial to their successful marketing creates extra headaches in tropical climates. Yet the excessive use of pesticides threatens the sustainability of export promotion in two ways. First, evidence indicates that large amounts of pesticide residue left on produce jeopardize entry into the US, the principal market for nontraditional agricultural products. To make matters worse, escalating cycles of increasing pest resistance and stepped-up pesticide application may reach the point in the near future where production must be abandoned altogether. The fact that the Dominican Republic reached this point with several nontraditional crops by the late 1980s should serve as a warning for Central America.

Second, fragmentary evidence indicates frightening consequences for human populations and the natural environment. Growers from Costa Rica and other Central American countries report symptoms of pesticide illness as well as bird and fish kills stemming from contaminated fresh water sources. They also report the destruction of forest areas as a result of the opening of new export-production sites. There is no telling what the longer-term impact may be on animal populations, soil, and ground water.

**Challenges**

A few years of spectacular export figures are not worth the long-
range degradation of Costa Rica’s natural resources. With a decade of experience, critics and proponents alike recognize the pitfalls of the current scheme of nontraditional export promotion. The time is ripe to push the new export model toward more equitable and sustainable development.

Costa Rica may find greater stability by intensifying the current movement toward trade diversification, in terms of both finding new markets for nontraditional exports and renewing efforts to establish regional trade agreements. Export incentives should be reduced and used selectively to target the types of industries and jobs that offer Costa Rica higher wages, more stable employment, and technological transfers. Lastly, environmental protection is crucial not only if high-value agricultural products are to become permanent export commodities, but also for the health of growers and the conservation of flora and fauna.

Such policy reform requires two things: increased government administrative capacity and a political coalition demanding and supporting such changes. Improved managerial capacity is compatible with a smaller but more efficient state. In an age of austerity, the problem will be locating the resources to train and pay more sophisticated state administrators. The second requirement is that political parties, above all, the Partido Liberación Nacional, pull away from their current preoccupation with the demands of exporters, the financial sector, and the international banking and aid community to incorporate peasants and the urban working and middle classes into political coalitions unified by a broad vision of sustainable development. Any support for such coalitions faces the formidable obstacles posed by the fragility of Costa Rica’s economic situation and its need for major injections of capital from foreign investors and international financial institutions.

John D. French, Editor

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ome of the world’s biggest companies are waging a little-publicized, high stakes war over the patent rights to plants, animals, and other life forms. According to the experts, the contest could ultimately yield billions of dollars in royalties for patent holders from the sale of new medicines, crop varieties, or even breeds of animals developed from the initial patents. The companies, and their huge product development budgets, are pitted against developing nations that claim that the corporations are stealing their natural resources to fuel the development process.

Backed by their governments, multinationals like Monsanto are pressing their case in Geneva, where the 103 signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have been struggling for more than five years to write new rules for world trade in goods and services. According to Monsanto’s William Duffey—general patent counsel for the St. Louis-based chemical giant—patents are “needed to give incentives to researchers to take risks . . ., to try and develop pharmaceuticals and agro-chemicals. If there’s no patent protection for discovery, companies like ours are not going to invest that kind of money for new medicines and new agro-chemicals.”

Confronting them, however, are the developing nations that accuse the multinationals of stealing Third World plants and crop varieties along with the knowledge required to use them. As if that were not enough, these nations contend, the multinationals later return the supposedly pilfered goods to the developing countries—previously patented and now sporting a huge price tag. Walter Reid, senior associate at the World Resources Institute in Washington, DC, summed up the conflict this way: “The developing countries say the North is patenting genes developed by farmers in the South . . ., and then the patented crop varieties are being sold back to the

Developing nations accuse the multinationals of stealing Third World plants and crop varieties along with the knowledge required to use them.

Paula L. Green is a reporter covering international trade and business for the Journal of Commerce.

A perfect illustration of Third World fears is the case of US patent No. 559. This patent gives its holder all rights to a rare variety of flower found in the distant rain forests of Guatemala. A US citizen obtained the patent in the 1940s after stumbling across the unique strain while vacationing there. According to Mooney, “He selected the best of the seeds, destroyed the rest and took out a patent on the variety,” which is now known as “Black Prince.”

The current Uruguay Round of GATT talks is the first to address the protection of intellectual property. Such property includes patents and trademarks as well as copyrights on everything from computer software to films to video recorders. With the general negotiations bogged down in a bitter controversy over agricultural subsidies, no one interviewed for this report was willing to predict the final result of the associated Geneva talks on the protection of intellectual property. “The outcome of the talks depends on what happens on other areas of negotiations,” said Abdulgawi Yusuf, legal policy director for the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). “The issue of patents will be the last issue to be decided. It requires political decisions.”

The rifts at the GATT negotiating table extend beyond the traditional North-South divisions. While the US and Japan advocate patenting all life forms, up to but not including humans, the EC takes a more pragmatic view. Karl Falkenberg, a counselor in the EC delegation to GATT, said the community has no stated negotiating position on the issue but will “wait to see
what's in it for us." Mooney observed that the EC delegation has resisted the patenting of any life forms above the level of a plant.

Some Western corporations insist that "inventions" based on life forms such as microorganisms need patent protection because their reproduction is tougher to control. London-based Imperial Chemical Industries PLC, through its ICI seed division, takes that position. According to Tim Roberts, who is intellectual property manager for ICI, an industrial invention must be designed and built before it can be reproduced, but a living organism can reproduce itself once it is released. He stressed that companies need protection for costly biotechnological developments that could improve the environment—developments like microorganisms that can clean up hazardous wastes or a new type of potato plant that produces twice the normal yield. As Roberts put it, "Unless there's protection for commercial use, the original investment would never be recovered." He concluded by stating that the UK parent company—which he says is not involved in animal research—favors the patenting of life forms up to the level of plants.

Many nations, however, want to exclude the patenting of life forms from the negotiations simply because the information is so new. "The implications of the technological advances are too uncertain. We want to see how the new biotechnology may evolve," said Antonio Trombetta, Argentina's negotiator on intellectual property rights. "It's too early a stage to have an international agreement. It would be difficult to change."

Cultural Survival, a human-rights organization for indigenous people, does not believe international trade talks and treaties are the best ways to preserve either the life forms or the knowledge of developing nations and their native communities. "My attention is on getting the company to do it right," said Jason Clay, director of research for Cultural Survival, which is based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. "I'm suspicious of conventions and treaties."

According to Abdulgawi Yusuf of the aforementioned UNCTAD, developing nations should be working to protect intellectual property rights to their plants, animals, and genetic resources before the substances are taken out of the countries by Western companies and government agencies. "Many times, one hand doesn't know what the other is doing. The awareness has not really reached the policymaking stage. The only thing (developing nations) can do for now is resist as much as they can the patenting of genetic resources." ■

Editor's Note: Adapted with permission from the Journal of Commerce (December 16, 1991).
With more than 3.5 million albums sold and six hit singles since its 1990 release, *Bachata Rosa*, by the Dominican Republic's Juan Luis Guerra and 4.40, is the most commercially successful recording in the recent history of Latin American music. In 1992, when major US rock performers had to cancel dates or reduce prices because of faltering ticket sales, 4.40 commanded $35 a ticket in solidly booked appearances throughout their US tour. Given that the venues were in the US, such success was a first for a Latin American band, but not the last for 4.40. After skyrocketing onto the *Billboard* charts, their popularity was noted by the likes of the *New York Times*, *Rolling Stone*, the *Village Voice*, and even the *Wall Street Journal*, but despite the volume of acclaim, very little attention has been paid to the history and nature of the *bachata* genre that inspired several of the songs in *Bachata Rosa*.

**Origins**

The *Diccionario de la Lengua Española* defines "*bachata*" as a spontaneous and informal backyard get-together. In rural areas of the Dominican Republic, *bachatas* include plenty of food and drink and are enlivened by either guitar or accordion-based music, but it was not until the 1970s that the term *bachata* came to include guitar-based music. Only then did it join the ranks of Dominican and other Hispanic-Caribbean genres such as *bolero*, *son*, *guaracha*, *guajira*, *corrido*, and *ranchera*.

While guitar-based ensembles had long been the preferred music in the Dominican Republic's rural areas, beginning in the 1930s the accordion-based *merengue* was singled out and favored by the dictator Rafael Trujillo, who in the 1940s and 1950s personally began to encourage—by patronizing top-notch *orquestas* (or big bands) — new, sophisticated versions of the rural *merengue* that were meant for the urban salon. Compared to these large cosmopolitan ensembles, rural guitar trios appeared rustic and provincial. Thus, while guitar-based music continued to be played by folk musicians at *bachatas* and other social gatherings, few if any recording opportunities were available to these self-taught rural musicians.

The post-Trujillo era witnessed profound demographic and social changes. When Trujillo died in 1961, 70% of the Dominican Republic's 3 million people lived in rural areas. With the fall of the dictatorship, rural migrants began to pour into the capital city of Santo Domingo, and they took their preference for guitar-based music with them. Though Santo Domingo was soon ringed by shantytowns filled with the unemployed and desperately poor, guitar-based music—so closely associated with the rural and urban poor—was unable to challenge *merengue*'s hegemony. Nevertheless, opportunities did open up for guitar music, if only on a small scale. Small, independent recording studios and producers provided new opportunities for poor and inexperienced Dominican musicians to record, while, at the same time, small local...
radio stations catered to a widening variety of tastes. Rural musicians who were unable to record or promote their music during the Trujillo era began to finance their own records and to seek radio play wherever they could find it. The first to do so were José Manuel Calderón, Luis Segura, and Oscar Olmos. Their ensembles, whose instrumentation has changed little to this day, consisted of two guitars, bongos, and maracas.

These early pressings were poorly recorded, produced, and manufactured. Still, they found immediate acceptance in the countryside and urban shantytowns, where people with rural origins continued to prefer guitar-based music. Most of the music produced was of the bolero genre, although other guitar-based genres were recorded as well. The romantic song texts, composed by people with little if any formal education, were usually written in a rather rustic and unadorned style, little resembling the florid Cuban boleros that they were imitating.

The decade of the 1960s, then, was the formative period for the bachata, when its distinctive features were established: the basic guitar-centered ensemble with its unpolished singing style, colloquial language and imagery, and a preoccupation with relationships between men and women. This guitar-based music—so clearly grounded in the customs and problems of the poor—became the object of increasing criticism and disparagement. Bachata was unfavorably compared with salsa, orquesta merengue, and balada, as well as US rock, which together dominated the mainstream Dominican music scene.

During the 1970s, as the Dominican Republic’s economic and social fortunes seemed to be on the rise, the middle and upper classes regarded the rustic guitar-based music as incompatible with the country’s newly acquired modern self-image. For the first time the music was labeled “bachata,” a word that acquired the negative connotation of rural backwardness and vulgarity. Bachata was shunned by major radio stations in urban areas, and record stores in urban, middle-class areas refused to sell it.

