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From Confrontation to Partnership

by J. Antonio Villamil

On June 27, 1990, President George Bush launched a far-reaching plan to increase economic cooperation in the hemisphere by creating, in the long term, a regional free-trade zone. This announcement provides a blueprint for regional action, based on the principle of free trade rather than increased economic aid. The blueprint highlights the concept of a "partnership" to bolster hemispheric prosperity, an approach made possible by Latin America's pronounced movement towards democracy and free markets.

Inter-American discourse could shift, therefore, from disjointed approaches to economic problems, such as the debt "crisis," to a comprehensive program to stimulate regional economic growth. The success of this opportunity hinges on the establishment of preconditions for increased economic intercourse.

The Plan

To begin with, the US must shift from being a net capital importer to its proper role as a net capital exporter, like Japan and Germany. Such a shift promises to allow scarce capital to flow into less-developed countries that offer increasing investment returns as they consolidate free-market policies. As a result, a capital-exporting US would foster steady increases in the hemisphere's economic welfare.

The US cannot re-emerge as a net capital exporter, however, unless it sharply reduces its fiscal deficit and stimulates private saving through pro-growth fiscal reform. The current US tax code, for example, promotes consumption at the expense of saving and production. Nonetheless, a promising sign is the current progress in bipartisan budget negotiations to reduce the fiscal imbalance. The outcome of such negotiations is uncertain, given fundamental differences in tax philosophy between Democrats and Republicans, a weakened US economy, and the outbreak of the Gulf crisis. A pro-growth budgetary package would include the following measures: reductions in federal expenditures as a percent of gross national product; reform of so-called entitlement expenditures like medicare; budgetary reform such as line-item veto power by the president; and business-transaction taxes to increase revenues. In addition, implementation of a lower capital gains tax on longer-term investments would stimulate saving and production.

Another precondition is world trade liberalization under the so-called Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The multilateral trade discussions began in 1986 and are scheduled to end in December 1990. A favorable agreement would unleash nearly $1 trillion in world trade that is currently subject to regulatory barriers, creating explicit rules and processes for the settlement of trade disputes. Furthermore, signatories of the agreement would commit to a steady reduction in agricultural practices that distort international trade. Among such practices are domestic subsidies, price supports, and export subsidies.

The US, Canada, and many agricultural exporting countries of the hemisphere are strongly committed to agricultural trade liberalization. There is significant opposition, however, from members of the European Economic Community, especially France and Germany, which heavily subsidize their agricultural sectors. By the same token, Congress would continue to vote in favor of US agricultural subsidies—as the recent farm support bill shows—unless an agreement is reached to liberalize agricultural trade under GATT.

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The stakes in the current deliberations are high. We can expect that a trade liberalization agreement will be signed in December, given its importance to world prosperity. A GATT agreement would provide a framework for negotiating regional free-trade agreements, and would be the best insurance for the Americas against a world of rival trade blocs.

As yet another precondition, Latin American nations must continue the process of free-market reform, including the consolidation of open trade and investment policies, to enhance economic efficiency. A free-trade agreement without such reform would exacerbate Latin America’s structural inefficiencies and restrict the region’s economic growth. The key is to allow the free flow of resources to those productive activities that offer the highest returns. This can be done only if business activities are deregulated and if investment is allocated on the basis of free prices, including market-determined exchange rates and interest rates.

Measures to reduce official, government-to-government debt are a vital part of the initiative. Creditor governments could accept deep discounts in the face value of official debts, longer-term rescheduling of payments, and reductions in interest rates.

Momentum
In short, the Bush initiative provides a road map for improving the long-term economic welfare of the hemisphere. The consultative process among nations is in full swing and promises eventually to achieve a regional free-trade zone. Mexico, which is on track to become a hemispheric economic power in the 21st century, has already signaled its intention to move towards a free-trade agreement with the US. The Southern Cone countries seem inclined to create their own trade bloc and then negotiate as a region for a free-trade agreement with the US and other countries of the Americas. There is growing momentum, then, in favor of the Bush plan. At a minimum the plan has changed the tone of inter-American dialogue from confrontation over economic issues to constructive discussion of development initiatives.

The results ultimately depend on our hemisphere’s commitment to the creation of the appropriate environment for economic cooperation rather than conflict. Count me as a cautious optimist that the Bush initiative will succeed and that the 21st century will usher in an era of improved living standards for the peoples of the Americas.
The Crisis in Trinidad

by Anthony P. Maingot

For five intense days during July and August 1990, a band of violent men, led by an ex-policeman with the adopted name of Iman Yasin Abu Bakr, attempted to overthrow the government of Trinidad by holding much of the government and all of the people hostage.

Were this event of interest only to Trinidadians, it would not be worth reviving. Its importance, however, reaches beyond the confines of that island. It relates directly to the situation of many Caribbean countries, which, like so many other countries around the world, are in transition from state-directed welfare states to free-market economic systems. The social, political, and economic tensions unleashed by the “adjustments” are everywhere enormous. Small Caribbean democracies, though, are facing a particularly dangerous situation: they are open systems lacking even elementary forms of state security. Television footage of four prime ministerial bodyguards trying to fend off 40 armed rebels with nothing more than handguns is a convincing reminder of that democratic civilian reality.

Abu Bakr in Perspective

An understanding of Trinidad’s social and political processes requires more than the typical reporting on “Third World turmoil.” Even more important, it requires more attention and sympathetic concern from those in positions of influence in the US. Not only has such concern not been forthcoming, but what has been said tends to be way off the mark. This superficial analysis is demonstrated by no less a figure than Mervyn M. Dymally, Trinidad-born member of the US Congress from California and a congressional leader on Caribbean affairs. In an August 3 letter to his colleagues asking them to oppose any US intervention, Dymally spoke of the island’s “grave social and economic injustices” and of an economy that had “virtually collapsed.”

Many analysts are guilty of one of the most prevalent and pernicious tendencies in the interpretation of Third World politics: the automatic linking of rebellion against established authorities with conditions of injustice and denial. History tells us that two dangerous self-delusions logically extend from this tendency: the assumption that the rebels invariably pursue justice and equality, or that they at least have to be better than the existing evil. The experiences of both Grenada and Suriname should have taught us to avoid such traps. But there is another insidious tendency: events, which in the US or Europe would be regarded as little more than criminal acts, take on political and even moral tones when they occur in the Third World.

One cannot help but wonder, for instance, what Mr. Dymally’s position is regarding Milwaukee alderman Mike McGee who has formed a Black Panther militia. McGee warns that unless some $100 million is invested in Milwaukee’s black area by 1995, the militia will take matters into its own hands “with a reign of terror against the white way of life” (The Economist, August 18, 1990, p. 19). Polls do not indicate much support for McGee’s position, but the Economist quotes a black professor at the University of Wisconsin who believes McGee reflects the feelings of an overwhelming majority of frustrated black Americans.

It is not at all surprising, therefore, that he should characterize the hostage-taking as stemming from “essentially a situation of social and economic neglect and exclusion of the Trinidad people.”

Above and beyond the superficiality of the analysis, Dymally, and the many who argued like him, are guilty of one of the most prevalent and, as such pernicious, tendencies in the interpretation of Third World politics: the automatic linking of rebellion against established authorities with conditions of injustice and denial. History tells us that two dangerous self-delusions logically extend from this tendency: the assumption that the rebels invariably pursue justice and equality, or that they at least have to be better than the existing evil. The experiences of both Grenada and Suriname should have taught us to avoid such traps. But there is another insidious tendency: events, which in the US or Europe would be regarded as little more than criminal acts, take on political and even moral tones when they occur in the Third World.

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the difference between the threats of McGee and those uttered for the past five years by Trinidad’s Abu Bakr are differences in physical capabilities, not in depth of resentment and rebellious intent? Is it not true that the right of any democratic government to expect obedience should not be confused with the capacity of that government to enforce such obedience? Is it not a plausible proposition that since both McGee and Abu Bakr claim their attitudes and postures stem from alienation, deprivation, and moral indignation, that their violent intentions should be judged in the same terms? These questions are especially relevant since only a daring person would argue that the US is a more democratic or less racist society than Trinidad.

**Political Motives**

Neither an opportunistic moral code nor simple socioeconomic arguments explain either the anger of urban American blacks or the events in Trinidad. After all, that island has, comparatively speaking, a high standard of living and of social welfare. Judged in terms of rates of infant mortality, longevity, and literacy—critical measures of development and social equity—Trinidad compares well with the much-touted Cuban case. Its income is better distributed than Mexico’s or Venezuela’s, indeed, even than Costa Rica’s. If economic conditions explain Abu Bakr’s actions, why are there no Abu Bakr’s in those countries? The reason is that Abu Bakr-type events are not merely spontaneous responses to temporary economic conditions or even a given government. They are conspiracies against a system of government. This explains why he began buying arms and training his men in Libya years ago.

It is time US journalists and congressional representatives call things by their names, whether they occur in the US or in a Third World democracy. ■
Soul Sport
by Abelardo Sánchez-León

Perhaps it is a quirk of history that the seeds of soccer took root not in North America but in South America. What germinated in the lower geographic tier of the New World was less a sport than a compelling feature of everyday life: a cultural expression of personal, social, and national aspirations.

During the 19th century soccer was primarily a sport of Europe’s working classes. It arrived in South America aboard British ships and became a major recreational activity in the port cities as they began to modernize with British assistance. The sport soon spread to remote mining camps in Andean cities like Cerro de Pasco and Huanacavelica in Peru and La Paz in Bolivia. These Andean enclaves, which were once part of the colonial trade routes of silver and mercury, were being revitalized by British railways that connected the mines with Peruvian ports.

The essence of British soccer—white skin and tired blue eyes—was replaced by local traits. The new players and fans were the mestizos of the Andes and beyond; the blacks of the Colombian, Ecuadorian, Peruvian, and Brazilian coasts; and the poor, barefoot Italians who were arriving in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. These are the coals and fire that burn today in the soul sport of South American life.

Flexible Specialization

Though created by the conservative British, soccer nimbly eludes the straitjacket of rules. Not surprising, then, is its supreme adaptability to local conditions—to differences in social composition and culture, economic development, and even the physical stature of people. Swimmers and runners, for instance, are alone in their rigidly defined space, pushing themselves beyond their physical limitations, calling upon their internal reserves of endurance and training. Soccer players, in contrast, blend their individual efforts as a loosely woven team on an expansive field. While physical talent is important, the faults of any one player can be offset by the assets of another, and more valuable than brute strength, speed, or able strategy is a knack for improvisation.

A population accustomed to uncertainty seems to expect the suspension of science and logic during the 90 magical minutes of a soccer game. Anything can happen; and poor nations can beat wealthy nations. Indeed, street wisdom has it that poverty—with its growth-stunted bodies and undereducated minds—generates a spirit of agility and resilience that, with the right footing, can outmaneuver the rich and powerful.

Such convictions are deeply etched into the psyche of Peruvians, for example, whose collective memory still resonates with the cheers of Peru’s convincing 1959 victory over England in Lima. Similarly remembered is the 1978 World Cup triumph over Scotland in Argentina. In that game the Peruvian team deflated the First World ego of the Scottish players and coach, who, having snickered at their Andean rivals, paid the price for an ill-advised night on the town.

But these victories involved something more than the international assertion of Third World pride. Soccer is played in few of Peru’s elite private schools. Rarely, then, do the white-skinned upper classes play as amateurs. And with one exception—Alfredo Tomasini, who died along with the rest of the immensely popular Alianza Lima in a 1987 plane crash—they never

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El fútbol demands neither endless hours of instruction nor expensive infrastructure; healthy legs, a ball, and a desire to kick it are enough to play.

With fluidity and improvisation comes uncertainty. And with uncertainty comes surprise—no less in soccer than in the endless villas miseras of South America. A population accustomed to uncertainty seems to expect the suspension of science and logic during the 90 magical minutes of a soccer game. Anything can happen; and poor nations can beat wealthy nations. Indeed, street wisdom has it that poverty—with its growth-stunted bodies and undereducated minds—generates a spirit of agility and resilience that, with the right footing, can outmaneuver the rich and powerful.

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play as professionals. The playing of the sport and the defense of the national jersey are left to mestizos and blacks, for whom soccer is much more than recreation.

Though ethnic patterns vary, the class structure of soccer is similar throughout South America. Yet by no means do all of the region’s countries share Peru’s humble posture on the international soccer circuit. In striking contrast, Brazil (a three-time winner of the World Cup), Argentina (twice victorious), and soccer power Uruguay stand as shining testimonials to Latin America’s broader aspirations and potential.

Since the US becomes rather minuscule on the soccer field, South America’s extra-regional soccer sights are set on Europe. The World Cup, of course, is the principal arena for this test of forces. In fact, Argentina’s military defeat by England in the Falklands was avenged in the 1986 Cup in Mexico—on Latin American turf, no less—with Diego Armando Maradona leading the heroic charge. Maradona not only scored a goal after eluding eight British opponents, but scored a second time with the help of, as he put it, “the hand of God.” For Argentines as well as millions of other Latin Americans, pride was restored.

National pride is just as hotly contested at the regional level as it is in the World Cup. According to Paulo Schilling, Uruguay’s relationship with Brazil is an exemplary case. The Uruguayan economy, like most of the other Southern Cone economies, is the object of substantial investment by Brazilians, a trend that exacerbates longstanding Uruguayan-Brazilian tensions. Whenever Uruguay conquers Brazil on the soccer field, the emotions unleashed represent not so much a sports triumph as a nationalist vindication.

The Other America

Given that the 1994 World Cup is scheduled to take place in the US, why, we might speculate, has soccer not taken root there? Consider Oliver Stone’s movie, *Born on the Fourth of July* (1989), which portrays a small-town high school athlete who enlists to fight in Vietnam. Like a quarterback rallying his team in the game’s waning moments, the soldier throws himself into the war effort, marching his squad ahead with swaggering confidence. Truth is victory and victory goes to the team “willing to pay the price.”

This clear, confident vision is alien to the soccer field. There improvisation prevails, the best teams frequently lose in penalty-kick shoot-outs, and an honorable tie (or even defeat) is often cause for celebration. At the 1990 World Cup in Italy, the US got a firsthand look at the heart, weapons, and ways of Latin America and the rest of the world.■

(Translated by Deborah Rosenberg)
Misreading Colombia

by Alex Wilde

The escalating US “war on drugs” in the Andes is a textbook case of domestically driven foreign policy. Such policy gathers momentum because it is popular—in this case, with beleaguered urban politicians, right-wing xenophobes, and Southern Command strategists. Ultimately, however, it must be judged not only by the support it receives from domestic constituencies but by the consequences reported at the place where it is applied. By this standard the Bush administration is embarking on a dangerous course in Colombia—potentially harmful both to human rights and democracy in that country and to the best interests of the US.

