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## Collaboration for Public Services: Explaining Outputs and Outcomes

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FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Miami, Florida

COLLABORATION FOR PUBLIC SERVICES:  
EXPLAINING OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

by

Jennifer Hilton Montero

2022

To: Interim Dean Guillermo J. Grenier  
Steven J. Green School of International & Public Affairs

This dissertation, written by Jennifer Hilton Montero, and entitled Collaboration for Public Services: Explaining Outputs and Outcomes, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

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Date of Defense: July 1, 2022

The dissertation of Jennifer Hilton Montero is approved.

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Florida International University, 2022

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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Keith and Christine Miller. I also dedicate this to my Ph.D. girl squad, Sarah Noppen and Monica Bustinza. Last but not least, to my co-major and major professors Dr. Susannah Bruns Ali and Dr. Milena I. Neshkova. Without their unwavering support and encouragement, the completion of this work would not have been possible.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION  
COLLABORATION FOR PUBLIC SERVICES:  
EXPLAINING OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES

by

Jennifer Hilton Montero

Florida International University, 2022

Miami, Florida

Professor Susannah Bruns Ali, Co-Major Professor

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This dissertation addresses a current gap in collaborative governance literature pertaining to the performance of collaborative regimes. Specifically, it conceptualizes collaborative performance as consisting of outputs and outcomes and offers a novel way to measure them consistently across policy domains. The study tests the contextual, situational, and institutional design factors that lead to enhanced outputs and outcomes of collaborative forums.

The dissertation consists of three essays, and the findings of one form the base for the others. Essay 1 systematically reviews the literature (n=274) and compares the approaches to studying collaboration in public administration to those in political science and policy studies. The review highlights the differences in the analytic approaches, connects collaborative processes to collaborative outputs and outcomes, identifies limitations, and suggests a research agenda. Essay 2 empirically assesses the performance of collaborative forums. The analysis uses data from task forces mandated by the Florida legislature between 2000 and 2020 across four policy areas and compares the outputs and outcomes produced by them. The selection of policy areas is informed by Ingram and

Schneider's (1993) and Gormley's (1986) typologies and includes child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and environment. Essay 3 draws on interview data with task force participants (n=26) and compares their experiences in mandated and voluntary forms of collaboration and the implications for performance.

Overall, this study contributes to the literature by devising a consistent measure to assess collaborative performance across policy areas and testing the explanatory power of key theories. Moreover, the analysis takes a multi-disciplinary and cross-policy approach and utilizes quantitative and qualitative data. The results inform research and practice on how to design more productive and representative collaborative forums in order to solve complex public problems.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. ESSAY 1: Collaboration Across Disciplines: Research Trends and Agenda..	12
Methodology and Critical Appraisal .....	17
Results and Discussion .....	22
Conclusion.....	44
III. ESSAY 2: From Processes to Outputs & Outcomes: The Performance of	
Collaborative Arrangements.....	48
Drivers and Performance of Collaborative Regimes .....	50
Task Forces as Collaborative Forums.....	53
Developing Testable Hypotheses .....	55
Data and Methods.....	61
Results and Discussion .....	72
Conclusion.....	86
IV. ESSAY 3: A Cross-Sectoral Study of Mandated and Voluntary	
Collaboration.....	89
Theoretical Framework.....	94
Data and Methods.....	100
Results .....	123
Discussion .....	131
Conclusion.....	136
V. DISSERTATION CONCLUSION .....	139
LIST OF REFERENCES .....	146
APPENDICES.....	158
VITA .....	163



## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1. Article Extraction Form .....	22
2. Summary Major Components and Influencing Factors to Cross-sector Collaboration.....	56
3. Total Observations Listed in Florida State Legislature .....	62
4. Example Observations of Policy Outcomes (Legislation).....	65
5. Variable Operationalization .....	68
6. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Models.....	69
7. Correlation Matrix .....	70
8. Predicting Task Forces' Policy Outputs Measured as Activities.....	83
9. Predicting Task Forces' Policy Outputs Measured as Recommendations.....	84
10. Predicting Task Forces' Policy Outcomes Measured as Legislation.....	85
11. Influencing Factors and Collaborative Stages .....	99
12. Task Forces and Study Participants .....	101
13. Child Welfare.....	124
14. Environment.....	125
15. Defense .....	127
16. Criminal Justice .....	129

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	PAGE
1. Percent by Field .....	26
2. Percent by Theoretical Approach.....	26
3. Cross-sector Collaboration Framework .....	30
4. A) Most Common Collaborative Factors Across Fields.....	34
B) Common Factors Across All Three Disciplines .....	34
5. Public Sectors Across the Three Disciplines .....	38
6. Methodology Trends by Discipline .....	39
7. Types of Target Populations .....	60
8. Layered Multi-Disciplinary Collaboration Theory and Factor Framework .....	95
9. Cross-sector Collaboration Framework .....	98
10. Public Policy Areas in the Layered Collaboration Theory and Factor Framework...	134

## INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly complex society, collaboration is becoming more and more essential as it allows organizations to pool resources and meet goals that they would not be able to achieve individually. While collaboration is a strategy implemented by many and studied at length, it is an elusive concept to test, quantify, and analyze its determinants. Even more uncertainty surrounds the questions about the factors that impact collaboration across different public policy domains. As Douglas, Ansell, Parker, Sørensen, Hart, and Torfing (2020, 495) argue, public administration is still to answer the question: What contextual, situational, and institutional design factors are consistently linked to processes and outcomes across sectors?

Multiple studies look at cooperation and collaboration (among other key variables) as central to improving individual and organizational performance and social impact, yet the existing research centers on general theoretical frameworks and case studies in specific policy areas. What lacks in the existing literature is research that links the entire collaborative process from inception to outputs and outcomes while looking at measurable factors applicable to multiple policy areas. To address this gap, the present study: 1) systematically reviews the literature on collaboration, collaborative governance, and the interorganizational factors that influence the collaborative process from inputs to outputs and outcomes, comparing public administration literature to that in policy studies and political science, thus comparing the different approaches to studying collaboration, 2) tests existing collaboration theory linking inputs to outputs and outcomes by operationalizing

collaboration through task forces mandated by the Florida State Legislature across four public policy areas – child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and environment from 2000 to 2020 and measures the effect of system context factors and process-related factors on outputs and outcomes, and 3) compares the experiences of members who participated in both mandated and voluntary collaborative forums through semi-structured interviews in order to understand the implications for performance. I have developed a mixed methods design for this study to both measure the impact of certain factors on the collaborative process and understand what influences and motivates collaboration. The study's multidisciplinary approach considers the full collaboration process from inception to outputs and outcomes across four public policy areas. The three essays will provide a full story of the collaborative process and address three main research questions:

**Research Question 1:** What is the state of knowledge in public administration, policy studies, and political science on inter-organizational collaboration and collaborative governance processes and influencing factors from inception to outputs and outcomes?

**Research Question 2:** How do we measure the performance of collaborative regimes connecting inputs to outputs and outcomes? Specifically, how do inputs such as system context (social construction, power, salience, and complexity of a policy area) and process characteristics (size, makeup, and sectoral diversity of actors, and the presence of human and financial resources) impact task force outputs and outcomes?

**Research Question 3:** How do task force members perceive the factors that enable or hinder the success of mandated versus voluntary forms of collaboration across

four public policy areas and what are the implications for the performance of collaborative forums?

### **Three Essay Summary**

The first essay presents a systematic review of the collaboration and collaborative governance literature discussing the different approaches to inter-organizational collaboration within three disciplines-- comparing public administration to policy studies and political science. It reviews the link between collaborative inputs, processes, and outputs/outcomes as well as major influencing factors. The analysis draws on 274 journal articles in top peer-reviewed journals across the three disciplines from 2006 to 2020. The beginning of the period is marked by a special issue of *Public Administration Review* on the Symposium on Collaborative Public Management and denotes a significant increase of focus on collaboration research in the field of public administration (O’Leary, R., Gerard, C., & Bingham, L. B., 2006). The findings of the systematic literature review demonstrate the differences in the fields’ analytic approaches.

Specifically, while political science focuses on motivations of actors and power struggles among collaborative partners, policy studies center on the economics of collaboration by analyzing the cost and benefits of such arrangements. Public administration has a more pragmatic view to collaboration, seeing it as complex but useful strategy for organizations to address “wicked problems”. The disciplines also vary in their theoretical lenses. Political science conceptualizes collaboration through the prism of game theory and political power.

In contrast, policy studies consider collaboration through transaction cost, economies of scale, and networks based on ideological similarity and boundary spanning for public problem-solving. Public administration's view of collaboration is informed by organizational behavior and consensus-building. Finally, the three disciplines emphasize different collaborative mechanisms. The study concludes that 1) the three disciplines can improve research through greater cross-pollination, 2) some mechanisms, such as task forces and commissions, offer a vehicle for the study of collaborative actions across the three fields, and 3) more cross-disciplinary research is warranted to sort out different factors, processes, and influences that lead organizations to collaborative success, failure, or somewhere in between.

The second essay continues the exploration of task forces as a vehicle for collaborative governance and analyzes the role of various collaborative factors on task force outputs and outcomes. Collaborative governance "brings public and private stakeholders together in collective forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making" (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 543). Task forces, therefore, are an example of collaborative governance and a key mechanism for state and federal legislative bodies to mandate collaboration to address severe policy issues. The analysis examines the task forces mandated by the Florida State Legislature from 2000 to 2020 across four public policy areas: child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and environment. The selection of public policy areas was informed by Ingram and Schneider's (1993) typology of target populations, defined by their social construction and political power and Gormley's (1986) taxonomy of policies along the dimensions of public salience and technical complexity. The

study tests whether policy context factors such as the social construction and power of the respective target populations and salience and complexity of the policy area, as well as process factors such as the size, makeup, and sectoral diversity of collaborative partners and the presence of devoted resources—both financial and human—affect collaborative results. Drawing on the theoretical propositions discussed above, I expect that:

**Hypothesis 1:** Larger task forces will produce less policy outputs and outcomes than task forces with fewer members.

**Hypotheses 2:** Task forces with more non-public members will perform better than those formed of predominantly public participants.

**Hypothesis 3:** Task forces exhibiting greater sectoral diversity will produce more outputs and outcomes compared to those with low sectoral diversity.

**Hypothesis 4:** Dedicated human resources will positively impact outputs and outcomes.

**Hypothesis 5:** Dedicated financial resources will positively impact outputs and outcomes.

**Hypothesis 6:** Task forces operating in policy areas with negatively constructed target populations will produce more outputs and outcomes than task forces working with positively constructed ones.

**Hypothesis 7:** Task forces operating in policy areas with politically powerful target populations will have more outputs and outcomes.

**Hypothesis 8:** Salience of the policy area will increase task force outputs and outcomes.

**Hypothesis 9:** Complexity of the policy area will decrease task force outputs and outcomes.

The study operationalizes partner sectoral diversity by the organization publicness— public, private, or nonprofit. The expectation is that including more non-public actors (private or nonprofit) will positively affect collaborative outputs and outcomes. Resource availability reflects whether there are human and/or financial resources available to a task force. Specifically, each task force is coded for the presence of budget and staff. The models also consider the effect of social construction and power of the policy target populations and salience and complexity of policies as system context factors. The outputs of collaboration are operationalized as the policy activities as well as policy recommendations produced by a task force, while the outcomes are measured by the reported legislative acts. Respectively, the three dependent variables in this essay reflect two types of outputs--policy activities and policy recommendations, and one policy outcome. The data on outputs and outcomes were gathered from annual reports of each task force. I use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model as the primary estimation. Given the count nature of the dependent variable, I also run the models using a negative binomial estimation technique and calculated the marginal effects as a robustness check. In addition, to account for the heteroskedasticity presence in the data, I run the models using robust standard errors. The results from these additional estimations are qualitatively similar to those derived from the baseline OLS specification.



The findings show that diversity of collaborative actors, especially the increase in private actors' participation in a task force, has a significant positive effect on collaborative outputs and outcomes. However, diversity negatively affects policy outputs as activities, showing that more achievable results may benefit from more homogeneity of task force actors. Total number of actors had a small negative effect on all dependent variables, suggesting that there can be a point where there are too many representatives at the collaborative table. The presence of budget and staff had an overall significant positive effect. Positive social construction decreased all outputs and outcomes, suggesting that more negatively constructed social public policy areas benefited from more attention and higher motivation from task forces. Complexity decreased activities and outcomes suggesting that the need for higher technical expertise lowered task force results. Salience had a positive effect across all types of outputs and outcomes suggesting that higher levels of public salience increased task force results. Power had a minimal effect, decreasing slightly the policy activities, but did not have a major effect on recommendations or outcomes, suggesting that the task forces were mostly insulated from political influences. The overall results support key aspects of collaborative governance frameworks, while showing that there is a higher level of complexity than previously acknowledged when considering the factors' effects on different levels of outputs and outcomes.

The third essay relies on interview data and compares the experiences and attitudes of task force members who participated in both mandated and voluntary forms of collaboration across the four public policy areas. The goal of the comparison is to understand the factors that enable or hinder successful collaboration in two different

collaborative arrangements. Drawing on the experience of task force members across public sectors, I analyze actors' motivations to engage in collaboration as well as the reported factors that most influence outcomes in different public policy areas.

Interviewees hailed from task forces created by the Florida State Legislature across four policy areas—child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and environment. The study also considers the different approaches to collaboration from political science, policy studies, and public administration in explaining motivation. The theoretical framework draws on Rosenbloom's typology of managerial, political, and legal approaches to public administration as well as Ansell and Gash's exploration of managerialism vs. adversarialism (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Rosenbloom, 1983). The data come from 26 semi-structured interviews with public, private, and nonprofit task force members regarding their experiences in forums established by the legislature and others that arose spontaneously. The study uses NVivo to analyze similarities, differences, and core themes in the interview data. The findings have important implications for public management theory and practice by showcasing the need to bridge the motivations of actors from different public sectors. The findings highlight that there are indeed factors that universally influence collaboration. However, different public sectors have different motivations and approaches to collaborate and value different factors they consider as more crucial to collaborative success in their specific area.

### **Purpose of the Study**

There is a consensus in existing theory on collaboration that, by pooling knowledge, resources, and the efforts of multiple people, organizations can increase their impact (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Thomson, A. M., Perry, J. L., & Miller, T. K., 2007;

A. M. Thomson & Perry, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991). Collaboration has been generally considered in the public administration field as a qualitative topic, as it is principally driven by human motivation and behavior. Most of the current research leans towards a focus on case studies, including environmental management, emergency and disaster management, corporate management, and private public partnerships, but has yet to offer a more comprehensive and cross-sectoral view of the collaborative process in a mixed methods format (Einbinder, S. D., Robertson, P. J., Garcia,

A., Vuckovic, G., Patti, R. J., & Gar-Cia, A., 2000; Fischer, K., Jungbecker, A., & Alfen, H. W., 2006; Imperial, 2005; Leach, 2006; Nkhata, A. B., Breen, C. M., & Freimund, W. A., 2008; Varda, D., Shoup, J. A., & Miller, S., 2012). Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006, 2015) review the state of the literature on designing and implementing collaboration. Their findings show that collaboration is an imperative in public administration, however, it can be challenging to manage, and difficult to ensure that there is a benefit to the process. In their most recent study, they found that one challenge to advance collaboration scholarship is to “blend multiple theoretical and research perspectives” (Rethemeyer, 2005) (Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M., 2015, 659). Per their advice, multidisciplinary approaches are necessary to avoid the siloed view of distinct approaches (i.e., network theory, collective action), which may provide only a piece of the collaborative puzzle. Douglas and Ansell’s (2020) recent work underlines the gap in the field around “getting a grip” on measuring the performance of collaboration, and how this measurement remains a challenge for today’s researchers. Identifying appropriate vehicles for collaborative governance that can span multiple policy contexts with continuity of measurable outputs and outcomes has been an ongoing

goal of public administration. This dissertation addresses the two-prong problem in the field: 1) the need for multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral studies on collaboration and collaborative governance, and 2) the need to identify vehicles that operationalize existing theories and frameworks that effectively and consistently measure factors and variables that cross disciplines as well as public policy areas.

This dissertation utilizes a multi-disciplinary, multi-level, and mixed-method approach to achieve its research objectives. Each essay takes on both aspects of the need for multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral study that consistently test and operationalize the existing knowledge. The systematic literature review and research agenda presents different approaches and perspectives to collaboration from public administration, policy studies, and political science. The three disciplines emphasize different collaborative mechanisms. The study concludes that 1) the three disciplines can benefit from greater cross-pollination, 2) some mechanisms, such as task forces and commissions, offer a vehicle for the study of collaboration across the three fields, and 3) more cross-disciplinary research is warranted to sort out different factors, processes, and influences that lead organizations to collaborative success, failure, or somewhere in between. The quantitative study operationalizes the task force as a vehicle of collaboration and analyzes the factors that influences the collaborative process from inputs to outputs and outcomes and does so across four public policy areas, addressing the need for cross- policy study. The analysis takes a deeper dive into the factors that enable and hinder collaboration. It contributes to the literature by comparing four different public policy areas and drawing on theoretical approaches to collaboration from political science, policy studies, and public administration. Finally, the third essay provides a micro view of the collaborative

governance process by presenting the perspectives and experiences of task force members from each of the four public policy areas. The findings have important implications for public administration theory and practice by showcasing the need to bridge the different approaches to collaboration as well as understanding the influencing factors within different policy contexts.

This dissertation effectively addresses the gap in the literature and empirically tests existing collaborative governance theoretical frameworks. It also identifies further subtleties in the effect of system context factors as well as process factors on more specific levels of outputs and outcomes, thus signaling important areas of further research in the field. This supports a research agenda of deeply exploring how academic and public sector silos can be broken down to encourage deeper and more efficient collaboration across disciplines, public domains, and international cultural contexts. By identifying the perspectives and factors each discipline has identified of the collaborative puzzle, and completely bringing them together to consider how the collaborative process actually plays out in mandated and voluntary environments across public domains, we can further illuminate the collaborative black box. This brings the field towards a more familiar toolbox, building proven competencies and techniques that can be adapted to specific environments and contexts.

## **ESSAY 1: Collaboration Across Disciplines: Research Trends and Agenda**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Collaboration and collaborative governance have been highly researched and trending topics in public administration since the early 2000s. This is especially true as “wicked problems” (those difficult societal problems which organizations and institutions must work together to face) increase in complexity as public management seeks practical solutions to these problems across sectors. However, as a field we still need to do some evaluation and consideration of how we approach collaboration. Collaboration is not just an act, rather it can be viewed as an intention and a skill that can be developed from novice-level to mastery. As often espoused of public administration, similarly collaboration can be viewed as both a science and an art. This study will explore how incorporating multi-disciplinary theoretical approaches to collaboration in public administration, policy studies, and political science will address the current gap in the collaborative governance field: the gray area linking inception to outcomes and comparing the processes and factors at play across different public sector contexts.

Collaboration can be more than just a tool for the survival of organizations seeking to solve problems they cannot solve on their own. In fact, if organizations seek success and sustainability in collaborative outputs and outcomes, a fuller embrace of the possibilities of collaboration is warranted. And yet, not all collaborative efforts lead to success and the road to collaborative outcomes continues to be somewhat of a black box. Public administration is still asking the question: what circumstantial, situational, and institutional design factors are consistently linked to processes and outcomes across

sectors (Douglas, Ansell, Parker, Sørensen, Hart, Torfing, 2020). The field still seeks to test the theoretical frameworks that we have developed and move beyond sector specific case and small “n” studies to more generalizable knowledge that moves the collaborative governance research forward. Thus, there is still considerable room for research that produces robust generalizations and cumulative knowledge that effectively reaches across silos and sectors and explains what is truly enabling or hindering collaboration. With issues at stake such as the environmental impacts of climate change, more complex defense and security issues, child welfare, and criminal justice among many others, improved collaboration skills and expertise has the potential to better equip public-serving institutions to face the complex issues of our time, and of the future.

In order to further public administration’s level of mastery in collaboration and collaborative governance, we can develop more awareness about the field’s areas of strength and weaknesses and learn from other discipline’s collaboration “styles” or perspectives, as well as the “competencies” or factors that emerge from each discipline as crucial to collaborative process improvement and expertise. Indeed, there is an opportunity to move beyond previous prescriptive patterns recognizing that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to collaboration. However, we can learn about the necessary skill sets, and approaches that would benefit different policy and collaborative contexts. This study suggests task forces could serve as vehicles to study collaboration that spans policy domains.

This systematic study begins in 2006, the year *Public Administration Review* published a special issue, the *Symposium on Collaborative Public Management*, and denotes a significant increase of focus on collaboration research moving forward. Some

of the most highly cited researchers in public administration studying collaboration and collaborative governance have followed up on their initial studies to continue developing the topic over time. In addition, this study comparatively reviews the collaboration literature in political science and policy studies.

The disciplines of political science and policy studies, while sister fields to public administration, have differing approaches and views of the collaborative process. These different approaches examine various parts of the collaborative process, including factors, processes, and influences that lead organizations to the achievement of outputs and outcomes. In general, public administration views collaboration and collaborative governance as a useful, although complex, strategy that organizations can use to confront “wicked problems” they would not be able to address individually (Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone 2006, 2015; Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S., 2012; Head & Alford, 2015; Kettl, 2006; McGuire, 2006; O’Leary, R., Gerard, C., Keast, R., Mandell, M. P., & Voets, J., 2015; O’Leary & Vij, 2012; Provan & Kenis, 2008; A. M. Thomson et al., 2007; A. M. Thomson & Perry, 2006; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Collaboration is thus an imperative to address wicked problems and a tool that organizations should use, while understanding the potential benefits and pitfalls. Although the complexities of the collaborative process are recognized and explored, most researchers determine that overall, collaboration is a worthy pursuit for the potential benefits.

Comparatively, the political science field considers collaboration and collaborative governance in terms of game theory, political decision-making, and collective action in contexts of shared political orientations, transaction costs and



potential access to perceived power through collaborative connections (Bertelli, McCann, & Travaglini, 2019; M. Fischer & Sciarini, 2016; Gerber, Henry, & Lubell, 2013; Leifeld & Schneider, 2012; Lubell, Henry, & McCoy, 2010; Scholz, Berardo, & Kile, 2008; Shrestha & Feiock, 2011; Siegel, 2009; Ting, 2003). Thus, collaborative networks are power & influence mechanisms. Based on this view, collaboration is more of a tool to compete and achieve political agendas in the context of players who have the resources and ability to ante up to the collaborative game.

In the middle ground, policy studies views collaboration as a cost-benefit analysis exercise. In this context, policy networks and economies of scale, which are often built on ideological similarity, are mechanisms to span boundaries and seek resources as a tool for public problem solving (Berardo, 2009; Berardo & Scholz, 2010; de Leon & Varda, 2009; Feiock, 2013; Henry, 2011; Scott & Thomas, 2017; Sørensen, E., Hendriks, C. M., Hertting, N., & Edelenbos, J., 2020; Weible & Sabatier, 2009). “This focus tends to emphasize participation incentives for public, nonprofit, and private stakeholders alike that motivate collective action” (Scott & Thomas, 2017, 192).

Ansell and Gash reflect these different views in their definition, which sets apart collaborative governance in public administration from the approaches of political science and policy studies to collaboration: adversarialism and managerialism.

“By contrast with decisions made adversarially, collaborative governance is not a “winner-take-all” form of interest intermediation. In collaborative governance, stakeholders will often have an adversarial relationship to one another, but the goal is to transform adversarial relationships into more cooperative ones. In adversarial politics, groups may engage in positive sum bargaining and develop cooperative alliances. However, this cooperation is ad hoc, and adversarial politics does not explicitly seek to transform conflict into cooperation” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 547).

In summary, this systematic literature review aims to set a foundation for a more in-depth study of the collaborative process from inception to outcomes across public sectors. A systematic review of collaboration and collaborative governance across public administration, in comparison to political science and policy studies, will further our understanding of the distinct approaches and inform a more holistic view of the collaborative process as well as the factors that effectively enable or hinder collaborative outputs and outcomes. This will inform a research agenda of identifying appropriate empirical vehicles and methods to analyze collaboration holistically.

Few prior studies have empirically linked the collaborative process from drivers (inputs or antecedents) to actions (or processes) to outputs and outcomes. “We know much about why collaboration is occurring and how collaborative processes (such as consensus) and outputs (such as agreements) vary. We need to know much more about outcomes. “[...] Existing research has measured and compared collaborative outputs, but relatively little research has linked inputs with outcomes” (Koontz & Thomas, 2006, 111). One finding of this study is that since 2006, there have been considerable efforts to link collaborative inputs and processes to outputs and outcomes. However, most extant research trends towards single public-service area case studies. Less progress has been made to quantitatively and qualitatively study influencing factors that enable or hinder collaborative success across policy areas. “The challenge is to move from case-based, mid-range theory building to more large-N driven systematic theory-testing, while also retaining the rich contextual and process insights that only small-N studies tend to yield” (Douglas et al., 2020, 495).

To address this gap in the literature and further our understanding, this study pursues three main objectives. First, it presents the approaches in public administration to collaboration and collaborative governance compared to political science and policy studies from 2006 to 2020. The analysis focuses on inter-organizational processes and outputs/outcomes as well as various factors that affect them. Second, it pays particular attention to research on task forces and commissions as forms of collaborative governance—their process dynamics and political influences, as well as their suitability as a vehicle for the study of collaboration across sectors and disciplines. Third, the study additionally reveals how legislatively mandated and voluntary types of collaboration may influence the collaborative process. The study analyzes the resulting themes, prior research limitations and suggests an agenda for future research.

The rest of the study is organized as follows. The first section outlines the methodology of the systematic review: the literature search, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and the data selection and extraction process. The following section discusses the critical appraisal process: how irrelevant pieces were eliminated and the eligibility criteria, as well as covers the final set of studies included in the analysis. Next, this study synthesizes the articles based on their methodological approaches, theories, themes, and policy areas. The last section concludes by discussing take-aways and limitations of prior research and traces an agenda for future research.

## **METHODOLOGY AND CRITICAL APPRAISAL**

As noted by Bandara et al in their work “Achieving Rigor in Literature Reviews: Insights from Qualitative Data Analysis and Tool-Support”, “a structured and efficient approach is essential” (Bandara, Furtmueller, Gorbacheva, & Beekhuyzen, 2015, 1). One

must rigorously review the previous literature as the first important step in planning and conducting empirical studies. Gathering previous trends and findings from past studies allows the researcher to effectively build on previous knowledge and identify key gaps in the field that need to be addressed. As the literature is quite extensive, the systematic review presented here processes the breadth and type of studies available in the topic, then summarizes the themes and interprets trends, to inform future study of the topic. This follows a content analysis approach which involves the synthesis of the studies, which are then categorized according to their contents.

