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Cardenismo or PAN?

Jonathan Fox's "Towards Democracy in Mexico?" (Hemisphere, Winter 1989) is a provocative article. I agree with Fox that "Mexican politics will never be the same," but for a different reason.

Fox gives excessive importance to the "Cardenas phenomenon." The Cardenas buildup was orchestrated by the government-controlled news media. Even the "official" results of the presidential election had a purpose: to scare the US State Department. The message was "Either help the PRI stay in power or the communists will take over Mexico."

Future events will prove that Mexico's evolution to democracy owes more to PAN's 50 years of consistent struggle than to the politics of Cardenas or other sporadic forces.

Norberto Corella
Secretario de Relaciones Partido Acción Nacional
Mexico, DF

Different Stories

The database (or lack thereof) and sweeping characterizations in John V. Lombardi's "Stories of Foreign Language" (Hemisphere, Summer 1989) normally would not incite me to answer it were it not for the fact that the author is a leading Spanish-American academic and a senior administrator at one of the nation's major research universities. I should like to believe that Lombardi was mainly addressing the unsatisfactory ways in which foreign languages have been taught, or continue to be taught, on those campuses that he has had a chance to observe personally. Only then would some generalizations, such as his statement regarding the "hammerlock" control that literature faculty allegedly exercise on language teaching, make sense. While this may be true in some cases, especially in private universities and some public universities, there clearly have been serious attempts on other campuses to correct such unfortunate structural deficiencies.

The intimate correlation between the teaching of language and culture has resulted in variedly successful applications of proficiency-oriented curricula and the rebuilding of foreign language faculty and programs. Such corrections include, but are not restricted to, a strong buildup of undergraduate and graduate language/applied linguistics courses and a hiring pattern that reflects the need for a redefined curricular balance. The vast majority of our faculty members consistently teach both language and culture/literature or linguistics courses, while attaining and maintaining in several instances national or international reputations in their respective fields. There are numerous other curricular and personnel actions, including a lively outreach orientation (Latin American studies, African studies, general linguistics, etc.), that can be advanced as strong evidence of a response beyond paying mere lip service to the needs that Lombardi so eloquently portrays. In the interest of presenting a differentiated view of the teaching of foreign languages and cultures in the US, I am sending this informal response to his very partially informed essay.

Raymond Gay-Crosier
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John V. Lombardi's "Stories of Foreign Language" takes an indiscriminate swipe at the foreign language profession from the perspective of an academic administrator and with the pique of a social scientist. Unfortunately, while Lombardi's piece accurately reflects the view of several years ago and of the institutions with which he has been associated most recently, it misstates some crucial facts.

First of all, "deans and other sensitive administrators" are not responsible for the changes in the foreign language profession, nor is the sociologist who heads the foreign language center at Johns Hopkins (I decline to say "think tank" because Lombardi claims "language is a relatively straightforward skill," and thinking is a devious enterprise that might obfuscate the language-learning process). The foreign language profession has been in the midst of a quiet revolution, and major changes in the methodology, measurement, and purpose of language instruction have taken place. Secondly, Lombardi attributes to the profession the expressed intents of the National Defense Education Act and the newer Education for Economic Security Act, when these were developed by social scientists and politicians. Thirdly, Lombardi believes the profession is not a panacea for America's economic woes, but that because he naively believed it at one time, it has, therefore, perpetrated a fraud. True, foreign languages cannot manufacture better cars, but Lombardi
should try to sell them in English to the Europeans or the Latin Americans.

In any case, it seems clear that Lombardi should stick to history, his own discipline, and not to the revisionism of the story of foreign languages that he falsifies in the telling. Would that it were one of the minor novellas of Cervantes: then we could move to rectify it.

Rodolfo J. Cortina
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Editor's Note: John V. Lombardi, author of "Stories of Foreign Language" and provost and vice president of Academic Affairs at The Johns Hopkins University, was appointed in November 1989 as president of the University of Florida, Gainesville. Lombardi will assume his new post following the spring semester of 1990.

Hemispheric Debate

I appreciate the thoughtful reviews of Partners in Conflict by Mark Falcoff and Rosario Green (Hemisphere, Summer 1989), each from a different political perspective.

In the spirit of continued collegial exchange, I wish to comment on two specific aspects of Falcoff's review with which I take issue.

Falcoff asserts that I fail to realize that "we (i.e. the US) are still important"; that I "deplore any and all differences between Washington and the Latin American capitals." These comments are unwarranted. I affirm repeatedly, in different ways, that the US is "still by far the strongest nation of the Americas" (p. 46), but I argue that to pursue our own interests successfully in a period of declining predominance, we need to understand those interests better and also to understand the interests and conceptions of the Latin American nations. We cannot take Latin American acquiescence for granted on the basis of hegemony or presumed regional harmony; we must treat Latin American nations as real states, as we do European nations.

This argument by no means presumes that conflict with Latin American nations is inherently negative or that it should be avoided by Washington's giving in to every Latin American demand. On the contrary, the thrust of Partners—made most explicit in the chapters on Brazil and Mexico—is that the first step toward effective policy is to recognize that conflict is natural and expected, and that it must be more effectively managed. Note the last two paragraphs of chapter four, for example, or the middle paragraph on page 128 in the Brazil chapter and the following paragraph, or the final paragraph on page 135.

Falcoff's review is substantially unfair in alleging that Partners "often oversimplifies policy choices, as if they were strictly discrete."

Surely my book, like any brief discussion, oversimplifies policy choices to some degree—but I simply do not recognize the false dichotomies listed on page 44 of the review as drawn from or based upon my book; Falcoff here conflates his quarrel with a whole lot of analysts (and perhaps with some of my own op-ed polemics) with the more nuanced argument advanced in Partners.

Falcoff and I do have real differences, some of which emerge in his review. To cite only three points, I have a different analysis and appreciation of the security issues in the hemisphere from his; I do not believe that Latin America's perceived significance to the US will disappear if and when the American public and the Congress diminish their concern with the supposed military security threat from Latin America; and I have a higher estimate of Latin America's economic significance and potential than he.

These and other differences of analysis should be explored in the mutually respectful tone that marks Falcoff's review and that I hope characterizes my own writing most of the time.

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Hemisphere welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be typed double-spaced, and are subject to editing for clarity and length.

Please address letters to: The Deputy Editor, Hemisphere, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199; FAX (305) 348-3593.
Bush’s First Stand  

by Robert J. Kurz

The winds of change have been blowing through Central America with the force of a Caribbean hurricane, shaking and in some cases blowing away the region’s old structures of international relations. The pressures giving rise to these powerful winds emanate more from the political currents of Moscow and Washington than from those of Central America, but it is the Central Americans who must face the consequences.

In Moscow the demise of the Brezhnev doctrine and the breakup of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe sent a political message to Cuba and Nicaragua, even if they hadn’t quite decided how to respond. In Washington the Reagan doctrine seemed to yield to the Bush administration’s pragmatism, including a clear effort to drop Central America several pegs on the priority chart. The Central American allies of Moscow and Washington were watching and wondering what their foreign patrons are likely to do.

Even as the predictability of the Cold War evaporates, the tradition of Central American instability and US intervention continues. Regardless of the Bush administration’s original inclination about Central America, the US invasion of Panama in December 1989 returned that region with a vengeance to the forefront of the Washington policy agenda. The invasion did not arise from US entanglements with the USSR, Cuba, or Nicaragua, but from the deterioration of US relations with a former friend and ally in Panama.

Robert J. Kurz is a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow.

Gorbachev’s Impact

If Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies are encouraging revolution, it is not in the Third World but in Eastern Europe. Fidel Castro is more than capable of resisting the pressure for change, as his words and actions indicate. Yet he cannot but have noticed the deft Soviet handling that dispatched another voice of resistance, East Germany’s Eric Honecker, from the political scene. The new Soviet thrust of defusing rather than exploiting conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean is further reducing Castro’s latitude for action. All this has not been lost on the Sandinistas, who have been heard to talk about the “black hand of perestroika” and wonder aloud about meeting the leaders of the Nicaraguan business community at the Soviet Embassy.

Imagine the reaction of the Sandinista hardliners when they discovered the Soviets offered to begin funding the Instituto Centroamericano de la Administración de Empresas: a US-sponsored business administration school established in Managua during the Somoza years. Equally telling are Sandinista complaints about their dependence on Soviet arms.

There are other indicators of this trend. Parts of the US intelligence community publicly confirm the Soviet claim that they have halted arms shipments to the Sandinistas. Further, during his October 1989 visit to Managua, Soviet foreign minister Edward Shevardnadze repeatedly mentioned the suspension of heavy-weapon deliveries, while seeking to emphasize commercial trade. During the September 1989 summit meeting in Wyoming between Shevardnadze and Secretary of State James Baker, a joint statement was quietly issued that called for ending military aid to irregular or rebel forces in Central America and for free and fair elections in the region.

Thus, after a decade of US worry about the Sandinistas and Soviet control of Nicaragua, it turns out that Moscow is no happier about its role in Managua than is Washington. If this trend holds, it will both reassure Washington that its worst fears were unfounded and erode the Cold War status quo in Central America.

Bush’s Stand

For Ronald Reagan, Central America was a place to crusade, but George Bush came to office downplaying the region’s importance. His October 1989 visit to Costa Rica to honor that country’s democracy and its president Oscar Arias was a stark rejection of Reagan’s hostility toward the Arias peace plan. The Bush administration regarded Central America as the scene of Reagan failure, a reminder of the Iran-contra scandal, and an unwelcome link with Panama’s Manuel Noriega.

For most of Bush’s first year in office, the pragmatic iron fist of Secretary of State Baker pushed Central America out of the administration’s way. Pragmatism, however, did not provide a road map for dealing with trouble in places like El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama. The Bush circle did not warmly receive public statements by insiders concerning the policy vacuum. Lt. General Fred Womer, one of the US military’s true Latin America experts, paid with his career for calling attention to the lack of a policy anchor in Panama. Simply put, there was no clear picture of what the Bush administration wanted to accomplish in Central America, nor was there a plan for...
ending that region's conflicts. That Bush could meet with all the democratic leaders of Latin America without producing a joint statement, much less proposing action on drugs, debt, or democracy, was indicative of Washington's policy paralysis.

In December 1989 the Bush administration reversed itself. By sending 24,000 US combat soldiers to unseat Noriega, the administration made Central America a priority in a way that even Reagan was unwilling to do. Initially both the Bush administration and the US public were euphoric about taking on Noriega. In spite of more than a decade of US support for the growth of Noriega's power, he had become the personification of evil: a drug kingpin, a torturer, and a murderer.

Because of Noriega's unraveling relations with the US, and the legitimacy of the Guillermo Endara government that grew out of Panama's May 1989 presidential election, the American people are sure to rally in support of Bush's use of military force. Still, the excitement of the chase is likely to give way to the cold, hard facts of the new US responsibilities in Central America. For virtually the first time in the 86 years of its involvement in Panama, Washington finds itself responsible for providing many of that country's government services. In addition, despite claims that the US is "restoring democracy," the difficult truth is that Panama's government has never been democratic. Helping the Panamanian people with the enormous tasks of establishing a democratic government and revitalizing their crippled economy is easier said than done. This is particularly true as, in light of the US deficit-based budget squeeze and diminished rivalry with the USSR, the US public's support for Latin American aid in general is being eclipsed. Consequently US dealings with Latin America suffer from limited resources.

Further complicating the Bush administration's Central American picture is the violent reality in El Salvador. The potent guerrilla offensive has proved a barbed reminder that the war in El Salvador drags on, while the blood of the six murdered Jesuit priests has defied the legitimacy of Salvadoran democracy.

In short the Bush administration was initially less interested in Central America than was its predecessor. It attempted to abandon the Reagan approach, but ultimately deepened US intervention in the region. As the Bush team struggles to manage this heightened responsibility, it finds itself constrained by severe budget problems.

Central American Reality

After a decade of several billion dollars in foreign assistance, it is troubling to see how little Central America's social, economic, and political structures have changed. Publicly available data from the CIA indicate the region's living standards remain depressingly constant. Despite talk of a "democratic tide," matters such as civilian control and political freedom remain subordinate to the power and privileges of the military, whose buildup has been financed by US and Soviet aid.

Regional peace initiatives, as well as Sandinista electoral concessions and the aborted FMLN-ARENA discussions, demonstrate that many Central Americans recognize the heavy price they are paying for this stalemate: widespread suffering and isolation from international investment and trade—all of which compound the region's plight. But this does not mean the wars will end.

In El Salvador the bloody stalemate continues, with neither the army nor the guerrillas being capable of winning and right-wing violence going unchecked. Whatever the outside pressures may be, the violence will continue.

In Panama the US is involved as deeply as ever. In spite of widespread Latin American sentiment against Noriega, the region's reaction to the invasion is less supportive than the US people would like. The endurance of the Endara government's legitimacy will depend on its ability to remove the US military from Panamanian affairs, establish its own capacity to govern, and revive the economy.

The result of all this is a fascinating irony. After decades of protest about Soviet intervention in the Caribbean Basin, the US is witnessing the USSR's gradual withdrawal. Yet this is occurring as Washington—despite its desire to disengage from Central America—has become more directly involved. However these realities may evolve, Central Americans must face their own basic internal problems, not the least of which are political rigidity and repression.

Central America's harsh, unyielding political structure presents Washington with an almost insurmountable dilemma. Local conditions and interests are producing renewed, unwanted tensions between Washington and Moscow. Even as the superpowers agree to reduce their commitments to the region, Central America may not allow this to occur. The tragedy is that while the Cold War is winding down, US policy toward Central America remains frustrating and hot.
Commentary: The Caribbean

The Difficult Transition in the Caribbean
by Anthony P. Maingot

The Caribbean is an area in ideological and economic transition. It is not clear which is driving which. What is clear is that the transition appears irreversible over the short to medium term and that it is accompanied by very real political consequences. Clearly one of the factors behind this transition is the failure of the traditional economies. Hardly anyone in the Caribbean doubts that something different has to be tried. The particular orientation this new vision is taking, however, appears to stem from two sources.

The first source is the failure of Caribbean-based experiments with centralized, state-driven strategies of development. Whether it be Cuban or Nicaraguan socialism, Guyana's "cooperative socialism," or the "mixed economy" experiments in Jamaica and, to a lesser degree, Trinidad, the results have been disappointing. The second source is the worldwide turn towards pragmatism and pluralism. The historical openness and receptivity of the Caribbean to world trends is showing itself to be quite alive and well. Society has disregarded those Caribbean writers who have so often scoffed at this easy receptivity to new trends. For example, V.S. Naipaul could hardly dissimilate his disdain for a people he labeled "mimic men" while René Márquez lamented their traditional "docility." But such derision hardly changes the reality. This is evident in a new political discourse throughout the region. Today the political language is so radically different from what it was in the 1970s that those who persist in the language, ideas, and metaphors of the 1970s suffer the worst of indignities in politics: being disdained and ignored. The ideological and programmatic transformation of a Michael Manley is merely the most visible sign of a much deeper search for a less dogmatic and confrontational approach to national development and international relations. Even a country such as Guyana, where the government has been less ready to relinquish military and political power, is no longer adverse to entertaining the privatization of major sectors of the state-controlled economy, dialoguing with the US State Department, and—inconceivable a decade ago—negotiating loans from the IMF and World Bank.

Pragmatism at Work

This new attitude towards the invariably unpopular IMF/World Bank prescriptions—noticeable even in Sandinista Nicaragua—is especially revealing. Opposition to this foreign "imperial" imposition was only a decade ago a major battle cry of the then-entrenched left. Today these agencies are not only welcomed, but their recommendations seem logical extensions of local thinking. Witness the tone of a recent Note from the Trinidad and Tobago government regarding a World Bank Appraisal Mission Report: "The Minister of Planning and Mobilization anticipates no special difficulty in reaching agreement with the World Bank ... since the action required is essentially what the Government itself has already approved." In fact, the pragmatism of the Trinidadians went beyond economics, demonstrating an admirable capacity to leverage the Bank's recommendation for internal administrative reasons. As the Note stated: "Acceptance of the proposal ... would merely enforce the discipline of implementation according to the agreed time-table."