The US War on Drugs

The most dangerous aspect of the US antinarcotics policy toward Colombia is its military component. Since 1988 US military and police aid to Colombia has grown dramatically. In addition to the growth of direct aid, antinarcotics legislation allowed the Export-Import Bank to guarantee $200 million in private loans in 1989 to the Ministerio de Defensa Nacional for the purchase of US military equipment. The number of US military personnel in Colombia is confidential, but it was reported at the end of 1989 to be 85, and given the abrupt increase in aid it may be higher.

Military aid has entangled the US in the Colombian military’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign. Following a military offensive by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional in the fall of 1989, the armed forces stepped up aerial bombing of suspected guerrilla strongholds. According to the Jesuit research center CINEP, in February 1990, A-37 airplanes and helicopters bombed and strafed the community of Llana Fria in San Vicente de Chucurí (Santander province), forcing more than 1,400 peasants to flee their homes and seek refuge in San Vicente, Barrancabermeja, and Bucaramanga. Similar bombing has been reported in villages in the Urabá, Yondo, and Meta regions.

Witnesses maintain that the attacks were not aimed at guerrilla camps, as the military claimed, but at civilian settlements. Eight A-37s were part of the $65-million US aid package. Witnesses of the bomb- ments have also sighted Blackhawk helicopters, which the Colombian armed forces purchased through the Pentagon with their 1989 Export-Import Bank guaranteed loans.

The US has chosen to address its national drug problem with a strategy that is fundamentally flawed in two respects: it is directed disproportionately toward the Andean supply countries, and it is conceived disproportionately in military terms. The Bush administration has shown a welcome awareness of some of the limitations of the supply-side approach, but the subject still merits congressional debate. Although prone to temporary fluctuations, the acreage planted to coca has grown enormously since 1980. And hard-headed military analysts admit the US would be fortunate to stop 10% of what would otherwise enter.

Of greatest concern, however, is the preponderant role assigned to the military in the so-called “war on drugs.” In recent years there has been a dangerous erosion of many of the safeguards the US Congress erected to maintain the democratic accountability of the US armed forces in their actions abroad. The Andean war on drugs could accelerate that erosion. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan signed a secret directive that made international narcotics trafficking a matter of national security. In 1989 President Bush agreed to allow US military advisers to go into drug-producing zones, an arena previously limited

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to US civilian personnel. The "rules of engagement" have recently been relaxed for US military personnel in such situations. The retiring CIA general counsel Russell J. Brommer noted in April 1990 that Executive Order 12333, which binds US Special Operations Forces and forbids assassinations overseas, has been reinterpreted to mean that "force may be used under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to attack terrorist targets." The Southern Command in Panama is reportedly planning to extrapolate to the Andes the military lessons of the "Just Cause" invasion of December 1989. It is by no means inconceivable, then, that US forces will soon be directly engaged in active combat in the Andes.

Likewise worrisome is a growing tendency to lump antinarcotics activity in with counterinsurgency. This tendency has implications for both the role of US personnel and the use of US equipment by foreign militaries. In the latter regard, the effectiveness of past controls on foreign military forces is not reassuring. For example, a September 1989 General Accounting Office report on Burma found that the State Department had not been able to ensure that US aircraft were not used for counterinsurgency purposes. The line between antinarcotics and counterinsurgency warfare has already been blurred for Peru (which might "further US antinarcotics objectives") and for Guatemala (where the US has worked with that country's military intelligence to pursue alleged drug traffickers). Will this also happen in Colombia?

The militarized concept of US policy ignores three fundamental aspects of Colombian reality. First, it overlooks how drug-related violence fits into the social panorama of Colombian violence, in particular the sinister alliance between the traffickers' paramilitary death squads and members of the state security forces. Second, it ignores the Colombian government's degree of responsibility for the country's human rights emergency, through failure to control members of its own military and police. And third, it does not address the 30-year expansion of the power and autonomy of the Colombian armed forces, which undermines democratic accountability and destabilizes the political system by blocking greatly needed reforms.

Colombia's Drug Violence

Colombia's some 170 years of independence encompass both the longest tradition of elected civilian government in Latin America and the bloodiest history of recurrent violence in the hemisphere. During the so-called "Violencia" (1946-58), violent deaths numbered at least 180,000. During the 1960s and '70s, the failures of Colombian social reform and the violent challenge of revolutionary guerrillas fueled a progressive militarization of Colombian life. It is of utmost importance that US policy comprehend this legacy, which frames the rise of drug-related violence. The drug cartels are only the most recent draft from a much deeper cup.

By virtually all measures, Colombia is experiencing one of the world's worst human rights emergencies. Understanding its dimensions and character is a complex but essential task. To begin with, violent death in Colombia is appallingly common: in 1988 there were 20,129 homicides (in a population of some 31 million), and murder ranks as the most frequent cause of death for males between the ages of 15 and 45. What is more, Colombia is in the midst of a guerrilla insurgency: 732 soldiers, police, guerrillas, and civilians were killed in combat situations in 1989. And the Colombian government is confronted by the violence of the drug...
cartels: according to the New York Times (June 3, 1990) in 1989 the cocaine mafia was responsible for 885 deaths.

Though Colombia has a long history of violent criminal activity, the drug cartels emerged as a political force in the early 1980s. US policymakers have made much of the so-called “narco-guerrilla” connection, an alleged alliance between drug traffickers and armed revolutionaries to overthrow electoral democracy.

Far more important, however, is the alliance forged between the drug mafias and the extreme right-wing elements among large landowners, economic elites, and members of the Colombian security forces. The first of the modern Colombian death squads—the so-called “Muerte a Secuestrados” (“Death to Kidnappers”)—was formed by the Medellin cartel in 1981 as a reaction to a favorite guerrilla tactic. Since then, these paramilitary groups, and cartel-financed hit men (sicarios), have proliferated. Among their targets have been judges, mayors, and other government officials, as well as the prominent political figures whose assassinations have made the US evening news. Yet, most striking in terms of the numbers is how many of their victims have been judges and members of the legal political left.

The new criminal elite created by cocaine wealth clearly feels threatened by the growing strength of the Colombian left.

Civil-Military Relations

Historically the Colombian military stood in sharp contrast to its counterparts in much of the rest of Latin America as a small force, marginal to its nation’s political life. Nevertheless, the Violencia and the counterinsurgency warfare of the last 30 years have transformed the military into a central and increasingly autonomous political actor. For decades every Colombian president has at some point faced open defiance by his minister of defense (who is drawn from within the armed forces). Since the late 1970s, however, public challenges to civilian authority have become more aggressive. Though none of these conflicts has led to a military coup d’état, the pattern of governance has become more militarized. In a perverse way the ingrained habits of repression through militarization have themselves become a principal cause of instability by thwarting peaceful and democratic change.

Fortunately, new president César Gaviria has spoken out against paramilitary activity and proclaimed his support for political reconciliation and change. There is also promise in the May 1990 electoral showing of M-19’s Antonio Navarro Wolf, who courageously chose to compete even though the two previous presidential candidates of the left, Bernardo Jaramillo and Carlos Pizarro, were assassinated. If M-19 can indeed make the transition from armed struggle to political competition, it could promote a more coherent, pluralistic, and responsive political system.

Human Rights and the State

Perhaps the most important aspect of Colombia’s human rights emergency is that drug-related violence represents only a part of it: the misguided emphasis on drug-related violence by US media and policymakers is the premise of fundamentally misdirected policy. The 385 deaths attributed to the drug mafias in 1989 must be seen against the much larger total of at least 2,479 deaths and disappearances in the same year due to noncombat political causes. Narcoterrorism is indeed tragic, but it is dwarfed by politically based violence.

Colombian officials often point to drug traffickers and guerrillas as the agents of violence, portraying the government itself as a victim. The government, though, has failed to control its own agents in the military and police forces. Hence the Colombian government bears responsibility for human rights violations not only against civilians during guerrilla-military conflicts, but also against political opponents and campaigners for social reform.

Military and police complicity in paramilitary activity has been documented by Colombian government
sources and human rights groups and by the 1989 US State Department Human Rights Report. The Colombian military high command denies the involvement of the armed forces in human rights violations, but has a long record of obstructing the legitimate investigations undertaken by other government agencies. According to the State Department report, 84 officers were dismissed from the armed forces in the first eight months of 1989, most of them for association with drug traffickers, involvement with rightist paramilitary groups, or violations of human rights.

A few egregious cases have been turned over to civilian courts. In theory, the Colombian supreme court has established that civilian courts have jurisdiction to try members of the military and police responsible for human rights violations. In practice, virtually all such cases continue to be heard within the military court system. The few cases brought to civilian courts languish in disturbing parallel to El Salvador. In the words of the State Department report, “Punishment for human rights abuses within the military judicial system seldom extends beyond dismissal from the service. . . . In the immediate future . . . there appears to be little prospect of effective action by judges of the weak civilian judicial system.” In sum, the Colombian military judges itself.

US Policy and Colombian Reform

The military is the chosen instrument of US policy to fight Colombia’s drug mafias. It is, however, the wrong instrument. If the Colombian government is to have any chance against the drug mafias, it must win deeper public support by carrying out fundamental political and social reforms—calling on the commitment, creativity, and courage of democrats across the political spectrum. Such support will be obtained only if the government honestly faces its responsibility for the country’s human rights emergency and augments its efforts to hold the armed forces accountable. US military aid undermines that possibility by strengthening the autonomy of the Colombian armed forces. And, in the name of combating “narco-guerrillas,” such aid threatens to draw the US into a counterinsurgency war in the Andes.

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Sustaining the Harvest

by Richard Reed

South America's tropical areas are suffering from massive and intensive land development. Ranching, commercial agriculture, and colonization schemes are clearing the forests to accommodate the land needs of peasants and the foreign-exchange needs of governments. The outcome of this transformation remains undetermined, but as the trees are felled for pasture and cotton fields, evidence mounts that the green forests are being permanently reduced to red deserts.

The low rolling hills of eastern Paraguay are covered by one of the last of South America's virgin subtropical deciduous forests. The region harbors a diverse biosphere, important as a refuge for large mammals such as the giant armadillo and the jaguar and for a variety of unclassified fauna. These forests are also the home of more than 15,000 Guarani Indians, the remnants of a much larger population that once stretched across the southern half of the continent, from the Andes to the Atlantic Ocean. Although the Guarani have survived five centuries of European settlement, present-day land development threatens their future.

Ironically environmentalists, in their search for models of sustainable development to protect Paraguay's remaining forest, are turning to indigenous peoples for answers.

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Environmentalists, in their search for models of sustainable development to protect Paraguay's remaining forest, are turning to indigenous peoples for answers.

The Guarani harvest a wild tea, yerba mate, for sale to international markets. Commercial yerba production began after the Spanish conquest in the 16th century and merchants were soon traveling into the farthest reaches of what is now Paraguay. Despite centuries of extensive harvesting, the extraction of the leaf did not harm the forest cover and had little impact on the diverse flora and fauna. Moreover, yerba production did not displace the Guarani from their forests and communities. They integrated commercial tea extraction into indigenous hunting and agricultural systems, allowing them the economic autonomy to maintain a distinct social organization and ethnic identity. As a model for future development in the area, such commercial extraction could protect both the forest and the Guarani.

Intensive Development

State-sponsored, large-scale development in eastern Paraguay is designed to provide land and profit to colonists and investors. New roads bring settlers and provide transport for new commercial activities. Rather than initiate land reform in the country's heavily settled areas, government colonization schemes are pulling non-Indian campesinos to this frontier area. The forests are being divided into 20 hectare plots and assigned to colonists, who are producing cotton to earn the money necessary to purchase land titles.

Agroindustries are contributing to this rapid and rapacious transformation. Fields of thousands of hectares are being planted in soybean and cotton for the international markets. Ranches are cutting into the forests at an even faster rate, creating pastures of more than 10,000 hectares in the wilderness. Between 1975 and 1980 alone the total area of eastern Paraguay under crops and pasture increased by 110%, destroying 876,000 hectares or 20% of the forests.

This transformation is devastating the region's wildlife. Deer and pig are hunted for food and jaguar and other rare mammals are trapped for their skins. The flora is suffering as well. Forest timber is sold off, even in areas not cleared for planting. Valuable hardwoods are hauled off to mills and the remaining timber is split for fence posts and firewood. The forest canopy is being destroyed and the number of remaining plant and animal species is being reduced by exposure to sun and rain.

Such development has been equally harsh on the zone's human inhabitants, the Guarani, most of whose land is summarily expropriated by the government and turned over to private enterprises. The Stroessner government took
steps to set aside land for the Guarani only after criticism by anthropologists such as Miguel Chase-Sardi and Bartomeu Meliá, by groups such as Survival International (England) and Cultural Survival (US), and by the Carter administration (1976-80). Even then, the Guarani communities were offered the same size plots offered to non-Indian peasants. This policy ensures that the Guarani engage in intensive commercial agriculture similar to that of campesinos.

Land development and confinement to reservations directly threaten the sustainable commercial economy of the Guarani. For one thing, 20 hectare parcels provide no forest expanses for commercial production. For another, the Guarani attempt to compensate for the loss of tea profits by planting cash crops. Surveys show that, in three communities confined to reservations, gardens have grown by an average of 40% as the Guarani begin to plant cotton. This trend increases the amount of forest cleared and forces them into a destructive spiral, as the apparent answer to their economic desperation exacerbates their plight. The result could well be similar to that of the Paraguayan peasants, who purchase inputs such as seed and pesticide to produce cotton, which then destroys the soil and renders producers increasingly indebted to an exploitative world market.

Worse still, the current form of development could prove unsustainable. Despite access to new land and high profits from the first crops in the forest, there are indications that the fragile soil resources of the region will not support intensive commercial development. Above all, rain and sun quickly break down the thin topsoils. Small farmers on similar lands in the Brazilian state of Paraná have found that production and profits decline rapidly after the first years, and thus they are fleeing north to the states of Rondônia and Acre.

Recent anthropological research calls attention to traditional resource management by the Guarani and suggests that they could provide an alternative model for development in eastern Paraguay: a model that promises to foster sustainable commercial profits without degrading forests.

**Biosphere Reserve**

The Guarani are in a unique situation to illustrate the rationality of their indigenous economy. Efforts are under way to preserve the region's flora and fauna as a biosphere reserve. Since the Guarani are a critical part of this environment, their traditional land-use patterns are being integrated into this regional plan, while providing them with a sustainable source of commercial profits.

In 1970 an extensive area of forest called Mbaracayu was purchased by an entrepreneur, not for the harvesting of yerba mate but for lumbering and speculative purposes, and was used as collateral for World Bank loans. When the
operation went bankrupt in 1974, the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank found itself holding title to more than 55,000 hectares of primary forest. By 1989 the World Bank, having never located a purchaser interested in the entire parcel, became willing to collaborate with an international environmental group, the Nature Conservancy, to establish a biosphere reserve. Looking for a debt-for-nature swap, the government of General Andrés Rodriguez, which succeeded the Stroessner dictatorship in 1989, has expressed strong support for the plan.

