POVERTY AND HOPE IN HAITI
Leslie Manigat, Bernard Diederich

DOES PEACE HAVE A CHANCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA?
Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sbarpe, Francisco Rojas Aravena

DRUG WARS IN THE AMERICAS
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IS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ITS OWN WORST ENEMY?
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Bramble & Sevilla on Swapping Debt for Nature
Monge on the Political Eclipse of Mario Vargas Llosa
Goldfrank on Chilean Fruits of Counterrevolution
Oppenheimer on Noriega and Cuba
Books in Review
Dear Reader:

In this and future issues, Hemisphere analyzes a region whose most salient feature is change. Hemisphere’s guiding principle is that responsible analysis of change cannot flow from only one sector of society or from only one part of the Americas. On the contrary, responsible analysis is a collective enterprise, and it requires the free and respectful expression of dissenting ideas by the gamut of concerned peoples from throughout society and the Americas. Hemisphere is therefore committed to publishing a variety of viewpoints that reflects the range and complexity of challenges facing the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Reflecting this commitment is the varied composition of Hemisphere’s editorial staff and editorial board. They include scholars and practitioners who represent a diversity of nationalities and political perspectives. What they share is a view of Latin America and the Caribbean in the midst of change and a multifaceted approach to the region’s challenges and prospects. As editor, my policy will be to listen carefully to their opinions and to involve them in planning each issue. The first issue is a product of their considerable involvement.

The location of Hemisphere’s editorial office in Miami, a true crossroads of the Americas, insure the publication’s access to talent and information. So, too, does the sponsorship of Florida International University and its Latin American and Caribbean Center. Together, this location and sponsorship facilitate hemispheric-wide dialogue on the problems, initiatives, and achievements of Latin America and the Caribbean.

On behalf of the editorial team and sponsoring institutions, I invite you to read Hemisphere and to give us your opinion. Subscribe to it and have your university, organization, or public library do the same. I promise you a magazine of interest and quality.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Anthony P. Maingot
Editor

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The United States and Nicaragua
Robert A. Pastor

Here is an insider's account of U.S. policy making toward Nicaragua, written by a major participant. Robert Pastor was Director of Latin American Affairs on the National Security Council from 1977 to 1981, a crucial period in U.S.-Nicaragua relations. With scholarly evenhandedness he offers a new interpretation of the kinds of choices that U.S. policy makers faced as they responded to the Nicaraguan crisis during the Carter administration, in which he served, and through the Reagan years.

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An Economic History of the Obrajes, 1539–1840
Richard J. Salvucci

The obrajes, or native textile manufactories, were primary agents of developing capitalism in colonial Mexico. Drawing on previously unknown or unexplored archival sources, Richard Salvucci uses standard economic theory and simple measurement to analyze the obraje and its inability to survive Mexico's integration into the world market after 1790.
Cloth: $40.00 ISBN 0-691-07749-5
COMMENTARY

A New Caribbean Politics for a New World Economy

by Anthony P. Maingot

With the admission of Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the EEC, that common market contains virtually all the climates and production capabilities of both the North and the South. The EEC is indeed an economic powerhouse. Compare it to the USSR, using the Purchasing Power Standard as our measure (PPS = a common unit representing an identical volume of goods and services for each country); the per capita PPS of the EEC as a whole is 10.012, nearly three times that of the USSR. Evidence of the USSR’s relative economic stagnation is the fact that its per capita PPS is 1,000 units lower than that of the EEC’s Portugal. The disparity promises to widen in 1992 when all trade barriers are lifted and the twelve-member EEC becomes a true common market. The benefits to be derived from the removal of customs formalities and barriers to production, the harmonization of investment codes, and the advantages of economies of scale are expected to be in the neighborhood of $230 billion of added GDP. The present growth rate of 2 percent is expected to jump to 4 percent in a short time.

Is it any surprise that Mikhail Gorbachev should be calling for Perestroika ("radical transformation") not only in the Soviet economy but, as he notes in his 1987 book by that name, in the "moral and psychological situation in society"? Is it any surprise that he should be advocating the concept of "a common European home...from the Atlantic to the Urals...a cultural-historical entity united by the common heritage of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment..."? The danger Gorbachev perceives is the same one Japan and the United States perceive: an EEC approximating autarky threatens to become highly protectionist.

Interestingly enough, similar trends are under way on the North American continent. On the northern border, the free-trade agreement between Canada and the United States creates an enormous and relatively self-contained market with its own energy sources. An example is the $15 billion in energy sales to New England by Hydro-Quebec, a company owned by the Province of Quebec. Neither Quebequois nationalism nor the tenacious opposition of the U.S. coal industry could stop this development. On the southern border, a new geopolitical world is taking shape through the expansion of the maquiladora industries. Over 3,000 factories import raw materials from the United States and use cheap Mexican labor to process them for export to the U.S. market. Today, the dynamics of that border area respond more to the needs and moods of the American market than to those of Mexico City. This fact will contribute to new U.S.-Mexican problems, but such problems will not stop the border’s growth. Such growth responds largely to the danger of future U.S. protectionism. It should come as no surprise that almost one-third of the maquiladoras are Japanese, eager to secure a window to the American market before the anticipated barriers are erected.

The EEC and the North American free-trade area are the two mega-markets whose business practices are creating waves worldwide. Together with Japan, they form the three polar points of the world’s future economic activity.

It is evident that the remaining economies of the world will be dwarfed in comparison with the EEC, Japan, and the North American free-trade area. What is the future for the mini-economies of the Caribbean? Until now, much of the relationship between these small economies and the EEC and the United States has been governed by privileged treatment under a series of multilateral and bilateral arrangements, to wit: the Lome conventions of the EEC, the CBI with the United States, and, on a much smaller scale, CARIBCAN with Canada.

But global trends indicate that we need to start discussing the future of these arrangements. The most generous by far have been the provisions of the three Lome conventions negotiated since 1976. Lome III comes to an end in 1990, and there is little possibility that any new negotiation will cover more than the traditional exports it has always covered. Inadequate economies of scale, high wages, and sociocultural attitudes antagonistic to agricultural labor all indicate that there is not much future for traditional Caribbean commodities such as sugar, bananas, and cocoa. Despite its generosity, the privileges of Lome will operate only on the margins of Caribbean development needs.

Caribbean relationships with the U.S. market promise to be even more difficult. Traditional exports are facing the protectionist political power of Florida, Louisiana, and Hawaii, semitropical areas that produce virtually everything the Caribbean does. Since 1984 the United States has cut 75 percent of its Caribbean sugar quotas; the Dominican Republic alone has lost $500 million in sugar sales. If there is no...
future for traditional Caribbean exports to the U.S. market, what about non-traditional goods?

The CBI was launched to encourage non-traditional exports to the U.S. market. Certain islands—the Dominican Republic in particular—have benefited from this arrangement. Yet the CBI has had marginal impact on overall Caribbean development. In global terms, the share of the U.S. market held by the 14 CBI-eligible countries of the Caribbean has dropped from 3.3 percent in 1982 to 1.7 percent in 1986. Granted, the decline stems from the phenomenal drop in oil prices, but the CBI has hardly picked up the slack.

One of the fastest growing areas of Caribbean export manufacturing, apparel, is excluded from the CBI's duty-free provisions. Apparel enters the United States under the TSUS 807.00 program: only the part manufactured from U.S.-produced raw materials is duty free. Assembling U.S.-produced and cut fabric provides jobs, but it certainly falls short of generating any of the local economic linkages associated with development. The Caribbean's position regarding 807 is fragile: there is the threat from U.S. protectionists who wish to scrap it; and if it survives, there is competition from Mexico, where 807 covers the maquiladora industries and where the capacity to devalue can make even Haiti's $3 a day minimum wage uncompetitive. The 1984 Mexican devaluation, for instance, cost Haiti 10,000 manufacturing jobs.

Potentially more profitable than the CBI is Puerto Rico's use of "936" funds to encourage twin plants. Again, the Dominican Republic has benefited most from this arrangement. But this is a privileged arrangement made possible by an act of Congress, one which has been under attack in the United States on several occasions.

By far the most tenuous aspect of the CBI and its sister plan, Puerto Rico's 936, is their original geopolitical justification: the fear of the spread of communism. Though this fear was alive and well in the late seventies and early eighties, four facts have removed the sense of threat: the assassination of Grenada's Maurice Bishop by his fellow communists; the disastrous economic performance and high political costs of Cuba; the economic failure of the other "socialist" experiments in the area: Guyana, Suriname, and Jamaica under the Manley administration; and most important for the future, the U.S.-Soviet detente. Ultimately, detente will mean the acceptance of spheres of influence. Devoid of a direct threat, the major powers will be satisfied to engage in a policy of either benign neglect or at best "strategic denial." But the anti-communist mood of the early Reagan administration, which impelled the CBI and saved 936 for Puerto Rico, will probably not be revived soon.

Benefit of this geopolitical card, this region of sovereign but balkanized and fragile states might be reaching the limits of its privileged bargaining with the United States and the EEC. Since there are no other major markets to turn to, the Caribbean states will have to compete economically like everyone else, or at least create new non-economic rationals for additional attention.

However we analyze trends in the Caribbean, it is clear that the small islands have to begin addressing new economic realities. One way to do so is to start assessing the economic effectiveness of their political structures. Is the individual mini-state, constitutionally sovereign to be sure, the most appropriate institution from which to confront this brave new world? What are the costs and benefits of closer association, even federation? How can closer association be initiated, given existing linguistic and institutional divisions? How can the Caribbean states move toward closer association in light of the dominant concepts of national independence and sovereignty?

Whatever the answers, present trends show us the outlines of the twenty-first century, and we at least need to be asking the right questions.

**LETTERS TO THE EDITOR**

*Hemisphere* welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be typed, double-spaced, and may be submitted in English, French, Portuguese, or Spanish. Brief letters are more likely to be published, and all letters are subject to editing for clarity and length.

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Swapping Debt for Nature?

by Barbara J. Bramble

An obscure tax ruling has opened the doors for U.S. commercial banks to dispose of some of their uncollectible Latin American debt through "debt-for-nature" swaps. In what the Ecuadorian ambassador to the United States recently called "a creative and problem-solving scheme," the swap plans link two grave problems—mounting external debt and accelerating environmental degradation that jeopardizes the economic future of many Latin American countries. Revenue Ruling 87-124, issued November 23, 1987, allows a bank to take a full face-value tax deduction for a donation of debt for use in debt-for-nature swaps, even though the donated portion would sell on the secondary market at a substantial discount.

Debt-for-nature swaps—modeled on debt-for-equity swaps—offer an ingenious way to turn the debt stalemate into a gesture of good will and a means of promoting sustainable development in Latin America.

Debt Swaps in Principle

The principle is simple: a bank either sells (through the secondary market) or donates (receiving a charitable tax deduction) a sharply discounted portion of the debt to a conservation group that negotiates the terms of settlement with the debtor government. The government agrees to set aside and manage an important area of tropical forest or wetlands; alternatively, it will usefully absorb the debt's capital in reforestation once the nearby rainforest is gone so also is the viability of the smelting plants.

An example is the common policy of boosting export production to service the foreign debt. This policy forces many Latin American countries to step up pressures on already overworked ecosystems, such as marginal farmlands and tropical forests. Thus, Mexico is mining the groundwater of its dry northern zone to irrigate the farms that produce vegetables for the U.S. market. But tomatoes for the California-based Safeway chain today come with a stiff price tag of rendering the region barren tomorrow. Irrigation pumping in northern Mexico will be economically viable for just a few more years. Mexico is literally sucking dry the potential of its own northern territory.

Yet another example is the common policy of boosting export production to service the foreign debt. This policy forces many Latin American countries to step up pressures on already overworked ecosystems, such as marginal farmlands and tropical forests. Thus, Mexico is mining the groundwater of its dry northern zone to irrigate the farms that produce vegetables for the U.S. market. But tomatoes for the California-based Safeway chain today come with a stiff price tag of rendering the region barren tomorrow. Irrigation pumping in northern Mexico will be economically viable for just a few more years. Mexico is literally sucking dry the potential of its own northern territory.

Policy Initiatives

As the links between environment and sound economic development are becoming apparent around the world, a not-so-quiet revolution is brewing in several international financial organizations and development banks. Fueled by a citizens’ lobby from around the world and by pressure from the U.S. Congress and several European and Latin American environmental agencies, the campaign to reform the environmental policies of the banks is yielding its first results. For example, the World Bank has announced a series of reforms: the formation of an environmental department; the addition of environment-
tal and social scientists to the policy staff and to each of the four regional departments; the launching of studies to determine the priorities of countries in conserving their natural resources; and a major increase in lending to forestry projects. Comparable reforms are being contemplated by the Inter-American Development Bank.

U.S. legislation has pushed for such changes since 1985. This year’s Continuing Resolution calls for scrutiny of the impact of policy-based loans and adjustment programs on natural resources and on the legal rights of indigenous peoples. The U.S. Treasury Department now has a modest staff to assist the nation’s executive directors on the boards of international financial organizations and development banks in making voting decisions on specific projects. And the U.S. Agency for International Development has established an “early warning system” to alert the Treasury Department to questionable projects from the field.

Such steps are promising, but no great improvements in the lending portfolios are yet evident. What is ultimately needed are smaller, more efficient projects that fulfill the needs of local people. The goal is “sustainable development” that meets a country’s needs and aspirations without jeopardizing the living standards of its future generations.

Until now, debt-for-nature swaps have depended on discounted-debt purchases by environmental organizations. Like the current phase of debt-for-equity swaps, in which a thin market seems to be getting thinner, this may be coming to a close.

Since the financial resources of environmental groups are restricted, the secondary market in debt-for-nature swaps may be drying up for lack of buyers.

With the new tax ruling, however, it may be fiscally advantageous for some banks to donate the debt instruments rather than attempt to sell them on the secondary market.

In such swaps, environmental groups play an essential role, whether or not they act as purchasers. They are the agencies that hold the expertise, the credibility, and the capacity to locate and design management plans for conservation programs.

Why should a bank settle a loan for conservation, rather than simply sitting on a bad debt and hoping for the best? First, because the amount of money involved is small in comparison with the entire debt problem, a bank does not stand to lose much. Second, these debts are probably not fully collectible in any event. And third, as the debt crisis has mounted, the reputation of private banks has taken a beating throughout Latin America.

In sum, debt-for-nature swaps emerge as a cheap investment in public relations and in the future development of a borrower. Banks that choose to go public with their swaps can improve their image as responsible investors, not only in the borrowing country but throughout the industrialized world, where conservation has achieved high visibility. A banker does not have to be a tree-hugger or an altruist to find the good news in debt-for-nature swaps. For lenders and borrowers alike, these deals make good sense in a bad time.

Barbara J. Bramble, a lawyer, is director of international programs at the National Wildlife Federation, in Washington, D.C.

Conserving Nature, Reducing Debt

by Roque Sevilla

Bolivia

During the summer of 1987, Conservation International, a U.S. non-governmental organization, used $100,000 to purchase $650,000 of Bolivia’s external debt. The organization subsequently worked out an accord with the Bolivian government to exchange the purchased debt for the management and protection of the Beni Biosphere Reserve in northeast Bolivia. The Bolivian government consented to:

- Strengthen the legal status of the reserve.
- Enlarge the reserve by adding 350,000 hectares from the Yacuma National Park and the Cordobeni watershed.
- Create the Chimane Forest Reserve, a buffer zone of over one million hectares.
- Establish an endowment in local currency for the management and protection of the Beni Biosphere Reserve, with Conservation International providing consultation on resource management through a counterpart Bolivian non-governmental organization.

Ecuador

In September 1987 Fundación Natura, an Ecuadoran nongovernmental organization, submitted a debt-for-conservation proposal to the Monetary Board of Ecuador’s Central Bank. As approved, the agreement stipulates that:

- Fundación Natura will be allowed to buy up to $10 million of Ecuador’s foreign debt with funds from international organizations.
- The Central Bank will exchange the debt for government bonds with the same nine-year term as the purchased debt.
- The Monetary Board will fix the interest rate of these bonds above the country’s rate of inflation and pay the interest to Fundación Natura every six months.
- Fundación Natura will invest the interest payments into Ecuadoran national parks, field research, the acquisition of key ecological zones, and the protection of the Machalilla and Galapagos marine reserves.
- The principal of the Ecuadoran bonds will constitute a trust fund to cover the future operating costs of Fundación Natura.

So far, Fundación Natura has swapped one million dollars of Ecuador’s debt, which it purchased at 35.5 percent of face value, thanks to a donation by the World Wildlife Federation. The bonds currently yield an interest rate of 33 percent.

The financial terms of the swap are attractive. Every $100 in donations purchases $282 in Ecuadoran debt. During the first year, the latter amount will yield $53 in interest; during the nine-year term of the bonds, the swap will yield eight dollars for every dollar in donations.

Costa Rica

In 1987 the Costa Rican government offered to exchange with international conservation groups part of its external debt for government bonds. In turn, the groups would invest the earnings of the bonds in the management and protection of Costa Rica’s national parks. The proposed exchange required that:

- The international conservation groups raise funds for the purchase of up to $5.4 million of Costa Rica’s debt at a substantial discount.
- The Costa Rican government swap...
the debt for government bonds issued in local currency and worth 75 percent of the face value of the corresponding debt, the term of the bonds being 20 years with an interest rate of 6 percent net of devaluation.  
- The interest and principal be invested in national parks according to the government’s priorities.

In this case, it was a government that took the initiative. In February 1986 the first transaction took place as four organizations—Conservation International, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Nature Conservancy, and the World Wildlife Fund—purchased almost $3.3 million of the nation’s foreign debt at 17 percent of face value.

Roque Sevilla, a businessman, is director of Fundación Natura, in Quito, Ecuador.

The Political Eclipse of Mario Vargas Llosa
by Carlos Monge

President Alan García’s July 1987 announcement of the nationalization of Peru’s banking and financial system served as a political boon to his conservative opponents: it provided the conservatives with catchy banners, significant social support, and potential new leadership.

García’s 1985 presidential campaign had captured the country’s rejection of the disastrous economic policies of the conservative Fernando Belaunde. As the candidate of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), García emphasized the need for economic programs aimed at reversing the deteriorating living standards of the Peruvian masses. He also called for a strategy against Sendero Luminoso based on social and economic reforms meant to undercut the bloody movement’s constituency. The electoral results confirmed García’s reading of the country’s mood: his decisive victory went unquestioned by both the conservative and the radical electoral oppositions.

During the first 18 months of his administration García took significant strides toward his programmatic goals. Dwinding inflation and the rising real income of workers were reflected in public opinion polls that indicated the president’s immense popular support.

García also forged an alliance with Peru’s entrepreneurs and middle classes, traditionally the political bulwarks of conservative movements. A key aspect of García’s economic policies was that the reactivation of mass-based demand was to be satisfied by private-business enterprises. The direct, personal relations between García (“the Messiah”) and the heads of Peru’s leading business conglomerates (“the twelve apostles”) were reflected in the “sweetheart” relationship between APRA and the economic elite. Their good relations eroded the social underpinnings of rightist and center-right alternatives.

Only in late 1986 did García’s popularity begin to slide. Economically, inflation reappeared and foreign monetary reserves shrank. Politically, there was the massive murder of surrendered senderista prisoners in the jails of Lima, as well as recurring rumors that García would flout the constitution by seeking reelection. By early 1987 challenges to the administration arose from the left and right.

The Rightist Response

The rightist challenge escalated in response to the announced nationalization of banks and financial institutions. Peruvian entrepreneurs closed ranks not only in defense of the bankers, but also against what they perceived as the beginnings of a more general aprista drive against private property. This closing of ranks allowed Belaunde’s Acción Popular (AP) and its ally the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)—previously on the offensive in the aftermath of the Belaunde presidency—to voice conservative criticism of the García administration. At the same time, it gave rise to a brand new political phenomenon: the “new right,” incarnated in the figure of novelist Mario Vargas Llosa and the Movimiento Libertad. The political emergence of Vargas Llosa and Libertad expressed both the exhaustion of the two traditional conservative parties and the push by the younger conservative generations for a new political vision.

Mario Vargas Llosa was the ideal person to incarnate the new vision. True, Belaunde had once offered him the post of prime minister, and in 1985 Vargas Llosa had expressed his electoral support for Luis Bedoya Reyes and the PPC. But the famed novelist was generally regarded as an independent, somebody who defended conservative views without directly participating in party politics. Vargas Llosa was likewise regarded as a reasonable critic of García. In an interview in Caretas (February 22, 1988), he had even approvingly and saluted some of García’s accomplishments prior to the nationalization. And given Vargas Llosa’s stature as a wealthy and internationally famous novelist, nobody could attribute his involvement in politics to base personal interests.