This study employs the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta- Analyses (PRISMA) method as of 2019 to get the largest breadth of knowledge on collaboration and collaborative governance, inter-organizational collaboration factors, as well as task forces and commissions in public administration. “PRISMA is an evidence-based minimum set of items for reporting in systematic reviews and meta-analyses” (PRISMA, 2021). I then ran the same key-word searches in the political science and policy study fields. I looked for studies discussing collaboration and/or collaborative governance, inter-organizational collaboration, and factors that enable or hinder collaboration as observed through outputs and outcomes. I also searched for articles analyzing task forces and commissions as vehicles of collaboration. I added the term “cooperation” to the political science searches in order to accommodate the typical use of that term in the discipline for studies addressing collaboration. The search included no books.

The PRISMA method involves several phases of inquiry: 1) Identification, Screening, Eligibility, Inclusion, and Analysis. Per this method, I first identified articles

in top peer- reviewed journals in the fields of public administration, political science, and policy studies. This was accomplished by reviewing the top-rated journals via Google Scholar Analytics based on h5-index and h5-median.

“The H5-index is created by Google Scholar and is similar to the h-index explained in Author-level Metrics. H5-index "It is the largest number h such that h articles published in [the past 5 years] have at least h citations each". Thus, an H5-index of 60 means that that journal has published 60 articles in the previous 5 years that have 60 or more citations each. H5-median is based on H5-index, but instead measures the median (or middle) value of citations for the h number of citations. A journal with an H5-index of 60 and H5-median of 75 means that, of the 60 articles with 60 or more citations, the median of those citation values is 75” (Subject Guides: Scholarly Research Impact Metrics: Journal-level impact - impact factor and more, 2021).

Journals were first reviewed for applicability. As one of the exclusion criteria for articles refers to purely international, multinational, or thematic contexts, area studies journals and specialized journals not applicable to collaboration or collaborative governance were removed from the analysis. The final sample included 17 political science journals and 19 journals from public administration and policy studies (see Appendix A).

The screening process followed the PRISMA method of using a keyword search applicable to the study in each journal between 2006 and 2020. Each journal underwent three keyword searches, each time screening both titles and abstracts. First, articles were screened for the term “collaboration”, then were screened for the term “collaborative governance,” with the alternate keyword search term “cooperation” for political science journals. The political science literature trended the use of cooperation in the same context as collaboration or collaborative governance in the public administration and policy studies literature. A third keyword search for the terms “task force” and/or “commission” was performed in the same journals. Articles with these keywords in either

the title or abstract were included. Articles discussing the terms in a multinational context (for example, those referring to the European Commission) were removed. Articles without the keywords in the title or abstract but with over five mentions of any of the keywords in the full text were also included. Duplicates, book reviews, opinion pieces and commentaries, as well as articles with less than five mentions of the keywords in the full text were removed from the set.

During the next phase, the articles' full text was assessed for eligibility. Articles were reviewed to ensure relevance to inter-organizational or cross-sector collaboration for public services. The full text went through another review for corporate, multinational, or international settings that would not be appropriate to include in the study. Articles focused on individual collaboration or individual participation in community-based organizations that did not involve the collaboration between two or more structured organizations were also eliminated from the sample. Articles were also reviewed for mention of influencing factors on inter-organizational collaborative process. The removal of multinational and international studies greatly impacted the final sample, especially for political science. Many searches using cooperation, task forces, and commissions as keywords returned studies on the European Union, international or global commissions, or multinational studies. This resulted in an overall smaller proportion of political science articles included in this study.

The total number of articles reviewed was 3,737, with 441 duplicates and 1227 book reviews, commentary, or other articles not meeting the criteria removed. This resulted in 507 articles in Phase 1-2. To provide a summary of the trends through 2020, only those articles with more than 100 citations or authored in the last two years (2018-

2020) were included in the final set of articles. This was done to ensure the trend analysis covers the most influential and recent work on collaboration and collaborative governance. This justification is especially pertinent as 1) collaboration and collaborative governance are buzzwords often mentioned but not necessarily studied in depth resulting in a high number of articles that mention the keywords but do not specify inter-organizational processes or factors, 2) many studies have performed systematic reviews of the topic to date, and 3) a high-level review allows for an analysis of the trends to date and gaps of study in the field.

To summarize, 274 articles published between 2006 to 2020 form the final sample—202 articles come from public administration, 54 from policy studies journals and 18 articles from political science outlets. The articles had either over 100 citations or were recently released in 2018-2020 and: 1a) studied collaboration, collaborative governance, or cooperation (only for the political science sub-sample), 1b) discussed inter-organizational and/or cross-sector collaboration to address public problems, with reference to influencing factors in the collaboration process, and 2) mentioned task forces and/or commissions as examples of the collaborative vehicles. A final supplementary review of the full texts explored if any of the included articles explored the legislatively mandated versus the voluntary type of collaboration. This last review was optional but provided an important aspect for future research: do researchers distinguish collaborative arrangements based on how they are initiated and how does this impact the perceived outcomes of collaborative processes. Appendix B presents the PRISMA Flow Diagram.

The final articles were input into an excel data extraction form (Table 1) that included: 1) the author, 2) year, 3) journal, 4) Google Scholar citations, 5) keywords, 6)

methods, 7) theories, 8) themes, 9) collaboration factors, and 10) public service areas.

**Table 1:** Article Extraction Form

<b>Category</b>	<b>Extraction</b>
<b>Source, Author, Year, Title, Journal &amp; page numbers, Citations, Keywords</b>	The title of the article and journal information
<b>Methods</b>	Articles were classified as Literature Review, Qualitative, Quantitative, or Mixed Methods
<b>Design and Measures</b>	Articles were classified based on the data collection and analysis as Case Study, Interviews, Survey, Observation, Ethnographic Study, Archival Data, Panel Data/Cross-sectional Data, OLS Regression, Network Analysis, Experiment, Multi-Level Regression, Q-Methodology, Panel Data, Factor Analysis.
<b>Theories</b>	Main theories were listed for each article (e.g., networks, game theory, resource dependency, organizational behavior, collective action)
<b>Factors Referenced</b>	Factors referenced by the article enabling or hindering collaboration
<b>Public Sector</b>	Government (generally), Environment, Emergency Management, Nonprofit, Medical, Child Welfare, Education, Criminal Justice, Law, Various Sectors

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **Approaches to Collaboration**

Collaboration and collaborative governance are the central theme of *Public Administration Review's* (PAR) special issue in 2006, *Symposium on Collaborative Public Management*. In the introduction to the issue, the authors (O'Leary, Gerard, & Bingham, 2006, 7) argue that collaborative public management "lacks a common lens or definition and is often studied without the benefit of examining parallel literatures in



sister fields.” Fast forward to today, we note continued interest that has been accelerating over the years. Although it is a popular topic among practitioners and scholars, “getting a grip on the performance of collaborations remains a challenge” (Douglas & Ansell, 2020, 1). By understanding the various theoretical approaches to collaboration and collaborative governance across multiple fields of study, we can build a solid understanding of the mechanisms and facilitating factors that enable or hinder the collaborative process and craft a research agenda to address the remaining gaps.



The Symposium on Collaborative Public Management in *PAR* pulled together the thought leaders at that time. By and large, the takeaway of the symposium is that while collaboration is a necessary and desirable strategy to solve challenging public problems, it is a complex process that requires an in-depth understanding of the processes, factors, design, and implementation (Agranoff, 2006; Bryson et al., 2006; Kettl, 2006; McGuire, 2006; A. M. Thomson & Perry, 2006). Current research continues to find that cross-sector collaboration is not an easy path to solve “wicked” public problems. Yet, such problems must be solved collaboratively since no agency or organization is equipped to tackle them individually (Bryson et al., 2015). Per the conclusion of the special issue, collaborative governance is both an imperative and “inescapable feature of public administration.” Furthermore, a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding collaboration is “our most important task in order to find what other disciplines have learned and use it to create higher-order theory for collaborative management encompassing the public sector” (Bingham & O’Leary, 2006, 161). In response to this call, the present review compares public administration to its sister disciplines, political science and policy studies referencing the fields’ recent research and trends.

## Theoretical Frameworks

Public administration defines collaboration, and collaborative governance, specifically, as multiple organizations or institutions seeking to jointly achieve an outcome or solve a public problem that could not be achieved separately or individually. Thomson and Perry (2006, 23) describe collaboration as “a process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together.” Ansell and Gash (2008, 544) go further to define collaborative governance as “a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.” Similarly, for Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012, 2) collaborative governance is “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.” These definitions of collaboration and collaborative governance reflect public administration’s view of organizations and institutions in a collective governance context.

Theories most commonly cited in the public administration literature include *governance* (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Rodríguez et al., 2007), *collective action* (Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006)(Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009), *networks* (Agranoff, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008), *resource dependency* (Head & Alford, 2015; Lundin, 2007; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009) as well as *New Public*

*Management* and *innovation* (Hartley et al., 2013; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Deliberative democracy and representative democracy (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Voets et al., 2008) are also commonly cited as important aspects of stakeholder engagement and participation in the collaborative process. In addition to these theories, themes of leadership and strategic management emerge (Sørensen & Torfing, 2019; Sullivan et al., 2012; Torfing & Ansell, 2017). These theories relate to the “publicness” of public administration addressing public (not private) interests and have been previously reflected in studies such as Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, Ansel and Gash, as well as Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh’s work. Problem severity and “wicked problems,” are also recurring themes (Head & Alford, 2015; McGuire & Silvia, 2010). Per Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2015, 659), much of the collaboration scholarship is either grounded in network theory or collective action theory, yet they recommend a blending of multiple theoretical and research perspectives to “capture the complexity inherent in cross-sector collaborations.” Overall, public administration scholarship views collaboration holistically; it is complex and does not always yield the expected results; however, it is a worthy and necessary pursuit for the potential benefits, both process- and outcome-related. Figure 1 below demonstrates the percent each theory is represented within its own field, i.e., the number of articles that mention that theory out of the total articles in that field (inclusive of all theories). Figure 2 visualizes the theories in a different way, presenting the percent that theory makes up in representation when comparing across the three disciplines. For example, collective action is most prominent in public administration at 41%, followed by 33% in political science, and 26% in policy studies.



The field of policy studies approaches collaboration from an economic perspective utilizing cost-benefit and risk analysis. In common with public administration and political science, policy studies discipline shares theoretical foundations in resource dependency (Scott & Thomas, 2017), collective action (Feiock, 2013; M. Fischer, 2014), and networks (Berardo, 2009; Bodin et al., 2017; de Leon & Varda, 2009; Y. Lee et al.,

2012). In common with political science, in policy studies, networks are held together by power-seeking relationships. Networks are the mechanisms through which organizations collaborate and are kept together by these power-seeking relationships that better enable actors to seek resources and affect policy change (Henry, 2011; Scholz, Berardo, & Kile, 2008; Siegel, 2009). These collaborative networks better enable individual actors to seek resources and affect policy change.

Policy studies' scholarship shares public administration's view that wicked problems and problem severity drive collaboration by encouraging inter-institutional agreements (Alford & Head, 2017; Head, 2019; Scott & Thomas, 2017). These wicked and complex problems spur governance structures that manage the collaborations, in which representation of stakeholders is a crucial factor, stemming from democratic governance theory (Douglas et al., 2020; M. Fischer & Leifeld, 2015; Newig et al., 2018).

Similarly, there is a theoretical overlap with the political science literature. Policy studies shares the view that "political and ideological similarity is a necessary condition for power-seeking mechanisms to drive the cohesion of policy networks, thus explaining the emergence of "advocacy coalitions characterized by shared systems of policy-relevant beliefs" (Henry, 2011, 361). Thus, social capital and relationships with like-minded others perform a crucial role in providing a platform for solving collective action problems (Scholz, J. T., Berardo, R., & Kile, B., 2008). In this vein, both policy studies and political science consider collaborative partners as political or policy actors who cross or span institutional boundaries and arrangements, ensuring that information is properly shared, and processes and solutions are properly aligned (Scholz et al., 2008; Sørensen et

al., 2020). In addition, similar to political science, in policy studies, the focus is on economic theory and the role of agreements as collaborative governance mechanisms (Feiock, 2013; Fukuyama, 2016; Y. Lee et al., 2012; Olivier, 2019; Ting, 2003; Ulibarri & Scott, 2017). These agreements can include bilateral agreements, memorandums of understanding, contracts, policy arrangements and provide mechanisms reliant on political authority that facilitate local governments collaborating and manage the transaction costs involved, making it easy for the institutions to enter and exit the collaboration and manage the terms involved (de Leon & Varda, 2009; Feiock, 2013; Lee, I. W., Feiock, R. C., & Lee, Y., 2012; Scott & Thomas, 2017).

While public administration brings us a collectivistic and public-centered approach, the emphasis in policy studies is on coalition building grounded in policy and cost-benefit analysis. Comparatively, political science offers an individualistic approach based on self-interest and grounded in game theory. We also see game theory mentioned in the public administration research; however, the context is quite different. While public administration considers game theory as interest-based negotiation and mutual gains bargaining, there is still an underlying collective interest at play (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). In political science, game theory is framed as “policy outcomes that emerge from actors pursuing their self-interests in multiple, interdependent, and rule-structured games” (Lubell, M., Henry, A. D., & McCoy, M., 2010, 287). Collaborative institutions are then motivated to “play” cooperative games that increase their power and decrease the power of other players. This contrasts with Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) theory, which theorizes that collaborative institutions increase cooperation by “reducing transaction costs and building social capital that


should spread to other institutions” (Lubell et al., 2010, 287). Political science also makes the argument that politics and collaboration are resource-dependent and interest-driven, not just power-based. Networks are power and influence mechanisms, while collaborative institutions “provide a venue for developing a common understanding of issues, gathering information regarding the consequences of decisions, and building policy networks and trust among actors” (Lubell et al., 2010, 289). Political science, similar to policy studies, considers collaboration in the sense of transaction costs. Collaboration has an intrinsic cost and provides the upper hand to institutions participating in collaboration compared to those who are not. Collaboration provides influence, knowledge, and access to more resources. In this sense, resource availability and dependency increase collaboration, while transaction costs increase individual interest and decrease collaboration. Those remaining outside collaborative arrangements save on the transaction costs and resources required to collaborate, however, those not “playing the game” lose out on the shared network, information, capital, resources, to name a few (Feiock, R. C., Steinacker, A., & Park, H. J., 2009; Gerber, E. R., Henry, A. D., & Lubell, M., 2013; Y. Lee et al., 2012; Leifeld & Schneider, 2012; Shrestha & Feiock, 2011).

### **Factors Facilitating Collaborative Process**

Over the years, researchers in public administration have reached a consensus regarding the collaborative governance process as having four basic phases: 1) initial conditions, “inputs”, or system context of the collaborative process 2) processes and structural governance, 3) contingencies and constraints and 4) outputs and outcomes (Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006; Bryson et al., 2015; Thomson & Perry, 2006). In their 2015 systematic review of collaboration and collaborative

governance, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone created a summary of the major theoretical frameworks and findings from 2006 to 2015 as adapted by Pinz, A., Roudyani, N., & Thaler, J. (2018) reflected in Figure 3.

**Figure 3:** Cross-sector Collaboration Framework (adapted from Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006, 2015) (Pinz et al., 2018)



There is also broad consensus across the field regarding the definition and role of inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes, especially their role in the performance of governance. We see references in political science to inputs as “quality of staff, resources, procedures, etc.”, outputs as “the immediate products of government action”, and outcomes as “the consequences of government policy for citizens” (Fukuyama, 2016, 98). According to Fukuyama, the “impact of inputs on outcomes is even more attenuated,



although inputs might in some cases be useful in measuring potential rather than actual outcomes” (Fukuyama, 2016, 98). However, in policy studies, we see a clearer separation of inputs vs. processes as well as a focus on managerialism to face “wicked problems”. Issues such as capacity, resources and procedures are more linked to processes and the goal is to fine tune these processes to get measurable results. “To the extent that performance-based managerialism moves away from a focus on inputs and processes and focuses attention further down the chain of “program logic” toward outcomes, managerialism potentially allows flexibilities in finding alternative means of achieving the desired results” (Head & Alford, 2015, 720). Per Ansell et al. (2017), managers should have a clear view from top to bottom of their organization and the ability to assess inputs, outputs, and outcomes and evaluate overall performance. Finally, public administration expands this view to include the overall system context and environment as the inputs affecting the wide variety of processes leading towards outputs and outcomes in collaborative regimes. “Determinants of the collaborative governance regime are rooted in the external context, including the resource conditions, policy and legal frame-works, and politics and power conditions” (Bryson et al., 2015, 649).

Bryson et al.’s study also emphasizes leadership as a crucial factor in the collaborative process. “The leadership challenge in cross-sector collaboration may therefore be viewed as the challenge of aligning initial conditions, structures, processes, and outcomes and accountabilities such that good things happen in a sustained way over time—indeed, so that public value can be created” (Bryson et al., 2015, 658). Other factors they mention is that governing mechanisms, stakeholder participation, planning processes, and conflict management strategies are within the control of collaborative

actors to influence the overall process. We can also see that resources and mandates are part of the general antecedent conditions that are influential, in addition to policy or political change. Per O’Leary & Vij (2012), the major factors influencing collaboration include context, mission, member selection (stakeholder engagement) and capacity building (including resources), motivation and commitment, structure and governance, power dynamics, accountability, communication, perceived legitimacy, trust, and information technology.

Major influencing factors in policy studies include problem severity/wicked problems, stakeholder engagement, knowledge building, resources, power, and conflict. “Power can distort, mediate and bridge the impact of the other factors” (Alford & Head, 2017, 40) and is both an internal and external influence on the capacities or resources the actors hold as well as on the context within the actors operate. Resources once again emerge as a crucial factor, and the ability and desire to use them towards a collaboration making a difference towards the feasibility of collaborative results (Alford & Head, 2017). Ansell & Torfing (2018) address those factors necessary for collaborative governance to scale up as including membership (number of stakeholders and duration of membership), the amount of interaction, and the strategic horizon (a time span of goals, projects, and results). They also refer to the amount and diversity of stakeholders being important, as it may influence the complexity of the negotiation. Berardo confirms this in his research results that “show a positive relationship between the inclusion of more partners in a project and the chances of getting funded, but also that once the project becomes too inclusive, those chances decrease if the partners fill more structural holes (e.g., provide more non redundant resources. In other words, organizations perform better

by adding more partners as long as this addition does not result in excessive complexity” (Berardo, 2009, 521).

Political science also looks at factors such as stakeholder engagement, representation, number and diversity of actors, resources, power, and shared interests (Cain, B. E., Gerber, E. R., & Hui, I., 2020; Krause & Douglas, 2013). Trust emerges as another key component to collaboration as it facilitates information sharing and reciprocity (Ahn, T. K., Esarey, J., & Scholz, J. T., 2009). Relationships and trust mitigate risks as “policy actors seek network contacts to improve individual payoffs in the institutional collective action dilemmas endemic to fragmented policy arenas. Actors also seek reciprocal bonding relationships supportive of small joint projects and quickly learn whether or not to trust their partners” (Berardo & Scholz, 2010, 632).

Based on the literature review, it is observable that the three disciplines share some common views regarding influencing factors on the inter-organizational collaborative processes. Figure 4a and 4b present the factors influencing collaboration in public administration, policy studies, and political science. This alignment across the three disciplines points at stakeholder engagement, resources, trust, problem severity, representation (the number of members as well as their diversity), leadership, and reciprocity as the most influential factors in the collaborative process from a multi-disciplinary perspective.




Figure 4b: Common Factors Across All Three Disciplines	Common Factors in Political Science and Policy Studies	Common Factors in Policy Studies and Public Administration	Common Factors in Political Science and Public Administration
Trust Relationships Networks Stakeholder Engagement Problem Severity Resources / Incentives Inclusiveness (Representation) Leadership Reciprocity Power	Social capital Influence Access Political Homophily/ Shared Ideology Opportunity Structures Political Resources Shared Demographics Conflict	Cooperation Benefits Information Sharing Knowledge Building Flexibility Effectiveness	Administration Structure Accountability Conflict Knowledge Building Transaction Costs Information Exchange Politics

## **Motivation**

In the public administration literature, collaboration is an imperative, and public service motivation causes an enate commitment to collaborate in order to solve wicked public problems (Hartley et al., 2013; Head, 2019; Kalesnikaite & Neshkova, 2021; Song, M., Park, H. J., & Jung, K., 2018). The topic of motivation has some diversity of thought in the field. Researchers recognize the diverse theories of motivation across disciplines stemming from classic liberalism and civic republicanism, drawing from the distinct views of rational choice, game theory, collective action, resource dependency, and public service motivation (Choi & Robertson, 2019). In this sense, the field recognizes the tensions between individual and collective interests as well as personal and organizational choice. Based on prosocial and public service motivation, “given that collaborative governance processes are usually addressing public problems or issues, it is reasonable to expect that some participants will be motivated as much or more by their desire to contribute to collective well-being as by the goal of accomplishing their own individual objectives” (Choi & Robertson, 2019, 395). Ultimately, most collaborative governance efforts will see a mix of personal, institutional, and social or public-oriented goals. Leadership continues to be an important aspect of encouraging and maintaining motivation among collaborative actors (Choi & Robertson, 2019).

In policy studies, we note a leaning towards understanding the political motivations of collaboration. “Frontline personnel, private stakeholders and target users stand to gain considerable political influence from active participation, and this might be a strong motivating factor. By contrast, elected politicians might for a number of reasons be reluctant to embrace the idea of collaborative policy implementation, either due to

disinterest in tackling complex policy problems, or due to interest in focusing on simpler issues aligned with supporting interest groups, or that will aid in re-election (Christopher Ansell, Sørensen, & Torfing, 2017). Exclusivity in forums and the expectation of successful resource exchange (e.g., information, power, and influence) are also viewed as strong motivators to collaborate (M. Fischer & Leifeld, 2015). Scott & Thomas (2017, 202) offer several propositions as to why and when public managers choose collaborative governance strategies including certainty regarding resource management and that “a public manager is more likely to encourage collaborative governance to the extent that: (15) she occupies a brokerage position within a network; (16) doing so serves to reduce points of contact; and (17) she can be certain about the nature of the processes and/or outputs that she is supporting. As described above, we identify all three motivations as relating most directly to encouragement and not leadership”.


Political science also views motivation along the lines of existing relationships and access to political power, influence, and resources. The stronger ties actors have in a network or collaborative process, the more likely they are motivated to participate. This motivation is compounded by shared interests and the leadership of elites who encourage motivation conformity (Siegel, 2009). “Actors engage in and invest in beneficial exchanges. Self-interested behavior together with limited rationality and the inherently incomplete nature of agreements make exchange risky. Actors, therefore, look for a governing mechanism that minimizes the transaction risks. Exchanges are also embedded in relationships. Relational structures such as mutual trust and mutual sanctions facilitate exchange by minimizing ex ante and ex post opportunism” (Shrestha & Feiock, 2011, 584).

Future work on motivation to engage in collaboration should include both individual and collective interests, the political, managerial, and contextual influences at play, and the leadership and governance structure in place to encourage motivation throughout the collaborative process.

### **Public Sectors**

Research on collaboration and collaborative governance spans multiple public and private sectors. As this study is focusing on the public aspect, Figure 5 shows the public sectors the studies present in this literature review. The 2006 *PAR* Symposium introduces what we see today as a main topic of study in the field of study of public administration. The case studies highlighted in that issue include government and environment (such as watershed partnerships) (Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Leach, 2006), emergency management (Donahue, 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006), interlocal collaboration (Sears & Lovan, 2006; Thurmaier, 2006), and education (Bushouse, 2006). In coming years, we register more studies on nonprofit management and studies that focus on cross-sector collaboration (AbouAssi, K., Bauer, Z., & Johnston, J. M., 2019; Cheng, 2019; Fowler, 2019; Getha-Taylor, 2012; Simo & Bies, 2007; Willem & Lucidarme, 2014). In policy studies and political science, the focus is on the study of government, economies, and political actors (Cain et al., 2020; Desmarais, B. A., Harden, J. J., & Boehmke, F. J., 2015; Gerber et al., 2013; Henry, 2011; Y. Lee et al., 2012), with some emphasis on environment (Newig et al., 2018; Tingley & Tomz, 2014; Weible & Sabatier, 2009). Overwhelmingly, the three disciplines focus on the government.


Figure 5: Public Sectors Across the Three Disciplines



### Trends in Methodology

The three disciplines show distinctive preferences in designs and methods to study collaboration and collaborative governance. Public administration prefers qualitative study, followed by a balance between literature reviews and quantitative study. Policy studies has the most balanced approach, with equal weight given to qualitative and quantitative study, followed by literature review. Political science is dominated by quantitative study. All three fields have a much lower percentage of deploying mixed methods approaches. The overview of the methodological trends by discipline can be viewed in Figure 6 below.





### **What We Learn**

When considering an appropriate vehicle for an empirical study across the disciplines of public administration, political science, and policy studies, task forces or commissions emerge as an operationalization of collaborative governance. As demonstrated earlier, the government sector is the most common area of study for all three disciplines. Task forces and commissions are collaborative governance mechanisms by design and structure. According to Leach (2006, 101), collaborative public management is “a diverse group of public and private sector stakeholders who convene regularly over a period of month or years in an effort to either (1) influence and possibly to achieve consensus on public policy and its implementation, or (2) achieve quid pro quo agreements among each of the participating private and governmental parties. Widely known examples include advisory committees, stakeholder partnerships, environmental dispute mediations, and negotiated regulatory rule-making processes”.

Task forces first emerged in the White House during the Kennedy administration to innovate presidential policy formulation (Thomas & Wolman, 1969). These task forces and advisory committees assist the government by creating networks which have the goal of solving complex problems through information exchange, access to community expertise around an issue, education of community members around the policy and resource implications of an issue, and joint policy-oriented learning (Imperial, 2005). The core identity of a governance network is if “we can identify a network of interdependent, yet autonomous actors, engaged in institutionalized processes of public governance based on negotiated interactions and joint decision making” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009, 237). Task forces are crucial tools for governance systems as they enforce state/corporate collaborations through a suitable legal environment and creating a flow of information (K. Fischer, Jungbecker, & Alfen, 2006). As policymakers want to reduce the cost of government while improving effective government, services provided to the public and enhancing accountability, the task force becomes an effective tool to do this (Nonprofits, 2013). However, collaborative efforts can also cause resentments with bureaucracy that does not act when provided with effective recommendations from community members as the groups will guarantee the formulation of new policy recommendations and a maximum range of options salient to public representative that can be developed over a short amount of time with minimum energy from leadership. The selection of task force members and providing support and resources to task forces then becomes an important factor in ensuring the task force’s success (Thomas & Wolman, 1969).

Additionally, there are references to task forces and commissions across all three disciplines of study—public administration, policy studies, and political science

(Berardo, R., Heikkila, T., & Gerlak, A. K., 2014; Hastedt, 2007; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2016; Miller & Reeves, 2017; O'Connell, L., Yusuf, J. E. (Wie), & Hackbart, M., 2009; Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2015; Sinclair, 1981; Tama, 2014; Zegart, 2004). This forms a strong argument for task forces as an appropriate vehicle for the empirical study of collaboration and collaborative governance across the disciplines and public sectors.