While bachata was denied access to promotion and distribution through the channels available to other forms of popular music, its popularity among the rural and urban poor expanded throughout the 1970s. Sold in markets and bus stops all over the country, the 45-rpm disks filled the shelves in makeshift street stalls owned and operated by people belonging to the same low socioeconomic class as bachata musicians and their audience. Nonetheless, the major means of dissemination was, and still is, the colmado, or neighborhood store, whose owners maintained their record collections up-to-date in order to please the customers and to encourage them to linger, socialize, and, of course, buy more beverages. Moreover, while neighborhood barras, or bars, were sometimes associated with prostitution, they were the only public spaces available to residents of poor neighborhoods for music, dancing, and drinking. The music most often played at barras and colmados was bachata, which, unlike the other popular genres, was seldom if ever heard on major radio or television stations.

Raw Bachata

By 1980 bachata reflected the nation’s worsening economic condition. Extended romantic courtship and a lifetime of marriage were no longer valid ideals in these urban shantytowns, where unions tended to be short-lived and dictated by money. The lyrics of bachata correspondingly became more sexually explicit, reflecting the crude shantytown realities of barroom brawls, lack of money to provide for a stable relationship, and transient affairs. Where boleros had expressed exalted feelings of eternal love, bachata lyrics more frequently expressed simply the desire for immediate sexual gratification. Meanwhile, tourists, visiting Dominican expatriates, and highly sophisticated Dominican TV with its seven color stations and US satellite broadcasts, flaunted a lifestyle that was unattainable to the poor.

In the 1980s a variant of the sexually explicit song, the doble sentido (double meaning), was popularized by a younger generation of singers such as Tony Santos, Julio Angel, “El Solterito del Sur,” and Blas Duran. In these songs, objects of daily life—vehicles, food, utensils—became metaphors for body parts and functions. The verbal play, relying on the contrast between mundane objects and explicit sexuality, was considered extremely humorous by the bachata audience; it was shocking, however, to mainstream Dominican society and became the target of severe criticism. The term “bachata,” which in the previous decade simply implied rural backwardness and ignorance,

“I have a little car that’s a delight
If I’m with a woman it goes faster
I keep my car in the carport
But I take it out for my female neighbor
Come here, neighbor, and don’t be afraid
I’m going to take the car out to give you a ride”

—Excerpted from “El Carrito” by Tony Santos (1985)
came to suggest another set of socially unacceptable features that were attributed to the “underclass,” including illicit sex, violence, and heavy drinking.

To their credit, the musicians who still played the more romantic variety of bachata resisted these disparaging associations. Around 1982 they began publicizing performances as fiestas de amargue (bitterness). The music became música de amargue, a reference to the feeling of nostalgia and suffering that characterized their music. This was a deliberate attempt to confer social prestige upon the musician and the audience by distinguishing the merely embittered songs from the “vulgar” ones, thereby associating the more romantic variety with social respectability. For example, one newspaper reporter asserted, “Amargue denotes sorrow and sadness, bachata carousing and vulgarity” (Hoy, August 25, 1983).

It is hard to say whether it was the new name, the appeal of the sexually explicit lyrics, or other socioeconomic factors that were responsible for a brief surge of widespread interest in bachata, but for a short period it became fashionable listening for the Dominican middle classes. The better known performers such as Luis Segura began playing in elegant hotels and nightclubs for standing-room-only crowds. This intrusion into mainstream society did not occur, however, without resistance and controversy. A concert held in 1983 at the national university in Santo Domingo was severely criticized by the university’s dean as something exotic and palatable for the middle-class audiences that scorned it, these musicians might be criticized for exploiting the bachata. Still, in Guerra’s case at least, he has drawn upon the genre in much the same way he has drawn upon other Dominican folk genres in the past—with respect and integrity. It is also significant that he chose the word “bachata” instead of the more polite term “amargue,” thereby expressing solidarity with the music in its more socially unacceptable form.

Guerra’s admirers should bear in mind, however, that his bachatas—composed by a sophisticated and economically comfortable urban intellectual—are interpretations of a local genre firmly rooted in the social realities. Ideally his commercial windfall will trickle down to bachata musicians—who themselves have never enjoyed even a glimmer of his success—in the form of a permanent cultural legitimacy within the Dominican Republic. Even better, perhaps Dominicans and other fans of Latin American music will seek out recordings by street-level bachateros so that they can hear and support bachata as it was, and is, made—by people on the margins of society.

The world reflected in bachata was neither an aspiration nor a fantasy, but a reality considered vulgar and uncouth by mainstream society. Bachateros adopted the stereotype and flaunted it with total disregard for the disapproval of mainstream Dominican society; the very directness of bachata songs posed a deliberate challenge to the values of a society that consistently excluded bachata’s practitioners and audience.

**Bachateros adopted the stereotype and flaunted it with total disregard for the disapproval of mainstream Dominican society.**

**Rosy Bachata**

Enter Juan Luis Guerra and 4.40. Their extraordinary success has put the previously despised bachata on the international music map. How close are the recording’s key songs to the grassroots bachatas upon which they are based? First, there is a fundamental difference between the stark simplicity of street bachata and Guerra’s elegant, sophisticated version. The latter can be categorized as bachatas only because they are rendered with the typical bachata instrumentation of guitar, maracas, and bongos, and are sung in an emotional, plaintive manner. In the case of “Barbujas de amor,” the similarity extends to the use of sexual double meaning in the lyrics. The crude shantytown realities—so clearly reflected in the grassroots bachata—are absent.

Guerra is not alone, however, in drawing upon bachata for artistic inspiration. In fact, the “dressed up” bachatas that have emerged in the wake of Guerra’s success are referred to in the Dominican Republic as tecnobachatas. Because they have transformed it into something exotic and palatable for the middle-class audiences that scorned it, these musicians might be criticized for exploiting the bachata. Still, in Guerra’s case at least, he has drawn upon the genre in much the same way he has drawn upon other Dominican folk genres in the past—with respect and integrity. It is also significant that he chose the word “bachata” instead of the more polite term “amargue,” thereby expressing solidarity with the music in its more socially unacceptable form.

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ew political leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean return to office a second time, and fewer still by reelection after a previous defeat. One of the notable exceptions was Jamaica's Michael Manley and his People's National Party (PNP). In February 1989—more than eight years after Prime Minister Manley and the PNP were soundly rejected by voters for failing to build democratic socialism in Jamaica—Manley was again in office as prime minister.

The Michael Manley of 1989 was, to all appearances, a very different figure from the radical firebrand of a few years earlier. The international media quickly dubbed him the "new" Manley. They noted that he now wore business suits rather than the open-necked karebas fashionable in Jamaican governmental circles in the 1970s, that he spoke warmly about future close relations with the US than as opposed to Cuba, and that he appeared to have eschewed the language of socialism for that of political moderation and free-market economics.

But was there really a "new" Manley? It is an appropriate time to ask this question, for at the end of March 1992, Manley resigned as prime minister and left Jamaican politics after 40 years of active and always controversial involvement. Since his new government had been in office for more than three years at that point, we can indeed evaluate the merits of the "new Manley" thesis. The key issue is not so much Manley’s altered political style—which may simply have reflected tactical judgments—or even his core ideological beliefs (which may have changed less than has been generally assumed), but rather his actual management of the Jamaican political economy from February 1989 onward. Here, at least, there is unequivocal evidence of a new Manley at work. His new approach did not manifest itself immediately on reelection, but developed haltingly, with Manley and his government perhaps having been rather more dragged along by events than confidently charting a new course.

Manley’s new approach developed haltingly, with Manley perhaps having been rather more dragged along by events than confidently charting a new course.

The Evolution

Manley’s 1989 government evolved through four stages. The first was one of “muddling through” on the basis of a structural adjustment program inherited from the outgoing Edward Seaga administration. Completely reversing the psychology of the 1970s, when the politics of change was his dominant ethic, Manley announced that he would not “agree to changing anything in the management of the economy” unless he was “absolutely sure that change is going to help and make things better in some way.”

With the public-sector deficit inflated by the costs of rebuilding after Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 and the burst of spending with which Seaga had tried to win the election, the Manley government had virtually no scope to introduce its mildly social-democratic program. Though it reached agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a $66 million standby program, the government was unable to hold the economy to the IMF targets, leading the administration to formally devalue the currency in October 1989. The failure to meet IMF targets also led to the suspension of the standby agreement and the inauguration of the second stage of the new Manley administration.

While a new deal with the IMF was quickly made, it almost immediately ran into trouble. Manley publicly argued that the breaches that occurred were technical, caused by the delay of bilateral donors making promised payments. The IMF, on the other hand, insisted that the Jamaican government had not gone far enough towards retrenchment and that a further devaluation was needed.

Yet, tension did not reach the heights of the Manley-IMF conflict of the late 1970s, and the political
mood in the country remained quiet. The PNP did reasonably well in local elections in March 1990 and the announcement of substantial fuel price rises in April of that year did not generate disturbances. Manley himself was out of the country for much of the summer of 1990, undergoing major surgery, with P. J. Patterson serving as acting prime minister.

Indeed, it fell to Patterson to launch the change of direction that initiated the next, and perhaps most important, stage in the PNP government management of the economy. In a surprise move in September 1990, the government floated the Jamaican dollar. Although the administration maintained foreign-exchange controls, the new policy allowed commercial banks to buy and sell hard currency, with an average weighted rate being calculated from those rates operating in the commercial sector. Petroleum and diesel prices, meanwhile, were also deregulated.

Patterson and later Manley announced that these were not measures of expediency, but rather the latest in a long line of government maneuvers by which Manley turned his back on the protected and regulated Jamaican economy of the past and embraced the new world of deregulation and liberalization. As he declared, "now that we are embarked on the course, I, for one, am excited by the challenge."

Deregulation was part of Jamaica's continuing dialogue with the IMF. The previous agreement was in effect reinstated and later replaced with a new standby deal. Nevertheless, the Manley government remained hard-pressed by foreign-exchange shortages and in its 1991 budget again had to increase taxes and cut subsidies, this time to rise steeply. In light of these difficulties, Manley's government deepened its commitment to deregulation by lifting all foreign-exchange controls. Manley told Jamaicans this action was necessary to kill off the black market in foreign exchange, implying that the currency had to be left to find its true market value. As the value of Jamaica's currency relative to the US dollar fell by 36% in September- November 1991, prices continued to rise steeply. In light of these difficulties, Manley's government pursed a new standby deal. Nevertheless, the Manley government remained hard-pressed by foreign-exchange shortages and in its 1991 budget again had to increase taxes and cut subsidies, this time to rise steeply. In light of these difficulties, Manley's government deepened its commitment to deregulation by lifting all foreign-exchange controls. Manley told Jamaicans this action was necessary to kill off the black market in foreign exchange, implying that the currency had to be left to find its true market value. As the value of Jamaica's currency relative to the US dollar fell by 36% in September-November 1991, prices continued to rise steeply. In light of these difficulties, Manley's government fully committing his government to deregulation. As a consequence, he left his administration little time for the benefits of neoliberal policy to emerge.