Not that there is no Caribbean opposition to IMF-type reforms that call for contraction in public sector expenditures, discipline and moderation in labor's wage demands, and receptivity to foreign investments. There certainly is. In Trinidad, for instance, it is one of the main themes of the newly formed United National Congress as well as assorted left-wing groups. But this opposition, in Trinidad as elsewhere, is devoid of the broad programmatic and ideological framework that gave it political sustenance and weight in the 1970s.

One explanation is the international demonstration effect: how to oppose dealing with the IMF in Trinidad when "cooperative socialist" Guyana and social-democratic Jamaica are both following that agency's strictures? Another explanation lies in the willingness to understand some basic facts that ideologically driven planning overlooked. Such is the case with the conventional radical opposition to tourism, fearing the "penetration" of detrimental ideas and customs. But why oppose tourism when mass communications and the considerable travel of Caribbean people them-
selves to these foreign centers are even more effective means of cultural borrowing and transformation? One example should make the point. In 1981, while the radical rhetoric against tourism was at its peak, two Caribbean states, Trinidad and Barbados, saw 7% of their populations visit the US. On a proportional basis, that was 30 times the number of US citizens who left their country to be tourists in those two islands. Since no country in the Caribbean except Cuba would dare ban the foreign travel of their citizens, the attack on tourism was misplaced.

This new global and regional pragmatism clearly presents the area's leaders with opportunities to try new development strategies. But opportunities, like the proverbial quest for more "time," are a neutral factor. It is what is done with those opportunities that counts. The mere acceptance of new economic and political thinking is a vital first step. There is a danger, however, that it can become another ideological ploy, no more useful than the socialist rhetoric was in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, there might be a danger in an overstated rhetoric about the benefits of privatization and the workings of the market place. This is especially true in a period of transition when contractions and structural adjustments create new problems even as the old problems persist. As their economies shift towards services and assembly manufacturing, traditional exports (oil, sugar, coffee, bananas) are still the major exchange earners and employers. Sugar—the area's largest earner—is a case in point.

Tough Problems

While the handwriting has been on the wall for a long time, the present problems facing the sugar industry are still traumatic. The 40% reduction in US imports in 1987 and the further 25% reduction in 1988 cost the region an estimated $500 million and perhaps 40,000 jobs. To be sure, the impact of this severe cutback in employment and earnings has not fallen evenly throughout the region. Those with access to the EEC under the Lomé convention—viz. the English-speaking Caribbean—were shielded from the full effects of US actions. Not so the Dominican Republic, the largest sugar producer in the Caribbean after Cuba.

There is danger that the new pragmatism can become another ideological ploy, no more useful than the socialist rhetoric of the 1960s and '70s. There might be danger in overstated rhetoric about privatization and the market.

The Dominican Republic's loss in employment has been calculated at 20,000 jobs. The joint effect of cuts in US quotas (from 533,000 tons in 1984 to 176,710 in 1988) and low world prices has meant that the $560 million earned from sugar exports in 1981 were reduced to $146 million in 1986 with further reductions in 1987. The 10% increase in the 1988 quota amounted to an insignificant 16,000 additional tons. In late 1989, faced with a worldwide shortage of cane sugar, the Dominican quota was raised to 337,915 tons. Dominican production will still be well below the 1.2 million tons produced in 1983. In fact, it is a telling point that in 1987 the Dominicans sold 225,000 tons of sugar to the USSR, an amount 50% higher than the US 1987 quota of 160,160 tons. And the Soviets paid 55% above the market price. It is only the defusing of the Cold War as well as the changed Dominican political-ideological context that prevented such a situation from turning into a major plus for Soviet foreign policy and gist for the Dominican anti-American mill.

True, the Dominicans have not been inactive. Taking advantage of the new international climate, they are trying to diversify their markets. For instance, a new Cuban-Dominican Chamber of Commerce is actively pursuing mutually beneficial exchanges in the areas of sugar, dairy, and meat production. More important, there has been a diversification of crops on former sugar cane lands into citrus and winter vegetables for local consumption and export. It is calculated that US agricultural exports to the Dominican Republic have declined by $60 million a year due to this diversification. Additionally the Dominican Republic has taken good advantage of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, even as that worthy initiative and the 936 Twin Plant program have been great disappointments in the region as a whole. By 1988 Dominicans had some 225 companies employing 85,000 workers in free zones throughout the nation.

A clear economic transition is on its way. By 1987 manufacturing (171%) had outstripped agriculture (16.1%) as a contributor to GDP. Another growth area has been tourism, which has been expanding at more than 16% per year since 1970. The island now has 18,758 hotel rooms and is third (after Puerto Rico and the Bahamas) in tourist arrivals. On its face, thus, it is not a bad performance.

Unfortunately there is a flip side to the story. By 1987 the Dominican Republic was spending 70% of its export earnings on debt repayments and the total debt grew from $3.1 billion in 1984 to $3.7 billion in 1988. In this the Dominican Republic is little different from the rest of the area. Levels of unemployment, moreover, have not yet been reduced by the restructuring. In its attempt to deal with the 30% unemployment rate, the government of Joaquin Balaguer has undertaken enormous public-building projects, financing these through increased taxation and import duties, devaluations, and, per-
haps especially, printing more money. Dominican inflation in 1988 was calculated at 60%.

The bloody riots that broke out in the Dominican Republic in 1988 were not unlike those in Venezuela: directly attributable to the declining standard of living of the urban masses. These were spontaneous outbursts, which, precisely because they had no overall controlling groups or organizations, were all the more difficult to deal with. There are no longer radical parties—in the Dominican Republic or elsewhere in the Caribbean—capable of mobilizing these slum dwellers. Nor is there an overarching ideological framework that rationalizes or justifies such violence. Rather than making us complacent, we should realize that this not-so-latent anger of urban masses experiencing enormous pressures because of the national restructuring is a Caribbean-wide phenomenon.

Complacency is even less excusable if we realize that the potential for social explosion is only one of the characteristics of this period of economic and political transition. Alongside the potential for such massive outbursts, there are three other Caribbean-wide social and political trends that seem to characterize this period of transition.

The first is the widely held perception that the quality of life in the region is deteriorating. From the Dominican Republic down to Trinidad, people are complaining about the cost of living, rampant crime, decreasing health and educational standards, and in vague, though no less politically significant ways, about a loss of faith in future improvements. The working classes grumble about it, while the middle classes demonstrate their loss of faith by migrating in increasing numbers. The latter invariably rationalize their move as being "for the children's future." Often unmentioned by the middle classes is the fact that any ideology espousing pragmatism and openness necessarily calls for more individual initiative, competitiveness, and a reduction in white-collar jobs in the historically bloated public sector.

The not-so-latent anger of urban masses experiencing enormous pressures is a Caribbean-wide phenomenon. Alongside their anger is the perception of a deteriorating quality of life, the existence of rampant corruption, and the crises of political parties.

Where this is accompanied—as is the case in many a Caribbean city—by constant electrical blackouts, water shortages, and a mushrooming informal sector occupying in helter-skelter fashion every inch of sidewalk space, nerves appear on collective edge. Where historical divisions of race and class exist, the new policies might aggravate them by making the adjustments seem discriminatory and partisan. In short, there is a new form of survival of the fittest, not unlike what is found in major cities elsewhere but one that contrasts sharply with the traditionally tranquil and even genteel life of the Caribbean middle classes.

Contributing to the sense of malaise of the middle class is rampant corruption. There is, first and foremost, the corruption wrought by the illicit trade in drugs. The Caribbean has become a major transshipment center for the US and Europe. Many of the region's leaders now agree with Michael Manley that the drug trade represents the greatest threat to their islands and the world. There is growing sentiment in the region for concerted action. But there is also widespread administrative corruption. In Venezuela the misappropriations, not to say outright theft, are counted in the billions of dollars, in Trinidad in the hundreds of millions. The amounts appear to reflect the nature and size of the economies. These are monies taken from development projects or military expenditures, and thus are materially harmful to the futures of these societies.

Also galling is the widespread impunity that violation of the public trust and monies appears to enjoy. This situation clashes dramatically with the religiosity and conservative-ness of these societies. The recent sentencing of an ex-president of the Dominican Republic to 20 years in jail, the trial of several ex-ministers in Venezuela, and the Costa Rican congressional report on administrative corruption in Costa Rica are rare acts indeed. No society can bear such internal tensions for long, which explains why charges of corruption tend to be the dominant theme of virtually every election in the region. Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic continually asserts that he has "manos limpias," knowing that the claim contributes enormously to his surprising new popularity, appealing even to a middle class historically skeptical of his populist intentions.

Contributing to this milieu of economic and moral uncertainty are the escalating crises in political party structures in the region. Even the historically strong and united parties have not escaped the divisions. The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano in the Dominican Republic is now three distinct parties. In Trinidad the formidable People's National Party split into three parties, one of which joined a victorious coalition that split into two parties only months after winning a landslide victory. The governing Democratic Labour Party in normally staid and proper Barbados split so badly that the splinter group is now the official opposition in parliament. In Grenada the government is virtually paralyzed because of internal splits. In the Netherlands Antilles there is a tenuous coalition of six parties forming the federal government while on each of the islands there is a bewildering array of parties and coalitions.
But if the governing parties appear to be prone to splintering, the opposition is in even worse shape. Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama are clear aberrations from the Caribbean-wide shift to pluralist parliamentary politics, but even there the opposition is characterized by its divisiveness. In Haiti there are perhaps 25 parties competing with the military for state power; in Nicaragua the opposition national front is composed of 14 parties; in Panama the courage and determination of deposed General Manuel Noriega's opposition did not heal the divisions between them, and their tenure in government promises to be equally fractured. In Guyana the entrenched government ridicules the five-party opposition coalition (the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy), noting that they cannot even agree on a spokesperson to negotiate over elections. In Suriname a weak and ethnically splintered government does not even have the power to control the corrupt and arrogant military clique still controlled by ex-dictator Colonel Desi Bouterse.

A New Direction
There can be no doubt that the vast majority of the Caribbean peoples prefer democracy, with all its foibles, to dictatorship. Whenever and wherever given a free choice, they have opted for pluralism. There can be little doubt, however, that the present crisis of confidence expressed most articulately and persistently by the region's middle classes and periodically but explosively by their urban masses is not a situation to take lightly. As welcome as the new openness is, it is evident that the accompanying trends have to be understood and monitored. The worst thing that can happen to any system in transition—with all the uncertainties and confusion that accompany it—is that fundamental components of the new policy initiative be either lacking or constantly in doubt. The Caribbean has chosen a new direction made compelling by international trends and national preferences. Merely adopting a new ideology, however, does not guarantee the availability of all basic ingredients. Markets and capital have to be competed for, and this competition, as the Caribbean is discovering, is becoming ever more difficult.

It is obvious that there are problems, even hardships, ahead in this transition. Yet there is also hope that the new realism and pragmatism of the Caribbean will see it through these difficulties without any harm to the admirable democracies they have created. Most Caribbean leaders have demonstrated that they understand two fundamental things about today's realities: first, pluralist politics are the foundations of any true development; and second, it is better to confront those realities with all their consequences than attempt to avoid them through an adherence to the status quo.
Cuba: ¿InfleXibilidad Total?

by Damián J. Fernández

Fidel Castro proclaims "¡Viva inflexibilidad!" while the Berlin Wall comes tumbling down. Neither Castro's rhetoric nor the dramatic events in the Soviet bloc are appropriate lenses through which to look at contemporary Cuban politics. To harp on the líder máximo's ideological rigidity or to use the example of Eastern Europe as a model for what awaits the island is to miss two fundamental points. One, changes have been taking place inside Cuba, not as mere repercussions of external events but as a result of internal dynamics. Two, Cuban history, and the Cuban revolution specifically, have always been atypical, and should not be cast in the molds that fit other societies.

Island Currents

At first glance one would say that the tide of reforms sweeping across the communist world has not reached Cuban shores. If one looks closer, however, one sees not a wave but a ripple of change. Although less sensational than the external developments, Cuba's internal developments are important nonetheless. To begin with, Cubans are increasingly willing to express their dissatisfaction with the way things function (or malfunction). Under the banner of rectificación, the top leaders have admitted to failures in the system. Utopia, contrary to 1960s prophesies, is not just around the corner. Throughout the island, at bus stops, in queues, and in artists' workshops, people are finding fault with Cuban conditions. They no longer place the blame outside the island (i.e., the US embargo) but on factors within the revolution. The artists, particularly the painters and sculptors, have adopted a critical stance, pushing the limits of self-expression to levels unseen since the 1960s. A visit to the Sala del Humor in the Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes reveals much more than the dark side of the Cuban sense of the comic.

Independent social groups, moreover, are staking their own claims. Like the artists, the Church has found in the late 1980s an assertive voice and is experiencing a renaissance, as are the island's other popular religions. A minuscule but courageous human rights movement is defying the odds to survive, as are at least half a dozen other cultural, religious, ecological, and political groupings.

In addition Cuba's youth show signs of restlessness. They are eager to strike a conversation with an outsider, to offer to buy your jeans, and to indict their society. The Gulf between those who rule—a gerontocracy, according to some critics—and the younger generation worries the Communist Party. Young Cubans are enraptured by the symbols of glasnost and perestroika rather than the revolutionary myths of yesteryear.

The ruling elite's ability to sustain cohesion has been acquired at a high price. The July 13, 1989, execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa is one example. The defection of second-tier officials points to discord under the surface of tranquility. Debate permeates the state and party organs, particularly over the issue of where to go from here.

Within Cuba and abroad there is consensus that the country must change. The sentiment is that, at the least, Cuba's political system will have to accommodate the economic transformations under way in the Soviet bloc. The questions are, how will Cuba change, and how much change will its political system tolerate? In this regard there is no consensus on the island. The regime itself is unsure which way to turn, and thus seems to be heading in contradictory directions. For instance it has rejected market mechanisms and economic liberalization, while encouraging joint ventures and tourism.

Above all the Cuban government is trying to avoid losing control at home. It will therefore attempt to manage the pressures for change that are emanating from the state and party, as well as from below and abroad. Yet the process of social change is hardly controllable or aseptic, even when directed from
above. To make matters worse, Cuba’s alternatives are neither clear nor promising.

**A Cuban Domino?**

What is clear is that Cuba is neither Poland nor Albania. To expect Havana to imitate the pattern of the Eastern bloc is to disregard the uniqueness of the Cuban revolution and Cuban culture. As Gustavo Pérez-Firmat states in *The Cuban Condition* (1989), Cuba has always been a "translational" society: the island creates its own identity by reinterpreting foreign models.

Just as simplistic is Castro’s attempt to stand up to Cuba’s dilemmas with staid symbols of ideological orthodoxy. The notion that change can be contained like a chemical reaction in a test tube, avoiding spillover, is anachronistic. Cuban society has already been “contaminated” by reformist ideas, rendering ineffective the old-time revolutionary mythology.

Whether we like it or not, the Castro government is not about to come tumbling down. A domino theory for the socialist world is simplistic and inaccurate. Although some forces are pulling the state and the society apart, other forces are keeping them together. On the one hand, economic decline, falling living conditions, and political discontent are not enough to undermine the system. On the other hand, repression is not the only cement that binds the pieces.

As occurs in other countries, a significant number of Cubans form an upper political stratum that has actively bought into the political system, for ideological reasons, lack of alternatives, or outright opportunism. In spite of some erosion, this stratum’s support remains strong. Meanwhile, for the same reasons that common citizens elsewhere identify with their national institutions and leaders, “rank-and-file” Cubans remain loyal fidelistas and will rally around their líder máximo to the end. In short, state-society relations in Cuba are like an incessantly bickering husband and wife: they may be on the emotional road to divorce, but they are held together by a shared past, an uncertain future, and sheer inertia.