The political science literature reveals that task forces and commissions have differing motivations and goals based on the political goals of leadership. Zegart identifies three ideal types of commissions: 1) agenda commissions to generate support initiatives and target a mass audience, 2) information commissions that provide new facts and thinking about policies targeted at government officials, and 3) political constellation commissions that seek to foster consensus among competing interests and target commission members themselves. Commissions can be continuing or ad hoc depending on if they are created by legislated statute or are temporary, lasting less than four years and targeting a discrete task (Zegart, 2004, 375). Therefore, commissions are whatever the leadership intends them to be, which could be political lip service for policy issues, a means to lend credibility in the public's eye, or provide benefits to government administrators such as fact-finding, enhanced policy design and credibility, and increased issue salience. Commissions can serve as important policy tools because they pool the knowledge and resources of experts to develop policy alternatives which may be better than government execution alone (Miller & Reeves, 2017). Wicked or difficult severe public problems are often a common motivator of task forces and commissions as they provide public attention toward a political goal, even though the actual motivations of leadership and involved politicians may not be to actually solve the problem but provide

a form of damage control (Hastedt, 2007). The more external parties are involved in task forces and commissions, the more likely that the motivations of the task force are to produce policy outcomes as the external members are not completely bound by political interests, although they have their own motivations in participating (Hastedt, 2007).

Tama (2014, 152) reinforces these motivations and goals to create task forces: 1) to seek expertise, 2) to advance on an agenda, 3) to overcome gridlock, 4) to gain political cover, 5) to conduct damage control, 6) to reassure the public and 7) to ward off pressure for change. Typically, a crisis or wicked problem once again is the largest motivator to create this kind of forum, but as they “tend to promote integration and coordination, they will remain appealing vehicles for advancing goals”. “Nevertheless, most experts agree that greater integration and coordination across the government are desirable and necessary to deal with the complexity of many policy challenges” (Tama, 2014, 161).

### **Mandated versus Voluntary Collaboration**

A review of the collaborative literature reviewed across the three fields provides some interesting context into the type of environment the collaboration emerges from. It is important to consider the influence of this environment and if it is mandated or voluntary when using task forces as a vehicle to study collaborative governance.

Mandated collaborations are those in which the collaborative work is required by a third-party organization that wants to command collaborative work from organizations within its sphere of influence (Rodríguez et al., 2007). Per Rodriguez et al. from the policy studies discipline, mandated collaboration is fundamentally political in nature and can only be effective when the actors involved have previous collaboration experience, aligned authorities, and similar values and interests. Participants can be forced to participate or must agree to participate or risk losing their legitimacy.

In contrast, voluntary collaborations in political science are born from relationships that institutions allow individuals to build and foment through reputational collateral and then use to select transaction partners carefully. These reputational mechanisms further build and encourage trust, which is a crucial factor to an effective collaborative process. “By focusing on voluntary exchange, voluntary information provision, and alternative reputation mechanisms, our study demonstrates that selection effects and information provision dilemmas are perhaps as important in the study of real-world reputation institutions as are the cooperative decisions that receive most formal analysis” (Ahn et al., 2009, 412). This is an interesting perspective from political science, essentially the individual interests that dominate the game-theory view can be mitigated through voluntary relationships based on reputation and thus contribute to the motivation to collaborate.

In public administration, scholars contend that mandated collaboration is often aligned with public governance, “public agencies may initiate collaborative forums either to fulfill their own purposes or to comply with a mandate, including court orders, legislation, or rules governing the allocation of federal funds” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 545). However, they note that while collaboration can be mandated through courts or legislatures in groups such as task forces, councils, commissions, or boards, the resulting participation by stakeholders is typically voluntary. These mandated forums can be essential especially in issues where incentives to collaborate are weak, however, mandated collaboration can also hide the lack of actual commitment from the participants. Mandated forums should ensure they have commitment from their

participants to address the issue at hand. Alternatively, voluntary collaboration is driven by the incentives of the stakeholders to engage, such as the benefits of knowledge, information, resources, and goal sharing. “Incentives to participate are low when stakeholders can achieve their goals unilaterally or through alternative means” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 552).

## **CONCLUSION**

The act of collaboration and collaborative governance in its best form has the intent of bringing together stakeholders and breaking down silos in order to advance a goal achievable only by a committed group of organizations. If we are not attempting to break down existing silos, we only achieve a myopic vision that cannot possibly represent diverse stakeholders. To this end, the academic disciplines also need to break down their research silos and learn from their diverse perspectives on how collaboration and collaborative governance work. This extends to the various public sectors as well – multidisciplinary collaboration works best, so must we broaden our understanding of collaboration and collaborative governance. The collaborative process still remains somewhat of a black box, just one that we have all become comfortable pulling out of our administrative bags to solve problems – and yet each discipline and research area has looked at and identified separate pieces of the box, or collaborative puzzle so to speak.

The endeavor of shining further light on the black box of collaboration matters as we put more pressure on public institutions to solve “wicked problems” defined as highly severe and complex problems in society that require the effort of multiple organizations and institutions (Head & Alford, 2015; McGuire & Silvia, 2010). More master collaborators are needed to face the collaborative imperative with intention, technique,

developed skills, and natural expert implementation. We can only inform the development of master collaborators by bringing together the knowledge of multiple disciplines, breaking down silos, and building a practiced, cross-sectoral skill set. Thus, we identify influencing factors and competencies that are more likely to lead to successful outputs and outcomes as well as avoid pitfalls and obstacles.

This literature review takes a deep dive into public administration's view of collaboration and collaborative governance in inter-organizational contexts from 2006-2020. The study takes comparative looks into the perspectives of political science and policy studies. It also observes the anticipated silos of knowledge and perspectives regarding the theories, motivations to collaborate, processes, influencing factors, and journeys to outputs and outcomes. Public administration can learn from these other perspectives in order to have a more realistic and comprehensive view of the collaborative process, and answer some of the unanswered questions of how the full collaborative process moves from inception to outcomes in different contexts. In addition, there are other questions revealed by political science and policy studies that public administration has yet to ask. For example, how can we truly understand the impetus to collaborate if we take different approaches to theories crucial to understanding motivation such as game theory and collective action theory? There are basic approaches that each of the three disciplines take to collaboration that influence the emerging frameworks and understanding of the collaborative process. Political science an individualistic, game-based view, policy studies an economic, resource-driven view, and public administration a collectivistic, consensus-based view. As more quantitative research emerges, a meta-analysis will be beneficial in further tracking the approaches to

collaboration across disciplines. Each discipline sheds light on why organizations and actors may come to the collaborative table with different goals, and why collaborative processes vary in intent and success.

To date, public administration has not fully explored how collaborative governance frameworks play out comparatively across public sectors. Much like the research on policy coordination and integration, the majority of the collaboration and collaborative governance research focuses on sector specific case studies, large N surveys, and small N case studies (Trein, P., Biesbroek, R., Bolognesi, T., Cejudo, G. M., Duffy, R., Hustedt, T., & Meyer, I., 2020). Similarly, public administration recognizes that more research needs to be done in order to truly understand how collaboration effectively works, test existing frameworks and theories, and identify factors that enable or hinder collaboration from inception to outcomes across public sectors. “The challenge is to move from case-based, mid-range theory building to more large-N- driven systematic theory-testing, while also retaining the rich contextual and process insights that only small-N studies tend to yield” (Douglas et al., 2020, 495). As collaboration itself is difficult to measure consistently, a study which seeks to test core factors and their influence on the collaborative processes as directly related to outcomes in different public sector contexts will provide much needed clarity and consensus in the field. Not only that, adding to this the comparison of collaborative frameworks and approaches from political science and policy studies to the mix will further deepen public administration’s understanding of how collaboration actually works, what factors consistently enable or hinder success, and what is required to prepare more “master collaborators”. Task forces can provide this environment for collaborative governance and policymaking and allow



us to observe the influence of factors such as stakeholder engagement, representation, and diversity, human and financial resources, as well as leadership and motivation in a political and power-influenced context. Thus, task forces will serve as a vehicle for more cross-disciplinary research to sort out factors, processes, and influences that lead organizations to collaborative success, failure, or somewhere in between.

## ESSAY 2: From Processes to Outputs & Outcomes: The Performance of Collaborative Arrangements

### INTRODUCTION

There is an unanswered question in public administration about the performance of collaborative arrangements. Stated differently, under what conditions does collaboration produce more outputs and outcomes? Collaboration is a management tool widely utilized in the administrative practice. The scholars have analyzed multiple single-case studies dealing with specific governance issues. The field has either focused on broad collaborative systems theory, or specific types of collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008). “Despite growing interest, empirical research on the performance of cross-boundary collaboration continues to be limited by conceptual and methodological challenges” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, 717). This study takes upon this challenge. Drawing on task forces as a vehicle of collaboration. I examine the determinants of task force outputs and outcomes. Specifically, the study addresses two interrelated research questions. The first question asks how we can measure the performance of collaborative arrangements in terms of outputs and outcomes. The second research question seeks to understand under what conditions collaboration produces more outputs and outcomes. Do task forces with greater sectoral representation produce more outputs and outcomes? Does task force performance improve with designated staff and/or financial resources? And finally, how does the policy context affect the outputs and outcomes of the collaborative governance?

Collaborative governance allows organizations to tackle projects and combine resources towards a common goal that they could not achieve on their own. It “brings public and private stakeholders together in collective forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 543). Task forces are a key tool used by state and federal legislative bodies to address severe policy issues. These forums are by definition collaborative, as representatives of all interested parties work together toward achieving a common goal. Consequently, in this study, I will explore the task force as an example of collaborative governance and link the processes to outputs and outcomes. The analysis focuses on task forces mandated by the Florida State Legislature across four policy areas—child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and

environment. The selection of policy areas was informed by Ingram and Schneider's (1993) typology of target populations, and Gormley's (1986) policy taxonomy along two dimensions defined by public salience and technical complexity. The study covers the period from 2000 to 2020 as reported in the Florida State Statutes available through the Online Sunshine website (<http://www.leg.state.fl.us/>), the official internet site of the Florida Legislature. To measure performance, I consider three dependent variables: two output measures and one outcome measure. Specifically, I code each task force based on the policy activities and recommendations they produced (output measures) and the pieces of legislation that were adopted as a result of a task force's work (outcome measure). The data for the three performance measures were collected from the task forces' annual reports. Using task forces to study collaborative governance allows us to test the existing theoretical frameworks. Prior work on collaboration argues that diversity of partners, presence of budget and staff, and policy area context may affect the collaborative process. Consequently, the present analysis considers several determinants of collaborative performance, including size and makeup, sectoral diversity, devoted human and financial resources, and policy context measured by salience and complexity of the policy area and social construction and political power of policy target populations.

The results provide new insights about the determinants of collaborative performance and the differential effect they have on the outputs and outcomes. Overall, policy outputs operationalized as activities suffered from higher sectoral diversity of actors serving on the task force, while policy outputs operationalized as recommendations and outcomes operationalized as legislation benefited from higher sector diversity of actors. The presence of budget and staff had varying impacts on outputs and outcomes. Future research could test if higher diversity of types of actors necessitates staff to help manage the interactions and decision-making processes of a group, seeking more complex objectives. In terms of a policy area, higher complexity had little effect on policy outputs (recommendations) and decreased results for both policy outputs (activities) and policy outcomes (legislation). This is expected, considering that higher complexity of the policy area makes the work towards outputs and outcomes more difficult. Higher salience of the public policy area increased outputs and outcomes across the board. Interestingly, task forces working in policies with positively constructed target

populations produced fewer policy outputs and outcomes. This signals that task forces working in policies with negatively constructed target populations such as criminal justice deal with greater problem severity and warrant more attention from legislators. I also notice higher task force productivity in terms of policy outputs, specifically activities, which suggests that those activities are more easily achievable.

This research addresses an important gap in the collaboration and collaborative governance literature by conceptualizing the performance of collaborative forums and devising specific measures to assess it, tracing inputs, to processes, to outputs and outcomes across policy domains. In an academic area dominated by case studies, qualitative reports, anecdotal evidence, and theory which has yet to consistently link collaborative processes to outputs and outcomes, this study provides one of the first large-*N* analyses of collaborative performance and its determinants. In doing so, the study also offers an empirical test of the leading theoretical frameworks and approaches.

The article proceeds as follows. The next two sections overview the literature on collaborative governance and task forces as vehicles of collaboration. I draw on key theories to formulate the research hypotheses linking the processes with outputs and outcomes. The following section presents the data, variable operationalization and the estimation techniques used in the analysis. Next, I discuss the results and their implications for the theory and practice. The last section concludes and offers directions for future research.

## **DRIVERS AND PERFORMANCE OF COLLABORATIVE REGIMES**

Collaboration is a social phenomenon that does not lend itself easily to quantitative study. However, it is increasingly utilized as a crucial tool in the administrative practice, especially as organizations compete for fewer resources and face an ever-growing demand for services from a diverse and multicultural public. Most researchers agree on a basic definition of collaboration as involving independent actors who work together towards a common goal that they could not achieve individually (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Thomson, Perry & Miller (2007, 25, 52) define collaboration as “a process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships, and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared

norms and mutually beneficial interactions”. It is important to note that collaboration is a higher form than what we think of as cooperation, in that it is more than just sharing information, but exchanging resources and combining activities to increase each organizations’ capacity towards a mutual goal (Nonprofits, 2013). Collaborative governance researchers have summarized and synthesized theory into well-established collaborative frameworks (Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006, 2015; Emerson et al., 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Provan & Kenis, 2008; A. M. Thomson et al., 2009; A. M. Thomson & Perry, 2006; M. Thomson et al., 2008). However, they have also pointed out the need for more thorough studies that validate both the concepts and the links among them. As the literature is dominated by area specific case studies, it is difficult to test the validity of the collaborative concepts and consistently link the processes to results, especially across public policy areas.

When reviewing the literature, collaboration and collaborative governance emerge as a popular response to New Public Management (NPM). NPM came about in the 1980s as public administration’s business response to fixing government performance. Under NPM, the public is treated as a customer, and public institutions run as businesses, with a primary focus on getting results (Vigoda, 2002). The main goal of an organization under the NPM model is efficiency and achieving outcomes in more a bottom-line like approach (Christensen, 2012). However, NPM came up short when trying to deal with “wicked problems”—complex problems poorly suited for market solutions. These “wicked problems require experts from disparate fields to cooperatively construct a reasonable and feasible way to address the complexities inherent in the problem at hand” (Isett, Mergel, Leroux, Mischen, & Rethemeyer, 2011, i159). Problems such as these span sector boundaries and are not solvable by one organization or individual, as they are too complex for one actor to have all the tools necessary to tackle them. Therefore, as problems became more complex and more “wicked” in a sense, in the post-NPM era, public managers began to turn to collaboration and cooperation. Within this new paradigm, civil servants serve as “network managers and partnership leaders” while politicians broker the deals among multiple stakeholders (Christensen, 2012, 2).

The enhanced coordination and collaboration between organizations leads to the surgency of network theory. Networks are in a way a response to the inability of New

Public Management tackle complex public problems, by providing flexible structures that are inclusive and allow public organizations to address problems by taking advantage of information and resources that are outside of their own scope (Isett, K. R., Mergel, I. A., Leroux, K., Mischen, P. A., & Rethemeyer, R. K., 2011). Agranoff (2006, 56) offers an extensive review of networks and contends that public managers are enmeshed in a series of collaborative horizontal and vertical networks and that networks need to be treated seriously in public administration. Isett et al. (2011, p.158) distinguishes among three types of networks: 1) policy networks where public agencies work with businesses with interest in a specific policy area, 2) collaborative networks consisting of government agencies and nonprofits who work together to provide a public good, and 3) governance networks that “fuse collaborative goods and service provision with collective policy making”. Networks then are in their nature collaborative, and a key aspect of the collaborative governance process.

Collaboration is a strategy that public managers often use to improve the governance of interorganizational networks (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). However, scholars agree that the process is not well understood, and explaining the collaborative governance process is still a challenge. Agranoff (2006, 56) defines collaborative management as “the process of facilitating and operating in multi organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations.” This definition is echoed by Ansell and Gash (2008, 545), who highlight six criteria of collaborative governance: (1) “the forum is initiated by public agencies or institutions, (2) participants in the forum include nonstate actors, (3) participants engage directly in decision making and are not merely “consulted” by public agencies, (4) the forum is formally organized and meets collectively, (5) the forum aims to make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not achieved in practice), and (6) the focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management.”

An important aspect to note here is that collaborative governance requires the participation of non-state actors (Ansell & Gash, 2008). It is a type of problem-solving that must include the common pursuit of government agencies and concerned citizens to solve problems. Of course, as mentioned previously, wicked problems are often complex multi-sector problems that cannot be solved by one actor. According to O’Flynn & Wanna

(2012, 8), drivers of collaboration can be categorized under internal drivers, external drivers, and “volition in relation to roles and responsibilities of government.” External drivers can reflect broad problems such as globalization, information technology, international economic pressures, terrorism and national security, environmental pressures, education, and changing demographics. Internal drivers can include budgetary frameworks, resource systems, effectiveness, performance management, and capacity issues. Collaboration allows for community and stakeholder involvement in problem solving, which means better policy recommendations and legislation that better meet the public need. However, collaboration can also harm clarity of accountability, increase the political blame game, and cause tension with stakeholders when goals are not met (O’Flynn & Wanna, 2012). These external and internal drivers serve as the impetus to collaborate. The collaborative process then begins to form within a system context and initial conditions, and the process of collaborating towards outputs and/or outcomes begins. This study will venture further into more detail regarding the literature’s stance on initial conditions / system context, process factors, and outputs, and outcomes, that are involved in the collaborative governance process.

### **TASK FORCES AS COLLABORATIVE FORUMS**

Leach (2006, 101) defines collaboration as “a diverse group of public and private sector stakeholders who convene regularly over a period of month or years in an effort to either (1) influence and possibly to achieve consensus on public policy and its implementation, or (2) achieve quid pro quo agreements among each of the participating private and governmental parties.” Examples include advisory committees, stakeholder partnerships, environmental dispute mediations, and negotiated regulatory rule-making processes. Task forces are another instance of collaborative forums, usually mandated by a legislative body to solve acute public problems.

The Kennedy administration saw the emergence of task forces as an innovation in presidential legislation formulation (Thomas & Wolman, 1969). Task forces along with advisory committees assist the government by creating networks with the goal of solving complex public problems through information exchange, access to community’s local knowledge, education of community members on policy and financial intricacies, and joint policy-oriented learning (Imperial, 2005). These types of committees and

commissions can have an important impact at both the federal and state levels. Sørensen & Torfing (2009, 237) define a governance network as consisting of “interdependent, yet autonomous actors engaged in institutionalized processes of public governance based on negotiated interactions and joint decision making”. Task forces are convenient problem-solving arrangements as they allow for state-corporate collaborations through creating the legal environment and flow of information (K. Fischer et al., 2006). As policy makers want to reduce the cost of government while providing effective services to the public and enhancing accountability, the task force becomes a handy tool (Nonprofits, 2013). For Tama (2014, 152), the motivations to create commissions and task forces could include to “seek expertise, advance an agenda, overcome gridlock, gain political cover, conduct damage control, reassure the public, and ward off pressure for change.” Leaders have to weigh the benefits and costs of task forces, because such collaborative efforts can stir up political pressure and/or cause resentments with the bureaucracy, which might not act based on recommendations from community members. The selection of members and providing resources becomes an essential factor in ensuring the task force’s success (Thomas & Wolman, 1969).

The Florida State Legislature, which is the primary data source for this study, defines a “committee” or “task force” as an “advisory body created without specific statutory enactment for a time not to exceed 1 year or by specific statutory enactment for a time not to exceed 3 years and appointed to study a specific problem and recommend a solution or policy alternative with respect to that problem” (Florida Senate, 2018). Typically, a task force includes both public and private or nonprofit actors representing the government and the community. Similarly, a “council” or “advisory council” for example is “an advisory body created by specific statutory enactment, appointed to function on a continuing basis for the study of problems arising in a specified functional or program area of state government and to provide recommendations and policy alternatives” (Florida Senate, 2018). There is precedent in considering task forces as a vehicle to study collaborative governance, and locally in Florida. Berardo, Heikkila, & Gerlak (2014) study a South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, providing an environmental policy area case study on the dialogue factors that encourage discussion or conflict in a collaborative environment. This study proposed here will expand the



literature from this typical micro-view case study to one that crosses public policy areas and measures major system context factors, process factors, and their effects on collaborative outputs and outcomes.

### **DEVELOPING TESTABLE HYPOTHESES**

Theories of collaborative governance have examined the collaborative process from inputs to outputs and outcomes, as well as the factors that influence the process, but have yet to validate it consistently with quantitative or qualitative data. Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2012) offer an integrative framework of collaborative regimes. Their “logic model” depicts collaborative process dynamics as influenced by the system context and environment. Specifically, the system context impacts the drivers for collaborative dynamics. These collaborative dynamics consist of principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action. The resulting actions are the collaborative outputs and higher-level collaborative outcomes, which then create change in the system context, influencing future collaborative regimes (Emerson et al., 2012). Building from Emerson and Nabatchi’s (2015) framework of collaborative governance regimes, I seek to compare collaborative processes and results across different policy contexts. As Emerson and Nabatchi specify, collaborative governance regimes (CGRs) can be self-initiated, independently convened, or externally directed. Task Forces fit nicely into externally directed CGRs. However, the collaborative process and experience could differ between these types of CGRs. In this study, I focus on the legislatively mandated CGRs and examine the system context that links the collaborative governance processes to outputs and outcomes.

Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006, 2015) have supported this general framework for understanding collaborative governance, compiling the major contributions to the collaborative governance literature from their initial study in 2006 to their updated study in 2015. Their initial review highlights synergies of the collaboration literature which points out four major stages of collaboration: 1) initial conditions (general environment, sector failure, direct antecedents), 2) process (formal and informal agreements, building, and managing) as well as structure and governance (formal and informal membership, configuration, and group structure), 3) contingencies and constraints (power imbalances, competing institutional logics), and 4) outcomes and accountabilities (outputs, outcomes,

results management, relationships with political and professional constituencies). Table 1 presents a compilation of influencing factors in the four different collaborative stages from the 2015 study.

**Table 2:** Summary Major Components and Influencing Factors to Cross-sector Collaboration.

<b>Theory Bases</b>		
Organization Theory, Planning and Environmental Management Studies, Public Administration Theory, Network Theory, Policy Studies, Leadership Theory, Conflict, Management Theory, Strategic Management Theory, Communication Theory		
<b>Major Components</b>		
<i>Initial Conditions / Antecedents:</i>	<i>Processes:</i>	<i>Outputs / Outcomes:</i>
Agreements / Commitment	Governance	Activities
Leadership	Administration	Accountabilities
Legitimacy	Organizational Autonomy	Authoritative texts
Trust	Mutuality	Actions
Planning	Norms of trust and reciprocity	Impacts
Shared understanding	Activation	Adaptation
Type of collaboration	Framing	
Power imbalances	Mobilizing	
Competing intuitional logics	Synthesizing	
Resources	Membership	
Contingencies	Structural configurations	
Network governance	Governance Structures	
Participant governed	Conflict Management	
Lead organization	Network administration	
Goal consensus	Efficacy vs. inclusion	
Network competencies	Flexibility vs. stability	
System Context	Communication	
	Resources, capacity	
<b>Particular Emphases</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutional logics, planning, contingencies, power, and the importance of remedying power imbalances, need for alignment across components</li> <li>• Learning, organizational autonomy, leadership, administration</li> <li>• Face-to-face dialogue, incentives, and disincentives</li> <li>• Leadership through a whole range of roles, processes, and structures, public value, capacity building and learning</li> <li>• Collaborative regimes, what makes collaborations work, capacity building</li> <li>• Pulling out collaborative actions from overall impact / outcomes</li> </ul>		

Reviewing Bryson, Crosby & Stone and Emerson, Nabatchi & Baloghs' work, I compared these factors and stages to the information publicly available in the task forces' annual reports. What emerged as the most consistently measurable data points across task force reports were 1) task force membership and sectoral representation (process factors -

membership), 2) presence of designated financial and human resources (process factors – capacity), 3) activities (outputs), 4) and authoritative texts/actions (outcomes).

Issues of salience, complexity, social construction, and power are further explored to help measure the system context. Thus, to model the determinants of collaborative performance, I consider the system context and initial conditions, as well as process-related factors such as membership and capacity/resources on the potential collaborative outputs and outcomes. The hypotheses are developed below based on existing theories and prior empirical research.

### **Task Force Size**

Earlier collaborative governance literature is not clear about the relationship between size of the collaborative group and the outcomes. Thomson and Perry found size has no significant effect on any of the five process–outcome relationships (Thomson et al., 2007). However, size may impact the ability for the collaborative group to develop trust and reach decisions. Bryson, Crosby & Stone (2006) listed size as a contingency, speculating that size directly impacts the degrees of trust among members. The larger the group, the more trust has to be built among members who may not be directly related among their networks, which could impede the task force’s collaborative work. This is corroborated in the political science literature which emphasizes trust as a key factor to collaborative success. “In general, there is an implicit tension between group size and the capacity of self-governance of policy forums” (M. Fischer & Leifeld, 2015, 373). The ideal size of the collaborative group depends on the diversity of the participants, the goal or objective of the group, or expertise needed for that particular collaborative forum (Krause & Douglas, 2013; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Thus, I hypothesize that larger task forces will produce fewer policy outputs and outcomes, as smaller task forces are better able to build trust and reach consensus. In my study, I tested if there was a critical mass of size that influenced outputs and outcomes, but the results varied across the three dependent variables. Thus, I do not report these values here. This is an area for more potential research.

**Hypothesis 1: Larger task forces will produce less policy outputs and outcomes than task forces with fewer members.**

## **Task Force Makeup**

I hypothesize that task forces with more non-public representatives and taskforces with greater sectoral diversity will produce more outputs and outcomes. I can further theorize that having motivated nonprofit and private participants on the task force will further enhance its legitimacy and the salience of its policy recommendations. The need for sectoral diversity is well explained in the paragraph below:

“Regardless of how a task force is created and structured, it is vital to include both government officials and non-government officials and nonprofit leaders with the necessary knowledge and experience of government-nonprofit contracting to add to the discussion and assessment of recommendations. Other important considerations for establishing an effective group are the selection of its participants and their levels of authority. Representational diversity among both governments and nonprofits strengthens the results. Reviewing the composition of previous task forces reveals two trends. First, governments came to the table in a nonpartisan manner not with just one agency represented, but with several because the problems – and solutions – extend far beyond the expertise of just one governmental agency. Second, a common denominator for all the task forces was participation, directly or indirectly, of the state association of nonprofits, which by their nature are both statewide and sector-wide, allowing them access to a broader pool of insights.” (Nonprofits, 2013, 2).