After Manley

This was the political context of Manley's March 1992 resignation. Given his ill health, speculation had long existed that his retirement from politics was imminent, with Patterson being the obvious successor. Nonetheless, in a shocking move at the end of 1991, Patterson left the government following a heated debate over cabinet procedure. He was under pressure because of his role in a scandal involving the waiver of duties to the local Shell Company. Additionally he wanted to be free to campaign for the post to be vacated by Prime Minister Manley. Though he was replaced as minister of finance, it was significant that he retained his position as PNP's chairman.

Although Patterson was regarded as less popular among party activists than Portia Simpson, the only member of the cabinet to challenge him for the leadership after Manley resigned, Patterson in fact won the electoral contest by a large margin. Thus he has taken over responsibility for the government's new neoliberal economic strategy at a time when there is already less than two years to go before the latest moment—February 1994—when the next election can be called.

There is actually little that Patterson can do to influence the election's results. In effect, what the "new" Manley government did was to ask the Jamaican people to suffer severely in order to create the basis for an export platform capable of at last propelling the economy into self-sustaining growth. Local and foreign businesses have greater incentives to invest in Jamaica today than ever before. The success or failure of the new strategy now depends on how they respond.
Article 27—Watch Out

In one of his most far-reaching reforms to date, Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari amended Article 27 of the constitution, thereby giving communal farmers the right to mortgage, rent, or sell their land. Reports indicate that the new law could affect half the acreage in the country and as much as 30% of the population. Despite the reported surge in interest on the part of foreign investors in this newly available real estate, some analysts worry that much of the rural population will be forced off the land. The consequences of the revised Article 27 could be further complicated by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Mexican negotiators have been reluctant to open the country to unlimited corn and bean imports. The combination of rural reforms coupled with a gradual opening of this formerly protected market could result in the large-scale relocation of rural workers, driving them into urban areas on both sides of the US-Mexican border.

Exceptions to the US Embargo of Haiti

Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.—a Miami-based firm specializing in international trade law—pulls no punches in its April 15, 1992, Trade and Industry Report newsletter. In an article on exceptions to the US trade embargo against Haiti, the firm notes that the US Department of Treasury—specifically its Office of Foreign Assets Control (FAC)—issued General License No. 8 on February 5, 1992. The General License allows, on a case-by-case basis, specific licenses to be issued authorizing certain US-Haiti exports and imports. According to the newsletter, the “FAC, generally a sleepy office hidden in the annex Treasury Department building, has been overwhelmed with applications for specific licenses.”

Worth Seeing

The American Federation of Arts has organized an international tour of short films from Latin America. Directed by Julianne Burton of the University of California at Santa Cruz, the exhibition presents 36 works from 12 countries and encompasses fictional subjects, documentaries, and animations. The offerings have been organized into six programs: “The Land,” “People at Work,” “Change and Conflict,” “Masculine/Feminine,” “Heroes and Healers,” and “Creativity and Expression.” The fall 1992 tour will include Miami (August 16-September 20), Los Angeles (September 28-November 9), Columbia, Missouri (October 2-November 6), Madrid (November 21-28), and Newport Beach, California (December 18-February 14, 1993).

No Lo Contendere

A Hudson Institute briefing paper on opportunities in Latin America provides a predictable outline of the region’s changing business environment. On Cuba, the document predicts some instability once Castro falls in the 1990s. According to the analysis, “The role of the exile community will be a difficult factor if exile groups seek political power, as many apparently will, and Cubans on the island regard them as foreigners. Regime propaganda has portrayed the exiles as millionaires planning to buy the island and recreate a Batista-style society, and only time will tell how deeply those arguments have sunk in.” The author? None other than former Reagan administration assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, Elliott Abrams.

At Least He’s Consistent

Unfortunately for Guatemala, Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo’s presidency (1985-90) was marked by corruption and mismanagement. Cerezo himself disappointed many with his desultory personal and political style. It was no surprise then, that despite ample prior notice, the former president expressed his regrets at being unable to attend this year’s conference observing the fifth anniversary of the Esquipulas II Peace Accords. Instead, Cerezo sent a thoughtful statement on the historic peace treaty in a lengthy telefax to conference officials. The recipients were startled, not by the document itself, but by the point of origin stamped at the top of each page: Hotel Fantasy Island. The hotel is located in the Bay Islands of the Caribbean, where Cerezo was enjoying a cruise in his yacht.

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
Fools and Follies

Glenn Garvin, who was the Washington Times' reporter in Nicaragua in 1983-89, has published Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA & the Contras (New York: Brassey's, 1992). The pithy forward to the long-awaited book sets the tone for Garvin's hard-charging style. Written by analyst P. J. O'Rourke, the forward lauds the author for indulging in "no heavy breathing over Iranian arms deals." O'Rourke further states that "Garvin shows us contra political leaders whose vanity and quarrelsomeness turned contra governance into something like an International Convention of First Wives," and that "Garvin puts all the fools and their follies into perspective."

World Bank Environment Roundup

The World Bank's Patrick Low is the editor of "International Trade and the Environment," a series of research papers prepared by leading environmentalists and trade specialists from academia and the World Bank. Topics of the 18 papers range from "Trade Policy and Pollution" to "Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Case of Indonesia and Brazil." They are available in the World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 159 (April 1992).

AT&T Phone Home

While some may be disturbed by the attempted coup in Venezuela on February 4, 1992, AT&T board vice chairman Randall L. Tobias remains upbeat. Speaking before a crowded Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce meeting just days after the incident, he assured his business audience that "we are not discouraged from investing in the region because of this single event." No wonder. As Tobias pointed out later in his address, AT&T's Latin American product sales soared from $6 million in 1989 to $150 million in 1991: a growth rate of 250%.

Backyard Low Politics

Now that there is no more Soviet threat in Central America and a peace treaty has been signed in El Salvador, the US can focus on issues that were neglected during the ideological struggles of the 1980s. Evidence of this is the fact that the US trade representative placed El Salvador in the Annual Report on Major Trade Barriers to United States Exports (1991). El Salvador was cited because of its willingness to condone the piracy of works copyrighted in the US. The citation subjects El Salvador to possible retaliation against its exports to the US.

What Did He Say?

President George Bush has often been accused of "bushisms," or speaking a language that only he understands. For example, at the Dearborn-based Economic Club of Detroit on March 13, 1992, the president said: "I am absolutely convinced—absolutely convinced—that in passing the NAFTA, the free trade agreement with Mexico, the North American—we call it North American Free Trade Agreement—it will create more jobs. I'm convinced that it's good for the environment. I believe a more prosperous Mexico, and there's going to be prosperity on both sides if we can get the proper kind of agreement, will be able to address itself to these environmental problems. I believe a more prosperous Mexico will be an even better market for US goods. And so I do not accept the wisdom of some that says that a trade agreement is going to result simply in an export of jobs. It is not going to do that, and I believe that we ought to keep pressing for it. I don't care what the politics of it are. I think it is best and I want to do exactly the same thing—this NAFTA, this North American Free Trade Agreement—I want to do exactly the same thing with the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round."

On the Move

Stuart Lippe, who formerly served in the US Foreign Service, has joined Radio Martí as director of research.

David E. Lewis has been appointed the new assistant secretary of state for Caribbean development of the Departamento de Estado of the government of Puerto Rico. Lewis formerly worked in Nicaragua at the Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES) and with the Ford Foundation.
Venezuela: Reversal or Renewal?

by Andrés Serbin

Democracy and civilian control over the military have distinguished Venezuela from the bulk of Latin American states. Did the country’s attempted coup of 1992 portend the reversal of regional progress toward democracy and demilitarization?

The attempted coup against Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez on February 4, 1992, was particularly surprising because, for more than three decades, Venezuela has been politically atypical among Latin American countries. This atypical status derived from four political features: first, a stable democracy, based on the consensus of the leading political parties; second, civilian control over the armed forces, including rotation of commanders, nonintervention in political life, and generous social benefits; third, social democracy, characterized by a capacity to permit the upward social mobility of wide sectors of the population; and fourth, substantial petroleum profits that have sustained this democratic social and political framework.

Fissures in this framework began to appear shortly after Pérez assumed the presidency of Venezuela for the second time in 1988. On February 27, 1989, an increase in the price of public transportation—introduced as part of a severe austerity package that sharply diverged from the populism of Pérez’s initial term in office (1978-83)—provoked three days of riots and looting. For the first time since the pacification of leftist guerrillas in the early 1970s, the Venezuelan army intervened to quell civil disturbances. The number of civilian deaths probably exceeded the official figure of 600. The cost of material damage in the country’s main cities was extensive as well.

Nonetheless, this dramatic popular response had little impact on President Pérez—newly converted as he was to neoliberalism—or the political elite in general—which was progressively losing political touch not only with the vast majority of Venezuelans but also with their very own political parties. Indeed, during the subsequent three years the political gap separating the masses from the Pérez government and party constituencies from their leadership grew increasingly wide, especially given the sharp contrast between the ostentatious lifestyle of the Venezuelan upper classes and the worsening economic hardships of the rank-in-file population, more than 40% of whom live below the officially defined poverty line.

In this context, reinforcing the political alienation of the Venezuelan majority has been widespread and unpunished corruption. Numerous scandals in current and previous administrations have involved government functionaries, military leaders, and entrepreneurs. These scandals have generally received light treatment by a political system whose appointed officials are dependent on the old guard of political parties. Combined with the harsh socioeconomic consequences for most of the population, the impact on public opinion has been to undermine the legitimacy of both the judicial system and the political system in general.

The combination of plunging living standards for Venezuela’s majority and plunging confidence in a political system increasingly identified with elite corruption and ostentatious consumption is the explosive ingredient that underlay the attempted coup of February 1992.

From Macroeconomic Upswing to Attempted Coup

Ironically, the deterioration of living conditions for the majority, the declining faith in the political system, and the attempted coup coincided with the first positive signs of President Pérez's neoliberal program: a 9.2% rate of economic growth in 1991 and a rate of inflation that did not exceed 30.7%. Accompanying these signs of recovery was the growing confidence of foreign investors and multilateral financial institutions in the Venezuelan economy, as well as Pérez's early 1992 announcement that a large-scale social project would be started to distribute the benefits of economic recovery more equitably.