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Long Live Inflexibility!

by Fidel Castro

We live in a world in which many bizarre, complex, and incomprehensible things are happening. This is why, remembering the words of Camilo [Cienfuegos], we must entrench ourselves behind our principles. We must entrench ourselves behind our Marxist-Leninist ideas more than ever; we must entrench ourselves behind the ideas of socialism and communism more than ever.

This revolution will never renounce its glorious title. To honor those who fell early fighting the mercenaries of Girón, it will never change its historic and glorious name of Socialist Revolution of Cuba. If some day we decide to change the name, it will have to be given the title the Communist Revolution of Cuba.

More than ever, we have firm, solid convictions in what socialism can achieve. We are more convinced than ever that no society in history can compare to socialism. Perhaps we are moving ahead of our times, or perhaps there is a trend to go back to old times, but we do not want to go back. We are going through bizarre times. You should see the news dispatches and speeches carried by the bourgeois press, which euphorically state that socialism has ended, that it was a dream, an illusion; that all men should turn back to a shameful, revulsive capitalism. The advocates of capitalist reform are considered to be progressive.

I contend that international news agencies, which are largely monopolized by the imperialist and capitalist media, have made subtle use of words. To the champions of Marxist-Leninism, to the champions of socialism, to the champions of communism, to those who do not surrender, to those who are firm, to those who do not waver in their ideas, to those who believe in their ideas, to those who are the most progressive people and who are at the forefront in the world, to those who have not yielded to the imperialist ideology, to those who have not yielded to the imperialist harassment: they are describing the people as inflexible. Long live inflexibility! Long live inflexibility when it comes to defending our revolutionary principles!

These people are also described as conservative. Since when has capitalism been progressive? Since when can exploitation of men by men be regarded as progressive? Since when has that filth been progressive? As Marx said, when there is no more exploitation of men by men, when capitalism stops owning the means of production, mankind will have emerged from the prehistorical age, that is, it would have entered the historical age. We have entered the historical age, but if others want to go back to the prehistorical age, that is their own business.

All the things I have mentioned here today—it would have been impossible to even dream of them under capitalism. We have experienced these realities stemming from socialism, whatever the difficulties we are still experiencing, whatever our problems. It was not socialism that created underdevelopment; socialism did not create colonialism; socialism did not create the neo-colonialism that is still affecting a large portion of the world. Socialism did not cause the famine of tens of millions of human beings in the various continents.

All of the problems affecting the world today—the arms race, the nuclear threat, the contamination of the environment, the poisoning of the atmosphere, the rivers, of the seas—stem from the chaos, the anarchy, the exploitation, the irresponsibility of capitalism.

We have to be determined to face any difficulty. We must be aware, well-informed, very alert to everything that is going on in the world. Come what may, we will continue to move ahead; come what may, we will continue to struggle for socialism and communism. I do not believe we will be left alone, and even if we were left alone and were the last ones, we would not be discouraged for a single second or moment.

We are not going to do things so that the imperialists may say we are good communists, good socialists. We are not going to make concessions of any kind. Imperialism should not even dream of this. We are not going to make any kind of concession. If they want to consider us demons, let them continue to consider us demons. We do not believe in wolves disguised as grandmothers.

In our country, people work with enthusiasm, confidence, and safety without fearing anyone or anything, or becoming discouraged. Knowing that our people are ready to face anything, are capable of attaining any goal and challenging any danger, and knowing that our people are capable of defending socialism and communism, and Marxism-Leninism until the last drop of blood is shed, we can say with the same conviction of that year: today the Cuban people embody one single Camilo!
Cuba and the American Left

by Lisandro Pérez

"Halifax" has become one of the code words in the Cuban-American political lexicon for "dialogue" between Cubans on both sides of the Florida Strait. The residents of the Nova Scotia maritime province cannot possibly suspect that the name of their city is now part of the political discourse in, of all places, Miami.

The reason is the November 1989 conference on Cuba convened in Halifax by St. Mary's University and the Canadian Association of Latin American Studies. In attendance were Cubans from the US and Cuba, as well as North Americans and Europeans.

To be sure, the willingness of the two groups of Cubans in Halifax to engage in a frank exchange was an important aspect of the conference. Not that this exchange was the most significant aspect of the gathering. After all, Cubans inside and outside the island, especially academics, have been communicating with each other for more than a decade. Halifax was just another chapter in that ongoing—and sometimes tortuous—exchange.

More significant was the broader picture. There were nearly 500 persons in attendance at the Canadian conference, of which probably no more than 100 were Cubans living either inside or outside the island. Most of the attendees were North American and European scholars and writers who have long sympa-

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thized with the Cuban revolution. The statements and mood of many representatives of the American Left were the most extraordinary aspect of the conference.

During the rousing final reception of the gathering, one of its organizers reminded the attendees that 1989 was not only the 30th anniversary of the Cuban revolution, but also the 20th anniversary of Woodstock. The seemingly incongruous remark was entirely appropriate for the occasion.

To understand this, one has to realize what the Cuban revolution has meant to the left in the US and especially to the American counterculture of the 1960s. Saul Landau, who was at Halifax, explained it this way in Mother Jones magazine (July-August 1989): “Like other foreigners who visited Cuba in the early revolutionary years, I discovered there were wonderful possibilities that Jean-Paul Sartre and C. Wright Mills popularized for the European and American New Left... the zany experiment, and the contagious enthusiasm of its leader, attracted revolutionaries who could not abide by the repressive doctrine and reality of Soviet socialism.”

Indeed, the countercultural movement that displayed itself on a New York farm 20 years ago had a natural affinity with a revolution led by young rebels who had instituted sweeping social reforms in defiance of the US “military-industrial complex.” The Cuban revolution was an important symbol and cause for the American idealists and rebels of the time. Now at the threshold or in the throes of middle age, those radical idealists of the 1960s were much in evidence at Halifax. They traveled long distances to talk about the revolution that is still dear to their hearts.

But how different is today’s world. For one thing, a dynamic Soviet leader initiates far-reaching reforms that promise to bring democratization and openness to the socialist world. For another, a gray-bearded Fidel Castro resists the changes and becomes the aging communist reactionary, hanging on to power in a stagnant revolution. Without abandoning their socialist and revolutionary stances, representatives of the American Left made clear in Halifax their criticisms of the state of affairs in Cuba. For instance, Landau distributed his Mother Jones article, in which he writes that “Cubans may not be able to break through the current crisis, both economic and political, with Fidel as Father, a role that prevents his people from achieving full political adulthood.”

Other participants at Halifax, long known for being sympathetic analysts of the revolution, mournfully noted the dismal performance of the economy, the disastrous consequences of the rectification campaign that a few years ago eliminated some progressive reforms, the continuing monolithic character of the Cuban political system, and the ethical questions raised by the Ochoa-De la Guardia Affair. The barbarous application of the death penalty to persons whose crimes were presumably confined to drug trafficking and corruption, was difficult to accept by those who have consistently opposed capital punishment in the US. At Halifax the enthusiastic support of the American Left for the youthful reformism of the Cuban revolution seemed—like Woodstock—a thing of the distant past.

Quite possibly when Cuban deputy minister Ricardo Alarcón returned from Halifax to Havana and reported to Castro, he didn’t even mention the “frank exchange” with the Cuban-Americans. He might have been too busy describing the mood among the revolution’s old American friends. In a world in which Cuba is becoming increasingly isolated, this was yet another bit of bad news for Castro.
Mexico, once the world's fourth-largest oil producer, was forced to cut exports substantially in 1989 and may cease to be an oil exporter by the turn of the century. Faced with rising demand and falling production, Mexico canceled sales of its light "Isthmus" grade oil to Israel and the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve and dropped to sixth place on the list of the world's oil producers.

More ominous still, a study prepared by the Planning Department of the state monopoly Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) says that even with extensive investments in exploration, crude exports will halt completely by the end of the century. There seems to be little awareness outside Mexico that the country has been cutting its exports, more than half of which go to the US.

In the latest round of negotiations on Mexico's $100-billion foreign debt, commercial bankers included a "windfall profit-sharing" clause. Under the clause, if oil prices rise above $14 a barrel in real terms after 1996, Mexico will have to pay the banks a premium. In case of a major drop in world oil prices, Mexico will also receive additional financing from banks. Mexico's position in the oil market has become a great worry, however, for both PEMEX analysts and students of the Mexican economy. "PEMEX has always been seen as the checking account of the nation," said one PEMEX source, who asked not to be identified. "Lately, it has been the banks' guarantor that Mexico can pay."

Jane Bussey is a free-lance writer based in Mexico City.

Oil has been linked to Mexico's economic fortunes since 1977, when the government of former president José López Portillo announced the country had joined the league of oil giants with proven reserves of 72.5 billion barrels. The conviction among Mexican government planners that world oil prices would continue to rise indefinitely set the country on a $60-billion borrowing spree that ended in 1982 because oil prices started to fall. Since the economic crisis began, PEMEX has given PEMEX investments a low priority. Expenditures on drilling and exploration have been slashed by 50%.

This cutback has meant lower production. From a high of 2.7 million barrels a day in 1984, Mexico is now producing 2.5 million barrels daily. Official reserves, estimated at 72.5 billion barrels in 1983, are now officially set at 67.6 billion barrels, and some even question that figure.

In 1989 Mexico has switched roles from gasoline exporter to gasoline importer to meet rapidly rising domestic demand, at an estimated cost to the balance of payments of $600 million. From January to August 1989 domestic demand for gasoline rose 12.5%, spurred on by an artificially low price maintained by the government's anti-inflation program.

Reduced Shipments

The gasoline situation and discrepancies with the US Energy Department over payments forced PEMEX to cancel crude contracts with Israel and the US—approximately 85,000 barrels a day in all—so that the higher grade Isthmus crude used for export could be diverted to Mexico's oil refineries for gasoline production. PEMEX sources said Mexico's other grade of crude, "Maya," was too heavy for Mexican refineries to process quickly. According to press reports, Mexico also plans to reduce its Isthmus exports to Japan by 30,000 barrels a day, although US clients are expected to increase their purchases.

Mexico's weakening position in the world oil markets is underscored by a confidential internal PEMEX report entitled "Possibilities of Crude and Natural Gas Production 1989-2000." The report warns that, under the present levels of investment, crude oil production would fall from the current 2.5 million barrels a day to 1.5 million in the year 2000. "This decline in production would cause an accelerated reduction in the crude export platform to the point that very probably exports would have to be suspended starting in 1997," the report says. The study's most optimistic forecast, in which the
investments in exploration are double the current amount, still projects crude oil exports ending by 1999. "Even in the case that investments increased significantly, crude oil and natural gas production could not be sustained in the actual levels," the study says.

The report also says that the discovery of new oil deposits would have little effect on the decline in the medium term because of the time lag between discovery and commercial exploitation. The study shows that exports will fall from the 1.2 million barrels a day planned for 1990 to around 800,000 barrels daily within a couple of years, drastically cutting a vital source of foreign exchange.

**Missed the Mark**

Although predictions about the oil market have missed the mark in the past, the study underlines the growing concern in the industry over Mexico's oil future. PEMEX reported in October 1989 that export earnings on 1989 crude sales totaled $4.8 billion in the first eight months of the year, a few hundred million more than originally projected. But estimated total annual earnings of $7.2 billion are still less than half of the $15 billion Mexico earned from crude exports in 1984 and do not even cover the service on the country's foreign debt.

There have long been questions about the spectacular increase in reserves in the late 1970s. Recently the Banco Nacional de México placed reserves at only 46 billion barrels, arguing that development of the Chicontepec field in northern Veracruz—which accounts for one-fourth of the official reserves—is not feasible at current prices. In October 1989 Fausto Alzati of the Nacional Financiera development bank, admitted the official reserves "were established with technical criteria that were perhaps excessively generous." While on paper Mexico has oil reserves for 57 years, industry experts say Mexico will run into supply problems before then. In the meantime the competing demands of domestic consumption and foreign exchange requirements are likely to increase.

Any substantial increases in investment are not planned for 1990 at least, the PEMEX source admitted. Instead the company is trying to do more with less. After the January 1989 arrest of Joaquin Hernández Galicia ("La Quina"), the boss of the Petroleum Workers Union of the Mexican Republic, more than 40,000 temporary workers were laid off and a new labor contract was negotiated by his successor, Sebastián Guzmán Cabrera.

Government planners are looking for new ways to attract capital, including reclassifying basic petrochemicals so that private-sector investment can participate. Despite these changes, 1990 promises to be another year of stagnation in PEMEX.

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**New World Soundings**

**Culture and Ideology in the Americas**

**Richard M. Morse**

Eminent and iconoclastic cultural historian Richard Morse takes a series of sharply focused looks at the Americas. He uses political ideology to contrast the traditions of Anglo and Latin America while surveying contemporary pressures for ideological change. He inquires into the ways in which speech and poetry evoke the common historical experience of North and South America and examines the transatlantic "sea changes" of European languages. And in the book's final sections, he addresses the north-south transaction from yet three more angles, ruminating on the problems involved in conveying the Latin American experience to U.S. students, considering the impediments to U.S.-Puerto Rican understanding, and recounting the myopic adventures of McLuhanism, "the world's first Brazilianist," as he travels through the exotic land he has chosen for definitive research.

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**The Cuban Economy**

**Measurement and Analysis of Socialist Performance**

**Andrew Zimbalist and Claes Brundenius**

Until now, information on Cuban economic performance has come largely from studies by emigrant Cuban economists living in the United States. Most of these studies are predictably negative. Andrew Zimbalist and Claes Brundenius contend that they are also wrong. Based in part on extensive interviews with Cuban workers and officials, The Cuban Economy is the first comprehensive account of Cuban economic development to appear in the United States in the thirty years since the Castro revolution. Zimbalist and Brundenius conclude that although Cuban economic performance falls short of government claims, Cuba is still outperforming its Latin American neighbors. The lessons learned about the role of the state in economic development, they argue, have important implications for other third world countries.

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Saving Costa Rica's Environment
by Jack W. Hopkins

The natural resources of Latin America and the Caribbean are being wasted and destroyed at an alarming rate. Vast areas of forest fall under the unregulated logger's chain saw; clear-cutting (cutting trees without replanting) is the rule rather than the exception. Subsistence farmers cut and burn for a year or two of good reforestation; once substantially covered by forests, the country envisions importing wood by 1995 to meet its needs.

Costa Rica is a telling example of environmental

devastation. A biological paradise containing a striking variety of plant and animal species, Costa Rica faces the prospect of a permanent loss of many of these species and the destruction of its basis for agricultural and economic growth. For the past quarter century, some 50,000 hectares of forest have been destroyed each year without

Jack W. Hopkins is professor of public and environmental affairs at Indiana University.
reports: Mexico

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Costa Rica is a telling example of the severity of environmental degradation occurring in the region, as well as a hopeful model for controlling that degradation. Since the 1960s Costa Rica has achieved an exemplary record of establishing national parks and reserves. Simultaneously, however, its territory has experienced a devastating rate of deforestation. A biological paradise containing a striking variety of plant and animal species, Costa Rica faces the prospect of a permanent loss of many of these species and the destruction of its basis for agricultural and economic growth. For the past quarter century, some 50,000 hectares of forest have been destroyed each year without reforestation; once substantially covered by forests, the country envisions importing wood by 1995 to meet its needs.