**Hypotheses 2: Task forces with more non-public members will perform better than those formed of predominantly public participants.**

## **Sectoral Diversity**

According to the National Council of Nonprofits, collaborative efforts require leadership and representative support from both affected government agencies and related community leaders to be effective (Nonprofits, 2013). Per Kalesnikaite & Neshkova (2021, 413), “when the issues are more obscure, less predictable, and highly contextual, governments tend to partner with less similar organizations who can offer perspectives that complement their own”. Ansell, Doberstein & Henderson emphasize the importance of inclusion in collaborative governance, emphasizing that the literature argues that collaborative platforms and processes need to include a wide range of stakeholders and diverse perspectives from different sectors (Ansell, C., Doberstein, C., Henderson, H., Siddiki, S., & ‘t Hart, P., 2020). This supports the hypothesis that increased sectoral diversity will better enable task forces to achieve outputs and outcomes.

**Hypothesis 3: Task forces exhibiting greater sectoral diversity will produce more outputs and outcomes compared to those with low sectoral diversity.**

## **Collaborative Capacity**

Task forces that are provided with a budget to organize and implement their activities will also be more likely to be effective in generating more policy outputs and outcomes. As stated in the United States Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report on *Managing for Results: Implementation Approaches Used to Enhance Collaboration in Interagency Groups*, using resources, such as funding, staff, and technology are key considerations for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms. The report highlights that successful task forces implement resource strategies such as "creating an inventory of resources dedicated towards interagency outcomes, leveraging related agency resources toward the group's outcomes, and piloting new collaborative ideas, programs, or policies before investing resources" (GAO, 2014).

**Hypothesis 4: Dedicated human resources will positively impact outputs and outcomes.**

**Hypothesis 5: Dedicated financial resources will positively impact outputs and outcomes.**

## **Policy Context**

The below hypotheses reflect my expectation about the impact of the policy context on the performance of task forces. To judge the policy context, I draw on two policy taxonomies 1) by Ingram & Schneider related to social construction and power of policy target populations, and 2) by Gormley related to the policy salience and complexity.

First, I considered Schneider and Ingram's (1993) typology of target populations that are formed along the dimensions of social constructions and political power, shown in Figure 7 as applied to public policy areas by Sabatier & Weible. Policies with positively constructed target populations may motivate both politicians and community members to engage in collaborative governance through task forces. Based on an initial review of the Florida State Legislature Statutes, policies with positively constructed target populations seem to be popular for task force creation. However, negatively constructed public policy areas may result in more task force outcomes due to the high problem severity and public salience of the issues at hand. Per Ingram and Schneider (cited in Sabatier & Weible, 2007, 336), "public officials are sensitive not only to power and

social construction, but also to pressure from the public and from professionals to produce effective public policies.” Therefore, task forces which are often populated by officials and by a heavy percentage of public government representatives, may also be more motivated by areas that receive more pressure from the public.

**Figure 7:** Types of Target Populations (Ingram & Schneider,1993, in Sabatier & Weible (2007)




FIGURE 4.2 Social Construction

Second, I draw on Gormley’s taxonomy of policies along the dimensions of salience and complexity. Specifically, I seek to test how task forces may react to highly salient issues that “affect a large number of people in a significant way” and how their behavior might change when dealing with technically complex issues (Gormley, 1986, 598). Complex matters raise questions which require a higher level of expertise to answer and are not easily addressed by generalists. Based on these insights, I expect that highly salient issues will increase collaborative outputs and outcomes, while complex issues will decrease them.

**Hypothesis 6: Task forces operating in policy areas with negatively constructed target populations will produce more outputs and outcomes than those working with positively constructed groups.**

**Hypothesis 7: Task forces operating in policy areas with politically powerful target populations will have more outputs and outcomes.**

**Hypothesis 8: Salience of the policy area will increase task force outputs and outcomes.**

**Hypothesis 9: Complexity of the policy area will decrease task force outputs and outcomes.**

I formulated the hypotheses to consider three major components of the collaborative governance process: 1) the system context and initial conditions (by looking at the policy context), 2) processes (size, makeup, sectoral diversity, designated financial and human resources) as the independent variables, and 3) outputs and outcomes operationalized through task force activities, recommendations, and legislation as the dependent variables. All these variables are based on the existing literature and constructed to most directly measure system context, processes, and outputs and outcomes consistently across multiple policy areas using mandated task forces as the vehicle of empirical study. As outlined in the GAO report, all the factors discussed above have been systematically linked to collaborative success in practice. However, measuring these factors quantitatively through the task force process will provide clear methodological links from theory to practice.

**DATA AND METHODS**

**Task Force Selection**

Data for this study come from legislative statutes of the State of Florida available through [www.leg.state.fl.us](http://www.leg.state.fl.us) as well as official annual task force reports. The documents not available online, were requested. As task forces are typically created for 1 to 3-year periods, and legislative reports on achievements 1 to 3 years after the task force concludes, I considered task forces created by the Florida State Legislature from 2000 to 2020 to get a broad study sample that would include task forces at their inception as well as their conclusion.

The task forces are typically mandated repeatedly from year to year by the legislature in order to provide a consistent mandate for them continue operations unless a bill is passed to change the organization and operation. For example, the 2011 Senate Bill (SPB) 7188 - Creation of Florida Defense Support Task Force changed the Florida Council on Military Base and Mission Support to the Florida Defense Support Task Force. Under the Florida State legislature, the mandate for a task force creation comes with clear membership requirements to include a certain number of public, private, and nonprofit representatives, and may or may not have staff and resources allocated to the

task force. All task forces are mandated to provide recommendations to the legislature through legislative reports. Typically, in the first one to two years of a task force’s creation by the legislature, the legislative report for the task force reporting recommendations, policy actions, and task force data points is not consistently available. A possible explanation for this “delay” is due to a “ramp up” year where the task force is organizing itself.

To select the task forces for the study, I first used Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) two by two typology of target populations formed by their social constructions and political power. I selected four policy areas to represent each quadrant of the taxonomy: defense (high power and positive social construction), environment (high power and negative social construction), child welfare (low power and positive social construction), and criminal justice (low power and negative social construction). I followed closely the descriptions and examples provided by Sabatier & Weible’s (2007) application of the typology to justify the placement of each area. Second, I used Gormley’s (1986) typology to consider the task force selection based on different configurations of policies’ salience and technical complexity. The four policy areas selected per Ingram & Schneider’s typology fit within two of the quadrants of Gormley’s taxonomy: defense (high salience and high complexity), environment (high salience and high complexity), child welfare (low salience and low complexity), and criminal justice (low salience and low complexity). Table 3 contains the task forces selected per each area.

**Table 3:** Total Observations Listed in Florida State Legislature

Policy Area	Task Force	Statute #	Years in Legislature
Child Welfare	Children’s Medical Services Forensic Interview Task Force	39.303	2017, 2018, 2019, 2020
Environment	Harmful Algal Bloom Task Force	379.2271	2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020
Defense	Regional Domestic Security Task Forces	943.0312	2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020
Defense	Domestic Security Oversight Council	943.0313	2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 (16 obs)
Defense	Florida Council on Military Base and Mission Support	288.984	2009, 2010, 2011



Defense	Florida Defense Support Task Force	288.987	2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020
Criminal Justice	Florida Violent Crime & Drug Control Council	943.031	2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020
			<b>Total Obs: 93</b>

### Measuring Task Force Performance

The analysis uses three dependent variables, all coded based on the annual reports provided by task forces for: 1) outputs as activities or achievements, 2) outputs as recommendations and 3) outcomes as actual house or senate bills, amendments, or other formal policy actions reported in the annual task force reports. There are a total of 93 observations in the data set covering the years 2000 to 2020, representing task forces from each of the four policy areas. The individual task forces repeat in the data set for the years they were mandated in the Florida Statutes. 73 of the observations represent years that the task forces were active, meaning that they had assigned membership, designated staff, and financial resources, and produced outputs as activities or achievements, outputs as recommendations, or outcomes as legislation. As there are years that task forces were inactive, the minimum value reported for those years is zero. A dummy variable is created *Active* to allow us to use only active task force-year observations for the empirical analysis. Task force policy outputs as activities or achievements average at 12.04. The variable ranges from zero to 82. The maximum number of activities of 82 was reported by the Florida Violent Crime & Drug Control Council in 2005. The average task force policy outputs as recommendations for the years of the study average at 3.31 and range from zero to 45. The task force that produced the maximum number of recommendations is the Harmful Algal Bloom Task Force with 45 recommendations in 2000. Finally, task force policy outcomes in the form of legislative acts average at 0.84, with a maximum value of 11 and minimum value of zero. The task force that reported the maximum legislative outcomes is the Florida Defense Support Task Force with 11 mentioned bills in year 2020. Table 3 lists examples of task force policy outcomes as legislation for each policy area.

The defense task forces were the highest performing among the sample in terms of legislation. The 48 defense observations present an average of 11.23 activities, and a maximum of 70 activities. They produced an average of 4.35 recommendations, with a

maximum of 19 recommendations. Defense saw the highest number of outcomes as legislation, with an average of 1.5, and a maximum of 11 bills reported in their annual task force reports. These task forces were also the largest, with an average of 53.52 total number of representatives between a minimum of 9 and maximum of 100. Defense task force membership saw lower percentages of sectoral diversity with an average of 91% public, 7% private, and 2% nonprofit members.

The criminal justice task force produced the highest number of activities. During the 20 years of existence, it generated an average of 27.25 activities, with a maximum of 82 per year. In terms of recommendation, this task force had on average 1.25 per year, with a maximum of 13. Outcomes measured as pieces of legislation averaged at 0.15, with a maximum of 1. The task force had on average 14 representatives. Criminal justice purported a low percentage of sectoral diversity with an average of 93% public, 7% nonprofit and no members from the private sector.

The environmental task force produced the highest number of recommendations. The 21 observations produce an average of 3 recommendations with a maximum of 45. Activities averaged 1.71 with a maximum of 45. Outcomes as legislation is an average of 0.10 with a maximum of 1. This task force had a more variable membership, with an average of 5.57 members and a maximum of 31. Environment presents the most diverse representation of sectoral diversity with an average of 17% public, 3% private, and 4% non-profit.

Child welfare produced the lowest number of outputs and outcomes; however, it is also the task force with the shortest time of activity, with 4 observations. This task force produced no activities, as they were more focused on producing well-informed recommendations in a short amount of time. They produced an average of 3.25 recommendations with a maximum of 13, and an average of 0.25 outcomes as legislation with a maximum of 1. They had on average 15 representatives, with 60% public, 13% private, and 27% nonprofit members – boasting the highest percentage of non-profit members among the sample.

**Table 4:** Example Observations of Policy Outcomes (Legislation)

Name	Year	Legislation Passed
Children’s Medical Services Forensic Interview Task Force	2017	HB 1269, SB 1454/SB 1318 – Relating to child protection
Harmful Algal Bloom Task Force	2019	HB 1135/SB 1552 - Red Tide Mitigation and Technology Development Initiative
Florida Defense Support Task Force	2015	HB 27 --Relating to Driver Licenses & Identification Cards; SB 184 -- Relating to Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot; HB 185 -- Relating to Public Records/Active Duty Servicemembers; HB 277 -- Relating to Public Lodging Establishments; HB 361 -- Relating to Military Housing Ad Valorem Tax Exemptions; SB 7028 -- Relating to Educational Opportunities for Veterans;
Florida Defense Support Task Force	2014	Florida GI Bill - HB 7015 - Relating to Military and Veteran Support; Engineers –HB 713 – Relating to Engineers Florida Defense Support Task Force – SB 858 – Relating to OSGR/Florida Defense Support Task Force; Persons with Disabilities: Medicaid Home and Community- Based Waivers;
Regional domestic security task forces	2009	House Bill 7141 – Seaport Security
Regional domestic security task forces	2004	Senate Bill 124 and amended Florida State Statute 943; State GR 2001 Special Session – recurring – 30 FTE
Florida Violent Crime & Drug Control Council	2004	HB 1347/SB 2352 – Relating to a comprehensive methamphetamine package

### Main Explanatory Variables

The data for the main explanatory variables come from the annual task force reports. Specifically, each task force was coded for 1) the total number of representatives, 2) the number of representatives from the public sector, private sector, and non-profit sector, 3) designated budget, and 4) designated staff. The total number of representatives average at 32.54. The variable ranges from zero to 100. The average ratio of public actors is 0.73 ranging from 0.37 to 1, showing that public actors held the majority of representation across the task forces. The average ratio of private actors is 0.05 ranging from zero to 0.33, meaning a max representation of private representation of 33%. The average ratio of non-profit actors is the same as private actors with an equal min and max.

To measure the salience and complexity of a policy area and verify the placement of the four policies into the quadrants of Gormley's (1986) typology, I use the following approach. Given that more technically complex policies require a higher level of expertise from task force participants, I counted the number of STEM Ph.D. and master's degrees held by the members of each task force. I used the information of representatives from 2020 as the most recent year. There was a clear delineation of complexity as the environmental and defense task forces had members who held STEM Ph.D. and master's degrees, while the child welfare and criminal justice task forces did not. Respectively, the variable *Complex* assumed a value of 1 for the taskforces in environment and defense, and zero for those in child welfare and criminal justice. Policy salience of a policy area refers to its importance for many people. To operationalize salience, I counted the average number of news articles per public policy area per year in the nine top circulated Florida local newspapers. The average *Salient* score for the sample is 2,520.84 and ranges from 64.11 to 9,326.22. Child welfare and criminal justice returned the lowest average salience scores of 244.49 and 899.13, respectively, and environment and defense returned the highest average salience scores of 1,926.71 and 5,152.41, respectively. In the analysis, I took the natural logarithm of the raw salience average values.

I performed an external validity check by searching each year "most read news stories Florida 20XX." The Miami Herald lists the proceeding news topics as the most popular: crime (police response to criminal activity), local business, environment, transportation, and schools. Criminal justice does not appear on the most popular topic list. It is important to note that although the defense task forces' names seem specifically related to state defense, their broader mission is to respond to crime and security issues (through the funding of local police and fire departments, and by providing training and equipment to local regional security forces). Thus, I link the task forces self-described as defense to overall crime and security prevention and response. The criminal justice task force is directly related to supporting legal processes and investigations focusing on violent crime, major drug/money laundering, victim/witness protection and relocation. I define these two areas distinctly, aligning the defense/security task forces with the prevention and response to crime on the scene, and the criminal justice task force with the justice system that deals with the resulting litigation of these crimes.

A 2019 article by NBC 6 South Florida presented the “Top Florida Stories of the Decade”, and highlighted 1) hurricanes (environment), 2) mass shootings (defense/security), 3) sports, 4) crime, and 5) politics as the stories that defined the decade (NBC 6 South Florida, 2022). This confirmed that the environment and the prevention and response to crime are the top issues, followed by criminal justice and child welfare.

To operationalize the expectations stemming from Ingram and Schneider’s (1993) theory, I utilized the following approach. To operationalize the power of a target population, I counted the number of lobbyists registered with the Florida legislature per policy area.<sup>1</sup> The average *Power* score for the sample is 45.1, with a range from 11 to 123. Based on the counts, child welfare and environment had the highest power scores of 85.33 and 82.43, respectively, and defense and criminal justice had the lowest power scores of 32 and 20.43, respectively. Given the difficulty in operationalizing social construction of target populations, I utilized the examples provided by Ingram and Schneider (1993) Sabatier and Weible (2007). The result is dichotomous variable *Positive Construction*, with a value of 1 for task forces in defense and child welfare, and zero for the task forces in environment and criminal justice.

### **Control Variables**

To isolate the effect of the main explanatory variables on policy outputs and outcomes produced by the task forces, I account for the fiscal and political context in which they operate. Thus, the models include the total annual spending per public policy area. The data come from the Florida Annual Appropriations reports [as found in the Florida Fiscal Analysis in Brief annual reports and Florida Tax Watch’s annual Taxpayers’ Guide to Florida’s State Budget]. Policy area budget share averages \$1,84.95M and ranges from \$101.53M to \$6,151M. I took the natural logarithm of the variable as the variable’s distribution was skewed. I also control for the percentage of Republican representatives in Florida House of Representatives, as the dominance of republican party politics in the State may have an effect on task force mandates and power pressures. Percent House Republicans is the percent of Republicans represented in

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<sup>1</sup> The number of registered lobbyists for all four policy areas was available from 2006 to 2020. I used the averages for the earlier years.

the Florida House of Representatives for each year from 2000 to 2020. It averages at 65.85% and ranges from 60.98% to 73.55%. Table 5-7 display the operationalization, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of variables used in the models.

**Table 5:** Variable Operationalization

<b>Variable/Factor</b>	<b>Operationalization</b>
<b>Dependent Variables</b>	
Policy Outputs (Activities)	Activities or achievements reported in the annual task force report (e.g., awarded grants, organized events, and commissioned studies).
Policy Outputs (Recommendations)	Official recommendations listed as reported to the Governor/ Florida State Legislature or listed as the workplan for the following year developed and based on recommendations from the previous year.
Policy Outcomes (Legislation)	Legislative acts (e.g., formal bills, amendments, or other formal policy actions) adopted by Florida State Legislature)
<b>Explanatory Variables</b>	
Size	Total number of representatives on the task force.
Sectoral Diversity	Total number of sectors (public, private, and nonprofit) represented on the task force.
Ratio Public Ratio Private Ratio Nonprofit	Makeup of a taskforce: ratio of public/private/non-profit representatives to the total number of representatives.
Task Force Active	Indicator showing if the task force was active in a given year, based on existence of task force report
Budget Present	Indicator showing whether the task force is allowed a budget under the state legislature or reported budget in the annual task force report
Staff Present	Indicator showing whether the task force is delegated staff under the state legislature or if staff is reported in the annual task force report
Positive Construction	Indicator coded as 1 for target populations designated as positive by Ingram & Schneider (1993) and zero otherwise
Complex	Indicator coded as 1 for task forces with high technical expertise based on the need for STEM Ph.D. or master's degrees, and zero otherwise
Power	The number of registered lobbyists per policy area
Salient	Continuous variable representing the average number of news articles published per year per public policy area across the nine top newspapers local to Florida based on circulation
<b>Control Variables</b>	
Policy Area Spending	Total state budget allocated to public-service area in millions.
Percent House Republicans	Percentage of Republicans in Florida House of Representatives

Table 6 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis. Table 7 displays the variable correlation matrix.

**Table 6:** Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Models

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>St Deviation</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<i><b>Dependent Variables</b></i>					
Policy Outputs: Activities	93	12.04	17.39	0	82
Policy Outputs: Recommendations	93	3.31	6.46	0	45
Policy Outcomes: Legislation	93	0.84	2.07	0	11
<i><b>Independent Variables</b></i>					
Size	93	32.54	35.79	0	100
Sectoral Diversity	93	1.41	0.92	0	3
Ratio Public Actors	93	0.73	0.37	0	1
Ratio Private Actors	93	0.05	0.09	0	0.33
Ratio Non-Profit Actors	93	0.05	0.09	0	0.33
Ratio Private + Non-Profit Actors	93	0.09	0.15	0	0.67
Task Force Active	93	0.78	0.41	0	1
Budget Present	93	0.53	0.50	0	1
Staff Present	93	0.80	0.40	0	1
Complex	93	0.74	0.44	0	1
Salient	93	2520.84	2039.18	64.11	9326.22
Positive Construction	93	0.56	0.50	0	1
Power	93	45.10	32.51	11	123
<i><b>Control Variables</b></i>					
Policy Area Spending (in mil)	93	1884.95	1894.60	101.5 3	6151
Percent House Republicans	93	65.85	3.56	60.98	73.55

**Table 7:** Correlation Matrix

Variable	Policy Outputs (Act)	Policy Outputs (Rec)	Policy Outcomes (Leg)	No of Reps	No of Types of Actors	Ratio Pub Actors	Ratio Private Actors	Ratio Non-Profit	Ratio Private + Non-Prof
Policy Outputs (Act)	1.00								
Policy Outputs (Rec)	0.04	1.00							
Policy Outcomes (Leg)	0.09	0.36	1.00						
Total Number of Representatives	0.25	-0.17	0.03	1.00					
Number of Types of Actors	0.18	0.32	0.15	-0.14	1.00				
Ratio Public Actors	0.38	0.13	0.12	0.56	0.39	1.00			
Ratio Private Actors	-0.16	0.45	0.43	-0.27	0.61	-0.12	1.00		
Ratio Non-Profit Actors	-0.05	-0.01	-0.15	-0.28	0.74	-0.10	0.48	1.00	
Ratio Private + Non-Profit Actors	-0.13	0.27	0.18	-0.32	0.78	-0.13	0.87	0.85	1.00
Budget	0.27	0.22	0.32	0.45	0.52	0.30	0.49	0.30	0.46
Staff	0.35	0.26	0.19	0.44	0.52	0.94	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04
Complex	-0.36	0.16	0.19	0.30	-0.49	-0.23	0.16	-0.40	-0.12
Salient	0.02	0.04	0.24	0.54	-0.23	0.25	-0.04	-0.31	-0.20
Positive Construction	-0.11	0.16	0.31	0.57	0.06	0.47	0.31	-0.08	0.14
Power	-0.35	-0.00	0.01	-0.29	-0.18	-0.62	-0.05	0.15	0.11
Policy Area Budget Share	0.13	-0.20	-0.32	-0.58	0.11	-0.39	-0.27	0.30	0.00
Percent Republicans	0.19	-0.03	-0.02	0.04	-0.25	-0.06	-0.18	-0.22	-0.23



**Table 7:** Correlation Matrix Continued

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Budget Y/N</b>	<b>Staff Y/N</b>	<b>Complexity Y/N</b>	<b>Salience AVG</b>	<b>Positive Const</b>	<b>Power</b>	<b>Policy Area</b>	<b>Percent Republicans</b>
Budget	1.00							
Staff	0.37	1.00						
Complex	0.03	-0.30	1.00					
Salient	0.18	0.14	0.52	1.00				
Positive Construction	0.37	0.41	0.47	0.49	1.00			
Power	-0.09	-0.45	0.18	-0.34	-0.19	1.00		
Policy Area Budget Share	-0.33	-0.28	-0.68	-0.59	-0.89	0.24	1.00	
Percent Republicans	-0.02	-0.14	0.04	0.44	-0.10	-0.32	0.01	1.00

## RESULTS

I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as the primary estimation method. Given the count nature of the dependent variables, I also use a negative binomial model as a robustness check and calculate marginal effects to facilitate interpretation. In addition, due to heteroskedasticity present in the data, the models were estimated with robust standard errors as an additional robustness check. The results from these additional estimations are qualitatively similar to those derived using linear regression.<sup>2</sup> Hence, in the discussion below, I focus on the baseline OLS results.

The models are estimated only for the years when the task forces are active. This results in 73 observations for the analysis out of a total of 93 observations in the data set. When reviewing the models, it is immediately observable that all models for each of the three dependent variables are highly significant with p-values of less than 1% for the joint test for the coefficients of all explanatory variables in each model.

I estimate six OLS specifications for each of the three dependent variables: 1) policy outputs: activities, 2) policy outputs: recommendations, and 3) policy outcomes: legislation. The three dependent variables are distinct and show low correlation below 0.36. Models 1-3 examine the effect of size and makeup of a task force, operationalized as total number of representatives (size) and percent of private and nonprofit actors (makeup reported as the ratio of private/non-profit out of the total number of representatives). Models 4-6 test the effect of sectoral diversity operationalized by the number of types of different sectors (public, private, or nonprofit) represented on a task

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<sup>2</sup> For brevity, I do not report these additional estimations. The results are available upon request.

force. Within each set of three models, the first considers the salience and complexity of the policy area and the second examines the social construction and power of the respective target populations. The last model presents the effects of all terms. All models account for the policy areas' spending (in millions) and the percent of Republican Party members in the House of Representatives.

### **Policy Outputs: Activities**

Table 8 contains the estimations for task forces' policy output measured as number of activities. Task forces report their activities and achievements in their annual reports. Such activities consist of grants awarded, events and trainings held, and analyses or guides produced.

Model 1 explains 70% of the variation of task force policy outputs in terms of activities, as indicated by the  $R^2$  value. The results show that the size of a task force is negatively associated with its productivity. For each one-person increase in the total number of representatives, activities decrease by 0.41. To present this differently, every five additional members on the task force are associated with a reduction of two activities. I also note that an increase in the fraction of private actors by 1% is associated with a reduction in the activities of a task force of 1.8 activities. Both effects are highly significant, with p-values less than 1%. Further, activities decrease by .83 activities for an increase in the fraction of non-profit actors of 1% and the effect is significant the 10 percent level. Budget and staff presence also significantly affect task forces' activities. Presence of budget is associated with an increase of 43.17 activities. The effect is highly significant as indicated by the p-value of less than 0.01. Interestingly, staff has an opposite effect, presence of staff person leads to a reduction of 33.85 activities.

Complexity is associated with a decrease of 39.16 activities and is highly significant at the 1%. An increase of 1% in salience is associated with an increase of .09 activities and the effect is significant at 5%.

To sum, the task force size (measured as the number of participants), makeup (measured as the percent of private or non-profit actors), and the complexity of a policy area decrease policy outputs operationalized as task force activities. Having a smaller group of decision-makers with more public actors in the representation makes it easier to produce more activities, the “lower-hanging fruit.” Task forces also tend to report more activities in policy areas that are salient to the public. Overall, these seem like easy wins achieved with less debate among representatives coming from similar backgrounds.

Model 2 tests the effect of policy area on activities but operationalizes policy area following Ingram and Schneider’s (1993) typology using the social construction and power of policy target population. The  $R^2$  value shows that the model explains 65% of the variation in the activities. Similar to Model 1, each additional representative on a task force brings down activities by 0.46 and the effect is highly significant at the 1 percent level. For an increase of 1% in the fractions of private actors and nonprofit actors, activities drop by about 2.17 and 1.4, respectively. As before, task forces with allocated budgets have higher outputs in terms of activities, while those with designated staff tend to generate less activities. Both positive social construction and power have slight negative effects on activities, however the effects fail to reach significance at conventional levels.

Model 3 tests for the effects of all the variables related to the size and makeup of the task force. We continue to see a negative and significant effect of size on activities.

The ratio of private actors continues to have a negative effect, as for an increase of 1% in private actors, activities drop by about 1.34. However, the effect of non-profit actors switches to positive, with every 1% increase in non-profit actors increasing activities by 1.04. Budget continues to have a positive impact, while staff loses its significance. The effect of complexity becomes larger, and activities decrease are 69.41 fewer for complex areas. The effect of salience also compounds, and for every unit increase in log-salience, activities increase by 12.15. Positive social construction decreases activities by 51.44, and there is a small positive effect of power, increasing activities by 0.10.