Months after the coup attempt, there is yet little consistent information about the ideological orientation of the rebel military leaders. Indeed, their attempt to seize television stations failed, they made no other major efforts to disseminate proclamations through the mass media, they burned their propagandistic materials when the attempted coup failed, and government censorship has minimized commentary on the opposition's motives. Still, the opposition's so-called Movimiento Bolivariano expressed the discontent of a significant portion of the military's middle-level command. They were unhappy with Venezuela's socioeconomic problems, the corruption of political and military leadership, the weakening of democratic institutions, and the frustrated expectations of the masses. Another source of military discontent was dissatisfaction over the long-standing negotiations on the Venezuelan-

The “Golpistas”: Who Are They?

There is a cottage industry of books on the “F-4,” the February 4, 1992, coup attempt in Venezuela. The chief conspirator, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez, is being lionized by many a politician and journalist. While he, and his fellow conspirators, continue to have a popular following, the polls indicate decreasing support for a military solution. In a poll taken just four days after the coup attempt, El Nacional found that 57% supported the attempt, 20% were indifferent, and 43% were opposed. By May 4, 1992, the same newspaper reported that 88% of the most recent poll favored a solution within the democratic system.

The golpistas claim to be followers of the doctrines of Simón Bolivar and his teacher, Don Simón Rodriguez. While this explains the adoption of the name “Movimiento Bolivariano” for their movement, it explains pitifully little else. The following information on the golpistas has been widely publicized:

- Three of the four major leaders (Lieutenant Colonels Hugo Chávez, Jesús Ortiz, and Francisco Urdaneta) had been under surveillance for the past eight years for their activities against what they called “the oligarchical chiefs” of the armed forces. Two years ago they were accused of planning to kidnap the top military commanders (El Universal, February 5, 1992).
- The total number of active rebels was two battalions—the Paracaidistas de Aragua and the Brigada Blindada de Valencia (with 30 tanks)—as well as others stationed at Maracaibo’s missile base. Their attack on the presidential palace and other political locations was met with stiff resistance from the Guardia Nacional and the president’s own guards. The threat that the loyal air force (equipped with F-16s) would be sent into action was a major reason why the golpistas surrendered.
- Their surrender message noted that “for now” they failed and that “new situations will come along.”
- As far as any ideology or program, little is evident. The oldest golpista, Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Arias Cárdenas, speaks in Biblical terms about justice and honesty (El Nacional, March 5, 1992). The joint letter of February 12, 1992, by Lieutenant Colonel Chávez and others to the governor of Zulia has a distinct Theology of Liberation tone: references to Christ, to the voice of “the Church which is committed to the people,” “idealism,” “participatory democracy,” anticorruption, etc.
- Of the 357 officers captured, only 55 were still in custody by April 26, 1992.

Editor's Note: Information collected by Hemisphere staff.
Colombian border in the potentially oil-rich Golfo de Venezuela.

Together, these sources of military dissatisfaction intersected with a diffuse and ambiguous nationalist discourse, whose inflections stressed the domestic conditions of Venezuela without linking them to hemispheric and world trends. The rebel conspiracy, however, was limited to a few sectors of the armed forces and, apart from some late efforts to arm university students in the city of Valencia, failed to incorporate civilians. Reflecting the depth of discontent among the politically isolated golpistas at the moment of surrender, their apparent leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez, declared that they would give up “for now.”

The Aftermath

Following the defeat of the golpistas, Venezuela’s party leaders, entrepreneurs, labor unions, and neighborhood associations declared their support for democracy. Nevertheless, voices of dissidence called attention to the conditions underlying the attempted overthrow of the Pérez administration. Among the dissident voices were former social- Christian COPEI president Rafael Caldera and leaders of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). Significantly, even though civilians did not participate in the coup attempt, public opinion polls revealed that more than 30% of the population supported the golpistas. In short, beyond the attempted coup itself lies an alarming accumulation of popular grievances that the Pérez administration, as well as the political leadership in general, must recognize and resolve. Unfortunately, so far there are few encouraging signs of such progress.

On the one hand, Pérez’s efforts to form a coalition government, incorporating the leadership of his own party, Acción Democrática (AD), along with that of opposition parties, has proved unsuccessful. The new cabinet that Pérez appointed following the coup attempt has not substantially reduced the administration’s strong ties to the technocratic team that formulated its original neoliberal policies, though the addition of some AD members to the team has modified its approach and eased tensions between AD and the Pérez administration. The new cabinet includes as interior minister former AD presidential candidate Luis Pineda Ordaz, widely respected for his honesty and seen as having a key role in combating corruption. It also included as foreign minister, until he resigned in June 1992, a member of the social-Christian party COPEI. The socialist party MAS refused to participate. In apparent compensation, Pérez also established a Consejo Consultivo consisting of representatives of AD as well as independent and opposition parties. This measure, together with the appointment of a new head of the Oficina Central de Información, may improve the government’s lines of communication with the population in general. By the same token, the transfer of a series of corruption cases to the attorney general may, in the short term, improve the Pérez administration’s image in the struggle against corruption.

“For Now”

Yet the fundamental challenge confronting President Pérez is not that of improving his government’s image, but rather of seriously reforming the Venezuelan political system. Such reform must establish effective mechanisms for political control over corrupt practices and for political participation that responds to the expectations of diverse sectors. In this respect, the Pérez administration needs to implement a series of proposals formulated by the Comisión de Reforma del Estado. Among these are proposals to reform the electoral system so as to eliminate the existing top-down manipulation of electoral ballots by entrenched party elites (known as “cogollos”) and to reform the judicial system.

If these and other serious political reforms are not carried out, then sooner or later the “for now,” as declared by golpista Hugo Chávez, may internalize as a more crystallized—and hence more explosive—amalgam of both the popular protests of February 27, 1989, and the attempted coup of February 4, 1992. Such an explosive force not only could put an end to more than 30 years of democracy in Venezuela, but also could portend the weakening or reversal of Latin America’s regional progress toward democracy.

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
Venezuelan Opinion

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Which concept best describes Venezuela’s political system?

- Democracy (89.0%)
- Dictatorship (5.0%)
- Another System (2.0%)
- Don’t Know/Unanswered (7.0%)

Should political parties be abolished because they are corrupt and ineffective, or should they be changed because they are necessary for democracy?

- Should Be Abolished (7.0%)
- Should Be Left Alone (4.0%)
- Don’t Know/Unanswered (7.0%)
- Changed (82.0%)

Will political parties make necessary changes to save themselves, or are they impossible to save?

- Are Impossible To Save (23.2%)
- Will Make Necessary Changes (64.6%)
- Don’t Know/Unanswered (12.1%)

Source: Adapted from El Nacional (Caracas)

SHOULD PEREZ RESIGN?

(Percentages)

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<tr>
<td>Perez should not resign</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/unanswered</td>
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IF PEREZ RESIGNS, WHO SHOULD BE NAMED INTERIM PRESIDENT?

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<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>No one. Perez should not resign</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arturo Uslar Pietri</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Fernández</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/Unanswered</td>
<td>30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Several others were mentioned by 1% or less of the sample.

Source: Adapted from El Nacional (Caracas)

EVALUATION OF STATE POLICIES

By social class

Social Policies

General Policies

Economic Policies

Source: Adapted from El Nacional (Caracas)
A true culture of corruption has been developing in Venezuela for more than 20 years. Corruption is defined as the process of decomposition, destruction, putrefaction, and eradication that is produced in living organisms when the vital force that gave them life and purpose has ceased to exist.

In the moral field a similar phenomenon happens when the individual or society enters, for whatever reason, into a process of disintegration, decomposition, and putrefaction, in which moral values and ethical principals begin to disappear and to be substituted by abject and base appetites.

Historically many societies have been destroyed by this sickness. It is active and present in all human organizations unless a constant effort is made to prevent it and to create an efficient moral prophylaxis. Human beings are not virtuous by nature, but we can acquire virtue, in some sense, by profound conviction. As Lord Acton said, "Total power corrupts," particularly when demonic temptation to do so encounters no obstacles.

The Temptation of Power and Excess

Venezuela was a backward and poor country at the beginning of this century. Suddenly, in the last quarter of a century, there appeared an immense wealth that neither government nor citizenry were prepared to manage. To make matters worse, this wealth fell totally into the hands of the state. One could not expect the people who have exercised the power in Venezuela during the last 25 years to understand and avoid the negative consequences of this rapid wealth and channel it toward what I called, many years ago, a policy of "planting the oil"—the healthy development of the society and economy of the country. Not only was this not done, but because of a fatal weakness—the temptation of power and excess and intellectual limitation—the elites, along with the majority of the society, scrambled to take advantage of that fortune in all of its possible forms.

The country was converted into an immense fools' paradise, in which all, as in a trance, stood in line to achieve some share of this great supply of personal benefits. The government became irresponsibly costly, propagating a lifestyle of ostentation, extravagance, and pathological consumerism that penetrated all levels of social life. As such, not only were the norms of moral conduct and intelligent utilization of wealth perverted, but there was ample opportunity for the proliferation of all imaginable forms of theft, impudent splendor, illicit enrichment, and abuse of power.

A Carnival of Appetites

The entire country seemed to submerge itself in a carnival of appetites. Consumption and ostentation were reflected, according to social rank, by Hollywood-style mansions, fleets of luxury automobiles and private airplanes, luxurious apartments, shell enterprises, risky business ventures, and all forms of pleasure and opportunism afforded by political and economic power. The majority was not excluded from this carnival of easy wealth. With an eagerness that should have been directed to education or health care, the state has sponsored and promoted every imaginable kind of gambling, including the easy money derived from speculation. Consequently, regard for work and savings has gone by the wayside. The gamesters' state promoted, through every means of communication, every game of chance, from horse-racing and lotteries to an evil complex of clandestine gaming organizations, which could not have existed without the large-scale complicity of government functionaries. To all of this, one has to add the virtual impunity of all those who have committed crimes of illicit enrichment.

This culture of corruption is corroding the soul of the country and cannot be confronted and corrected with mere proclamations of intent to amend or isolated gestures of repentance. We have to go to the core, attacking the corrupt practices of gamesters, felons, and the state. We have to establish effective norms and real examples of moral and civic conduct. We have to educate for work, savings, and service and not for the enjoyment of easy wealth and splendor. This is the challenge that Venezuela has before it, if it truly wants to amend its destiny, cure its vices, and reach its true destiny.

Editor's Note: Adapted from El Nacional, March 8, 1992.

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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Venezuela in Crisis
An Interview with Rafael Caldera

Dr. Caldera, as one of the originators of this political system, you know it well. When and where did the first fissures in the system become apparent?

