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Credibility and Opportunity: The Limits on U.S. Coercive Strategies After the Cold War

Danijela Felendes
dfelende@fiu.edu

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FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Miami, Florida

CREDIBILITY AND OPPORTUNITY: THE LIMITS ON U.S. COERCIVE
STRATEGIES AFTER THE COLD WAR

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

Danijela Felendes

2021

To: Dean John F. Stack, Jr.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs

This dissertation, written by Danijela Felendes, and entitled *Credibility and Opportunity: The Limits on U.S. Coercive Strategies After the Cold War*, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

Rebecca Friedman

Harry D. Gould

Félix E. Martin

Thomas A. Breslin, Major Professor

Date of Defense: July 2, 2021

The dissertation of Danijela Felendes is approved.

Dean John F. Stack, Jr.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs

Andrés G. Gil
Vice President for Research and Economic Development
and Dean of the University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2021

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DEDICATION

To my parents, Ruzica and Josip Felendes, and to my husband, Gerson I. Dias. I am eternally grateful for your unconditional love and support.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
CREDIBILITY AND OPPORTUNITY: THE LIMITS ON U.S. COERCIVE
STRATEGIES AFTER THE COLD WAR

by

Danijela Felendes

Florida International University, 2021

Miami, Florida

Professor Thomas A. Breslin, Major Professor

In coercive diplomacy, states employ the threat of force to get an opponent to change its behavior. A common belief is that strong military powers, such as the United States, make persuasive threats due to their capability to inflict punishment in the case of noncompliance. However, the record shows that the failure of asymmetric coercion has been a persistent feature of international crises. This finding inspires the core question of this dissertation: Why do weak states resist coercive threats from a militarily superior state, and under what conditions do weak states concede?

This dissertation addresses the question by proposing the Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle, a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crisis. At the core of this model are three conditions: Credible threats, credible assurances, and the international strategic environment favoring the coercer. This model predicts that in asymmetric interstate crisis, the target will acquiesce to the coercer's demands when all three conditions are present. To test the explanatory power of this model, this dissertation examines U.S. coercive strategies during the Bosnian War (1992-95) and during the Kosovo Crisis (1998-99). The dissertation employs a process tracing, structured, focused

comparison, and a modified form of the Boolean truth table to analyze how these three conditions influence the outcome of coercive diplomacy in three episodes of U.S. coercion in the Bosnian War and five episodes of U.S. coercion during the Kosovo War.

The evidence shows, as predicted by the CD Triangle, that credible threats, credible assurances, and the international environment favoring the coercer are present when coercive diplomacy succeeded. The evidence also shows that coercion in asymmetric interstate crises often fails even if the threats are credible (“believable”) and even if the international environment favors the coercer because the coercer underestimates the target’s “need” for assurances that the coercer’s demands are limited and true to those stated by the coercer. Consequently, to improve the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric interstate crises, a coercer should combine threats with assurances that the target will not be harmed if the target complies with the demands.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACTORD	Activation Order
ACTREQ	Activation Request
ACTWARN	Activation Warning
ADST	Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training
AP	Associated Press
CD	Coercive Diplomacy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chair of Joint Chiefs of Staff
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
G8	Group of Eight
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
ICFY	International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JNA	Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav People's Army)
KDOM	Kosovo Diplomatic Monitoring Mission
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLM	Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission

KDOM	Kosovo Observers Mission
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OAF	Operation Allied Force
ODF	Operation Determined Falcon
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PRD	Presidential Review Directives
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDS	Serbian Democratic Part
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America
USKDOM	United States Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
VJ	Vojska Jugoslavije (Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

“The general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one’s demands on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance” that the adversary will consider credible and potent enough to persuade the adversary to comply with demands.¹ In the words of Thomas Schelling, “[T]he power to hurt (...) is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply.”²

It would be logical to assume that strong military powers, such as the United States, would make persuasive threats due to their capability to inflict punishment (their “power to hurt”) in the case of noncompliance. However, the historical record does not support this conventional wisdom; the record shows that the failure of asymmetric coercion has been a persistent feature of international crises.³

The failure of coercive diplomacy and military coercion resonates strongly in U.S. foreign policy.⁴ Robert Art concluded from a combined set of twenty-two case studies

¹ See Alexander George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 8th ed. Robert Art and Kelly M. Greenhill (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015), 72.

² *Ibid.*, 6.

³ For example, the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) and Athens’ attempt to unsuccessfully intimidate the tiny island of Melos to surrender its neutrality; Russian coercion of Turkey which led to the Crimean War; American “Gunboat Diplomacy.” See Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,” *International Organization* 64, no.4 (Fall 2010), 628. Also, Paul Gordon Lauren, A. Craig, and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 203.

⁴ In asymmetric interstate conflict, the distribution of power favors the coercer, where the coercer (usually a great power) can threaten the survival of the target (usually a weak

that U.S. coercive campaigns, since the late 1930s, have succeeded roughly 30 percent of the time.⁵ Dianne Chamberlain concluded that during the Cold War (1947-1989) the United States issued compellent threats in eleven of forty-nine crises and the success rate was roughly 55 percent. Regarding the post-Cold War period (1989-2007), Chamberlain concluded that the United States issued compellent threats in eight of fourteen crises and the success rate was 25 percent.⁶ Phil Haun concluded that the United States failed to coerce the opponents in five out of twelve coercion cases that took place in the post-Cold War era (1989-2011).⁷ Robert Jervis confirmed that in the post-Cold War era the United States issued compellent threats which failed to convince a succession of weak adversaries, including Serbia in 1999, to change their behavior leading the United States to take on military action.⁸

state), but the target cannot threaten the survival of the coercer. See, for example, Phil Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 20.

⁵ See Robert Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?” in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 387.

⁶ See Dianne P. Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coercer Weaker States* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 59-70. Chamberlain used the data and case histories from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project as a starting point for her data set on U.S. compellent military threats in crises from 1945 to 2007.

⁷ See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 5-6. Haun used International Development and Conflict Management’s International Crisis Behavior (IISB) database and Kenneth Schultz and Jeffrey Lewis’s Coercive Diplomacy Database to evaluate U.S. success rate in coercing military weaker opponents. Haun also argues that in roughly 18 percent of case coercion is coded as failure.

⁸ See Robert Jervis, “Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs* 92, no.1 (January/February 2013), 105-115.

1.1 The Puzzle, the Research Questions, and the Main Argument

Taking into consideration that after the Cold War, U.S. military, economic, and political preponderance was without any serious competitor, it is puzzling that the United States has had difficulties in coercing militarily weak opponents, who often rejected coercive threats and refused to comply with the U.S. demands.⁹ Therefore, the key goal of this dissertation is to answer the following questions: Why do weak states resist coercive threats from a militarily superior state, and under what conditions do weak states concede?

The core of the argument presented in this dissertation is two-fold: First, building on the work of Thomas Schelling and Alexander George, this dissertation argues that three conditions *minimally sufficient* and *necessary* for the success of *coercive diplomacy* applied in the asymmetric interstate crises are: *Credible threats*, *credible assurances*, and the *international strategic environment favoring the coercer*.¹⁰ The three conditions comprise the *Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle*, a model for coercive diplomacy in asymmetric interstate crises. Second, this dissertation argues that coercion in asymmetric interstate crises often fails even if the threats are credible (“believable”) and even if the international environment favors the coercer because the coercer underestimates the

⁹ The focus is on the past instances where the United States used its military force in the conduct of statecraft as a means to communicate U.S preferences to the adversary, not as a use of brute force to impose its will on the adversary.

¹⁰ The distribution of power in asymmetric crises favors the coercer, where the coercer, a great power, can threaten the survival of the target, a weak state, but the target, a weak state cannot threaten survival of the coercer, a great power. See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 12.

target's "need" for assurances that the coercer's demands are limited and true to those stated by the coercer.¹¹

Why does this matter? First, failed coercive diplomacy (use of military threats), usually leads to military coercion (use of limited military force) and war (use of brute force). Therefore, one can argue that explaining why coercive diplomacy fails is important for scholars seeking to understand the causes of war and the conditions for peace.

Second, the current literature on coercion in international relations undertheorizes the importance of differentiating between the strategy of using *military threats* only (in this dissertation defined as *coercive diplomacy*) and the strategy of using *limited force* (in this dissertation defined as *military coercion*) to obtain compliance from the target. By differentiating between the two strategies, this dissertation explains under what conditions the target decides to resist the coercer's demands, despite that the coercer demonstrating the *will* and *capability* to escalate coercion, that is, despite the threats being perceived as credible by the target.

Lastly, this dissertation aims to make contributions to understanding U.S. foreign policy. Using the *CD Triangle* to analyze the cases where the United States was directly involved in coercing the weak targets should enhance understanding not only why the targets resist acquiescing to the demands, but also why the coercer escalates the crisis by elevating coercion from the *use of military threats* to the *use of limited force*. Identifying

¹¹ Phill Haun defines an asymmetric interstate conflict as one where a conflict arises between a powerful challenger and a weaker target over an issue controlled by the target. See Haun, *Coercion, Survival and War*, 21.

a condition missing from the coercive strategy should be helpful to policymakers when making the decision to escalate coercion. For example, the coercer's response to the target's "need" for assurances (tied to target's expectations and "anxiety" of further demands) can be solved with diplomatic engagement and not with military escalation. Therefore, the *CD Triangle*, could be helpful to policymakers when employing coercive strategies and tools.¹²

The remainder of the Introduction is divided into three sections: Section 1.2 provides a definition of *coercive diplomacy* and summarizes the existing explanations for the success and failure of *coercive diplomacy*. Section 1.3 gives the summary of the *CD Triangle*, a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crisis. Section 1.4 discusses the research design. Section 1.5 gives an overview of the rest of the dissertation.

1.2 Coercive Diplomacy: A Conceptual Definition and the Conditions for Success

As stated before, coercive diplomacy has been often employed in international crises. However, there is a general consensus among scholars of international security studies, and coercive theorists in particular, that coercive diplomacy is hard; a coercer has a

¹² The starting point is that the policymakers who use this threat-based strategy use it with the purpose of avoiding war, not as a pretext for war. In addition, this notion of 'winning without fighting' (generalized as to 'stop and/or reverse' acts of military aggression with no use of force) is especially attractive from a crisis management perspective. In addition to coercion, accommodation is another important element of crisis management, but with different constraints and goals.

difficult task to simultaneously balance frightening and reassuring a target.¹³ The coercer also has to influence the behavior of another actor in the international system (mostly another state/s or a nonstate actor/s usually affiliated with a state).¹⁴ Since one of the main characteristics of the Westphalian international system is that each state has sovereignty over its territory and its domestic affairs, some would point out that sovereignty gives an additional burden to the success of coercive diplomacy, especially when employed in intrastate crises.¹⁵ Therefore, some scholars argue that coercive diplomacy is so hard that there is “no recipe for success,” or it is so hard that it should not be attempted.¹⁶ On the other hand, one can argue that the reason why *coercive diplomacy*

¹³ See, for example, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory” *International Studies Perspectives* 12 (2011), 153–170; Robert Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?,” 361-371.

¹⁴ Where war (use of brute force) removes a choice that the target state has, the goal of coercion should be to shape the target’s choice according to the coercer’s preferences.

¹⁵ As Kenneth Waltz points out, “To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems (...).” See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 96. Arguably, the post-Cold War era can also be called the post-Westphalian international system where ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) gives the United Nations (UN) members rights and responsibility to intervene if the member state does not meet its obligation to protect its population.

¹⁶ For example, Alexander George and William E. Simons, eds. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Peter Vigo Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998); Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Rob de Wijk, “The Limits of Military Power,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no.1 (2002); Robert Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?” in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003); Todd S. Sechser, “ Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011).

is hard, and why there has not been formulated a systemic general theory for successful *coercive diplomacy* or successful *compellence*, is due to the lack of consensus among scholars when it comes to conceptual and operational definition of the main concepts.

1.2.1 Coercion, Deterrence, and Compellence

There is an agreement among scholars that the term *deterrence* is characterized by the use of military threats to dissuade the target from changing the status quo.¹⁷ However, scholars disagree on how to define the term when military threats and/or limited force is used to persuade the target to change the status quo and stop doing or undo something that is considered by the coercer as unacceptable and harmful. There are four approaches to this dilemma: First, some scholars who follow in Thomas Schelling's footsteps use the term *compellence*, which includes both *blackmail* (to initiate target action; an offensive strategy in its nature) and reactive *coercive diplomacy* (to stop/undo action which was undertaken by the target). Second, some scholars, who follow in Alexander George's footsteps, narrow the term to reactive *coercive diplomacy* (responding to the unacceptable actions of the target; defensive strategy in its nature). Third, some scholars use the term *military coercion*, which encompasses both *coercive diplomacy* and *compellence*.¹⁸

¹⁷ See, for example, Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 70-73; Samuel W. Lewis, forward to *Forceful Persuasion*, by Alexander L George (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1991), x.

¹⁸ See, for example, Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (New York: Cornell University, 1996); Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion* (2002); Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy* (1998); Peter Vigo Jakobsen, "Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory," *International Studies Perspectives* 12 (2011).

Lastly, some scholars use the term strategic coercion, which encompasses both *deterrence* and *compellence/coercive diplomacy*, that is use of threats in general.¹⁹ The term *coercion* is sometimes used interchangeably with *compellence*.²⁰ However, as argued by Schelling, *coercion* and *compellence* should not be treated as the same term, since the term *coercion* encompasses both *compellence* and *deterrence*.²¹

In addition to disagreeing how to define *compellence* and *coercion*, one has to mention that scholars also disagree on how limited or exemplary use of force should be defined.

1.2.2 Military Threat and Limited Use of Military Force

Alexander George defines *coercive diplomacy* as the use of threats and limited/exemplary force to make an adversary halt a course of action it has embarked on or reverse an action that was done already.²² According to George, *coercive diplomacy* is termed a success (threats are considered credible and successful) if the target concedes to the demands of the coercer without the use of force as the main tool.²³ On the other hand, coercive diplomacy is termed a failure if the coercion leads to a full-fledged war or if the coercer

¹⁹ Most notably Lawrence Freedman ed., *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

²⁰ See, for example, Pape, *Bombing to Win*.

²¹ See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 71.