The birth of Libertad announced the promise of a redefinition of Peruvian conservative politics. AP and PPC, in the tradition of Peruvian politics since the 1930s, had always recruited popular support only for electoral purposes and on the basis of personalist loyalties and rewards in the form of state jobs and resources. Libertad emerged as a modernized conservative alternative. In spite of its dependence on the personal prestige of Vargas Llosa, it attempted to articulate a true ideology and program as the basis of a multi-class movement. This movement’s ideology is espoused in Hernando de Soto’s El otro sendero, which criticizes Peru’s traditional elite and calls for a kind of popular capitalism in which the entrepreneurs of the “informal economy” would play a leading role.

The first of Libertad’s rallies, at the Plaza San Martin in Lima on the evening of August 21, 1987, illustrated just how the new movement sought to redefine the conservative agenda. While members of the Lima aristocracy and upper-middle classes comprised the majority in attendance, the rally included significant numbers of middle and lower-class people. Even the speakers, who included Agripina Urquizo, the leader of a Lima shantytown, were recruited to underscore the open, democratic style of Peru’s new right.

But this initial rally also illustrated the limitations of the new right in espousing such an alternative. Aside from Urquizo, the other speakers were clear-cut representatives of the Peruvian aristocracy. The
Provoking debate on the region’s problems, initiatives and achievements...

Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.
presence of Miguel Cruchaga Belaunde (a nephew of Fernando Belaunde and very close to AP), de Soto, and Vargas Llosa himself demonstrated that continuity with aristocratic leadership was at least as important as popular support in forming the movement’s foundation. Even the newspaper Caretas, which nobody would seriously accuse of having leftist inclinations, complained about the patronizing way in which Urquijo was presented to the crowd.

**Libertad at the Crossroads**

This contradiction eventually forced Libertad’s leadership to choose between two lines of development. On the one hand, de Soto proposed that the movement maintain its independence from the other traditional parties and strengthen its links with the urban populace, especially the workers of the informal economy. On the other hand, Vargas Llosa worked toward a common political strategy with AP and PPC. Vargas Llosa himself has acknowledged this difference of opinion and the fact that de Soto is not an active participant in Libertad’s coalition with AP and PPC. As he puts it, there is little time to prepare for the electoral campaigns of 1989 and 1990, and the alliance between AP and PPC must be solidified to avoid a split of the conservative vote that could open the way to electoral triumph by APRA or the left. While this stance may be valid, its political implications are far-reaching.

**The political emergence of Vargas Llosa and Libertad expressed both the exhaustion of the two traditional conservative parties and the push by the younger conservative generations for a new political vision.**

In the early stages of Libertad Vargas Llosa was identified with the radical conservatism advanced most prominently by de Soto. The latter’s basic argument was and remains that the development of Peruvian capitalism has been stunted by the state’s alliance with groups such as labor unions and big corporations, which block the emergence of a free-market economy and push the majority of the population to the fringes of legal economic life. The call for a “free-market” society formed the ideological core of Libertad.

This is why Libertad initially succeeded in avoiding the image of a movement dedicated to the defense of the expropriated bankers, presenting itself instead as a reaction against a statist measure and, more important, against several decades of statist at the cost of personal political and economic freedoms. Libertad’s opposition to the nationalization of banks and financial institutions was therefore understood as the defense of a principle and as a campaign to prevent the further erosion of personal liberties.

But Vargas Llosa, in eventually aligning Libertad with the traditional parties, diverted the movement from its original course. He stressed that this alignment was not only desirable but virtually inevitable, since the older parties were Libertad’s primary means of bolstering its political leverage. On February 1, 1988, the alliance of Libertad with AP and PPC was formalized with the establishment of the Frente Democrático (FREDEMO).

What are the characteristics of FREDEMO’s leadership? Heading the coalition are Bedoya Reyes, Belaunde, and Vargas Llosa, the leaders of its three components, along with a commission of nine, comprised of three representatives of each group. The three Libertad delegates are Miguel Cruchaga Belaunde, Luis Bustamante Belaunde, and Miguel Vega Alvear. The first two are nephews of Belaunde, and Cruchaga in particular is known to be very close to the former president and his party—essentially an AP man within Libertad. Vega Alvear is neither related to Belaunde nor a member of AP, but he is a representative of the Romero-Raffo group, Peru’s biggest economic conglomerate and, as owners of the Banco de Crédito, the principal victim of the nationalization. There is little new in a group whose leadership is so clearly tied to traditional political and economic interests.

The failure of Libertad to put its founding ideology into practice has occurred in this manner: radicalism not only by leftists and by García supporters but by rightists as well. For example, even before Libertad’s coalition with Bedoya and Belaunde was formalized, Alfredo Torres Guzmán, an analyst for the influential private consulting firm APOYO, observed that, “As Alan García veered to the left, his growing distance from the electoral center precipitated the appearance on the scene of a leader such as Mario Vargas Llosa, who worked to coalesce the Peruvian center and right. But a public opinion poll...by APOYO indicates that the writer has jeopardized his mass following by prematurely cultivating the right. If he is to regain his broader base, he’ll have to move back toward the center with a renewed message of social solidarity” (Caretas, September 21, 1987).

Later, after the formation of FREDEMO was announced, de Soto chose to further distance himself from the political course of Libertad by launching the formation of a coalition between formal and informal entrepreneurs, La Alianza Formal-Informal.

**Political Consequences**

It is difficult to speculate about the future course of political events in Peru and the political role of Vargas Llosa and Libertad.

There is little new in a group whose leadership is so clearly tied to traditional political and economic interests.

For example, the FREDEMO alliance now appears to be the right’s only viable short-run alternative. Nevertheless, while many politicians and commentators view Vargas Llosa as the coalition’s “natural” leader and its best candidate for 1990, Belaunde himself has not ruled out the possibility of running for a third term as president.

In any case, Libertad has accommodated itself to traditional Peruvian conservative politics, a fact not lost on the nation’s electorate. A March 1988 public opinion poll by APOYO asked respondents what political party they would support, independent of the candidate, if the elections were held tomorrow. Twenty-nine percent said they would favor Izquierda Unida, 26 percent APRA, and 23 percent FREDEMO. But, when the answers were grouped according to the socioeconomic status of the respondents, APRA and IU received disproportionate support from the popular sectors, while more than half of FREDEMO’s support was drawn from the middle and upper strata. When respondents were asked what candidate they would vote for, Barrantes won by some ten points, and Vargas Llosa received more votes than the aprista Alva Castro. But, again, Vargas Llosa’s support was heavily concentrated in the upper socioeconomic groups. In sum, wealthier voters tend to support FREDEMO and poorer voters tend to support leftist or aprista parties and candidates.
No matter what immediate course Vargas Llosa and Libertad might take with respect to FREDEMO, AP, and PPC, Peru's political right has already missed the opportunity to transform itself into a modern, massive, and democratic political alternative. Libertad could have initiated a profound redefinition of Peruvian politics. For the first time in Peru's modern history, there could have been a conservative political alternative based not on personalist loyalty and patronage, but on a multi-class program of national development. Yet the combination of electoral exigencies and the Peruvian elite's inability to democratize its political practices led to Libertad's accommodation to the ways of the traditional right. As a result, the promise of a new right and of new conservative leadership for Peru has been postponed—perhaps for good.

Carlos Monge is a research associate at the Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales, in Lima, Peru.

Chilean Fruits of Counterrevolution

by Walter L. Goldfrank

Chile since 1970 grimly mirrors the agony and the contradictions of Spain in the fascist era. A fractious left-wing coalition with revolutionary dreams has yielded to a right-wing military regime with counterrevolutionary projects: death, exile, repression, piety. A messianic general delivers his beloved country from the threat of communism, no price too high in lives, well-being, or international esteem. An exile community repeats the anti-fascist alarm, while beneath the rhetorical surface, economic and social changes irrevocably transform the conditions and prospects for struggle. One of those transformations is the export boom in Chilean produce, the fruits, if you will, of counterrevolution.

Chile falls squarely among the mid-ranking countries of the world economy. Its mix of productive activities and production relations includes subsistence agriculture by small holders and tenants and automated manufacturing by unionized wage workers. It exports primary products to developed countries and manufactured goods to less developed countries. Its product per capita situates it at an intermediate position. Its politics, as suggested above, have been unusually conflictive, and its state much more involved in economic life than its free-market pronouncements would indicate.

Given the initial directions taken by the Pinochet regime after the 1973 coup, it was not unreasonable to expect decline toward the periphery of the world economy. Many professionals and skilled workers were among the executed, the disappeared, the jailed, and the exiled. Deindustrialization—the reversal of years of import substitution—was occurring on a significant scale. Government economists, the famous "Chicago boys," preached an extreme version of free-market ideology, openness to the world economy, and massive restructuring. They stressed primary-product exports as a source of foreign exchange, going beyond copper to subsidize expansion in timber, fish, and produce.

But the current picture, despite certain appearances and perhaps some decline relative to more thriving newly-industrializing countries, suggests that Chile remains among the world's mid-ranking economies. Rather than regressing to the periphery, the merciless rule of Pinochet has succeeded in restructuring and redistributing its "middleclass." The state-directed industrialization and welfare model of the Frei (1964-70) and Allende (1970-73) years has given way to a market-driven and export-led model, with concentration and enrichment at one pole, unemployment and immiseration at the other. State industries have been bankrupted or sold to the private sector, and despite some improvement in the last five years, the standard of living of the popular classes is significantly lower than during the Allende years. Meanwhile, the export diversification projected in the 1960s and propelled by Allende has come to fruition: moving from an almost total dependence on copper for foreign exchange, Chile now has found significant markets for fish, timber, produce, and assorted manufactures. Given the recent conjuncture of cheap oil, the weak dollar, rising copper prices, and an increased inflow of foreign investment, relative prosperity may well carry Pinochet through the plebiscites scheduled for 1989 and 1990. Thus it is misleading to focus too heavily on repression and popular misery in considering counterrevolution in Chile. In substantial part because of fruit exports, the economy is not so badly off as it would otherwise be and as many on the left portray it; nor would the right so readily find an example of the miracles of the market in promoting growth.

Dimensions of the Fruit Boom

Chilean fruit exports to the United States alone have become a billion-dollar business. Fruit production has been growing rapidly in the 1980s, with new lands being converted to or opened up for orchards. In 1975 the United States and Canada took 29 million pounds of Chilean grapes; by 1985 the figure was 395 million. Beyond their contribution to foreign exchange, orchards provide an increasing proportion of agricultural employment, with many more workers in packing sheds, internal transportation, and in the revitalized port of Valparaiso.

The Chilean fruit boom is one aspect of the internationalization of an economic sector that for centuries had been local or regional and only recently has become national. New cooling and freshness-preserving technologies—the world's largest artificially cooled packing shed is in Curicó, south of Santiago—along with faster ships and air freight have facilitated a "winter" produce boom from Southern Hemisphere countries, where the seasons are reversed. U.S. and European importers who deal with Chile in grapes, apples, and stone fruits (peaches, nectarines, apricots, plums), also sell apples from South Africa and New Zealand and kiwis from the latter, in addition to the more traditional tropical and sub-tropical products such as bananas, pineapples, and citrus. Swiss investment houses and Saudi oil money finance part of the Chilean trade, and Italians operate one of the largest exporting firms. Three large international exporters that came on the scene with dollars during the 1982 Chilean crisis already control 27 percent of the market.

Changing consumption patterns provide part of the explanation, and where consumption changes are involved, one is likely to find aggressive marketers and promoters. In the present case we can point to the Association of Chilean Fruit Ex-
porters, which budgets substantial sums for radio advertising in the United States and is trying to persuade Europeans that seedless grapes are a snack food. Health notions and the "yuppification" of tastes have contributed to the growing preference for fresh produce over canned or frozen and to a widening market for exotic species and for unusual varieties of traditional ones.

Where there are markets, there is likely to be competition. Chilean growers face long-term threats from other Southern Hemisphere potential producers such as Australia and Argentina, current challenges in avocados and asparagus from Mexico, and a struggle about overlapping seasons from growers in the Coachella Valley of Southern California. These growers want Chilean grapes out of the United States after April 1, although their own product is not usually ready for markets until late April. New technologies could conceivably extend the growing and/or shipping seasons of the developed countries, creating additional competitive constraints. Already the European Community has instituted a license payment for Granny Smith apples that compete with their red varieties.

A final aspect of the fruit export boom is its capacity to generate political protest. Activists in several U.S. cities have sought to mobilize opinion against the fruit and its country of origin, mostly via boycotts, to pressure for human rights improvements in Chile and for changes in U.S. policy. This movement has not yet achieved much success or recognition. The obstacles it faces are especially strong in Philadelphia, where about 80 percent of the Chilean fruit destined for the United States arrives. The port city's government has leased a warehouse and two docks for 16 years to a consortium of Chilean firms, expecting this to account for 25 percent of all waterfront labor. It is not inconceivable that a new round of savagery in Chile and/or a Democratic party capture of the U.S. presidency might breathe new life into a boycott, say in the winter of 1990. Central America and Southern Africa, however, appear more likely candidates for the sympathetic energy of left-wing activists in North America.

Dependency, Food, and Class Relations

Three aspects of the fruit boom offer insights into the complex changes effected or facilitated by counterrevolution. Has Chile's increased reliance on primary-product exports resulted in growing economic backwardness? How has the expansion in acreage devoted to orchards and vineyards affected food production and supplies? How have agrarian class relations shifted, and what are the possibilities of revived organizations and social movements?

As primary-product exports, minerals and agricultural raw materials symbolize economic dependency. Yet one cannot judge dependency from the nature of the product alone. U.S. or Canadian wheat, Danish or English cheese, and French or Italian wine suffice as counter-examples. Of basic importance is the nature of production relations in the economy's agricultural sector and the linkages between that sector and others. In terms of technology, ownership/renumeration, and linkages, Chile's fruit sector is less dependent, less backward, than it might appear. At the same time, it does not yet approach the above examples of agriculture in developed countries.

Technologically, Chilean horticulture is rather advanced, especially in grapes. The newest producing zone, on the edge of the desert in the north, uses Israeli computerized drip irrigation/fertilization to meet North American demand in November, commanding a premium price at that monopolized moment. Computers monitor temperatures and track pallets from packing sheds to market. Electronic sizing, the world's largest low-oxygen cooling facility, and sulfur-dioxide pads for slow release of spoilage retardant are among other technically sophisticated features of this sector. The Fundación Chile, a joint venture of the government and the ITT corporation, acts as a center for technology transfer and innovation in the export industries. In fruit, it stresses quality control and grafting techniques that enable growers to respond quickly to shifts in consumer preferences for different varieties—for example, the current spurt in Granny Smith apples. Chilean agronomists make independent scientific and technical contributions to horticulture.

On the ownership side, virtually all of the growing and much of the shipping is under Chilean ownership and control. Of the seven major shippers (there are about 200 exporting firms in all), three are foreign-owned; Chileans are to a degree integrated into the control structure of these international firms. The smaller growers have recently formed an association to protect their interests against the large grower-shippers. The largest Chilean firm has 12 agronomists on staff and publishes a quarterly magazine.

Besides small amounts of juicing and drying, the "downstream" linkages of fruit production are negligible, but "upstream" effects are proving considerable. Fruit shipments have revitalized the ports of Valparaiso and Coquimbo. The demand for containers has stimulated the forestry sector; it has also provided orders for refrigerated containers for air shipping asparagus, apricots, cherries, and raspberries to Cardoen Industries, better known for its armaments and explosives. In sum, the picture comes closer to "dependent development" than to growing backwardness.

A second major issue is the relationship between the fruit boom and domestic food production: the competition for land between the food needs of the people on the one hand, and the profits of the growers and the pleasures of the international consumers on the other. We are, to varying degrees, familiar with Central American deforestation to raise beef cattle for McDonald's and Burger King, with Sahelian drought caused by the millet and sorghum giving way to peanuts for French cooking oil, with strawberries, melons, and vegetables displacing Mexican corn and beans. Although some croplands have become orchards, the Chilean situation has little in common with these disgraces—the nutritional deficiencies of the Chilean poor, perhaps 25-50 percent of the population, have non-agricultural causes. Rather, due to the scant purchasing power of the popular classes, the crisis-induced (1982) introduction of price supports, and the belated arrival of "green revolution" technology, over the last five years Chile has approached self-sufficiency in most basic agricultural commodities. Under Pinochet's original free-market policies, per...
capita production of wheat had fallen to nineteenth-century levels, but it has since surged to new highs; between 1980 and 1986 the yield increased more than 50 percent. Supply of other basic commodities—dairy, sugar (beet), oils, legumes—is strong, but high unemployment, low wages, and high prices make demand weak. Although the rural and semi-rural poor would probably be better nourished if they regained or received direct access to cultivable plots, Chile is a heavily urbanized country: its nutritional deficit results far more from a highly skewed income distribution than from devoting prime lands to fruit production for export.

Raising the question of access to land requires discussion of the changed agrarian class structure, both cause and consequence of the boom in fruit exports. Here, consideration of the fruit sector leads to the analysis of rural Chile in general. There have been significant changes at the top and at the bottom, while intermediate strata continue to exist, much recomposed.

Under the Frei and Allende administrations, the state introduced a series of land reform measures that greatly altered the countryside. Simultaneously, the export diversification into fruit began, as envisioned and fostered by CORFO (the state development agency). Through the reform, many inquilinos (resident laborers on large estates paid in part via usufruct) received individual parcels. Estate owners bent on evading the reform process artificially divided some of their lands and “sold” them to relatives and/or friends; others accepted the indemnification payments and invested elsewhere. Roughly 80 percent of rural wage workers joined unions, while small holders were organized into peasant associations seeking credit and technical assistance from the state. Leftist parties attempted to hasten the reform and consequent organizing efforts, contributing to destabilization during the Allende years, while the large landowners played a major role in destabilization from the right.

The military coup that brought General Pinochet to the presidency accelerated some changes (commercialization of land and increase in wage labor) and utterly reversed others (redistribution of land and organization of labor). The small farmers and the rural poor, beneficiaries of the reform, were systematically denied resources. This denial stemmed partly from politics, partly from the free-market orientation of the new economic planners, and partly from the mistaken view—really part of the Chicago boys’ ideology—that large is more efficient than small. Legalization of corporate farming gave a further boost to large growers. Counterreform restored many lands to their former owners and difficult conditions induced some beneficiaries to sell their parcels. The net effect of these changes, combined as they were with severe political repression, has been the creation of a reconstituted and newly capitalized landed class at one extreme and an impoverished, dispossessed, and semi-urbanized working class at the other.

In the fruit sector, two organizations have developed, one representing the large grower-shippers, the other representing the medium and small producers who bear a disproportionate share of the risks. The former occupies a handsome suite of offices, the latter two tiny rooms. Agriculture has become more of a business than a way of life; commercialization from the right has completed the task which reform from the left had begun, that of removing non-freehold peasants from the historical stage. Land and equipment sales are brisk; Chilean rural social organization is coming more and more to resemble that of California, to which its physical resemblances have long been noted.

In terms of the rural working population (roughly 20 percent of the paid labor force), there remain some beneficiaries of the land reform along with scattered small holders, especially in marginally productive areas. But the vast majority are now wage workers, many living in shabby new hamlets, many in towns and cities. Most employment in the fruit sector is seasonal and temporary, often unstable from year-to-year as workers seek alternative employment in urban construction or services. The largest grower has a year-round work force of 500; his rolls reach 5,000 at the peak harvest season and include 13,000 different individuals throughout the year, as the picking, packing, and shipping move from north to south. Many of these workers are female, especially in the packing sheds. This is a major change in agricultural labor patterns with as yet unknown consequences for family structure. Low wages make Chilean fruit affordable in the Northern Hemisphere in spite of the high transportation costs, a semi-luxury for middle-class Americans rather than a total indulgence. Exposure to unregulated chemicals adds injury to insult.

Worker organization has thus far proved extremely difficult and is to date negligible. What the politics of rural workers will be when politics are again possible in Chile is difficult to foresee. Perhaps we can expect unionization and wage struggles, although the experience of going through a subsequently nullified land reform might conceivably affect rural politics in an unusual manner. It is idle to speculate about what could have been. An Allende-sponsored, cooperatively organized fruit exporting system might have brought considerable prosperity to the countryside (a number of small growers, land reform beneficiaries, are in fact thriving). Instead we see the flow of hefty profits to a handful of growers together with misery for the semi-employed workers who tend to be young, uncommitted to agriculture beyond a year-to-year basis, and difficult to organize.