Anthropologists have been enlisted by the Nature Conservancy and the Inter-American Foundation to adapt indigenous production systems to a long-term model for resource management of the area, which has considerable potential for sustained yields of yerba. The zone has been the most fertile of the natural yerba forests and the home to at least nine distinct yerba fields. In the early 1900s an average of 25,000 kilograms of tea were harvested annually from the area. At current market rates of more than a dollar per kilo, this harvest would yield $250,000 per year.

The 400 Guarani families located near the land have title to small reservations that are suitable for agriculture but insufficient for hunting or commercial production. Anthropologists suggest that these communities be provided rights to commercial yerba gathering on Mbaracayu land, supplementing their subsistence gardens on their own lands. Rights to other uses of the biosphere reserve will remain restricted, since the Guarani could drastically alter the forest if provided unrestricted gardening rights. Gathering tea from the land could provide cash to relieve the dependence of the Guarani families on cotton production, thereby slowing the pace of forest clearing for agriculture and allowing traditional slash-and-burn systems to keep pace with gardening.

Such production is well suited to the labor resources of the Guarani. The harvesting of yerba is labor, not capital, intensive, and the annual cycle of agricultural work, peaking in August and September, integrates well with the peak yerba harvest from March to June. Further, the Guarani have traditionally harvested the leaf as members of teams based on kinship and household. These teams can be drawn from extant communities, forming a social structure to coordinate the administration of labor and the allocation of profits.

Traditional social relations within and between communities may provide the structure for the marketing of yerba as well. Currently five Guarani communities are loosely affiliated with each other. What they lack, however, is a formal mechanism that will allow for effective political action or economic cooperation. Yerba production would necessitate the formation of a regional federation of Guarani communities to administer the transportation and sale of yerba from Mbaracayu.

The production of yerba, then, could permit the Guarani to maintain an economy that preserves their distinct social organization and ethnic identity. Moreover, it could provide the Guarani with the impetus to form a regional agency to defend their economic interests in the regional economy and their legal and political interests in the national sphere. Finally, Mbaracayu could provide a model for wresting sustainable profits from forested regions without degrading the forest environment.

Commercial development does not inevitably destroy the forests, as the Guarani have demonstrated for centuries. Perhaps we can learn from them before it is too late.
Nicaragua: Staying the Course

by Luis Guillermo Solis

Aft er the overwhelming electoral defeat of the Sandinistas by the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO) on February 25, 1990, Nicaragua came to symbolize Central America’s Esquipulas vision of “ballots for bullets.” UNO’s decisive victory demonstrated that popular sovereignty can be effectively expressed in free and fair elections if the secrecy of the vote is guaranteed. Unfortunately, however, Nicaragua’s antidemocratic legacy of dictatorship, intervention, and violence are proving to be formidable obstacles to the country’s democratic transition.

A Divided Household

Political rifts are wider within the 14-party UNO coalition than between it and the Sandinista party, a problem that dates from the coalition’s hasty amalgamation in mid-1989. The parties within the coalition range from communist to conservative, and since the February elections their quarrels are anything but muted.

A focal point of this disunity is the feud that pits Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo and Congress Secretary Alfredo César, two pragmatists who advocate moderation in the government’s relations with the Sandinistas, against Vice President Virgilio Godoy and UNO’s Consejo Polí tico, whose stance is confrontational. The moderates scored an early major victory when they negotiated a pre-inaugural agreement between the incoming administration of Violeta Chamorro and the outgoing administration of Daniel Ortega, who, with his brother Humberto, has a stake in marginalizing Sandinista hardliners such as Bayardo Arce and Tomás Borge.

In setting the ground rules for the transfer of power, the agreement assured the Sandinistas that the Chamorro government would not dismantle key programs such as agrarian reform. In addition it called for the demobilization of the contra, a major reduction in the size of the Sandinista army without the reorganization of its command structure, and the transformation of the dreaded Ministerio del Interior into the civilian-oriented Ministerio de Gobernación. Yet, according to the agreement’s opponents within the UNO coalition, it was merely part of a larger, secret scheme to establish a co-gobierno with the Sandinistas, including the continued presence of Humberto Ortega as the highest ranking officer in the armed forces. Further developments, particularly the two Sandinista-organized labor strikes in May and July against the government’s harsh austerity program, show that a mass-based party structure keeps the Sandinistas afloat as Nicaragua’s principal power broker. Not surprisingly, however, such developments have strengthened the resolve of anti-Sandinista hardliners.

At the height of July’s strike, Vice President Godoy, together with a group of UNO notables and with backing by the Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (COSEP), announced the creation of the Comité para la Salvación Nacional, supposedly to prevent the onset of anarchy. Though President Chamorro immediately rebuked the Comité, its creation sent shock waves through the political establishment. The Sandinistas condemned the initiative as a “civilian coup” aimed at undermining Chamorro’s authority, especially since it proposed the formation of a “parallel cabinet” under vice-presidential control.

Neither the end of the strike nor the Godoy group’s eventual political retreat stabilized the Chamorro administration’s underpinnings. Both COSEP and UNO’s Consejo Político stridently criticized the administration’s concessions to organized labor, including the suspension of the program to return land to its former owners. The administration, they argued, had become a prisoner to the Sandinistas.

Not that the Sandinistas themselves are exempt from such discord: the labor strikes also brought to the surface conflicts between the party’s pragmatic and radical factions. When the Sandinistas assembled in May to assess the electoral results and discuss the party’s future, the pragmatists, led by the Ortega brothers, called for the democratization of the party. They called as well for the forging of a “constructive” relationship with the ruling sectors of UNO, whose importance to Nicaragua’s “democratic conquests” they acknowledged. In contrast the radicals argued for the preservation of the Dirección Nacional as the Sandinistas’ highest and unquestioned...
ruling body. They maintained that the Chamorro government should be opposed relentlessly, and that the Sandinistas must "govern from below"—a phrase coined, ironically, by Daniel Ortega himself. While the pragmatists seem to have the upper hand, their advantage is tenuous in light of Nicaraguan uncertainties.

In short, the Chamorro administration is not only grappling with the problems of imposing a severe austerity program on one of the hemisphere's most underdeveloped economies. It is simultaneously embroiled in conflicts at both ends of the political spectrum: with the UNO coalition's strident anti-Sandinista factions, and with the radical wing of the Sandinista party. What makes the governing clique's position especially precarious is that neither Chamorro nor her closest allies, Antonio Lacayo and Alfredo César, can count on the support of any broadly based partisan organization.

Building Institutions

If democracy is to survive in Nicaragua, the politics of personalism must somehow be superseded by the politics of institutions. Chamorro's first steps in this direction have centered on the demobilization of the contra, the reduction of the army's size, and the depoliticization of the police force by replacing the Ministerio del Interior with the Ministerio de Gobernación. The consolidation of these measures is crucial.

Reinforcing Chamorro's efforts has been the official support of the Sandinistas, based on the dominance of that party's moderates. Unfortunately, however, Central America's climate of disarmament has not been as favorable. So far, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have expressed commitment to only minor reductions in the size of their armies. As a result the Nicaraguan government is willing to disarm merely to the point of "reasonable" balance with its neighbors.

Similarly important, if much less discussed, is the strengthening of Nicaragua's judicial system, historically a weak, highly partisan set of institutions. The strengthening of the judicial system would widen channels for the negotiation of conflicts and enhance the state's legitimacy. Nevertheless, such reform requires much more consensus than exists among political contenders regarding the interests and form of a rebuilt state. Secondarily it requires much more international aid than is available for professionalization, staffing, and other technical and material needs.

The euphoria of UNO's electoral victory is now but a dim memory. The challenge ahead is to stay the course from bullets to ballots.
In most of Latin America the 1980s were a decade of declining investment and economic growth, shrinking per capita income, swelling external debt, and escalating inflation. Against this dismal backdrop, the economic success of Chile stands in stark contrast.

While the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are only recent converts to the gospel according to Adam Smith, Chilean economists have been preaching the blessings of a free-market economy for years. The conversions have been many and the results miraculous. Even the political left in Chile has embraced many of the structural and macroeconomic reforms behind its economy. In addition, it adopted macroeconomic and fiscal policies that encouraged investor confidence, particularly in areas where Chile enjoys natural advantages for developing exports, as in mining and renewable resources such as fish, fruit, and forestry products.

Much of Chile's future growth will continue to be financed by foreign investment in export-oriented industries, which are expected to expand by 10-15% annually well into the 1990s. The traditional mining sector, for example, is experiencing a boom, with major projects representing more than $2 billion in Asian, European, and US investments. Much of Chile's future growth will continue to be financed by foreign investment in export-oriented industries, which are expected to expand by 10-15% annually well into the 1990s. The traditional mining sector, for example, is experiencing a boom, with major projects representing more than $2 billion in Asian, European, and US investments.

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**Economic Goals**

The goals of Chile’s economic model were to boost exports, increase domestic savings, and reduce the foreign debt. The country succeeded in all three, in part due to external factors in the late 1980s such as high copper prices, low international oil prices, and moderate interest rates. However, the major reason for Chile’s success has been its reliance on the private sector and de-emphasis of the state’s role in managing the economy. In addition, it adopted macroeconomic and fiscal policies that encouraged investor confidence, particularly in areas where Chile enjoys natural advantages for developing exports, as in mining and renewable resources such as fish, fruit, and forestry products.

Much of Chile’s future growth will continue to be financed by foreign investment in export-oriented industries, which are expected to expand by 10-15% annually well into the 1990s. The traditional mining sector, for example, is experiencing a boom, with major projects representing more than $2 billion in Asian, European, and US investments. Fish, fruit, and forestry product exports, which form the core of Chile’s nontraditional export sector, also continue to expand at impressive rates.

**Continued Success?**

Nonetheless, some doubting Thomases question whether Chile’s free-market model can continue its success following the demise of General Augusto Pinochet’s regime (1973-90). It was under his authoritarian administration that membership in labor unions fell by about two-thirds. While some investors may indeed have been attracted to Chile by Pinochet’s “rules of the game,” it does not follow that authoritarianism is either a necessary or sufficient condition for the success of a free-market model. During the 1980s many Latin American economies worsened under authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the world’s most successful free-market economies—North America, Western Europe, and Japan—are also its most stable democracies. In any case, the Chilean model has continued to prosper and attract investors under the current Christian Democratic administration of President Patricio Aylwin.

Of course, factors outside the marketplace help to explain the success of free enterprise in Chile. For instance, Chile is relatively free of corruption. Its government agencies assist foreign investors in overcoming obstacles, instead of creating them. And it possesses a well-educated, hard-working labor pool that is largely untouched by xenophobia.

Perhaps most important of all, the success of Chile’s economic model has narrowed the differences among political groups regarding structural reform and macroeconomic policy. To be sure, political differences remain concerning labor reform and government spending on health and social welfare. There is consensus, however, that dramatic reversals in macroeconomic policy are unnecessary. This consensus has been bolstered by recent world developments, notably the end of the Cold War and recognition by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union of the economic superiority of free enterprise.

A spirit of compromise among Chilean political groups, from right to left, has enhanced President Aylwin’s ability to forge a consensus. The ideological breadth of the government coalition and its leadership by a skilled negotiator give the administration a reasonable chance to maintain a stable, effective government over the next four years, and to continue to attract domestic and foreign investors.

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Deals and Ideals

What’s happened to the Chico Mendes Foundation, the legacy of the Brazilian union leader and environmental activist who was murdered in 1989? Intense Hollywood bargaining for the movie rights to the Chico Mendes story has caused equally intense infighting to rip through the organization. The main source of agitation is Ilzamar Mendes—the activist’s 24-year-old widow—who, coincidentally, has become suddenly affluent as a result of the competition. She, in turn, accuses other Brazilian and US environmentalists of profiting from Hollywood’s interest (The Miami Herald, August 26, 1990). But all sides have good words for British producer David Puttnam (Chariots of Fire, The Killing Fields), who plans to begin filming in mid-1991.

Left Out?

The field of Latin American studies is left-leaning and marginal to the policy world. So argues William Ratliff, a senior researcher at the Hoover Institution, in “Latin American Studies: Up from Radicalism?” (Academic Questions, Winter 1989-90). As for the Latin American Studies Association, Ratliff quotes a “social democratic colleague” who concludes that “the best thing about LASA lately is its increasing irrelevance outside of itself.”

Hugo’s Wrath

The effects of Hurricane Hugo’s damage are still being felt throughout the Caribbean. In May 1990 the US International Trade Commission reported that Hugo was the primary reason for the disastrous decline in rum exports from the US Virgin Islands, which dropped from 7.9 million proof liters in 1988 to about 500,000 proof liters in 1989.

Try Erótica

In February 1990 Epic Records released Erótica by harpist Roberto Perera, a native of Uruguay who has been in the US for almost two decades. The musician’s instrument is the Paraguayan harp, a pedal-less folk instrument carved from spruce and either mahogany or cedar. Of his music, one reviewer stated “it is not new age. Nor is it jazz or pop or anything else known to those who categorize music” (Greg Baker, “Harp of Gold,” New Times, April 4-10, 1990, p. 42).

Courtesy of Hollywood

Thanks to Hollywood actor Emilio Estévez, Bolivian president Jaime Paz Zamora now has his own official Lear jet. In June 1990 Estévez and four others visited Bolivia to scout a future film site. When Bolivian authorities discovered traces of cocaine in Estévez’s rented Lear jet, they arrested the actor and his companions, confiscated the plane, and, after a pompous ceremony, presented it to Paz Zamora. Critics in the Bolivian congress charged the US with hypocrisy when, in the midst of the US-promoted war on drugs, Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard pressured Bolivian authorities to release Estévez and the others. The plane, however, remains in Bolivian possession.

Watch Out

Fyffes, an Anglo-Irish company based in the UK, has successfully broken a contract held by Chiquita International Brands with a local banana producer in Honduras. The conflict between the two banana exporters erupted in March 1990 and was resolved in June through an out-of-court settlement. The agreement has recast the terms of business reference. Fyffes now pays for bananas in dollars—a move that has forced Chiquita to do the same—and has offered a 50% price increase to Honduran producers. Fyffes’s actions are a harbinger of new producer-exporter relations, as other European firms seek to meet the continent’s growing demand for tropical fruit.
Fine Print
On July 23, 1990, the US government announced that 67 products (e.g., plywood, laminated cotton products, toys, fruits and vegetables, flatware, cut flowers, ethanol, and soybean oil) from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia are eligible for duty-free entry into the US under a special review of the Generalized System of Preferences. It now seems, however, that the measures designed to stimulate these Andean economies may be more beneficial to Pacific-rim countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Of the Andean economies, Peru—the biggest and most diversified—may be the greatest beneficiary.