²² See Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

²³ The limited/exemplary use of force is permitted.

backs down without the demands being fulfilled. However, George never fully defined the term ‘limited/exemplary’ use of force. According to George ‘limited/exemplary’ use of force meant “the use of just enough force” to give credibility to the threat.²⁴ Some scholars, such as Robert Art accepted the term and the use of limited force as a part of coercive diplomacy.²⁵ Other scholars, such as Jakobsen have made air and sea power part of a coercive strategy, since it leaves the choice to the target to comply with the coercer’s demands.²⁶

1.2.3 The Conditions for Success

In addition to a disagreement among the scholars about how to define coercive diplomacy there is a disagreement regarding what conditions have to be present for coercive diplomacy to succeed. According to Schelling there are five necessary conditions for successful *compellence*: Threats must be potent; threats must be credible; clearly defined deadline for compliance; definite demands; and the conflict should not be perceived as a zero-sum game.²⁷ Alexander George expanded Schelling’s abstract framework by

²⁴ See Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 5. Also, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, referencing George’s definition of limited force, wrote “The problem is that it is next to impossible to operationalize ‘just enough [force]’ ... It can only be known after the fact.” See, Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion,” 162.

²⁵ See Robert Art, “Introduction,” in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 6.

²⁶ See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, 16. Also, see for example, Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 18.

²⁷ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 3-4, 69-76, 89, as quoted in Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion,” 156.

identifying five contextual factors (global strategic environment; type of provocation; image of war; unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy; and isolation of the adversary) and nine conditions (clarity of the objective; strong motivation; asymmetry of motivation; sense of urgency; strong leadership; unacceptability of threatened escalation; clarity and the precise terms of settlement of the crisis; adequate domestic support; and adequate international support) necessary for successful *coercive diplomacy*.²⁸

Scholars following in the footsteps of George and Schelling have been exploring the conditions necessary for success offering possible explanations why coercive diplomacy fails or why it succeeds. However, there is no agreement among international relations scholars on the theoretical mechanism, as well as a strategy, that makes coercive diplomacy effective.

1.3 Coercive Diplomacy, Military Coercion, and the Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle

This dissertation distinguishes between *coercive diplomacy* (use of threats only) and *military coercion* (use of limited force). To define limited force, this dissertation employs Jakobsen's approach, which makes air and sea power part of a coercive strategy. However, the coercer has to leave the choice to the target to comply with its demands.²⁹

²⁸ See George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 270, 271-274, 279.

²⁹ See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, 16.

This dissertation defines the term *coercive diplomacy* to be when the coercer threatens to use military force to obtain the compliance from the target.³⁰ The threat of force can only involve a verbal warning, swaggering, or mobilization, but not actual use of force.³¹ *Coercive diplomacy* succeeds when the target acquiesces to coercer's demands without use of force. *Coercive diplomacy* fails if, after the coercer communicated threats and demands, the target: (1) Resists acquiescing to the demands; (2) the coercer escalates the crisis and uses limited or brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodates the target and abandons the coercive strategy.

This dissertation defines the term *military coercion* to be when the coercer employs limited force to persuade the target to change its behavior. Military coercion succeeds when the target acquiesces to coercer's demands after coercer used limited force (short of full-scale war) to coerce the target. Military coercion fails if the target: (1) Does not acquiesce to coercer's demands after the coercer used limited force; (2) the coercer escalates the crisis and uses brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodates the target and abandons the coercive strategy.

The *CD Triangle*, a model of coercive diplomacy in an asymmetric military crisis, predicts that if the following three conditions are present, it is most likely that the target/weak state will acquiesce to the demands of the coercer/great power: *Credible threats*, *credible assurances*, and the *international strategic environment* favoring

³⁰ As Schelling points out, "successful threats are those that do not have to be carried out." See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 10.

³¹ As Art argues, swaggering (that is, showing off military power through military exercise) potentially has coercive power. See Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power," *International Security* 4 (Spring 1980), 10.

coercer. Where credible threats are crucial to convince the target that the coercer has the capability and will to inflict pain, credible assurances are necessary to convince the target that the demands and objectives are limited to those stated by the coercer. Moreover, a key component of credible assurances is trust. This dissertation argues that the trust perceived by the target that the coercer will not expand its demands shapes the target's behavior in a predictable way; that is, it will influence the target's cost-benefit equation in a predictable way: The target will acquiesce to coercer's demands if the target trusts the coercer that the coercer will not change the cost-benefits equation, where expanded demands mean increased cost for the target. If the target does not trust that the coercer's assurances are true, the target will resist acquiescing to the coercer's demands and the target will look for regional or global *spoiler/s* to balance the coercer's threat. The *spoilers* are those states that may perceive the failure of coercion (that is, escalation of crisis to war) to be as beneficial to their regional or international standing.

To test the explanatory power of *the CD Triangle*, this dissertation analyzes U.S. coercive strategies in two case studies: the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Crisis.

1.4 Research Design

This section is divided into four parts: The first part gives an overview of the criteria for the selection of cases. The second part outlines the methods employed to identify and analyze the influence of *credible threats*, *credible assurances*, and the *international strategic environment* on the success of *coercive diplomacy* and *military coercion*. The third part presents an overview of the sources on which the case studies are based.

1.4.1 Case Selection

The cases selected for the empirical analysis are the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Kosovo Crisis (1998-1999). The two selected cases are instances of the same class of events, that is, they share an effort by the United States (unilaterally or as a part of a coalition, but always in the leading role) to employ the coercive strategies after the end of the Cold War against weaker states. In addition, the two cases are important because the Bosnian War is generally coded as a success, while the Kosovo Crisis case is generally coded as a failure.³² It is significant that despite the asymmetry of military capability favoring the United States and the explicit military threats, Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, did not acquiesce to the United States' demand to sign and implement the Rambouillet agreement.³³ As a result, the United States escalated coercion from use of military threats to use of limited force; that is, the U.S.-led NATO Operation Allied Force (OAF) began on March 24, 1999.

Two important limitations are: First, the cases are not varied geographically, and all involved states, although the non-state actors also played an important role. Second, this dissertation has a two-case research design (small-n). While some scholars doubt the

³² See, for example, Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*; Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Bayman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*; Steven L. Burg, "Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans: The Use of Force in Bosnia and Kosovo" in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 57–118.

³³ See *UN Peacemaker*, "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords)."

utility of small-n observation case studies, other have found them valuable depending on the nature of the selected case.³⁴ In addition, the two cases are broken down into three coercing episodes during the Bosnian War and five coercing episodes during the Kosovo Crisis. This has allowed more tests of the hypothesized framework with a greater variety of data.

1.4.2 Research Methods

The dissertation employs a process tracing, structured, focused comparison, and a modified form of the Boolean truth table to evaluate the explanatory power of *Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle*; more precisely, to analyze how *credible threats*, *credible assurances*, and *international strategic environment* influence the outcome of coercive diplomacy and military coercion if attempted in asymmetric interstate conflict.

This dissertation employs the process tracing method to analyze the evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events in the episodes of coercion in each case study.³⁵ The advantage of process tracing over statistical analysis is that process tracing helps gather a wide range of evidence, especially *transcript evidence*, that is, what the

³⁴ George and Bennet argue that “several kinds of no-variance research designs can be useful in theory development and testing using multiple observations from a single case. These include the deviant, crucial, most-likely, and least-likely research designs, as well as single-case study tests of claims of necessity and sufficiency.” See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case study and Theory Development in the Social Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 32-33.

³⁵ See Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices” in *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool*, edited by Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). See 33. See also Collier David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 2011), 823-830.

actors (decision-makers) in the particular episodes of coercion, and those around them, actually said and/or wrote.³⁶ *Transcript evidence* is valuable in assessing why the targets refused to acquiesce and why the coercers escalated their coercive strategy (from *coercive diplomacy* to *military coercion*). Furthermore, process tracing is a valuable tool in uncovering causal mechanisms that might casually explain the case, with the purpose of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms.

For the cross-case/cross-episode comparison, this dissertation employs the method of structured, focused comparison combined with the modified Boolean truth table.³⁷ By employing the structured, focused comparison this dissertation focuses on the particular indicators to determine the presence or absence of three conditions postulated by the *CD Triangle* model as minimally sufficient for the success of coercive diplomacy: Credible threats, credible assurances, and the international environment favoring the coercer. To assess presence or absence of credible threats (*ex-ante*) the dissertation focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did the coercer fail to respond to the challenges made by past targets in similar situations? (2) Did the coercer explicitly communicate its interest/s in a particular episode of coercion? (3) Did the coercer demonstrate its

³⁶ Peter Lorentzen, M. Talor Fravel, and Jack Pine, “Qualitative Investigation of Theoretical Models: The Value of Process Tracing,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 25 (September 2016), 13-14.

³⁷ I follow the George and Bennett’s definition of structured, focused comparison, “the method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the researcher objective [and they are asked] of each case under study to guide and standardized data collection.” The method is “focused” in that “it deals only with certain aspects of the (...) case examined.” See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. *Case Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 67.

readiness to employ military force (by, for example, mobilizing troops or conducting a military exercise)?

To assess the presence of credible assurances this dissertation focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did the target explicitly manifest its distrust of the coercer? (2) Did the target perceive the coercer as trustworthy? (3) Did the coercer clearly communicate its assurances?

To assess if the international strategic environment favors the coercer this dissertation focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did any of the great powers extend public and/or military support to the target? (2) Did the coercer engage diplomatically with the potential *spoiler*? (3) Was the target a member of a military alliance or did the target sign a military treaty with any of the great powers?

The modified Boolean truth table is used to explore and present similarities and differences across comparative cases/episodes and make generalizations.³⁸ The steps taken to construct the Boolean truth tables are: First, the hypotheses are described in terms of a set of conditions (independent variables) and outcomes (dependent variables).³⁹ Second, the qualitative data are transformed into truth tables; where each

³⁸ Stuart Mill's system of logic is usually used in conventional cooperative methods; in particular Mill's 'direct method of agreement' and 'indirect method of differences'. In Mill's method of agreement the researcher attempts to determine which of the possible causal variables is constant across all instances, where Mill's method of differences involve a search for patterns of invariance. However, one of the main problems with this method is its inability to deal with multiple causations. See A. Georges L. Romme, "Boolean comparative analysis of qualitative data: A methodological note" *Quality & Quantitative* 29 (1995), 322.

³⁹ See, for example, Romme, "Boolean comparative analysis of qualitative data," 322-324; Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative Quantitative Strategy* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2014), 106-108

condition (independent variable) can have two logical states: 1 (presence/true) and 0 (absence/false). In this dissertation, the conditions (independent variables) are credible threats (CT), credible assurances (CA), and the international strategic environment (ISE). The outcomes (dependent variables) are coercive diplomacy (CD) and military coercion (MC); each outcome (dependent variable) can have two logical states: 1 (presence/true) and 0 (absence/false). Lastly, the results obtained in the truth table are compared with the initial hypotheses in each empirical chapter as well as the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

1.4.3 Sources

This dissertation relies on primary and secondary sources. For both the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Crisis there is a rich body of primary sources available through the *Clinton Digital Library* containing declassified documents regarding the top-level decision making from the William J. Clinton presidency, 1993-2001. Especially valuable were three groups of documents: First, declassified documents concerning Russian President Boris Yeltsin, more precisely, the transcript of telephone conversations between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. Second, declassified documents concerning the National Security Council (NSC). Third, the declassified documents concerning Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, documented testimonies and reports from the trial of Slobodan Milosevic and other top-level Serbian and Bosnian decision-makers accessed through the *United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia* database were valuable in analyzing the top-level decision making in FR Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska, and Serbia.

This dissertation also draws on memoirs, speeches, and interviews with top-officials from the United States, Russia, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia and other countries published during and after the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Crisis. Most notably are the *University of Virginia Miller Center's Presidential History Project* (an archive of 134 interviews with senior members of the Clinton administration, political advisors and the foreign leaders with whom President Clinton had a close working relationship) and the *Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training (ADST) Oral History Collection* (an archive which includes the interviews with American diplomats directly involved in negotiations with President Slobodan Milosevic during the Bosnian War and Kosovo Crisis). This dissertation also makes use of Serbian, Bosnian, U.S., and global media coverage of the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Crisis.

1.5 Outline of the Dissertation

The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on *coercive diplomacy* and *compellence* in international relations as well as the most prominent theoretical attempts to explain and predict coercion's success and failure. After the literature review, Chapter 2 identifies the model explaining how *credible threats*, *credible assurances*, and the *international strategic environment* influence success or failure of *coercive diplomacy* in asymmetric interstate crises.

The proposed model is applied in two case studies. Chapter 3 examines four phases of the United States involvement in the Bosnian War and tests the proposed model on three episodes of coercion. In one episode the United States used coercive diplomacy and failed to coerce the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. In two episodes of

military coercion, the United States succeeded once. The *CD Triangle* correctly predicted that the target would acquiesce to the demands when all three conditions postulated were present. Chapter 4 examines four phases of U.S. involvement in the Kosovo Crisis and tests the proposed framework on five episodes of coercion. In two episodes, the United States used coercive diplomacy and succeeded once. In three episodes the United States used military coercion and succeeded once. The *CD Triangle* correctly predicted that the target would acquiesce to the demands when all three postulated conditions are present. However, this chapter shows that the deficit of trust between a coercer and a target can be balanced by a third “trustworthy” actor.

Chapter 5 summarizes the principal findings of the study and discusses the implications for theory building and practice/policy making. This chapter also briefly explores possible avenues for future research.

CHAPTER II: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: THEORETICAL SHORTCOMINGS AND THE COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (CD) TRIANGLE

The structure of this chapter is as follows: The first part of this chapter conducts a literature review and briefly discusses theoretical shortcomings important to this dissertation. The second part discusses the *Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle* as a proposed explanation for the success and failure of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric interstate crises. The third part provides a road map for the remaining chapters of this dissertation.