What the politics of rural workers will be when politics are again possible in Chile is difficult to foresee.

During the past 15 years, the most developed countries of South America have been abandoning import substitution and adopting neo-liberal economic policies. In Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, this attempt to cope with a stagnant global economy was associated with right-wing regimes, preemptively if not explicitly counterrevolutionary. It is perhaps not accidental that only Chile has continued to resist a pendular swing back toward democracy, since only Chile implemented so severe a version of neo-liberalism, privatizing even the social security system and enforcing pitiful wages in export agriculture. The fruits of counterrevolution may be sweet to the wealthiest nations, but for the producers they represent a bitter harvest.

Walter L. Goldfrank is professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz.
Cuba to the Aid of Noriega?

by Andres Oppenheimer

What has been the true measure of Cuba's assistance to Panama's military chief General Manuel Antonio Noriega?

A careful examination of Cuba's interests, as well as intelligence information from U.S. military officials based in Panama, indicates that Cuba's role in Panama is smaller than that portrayed by some Panamanian opposition leaders and Washington-based U.S. officials.

Allegations of massive Cuban involvement in Panama have mushroomed since the Noriega-engineered February 26 ouster of Panamanian president Eric Arturo Delvalle. Some of these accounts, such as that of former Panamanian Air Force Major Augusto Villalaz, who claims to have flown arms from Cuba, deserve some credibility. Villalaz, after his defection in March, said that he helped fly munitions from Havana to Panama on three occasions. He added that 16 flights were planned to carry a total of 50,000 pounds of weapons to Panama. The shipments carried by Villalaz were to be stashed outside Panamanian military facilities so that Noriega could then turn them over to supporters "when he wants."

Other accounts, such as a variety of second-hand reports of large numbers of Cuban troops in Panama, should be viewed with skepticism. Among the most widespread of these allegations:

- Several Panamanian opposition leaders, quoting witnesses in the area, have reported the presence of more than 1,200 Cuban troops and military advisers in the mountains of the northern province of Chiriqui. A similar account—or perhaps the same one—was reported as a fact by the conservative daily Washington Times.

- Ousted President Delvalle, whom the U.S. government continues to recognize as Panama's legitimate president, gave further credence to this claim by saying that his country is "being invaded" by Cuban troops.

- In an April 29 interview with The Miami Herald in Panama City, Delvalle said he had "reliable reports" that Cubans had set up military camps in Chiriqui as part of a plan to intervene if Noriega were ousted by U.S. or Panamanian troops.

- "In some parts of Chiriqui, the Cubans are descending from the mountains in search of food," Delvalle said. "People have seen them grabbing cows and other animals."

- The ABC network and The San Francisco Examiner in late April quoted unidentified U.S. officials as saying that Cuban troops or military advisers were behind mysterious night incursions into U.S. military facilities in Panama. According to an April 28 ABC broadcast, at least one intruder died during the April 20 incursion by about 30 unidentified men into a U.S. observation post near Howard Air Force Base, and one body was taken to a Cuban ship passing through the Panama Canal.

- On April 22 The Examiner quoted "knowledgeable Pentagon sources" as attributing the nighttime raids on U.S. installations to "highly trained Cuban commandos."

- But officials of the Panama-based U.S. Southern Command, which is in charge of all U.S. military activities in Central America and South America, say they have not found hard evidence of recent Cuban weapon shipments or training camps. Nor have they found a Cuban connection in the nighttime incursions into U.S. military bases in Panama.

- CIA director William Webster said in early May that, while U.S. intelligence services have detected some Cuban flights to Panamanian bases, "there are no indications" that large numbers of Cubans arrived or that Noriega asked for help from Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

- Though some mid-level Pentagon and Reagan administration officials have leaked unconfirmed reports of a major Cuban military involvement to journalists, officials of the U.S. Southern Command have expressed amazement at the claims emanating from Washington. "We have no conclusive evidence of a large-scale Cuban military presence in Panama," Commander Mark Neuhart, a spokesman for the Southern Command, said in late April.

Small Numbers

The consensus among U.S. military and diplomatic officials based in Panama is that a small number of Cuban advisers, probably fewer than a dozen, are helping the Noriega regime. One U.S. military source said privately that U.S. intelligence officers have evidence of the arrival of about a dozen Cuban advisers since the beginning of the crisis.

Apparently, most of the Cubans are civilians who are helping the Defense Forces with tasks such as mapping anti-U.S. propaganda campaigns in the military-controlled media. The Defense Forces' daily Critica, for instance, has suddenly started printing more sophisticated anti-American slander campaigns, twisting legitimate news stories rather than making off-the-wall claims as in the past, U.S. officials say.

On the nighttime incursions into U.S. military bases, U.S. Southern Command officials say privately that the intruders were probably Panamanians linked to the Defense Forces. Noriega denied any knowledge of the incidents, ridiculing the U.S. soldiers as confused rookies who were "shooting at palm trees" swaying in the tropical night breeze.

The Southern Command denied knowledge that some of the intruders died or were taken to a Cuban ship. According to spokesman Neuhart: "We haven't found a body, nor shells, not anything that would support the reports that there were casualties, or that they were taken into a Cuban ship."

On the reports of the presence of 1,200 Cuban soldiers and military advisers in Chiriqui, Southern Command spokesman Colonel Ronald Slongers had this to say: "We have no evidence that this brigade exists."

On the Villalaz allegations, Southern Command officials say the former Panamanian air force major may have told the truth, but the weapons he talked about had not turned up as of early May.

Most Latin American and Western European diplomats in Panama say they have no first-hand knowledge of major Cuban involvement to help Noriega prolong his rule. They also point out that there are a number of reasons why it would not make sense for Cuba to get too involved in Panama.

They say that it would not make sense...
for Castro to risk getting caught in a military adventure in Panama when Cuba is trying to mend fences with Latin American countries and, increasingly, with the United States.

In March and April, at the height of the U.S. offensive to oust Noriega, U.S. and Cuban officials were beginning to implement a new immigration agreement signed last November. At the time, the two countries were also drafting an agenda for their first round of negotiations on a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Regarding

…it would not make sense for Castro to risk getting caught in a military adventure in Panama when Cuba is trying to mend fences with Latin American countries and, increasingly, with the United States.

Angola, U.S. and Cuban officials held their first preparatory meeting January 25 in the Angolan capital of Luanda, only days before a grand jury in Miami indicted Noriega. The talks began in early May.

Diplomatic sources in Panama say Castro would hardly risk a breakdown in Cuba's first series of major talks with the United States in several years for an intervention to help an unreliable ally such as Cuba's first series of major talks with the United States. The talks began in early May.

This figure includes spouses and children, and is a former CIA asset who may return to his old boss once his current troubles are over.

Latin American and European diplomats in Panama cite superpower politics as another factor likely to discourage Cuba from getting its feet too deep into the Panamanian quagmire. It would be hard to conceive of Cuba engaging in a new military adventure at a time when Moscow is pulling its troops from Afghanistan and pursuing better relations with the United States, they say.

**Cuba's View**

Cuban officials, as one would expect, deny that there are even a handful of Cuban advisers in Panama. The Cubans say Panama would have a lot to lose if it received military assistance from Cuba.

"Any military help we could give Panama would not be enough to offset the trouble it would bring along with it," a high-ranking Cuban embassy official said in an interview. "The United States would have a perfect excuse for an invasion."

Cuban diplomats also say that Panama's military is among the best trained in Latin America, even in areas such as irregular warfare. Panama's Defense Forces would hardly need Cuban assistance, they argue.

Cuban diplomats say rumors about the alleged presence of Cuban soldiers in Panama could have resulted from mix-ups. There are about 3,500 Cuban exiles in Panama; in a country rife with rumors, many may have been mistaken for Cuban advisers, they say.

The Cubans did not take those allegations lightly, however.

Reports of a massive Cuban military presence in Panama troubled the Castro regime enough to drive Cuba to lower its profile in Panama— at least until the political crisis is over.

Cuban fishing vessels that normally change their 50-man crews in Panama were ordered by Havana to temporarily transfer that operation to Peru. Likewise, many of the estimated 20 Cuban vessels that used to stop for repairs at Panama's port of Vaca Monte were sent to Peruvian ports, according to Cuban officials.

Cuban sports and political delegations that used to pass through Panama's Omar Torrijos Airport on their way to other Latin American countries were also re-directed to Peru, the officials said.

"We want to avoid provocations," a top Cuban embassy official said in an interview. "We don't want to give anybody the pretext to talk about a Cuban intervention that doesn't exist."

Officially, Cuba has supported Noriega's struggle against Yankee colonialism, and has issued numerous public statements to that effect. There are questions, however, as to whether those statements have translated into much more than moral support.

A small detail that could shed some light on Cuba's behavior was the much-publicized shipment of Cuban medicines to the Noriega regime. The Panamanian government press said that as much as 14 tons of medicines have been donated by Cuba to help offset the shortage of drugs caused by the U.S. financial blockade of Panama. Cuba's "act of solidarity" made headlines in the government press.

But Panama's Ministry of Commerce officials told this correspondent privately that the shipment was not really a donation, but a barter operation. Panama was to send a shipment of wood to Cuba in exchange for the medicines.

Whatever the extent of Cuba's current involvement in Panama, it is no secret that Cuba has had close relations with Panama in recent years.

The Cuban Embassy in Panama, its consulate, and two affiliated commercial offices employ a total of 20 officers. Along with a group in Argentina, this is the largest Cuban diplomatic mission in Latin America.

Cuban-Panamanian commercial ties have grown steadily in recent years, partly because Cuba uses Panama to circumvent the long-standing U.S. trade embargo. Cuba's imports from Panama's Colon Free Zone rose from $15.3 million in 1982 to $48.5 million in 1986, according to Panamanian government officials.

Cuban officials say there are not more than 80 Cubans based in Panama who have any affiliation with the Cuban government. This figure includes spouses and children, they say.

The Cuban Embassy employs about 15 Cubans, while about five other workers at the consulte or at the two sister offices in charge of economic cooperation and import-export activities. A handful of Cubans are also here as journalists or academics, Cuban diplomats say.

The Cuban diplomatic mission in Panama processes about 15 scholarships

...Cuba contends that Noriega is a former CIA asset who may return to his old boss once his current troubles are over.

a year for Panamanian college students. About 100 Panamanians are studying in Cuba, according to Cuban officials.

So what is one to make of claims that Castro's Cuba has secretly launched its latest military adventure in Latin America? U.S. intelligence sources say the truth lies somewhere between the bombastic charges by some Panamanian opposition leaders and the claims of innocence by Cuban diplomats.

"We have evidence that there are about a dozen Cuban military and civilian advisers in Panama," one U.S. military source said. "That's about all."

Andres Oppenheimer is a Latin American correspondent for The Miami Herald.
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After Reagan: Rethinking U.S. Options in Latin America

by Mark B. Rosenberg

In Tiempo Nublado, Octavio Paz laments the fact that U.S. foreign policy flows more from demands made at home than from pressures generated abroad. As we turn into the homestretch of the U.S. presidential campaign, there are fresh indications that Paz's analysis is on target.

Serious debate about U.S.-Latin American relations has not been a feature of the 1987-88 presidential campaign. Yet, at the margins of the campaign, a series of efforts are afoot to formulate guidelines for U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America during the next four years.

True, the candidates themselves will not have a direct role in these efforts, but their advisers and speech writers will certainly give close study to foreign-policy recommendations. Such recommendations will lay the groundwork for intense lobbying on Capitol Hill aimed not only at elected senators and representatives but also at their staffers, whose power multiplies with the specialized information and policy opinions that the lobbyists provide. The proposals will give direction to the panoply of solidarity networks currently involved in lobbying and public education throughout the United States on Latin America and the Caribbean.

So, the efforts to develop policy recommendations are noteworthy: not only do they span the U.S. ideological horizon, they give testimony to the growing subordinance of U.S. foreign policy to competing domestic initiatives.

At least five major proposals on U.S.-Latin American relations are, or will soon be, circulating. The Washington-based Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA) was established in response to the Kissinger Commission's report on Central America. PACCA's Changing Course: Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean (1984) was one of the first anti-Reagan documents on the region. Recently, Forging Peace: The Challenge of Central America has been given wide distribution. Both PACCA documents have generated ideas and lobbying strategies that led one academic observer to categorize the group as typical of Washington's "clerico-leftist foreign policy lobby." PACCA documents circulate in the United States and Latin America through the efforts of solidarity networks of activists committed to redirecting U.S. foreign policy in the region.


In anticipation of the November presidential election, a new Miami Report has been issued by the University of Miami's North-South Center: Miami Report II: New Perspectives on Debt, Trade and Investment—A Key to U.S.-Latin American Relations in the 1990s represents the views of a politically moderate segment of Miami's internationally-oriented business and academic communities. The Report criticizes the United States for ignoring the problems of Latin America to the detriment of U.S. international objectives and national well-being and details inter-American policy issues in investment, debt, trade, and international education. It serves as a vehicle for members of the Miami international community whose interests in the region extend beyond the confining East-West perspective associated with South Florida politics.

A new Santa Fe Report has been promised by the authors of the 1980 document that set the tone for the Reagan administration's policy toward Latin America. Heading the study's preparation are officials of the neo-conservative Washington Times and the Washington-based Inter-American Security Council. Despite its conservative agenda, we should anticipate surprises. On the one hand, the document is likely to underscore the economic dimensions of U.S.-Latin American security relations—the debt issue, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the U.S. demand-side of narcotics trafficking. On the other hand, the Santa Fe group is likely to take a pragmatic position regarding Cuba, even arguing for a rapprochement between the United States and Castro. The document will be highly influential among the many and often com-
peting neo-conservative lobbies that have emerged in response to the controversies over funding the Contra movement. But even if the new Santa Fe Report is issued in timely fashion, it may well play a secondary role in the making of Republican policy toward Latin America. Poised to assume the leading role is the document being prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (formerly of Georgetown University). CSIS’s team consists of pragmatic Washington insiders, many of whom have mid-level foreign affairs experience. This team will hasten to distance itself from both the para-militancy of the Santa Fe group and the conciliatory, Carteresque quality of the Inter-American Dialogue. Though the participants are bipartisan, the impact of their proposals will be greatest if the Republican ticket wins. Clearly, the emergence of such working groups and the intensity of their efforts reflect the growing interplay between U.S. domestic concerns and developments in the wider world. The political gamut of working groups and proposals enhances the democratic quality of debate and participation in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. The flipside, however, is that the making of policy has become increasingly fragmented. While such fragmentation presents new opportunities to influence U.S. policy toward Latin America, it complicates the crafting of bilateral relations between the United States and almost every country in the region.

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Hemisphere / Fall 1988
Insider briefs on people and institutions shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

On the Move

Pamela Constable, formerly the Latin American correspondent for The Boston Globe, is now its diplomatic correspondent. Her responsibilities include the Department of State and national security affairs.

Joan Dassin, staff associate on Latin America for the Social Science Research Council, has been named a representative in the Ford Foundation’s office in Rio de Janeiro. Her replacement at the SSRC is Silvia Raw, an economist specializing in Brazilian development, who formerly taught at Vassar College.

Norma Parker is the U.S. Agency for International Development’s new officer in charge of democratic development and administration of justice. Fresh from a tour in Peru, Parker and other AID officials are now shaping a strategy to fund programs that promote Latin American democratization.

Rodrigo Fernández has been re-elected as secretary general of the Confederación Universitaria Centroamericana. Growth of CSUCA under Fernández’s stewardship has been impressive. CSUCA’s budget is now about $3 million. More important, the organization enjoys added credibility with the international education community.

Guess who’s involved again in the U.S. policy initiatives in Central America? John Dimitri Negroponte, who earned a reputation while U.S. ambassador to Honduras (1981-65) as the “master of the pointless interview,” has been appointed as deputy director of the National Security Council. He reportedly presides over the Central America Inter-Agency Policy Council. He reportedly presides over the Central America Inter-Agency Policy Council. His mandate is to expand the Institute’s role as a catalyst for improved understanding between the Americas and the Pacific Rim.

Paul Boeker is the new president of San Diego’s Institute of the Americas. A career foreign service officer, Boeker has served as U.S. ambassador in Bolivia and Jordan. His mandate is to expand the Institute’s role as a catalyst for improved understanding between the Americas and the Pacific Rim.

Thomas Skidmore assumed the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes chair at Brown University in September. A Brazilianist, Skidmore had been on the history faculty at the University of Wisconsin for 22 years. Among the attractions at Brown: its Center for Portuguese and Brazilian Studies and the shorter commuting time between Providence and Washington, D.C., where his wife Felicity is a researcher at the Urban Institute.

Foreign Affairs—Caribbean Style

A new journal, modeling itself after the establishment-oriented Foreign Affairs, has been launched in the Caribbean by a consortium of investors and intellectuals. Contributors to Caribbean Affairs have included Michael Manley, Vaughan Lewis, Selwyn Ryan, Alister McIntyre, and Gordon Lewis. The publication is testimony to the efforts by Trinidadian elites to shed the isolationism of the Eric Williams era.

Bantam’s “Showdown”

Miami Herald book editor William Robertson has reported (February 14, 1988) that Bantam Books paid a record $250,000 for the U.S. rights to Jorge Amado’s Showdown. The fast-moving novel has already sold more than 500,000 copies in Brazil. Bantam is making a major U.S. marketing effort to ensure visibility and sales. The story is situated in Bahia and revolves around the lives of poor settlers who are dedicated to developing Tocaia Grande, a new city. True to form, the book is heavy with sex and violence, but the underlying themes of cultural pluralism and social injustice permeate Amado’s narrative.

Watch Out

Bruce Bagley’s departure from The Johns Hopkins University to the University of Miami’s Graduate School of International Studies is yet another indicator of the growing strength of area studies at the South Florida institution. Bagley’s appointment complements GSIS’s recent hiring of Enrique Baloyra and Jiri Valenta. Credit the school’s dean, Ambassador Ambler Moss, and the Interamerican Institute’s director, Jaime Suchlicki, for persistent efforts to strengthen UM’s international studies program. Expect a higher UM profile in area studies, especially in the fields of national security and comparative foreign policy.

All That Jazz—in Havana

Everyone has heard of Paquito de Rivera, the Cuban jazz musician who now lives in the United States. But does anyone know who de Rivera’s trumpeter in Havana was? Cuba’s Ninth Latin Jazz Festival was dedicated to Arturo Sandoval, who is now the country’s top jazz-rock musician.

Out-Faxing the Censors

Who hasn’t been asked in recent months to send something by fax to a colleague in another city? The fax is the latest high-tech toy to undermine office budgets. Lately, the fax has played a key role in helping Panamanian dissidents to beat the military censors in their country. The Panamanian News Center in Washington relying almost exclusively on the fax machine to send copies of U.S. newspaper articles on Panama to numerous points throughout the isthmian country. There, the anti-government opposition uses the fax to distribute the articles more widely.
President Manigat prepares to take on the “last crisis of traditional Haiti”—before his ouster by the first of two recent military coups.

The crisis continues...

Leslie Manigat on Haitian Modernization and the Pursuit of Happiness

An Interview by Anthony P. Maingot

In your earlier scholarship you posited the idea of stages in Haitian history. What “stage” do you believe Haiti is in right now, and what are the major characteristics of that stage?

I think we are at the end of a model of society in Haiti. The best way to understand our analysis of Haitian history and the evolution along stages is to get an inspiration from the book by Daniel Lerner on Turkey, The Passing of the Traditional Society.

It seems to me that the crisis that we are living now is the final crisis of the Haitian traditional society, one which came out of the Independence War and established itself after the assassination of Dessalines, from 1806 to the Duvalier era. To follow the truth more strictly, I should have said from the assassination of Dessalines to the U.S. occupation. This is so because the crisis was there at the time of the U.S. occupation. There was an aborted attempt to modernize Haiti by the Americans during the occupation. The old system remained without being renovated, changed, or modernized. Therefore we have the last crisis now of the traditional society, and the answer to that crisis is modernization.

The problem is, what type of modernization? When we speak of stages, we are at the end of the traditional society, which is going into its final stage. Of course, this crisis will last because it began under the Duvalier, Francois the father, who gave a fascistoid answer to that crisis. And, after that, his son Jean Claude gave another answer: an attempt at liberalization but within the context of an authoritarian regime led by the father. So it was a mixed, ambiguous response with finally an “opening up” of the country to outside forces but in disorder, what you might call capitalisme sauvage under Duvalier the son, which finally explains Haiti today: the abandonment of Haitian sovereignty.