Polling the Polls
The spring 1990 issue of Inter-American Public Opinion Report provides a thoughtful set of analyses on recent public opinion efforts in Latin America. Published by the Latin American Studies Program at California State University (Los Angeles), the newsletter examines recent polling difficulties in Nicaragua and Peru. For instance, one article suggests that Alberto Fujimori’s startling ascendency during Peru’s primary election campaign was generally predicted by Apoyo, the same polling firm that had been employed by novelist and candidate Mario Vargas Llosa. Apoyo predicted the new president’s extent of support at about 21%. He actually received 29% and then soundly whipped the hapless writer in the June run-off.

Greener Pastures
Once he covered death squads in El Salvador and cocaine trafficking in Colombia. Now Guy Gugliotta, a former Miami Herald correspondent currently with the Washington Post, is writing about farming in the US. His Post story, “Agencies’ Spat Blocks Plan for Reducing Coca Crops” (June 27, 1990, p. 17), exposes a nasty “spat” between the Departments of Agriculture and State over the latter’s support for crop diversification. The story highlights the contradictions of US efforts to convince Latin American countries to commit to alternative crop development, particularly if the alternative will compete with US exports. In this case, US programs to facilitate Bolivia’s efforts to expand soya cultivation clash with efforts to boost US exports of soya to other markets.

The Latest Word
“Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response” (July 1990) is one of the most useful policy-oriented studies on international migration produced in years. The study was developed by the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, a bipartisan commission led by former US ambassador Diego Asencio. It does not mince words: for instance, “US immigration policy has long been ambivalent and often incoherent,” and “The issue for many countries is stark: they either export goods and services to create jobs at home or they export people.”

Artistic Touch
Latin American Art is a new Arizona-based magazine published and edited by Michael Marcellino. Each issue is packed with vibrant multicolored advertisements and reproductions of classic traditional and modern Latin American artwork. The spring 1990 issue carries a richly illustrated article on American painter Stuart Davis’s trip to Havana in the early 1920s. Another article, written by Andeanologist James Reid, describes the evolution and importance of Peruvian figurative textiles.

On the Move
Francisco Rojas Aravena, one of Central America’s leading social scientists, returned to live in his native Chile after ten years in San José, Costa Rica. A Hemisphere board member, Rojas will work with the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, in Santiago.

Guido Pennano, economist, publisher, and Hemisphere board member, has been appointed minister of industry and commerce in Peru. He will also have responsibility for economic integration, tourism development, and the new government’s privatization program.

Jaime Lavados has become the first democratically elected rector of the Universidad de Chile in 17 years. During that period the institution’s leadership had been named directly by General Augusto Pinochet. Lavados, a physician, is an internationally recognized specialist on Latin American higher education.
Castro was reported to have said to a group of astonished diplomats in Havana: “If these changes go on in the USSR, they will soon be describing us as those madmen in the Albania of the Caribbean.” Whether this is a piece of apocrypha or an actual interview, the fact is Albania and Cuba remain, albeit for quite different reasons, holdouts in the revolutions that have swept communist regimes from power in Eastern Europe, and have roiled the political process within the USSR. To be sure, and as hard as it may be to believe, there has been more movement toward reform in Albania in 1990 than in Cuba. Why has Cuba been resistant to change, and what changes can be expected?

Cuba: Stasis and Change
The first reason for Cuba’s holdout is its inherited version of Latin American militarism. Cuba is neither socialist nor Third World in the classical sense. Caudillismo is more prevalent in Cuba than in most Latin American societies; indeed, the caudillo image is probably truer for Cuba now than in the pre-Castro epoch. Cuba’s armed forces have occupied a most-favored status from the outset of the Castro regime some 31 years ago. This status has been overlooked, or better muted, because the extreme left was able to define the situation, insisting upon casual designations of Cuba as socialist or communist.

There was a false presumption that radical regimes tend to undercut long-standing Latin American traditions of the military figure on horseback. But the military man in a tank is much the same thing. The key is neither the horse nor the tank—but the militarized character of the society. In fact, the military is the only social force that has been institutionalized in contemporary Cuba. As a result it might well be the unique element in the Cuban cockpit that would fight to support rather than overthrow Castro in a showdown struggle.

A second reason is demographic displacement, that is, the drainage of revolutionary sentiment through the emigration of malcontents and innovators to other shores—from Miami to Paris. Consequently the most discontented and determined ended up in exile and not in armed insurrection against the regime. Castro learned well the lessons of sociology: that permitting emigration is the functional equivalent of tranquilizing a discontented people.

A third reason for Cuba’s stasis is its geographic isolation. A unique characteristic of many island societies is their remoteness. Since external ideas and influences filter into Cuba only with difficulty, information, even from the USSR, can be shut out at the whim of the leader. Moreover, insularity means that local issues become global in perceived importance. Irritations that occur in nations that share common borders and uncommon social systems have not affected Castro’s Cuba, at least not as serious threats to regime stability.

A fourth reason is the “original-leader” syndrome. As shown by the case of Francisco Franco in Spain, the political structure of a regime may persist long after the utility of a regime has vanished, in part because of the sheer physical survival of a charismatic original leader. Such a leader often becomes exempt from criticism and immune from removal. As such, the Castro regime is a prime example of the original-leader syndrome.

These considerations should not lead, however, to the politics of assassination. For one thing, the first attempt at assassination failed miserably. But more important, we have no assurance that the liquidation of Castro will bring about the end of the dictatorial regime. Despite lacking a popular base, Raúl, as the younger brother,
could inherit all sorts of good will, and protract the period of dictatorship instead of bringing down the regime. Desperation politics is neither desirable nor necessary at this time.

**Castro's Neo-Stalinism**

The character of neo-Stalinism as an independent element in communist survival cannot be overlooked. One must emphasize the term "neo," in that the genocidal potential of the Castro regime was rarely impressed on the Cuban citizenry. Neo-Stalinist elements in Cuba include lawlessness of the system, lack of accountability (both to its own people and to outside powers), and secrecy in decision-making.

Neo-Stalinism has all of the elements of repression without the necessity for physical dismemberment. Symbolic terror, and the everyday social force of the Comités para la Defensa de la Revolución, are adequate to the task. Such neo-Stalinist cadres make it more likely that a bitter civil struggle as in Romania, rather than the benign outcome as in the rest of Eastern Europe, is the scenario to anticipate.

Dynastic communism as such enters the Cuban equation. While it shares many of the properties of neo-Stalinism, the familial feature of the Castro regime has long been recognized as an element unto itself. Descriptions of fascist Italy have called this pattern "clientelism." In the absence of formal structures that tend to make public actions predictable, the state is displaced by the person as the dominant force in public actions. Private gift-giving and factional intrigue become the dominant mode of operation. Fidel, Raúl, and Vilma become Cuban equivalents to Richard, Henry, and Elizabeth—monarchs who sit unsteadily on their thrones.

As Douglas W. Payne points out, capriciousness plays a role: "Castro’s career has been marked by numerous sharp turns in both domestic and foreign policy. The possibility cannot be excluded that he might suddenly declare himself a champion of perestroika and swear, in typically egotistical fashion, his perestroika is the best. He would then demand immediate concessions from the United States, including an end to economic embargo, and would have the full support of Moscow" (Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, January 12, 1990, p. 9). This scenario is possible but not inevitable.

**Cuba at the Breaking Point**

What then pushes the Cuban political process to the breaking point, but prevents it from going to pieces entirely? Primarily the foreign, overseas conditions in which Cuba finds itself: total dependence upon Soviet economic support, declining interest on the part of former Eastern European allies like Czechoslovakia, the willingness of the US to let Castro continue to twist in the wind, and a near breakdown in Cuba’s ability to meet its economic embargo, and would have the full support of Moscow? (Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, January 12, 1990, p. 9). This scenario is possible but not inevitable.

The USSR has so many problems within a European context, that it will not threaten its stable relations with Cuba unless absolutely forced to do so. Similarly, on the Cuban side, with the enormous shrinkage in aid and trade with Eastern Europe, Cuban dependency on Soviet aid is higher than ever. And with debt repayment at a standstill, neither side is prepared to cancel the debt nor put an end to continuing supports—especially with outstanding debt reaching $17 billion in 1988. To be sure, Castro will seek to replace the decline in trade with Eastern Europe by appeals for hemispheric solidarity. But even if he finds ideological support in this action, the sad state of so many Latin American economies will restrict its acute sense of functional dependence upon the USSR.

Continuing aid and trade, then, is the best way for the USSR to move Castro from his current fanatic antiprivate-sector position. This is to be done by compelling Cuba to deal with autonomous Soviet factories rather than with a centralized agency as in the past. Such bilateralism will have the effect of imposing economic rationality on Cuba by forcing a balanced
trade and decreasing subsidies. The Cuban edge will be in the prospects for getting world market prices for its sugar exports, of which 80% go to the USSR at present. In any event, enterprise to enterprise arrangements are inherently more balanced than small nation to giant nation bilateralism.

In this setting, the Cuban military system remains entirely a creature of Soviet hardware and logistics. It is impossible for a complete shutdown in hardware aid to lead to anything other than a complete rupture. Indeed, in 1990 Cuba is completing a large missile battery project on the outskirts of Havana that will deploy Soviet-made SA-2 Guideline missiles. US satellite photos indicate that these missiles are already in the early stages of deployment. The missile can strike aircraft flying at up to 50,000 feet. And given Castro's conviction that an invasion from the US must come sooner or later, he is in no position to do without Soviet hardware—even if it be of a late 1950s vintage. A bargaining chip for Castro, however, is that Cuba is now the USSR's only bastion in the Western world.

Still, there are dangers in the Cuban situation. In Spain a monarchical tradition provided a key element in the transition to Spanish democracy in the 1970s. Such an element does not exist in Cuba. It is possible, though, that the exile community may function in such a restorationist capacity, at least to cushion the shock of transition during the early stages of a return to democratic norms and free-market relations. Both a welfare-oriented left and a free-market right will have to be reeducated in Cuba as a means to assure the durability and stability of a democratic transition.

That we are talking in admittedly speculative terms indicates that some form of end to the Cuban dictatorship is near at hand; if not in 1990, then it assuredly will occur in this decade, probably in the early years. Castro is down to the bare bones of the family. His administrative infrastructure is demoralized, the earlier passion among the military cadres for international adventure has been sapped by battles in Africa and trials in Cuba, and the energy of the best and the brightest has long ago migrated abroad.

Cuban society has been so dismantled that few independent forces can be identified, much less predicted to play important roles in political renewal.

A Post-Castro Cuba

There is broad consensus on how a viable economy can emerge from the rubble of a post-Castro Cuba: a renewed emphasis on tourism; the opening of the agrarian sector to private initiative and distribution; and the sort of crop diversification long promised but never delivered by the Castro regime. There is substantially less agreement, however, on the sources of Cuban political renewal. Cuban society has been so dismantled that few independent forces can be identified, much less predicted, to play important roles. The military is so constrained by Soviet patterns of professionalism that it can hardly be counted on for probing, much less bringing forth, democratic options. The Catholic Church is not in the position to exercise supreme authority as it is in, say, Poland or even in Nicaragua. Unlike Eastern Europe, it might well turn out that the most serious problems of reconstruction in Cuba will be political rather than economic.

What we have is best described as a continuing political tragedy, slightly lessened by an end to the tyranny in sight. Any rejoicing should be muted in the face of the calamitous outcome of this revolution, one begun in high expectations and concluding with the near total paralysis of a major Caribbean nation. The great length of time under which Cuban people have suffered tyranny will make the task of democracy harder and the potential for disillusionment greater. Fortunately the quality of Cuba's people, and the good will they have engendered by their diligence and patience everywhere from Miami to Caracas, should serve to cut down the retouching time of the society in its effort to return to the family of democratic nations. Still, we would be well advised to think carefully on the heavy price paid by blind passions and a revanchist spirit in past efforts to improve the lot of the Cuban people and system. In so doing, we must start by curbing our own euphoria while passing along our current wisdom, without laundering our past follies, to the next generation.

The Cuban people deserve nothing less from academic intellectuals and federal policymakers than a proper display of candor. Cerebral types have made terrible mistakes in the past—starting with empirical miscalculations on the nature of regimes at their outset, and ending with renewed appeals for reconciliation in the dictators' final years. For these reasons we must greet the coming democratization of Cuba with joy in our hearts, tempered by modesty in our analysis and recommendations. To do otherwise is to run the serious risk of repeating errors rather than locating truths of this quite special moment in history.

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A couple of small waves of official proclamations tout the virtues of rectificación, a quiet undertow of illegal trade and personal profit tugs at the everyday lives of Cubans. Though it stands in defiance of the state's ideology and policy, almost all Cubans dabble in the island's black market. Luis and Clara, fictitious names for a Havana couple in their 40s, work in modest restaurant jobs. Together they earn a mere $520 a month at the official exchange rate. Since 1985, however, the couple has moved into a much more spacious apartment, bought a Polish Fiat, and purchased a motorcycle. Luis and Clara owe little of their good fortune to frugality. They are members of a shadow capitalist class that trades with the help of foreign partners for hefty profits.

As Luis explains, "Say a pair of jeans costs $15. We don't sell them for 5 pesos to $1. We sell them for 150 pesos, with 10% going to the partner." As a result the couple has a joint account with a cousin at a Miami bank, a Spanish partner who helps with their financial transactions, and another foreign partner who appraises the gold jewelry they handle as a sideline.

The widespread availability of consumer goods, fashionable footwear, and other items is striking in comparison with the barren state stores where only Cuban currency is accepted and goods are rationed. The reason is that Cubans who manage to obtain dollars or have large quantities of pesos can buy goods at hugely inflated prices.

A Japanese television, for example, that normally sells for $400 might sell for $4,000 on the black market.

Points of Entry

How are the foreign goods and currency obtained? Among the myriad channels is the Russian connection. Soviet technicians and other workers with access to foreign currency and to special stores for diplomats and tourists are notorious for reselling goods for a small profit. On the black market, said one Havana resident, the going price for a ruble certificate that allows the purchase of a dollar's worth of goods in diplomatic stores is 3 pesos, while a dollar certificate is worth 7 pesos.

Relatives visiting from the US or Spain are another source of currency and goods, particularly clothing and small appliances. So are Cubans who work for, or have contact with, foreign diplomatic missions, as well as store clerks who simply help themselves when shipments arrive. Of course, Cubans sometimes befriend foreigners solely to enlist them for purchases in dollar stores. On balance, most of the products seem to come from the diplomatic and tourist stores. According to US economist Andrew Zimbalist, the black market probably accounts for 10-15% of the Cuban economy.

Havana is filled with young men with no apparent occupation who do odd jobs and dabble in the black market, including selling quantities of rationed staples, like butter, at substantial markups.

Twenty-four-year-old Pablo, a former technical drafting teacher who has not worked in three years because he turned down a transfer to a school outside Havana, sells small items obtained through connections in the dollar stores. "I'm very careful. I stay away from major items and I manage to stay out of trouble," he said.