2.1 Coercive Diplomacy Versus Compellence

Two scholars who set the path for the theory, as well as strategy, of coercive diplomacy are Thomas Schelling and Alexander George. Schelling asserted that *coercion* includes *deterrence* (efforts to discourage through fear to take action) and *compellence* (efforts to actively change an existing situation; to force into action).⁴⁰ Schelling's *compellence* includes *blackmail* and *coercive diplomacy* (see Figure 1). Where *blackmail* includes threats that are aimed to initiate some action (that is, a proactive use of threats), the main purpose of *coercive diplomacy* is to undo or to stop a certain action (that is, a reactive use of threats). On the other hand, the main purpose of *deterrence* is to prevent an action by

⁴⁰ See Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 69. Also, Freedman argues that deterrence is the defensive equivalent of coercion, that is, persuading an enemy not to attack. Freedman also argues that *compellence* is the offensive equivalent of coercion, which includes withdrawal or acquiescence. See Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 163.

the target. *Compellence* also involves timing in a way that *deterrence* commonly does not; that is, *compellence* must have a defined deadline for compliance.⁴¹

Figure 1. Coercion: Terminological Overview⁴²



Alexander George defined *coercive diplomacy* as “coercive threats employed to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action.” The focus in *coercive diplomacy*, according to George, is on reactive threats and involves accommodation and diplomacy, whereas *compellence* mostly relies on threats of force.⁴³ George also differentiated

⁴¹ As Schelling points out, “If action carries no deadlines it is only a posture, or a ceremony with no consequences.” Therefore, making a clear deadline is a necessary component of successful compellence. See *Schelling, Arms and Influence*, 72.

⁴² See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War*, 12.

⁴³ Alexander L. George, “Theory and Practice,” in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., edited by Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview, 1994b), 7. Also, when stating that compellence *mostly* relies on the threats of force, one has to mention that Schelling indicates that “the power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it.” Therefore, limited use of force is permissible. See *Schelling, Arms and Influence*, 2.

between the defensive and offensive use of threats. The defensive use of threats has the main role of stopping or reversing an act already started by the target, for example, an invasion of a nearby state or violence against its citizens. The offensive use of threats aims at provoking a target to do something that, if not provoked, the target would not do; for example, giving up power. George called the offensive use of threats *blackmail* and regards it as illegitimate (see Figure 1).⁴⁴

The differentiation between the offensive and defensive use of force has been criticized, most notably, by Lawrence Freedman, Robert Art, and Peter Viggor Jakobsen. Freedman argues that limiting coercive diplomacy to use of defensive threats is not practical and is not useful analytically, since in some instances it may be hard to distinguish between the offensive and defensive use of threats.⁴⁵ Robert Art argues that the coercers and the targets may see themselves as acting defensively; the coercers may perceive their use of threats as defensive and, on the other hand, the target may perceive the coercer's use of threats as unjust and offensive.⁴⁶ Jakobsen points out that whether coercive diplomacy is justified cannot be determined by generally defining threats as offensive or defensive, since threats to change the *status quo* cannot be generalized as

⁴⁴ See George, "Coercive Diplomacy," 7; Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy*, 13.

⁴⁵ See Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, edited by Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 18.

⁴⁶ See Robert Art, "Introduction" in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 6.

offensive and, therefore, generalized as illicit.⁴⁷ Since George's distinction between the defensive and offensive use of force is hard to operationalize, many scholars, including Freedman, Art, and Jakobsen, have accepted Schelling's assumption that coercive diplomacy can include defensive and offensive use of threats. This dissertation also follows Schelling's assumption.

2.2 Threat of Force Versus Limited Use of Force

Alexander George defines *coercive diplomacy* as the use of threats and limited/exemplary force to make an adversary halt a course of action it has embarked on or reverse an action that has been done already.⁴⁸ According to George, *coercive diplomacy* is termed a success (threats are considered credible and successful) if the target concedes to the demands of the coercer without the use of force as the main tool.⁴⁹ On the other hand, *coercive diplomacy* is termed a failure if the coercion leads to a full-fledged war or if the coercer backs down without the demands being fulfilled. However, George never fully defined the term, "limited" use of force. According to George limited/exemplary use of force meant "the use of just enough force (...) to establish the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary."⁵⁰

⁴⁷ See Jakobsen, "Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory," *International Studies Perspective* 12, no.2 (2011), 162.

⁴⁸ See Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

⁴⁹ The limited/exemplary use of force is permitted.

⁵⁰ See George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 5. Jakobsen, referencing George's definition of limited force, wrote "The problem is that it is next to impossible to operationalize 'just

Although George's definition of *coercive diplomacy* is widely accepted among scholars, there is disagreement how to define "limited" or "exemplary" use of force. Some scholars, such as Robert Art, accepted the term and the use of limited force as a part of *coercive diplomacy*.⁵¹ However, Art is not clear what "limited" or "demonstrative" use of force exactly means when applied in practice.⁵² Art acknowledges that defining where exactly the boundary is between limited and full-scale use of force is crucial for coding a case as a success or failure of coercive diplomacy; however, Art concludes that, after all, categorizing cases "becomes an exercise in qualitative judgment."⁵³ Art, for example, codes NATO air strikes against Serbia/FR Yugoslavia in 1999 as a full-fladged war and the Kosovo Crisis as an example of unsuccessful coercive diplomacy.⁵⁴ On the other hand, Bayman and Waxman define the NATO air strikes as limited use of force and the Kosovo Crisis as an example of successful coercive diplomacy.⁵⁵

enough [force]' ... It can only be known after the fact." See Jakobsen, "Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion," 162.

⁵¹ See Art, "Introduction," in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, 7.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 9.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵⁵ See Daniel Bayman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 101.

In his attempt to operationalize the distinction between limited and full-scale force, Jakobsen differentiates between the objective for which force is used and the amount of force employed.⁵⁶ Regarding the objective for which force is used, Jakobsen argues that signaling what the coercer's preferences are is considered a use of limited force. The amount of force should not impose compliance but signal what a prescribed or preferred behavior is, leaving a choice to the target to comply or not. Jakobsen's approach makes air and sea power part of a coercive strategy, since, according to Jakobsen, it leaves the choice to the target to comply with the coercer's demands.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the use of ground forces, as a part of the strategy, is only permitted if it does not, for example, include taking control of the entire territory and, therefore, eliminates the element of choice.⁵⁸

Although Jakobsen's distinction between limited and full-scale force is more precise than any other attempt to define the distinction between the two (including George's "just enough force"), some scholars argue that it still does not precisely state what the distinction is between the limited and full-scale force. For example, Art points out that air power, due to technological advances, can also be used to escalate the conflict to what some would define as a limited war.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, 16.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵⁸ War removes the choices, where coercion should retain and shape the choices. Haun also argues although the threat of ground invasion is coercive, the commencement of a ground offensive is more appropriate to be classified as a brute force strategy and not a coercive strategy. See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 18.

⁵⁹ See Art, "Introduction," 18.

Todd Sechser, in his attempt to define what constitutes the limited use of force, sets the threshold of 100 fatalities on the target side. He argues that “a militarized compellent threat is defined as an explicit demand by one state (the coercer) to another state (the target) to alter the status quo in some material way, backed by a threat of military force if the target does not comply.”⁶⁰ Sechser argues that outright physical compulsion is sometimes necessary and he justifies use of limited force as a way to communicate resolve.⁶¹ However, a limit has to be set on how much force can be used so the outcomes are not the result of the brute force as opposed to threat of force, that is, for successful wars not to be classified as a successful use of threats. Therefore, Sechser argues that the military action should not produce more than 100 fatalities on the target’s side.

As Jakobsen points out “disagreement over how limited force should be defined (...) translates into disagreement over how coercion outcomes should be evaluated.”⁶² Therefore, it is a contributing factor towards unsuccessful formulation of a systemic general theory of coercive diplomacy success.

⁶⁰ See Todd S. Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011), 380.

⁶¹ See Todd S. Sechser, “Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (June 2016): 327. Also see Fearon James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1, 68-90.

⁶² See Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory,” 159.

2.3 Success Versus Failure

Relying on a cost-benefit model and the assumption of unitary actor rationality, Thomas Schelling logically deduced five necessary conditions for successful *compellence*: (1) The threat conveyed by the coercer must be potent enough to persuade the adversary that non-compliance is too costly; (2) the target must perceive the threat (conveyed by the coercer) as credible; (3) the target must be given a define time to comply with the demand; (4) the coercer must assure the target that compliance will not lead to more demands; (5) the coercer's intentions must not be perceived as zero-sum game; that is, the coercer and the target must be persuaded that it can gain more by bargaining than by using brute force.⁶³ One of the main strengths of this framework is its parsimonious character, mainly due to the small number of the necessary factors for success. However, the main drawbacks of Schelling's work on *compellence*, as Schelling himself concedes, are that his framework is purely at the theorizing stage, where historical examples were used "as illustration, not evidence," and the parsimony and abstractness of this model make it very challenging to operationalize the variables necessary for success.⁶⁴

In contrast, Alexander George motivated by the unsuccessful U.S. campaigns to coerce North Vietnam in the 1960s, opted for an inductive approach.⁶⁵ George and

⁶³ Schelling as cited by Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998), 156.

⁶⁴ See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, vii.

⁶⁵ See Alexander L. George, Alexander L., David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); George, Alexander L. *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991); Alexander L. George,

Simons expanded Schelling's abstract framework by identifying five contextual factors and nine conditions necessary for success.⁶⁶ It is significant that they also included "carrots" or incentives (not mentioned in Schelling's model), which should enhance the probability of coercive diplomacy success.⁶⁷ The five contextual factors identified by George and Simons are: (1) Global strategic environment; (2) type of provocation; (3) image of war; (4) unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy; (5) isolation of the adversary.⁶⁸ The nine conditions relevant to any situation in which coercive diplomacy might be contemplated: (1) Clarity of the objective; (2) strong motivation; (3) asymmetry of motivation; (4) sense of urgency; (5) strong leadership; (6) unacceptability of threatened escalation; (7) clarity/the precise terms of the settlement of the crisis; (8) adequate domestic support; (9) and international support.⁶⁹

Although George and Simons provide much better operationalization of the necessary conditions for success (compared to Schelling's model), the drawbacks of their

"Theory and Practice," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., edited by Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview, 1994).

⁶⁶ See Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., edited by Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 271-291.

⁶⁷ George points out that "carrots" or positive inducements can include variety of things that are important to the target. For example, from face-saving concession to side payments. See Alexander L. George, "Theory and Practice," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., edited by Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 17.

⁶⁸ See George and Simons, "Findings and Conclusion," 271-274.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 280-286.

model are that asymmetry of motivation and urgency of compliance can be measured only after the crises are over.⁷⁰ In addition, the large number of variables (14 in total) create additional problems when applying the proposed model. George and Simons argue that, while success is more likely if all nine conditions for coercive diplomacy success are present, not all of these nine conditions are equally important. The four conditions that are particularly important for influencing the outcome of coercive diplomacy are: (1) Asymmetry of motivation, where the target perceives that the balance favors the coercer; (2) the target's fear of escalation that would produce unacceptable cost; (3) sense of urgency where the target feels that there is an urgent need to comply; and (4) clarity of settlement, where the clarity of the coercer's objectives and demands demonstrate the coercer's strength of will.⁷¹

George and Simons also put forward a broadly defined and not fully operationalized argument that on the scale from low (not vital for the survival of the state) to high (vital for the survival of the state), the higher the demand, the target will be less willing to comply with this demand.⁷² Therefore, the nature of the demand will have

⁷⁰ Based on *ex-post* factors as oppose to *ex-ante* factors.

⁷¹ See George and Simons, "Findings and Conclusion," 287.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 281. Although George and Simons are more precise than Schelling what constitute demands (that is, more precise than Schelling's "general directions of compliance"), they are not precise about what constitutes "vital interests." Jakobsen based on the realist assumption that the international system is characterized by Hobbesian anarchy and the welfare and survival of the states are the highest interests, develops a hierarchy of interests where interests are ranked according to the importance interests have for the welfare and protection of the state. The four interests ranked from high to low importance are: vital interests (the defense of the homeland); strategic interests (the preservation of the existing balance of power in the international system); stability interests (preservation of the balance of power in the regional system); and

a key influence on the asymmetry of motivation; broadly defined, the higher the demand the target will be more motivated to resist it. However, one has to point out that Schelling's model is even more imprecise when it comes to defining the demands, providing a range of options where threats should communicate "only the general direction of compliance;" therefore leaving space for further bargaining.⁷³

George also suggests that his proposed model could be more actor-specific, since the target can be influenced by cultural factors and misperceptions.⁷⁴ George and Simons, expanding on George's proposition, argue that whether the proposed strategy of coercive diplomacy will succeed relies on "perceptions held by the leaders of the state that is being subjected to coercive diplomacy," that is, it "rests heavily on the correctness of the policy maker's assessment of the opponent's perceptions and strategic reasoning."⁷⁵ George and Simons make another important argument that the coercer should combine demands with incentives; that is, the incentives should be coordinated and clearly communicated

moral/ideological interests (protection of the principles of international law, human rights and, more broadly, ideological values of the coercer). See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*. 36-38. On the other hand, Press presents a hierarchy of three state interests ranked from high to low: Vital, important, and concerns. Vital interests are related to state's survival (especially preserving sovereignty); important interests comprised of issue that are important but do not threaten the state's survival; and concerns are related to state's values. See Daryl G. Press, "The Credibility of Power." *International Security* 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004-5), 26-27.

⁷³ See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 73.

⁷⁴ See Alexander L. George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., edited by Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 4.

⁷⁵ See George and Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," 288.

(through verbal and non-verbal means).⁷⁶ Although this dissertation does not support the counter argument that incentives should not be a part of coercive strategies, that is, the strategies should be based on fear, this dissertation proposes that assurances should be coordinated and clearly communicated with demands.⁷⁷

In sum, George and Simons expand Schelling's model, but, as they also note, their research does not enable them "to state that these perceptual variables are strictly necessary or sufficient conditions for the success of the coercive diplomacy."⁷⁸

Therefore, leaving space for further research.

2.4 Why Great Powers Fail to Coerce Weak States

Scholars, expanding on the work of Schelling and George, have offered different explanations why the strategy of coercive diplomacy, although desirable by great powers, seems to be more difficult for states that have the most powerful military capabilities.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Ibid. Instead using a strategy based on coercion and accommodation, a coercer should use a stick-and-carrot strategy, where incentive/s are introduced together with military threats.

⁷⁷ Incentives, though aimed at changing the target's behavior, are not an example of coercion, but, arguably, a bribe.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 292.