The state is no longer functioning to satisfy the basic needs of the population but depends on help from abroad. Whether from governments or from international organizations, this aid is a substitute for the normal function of the state. That is why you can have about 300 NGOs [non-government organizations] taking care of the basic needs in Haiti and assuming responsibilities which should normally be the responsibilities of the state. It is evident, therefore, that the answer given by Duvalier was not the correct one to modernize Haiti. That is the reason we are coming with our own answer to that crisis.

Modernization for us means “triple” modernization—first, political modernization, which is democracy. This will take some time, but we are definitely entering the process of the organization of Haiti. That is the reason why I called February 2 “the first day of the year one” of democracy in Haiti. Second, economic modernization, which means a type of integrated development with a strong participation of the population itself in building the new economic structures of the country. And third, social modernization, which means a more just society; we must fight against an unacceptable degree of social injustice in the traditional society; we must build a more equitable society.

But while doing that in the economic and social field, we must preserve what we have called Haitian soul, Haitian cultural identity, basic Haitian cultural personality. I define Haiti, we have defined Haiti, as the country of joyful or cheerful misery. We have to fight misery; however, we must be very careful not to eliminate this capacity to smile at life, to be cheerful, to be joyful. Let us say—no matter how sad it may sound it may sound so—to be happy within misery.

President Manigat, how do you perceive your relations with the following countries: the United States, the Dominican Republic, the CARICOM countries, France, Cuba, and Venezuela?

With the U.S., it is very easy to define our relationship. We are in the Caribbean area at the southern border of the United States. The United States is one of the two superpowers of the world, and there is a tradition of friendly relations in certain fields with Haiti since the independence of the two countries. Therefore we are interested in strengthening this friendship, this solidarity.

But it is also true, again looking at history, that we have been also victims of a degree of dependence which constitutes a negation or
a denial of national sovereignty. This has been the case in the political field, as well as in the economic field. There is a feeling in Haiti that in dealing with the United States we must preserve our national interest, our national dignity. We want to be friends, but like Carlos Fuentes said, not satellites.

Since we consider it normal for Washington to defend and promote its own national interests, Washington must also consider that it is normal that we defend and promote our own national interests. Therefore the dialogue will be a dialogue between two partners, each defending its interests, its views and conceptions.

What does Washington represent to Haiti? One, Washington is a big Western democracy. In the political field there is a strong affinity, strong political aspirations, to build a viable democracy in Haiti based on the political system of the United States, which is a more traditional, classic democracy of the Western style. Second, the Americans represent for us the biggest consumer market in the world, and we are geographically close to that market. Third, America is the leading power in the field of high technology. Technology will probably be the leading variable to build the new society, to build the new civilization. And fourth, the U.S. is one of the richest countries in the world, a center of financial resources and an important power within the world's financial organizations. We need, therefore, to welcome American investments in Haiti.

But again, we emphasize the fact that this must, in our opinion, meet an equivalent good will from Washington, an effort to understand Haiti as a small nation, and also an effort not to try to put Haiti on its knees, because I think this will be counterproductive, given Haitian history and Haitian pride.

Could you briefly tell me something about your relations with the Dominican Republic, Cuba, the other Caribbean countries, and finally, Venezuela and France?

Let us define ourselves quite briefly but strongly: we are a Caribbean nation. We are the first Caribbean nation as such, politically speaking, and the new government wants to orient our effort, our own people, toward the content and the meaning of that definition of being a Caribbean nation. We want Haiti to be more associated with its neighbors in the Caribbean area—to play a more active role in the shaping of the Caribbean future, to be accepted as an important actor in the collective effort towards Caribbean unity. When I was in Trinidad, it seemed to me that it was obvious to everybody that I was a Caribbean man and I will be in power as a Caribbean man.

Many times I have made strong statements about the way we in Haiti see the future of relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. We are seeking a change in the dominant characteristics in relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in order to build a new era of cooperation between the two nations, the way that Adenauer and DeGaulle did. However, to be partners, there must be at least two; we therefore expect the same position, the same disposition on the other side of the border. What does that mean? First, there must be a change of conceptions on the other part of the border, because if you conceive a new partner—not its elite but its masses—as being inferior in racial and cultural terms, it is difficult to fully accept this partner on an equal basis. There must be an effort to change the Dominican mentality, to change their traditional conceptions of the Haitian masses. There is one thing which is not well perceived on the other part of the border: that Haiti might be poor in the economic and social field and the elites rich and supulent, but there is a popular culture in Haiti which is very rich. So, when you perceive the masses as being culturally inferior, you don't know the masses, because it is in the Haitian masses that we are the most rich, diversified, and extraordinary country.

But I must add one thing. There is a possibility that there is a new trend in the Dominican Republic, among the intellectuals and even among the people themselves. I say this because, contrary to what I have just said, there are some good practices and traditions of friendship between the two countries. I have also detected in some of the recent statements of the present Dominican government a kind of disposition for that new type of relations. Since the present party in power in the Dominican Republic has adopted, at least officially, a Christian Democratic label, maybe in Christianity, with its strong message about the equal dignity of every human being, you will find the source of inspiration for this new conception and attitude in the Dominican Republic toward Haiti.

What do you perceive your relations with the CARICOM countries to be?

We certainly know that during the presidential campaign I was the only one to raise the problem of the English-speaking Caribbean as our friends and brothers and to try to inject some Caribbean content in the list of issues in the campaign, for the future of Haiti. I believe I have been called by someone the "Caribbean man" among the candidates. That is because I spent almost five years in the English-speaking Caribbean, and I traveled more than ten years in the area. I am determined to take all possible initiatives to favor and bring to fruition a rapprochement and association with the English-speaking Caribbean.

But the problem is that this must correspond to some impulse also from CARICOM, from our Caribbean brothers. I ask myself, how can you have a man like Leslie Manigat in power—with what I tried to do in the Caribbean, with the ideas that I have and positions I have taken—and yet it is right at this moment that some reservations are expressed about Haiti or about the Haitian government?

I don't understand, quite frankly, why a country like Barbados seems to have taken such a strong position when I have only friends in Barbados, among officials and among the population. I don't think they are correctly informed about what is happening in Haiti and what the position of the new government is. It is only now that we have a chance for democracy, now that we have preserved the chance for democracy in Haiti. Be assured that if it were not for our solution, there would have been chaos, civil war, a coup, or foreign intervention in Haiti. All of these alternatives would have been undemocratic or anti-democratic.

How do you perceive your relations with Cuba?

People must realize that in all the Caribbean area we are the closest neighbor of Cuba. They must also realize that we have had a Haitian colony in Cuba since the beginning of this century and they maintain some kind of Haitian feelings, if not a total Haitian identity. People must also realize that every day we have radio transmissions from Havana in Creole that any Haitian peasant with a small transistor may listen to. Therefore Cuba has more of a presence in Haiti than any other Caribbean island.

But here is something which is very important: because of the political situation, because of the nature of the Cuban regime, we have no official relations with Cuba. We have a strange situation in which there is a presence, but this presence is not formalized in diplomatic relations. Can we live with that? Of course we can. There
is no problem. An important fact about Haiti is we have no enemies. Our problem with Cuba is only a problem in that, unfortunately, Cuba represents the introduction of the East-West conflict in the Caribbean. Haiti does not want to be involved in the East-West conflict. We have all that we can handle with the North-South conflict. We do not wish to add to our present problems, our present complications. That’s why we don’t think it is a matter of priority for Haiti to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Cuba is not obsessed, either, with the assumption of diplomatic relations with Haiti. Cuba is more interested in developing peaceful, friendly relations, and to find some ways of cooperation in the economic and social fields. Our decision, therefore, is very simple: we can live with Cuba as a neighbor without interfering in Cuban affairs and with no interference from Cuba in our own internal affairs. I think that the Cuban problem will have to be solved in a regional context, not in the national context.

President Manigat, could you conclude the second question by telling us something about Haiti’s future relations with France and with Venezuela?

Look at the present Haitian government and you will see a lot of people who have been trained in France. From the president to the prime minister, the minister of external affairs, to other members of cabinet. Given the aristocratic origin of Haiti and the francophone character and tradition of our elites, France is for us a very important partner. And France is a very important partner in the political sphere for a lot of reasons. France today is a country with a strong current of modernization from which we may benefit. But let me make some specific points. Today, in France, what do we see? We see the first possibility since DeGaulle to have a more comprehensive North because, since DeGaulle, France has developed a conception of North-South relations which is, according to what I know, (except for the Scandinavian countries, Sweden for example) the most humanistic one that the North has developed toward the countries of the South.

Also, France has two islands in the Caribbean, Guadeloupe and Martinique, where I have lived, which are very close to our hearts. I taught there, and we plan to develop our relations with them. They are officially part of France, so that is an additional reason why we are interested in France.

What is the status of your government’s relations with Venezuela?

Venezuela for us is a special case because we think that Venezuela is symbolic of our relations with Latin America. We want to be more associated, more integrated with Latin America, for a lot of reasons. One reason is historical: that is where our diplomatic relations and solidarity started. But we also want to put an end to any ambiguity in the Haitian identity and position, because we have long been the only purely black nation in Latin America and, additionally, we are French-speaking and not Spanish. We are in a singular position within Latin America. But now that the world has seen the evolution of Caribbean and African black nations, this is no longer an oddity. The fact that we speak French is no longer an obstacle, because more and more Haitians speak Spanish. Besides, French, after all, is a Latin language. Therefore, we should realize what the world is seeing: that Haitians are Latin Americans, too. We are definitely oriented toward that kind of closer association with Latin America, and Venezuela represents for us the gateway to Latin America.

But more than that, with eight years of exile in Venezuela, we have some very strong personal and institutional links with Venezuela. And there is one very serious point: since 1968 Venezuela has made an experience of the democratic process, which we have observed with interest. I am not trying to exaggerate the virtues of Venezuelan democracy, but I must say that I have seen in Venezuela how parties deal with each other, how the liberties and freedoms have been respected, how institutions function.

Of course, unfortunately for us, Venezuela is no longer in the golden period of the oil bonanza, in what they sometimes called “Venezuela Saudita.” Unfortunately for us because at that time Venezuela was helping other countries in Latin America, in the Caribbean, to an extent that has no precedent. But despite the limitations, they still are a rich oil country and we think that we can cooperate in many ways, not only in the financial field but also, for example, in the model of relations between the military and the civilian government.

President Manigat, could you address the question of foreign aid generally, but very specifically the relationship of the approximately 300 NGOs in the process of development, as you have outlined it in this interview?

First, we must rethink the problem of foreign aid to Haiti. Foreign aid has helped us to accelerate the process of modernization, the process of development. We welcome foreign aid. But it must be foreign aid directly to our country. We would like, therefore, to see the aid be more efficient, to be really channeled to the masses. But there is also another issue. Since we are benefiting from aid from various countries, there is a problem in the coordination of this foreign aid, how to incorporate it into a national scheme of development. Much aid goes through NGOs, and we have 300 or more working in Haiti. But each NGO in Haiti is doing what it wants, according to their own scheme, their own programs, their own conceptions. Let us put it another way: I would say that the sovereignty of the country has been, to a large extent, abandoned to the initiatives and responsibilities of the NGOs.

That is why we have decided to let the minister of external affairs, whose ministry is the entry gate for any international contact of the government, dedicate himself to the coordination and organization of our foreign economic relations. We have given the minister the additional title of directeur generale de la cooperation internationale. Again, there is another thing I would like to see result from foreign aid: foreign aid must generate more national production and encourage national participation in the building of the new society. We welcome that foreign aid when it is needed, but we don’t want to be perpetually, for all Haitian history, dependent on foreign aid.

As a matter of principle, as a matter of interest, we want to diversify our partners in the field of foreign aid, and we have good relations with Germany—a country which has never ceased providing aid. That’s one good example which will serve us in our cooperation with countries like Italy, Spain, but also with Third World countries in Africa and particularly in Asia. With the newly developed nations in Asia we are sure that we can develop good and fruitful relations in the field of economic-social mutual cooperation because they have already started the process.

President Manigat, it is frequently noted that in Haiti there are three urban economic sectors in conflict, a conflict which is structural but which also has a political dimension. To wit: the conflict between that sector which you traditionally have
called the commercial sector (commission agents importing for resale within Haiti), the sector which is involved in import-substitution manufacturing, and the newest sector in Haiti, the industrial or assembly sector geared to export. How will you attempt to harmonize state policy towards these three groups?

It is true that there are, if not conflicts of interest, at least divergencies of interest between these three sectors. The most traditional one has been the commercial sector, the export-import trade sector. They have been present since the beginning of Haitian history. They are part of the traditional system, and for a long, long time they have been the only decisive factor in the economic field and in the political field. They have been the traditional oligarchy. The second sector, which is involved in import substitution, has something to do with the Latin American trend, with CEPAL and so on, and has been at least a more modern sector compared with the first one. The third one, the assembly industry, at the time of Jean Claude Duvalier particularly benefited from the opening up of the U.S. market and also from the new redistribution of industrial activities at the world scale.

Now, what is the national interest of Haiti, and how to harmonize these three sectors? These three sectors are correctly analyzed as being three, but for us, operationally, there are two. Why am I saying this? Remember what I said earlier: the main problem of Haiti is modernization. Now, if you put our objectives in that light, you must analyze these three sectors in the following terms: where is there archaism and where is there modernity? Today the frontier line is not between the three sectors but within each sector.

One of the most dynamic and most promising sectors is the national industry working with local raw materials for national consumption. Industrialization must not be something artificial, it must correspond to the profound realities of what we can call "deep country." Now, what kind of economic activity is in keeping with that "deep country"? It is that industry which transforms local raw materials into products for local consumption. The problems that we have in that sector are, first, that production, unfortunately, is too weak. This is why this sector is interested in our policy of social justice, because if you want to raise the buying power of the workers so that they become consumers of our own production, you must make an effort towards social justice. That is why we find more understanding, more comprehension, more support, from that sector than from any other modern sector in the society.

One other advantage I've seen in that area is that at the same time that they are producing for local consumption, they can produce for export. But in order to achieve that, they have to do two things that are crucial for the modernization process: first, stimulate cooperatives of tomato growers, and secondly, rationalize land-holding patterns—many smaller plots into more productive holdings. They are creating jobs while also producing for the local market and placing themselves in a position to export. So it seems to us that this sector is one of the most important for the future of Haiti.

Now let us take the third one, the assembly industry. It is good for the country, in a certain sense, because it has been the most dynamic sector in the national process for these past years. We must encourage its development, maintain its existence, because it is creating jobs in Haiti. But now, what is the problem of this sector? It relates to the fact that Haiti has a strict parity with the dollar, one for five, that we cherish, and we intend to defend that exchange rate for a lot of reasons. This makes this sector a precarious one, because competition is such that it is enough for a change in the monetary situation of any state to jeopardize the existence and the strength of this sector. By the simple effect of the change in the monetary parity expressed in terms of dollars, the salary of the workers in Venezuela, Mexico, or in the Dominican Republic may become lower than that in Haiti. Nearly immediately, investors become interested in transferring their dollar activities in Haiti to places where things are cheaper in terms of dollars. So this is why one must watch the evolution of events in this sector. And this is one of the primary reasons why you cannot accept sudden increases in wages which might jeopardize the creation of jobs as well as existing ones. If you say the people are miserable because they are receiving only three dollars a day, and that is impossible, not acceptable, so we should put the minimum wage at five dollars a day, you are going to kill "the goose that laid the golden egg."

Now, let us come to the last one, the more traditional one: the commercial sector in the strict sense of import/export trade. Here there is the problem of the tension between routine and modernization. Some of the people involved have become accustomed to living with what we call in French a mentalité de rentier. They understand too much of any move, any change which could jeopardize their interest. They don't see the necessity to expand, to modernize, because it has always been like that, their marginal profit, their security. They don't want to face the risk of changing. It is not, therefore, a true capitalist mentality, nor is it an entrepreneurial mentality.

Yet, I must say that for the past few years there has been developing within that sector a more modern segment. I recently called that segment la bourgeoisie d'esprit capitaliste. They understand more and more the necessity of change, the necessity of transition, the necessity to abandon the oligarchic mentality and to accept a more democratic mentality, not only in the political field but also in economic relations, in social relations, with the unions as their partners. This latter is especially important because it is in that import-export sector that you traditionally have found resistance to unions. You also, of course, find this resistance in the other sectors. They have to change, to modernize their work relations and accept the unions as partners in the process of production.

Finally, I must confess that today I observe some efforts towards the integration of the three sectors. For instance, right now, as we are speaking, there are attempts under way to harmonize the interests of these three sectors and even to try to put the three under the same hat, through a kind of committee or other kind of institution. So there is an effort to reduce traditional divergencies and move towards a more unified position favorable to economic and social modernization.

President Manigat, there is a question about rural Haiti, still the majority of Haiti, although that is changing very fast. Agriculture faces a dilemma. Again, it stems from conflicting interests.

How will you reconcile: (1) protectionism to encourage local production of staples (even though they have high production costs); (2) the continued receipt and distribution of free staples as aid; and (3) measures to minimize living costs by opening up the market to imports, which very often come cheaper than locally manufactured products?
It is true we are in the evolution of the country from a predominant-
ly rural population toward a more equilibrated rural-urban balance. 
But in spite of that trend, the country is still predominantly rural. With 
70 percent of Haitians living in the countryside, the main part of the 
population is still composed of rural dwellers, of peasants. In attempt-
ing to understand where the national interest lies, you must take in-
to consideration, first, who the 70 percent are. Second, we are in 
a system of free enterprise. But at the same time that we accept 
the market economy, we have the national interest to defend and 
national interest also means national production.

If we take these two observations into account, our problem is 
the following: what does free enterprise, free trade, mean for Haiti 
today? If we accept what I said earlier on, that Haiti is at the end of 
a stage, the end of a system, that we are going toward moderniza-
tion (which includes the process of industrialization), what does that 
mean for Haiti?

Adopting the free enterprise system does not mean that one can-
not use some kind of protection in order to protect the infant 
economy, infant production. We are even more inclined toward pro-
tection because, when you look at the products which are in com-
petition with our national products, you see that many of them are 
subsidized. Let me use the example of rice. We were once an ex-
porter of rice, but this sadly changed under the Duvaliers. Today we 
face strong competition from cheaper rice. Our position concern-
ing the rice issue is very simple: we must not permit the destruction 
of our national production of rice. Now, does this mean that we shall 
limit ourselves to protectionist policies, putting a high tariff on the 
rice from abroad in order to protect our rice?

The answer is no. The answer is not to prohibit rice entering legally 
through customs. Because if you do that, you are going to encourage 
archaism, you are going to encourage the attitude of not changing 
things, not modernizing production. The answer is to do what we 
called in French, moduler, modulate a policy. On the one hand, not 
to permit the destruction of the national rice industry, but at the same 
time, to encourage the Haitian rice industry to modernize its pro-
duction in order to be more competitive.

Thank you President Manigat. Would you now care to make 
a final statement for this interview?

We want to develop, to realize the economic and social modern-
ization of our country. As we said, Haiti is still a peasant society, so 
we have to pay special attention to the peasant sector when we 
speak of modernizing the country. We must develop cooperatives, 
but we must develop them through the original Haitian culture, us-
ing our strong, spontaneous cooperative spirit. That is why we have 
created two new ministries, the Ministry of Cooperatives and Mutuali-
ity and the Ministry of Culture. Now, what will be the tool, the instru-
ment for rural development? We want to cover the country with a 
network of what we call la maison du peuple.

What is the role of maisons du peuple? It is, first of all, a center 
where the population will find the services from the state—for exam-
ple, medical care, information, practical education, debate about 
local problems, and cultural activities. Finally, this maison du peul-
pe will be what we call in French un centre nodal de developpement. 
That is why there will be attached to each center a piece of land in 
which people can experiment with plantings.

The maison will also create an atmosphere which should encou-
rage cooperation and solidarity between the military and the 
civilian, a new type of relationship between the police and the popula-
tion and even a new type of orientation towards solidarity and, if 
possible, the apprenticeship of common happiness.

I have heard you expound on the concept of happiness. I 
think it is the first time I ever heard a social scientist talk about 
happiness in operational terms as a variable; one usually talks 
about it in terms of an ideal. Maybe you could tell us a bit about 
this notion of happiness.