Costa Rica is fortunate, though, in that by the 1970s the scientific base and culture to support a healthy conservation movement were solidly in place. This base was a prerequisite for the subsequent development of the country’s national parks and reserves. Reform at the Universidad de Costa Rica in the 1950s led to increased emphasis on the natural sciences and applied disciplines, as well as the revitalization of the Museo Nacional. The Tropical Agronomy Center for Research and Teaching at Turrialba was founded in 1942, followed in the 1960s by the founding of the Tropical Science Center and the Organization of Tropical Studies (a consortium of North American universities and the Universidad de Costa Rica). In the 1970s the establishment of the National Parks Service and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Research consolidated the organizational underpinnings for the rapid development of Costa Rica’s conservation movement. This movement derives support from a comparatively egalitarian social structure and a political system that has functioned with remarkable stability since the civil war of 1948 restored democratic government.

The impressive result, rivaled by few countries in the world, is a national park and reserve system that includes more than 25% of Costa Rica’s territory. Yet this accomplishment conceals the rapid deforestation and degradation of much of the country’s remaining area, even within the national parks. Along with the efforts of nongovernmental organizations such as the National Parks Foundation and the Neotropic Foundation, the conservation community has fought an uphill battle both to protect the progress achieved and to replace the devastation of the natural environment with sustainable development.

Several circumstances have driven home the importance of sustainable development—which emphasizes the compatibility of a healthy economy with the collective responsibility for preserving the environment—and encouraged the conservation community to search for solutions. The most prominent and compelling case is that of the Corcovado National Park in southwestern Costa Rica. Traditionally the economy of the region has been dominated by production of bananas for export. But plant diseases, declining world market prices, labor unrest, and other problems led to the closing of the plantations and withdrawal of the foreign fruit companies. Displaced workers began panning for gold in the national park, where they caused serious environmental damage to rivers and streams. The problems of Corcovado vividly called attention to the critical links...
between, on the one hand, conservation and national parks, and on the other hand, the surrounding society and economy. It became clear that parks and reserves cannot be protected unless the population around them is secure.

Depressed economic conditions and lack of employment alternatives force people into survival activities; under such conditions, attempting simply to "protect" a park is futile. Despite costly programs to evict the illegal miners and relocate them, the Costa Rican government failed to solve the problem in traditional ways. The costs exceeded the total budget of the National Park Service.

As much as any other factor, the situation in the Corcovado National Park gave impetus to the concept of sustainable development in Costa Rica. In turn this concept provoked the sweeping reorganization of the government structure for conservation. The changes being implemented fundamentally alter the philosophy of conservation as well as the management style and the organization of Costa Rica's national park system. These changes, although unique to Costa Rica, may have relevance to other countries struggling to deal with environmental problems. In country after country, finding a workable balance between conservation and development poses enormous difficulties.

The World Conservation Strategy of 1980 was formulated by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in cooperation with the UN Environmental Program and the World Wildlife Fund. This strategy focuses on three objectives: maintenance of ecological processes and life support systems, preservation of genetic diversity, and sustainable use of species and ecosystems. The Costa Rican version of this strategy—the Estrategia Conservadora para el Desarrollo Sostenible (ECODES)—broadens the concept of sustainable development, stressing issues such as the linkages between a healthy economy, social justice, and an environmental-ist ethic. ECOIDES is based on a clear diagnosis of Costa Rica's environmental problems, on the government's strong commitment to sustainable development, and on an unusually high level of international support.

Parks and reserves cannot be protected unless the population around them is secure. The lack of adequate employment forces people into survival activities. This problem gave impetus to Costa Rica's policy of sustainable development.

Costa Rica became the first country in Central America and the Caribbean to elevate environmental concerns to a cabinet-level position. In 1988 the previously scattered organizations that dealt with natural resources, energy, mining, and national parks and reserves were consolidated into the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines. In 1989 the ministry implemented a reorganized structure for the new environmental strategy, which amounts to a sweeping change in the previously fragmented system of management. The plan is remarkable in organization, philosophy, and policy.

Organizationally the plan creates nine new Regional Conservation and Sustainable Development Units (URCs). This scheme is modeled after the structure for the new Guanacaste National Park, which involves a regional advisory committee that includes local representatives. In addition, government staff (of the National Park Service) and noncivil service staff (of the Neotropic Foundation) work alongside each other with respective jurisdictions established by law.

Not all URCs will follow this mixed-management concept; a key feature of the plan is flexibility in organizational arrangements, with URC directors having the main responsibility for their regions. This feature stands in marked contrast to both the old system and the top-heavy organization of the National Park Service. Indeed, the scheme will eventually incorporate people from the municipalities into the planning process as part of the regional committees, which will advise URC directors. Many of the precise administrative arrangements, such as the selection of local representatives, are as yet unspecified. It is likely that URCs will develop significant authority.

Regional Prospects?

The Costa Rican plan—an overhaul of the structure and philosophy of the nation's conservation system—evolved from months of discussion and preparation by the conservation community, inside and outside of government. It afforded, moreover, an opportunity for extensive public discussion and debate about matters such as the environmental roles of the private sector and the government.

Will other Latin American countries soon follow Costa Rica's environmentalist path? Other Latin American countries, facing similar ecological problems, may not enjoy the combination of advantages that Costa Rica possesses: a relatively stable, demilitarized political system; broad consensus on environmental goals; and substantial international commitment and financial support. Hence they may lack the means to implement such an ambitious program. Nevertheless, Costa Rica's program may serve other countries well as a model for undertaking the critical task of saving the earth's environment. ■
Skim children in a corner of Honduras have found a new way of escaping poverty and hopelessness: studying Mozart, Bach, and Beethoven, and becoming classical music virtuosos.

In what organizers proudly describe as the best-kept musical secret in the hemisphere, the 75-student Victoriano López music high school is giving Honduran youths—many of them from impoverished homes—a chance to become world-class concert performers.

One recent graduate was accepted by New York's Juilliard School of Music. Another won second place in a nationwide American String Teachers' Association contest. Ten other recent graduates have won full scholarships to pursue their musical studies at Columbus College in Georgia. "Many students have made wonderful careers abroad," said Gloria de Gallegos, mother of a graduate of the school. "Our daughter wants to become a classical violinist. We're hoping she will get a scholarship and study abroad."

The school operates in an unlikely atmosphere. It is located in the El Prado neighborhood of San Pedro Sula, an industrial city in the heart of the Honduran banana-growing region, on a street that was paved only five years ago. On any afternoon, the music of Mozart, Schubert, or Vivaldi clashes with the gnashing metal sounds from nearby factories. A Pepsi-Cola bottling plant is a block away. Several other factories and warehouses are scattered throughout the neighborhood. At

Mozart in Honduran Barrios

by Andres Oppenheimer

Andres Oppenheimer is a Latin America correspondent for the Miami Herald.
Reports: Honduras

the school's entrance—in place of the portraits of independence heroes that hang in most Latin American schools—are pictures of Schubert, Haydn, Liszt, and other composers. The only Honduran whose portrait hangs on the wall is Victoriano López, the small-town music teacher who founded San Pedro Sula's first music school in the mid-1940s. Inside is a library with 3,000 music scores, carefully folded in cardboard boxes discarded by a nearby factory. According to officials, the school—which is partially funded by the Honduran Education Ministry, the city of San Pedro Sula, the Central Bank, and private donations—has to find creative ways of functioning within its meager budget.

Rigorous Discipline

Tuition is free, but students must show musical talent to be admitted, and must be ready to comply with the school's rigorous discipline to stay in. Students go to their regular high schools in the morning. In the afternoon they attend the Victoriano López school, where they can obtain a second high school diploma after five years of study. There is a five-hour daily schedule of violin, piano, or flute lessons, plus homework. There are 26 small rooms where students receive daily individual lessons from one of the eight full-time faculty members. The curriculum includes three years of music reading, five years of a major instrument such as violin, three years of a minor instrument, and five years of group performance, including orchestra, choir, and small ensemble. "Some parents criticize us because they think our music is too serious," said director José Antonio Chain, an Uruguayan-born violinist, "but they generally end up liking it." To help fund itself, the school offers about 60 concerts a year, most in the school's 130-seat auditorium. The seats came from a demolished theater in New Orleans. One donor paid their transport to Miami, and another paid their way on to Honduras.

Several of the school's graduates who are on full scholarships in US schools come from homes where food is scarce. The school's parents' association pays for the meals of students who cannot afford lunch. "In one recent case, a construction worker whose son studied at the school wanted to take the kid out and put him to work," Chain said. "We persuaded him not to. Now the boy is in a US college, all expenses paid," he continued. "His parents can't believe it. They think it's a miracle."

According to Chain, one of the reasons Victoriano López students do so well in the US is that they are "performance-driven." He observed that the school puts much more emphasis on performance than most of its US counterparts. "Our school is competition-oriented," Chain said. "All our competitions are behind curtains. Our children are used to competition from early on. They don't freak out when facing an important test."

Few Distractions

Robin Smith, an American music instructor who is part of the school's staff, says that in some ways San Pedro Sula offers a better atmosphere for classical music training than many US or European cities. "We have a great advantage here: there are very few distractions around," she said. "There is nothing else to do in San Pedro Sula. These children live playing music." On the minus side, Honduran students usually start out playing by rote and showing little creativity, Smith said. Once instructors encourage them to overcome their inhibitions, however, they become excellent musicians, she said.

Wouldn't most of the students prefer to play rock music if given a choice? "Not at all," countered Smith. "That's the other big advantage we have: there's no teen-age rebelliousness here, and rebelliousness is what produces rock music."

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Editor's Note: Adapted from the Miami Herald, August 17, 1989.
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Insider briefs on people and institutions shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

The Down Side of Eastern Europe’s Opening
A November 1989 French Agency Press wire points to a major dilemma for Western Europe: where to invest? The pressing economic needs and favorable investment environment of Eastern Europe may divert scarce foreign investment that was previously destined for Latin America. To the reported consternation of Latin American representatives in Rome, Italian officials declared their two investment priorities are now North Africa and Eastern Europe. In 1987 Italy signed a $6 billion, five-year investment agreement with Argentina and Brazil. Venezuela has been anxious to sign a similar accord.

Not a Best Seller
In his “Stone Cowboy on the High Plains” (Atlantic Monthly, June 1989), a fictional story set in Bolivia, Mark Jacobs calls Bolivians “trolls.” The unflattering account caught US State Department officials off guard because the author was one of their own: now an embassy spokesperson in Honduras, Jacobs wrote the article as he was leaving a similar post in Bolivia.

Take a “Morning Ride”
Try the new album Morning Ride (Polygram) by Puerto Rican jazz flutist Néstor Torres. Three songs on the album reflect the musician’s Latin roots: “Tropicalia,” “I Just Wanna Make U Dance,” and “El cándor pasa.” The album is his first.

More Mambo
Oscar Hijuelo’s The Mambo Kings Play Songs of Love (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1989) details New York’s Latin popular-music currents of the 1950s. One review described the Cuban-American novelist’s second book as “original in conception, stylish in execution and exuberant in its largeness of spirit.”

No “More Mambo”
Dámaso Pérez Prado died on September 14, 1989, in Mexico City at the age of 72. Originally a classical pianist, Pérez moved from his native Cuba to Mexico in 1948 to expand upon his musical repertoire. There he became famous for his “Que rico el mambo,” later released in the US as “More Mambo.” Credited with fomenting the “mambo craze” of the mid-1950s, Pérez’s “Cherry Pink and Appleblossom White” led the music charts for a time in 1955.

So What Else Is New?
Business Week’s October 23, 1989, article on “cocaine countries” reveals once again the immense difficulties confronting countries that attempt to cooperate with US drug-eradication efforts. For instance, Bolivia—one an economic basket case, but now a “showcase,” according to some State Department insiders—has had some success in crop substitution. But according to the magazine, the US “Congress has kept a tight rein on any money for Andean soybean assistance.” Who’s responsible? The US soybean lobby.

Penny Lernoux
On October 8, 1989, cancer claimed 49-year-old Penny Lernoux, author of numerous books and articles on Latin America, including the popularly acclaimed Cry of the People (Doubleday, 1980). A resident of Bogotá for more than two decades and a chain-smoker, Lernoux left a husband and young daughter.

Banding Together
Konbit (A&M Records, 1989), a compilation of Haitian dance music, is the latest venture of filmmaker Jonathan Demme (Something Wild, Married to the Mob). Demme gained his musical credentials with 1985’s Stop Making Sense, a concert film of the American pop group Talking Heads; recent forays into pop music geography by Talking Head David Byrne may have inspired Demme to create his own compilation. The proceeds from Konbit—or “community work brigade”—will benefit “Water for People,” a self-help development project in Haiti. Among the performers are Haitian groups Tabou Combo, Magnum Band, and D. P. Express, as well as the Neville Brothers of New Orleans.

Global Standards?
“Think globally, act locally” is no longer a mere cliché, as some people are thinking daring thoughts. In the Netherlands there is incipient, high-level discussion about replacing Dutch with English as the official language. In Argentina influential voices are advocating adoption of the US dollar as the national currency.

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
Grin and Bear It

When he was in Honduras as head of the US Information Agency in 1980-85, Cresencio Arcos moved around the country with the authority and respect of an ambassador. Now, after four years in Washington, Arcos has been nominated by the Bush administration to be the new US envoy to Honduras. How have the Hondurans responded? One newspaper editorial pointed to the ambassador-designate's qualifications by stating: “During his earlier stay he constructed a vast network of relations with politicians, businessmen, labor leaders, professionals, and military officers...and he came to understand the visible and hidden mechanisms” of the regional crisis. Another analysis of the Arcos nomination referred to his “detailed knowledge of the country” and called him a “sagacious calculator.”

A New “Art Form”

Now that he is retired from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe Jr. has gone public with his long-standing antagonism toward former Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams. In response to an Abrams opinion-page editorial (The New York Times, October 5, 1989) on the need to use “power” against Panama’s General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Crowe stated the proposals were “naive in their formulation and reckless in their casual commitment of our military men and women.” According to Crowe, “Mr. Abrams raises [this approach] to an art form” (The New York Times, October 16, 1989).

What’s in a Nacatamal?

The Nicaraguan influx in Miami has helped to diversify the local diet. Now, Little Havana sports numerous fritangas, or sidewalk barbecues, that feature the nacatamal, a Nicaraguan dish. What’s in a nacatamal? Rice, prunes, green olives, pork, and potatoes are smothered in corn meal and surrounded by a banana leaf. The nacatamal is then boiled for two hours and served steaming and yellow, to be eaten out of the leaf.

Energizing Brazil

In the 1970s sugar-based alcohol fuel seemed the perfect solution to two of Brazil's critical problems: hard-currency imports of oil and environmental pollution. One third of Brazil's 12.5 million cars run solely on this fuel. Yet many car owners might soon be walking to work: there is a shortfall of some 2 billion liters. Imported gasoline is now cheaper than sugar-based alcohol.

They’re Everywhere

Add Mario Vargas Llosa to the growing list of presidential candidates who are relying on US public relations firms to guide their electoral campaigns. The Sawyer-Miller Group of New York is assisting Vargas Llosa to develop his campaign strategy; the firm has probed issue receptivity within the electorate through public polling and focus groups. Sawyer-Miller has handled the successful campaigns of Corazón Aquino (Philippines), Rodrigo Borja (Ecuador), and Virgilio Barco (Colombia), among others.

People on the Move

Tim Golden has written his last article for the Miami Herald. He is now with the New York Times and will resume his Latin American news-coverage efforts following a new-employees orientation in the Big Apple.

Ronald William Roskens has been named by President George Bush as the new head of USAID. He became available for the job after he was fired as president of the University of Nebraska.

Guido di Tella has been appointed the Argentine ambassador to the US. The new ambassador holds a Ph.D. in economics from MIT. He served as a Judicialist Party congressional representative in 1988-89 and co-edited The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-1983 (MacMillan, 1989).

Carla Anne Robbins has taken leave from US News and World Report to enjoy a Nieman Foundation Fellowship at Harvard University.

David Bray is the Inter-American Foundation's new program representative for Mexico. Formerly the program representative for Paraguay, Bray will be residing in Oaxaca from January to July 1990.