⁷⁹ The explanations discussed in this section are in the realm of rational explanations of coercion failures and success. The literature also offers reasons in the realm of the nonrational behavior including, for example, misperceptions, group bias, and emotions. See, for example, Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under Risk," *Econometrica* 47, no. 2 (March 1979), 263-292; James March, *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen* (New York: Free Press, 1994); Gary Schaub, "Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 3 (2004), 389-411; Robin Markwica, *Emotional*

Daniel Byman and Mathew Waxman argue that coercive threats are most likely to succeed when the coercer achieves *escalation dominance*, defined as the coercer's ability to increase the threatened costs to a target while denying the target the opportunity to neutralize those costs or to *counterescalate*.⁸⁰ The difficulties, and eventually the failure of coercive diplomacy, arise from the coercer's domestic politics (where democracies, most notably the United States, are averse to civilian casualties) and from using forces in alliances that hinder the coercer's ability to escalate the crisis and achieve *escalation dominance*.⁸¹ On the other hand, Peter Viggor Jakobsen proposes that for successful use of coercion in alliances, leadership is one of the requirements, that is, "the presence of

Choice: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁸⁰ Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, 30.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 19. Also, Kenneth Schultz, in his attempt to answer how the institutions and practices of democracy influence the use of threats to wage war, argues that the coercer's domestic institutions are a source of threat credibility, where democracies, as opposed to nondemocracies, are better able to credibly signal their intentions. The public nature of democratic politics and the support of the opposition parties conveys information to the target if the threats are carried out. See Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1, 9, 57-59. Further to that, Dan Reither and Alan Stam argue that democracies, as opposed to nondemocracies, are more likely to make military threats when they can carry them out successfully, making *democratic* threats more credible. See Dan Reither and Alan C. Stam III, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 2 (June 1998), 377-389. However, Scott Bennet and Allan Stam, underscoring the coercer's commitment problem and the target's willingness to exploit the coercer's breaking point, argue that demands from democracies are more likely to be rejected in protracted conflicts. See Scott D. Bennett and Alan C. Stam III, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (June 1998), 344-366.

one or more states willing and capable to take the lead and accept most of the cost.”⁸²

Moreover, Jakobsen, focusing on the Western use of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric crises, argues that the coercer should offer positive incentives (“carrots”) for compliance.⁸³ Robert Pape uses the cost-benefits calculus on the part of the target and argues that “economic inducements,” whether “employed simultaneously or promised to sweeten deals,” are not likely to influence the target’s decision to acquiesce to the demands. According to Pape, positive incentives are “poor compliments to military coercion over significant interest.”⁸⁴ Pape also argues that military coercion succeeds when used to aim at the target’s military vulnerabilities, making it too costly for the target not to acquiesce to the demands and to escalate military coercion to full-scale war.⁸⁵

In more recent literature, Todd Sechser focuses on the coercer’s demands and the target’s reputation, where Phil Haun focuses on the coercer’s demands and asymmetry of power (favoring a coercer).⁸⁶ On the other hand, Diane Chamberlain focuses on the

⁸² Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, 138. The argument is that “coalitional consensus concerning threats and use of force requires” leadership by one or more states. *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁸⁴ See Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (New York: Cornell University, 1996), 17.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 1. Pape posits that by threatening to harm civilians, the coercer seeks to raise the costs of the continued resistance of the target above the target’s value for the territory at stake, the assumption being that the demands are territory-related. See *Ibid.*, 17.

⁸⁶ See Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,” *International Organization* 64, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 627–660; Todd S. Sechser, “Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (June 2016), 1–28; Phil Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015)

coercer's resolve (that is, the willingness of the coercer to accept costs to achieve its objectives/demands,) and its influence on the credibility of threats and the success and failure of coercive diplomacy.⁸⁷ Each scholar identifies different contextual factors that have a negative influence on the outcome of coercive exchanges between the coercer (a great power/strong state) and the target (a small power/weak state).⁸⁸

Sechser explains the effectiveness of coercion from the perspective of a target state. He argues that the targets, despite the military disadvantage, fight to defend their reputations; the target hopes that by not acquiescing to the coercer's demands, the target will deter future challenges from powerful states.⁸⁹ Sechser's model identifies the target's need to preserve its reputation as a key drawback to a successful asymmetric military coercion. He further argues that the coercer could benefit by taking into consideration the

⁸⁷ See Dianne P. Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016). It is important to note that Jonathan Mercer argues that in deterrence theory a reputation for resolve is critical to credibility. Mercer defines the reputation for resolve as "the extent to which a state will risk war to keep its promises and uphold its threats." See, Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1, 2 and 7.

⁸⁸ See, for example, Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 20.

⁸⁹ See Sechser, "Goliath's Curse;" Sechser, "Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining." Other scholars who aim to explain effectiveness of symmetric and asymmetric coercion from the target's perspective are, for example, Daryl Press who argues that the target states care more about the current balance of power than the coercer's reputation of being credible. See, Daryl Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005). Roseanne McManus puts forward an argument that the target states in addition to military capability also take into account a political capability of the coercer to fulfill its coercive threats. See Roseanne McManus, *Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

reputation costs that the target includes in the calculation of costs and benefits when deciding to acquiesce to the coercer's demands. He proposes that the coercer should offer side payments and lower its demands to offset the cost to the target's reputation.⁹⁰ Sechser also points out that the coercer's incentives to discount its demands to offset the reputation cost of its target will be additionally influenced by the target's perceptions of the likelihood of further crisis as well as the ability of coercers to commit to restrain its demands in the future.⁹¹ Sechser's observation that the target's perceptions of the worst (that is, fear of future demands) and the coercer's inability to estimate the target's anxieties and "insufficiently discount its demands" is significant but left under-researched.⁹²

Haun argues that in asymmetric interstate conflict, the coercer has a significant military superiority over the target and the coercer's vital interests are not threatened.⁹³ This imbalance in military power (favoring the coercer) will cause the coercer to make high demands, which are too costly for the target; that is the cost of acquiescing to demands is higher than the benefits of acquiescing to demands.⁹⁴ Therefore, high demands, which Haun defines as regime change and surrender of territory, are the main

⁹⁰ See Sechser, "Goliath's Curse," 627-628.

⁹¹ See Sechser, "Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining," 319-321.

⁹² See Sechser, "Goliath's Curse," 627-628.

⁹³ See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 13.

⁹⁴ As George points out the goal of coercive diplomacy is to influence the target's expectations of cost in a way that erodes the target's motivation to continue what the target is doing. See Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 11.

explanation why asymmetric coercion fails.⁹⁵ Applying Haun's hypotheses to the U.S. coercion attempts, Haun argues that the United States makes demands that threaten the survival of the target and by exceeding the cost acceptable to the target makes it more profitable for the target not to acquiesce to its demands.

Although one can agree with Haun that coercers should be wise when defining their objectives and demands (especially concerning the target's vital interests), one can also argue that there are many examples of leaders abdicating when facing coercive demands against vital interest (such as a demand for regime change), which according to Haun's hypotheses should end by the target refusing to acquiesce.⁹⁶ Moreover, one can argue that the Kosovo Crisis of 1998-99 (the dispute with Serbia over Kosovo) does not support Haun's hypothesis that coercive demands concerning territory are destined to fail. Kosovo, in the end, became of "marginal concern to Serbians."⁹⁷ Therefore, Haun's hypothesis that asymmetry of power (favoring the coercer) leads to unrealistic demands that eventually lead to asymmetry of motivation favoring the target (and finally failed coercive diplomacy) leaves space for further research. It is especially puzzling under what conditions demands concerning territory and/or regime change are perceived by the target as a threat to survival of the state.

⁹⁵ See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 23-24

⁹⁶ One example is the abdication of the Haitian military regime led by Raoul Cedras in 1994 under the U.S. coercive demands to do so.

⁹⁷ See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 125.

Focusing on the credibility of threats, Chamberlain argues that after the end of the Cold War, the cost (financial and human) of using military force for the United States became noticeably low (mainly due to use of advanced technology and relying more on military contractors and an all-volunteer army).⁹⁸ The downside to the shrinking costs of war is that “cheap threats” undermined the ultimate credibility of American threats; whereas “costly threats” are actually more credible and useful in coercive bargaining.⁹⁹ Chamberlain argues that the “cheap threat” to use force is not a signal of high motivation to target states. Although Chamberlain makes an important distinction between immediate credibility (a threat taken in specific action) and ultimate credibility (a threat that the coercer is committed to fighting a long war), one of the counter arguments is: If the cost to use force is low, then the United States should be more willing to use it, and it should make it more believable that if the United States threatens use of force, since it is cheap to use the military, the United States will fulfill its threat.¹⁰⁰ In sum, the argument that the asymmetry of power (favoring the coercer) leads to the asymmetry of motivation (favoring the target), which eventually leads to the failure of coercive diplomacy, lacks

⁹⁸ See Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats*, 4-6.

⁹⁹ On the contrary, Jakobsen argues, “A cheap threat is more credible than a costly one, and issuing threats of force are cheaper for the coercer if he can win quickly with little cost (...).” See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War*,

¹⁰⁰ As Chamberlain argues immediate credibility “refers to the extent to which the target believes the coercer will execute its immediate threat.” And ultimate credibility refers to “whether the target believes the coercer is willing to apply additional force and escalate if the target resist[s] after the immediate threat has been executed.” See Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats*, 12.

empirical ground as well as logical reasoning leaving significant space for further research.

Although Sechser, Haun, and Chamberlain point at the negative correlation between the coercer's physical capability and compellence success ("more power, less success"), they propose different explanations for why the target decides not to acquiesce to the demands. Sechser, evaluating under what conditions the target would decide to fight in an asymmetric crisis, points to the target's expectations ("anxiety") of future demands.¹⁰¹ Haun points at the coercer's present demands being too costly for the target, and Chamberlain points at the coercer's threats not being adequately credible to back its demands. Although these scholars provide a good analysis of asymmetric strategic coercion in general and coercive diplomacy in particular, there is little consensus on why great powers fail to coerce weak states.

2.5 The Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle

Why do militarily weaker states resist coercive threats from a militarily superior state and under what conditions do weaker states concede? This section addresses these questions by proposing a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crises. At the core of this model are three conditions considered as *sufficient* and *necessary* for the success of

¹⁰¹ Sechser points out "from target's perspective, two factors influence the likelihood that it will face future threats: the challenger's capabilities and its intentions." Where the capabilities are largely observable to the target, intentions are not. Disagreement about the challenger's (coercer's) future intentions will lead to target fearing the worst due to challenger's preponderance of power; on the other hand, the challenger will underestimate the target's anxiety and insufficiently discount its demands. See Sechser, "Goliath's Curse," 643.

coercive diplomacy in asymmetric international crises: (1) *Credible threats*, (2) *credible assurances*, and (3) *the international environment favoring the coercer*. This model expects *coercive diplomacy* to succeed (that is, the target to acquiesce to the coercer's demands) when all three conditions are present. Before discussing the three minimally sufficient and necessary conditions for success, the main terms are defined, as applied in this dissertation.

2.5.1 The CD Triangle: Coercive Diplomacy Versus Military Coercion


Taking into consideration that the purpose of *coercive diplomacy* should be to persuade a target to comply with the coercer's demands and proposing that distinguishing between the *use of threats* (only) as opposed to the *use of limited force* can have significant implications for the theory as well as the strategy of coercion (for example, when and why the coercer escalates from using threats only to using limited force) this dissertation employs the term *coercive diplomacy* when military threats (only) are used to coerce the target (see Figure 2).¹⁰² The threat of force can only involve a verbal warning, swaggering, or mobilization, but not the actual use of force.¹⁰³ In addition, this dissertation employs the term *military coercion* when limited force is employed by the coercer to persuade the target to change its behavior (see Figure 2). To define limited

¹⁰² As Schelling argues, "the power to hurt (...) is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply." See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 3.

¹⁰³ As Art argues, swaggering (that is, showing off military power through military exercise) potentially has coercive power. See Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power." *International Security* 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980), 10.

force, this dissertation employs Jakobsen’s approach, which makes air and sea power part of a coercive strategy; however, the coercer has to leave the choice to the target to comply with the coercer’s demands.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, the use of ground forces, as a part of the strategy is permitted only if it does not eliminate the element of choice.¹⁰⁵

Figure 2. Spectrum of Coercion¹⁰⁶



Coercive diplomacy and *military coercion* share the following four characteristics: (1) Coercion is a state action; (2) a coercer has a clear target; (3) demands are clearly defined; and (4) demands and military threats are communicated.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, 16.

¹⁰⁵ See Section 2.2 in this chapter for further elaboration.

¹⁰⁶ Figure 2. Spectrum of Coercion created by Danijela Felendes.

¹⁰⁷ Non-military coercion includes diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, and gray-zone coercion, where military coercion involves display of force short of war. See, for example, Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan eds., *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives*,


In sum, *coercive diplomacy* fails if, after the coercer communicates threats and demands, the target: (1) Refuses to acquiesce to the demands; (2) the coercer escalates the crisis and uses limited or brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodates the target and abandoned the coercive strategy. Furthermore, *coercive diplomacy* succeeds when the target acquiesces to the coercer's demands without use of force. On the other hand, *military coercion* succeeds when the target acquiesces to the coercer's demands after the coercer uses limited force to coerce the target. *Military coercion* fails if the target: (1) Does not acquiesce to the coercer's demands after the coercer used limited force; (2) the coercer escalates the crisis and uses brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodates the target and abandoned the coercive strategy.

2.5.2 The CD Triangle: The Three Conditions for Success

Drawing on the *compellence* model put forward by Schelling, the *coercive diplomacy* model put forward by George, and insights from the literature on coercion, credibility, and reputation, this dissertation proposes the *Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle*, a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crises (see Figure 3). As stated before, at the center of this model are three conditions considered as *sufficient* and *necessary* for the success of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric international crises: (1) *Credible threats*, (2) *credible assurances*, and (3) *the international strategic environment favoring the coercer*.

Sanctions, and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Kelly Greenhill and Peter Krause eds., *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

Figure 3. The Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle: A model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crises¹⁰⁸



The logic behind focusing on the selected conditions is that the coercer and the target are rational actors that behave according to defined preferences, that is, they assess the benefits and the costs of engaging in military coercion (the coercer) and the benefits

¹⁰⁸ Figure 3. The Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle: A model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crises, created by Danijela Felendes.

and costs of acquiescing or not acquiescing to the demands (the target).¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the leaders/decisionmakers will try to maximize utility while minimizing cost when deciding among the identified choices. In the coercer's case, it means choosing among the strategy of coercion (that is coercive diplomacy or military coercion), inaction, or the strategy of brute force (that is war); in the target's case, it means choosing between acquiescing to the demands or resisting. Where *credible threats* are crucial to convince the target that the coercer has the capability and will to inflict pain, *credible assurances* are necessary if the coercer wants to convince the target that the demands and objectives are limited and true to those stated by the coercer. Furthermore, a key component of *credible assurances* is *trust*, where the asymmetry of power (favoring the coercer) and the asymmetry of demands (favoring the target) can be balanced by presence of trust.¹¹⁰ This dissertation argues that the target's trust that the coercer will not expand its demands shapes the

¹⁰⁹ According to rational choice theories, “[r]ationally refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specific constraints.” A decision process consists of these three main stages: Actors first identify alternative options [choices]; followed by calculation of benefits and costs that each option will bring; and, finally, the course of action that advances actors interests. See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999), 18. Also, as Branislav Slantchev argues, “the actors can rank-order all the various possible outcomes of their interaction in a logical coherent way.” See Branislav Slantchev, *Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4.