Let me say it very briefly and very simply. What is the objective 
of development? I don't think it is richness because if it were richness, 
then there is something terribly unjust in the world, because the 
United States and the bigger countries have reached a degree of 
richness that we will never reach unless we discover some very 
precious resource that was unknown before. So the object of 
development for us is not richness. It is a decent life, which is quite 
different from richness. A modest life, to satisfy the basic needs. I 
have called this the capacity to smile with life and with others, which 
I sometimes define as happiness. After all, what is a smile? A smile 
is not only an external expression. A smile is an internal expression. 
The capacity to smile is something which gives an equilibrium to a 
lot of things. The capacity to smile to oneself, to accept yourself, 
must come first. That means not having any complex or unusual 
stress, no obsession that accounts for unhappiness. That is why you 
have to smile first to yourself, and second at life.

Here in Haiti you see people confronting a totally unacceptable 
situation of a lack of water and they can still smile. You can come 
to a peasant house where they are deprived of everything, but they 
will serve you the best that they have. If all they have for themselves 
is a cup of coffee, they will offer that cup of coffee to you. They can 
smile at life, smile at others. I would even say that loving others is 
the norm in Haiti. This does give a certain religious touch to the 
problem.

If we are responsible leaders of the society, we should strive for 
a goal in which—even in sometimes hard conditions—we find a feel-
ing of solidarity, a feeling of peace and loving, a feeling we call 
happiness.

I remember once at a meeting of the Caribbean Development 
Bank we were discussing the future of Haiti with a group of so-called 
experts. I injected these comments about the pursuit of happiness 
in the analysis, and someone at the meeting mentioned, smiling as 
a joke, that he was not interested in happiness. And I said, what a 
pity, you should be.

Voodoo's New Legitimacy

by Bernard Diederich

Gro Roche's friendly face wrinkled into a smile as he caught his 
breath, resting against a large rock in the lakou of his houmfort at 
Lilavois, just a mile up the gravel road from Brigadier General Henri 
Namphy's little ranch. The 75-year-old houngan could afford to smile. 
He had provided his los for a rich and bountiful ceremony. A huge 
brown bull had been sacrificed on the afternoon of November 25, the 
last day of the traditional rite at Gro Roche's place. On the eve of the 
first democratic elections in 30 years, the turmoil gripping the coun-
try did not enter this secluded rural corner some 12 miles from the 
capital.
Not that Lilavois remained untouched by national politics: the ceremony—one of the most important in the vodoo pantheon—was fundamentally a prayer for peaceful and successful elections. This aspect of voodoo rarely enters into accounts of the folk religion, which instead portray it as an exotic, sinister force.

Making voodoo the whipping boy for Haiti’s ills is as old as Haiti itself. Recent events indicate that this custom is alive and well, both in Haiti and abroad.

In Haiti, the overthrow of Duvalier unleashed waves of popular revenge against a regime regarded as evil. In the countryside the first wave of popular justice against the hated Ti Macoutes was followed by mob action against Ti Hounans who were Ti Macoutes, then against houngans and mambos. There were signs that Catholic youths and some priests, as well as Protestant pastors, were involved in an anti-voodoo crusade despite the church’s earlier call for a halt to revenge. The last wave was directed against loup-garous, the mythical werewolves, which to many Haitians are terrifyingly real. People were intent on exercising their own fears by killing evil. A man near Gonavies accused of being a loup-garou and a charanpwell was hacked to death by a mob. His remains, tied to a telephone pole, were set aflame. Only three days earlier the victim had been a dechouker involved in the killing of another man singled out as a malfete.

Abroad, voodoo has helped to sell more books about the society than have Haitian secret societies themselves. The morbid fascination with voodoo helps to explain why events in Haiti have always aroused intense curiosity. Often the commentary evoked abroad is far stranger than the events themselves.

Soon after the tragic election day, The Wall Street Journal decided that the secret voodoo societies were responsible for the terrible events in Haiti. Bizango bashing was in.

Haiti was said to be in the grip of these secret societies, in particular the Bizango. The mystical misfits and nightmareish characters of Haitian folklore were alive and well. Bakas and loup-garous, gangs of sorcerers, the chancy well, Bizango, zobop, viendendeng, and galipot were flying through the rural night, bewitching and switching into animal form. They generate a fear that keeps children from misbehaving, turns thieves chicken, and keeps the rural road clear of nighttime traffic. They also have a remarkable ability to trick writers into joining the chorus of fools, along with bouqui and malice.

When tapping the Haitian’s well-stocked memory bank of myths, a writer must be careful not to take literally everything that is said. Writers for The Journal, in their zeal to explain what they called the “Haitian Horror,” seemed unaware of this fact.

On November 29, 1987, The Journal charged that “after the French left in 1804, the male voodoo priests, or houngans, ruled the countryside through the use of native poisons and secret religious societies.” Bringing the reader up to date, the newspaper made an even more outrageous charge: “It is clear that to this day much of Haiti is controlled by a voodoo theocracy called Bizango.”

The Journal’s cited source was New York Botanical Garden ethnobiologist Wade Davis, who, it claimed, “penetrated this world in search of the potion used to create zombies. He found it, but he also uncovered the immense power wielded by the Bizango sorcerer-priests.” According to The Journal, in 1983 Davis interviewed a Bizango leader who bragged, “The [politicians] in Port-au-Prince must cooperate with us, we were here before them and if we didn’t want them, they wouldn’t be where they are. There are not many guns in the country, but those that there are, we have them.”

Despite the scapegoating in Haiti and abroad, what emerges is voodoo’s remarkable capacity to overcome adversity.

Journal asserted that the Duvalier dictatorship had allied itself with the Bizango, which served the regime as a kind of secret police. It quoted Davis as stating that the leaders of the secret societies almost inevitably became powerful members of the Ton Ton Macoute, and that the army is still riddled with members of the secret societies.

“If Haiti is to gain release from its powerful voodoo theocracy,” warned The Journal, “it will need the skills and energy of many of its exiles.” Haitian leaders will need continued U.S. support, the report added, “if they are going to prevail against the kind of sinister force in Haiti that most Americans can only begin to comprehend.”

From Zombies to Secret Societies

A few days later, The Journal published an article by Haitian anthropologist Michel S. Laguerre, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley and the author of Politics and Voodoo: Still a Potent Combination in Haiti. Laguerre took to task the November 29 report.

“Clearly the world is correct in defining the carnage that took place in Haiti last Sunday as a harvest of shame for the ruling junta and the regular army,” he wrote. But the outside reporters, analysts, and politicians, he added, have taken “the simplistic road of categorizing these events as rightwing, leftwing, interventionist, non-interventionist, etc., depending on their own ideological predilections.” In fact, said Laguerre, “confusion about the functioning of Haiti’s army-led government stems from the inability of some analysts to understand two important aspects in the makeup of the army: its historical relationship to the Ton Ton Macoute Force and the participation of some of its members in secret societies.”

Laguerre noted that, in describing Duvalier’s creation of the Ton Ton Macoute and neutralization of the armed forces, one more complication must be added to the puzzle: the secret voodoo connection.

Laguerre contended that: “Another major development in the army during the Duvalier years was the extent to which soldiers and Ton Ton Macoutes became involved in the network of voodoo secret societies. The secret societies function in Haiti as a paramilitary government with their own underground police force, judicial bodies and spying agents. They even issue passports, without which one is ill-advised to travel in the countryside at night.”

Since Francois Duvalier was recruiting without discrimination, a number of voodoo practitioners were incorporated into the Ton Ton Macoute. General Namphy’s disbanding of the Ton Ton Macoute had no impact on the sub-groups formed by such practitioners, for the simple reason that they have a long tradition and function as both military and religious organizations.

Laguerre reported that one soldier said that some of his comrades joined secret societies out of “fear for their own lives because of the suspected malevolent intent of their fellow soldiers and also because of their belief in the practice of voodoo as a way of getting promotions.” According to Laguerre, soldiers cannot protect civilians “when a secret society decides through its underground governing council to take action against an outsider.”

Laguerre’s conclusion stressed that, for Haiti to establish democratic institutions, “much effort must be expended to understand the strength, the operation and the relationship of the secret societies to the regular army.” Foreign intervention, he argued,
would strengthen the secret societies, as it had in the past. As a solution, Laguerre advocated "bringing voodoo out in the open. Official recognition would drain the secret societies of perhaps their most powerful raison d'être: secret protector of the national religion."

The Journal's editor, Robert L. Bartley, responded by personally defending his analysis of Haiti. Bartley reassured the readers that his sources vouch for the fact that the Bizango societies operate as a shadow government in Haiti—with their own leaders, chains of command, and means of discipline—and that the Duvalier government consolidated itself by championing the ancestral voodoo religion against outside influences.

Not long afterwards, the fearsome image of Haiti received Hollywood-style embellishment. The movie version of Professor Davis's research, "The Serpent and the Rainbow," appeared this past spring, thrilling horror-film fans with evil Macoutes murderers zapping zombies. The Macoutes do exist, but the movie's terrifying imagery represents the imagination and fears of foreigners.

The New Legitimacy of Voodoo

Despite the scapegoating in Haiti and abroad, what emerges is voodoo's remarkable capacity to overcome adversity. Voodoo has survived one of the most difficult periods in its tumultuous history, and even managed to win the endorsement of Leslie Manigat during his short-lived presidency.

As Leslie Manigat's February 7 inauguration approached, the Catholic Church faced a dilemma: to sing or not to sing a Te Deum, meaning what it always has been considered important in Haiti; it is the sacred aspect for the new president. The traditional Catholic benediction has suggested by their actions, that voodoo is no longer content to play other religions. Recognition also means, as some suggest by their actions, that voodoo is no longer content to play other religions. Recognition also means, as some "suffering the sins of others."

Although such recognition doesn't mean that voodoo has suddenly become Haiti's quasi-official religion, it does mean that voodoo can no longer be ignored. Voodoo has been decriminalized; the 1987 constitution recognizes voodoo as a cult with the same rights as other religions. Recognition also means, as some houngans have suggested by their actions, that voodoo is no longer content to play the passive role of "suffering the sins of others."
The next president of the United States will inherit the destructive legacy of Reagan policy in Central America. But if Dukakis wins, will his administration do any better?

Undoing Reagan's Legacy

by Morris Blackman and Kenneth Sharpe

If Michael Dukakis wins this fall's elections, Central America will be one of the major foreign-policy dilemmas he faces. A Dukakis administration will inherit a difficult situation made worse by eight years of failed Reagan administration policies, and the U.S. public will expect a new course of action. It is crucial that Dukakis recognize the problems inherent in the Reagan legacy and work to reverse their damage.

The legacy is clear. In El Salvador, policies meant to end the civil war and consolidate a moderate government have deepened the conflict. The insurgents remain a serious military force and retain significant mass support, while the government of the gravely ill José Napoleón Duarte has suffered serious erosion of support due to corruption, failure to implement promised reforms, and inability to end the war. The fragile political facade erected by Reagan policies could come apart at any moment.

In Guatemala and Honduras, as in El Salvador, elected governments hold office, but harsh and corrupt military officers still monopolize power. Fundamental political and agrarian reforms to eliminate the sources of turmoil have not been undertaken. The Reagan administration's funding of a contra army to oust the Nicaraguan government has turned Honduras into a military base of operations and destabilized the Honduran economy, promoted capital flight, encouraged drug dealing and corruption among its high officials, and strengthened the military at the expense of a fledgling civilian regime.

In Nicaragua, contra aid not only has sacrificed peace for war and undermined development programs, but it has also further involved East-West issues in a basically local conflict by pushing the Nicaraguans to militarize, seek increased Soviet arms shipments, and maintain the presence of Cuban advisors.

Our major regional and European allies see the United States as scuttling attempts to negotiate peace and security agreements, while often backing disreputable, anti-democratic military officers and political leaders. The Central American Accord (Esquipulas II) provides the United States with a historic opportunity to forge a true partnership in the region that could serve both U.S. and Central American interests.

What's the smart, effective, principled policy the United States needs in order to reverse eight years of failed Reagan policies?

Combining Principles and Realism

Democrats have already laid a solid foundation in the primary campaigns with cogent criticisms of the Reagan administration's methods: its counterproductive use of force, immoral and ineffective proxy armies, bullying attitude toward our neighbors, flouting of U.S. democratic procedures, and indifference to social, economic, and political justice. It is equally important to make clear how the goals of Democrats differ from those of Republicans, and to anticipate the attacks against the Democratic agenda by the Republican right.

The goals of the Democratic agenda are simple: peace and security for the United States and Central America. These goals demand policies that not only minimize East-West intervention in local conflicts but also foster equitable development and democratic governance. No matter how much assistance the United States pours into Central America, significant development cannot take place until the region's governments implement the very reforms that economic and military elites are blocking. Nor will there be significant development as long as civil conflict is raging: pumping aid into war-torn countries does little more than superficially repair damage and prop up local armies.

A Dukakis administration should put into action a five-point program to:

- De-escalate superpower rivalry in the region.
- Demilitarize the region.
- End support for mercenary activity.
- Encourage genuinely democratic institutions, values, and practices.
- Reestablish the primacy of diplomacy, negotiated settlements, and true partnership with regional allies.

Such goals have broad party support. Yet they are vulnerable to the charge that they add up to an idealistic, impractical approach to U.S. security in a hostile world. Unless Democrats are willing to challenge the web of distortions and misguided assumptions that underlie this charge, their own policies will be condemned to perpetuate the failures of the last eight years.

The Traps and Pitfalls

The cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador illustrate that many Democrats have been trapped by the Reagan agenda. The Reagan

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government has managed to define the agenda for Nicaragua by weaving together two dubious assumptions: the notion that vital security interests are at risk as long as the Sandinista government remains in power; and the supposition that the United States has the right and the responsibility to guarantee Nicaraguan democracy. The acceptance of these assumptions leads to one conclusion: the Sandinistas must be ousted, or forced to restructure their regime through "democratization," which, to the Reagan administration, means negotiated ouster.

Protecting security and encouraging democracy are two U.S. interests that a Dukakis administration does want to advance, but ousting the Nicaraguan government by force serves neither objective. Few Democrats have openly challenged the two questionable assumptions, or even the distorted concept of simplistically identifying democracy with "anti-communism" and "ousting the Sandinistas." Instead, Democratic criticism has concentrated on the ineffective and immoral means used by the Reagan administration, including the corruption and authoritarian tendencies of its contra allies. Restricting criticism to the means implicitly concedes the legitimacy of the Reagan administration's objective to topple the Sandinista government.

As long as this agenda goes unchallenged, the Dukakis team risks being trapped on the campaign trail by the question: "What are you going to do to overthrow Nicaragua's Marxist revolutionary regime?" In softer form, the question is: "If contra aid is reduced, how can you guarantee that negotiations will lead the Sandinistas to democratize?"

In fact, no U.S. policy can guarantee Nicaraguan democratization, especially if the "litmus test" is American-style democracy or abdication by the Sandinistas. No matter how much more humane and pluralistic the Nicaraguan government might be relative to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, or compared with revolutionary regimes elsewhere, the Sandinistas will always fail the test. Nicaragua is undergoing a social revolution: major reforms not only threaten historic privileges of wealth and power, but generate disruption and opposition. Reluctance to give opposition groups the power to block such reforms is likely to include curbs on civil liberties. A Dukakis administration must be forthright in telling the American people that nothing can guarantee a regime that is to our liking. The Reagan government has proven that it cannot be done by war; Dukakis must show that diplomacy, although it holds no guarantees, can facilitate democratization.

The trap for a Democratic alternative in El Salvador is set by the false picture the Reagan administration has painted of a struggling but popular "reformist democracy" confronting Soviet-sponsored revolution. The reality is an increasingly unpopular elected civilian government dominated by a repressive military. This situation could soon come unraveled. If it happens under the Democrats, the Reagan failure may be laid at their doorstep, trapping them into choosing between unrealistic policies to "protect democracy" or accepting responsibility for "losing" El Salvador.

The fact is that the Salvadoran leftist insurgency is a home-grown movement with considerable support in some rural areas and restricted Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan assistance. U.S. aid of over $2.3 billion since 1981 and a counterinsurgency campaign of air assaults, bombing, and forced relocation of rebel supporters have failed to end the civil war. No end is in sight, and U.S. aid only adds to El Salvador's problems.

Further, Duarte has been unable to stop the abusive interrogation techniques, physical beatings, death threats, disappearances, and assassinations that continue to be used against opponents. Despite millions in U.S. AID support, no military officer has been convicted or even tried for human rights abuses, and the October 1987 Amnesty Law wiped out any chance of justice by dropping charges against those involved in army massacres and military-connected death-squad actions.

The problem is not the Democratic program, but the tacit acceptance of the Reagan administration's unrealistic, costly, and dangerous ends. Failed reform, widespread government corruption, decreasing wages, and repression against peasant and labor organizations have outraged many of Duarte's former supporters. Widespread frustration led to the decisive defeat of Duarte and the Christian Democrats in the March 1988 Assembly elections. The victory by the right-wing ARENA party—headed by death-squad leader Roberto D'Aubisson—represents popular rejection of the Duarte regime and Reagan policies, as well as the absence of any moderate alternative within El Salvador's repressive political climate. As long as the high command can rely on Washington's aid, it would rather fight than engage in the dialogue that many Salvadorans are demanding.

The realistic alternative in El Salvador is to promote a negotiated settlement that protects opposition forces anxious to pursue nonviolent means and gives the insurgents a rationale for laying down their arms. But the Reagan government has orchestrated the false image that its policy is working and that more elections and more U.S. aid will resolve the problems. Unless Dukakis begins now to publicize the reality of El Salvador, the responsibility for this deteriorating situation could fall on the Democrats after January 1989 when the Reagan image-making machinery collapses. The situation could deteriorate in two ways: a severe crackdown by the military that would plunge the country back into the brutality of 1980-84, or an escalated rebel offensive. If Democrats do not soon challenge the Reagan agenda, they will be obligated to save what falsely appears to be a democracy under siege.

A Democratic Agenda

A Dukakis administration need not be trapped. The problem is not the Democratic program, but the tacit acceptance of the Reagan administration's unrealistic, costly, and dangerous ends. At issue is a Democratic agenda that addresses the United States' real national interests in Central America—guaranteeing U.S. security and fostering regional peace, equitable development, and democracy. When the Republicans ask: "What will you do about the Sandinistas and how will you prevent revolution in El Salvador?" the Democrats' response must be: "Those are the wrong questions. Republican policies are undermining our real national interests. The Democratic agenda will advance them."

Take security first. The idea sold by the Reagan government, that Nicaragua poses a direct and vital threat to the United States, is patently absurd. The United States does have security interests in Central America—discouraging armed aggression by one country against another, minimizing cross-border arms flows to insurgents, encouraging demilitarization, and reducing the region's number of foreign advisors. But the only true threat to the United States would be if the Soviets were to alter the zone's strategic balance, for example, by putting nuclear missiles in Nicaragua.

That possibility is highly unlikely, given the potency of the Soviets'
arsenal of submarine-based missiles. A Dukakis administration could make it remain unlikely by dealing directly with the Soviets on the matter. The kind of understanding worked out after the Cuban missile crisis could be extended to cover the whole region. The principal way to protect U.S. security is to reduce superpower tensions in the region.

How about our other security interests, such as preventing foreign aggression and discouraging substantial material assistance to insurgent groups? These interests do not require that the United States overthrow the Sandinistas. The latter know that such aggression would lead to disastrous military confrontation with the United States. If there were aggression, a Democratic administration could utilize hemispheric agreements to mobilize international diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military resources to stop it.

The flow of arms to El Salvador would be a concern, if there were credible evidence that it occurs. For years Managua has offered to negotiate verifiable agreements to assure that no such arms flows take place. As president, Dukakis could agree to such negotiations. If Managua followed through on its word, there would be no problem. If not, the president could stop arms flows by appealing to hemispheric diplomatic arrangements to impose multilateral sanctions against the Sandinistas.

How about our national interests in equitable development, peace, and democracy? Their promotion is the only way to remove the long-term poverty and inequality that underlie Central American conflicts. A Dukakis administration could work with other countries in the region to formulate a Central American development plan. But economic assistance makes no sense in the absence of the far-reaching reforms necessary for development to take place. This fact underscores the need to throw the full weight of the United States behind the Central American Accord as well as the negotiated solutions advocated by the Contadora countries.

Lasting peace requires equitable economic development and an end to political repression: a population that is the enemy of its government will always be on the verge of war with it. Because peace and development demand political and social reforms, the United States has a stake in encouraging the consolidation of governments dedicated to the welfare of their peoples. But the Democrats must explain to the public that encouraging democracy is different from imposing democracy, and that their efforts will minimize direct U.S. intervention into the politics of other countries.