Paradoxically the deterioration in the system began when Venezuela obtained a fairer price for its oil. When we sold oil at $2 a barrel, even after we subtracted the cost of production and split the rest between the government and the multinationals, we thought of ourselves as relatively rich. We were concerned at that time with correcting fundamental affairs. Based on the figures presented by the most impartial economists, we now know that we have never been as well off as we were before the oil boom; our gross national product grew, we industrialized, unemployment was reduced, and inflation was practically nonexistent, as was for all practical purposes the foreign debt.

When the flow of money started, it engendered two particularly serious processes and trends: first, the tendency to easy accumulation and earnings permeated all social sectors, and second it reached into the top political levels of the state. This "facilismo" spawned a type of corruption that had been an integral part of all dictatorships. I insist on emphasizing this latter point because it is now popular to say that corruption is a result of 34 years of democracy; it is not true that corruption began with democracy, nor is it true that there was no corruption under the dictatorship. What is true is that it was the [Carlos Andres] Perez administration that initiated the criminal insanity of contracting unnecessary debts.

The best institutions in the world deteriorate when they are in the hands of people without noble interests and who use them for their own convenience.

What is the remedy: changing the people without changing the system?

The system . . . ? I wish you would tell me what is the system you are going to change. Are you going to change democracy? Are you going to abolish the congress? Are you going to establish a monarchical constitution? The reality is that people speak of the system in vague terms, no one wishes to be precise. Specifically we can improve the system by introducing a series of institutions or practices such as the popular referendum, a reform of the judicial system, maybe by instituting the office of prime minister or an ombudsman for human rights. But all this presupposes that the country's established democratic constitutional system will not be altered, what will be altered is how it functions. My specific proposal covers seven points:

- The creation of a high judicial commission to represent not only the legal profession but the country as a whole. This commission will select the candidates from which congress selects the members of the supreme court. It will also have the authority to dismiss forthwith any magistrate or judge—no matter the rank—when it is convinced that an official is not complying with his/her judicial duty.
- The introduction of a fundamental charter regulating the...
function of political parties. This should include transparency in the management of its funds and setting limits to its functions; since parties are the fundamental instruments of democracy, we should stop them from being the mechanisms of clientelism, of pragmatism, and of abusive power; in other words, we should avoid the so-called partidocracia (oligarchy of the party).

- The creation of the post of prime minister who will share responsibilities with the president and who can be dismissed with a vote of no confidence from the chambers; once this occurs there will have to be a shuffling of the cabinet.
- The creation of the post of ombudsman for human rights so that society can have a spokesman, a sort of catarasis y de amparo (a protector and upholder of rights) when tremendous violations are committed.
- We need to categorically establish the right to information, one of the many rights that are essential and clear to so many sectors of the society.
- Any change in the constitution, even the making of a totally new one if necessary, should require the convening of a constitutional assembly that responds to a popular mandate, not to the will of a select few.
- Another very important matter that should go into the constitutional reform is a transitory disposition that reduces the present constitutional presidential period by at least a year; in other words, after making the constitutional reform, we should proceed to renew all public offices. The oft-repeated phrase that this is the last opportunity for democracy truly applies to our situation.

Editor’s Note: Reprinted from Revista ZETA (Caracas), March 12-23, 1992.

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
Military Questions in El Salvador

by José Z. García

On January 16, 1992, the guerrillas and government of El Salvador signed agreements ending the country’s 12-year-old civil war. The peace accords owe much of their success to international pressure. By the time the Bush administration came to office in 1989, US policymakers were tired of funding the seemingly endless war in El Salvador and wanted out. Moreover, the international collapse of communism was eloquent testimony that time was not a friend to the guerrillas of the Ejército Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN). Success at the negotiating table occurred when both sides acknowledged international realities and agreed to negotiate what amounted to a promise to reincorporate the guerrillas into mainstream political life—a process that will take place under UN supervision and with institutional mechanisms designed to increase the public accountability of the military and security forces. What remains unclear is whether there exists enough goodwill on all sides to create a viable political system when the international community is distracted or has withdrawn from Salvadoran affairs.

Political crisis in the 1980s bolstered the military’s formidable power in Central America. Paradoxically, however, it catalyzed a peace process that promises to tame the military’s might. Given the realities, is the optimism justified?

On paper the accord is extensive and create institutions to ensure compliance. One thousand UN observers will spend the next few months supervising the demobilization of the guerrillas. A Comisión para la Consolidación de la Paz (COPAZ) has been formed that includes civilians representing all parties in the legislature. Its purpose is to verify compliance with the agreements. One of COPAZ’s tasks will be to supervise the resolution of land disputes between those who hold title to land in areas affected by civil war and those now occupying that land. A Comisión de la Verdad, composed of former Colombian president Belisario Betancur, former Venezuelan foreign minister Reynaldo Figueroa, and US law professor Thomas Burgenthal, has been appointed to investigate and reveal the facts in unresolved cases of gross human rights abuse committed by the armed forces of both sides. And a Comisión Ad Hoc has been appointed to evaluate and supervise a host of reforms contemplated for the armed forces.

Down-sizing the Armed Forces

Based on the accord, the armed forces will be reduced by 50%, to 31,000 officers and troops. This figure, however, represents roughly twice the size of the armed forces in 1979, when the war began, and is artificially high. For several years, army commanders, for various reasons, have exaggerated the actual number of troops under their command. The figure 31,000 represents one-half the public security forces, and in fact, may represent a reduction of only 10,000 or so. Furthermore, the accord does not guarantee a reduction in the size of the most politically relevant military group, the officer corps, which, including security forces, currently numbers some 2,100—twice the size of the 1979 officer corps. The major substantive change involves the dissolution of the five Batallones

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As cohesive as they were powerful, *tandona* members were often accused of covering up for one another in suspected cases of gross violations of human rights or financial conflicts of interest. Just as resentment against their power began to rise among junior *tandas*, one *tanda* member, Colonel Guillermo Benavides, was accused of conspiracy in the infamous 1989 Jesuit murder case. Extraordinary pressure by human rights organizations and the US government finally caused Benavides to be tried in civilian court—the first such instance in Salvadoran history—and resulted in a conviction carrying a 30-year sentence. Resentment against the *tandona* on the part of junior *tandas* partly explains why this punishment was accepted within the armed forces, even as resentment against the conviction exists within the military in general.

*While Cristiani may have sound administrative reasons to keep the tandona at the head of the armed forces, doing so will impede national political reconciliation.*

Postwar Politics and the Armed Forces

A major achievement of the peace accord process in El Salvador was that for the first time since national independence in the early nineteenth century, the role of the armed forces has been debated, negotiated, and acted upon by political parties, the government administration, guerrillas, and the military itself. This achievement alone is significant and has implications at least as wide-ranging as the results of the negotiations so far. Civilian actors are likely to insist in the future that the subject of the armed forces remains on the public agenda. If so, the peace accords will have indirectly taken the country a step toward the development of shared democratic norms.

With regard to the military, the most important feature of the peace accords is the separation of domestic police functions from the armed forces. The accords call for the creation of a new entity, the *Polícia Nacional Civil (PNC)*, by the
end of 1992. The PNC will assume the public security functions previously exercised by the Guarnía Nacional, Policía Nacional, and Policía de Hacienda, which were controlled and staffed by the armed forces. In addition, the PNC will have its own training academy and will be controlled exclusively by civilian national government officials through the Ministerio del Interior.

These steps reverse a more than a century-old trend in which the armed forces exercised increasing control over both internal security and national defense. In 1912, for example, the Guarnía Nacional was created by the armed forces and placed under their control in order "to protect private property especially in rural agrarian zones" (Revista de la Fuerza Armada [San Salvador], 1938, p. 17). By the 1970s virtually all law enforcement institutions were controlled by the armed forces and were often associated with human rights abuse.

Removal of domestic security functions from armed forces control implies far more than possible improvement in human rights treatment, however. It was through the exercise of national guard, police, and customs functions that the armed forces acquired sufficient knowledge, networks, and presence throughout the country to be able to govern. And it was partly through the exercise of these functions that the military managed to control the political activities of its citizens from the 1950s to the 1970s, when the army controlled an "officialist" party—the Partido de Conciliación Nacional—that won elections. The ruling Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) itself was founded in part by the late Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, whose support base included village elites he had helped across the country in his position as chief of intelligence of the Guarnía Nacional during the late 1970s, when death squads began to operate on a national scale to eliminate suspected leftists. In sum, removal of police forces from military control implies a major reduction in the political impact of the armed forces on Salvadoran society, another necessary but insufficient condition for democracy.

**Ultimately the future role of the armed forces depends on the quality of the political system that emerges during the postwar period.**

**Future Role of the Armed Forces**

During the civil war, the Salvadoran armed forces had to learn how to fight a guerrilla war. Eventually they also had to learn flexibility in the art of making political alliances, not only domestically but internationally as well. Now the elimination of their internal security functions and the careful scrutiny of their political role will surely teach the armed forces the costs of overextending themselves as an institution. Still, the Salvadoran military has survived, and after 12 years of war its basic values and mentality remain astonishingly unchanged. Hence, it is not to the armed forces that one should look for guidance toward democracy, but rather to the postwar dynamics of civilian politics.

Ultimately the future role of the armed forces depends on the quality of the political system that emerges during the postwar period. Since 1983 a small oligarchy using military force has refused to acknowledge the political legitimacy of large sectors of the polity, especially organized labor. This refusal is the root cause of the civil war. From the 1950s onward, the armed forces, as instruments of this oligarchy, extracted increasing amounts of power and privilege for their services. By the late 1970s abusive military behavior became more of a focal point for opposition (especially in the eyes of non-Salvadorans) than the less tangible but more fundamental relationship between the oligarchy and other sectors of society.

Though the civil war is over, it is unclear whether these patterns will reemerge. Democratic theory and the experience of other Latin American countries suggest that, until all major political actors can agree to create and abide by rules of the game that limit coercive military involvement in politics, the longevity of the current peace process is in doubt.

For the time being, international scrutiny and the transparency built into the peace accords will probably cause both sides to abide by the agreements, albeit reluctantly and behind schedule. Compliance thus far has been slow on both sides. The real test will occur when the Left is able to demonstrate with ballots what it could not demonstrate with bullets: that it has strong political support. When the Left demonstrated such support in the past, civilian groups tied to the ruling oligarchy were always ready to sacrifice democracy. Whether the pattern repeats itself again will depend on the resolve with which democratic forces forge a minimum alliance to preserve themselves. Finally, in this postmodern civil war, international interests—such as governments, human rights and church groups, and writers—played important roles in articulating issues and monitoring events, including the very negotiation of the war's end. Now that the country is no longer engulfed in war and thus is no longer a focus of world attention, El Salvador's democratic prospects depend to a significant degree on the continued scrutiny and passion of these players.
Claude E. Welch, Jr., Editor
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Taming the Honduran Military

by Steve Levitsky

In few areas of Honduran society is the lack of civilian control over the armed forces more manifest than in the justice system. The Honduran military refuses to allow its members to be tried in civilian courts, even when they commit common crimes. And civilian authorities, fearful of confronting the military, do not challenge the armed forces’ claim to “military jurisdiction.” As a result, members of the military have become virtually untouchable by civilian law. “In place of a state of law,” the Comité para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Honduras (CODEH) reported in July 1991, Honduras “has a state of illegality.”