Ricardo Arias Calderón, the new first vice president of Panama, was successively chair of the philosophy department, dean of Arts and Sciences, and academic vice president at Florida International University.
Crisis and Cinema in Latin America
by Ana M. López

The Latin American cinema is intimately linked to the region's economic and sociopolitical dynamics. Will the regional crisis undermine the cinema or serve as an energizing force?

Long a source of pride and nationalist dreams, an arena for revolutionary arguments, a victim of censorship, and the prey of international economic forces, the Latin American cinema continues to thrive, undaunted by what may be the most serious threat it has ever faced.

Unlike the economic threat faced in the 1930s, when Hollywood forever changed the cinema with sound technology that Latin American nations could ill afford, or the political threats of the 1970s, when a series of military coups d'état stifled the hopes of many revolutionary filmmakers, the current danger is simultaneously social, economic, and political: the Latin American cinema is losing its theatrical audiences. The cinema's long reign as the region's most energetic sociocultural force may have ended.

This phenomenon is not unique to Latin America. Throughout Western Europe and North America, the theatrical film gradually lost ground to television, cable, and home video over the last two decades. In Latin America, however, the process has been more rapid and, paradoxically, has forced the cinema to reach new levels of achievement. On the eve of the new century the cinema stands poised to surge forward with new creative energies, sophisticated technology, and innovative organization.

From Past to Present

The 1960s were years of political and cultural effervescence in Latin America, and the cinema—conceived of as an aesthetic, cultural, and political medium—was fully immersed in the debates of the era. In the 1960s it became clear that a "national" cinema could be a powerful mass medium, especially when produced and circulated outside established industrial channels. Beginning in the 1960s, quasi-industrial organizations in countries like Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil had attempted to produce national cinemas following the Hollywood model of production. But by the 1950s their near financial and aesthetic bankruptcy, and the sudden international visibility of anti-Hollywood movements such as Italian Neo-Realism and the French New Wave, invigorated Latin America's search for viable national cinemas with alternative social aspirations.

In Buenos Aires, for example, a group of young amateur filmmakers, trained in cine-clubs and universities rather than in the established industry, approached the cinema as a vehicle for self-expression. Known as the Nueva Ola, this group was much influenced by the French New Wave and made narratively experimental, personal films that focused on what they knew best, the middle class of Buenos Aires. In the interior city of Santa Fe, Fernando Birri, a filmmaker trained at the Centro Sperimentale in Rome (the birthplace of the Neo-Realist movement), called for another kind of national cinema. He proposed an Argentine cinema that focused on the physiognomy of the people and the land: a cinema of the humble rather than the exalted. His work at the Documentary School of Santa Fe, where he produced films such as Tire dió (1956-60) and Los Inundados (1961) and a number of important theoretical texts, served as a paradigm for many Latin American filmmakers.

In Brazil the Cinema Novo movement of the 1960s also rose out of the ashes of a bankrupt attempt to produce a cinema of Hollywood-studio quality (at the Vera Cruz studios in São Paulo). These filmmakers took on the cinema as a medium for the radicalization of culture. Politically, stylistically, and practically, they bypassed industrial limits and developed the language of cinema in films such as Nelson Pereira dos Santos's Vidas Secas (1963), Glauber Rocha's Baravento (1962), Carlos Diegues's Ganga Zuma (1963), and Ruy Guerra's Os Cafajestes (1963).

Similarly inspired filmmakers in...
Cuba had a marked advantage over their Latin American counterparts. In 1960, only three months after the triumph of the revolution, the government established the Instituto Cubano de Artes e Industrias Cinematográficas (ICAIC) and empowered it to take charge of all cinema-related activities. The young filmmakers who formed the core of ICAIC began their task of developing a national cinema from scratch by focusing on testimonial documentaries and newsreels that chronicled the changes taking place in Cuban social and political life. Although this work—particularly Santiago Alvarez’s innovative and hard-hitting newsreels—was very effective, ICAIC also ventured into fiction filmmaking, and by the late 1960s films such as Tomás Gutiérrez Alea’s Memorias del subdesarrollo (1968), Julio García Espinosa’s Las aventuras de Juan Quin (1967), and Humberto Solas’s Lucia (1968) proved that a different, socially responsive national cinema could be produced in Cuba. ICAIC’s innovative distribution and exhibition experiments—including “cine móviles” that brought the cinema to remote parts of the island—further promoted the cinema as a social force for the consolidation of a new socialist society.

The Argentine, Brazilian, and Cuban movements emerged as national attempts to change the social function of the cinema. By the mid-1960s, however, these national movements found a new source of inspiration, as well as practical and ideological support, in the cinematic work of their Latin American neighbors. Through a series of festivals and meetings, organized first in Sesri Levante, Italy, and later in Viña del Mar, Chile (1967, 1969) and Mérida, Venezuela (1968), filmmakers throughout Latin America began to recognize their common problems and goals and to formulate the project of a New Latin American Cinema.

The New Latin American Cinema was, above all, conceived of as a politically engaged practice, committed to changing the social function of the cinema in the region. In the many declarations and manifestos penned in the late 1960s and 1970s, filmmakers and producers conceived of the cinema as a vehicle, not of mass entertainment or “auteurist” personal expression, but of social and political consciousness. Their films—documentary and fictional, short and feature length—rejected the aesthetic paradigms of the dominant Hollywood cinema and attempted to establish a more direct and active communication with audiences.

Shunning mainstream channels of distribution and exhibition, they circulated their films through alternative, often clandestine, circuits including cine-clubs, neighborhood associations, labor unions, and political groups.

Paradoxically, however, the New Latin American Cinema coalesced precisely as the region underwent cataclysmic political changes. The repressive regimes, military coups d’état, and failed socialist experiments of the 1970s exiled and/or silenced the New Latin American Cinema. Although exile often intensified the Pan-Latin American character of the movement (as was the case, for example, with the prolific Chilean exile cinema produced in countries as diverse as Mexico, Brazil, Cuba, and Nicaragua), repression and censorship also weakened the movement’s links with social problems and critical realities.

In addition an intrinsic contra-
can markets. Primarily as a sign of solidarity with other emerging cinematographies, Cuba has dedicated a significant portion of its scant resources to co-productions. These have been as diverse as Jorge Ali Triana’s *Tiempo de morir* (1985, with Colombia), an adaptation of a Gabriel García Márquez story directed in the style of a classic western; Lisandro Duque’s *Visa USA* (1985, also with Colombia), an amusing story of a Colombian who wants to emigrate; and Miguel Littin’s *Alina y el cóndor* (1982, with Mexico and Nicaragua), a fantasy about a crippled young boy who dreams of flying in war-torn Nicaragua.

Of greater significance, however, is Cuba’s eleven year-old annual December festival. Bringing together filmmakers, producers, distributors, journalists, critics, and scholars for ten days of screenings, meetings, debates, and awards, the Havana festival has kept the constantly shifting Latin American film scene in focus for all. Together with its affiliated market for films, videos, and television, the festival has stimulated Pan-American efforts to promote politically conscious national cinemas without ignoring the medium’s commercial aspects. Furthermore, as a result of festival-sponsored seminars, the Committee of Latin American Filmmakers established the multinational *Fundación del Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano* (headed by Nobel laureate Gabriel García Márquez) and organized a tri-continental film and television school directed by Fernando Birri. Located outside Havana, the Escuela Internacional de Film y Televisión (more commonly known as the “Escuela de los Tres Mundos”) offers a tuition-free, three-year program in film and video production to more than 200 students from Africa, Asia, and the Americas.

### The Havana Festival, 1988

The festival of December 1988 proved that, although the cinema may be suffering from reduced audiences throughout Latin America, filmmakers are working hard to reverse the tide, taking advantage of the very technologies—television and video—that threaten the cinema’s popularity.

The 1,400 foreign delegates participating in the festival had the opportunity to watch 55 features, 49 short fictions, 81 documentaries, 17 cartoons, 160 video programs, and 272 videos from 23 countries. There were also a number of special *mostras* as well as various seminars and round-table discussions. From an industrial perspective, the most impressive event of the festival was the premiere of two series of multinational co-productions involving television and film producers.

The first was “Amores Dificiles,” six films adapted from García Márquez’s stories and directed by filmmakers from Brazil, Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain. The package was co-produced by the International Television Group and Televisión Española (RTVE) under the auspices of the *Fundación del Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano*. Individually conceived, the films reflect the stylistic and political diversity of the filmmakers. The particularly impressive films by Brazil’s Ruy Guerra (*La crónica de la bella palomera*), Cuba’s Tomás Gutiérrez Alea (*Cartas del parque*), and Colombia’s Lisandro Duque (*Milagro en Roma*) are convincing proof that television and the cinema need not remain enemies in the 1990s.

The second series was “Visión Latina,” a package of nine made-for-TV fictional films organized at last year’s festival. Exploring a common theme—the problems of childhood in Latin America—“Visión Latina” is not as accomplished as the more expensive “Amores Dificiles,” but it demonstrates the vitality and importance of Pan-Latin American film and television productions.

The festival featured a number of other multinational productions, several of which involved the participation of ICAIC and RTVE. Because Spain will commercialize and more than triple its TV channels in 1990, Spanish television producers have looked to Latin American filmmakers to obtain more products. Besides “Amores Dificiles,” RTVE co-produced Fernando Birri’s *Un señor muy viejo con alas enormes* (with ICAIC and Laboratorios de Poesía Cinematográfico, Rome), Ramiro Lacayo’s *El espectro de la guerra* (with the Instituto Nicaragüense de Cinema and the Instituto Mexicano de Televisión), and Francisco J. Lombardi’s *La bocia del lobo* (with Tornosol Films, Spain, and Inca Films, Peru). These films, although markedly different, are the result of a new industrial incentive for the New Latin American Cinema that promises to broaden its audience and bolster its productivity without compromising its integrity.

Though beset by financial difficulties and declining audiences, the traditionally strong national cinemas of Latin America—those of Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba—were also well represented. The Gran Coral award and the Coral award for best fiction film went to an Argentine film, Fernando Solan’s *Sur*. A sophisticated *tanguedia* (tango tragedy) of exile, loss, and return in the style of his earlier *Tangos: el exilio de Gardel*, *Sur* is a love story about a man’s return home from prison at the end of Argentina’s military dictatorship. The film’s ample budget (supplied by a French producer), sophisticated technology, skilled actors (Susu Pecoraro, Philippe Léopard, and Miguel Angel Sola in the lead roles), original scores by Actor Pizzolato, and breathtaking cinematography by Felix Monti raise the film to a level that easily surpasses current Latin American standards.

A much more modest Argentine entry, Jorge Zanada’s *Tango: baile nuestro*, was also impressive. An experimental documentary about the continued popularity of the tango and its mythical reverberations and implicit sexism, the film combines interviews and clips of professional and amateur dancers with clearly fictionalized scenes, a probing voice over narration, and an astounding visual sensibility. Other festival entries, although less accomplished than these two films, attested to the continued productivity of the Argen-
tine cinema. In spite of a deep economic crisis and a 55% decline in film audiences since 1984, the Instituto Nacional de Cinematografia has struggled to sustain a steady rate of production, to back young filmmakers, and to promote audience interest through special promotions and reduced ticket prices.

The Brazilian cinema has not fared as well. The rapidly deteriorating Brazilian economy has diminished theatrical film audiences as well as Embrafilme's ability to fund productions. After years of producing an average 60 films per year, in 1988 production plunged to ten films, only eight of which received Embrafilme funding. Most interesting among the Brazilian offerings shown in Havana were Roberto Gerwitz's Feliz Ano Velho, a narratively complex tale of postmodernist angst, and Guilherme A. Prado's A Dama do Cine Shangai, a highly stylized homage to the Hollywood film noir starring the popular actress Maite Proença. The most awarded Brazilian film was Bruno Barreto's O Romance de Empregada, a light romantic comedy that received a Special Jury's Prize as well as a best actress Coral award for lead actress Betty Faria. These films are typical of the contemporary Brazilian film scene, which embodies a split between "art" cinema with great displays of style for style's sake and a less ambitious commercial practice with greater popular appeal.

The Cuban cinema, although for years insulated from market pressures by the longevity and stability of the Cuban government and ICAIC, has likewise confronted serious problems in the 1980s. Not the least of these problems was the marked decrease in theatrical film attendance that accompanied the growth and improvement of Cuban television and the popularization of video. Another was the bureaucratization, stagnation, and hermeticism that ICAIC had unwittingly fallen into. For example, by the 1980s its once innovative apprenticeship program became a stumbling block for the promotion of young filmmakers, whose work ranged from documentaries to feature films. In 1987 ICAIC responded with a broad reform that decentralized film production. Three independent production units were created, each headed by a "senior" filmmaker with a clearly identifiable style: the dialectical Tomas Gutiérrez Alea, the stylized and operatic Humberto Solas, and the more popular/commercial Manuel Pérez.

It is too soon to assess the effects of these changes, but a renewed vigor was in evidence among Cuban filmmakers and in Plaff, the most celebrated Cuban film premiered at the festival. Directed by Juan Carlos Tabio, one of the new breed of young directors at ICAIC, Plaff is a self-reflective comedy that pokes fun at Cuba's bureaucracies, inefficiencies, and idiosyncratic national character.
The film features an excellent performance by Daisy Granados as a middle-aged widow who is uncertain about starting a new love relationship at her age, believes in santería, and fears the mysterious egg projectiles that land all around her at every move, making the sound “plaff” as they fall. The winner of the Coral award for best script, Plaff exemplifies the recent renewal of Cuban cinematic comedy, which has taken up the challenge of contemporaneity and uses a specifically Cuban style of humor as the basis for social analysis and critique.

As always, ICAIC’s documentary work was excellent and well received, especially Rigoberto López’s El viaje más largo, Mayra Vilasis’s Con la luz propia and Guillermo Centeno’s Volvamos a empezar, all winners of Coral awards.

The festival also featured interesting work from unexpected countries. Uruguay, for instance, although previously unable to sustain much film production, has experienced a boom in experimental and political video. In Chile video and documentary filmmaking have again surged, spurred by the “Vote No” campaign of the 1988 plebiscite and by the loosening of Pinochet’s repressive regime. Indeed, a Chilean film, 100 niños esperando un tren by Ignacio Agüero, won the Coral award for best documentary. Likewise significant was the winner of the best opera prima award, Agliberto Meléndez’s Pasaje de ida, the first feature-length film produced in the Dominican Republic.

Surprisingly two of the festival’s most prominent films were from Peru: Francisco Lombardi’s La boca del lobo and the Grupo Chaski’s Juliana. These two films, from a nation with typically low annual film production, manifest not only the diversity of the festival, but also the difference between international scale co-productions and the small-scale collective filmmaking that once characterized the New Latin American Cinema.

La boca del lobo is an excellently photographed but otherwise typical war-action film, characterized by many critics as a combination of Platoon and The Deerhunter with a dose of Apocalypse Now thrown in for good measure. The film deals with the problems of a young army conscript who learns—after much gory violence and encounters with murderous Sendero Luminoso forces, a deranged commanding officer who likes to play Russian roulette, and a corrupt soldier-buddy turned rapist—that although the military institution might be rotten, there is still some principled men with it. He also learns that, no matter how bad it may seem, the military institution is superior to the downtrodden peasants it should be protecting and the Sendero Luminoso villains it must fight. This simplistic and politically dubious story is impressively filmed and skillfully narrated to please popular audiences. Yet the film leaves a sour aftertaste, not only because of its politics but because it uses the same passive and exploitative techniques as mainstream Hollywood to mobilize its audiences. The only unique feature of the resolutely two-dimensional world of La boca del lobo is the insistently present of the harsh Peruvian landscape.