¹¹⁰ Asymmetry of power refers to relative military power; that is, the distribution of power where great power has military capability to threaten the survival of the target/weak state. On the other hand, the target/weak state cannot threaten the survival of the coercer/great power. The asymmetry of demands refers to the target (weaker state) having greater resolve than the coercer (if the target perceives that its survival is at stake or could be at stake if the coercer expands its demands). See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 12-13.

target's behavior in a predictable way, that is, it will influence the target's cost-benefit equation in a predictable way: The target will acquiesce to the coercer's demands if the target trusts that the coercer will not change the cost-benefit equation, where expanded demands mean increased cost for the target.¹¹¹

If the target does not trust the coercer's assurances, the target will resist to acquiescing to the coercer's demands and the target will look for the regional or global *spoiler/s* to balance the coercer's threat. The *spoilers* are those states that may perceive the failure of coercion (that is, escalation of crisis to war) as beneficial to their regional or international standing.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Trust between the coercer and the target is built by the coercer through clear communication and signaling of its assurances. See Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

¹¹² Stephen John Stedman uses the term "spoiler" defining the spoilers in peace process as "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interest, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it." See Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Process," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997), 5-53. Also, if the *CD Triangle* were to be placed in the levels of analysis framework (comprised of the international system, state, and individual level), it can be argued that the decision made by the target state's leaders is the product of: The perceptions of the target states' leaders/policymakers; the signals projected by the leaders/policy makers of the coercer state; and the influence of the international power structure. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). The *CD Triangle* takes into consideration a domestic level as well as a systemic level of analysis; one can argue that *CD Triangle* has a neoclassical realist view in which systemic variables get *filtered* through domestic and unit level variables (such as domestic politics and leaders' perceptions). See for example Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1, October 1998. Rose points out the disadvantages of giving priority to only one of three levels of analysis as explanation for foreign policy decisions and stresses the advantages of neorealism's approach. See also Norrin M. Ripsman et al, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

2.6 Independent and Dependent Variables

Independent and dependent variables are defined in the following sections.

2.6.1 Independent Variables

Based on the logic of the *CD Triangle*, the three independent variables (IVs) used in this dissertation are as follows: *Credible threats*, *credible assurances*, and the *international strategic environment* favoring the coercer.

2.6.1.2 Credible Threats

One can argue that coercion is an exercise in risk manipulation. The essence of risk manipulation is to create in the minds of the target state's leaders/policymakers the possibility that the situation might escalate to war.¹¹³ Therefore, for the coercer's threats to be credible, they must be perceived as credible by the target. One way to measure if the threats were perceived as credible by the target is to inquire if the target acquiesced to the demands or resisted (*ex-post*). Another way to measure if threats are credible or not, is by measuring if the coercer has the power and will to proceed with punishment (*ex-ante*).¹¹⁴ Schelling argues that coercion needs to exploit the target's fears and wants; therefore, to be credible, the coercer has to demonstrate the ability and willingness to

¹¹³ See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 188.

¹¹⁴ The existing literature has mostly used rationalist models to explain a target's decision-making. A generally accepted rational choice approach suggests that the target states follow a cost-benefit calculation, and they apply a logic of consequences: They acquiesce to coercive threats only if acquiescing entails lower costs or more benefits than resistance. See Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 15

hurt. This indicates two important factors that influence a target's cost-benefit equation: (1) Coercer's will to pay the escalating cost if the threats would fail to make the target acquiesce to demand/s (that is, if the threats do not produce desired results); and (2) coercer's military capability to execute its threats. Since the focus of this dissertation is asymmetric coercion, when the coercer has the significant military advantage over the target, the military capability of the coercer is not in question.¹¹⁵ Therefore, the main focus in determining the credibility of the coercer's threats (*ex-ante*) is on assessing the coercer's will to pay the cost of escalation (to "pay" for the potential failure of military coercion and escalation to war). The two factors that can influence the target's perception of the coercer's will to go through with its threats are: coercer's present objectives and coercer's behavior in the past crisis situations (resolute as oppose to irresolute).¹¹⁶

Regarding the coercer's behavior in past crisis situations, the *past actions theory* can assist in the task to probe into the past actions of the coercer in crisis situations. This theory postulates that a state's credibility depends on its history of fulfilling or breaking its commitments.¹¹⁷ The leaders/decision-makers would look to a coercer's past actions

¹¹⁵ For example, Haun argues, "only a few nations since World War II have achieved great powers status: The United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, Great Britain, France, and China. All other states are weak by comparison." Haun's argument is based on the dataset provided in the *Correlates of War* project and the fact that great powers have the military capability (conventional and/or nuclear) to engage in total war (that is, to invade the weaker state and overthrow its government). See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 12.

¹¹⁶ See, for example, Daryl G. Press, "The Credibility of Power." *International Security* 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004-5), 136–169.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 140.

pattern of behavior; broken commitments will be considered irresolute, and, if the state consistently kept its promise and carried out its threats, the state will be considered resolute and its commitments will carry weight. Press argues, “the core of the theory is that the past behavior of an enemy can shed light on useful information about its character, capabilities, or interest.”¹¹⁸

However, there are different versions of this theory.¹¹⁹ Noticeably, Harvey and Mitton who link resolve reputation and past actions to credibility, distinguish between two types of reputation: general and specific. General reputations rarely change and are typically based on widely accepted impressions of the opportunities and priorities.¹²⁰ With regard to specific reputation, Harvey and Mitton point out that it typically emerges as a “direct consequence of specific interactions and exchanges during different stages of a protracted military crisis or enduring rivalry.”¹²¹ One of the important characteristics of

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 141.

¹¹⁹ For example, Mercer’s study of reputation examines whether leaders learn about each other’s reputation from their behavior during crises. See Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics*. In another version, a state’s actions have a long-lasting effect on its credibility in crises everywhere around the world and in situations that involve different issues and different stakes. See, for example, Schelling, *Arms and Influence*. Other versions posit that a state’s behavior in one crisis has a more limited impact on its overall credibility. See, for example, Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse.” On the other hand, Chamberlain points out that it should be distinguished between immediate credibility (a threat taken in the specific action) and ultimate credibility (a threat that the coercer is committed to fight a long war). See Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats*.

¹²⁰ See Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton, *Fighting for Credibility: U.S. Reputation and International Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 96. For example, a general U.S. reputation, one that has regularly affected the way adversaries assess the United States’ resolve, is the Western (liberal democratic) aversion to military and civilian casualties.

¹²¹ Ibid.,

specific reputation is that this reputation, as opposed to general reputation, can change relatively quickly.

Applying this argument to coercive diplomacy: If the coercer, in previous episodes of coercion, failed to respond to the challenges made by past targets (or the present target in protracted crisis), the present target is likely to interpret this as coercer's lack of willingness to use military capabilities to enforce the threat in similar/present situations. Therefore, the past actions theory postulates that the credibility of threats is a product of past actions in similar situations.¹²²

Regarding the objectives that influence and/or determine will, they can be measured through assessments of coercer's interests being ranked from high to low importance with vital interests being the most important, and moral/ideological interests being the least important (as opposed to being vital to the target's survival). As mentioned before, the four interests ranked from high to low importance are: Vital interests (the defense of the homeland, territory, change of government); strategic interests (preservation of the existing balance of power in the international system); stability interests (preservation of the balance of power in the regional system); and

¹²² Press tests these two competing theories, the *past actions theory* and the *current calculus theory*, on a series of crises (Munich 1938-1939; Berlin 1958-1961; and Cuba 1962). Press points out that states do not use an adversary's past behavior to calculate credibility of threats, but they assess the credibility of threats by rationally calculating whether the coercer has the sufficient power (capability) to follow through on a threat, and whether the coercer is willing to do so (interest). See Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005). On the other hand, the critics of Press concluded just the opposite, that reputations do matter. See, for example, Alex Weisiger and Karen Yarhi-Milo, "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics," *International Organization* 69 (Spring 2015), 473-495; Harvey and Mitton, *Fighting for Credibility*.

moral/ideological interests (protection of the principles of international law, human rights and, more broadly, ideological values of the coercer).¹²³ In contrast to *the past actions theory*, the *current calculus theory* posits that when assessing the credibility of coercer's threats the decision-makers assess if the coercer has the will (that is "sufficient" interests), in addition to the capability, to pay the cost if the threats would fail to produce desired results.¹²⁴ The key factor is that the coercer must convince the target that the threats will be executed if the target does not comply with the demands. Therefore, the credibility of the threat depends on the relative balance of power between a coercer and a target (capability) and the coercer's interests (that is, will). Press goes further by arguing, "if the threatened action would achieve something of value and entail low costs, the treat will be credible." However, "if the threatened action would likely result in failure or be very costly, and if the potential gains would in all probability be small, the threat will be dismissed."¹²⁵

One of the drawbacks of the *past actions theory* is that it does not specify whether the decision-makers weight an adversary's power or interests more heavily; that is, low-cost threats and small interests, as opposed to large interests and costly actions. More generally, the theory holds that for a given level of interests, fluctuation in power will

¹²³ See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War*, 36-38.

¹²⁴ See Press, *Calculating Credibility*, 140.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 141. It is important to note that Chamberlain and Press disagree if "cheap threats" are less credible (as argued by Chamberlain) or more credible (as argued by Press); that is, the target's perception on the credibility of threats. See Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats*; Press, *Calculating Credibility*.

have a predictable effect on credibility. On the other hand, for a given balance of power, threats to defend vital interests will be more credible than threats to defend strategic, stability, or moral/ideological interests. This goes along with George's argument that "if the coercing power pursues ambitious objectives that go beyond its own vital and important interest, and if its demands infringe on vital or important interests of the adversary, then the asymmetry of interests and balance of motivation will favor the adversary."¹²⁶ The current calculus theory suggests that for a country to enhance its credibility, it has to build sufficient capabilities to defend its interests as cheaply as possible.

One can argue that the *past actions* and *current calculus* theories appear to overlap when decision makers study an adversary's previous behavior to assess its power and interests. For example, previous behavior may also be used to learn what the adversary's values are. However, Press points out that a clear line can be drawn between the two theories: If the decision-makers use the adversary's past coercing attempts to assess the adversary's power or interests, they are reasoning the way the past actions theory predicts.¹²⁷ On the other hand, the use of an adversary's military effectiveness to assess the adversary's power, and its credibility, supports the current calculus theory. The logic of the current calculus theory is that if a state fights, it should fight to win that particular battle. The logic of the past actions theory is that if the state fights, it should fight not only to win that particular battle, but also to look powerful in the future.

¹²⁶ See George, "Theory and Practice," 15.

¹²⁷ See Press, *Calculating Credibility*, 141.

In sum, to determine the presence or absence of credible threats the dissertation focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did the coercer fail to respond to the challenges made by the past targets in similar situations? (2) Did the coercer explicitly communicate its interest/s in a particular episode of coercion? (3) Did the coercer demonstrate its readiness to employ military force (by, for example, mobilizing troops, conducting military exercises)?

2.6.1.3 Credible Assurances

Assurances refer to the coercer's promise not to expand its demands and not to change its objectives once the target complies with the initial coercer's demands. Translating it to a cost-benefit equation, the target must believe that acquiescing to demands today will not lead to more demands tomorrow, making the cost of acquiescing to that particular demand higher than not to acquiesce to that particular demand. It is about utility, about reason, not emotions, to persuade the target (not just to frighten the target) that the target will be better off if the target acquiesce to coercer's demands.¹²⁸ However, as Schelling argues, "The assurances that accompany a compelling action - move back a mile and I won't shoot (otherwise I shall) and I won't then try again for a second mile - are harder to demonstrate in advance, unless it be through a long past record of abiding by one's own verbal assurances."¹²⁹ Therefore, a threat should be combined with credible assurances that the target will not be harmed if the target complies with the demands. Jakobsen

¹²⁸ See, for example, Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats*, 4.

¹²⁹ See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 74-75.

agrees that communicating credible assurances is essential for the success of coercive diplomacy, however, Jakobsen points out that it has not been studied systematically by coercion theorists.¹³⁰ This dissertation, therefore, introduces the role of trust and its impact on the credibility of assurances.

2.6.1.3.1 The Role of Trust

This dissertation analyzes the role of trust, not as its own variable, but rather how it affects the credibility of assurances. Trust can be understood and defined in many different ways.¹³¹ Andrew Kydd argues that to be *trustworthy* is to return cooperation rather than exploit it. On the other hand, to be *untrustworthy* is to exploit cooperation.¹³² Applying this argument to the international system, hegemony (the presence of a very powerful state) can promote cooperation, but only if a hegemon is relatively trustworthy; an untrustworthy hegemon will make cooperation less likely.¹³³

¹³⁰ See Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory,” 164.

¹³¹ For example, Hardin presents a good critique of different conceptions of trust; Coleman presents a discussion of concept of trust from a rational choice perspective; Hoffman presents a discussion of the concept of trust in international relations. See Russell Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Belknap Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990); Aron M. Hoffman, “A concept of Trust in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 8 (2002), 375-401.

¹³² See Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 6.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 9.

Michel argues that the emotional element in acts of trust should not be ignored in international relations; the emotional element should bring richness to our understanding of international relations and foreign policy making.¹³⁴ Hoffman agrees that trust could be an attitude which was born of emotion rather than rational calculation. However, Hofmann adds that there is “no reason to suppose that emotional responses violate an actor’s self-interest.”¹³⁵ In addition, Hoffman puts forward Hardin’s rationalist argument that trust can be understood in terms of self-interest and that “trust is never unconditional;” it always applies that ‘A trusts B to do x’.¹³⁶ Applying this to international relations, and taking into consideration the anarchical features of the international system, it is difficult to imagine a relationship in which one actor trusts another unconditionally. Therefore, trust is important when the actors are not sure of the fate of their interest, which introduces calculations of risk as well as estimates of the probability that their trust will be honored into the decision making.¹³⁷

This dissertation, as stated before, takes the rationalist approach where the target is a rational actor applying a decision-making cost-benefit analysis with the goal of maximizing utility and minimizing cost. Therefore, if the target perceives the coercer as trustworthy, it translates to a cost-benefit calculation in which the target is better off

¹³⁴ Torsten Michel, “Time to get emotional: Phronetic reflections on the concept of trust in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 4, (2013), 869-890.