A Dukakis administration could foster democracy not only by advocating elections, but by providing steadfast support for human rights. If elections in Central America are mere disguises for official violence and repression, they will be locally discredited. Fostering democracy means publicly condemning gross and systematic violations of human rights no matter where they happen, in countries of the left or the right. It means providing full-scale U.S. diplomatic support to non-violent opposition movements of the right, center, and left; speaking up for those imprisoned or disappeared; actively backing the work of human rights monitors and international human rights organizations; and refusing to tolerate abuses even during civil wars. Above all, U.S. interest in fostering democracy is served by refusing to consider any but humanitarian aid to governments of the left or the right that are gross and systematic violators of human rights. Right-wing tyrants must no longer be allowed to pull our anti-communist heartstrings to aid their repressive regimes, even if they are faced by insurgencies.

But a Dukakis administration must also make clear the limits of U.S. power to promote democracy. The United States has neither the ability nor the responsibility to use force to impose a political solution. It must be generous with countries who respect human rights and favor reform and development, but it owes nothing to those who do not. Yet the United States should not, as John Quincy Adams rightly warned, go "abroad in search of monsters to destroy. [America]...knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own...she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom."

The Political Struggle to Define a Democratic Agenda

A new Democratic agenda will confront opposition because the Reagan agenda has mythologized reality, usurped and distorted traditional, moderate symbols such as democracy and human rights, and inflamed popular fears of threats to America. Thus, a Democratic administration must lead a political struggle to redefine the nation's foreign-policy agenda by challenging the myths, reclaiming the symbols, and confronting popular fears.

Challenging the myths involves Democratic efforts to counter the misleading portrayal of El Salvador as a nascent civilian democracy under siege by Soviet-linked guerrillas. It also involves efforts to put to rest the erroneous notion that the Sandinistas represent a threat to U.S. security, and that the United States can and should impose a political solution in Nicaragua.

Reclaiming the symbols is essential if the American people are to understand that advocating human rights and democracy means, for example, challenging the distorted identification of anti-communists with "democrats" or "freedom fighters." A Democratic administration must publicize the reliable evidence of contra brutality, corruption, and authoritarianism. It must convince the U.S. public that non-lethal aid, which sustains the contra army in battle, is not "humanitarian" aid, and that elites who defend the unrestrained pursuit of wealth in the name of free enterprise are not defending democracy and freedom. And it must criticize press censorship and the people's courts should they reappear in Nicaragua.

But a Democratic administration must also make clear that the killing and terrorizing of journalists in Guatemala and El Salvador is as much press censorship as the closing of a newspaper, and that the disappearances of hundreds of arrested citizens in these countries is a far graver violation of democratic principles than the jail- ing of suspected contras by people's courts. It must insist that a democracy is not constituted by electing someone to office who has little or no power; that a reform government is not achieved by electing someone with reformist credentials; and that respect for human rights cannot be equated to a decline in death-squad killings, while arbitrary arrests, disappearances, and torture continue.

Regarding the fears of the American public, Democrats must confront both the fear of "another Vietnam" and the fear of "another
Democrats have already taken on the first fear, speaking to the unease many feel about being drawn into future quagmires. But the fear of “another Cuba” remains powerful and unchallenged.

The key is to accept the kernel of truth around which the big lie is built, to educate people to distinguish real threats from false threats, and to show them how preoccupation with false threats blinds them to the smart alternatives that will reduce the real threats. That means recognizing that there is a major rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and ensuring that the United States has the military capability to defend itself against real military threats. But not all international turmoil stems from the Soviet threat. The United States needs to reduce the chances that the superpower rivalry will inflame and complicate other forms of turmoil.

Central America is an ideal place for a Dukakis administration to start winding down Cold War tensions. Firmly putting forward concrete measures to reduce superpower rivalry and de-escalate conflicts would do much to defuse irrational fears and convince the U.S. public that Democrats understand, and can effectively deal with, real threats.

Regarding U.S. security issues, a Dukakis administration could immediately pursue Gorbachev’s offers to negotiate reductions of arms shipments to Nicaragua in the context of a regional settlement that complements the Guatemalan peace accords. Dukakis and his fellow Democrats could enter into bilateral discussions with Nicaragua to negotiate mutual security concerns. And they could initiate bilateral consultations with Cuba about Central America. Given Cuba’s involvement in the region, it makes sense to talk with its government.

Regarding Central American regional security issues, a Dukakis administration could throw its full weight behind the Guatemala accords. It would therefore back the Contadora-mediated negotiations to help the five Central American presidents resolve their political and security issues. That would mean encouraging a negotiated solution to the conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as Nicaragua—a solution that includes all political forces. Democrats would have to make continued economic and military aid conditional on such a negotiated settlement.

Dukakis and his associates could back efforts to have international forces monitor and, where necessary, patrol the Honduran and Nicaraguan borders to minimize cross-border arms flows and incursions. They could support efforts to remove foreign military advisors from the region. And they could take the lead in pressing for a Carribian Basin treaty with verifiable and enforceable provisions prohibiting offensive strategic weapons in the region.

These measures to help demilitarize the region, reduce superpower conflict, and negotiate peaceful settlements are only the first steps. It is essential that the long-term U.S. interests in equitable development and democracy also be pursued. Such interests demand immediate steps to help all countries with postwar reconstruction: the resettlement of insurgents and refugees, the provision of medical care to the injured, and the rebuilding of infrastructure.

But they also demand U.S. help in creating political arrangements that address the region's deep-rooted problems of poverty, inequality, and repression—the causes of turmoil and insecurity. Here Democrats can back a regional, multilateral economic plan that would allow any country, independent of its ideology, to participate if it demonstrated a serious commitment to equitable development and human rights. Thus, development aid would be available to those governments seriously interested in the welfare of their people.

A Dukakis administration could lead the political struggle against the unrealistic policies and counterproductive Central American agenda of the Reagan years. Its policies could protect the real national interests of the United States in security, peace, equitable development, and democracy. And by challenging the lies, reclaiming the symbols of democracy and human rights, and confronting irrational fears, it could gain the popular acceptance these policies toward Central America deserve.

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The Central American Accord
by Francisco Rojas Aravena

For Central America, the last year has been a time of intense and fragile negotiation. The convergence of national and regional crises with shifts in Latin American-wide and East-West alignments has presented Central American governments with an urgent set of challenges. Such challenges have compelled the zone's leaders to set up channels not only to renegotiate the terms of domestic governance and isthmian geopolitics, but also to assert control over Central America's position in the wider world. The Central American Accord (known also as Esquipulas II) marks the beginning of a new era for the region, particularly in its relations with the United States. At all levels, the obstacles to peace and democracy remain formidable. Yet the strides taken toward domestic and regional reconciliation provide grounds for optimism.

Antecedents

Since the late seventies, questions of regional and extra-regional crisis have pervaded Central American affairs. These questions generated two contrasting responses: U.S.-based military initiatives and Latin American-based diplomatic initiatives. Standing at loggerheads, each response ensured the other's failure. The consequences were prolonged Central American instability and the escalated threat that war would engulf the isthmus as a whole.

By early 1987 developments on both fronts—the outbreak of the Iran-contra scandal and the failed “tour of mediation” by the Contadora participants and the secretaries-general of the OAS and the UN—underscored the state of paralysis. As the Reagan hardliners and Contadora alike fell into disarray, the combination of isthmian economic crisis, Soviet reformism, and thawing U.S.-Soviet relations further disposed the region's leaders to negotiation. President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica responded by proposing a peace plan that places diplomatic responsibility squarely in Central American hands.

The Making of the Accord

The Arias initiative led to a meeting of the presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica in...
Esquipulas, Guatemala. On August 7, 1987, the presidents signed a set of agreements intended to lay the foundations for regional peace and democratization. The path-breaking agreements took the world by surprise, especially since they were achieved without the participation or consent of the dominant player in the zone, the United States. The signing of the Central American Accord left the Reagan government with no clear line of action. Reflecting its continued misreading of the region's affairs as Central America inaugurated a course of peace through negotiation, the Reagan administration replaced its special ambassador to Central America, the pragmatic Philip Habib, with hardliner Morris Busby. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union welcomed the Esquipulas Initiative since it promised to relieve the Soviets of a high-priced ally in a low-priority region. And for Cuba, the initiative meant the possibility of reduced East-West tensions over Central America and improved relations with the United States. No less important was the fact that the Latin American governments comprising the Contadora Group and its Support Group began preparing for a new, subordinate role in Central America.

The Accord addressed both domestic and regional problems by calling for the establishment of a national reconciliation commission in each country, an executive committee of Central America's foreign ministers, and an international commission for verification and monitoring. Only the international commission incorporates representatives from outside the region, as among its members are officials from Contadora, the Contadora Support Group, and the secretaries-general of the OAS and the UN. Yet worldwide legitimacy was bestowed in the form of the Nobel Peace Prize to Oscar Arias.

## Developments Since the Accord

During the initial stage, progress was rapid, and reciprocal confidence grew out of inter-country ministerial meetings of all kinds—economic integration, finance, health, culture, and so forth. Since then, progress has been slow. It is no surprise that problems have centered on questions of national reconciliation and cease-fire, as governments and rebels have sought from the start to bolster their negotiating leverage. Thus, going into last January's key presidential meeting in Alajuela, Costa Rica—whose purpose was to set in motion far-reaching solutions—Central America faced a climate of polarizing domestic and regional politics. This climate severely limited the mediating efforts of Costa Rica and Guatemala. On the one hand, Nicaragua claimed that it was complying with its peace-making obligations and that, because of the complexities of its domestic situation, the time limits of the peace process should be extended. On the other hand, El Salvador and Honduras took U.S.-aligned hawkish stances, taking issue with Nicaraguan claims and arguing against a deadline extension. Further polarizing affairs was the Reagan administration's announcement that it would seek several million dollars in new contra aid.

A first reading of the Declaration of Alajuela might point to Central America's anti-Sandinistas and the Reagan administration as the clear winners. But a closer reading shows that, because the signatory nations reaffirmed their obligations and their willingness to comply with them, the document represented a political triumph for Central America as a whole. The real winner was the diplomacy of pragmatism, which managed to put the breaks on confrontational interests. In this context, Nicaragua's announcement of a series of conciliatory measures—an end to its state of emergency, direct dialogue with the contras, extended amnesty, and a willingness to hold elections—helped the U.S. Democrats to defeat Reagan's campaign for new contra aid. All signs pointed to the renewed impetus of the peace process, including March's Hamburg meeting of the foreign affairs ministers of Western Europe, Central America, and the Contadora nations, which restated European backing of the Peace initiative.

In mid-March, however, the Honduran-Nicaraguan border clash and the increased presence of U.S. troops in that area threatened to undo the fragile progress. Growing U.S.-Panamanian tensions made matters worse. Fortunately, Secretary of State George Schultz announced that negotiations in Nicaragua should continue. And with its policy toward Panama in disarray, the United States did not attempt militarily to overthrow Noriega. Under these circumstances, the Nicaraguan government, at its late-March meeting with the contras at Sapoá, reasserted local commitment to peace by adopting agreements to free political prisoners, allow the return of Nicaraguans in exile, guarantee freedom of expression, and provide for elections. Vital to these agreements was the naming of Nicaraguan cardinal Obando and OAS secretary-general Scares as guarantors.

Since the meeting at Sapoá, the Nicaraguan dialogue has had its ups and downs. So have the chances for dialogue elsewhere. For example, if Nicaraguan developments have raised hopes for a new round of negotiations between the Guatemalan guerrillas and the Cerezo government, the Guatemalan army's anti-Cerezo actions most certainly have not. In El Salvador, escalated guerrilla warfare and ARENA's recent electoral victory make negotiations and reconciliation highly unlikely; Duarte's grave illness adds more uncertainty to Central America's most polarized situation. As for Honduras, the military's mounting power does not augur well for democracy, particularly in light of reduced U.S. commitment to the Nicaraguan contra forces and Panamanian general Noriega's ability to stand up against U.S. pressures. The fact remains that the Central American Accord in itself is a fundamental regional achievement. In the midst of crisis, Central America has taken strides toward reorienting not simply intraregional politics and diplomacy but also its relations with Latin America, Europe, and, most important, the United States. In so doing, it has recognized that the basis of isthmian stability and development is not force but rather conciliation and democracy.

(Translated by Ruth Gahler)

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Hemispheres / Fall 1988
Where has Reagan's anti-drug diplomacy gone wrong?

Winning Battles, Losing the War: U.S. Anti-Drug Policies in Latin America

by Bruce Michael Bagley

Since President Reagan declared "war" on drugs in the early 1980s, U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has entered an era of drug diplomacy. Control of drug trafficking now ranks with immigration, foreign debt, and communist expansion in Central America as a leading issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. In 1986 drug trafficking has been a principal point of friction between Washington and Panama, Mexico, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. In these countries, drug trafficking not only has assumed major economic proportions; it has either presented fundamental challenges to central authority or at least added complicating dimensions to the imperatives of governance.

The rationale for drug policies in these countries, therefore, extends beyond the issue of drug abuse to basic questions of domestic governance and foreign relations. The growing threat posed by drug lords to various Latin American governments, combined with U.S. concerns about the massive inflow of drugs, constitutes a potential basis for U.S.-Latin American cooperation.

Dimensions of the U.S.-Latin American Drug Trade

Supply

Nine Third World countries account for the bulk of the illegal marijuana, cocaine, and heroin smuggled into the United States each year. Some 90 percent of all the marijuana imported into the United States (11,650 tons in 1986) originates in four Caribbean Basin countries: Mexico (35-40%), Colombia (20-25%), Jamaica (10-15%), and Belize (5-10%). The United States itself produces an additional 2,100 tons annually. Virtually all the cocaine (105-7 tons in 1985) is cultivated in three South American nations: Peru (50%), Bolivia (40-45%), and Colombia (5-10%).

Colombia emerged in the mid-1970s as the principal site of cocaine refining and since then has controlled roughly 75 percent of all the refined cocaine exported from the Andean region to the United States. Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are believed to have smuggled some 30 tons of cocaine to Western Europe in 1985. In the last three years, several other South American countries—Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Argentina—have also surfaced as coca producers. This occurred as the United States and Latin American governments stepped up enforcement operations, thereby forcing some grower-dealers to find cheaper and safer locales for cultivation and processing.

Mexico is Latin America's only heroin-producing country. Of the estimated 6.46 metric tons of heroin smuggled into the United States in 1986, about 39 percent was grown in Mexico. About 50 percent of the remainder came from the Golden Crescent (especially Pakistan, the world's largest producer) and the Golden Triangle (especially Burma).

U.S. Demand

There are 20-25 million marijuana smokers in the United States, 5.3 million regular users of cocaine, and 0.5 million heroin addicts. In 1986 the wholesale value of all illegal drugs smuggled into the country was around $25 billion. At retail or street prices, the U.S. public annually spends as much as $130 billion on illicit drugs. The potential for profit is obviously immense at all levels of the industry, though most profits are made in the distribution process once the drugs have entered the country. It is not known how deeply the major trafficking organizations penetrate and profit from the distribution chain below the wholesale level, but Colombia's Medellin Cartel makes $4-6 billion annually in the cocaine trade.

The U.S. War on Drugs

Without question, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 represents the most comprehensive effort in U.S. history to lower domestic demand for illegal drugs and to reduce the inflow of narcotics into the United States. The Act includes provisions designed to attack the drug problem on a variety of fronts simultaneously: tougher law enforcement in U.S. cities; more ambitious anti-drug school and community programs; intensified testing in the work place; expanded treatment and rehabilitation programs for users; lengthier prison sentences for traffickers; increased federal support for state en-
forcement efforts; augmented interdiction at the border; and additional resources for eradication, crop substitution, and enforcement programs abroad.

From fiscal year (FY) 1981 to FY 1988 federal spending on drug control tripled, rising from $1.2 billion to $3.9 billion. The U.S. military was ordered to become more active in support of civilian enforcement programs. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report released in June 1987 indicates that the total cost of the U.S. Defense Department's interdiction activities jumped from an insignificant $4.9 million in FY 1982 to approximately $387 million in FY 1987.

Allocations of U.S. foreign aid reflect the Reagan administration's emphasis on financing the anti-drug war. Between FY 1980 and FY 1987 U.S. allocations for overseas narcotics control efforts more than tripled, surging from some $40 million to over $200 million annually. As a percentage of total U.S. aid to Colombia, for example, State Department narcotics aid rose from 30 percent in FY 1984 to 70 percent in FY 1987. Congress moved to link foreign aid to what countries do or fail to do about drug trafficking. For instance, the United States imposed sanctions on Bolivia in 1986 and 1987, mainly because Bolivia had not acted seriously to eradicate its coca crop. In 1988 the Reagan administration, under congressional pressure, decertified General Noriega and Panama. Further, several U.S. congressmen initiated efforts to decertify Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, and the Bahamas. They did so despite President Reagan's contention that such punitive measures would not only damage U.S. relations with those countries, but also inhibit future cooperative efforts between them and the United States in the war against drug trafficking.

As the Reagan administration and the U.S. Congress have gotten "tougher" with the governments of Latin America's drug-producing countries, the U.S. "drug warriors" have scored some impressive victories. Cocaine seizures, for example, vaulted from 2 tons in 1981 to 27 tons in 1986, with local and state enforcement agencies capturing similar amounts. In the same year, federal agents captured a half ton of heroin, 9 tons of hashish, and 1,106 tons of marijuana. In May 1987 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) completed a three-year, undercover drug enforcement operation. Dubbed "Operation Pisces," this effort resulted in the confiscation of cocaine worth some $270 million at U.S. wholesale prices. Likewise, Operation Alliance—a multi-agency task force created in 1986 and intended to curtail the flow of drugs across the U.S.-Mexican border—reported that seizures of marijuana in 1987 had doubled the previous year's total and that cocaine confiscations had escalated by 400 percent. Arrests on drug charges have increased sharply, as have average prison sentences for offenders.

Why U.S. Policies Have Not Worked

Despite the increased resources, manpower, drug seizures, and arrests, the evidence indicates that "...worldwide production of illicit opium, coca leaf and cannabis is still many times the amount currently consumed by drug abusers" (U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1987, p. 40). U.S. narcotics experts estimate that interdiction programs catch just 3 percent of marijuana imports and 10 percent of cocaine imports; thus, increased drug confiscation probably means that more drugs are being smuggled into the United States. Reinforcing this conclusion is that between 1981 and 1988 the price of a kilogram of pure cocaine plunged from about $60,000 to under $10,000. The widespread availability of cocaine and other drugs in the United States, the epidemic in crack use, and the notorious growth of drug-related crime and violence also suggest that America's drug plague is worsening.

Nevertheless, the most serious accusation is not that the U.S. government is losing the war on drugs, but that the Reagan administration never launched a full-scale attack. U.S. policies have been stymied by inadequate resources, lack of bureaucratic coordination, and inconsistent leadership. They have also frequently been subordinated to other concerns of U.S. foreign policy, especially national security.

Inadequate Resources

Three months after signing the 1986 anti-drug statute, President Reagan submitted his FY 1988 budget in which he proposed to eliminate $1 billion from drug allocations. Among the key cuts: $225 million from state and local enforcement; half the funds for drug treatment; and $400 million out of drug education (from $500 million to $100 million). Although some protests were voiced by congressional leaders, in practice Congress proved willing to restore only a small portion of Reagan's cutbacks. The administration's subsequent decision not to request reauthorization in FY 1989 for $1 billion in federal funding for local law enforcement, education, and rehabilitation programs further undermined the war on drugs. Given that Reagan had already lowered federal spending on drug treatment and prevention from $200 million in 1982 to $126 million in 1986, and then deliberately delayed FY 1987 disbursements until the end of the fiscal year, by 1988 many governors, mayors, and local officials were frustrated and confused about Washington's real priorities. As Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY) put it, "These cuts seriously call into question the Administration's commitment to an effective national drug abuse strategy" (The New York Times, October 26, 1987, p. 13y).

Lack of Coordination and Leadership

In 1984 President Reagan created the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board to centralize U.S. government anti-drug programs. In March 1987 he broadened the Board's authority to include not only enforcement but also prevention, education, and treatment activities. Headed by Attorney General Edwin Meese and Health and Human Services Secretary Otis Bowen, the 17 members of the Board include all cabinet officers and representatives from the vice president's office, the Office of Management and Budget, and the CIA.

Despite Reagan's formal bureaucratic reorganization, however, recent reports by the GAO and the House Committee on Government Operations have found that responsibility for U.S. drug policy remains "diffuse and overlapping" (The New York Times, October 28, 1987, p. 13y). The House report was especially critical of the Board's inability to resolve long-simmering inter-agency " turf battles" and its delayed implementation of mandated studies and programs.