By comparison the Grupo Chaski’s Juliana is a paradigmatic example of small-scale collective filmmaking. The five-year-old Grupo Chaski collective is a grass-roots organization with more than 30 members that produces, distributes, and exhibits its films and videos. Juliana’s script was developed collectively after researching the plight of homeless girls in the streets of Lima. Co-directed by group members Fernando Espinoza and Alejandro Legaspi, Juliana is impressive because of the astounding performances of street children transformed into actors, its vivid location cinematography, and narrative complexity. The film begins as a standard semi-documentary account of the difficulties of one girl’s home life with an abusive and exploitative stepfather and of her decision to follow in her brother’s footsteps and join a street gang disguised as a boy. Slowly, however, the story becomes a resolutely fictional odyssey with magical overtones. As the children “work” for tips as musicians on city buses, they bond and form allegiances and resist the exploitation of the man who “protects” them. Eventually they escape from his clutches into an almost magical world where each can assume their true identities (e.g., Juliana can be a girl again) and where, in control of their own bus, they ride joyfully in freedom through the streets of nighttime Lima. The film’s power lies in its simplicity and its appeal to a purely fictional, magical universe that distinguishes it from the trite slice-of-life Neo-Realist tradition and from the seamless, illusionist, and manipulative “Hollywood” style of filmmaking.

As long as films like Juliana continue to be produced, the future of Latin American cinema as a unique practice and as a mode of filmmaking intimately linked to sociopolitical problems and to the creative, magical power of a Latin American vision seem assured. As Fernando Solanas declared at the premiere of his film Sur, “Films are made so that people can take them away.” But for people to “take them away” productively, the films themselves must echo the life invoked by Juliana at the end of her film—a life “made out of the same fabric as dreams.”
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A trend has emerged among Latin American film directors. They are increasingly making the pilgrimage from the periphery of filmmaking to its centers—either Los Angeles, the mecca, or Paris, where technical facilities and financial support are available to leading artists from underdeveloped countries. After achieving considerable success in their native lands, many of the most talented Latin American filmmakers are being hired by major studios in Hollywood and France to write scripts, direct films, and serve as project consultants.

For both the studios and the directors, the rationale is clear. Studio insiders believe the Latin American directors are the most capable of reproducing the spirit of their home milieu, and that under substantial pressure such directors can deliver commercially appealing products for the US or European market. The foreign directors gain the luxury of working with superstars and huge budgets. Given the exasperating economic and technical conditions in Latin America, the lure is powerful. Yet the pilgrimage is not without cost: artists working in a foreign idiom and an unfamiliar environment may surrender their personal styles.

One example is the experience of Argentine director Hector Babenco, who scored internationally with his Latin American-made film *Pixote*, a compelling, unsentimental portrait of homeless Brazilian youths exploited by criminals, mistreated in reform schools, and involved in seemingly every sort of street crime. *Pixote!*'s critical and commercial success opened to Babenco the doors to the power and money of Hollywood's inner circle. He acquired the rights to Mario Puig's novel *Kiss of the Spider Woman*, gained access to an immense studio-distribution network, and cast three stars in the title roles: William Hurt, Raúl Julia, and Sonia Braga. The result was less experimental and authentic than his earlier films. But audiences loved *Kiss of the Spider Woman*, and its reception prompted Babenco to immerse himself in the US production style. His next film, however, was catastrophic. *Ironweed*, set in Albany, New York, during the Great Depression, starred Jack Nicholson and Meryl Streep, but failed to show the imprint of Babenco's personal style.

Other examples are Brazil's Ruy Guerra, Mexico's Luis Mandoki, and Argentina's Luis Puenzo. Puenzo's *La historia oficial*, a psychological perspective on the desaparecidos in Buenos Aires during the aftermath of the dictatorship, earned him the 1985 Academy Award for Best Foreign Film. His *Old Gringo*, financed by Hollywood and directed with pomp and fanfare, is an epic tale about US writer Ambrose Bierce, set against the backdrop of the Mexican Revolution. Based on the novel by Carlos Fuentes, the screenplay, co-authored by Puenzo and *La historia oficial* scriptwriter Aida Bortnik, portrays Bierce's final days trying to find Pancho Villa in Chihuahua.

The movie shows the symptoms of the illness. *Old Gringo* was filmed on location in Mexico with an all-star cast. Jane Fonda (who owns the novel's film rights and promoted the project) stars as schoolteacher Harriet Winslow, with Gregory Peck as Bierce, Jimmy Smits as General Tomás Arroyo, and Pedro Armendariz Jr. as Villa. Despite the story line's considerable potential, the
results are poor. No doubt Puenzo and Bortnik improved Fuentes's labyrinthine prose. Yet the dialogue, which seems to have been drafted in Spanish and translated to English, is bombastic and hence not believable. While the cognoscenti recognize Bierce as well as the fact that this is an imaginary account of what happened to him after he vanished across the Mexican border in 1914, the uninitiated viewer suffers from a lack of background information and cannot see the film is partially based on historical reality.

Not wanting to betray his past, Puenzo convinced the film's producers to use subtitles in some segments, an unpopular device in the US because it makes films look "foreign." Old Gringo injects a good dose of Spanish slang into the mouths of peasants and lieutenants and leaves English to the Americans. This pattern delivers some unconvincing moments: although many of the Mexican generals were illiterate, here they unfailingly communicate with Bierce and Winslow in well-spoken English.

As an Argentine, the director portrays the Mexican Revolution in picturesque, cartoonish terms. The music is folkloric. Inspired by Sergei Eisenstein's ¡Que viva México!, the film's texture is candid, yet unreal and unbalanced. Puenzo seems to discover the delights of a large-scale production, but loses control when he overemphasizes the battle scenes, shooting them in virtually every possible camera angle.

Old Gringo is the latest evidence of the damage inflicted on the style of talented Latin American filmmakers by their pilgrimage to the north. Wouldn't it be better, then, for filmmakers like Puenzo and Babenco to stay home, grapple with Latin America's severe limitations, and use them to create a more authentic, personal art? The answer is no. Experimentation, while no guarantor of artistic success, is essential to creative growth. After such films, Puenzo, Babenco, and others may return to their native soil and demonstrate to the world an unquestionable mastery of their craft.

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Latin America's Castles in Spain

by Alan Riding

After more than a decade of renewal, relations between Spain and Latin America are cooling. Much to Latin America's chagrin, Spain's demanding new marriage to the European Economic Community (EEC) is diverting the mother country's attention from her transatlantic offspring.

With the end of the Franco regime in 1975, the mother country suddenly recovered her respectability and relieved Latin Americans could once again feel warmly about Spain. Seven years later, the rapprochement accelerated with the election of a socialist government under Felipe Gonzalez, a man well known in Latin America and well informed about its problems. With Spain's entry into the EEC in 1986, Latin Americans felt reassured that, through Spain, their interests would at last be represented in the crucial council of nations.

Spain, in turn, enjoyed its revived popularity in Latin America. Not only were Gonzalez and King Juan Carlos feted whenever they visited the New World, but so too was Adolfo Suarez, who as prime minister between 1975 and 1981 was the architect of Spain's transition from dictatorship to democracy. Dusting off the old idea of hispanidad, Spain also began spending heavily on cultural promotion. It felt its special ties to Latin America would give it extra clout in Europe, and with the 500th anniversary of Columbus's voyage fast approaching, hoped that only the positive features of its colonial legacy would be remembered.

So what went wrong? Why do so many Latin Americans today feel neglected by Spain? Why has Spain failed to fulfill Latin America's expectations? And why, notwithstanding flowery speeches to the contrary, has Spain's European option forced it to turn its back on Latin America?

The Pre-Nuptial Agreement

The fact is that Spain's priority was to end generations of isolation from Europe by joining the EEC's process of economic and political integration. To win acceptance, however, Spain was in no position to lay down conditions. On the contrary, Gonzalez had to drop his objections to Spain's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, lift the blockade of Gibraltar, and agree to a transition to full EEC membership of only seven years, a painfully short period given the country's relative backwardness.

Simultaneously Spain had to abandon any thoughts of extracting for Latin America the same trade-and-aid privileges enjoyed by former British, Belgian, and French colonies. Other European governments argued that the EEC already had to channel huge resources into Spain itself if the new member were to catch up with the rest. They also noted that, with the exception of Haiti, Latin American countries were not among the world's "deeply poor" and that some, like Brazil and Mexico, were potential economic powers in their own right.

So if Spain could not serve as a bridge to the EEC, what could it do? In order to survive in Europe, it needed to spend all its energies and resources on modernizing its economy and on raising the standard of living in a country where social wel-
fare was thoroughly inadequate. Put differently, with Spain busily importing capital for its own development, it had little to spare for loans and investment in Latin America. Even trade with the region fell during the 1980s.

González was all too conscious of the gap between Spain’s words and actions. To compensate, he organized a ministerial meeting between the European Twelve and Latin America’s Group of Eight during his term as EEC president. He also tried—unsuccessfully—to have the Latin American debt crisis debated at the European summit in Madrid in June 1989. He continued to receive droves of Latin American leaders and even received some of their concerns when

Europe's response has been that if Latin America cannot help itself, why should anyone else step in to perpetuate its economic absurdities? Latin America must first prove itself economically.

In a sense, though, Latin America is also at fault. It looked to Spain to open its doors to Europe, but the problem lay not in any betrayal of promises by Spain but rather in Latin America’s image in Europe. Today, Western Europe is absorbed not only by the complexity of its own moves towards economic and political unity but also by the rapidly evolving situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Western Europe is preparing to compete with the US and Japan while confronting past European problems; it has little time for a Latin America that offers headaches rather than opportunities.

Unlike the US, Western Europe also feels no particular responsibility to help Latin America. Some Spanish intellectuals may be embarrassed by the results of three centuries of Spanish rule in Latin America, but the major European powers—West Germany, Britain, and France—are happy to see Washington assume the burden of easing Latin America’s debt crisis and bolstering its fragile democracies. Latin America is a sort of hobby for many Europeans: they protest human rights violations, worry about disappearing Indian tribes, and complain about Amazon deforestation, but they are reluctant to become more deeply involved.

For European investors, bankers, and governments to take a stronger interest in Latin America, it must prove itself more economically viable. That, of course, passes responsibility to Latin America. In the 1980s the region’s share of world trade, investments, and credits gradually diminished, and it became apparent that most Latin American governments have failed to address their own problems. If anything, the foreign debt crisis has become an excuse for inaction. The European response has been that if Latin American countries cannot help themselves, why should anyone else step in to perpetuate economic absurdities?

All, however, is not lost. On the one hand, once the EEC has passed its own watershed in 1992, it will soon be energetically searching for new markets and investment opportunities in the Third World. On the other hand, when countries like Chile, Mexico, and perhaps even Argentina have dared to reorganize their economies, European interest has quickly come alive. Even Spain, albeit cautiously, has begun looking beyond its own borders.

For now at least, Spain’s most useful role in Latin America is as a model. In political terms it has demonstrated that a solid democracy can be born of an authoritarian tradition, even to the point of depoliticizing armed forces long accustomed to being in power. In economic terms it has shown that, by closing down or privatizing inefficient state enterprises and by welcoming foreign investment, recessions can give way to rapid growth. Latin Americans are right in looking to Spain, but as a guide rather than a savior; it can do little more than point a way out of Latin America’s political, economic, and intellectual quagmire.
Latin America’s Castles in Spain

by Alan Riding

In struggling to reinvigorate their economies, Latin America and the Caribbean are looking to the world’s ascendant markets and investors, particularly Europe. The response, however, is not encouraging.

After more than a decade of renewal, relations between Spain and Latin America are cooling. Much to Latin America’s chagrin, Spain’s demanding new marriage to the European Economic Community (EEC) is diverting the mother country’s attention from her transatlantic offspring.

With the end of the Franco regime in 1975, the mother country suddenly recovered her respectability and relieved Latin Americans could once again feel warmly about Spain. Seven years later, the rapprochement accelerated with the election of a socialist government under Felipe González, a man well known in Latin America and well informed about its problems. With Spain’s entry into the EEC in 1986, Latin Americans felt reassured that, through Spain, their interests would at last be represented in the crucial council of nations.

Spain, in turn, enjoyed its revived popularity in Latin America. Not only were González and King Juan Carlos feted whenever they visited the New World, but so too was Adolfo Suárez, who as prime minister between 1975 and 1981 was the architect of Spain’s transition from dictatorship to democracy. Dusting off the old idea of *hispanidad*, Spain also began spending heavily on cultural promotion. It felt its special ties to Latin America would give it extra clout in Europe, and with the 500th anniversary of Columbus’s voyage fast approaching, hoped that only the positive features of its colonial legacy would be remembered.

Spain’s priority was to end generations of isolation from Europe by joining the EEC. To win acceptance, Spain was in no position to lay down conditions, such as trade-and-aid privileges for Latin America.

So what went wrong? Why do so many Latin Americans today feel neglected by Spain? Why has Spain failed to fulfill Latin America’s expectations? And why, notwithstanding flowery speeches to the contrary, has Spain’s European option forced it to turn its back on Latin America?

Alan Riding is senior correspondent and Paris bureau chief for the *New York Times.*
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Now the outlook is for even more delicate relations between Spain and Latin America to cast a shadow over the 500th anniversary celebrations of Columbus's discovery in 1992. At present, Latin American citizens can still enter Spain without a visa, but when Europe eliminates its internal borders after 1992, the same immigration requirements will be adopted by all EEC members. The rest of the EEC has made it clear to Spain that Latin Americans will need to obtain visas, and so a bureaucratic procedure for Europe will become a disturbing symbol for Latin America.

Taking Initiative

In a sense, though, Latin America is also at fault. It looked to Spain to open its doors to Europe, but the problem lay not in any betrayal of promises by Spain but rather in Latin America's image in Europe. Today, Western Europe is absorbed not only by the complexity of its own moves towards economic and political unity but also by the rapidly evolving situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Western Europe is preparing to compete with the US and Japan while confronting past European problems; it has little time for a Latin America that offers headaches rather than opportunities.

Unlike the US, Western Europe also feels no particular responsibility to help Latin America. Some Spanish intellectuals may be embarrassed by the results of three centuries of Spanish rule in Latin America, but the major European powers—West Germany, Britain, and France—are happy to see Washington assume the burden of easing Latin America's debt crisis and bolstering its fragile democracies. Latin America is a sort of hobby for many Europeans: they protest human rights violations, worry about disappearing Indian tribes, and complain about Amazon deforestation, but they are reluctant to become more deeply involved.

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A New Dark Age for Latin America?

by David Ronfeldt

Latin America seems to be sliding into a new dark age, and there may not be much the US can do about it. According to most analysts, the rise of civilian democratic regimes in the 1980s signified the region's emergence from the harsh military regimes and "dirty wars" of the 1970s. If the US and its neighbors would just cooperate and do the right things about debt and other issues, democracy would take root, economic growth would be restored, and US-Latin American relations would enter a bright new era.

The analysts also said that the emergence of a multipolar international system and the relaxation of US-Soviet tensions would benefit Latin America. Polarizing conflicts between left and right would diminish; toleration and accommodation of the left would grow; and the US would no longer feel threatened by radical change. The region's nations would be able to emphasize economic rather than security concerns, diversify and expand their trade and investment relations abroad, reduce their historic dependency on the US, proceed with regional economic integration, and assume new international leadership roles. Meanwhile, if the major powers built regional trade blocs, US interest in collaborating with Latin America would increase.

Such thinking has dominated intellectual and policy dialogue since the democracy trend began in the early 1980s. Its proponents now sound less optimistic; they add warnings as debt, drugs, and other problems continue to jeopardize democratic trends. Yet their hopefulness persists. The scenario of a democratic future is periodically adjusted; but it remains widely accepted. Its credibility even advanced in 1989 with the election of Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela, Michael Manley in Jamaica, Alfredo Cristiani in El Salvador, and Carlos Menem in Argentina, and with the demise of the Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner. Central American peace initiatives have periodically added promise.