¹³⁵ See Hoffman, “A concept of Trust in International Relations,” 382.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 377.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 382.

trusting that the coercer will fulfill its assurances (that is, the coercer will not change its demands and its objectives once the target acquiesces) and the fulfillment of the coercer's commitments will make the target better off (than not acquiescing).¹³⁸ Therefore, this dissertation hypothesizes that presence of trust shapes the target's behavior in such a way that target perceives the assurances as credible which contributes to the success of coercive diplomacy.

To assess the presence of credible assurances this dissertation focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did the target explicitly manifest its distrust of the coercer? (2) Did the target perceive the coercer as trustworthy? (3) Did the coercer clearly communicate its assurances?

2.6.1.4 International Strategic Environment

Taking into consideration that the international system is characterized by sovereign states and Hobbesian anarchy, neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that distribution of power is crucial to the system stability.¹³⁹ Furthermore, even though the case of coercion involves two major parties (that is, a coercer and a target), super powers and great powers and their support (or lack of support) can have a significant influence on the target's perception of the necessity of acquiescing to the demands put forward by the

¹³⁸ The danger of being betrayed can be lowered (but not eliminated) by improving the amount and quality of information actors have about one another. See Hoffman, "A Concept of Trust in International Relations," 379.

¹³⁹ See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979). More precisely, Waltz argues that the number of superpower and great powers is crucial to the international system's stability, where the bipolar system is the most stable.

coercer.¹⁴⁰ The assumption is that a bipolar international system (characterized by two superpowers) restrains the use of compellent threats because the superpower (*a bipole*) must take into consideration reaction of the other superpower in the system.¹⁴¹ The assumption is also that a multipolar system, which is characterized by three or more great powers, makes it even harder for the coercer to issue compellent threats since the coercer should take into consideration the interests of the other great powers in the system and the possibility of hostile great power intervention. On the other hand, in the unipolar system a hegemon (or *a unipol*) is less restrained when issuing compellent threats.¹⁴² However, there are two important factors that can influence even the hegemon: The presence of a rising global power and/or the presence of reemerging global power/s, which is/are ready to take the role of *spoiler* and potentially (strategically) benefit from the failure of coercive diplomacy and escalation of crisis (that is, the target not acquiescing to coercer's demands).¹⁴³ The assumption is that escalation of a crisis and the

¹⁴⁰ See also George and Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," 284.

¹⁴¹ See, for example, Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats*, 75.

¹⁴² For example, John Mearsheimer, stressing the material basis of hegemony, defines a hegemon as a "state (...) so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system." See John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Powers Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 40. Robert Gilpin also points out that a hegemonic structure is present when a "single powerful state (...) dominates the lesser states in the system." See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 29. For John Ikenberry (2006), a difference between a *unipol* as opposed to a *hegemon*, is not who leads (the most powerful state in the system), but who benefits (and how). See John Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?," *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (2018), 7-23.

¹⁴³ As Jakobsen points out that George and Simons' "isolation of the adversary" can be perceived as a part of this variable. See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War*,

coercer's military failure may influence the regional or global balance of power and give significant boost to a *spoiler* in the international arena.

As described by Stephen Walt, states have a tendency to balance against threats instead of joining or bandwagoning with the stronger power (in this case the coercing state).¹⁴⁴ If coercion is applied, not just the target state, but also other states (such as regional or global powers) might side with the target state against the coercer, especially great powers with whom the target state has a military alliance or has close military and economic relations. This could lead to the failure of coercion, where the lower cost of not acquiescing could encourage the target not to acquiesce to the demands. The failure of coercion means either escalation into military confrontation or loss of credibility in case if the coercer decides to appease the target.

To assess the presence of a *spoiler*, this dissertation focuses on the great powers in the international system and their stand on the demands put forward by the coercer and their interactions with the coercer and the target. More precisely this dissertation assesses documentary evidence in which leaders/decision-makers proclaim their stand on the demands put forward by the coercer and their interaction with the coercer and the target. This dissertation investigates if the target approached any of the great powers in the international system in its attempt to balance the coercer's threats, or if any of the great powers approached the target offering logistical and/or any other type of assistance and encouraging the target not to acquiesce to the demands.

¹⁴⁴ See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Also, where balancing can be defined as an attempt to prevent the military domination of one state by foreign power or coalition (internal by aggregating military power; external by foreign military alliances).

To determine/assess if the international strategic environment favors the coercer this dissertation focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did any of the great powers extend public and/or military support to the target? (2) Was the target a member of a military alliance or did the target sign a military treaty with any of the great powers? (3) Did the coercer engage diplomatically with the potential spoiler?

2.6.2 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables (DVs) of this dissertation are defined as a success/failure of coercive diplomacy and success/failure of military coercion. *Coercive diplomacy* fails if, after the coercer communicated threats and demands, the target: (1) Resisted acquiescing to the demands; (2) the coercer escalated the crisis and used limited or brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodated the target and abandoned the coercive strategy. *Coercive diplomacy succeeds* when the target acquiesces to the coercer's demands without use of force.¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, *military coercion succeeds* when the target acquiesces to coercer's demands after the coercer used limited force to coerce the target. *Military coercion* fails if the target (1) does not acquiesce to the coercer's demands after the coercer used limited force; (2) the coercer escalates the crisis and uses brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodates the target and abandons the coercive strategy.

¹⁴⁵ In this dissertation, the success of coercive diplomacy/coercion is based on effectiveness as opposed to efficiency. As Haun points out "effectiveness measures whether objectives are achieved, whereas efficiency is a relative comparison of the costs and benefits of the strategy adopted against viable alternative strategies." See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 17.

2.6.3 The CD Triangle: Predictions

The CD Triangle predicts if the following conditions are present the target will acquiesce to a demand:

- First, the target perceives threats as credible; that is, the coercer succeeds in communicating that the coercer has the *will* to pay the cost if the threats fail.
- Second, the target perceives assurances as credible; that is, the target trusts the coercer that the coercer will not change its demand after the target acquiesces to the coercer's demands and there will be no more demands tomorrow.
- Third, the international environment favors the coercer; that is, there are no global/regional *spoilers* willing to balance the coercer's threats.

2.7 Conclusion

Although scholars provide a good analysis of asymmetric strategic coercion in general and coercive diplomacy in particular, there is little consensus on why great powers fail to coerce weak states. This dissertation addresses the questions by proposing the *CD Triangle*, a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crisis. At the core of this model are three conditions considered as *minimally sufficient* and *necessary* for the success of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric international crises: (1) *Credible threats*, (2) *credible assurances*, and (3) *the international strategic environment* favoring the coercer. This model predicts that the target will acquiesce to the coercer's demands when all three conditions are present. In the next two empirical chapters this model is applied to U.S. coercive strategies during the Bosnian War (1992-95) and during the Kosovo Crisis (1998-99).

CHAPTER III: THE BOSNIAN WAR AND U.S. COERCIVE STRATEGIES (1992-1995)

After a brief overview of the events that preceded the Bosnian war and a brief overview of the four phases of U.S. involvement in the Bosnian war, as related to the use of coercive strategies, this chapter focuses on the fourth (last) phase of U.S. involvement in the Bosnian war, when the United States decisively applied the strategy of coercive diplomacy and military coercion to stop the war. The *Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle*, introduced in Chapter 2, is used to analyze success and failure of U.S. coercive diplomacy and military coercion.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the *CD Triangle* predicts that, if the following conditions are present, coercive diplomacy will succeed: First, the target perceives threats as credible, that is, the coercer succeeds in communicating by using a threat of force (coercive diplomacy) or by using limited force (military coercion); that the coercer has the will to pay the cost if the threats fail. Second, the target perceives assurances as credible, that is, the target trusts that the coercer will not change its objectives and will not change its demands (there will be no “more demands tomorrow”) after the target acquiesces to coercer’s demands. Third, the international environment favors the coercer, that is, there are no global or regional spoilers willing to balance the coercer’s threats. Similarly, failure of coercive diplomacy is expected if: The target does not perceive the coercer’s threats as credible; and/or the target does not trust the coercer that its assurances are credible, leading the target to look for regional or global spoilers to balance the coercer’s threats without acquiescing to the coercer’s demands.

3.1 Historical Overview of Yugoslavia and the Origin of Bosnian War

The first state of Yugoslavia (or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as it was initially called) was founded on December 1, 1918, on the ruins of two empires: Ottoman and Habsburg.¹⁴⁶ Initially, Yugoslavia was a parliamentary monarchy, and Peter I, from the Serbian dynasty Karadjordjevic, became the first king of this new state. In January 1929, King Alexander I abolished the parliament, suspended the constitution, and declared absolute rule.¹⁴⁷ The same year he officially renamed the country to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The first Yugoslavia ceased to exist in 1941 when Nazi Germany occupied the territory.¹⁴⁸

The second Yugoslavia came into being in November 1945, when the Yugoslav Communists, led by Josip Broz Tito, proclaimed the establishment of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁹ The Constitution of 1946 divided the territory into the six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-

¹⁴⁶ Carol Rogel points out that the state was a 'product' of Wilsonian idealism and pragmatism, a combination of national rights for self-determination as proclaimed by President Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points, and a "buffer against a resurgent Germany and a revisionist Russia" created after the First World War. See Carol Rogel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath* (Westport: Greenwood, 2004), 6.

¹⁴⁷ See Kate Hudson, *Breaking the South Slav Dream: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 4.

¹⁴⁸ The Independent State of Croatia emerged at that time run by a fascist puppet regime of the Third Reich, known for its atrocities committed against Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Croatian opponents of the regime.

¹⁴⁹ Josip Broz, a Croat, born in 1892 of a Croatian father and a Slovenian mother, was a charismatic political and military leader who was in the 1930s a permanent member of the Comintern and who in 1939 became a General Secretary of the Communist party of Yugoslavia.

Herzegovina) and the Constitution of 1974 identified two autonomous provinces within Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo (see Figure 3.1 Map of Yugoslavia in the 20th Century, 1941 - 1989).

Figure 4. Map of Yugoslavia in the 20th Century, 1941-1989¹⁵⁰



After World War Two, Tito emerged as widely accepted within Yugoslavia.¹⁵¹ However, Tito's attempt to maintain 'political independence' from the Soviet Union, became

¹⁵⁰ This map is adopted from Paul Robert Magosci, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), 139, fig 41.c.

¹⁵¹ Yugoslavia, whose economy was destroyed during the war and which lost 11 percent of its population, was undergoing a rapid process of social and economic recovery. See, for example, James Gapinski, *The Economic Structure and Failure of Yugoslavia* (London: Praeger, 1993), 4.

increasingly challenged by the Soviet leadership and culminated in Yugoslavia's removal from the Cominform in 1948. Following this event, Tito restored trade relations with the West; however, he stayed committed to socialist ideas.¹⁵² Tito's death in 1980, after being in power since the very inception of SFR Yugoslavia, left a political power vacuum.¹⁵³ In addition to domestic political changes, the increase in oil prices and the rise of international interest rates in the 1970s made SFR Yugoslavia's deficit in 1979 the largest deficit SFR Yugoslavia ever had.¹⁵⁴ In an attempt to curb the deficit, the federal government introduced an "inflammatory macro-economic stabilization policy of radical austerity, trade and price liberalization, and institutional reforms."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² For example, Susan Woodward argues, "Tito's regime survived thanks to the U.S. economic assistance. In exchange, socialist Yugoslavia played a critical role for U.S. global leadership during the Cold War: as a propaganda tool in its anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaign (...);" as quoted by Kate Hudson, *Breaking the South Slav Dream*, 39.

¹⁵³ For some scholars and analysts, such as Gojko Vuckovic, the key event in Yugoslav disintegration was the death of Tito in 1980 when the federal government ceased to be an effective institution. See Gojko Vuckovic, "Failure of Socialist Self-Management to Create a Viable Nation-State, and Disintegration of the Yugoslav Administrative State and State Institutions." *East European Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (1998), 354. However, for other scholars, such as Susan Woodward, the collapse of the Cold War international order (the international system factors) made internal events lethal and war inevitable. See Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1995), 16-22.

¹⁵⁴ In 1979, Yugoslavia was facing a \$3.7 billion deficit. By 1981 SFR Yugoslavia was paying on its debt an average interest of 18.7 percent, which was far more from the interest SFR Yugoslavia paid in 1972. See Gapinski, *The Economic Structure and Failure of Yugoslavia*, 2-5; Dyker, *Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt*, 95.

¹⁵⁵ See Dyker, *Yugoslavia*, 95. Dyker also argues that the market-oriented reforms led to a shift from the primary production towards the production of western markets, that is, "demand declined for produce in agriculture, mining and metallurgy, and defense, which tended to concentrate in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia, and its two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina." See Dyker, *Yugoslavia*, 60. It is important to point

The impact of the 1980s market-oriented reforms on SFR Yugoslavia's population was severe.¹⁵⁶ In a background of almost a total loss of confidence in the federal government and economic hardship, the Serbian League of Communists leader Slobodan Milosevic established a degree of charismatic popularity in Serbia.¹⁵⁷ Milosevic "started to build up tremendous support in Serbia through blunt exploitation of Serbian sensitivities in relation to Kosovo, an autonomous province of the Serbian republic," historically perceived as a heartland of Serbia, but 85 percent Albanian in population.¹⁵⁸ To republican leaders in Croatia and Slovenia, Milosevic looked like

out that in 1985, the Vrhovec Commission came into existence. This commission, named after its chair Josip Vrhovec, Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, had a goal of exploring a possible path towards reforming the political system, which would eventually speed up the economic reforms in Yugoslavia. See Steven L. Burg, "Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 38, no. 2 (April 1986), 170-171.

¹⁵⁶ Rationing was introduced for items such as petrol, sugar, flour, and coffee. Investments in public infrastructure and social services were stopped; unemployment accelerated, and, largely due to devaluation, the Yugoslav currency (*dinar*) fell by 90 percent. See Hudson, *Breaking the South Slav Dream*, 53.