Clashes of Interests and Policy Priorities

In the Asian heroin-producing countries, many of which share borders with communist powers, the struggle against communist expansion has always had diplomatic priority over the war against drugs. It is hard to envision the United States ever imposing sanctions on Pakistan, even though that country is the world's top heroin producer, or on the Afghan "freedom fighters," despite their deep involvement in opium cultivation and transport. When President Reagan met with a number of Afghan guerrilla leaders at the White
House in November 1987, he apparently never even broached the topic of drugs.

In Latin America, too, the war on drugs has often been subordinated to interests of U.S. security. Panama, Honduras, Jamaica, and the contras are examples. Both the Carter and the Reagan administrations tolerated Noriega for years because he was a useful "asset" despite growing evidence that he was involved in the drug trade. U.S. intelligence sources linked Noriega to drug trafficking as early as 1972. A secret 1985 study written by the U.S. Army's Southern Command charged the Panamanian Defense Forces with involvement in the narcotics trade. According to former National Security Council Chief-Economist Norman Bailey, the State Department's attitude was "lukewarm," the Pentagon did not want to "rock the boat," and the CIA actively opposed doing anything: "He's an important asset" (The New York Times, April 10, 1988, p. 10y).

In Central America, the U.S.-backed contras have repeatedly been accused of involvement in drug trafficking, although no hard evidence that implicates the principal contra organization, the Fuerzas Democráticas Nicaragüenses, has ever been made public. The CIA did have suspicions that other contra factions may have been involved, but it never pursued them aggressively because of the Reagan administration's heavy commitment to the contra movement. In contrast, with less than conclusive evidence, Washington has frequently accused the Sandinista government in Managua of active participation in the drug trade.

As with the contras, numerous allegations of Honduran military involvement in the narcotics trade have surfaced in recent years. A DEA agent based in Honduras between 1981 and 1983 reported that Honduran army and navy officers were involved in the transshipment of drugs through Honduran territory and in the protection of drug traffickers. DEA Chief John Lawn explained that the evidence was too "weak" to merit investigation. The DEA office in Honduras was finally shut down in 1983 because it had not been "productive." According to one Reagan administration official: "It wasn't that there was a coverup. It's that people knew certain questions shouldn't be asked" (The New York Times, April 10, 1988, p. 10y).

**Drug Trafficking and U.S.-Latin American Relations**

Drug trafficking is a major problem in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America. Many countries, including Colombia and Mexico, have been heavily involved in the production and distribution of cocaine and other drugs. The United States, as the largest consumer of illegal drugs, has been a key player in the war on drugs.

**Options**

What can U.S. policy do to address both the domestic and international sides of the drug-trafficking equation? On the domestic side, any plan of action should strive to reduce demand, an approach that calls for increased funding of anti-drug abuse programs and innovative ideas about the problem's roots. Complementing this approach should be stepped-up law enforcement in the United States against traffickers and users.

On the international front, the United States could take the lead in building up hemispheric drug-fighting capabilities. This would require a coordinated effort among all member countries of the Organization of American States (OAS) to share information and resources, to develop common strategies and tactics, and to establish a regional drug control framework.

For example, the United States could work with other countries to establish a joint interagency task force to monitor drug trafficking networks, to share intelligence and other information, and to coordinate law enforcement actions across national borders. The United States could also provide technical assistance and training to help countries develop their own drug-fighting capabilities.

In summary, the United States must take a more active role in the war on drugs and work with other countries to develop a comprehensive strategy to reduce the influence of drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. This will require a commitment of resources and a willingness to work together with other countries to address this complex and multifaceted problem.

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implemented in drug-producing countries.

The United States could also undertake to "Americanize" the anti-drug war. In so doing, the United States would take over drug enforcement functions that drug-producing countries cannot perform, as long as those countries consent. Examples of Americanization are the trial of Colombian drug traffickers in U.S. courts and the U.S. Army-supported operation against cocaine laboratories in Bolivia in the summer of 1986 (Operation Blast Furnace). But the introduction of U.S. military forces was condemned by all segments of Bolivia's political establishment, and the Blast Furnace model has been rejected by other governments in the region. Moreover, extradition seems to be on hold in Colombia—an understandable if undesirable consequence of intensified drug-mafia violence and threats. Americanization is therefore a risky approach and should be used only in the most extraordinary circumstances.

Most important of all, the United States could help Latin America find economic alternatives to the drug trade. One way, of course, is through direct economic aid (which the United States does not provide to Colombia). Another way is through reduced import barriers for legitimate exports—textiles, sugar, coffee, and so forth—and the extension of the Caribbean Basin Initiative system to additional Latin American nations that commit themselves to serious efforts against drugs. Economic development in the region is the sine qua non of any successful campaign against drug trafficking.

**The Decomposition of Sucre**

Peace in Sucre was obviously a mirage. It could not last with unemployment rates of 25 percent and with a 70 percent malnutrition rate among the state's children. Its capital lacks water and has the highest energy costs in Colombia. Its municipalities have been abandoned to God's mercy, and there is a high level of land concentration and a progressive pauperization of peasants. The "regional" hospital in Sincelejo announces on the radio that it lacks even a piece of gauze to treat the victims of the corridojes (the running of the bulls in the local stadium), which has claimed, so far, three dead and ten wounded.

A central factor in the decomposition of Sucre is its political class—ravenous and corruptible like few in the country. The misuse of parliamentary aid, the personal appropriation of financial allotments for public works, and the customary practices of shameless plundering of public service agencies become even more shameful when they take place in such a poor and needy state. The fact that 20 years after it was declared a capital elected officials have still not procured water for Sincelejo is perhaps the greatest example of their incompetence. Hundreds of pesos have been allotted for this purpose. The monies that the political voracity is buried in wells that never work or in worthless pipelines installed haphazardly just before each election.

**A Colombian Town in Agony**

*by Enrique Santos Calderón*

The state of Arauca has been the site of a scandalous misappropriation of petroleum rights by local leaders and politicians. This corruption has done nothing but encourage an already alarming guerrilla presence in a strategic region shaken once more by daily attempts against pipelines and petroleum installations.

The case of Arauca is merely a reflection of what is happening in Sucre. Just a week in this coastal cattle state is enough for one to appreciate the explosive situation it faces. Sucre is the product of extraordinary social conditions, unrestrained corruption by its political class, and a recent but intense guerrilla threat.

Less than two years ago Sucre was a paradise of peace. It had managed to escape the armed subversion that some time ago plagued the neighboring states of Córdoba, Bolivar, and Antioquia. Today, it is a totally different kind of place. The guerrilla movement has established a presence that permeates this zone, which is not exactly mountainous or jungle-like.

The area's cattle ranchers have been threatened and very few of them dare to visit their farms. Many of the farms have been bought by the "godfathers of Medellín," that is, Ochoas and company, who don't haggle over prices and don't seem to be intimidated by threats. "This is going to get worse than the Cateca," the most pessimistic ranchers say. They also say that the guerrillas "recruit" young farmers and pay their families up to 100,000 pesos ($390) for each farmer they take. In the few days I spent in Sucre, there were two kidnappings, an assault on a marine squad 60 kilometers from Sincelejo (the capital of Sucre), a murder of a teacher in Colozal, and a civic revolt in San Onofre against a political leader (his house was set on fire).
This is how the people of Sincelejo remain in the same rut. The well-to-do buy water at exorbitant prices from a water truck that delivers it to their houses, while at the crack of dawn an army of women and children from the town must go to faraway reservoirs to obtain theirs. Yet all of the people, at the top and at the bottom, continue to put up with and elect the same officials responsible for such prolonged trampling. When will they learn their lesson?

By Means of Rum and Money

The elections for mayor will soon be held. It is interesting to see the "prize candidates" who have ventured into important cities such as Corozal or Since. One of these individuals was recently censured publicly and fired from his post as director of Sucre's Department of Public Works. Another has been accused of masterminding the murder of a Sincelejo reporter. Without doubt these two will win; such is the level of control through patronage--"by means of rum and money"--that they exercise over the electorate.

One is uneasy leaving Sucre. Everywhere the air is heavy with discouragement, a nervous pessimism among the well-to-do and a hopelessness that could very well turn into desperation for the poor. They have plenty of reason to feel this way, subject as they are to double pillaging. On the one hand, the guerrillas extort and kill without scruples, exterminating, as they go, any type of productive action. On the other hand, the political class misappropriates without any qualms the funds destined to improve the community's living standard.

Let's not be surprised, then, if the next civic outburst in Colombia takes place in Sucre. This state, so full of possibilities, does not deserve such a cruel destiny, and nothing lasts forever, including the tolerance of abuse.

(Translated from El Tiempo by Lourdes Simon)

Enrique Santos Calderón is a columnist for El Tiempo of Bogotá, Colombia.

Editor's Note: In 1989 mayors in Colombia were popularly elected for the first time. Enrique Santos Calderón informed Hemisphere that the mayoral candidate in Corozal withdrew from the race because of the article, while the candidate in Sincelejo ("Since") was defeated.

Is Colombia to Blame?

by Alfonso López-Michelsen

During the last decade, Colombia's involvement in drug trafficking has become the stuff of headline news. The key item has been the emergence of a group of smugglers, mostly from Medellín, that terrorizes the country through assassination and other violent actions. Like any other issue involving sizable amounts of undercover money, the stories are not always accurate. I have written the following notes to clarify a few widely misunderstood issues.

At what time, and for what reason, did there originate such a gigan-
nor boats could reach U.S. ports with cocaine. When the collabora-
tion of the United States—the greatest military power of the conti-
ment and perhaps of the world—was requested for this task, the reac-
tion was negative. The U.S. ambassador to Colombia stated that the
U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts were so vast that they could not com-
pare with those of Colombia for purposes of vigilance. It was only
when the drug traffic acquired its present magnitude that the United
States took fundamental measures against the traffickers. One long-overdue measure was
the freezing of bank accounts to prevent dollar laundering. But what the U.S. government
spends on drug control is minuscule when
compared to the volume of money moved by
the coke capos.

Misinformation also persists about the
downfall of the Extradition Treaty. In Colombia,
treaties are not approved in the same way as they are in the United
States. Instead of requiring only the senate’s advice and consent—as
is the case in the United States—in Colombia treaties are approved
by law, debated in both houses and sanctioned by the president’s
signature. In the case of the Extradition Treaty, in Colombia the ap-
proving law was repealed because of a technicality: it had not been
signed by the president himself but by a minister who believed he
was acting lawfully as the president’s delegate during the latter’s
absence from the country. The supreme court ruled that the law ap-
proving the treaty was unconstitutional on the grounds that it should
have been signed by the president himself and not by his delegate.
I disagree with this stance, but the fact remains that a supreme court
decision overturned the approval of the Extradition Treaty. It was
not, therefore, a turnaround by either the executive or the congress.
Rather, it was the result of a decision by the supreme court, whose
duty is not to design policies but to decide on the constitutionality
of the law.

Something similar has happened concerning interpretations of
the “sinister window.” This term refers to the purchasing of dollar
checks by the Colombian central bank without demanding certifica-
tion for the origin of the funds. I can hardly think of greater
misunderstandings than those surrounding these central bank
operations. In countries without exchange controls, such as the
United States, there is little awareness of how the two foreign-
exchange markets operate in other countries: the “official” market,
conducted by the central bank, and the “ unofficial,” black market,
involving clandestine, private transactions. The black market pays
a higher price per dollar than the official market: in Colombia the dif-
terence is presently around 14 pesos per dollar. Obviously, the black
market is the more propitious for selling dollars of a doubtful origin.

It is a sign of ignorance to argue that the purchase of dollars by
the central bank promotes laundering. True, cocaine dollars can be
sold to the central bank, but traffickers will profit more by selling them
on the black market, where they do not have to explain or justify the
source of their dollars. Should we expect traffickers to operate
through legal channels? Besides, they have many means of hiding
their funds. Most simply, they can opt not to bring them into the coun-
try; they can sell a few dollars in the black market for their operating
needs while depositing their enormous profits in Swiss bank ac-
counts. One recent article in El Espectador of Bogotá announced
that the amount of funds entering through the “sinister window” is
increasing, which is tantamount to admitting that dollar laundering
is increasing. The article added that Colombians are “repatriating”
money from the United States because of last fall’s plunge in the
New York Stock Exchange. Yet if capital that purportedly enters
through the “sinister window” is being “repatriated,” then these are
not dollar-laundering transactions but “black” stock investment
transactions that are being reversed. It is for such transactions that
tax amnesties were created. Thus, people who violated the ex-
change statute by taking dollars out of the country can easily rein-
corporate them into Colombia.

Clearly, we cannot place the responsibility for either the produc-
tion or consumption of drugs on any single
country: the drug problem is eminently in-
ternational and, as such, knows no boundaries.
Further, eradication of a vice through police pro-
dcedures has never been successful. Neither
prostitution nor alcoholism nor tobacco respon-
d to prohibition. Only by means of educa-
tion and information about their negative con-
sequences can vices be controlled. Successful
examples include the diminishing of cigarette consumption for fear
of cancer and the checking of prostitution for fear of AIDS. Hence,
in order to reverse what is now identified as a “Colombian problem,”
we need a multi-faceted international campaign.

Let us not forget that U.S. consumption of cocaine has contributed
$1.5-2 billion to the Colombian economy. This startling sum has
perhaps reduced Colombia’s unemployment and increased its con-
sumption of goods and services; at the same time, however, it has
ruined public administrators and the police force. This situation
should be of great concern to the United States, as it already is to
Colombia and its neighbors. We Colombians would welcome a solu-
tion based on a fair analysis of the responsibility of each member
of the international community.
Is U.S. Foreign Policy its Own Worst Enemy?

Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua


by Heraldo Muñoz

In recent years the academic world has been flooded by a wave of writings on U.S. policy toward Central America and, specifically, on Washington's relations with Managua. Unfortunately, the quality of this literature does not always match the challenges posed by the relevance and complexity of the subject. Robert Pastor's Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua, stands as an important exception. It is a clear, well-written, and fascinating account of the evolution of U.S. policy towards Nicaragua under the Carter administration. The author, a former director of Latin American and Caribbean affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), provides abundant and previously unknown details about the critical period marked by the fall of Somoza and the triumph of the Sandinistas, laced with provocative interpretation of those details. Condemned to Repetition is required reading for anyone wishing to understand the motives and outcomes of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua.

Pastor's book is divided into sixteen chapters. Chapter one outlines the purposes and basic arguments of the book, while chapters two and three explore the historical background of U.S.-Nicaraguan ties. These second and third chapters are unnecessary, as they repeat facts that other works treat in greater depth. The best part of the book is in chapters four to eleven, in which Pastor gives a personal account of the succession crisis in Nicaragua and the Carter government's relations with the victorious Sandinistas. The final chapters attempt to explain the process of estrangement between Washington and Managua, exploring the question of whether U.S. leadership and Latin American revolutionaries are bound to repeat past mistakes, leading to inevitable confrontations. Pastor furnishes a provocative set of policy recommendations on these issues.

Difficult Decisions

The author's account of U.S. policy making during Nicaragua's succession crisis supports some conventional propositions about decision making in U.S. foreign policy. Not unusually, the State Department and the NSC were sharply divided over what course of action to pursue. According to Pastor (p.156), the State Department favored acceptance of the Sandinista victory as inevitable and a quick adjustment to that imminent scenario, while the NSC wanted to play alternative cards up to the very end. Pastor asserts that this division pitted political appointees against career officials. The former, who sought to formulate policies that were defensible in the United States, "were more inclined to advocate a North American approach to solving the problem; elections; while career officials were more attuned to the debate in Managua and more disposed to make the opposition's case for pushing Somoza out" (p.107).

Graham Allison's classic critique of the "rational actor model" of foreign policy, which assumes that government officials make "consistent, value-maximizing choices within specified constraints" (Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1971), is illustrated in the Nicaraguan case. Pastor suggests that faulty intelligence gathering and communications, as well as bureaucratic infighting, plagued U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. He observes that "by and large, the U.S. government knew less about the [Nicaraguan] Guard than Somoza knew about the U.S. government," and that "from at least 1976 to July 1979, there were no independent, unauthorized contacts between U.S. government officials and Guard officers" (p.176). This point emerges with striking clarity in the content of the final settlement. Somoza agreed to leave on the morning of July 17, 1979, following a negotiation that included the replacement of the Guard commander, integration of the FSLN with the Guard, and enforcement of a cease-fire. Nevertheless, when the NSC's Special Coordination Committee on Nicaragua met on July 16, its members "did not know that Somoza was leaving the next day" and did not know the details of the arrangement negotiated by the U.S. embassy in Managua (pp.182-83). In Pastor's view, this problem occurred because the principal members of the U.S. mission in Managua were themselves out of touch with local developments (p.154).

Beyond the theoretical aspects of decision making, Pastor's work focuses on the substantive side of the Carter administration's policies. The impression one draws from Pastor's account of the intraadministration debates is that the Carter presidency never grasped the depth of the Nicaraguan and Latin American conviction that the overthrow of Somoza was essential to ending the Nicaraguan crisis. Despite the tough anti-Somoza stance advocated by Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs Peter Vakly and special representative William Bowdler, the Carter government adopted a cautious stance that seemed to favor the Nicaraguan dictator. This stance explains President Carter's openness to appeals by Somoza's supporters in Washington.

The United States' reluctance to abandon Somoza led to an effort at mediation, which involved the Dominican Republic and Guatemala as well. Understandably, most Nicaraguans and Latin Americans viewed this effort as a play to keep Somoza in power. Pastor candidly recognizes that none of the Nicaraguans wanted such mediation except Somoza himself, who

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simpley wanted to buy time. The most moderate sectors of the anti-Somoza opposition considered the U.S. initiative a "charade" (p.94). It seems that at some points in history mediation or "neutrality" is tantamount to taking sides. In the Nicaraguan case, the Carter administration's attempt at mediation threatened to undermine a quest for change.

One could suspect from the outset that the mediation effort was condemned to failure. From the U.S. perspective, such failure was doubly negative: first, it served to prolong the crisis; and second, as Pastor claims, it strengthened the internal resolve of the FSLN forces in the face of what they considered a maneuver to strengthen Somoza.

The FSLN's distrust of the United States was further justified in view of the Carter administration's strategy of maintaining "two pillars of power" in Nicaragua (p.15). Pastor explains that this strategy sought to bolster a moderate alternative to Somoza and to preserve the National Guard. Pastor himself agreed with these objectives (p.153). Apparently, though, as the Guard stepped up its savage repression of Somoza's opponents and openly murdered a U.S. television reporter, the Carter administration came to recognize that preserving the Guard meant preserving the dictatorship: "Somocismo sin Somoza" (p.178).

Pastor himself agreed with the official objective of "preserving the Guard" while "obtaining Somoza's resignation" and establishing an executive committee composed of moderate opposition members who "could become an alternative source of power when Somoza left" (p.153). But Pastor now admits something he didn't comprehend then: that, given the incestuous relations between the Guard and the Somoza family, neither could have survived without the other (p.178).

The author describes in detail the policies of those Latin American governments that unequivocally sided with the Sandinista military campaign. Pastor concludes that for a long time the Carter administration did not fully realize "just how different the Latin American view of the Sandinistas was from its own" (p.139). Indeed, President Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela and General Omar Torrijos of Panama accomplished what the Carter administration failed to do: they predicted the triumph of the final FSLN offensive (p.133).

Looking back, one cannot resist thinking that the preservation of U.S. interests in Nicaragua, as well as the satisfaction of Nicaraguan popular demands, would have been better served by the proposals of Latin American leaders, particularly Venezuela's Pérez. Simply put, their proposals sought to force Somoza out and negotiate the establishment of a new government in which the Sandinistas would have effective participation. Had the Carter government taken the Latin Americans seriously, perhaps the outcome of the crisis would have been not only palatable to Washington but also acceptable to the Nicaraguan people.

But the Carter government ignored their ideas. Thus, Pérez pointed out that Somoza remained in power "thanks to U.S. support," and Torrijos believed that, as always, the United States "is too slow to recognize new realities." The U.S. obsession with Cuba's role—particularly strong among "globalists" in the administration—made Washington lose sight of how deep feelings ran against Somoza and how inadequate the East-West perspective was in grasping the basic features of the Nicaraguan crisis. Costa Rican president Rodrigo Carazo reflected the opinions of a wide spectrum of Latin Americans when he told Pastor why Costa Rica worked with the Cubans to aid the Sandinistas: "It was more important for Somoza to fall than to keep out the Cubans" (p.129).