Ironically, even as the Cuban government campaigns for "revolutionary purity," underground buying and selling is abetted by the official program of tourism development to obtain much-needed foreign currency. In August, however, the provincial court in Ciego de Ávila sentenced 19 people in connection with a black-market scheme at the dollar store in the Morón Hotel. The scheme included illegal purchases by Cubans and foreigners alike in cooperation with the store administrator and several other employees. When arrested, the group had $4,000 in cash, as well as illegally purchased clothing, electronic goods, and appliances. The store administrator received the longest sentence: four years.

Yet black-market operations, like those of Clara and Luis, will not be easy to eradicate. As Clara asserted, "We're not harming anybody. We don't steal. In fact, we supply people with things they wouldn't be able to buy otherwise. This society needs people like us because the state doesn't know how to run a business."

Luis believes free-market reforms will come to Cuba eventually. "They're coming, no doubt about that. But it'll be a few years," he said. "Meanwhile we're doing well for ourselves. The secret is, if you're smart you can do well in business, but you always have to keep a regular job and have a good record. I tell you we perform needed services in this country."

Mimi Whitefield is a Latin America correspondent for the Miami Herald.
A new crop of young Cuban singers and artists is startling the sensibilities of hardline Communist officials with jibes at revolutionary icons and calls for reform. Among them is pop singer Carlos Varela, whose biggest hit is banned on Radio Habana, even though he is a self-professed supporter of the Cuban revolution and an enemy of Yankee imperialism. Many already call the 27-year-old performer the spokesman of his generation.

In November 1988 the manager of the Teatro 23 y 12 in Havana decided Varela’s musical message exceeded the bounds of acceptable socialist self-criticism. During a break, he told Varela the rest of the show was cancelled. Word of the order spread quickly through the crowd, murmurs of protest turned to shouts, and fist-fights broke out. By the end of the melee, a throng of Varela’s fans—fervently loyal young women, for the most part—had been carted off to the police station. Varela says the incident spotlighted the type of narrow-minded thinking many members of his generation would like to see eradicated in Cuba. “They are culture police,” Varela said. “And they are all infected with the suspicion syndrome. But fortunately the truth is greater than they.”

Generation Gap

Varela is by far the mildest of Cuba’s young artistic enfants terribles. In “Guillermo Tell” he employs a subtle allegory to warn greying revolutionaries that a new generation is coming of age in Cuba, where 60% of the population was born after the 1959 revolution. “William Tell didn’t understand his son who one day got sick of having the apple on his head...it was a shock when the young one said ‘Now for the father the apple on his head/William Tell your son has grown/he wants to shoot the arrow...and with your own crossbow.’”

Frustrated by restrictions on personal freedoms and by consumer shortages, the most open critics of the revolution are emerging from the generation raised by it.

Varela believes there is a generation gap in Cuba, and that younger Cubans want more freedom of expression and movement. He speaks of the need to reform—rather than fundamentally change—Cuban socialism. “This generation is moving at a much faster pace. It is more critical, more dissatisfied,” he said. “It’s a spirit of rebellion against conformity, intransigence, poor workmanship,” Varela said. “You talk to an older Cuban man and he’ll say ‘remember when we were paid wages too low to live on, when we had no refrigerator or running water.’ But we weren’t even born then.”

As the IV Congreso del Partido approaches, the state is officially encouraging people “within the revolution” to criticize anything but the most basic issues—one-party rule and the centralized socialist economy. It is cracking down on people, like political dissidents, viewed as being “against the revolution.”

Some young artists have been accused of taking their aesthetic critiques too far. According to artists and diplomats, in a “guerrilla theater” performance piece that began popping up in late 1989, a youth would sit on a toilet reading the official Communist Party organ, Granma, while a tape of Fidel Castro droned in the background, sometimes even in public places like parks. The group responsible was Arte Calle, whose members were systematically detained for questioning. The group has since dissolved.

Attempts to absorb such independent art movements into the party youth framework have sometimes backfired. For example, in May 1990 the party organized a sculpture show at the Centro de Artes Visuales as part of a national campaign to educate Cuba’s youth about their “historic debt” to the revolution. At the now notorious avant-garde show, one young artist stacked tiers of television sets with images of the main checkpoint of the Berlin Wall on their screens. The last screen held a vast, empty view of the ocean, something guests interpreted as a symbol of Cuba’s own aquatic iron curtain.

Anne-Marie O’Connor is a Latin America and Caribbean correspondent for Cox Newspapers.
diplomats and artists said. Another artist exhibited something even less subtle: a copy of Granma that he had defecated on.

People who rushed to the Centro de Artes Visuales the day after the opening found it closed. The official who oversaw it was moved to a noncultural post and several others were demoted. "That exhibit was considered much too much," a Latin American diplomat said. "The government realized that the young artists were very aggressive in the use of symbols—Fidel, Che, Granma—that are considered sacred."

Tough Times

Some diplomats say such elements of Cuba's youth culture point to fundamental differences in generational attitudes. They say that, frustrated by restrictions on personal freedoms and by consumer shortages, the most open critics of the revolution are emerging from the generation raised by it. "There is a very impressive generation gap here," said a European diplomat from a country with a commercial and cultural exchange with Cuba. "Many people born after the revolution feel like, 'Okay, we have free health care, we have free education, but why should that be the end-all? We want more, is that a sin?'" He adds, "There is a core group who would follow Fidel to the end. But many of the young are bored with the same old speeches that haven't changed in 30 years."

Party officials say there is no generational rift, but they admit a top priority is educating the 60% of Cubans born after the revolution. "There are many who were born after the revolution and never knew Cuba as it was before," said 34-year-old Roberto Robaina, an adjunct member of the Politburo and the orchestrator of a new series of pop concerts, parties, and educational events designed to demonstrate the relevance of the party to young people's lives. "They do not know what conquests health care and education were, and they take them for granted. That is our most complex problem," he said.

Moreover, young Cubans are coming of age amidst profound changes in Cuba's economy. The gradual collapse of the subsidized communist bloc trade is exacerbating scarcities in everything from razor blades to insecticide. But under a strange and highly unpopular system of "tourist apartheid," the rarest luxury goods are openly available at tourist stores closed to ordinary Cubans.

Tropical Fallout

The resulting political fallout has made a hit of Carlos Varela's sizzling salsa-Latin-jazz dance tune called "Tropicollage," which employees of Radio Habana say they have been told not to air. Its title was inspired by Tropicola, a Cuban version of Coca-Cola, but the lyrics are no endorsement: "If you go to the hotels and you are not a foreigner, they treat you differently. That's what's going on here, and I want to change it, and whoever denies it is full of Tropicollage."

Gillian Gunn, of the Cuba Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that given the outlook of increasing scarcity, the Communist leadership may decide it is politically expedient to expand young people's freedoms. "I suspect that what some people in the leadership are arguing is 'Look, we don't have the foreign exchange to satisfy their hunger for consumer goods, but freedom of expression doesn't cost foreign exchange,' Gunn said. "And if what they're asking for is to be able to sing certain songs and be part of a global youth culture that does not explicitly threaten the revolution, a strategic decision may be made that that's the best way to defuse discontent."
Early Muslims referred to the Jews as the “People of the Book.” For Islam the Jews’ unique devotion to the Torah set them apart from other peoples of the ancient world.

Cubans are “people of the rhythms.” As much as some other integral parts of Cuban national identity—the work of José Martí or the common suffering of 30 tragic years of revolution—the island’s popular music is its Torah.

The July 1990 defection of Arturo Sandoval, one of the world’s best trumpet players, discredits the Cuban government’s claims about Cuban identity and culture. Havana’s ideologues assert that Cuban identity can only be conceived within the “revolution.” That is an insidious way of saying that only revolutionaries are “true Cubans.”

Allusions to music are notably absent from Fidel Castro’s speeches. Little is known about his musical tastes. I have the impression that he cannot tell a Sandoval trumpet solo from a Galician bagpipe chorus. Music does not matter to “El Comandante en Jefe,” who takes a manic interest in just about everything else: modern medicine, ancient history, bread-making, and hydroponic agriculture.

Thus, the Proceso de Rectificación, Castro’s regressive counterreformation, is partly based on a denial of reality. Rectificación does not constitute a coherent set of policies. It is the improvised strategy of a paranoic ruler who seeks to preserve his absolute hold on power. It is also the stratagem of a tone deaf despot, for whom traditions such as the son—that most Cuban of all musical forms—have no place.

Rhythm of Renewal

Sandoval’s defection augurs the final dissolution of the Cuban regime. A brilliant musician who shelters Cuba’s soul within his trumpet’s remarkable voice, Sandoval did not flee Cuba in search of lucrative record contracts. He will certainly earn more money in the West, though in Cuba he enjoyed material comforts comparable to those of most distinguished American jazz artists. Sandoval toured abroad and played with excellent musicians. But he toured in the perpetual state of fear that afflicts most Cubans. To borrow from Yeats’s “Second Coming,” Arturo Sandoval has fled an island where “the center cannot hold ... things fall apart ... the blood-dimmed tide is loosed ... the worst are full of passionate intensity.”

Sandoval was not an invention of the “passionate intensity” of Cuba’s groveling commissars. Before taking up jazz and classical music, Sandoval learned to play the son. By turning to the son and other Cuban rhythms, he honored his predecessors, illustrious Cuban trumpeters like Luis Escalante, Chappotín, Jorge Varona, Alejandro “El Negro” Vivar, and “Chocolaté” Armenteros.

His genius first moved me in 1978 when a friend called my attention to Sandoval’s playing on the Havana to New York Jam record. Technically Sandoval was the most dazzling trumpeter I had ever heard. His registers were so high that he managed to make his horn sound like a novel instrument. Years later I was even more stirred by Sandoval’s forays into traditional Cuban music. By then his technical virtuosity had been tempered and his improvisations were convincing and deeply felt. Sandoval sounded like a mature man who had rediscovered the strengths of his musical origins.

Most Cubans define themselves by what they are not. They are, for instance, “anti-Castroites,” “anti-imperialists,” or “nonpolitical,” though the dislocations and the ordeals of the last three decades have deepened the sense of identity and the values of numerous Cubans. Sandoval’s best work embodies some of those values. The music he plays in exile will continue to embody them.

His decision to seek political asylum in the US will inspirit the people of Cuba as much as Cuban air force general Rafael del Pino’s spectacular flight to Key West in 1987. I wonder what the reaction of millions of Americans would have been if Frank Sinatra had defected to the USSR at the height of the Vietnam War.

Sandoval does not have any secrets to share with CIA debriefers. They are not interested in the techniques of a virtuoso trumpet player. But more than any analyst, Sandoval knows the secrets of a Cuba that will endure long after Fidel Castro disappears. Unlike the limited “data” some defectors spirit away when they flee, the riches Sandoval brings with him replenish themselves each time he blows on his incredible trumpet. It is the only instrument that evokes the horns of Jericho.
Recent events in Cuba have caused me to re-evaluate my position on United States policy toward that country. For 30 years I have advocated normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States, and the lifting of economic sanctions against Cuba. In that period I have made three trips to Cuba, the most recent in November 1988. At the time of that trip some very positive things were happening in Cuba, including greater freedom for the small human rights groups that had formed, improved prison conditions, and the release of a number of political prisoners.

During my last meeting with President Castro, I handed him a list of suggestions for a series of mutually beneficial steps that the United States and Cuba could take to prepare the way for an eventual normalization of relations. Following my visit the Cuban government released a number of political prisoners, including most of those referred to as "historic plantados," some of whom had been in prison for up to 25 years. I was grateful that these prisoners were released, and some of their families have expressed gratitude to me for my efforts. But aside from that there has been no sign that President Castro really wants an improved relationship with the United States.

I recognize that the Cubans, and President Castro in particular, have reasons to be cautious about the United States—past US-sponsored attempts at assassination and invasion head the list. Perhaps it is Castro's assessment that the Bush administration is not ready to improve relations with Cuba at this time. But in the 18 months since my trip I have not seen any evidence of a desire by Cuba to even explore steps toward an improvement of relations.

In refusing to follow Gorbachev's lead on perestroika and glasnost, it seems that Castro does not care if Cuba becomes the Albania or the North Korea of the Caribbean.

Adding to my disappointment is the reverse direction in which President Castro is steering his country. While almost the entire communist world is changing and moving toward democracy, greater individual freedoms, and more open and free-market economies, Cuba is moving in an opposite direction. Recent actions, including the placing of hand-picked military commanders in key political positions, indicate that Castro is tightening his grip on the country. In a speech on March 7 he lamented the downfall of socialism in Eastern Europe and declared that Cuba would have to go it alone. His constant use of a new slogan "Socialism or Death" is further evidence that his response to the changes in Eastern Europe is to dig in his heels.

In refusing to follow Gorbachev's lead on perestroika and glasnost, it seems that Castro does not care if Cuba becomes the Albania or the North Korea of the Caribbean. Even Albania, to my amazement, seems to be responding to the changes in Eastern Europe. President Castro should realize that it is time for the Cuban system to permit greater political and economic freedom for the Cuban people.

The fact that more and more people in Cuba are speaking out, despite the great risks involved, is evidence that significant dissent and dissatisfaction exist. Rather than accept and deal with these forces in a positive and constructive way, President Castro appears to have decided to clamp down and deal harshly with political and human rights activists. Severe prison sentences are meted out for what the Cuban government calls treasonous acts against the state, but which most of the world would consider mere expressions of universally accepted rights.

Human rights activist Elisardo Sánchez, head of the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, with whom I met during my November 1988 visit to Cuba, was sentenced to a two-year jail sentence for making statements to the international press after the trial of General [Arnaldo] Ochoa last summer. A few weeks ago the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS) stated that the measures taken against Sánchez and his two associates violated international norms that protect freedom of
I believe that conditions in Cuba and the attitude of Fidel Castro have deteriorated in the past year to a point that a new approach in dealing with Cuba is required. It is for this reason that last month [May] I joined Senator [Bob] Graham (D-FL) in asking the president to urge the Soviets to end military assistance to Cuba. I have also supported an effort by Senator [Connie] Mack (R-FL) to tighten economic sanctions against Cuba.

It is time for the Cuban people to determine their own future in a democratic manner. I therefore would ask President Castro to convene free and fair elections under international supervision. Until he does so, it is my view that he and his government must be made to understand that they are paying an increasingly high price for resisting the march of freedom.

Editor's Note: Speech presented to the State of Florida Senate on June 28, 1990.

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Baja’s Tourism Boom

by Lawrence A. Herzog

Flows of capital, goods, and people are sweeping Baja California into a vast US-Mexico megalopolis—and transforming much of Baja into a vacation enclave for up-scale foreigners. Do the benefits to Mexico outweigh the cultural, economic, and environmental costs?