Nonetheless, much of Latin America seems headed toward a different future: the failure of democracy and a plunge into a new dark age. This grim possibility has grown with one event after another since the ugly, forgotten disorders in Haiti in 1986. Recent events—the political disarray in Panama, the escalation of strife in El Salvador, the war between the drug cartels and the government in Colombia, and the violence of Sendero Luminoso in Peru—suggest that Latin America is entering a new dark age. Its hallmarks will not be democracy and development under moderate civilian leaders.

What would a new dark age look like? Most countries will remain weak from economic stagnation and political disarray; doubts about the "superiority of democracy" will resurface; and dictators and demagogues will take over—some through elections, others through force. These occurrences may resemble another cyclical return to military regimes. But something deeper will be happening: the rise of a new generation of caudillos who prefer corporatism to democracy. Their regimes will embrace odd alliances and contradictory ideological tendencies. Meanwhile extremists on the right and left will opt for more barbaric modes of conflict.

In this scenario the Latin America of the 1990s succumbs to the worst features of the 1930s and 1970s. Yet this time protagonists on all sides will have access to the latest information, communications, transportation, and weapons technologies. The post-Cold War world, far from bringing peace and prosperity to Latin America and other Third World areas, may thus be plagued with post-industrial modes of political crime and violence, committed by what often amount to pre-industrial perpetrators. The latter include political gangsters, drug lords, and nativist revolutionaries with backland mentalities who keep records and prepare propaganda on computers, use international electronic mail and banking services, conduct surveillance with sophisticated video equipment, and communicate with gunmen via portable radio and telephone systems.

Paths to Darkness

How might this occur? Not because of single factors like debt or drugs, but because of varied global, regional, and, especially, internal trends that weaken moderate leaders, arouse antidemocratic forces, and lessen the constraints on violence. A new dark age may prove likely if the following trends continue.

The first such trend is the continued disengagement of the US and USSR from conflict in Latin America, along with the focus of the US, the European Economic Community, and Japan on trade and investment opportunities elsewhere. Against this backdrop, it would become difficult to claim that the US has major interests at stake and should care much about Latin America strategically, politically, or economically. Latin

David Ronfeldt is a political scientist with the Rand Corporation.
None of this means the US should give up hope for democratic progress in Latin America, but some rethinking of US policy may be needed.

Signs of Danger
The worst signs are already evident in Peru, Colombia, Panama, and El Salvador. In Peru, Sendero Luminoso, which is reminiscent of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, controls vast coca fields. It is close to provoking a Peruvian army that favors an "Argentine solution," which may mean killing hundreds of thousands of Indians in the Peruvian highlands. Colombia is being undermined—city by city, region by region, institution by institution—by drug cartels, right-wing paramilitary forces, and left-wing revolutionary movements engaged in crisscrossing battles with each other, the government, and the army.

In Panama, Noriega's domination showed again that peaceful, democratic protest movements based on the middle classes stand little chance against political gangsters who are solidly backed by ruffian security forces and encouraged by leftists in Cuba and Nicaragua, not to mention rightists from Argentina and Colombia. The US military intervention to oust Noriega and his apparatus in December 1989 should turn out well. But if this effort to resume the democratic scenario results in a prolonged US occupation, political and economic disarray in Panama, and intensified anti-Americanism in Latin America, then it will not prevent the dark scenario. It may instead fuel the unwelcome thesis that the US, far from disengaging, will intervene more in Latin America in the post-Cold War world.

In El Salvador warfare undercuts the vulnerability of the country's democratic leadership, the exhaustion of its people, and the frightful ability of its extreme left and right to rejoice in each other's violence. The FMLN's full-scale attack in November 1989 seemed motivated partly by a concern that the USSR is losing interest in the region, while the response by the armed forces (and death squads) indicated that, under pressure, they will continue fighting as primitive as before, despite more than a decade of US attempts at reform.

Even if Central America's conflicts could be ameliorated, economic crisis and political fragility augur badly for the future of democracy there. Further south, the December 1989 presidential elections in Brazil and Chile raise hopes that the Southern Cone countries will remain on the road to economic liberalization and political democracy. Nevertheless, the failure and regression of just one of them would confirm the scenario at hand.

None of this means the US should give up hope for democratic progress in Latin America, but some rethinking of US objectives and priorities may be needed. The democratic scenario invited (limited) US involvement. Yet the dark-age scenario—especially if US policy actions, like the intervention in Panama, cannot keep it from occurring—may suggest we should keep our distance, channel our policies through multilateral mechanisms, and avoid getting drawn into drug wars and other murky conflicts. We should expect a flood of refugees heading for the US. And we will have all the more reason to resolve social problems at home, as well as concentrate on the economic development and integration of North America as a whole, including Mexico and Canada. Indeed, Mexico—based on its economic and political reforms—is an emerging bright spot, a promising exception to the prospects elsewhere. ■
Economic Trends: Latin America and the Caribbean

CONSUMER PRICES

Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

GDP PER CAPITA

Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

EXTERNAL DEBT

Source: International Monetary Fund

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Source: Inter-American Development Bank
### Trade Partner Concentration, 1988

**(Selected Countries)**

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<th>Country</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>EEC</th>
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<th>USSR</th>
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Percent of each country’s total foreign trade

*Source: International Monetary Fund*

### World Trade: Growth Rate

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*Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe*
Britain and the Caribbean's Future

by Anthony J. Payne

The most striking feature of British policy towards the Caribbean since the end of World War II has been its withdrawal from the region's affairs. The unmistakable long-term trend has been retreat from full-scale colonialism to the possession of a mere handful of minuscule territories. This trend is not difficult to explain, especially in light of the transfer of hegemony from Britain to the US in the postwar era. Because the Caribbean is situated in the “backyard” of the US, the only surprise is the length of time the process took. As the Universidad de Puerto Rico's (Welsh-born) Gordon Lewis has noted, the Grenada crisis constituted “the earthquake that records on the seismic graph the moment of that transition” in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled, 1987).

Yet the embarrassment caused by the Grenada crisis provoked the British government into an acknowledged reappraisal of its Caribbean policy. A passage in an official statement on the British government's handling of the invasion period (presented to the House of Commons in June 1984) recognized “an increased American involvement in the Caribbean” as a fact of life. The passage declared the conviction, however, that this trend “need not inhibit Britain from maintaining a distinctive policy towards the area.”

Toward a New Postcolonial Role?
The Foreign Office was unquestionably stung by the allegation, widely made in October 1983, that Britain had turned its back on the region. Since then it has devoted considerable effort to reassessing British policy towards the Caribbean and, above all, to widening its focus beyond a narrow preoccupation with Cold War issues. Even so, in the immediate aftermath of Grenada, security emerged as the item that topped the agenda.

The embarrassment caused by the Grenada crisis provoked the British government into an acknowledged reappraisal of its Caribbean policy. Security topped the new agenda.

Following the Grenada crisis, Britain increased its assistance in the provision of equipment and training to the police and security forces of the Caribbean. Such assistance focuses on the Eastern Caribbean states and includes financial and technical support for the Regional Security System set up between Barbados and these states in 1984. In addition Britain quietly reinstituted a military exchange program with the Jamaica Defence Force. These measures have given Britain a renewed security presence in the Caribbean beyond the special case of its commitment to Belize. According to official thinking, this presence gives the region an alternative to reliance on the US for defense assistance.

After the Grenada affair and beginning in September 1985 with the “Exotic Palm” exercise, British army, naval, and air force personnel have regularly participated in US-organized training maneuvers in the Caribbean. To this extent, Britain has demonstrated its willingness to contribute to the defense of general Western security interests in the Caribbean. It has done so in a way that ultimately sustains US military dominance over the region.

Other policy initiatives launched since 1984 have concerned the remaining British dependencies and the growing problem of drugs. From London's perspective, the two are related. The 1985 drug-related arrest in Miami of the chief minister of the Turks and Caicos Islands generated a scandal that shook the British government and caused it to reexamine policy towards its Caribbean dependent territories. As announced in December 1987, the new British stance was that “we would not urge them to consider moving to independence,” although the government remained “ready to respond positively when this is the clearly and constitutionally expressed wish of the people.” Meanwhile Britain would implement “a number of administrative measures to improve the effectiveness with which we discharge our obligations.”

Despite its careful wording, the statement represented a significant shift of approach. In the past the assumption had been that, sooner or later, the dependencies would progress to independence; the current attitude favors their remaining under residual British control. Independence was still there for the asking.

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but it was not to be the presumed outcome. Moreover, for as long as the British government retained responsibility for the territories, it would exercise its role actively rather than passively.

This meant, among other things, that Britain would have to address the drug problem. The Foreign Office conducted a review of the drug situation in all other British dependent territories in the Caribbean in 1987 and introduced a number of policy changes. These included the establishment and strengthening of police antidrug units, the improvement of surveillance and interdiction, and the promotion of tougher antidrug legislation. The approach was later applied to the independent states of the English-speaking Caribbean, in conjunction with the US government but with the consent of the countries concerned. In practice, the drugs arena became another instance of close cooperation between London and Washington.

Besides these relatively new policy concerns are the long-standing questions of Britain's military presence in Belize and the perennial issues of trade, investment, and aid. British diplomacy quietly seeks to facilitate a resolution of the territorial dispute between Belize and Guatemala, but of late there has been no great pressure in London to rescind the unusual postcolonial defense commitment to Belize. As for economic issues, the Thatcher government is alarmed at how far Britain's trading position with the Caribbean has slipped and is trying to become a more visible actor in forums such as the Caribbean/Central American Action's annual Miami conference. British aid to the Caribbean continues, but not yet resolved is the fate of the preferential access enjoyed by Caribbean rum and bananas to the European Economic Community after the single market is completed in 1992.

In short, since 1984 Britain has unquestionably become more active in Caribbean affairs, focusing its energies on the Commonwealth Caribbean. As a player of significance on the world stage in its own right, Cuba gets noticed, but the traumas of Haiti after the fall of the Duvaliers or the growing problems of the Dominican Republic do not generally receive much official British attention. The British Embassy in Santo Domingo was, in fact, closed in 1985. Even so, British resumption of a limited Caribbean role is significant and needs to be explained.

**British Motives**

Three alternative, though not mutually incompatible, explanations suggest themselves. The first concerns the question of image, as mentioned by the minister responsible for the Caribbean in the Foreign Office, Baroness Young, in her 1984 "reappraisal" speech when she denied that Britain had turned away from the Caribbean. Baroness Young pointed out that Caribbean prime ministers and chief ministers visited London, and British ministers the Caribbean, so regularly and in such noncontroversial fashion that these events often went unnoticed by the media. The result, she said, was "a feeling that little is going on." Accordingly, she stated, the government intended to take positive steps to protect its interests in the region. Since 1984 Britain has achieved more than a readjustment of its image in the Caribbean, but the raised profile of this period was one of the goals set out in the policy review.

The second explanation concerns the US and insists that, in not so many words after the Grenada affair, the Americans told Britain to play a bigger part in protecting Western interests in the Caribbean. The extent of Anglo-American security and intelligence cooperation in general can hardly be exaggerated and certainly applies to the Caribbean. Certainly too, US officials at both State and Defense perceive Britain as having "returned" to the region, a shift they unreservedly welcome. In the long term, British security assistance reinforces US control over the Caribbean. In the short term, however, it provides an alternative for troubled or beleaguered regional states. Without question, strong US input influenced Britain's post-Grenada reconsideration of its role in the Caribbean. Yet it does not follow, even under the Thatcher administration, that Britain obeys every instruction given it by the US.

The third explanation is the one argued, especially in the last year or so, by the present Conservative British government. In a speech in June 1988, Tim Eggar, who assumed ministerial responsibility for the Caribbean following the resignation of Baroness Young, addressed the question of Britain's relations with the region. Riding quickly over the traditional ties of history and sentiment (which have preoccupied so many official British statements on the Caribbean in recent years), Eggar observed that "if asked to put my money in a sound investment, I would look to a relationship based firmly on sound mutuality of interest." This statement struck a new note in the long history of Anglo-Caribbean relations. As Eggar elaborated, the Caribbean can now offer a weaker, postimperial Britain a number of benefits. These include a significant market for British goods and investment, a large number of potential votes at the UN for causes of importance to Britain (such as the Falklands/Malvinas conflict), a base from which to fight the international drug menace, and a political force for the preservation of democracy in the world.

The importance of the Caribbean benefits to Britain is not clear. What is clear is that the British government has begun to see its relationship with the Caribbean in these terms. This suggests, above all, that Britain's post-1984 reinvolve in Caribbean affairs flowed mainly from a hard-headed assessment of what British interests are in the region. Though it is too early to tell, this reappraisal may mark the beginning of the end of the postcolonial phase of Britain's relations with the Caribbean.
Brazilian Prospects

Brazil's prospects for continued democratization hinge on the dynamics of two institutions, the economy and the military. Two books—one by Brazilian economists, the other by a US political scientist—underscore the depth of the challenges.

Sair da Crise

Economic Solutions?
by Thomas P Noonan

Every time the Wall Street Journal mentions Brazil, it adds a simple parenthetical phrase: "the country with the largest foreign debt." It's a statement echoed by the New York Times, the Miami Herald, the Chicago Tribune, and every other major newspaper in the world. It is also completely inaccurate, since the foreign debt of the US is six times larger than Brazil's and growing at a much faster rate. Confronted with these facts, leading newspapers seem to say, "Well, O.K., but we meant in comparative or proportional terms, such as compared with GDP." Once again, they are embarrassingly far off the mark. Brazil's total foreign debt of $111 billion is 23% of Brazil's GDP. Mexico's foreign debt of $100 billion is 51% of its GDP, and Argentina's foreign debt of $58 billion is 99% of its GDP. Nigeria, Poland, the Philippines, and Venezuela all have substantially worse debt/GDP ratios than Brazil. Why, then, the consistent error?

The answer is not difficult: Brazil is the world's least known, least analyzed, and least worried-about superpower. Neither the Wall Street Journal nor the Miami Herald, for example, bothers to note that the Brazilian economy is three times the size of Taiwan's and two and a half times the size of Korea's. In fact, it's the world's eighth largest non-communist economy, right behind better-known economic giants such as the UK and Canada. Since Brazil's economic size is underestimated, its rank in the "foreign-debt hierarchy" also appears to be much higher than it really is.

The book at hand, Sair da Crise, is a well-reasoned discussion of Brazil's major economic problems and solutions. Its authors are five Brazilian economists—Carlos Luque, Guilherme Dias, Paulo de Tarso Soares, Roberto Macedo, and Simão Silber—who are, or have been, associated with the prestigious economics department of the Universidade de São Paulo. As a five-author collaboration, the book suffers from an occasional discontinuity in style and focus, but more important, it is nonpolitical, quiet in tone, and scholarly without getting lost in academic minutiae. The book succinctly covers the predictable litany of ills. Yet, if the choice of ills is predictable, the suggested responses are frequently surprising.

Problems and Solutions

The discussion of Brazil's economic crisis begins, appropriately, with its public sector. The discussion traces the origin of the estado empresário, or "state-as-engine-for-growth," from the end of World War II to the 1980s. During this period the public sector grew so much faster than the private sector that it came to represent almost two-thirds of Brazil's GDP. Unfortunately this absorbed much more in the way of resources than it produced.

By the mid-1980s the growth of the public sector ran out of gas because it exhausted all possible methods of financing, while the Brazilian people and the congress lost faith in the public sector's ability to pull the private sector in its wake. Of the two, the financing problem is the most intractable; the obvious sources of finance have been exhausted without the appearance of any new candidates. The other problem—the negative image of the public sector as a free-spending wastrel making sweet deals with privileged friends—is a lesser threat because it can be turned around by a new government willing to get tough on abuses.

The authors explain that during the 1950s the main financing method
was the printing press. During this decade recourse to direct money creation did not lead to hyperinflation because Brazil emerged from World War II with a low rate of inflation and large foreign reserves. Hence the country managed to live with a relatively high level of monetary expansion for several years without disastrous results.