¹⁵⁷ In the 1987 *NIN*, the leading Serbian news outlet, public opinion survey, 79 percent of respondents said that they believed that SFR Yugoslavia's economic problems might never be solved. See Dyker, *Yugoslavia*, 182. Woodward points that "Although the Yugoslav federal government continued to function up to the second half of 1991, its authority and especially its enforcement power had declined so much that (...) the context of its dissolution could be said to resemble the conditions of anarchy in which a security dilemma in international relations is said to occur." See Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 80.

¹⁵⁸ See Dyker, *Yugoslavia*, 181; also, see Gapinski, *The Economic Structure and Failure of Yugoslavia*, 5. The event that propelled Milosevic to political stardom was his speech at Kosovo Polje, on April 25, 1987. Milosevic (as a protégé of Ivan Stambolic, a President of Serbia) was sent to Kosovo Polje, a town located in central Kosovo, to ease the tensions between the Serbs minority and the Albanian majority. Milosevic faced a crowd of angry Serbs, who believed that the state failed to protect them and that Kosovo police unjustifiably beats the Serbs. In his attempt to take the control of situation Milosevic said, "No one should dare to beat you!" ["Niko ne sme da vas bije!"] See, for

another Great-Serbian hegemonist, who had opened the door for the rise of ethnocentrism in their own backyard. Economic hardship and nationalist sentiment were used by the leadership of all republics to their advantage to win the voters in the first multi-party elections in 1990.¹⁵⁹

As the economic and political situation in Yugoslavia was worsening and without any hope that agreement would be made between two opposing camps (Slovenia and Croatia, on one side, arguing in favor of confederation, and Serbia, on the other side, arguing in favor of federation), on June 25, 1991, Slovenia, followed by Croatia, declared independence (or, as Slovenians argued, disassociation) from the federal state (SFR Yugoslavia).

The war between Slovenia and the Yugoslav Federal Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija (JNA), hereafter referred to as JNA) started on 27th June 1991, when JNA troops tried to retake a border post from the Slovenian National Guard.¹⁶⁰ The war

example, “No one should dare to beat you: The rise of Milosevic and the fall of Tito’s Yugoslavia began with this sentence,” [““Niko ne sme da vas bije”: Ovom recenicom je poceo uspon Milosevica i pad Titove Jugoslavij”] *Telegraf.rs*, April 24, 2020, <https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politica/3181821-nitko-ne-sme-a-vas-bije-ovom-recenicom-je-poceo-uspon-milosevica-i-pad-titove-jugoslavije>.

¹⁵⁹ In Croatia, the Croatian League of Communists, later known as the Party of Democratic Change (SDP), was defeated by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). Franjo Tudjman, the head of HDZ, was elected the President of Croatia. In Serbia, which held the multi-party elections in December 1990, the Social Party of Serbia, that is the merger of the Serbian Communist League and the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia, under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic won the election.

¹⁶⁰ The armed forces of SFR Yugoslavia were comprised of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija (JNA)) and the Territorial Defense Force (Teritorijalna Obrana (TO)). The JNA was a federal body, whereas the TO was organized on the level of each republic and equipped with light/infantry weapons. The Presidency of the SFR Yugoslavia (which since 1988 had eight members, one represented each republic and

ended on 7th July 1991 when the European Community (EC) negotiated a peace agreement in the Croatian town of Brioni.¹⁶¹ The war in Croatia started in August 1991, when the JNA directly became involved in the conflict between Croatian police forces and the force formed under the territory controlled by the ethnic Serbs supported by the JNA.¹⁶² In December 1991, while fighting was intensifying in the Eastern part of Croatia,

autonomous provinces) was responsible for “command and control” of the JNA. See “*Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia of 1974, Articles 240, 262, 279, 313, and 328*”, accessed August 23, 2019, <https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yugoslavia-Constitution1974.pdf>. Christopher Hill describes the JNA as “a well-equipped army with a doctrine of citizen-soldier.” See Christopher Hill, *Outpost: A Diplomat at Work* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 137.

¹⁶¹This agreement is also known as the *Brioni* agreement. For elaboration see, for example, Hudson, *Breaking the South Slav Dream*, 83; Carol Rogel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath*, 57. Also, Borisav Jovic, Serbia’s representative to the Presidency of the SFR Yugoslavia and its vice president and president from 1989 to 1991, stated that “[Slovenia] was a one-ethnic state, and it was easy to settle accounts with them.” See Borisav Jovic, witness statement in “Milosevic” *ICTY*, November 20, 2003, [p.293666] https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/031120IT.htm.

¹⁶² Croatia had a significant ethnic Serbian population; according to 1991 census data 12 percent of the Croatian population in 1991 were ethnic Serbs. See “Intelligence Report: Croatia’s Ethnic Serb-Controlled Areas: A Geographic Perspective,” *CIA*, May 1995, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1995-05-01A.pdf>. In summer of 1990 the members of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) withdrew from the Assembly of the newly independent Republic of Croatia. In their attempt to establish sovereignty and autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia, and with the support of JNA, the Serbs started to barricade the roads leading to the territory where Serbs were the majority or a significant minority and eventually, on December 21, 1990, proclaimed the Serbian Autonomous District (SAO) Krajina; the assembly of the SAO Krajina proclaimed the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). On February 1992, the SAO of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem and the SAO of Western Slavonia joined the RSK (approximately 25 percent of Croatian territory bordering Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). See, for example, “Martić (Trial Judgment),” *ICTY*, June 12, 2007, [pp.49-53] <https://www.icty.org/case/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf>; see also “Intelligence Report: Croatia’s Ethnic Serb-Controlled Areas: A Geographic Perspective,” *CIA*, May 1995, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingsroom/docs/1995-05-01A.pdf>.

and four months before the war began in Bosnia, the debate over whether to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent states divided the Western powers. On December 23, 1991, after the atrocities had been committed by the JNA and Serbian paramilitary forces in the Croatian town of Vukovar, Germany unilaterally recognized Slovenian and Croatian independence. The EC followed the lead of its member, Germany, and recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. The EC also indicated that it would recognize the independence of any other ex-SFR Yugoslav republic that would meet certain conditions, including democracy and respect for human rights.¹⁶³

Fighting in Croatia lasted until 3rd January 1992, when the United Nations-negotiated cease-fire agreement between Croatia and the leaders of JNA and Serbia came into effect.¹⁶⁴ What was significant for the upcoming war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) was that the JNA, while leaving Croatia and Slovenia, moved troops and ammunition from those two republics to Bosnia (mostly to the areas populated by the Bosnian Serbs) and Serbia. In addition, “small arms, ammunition, and weapons plants [were] clustered in Serbia, and the greatest variety of weapons [was] produced in Bosnia” giving military advantage to these two republics (see Figure 5 & Figure 6).

¹⁶³ See William Drozdiak, “12 West European Countries Recognized Croatia, Slovenia,” *Washington Post*, January 16, 1992, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/01/16/12-west-european-countries-recognize-croatia-slovenia/56869807-2131-4da8-8891-59df8c7d9838/>.

¹⁶⁴ See Chuck Sudetic, “Cease-fire Stills Gunfire in Croatia,” *New York Times*, January 4, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/04/world/cease-fire-stills-gunfire-in-croatia.html>.

Figure 5. Military Regions & Corps Headquarters (SFR Yugoslavia)¹⁶⁵




Figure 6. Major Weapons Production Facilities (SFR Yugoslavia)¹⁶⁶



As Slovenia and Croatia became internationally recognized as independent states, Macedonia, whose citizens during the referendum conducted in September of 1991

¹⁶⁵ This map is adopted from “Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War” *CIA*, March 1991, [p.5], <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1991-0301.pdf>.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

overwhelmingly voted for independence, hoped to be recognized by the international community too.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, the voters in Montenegro gave support to Montenegro's union with Serbia in a truncated Yugoslav state, and in late April 1992 Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the (two-republic) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) with *de facto* dominance of Serbia and its leader Slobodan Milosevic.¹⁶⁸

In the multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia, the referendum conducted on March 2, 1992 was a victory for Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and those who voted for an independent Bosnia (mostly Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, who together accounted for 60 percent of four million Bosnian citizens).¹⁶⁹ The Bosnian Serbs, who accounted for 31 percent of the population and opposed independence, boycotted the referendum and formed, so called, "Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" (also known as "Republika Srpska"). Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serbian Democratic

¹⁶⁷ See John Tagliabue, "Macedonians Voted for Independence from Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, September 10, 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/10/world/macedonians-voted-for-independence-from-yugoslavia.html>.

¹⁶⁸ See John F. Burns, "Confirming Split, Last 2 Republics Proclaim a Small New Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, April 28, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/28/world/confirming-split-last-2-republics-procalim-a-small-new-yugoslavia.html>.

¹⁶⁹ According to the *CIA* report, the population of multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina (approximately 4 million people) was fragmented into "Slavic Muslim community (comprising 43 percent of the population), Serbian community (comprising 31 percent of the population), and Croat community (comprising 17 percent of the population)." See "Bosnia-Herzegovina: On the Edge of the Abyss," *CIA*, December 19, 1991, [p. 2], <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1991-12-19.pdf>.

Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Srpska Demokratska Stranka* (SDS)), declared himself a president of an ‘independent’ Republika Srpsa.¹⁷⁰

On May 12, 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly met in Banja Luka (*de facto* capital of Republika Srpska) and adopted a document presented by Radovan Karadzic titled “Six strategic objectives for the Serbian people in BiH [Bosnia].”¹⁷¹ This document defined the borders of the Serb state within Bosnia and separation from the other two ethnic communities in Bosnia, as well as division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Bosnian Muslim parts.¹⁷² During the same session of the Bosnian Serb assembly, the decision was made for the formation of the Army of Republika Srpska (*Vojska Republike Srpske* (VRS)). The VRS was formed by the combination of the JNA units, the Territorial Defense (TO) forces, and local Serb volunteer units. The VRS assumed the organizational structure, personnel, military equipment and weapons of the JNA.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ Karadzic was elected President of the three-member Presidency of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska, in December 1992. See “Karadzic” *ICTY*, July 22, 2011, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/110722ED.htm>.

¹⁷¹ Although the constitution of Republika Srpska named *Pale*, a village near Sarajevo, as its capital, Banja Luka, the second largest city in Bosnia, became *de facto* capital of Republika Srpska.

¹⁷² The six strategic goals defined by Karadzic were: 1) To create a separate state within Bosnia; 2) to establish a corridor between Semberija [located in Bosnia] and Autonomous Region of Krajina [located in Croatia, occupied by the Serbs until 1995]; 3) to eliminate the river Drina as a border between Republika Srpska and Serbia; 4) to establish the border on the Una and Neretva rivers; 5) to divide the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Bosniak parts; 6) to secure a passage to the Adriatic Sea. See footnote 487 in Jovana Kolaric, *Dossier: The JNA in the Wars in Croatia and BiH*, (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center, 2018), 71; also “Karadzic” *ICTY*, July 22, 2011 [pp.17186-17189], <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/110722ED.htm>.

¹⁷³ See Kolaric, *Dossier*, 67. The SDS with JNA support, started to arm the Bosnian Serbs in the spring of 1991, and “by 20 March 1992 the JNA distributed 51,900 pieces of

General Ratko Mladic, a career military officer, and the commander of the 9th Corps of the JNA, who participated in the fighting in Croatia, became a commander of the VRS.¹⁷⁴ The JNA played the key role in arming and staffing the VRS. After the JNA had to officially withdraw from independent republic Bosnia in May of 1992, the successor of the JNA, the Yugoslav Army (VJ), continued to provide “the logistic, personnel and material support” to the VRS.¹⁷⁵ The support of the JNA and its successor the VJ (as well as Serbia as a driving force in the two-republic Federal Yugoslavia) made the Bosnian Serbs, among the three communities (Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats) by far the best-armed force in Bosnia.¹⁷⁶ After the proclamation of Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb forces started to seize control of the territory they perceived to be

weaponry to Serb volunteer units in the area of the responsibility of the 2nd VO. (...) 17,298 pieces of weaponry were distributed through the SDS.” The SDS also received weapons from JNA units that had to leave Slovenia and Croatia, for example, 20,000 pieces of weaponry from the military warehouse in Skradinik (Croatia) to the Bosnian municipalities where ethnic Serbs had a majority. In addition to arms being supplied to the Bosnian Serbs, the JNA played a major role in training Bosnian Serbs paramilitary. See Kolaric, *Dossier*, 63-64.

¹⁷⁴ “Case No. IT-95-5/18-I: The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Ratko Mladic,” *ICTY*, October 10, 2002, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/ind/en/mla-ai021010e.pdf>.

¹⁷⁵ See Kolaric, *Dossier*, 63. See also “The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Report of the [UN] Secretary General, 3 December 1992: Document A/47/747,” *UN*, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/747. Also, the VJ was the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) comprised of Serbia and Montenegro.

¹⁷⁶ Cited by Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War*, 80; James Gow, “One year of war in Bosnia and Hercegovina,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 23 (4 June 1993), 9-10; also, Milos Vasic, “The Pattern of Aggression: Two Against One in Bosnia,” *War Report*, no. 17 (January 1993), 8.

strategically important, according to Karadzic's "six strategic objectives," with the ultimate goal of a union with Serbia.

In April of 1992 the Bosnian-Serb militia isolated major Bosnian cities (including the capital city Sarajevo) and began ethnic cleansing. Alija Izetbegovic, a president of the Republic of Bosnia, ordered the mobilization of the TO, that is, the national guard, and police reserve units, calling on the Republic's people to "defend themselves."¹⁷⁷

However, the militarily superior Bosnian Serb Army was on the offensive, and by the end of summer of 1992 two-thirds of Bosnia was under the Bosnian Serb control. As Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. Ambassador to SFR Yugoslavia (1989-92), points out, "There was no debate in Washington who started the war; it was the Serbs. The issue was what to do about it."¹⁷⁸

3.2 Phases of U.S. Involvement in the Bosnian War as Related to the Use of Coercive Strategies (1992-1995)

The United States involvement in the Bosnian crisis and war can be divided into four phases. Phase I: The politics of not using force (non-military coercion) and following the EC/UN lead. Phase II: A rhetorical toughness, the politics of not using force, and

¹⁷⁷ See Chuck Sudetic, "Bosnia Calls up Guard and Reserves," *New York Times*, April 5, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/05/world/bosnia-calls-up-guard-and-reserves.html>. Also see Chuck Sudetic, "Conflict in the Balkans: Bosnia; Serb Troops Press Gorazde, Ignoring NATO Ultimatum," *New York Times*, April 23, 1994, <https://nytimes.com/1994/04/23/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-serb-troops-press-gorazde-ignoring-nato-ultimatum.html>.