Shortly after taking office in December 1988, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari announced—to the dismay of many Mexicans—that his administration would “restructure” foreign investment laws to bring in badly needed outside capital. Among the changes immediately enacted was the relaxation of laws that permitted a maximum of 49% foreign ownership of business enterprises in Mexico; the laws now permit 100% foreign ownership in certain kinds of economic activity. In addition the revised laws double the leasing period for foreign possession of property, through the so-called fideicomiso (trust), from 30 to 60 years.

The Salinas government was prepared to actively court US investment in some sectors of the economy. For example, tourism represented a potentially much greater source of national revenue than previous administrations had tapped; but new infrastructure could not be built without foreign capital. Not surprisingly, in the spring of 1989 Minister of Tourism Carlos Hank González embarked on a whirlwind campaign to attract North American investors. One US magazine asked: “What might rescue Mexico, at least from the stigma of its incessantly predicted collapse? Not crude oil, but tanning oil. Tourists” (Harper’s, July 1989, p. 43).

The US Growth Machine

Less-developed nations such as Mexico have become dynamic actors in the global economy. They are the debtors in a transnational banking system in which low and middle-income countries owe nearly a trillion dollars; Latin America alone must somehow repay an estimated $400 billion. Yet debt servicing is strangled by trade policies that favor the world’s dominant countries, by the continued flight of capital from south to north, and by the increasing economic leverage of transnational banks and corporations. Evidence suggests that in Mexico and other Third World nations certain state and economic interests are willing to accommodate the inflow of global capital because they stand to benefit.

Mexico’s century-old apprehensions about economic dependence on the US have yielded to a state of national uneasiness, especially as negotiators proceed for a free-trade agreement and as policymakers consider the formation of a Mexico-US common market. Still, the loosening of Mexico’s constitutional barriers against foreign control of the economy raises questions about the national impact of development fueled by investment from abroad. Throughout the underdeveloped world, disastrous economic and ecological results of such development patterns have been well documented. Perhaps most serious of all is the way massive investment can damage the cultural fabric of regions by unraveling the web of unique physical elements—houses, neighborhoods, towns, and natural environment—that are woven into the everyday lives of local people.

Mexico’s vulnerability to US investors is most blatantly revealed along the international border they share. Nonetheless, northern Mexico and the southwestern US have one element in common: growth. Northern Mexico has displayed one of that nation’s fastest rates of population expansion over the last three decades, due mainly to flows of internal

Lawrence A. Herzog, associate professor of Mexican-American studies at San Diego State University, is the author of Where North Meets South (University of Texas Press, 1990).
migration. The southwestern US claims a similar distinction north of the border. Fueling the enormous population expansion on both sides is large-scale economic transformation—in industry, technology, trade, services, and tourism. At the heart of this transformation is the so-called US “growth machine,” an amalgam of development-oriented enterprises. These include not only the commonly cited maquiladoras and tourist sector. They also include land investors, real estate entrepreneurs, developers, banks, construction companies, architecture firms, and related businesses.

Despite the evolution of transnational flows of capital, goods, and services, the collision between economy and culture has been particularly abrupt in Baja California, where hundreds of miles of beach-front property are finally being discovered by investors from the north. Baja California is a 55,000 square-mile peninsula dominated by desert and mountain wilderness. Its vast coastline, east and west, is mostly undeveloped and exquisite. While its northern flanks, lying at the foot of southern California, are heavily urbanized, the remainder of the peninsula is wildly pristine, a vast frontier comparable in magnitude to other great wilderness areas such as Brazil’s upper Amazon Basin and Australia’s outback.

Proximity to the postindustrial megalopolis of southern California makes Baja California highly vulnerable to the marketing interests of the US growth machine. Several decades ago, writers glorified Baja California’s isolation in books like Joseph Wood Krutch’s *The Forgotten Peninsula* (1961). It was inevitable, however, that a land so rich in beauty and so close to the exploding markets of southern California would be brought within reach of land developers.

Already there is evidence that the peninsula is losing its Mexican cultural flavor, as North American influence migrates south. More than 25 million US tourists visit the peninsula each year. Some 42,500 North Americans reside on the peninsula, and in one stretch of 65 miles along the coast between Tijuana and Ensenada, 25,000 North Americans occupy exclusive housing subdivisions in an enormous wedge of prime beach-front land. Only Guadalajara, long a retirement destination for US citizens, has more North Americans.

These statistics convey only part of the extent to which the peninsula is being swept into North America’s cultural and economic web. For instance, several commercial airlines are opening direct service routes into Baja California. Direct flights connect Baja with San Diego, Los Angeles, Dallas, Denver, Vancouver, and Toronto, and the list keeps growing. Furthermore, beaches from San Felipe to Loreto and Cabo San Lucas, which were once isolated, are now overrun by time-share condominium developments, all-terrain vehicles, and recreational vehicle parks.

To Californians looking south, Baja California no longer seems distant, isolated, and empty, or far from the beaten path. Even Hollywood considers southern Baja within reach. In a recent movie *The Boost* (1989), members of the Los Angeles jet set flew their private airplane to Cabo San Lucas on the southern cape of Baja (some 1,000 miles south of San Diego) for a weekend of fun. In another film, *Piranha* (1970), a remote beach in Baja is the site of a man-eating adventure on the high seas.

Driving Baja’s transformation is the US-based “growth machine.” It includes not only maquiladoras and the tourist sector, but also businesses such as land development, banking, and construction.
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The Salinas government was prepared to actively court US investment in some sectors of the economy. For example, tourism represented a potentially much greater source of national revenue than previous administrations had tapped; but new infrastructure could not be built without foreign capital. Not surprisingly, in the spring of 1989 Minister of Tourism Carlos Hank González embarked on a whirlwind campaign to attract North American investors. One US magazine asked: “What might rescue Mexico, at least from the stigma of its incessantly predicted collapse? Not crude oil, but tanning oil. Tourists” (Harper’s, July 1989, p. 43).

The US Growth Machine

Less-developed nations such as Mexico have become dynamic actors in the global economy. They are the debtors in a transnational banking system in which low and middle-income countries owe nearly a trillion dollars; Latin America alone must somehow repay an estimated $400 billion. Yet debt servicing is strangled by trade policies that favor the world’s dominant countries, by the continued flight of capital from south to north, and by the increasing economic leverage of transnational banks and corporations. Evidence suggests that in Mexico and other Third World nations certain state and economic interests are willing to accommodate the inflow of global capital because they stand to benefit.
migration. The southwestern US claims a similar distinction north of the border. Fueling the enormous population expansion on both sides is large-scale economic transformation—in industry, technology, trade, services, and tourism. At the heart of this transformation is the so-called US “growth machine,” an amalgam of development-oriented enterprises. These include not only the commonly cited maquiladoras and tourist sector. They also include land investors, real estate entrepreneurs, developers, banks, construction companies, architecture firms, and related businesses.

Despite the evolution of transnational flows of capital, goods, and people, international borders still serve, in principle, as dividing lines between national cultures. Arguably, culture is the most sovereign of a nation’s possessions; and in the case of Mexico and similar countries, it may be the last bastion of local protection against First World economic interests. It follows that the test of Mexico’s cultural survival will begin in the northern border zone, the first line of defense against the growth machine.

Colliding Forces

The economic forces that shape rapidly urbanizing areas of the US, such as southern California, are now aimed squarely at Mexico. The development of the tourism economy along the Mexican border is a telling example of how Mexico’s search for a quick economic fix may be culturally disruptive in the long run.

This collision between economy and culture has been particularly abrupt in Baja California, where hundreds of miles of beach-front property are finally being discovered by investors from the north. Baja California is a 55,000 square-mile peninsula dominated by desert and mountain wilderness. Its vast coastline, east and west, is mostly undeveloped and exquisite. While its northern flanks, lying at the foot of southern California, are heavily urbanized, the remainder

**Driving Baja’s transformation is the US-based “growth machine.” It includes not only maquiladoras and the tourist sector, but also businesses such as land development, banking, and construction.**

of the peninsula is wildly pristine, a vast frontier comparable in magnitude to other great wilderness areas such as Brazil’s upper Amazon Basin and Australia’s outback.

Proximity to the postindustrial megalopolis of southern California makes Baja California highly vulnerable to the marketing interests of the US growth machine. Several decades ago, writers glorified Baja California’s isolation in books like Joseph Wood Krutch’s *The Forgotten Peninsula* (1961). It was inevitable, however, that a land so rich in beauty and so close to the exploding markets of southern California would be brought within reach of land developers.

Already there is evidence that the peninsula is losing its Mexican cultural flavor, as North American influence migrates south. More than 25 million US tourists visit the peninsula each year. Some 42,500 North Americans reside on the peninsula, and in one stretch of 65 miles along the coast between Tijuana and Ensenada, 25,000 North Americans occupy exclusive housing subdivisions in an enormous wedge of prime beach-front land. Only Guadalajara, long a retirement destination for US citizens, has more North Americans.

These statistics convey only part of the extent to which the peninsula is being swept into North America’s cultural and economic web. For instance, several commercial airlines are opening direct service routes into Baja California. Direct flights connect Baja with San Diego, Los Angeles, Dallas, Denver, Vancouver, and Toronto, and the list keeps growing. Furthermore, beaches from San Felipe to Loreto and Cabo San Lucas, which were once isolated, are now overrun by time-share condominium developments, all-terrain vehicles, and recreational vehicle parks.

To Californians looking south, Baja California no longer seems distant, isolated, and empty, or far from the beaten path. Even Hollywood considers southern Baja within reach. In a recent movie *The Boost* (1989), members of the Los Angeles jet set flew their private airplane to Cabo San Lucas on the southern cape of Baja (some 1,000
miles from Los Angeles) for dinner, presumably returning to Los Angeles the same evening. Even though Hollywood often distorts distance and the nature of places, such scripting reflects California's changing perceptions of its southern neighbor. Mexico has moved into Hollywood's line of vision, and its exotic shores lie within reach of the affluent.

A century ago, Mexico coined a term, filibusteros (freebooters), for foreigners who came to places like Baja California with ill intentions. Many an adventurer saw in Mexico the possibility of earning great wealth quickly, if not illegally. One of the better known filibusteros was William Walker, who in 1853 sailed into the southern Baja California port of La Paz with an expedition of 200 armed men and captured the city. For a short time, Walker lived out his fantasy: he declared himself president of Lower California.

Today's filibusteros may be the North American investors and real estate entrepreneurs who want to convert Baja California's wilderness into an international tourist mecca. The costs of selling off the coastline to tourist developers are many, not the least of which is the destruction of authentic local culture. For example, Mexico's Pacific coast town of Acapulco has long been marketed as an exotic, palm tree-laden paradise of fancy hotels, and a slow-paced Latin escape from high-pressure urban life. The real Acapulco, however, is now an overdeveloped resort with enormous social, environmental, and city planning problems. It has been called "seedy, polluted, overpopulated, homogenized, overbuilt, money-crazed, exhausted" (Harper's, July 1989, p. 44).

From Acapulco to Baja
Is this what awaits Baja California? While tourism development does offer measurable short-term benefits, it can create serious long-term problems. To begin with, tourism facilitators commonly hand over ownership of local property to foreign interests, as is occurring in Baja California. Moreover, such development can wreak havoc on the natural environment, as is clear in Acapulco and other large-scale resorts. Finally, unbridled tourism can fracture and destroy the built environment and, most important of all, the local cultures it expresses and anchors. In the latter regard, the tourism economy is giving foreign capital, in concert with a class of elite Mexican "facilitators"—lawyers, bankers, financial consultants, engineers, architects, and government officials who assist in setting up investment projects—the power to reconstruct places such as Baja California in the image of their choice.

Consequently, Baja California's striking landscape of small farming communities and fishing villages against a backdrop of wide-open spaces is being transformed into "tourist architecture"—a series of resort complexes and generic theme parks. One of the first things a visitor notices on arriving at the new population centers of this desert peninsula—San Felipe, Loreto, and Cabo San Lucas—is the highway signs in English that announce the sale of land for single-family housing, golf villas, and condominium developments. The rural towns, with their traditional central plazas, are being brushed aside in favor of streets lined with international boutiques and high-rise hotels.

Tourism development in general has come to encourage the homogenization of places so as to produce predictable, marketable travel packages. Illustrative of this trend are the ubiquitous Club Med developments scattered along Mexico's coasts. Club Med creates a "safe" exotic enclave. As a truly "placeless" form of tourist marketing, it offers a self-contained package: tourists need not venture beyond resort walls to rub shoulders with the local people and experience their ways of life.

The growth machine that drives such tourism development aims to create a consumable product; if the surrounding culture and material conditions interfere with the marketing of the product, then they are simply to be removed. From this standpoint, the tourist is to be provided with an uninterrupted feeling of comfort and escape, a strategy much like that employed by gambling casino developers in Las Vegas and Reno. There the absence of clocks and the constant, seductive evening-like lighting of the gambling parlors are ploys to create a timeless setting in which consumers can escape...and spend. In Mexico the strategy is the same, the difference being that palm trees and thatched beach cabanas are the local props.

A leading Mexican architect, Ricardo Legorreta, has designed a number of major resort hotels, including the lavish Mayan temple-like Camino Real in Ixtapa. Describing his relationship with Ixtapa's developers, Legorreta lamented that they failed to grasp the need to integrate the architectural design with the regional context. He added that "the main attraction of Mexico's Pacific coast is that it has the best climate in the world, but the builders wanted to seal all windows and put air conditioners in all 450 rooms" (public lecture, School of Architecture, University of California at San Diego, February 4, 1989).

Selective tourism development may indeed be healthy for Mexico's economy if its by-products—from environmental to cultural pollution—are controlled. The essence of Mexican culture is embodied by its many varied regions and their powerful identities. This is true even of the northern border regions, in spite of the tight interweaving of their economy and pattern of life with those of the US. Any form of development, tourism or otherwise, that endangers regional identity should be questioned.
New Books on Latin America and the Caribbean

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Up-scale Migrants

by Nora Leticia Bringas

"Poor Mexico! So far from God, so close to the United States!" This widely cited declaration cuts right to the heart of the history of US-Mexican relations. In response, the constitution adopted by Mexico's 1910 revolution embraces a pragmatic brand of nationalism, seeking both to regulate and attract foreign capital. The constitution vests ownership of Mexico's land and natural resources in the nation, and prohibits foreign ownership of land within 100 kilometers of the country's borders and 50 kilometers of its coasts. Yet it also empowers the state to transmit title or concessions to private domestic and foreign interests in accordance with the "public good."

A prime example of pragmatism in action was the economic policy of President Luis Echeverría (1970-76), who, despite his nationalist programs and image, established foreign investment in tourism as the fulcrum of his regional development strategy. Echeverría's strategy revolved around two controversial initiatives. The first was the introduction of fideicomisos (trusts) granting foreigners 30-year leases on littoral property (which current president Carlos Salinas de Gortari has extended to 60 years). The second was the expropriation of advantageously located coastal ejidos, communal rural landholdings created through the revolution, for transformation into international tourism complexes. Echeverría's plan was to compensate the campesinos for their land and incorporate them into the labor force of tourism-based "growth poles." His initiatives laid the local foundations for the tourism boom in Baja California, which fits hand-in-glove with the Salinas administration's broader campaign to attract foreign investment.