The U.S. government imposed sanctions on Somoza in February 1979, a decision received with a "sigh of relief" by moderate Nicaraguans and by Latin Americans as a whole. "The United States had finally acted" (p.120). But, as the inevitable fall of Somoza drew near, the Carter administration's desperation reaffirmed widespread suspicions about the United States' obstructionist role. According to Pastor, Zbigniew Brzezinski actually argued in favor of direct military intervention to impede the Sandinista victory. President Carter firmly opposed the proposal.

The case of Nicaragua highlighted the limits of U.S. influence. Washington found itself in the middle of Nicaraguan politics but unable to control political outcomes. As Pastor indicates, at some point the Carter administration realized that it could not alter the course of events in small and dependent Nicaragua and that it was a mere bystander to a situation shaped primarily by domestic forces.

**Explaining the Past and Drawing Lessons for the Future**

The last three chapters of Condemned to Repetition contain a set of reflections about U.S. foreign policy that merit special attention. Chapter 14 analyzes U.S. policy toward not only Nicaragua but also toward other countries that face succession crises. This section (which would have served as a useful guide to the reader if placed at the beginning of the book) questions the "security motive" as a valid explanation of U.S. policy toward Cuba and Nicaragua. Pastor writes that the "security motive" helps to elucidate "why and when the United States became exercised about developments in Nicaragua, and it partially explains why the United States identified with Batista and Somoza and confronted the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutionary governments." But Pastor goes on to say that the security motive does not tell us "why the United States dissociated itself from Batista and Somoza and why it initially respected the two revolutionary governments" (p.270).

One could argue that the United States dissociated itself from Batista and Somoza only when there was no other choice and when doing so would no longer make a difference. Yet Pastor is right when he attributes contradictions in U.S. policy toward such dictatorships to the "political character, values and experience of the United States, which has always given more attention to the character and international behavior of regimes than have most other nations" (p.271). This assertion leads to the hypothesis that national security interests do not enjoy undisputed primacy in U.S. foreign policy.

Washington has often adhered to criteria of "national security" by backing military coups and maintaining cordial relations with dictatorial regimes. Not uncommonly, however, public opinion and Congress pressure the White House into criticizing human rights violations and prod-
typically respond by viewing the United States not only with great mistrust but as a decadent power, soft on communism, which in the final instance is part of the enemy camp. The only policy that military regimes tend to accept is one of unconditional, uncritical support. Given the structure of the U.S. political system, such support is practically impossible.

In Pastor's judgment, "when the 'middle' delegitimizes a dictator, U.S. officials are compelled to follow the 'middle'. Even a conservative administration cannot sustain a policy of supporting a dictator if the middle groups in that country have rejected him" (p.272). This thesis merits further testing. In many instances of dictatorial rule either there are no middle forces or they wind up joining the armed rebellion. El Salvador is a clear example. In such cases, the U.S. government often tries to create a centrist political sector. Pastor argues that this "middle options preference" explains the decision not to overthrow Somoza. A different explanation, however, is that the United States chose not to overthrow Somoza out of an inordinate fear of revolution and a proclivity to equate revolutionary change with security threats.

Nonetheless, one must agree with Pastor's assertion that the United States "is uncomfortable about supporting dictators but also about overthrowing them" (p.272). This assertion may suggest that any U.S. administration—even that of Ronald Reagan—faces constraints in its prolonged and close friendships with governments that violate human rights and deny widespread demands for democracy. Such governments eventually provoke adverse reactions from the media, church groups, human rights groups, Congress, and sometimes from policy makers within the administration itself. Yet U.S. policy likewise faces constraints from the opposite direction: Washington will not engage in open confrontation with a government that shares its anti-communist and free-market world view.

Chapter 15 of Condemned to Repetition outlines six moments between October 1979 and November 1984 when an alternative U.S. decision might have yielded a brighter future for U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. Looking back, Pastor reflects that in October 1978 he believed that pressures against Somoza would not work. But then he admits: "I now believe the U.S. should have applied gradually escalating pressures" (p.289).

Pastor next analyzes crucial moments in which the Sandinistas missed the chance to improve their relationship with Washington. He asserts that one of these missed opportunities occurred from early 1984 onward, when the Sandinistas "dismissed the internal opposition and rejected any dialogue with those in the armed opposition" (p.291). But on March 24, 1988, after dismissing this possibility for six years, the Sandinista government participated in direct talks with the contra leadership. Granted, circumstances had changed substantially: the Sandinistas had practically defeated the contras in the battlefield, the Iran-contra scandal had politically weakened the White House; and the talks stemmed from Central America's own Esquipulas peace plan instead of from U.S. initiatives. The Sapoá negotiations may well become another lost opportunity, owing not to the Sandinistas' lack of flexibility but to the Reagan administration's strategy of confrontation.

The last chapter of Pastor's book contains a series of policy recommendations. He suggests, for example, that the White House should develop a better "support system" to deal with success crises. Pastor therefore proposes that the White House establish both a "historical office" and ad hoc working groups to provide the information necessary to make informed judgments when dealing with the succession crises of dictatorships.

More significant, Pastor identifies four options to guide U.S. policy during such crises: "1) bolster the dictator, 2) aid the revolutionaries, 3) let events take their course, or 4) promote a democratic transition" (p.298). It is not surprising that he recommends the last option. Nevertheless, the enumeration of such options amounts to a mere exercise in theory. In actuality, a true democratic transition can be achieved only by withdrawing all support to the dictator, thus favoring the revolutionary forces.

Pastor goes on to outline a broad strategy aimed at the dictator, the moderate opposition, the military, other governments in the region, and the revolutionaries. The most interesting part of this outline is the way which relates to the revolutionary governments. Here Pastor makes a highly commendable proposal: "The United States needs to demonstrate to all those on the left in Latin America that it can live with—indeed, that it welcomes—genuine social change and justice in Latin America" (p.310). He describes other steps to adopt regarding succession crises, seeking all the while to "expand and consolidate democracy in the Americas" (p.311).

Is the United States condemned to repeat the same errors it made when confronted by revolutions such as those of Cuba and Nicaragua? Pastor says no. He nonetheless argues that old approaches need to be replaced by two new ones. First, the United States and revolutionaries need to rethink the patterns of their past conflicts, and second, big nations like the United States and small ones like Nicaragua need to discard stereotypes and find a new, less destructive relationship (p.313). Each side, Pastor argues, has expectations about the other that have some basis in reality. But, through "confidence-building steps," perhaps the negative expectations can be replaced by positive ones. The United States, he reasons, "could recognize the need of the revolutionaries for dignity and equity, and the revolutionaries could accept U.S. security concerns" (p.314).

Pastor poses a welcome challenge. Today, some changes can be observed in the direction of mutual understanding and acceptance. Until now, however, Latin Americans seem to have recognized U.S. needs and interests much more than the United States recognizes the need for change in Latin America. Let us hope that another repetition of Cuba and Nicaragua will not have to pass before the United States and Latin America reach the mature relationship that has proven so elusive.

Aztec Destiny

The Great Temple of Tenochtitlán: Center and Periphery in the Aztec World


Written mainly for specialists, this book consists of three long and well-documented essays by archaeologist Eduardo Matos Mocetxuma, ethnohistorian Johanna Broda, and religious historian David Carrasco. The essays analyze aspects of the recent discoveries at the Templo Mayor (1978-82), the most important pyramid in the city of México-Tenochtitlán. The considerable number of in situ artifacts and untouched edifices gives us an awesome vision of the complex ceremonialism and symbolism of Aztec life. The Templo Mayor,
with its twin shrines dedicated to Huitzilopochtli (the principal Aztec tribal god) and Tlaloc (the ancient rain god), occupied a relatively small area within the ceremonial precinct but constituted the focal point of local and imperial cult.

At its beginnings (phases I-III) the Templo Mayor—the principal materialization of the Aztec "manifest destiny"—was a humble and austere edifice. Following an expansive political boom, the Aztecs enhanced and enlarged the temple through a series of superimpositions and reconstructions. The offerings from the pyramid and surrounding areas provide the largest body of information now available. In his chapter, "The Templo Mayor of Tenochtitlán: History and Interpretation," Eduardo Matos recounts the earlier excavations in the area and gives his own interpretations of the double cult to Tlaloc and Huitzilopochtli. He also gives the first detailed cataloguing of the offerings, "giving a general idea of their content and of the construction period to which they belong" (p.39). According to Matos, the offerings were first deposited at the time of the original construction (ca.1375-90); however, since that pyramid has not been uncovered, the sequence of ceremonial items actually begins a bit later (ca. 1390) and concludes at the time of the Spanish conquest (1519-21). About 7,000 objects found in more than 100 offerings are known today.

In the chapter "Templo Mayor as Ritual Space," Johanna Broda examines the mythical content of the ritual objects found in fills and caches. Using archaeological, ethnohistorical, and ethnographic information, Broda advances provocative hypotheses regarding the complex hill-water-fertility elements involved in the extraordinary ceremonies that took place when offerings were deposited in the temple. Broda warns us against simplistic interpretations and insists that among Middle American Indians, particularly the Aztecs, nature, ritual, and society had relations that developed at different cultural levels and different historical times. David Carrasco's chapter on "Myth, Cosmic Terror and Templo Mayor" explores what religious historians call the "vision of place" through the analysis of two important mythic episodes: the birth of Huitzilopochtli in Coatlicue and the creation of the Fifth Sun in the sacred city of Teotihuacán. He explains how the Aztecs employed these archetypes to establish dominance over peripheral communities by forcefully incorporating them into the Aztec world.

Regarding the Templo Mayor, many puzzles remain to be solved. For example, Matos and Broda call attention to the absence of direct representations of Huitzilopochtli in his principal site of worship in Tenochtitlán, and to the presence of Olmec, Teotihuacán, and Toltect objects in the caches. In addition, a significant group of similar stone sculptures of a deity probably linked with the old god, the God of Turquoise and Fire (Huehueteotl-Xiuhtecuhtli), was discovered in different locations of the pyramid.

Do the objects from past civilizations denote the existence of a consciousness of cultural heritage that preceded the Meksicas? Does the absence of Huitzilopochtli and the proliferation of the images of Tlaloc (a torincic-pluvial god) and Huehueteotl-Xiuhtecuhtli (a god associated with the mythical center) show that our knowledge of the intricate rituals performed in the Templo Mayor remains incomplete? Did both Tlaloc and Huehueteotl-Xiuhtecuhtli represent only the mythical spaces of "center" and "below" in the temple? Did the cult of Huitzilopochtli not leave any trace in the temple because his offerings, associated with the successive architectural changes, were not buried or burnt? The excavations of the most important Aztec temple have been the object of local and foreign scholarly attention. This book analyzes literary writings on "the Indian" in Peru, focusing on such writings as a product of the intra-elite political debates of nineteenth-century urban Peru. The book is innovative because it regards Peru's indigenista literature not as mere description of the Indian, but rather as discourse grounded in the epoch's socioeconomic and political transformations.

Each of the book's well-organized chapters is dedicated to a particular period and to the literary and political discourse of a particular socioeconomic group. The first chapter elaborates upon the importance of Narciso Arestegui's novel El Padre Horán (1848) as a reflection of the critical position of the liberal landowners regarding the clergy's abuses of the Indian. Of greater depth were the ideas of the mining-centered export oligarchy, which called for education of the Indian and opposed the abolition and conscription of Indians into the army. These ideals emerge in Ladislao Graña's Se bueno y serás feliz (1861), Juana Manuela Gorriti's Si haces mal no esperes bien (1861), and Juan Vicente Camacho's No era ella (1862).

Opposed to the ideals of the export elite were the nascent Peruvian industrialists, whose interests in building a modernized nation are primarily represented by the works of González Prada and by Clorinda Matto de Turner's Aves sin nido, Indole, and Herencia. Turner is no longer portrayed as the writer who initiated indigenista literature, but as someone who followed a tradition begun much earlier. Kristal views her as an important member of González Prada's literary group, whose journal Círculo Literario set out the group's literary guidelines. As a result of the book's emphasis on Matto, the reader achieves a deepened understanding of her role as an intellectual, especially during the tense political conflicts between industrialists and the export oligarchy during the second presidency of Nicolás de Pierola. These conflicts became all the more acute during the subsequent presidency of Augusto B. Leguía. Regarding the latter period, the ideology of the export elite is restated in Francisco García Calderón's Le Perou Contemporain (1907), together with the novels and short stories of his brother Vicente García Calderón.

The significance of Kristal's book is that it analyzes the indigenista literature of nineteenth-century Peru as a political construct rooted in the evolving material realities of urban society. Thus the book underscores the interrelation of the writing of this literature with the economic, social,
Provoking debate on the region’s problems, initiatives and achievements...

Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.
and political dynamics of the era. Kristal’s emphasis represents a major contribution not only to the study of nineteenth-century Peru, but more generally to scholarship on the production of literature as a cultural form.

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A Tale of Two Cities

Rethinking Ciudad Guayana

In 1961, at the junction of the Orinoco and Caroní rivers in the south of Venezuela, a Venezuelan development agency, the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana, created a new city. Rather, it created two different cities: the planned city and the real city. As Lisa Peattie puts it, “the form of the built environment that was the result of the planning process bears a rather loose relationship to that proposed in the plan” (p.154). And it is precisely this difference between the CVG’s plan and the reality of Ciudad Guayana that Peattie seeks to explain.

Peattie’s criticism of the conventional planning practices in Ciudad Guayana in the early 1960s touches on many of the issues now being raised by other scholars and practitioners, such as John Friedmann, and characterized by a marked spatial separation between the rich and the poor as well as unequal access to services and amenities.

Peattie arrives at no new or startling conclusions about planning; her main argument being that planning practices in Ciudad Guayana purposefully ignored the way the development of the city benefited some and disadvantaged others. The book’s most distinctive thematic aspect is its excellent treatment of the symbolic representations of the social reality—maps, plans, architectural drawings, and statistical analyses—that constitute the discourse of planning. The book’s least satisfactory aspect is the reproduction of correspondence between Peattie and her brother, a classics scholar, concerning the nature and meaning of urban design. Although the political argument for the development of a community’s built environment is sound, the book treats the complex theme too simply. Nevertheless, this same straightforward exposition of other, more familiar themes in planning and urban design gives the book great appeal for both specialists and non-specialists.

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Characterizing the Military

The Evolution of the Cuban Military: 1492-1986

Cuban history has revolved around two poles: sugar and the military. It is impossible to understand the politics of the Island without wrestling with these two powerful forces. While the literature on the impact of sugar on Cuban development is extensive, the same cannot be said about the literature on the military. Yet armed forces (both national and foreign) have shaped politics in Cuba, as in most Latin American countries, since pre-colonial times. The latest link in the long chain is the Revolution of 1959. Led by Fidel Castro, the Revolution reached power through violent means, although dictator Fulgencio Batista’s departure from Havana cannot be strictly considered a military defeat. Since 1959 the army (first the Rebel Army and later the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, or FAR) has been the principal pillar of Castro’s regime. The líder máximo prides himself in being a military man and commander-in-chief. Under his command, the state has militarized Cuban society, an uncommon phenomenon in Latin America. The military in Cuba, therefore, shares common features with its Latin American counterparts, while at the same time manifesting unique characteristics.

Rafael Fermoselle’s The Evolution of the Cuban Military: 1492-1986 is the first attempt to study military history in Cuba from the fifteenth century to the 1980s, although half the book is devoted to developments after 1959. The book is divided into three chronological sections: the Colonial Period, the Republic, and the Revolution in Power. These sections are also organized chronologically, integrating larger political developments with military history. A lengthy section covers Cuba’s policy of military internationalism in the Western Hemisphere / Fall 1988
The book also includes a series of valuable appendices on the current organization and leadership of the Cuban armed forces, information that is not readily available elsewhere.

Fermoselle's point of departure is that the "Cuban character," which he defines, albeit in a sketchy manner (pp. 3-9), is somehow responsible for the continuous presence of the military in Cuban life. After presenting this underdeveloped and questionable proposition, the author enters into the historical account. Here is where the strength of *The Evolution of the Cuban Military* lies. The book does a good job of intertwining political and military history, as good as can be expected of a book which covers 494 years in 456 pages of text. A significant amount of the material (especially in the discussion of recent history) derives from primary sources.

The collection of data on the top leaders of the FAR makes this volume an important reference source. For the specialist, this might be its major attraction. For the non-specialist, the broad historical account, minus the details, might be of greater appeal. Several charts (for instance, "The Flow of Intelligence in Cuba," p. 342) and concepts (such as the "new class") are also worthwhile contributions. Fortunately, the information is presented in a readable style that makes potentially dry material palatable.

In spite of its strengths, *The Evolution of the Cuban Military* suffers from weak analysis and the absence of a theoretical framework. There is little discussion of the concept of militarization, the pattern of civil-military relations, ideology and militarism, and Cuba in comparative Latin American or communist-regime perspective. At times the information is sketchy, and throughout the volume the author, tongue in cheek, editorializes without substantiating his remarks (e.g., "People with a tendency toward fanatical activism seem to find it easy to change their ideological masters." [author's italics], p. 279). This same carefree attitude is reflected in the usage of the term "adventures" to describe Cuba's massive and well-planned deployment of troops abroad (specifically, in Angola and Ethiopia). In this episode of military history, the author should have stressed the discontinuity, rather than the continuity, in the role of the military after 1975.

A discussion of the potential role of the FAR in a post-Castro succession would have been of interest, although speculative by definition. But, as Fermoselle himself recognizes: "this study...only covers the highlights...It would take several books to do justice to the subject" (p. 18).

Fermoselle's book is a useful contribution to the study of the Cuban armed forces and adds to the growing literature on the military in Latin America. If used in conjunction with James Morris's *The Cuban Military: Status and Outlook* (Miami: Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1988), Fermoselle's volume would be even more valuable, for the two works examine complementary aspects of the Cuban military.

**Damian J. Fernández**

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**Challenging the U.S.?**

*Continuidad y cambio en las relaciones América Latina-Estados Unidos*


This volume is a collection of eight articles on relations between the United States and several Latin American countries. The case studies include Argentina (Roberto Russell), Brazil (Monica Hirst), Chile (Heraldo Muñoz and Carlos Portales), Colombia (Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G. Tokatlian), Cuba (Rafael Hernández), Mexico (Guadalupe González G.), and Peru (Laura Madalengoitia U.). A final essay by Alberto van Klaveren deals with Latin American-U.S. relations from a more general, comparative perspective. The authors are members of the Working Group on Comparative Foreign Policies of Latin America, organized by the Program for Joint Studies on Latin American International Relations (RIAL). This collection is the first product of their collective work.

*Continuidad y cambio* focuses on developments during the last decade, particularly during the first four years of the Reagan administration. Its main purpose is to assess the degree of international autonomy attained by each country and by the whole region, departing from an analysis of the United States as the hegemonic actor in the hemisphere. The factors used in evaluating this autonomy include the role of internal and external actors in the making of national foreign policies, the bilateral diplomatic agenda of 1981-85, and the medium-term prospects for relations among the countries.

The chapters are rich in information, intelligent from the analytical standpoint, and successful in dealing with the various issues. Although the essays do not produce startling conclusions—at least for those acquainted with the evolution of Latin American-U.S. relations in the last decade—they provide a wealth of information and comprehensive interpretations of the evolving nature of bilateral relations. Most valuable in this regard are the articles on Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru; these articles evaluate the influence of domestic factors—political and economic variables and decision-making processes—in shaping the dynamic interaction between Latin American foreign-policy behavior and U.S. initiatives and reactions. In contrast, the studies on Chile and Cuba, though interesting in themselves, mainly focus on the U.S. side of the relationship and do not provide a clear picture of the domestic elements that shape foreign policy.

Van Klaveren's concluding chapter gives an excellent comparative review of the case studies. The chapter discusses how the studies measure up to the group's initial objectives and how they contribute to the understanding of bilateral relations.

The common perspective elaborated in the volume's introduction, however, is not always respected by the authors, whose articles cover varying periods and examine differing issues. This is obviously the outcome of analyzing, on a case-by-case basis, dissimilar national and international situations that require distinct approaches. While such divergence does not diminish the informative and analytical value of the book, it is difficult to find themes that facilitate comparative conclusions. What clearly stands out is the diversity of situations in Latin America and the varying degrees to which these countries have managed to affirm their autonomy at the international level.

*Continuidad y cambio* represents an important contribution to the understanding of Latin America's contemporary relations with the United States. Also, it serves as a valuable bibliographic reference book. Specialists should look forward to the publication of other fine studies by the members of this group, especially the announced work on Central American foreign policies.

**Aldo C. Vacs**

*Skidmore College*
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