The Honduran military, it should be noted, is somewhat different from those of El Salvador and Guatemala. Unlike the armies of its neighbors, the Honduran army has never been linked to the oligarchy, but rather has traditionally maintained ties with the popular sectors. In the 1970s the military government of Oswaldo López Arellano (1972-75) openly aligned itself with peasant and labor movements against economic elites. This explains why many Hondurans do not view the country’s military as highly repressive. Indeed, the Honduran military’s human rights record—though far from clean—is considerably better than those of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan armies.

That changed somewhat in the 1980s. Under the leadership of General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, armed forces chief from 1982 to 1984, the military adopted a more repressive orientation, cracking down on unions, peasants, students, and leftist politicians in the name of “national security.” According to CODEH, between 1981 and 1984, 218 political assassinations, 110 “disappearances,” and 1,984 illegal arrests took place. Though human rights violations have decreased since the mid-1980s, Americas Watch reported that “political killings of student, union and peasant leaders continued through the end of ’90 and the first months of ’91.” Military officers were implicated in brutal crimes against civilians on several occasions in 1991, yet soldiers are never tried in civil courts and few are convicted in military tribunals.

A “Shield of Impunity”? The military bases its refusal to be subject to civilian jurisdiction on article 90 of the Honduran constitution, which declares that “military jurisdiction is recognized for crimes of a military order.” According to Colonel Napoleon Santos Aguilar, the armed forces interpret “military jurisdiction” to include “all cases that involve officials or enlisted men” in the active service of the military. Nonetheless, lawyers, scholars, and politicians across the Honduran political spectrum are nearly unanimous in interpreting military jurisdiction as applying “strictly to military matters” such as mutiny or other crimes committed during war.

According to retired general Walter López, armed forces chief from 1984 to 1986, the military should claim jurisdiction only over “internal crimes,” while “civilian courts should try all other crimes.” Leonidas Rosa Bautista, president of the Colegio de Abogados, expresses a similar view. According to legislator Salatiel Urbina of the Partido Liberal, “All cases in which soldiers are involved in crimes against civilians should be tried in civilian courts. If I am a soldier and I shoot someone in a bar, there is no reason for me to be tried in a military court.” Yet the military claims jurisdiction in all cases where soldiers commit crimes. Since the country’s police force and investigative bodies are run by the armed forces, the military has been able to ensure that its members stay out of civilian courts.

The problem is that seldom have military tribunals brought justice. Military judges are active military members appointed by the armed forces. Trials take place within military installations, are closed to the public, and are in no way responsible to the civilian judicial system. “The military justice system’s track record is not very good,” acknowledges one US embassy official. “You’ve got second lieutenants judging colonels, which is very difficult to do.” Lawyer and legislator Luis Alberto Rubi of the Partido Liberal says, “The army is using military jurisdiction as a shield of impunity. It’s totally unconstitutional. They’re judging themselves.”

Judicial Weakness Despite widespread opposition to military jurisdiction, few politicians or judges have challenged it. A July 1991 legislative proposal to “clarify” the definition of military privilege was immediately buried in the Hon-
duran congress, and the country’s supreme court has thus far refused to rule on any cases concerning military jurisdiction. Such a ruling would set a precedent for future civil-military conflicts by defining, once and for all, the limits of military jurisdiction.

"The judicial authorities have always been afraid of the armed forces," said CODEH lawyer Linda Rivera. Yet, Manuel Gamero, director of the daily newspaper Tiempo, argues that such fears are no longer justified. "If the supreme court ruled that these military crimes should be tried in civil courts, what would happen? Would there be a coup? Would they kill the justices? Of course not." According to CODEH, the justice system’s “abdication of civil authority” is the fundamental reason the military’s impunity continues to exist in Honduras.

In 1991 civilian and military authorities clashed over the issue of military jurisdiction in three major cases. On each occasion the armed forces openly refused to cooperate with the civilian justice system, and each time civilian authorities proved unable to exert control. In the first case, known as the "El Asilleró" massacre, Colonel Leonel Galindo is suspected of paying his farmhands to attack a group of peasant squatters on his land. Five peasants were killed in the attack on May 3, 1991. A military investigation concluded soon after the massacre that “no soldiers were involved,” and although Galindo was supposedly taken into military custody, he was not tried. As the massacre was a “common,” rather than military crime, civil judge Leonardo Banegas asked the armed forces to release Galindo to the civil court system. They refused. Judge Banegas then petitioned the supreme court to rule on the case’s jurisdiction, but according to Linda Rivera, who represents the families of the murdered peasants, "Something always happens so that the supreme court doesn’t make a ruling.” Banegas adds that “al-though it hurts to say it, military authority is superior to civil authority.”

The military took similar action in the case of former defense minister Colonel Erick Sánchez, who on June 9, 1991, shot civilian Gustavo Funez, leaving him semiparalyzed. Reportedly drunk and enraged after an argument with a fellow officer, Sánchez shot Funez, who apparently was an uninvolved bystander. After a brief investigation, a military tribunal absolved Sánchez of the crime, declaring that Sánchez had shot the unarmed Funez out of “self-defense.” At the end of 1991, Sánchez remained on active military duty. According to Rivera, also prosecuting the Sánchez case, civilian judge Wilfredo Méndez “never even began proceedings” against Sánchez and “impeded me in my accusatory work.” Funez, for example, was never called to civil court to make his initial charges. Rivera called the civil judge’s failure to act a “mockery of justice.” Legislator Salatiel Urbina says that “the fact that Sánchez was declared innocent tells the world that it is the military and not civilians who rule this country.”

The most widely publicized 1991 case surrounded the rape and murder of Riccy Mabel Martínez, a high-school student whose mutilated body was discovered on July 15 of that year. Martínez had last been seen at a local army barracks two days earlier, where she reportedly went to seek her boyfriend’s release from military service. Both military and civil investigations were launched, but when on July 26 civil judge María Mendoza ordered the arrest of two high army officials, Colonel Angel Castro and Captain Ovidio Andino, the police refused to carry out the order. Police commander Guillermo Paredes told the press, “I am not going to authorize this order . . . these boys are in active service and we have military jurisdiction.” The daily Tiempo called Paredes’s statement a “manifestation of the dominance of military authority over civil authority.”

The army then took custody of Castro and Andino, refusing to turn them over to civil authorities. Judge Mendoza petitioned supreme court president Oswaldo Ramos to grant the civil court jurisdiction over the case. Yet, after a July 30 meeting with armed forces chief Luis Alonso Discua, Ramos announced the case would be pursued by both the military and civil courts, thus refusing to order the military to turn over the two officers. Earlier that month Discua had publicly declared that Castro and Andino should be tried in military tribunals. Asked why Judge Mendoza was unable to take custody of the two officers, Ramos declared that the “judicial authorities are powerless” and that Mendoza “is not the Bionic Woman or Wonder Woman.”

Antimilitary Pressures

Two critical factors, however, intervened to prevent the murder of Riccy Mabel Martínez from being forgotten, and may well have transformed the case into a turning point in Honduran civil-military relations. First, the US embassy, virtually silent during the repression
of the 1980s, began to publicly

demand that justice be done. On

July 23 Ambassador Crescencio

Arcos declared that there was the

need for “a just and transparent ju-
dicial system to resolve this and

other cases,” since “democracy is

not just elections, but providing
every citizen, humble as he or she
may be, equality before the law.” A

week later the embassy called on

the Honduran government to

“bring the authors of this horrible
crime to justice,” and offered the

technical assistance of the FBI to

assist with the case.

Arcos’s unprecedented in-

tervention made an immediate and

powerful impact by strengthening

the position of the civil authorities.

According to a US embassy official,

Arcos’s statement “allowed others
to come out and criticize the mili-
tary,” as politicians could “shield
themselves behind Arcos” in their
attacks on the armed forces. Em-

boldened by the US position, su-

creme court president Ramos

declared on August 2 that the Mar-

tinez case “has to go to the civil
courts. . . . Why do doctors, econo-
mists, workers, peasants, and busi-

ess people but not soldiers submit
to themselves to civil law?” The mil-

itary leadership, on the other hand,
denounced Arcos’s “intervention

into the internal affairs of our coun-

try” and called for the ambassador
to be declared persona non grata.

It is evident that, given the ex-

traordinary degree of US influence
in Honduras, Arcos’s stance could
not be ignored. On August 21 it

was announced that defendants

Castro and Andino would be tried
by the civil court system. At the

same time, however, the military
announced that both officers had

been released from the armed
forces and would be tried as civil-

ians, thereby avoiding a precedent-

setting trial of military officers by a

civilian court.

Few Hondurans doubt that

Arcos’s intervention was decisive in
the Martinez case. “If Arcos hadn’t

made that statement, the military
would have absolved the officers,”
said a CODEH official. Still, do-

mestic pressure also played a criti-
cal role in the Martinez affair. The
brutality of the murder, as well as
the almost certain involvement of
military personnel, produced an
unprecedented outburst of anti-
military sentiment. A series of large

student demonstrations in August
1991 frightened the military, which

responded by filling the capital
with soldiers. The news media was
also very active, keeping the case
on the front page for weeks and

providing a forum for antimilitary
views. According to CODEH presi-
dent Ramón Custodio, the press
“played an incredibly important
role. . . . If the armed forces hadn’t
had to confront the press cam-
paign, the student mobilization,
and international pressure, they
might have arranged the pardon of
the soldiers.”

“We’ve Lost Our Fear”

The Martinez case may have long-

lasting effects on Honduran civil-

military relations. In addition to

strengthening the resolve of civic
leaders, it has had an empowering

effect on the population in gen-

eral. According to Honduran politi-
cal analyst Victor Meza, the case

“permitted antimilitarism to be-
come public . . . the army is no
longer a taboo subject.” This pub-
lic empowerment, sociologist Leti-
cia Salomón has argued, “is very
promising because the moment ci-

vilians feel they can challenge the
military and seek justice for abuses,
real changes will take place.” The
military is clearly on the defensive.
“Soldiers know things are not like
before,” says the president of the
Asociación de Prensa Hondureña,
Miguel Osmando Mejía. “They have
to be careful. If they kill someone
now, they may not remain untouch-
able.”