A basic question is whether an alternative development policy would result in more widespread and durable benefits for Mexicans.

Tijuana-Ensenada

Along with the emergence of Tijuana as Mexico's principal site of export-assembly industry, tourism development has been a leading factor in the accelerated urbanization of Baja California's Tijuana-Ensenada zone, which ranks behind the hinterland of Guadalajara as Mexico's second largest "US colony." A pressing challenge to Mexico's urban and regional planners is to assess the impact of tourism development as part of the far-reaching process of transformation.

It is unknown how much of Tijuana-Ensenada's striking population growth of recent years is linked to the expansion of tourism, including the development of that sector's labor force. It is known that in 1985 42,500 foreigners—almost exclusively retirees—resided in the state of Baja California, primarily in the Tijuana-Ensenada corridor. This group was composed mainly of US citizens (and secondarily of Canadians), with 20% living as renters and 80% as homeowners through fideicomisos. The 1990 cost of buying a residence in this market sector begins at $125,000.

It seems the clearest winners so far are real estate developers, the construction industry, and related businesses. Another echelon of beneficiaries seems to be the providers of up-scale services to foreign residents, including medical services to retirees. Moreover, not only do foreign "buyers" obtain attractive coastal housing at prices substantially less than those of similar housing in the US, but they also stand to profit, especially in the long run.

It is unclear, though, how much of the tourism-related investments, expenditures, and profits stay in Tijuana-Ensenada and in Mexico at large. Moreover, tourism development seems to adversely affect the quality and cost of housing and public services for Mexicans, and to generate jobs that are typically low wage and unstable. The prevalence of "private beach" signs attests to the growing exclusion of Mexicans from an important public resource, and coastal pollution is worsening.

In this setting, a basic question is whether an alternative development policy would result in more widespread and durable benefits for Mexicans. A related question concerns the long-term political ramifications—including for

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regional planning and growth management—of an expanding concentration of foreign residents in a crucial area of the Mexico-US border.

In Sixty Years . . .

If the proliferation of fideicomisos continues, we can anticipate two overlapping scenarios for the end of the 60-year period. On the one hand, the Mexican government could repossess the developed properties, compensate the foreign investors for the original and appreciated value, and resell the properties to Mexicans or foreigners on similar or new fideicomiso terms. On the other hand, the government could return the contracts to Mexican financial institutions, which themselves would resell the properties to foreigners under similar terms. Either way, a new buyer could conceivably be a member of the original buyer’s family or a pres-tanombre, the original buyer under the guise of another name or entity.

Mexico cannot afford delay in recognizing the magnitude of the social, environmental, and economic costs inherent in large-scale real estate speculation and massive population growth along the coast of Baja California. To minimize such costs, the Tijuana-Ensenada area urgently needs a coastal planning and management agency with the authority and resources to address the following concerns:

- The provision of housing and services for the rapidly growing local population, including guaranteed access to beaches.
- The prevention, through infrastructural development and legal action, of the discharge of toxic waste and untreated sewage.
- The designation of ecological reserves for the conservation of the coastal habitat and its wildlife.

The time has come for creative, broad-ranging measures. At stake is nothing less than the ecological, economic, and cultural preservation of one of Mexico’s most vulnerable regions.
Features: Mexico

Los Vecinos: Life on the US-Mexico Border

Double Vision I (Tijuana)

Editor's Note: These photographs are selections from the exhibition "Los Vecinos/Neighbors: Images and Discussion of Life on the U.S./Mexico Border," Museum of Photographic Arts, San Diego, California, November 21, 1989-January 7, 1990. Reprinted with permission from the Museum of Photographic Arts. The exhibition was supported by funds from the Los Angeles Times-San Diego County Edition and the Times Mirror Foundation.

Delicate but Desperate (San Diego)
Gang Members (East Los Angeles)

High Road/Low Road (San Diego)

Street Vending (Tijuana)

La Casa (Tijuana)

Double Vision II (Tijuana)
Politicized Religion

by Edward L. Cleary

Is Latin America Turning Protestant?

A wave of evangelical Protestantism is sweeping Latin America. Social scientists tend to ignore this phenomenon because, according to scholar David Martin, they assume that the evangelical movement is apolitical. David Stoll, an anthropologist who has been researching Latin American Protestantism for some ten years, does not share this view.


Assigning Blame

The book's plan is orderly enough: it describes what is taking place; points out the systemic failure of the Catholic Church and why groups in the US have been supporting Protestant missions and aid programs of a certain kind; and discusses the main US-Latin American implications.

Yet Stoll begins, and continues well into the volume, with a disconcerting focus: the analysis of Protestantism in Latin America from the perspective of North America. I would have expected the volume to dig deeply into Latin American soil, especially given that its author is an anthropologist. Instead the first half of the book is largely stuck in the US or with persons like evangelist Luis Palau, who is portrayed as "the Billy Graham of Latin America" (p. 121). Even when the book's plan calls for a shift to Latin America, the framework of analysis remains nearly the same. The reader is repeatedly left to consider North Americans and their organizations.

Organizations such as the Fuller Theological Seminary and Church Growth Institutes are well worth learning about, but why not emphasize evangelical groups in Latin America, some of which have been successful for almost 100 years? And why not emphasize the remarkable Latin American qualities of the region's evangelical groups? A more insightful approach could have begun with, say, La Iglesia Metodista Pentecostal, the largest Protestant organization in Chile, which was started by US Methodists but which quickly broke off and expanded tremendously.

Stoll eschews such a choice because he is interested less in Latin American Protestantism than in assigning blame to the US religious right for all they have done to Latin America: "That evangelism is a spiritual con game...is the conspiracy explanation for evangelical growth in Latin America...I wanted to refute, not affirm. Yet Oliver North and his evangelists...have shown that it is true...Evangelism continues to be used as an instrument not just of US foreign policy but of covert and immoral "dirty wars"" (p. 327).

Whatever limitations Stoll's intentions may impose, the book is an important, if rough-cut, pioneer study. He provides an investigative journalistic survey, giving the reader valuable knowledge of the array of persons, movements, and organizations involved. He shows that evangelical religion is much more substantial than we would discern from the descriptions of it as ideological fluff. The reader closes the book with a deepened understanding of the attraction, and at times the beauty, of evangelical religion, especially among the poor.

In addition, Stoll presents some stimulating arguments, even if he leaves most of them unresolved. The effort of tracking persons and organizations, however, is immodestly done. In providing a bewildering display of people and doctrines, Stoll tells us everything he knows but much that the reader may not care about or need to know.

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know. Moreover, Stoll shows little theological understanding. In the case of liberation theology he gives us little more than a cartoon depiction. Stoll reifies liberation theology, making it seem as if all progressive Catholics and some Protestants are motivated by a single fully internalized vision. He never defines liberation theology, even though it appears in the book as a central force in Latin American religion. From Stoll’s description, it seems to be any religious tendency for progressive change in Latin American society.

Almost all of Stoll’s mapping in the US comprises the religious scene in California. He imparts little sense of other religious movements in the US with special ties to Latin America or to the mission movement, like the Assemblies of God (Springfield, Missouri; Anderson, Indiana; and Cleveland, Tennessee) and the national networks of Pentecostal and charismatic researchers. Even regarding California he would have enlightened the readers much more by interviewing Pentecostal researchers, such as Everett Wilson of Bethany Bible College, than by interviewing persons who are largely marginal to Latin America.

A Wider Lens

How accurate is the book in describing Latin America’s religious awakening? Stoll leads the reader through many of the available statistics and carefully lays out their often unrealistic assumptions. By any of the measures he presents, the phenomenon of evangelical growth is impressive. On its own, however, the analysis of evangelical Protestantism fails to provide the wide lens needed to view Latin American religion in general.

For one thing, Catholicism, as practiced by a significant minority, has engendered a self-reliance that allows for a greater national character of its churches. The statistics for some aspects of Latin American Catholicism are as impressive as the growth charts for evangelical Protestantism: the number of seminarians in most Latin American countries jumped 300-700% in 1972-87; 120,000 nuns serve in many innovative capacities; and millions of lay persons have assumed responsibilities within the Church in ways only dreamed of 20 years ago. The religious commitment of many of these lay Catholics rivals that of evangelicals. Add to these statistics anthropological reports of the flourishing of syncretic religions, such as spiritism in Brazil, and a more comprehensive viewpoint emerges for assessing the excited talk about evangelical growth. Indeed, we know little about the extent that people switch back and forth between Catholicism, evangelical Protestantism, and other religions. Stoll, however, barely scratches the surface of these dimensions, except to say that the desire for exorcism and similar local responses have developed in the face of modernizing impulses.

Research on Protestant expansion, as well as on shifts in the Catholic Church and on syncretic religions, needs to devote much greater attention than does Stoll to explaining the larger social forces that underlie the religious awakening. Stoll tends to eschew a systemic approach in favor of what he calls a “pot-shot” one. An example of this inadequacy is the book’s treatment of the noted advocate of Indian rights, Ecuador’s bishop Leónidas Proano. Nowhere in Ecuador have evangelicals gained a greater foothold than in Proano’s Riobamba diocese, yet Stoll gives insufficient attention to the social forces that have facilitated their impressive gains in this zone.

Impoverishment and political oppression, as emphasized by Stoll, only partially explain Latin America’s religious transformation. An understanding of social forces has led some Latin Americanists concerned with religion, such as Daniel Levine and Scott Mainwaring, to point to several trends: concentrated agrarian landownership, large-scale migration, improved transport, expanded literacy, and access to media. A consequence of these trends is the undermining of traditional ties between elites and the masses, which leaves the popular sectors open to alternative ideas and forms of organizations. In this respect, Stoll’s work is unrefined; it needs more than scattered statements about transactions in villages or warranted generalizations about revitalization movements.

Regarding Stoll’s political agenda, the evidence he presents about the role of the religious right among evangelicals is indeed frightening. In this respect, US politics has corrupted Latin American religion. On the other hand, Stoll’s characterization of liberation theology is unfortunate and dangerous. Among his statements are these: “The kinds of defiance liberation theology tends to encourage ... have been suicidal in many times and places,” and its “frequent assumption of the need for revolutionary upheaval indicates that more or less safely situated intellec-
tuals have had an outsize role in its production” (p. 313).

Since I have heard accusations similar to Stoll’s, I defer to Arthur F. McGovern’s Liberation Theology and Its Critics: An Assessment (Orbis Books, 1989, p. 269): “I have yet to find any statement by a liberation theologian calling for violent revolution or declaring it necessary . . . in Latin America.” Accusations like Stoll’s not only are unfounded but do great harm. As Charles L. Moutonot, a Jesuit priest, writes: “This language is terribly misleading. It feeds into the persistent and false characterization of liberation theology as theological justification for violence and its proponents as advocates of violent revolution” (New York Times Book Review, May 22, 1990, p. 4).

The false portrayal of liberation theology has contributed to many deaths in Latin America. Such stereotyping has no place in a book whose publication will provoke expanded interest in Latin America’s religious awakening.

Raising Bolivia

Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia 1880-1930


In the 20th century the elite in several Latin American countries initiated agrarian reform measures designed to radically alter the structure of the rural economy and to redistribute land. Most such reforms came in response to perceived problems in the countryside, but generally they were imposed from the top down. One notable exception was the 1952 Bolivian agrarian reform, which had its origins in the politics of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario and in the agitation of the autonomous peasant leagues.

Numerous social scientists have studied the consequences of the implementation of that reform, yet few have examined the pre-reform agrarian structure and the social forces that led to the formation in the 1930s and 1940s of the dynamic peasant-league movement. Erick Langer’s book is one of the first monographic studies of Bolivia’s pre-reform agrarian structure.

Langer describes the process of agrarian change and the transformation of rural social relations in Chuquisaca Department as a consequence of a profound crisis in southern Bolivian silver mining in the 1880s. According to the author, the Sucre elite reacted to the downturn in silver mining by investing in land, which was more secure but less profitable. Moreover in some instances they attempted to modernize labor relations on their haciendas. Investments in land entailed the purchase of existing haciendas or of lands from the corporate Indian communities abolished by legislation enacted in 1874. Economic stagnation in southern Bolivia affected agriculture in Chuquisaca Department, but attempts to modify labor relations on haciendas generated several types of resistance, including labor strikes. The growing level of rural violence culminated in a massive rural revolt in 1927, which attempted to restore pre-1860 land tenure patterns and social relations.

Langer supports his arguments with an impressive amount of data abstracted from cadastral surveys, inventories and wills, trial records, and land sale contracts taken from local and regional archives. In addition he makes use of a number of private hacienda account books, an invaluable source of information generally not available to historians of rural history. Nonetheless, there are many flaws in Langer’s model, as well as major assumptions without empirical substantiation.

For instance, Langer provides only a handful of examples to verify his hypothesis that members of the Sucre elite responded to the mining crisis by diversifying their investments through purchases of land (chapter 3). Furthermore he does not provide evidence that mining investors became the dominant landowning group in Chuquisaca Department. A comparison of cadastral surveys prepared after 1880 with published lists of the stock owners in the large silver mining companies—a relatively simple exercise—could have documented quantitatively changing patterns of hacienda ownership and whether there was an infusion of silver money into Chuquisaca land.

While Langer regards land ownership as a relatively safe investment with a modest return, he does not fully employ the rich source of the account books to outline the workings of the internal economy of the hacienda. Moreover the relative profitability of land was linked to the diversity of investments by the elite, other sources of income from government and employment, and revenue generated from agriculture to support a certain lifestyle. Langer offers several examples of the investment portfolio of members of the Sucre elite (chapter 3, especially p. 41), but needs a more comprehensive view of the Chuquisaca elite to prove this important point.

The author presents a convincing, well-documented, and detailed discussion of regional variations in the process of agrarian transition in Chuquisaca, but does so within the awkward conceptual framework of the administrative jurisdiction of the province. Bolivia is dominated by a wide variety of ecological zones that are distinct in their historical development, and the provinces Langer studies in Chuquisaca each contain two or more such zones. While Langer outlines the rural history of the dominant ecological zone in each province, he is forced to make exceptions for developments in the other ecological zones, detracting from the strength of his analysis.
State of the Art

The Film Industry in Brazil: Culture and the State

As a commercial art form, film production straddles the boundaries between industry and culture. In the US it is a well-established, multi-billion-dollar industry controlled by Hollywood studios that function as independent, private enterprises. In much of the rest of the world, however, the film industry is substantially supported and heavily regulated by the state through film boards and agencies. State protection, regulation, and support stem from the delicate and difficult nature of the film business, as well as from its power as a cultural medium of mass communication.