The favored form of financing during the 1960s was internal debt, as the state emphasized the selling of government debt instruments—bonds, notes, and bills—to individual and institutional investors. During the 1970s another shift occurred, as Brazil resorted to massive foreign borrowing. From less than $10 billion in 1972, the country’s foreign debt ballooned to more than $90 billion in 1982. Since 1985 virtually no new voluntary financing has been available from abroad. Brazil has therefore reverted to both the printing press and to internal debt, but seems to have reached the limits of both.

Recognizing the central role of the public sector in both the problem and the solution, Carlos Luque and his colleagues make a series of thoughtful, practical suggestions for reform. They cite the need to decentralize much of the administrative apparatus. Extreme centralization, say the authors, is inefficient and undemocratic in a country the size of Brazil. They go on to advocate devolving a substantial amount of authority from the federal government to the state governments, which should continue to depend on the federal government for funding. The authors argue such dependence is necessary given the inability of the states to fund themselves directly.

In discussing Brazil’s tax structure, the authors stress one of its major problems: over the past 25 years the federal government has given away a large part of its revenue base through a bewildering series of tax incentives. Government leadership has used such incentives to channel investments into the northeast, the Amazon, export programs, and numerous other activities that it deemed to require encouragement and help. Yet, once tax incentives are in place, it is no easy task to eliminate them: their powerful beneficiaries come to regard them as an acquired right.

One wishes the book would have focused upon the effects of the state’s incessant tinkering with the economy and the consequent growth of the bureaucracy to control and monitor these “engines for growth.” From 1985 to 1989 the Sarney government added more than 500,000 people to the public payroll, many of them ostensibly to perform monitoring functions, but others to hold fictitious jobs in which the salary is divided between benefactor and beneficiary. Brazilians widely acknowledge that a large number of positions in the public sector are phantom jobs. The existence of a bloated, convoluted bureaucracy with a constantly evolving set of programs makes it easy for government leadership to defend the jobs by pointing to the need for an ever-growing body of civil servants. For example, the authors pinpoint the Instituto Brasileiro do Café and the Instituto do Alcool e Açúcar as candidates for immediate elimination. But these useless bureaucracies have survived on legislative hit-lists for years because enough people with political clout have a vested interest in them.

During the last 20 years Brazil has experienced explosive growth in soybean production and exports, rising from virtually nothing to second place, behind the US, in world production. When asked what contributed most to this phenomenal expansion, a leading Brazilian soybean grower replied, “We were successful in resisting the creation of a Brazilian Soybean Institute, which would have killed the business.”

The same can be said for orange juice, another spectacular success over the past 15 years. Brazil has come from nowhere to become the world’s largest producer of orange juice concentrate. The growers cringe in horror at the thought of “LANJARBRAS” (a Brazilian orange institute). Fortunately, today’s mistrust of the federal bureaucracy means that no such monster is in the offing.

Sair da Crise analyzes a series of key issues that transcend the ills of the public sector. The problem of income distribution, for example, is addressed throughout the volume, and rightfully so. Simply put, Brazil’s rich are getting richer and its poor are getting not only poorer but much more numerous. The top one-quarter of the population today absorbs more than 70% of Brazil’s income, compared with 62.5% in 1960.

The volume examines the problem of income distribution not simply in terms of fairness, but also in terms of its inevitable effect on labor-management relations and government efforts to combat runaway inflation. Until labor leaders see some hard evidence of a reversal in the trend toward income polarization, they will maintain their posture of class warfare. The policy upshot is that the widening gap between rich and poor undercuts official attempts to tame inflation, since any successful policy would require a labor-management-government pact that
holds together for more than three months. Brazil's growing concentration of wealth stands in the way of negotiations to piece together such a tripartite pact. In turn the inability to form a pact jeopardizes the long-range vitality of the Brazilian economy.

Groping for Solutions

The way out of the crisis requires tough measures across several fronts. Beyond the need to attack the deep-seated ills of the public sector and reverse the alarming trend in income inequality, the Brazilian economy must be opened up to the rigors of international competition. The closed, comfortable Brazilian version of import substitution—which revolves around elaborate forms of protection for local manufacturers—requires complicated surgery. Among the entrepreneurs who have struggled to import the most basic industrial components into Brazil, few would disagree. The chapter on distortions caused by Brazil's system of protectionism is incisive and should be required reading for all investors who may have the misfortune of having to import something into Brazil in the near future.

In spite of the horror stories, Sair da Crise leaves the reader with a sense of optimism. Brazil became an economic heavyweight by following an unusual mixture of good and awful economic policies. If most of the good can be maintained while correcting some of the ills addressed in the book, it is not impossible to envision a Brazil in the year 2000 that is ready to sit at the same table with the OECD superpowers that today still seem to be playing in a different league.

The Collor de Mello government that takes office in 1990 will confront a fundamental challenge: it must convince key sectors of the economy to sign up for a new set of economic reforms that will sound like many of the broken promises of the past five years. The job will be tough, but it is doable under the right management.
Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone

Democratization and the Military
by Paul W. Drake

In the flood of recent writings on democratization, surprisingly few have targeted what may well be the single most important actor: the armed forces. Thankfully, one of the hemisphere’s leading experts on Latin American armed forces, Alfred Stepan, addresses the question of “how to manage the military democratically.” He accomplishes a remarkable amount in his brief but pithy volume. The reader is left with a sobering picture of the continuing autonomous power of armed forces within states returning to civilian government.

Institutional Patterns

In studies of military rule in Latin America, three schools have predominated: the cultural, the structural, and the institutional. Cultural proponents, like Howard J. Wiarda, attribute authoritarianism to the deeply-rooted hierarchical, paternalistic values of the Iberian colonial past. The structural school, exemplified by John J. Johnson, José Nun, and Guillermo O’Donnell, seeks the wellspring of military behavior in underlying social and economic conditions, such as the rise of the middle class or the stagnation of industrialization. A third cluster of specialists stresses institutional variables, focusing on the legal, corporate, and internal elements that condition military policies and actions. Stepan has been closest to the latter school in analyzing military politics.

Stepan is concerned with the roles of the military in authoritarian regimes, in transitions toward democracy, in the consolidation of democracies, and in conflict with civilian contenders for power. Although concentrating on Brazil, he draws comparisons with Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Spain. From these cases he casts generalizations for broader theories about military behavior.

As in his previous work on the breakdown of democratic regimes, Stepan rejects deterministic models. He insists on the significance of sequence, choice, and statecraft in producing results. In other words, the success of democratization hinges, in part, on the decisions of policymakers at crucial junctures, within the boundaries Stepan sets. With his map of the land mines and pitfalls of democratization, and a certain amount of luck, democratic leaders may be able to solidify civilian rule.

The first section of the book deals with the expansion of military functions and powers while they governed the country. This section pays particular attention to the growth of intelligence agencies, which threatened not only civilians but also elements of the armed services. In Brazil the dangerous autonomy of the Serviço Nacional de Informações, Brazil’s chief intelligence agency, led some regular officers to join civilians in a preference for liberalization.

The second segment of the book examines the military during the transition toward democracy. Stepan explores the officers’ motivations and mechanisms for opening up the political system. Through a fascinating discourse analysis, he shows that Brazil’s national security doctrine evolved to encompass liberalization, but stopped short of accepting unconstrained democratization. Although emphasizing military initiatives and maneuvers in the transition process, Stepan includes the impact of opposing civilian social and political organizations, which can stretch the opening farther than the armed forces had envisioned. He conceptualizes this struggle as a dialectic between “regime concession and societal conquest.”

The third portion of the book unveils remaining barriers to democratic control over the armed services. These final chapters are the most innovative, comparative, exciting, and ominous. Stepan indicates that the degree of military manipulation of the transition largely determines the scope of the military’s authority thereafter. In a closely guided democratization such as Brazil’s, the armed forces normally retain great autonomy and tutelage.

Stepan assesses the military’s strength in new democracies by employing the concepts of “contestation” and “prerogatives.” The fragility of civilian rule depends on the intensity of military conflict with the successor government and the extent of the military’s continuing institutional privileges. Contestation normally revolves around settlements of previous human rights abuses, respect for the services’ organizational integrity, and allocations to the budget. A long list of prerogatives would include established roles for the armed forces in the cabinet, the bureaucracy, state enterprises, and domestic intelligence and police operations. Where levels of contestation and prerogatives are both high, democracy will be most difficult to sustain.

After setting forth the formidable obstacles to entrenchment of civilian rule, Stepan concludes with some recommendations for shifting the balance of power toward democratic forces. He urges legislatures to cultivate the skills, staff, and procedures to monitor military and intelligence activities, and for civilians to develop the intellectual and technical capacity to debate military issues, so that the armed forces cannot claim a monopoly of expertise on security matters.

By the same token the executive branch needs to elaborate a comprehensive, coherent vision of the proper role of the armed forces. It...
must assign them positive, professional, noninterventionist purposes. Over the long run their educational systems and doctrine will have to be transformed, until the soldiers no longer believe they have the right to confront and overthrow civilian regimes. Somewhat paradoxically the military must be simultaneously removed from political roles in the civilian sphere and integrated with civilian leadership in the security and intelligence fields. Until democratic leaders can exert such controls, their conquests over the armed services will continue to be reversible.

Comparing Nations

Stepan tempers his generalizations with a recognition of the idiosyncrasies and complexities of each individual case. For example, Brazil’s experience was paradigmatic in some respects but quite unique in others. That authoritarian regime’s fairly statist economic policies, robust arms export industry, two-party political system, relatively mild human rights record (in terms of atrocities and violations), and protracted transition were all unusual. Stepan goes beyond these peculiarities, however, to elicit key features of Brazil’s civilian-military relations that are relevant to other countries.

The utility of his framework can be shown in its application to Chile. Under the rule of General Augusto Pinochet since 1973, the military has greatly expanded its reach, role, and mission. In addition the armed forces have tightly controlled every step of the transition, adhering to the authoritarian 1980 Constitution. Even the unanticipated defeat of Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite occurred precisely according to the junta’s own rules. Relatively free presidential and congressional elections took place in December 1989. Nevertheless, the armed forces have declared they do not expect elected civilian leaders thereafter to overturn the constitution, the authority of the military, or the market-driven economic model.

The Chilean armed services have carved out a powerful future position for themselves. In terms of contestable issues they have ruled retribution for human rights violations, interference with the military hierarchy of command, political participation for Marxists, and socialistic state policies as out-of-bounds. In terms of privileges they have assigned to their national security council the right to overrule civilian governments. According to Stepan’s logic, that presages an explosive combination of contestation and prerogatives. In all likelihood Chilean democracy will remain limited and vulnerable until civilians can impose subordinate roles for those in uniform.

Stepan thus presents a daunting challenge to the champions of liberal democracy in Latin America. Other analysts have warned them that they are unlikely to succeed unless they can surmount the various economic, political, and social crises that beset them. Now Stepan reminds democrats that the first priority may be bringing to heel the monopolizers of coercive force. As he underscores the enormity of that task, he describes how other nations have mastered similar situations.

In sum, Stepan’s insightful book will prove valuable reading for policymakers as well as analysts. Based on original research and interviews, it advances both our empirical knowledge and our theoretical understanding. For over a century most observers have viewed the Latin American military as an integral, enduring actor in the region’s political life. Only in the last decade have scholars and politicians dared to suggest that the armed forces can be definitively removed from the democratic arena. In light of the horrors committed by military regimes in the 1970s, no topic in the hemisphere is more important for the 1990s.
Sexuality and Marriage in Colonial Latin America

Edited by Asunción Lavrin

This collection of original essays, the first in English to explore sexuality and marriage in colonial Latin America, examine the variety of sexual expression in different periods and among persons of different social and economic status, the relations of the sexes as proscribed by church and state and the various forms of resistance to their constraints, the couple's own view of the bond that united them and of their social obligations in producing a family, and the dissolution of that bond. Topics infrequently explored in Latin American history but discussed here include premarital relations, illegitimacy, consensual unions, sexual witchcraft, spouse abuse, and divorce.

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Judas at the Jockey Club
and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico

By William H. Beezley

"The author succeeds admirably in opening a window to the minds of turn-of-the-century Mexicans pursuing the elusive idea of progress. A delightfully written, unique example of what social history is about." — Library Journal.

"Important but neglected themes of Mexican history are rescued and, what is more, related to a stimulating thesis concerning Mexico's development during crucial pre-revolutionary years." — Southwestern Historical Quarterly. "Witty, entertaining, and thought-provoking." — Thomas Benjamin, American Historical Review. "William Beezley significantly adds to our understanding of elite and folk culture in Mexico during the Porfiriato." — Harold E. Hinds, Jr., The Americas.

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Hemisphere, Fall 1989
The Latin American Cinema

by Marian Goslinga

In Latin America the cinema has reflected not only the area's rich cultural heritage but also its political outlook. Thus the bibliographical output on the cinema says much about both dimensions of Latin American society. Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina have long enjoyed a vibrant film industry, and their movies have played to worldwide audiences. Yet smaller countries such as Venezuela have also produced notable endeavors in the field.

Basic research on the subject cannot be properly conducted without consulting Julianne Burton's comprehensive and ground-breaking bibliography of sources, published in 1983. This work has not been updated, although current treatises on individual countries do exist.

What follows is a selective list of new publications, which is intended to serve as an invitation to further study on the Latin American cinema.


Exiles and Emigres: Crosscurrents in Cinema from the 1890s to the 1980s. Julianne Burton. Intellectual Migrations: Transcultural Contributions of European and Latin American Emigres (Papers of the 31st annual


Nietos Show. E. Stein. Film Comment, v. 23 (January-February 1989), p. 4. [Cartagena Film Festival.]


New and Recent Books on Latin America

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA
Tom J. Farer

In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on such issues as right- and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this fascinating manner, fusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin America since the end of World War II. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America (he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. His essays combine a sophisticated analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.

ISBN: 0-88738-155-3 (cloth) 448 pp. $39.95

THREE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS
GINO GERMANI, PABLO GONZALES CASANOVA, FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO
Joseph A. Kahl, new Introduction by Peter B. Evans

This is the long overdue second edition of Joseph A. Kahl's masterful Modernization, Exploitation, and Dependency in Latin America. In the book, Kahl describes, examines and introduces the life and work of three of the most important figures in the development of comparative politics and political sociology: Gino Germani (Argentina), Pablo Gonzales Casanova (Mexico) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil). As Peter B. Evans points out in his splendid Introduction, the book has not lost its importance and attractiveness in the years that have passed. Rather the subsequent developments in comparative scholarship, as exemplified in the fate of modernization and dependency theory, have only highlighted the influence of the three Latin Americans.

ISBN: 0-88738-169-3 (cloth) 240 pp. $24.95

POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR
John D. Martz

In this book, John D. Martz probes the differences and similarities between military authoritarianism and democratic pluralism through an analysis of the politics of petroleum in Ecuador. Martz uses a textured and detailed analysis of global oil companies and nationalist politics to trace the growth and evolution of Ecuador's petroleum industry. Against this interplay of politics and the nationalist struggle against multinational pressures, he compares policymaking under military and civilian government.

ISBN: 0-88738-132-4 (cloth) 432 pp. $34.95

REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA 1964-1985
James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamara

This volume focuses on two decades of political life in Bolivia, from the overthrow of civilian president Victor Paz Estenssoro in November 1964 until his return to office in August, 1985. The body of the book provides an account of the main contours of political economy in Bolivia from 1964 until 1985. The authors also present an interpretative analysis of the problem of regime formation in Bolivia by focusing on the alternations among various authoritarian and democratic modes of governance. In a concluding chapter the authors provide an analytical framework tying Bolivia into more regional trends concerning the questions of regime formation and transition. Bolivia is seen as an extreme case of a common set of problems that have pervaded the region during this period.

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