Several important steps have
been taken towards ending impu-

nity. In September 1991 the national

police opened up a complaints of-

fice, reportedly at the request of

the US embassy. Despite the fact

that those officers deemed to have
committed crimes against civilians
are punished internally rather than
sent to civilian courts, Custodio
says the office has yielded “some
positive results.” More important,

the supreme court announced in

November 1991 that it would in-
vestigate both the Galindo and

Sánchez cases and make a ruling

on the jurisdiction of each. Accord-

ing to former armed forces chief
López, “If the court rules that these
cases belong in civil courts, two
things will become clear: one, that
high officers are involved in hu-

man rights violations, and two, that
these officers can and should be

tried in civilian courts.”

So far, however, neither

Sánchez nor Galindo have been
charged and the investigation into
the Martinez killing has moved
slowly, amid charges that impor-
tant evidence has been tampered
with. In addition, the July 1991

murder of human rights activist
Marco Tulio Hernández and the

September 1991 assassination of in-

digenous leader Vincent Matute re-

main unsolved. Fear of the military

has not disappeared, particularly
among judges in rural areas. More-
over, many question whether the
current reform movement could
be sustained without US pressure.

Legislator Luis Alberto Rubi asks,
“The day we don’t have Arcos,
what will happen? Will impunity
remain?”

Yet others maintain that the tide
toward civilian control over the mil-
itary is irreversible. “Because we
have lost our fear of the military,
the boots and the uniforms don’t
mean anything anymore,” said Fa-
ther Elías Ruiz, who has braved
death threats in his effort to bring

Colonel Galindo to justice for the

May 3 massacre. Hondurans can

only hope that his bravado is in-
deed true. ■

Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission

from Mesoamérica (San José, Costa
Until 1982 the Guatemalan military exercised a direct role in the creation of a seemingly endless succession of authoritarian governments. The massive corruption, electoral fraud, and repressive politics of these regimes fueled both the contemporary economic crisis and a widespread and well-documented climate of grave human rights abuse. In 1982, however, the presidency of General Romeo Lucas Garcia was overthrown in a military coup, and a process of democratic transition began. The question is why did some military circles decide to gamble on an alternative, democratic path?

The reason, it seems, was the emergence of an alternative to repression as a strategy for defeating Guatemala’s insurgent movements. In the conservative view, achieving victory in counterinsurgency warfare justified systematic military reprisals against the general population, particularly those suspected of providing sustenance, protection, and recruits to insurgent armies. A more sophisticated, liberal strain of this philosophy sought to make the approach more flexible and effective by recognizing the social-structural roots of insurgency and adding a new element—psychological warfare—in an attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of the masses.

The modernization of counterinsurgency strategy, however, did not end with the addition of psychological warfare. Another major step in the development of the theory of Guatemalan counterinsurgency warfare was the military’s realization that any society characterized by extreme poverty and inequality would be vulnerable to insurgency. This updated version of counterinsurgency doctrine was refined in both the Centro de Estudios Militares and the Estado Mayor (the executive body of the armed forces) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was subsequently galvanized by the strengthened military capacity of the country’s guerrilla forces—whose growing momentum was signified by their 1982 amalgamation as the Unión Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)—and finally put into practice under the two transitional military governments that existed between the fall of Lucas García and the formation of a constitutional government under Christian-Democrat Vinicio Cerezo. Based upon their new conceptions, these interim governments implemented a two-pronged policy. On the one hand, they launched all-out military offensives that—at a terrible cost in lives and damage to the social fabric, particularly to indigenous communities in the countryside—devastated the insurgent support network and left the guerrillas in disarray. At the same time, they prepared for the free elections that culminated in the Cerezo presidency by rebuilding the party system and creating a constitutional assembly.

Political Consequences

The ultimate results, though, were not exactly what the strategy’s architects had expected. To begin with, the liberal wing of military leadership remained a minority, outnumbered by a conservative
military caste whose members feared that democratization would present new political opportunities for the insurgents. A reflection of this divergence was the debate over ending the guerrilla war by means of a negotiated settlement. President Cerezo and the liberal wing of the armed forces supported this approach, suggesting an agreement within the framework of the August 1987 Esquipulas II initiative for Central American peace and democratization. In contrast, the conservative wing not only opposed the approach but attempted two coups against the Cerezo administration.

Equally reflective of the political divergence between the military's liberal and conservative wings is the persistence of human rights violations. It is well documented that, in spite of the country's democratically elected presidencies, death squads encrusted within the government's national-security machinery and connected with reactionary sectors of civil society continue to commit serious and widespread violations of human rights. In this respect, the US Embassy, which has clearly supported the military modernizers, has sharply criticized Guatemala's record of human-rights abuses, particularly with respect to the murders of US activists Mirna Mack, Michael Devine, and Dianna Mae Ortiz.

The split within the executive ranks of the armed forces leads to a key question concerning the long-range balance of civil-military relations: to what degree is the Guatemalan military willing to relinquish its traditional spheres of power? While the liberal wing is disposed to cede power in order to undercut the insurgent threat, the conservative wing is equally insistent that it must maintain power in order to achieve the very same objective.

In any case, the liberalization of the Guatemalan armed forces continues with the introduction of curriculum reforms at various levels of training and education. Spearheading the reforms are the introduction of courses such as human rights, the incorporation of relatively progressive civilian educators into military faculties, and the initiation of civil-military leadership forums to discuss questions of national security within the liberalized framework. The latter have been linked to the Centro de Estudios de la Estabilidad Nacional through the past efforts of a leading military modernizer, former defense minister General Héctor Gramajo, as well as to current planning to establish the Escuela Superior de Estudios Estratégicos. It is through these reforms that the modernizers seek to eventually alter the military mentality.

The Future of Civil-Military Relations

Clearly the military's liberal sector has been strong enough to initiate and defend Guatemala's transition to democracy as well as the internal reform of the armed forces. Nonetheless, the future of both political democratization and military liberalization is uncertain as long as the country's internal war goes on. With this in mind, what has been the role of civilian political players? At first it was perhaps limited to whatever political space the military was willing to cede. While President Cerezo initially attempted to broaden this space, two attempted coups forced him to take a defensive posture. His successor, Jorge Serrano, who took office in 1990, made his objective the strengthening of his constitutional authority as head of the military. Though the political dominance of the armed forces remains solidly intact, Serrano has made substantial progress with respect to selecting high military officials and reducing the military's invulnerability to charges of human rights violations.

The clearest evidence of growing civilian power, however, is that the military allowed Serrano to initiate direct negotiations with URNG. As a result of these talks, which took place throughout 1990, a
negotiated end to the internal war has become a distinct possibility. Insofar as they have strengthened the nexus between the government's civil machinery and the liberal sector of the armed forces, these developments point to a long-term reorganization of Guatemalan civil-military relations. In this regard, it should be recognized that, as in the case of El Salvador, a successful conclusion to peace negotiations would be a definitive step toward demilitarization and the redefinition of the military's role. The liberal sector of the armed forces seems to have accepted this possibility.

Debate within the Guatemalan armed forces is beginning to converge with wider Latin American military trends by considering possible new roles.

The Guatemalan military confronts a paradox: while political crisis has led to the institution's growth, modernization, and maturation, Central America's emerging regional order promises to de-emphasize the role of military forces. If this regional promise indeed crystallizes, then democratic civil-military relations could well become a Central American and Guatemalan reality.

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)

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In any case, the liberalization of the Guatemalan armed forces continues with the introduction of curriculum reforms at various levels of training and education. Spearheading the reforms are the introduc-
negotiated end to the internal war has become a distinct possibility. Insofar as they have strengthened the nexus between the government’s civil machinery and the liberal sector of the armed forces, these developments point to a long-term reorganization of Guatemalan civil-military relations. In this regard, it should be recognized that, as in the case of El Salvador, a successful conclusion to peace negotiations would be a definitive step toward demilitarization and the redefinition of the military’s role. The liberal sector of the armed forces seems to have accepted this possibility.

As a consequence, debate within the Guatemalan armed forces is beginning to converge with wider Latin American military trends by considering possible new roles ranging from antidrug trafficking initiatives to environmental conservation. For example, the Guatemalan military’s small air and naval forces are already substantially involved in the interception of drug traffic. Further, the military is deploying its system of urban control—originally constructed for the counterinsurgency campaign—to combat the widely recognized problem of urban crime. And the military has acted to protect the Biosfera Maya, an immense park in the northern province of Petén, against incursions by illegal tree-cutters from across the Mexican border.

The Guatemalan military confronts a paradox: while political crisis has led to the institution’s growth, modernization, and maturation, Central America’s emerging regional order promises to de-emphasize the role of military forces. If this regional promise indeed crystallizes, then democratic civil-military relations could well become a Central American and Guatemalan reality.

Debate within the Guatemalan armed forces is beginning to converge with wider Latin American military trends by considering possible new roles.

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Baseball’s Caribbean Connection

by Martin F. Murphy

Sugarball: The American Game, the Dominican Dream

El Beisbol: Travels through the Pan-American Pastime

The Tropic of Baseball: Baseball in the Dominican Republic

arefoot boys playing baseball with mitts fashioned from milk cartons, any round object serving as a ball and any long stick as a bat, with a sugar-cane plantation providing the backdrop. These images provide an irresistible human interest angle for foreign journalists. Add multimillionaire Dominican major leaguers and the story has the makings of a Horatio Alger tale—a seductive motif for North American audiences.

US newspapers and magazines serve up a kaleidoscope of these images throughout the year. Unfortunately most of these stories are the same. The same images, fallacies, and superficialities are repeated. Authors Alan Klein, John Krich, and Rob Ruck set the record straight on the past and present realities of Dominican baseball.

Baseball did not arrive in the Dominican Republic with the US occupation of 1916-24, as many believe. It came, rather, from Cuba in the 1880s. Though an import, it became the Dominican game. But it was not until Jackie Robinson—among others—broke the “color barrier” in the 1950s that US major-league teams took an interest in recruiting Dominican ballplayers.

Poor kids are told “you can make it, if you try,” and that “the streets of America really are lined with gold, at least for professional ballplayers.” Few kids understand that the vast majority of professional baseball players languish in the rookie and minor leagues. Most of those fortunate and gifted enough to make it to the US earn an average gross salary of less than $10,000 a year and receive only $15 to $25 a day for expenses while they are on the road. Instead of traveling in planes, they ride up to nine hours a day in recycled passenger buses. And they play ball seven days a week to crowds that average less than 1,500 in such out-of-the-way towns as Peoria and Utica.