Randal Johnson's *The Film Industry in Brazil: Culture and the State* is meticulously researched and provides not only a thorough discussion of the development of the Brazilian film industry, but also valuable insights on the relationships between film, culture, and government. The book focuses on the legislative, regulatory, and administrative programs implemented to promote and protect the Brazilian film industry since its inception in the early 1900s. Johnson analyzes these policies within the framework of Brazilian political, economic, and cultural dynamics.

Johnson warns against defining the relationship between Brazilian cinema and the state as based solely on a national industry's need for protection. Still, the dominating role of foreign—especially US—film in the Brazilian market demonstrates a historical and consistently formidable competition for the national cinema and its audiences. Like Coca-Cola, hamburgers, and rock-and-roll, US films are an omnipresent cultural force that create an audience appetite for the style and technology that mark its productions. As early as the 1920s US films comprised more than 80% of the Brazilian market, and by 1929 Brazil had become the US industry's fourth largest market. The US continues to control almost 70% of Brazilian screen time. In order to nurture the development of Brazilian film and to create opportunities for its exhibition, Brazilian filmmakers have looked to their state for assistance.

Much of the relationship between the Brazilian film industry and the state has focused on protectionist policies. Johnson addresses the complexity of these policies in part by identifying the segments of the Brazilian film industry that benefit from cooperation with foreign distributors and producers.

The tension between, on the one hand, Brazilian distributors and exhibitors (or theater owners), and on the other hand Brazilian producers, dates to the early days of the industry. Initially the industry was vertically integrated, with individuals or small companies producing and exhibiting films. By 1912 the business of film rentals increased in step with the US film industry's development on an international scale. The call for state support and protection was heard in Brazil as early as 1920. The quest for the most effective means for protecting and promoting the Brazilian film industry has characterized the relation of Brazilian filmmakers, distributors, and exhibitors with the state for some 70 years.

*The Film Industry in Brazil* chronologically traces the evolution of the state's film-related policies, programs, and agencies, as well as the initiatives of the film community itself. Central to this interplay have been screen quotas for Brazilian films, import restrictions and tariffs on foreign films, state subsidies and financing, exemptions from custom duties and import tariffs on film equipment and raw stock, and, not the least, censorship. Among other things, Johnson presents a balanced mix of factual detail and analysis regarding the early formation of Brazilian film studios, such as Santa Cruz and Atlantida, the development of the *Cinema Novo* group of filmmakers and the vision they represented, and the proliferation of the film commissions and agencies that were the antecedents of *Embrafilme* and *Conselho Nacional do Cinema*.

*The Film Industry in Brazil* opens an important door in analyzing the interplay of filmmakers, distributors, exhibitors, and the state in the development of the cinema as both an industry and an expression of national culture.

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Stating Goals


Scholars and politicians in the Caribbean anticipate having to deal with significant challenges and changes in the 1990s, not only at the domestic level but at the regional, hemispheric, and global levels as well.

The Caribbean in World Affairs is a first in its field, filling a long existing void in the study of Caribbean foreign policy. Author Jacqueline A. Braveboy-Wagner provides a comprehensive analysis of the Caribbean's foreign policy pursuits and problems, stressing that the goals of Caribbean foreign policy—security, economic development, and prestige—are neither static nor considered equal priorities by the region's 12 states. She observes that, depending upon domestic and foreign circumstances, the hierarchy of goals and the selection of strategies has varied over time and among states. In examining the issues of Caribbean foreign policy, the author looks at patterns of interaction at the regional, hemispheric, and international levels. She takes the position that the region's foreign policy pursuits have been characterized not only by cooperation at those levels, but by conflicting relations with state and nonstate actors at each level.

What stands out in the study is the multidimensional nature of Caribbean foreign policy. While Braveboy-Wagner is careful to show wide regional variations, she points out that in setting goals and implementing policy there is sometimes more commonality in the Eastern Caribbean than in the region as a whole. To illustrate peculiarities and generalities she uses case studies of Grenada and St. Lucia.

The author uses some generally accepted propositions about decisionmaking under crisis in her cogent analysis of the 1983 Grenada affair. Nevertheless, she transplants propositions applicable to intrastate crisis to the interstate context, thereby obscuring the dynamics of such decisionmaking at the domestic level. One can indeed look at variables such as the decision unit, information and information flows, and operational environment in assessing both domestic and international crisis decisionmaking. The nature and dynamics of those variables, however, differ from level to level.

One could argue that the Grenada affair was the only recent situation in the Caribbean that qualifies as a significant domestic crisis caused by foreign policy, and hence was the only candidate for discussion. There were, however, earlier crises in the Caribbean that might have provided scope for an analysis of domestic decisionmaking. One was the 1976 Cubana Air disaster, which presented a foreign policy crisis to Barbados, among other countries. Another was the 1981 security threat to Belize, which necessitated crisis decisionmaking in that country.

In looking at diplomacy in the Caribbean, Braveboy-Wagner suggests that the patterns and number of official visits are indexes of diplomatic linkage and country importance. I agree with this view, but it is important to differentiate among the visits, even "high-level" ones, assessing not only their objectives but also their results, including the correlation of results and objectives.

The observation that Trinidad and Tobago was the only country to appoint foreign ministers, rather than select them from among the elected leadership, ignores parallels elsewhere. In Guyana, for example, attorney Fred Wills was appointed foreign minister in 1975 following the departure of Shridat Ramphal to become commonwealth secretary general. And in 1978 Rashleigh Jackson, the present foreign minister, was elevated from the position of permanent representative to the UN to become Wills's successor.

Braveboy-Wagner notes what many observers of Caribbean foreign policy would know: much of the region's foreign policy is devoid of systematic formulation and execution. There is considerable "muddling through." Her call for Caribbean states to rationalize their foreign policy bureaucracies so as to maximize efficiency deserves support and emphasis.

The study concludes that the foreign policy goals of Caribbean states have been realistic. Security goals have revolved around preserving territorial and political sovereignty. Economic development has been defined in "gradualist and survivalist terms." Prestige has generally meant participation in world affairs. The strategies of Caribbean foreign policy in pursuing these goals, moreover, have been largely successful.

Of course there have been exceptions. For example, Guyana and Jamaica once adopted bold and somewhat unrealistic economic development goals. Both countries have also aimed at leadership in sectors of the international community, particularly the Nonaligned Movement. Along the same lines, the 1983 Grenada debacle suggests that the New Jewel Movement strategy miscarried.

The Caribbean in World Affairs is well organized, simple to read, and up to date. It is essential reading for scholars and practitioners of Caribbean foreign policy. The book makes admirable use of the normative and empirical approaches to international politics, making it valued reading for people interested in comparative foreign policy in general and the foreign policy of small states in particular.

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A Sordid History

Neighbors in Turmoil: Latin America

The Reagan administration's go-it-alone policy toward Latin America spawned a number of books designed to help Americans better understand our neighbors to the south. In Neighbors in Turmoil, James D. Cockcroft takes on the huge task of explaining the internal and external factors important to understanding the changing political realities in the region. Instead of covering only the Central American and Caribbean "hot spots," his book deals with all of Latin America (including a rare chapter on Puerto Rico), focusing on much of the sordid history of US-Latin American relations.

Neighbors in Turmoil is basically an anti-interventionist critique of US relations with Latin America. Meant to be used as a textbook to understand modern Latin American history and politics, it attempts to construct a more enlightened policy toward the hemisphere. In this respect, a useful feature is a "Documents" section consisting of Reagan-era items such as the Kissinger Commission Report and various Central American peace initiatives.

The controversial aspects of Latin American politics and US policy toward the region are incorporated in such a way as to encourage (some would say provoke) classroom debate or group research projects. Although Cockcroft provides opposing viewpoints in hopes of stimulating critical thinking by students on contemporary issues, he places a great deal of blame for the turmoil afflicting the hemisphere squarely on flawed US policy and the historical power of military and civilian oligarchs opposed to meaningful reform. This emphasis stems in part from Cockcroft's previous work in the areas of "dependency" analysis and "cooptation/control" politics.

Economic explanations of the US role in Latin America and the nature of domestic turmoil receive the most credence as each country is examined. The connection between economic history and political turmoil is the major thread that ties together the fate of the Latin American countries and their relationship with the US. Cockcroft thus uses much of the current economic problems confronting Latin America—drugs, debt burdens, economic enclaves, unemployment, trade imbalances—to provide the backdrop to the ideological, labor, peasant, religious, and civil-military conflict so prevalent in the region. While all of these factors are important and need closer examination for understanding the complexities of Latin American turmoil, one gets the feeling that there are more economic and political successes in modern Latin America than are included in this analysis.

In Mexico, for example, the road to crisis is blamed on foreign intervention and competition among elites for control over a hard-working but rebellious labor force. Honduras is a nation that is dying from US influence. Puerto Rico would be a thriving independent island in the Caribbean if the US did not have such a firm grip on economic and political activities. Cockcroft states, for example, that "during the Watergate scandal of the Nixon presidency in the early 1970s, it was discovered that the FBI had a long history of interfering in Puerto Rico's elections and harassing advocates of Puerto Rican independence" (p. 276). The flaws in Nicaragua's and Cuba's efforts to solve the problems of development are tied closely with past and present US policy. While the US is not blameless in these two cases, little is said about the economic or military influence of the USSR or the flawed policies of their revolutionary elites.

Further frustration stems from the frequent quotes, without footnote references with which to track down sources and context, that Cockcroft uses to support his anti-interventionist thesis. Some of the most troublesome are found in the treatment of El Salvador and Guatemala. For example, "The 10,000 peasants residing on the slopes of the Guazapa volcano outside San Salvador suffered more tonnage of nonatomic bombs per square inch of territory than any other people in history" (p. 142). For Guatemala, Cockcroft writes "By 1977 the number of disappeared from all walks of life, including children, approximated 40,000, the highest figure in the world" (p. 112). To bolster his economic explanation of the turmoil in Puerto Rico, he states "In the mid-1970s it [Puerto Rico] was generating one quarter or more of US corporation's profits in all of Latin America" (p. 277).

Much of the descriptive material dealing with turmoil and US policy will disturb those of the "national security" school of US-Latin American relations. Cockcroft concludes, however, with nine thoughtful recommendations to create a more enlightened policy toward Latin America, which revolve around demilitarization, democratization, debt forgiveness, and grassroots development.

If the US is at some sort of policy nadir in dealing with Latin America, perhaps books such as Neighbors in Turmoil can begin to turn the tide in a more optimistic and healthy direction. Cockcroft's survey of contemporary and historical developments in Latin America may provide the necessary information with which to learn from the past and to challenge US policymakers into thinking of the hemisphere as being intrinsically important. Until this kind of revolutionary thinking about Latin America takes hold, neither "benign neglect" nor "gunboat diplomacy" will lead the hemisphere in the proper policy direction.

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Sport in Latin America and the Caribbean

by Marian Goslinga

Joseph L. Arbena’s *An Annotated Bibliography of Latin American Sport: Pre-Conquest to the Present* (1989) is a standard reference tool for research on Latin American sports. The quarterly *Physical Education Index*—which includes sports—is a basic subject index to domestic and foreign periodicals published in English. It complements Arbena’s bibliography but is limited by its lack of indexing by country.

Listed below are some recent publications attesting to the local interest in different aspects of sports. Baseball predominates in Central America and the Caribbean, soccer in South America, and mountaineering in the Andean countries. Other entries deal with the growing field of sport and social analysis.

Serials

**Anuario de montaña.** Santiago: Federación de Andinismo y Excursionismo de Chile. [About mountaineering in the Andes.]

**Anuario del fútbol uruguayo.** Montevideo: Codelva.

**Anuario deportivo Saprissa.** San José: Publisa. [About sports in Costa Rica.]  

**Beisbol: guía oficial cubana.** La Habana: Instituto Cubano del Libro. [Periodical of irregular frequency.]

**Chile Ski.** Asociación de Centro de Ski de Chile, ed. Santiago: Zig-Zag. [Published annually.]


Books and Periodicals


**Arriba Alianza!: testimonios personales.** Augusto Alvarez Rodrich, et al. *Debate*, v. 9, no. 48 (December 1987), p. 28-37. [About the Peruvian soccer team.]


**Crisis, pues, y un poco de deporte.** Abelardo Sánchez-León. *Debate*, v. 10, no. 49 (March-April 1988), p. 67-68. [About sports in Peru.]


**El deporte indígena de América.** Hugo Angel Jaramillo. 2nd ed. Pereira, Colombia: Corporación Biblioteca Pública, 1988. 185 p. $5.00.

**Deporte y delito.** Antonio José Cancino, ed. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 1989. [About social aspects of sports in Colombia.]


New and Recent Books on Latin America

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA
Tom J. Farer

In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on such issues as right- and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this fascinating manner, fusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin America since the end of World War II. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America (he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. His essays combine a sophisticated analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.

ISBN: 0-88738-155-3 (cloth) 448 pp. $39.95

THREE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS
GINO GERMANI, PABLO GONZALES CASANOVA, FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO
Joseph A. Kahl, new Introduction by Peter B. Evans

This is the long overdue second edition of Joseph A. Kahl's masterful Modernization, Exploitation, and Dependency in Latin America. In the book, Kahl describes, examines and introduces the life and work of three of the most important figures in the development of comparative politics and political sociology: Gino Germani (Argentina), Pablo Gonzales Casanova (Mexico) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil). As Peter B. Evans points out in his splendid Introduction, the book has not lost its importance and attractiveness in the years that have passed. Rather, the subsequent developments in comparative scholarship, as exemplified in the fate of modernization and dependency theory, have only highlighted the influence of the three Latin Americans.

ISBN: 0-88738-169-3 (cloth) 240 pp. $24.95

POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR
John D. Martz

In this book, John D. Martz probes the differences and similarities between military authoritarianism and democratic pluralism through an analysis of the politics of petroleum in Ecuador. Martz uses a textured and detailed analysis of global oil companies and nationalist politics to trace the growth and evolution of Ecuador's petroleum industry. Against this interplay of politics and the nationalist struggle against multinational pressures, he compares policymaking under military and civilian government.

ISBN: 0-88738-132-4 (cloth) 432 pp. $34.95

REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA 1964-1985
James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra

This volume focuses on two decades of political life in Bolivia, from the overthrow of civilian president Victor Paz Estenssoro in November, 1964 until his return to office in August, 1985. The body of the book provides an account of the main contours of political economy in Bolivia from 1964 until 1985. The authors also present an interpretative analysis of the problem of regime formation in Bolivia by focusing on the alternations among various authoritarian and democratic modes of governance. In a concluding chapter the authors provide an analytical framework tying Bolivia into more regional trends concerning the questions of regime formation and transition. Bolivia is seen as an extreme case of a common set of problems that have pervaded the region during this period.

ISBN: 0-88738-159-6 (cloth) 256 pp. $29.95

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