Models 1-3 consistently show that smaller task forces and task forces with more public actors, as well as task forces that operate in salient and noncomplex policy areas produce more policy outputs measured as activities. In other words, to have “lower-hanging fruit” achievements, you cannot have too many “cooks in the kitchen.” More representatives may make achieving consensus difficult and slow down the group from taking action. The same logic also seems to apply to the task force makeup. The percent of private actors, especially, is significantly and negatively associated with number of activities. Once again, we can theorize that diversity of actors decreases the ability to achieve faster results as in the form of various activities and achievements reported by a task force. Ease of achievement of policy outputs as activities is facilitated by higher salience and lower complexity of the policy area. Stated differently, issues that are of higher importance to the public would get more attention from the task force and be a way to get quick recognition and appreciation from the public. The efforts in areas of lower complexity would also facilitate implementing more activities as they require less technical expertise to execute. Similarly, we see indication of lower outputs in areas with

positively constructed target populations without power. This would confirm the theory that policy areas with negatively constructed target populations may receive more attention and concern from task forces as they bear higher problem severity.

Models 4-6 operationalize the diversity of actors participating in a task force differently by measuring the number of types of actors (public, nonprofit, or private). All three models have  $R^2$  values ranging from 60 to 74 percent and joint significance of variables at the 1 percent level. The coefficient on *Sectoral Diversity* is significant in all three of the models. In Model 4, we observe the effects of complexity and salience. We continue to see activities decrease by 37.85 for complex areas. Activities continue to increase, by 9.71, for every unit of log-salience. Budget continues to be positively and significantly associated with an increase in activities of 31.95. Staff is negatively associated with activities but does not show significance in this model.

In Model 5, we observe the effect of positive social construction and power. Every additional type of actor decreases activities by 37.34 and the effect is highly significant at better than the 1 percent level. Presence of budget leads to an increase in policy outputs of 39.49, a p-value of less than 0.01. Moving from a negative to positive social construction decreases policy outputs by 26.30 as indicated by negative and significant at the 1 percent level coefficient. In Model 5, the coefficient of *Power* is positive, yet not significant.

Lastly, in Model 6, we consider the effects of all of the variables on activities when considering sectoral diversity. Every additional type of actor decreases activities by 20.57 and the effect is highly significant. Presence of budget leads to an increase in policy outputs of 29.95. Policy outputs decrease by 44.33 for complex areas. Positive

construction of the target social areas decreases policy outputs as activities by 44.10, and power has a small positive effect.

The takeaway from the models of policy outputs operationalized as the number of activities reported by a task force is that diversity of representatives consistently has a significant negative effect on outputs. These results go against my first hypothesis that diverse task forces will produce more outputs. Having a budget, on the other hand, has a consistently positive and significant impact. Staff appears to have a mixed, and weak, effect. The impact of resources on task force performance warrants more investigation in future research.

My estimations also clearly document the importance of policy context. Task forces in complex policy areas such as defense and environment tend to produce fewer activities. This makes sense as problems that require higher technical expertise would not be as simple to achieve outputs. On the other hand, salience has consistently a positive, and mostly significant, effect. Issues that have higher importance to the public draw more attention and create opportunities for simpler, faster “wins” for a task force. A possible explanation is that politically powerful target populations can create pressure and obstacles for task forces. We also register lower policy outputs for task forces in policy domains with positively constructed target populations. This result is consistent with the notion that most task forces are created to solve long-standing problems associated with negatively constructed social groups.

### **Policy Outputs: Recommendations**

Table 9 presents the models for policy outputs operationalized as recommendations. These constitute formal recommendations submitted to the legislature

or the Governor, as official outputs of the task force. We run the same specifications but with recommendations as the dependent variable. Models 1-3 test the effect of size and makeup of a task force, operationalized as total number of representatives (size) and shares of private and nonprofit actors out of the total number of representatives (makeup). Models 4-6 estimate the effect of sectoral diversity operationalized by the number of types of actors (public, private, or nonprofit).

Starting with Models 1-3, we document a similar, albeit smaller, effect of the total number of representatives on policy recommendations. For each additional member, the number of recommendations decreases between 0.08 to 0.13 units, and the effect is significant at the 10 percent level or better across all three models. Interestingly, Model 1 shows that task forces in complex policy areas produce more recommendations. To interpret, moving from non-complex to complex policy areas is associated with an increase by 11.26 recommendations. From this result we can glean that the policy area complexity and the technical expertise of the task force members aid the group in producing more policy outputs in the form of recommendations. This contrasts with policy outputs in the form of activities. Further, task forces in areas with positively constructed target populations tend to produce fewer recommendations (Model 2), an effect similar to the one registered in the model for activities. In contrast to policy outputs as activities, policy outputs as recommendations see a more consistent positive effect from staff. Staff presence leads to an increase in activities by 18.62.

Moving to Models 4-6, we document a positive effect of task force diversity on policy recommendations, but the effect is significant only in Model 5. For each additional type of actor, recommendations increase by 5.26. Interestingly, we see that budget has a



positive, but insignificant effect on policy outputs as recommendations. Future research should investigate the effects of budget on task force productivity at a deeper level. Staff, however, shows a significant positive impact, as presence of staff leads to increases in policy recommendations between 16.79 and 17.46, an effect significant at the 1 percent in all three models. In these models we see positive, but insignificant effects from complexity and salience on policy outputs as recommendations. However, we do see a significant effect of positive construction decreasing recommendations by 5.98. Thus, ease of achievement of policy outputs as recommendations is facilitated by negative social construction.

### **Policy Outcomes: Legislation**

Table 10 depicts the models using policy outcomes as the dependent variable measured as pieces of legislation adopted based on the task force's work. These constitute house or senate bills, or amendments voted by the Florida legislature.

The same models are estimated, with the first three testing the impact of the size and makeup of a task force on policy outcomes, and the second three examining the effect of sectoral diversity. The first three models reveal the similar pattern regarding the size--having a higher number of representatives negatively affects the pieces of legislation adopted as a result of a task force's work. The effects are, however, smaller than those in previous models and insignificant. Regarding the makeup, Model 1 reveals a positive effect of having more business representatives on a task force. In other words, for an increase of 1% in the share of private actors, adopted legislation increases by .126 ( $p$ -value  $< 0.05$ ). As in previous models, complexity is inversely related with policy outcomes. Moving from noncomplex to complex policy area decreases legislation by

4.32. As before, task forces dealing with salient policy areas tend to produce more legislation. We also observe that having more nonprofit representatives compared to public ones negatively affects the outcomes in Model 2. Per Model 2, for each percent increase in the ratio of nonprofit to public actors, legislation decreases by 18.48. This denotes that for the task forces in the data set, increasing nonprofit actors seem to add little to the productivity of the group. We also register some positive effects of political power on policy outcomes.

Models 4-6 confirm the positive effect of sectoral diversity on task force's performance in terms of legislative outcomes. Compared to previous models, we see that having representatives from more sectors assists with more outputs (recommendations) and outcomes (legislation). Diversity can be seen as a positive driving force for the group to achieve results. We also note that the presence of staff has a significant positive effect on legislative outcomes.

## **DISCUSSION**

In this analysis, we use task forces to study collaborative governance and test existing theoretical frameworks for collaboration. Prior work argues that diversity of partners, presence of budget and staff, and policy area context may affect the collaborative process.

This study sought to address the gap in collaborative governance literature regarding tracing inputs to outcomes across policy domains. My results provide new insight into another level of intricacy considering different types of outputs (activities and recommendations) and outcomes (legislation). The analysis shows that diversity of sectoral representation on task forces may actually be a hindrance when working towards

simpler, more achievable outputs such as activities. However, we do see a clear positive link between sectoral diversity and higher levels of outputs such as task force recommendations and outcomes in the form of legislation. It is also apparent that too many representatives on a task force hurt its productivity. Therefore, collaborative governance groups need to remain sensitive to both the diversity of stakeholders represented, as well as the size of the group. While too many cooks in the collaborative kitchen are bad news for performance, there is a need for the right level of expertise and diversity for the task at hand. Policy outcomes in the form of legislation saw the greatest benefit from a having a higher share of private actors. Policy outputs in the form of activities saw the greatest detriment from having a higher share of nonprofit actors. This may be due to private actors having a higher level of technical expertise as high levels of complexity decreases the policy outcomes (legislation), and non-profit actors may have the lowest level of technical expertise as high levels of complexity decreases the policy outputs (activities).

Overall, policy outputs operationalized as activities suffered from higher sectoral diversity of actors serving on the task force. The presence of budget and staff had varying impacts on outputs and outcomes. This could be a too many cooks in the kitchen scenario when the objectives are more attainable, as seen in specifications 4-6 the great benefit the presence of staff has in producing policy outputs (recommendations) and policy outcomes (legislation). Future research could test if higher diversity of types of actors necessitates staff to help manage the interactions and decision-making processes of a group, seeking more complex objectives. In terms of a policy area, higher complexity had little effect on policy outputs (recommendations) and decreased results for both policy

outputs (activities) and policy outcomes (legislation). This is expected, considering that higher complexity of the policy area makes the work towards outputs and outcomes more difficult. Higher salience of the public policy area increased outputs and outcomes across the board. Interestingly, task forces working in policies with positively constructed target populations produced fewer policy outputs and outcomes. This signals that negatively constructed policy areas such as criminal justice pose greater problem severity and warrant more attention from collaborative governance regimes and legislators. We also notice higher coefficients for policy outputs (activities) across the board, which also signals those activities are both more easily achievable, and more influenced by the factors at play.

**Table 8:** Predicting Task Forces' Policy Outputs Measured as Activities

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Size	-0.41** (0.10)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.46** (0.11)	-0.34** (0.09)				
Sectoral Diversity					-5.75 (4.42)	-4.97 (3.77)	-15.57** (4.31)	-11.68** (3.91)
Ratio Private	-182.98** (37.76)	-43.32 (48.16)	-217.11** (39.87)	-183.30** (34.48)				
Ratio Non-Profit	-82.98^ (52.27)	161.52* (76.13)	-140.12** (54.15)	107.39^ (67.17)				
Budget	43.17** (6.13)	19.65* (7.97)	46.00** (6.71)	40.72** (5.79)	19.60** (3.60)	20.37** (3.07)	20.88** (3.92)	22.55** (3.49)
Staff	-33.85^ (19.29)	57.93* (28.39)	-56.68** (19.80)	20.40 (22.70)	7.78 (9.79)	9.72 (8.35)	-6.94 (10.81)	-3.91 (9.58)
Positive Construction			-9.19 (9.22)	-83.69** (16.70)			-26.74** (8.31)	-61.05** (10.74)
Complex	-39.16** (11.75)	107.05** (37.41)			-52.86** (10.08)	82.61** (28.21)		
Power			-0.03 (0.08)	-0.75** (0.16)			-0.04 (0.08)	-0.44** (0.12)
Salient (log)	9.43* (4.54)	35.38** (7.56)			13.76** (3.31)	21.03** (3.17)		
Salient (log) × Complex		-26.54** (6.52)				-19.23** (3.81)		
Positive Const × Power				0.80** (0.16)				0.57** (0.13)
Policy Area Spending (log)	-2.37 (2.73)	-11.29** (3.28)	1.82 (3.81)	-17.80** (5.06)	-0.19 (2.64)	-1.87 (2.27)	2.77 (2.66)	-2.75 (2.67)
Percent House Republicans	-37.39 (52.31)	-29.36 (46.88)	31.95 (46.92)	79.77* (40.93)	-25.39 (54.06)	25.66 (47.19)	81.97^ (51.18)	106.02* (45.58)
Constant	50.23 (36.72)	-157.67** (60.72)	56.67 (39.65)	111.96** (35.38)	-41.66 (33.95)	-109.19** (31.90)	-14.89 (38.81)	16.43 (35.04)
<i>N</i>	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73
<i>F</i> -statistic	16.65**	20.35**	12.77**	18.51**	14.06**	20.10**	10.85**	14.55**
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.70	0.77	0.65	0.75	0.60	0.72	0.54	0.65
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.66	0.73	0.60	0.71	0.56	0.68	0.49	0.60

Note: The models report coefficients from linear regression estimations, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in all models is *Activities*. \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05, ^p<0.1.

**Table 9:** Predicting Task Forces' Policy Outputs Measured as Recommendations

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Size	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.14^ (0.07)	-0.08^ (0.05)	-0.10^ (0.05)				
Sectoral Diversity					11.41** (2.06)	11.58** (2.02)	10.81** (1.88)	10.88** (1.94)
Ratio Private	11.39 (19.14)	7.25 (27.48)	26.57 (19.25)	21.81 (19.53)				
Ratio Nonprofit	-26.10 (26.51)	-33.35 (43.44)	9.61 (26.14)	-25.20 (38.05)				
Budget	4.16 (3.11)	4.86 (4.55)	1.96 (3.24)	2.70 (3.28)	-3.33* (1.68)	-3.17^ (1.64)	-2.64^ (1.71)	-2.61^ (1.73)
Staff	7.10 (9.78)	4.38 (16.20)	18.62* (9.56)	7.78 (12.86)	22.61** (4.56)	23.02** (4.47)	21.37** (4.70)	21.42** (4.75)
Positive Construction			-7.34^ (4.45)	3.14 (9.46)			-6.09^ (3.61)	-6.65 (5.32)
Complex	11.26^ (5.96)	6.93 (21.35)			-0.74 (4.70)	28.06^ (15.09)		
Power			0.02 (0.04)	0.12 (0.09)			-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.06)
Salient (log)	-1.20 (2.30)	-1.97 (4.31)			2.35^ (1.55)	3.89* (1.70)		
Salient (log) × Complex		0.79 (3.72)				-4.09* (2.04)		
Positive Const × Power				-0.11 (0.09)				0.01 (0.06)
Policy Area Spending (log)	1.55 (1.39)	1.81 (1.87)	-3.28^ (1.84)	-0.52 (2.86)	-3.18** (1.23)	-3.53** (1.21)	-5.39** (1.16)	-5.48** (1.32)
Percent House Republicans	28.37 (26.53)	28.13 (26.75)	29.53 (22.66)	22.80 (23.18)	18.62 (25.21)	29.47 (25.23)	35.96^ (22.26)	36.35^ (22.59)
Constant	-26.59 (18.62)	-20.42 (34.65)	-8.42 (19.14)	-16.19 (20.04)	-44.51** (15.84)	-58.87** (17.06)	-18.88 (16.88)	-18.38 (17.37)
<i>N</i>	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73
<i>F</i> -statistic	6.59**	5.85**	5.53**	5.18**	6.57**	6.52**	6.45**	5.56**
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.48	0.49	0.44	0.46	0.41	0.45	0.41	0.41
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.40	0.36	0.37	0.35	0.38	0.35	0.34

Note: The models report coefficients from linear regression estimations, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is *Recommendations*. \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05, ^p<0.1.

**Table 10:** Predicting Task Forces' Policy Outcomes Measured as Legislation

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Size	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)				
Sectoral Diversity					3.34** (0.67)	3.36** (0.67)	2.00** (0.67)	2.43** (0.65)
Ratio Private	12.60* (6.50)	18.16* (9.28)	8.68 (6.36)	10.01^ (6.48)				
Ratio Nonprofit	4.84 (9.00)	14.58 (14.67)	-18.48* (8.64)	-8.73 (12.62)				
Budget	0.89 (1.05)	-0.05 (1.53)	1.24 (1.07)	1.03 (1.09)	0.27 (0.55)	0.29 (0.55)	0.30 (0.61)	0.49 (0.58)
Staff	6.88* (3.32)	10.54^ (5.47)	-1.55 (3.16)	1.48 (4.26)	6.54** (1.49)	6.59** (1.50)	4.43** (1.67)	4.76** (1.58)
Positive Construction			0.40 (1.47)	-2.53 (3.14)			-1.48 (1.28)	-5.27** (1.77)
Complex	-4.32* (2.02)	1.51 (7.21)			-5.62** (1.53)	-2.10 (5.05)		
Power			0.02^ (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)			0.00 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)
Salient (log)	1.49^ (0.78)	2.52^ (1.46)			1.70** (0.50)	1.88** (0.57)		
Salient (log) × Complex		-1.06 (1.26)				-0.50 (0.68)		
Positive Const × Power				0.03 (0.03)				0.06** (0.02)
Policy Area Spending (log)	-0.98* (0.47)	-1.34* (0.63)	0.18 (0.61)	-0.59 (0.95)	-2.05** (0.40)	-2.09** (0.41)	-1.42** (0.41)	-2.03** (0.44)
Percent House Republicans	-10.04 (9.00)	-9.72 (9.03)	5.23 (7.49)	7.11 (7.69)	-10.18 (8.22)	-8.86 (8.45)	6.22 (7.90)	8.88 (7.53)
Constant	-2.10 (6.32)	-10.39 (11.70)	-2.63 (6.33)	-0.45 (6.65)	-0.44 (5.16)	-2.20 (5.71)	-1.18 (5.99)	2.28 (5.79)
<i>N</i>	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73
<i>F</i> -statistic	5.41**	4.91**	5.06**	4.67**	6.39**	5.62**	3.85**	4.83**
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.44	0.44	0.42	0.43	0.41	0.41	0.29	0.38
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.36	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.22	0.30

Note: The models report coefficients from linear regression estimations, standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in all models is *Legislation*. \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05, ^p<0

## CONCLUSION

There has been lack of quantitative data in the collaboration literature, especially linking system context and initial conditions, to collaborative process factors, to outputs and outcomes. In addition, there is little quantitative evidence that these collaboration stages are positively correlated and consistently produce positive collaboration outcomes. “Moreover, collaborative governance usually happens among several autonomous actors and over time, which means that outcomes must be measured at multiple levels and stages. These and other challenges have created real obstacles to the robust examination of collaborative performance”(Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, 718). Understanding the collaborative process from inception to outputs and outcomes is crucial as public administration organizations strive to ensure efficient delivery of public services and address key challenges in a world of increasing complexity.

This study draws on task forces as vehicles of collaborative governance to test leading collaboration theories with data across four public policy areas. The analysis empirically examines the role of member selection and sectoral diversity, presence of budget and staff, and impact of policy context measured by complexity and salience of policy area and the social construction and power of target populations. This study has effectively addressed an existing gap in collaborative governance literature regarding the performance of collaborative forums by tracing inputs to outcomes across different policy domains. The results presented here provide new insight into another level of intricacy considering different levels of output and outcomes.

This study analyzed the task force performance in four policy domains in Florida. I theorized that task forces with high and diverse levels of public/private representation as



well as devoted organizational resources and staff support increase the number of policy outcomes that are formalized into policy legislation. The testing of the hypotheses confirmed that larger task forces see a decrease in outputs and outcomes due to a “too many cooks in the kitchen” effect, and that collaborative leaders should consider the right number of members and appropriate amount of diversity for a task force based on its goals. Upon testing critical mass effecting outputs and outcomes using quadratic effects, we noted varied results that warrants an area for future research. The second and third hypothesis showed a new level of depth to consider when approaching sectoral diversity in task force membership. Policy activities are hindered by too much diversity as they seek to achieve lower-hanging fruit than may be easier to achieve with more homogeneity. Contrastingly, an increase in number of types of actors increased higher-level task force outputs and outcomes. Considering the fourth and fifth hypothesis, the presence of dedicated budget and staff has significant impacts on policy outputs and outcomes, but the true impact remains unclear as it appears to be situational in nature. This is an area for further research. Finally, we observe that negative social construction, salience, and complexity affect the collaborative process as is theorized. Power offers another opportunity for further research as the effects on the task forces in the current data set are not significant overall. Future research could consider more policy areas and other state contexts, thus contributing to a larger n-data set. Increasing the scope of this study would further confirm the links from theory to practice and provide a deeper understanding of the situational impacts of budget and staff, and the contextual impacts of power. This task force model confirms the collaborative theory frameworks that link system context and process factors to outputs and outcomes. This key research links

theory to practice and proposes a way to measure best practice in successful collaboration outcomes. By using task forces as an operationalization of mandated collaborative governance, we achieve more clarity on the collaborative process. This provides a considerable positive contribution to the collaboration literature by increasing quantitative support for the existing theories founded in case studies, and thus increasing salience of collaboration strategies for researchers and practitioners alike.

## **ESSAY 3: A Cross-Sectoral Study of Mandated and Voluntary Collaboration**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Collaboration has been studied extensively, and public administration has an established view of the frameworks, processes, and factors at play in the collaborative governance process. However, we have largely ignored the approaches to collaboration in sister fields. One challenge of advancing collaboration research is to consider multiple theoretical and research perspectives (Bryson et al., 2015). In addition, although we have extensive frameworks and theories for collaboration from inception to outcomes, these frameworks remain largely untested, especially spanning public policy areas. This study presents new findings regarding the factors that enable and hinder the collaborative process from the perspectives of task force members spanning four public policy areas – child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and environment. These public policy areas were chosen following Sabatier & Weible’s application of Ingram & Schneiders social construction of target populations taxonomy (Ingram & Schneider, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The selection allowed for the inclusion of a public policy area to represent each quadrant of the taxonomy: defense (high power and positive social construction), environment (high power and negative social construction), child welfare (low power and positive social construction), and criminal justice (low power and negative social construction) The goal of this study is three-fold: 1) to explore the factors that enable or hinder collaboration across public policy areas, 2) to compare mandated vs. voluntary collaborative governance environments and 3) to consider the motivators for collaboration from a multi-disciplinary perspective. The study addresses the current gap in the collaborative governance literature by taking a cross-sectoral, multi-environment,

and multi-disciplinary approach (Douglas et al., 2020, 495) to increase our understanding of the motivations to collaborate as well as the differences between mandated and voluntary collaborative environments. The main research questions of the study are:

**Research Question 1a:** What are the factors that influence collaborative outcomes?

**Research Question 1b:** How do factors and processes differ in mandated vs. voluntary collaborative environments?

**Research Question 2:** How are these factors similar and/or different across public policy areas?

**Research Question 3:** How does motivation and collaborative culture differ across policy areas and through the lenses of public administration, political science, and policy studies?

By understanding the similarities and differences of the collaborative process in mandated versus voluntary collaborative settings and how the process changes across different policy areas, this study seeks to refine previous prescriptive understandings of the main determinants of collaboration and be able to adapt our knowledge to the collaborative cultures of specific policy domains, as well as to the needs of the context and problem at hand.

Public administration largely omits political science and policy studies' views on collaboration and avoids comparing the conditions of public policy areas beyond confirming that systems contexts vary and influence the collaborative process. Most existing studies focus only on one public policy area such as environment (Berardo & Scholz, 2010; Koontz & Thomas, 2006a; Leach, 2006; Raymond, 2006; Weber & Khademian, 2008), emergency management (Jung, K., Song, M., & Park, H. J., 2019; McGuire & Silvia, 2010b; Waugh & Streib, 2006), criminal justice (Brainard & McNutt,

2010; Waardenburg et al., 2019), or child welfare (Berry, C., Krutz, G. S., Langner, B. E., & Budetti, P., 2008; Dudau & McAllister, 2010; Marwell & Calabrese, 2015; Selden, S. C., Sowa, J. E., & Sandfort, J., 2006) just to name a few. Alternatively, many studies summarize the general frameworks and theories (Bryson et al., 2006, 2015; Emerson et al., 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Head, 2008; Nabatchi et al., 2017; O’Leary & Vij, 2012). Importantly, what emerges from the literature, especially when comparing public administration collaboration literature to political science and policy studies, is that there are some universal truths about the collaborative process. There are also public policy area specific conditions that impact the collaborative process. This study will explore the different approaches to collaboration, comparing public administration to political science and policy studies across four different policy areas and mandated and voluntary environments.

The study of collaboration has garnered significant attention due to its nature as a social phenomenon that can equip organizations to solve public problems they could not address on their own. Determining how and why collaboration is successful, and what factors and environments matter, is clearly an exploration of a social phenomenon. However, there are few studies of collaboration that effectively capture influential factors *across* public policy areas and disciplines. This qualitative study addresses this gap in the literature by presenting the results of interviews of public, private, and non-profit representatives from task forces across four public policy areas. The interviews relate the task force members’ experiences in forums established by the legislature and others that arose spontaneously.

In the first and second sections of the study, I will explore the literature regarding the relevant theoretical frameworks of managerial, political, and legal approaches to public administration (Rosenbloom, 1983), managerialism vs. adversarialism (Ansell & Gash, 2008), designing and implementing cross-sector collaborations (Bryson et al., 2015), and evaluating the productivity of collaborative governance regimes (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015) to conceptualize differences in collaborative contexts and motivations across public sectors.

I will then discuss the data, methods, and results of the study. This study draws on data gathered through semi-structured interviews with 26 participants representing Florida State Legislature mandated task forces in four public service areas: child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and environment. Task force data was collected from the years 2000 to 2020 and interview participants were invited from the most recent/active task force iteration, from one to two task forces in each public policy area. The study uses NVivo to analyze similarities, differences, and core themes in the interview data. I then review the resulting themes across the four public policy areas and discuss the meaningful results and concepts for consideration.

The reviewed theory informs the exploration of the three research questions regarding 1) the factors that influence collaborative outcomes, 2) comparing mandated and voluntary collaborative environments, and 3) considering the motivators for collaboration across public administration, political science, and policy studies. I will compare participants' responses and discuss similarities and differences between the literature and actual experiences as well as relevant definitions of collaborative factors in the results and discussion section.

Finally, I will conclude with the main take-aways of the study and discuss implications for future research. An important take-away for collaborative governance research is that collaboration is influenced by the norms, values, and pressures of the public policy area it is taking place in. Each public policy area has different levels of managerial, economic, and political influences that affect its prioritization of different collaborative factors. In addition, there are collaborative approaches and pressures to be considered from public administration, political science, and policy studies. Child welfare has a more managerial approach and prioritizes leadership and clear objectives/ the big picture. Environment spans a managerial and network economics approach valuing clear objectives and sufficient resources. Defense aligns with network economics balancing stakeholder engagement and resource management. Criminal justice has the most adversarial environment, prioritizing trust, reciprocity, and incentives. Universal factors that influence collaboration across the public policy areas, although they are prioritized differently in each sector are: 1) Trust, 2) Stakeholder Engagement, 3) Resources / Incentives, 4) Problem Severity, 5) Representation / Multi-Disciplinarity, 6) Leadership, and 7) Reciprocity. Three more process factors that emerged from the interviews are: 1) “the Right People”, 2) Clear Objectives, and 3) the “Big Picture”.

This cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary approach is new and significantly contributes to the vast collaborative governance literature. It increases our current understanding of collaboration and collaborative governance and moves the field forward in understanding the collaborative process from inception to outcomes across different public policy areas. It also provides us with greater discernment regarding the factors that influence collaboration, and in what contexts. This will allow us to move away from the

prescriptive lessons and public policy area specific results of past research and closer to applying theories and frameworks to span public policy areas. Awareness of the public policy area, influencing factors, approaches and pressures, and level of collaborative skill of the participants are all important aspects to leading collaborative governance with intentionality and success.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

In this section, I review relevant public administration theory to better understand and contextualize the participant responses and develop an applicable framework to analyze the study's results. These theories shed light on the different public policy areas and potential collaborative cultures they experience. It will also allow for a better understanding of what factors may be more influential in each public policy area. These theoretical frameworks were chosen due to their application to policy areas, administrative policy and regulatory politics, social constructions and policy agendas, and collaborative governance. These theories inform a layered framework created in this study to better understand how public policy areas may have their own regulatory and collaborative cultures, and how the public policy areas interact with the different approaches to collaboration we see in public administration, policy studies, and political science. This layered framework applies a similar approach developed by Rosenbloom (1983), then expands it to organize collaboration theory for the three disciplines and influencing factors. "Public administrative theorists must recognize the validity and utility of each of the approaches (managerial, political, legal). Consequently, a definition of the field of public administration must include a consideration of managerial, political, and legal approaches. Second it is necessary to recognize that each approach may be



more or less relevant to different agencies, administrative functions, and policy areas” (Rosenbloom, 1983, 225). The layered framework (Figure 8) presents the intersection of the three disciplines’ approaches to collaboration, the collaborative factors at play, and the theorized public policy area collaborative culture.

**Figure 8:** Layered Multi-Disciplinary Collaboration Theory and Factor Framework

<b>Layered Theory, Factor Framework</b>	Managerial	Network Economics	Adversarial		
Group Interest	<p><b><i>Public Administration</i></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Leadership</li> <li>- Clear Objectives / Big Picture</li> </ul>				
Mixed Interests				<p><b><i>Policy Studies</i></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Stakeholder Engagement</li> <li>- Resources</li> </ul>	
Individual Interest				<p><b><i>Political Science</i></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Trust</li> <li>- Reciprocity</li> <li>- Incentives</li> </ul>	


Rosenbloom (1983) sets forth his framework of the Separation of Powers and approaches to public administration based on three principal categorizations: 1) the managerial approach 2) the political approach, and 3) the legal approach. All three approaches discuss the individual and organizational/group views in these approaches (Rosenbloom, 1983). We see a continuation of this theoretical approach in Ansell and Gash’s discussion of the influence of managerial vs adversarial aspects of public groups. Ansell and Gash define collaborative governance in a way that distinguishes between adversarialism and managerialism – two contrasting patterns of policy making (Ansell & Gash, 2008). In adversarial politics, “groups may engage in positive-sum bargaining and

develop cooperative alliances. However, this cooperation is ad hoc, and adversarial politics does not explicitly seek to transform conflict into cooperation”. In adversarialism there is a winner-take-all form of interest intermediation, often aligned with political interests (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 547). Alternatively, in managerialism, “public agencies make decisions unilaterally through closed decision processes, typically relying on agency experts to make decisions” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 547). Additionally, Ansell and Gash refer to the other term of “policy network which typically imply cooperative modes of decision making among actors within the network and involves more boundary spanning”. Collaboration implies a more open process when compared to typical managerial / administrative processes. However, to better understand different approaches to collaboration, I categorize the influences based on Rosenbloom’s and Ansell and Gash’s theoretical constructions. Public administration can be compared with managerialism, reflecting aspects of organizational behavior and leadership. Political studies can be compared with adversarialism, with a more winner-take-all and interest-based approach. Finally, policy studies can be compared with “policy networks” where actors span boundaries to manage risk, gather resources, and make economic decisions along the networks. There are group vs. individual interests and managerial vs. adversarial interests that align to influence the collaborative governance culture. Well-managed and intentional collaborative governance could mitigate these different patterns to allow for a more open, representative, balanced, informed, and successful approach. “The term “collaborative governance” promises that if we govern collaboratively, we may avoid the high costs of adversarial policy making, expand democratic participation, and even restore rationality to public management” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 561).

However, we also have to recognize that different policy areas, as they may have different governing influences and varying influencing factors at play. A more informed and balanced approach could actually take these influences into account.

The next layer to the Collaboration Theory and Factor Framework presented in Figure 8 considers the most influential factors in the collaboration process and the existing collaborative governance process frameworks in the field. Bryson, Crosby and Stone provided a follow-up 2015 analysis to their 2006 literature review of collaboration and collaborative governance. They specifically focus on the research and frameworks developed by themselves in 2006, Thomson & Perry (2006), Ansell & Gash (2008); Agranoff (2007, 2012); Provan and Kenis (2008); Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2011); and Koschmann, Kuhn, and Pfarrer (2012). These public administration scholars have reached a consensus regarding the collaborative governance process as having at least three basic phases: 1) initial conditions or antecedents to the collaborative process 2) processes and drivers of collaboration and actions that lead to 3) outputs and outcomes (Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006, 2015; Thomson & Perry, 2006). In their review of collaboration and collaborative governance, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone summarize the major theoretical frameworks and findings from 2006 to 2015 (see Figure 9).

**Figure 9:** Cross-sector Collaboration Framework (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006, 2015)  
(Pinz et al., 2018, p.12)



Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) extend this framework to include the system context in which collaboration takes place (Bryson et al., 2015; Emerson et al., 2012). “Determinants of the collaborative governance regime are rooted in external context, including resource conditions, policy and legal frameworks, and politics and power conditions” (Bryson et al., 2015, 649). The factors influencing collaboration are listed in Table 11. Ingram & Schneider’s (1993) taxonomy provided the theoretical rationale for choosing the task forces for the study. In their typology of social construction and power, target populations are 1) advantaged (positively constructed and powerful), 2) contenders

(negatively constructed and powerful), 3) dependents (positively constructed and weak), and 4) deviants (negatively constructed and weak). Sabatier & Weible apply this typology and include the military as advantaged, environmentalists as contenders, children as dependents, and criminals as deviants. The selected four task forces fit well these descriptions.

**Table 11:** Influencing Factors and Collaborative Stages (Bryson et al., 2015)

<b>General Antecedent Conditions</b>	<b>Initial Conditions, Drivers, &amp; Linking Mechanisms</b>	<b>Collaborative Processes</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mandated vs. Voluntary</li> <li>• Political Dynamics</li> <li>Resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leadership</li> <li>• Sponsors &amp; Champions</li> <li>• “Big Picture”*</li> <li>• “Right Person”**</li> <li>• Formal Agreements</li> <li>• By-laws</li> <li>• Prior relationships</li> <li>• Existing Networks</li> <li>• Trust</li> <li>• Legitimacy</li> <li>• Incentives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trust &amp; Commitment</li> <li>• Communication</li> <li>• Legitimacy</li> <li>Collaborative Planning</li> </ul>
<b>Collaboration Structures</b>	<b>Intersection Processes &amp; Structure</b>	<b>Accountabilities &amp; Outcomes</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contextual Influences / Systems/ Policy Fields</li> <li>• Networks</li> <li>• Ambidexterity/ Flexibility</li> <li>• Power</li> <li>• Hierarchy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leadership roles, practices, and skills</li> <li>• Sponsors &amp; Champions</li> <li>• Managing Unity &amp; Diversity</li> <li>• Governance</li> <li>• Technology</li> <li>• Collaborative capacity &amp; competencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public Value</li> <li>• Immediate, intermediate, long-term effects</li> <li>• Resilience &amp; reassessments</li> <li>• Complex accountabilities</li> <li>• Authoritative Text/</li> </ul>

\* “Big Picture” – “initial, albeit general agreement on the problem definition that also indicates the interdependence of stakeholder organizations when it comes to addressing the problem; the ability to frame the issue at hand so that diverse partners can understand its importance and its relevance to them” (Bryson et al., 2015, 652).

\*\* “Right Person” – “having a collaborative mindset, as well as belief that a problem needs to be addressed, relevant educational qualifications, etc.” (Bryson et al., 2015, 652).

Public administration recognizes that more research needs to be done in order to truly understand how collaboration effectively works, test existing frameworks and theories, and identify factors that enable or hinder collaboration from inception to outcomes across public sectors. Public administration is still asking the question: what contextual, situational, and institutional design factors are consistently linked to processes and outcomes across sectors (Douglas & Ansell, 2020, 495)? This is the question this study explores through a cross-sectoral study of these diverse, multi-disciplinary perspectives of the collaborative governance process. Bringing all the above together in understanding the culture of different public sector, we develop the awareness and intentionality necessary of master collaborators.

## **DATA AND METHODS**

This study seeks to understand the factors that enable or hinder successful collaborative outcomes, how these differ across public policy areas, as well as the motivations to collaborate in mandatory and voluntary settings. The study draws on data gathered through semi-structured interviews with 26 participants representing Florida State Legislature mandated task forces in four public service areas: child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and environment. Task force data was collected from the years 2000 to 2020 through the Florida State Legislature Online Sunshine portal (<http://www.leg.state.fl.us/>) and interview participants were invited from the most recent/active task force iteration whose membership information was available online.

**Table 12:** Task Forces and Study Participants

<b>Task Forces</b>			
<b>Policy Area</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Florida Statute #</b>	<b>Name, Participant Numbers</b>
Child Welfare	5	39.303	Children's Medical Services Forensic Interview Task Force; Participants: 8, 10, 12, 16, 22
Criminal Justice	3	943.031	Florida Violent Crime and Drug Control Council Participants: 2, 6, 24
Criminal Justice B**	4	N/A	Supplementary - Miami Dade Office of the State Attorney; Participants: 18, 20, 25, 26
Defense	4	943.0313	Domestic Security Oversight Council; Participants: 7, 9, 11, 21
Defense	4	943.0312	Regional Domestic Security Task Force; Participants: 4, 5, 15, 19
Environment	6	379.2271	Harmful-Algal-Bloom Task Force; Participants: 1, 3, 13, 14, 17, 23
	<b>26</b>		

\*\* Due to the inactivity and security of the Florida Violent Crime and Drug Control Council, only three members were able to participate. To have an equal representation in the criminal justice area, participants were recommended through the Miami Office of the State Attorney as colleagues with experience on task forces or councils (although not through the Florida State Legislature). Those results have been reported and indicated as the results of those participants are consistent with the results of the Florida Violent Crime and Drug Control Council and the other task force members.

I used a purposive sampling technique targeting specific task force members, beginning with the chair and vice chair, and then targeting the following members based on random sampling or alternatively by the recommendations of previous interview participants. I continued with this style of sampling until data saturation was reached. The task forces and participant numbers are listed Table 12 (numbers randomly assigned for anonymity).

For this study of the factors that enable or hinder successful collaboration in mandated vs. non-mandated collaborative governance, I performed semi-structured interviews and ensured representation from each public policy area: child welfare,

criminal justice, defense, and environment. The perspectives per public policy area are operationalized via semi-structured interviews of task force representatives' experiences and review of secondary resources related to Florida State Legislature mandated task forces from 2000-2020. There is an average of 10-20 members per task force from the four public policy areas (not all task force members agreed or were available to interview). Therefore, I have conducted interviews to represent each of the four public policy areas, 26 interviews total (4-5 interviewees per task force for each policy area). This resulted in the total interviews specified in Table 12. Participants were invited to interview until there was data saturation and no new information was forthcoming. In the area of criminal justice, I discovered that the Florida Violent Crime and Drug Control Council (VCDCC) has been inactive beyond funding victim/witness protection and relocation reimbursement requests, as they have not received any financial resources from the state since 2008 to operate in a more general sense. There had been no activity in this task force beyond calling in for attendance roll call, during which the organizers noted that no funding was available to commence any additional activities. A separate higher-level council related to the VCDCC was created to address victim/witness protection funding requests, and those committee members were not available to interview due to the sensitive nature of their activities requiring high security clearance. In order to mitigate the low number of participants in the criminal justice area, I included results from four participants recommended through the Miami Office of the State Attorney. These participants were referred in the same manner all other participants were referred, through the final request at the end of each interview for other contacts in their area participating in this or related task forces. I have therefore included the results in this



study, noting them separately. These participants provided similar results to the other criminal justice and overall responses.

Semi-structured/standardized interviews are appropriate for my somewhat larger sample size and have been typically used in similar research studies with multiple sites, case studies, or larger sample sizes (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Semi-structured interviews provide a middle ground between standardized and unstandardized interviewing styles allowing me to implement a number of pre-determined questions and special topics, while still allowing for a flow of conversation. In this format I asked a standard set of questions of each interviewee in a systematic and consistent order (Appendix C), while allowing my interviewees the freedom to digress and explore other topics of importance (Harrell; Bradley, 2009). The interviews are semi-structured and somewhat standardized, so as to ensure specific questions are asked, which is a more manageable interview style considering the size of the population (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). The purpose of the interviews is to explore the task force members' experiences in the mandated task force compared to voluntary or ad-hoc collaborations in similar public service areas, and learning what factors enabled or hindered successful collaboration from taking place.

The semi-structured interviews took place virtually over zoom. Participants were sent confirmations and consent information before the interview starting. They confirmed their participation and consent either verbally or electronically. The interviews lasted forty-five minutes to an hour each. While all participants responded to the questions in Appendix C, I allowed for some flexibility in the order of questions, following the natural flow of conversation with each task force member. Interviews were recorded, then

transcribed, and any identifying information was removed. Instead, each participant was randomly assigned a number. No participant names were linked to the files. The files were then uploaded into NVivo for coding and analytical processes. Interview data were transcribed and analyzed using both inductive and deductive coding methods. First, I applied deductive techniques coding for the key words and factors mentioned specifically in the questions asked. I then applied inductive coding techniques for patterns and themes as they emerged in the interviews.

**I. Research Question 1a:** What are the factors that influence collaborative outcomes?

### **Universal Collaborative Factors?**

*“The factors that are absolutely critical to collaboration are: trust; funding and designated staff; leadership which is clearly defined, a way to make decisions, and making decisions in a clear and effective manner; commitment; a clear understanding of goals and responsibilities (the objectives); clear communication; follow-through; flexibility and adaptability; and a sense of purpose.” – Participant 26, Criminal Justice*  
*\*\*B*

In addition to differing lenses and approaches to collaboration, the three fields consider that different factors influence the collaborative process. The factors considered by each field align with their distinctive approaches to collaboration. Political science considers factors related to power, influence, incentives, stakeholders, interest groups, policy arenas, social capital, trust and political homophily. Policy studies considers factors related to economics such as resources, access, institutional actors, opportunity structures, networks, shared ideology, conflict, and risk. Public administration in comparison, considers factors that align with organizational behavior such as management, networks, communication, clear objectives, mutuality, effectiveness, flexibility, information sharing, and leadership. In my previous literature review I

identified collaborative factors shared by all three disciplines. The factors which emerged as commonalities across public administration, policy studies and political science also emerged as commonalities across the resulting interviews of this study spanning four public policy areas. The top factors mentioned across the three disciplines in the literature as well as the four public policy areas through the interviews include: 1) Trust, 2) Stakeholder Engagement, 3) Resources / Incentives, 4) Problem Severity, 5) Representation / Multi-Disciplinarity, 6) Leadership, and 7) Reciprocity. Three more process factors that emerged from the interviews are: 1) “the Right People”, 2) Clear Objectives, and 3) the “Big Picture”. These constitute the top ten factors that influence the collaborative process across the three disciplines and the four public policy areas presented in this study. However, a new theoretical framework is introduced which envisions that there are different factors more prevalent in different public policy areas that we learn from the three disciplines’ varying approaches to collaboration. First, I consider the factors that are influential across the board no matter the approach or perspective we take. These factors are problem severity, representation/multi-disciplinarity, and the right people at the collaboration table.

### **Problem Severity**

*“The task force arose out of a specific incident that I brought to the attention of a board who had the ability and the wherewithal and the influence to get a task force, to look at it in general. Sometimes you're able to take these specific instances and bring them to the level of let's look at it generally speaking, how can we solve this? Because typically the specific instance is not just one. There's a general problem out there, you know?” – Participant 22, Child Welfare*

*“We do it after even Homeland security incidents. For instance, when we had the Pulse shooting, the Parkland, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting, we do organically talk about what can we do differently? What were our gaps? How do we start fixing those gaps?” – Participant 21, Defense*

*“I guess the task force resurfaced when people's consciousness did, oh, there's a task force. What are you doing about it? That's what we talked about, getting the task force reinstated for a while. Then the governor provided a little poke and some money. Between that moving down of the taskforce, it had kind of done its job and drifted out of the public eye. But then when things got really bad and the public, they wanted it back. So here we are, we've been back to it a couple years now.” – Participant 17, Environment*

Problem severity is often a catalyst for collaboration as organizations are motivated to work together to solve problems they could not solve alone (Kalesnikaite & Neshkova, 2021). This is also expressed through the idea of “wicked problems”, a common term in public administration, defined as problems that are unstructured, cross-cutting and relentlessly difficult to address (McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Such problems spur collaboration and collaborative governance out of necessity to tackle problems greater than one single organization can solve. “These wicked policy problems cannot be solved simply by throwing more money or standard solutions at them; rather, they require innovative policy solutions” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011, 848). Political science also considers problem severity as catalyst, especially in its preference for institutional collective action theory. Policy studies put forward the Institutional Collective Action Framework which seeks to understand how governments use integrative mechanisms to overcome barriers to collective action and promote collaborative governance (Feiock, 2013; Feiock et al., 2012; Y. Lee et al., 2012; Shrestha & Feiock, 2011). However, both political science and policy studies consider this impetus to collaborate to solve problems through a lens of mitigating risk and spanning political boundaries (Berardo & Scholz, 2010). Problem severity is a motivator as long as the risks and costs of collaborating do not outweigh the potential benefits.

## Representation / Multi-Disciplinarity

*“It's multidisciplinary as well. You've got participants not only from law enforcement, but you also have participants from local EMS [Emergency Medical Services], EMT [Emergency Medical Technician]. You have firefighters all the way across as well as other public entities. Whether it's the board, the commissioner of agriculture or education there's a representative there for education and different things like that. It's very collaborative in that respect.” – Participant 11, Defense*

*“We have the law enforcement, we have prosecutors, we have victim advocates and then we have staff to support all those. Those are the ones that are actually sworn into the task force that are the day-to-day operators, basically of the task force. We have partners with, whether it's medical, housing, mental health, all kinds of different things. We work with DCF [Department of Children and Families] as well. It's got other government agencies. For this case, it's essential. We couldn't operate without them.” – Participant 25, Criminal Justice B\*\**

Another key factor emerging from all three disciplines is diverse and multi-disciplinary representation of participants in collaborative governance regimes. In public administration there is a clear understanding that diversity and multi-disciplinary representation in collaborative groups provide the necessary capacity and bandwidth for success (Kalesnikaite & Neshkova, 2021). “Communication, training, and a diverse selection of participants with multiple (representative) perspectives often are needed for building capacities” (O’Leary & Vij, 2012, 512). The range, scope, and diversity of interests represented, the knowledge and skills they bring to the table, and the resources they can mobilize both in their own organization and the collective greatly affect the collaborative network dynamic (Head, 2008). In political science the importance of diverse and multi-disciplinary representation lies in the importance of spanning boundaries and interests. While groups tend to form around existing coalitions and shared ideologies, expanding to a more diverse representation will strike a better balance in addressing public concerns (Cain et al., 2020). Policy studies agrees, viewing

collaborative policy networks as “characterized by discursive properties, specifically reciprocity, representation, equality, participatory decision making, and collaborative leadership” (de Leon & Varda, 2009, 59). The literature stresses that all relevant and significant interests be given a standing in public decision making (Scott & Thomas, 2017).

### **The Right People**

*“I think more than just the knowledge base, it’s being able to understand, and again that doesn’t mean that an elected official can’t educate themselves. But I think there’s a disconnect if they haven’t had that experience for the right way to look at it, so to speak. I’m really careful in saying, you know, the right versus the wrong way, because again, they’re elected for a reason, they’re elected to represent the state or the community that they’re coming from. But if they don’t rely on those subject matter experts to at least guide them in the right direction, that could be a failing.” – Participant 11, Defense*

*“I think everybody needs to have a voice and it needs to be the same voice and people need to be mature about it. And I think you sometimes just because people are well positioned doesn’t mean that they have the maturity to discuss things, that they have opposing views. And you can have opposing views. I say this all the time about I’m one political party and somebody else, another political party, they can have opposing views from me. And as long as they talk about it, rationally, I’m willing to listen. I would see a lot of taskforces or groups not working because people just take it personally.” – Participant 8, Child Welfare*

In public administration there are references to what constitutes “the right people” in terms of representative bureaucracy, empowerment, expertise, authority, and leadership capabilities. Leach discusses this in terms of empowerment and authority, “whether each participant has adequate authority to negotiate on behalf of his or her organization” (Leach, 2006, 107). Purdy (2012) presents a framework in which each category (formal authority, resources, and discursive legitimacy) includes aspects of “the right people” at the table in assessing the power in the collaborative process (Purdy, 2012). These include the selection of the participants, the expertise of the representatives,

and that the representatives understand and can analyze the issue, as well as the status and “voice” of the representatives. Policy studies assumes that actors participate in collaboration after considering the costs and benefits, and in alignment with their own interests and purposes. (Scott & Thomas, 2017, 194). In political science, there is an affirmation of government and interest group representatives holding power in collaborative governance settings, and that private citizens should be included in order to mitigate typical power influences (Cain et al., 2020). Who exactly “the right people” are to participate in collaboration is a bit more fuzzy in the literature as it is an amalgamation of various aspects. This study will shine some new light on who “the right people” are based on task force participants’ perspectives, and why they are motivated to set “clear objectives” towards achieving the “bigger picture” of collaborative governance.

What emerged from the participant interviews illuminated that indeed, public policy areas have different cultural contexts, and these contexts influenced the collaborative governance style, even as task forces called upon multi-disciplinary and diverse members. This study further explores individual and collective interests, the political, managerial, and contextual influences at play, as well as the leadership and governance structures in place to encourage motivation throughout the collaborative process. First the resulting descriptions of influencing factors by participants are presented with supporting evidence from literature from the three disciplines.

### **Leadership**

*“I would think it has to do a lot with leadership. And do you have people? We've put these groups together, but do you have people that really know how to lead and carry it through? I know that there's supervisors that I've dealt with, that, you have meetings, okay, we're going to do all this. And then they're like, okay, what are the deadlines that we're going to do that by? When is this going to happen*

*versus you go to others and they're just like, we're going to do this. And it's all great. And it's all beautiful. And then you meet the next week and it's like, oh, okay. Nobody did anything. All right. I think it's a leadership thing. I think it's just putting people who have the ability to lead and to bring it forward, keep it going.” – Participant 25, Criminal Justice B\*\**

*“And they're actually able to help fuel things and make things progress quicker with a lot of momentum because they backed, it, supported it, they've actually vocalized it which ends up being a yes. So, what was a no becomes a yes, because they provided very important feedback that has been actively included in the planning or strategic thought process with everything. Having that very open collaborative platform with everybody right off the bat, no matter who you are, you're part of this.” – Participant 5, Defense*

Across the disciplines we can see that leadership plays an important role in both initiating, driving, and encouraging commitment and follow-through during the full collaborative process as well as managing authority and power. In public administration leadership is a major component of the initial conditions of cross-sector collaborations (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006, 2015), although there are some diverse points of view as to how leadership comes into play and in what specific roles or activities. Leadership is also an important driver of collaboration separate from the system context the collaboration takes place in (Emerson et al., 2012). Leadership serves as an important champion of the collaborative effort and in encouraging the participants to move the collaborative effort forward. “Leadership can play an important role in encouraging collective action without relying on trust among cooperators” (Raymond, 2006, 37). Sullivan, Williams, and Jeffares (2012) identify five configurations of leadership for collaboration: 1) as co-governing through inclusive relationships, 2) as negotiating dynamic complexity, 3) as judicious influence by elites, 4) as the achievement of key outcomes, and 5) as co-governing through expert facilitation (Sullivan et al., 2012). In political science collaborative leadership is debated in terms of authority, hierarchy, and



power. In Fischer and Sciarini's (2016) study, preference similarity and perceived power are the only two factors that matter in all 11 decision-making processes of their study of drivers of collaboration in political decision making (M. Fischer & Sciarini, 2016).

Bertelli, McCann, and Travaglini (2019) discuss collaborative governance as delegation of power from the federal to the state level, and how leadership and authority are passed on to be managed in collaborative partnerships to solve public problems (Bertelli et al., 2019).

### **Clear Objectives**

*"There's no one telling you to do it. It's more like you all have a common goal and you'll probably be willing to invest time in it. And I think that's pretty much it that the people doing it really care about it. The challenge is people might be so passionate that they're doing a voluntary thing, they may not want to see the other side." – Participant 12, Child Welfare*

*"We need to understand what's going to happen. I mean, we're trying to be the best stewards to our community that we can, we're trying to support our community, and we need to have a clear direction." – Participant 9, Defense*

### **The Big Picture**

*"It's a non-funded council. The people that sit on it are really there because they have an interest. And they feel that it's an important thing to help keep our citizens safe and secure." – Participant 7, Defense*

*"And so, you know, while the legislation requires that we have a dedicated school safety specialist in each district, you know, some of that is getting watered down in the sense that they say, okay, you're the school safety specialist, but you're also over transportation and food service and business services and 16 other things. We're starting to see a little bit of that. And it's like, how do you prevent that slide? How do keep the mission?" – Participant 2, Criminal Justice*

Kettl (2006) refers to mission, resources, capacity, responsibility, and accountability as the five roles of boundaries that have long played a role in American public administration (Kettl, 2006). Mission "defines what purpose policy makers mean

the organization to pursue”, as well as what not to pursue, and is a sign of the organizations commitment to address a problem (Kettl, 2006, 14). O’Leary & Vij (2012) discusses Huaxhuam (1993)’s proposition of how a collaborative advantage is achieved and will continue until an objective is met “that no organization could have produced on its own and when each organization, through the collaboration, is able to achieve its own objectives better than it could alone” (O’Leary & Vij, 2012, 510). Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2015) discuss the importance of collaborative planning, which is intentional and formal with early designation of mission, goals, and objectives as well as roles and responsibilities (Bryson et al., 2015).

### **Stakeholder Engagement**

*“And all these research prioritization efforts, those involve external stakeholders. A lot of our time, all these collaborative efforts, I mean, I would even consider the Florida HABS task force includes external stakeholders.” – Participant 1, Environment*

*“I would say one thing would be good that we were missing is funding so we can have people that it impacts the most to be part of the task force that may not have money. I can get going with homelessness, you want a homeless person there, substance abuse, you want that foster care. You want foster kids being delinquent, you want delinquent kids to be there. That was one piece missing. But I think enough of us represented them that we felt we could cover that base.” – Participant 12, Child Welfare*

Stakeholder engagement refers to involving key constituents that have interest or would be impacted by the collaboration. Stakeholder engagement emerges from all three disciplines as extremely important in the collaborative process. It ensures input from interest groups, impacted community members, and a diverse level of buy-in from multiple organizations and agencies. “Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they establish — with both internal and external stakeholders — the

legitimacy of collaboration as a form of organizing, as a separate entity, and as a source of trusted interaction among members” (Bryson et al., 2006, 47). Stakeholder participation and understanding of the existing and needed knowledge is required to address wicked problems from a collective mission (Leach, 2006; Weber & Khademan, 2008). Political science also understands the importance of stakeholder engagement in collaborative governance processes, and now recognizes public administration scholarship in the definition of collaborative governance as “a regime in which multiple stakeholders (e.g., public agencies, groups of citizens, business interests) jointly deliberate over public problems” (Bertelli, A. M., McCann, P. J. C., & Travaglini, G. L., 2019, 378). However, Bertelli points out that the more formal legislated and political forms of governance often do not include the capacity to engage and deliberate with stakeholders, and that the addition of collaborative provisions such as stakeholder engagement increases political uncertainty (Bertelli et al., 2019). Policy studies sees stakeholder engagement as a potential solution to the dysfunctional structures of policymaking and views stakeholder groups within the policy process (Henry, 2011). Stakeholder groups can help solve challenging public problems by mitigating typical top-down and bottom-up approaches to yield agreements and recommendations in all stages of the collaborative process (Koontz & Newig, 2014).