In a conversation with a Dominican who played for a Chicago White Sox farm team, the player both lamented and relished his present and future. Over his first home-cooked Dominican meal in eight months, he spoke about how he was getting old and had, at best, a few years left to make it out of the A league and into the majors; how when he needed a new mitt an agent would provide it, hoping he would someday sign a lucrative contract. He related to me the social pressures he encounters when he returns to his community in the Cibao, the fertile valley in the center of the island of Hispaniola. Family, friends, neighbors, and hangers-on all assume that he makes millions of dollars like Pedro Guerrero of the St. Louis Cardinals. When he doesn’t share his “wealth,” they say he is selfish.

Ninety percent of Dominicans fall into the category of black in US racial taxonomy, a group that simply was not permitted to play with white major-league ballplayers until Robinson came along. To be sure, Dominicans did play North Americans before then, but both their teammates and opponents were African-Americans from the Negro Leagues. With a few exceptions—by and large standouts such as Juan Marichal, the Alou brothers, and the Carty brothers—Dominicans did not break into US major-league baseball until the 1970s. They now represent the largest group of non-US born players.

Dominican sports folklore and sports pages maintain their own erroneous images. Poor kids are told “you can make it, if you try,” and that “the streets of America really are lined with gold, at least for professional ballplayers.” Few kids understand that the vast majority of professional baseball players languish in the rookie and minor leagues. Most of those fortunate and gifted enough to make it to the US earn an average gross salary of less than $10,000 a year and receive only $15 to $25 a day for expenses while they are on the road. Instead of traveling in planes, they ride up to nine hours a day in recycled passenger buses. And they play ball seven days a week to crowds that average less than 1,500 in such out-of-the-way towns as Peoria and Utica.

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and tacán (cheap). In the midst of the laments, he affirmed he would make it to the real White Sox team. He just needed to work hard, not be a "head case," and "if God was willing" he would someday play in Chicago's new Comiskey Park.

Dreams do not die easily, even with heavy doses of reality. Most poor and working-class boys not only fantasize about being in the big leagues, but know someone who "was signed" by a major-league organization. Their friends or relatives seldom made it past the recruits' academies in the Dominican Republic or the rookie league in Florida. Nonetheless, as a reminder that some do "get called up," even the biggest superstars—like Pedro Guerrero, George ("Jorge") Bell, Tony Fernández, and Julio Franco—spend the winter at home. Indeed, the guys to whom the gringos pay millions of dollars a year are never very far away—a lesson I learned to my embarrassment.

As I was riding a bus from the capital city of Santo Domingo to San Pedro de Macorís in 1983, my seat mate struck up a conversation. He looked like most other 20-year-old men from San Pedro. He was even wearing a Philadelphia Phillies T-shirt, as did many young Dominican men that winter, months after the team had won the National League pennant. He told me that he played for the Phillies organization, but he had made it to the "bigs" in grand style: Juan Samuel was voted 1984 National League Rookie of the Year by the Sporting News.

Most poor and working-class boys not only fantasize about being in the big leagues, but know someone who "was signed" by a major-league organization.

Sports and the Study of Society
Using a variety of disciplinary and theoretical approaches, scholars have demonstrated that sport is a valid area of social inquiry and that the study of sport can inform us about society and culture. But they have set a difficult task for themselves. They must face two opposing camps. Many in the snobbish US intellectual community like to think of themselves as somehow above the study of games. On the other hand, many sports fans want to see sport on its own terms, not clouded with social analysis and commentary.

In this setting, Klein's *Sugarball* and Ruck's *Tropic of Baseball* attempt to walk the fine line between baseball lovers and more rigorous scholars. The two books amply demonstrate that the study of sport, in this case, baseball, can be intimately tied to the study of society and culture, especially the study of a particular society and culture.

Klein's anthropological study is organized around the theme of the dialectic between hegemony and resistance. Hegemony, he argues, is expressed in the control that US culture (in the form of baseball) and capitalism (in the form of major-league organizations) exert over Dominican sport and society in general. Resistance, he claims, is evidenced by the national hero worship of Dominican ballplayers who have long dominated the big leagues—Juan Marichal striking out gringos, Pedro Guerrero or George ("Jorge") Bell blasting a home run off America's best pitchers. Every hit, every strike pitch, every heroic catch by a Dominican is a source of national pride.

The model is compelling, but Klein's treatment of it is often forced, and a number of his statements about the Dominican Republic are simply erroneous. The most striking of these—that the country exhibits the lowest per capita income in the Western Hemisphere (p. 9)—ignores, among other countries, the Dominican Republic's closest neighbor: Haiti. Klein is at his best when describing how Dominican players and fans behave in the stadium and discussing the young recruits—the "Wannabees." These chapters provide ethnographic insights, but are unfortunately tainted by the author's preoccupation with differences between Dominicans and North Americans. Klein seems unable to interpret Dominican culture without constant reference to his own.

Rob Ruck is an historian by vocation and a lover of baseball and good literary style by nature.
Unlike Klein’s *Sugarball*, whose primary mission is to test scholarly hypotheses through the study of baseball, Ruck’s *Tropic of Baseball* is unabashedly about the game itself. His book, then, is written for fans. As a scholarly work, however, it subtly teaches the history of Dominican society and culture to an audience of North American baseball fans. Indeed, his description and analysis of the development of baseball in the Dominican Republic is the definitive treatment of the topic.

In *El Béisbol*, journalist John Krich employs a grander view than that of Klein or Ruck; he discusses five principal suppliers of major-league ballplayers (the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela). He also approaches Hispanic Caribbean baseball with no academic pretensions and tells his story with the wacky and whimsical flair of a Hunter Thompson. Krich’s approach makes for fascinating reading—an adventure in the tropics, with baseball and the history of US dominance over Latin America as the unifying themes. In short, Krich has written a book for politically progressive US baseball fans. No fan can finish this book without appreciating the social and political problems of Caribbean Basin nations and the inequities in US-Latin American relations. Whether discussing Mexican, Venezuelan, or Dominican baseball, Krich has the unique talent of combining tales of individual passion with the wacky and whimsical flair of a Hunter Thompson. Krich’s approach makes for fascinating reading—an adventure in the tropics, with baseball and the history of US dominance over Latin America as the unifying themes. In short, Krich has written a book for politically progressive US baseball fans. No fan can finish this book without appreciating the social and political problems of Caribbean Basin nations and the inequities in US-Latin American relations. Whether discussing Mexican, Venezuelan, or Dominican baseball, Krich has the unique talent of combining tales of individual passion with broad historical events. Sexual liaisons exist side-by-side with racial confrontations. Salsa rhythms and fried plantains inhabit the same canvas with dictatorships and US military occupations.

Krich’s wildest political fantasies are found in his last chapter, “The Reconquest.” Latin ballplayers conquer US baseball and society as leftist guerrillas: “. . . all the Latin leaguers simultaneously put down their mitts and pick up machetes. The banana republics become baseball republics once and for all. And that’s when the hot pot that’s been cooking for a century boils over” (pp. 269-70). Roberto Clemente returns to lead the troops, Juan Marichal’s trademark “high kick proves useful in evading the barred wire on army bases” (p. 270), US governors and senators are replaced by umpires, games are played in “Anti-Yankee Stadium,” and “the White House becomes the Tan House” (p. 271).

**As quickly as Dominicans emerged as solid and even superstar major-league players, professional baseball’s popularity in the country is declining even faster.**

**The Future of Dominican Baseball**

Baseball is still a vital part of Dominican popular culture, but as both Klein and Ruck remind us, all is not well in the Dominican game. As quickly as Dominicans emerged in disproportionate numbers as solid and even superstar major-league players, professional baseball’s popularity in the country is declining even faster. The reasons are myriad and diverse. They are related to the declining quality of winter ball in the Dominican Republic, economic crisis, and competition from another US-born sport.

Major league ballplayers who toil for their millions of dollars during the summer in the US are now reluctant to play during the Dominican winter season. They argue that they need to rest and cannot risk a career-ending injury for a few pesos. Dominican fans grew accustomed to seeing some of the world’s greatest baseball players display their skills in their home country. Since the mid-1980s, however, few Dominican major leaguers play “winter ball” to audiences of their fellow countrymen, and those who do so tend to play a shortened season. Tony Peña, of the Boston Red Sox in the summer and the Aguilas Cibaeñas (Cibao Eagles) in the winter, is the noteworthy exception and thus is now a national hero. Peña is not enough of an exception to save attendance, however. As Dominican fans have come to recognize the declining quality of winter baseball, the number of fans present in the stadium has plummeted.

Another key reason for plunging attendance is that the Dominican economy has been in shambles since 1984. The economic crisis has brought prolonged daily blackouts that limit night games. More important, the lion’s share of Dominican fans comes from the working class, a group that can no longer afford the admission price.

Ruck also notes an important recent shift in sports interest in the country: basketball is beginning to supplant baseball as the Dominican national sport. Many Dominicans now view basketball as the game of the older generation, of rural areas, and of the poor. Basketball is the new passion of the emerging urban lower-middle class. Michael Jordan mania is on the rise in the Dominican Republic: Chicago Bulls T-shirts and high-top sneakers are now the youth fashion rage, and the new-style “wannabees,” “wanna be like Mike.”

So far, only one Dominican, Tito Horford, has made it to the National Basketball Association (NBA) and his tenure was brief. Will the second half of the 1990s bring an onslaught of Dominican roundball players to the NBA? Nonetheless, and regardless of the possible future success of Dominicans in the NBA, basketball in the Dominican Republic, like baseball, will always be a Dominican game.
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Civil-Military Relations in Latin America

by Marian Goslinga

Throughout Latin America's modern history, militarism and authoritarianism have been the norm, and democracy and reform the exception. In the 1950s, for instance, 12 out of the 20 republics were ruled by military juntas. Yet by 1961, 11 of the 12 had been eliminated. Only a year later, a new wave of military coups had begun as a result of which, by 1964, seven new military juntas were in office. It has been estimated that, between independence and World War I, the Spanish-American republics experienced 115 successful military coups and many times that number of abortive military revolts (Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*, rev. ed., Praeger, 1961).

In the 1980s and early 1990s the military seemed to be on the retreat as country after country chose to experiment with constitutionally elected government. Nonetheless, recent events in Haiti, Peru, and Venezuela appear to have swung the pendulum the other way. At the least they have proven that the Latin American military remains a powerful wild card. Until Latin American democracy is able to shed its eggshell fragility, this vicious circle is apt to continue indefinitely.

The literature listed below is one indicator of the durability of military influence on Latin American government and political affairs.

<table>
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<th>Title</th>
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| Argentina y los nexos militares.                                     | Leobardo Urrutia Juárez. *Hispano Americano*, v. 99 (August 1991), p. 39. | [Describes the government’s efforts to break up the money laundering and drug trafficking begun under the military regime.]
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