### **Resources and Incentives**

*“The money question is always there. I don't think it will ever not be there as much as we try on the task force to not worry about the money on the project development side, and then try to figure out where to find the money for the project later. Ultimately, the money always does matter because there's oftentimes ... we have to make some decisions on those projects connected to the money that's available.” – Participant 19, Defense*

*“It started, there wasn't any money, but you know, here you are a task force trying to come up with research priorities without any money. And they don't really go anywhere because there's no authority for anything.” – Participant 23, Environment*

*“One of the challenges with the task force, right, and you may have seen it, like you've already referenced. One of the challenges is, and I'll speak for myself and my current position - I have my own division and my own responsibilities to my agency, right. Day- to-day responsibilities. Where do we find the time to then participate in the task force and see value in participating in that taskforce? That's the first challenge.” – Participant 18, Criminal Justice B\*\**

*“One of the things that made this particular task force, you need to have someone who's going to be there... but it's, writing the report, editing the report, putting it together, things described at meetings. Because people are doing a lot of talking, so there's a piece to this that you need kind of a support role, whoever that might be, to make sure that you're getting a product. And that you're reviewing that product. Someone's got to send it out. Someone's got to set the meeting. These are all things, again, that take up a lot of time. And in our task force, you know, the one that kind of brought us together was the department of health, and we use their personnel to do that.” – Participant 16, Child Welfare*

Collaborations require both resources and incentives to fuel and sustain the process. Resources can take various forms such as financial, human, technologies and others that help support the collaborative endeavor. They can also signify a commitment and buy-in from the participating organizations to see the collaboration through (Kettl, 2006). Incentives “refer to either internal (problems, resource needs, interests, or opportunities) or external (situational or institutional crises, threats, or opportunities) drivers for collaborative action” (Emerson et al., 2012, 9). Both resources and incentives are considered important drivers of collaboration in public administration, and in Emerson and Nabatchi’s framework, they are essential to the collaborative process successfully unfolding. Political science also views resources and incentives as a major influencing factor. “Many critical issues that political scientists study— such as collective

action problems, international cooperation, and economic development—are influenced by the flow of ideas, information, and resources between those connected political actors” (Desmarais et al., 2015, 392). However, we can see the perspective in political science of “pay to play”, in essence collaborative environments requiring a certain amount of resources, social capital, and influence for organizations to participate. Similarly, policy studies considers that policy actors tend to participate in collaborations to increase their own access to political resources, and often within ideological similar groups. Since no one actor has enough resources to unilaterally impact policy, they need collaborations with others to pool together their resources. “In a policy context, resource dependency theory therefore emphasizes the use of collaborative ties to maximize one’s access to political resources. The most efficient way of doing this is to seek out collaborative partners who are influential in the subsystem due to their control over (or access to) critical resources such as information, technology, personnel, or political clout” (Henry, 2011, 367).

## **Trust**

*“[We’re all] different people, but by the end we all knew each other... We probably knew of each other's reputation at some point just because this was a very high-level task force. But in the end, I thought we had a lot of trust. I think, as we went through the process, we develop more trust.” – Participant 12, Child Welfare*

*“And we set up various committees made up of subject matter experts to go over those requests to make sure that in fact, those were legitimate needs and legitimate requests all in an effort to build that trust from those agencies that, that the domestic security task force is in fact, working for the benefit of the entire state and not just simply for the larger communities, the largest cities or counties in our, in our state.” – Participant 4, Defense*

In public administration trust is a key component, an important starting condition, and a facilitating factor to collaborative governance. Trust-building continues through the

collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008). It is very important that participants either have a history of working together or feel a mutual identification and/or commitment to the goal/mission of the collaboration. Thomson and Perry (2007) define trust through Cummings and Bromiley's work as, "a common belief among a group of individuals that another group will: (1) make "good- faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit and implicit," (2) "be honest in whatever negotiations preceded such commitments," and (3) "not take excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available" (Cummings and Bromiley 1996, 303)" (Thomson et al., 2009, 28). Collaborators that are new to each other can also develop trust through "clear communication, reciprocity, goal alignment, transparency, information and knowledge sharing, and by demonstrating competency, good intentions, and follow-through" (O'Leary & Vrij, 2012, 4). In political science trust is aligned with shared ideology and coalitions and is amplified by the number of allies and contacts. Collaborators' trust increases if they sense the other organization is a member of the same coalition (Leifeld & Schneider, 2012). Trust is thus related to social capital and political homophily and can be increased through small dense networks, enhancing agreement among participants (Gerber et al., 2013; Scholz et al., 2008). Policy studies also views trust as an important managing factor of collaborations, which are built on strong relationships and networks often formed around shared policy views (de Leon & Varda, 2009). However, policy studies also considers that policymakers may spend more time "on creating incentives and assurance mechanisms to encourage collaboration, rather than the potentially fruitless task of building of social capital among rival stakeholders" (Raymond, 2006, 37). Trust therefore is both a crucial and complex building-block of

collaboration as well as a factor requiring an investment of effort both at the beginning and throughout the collaborative process.

### **Reciprocity**

*“But to me, it's about collaboration. What's most important about collaboration is good communication, finding out what I want, finding out what they want and, and trying to figure out a place where our wants and goals intercede on the Venn diagram.” –Participant 18, Criminal Justice B\*\**

*“What I find is a lot of times with these positions, there is this expectation to serve a greater purpose than your own jurisdiction. And I think that we go in there with the mindset to give and take, and these collaborations are only as good as one's willingness to share information and intelligence.” – Participant 15, Defense*

In public administration reciprocity and trust are concepts that are closely related. Thomson and Perry distinguish reciprocity as an “I-will-if-you-will” mentality “based on perceived degrees of the reciprocal obligations each organization/partner will have toward the others” (Thomson et al., 2009, 28). Political science sees reciprocity as mutual cooperation in the development of social capital (Berardo & Scholz, 2010). Similar to public administration but perhaps more centered on individual interest, political science sees reciprocity as a kind of quid- pro-quo. “If an actor receives information from another actor, it is more likely to send information to this actor” (Leifeld & Schneider, 2012, 733). Policy studies agree on this view of reciprocity and its importance as a collaborative and collective action factor. “Reciprocity is the most fundamental value in most social interactions among organizations as well as individuals (Ostrom, 1998). Actors who receive resources or information from others are expected to return them in some other form” (Lee et al., 2012, 554). This array of approaches and lenses to collaboration as well as the differing definitions of the top influencing factors means that we need to consider this multiplicity of perspectives when approaching a collaboration.

**II. Research Question 1b:** How do factors and processes differ in mandated vs. voluntary collaborative environments?

**Volunteered or Mandated Collaboration**

*“Oftentimes those (volunteer groups) grow out of a short-term necessity without any formal structure to them without any formal mandates, without any statutory authority, without any bylaws without any formal structure. Basically, without that, oftentimes it comes down to leadership and personalities on the direction that ad hoc voluntary group goes. I’m not saying that’s a bad thing, that allows for a lot of flexibility, right? And oftentimes it’s an ad hoc task force for a local robbery spree or a regional robbery trend that can be a very positive thing because it allows the flexibility to quickly adjust at a more operational level. When you look at the more formalized structure, it limits the flexibility because there are bylaws that we have to follow.” – Participant 19, Defense*

*“A lot of the ad hocs usually happen at the ground level. They’re usually more in line with, multiple jurisdictions or disciplines tackling a problem that’s facing them. They decide that they’ll come in and get together and work towards achieving that one goal. Most of the time they’re pretty effective because the people working together know one another and want to work on the problem so there’s a lot of good communication. They’re effective from that perspective, getting things done and accomplishing and moving things along. I think where they have a hard time is sometimes when the problems become a little more long-term and you might need more formal assistance from an agency, and you don’t have those formalized commitments, that you might have a problem or resources getting pulled. Because again, it’s an informal get together like you, me and somebody else deciding that we’re going to work together on something. And then at some point, my boss pulling me from that program into something else. Overall, they’re usually, in my experience anyway, pretty effective while the original members are there. Because again, they’re driven, they have a clear goal of what it is they hope to accomplish, usually as people that combine or develop a task force because they already get along. They combine their resources going forward.” – Participant 6, Criminal Justice*

As noted above, participants reported that mandated and voluntary collaborative environments serve distinct purposes. Voluntary environments may better serve short-term objectives that require flexibility and adaptability to quickly address an issue, while mandated environments provide the structure, funding, and reported better suited to achieve long-term objectives. A review of the collaborative literature from the three



fields highlights that it is important to consider the influence of this environment and if it is mandated or voluntary when studying collaborative governance. Per policy studies, when collaboration is mandated, collaborative work is required by a third-party of organizations within its sphere of influence (Rodríguez et al., 2007). Mandated collaboration is fundamentally political in nature and can only be effective when the actors involved have previous collaboration experience, aligned authorities, and similar values and interests, per Rodriguez et al. Participants risk losing their legitimacy if they don't agree to participate. "It is important to note that the values sought by the political approach to public administration are frequently in tension with those of the managerial approach. For instance, efficiency in the managerial sense is not necessarily served through sunshine regulations which can dissuade public administrators from taking some courses of action, though they may be the most efficient, and can divert time and resources from program implementation to the deliverance of information to outsiders. Consultation with advisory committees and "citizen participants" can be time consuming and costly. A socially representative public service may not be the most efficient one" (Rosenbloom, 1983, 221). In summary, the managerial influences on control task forces, such as the sunshine laws and requirements for specific stakeholder engagement, may actually pose an obstacle to solving short-term problems best addressed by ad-hoc volunteer groups. Also, the political forces that emerge from stakeholder engagement can also exert pressure that dissuades fast action.

In contrast, per political science voluntary collaborations develop from relationships fostered by individuals through institutional links, thus fomenting reputational collateral and enabling the careful selection of transaction partners. Relationships foster

reputational social capital, which further builds and encourages trust, a crucial factor to effective collaboration. “By focusing on voluntary exchange, voluntary information provision, and alternative reputation mechanisms, our study demonstrates that selection effects and information provision dilemmas are perhaps as important in the study of real-world reputation institutions as are the cooperative decisions that receive most formal analysis” (Ahn et al., 2009, 412). It is interesting to consider this view from political science which highlights those individual interests (propagated in game- theory) can be mitigated through voluntary relationships based on reputation, further motivating collaboration.

Public administration views mandated collaboration as often aligned with public governance goals. “Public agencies may initiate collaborative forums either to fulfill their own purposes or to comply with a mandate, including court orders, legislation, or rules governing the allocation of federal funds” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 545). Although courts or the legislature can mandate collaboration in task forces, councils, commissions, or boards, stakeholders often end up agreeing to collaborate voluntarily. These mandated forums can be essential especially in topics or issues where incentives to collaborate are weak, however mandated collaboration can also hide the lack of actual commitment from the participants (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Mandated forums should ensure they have commitment from their participants to address the issue at hand. Alternatively, voluntary collaboration is driven by the incentives of the stakeholders to engage, such as the benefits of knowledge, information, resources, and goal sharing. “Incentives to participate are low when stakeholders can achieve their goals unilaterally or through alternative means” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 552). Clearly it matters if a collaboration takes

place in either a mandated or voluntary/ad-hoc environment. This environment can reflect motivation, incentives, and commitment. What becomes clearer through the participant responses is that each environment, both mandated and voluntary/ad-hoc, have their purposes and applications.

**III. Research Question 2:** How are these factors similar and/or different across public policy areas? **Research Question 3:** How does motivation and collaborative culture differ across public policy areas and from the theoretical approaches of public administration, political science, and policy studies?

#### **Motivation: Why Collaborate?**

*“Quite honestly, the first thing from my perspective that's so important about collaboration, is the two parties realizing that it's in all of our best interest and we'd get better outcomes if we can sit down and come to some agreed upon resolution to whatever the problems and issues are.” – Participant 4, Defense*

*“The one thing that motivates the people is that you're going to do something. This isn't just some rubber stamp. You're not here to listen to nice people present and then do nothing. I think that's a motivator because we had good people in both of (the groups) and they worked hard on this. And the more they were interested in getting this right, that is the interview of children and handling of these cases, then the more interested they were in this thing.” – Participant 10, Child Welfare*

One major research question of this study is: How does motivation and collaborative culture differ across public policy areas and from the theoretical approaches of public administration, political science, and policy studies? As seen in the quotes above, understanding that collaboration allows the group to come to an agreement that works for all, as well as coming from a similar point of interest in the topic, helps the participants get the collaborative process “right” and produce outcomes. Collaboration is viewed an imperative in the public administration literature. This perspective originates

from the concept of public service motivation which causes an innate commitment to collaborate in order to solve wicked public problems. Based on prosocial and public service motivation, “given that collaborative governance processes are usually addressing public problems or issues, it is reasonable to expect that some participants will be motivated as much or more by their desire to contribute to collective well-being as by the goal of accomplishing their own individual objectives” (Choi & Robertson, 2019, 395). Realistically, a mix of personal, institutional, and social or public-oriented goals are involved in collaboration (Choi & Robertson, 2019). Leadership plays a key role in encouraging and motivating collaborative actors in bridging these varied interests.

Policy studies embraces the political motivations of collaboration more fully. “Frontline personnel, private stakeholders and target users stand to gain considerable political influence from active participation, and this might be a strong motivating factor. By contrast, elected politicians might for a number of reasons be reluctant to embrace the idea of collaborative policy implementation” either due to disinterest in tackling complex policy problems, or due to interest in focusing on simpler issues aligned with supporting interest groups, or that will aid in re-election (Ansell et al., 2017, 479). Exclusivity in forums and the expectation of successful resource exchange (e.g., information, power, and influence) are also viewed as strong motivators to collaborate (M. Fischer & Leifeld, 2015). Scott & Thomas, (2017, 202) propose several propositions as to why and when public managers choose collaborative governance strategies including 1) to manage resources, 2) broker a position within a network, and 3) reduce conflict and uncertainty. All three motivations serve to encourage collaboration.

Political science also views motivation along the lines of existing relationships and access to political power, influence, and resources. The stronger ties actors have in a network or collaborative process, the more likely they are motivated to participate. This motivation is compounded by shared interests and the leadership of elites who encourage motivation conformity (Siegel, 2009). “Actors engage in and invest in beneficial exchanges. Self-interested behavior together with limited rationality and the inherently incomplete nature of agreements make exchange risky. Actors, therefore, look for a governing mechanism that minimizes the transaction risks. Exchanges are also embedded in relationships. Relational structures such as mutual trust and mutual sanctions facilitate exchange by minimizing ex ante and ex post opportunism” (Shrestha & Feiock, 2011, 584). It is important to note that task forces are created with differing objectives which also influences the participants’ motivations. Some task forces are created with activities in mind, others to produce recommendations, some to influence policy and thus legislation created, and some a mix of these. Others are created simply for political reasons. The objectives of the task force may also be influenced by the policy domain context and collaborative culture. This study will further explore individual and collective motivations and interests, the political, managerial, and contextual influences at play, as well as the leadership and governance structures in place to encourage motivation throughout the collaborative process.

## **RESULTS**

Tables below present the themes from the semi-structured interviews per each policy area: child welfare (Table 13), environment (Table 14), defense (Table 15), and criminal justice (Table 16). The themes emerged from an analysis in NVivo.

**Table 13: Child Welfare**

Theme	Quotes
“the Right Person”	<p>“I know that we wanted to make sure that we included everyone that has an interest in it and people with a personality that want to solve a problem and not people that we're going to dig into their personal role” – Participant 12, Child Welfare.</p> <p>“A big ingredient is the individual background and experience of the members. If you've got people who have been deeply involved personally, in whatever area of endeavor, it's really helpful.” – Participant 10, Child Welfare.</p>
Motivation	<p>“I think, you know, the organic group realized they had to get to an answer quick because we had children to care for. And as long as we didn't have an agreement on how we're doing this, it's going to always be a problem.” – Participant 12, Child Welfare.</p>
Representation	<p>“I've done it much more so in child welfare, because it lends itself, this, this arena lends itself to a very multidisciplinary type of approach to trying to solve problems and overcome challenges”. Participant 16, Child Welfare.</p> <p>“I think, in my world, multichannel disciplinary teams are really important because they serve a specific purpose in what we do.” Participant 22, Child Welfare.</p>

In child welfare, the top factors from the interviews are “the right person”, motivation, and representation. In the area of “the right person” to be on the task force, passion and interest in the topic mattered the most, followed by expertise. In representation, a multidisciplinary and diverse participant body came through the interviews as the most important. The multi-disciplinary teams allow the task forces to triangulate necessary expertise and knowledge sharing in a public sector where multiple agencies across disciplines that interact on any given case. A more diverse and multidisciplinary task force allows for cross-sectoral logistics and coordination in providing the most efficient and helpful service to the minors impacted. As far as motivation, this public policy area reported motivation coming from interest in child welfare issues and the severity of the problem at hand. There is a sense of urgency and

level of advocacy that relates to the public policy area. It is relatively easy for participants in this area to be motivated by their interest in solving problems that directly impact a dependent group of the population. Multiple participants in this area referenced how passionate, involved, and knowledgeable all of the task force members were, hailing from multidisciplinary organizations from all over Florida.

**Table 14:** Environment

Theme	Quotes
Funding	<p>“It started, there wasn't any money, but you know, here you are a task force trying to come up with research priorities without any money. And they don't really go anywhere because there's no authority for anything. In the second year it was active we did get some funds to allocate and then prioritized took our previous list. And then we're able to prioritize and address, you know, two of our four objectives through some funds last year.” – Participant 23, Environment</p> <p>“Well, unfunded mandates, I mean, that's, that's the top-down example where we're doing this task force and you have to go to meetings and there's no money and there's no vision and everybody's looking at each other going, is this, do you want this? Do I want that? I'd say that's the downside.” – Participant 23, Environment</p>
“Big Picture”	<p>“That personal investment and then the knowledge base is really huge. Because of that, they all usually have an interest in, but also passion for the care and results. They're really looking at it from the perspective of what are the public needs and wants and making sure that we're not addressing these for a research interest or what might be financially successful or what the government wants, but what is we are body for the people. And, um, let's make sure that we're not just identifying what we think are issues, but what are the most important actions to address that our public caring interests. And I think that's really huge in other bodies that I've worked on.” – Participant 14, Environment</p>
Problem Severity	<p>“And, and honestly it (the task force) needs to exist. I see that as a gap. I kind of saw the (task force) opportunity as a way to not just address the technical issues through FWC [Fish and Wildlife Conservation], but to be able to push for as one of those voting members for the governor, you know, push for better communication and synergy with the (other task force).”</p>

	– Participant 3, Environment
“the Right Person”	<p>“that diversity, the complementary expertise of the members. That's really important. We're not all biologists, we're not all health professionals, we're not all government, uh, that, so it's really important. They have that expertise, that range of expertise, um, the experience everyone is well, some have more professional experience, and some have more personal experience, but there is an, they are leading experts on there, but they, they are also, um, largely inhabitants. They don't just work professionally in this capacity, and they don't just have, you know, scientific knowledge or expertise, but they're personally invested because they're also residents experiencing the issues from a personal level so they bring that joint, um, experience to it. That personal investment and then the knowledge base is really huge.” – Participant 14, Environment</p> <p>“I think that trigger points for success on any collaborative governance model or a structure is having the right people at the table. It's not just top-down leadership, it's bottom-up leadership and, and a common vision that we are better together than we are individually, which has a really high bar then.” – Participant 3, Environment</p>

In environment, the top factors from the interviews are funding, “the big picture”, problem severity, and “the right person” Funding played a major role in this task force. While the task force received funding in its initial launch, funding dried up in 2003 as the issue of harmful algal blooms became less of an issue obvious or important to the public. The task force spent several years dormant until the issue became salient again to the public at large and a fresh issue for politicians. The task force became active again in 2019 as it received support from the current governor and was provided funding to reinvigorate the task force. A common perspective from task force members was that the issue of harmful algal blooms is one that needs constant prevention and maintenance to avoid flare ups and keep the ecosystem balanced. However, this is not evident to the general public or politicians, and so the issue receives inconsistent awareness. As harmful



algal bloom knowledge is driven by scientific and academic endeavors, expertise on this task force was crucial – the “right people” with the right knowledge and experience with harmful algal blooms in the region had to be present on the task force. These members were motivated both by their expertise and interest in the topic area, as well as their passion for solving the problem of harmful algal blooms.

**Table 15: Defense**

Theme	Quotes
Funding	<p>“That’s an interesting question because if the executive group had no funding mechanism, if they had no governmental grants, I don’t know how many people would be there, right? Because if they’re not providing anything, why would they be there?” – Participant 9, Defense</p> <p>“And it’s important where some of those federal dollars get allocated and what those dollars get used for to ensure that the fire department in the local jurisdiction has the assets that they need to respond to a hazardous event, whether it’s manmade or accidental, whether the local SWAT team has the materials or the supplies they need to protect that local jurisdiction. And ultimately because federal dollars are used, whether or not that asset is available to other parts of the state, should it need to enter in an emergency declaration” – Participant 11, Defense</p>
“Big Picture” and Incentives	<p>“What I find is a lot of times with these positions, there is this expectation to serve a greater purpose than your own jurisdiction. And I think that we go in there with the mindset to give and take, and these collaborations are only as good as one’s willingness to, to share information and intelligence.” – Participant 15, Defense</p> <p>“Because of those same competing priorities. That’s where the hard decisions are made and where those hard discussions have to be had. And if they’re not in the same room, those discussions may not be made. I think it helps in that respect. It’s still family at the end of the day and you may argue and fuss and fight. But at the end of the day, it’s a united front. When the decision is made, everybody, you know, may not like it, compromises are made. But ultimately, I think for the good of the state the right decisions are ultimately gotten to.”</p>

	– Participant 11, Defense
“the Right Person”	<p>“I think the other is getting the right people to the table on the task force that have the ability and the desire to participate, the ability to maintain communication across that collaborative task force and to actually follow through, not just having, you know, quarterly conference call meetings and discussing what we should be doing, but actually taking action on those meetings, both communication to the members and making sure that we're actually taking action on those communications.” Participant 19, Defense</p> <p>“You want someone there to bring back the information, but you don't have anybody that can really provide what's needed for the meeting. And that makes sense. They may not know or have the authority to really vote in on something that they understand, and that can be a problem. And I, and I have seen that when people have had to send proxies and the person there is like, oh, I'm just here to take notes. It's like, well, you know, you could've just called in or something, that makes it more difficult.” – Participant 7, Defense</p>
Relationships	<p>“Typically, you know, some of the task forces that we work on at law enforcement are very much interpersonal, you know, you build upon the human interaction and relationships with other people to the point where you feel confident enough to be vulnerable. And sometimes when it comes to brainstorming and sharing there's an expectation that you'll say what you feel about a situation. And I think that it takes time to establish that.” – Participant 15, Defense</p>

In defense participants emphasized financial resources, the “big picture” and incentives, “the right person” and relationships. In contrast to the environmental area however, the defense area has been consistently funded at the state and federal levels throughout its existence, although federal dollars have been decreasing over the years. These financial resources are crucial as the task forces’ main responsibilities are identifying and approving funding requests for the various sheriff, police, fire department, and other defense related departments across the state. This structure means that participants have a strong motivation to participate, both for the bigger picture of

security initiatives and keeping the public safe, as well as for ensuring that their own agencies receive funding for crucial resources and projects. The “right person” in this public policy area should have the appropriate expertise, but more importantly should have the right level of authority to make decisions and participate in debates over strategic priorities. Membership on the task forces is agency driven according to position and the group is highly hierarchical and structured, reflecting the militarized culture of public policy area. This reflects in the importance of relationships among the members to help break down institutional silos and levels of authority and responsibility.

**Table 16:** Criminal Justice

Theme	Quotes
Motivation	<p>“The failures usually resulted from lack of motivation because of political issues, you would have a crash that killed someone, a crisis/problem that creates intense scrutiny on the issue, a politician would take issue and it would get done, but sometimes because the person is getting credit” – Participant 26, Criminal Justice **B</p> <p>“The better job that everybody sees that they're doing, the more likely they're going to want to continue that. I think morale is because we're all human morale is a huge part of like going the extra mile, doing the extra work, being more thoughtful about your work, you're willing to volunteer for tasks and willing to think creatively about solutions. I think morale is like the kind of underrated factor and I'm probably using the word like broader than most people would, but, you know, even if you look at countries that fail for problems with public corruption, you know, I would pin that all down to a morale factor. They would rather have the money than the respect of the title and the feeling of serving a common purpose. That's kind of like the one, the one catch all that I see as affecting the efficiency and efficacy of a task force.” – Participant 18, Criminal Justice **B</p>
Funding	<p>“At the most, I think it, when you start off small, you're able to do it with little bit of funding, but as you start growing your need of additional funding, and I think that's where it really hits. Funding is huge.” – Participant 25, Criminal Justice</p>

<p>“Right Person”</p>	<p>“Listen, at the end of the day, it's always personalities, right? Um, I'm sure you've you've seen that. Right? Sometimes they have personality issues, whether it be somebody higher up. A lot of it is personality. You got to have a team that fits right. You got to have a team that fits MDPD. You know, those police officers are a funny breed. They're all about the blue, right? They're all about their own.</p> <p>Everybody else is an outsider. It's tough. It can be sometimes even, even as a seasoned prosecutor it's hard to get in with them. But once you get in and they trust you, they can share their sources with you. Things like that, magic happens.” – Participant 20, Criminal Justice B**</p>
<p>Task Force in Name only</p>	<p>“I think it's mostly for, uh, people who want to testify or provide information, but need to have their identities hidden and that kind of thing. That's why it's closed. It's a very sensitive subject, but because the first half of the council and its activities have not really been funded for the entire time that I've been on the council, the meetings have been very short and we haven't really had an opportunity to discuss much of anything because the meetings pretty much go like this: Well, we still don't have any funding. Unfortunately, there's not really anything to discuss for this meeting. Anybody have anything they want to talk about? No, and the meetings over in five minutes. It's been like that for the last three years.” – Participant 24, Criminal Justice</p>

In criminal justice the themes of motivation via morale and credit-seeking, funding, and “the right person are major themes. Once again, we see differences in how these themes play out in the particular public sector. Motivation is discussed more in aspects of morale and accomplishment. This public policy area is much more impacted by politics and credit-seeking. Therefore, participants need to see early success and the group must be able to report positive metrics in order to continue working towards task force goals. Politics plays a role, and leadership is motivated by funding and the opportunity to achieve collaborative accomplishments that benefit their individual organizations. In the case of the Violent Crime and Drug Control Council, we see an example of a task force in name only that is not able to operate or make progress due to a lack of funding.

## DISCUSSION

What is evident in the above thematic groupings per policy area, is that many of the influential factors overlap and we see some universal themes. “The right person” comes across all the public policy areas as a crucial influential factor. However, within this similarity we also see differences as to what constitutes the “right person”. Child welfare prioritizes personal interest and passion in solving issues impacting the population, while environment prioritizes expertise in the subject area. Defense prioritizes authority and the ability to communicate and follow-through, while criminal justice speaks more to personality and relationships. Multidisciplinarity and the importance of diversity on the task forces come through across the policy areas as well. However, there seems to be a threshold between diversity and expertise. Having more diverse and multidisciplinary representation is mentioned by a majority of the participants as being crucial to the task force’s success, but expertise and knowledge of the subject area is equally as important. One question for future research that emerges is how do we break down disciplinary silos and encourage diversity in representation on task forces while ensuring participants have enough commonality in expertise and understanding of the subject area to be able to effectively participate?

This sheds some light on a new perspective on collaborative governance factors. Across the disciplines and public policy areas, we see the same factors come up as important to participants: leadership, “the right people”, “the big picture”, clear objectives, multidisciplinary representation, funding, problem severity and relationships. However, we also note that within these broad categories of influential factors, different public policy areas weigh different aspects of what makes up these factors as important.

“The right person” has different nuances to child welfare than to environment, defense, or criminal justice. This allows us to infer that there are collaborative cultural contexts to each public policy area. Consequently, different public policy areas have different motivations to collaborate. In some areas there is more of the public administration collaborative mandate, warranted by the public service motivation inherent to the public policy area, such as child welfare.

*“You should also know that at least in my field and child welfare, (collaboration) is almost required. Right? You are part of like every, every day there's, there's a different collaborative group or, or an additional collaborative group that needs staffing. Not just me, but my staff is on all kinds of different collaborative groups across the state and across our own local system of care. It's a big part of our culture, our everyday culture, at least in child welfare.” – Participant 16, Child Welfare*

*“They're really looking at it from the perspective of what are the public needs and wants and making sure that we're not addressing these for a research interest or what might be financially successful or what the government wants, but that is, we are body for the people.” – Participant 14, Environment*

In other sectors, such as defense, collaboration serves both a public service motivation as well as an economic motivation, allowing participants to network and advocate for the allocation of resources.

*“Ultimately that's the reason the council was put into place so that all of those multi- disciplinary individuals can come into the same room and have those conversations to ensure that the money goes where it should to do the most good.” – Participant 11, Defense*

In comparison, an area like criminal justice sees a much stronger influence of individual and adversarial interests, showing a more politically based culture.

*“Most people have a private desire for career or self-betterment, too, and usually it works better to collaborate than not.” – Participant 18, Criminal Justice\*\*B*

Considering these results and the three major research questions, 1) what are the

factors that enable or hinder collaboration across public policy areas, 2) how do mandated vs. voluntary collaborative governance environments compare, and 3) what the motivators for collaboration from a multi-disciplinary perspective are, we see some clear trends. Collaborative governance does in fact have factors that seem to have universal influence in enabling or hindering the process and outcomes. Those factors include funding (financial, human, and capacity resources), motivation (personal interest, “the big picture”, problem severity, accomplishment), “the right person” (expertise, personality, authority), problem severity (good cause, reactive problem solving, crisis), representation (multidisciplinary, diverse), leadership, politics, clear objectives, communication, and relationships. Participants across all sectors consistently reported that the presence and efficiency of these factors were crucial to the success of their task forces. They also communicated that a lack of these factors contributed to obstacles or having trouble within their task forces.

Motivation came across as a clear influence in entering in and sustaining a successful collaboration. However, motivation to collaborate as well as the aspects that make up these top influential factors varied across the public policy areas. When considering the layered theoretical framework of managerialism – network economics – and adversarialism, the public policy areas seem to line up to the different disciplines’ approaches to collaboration as represented in Figure 10 below. Motivation reported in the child welfare and environmental task forces most closely aligns with working for the public and group interest as well as public service motivation, aspects we see traced most often in the public administration field. Motivation in the defense task forces most closely

aligns with mixed interests and cost benefit analysis, balancing the interest of the public with the private interests of the organizations involved, and working with networks and relationships to ensure the effective distribution of resources, aspects we see reflected in policy studies. Lastly, the criminal justice task forces reported the most political and individual interests impacting their collaborative efforts, which aligns with approaches we see in political science. This view on collaborative cultures, approaches, and influences across policy areas and disciplines allows us as researchers and practitioners to better understand how to better approach collaborative governance in different contexts.

**Figure 10:** Public Policy Areas in the Layered Collaboration Theory and Factor Framework

<b>Policy Areas in Layered Framework</b>	Managerial	Network Economics	Adversarial
Group Interest	<i>Public Administration</i> - Child Welfare - Environment		
Mixed Interest		<i>Policy Studies</i> - Defense	
Individual Interest			<i>Political Science</i> - Criminal Justice

A mandated vs. voluntary environment does impact the collaborative governance process. I was surprised to learn that the majority of the participants preferred a voluntary environment to a mandated one. Voluntary or ad-hoc groups tend to grow out of problem-severity and a passion and commitment for solving the problem at hand. These ad-hoc groups tend to be more flexible, adaptable, and faster in addressing short-term problems. However, the participants reported that due to the lack of structure, these ad-



hoc groups dealt with issues of leadership, funding, and long-term stability. Mandated groups, on the other hand, provided more structured and consistent environments to address problems in the long-term, with funding and reporting structures in place to assess the success of addressing the problem into the future. However, they struggled with managing the bureaucracy of meeting sunshine-law requirements, ensuring the right people were at the table (not overly delegated up or down), and maintaining the same level of passion and commitment. However, several participants reported that regardless of the collaboration type, that they would continue participating in task forces because they understood the important role task forces play in addressing public problems. Several mentioned that both mandated and voluntary groups serve a particular purpose and role in public management, and that they felt a sense of accomplishment and pride in their contributions to both task forces and ad-hoc collaborative groups, although they did point out that both of these groups took time away from their regular roles, especially voluntary/ ad-hoc groups.

*“It's hard for me to say one work better than another, because honestly, even if somebody put a taskforce together that was say mandated by the legislature, but you don't have those components that I just mentioned in terms of the facilitation, the goal, the timing, you know, the fact that they put it together mandated by somebody doesn't make it as a task force. You know, I think the discipline and the structure is the most important thing, whether it's mandated by somebody like the legislature or whether it's an ad hoc thing that happens, that somebody takes on that facilitation.” – Participant 16, Child Welfare*

*“I'm the type of person that I like when you can just say what's on your mind and well, let's do some brainstorming. I love brainstorming. I love doing things, you know, up there and then, and working around it, you know, and poking holes and things. At the formal, by the time things get to the council that work's already been done. To me, that's the fun work. The council is there to say, you know, to put on that hat of let me look at this from a policy, stand for point from budgetary issues etc. And, you know, and they take those kind of big picture things and they say, yeah, that'll work and approve something, but they didn't do the blood, sweat*

*and tears part.” – Participant 7, Defense*

*“The ad hoc usually happen at the ground level. They're usually more in line with multiple jurisdictions of disciplines tackling a problem that's facing them. And so they decided that they would look at them and we'll just get together and work towards achieving that one goal. Most of the time they're pretty effective because of people working together to work on the problem until there's a lot of good communication and some type of all the participants are problem-solving. They're effective from that perspective, getting things done and accomplishing and moving things along. I think where they have a hard time is sometimes, um, when the problems become a little more long term and you might need more assistance formal assistance from an agency, and you don't have those formalized commitments that you might have a problem or resources getting pulled. Because again, it's an informal get together like you, me and somebody else deciding that we're going to work together on something. And then at some point, my boss pulling me from that program into something else. But overall, they're usually pretty effective while the original members are there. Because again, they're driven, they have a clear goal of what it is they hope to accomplish, usually as people that combine or develop a task force because they already get along. They combine their resources going forward.” – Participant 6, Criminal Justice*

*“I probably prefer the ad hoc. I like the clear mandate of the other ones, but for the ad hocs, the flexibility and the commitment of people to it, usually there's a clearer shorter- term goal. That's a one big thing about this task force. It's too large. The statute is too large. The task force only works as it breaks down the components of those tasks it's mandated, but it's supported. I think it's important that it's in the statute to show that there's support for it and an ongoing commitment to them.” – Participant 14, Environment*

## CONCLUSION

Public policy area collaborative cultures matter, and are influenced by their own managerial, economic, and adversarial influences that we can see described in public administration, policy studies, and political science. “Public administration theory must make greater use of political theory. Attention must be paid to the practical wisdom of the public administrative practitioners whose action is circumscribed by internal considerations of checks, balances, and administrative and political pressures generally” (Rosenbloom, 1983, 225). While there are universal factors that enable or hinder

collaboration such as: resources and incentives, mission vs group vs individual motivations, “the right person”, problem severity, stakeholder engagement, representation, leadership, politics, clear objectives, communication, relationships, trust, and reciprocity – the aspects that make up these factors vary across public policy areas, and certain factors have greater influence than others in each area. Motivation matters as well and is often aligned with sectoral influences we observe across the disciplines. Studies designed to cross disciplines and public policy areas allow us to make more in-depth comparisons that provide deeper context and realizations as to how collaborative factors change in characteristics and influence. This is the first step in realizing a research agenda that will better address the current gap in the study of collaboration and collaborative governance regarding the contextual, situational, and institutional design factors that are consistently linked to processes and outcomes across sectors (Douglas & Ansell, 2020). By designing multidisciplinary and cross-sectoral studies of collaboration, we can better understand what factors enable or hinder collaboration, how, when, and why. This equips us to enhance our skills as master collaborators and better approach the collaborative process in practice, adapting our techniques and tools to the context at hand. Future research should dive deeper into how we can equip participants to break down silos and participate in the collaborative process with improved and common language. For example, if expertise is a key component of “the right person” as a collaborative factor for a specific public policy area, how do we select or educate the right participants and increase the multidisciplinary and diversity at the collaboration table? Future studies should also seek to understand the empirical influence of factors on the collaborative process in order to have a more macro view of the most impactful

factors from inception to outcomes. By providing greater context to how collaboration works in different policy areas, universal influencing factors, and factors that have empirical influence on the collaborative process, we can better address the black box of what is actually happening behind the collaborative curtain.

## DISSERTATION CONCLUSION

More multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral studies that break down existing academic and sectoral silos would advance collaboration and collaborative governance research. Current requests for research seek to unite case study databases and define consistent factors and variables that can be studied across public policy areas (Douglas et al., 2020). This dissertation has made a compelling case for operationalizing task forces as vehicles for studying collaborative governance. Task force outputs and outcomes, as well as collaborative process factors such as designated human and financial resources, can be consistently observed through publicly available information. In addition, they allow us to get a glimpse into how collaboration has universal influencing factors, as well as policy-specific influencing factors. This enables us to consider the subtleties and complexity of collaboration implementation, as well as the different approaches to collaboration offered to us by public administration, policy studies, and political science. Through a systematic literature review of the sister disciplines, a quantitative empirical study of Florida State legislated task forces in four public policy areas, and a qualitative study of task force members' perspectives and experiences through mandated and voluntary collaborative environments, I have addressed the three research questions:

**Research Question 1:** What is the state of knowledge in public administration, policy studies, and political science on inter-organizational collaboration and collaborative governance processes and influencing factors from inception to outputs and outcomes?

**Research Question 2:** How do we measure the performance of collaborative regimes and how do system context (social construction, power, salience, and complexity of a policy area) and process characteristics (size, makeup, and sectoral diversity of actors, and the

presence of human and financial resources) impact task force outputs and outcomes?

**Research Question 3:** How do task force members perceive the factors that enable or hinder the success of mandated versus voluntary forms of collaboration across four public policy areas and what are the implications for the performance of collaborative forums?

### **Summary of the Findings**

The systematic literature review demonstrates that public administration, policy studies, and political science differ in their analytic approaches and theoretical lenses of collaboration and collaborative governance. Public administration views collaboration as a mostly positive, if sometimes difficult, imperative for organizations to work together to solve problems they could not individually. However, as public administration leans heavily on a public service motivation and consensus-based perspective, it does not closely examine the differing motivations actors bring to the collaborative table. Public administration can learn from policy studies and political science in their more realistic and comprehensive views of the collaborative process. Policy studies, for example, considers the costs and benefits to collaborating within a network context of economies. There are transaction costs to collaboration that may mean it is not in an organization's best interest to participate. Similarly, political science considers the more individualistic and game-theory aspects to collaboration. Actors may have purely selfish motivations, entering into collaborations for access to influence, power, and credit-seeking opportunities. This understanding of differing motivations provides a deeper contextual meaning to the system context, process, actions, outputs, and outcomes involved in the dynamic collaborative process. However, although the different disciplines approach collaboration from different perspectives, the results of the systematic literature review

shed light on some consensus. We clearly understand that there are four major components of the collaborative process: 1) initial conditions/system context, 2) process, structure, and governance, 3) contingencies and constraints, and 4) outputs, outcomes, and accountabilities. The three disciplines agree that trust, stakeholder engagement, resources/incentives, problem severity, representation, leadership, and reciprocity are the most recognized collaborative factors that affect the process. Contrastingly, the disciplines do show factors that differ among them, and may be more applicable to public policy areas with higher influences of public service and interorganizational relations (public administration), economics (policy studies), and/or politics (political science). For example, groups linked through networks of economies may feel heavier influence of shared demographics, opportunity structures, or economic incentives, while groups in political spheres may feel heavier influence of power, access, and political resources. Finally, we learn that the type of collaborative environment, mandated or voluntary, does influence the collaborative process and is an important aspect to keep in mind when studying collaborative governance regimes. Mandated collaboration is often aligned with public governance and public agencies and can serve to address longer term issues as well as incentivize stakeholders to engage consistently if the incentives to collaborate are weak. Voluntary collaboration, on the other hand, is primarily driven by the motivation of the stakeholders themselves when they can align efforts to make a faster, shorter-term impact on an issue that is of mutual interest.

The systematic literature review provided a deep understanding of the theoretical trends and overarching frameworks that explain the collaborative process across public administration, policy studies, and political science. The results provided clarity on the

stages of collaboration, the differing approaches, and the most influential factors on the collaborative process. It also provided the groundwork for considering task forces as an appropriate vehicle to study collaboration across disciplines and public policy areas. The empirical study then applies these concepts to task forces mandated by the Florida State Legislature from 2000 to 2020 across four policy areas—child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and environment, a total of 93 observations. The empirical study operationalizes the concepts and theories introduced in the literature review and effectively tests the frameworks and related factors. The main stages of the collaborative process – initial conditions / system context, process and governance, and outputs and outcomes, are tested with related variables. The set of hypotheses considers if social construction, power, salience, and complexity impact policy outputs as activities, policy outputs as recommendations, and policy outcomes as legislation. The next hypothesis considers if the diversity of types of actors (from private and non-profit sectors) increases outputs and outcomes. The final set of hypotheses looks at the impact of designated financial and human resources’ impact on policy outputs and outcomes. The OLS regressions examine the effects on each of the dependent variables. The results of the study confirm that diversity of actors improves collaborative outcomes, however, also shows a negative impact on outputs. This suggests that “lower-hanging fruit” objectives such as policy activities are more easily achievable by a homogenous group, while a heterogenous group is able to achieve more difficult policy outputs such as recommendations and policy outcomes as legislation. The results confirm that the presence of budget and staff have significant positive effects on outputs and outcomes. In addition, system context factors have significant impacts on task force outputs and outcomes. Positive social construction



negatively impacted all outputs and outcomes, suggesting that negative socially constructed public policy areas receive more attention and efforts due to the problem severity involved. Power had a very low impact on outputs and outcomes which signals that the task forces in the sample were mostly insulated from external political influences. However, they were not insulated from high public salience, as salience had a strong positive effect on both outputs and outcomes. Issues salient to the public therefore received more effort from task forces in the sample. Complexity had an overall negative effect on task force outputs and outcomes, signaling that issues that required higher technical expertise were more difficult to manage in the task force.

In the final essay, the study takes a deeper dive into understanding task force members' experiences and perspectives as part of collaborative governance regimes. The study explores their attitudes regarding the factors that enable or hinder collaboration, as well as how they compare voluntary and mandated collaborative environments. This study once again contributes to our understanding of how collaboration actually works, across public policy areas, and when considering the differing approaches to collaboration from public administration, policy studies, and political science perspectives. The results both confirm and contribute to our understanding from the literature review. It reveals that in practice there are universally influential collaborative factors as well as sector specific collaborative cultures that value different factors for collaborative success. While the universal factors include resources and incentives, mission vs group vs individual motivations, "the right person", problem severity, stakeholder engagement, representation, leadership, politics, clear objectives, communication, relationships, trust, and reciprocity – the aspects that make up these factors vary across public policy areas,

and certain factors have greater influence than others in each area. Motivations to collaborate do in fact vary across the different public policy areas, but most participants report that “the big picture” of the problem at hand, and an overall interest in addressing the topic kept them participating in the groups. The study also confirms that mandated and voluntary collaborative environments have different applications to public problem-solving. Mandated environments provide consistent structure, reporting, and funding that enable groups to address problems long-term. Contrastingly, volunteer environments are better equipped to address short-term issues and align with problem-severity and high levels of interest in the problem.

The three studies provide a full story of the collaborative process, across three disciplines, and four public-policy areas. The results support existing collaborative governance theory, as well as provide new insights about the impact of diversity, capacity, policy system context, motivation, and the influence of collaborative factors across public policy areas.

### **Limitations of the Study**

This study considered four public policy areas represented by child welfare, criminal justice, defense, and environment, within the context of the state of Florida. Another limitation pertains to the information made publicly available, and the consistency of information available for the task forces within the selected policy areas. Information was only accessible from task forces that had the necessary information readily available either via website or through a responsive administrative representative. Task forces in areas with less administrative support were more difficult to track down, and inevitably could not be included in the data set. This could result in a data set biased

toward task forces that are by their nature more financially and administratively supported, and thus more productive in outputs and outcomes. Also, there might be a selection bias in the task force representatives who agreed to participate in the interviews.

This study provides a strong argument for operationalizing task forces as forums for collaborative governance that allow to study outputs and outcomes. Future studies could seek to branch out to other states and policy areas to further study the effects of system context and process factors on collaborative outputs and outcomes. This would increase the generalizability of the inferences registered in this study.

### **Implications for Theory and Practice**

One of the implications stemming from the findings of this dissertation is that collaborative governance research should continue to branch out and seek to break down silos between disciplines and policies. Scholars should seek to increase the common dictionary of collaborative factors and the understanding of how different contexts influence the collaborative culture. It seems obvious to state that more collaboration needs to take place between researchers from different disciplines and public policy areas to join their studies, thus creating research with greater impact and generalizability. By identifying the perspectives and factors each discipline has contributed to the collaborative puzzle, and completely bringing them together to consider how the collaborative process actually plays out in mandated and voluntary environments across policy areas, we can shed further light onto the collaborative black box. This moves the field towards a more familiar toolbox, building proven competencies and techniques that can be adapted to specific environments and policy contexts.

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APPENDIX A  
**Included Top-Peer Reviewed Journals per Google Scholar Metrics**

**Public Policy and Administration**

[https://scholar.google.com/citations?view\\_op=top\\_venues&hl=en&vq=soc\\_publicpolicyadministration](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=top_venues&hl=en&vq=soc_publicpolicyadministration)

<b>Included</b>			
<b>No.</b>	<b>Publication</b>	<b>H5-index</b>	<b>H5-median</b>
<b>1</b>	Public Administration Review	58	87
<b>2</b>	Public Management Review	49	72
<b>3</b>	Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory	46	68
<b>4</b>	Public Administration	40	63
<b>5</b>	The American Review of Public Administration	38	57
<b>6</b>	Governance	38	54
<b>10</b>	International Review of Administrative Sciences	30	51
<b>11</b>	Policy Studies Journal	30	49
<b>12</b>	Administration & Society	30	46
<b>13</b>	Policy Sciences	29	48
<b>14</b>	International Journal of Public Administration	29	38
<b>15</b>	Social Policy & Administration	28	37
<b>16</b>	Local Government Studies	28	36
<b>17</b>	Review of Public Personnel Administration	27	52
<b>18</b>	Policy & Politics	27	48
<b>19</b>	International Public Management Journal	27	38
<b>20</b>	Policy and Society	26	37
	Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*		
	Public Performance & Management Review*		
<b>Removed (Not Applicable)</b>			
<b>7</b>	VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations	34	48
<b>8</b>	Science and Public Policy	32	45
<b>9</b>	Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy	31	43

\* Included journals based on contextual applicability, not listed in google scholar metrics

**Political Science**

[https://scholar.google.com/citations?view\\_op=top\\_venues&hl=en&vq=soc\\_politicalscience](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=top_venues&hl=en&vq=soc_politicalscience)


<b>Included</b>			
<b>No.</b>	<b>Publication</b>	<b>H5-index</b>	<b>H5-median</b>
<b>1</b>	American Journal of Political Science	69	105
<b>2</b>	American Political Science Review	58	97
<b>4</b>	The Journal of Politics	54	77
<b>5</b>	Comparative Political Studies	48	73



<b>6</b>	Journal of Democracy	47	73
<b>7</b>	Journal of Common Market Studies	47	65
<b>9</b>	Annual Review of Political Science	43	69
<b>11</b>	Party Politics	42	66
<b>13</b>	Political Studies	40	61
<b>14</b>	Democratization	40	57
<b>15</b>	Political Analysis	38	65
<b>16</b>	Governance	38	54
<b>17</b>	Political Behavior	37	57
<b>18</b>	Electoral Studies	35	45
<b>19</b>	Political Research Quarterly	34	50
<b>20</b>	Political Science Research and Methods	33	46
	Presidential Studies Quarterly*		
<b>Removed (Not Applicable)</b>			
<b>3</b>	Journal of European Public Policy	55	78
<b>8</b>	British Journal of Political Science	46	71
<b>9</b>	Annual Review of Political Science	43	69
<b>10</b>	West European Politics	43	64
<b>12</b>	European Journal of Political Research	41	60

\* Included journals based on contextual applicability, not listed in google scholar metrics

APPENDIX B  
PRISMA Results Flow Diagram



From: Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG, The PRISMA Group (2009). Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement. PLoS Med 6(7): e1000097. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed1000097

APPENDIX C  
Interview Guide

*To be read by the interviewer at the beginning of the recording after permission.*

<b>Interviewer:</b>	
<b>Date:</b>	
<b>Interview Type (e.g., Phone, Zoom, Skype):</b>	
<b>Starting Time:</b>	
<b>Name of the Interviewee (to be replaced by the pseudonym):</b>	

**I. BACKGROUND**

*I would like to start our conversations with some general questions about you.*

1. Tell me a little bit about your organization and what you do.
2. Does your organization or do you collaborate with many organizations? Are your partners mostly governments or private/nonprofit organizations (depending on the respondent's organization)?
3. Have you served on other task forces before?

**II. TASK FORCE EXPERIENCES**

*Now I will be asking you questions about your experience serving on the legislated task force.*

1. Can you tell me a little bit about your role on the X Task Force?
2. How would you describe your experience in X Task Force?
3. What motivated you and/or your organization to participate in X Task Force?
4. Did you have any concerns or reservations about participating? What were they?
5. In your opinion, what makes a task force work well, or what makes it have trouble?
6. How was success defined for X Task Force? In what ways would you say this taskforce was successful and ways it was unsuccessful?
7. OPTIONAL: Do you think the policy recommendations and the legislative acts that resulted from them properly reflected the taskforce members' opinions and perspectives? Did everyone get heard?
8. OPTIONAL: What have you learned from this experience? Has this experience benefited you/your organization? If yes, in what way? If not, why? Would you participate in another task in the future?

### **III. VOLUNTARY COLLABORATION EXPERIENCES**

*I also would like to ask you questions about your experiences in other, ad-hoc collaborations.*

1. What do you think motivates you and/or your organization to participate in collaborative projects/forums that are not taskforce-related?
2. In your opinion, under what circumstances are such collaborative arrangements successful or not successful? How do they differ from those for task-force-based collaboration?
3. How would you compare your experience in taskforce settings versus other non-task force- related collaboration? Which one was most successful / least successful?

### **IV. FACTORS AND OVERALL EXPERIENCE**

*In this section, we will talk about factors that may enable or hinder collaborative forums.*

1. In your experience, are there factors or aspects that allow a collaboration to be more successful or less successful? Such as financial or human resources? Can you think of some examples, positive or negative?
2. Are there any other factors that positively or negatively affect the process?
3. What about factors such as stakeholder engagement, trust, the severity of the problem at hand, representation on the task force, leadership, reciprocity, or politics?
4. How does the task force collaborative experience compare with voluntary collaborative projects?
5. Is there anything from your experience with collaborative projects that stands out upon which we haven't touched?

### **V. POST QUESTIONS:**

1. Would you participate in a task force again? Why or why not?
2. Are there any colleagues or other contacts and documents that you could share with me that will shed more light on collaborative practice?
3. Would you like to be kept in the loop and informed about the outcomes of this project?

*We are at the end of our interview. Do you have any questions for me or anything you would like to talk about that I have not asked about? We'd like to know who else you'd suggest for us to interview. These individuals could be, for example, policy makers, business leaders, and NGO or community leaders in your area participating in this or related task forces.*

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.**

## CURRICULUM VITAE

JENNIFER HILTON MONTERO

Born, Dallas, Texas, United States of America

- 2002 Study Abroad  
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile
- 2004 B.A., International Studies, Spanish  
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- 2022 – Present Director for International Initiatives  
International Center  
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- 2014 - 2020 Director, Office of Global Initiatives, and  
Center for International Business Education and Research  
Florida International University Business School  
Miami, Florida
- 2020 -2022 Doctoral Candidate, Public Affairs  
Florida International University  
Miami, Florida

### PRESENTATIONS

TAD Transatlantic Dialogue Session Presenter: From Processes to Outputs & Outcomes:  
Assessing the Performance of Collaborative Arrangements (June 2022)

ASPA Annual Conference Session Presenter: Linking Processes to Outcomes in Collaboration for Public Services: Research Trends and Agenda (March 2022)

ASPA Annual Conference Session Presenter: The Missing Link in Collaboration Theory – Connecting Motivation to Successful Outcomes with Dr. Susannah Ali (March 2019)

EQUAA Annual Conference Plenary: International Collaborative Agreements Best Practices (November 2018)

NAFSA Annual Conference Session Chair: Journeys to Undergraduate Dual Degree Programs (May 2017)