¹⁷⁸ See Warren Zimmerman, "Yugoslavia: 1989-1996," in *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*, edited by Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin (Washington, DC: RAND, 1996), 190.

diplomatic support for the Vance-Owens peace plan. Phase III: The escalation of diplomatic pressure and the Contact Group peace plan. Phase IV: The United States leads and backs diplomacy with military force, resulting in Operation Deliberate Force, and the Dayton peace agreement.

3.3 Phase I: The Politics of not Using Force and Following the EC/UN Lead (March 1992- January 1993)

The George H. W. Bush administration (1989-1993) viewed the crisis in SFR Yugoslavia, and Bosnia, as a European problem and maintained a largely ‘hands-off’ policy in the region.¹⁷⁹ When, in June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence, the U.S. policy towards these two republics was clear: They or any country (including any of the six former Yugoslav republics) should not challenge the existing (SFR Yugoslavia’s) borders. However, the Bush administration supported “any new configuration that the Yugoslav republics negotiated” with an emphasis that it had to be done peacefully through negotiations.¹⁸⁰ Military intervention was not threatened, and

¹⁷⁹ See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, “Conflict in Yugoslavia; War In Yugoslavia Feared by Baker,” *New York Times*, July 4, 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/04/world/conflict-in-yugoslavia-war-in-yugoslavia-feared-by-baker.html>. Also, for example, James A. Baker, Secretary of State during the Bush administration, points out that “[t]he game did not envision the unilateral use of American military power, nor was force envisioned as a means to resolve the underlying conflict.” See James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 649. Baker’s statement, “[w]e don’t have a dog in this fight,” presents a general attitude during the George H. W. Bush administration towards the crisis in Yugoslavia. See Richard Holbrook, *To End A War* (Random House: Toronto, 1998), 27.

¹⁸⁰ See Thomas L. Friedman, “Conflict in Yugoslavia; War in Yugoslavia Feared by Baker” *The New York Times*, July 4, 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/04/world/conflict-in-yugoslavia-war-in-yugoslavia-feared-by-baker.html>.

it was not considered as one of the possible options. As Zimmermann, the last U.S. Ambassador to SFR Yugoslavia, points out, “If those who wanted their republics to secede from Yugoslavia feared no American use of force to stop them, those who wanted to prevent secession felt a similar absence of threat.”¹⁸¹ However, as the war was spreading from Slovenia to Croatia, the United States, in its attempt to defuse the violence, suspended its financial assistance and aid to SFR Yugoslavia and supported UN Security Council Resolution 713. This resolution, in September 1992, imposed an arms embargo on SFR Yugoslavia.¹⁸²

The crisis in Bosnia started to rapidly escalate after the first Bosnian multiparty elections were held on November 19, 1992, dominated by the parties based on ethnic lines.¹⁸³ The war became inevitable after the referendum on independence, conducted on March 2, 1992, when Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats voted for an independent

¹⁸¹ See Zimmermann, “Yugoslavia: 1989-1996,” 185.

¹⁸² Thomas L. Friedman points out the U.S. “sells no arms to Yugoslavia, so this would only apply to European countries. The Soviets have been Belgrade's traditional arms suppliers, providing mostly tanks.” Slovenia was obtaining weapons from Singapore and Croatia from Hungary. See, Thomas L. Friedman, “Conflict in Yugoslavia; War in Yugoslavia Feared by Baker” *The New York Times*, July 4, 1991. Also, see “UNSCR 713,” *UNSCR*, September 25, 1991 <http://unscr.com/en/resolution/doc/713>.

¹⁸³ Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the local Serb nationalist party (the Serbian Democratic Part SDS), was committed to the union with Yugoslavia, while Stjepan Kljuic, the leader of the Croat Nationalist Party (Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)), was committed to Bosnian sovereignty. Alija Izetbegovic, the leader of the main Muslim party (the Party of Democratic Action (SDA)) has called for ‘compromise’ between confederation and federation. See Chuck Sudetic, “Evolution in Europe; A Yugoslav Republic Holds a Contested Election,” *New York Times*, November 19, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/19/world/evolution-in-europe-a-yugoslav-republic-holds-a-contested-election.html>.

Bosnia and the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed an ‘independent’ Republika Srpska. In an attempt to constrain escalation, the United States, following the EC, on April 7, 1992, recognized Bosnian independence.¹⁸⁴ Motivated by significant military advantage and supported by the JNA (*de facto* under the leadership of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic) the Bosnian Serbs started a military offensive in their attempt to take over the territory as outlined in Karadzic’s plan.¹⁸⁵

As the violence progressed and refugees flooded neighboring countries, the Bush administration continued to take a secondary role by supporting the EC and UN in their attempt to negotiate peace among the warring parties and by supporting UN economic sanctions (that is, non-military coercion) aimed at FR Yugoslavia. More precisely, the Bush administration perceived economic sanctions as a way to isolate Milosevic and neutralize his support for the Bosnian Serbs and their military offensive. Despite the Bush administration having discussed military support for humanitarian objectives and having discussed the potential use of air power, that is, limited air strikes, to dislodge the Serbian artillery around Sarajevo, the Bush administration did not, during its mandate, threaten military force; it stayed committed to supporting the UN/EC diplomatic initiatives and sanctions; the goal was to negotiate peace not to impose it. As Zimmerman notes “none

¹⁸⁴ See George H. W. Bush, “Statement on United States Recognition of the former Yugoslav Republics,” April 7, 1992, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/4152>.

¹⁸⁵ Slobodan Milosevic was President of FR Yugoslavia from July 15, 1997 until October 6, 2000, and as FRY President, he was the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army. See “Kosovo, Croatia & Bosnia” (IT-02-54): Slobodan Milosevic” *ICTY*, accessed July 2, 2021, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/cis/en/cis_milosevic_slobodan_en.pdf.

of the major shapers of U.S. policy toward Bosnia leaned toward force;” most significantly, President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. All declared that U.S. ground forces were not to be used in Bosnia.¹⁸⁶

However, as the Bosnian Serb offensive intensified during the summer and fall of 1992, the Bush administration supported the UN initiative to deploy 7,700 UNPROFOR troops (UN Protection Forces/non-U.S. peacekeepers); the goal was to secure the Sarajevo airport and ensure delivery of humanitarian aid.¹⁸⁷ The Bush administration also supported the efforts by the UN and the EC in forming the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), co-chaired by the UN representative (and former U.S. Secretary of State), Cyrus Vance, and the EC envoy (and former British Foreign Secretary), Lord David Owen, which by January 1993 proposed the Vance-Owen peace plan.¹⁸⁸ This plan proposed for Sarajevo to become a demilitarized zone, Bosnia to be divided into ten provinces and governed by the decentralized government, and it also called for the Bosnian Serbs to abandon the territory they had gained in the past year.

¹⁸⁶ See Zimmerman, “Yugoslavia: 1989-1996,” 190. Zimmermann also argues that aversion to use force had three sources: The “lessons” from Vietnam (“even a minimum injection of American force could swell (...) into a major commitment and produce a quagmire”); the need for clear objectives before possible U.S. intervention (that is, the need for an “exit strategy” and “American casualties were sure to be minimal;” the coming presidential elections of 1992 and [again] fear of American casualties. See *Ibid.*, 191.

¹⁸⁷ See “UN Security Resolutions 764, 770, & 776,” *UN*, accessed April 24, 2019, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1992>.

¹⁸⁸ See Phil Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, (Stanford University Press: Stanford: 2015), 97.

However, the Bosnian Serbs, encouraged by their territorial gains, and without any credible coercive threats, were not willing to accept the plan.¹⁸⁹

3.4 Phase II: A Rhetorical Toughness, the Politics of not Using Force, and the UN/EC Peace Plan (January 1993- February 1994)

When President Bill Clinton took office in January of 1993, the siege of Sarajevo was in its second year, the Bosnian Serbs were holding onto their territorial gains (with their eyes and heavy artillery aimed at the Bosnian Muslim enclaves), and a war (within a war) had broken out between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims whose military was the most disadvantaged by the UN imposed arms embargo in 1992.

As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton was critical of U.S. Bosnia policy, calling for “real leadership”¹⁹⁰ and the use of military force to “open Serbian detention camps”.¹⁹¹ However, the rhetorical toughness that marked his 1992 presidential race did

¹⁸⁹ See “The Vance-Owen Plan,” *UCDP-Uppsala Conflict Data Program*, March 25, 1993, https://ucdpged.uu.se/peaceagreements/fulltext/BA_930502_The_Vance-Owen_Plan.pdf.

¹⁹⁰ Among other things, presidential candidate Clinton proposed that economic sanctions to be tightened against Serbia, that President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia be charged “with crimes against humanity,” and for the United States to take the lead in seeking UN Security Council authorization for air strikes against those who were attacking the relief efforts. He called for air and naval forces, adequate to carry out these operations, to be visible in position. See Andrew Rosenthal, “The 1992 Campaign: The Republicans; Clinton Attacked on Foreign Policy,” *New York Times*, July 28, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/28/us/the-1992-campaign-the-republicans-clinton-attacked-on-foreign-policy.html>.

¹⁹¹ See Gwen Ifill, “Role of U.S. in Bosnia Conflict,” *New York Times*, August 10, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/10/us/conflict-balkans-clinton-takes-aggressive-stances-role-us-bosnia-conflict.html>.

not translate to a ‘tougher’ or more ‘decisive’ U.S. Bosnian policy during 1993. The new Clinton administration faced the same dilemma that the Bush administration had: How to end the war without committing U.S. ground forces. The Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia (a collaboration of the UN and the EC) was the focus of the White House Principals’ committee meeting on Bosnia, conducted on February 5, 1993. During the meeting General Powell argued, referring to the Vance-Owen peace plan, that “The nature of a Bosnia agreement will require ground forces. We can punish from the air but cannot enforce from the air.”¹⁹²

The Clinton administration, like the Bush administration before, concluded that sending troops to fight in Bosnia to enforce the peace plan would not be supported either by Congress or the American people, therefore, ruling out any military intervention (or threat of military intervention) in the absence of a peace agreement.¹⁹³ However, the Clinton administration proposed several initiatives that did not directly include a U.S. commitment to use military force. On February 22, 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 808 initiating the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to prosecute war crimes in the Former Yugoslavia.¹⁹⁴ To help enforce the Vance-Owen plan, the

¹⁹² Vice President Al Gore was clear that “American people will not want to send our boys there [to Bosnia].” See “1993-02-05, Minutes of the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993,” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12307>.

¹⁹³ Ibid. Also see James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 648-649.

¹⁹⁴ See “UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 808 on War Crimes Tribunal: Statement by U.S. Ambassador, March 22, 1993” *HeinOnline*, <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/dsptch8&div=108&id=&page=>. The UNSC passed resolution 827 establishing the *International Criminal Tribunal*

Clinton administration supported tougher economic sanctions against Serbia [that is, FR Yugoslavia] and in April 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 820 reflecting this initiative.¹⁹⁵ Milosevic, pressed by economic sanctions, began, at least publicly, to urge the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Vance-Owen peace plan. However, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan in a mid-May referendum.¹⁹⁶

In an attempt to protect the Bosnian Muslim population in towns besieged by the Bosnia Serbs, in May 1993, the United States, Britain, Spain, and Russia reached agreement on a joint action program called for the establishment of “safe areas”. It set the stage for the passing of U.N. Security Council Resolution 824 authorizing the establishment of six UN-protected safe areas: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa.¹⁹⁷ The Clinton administration also cosponsored UN Security Council Resolution 836, which extended the mandate of UN troops (UNPROFOR) to “deter attack” on the safe areas.¹⁹⁸ UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali insisted that, in

for Former Yugoslavia on May 25, 1993. See “UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993),” *UNSCR*, May 25, 1993, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/827>.

¹⁹⁵ See “UN Security Council Resolution 820,” *UNSCR*, April 17, 2020, <https://www.unscr.com/en/resolutions/820>.

¹⁹⁶ As Haun argues, “as a coercive strategy, the Vance-Owen plan proved to be flawed as it mismatched the demands and threats made of the Bosnian Serbs.” It called for the Bosnian Serbs to relinquish 30 percent of their territory, much of which had been gained in the past year’s fighting, and “no major power committed its military to implement the plan.” See Haun, *Coercion Survival and War*, 97-98.

¹⁹⁷ See “UN Security Council Resolution 824 (1993),” *UNSCR*, May 6, 1993, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/824>.

¹⁹⁸ See “UN Security Council Resolution 836,” *UNSCR*, June 4, 1983, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/836>.

order to be able to fulfill its mandate (to protect the safe areas) additional troops were needed; proposing a “force of up to 70,000 troops, including tens of thousands of American soldiers”.¹⁹⁹ However, only a fraction of that total was provided, mostly comprised of French troops, leaving the safe areas exposed to the Bosnian Serbs’ heavy weaponry and attacks.

Although the Clinton administration ruled out committing ground forces, the administration was considering the limited use of force, that is, to support strategic NATO air strikes to enforce the “no-fly zone” over Bosnia as well as to coerce Bosnian Serbs to place their heavy weapons under international monitoring.²⁰⁰ This consideration evolved into a “lift and strike” policy; to lift the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslim government [to give the Muslim Government better chance to defend itself] and to employ strategic NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS). The ultimate goal was to stop the war and compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan. However, the Clinton administration was not ready to “press” the “lift and strike” policy “to the point of shattering relations with their European allies or the Russians.”²⁰¹ Russian President Boris Yeltsin was explicit in only in supporting the

¹⁹⁹ See Julia Preston, “Boutros-Ghali Asserts U.N. Role in Bosnia,” *Washington Post*, May 5, 1993, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/05/05/boutros-ghali-asserts-un-role-in-bosnia/293bbac5-e26b-4ad0-ac17-6c257a96b6b7/>.

²⁰⁰ See John M. Goshko and Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. to Study Wider Options on Balkans,” *Washington Post*, January 28, 1993, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/01/28/us-to-study-wider-options-on-balkans/01c27f08-8d48-4c16-b85f-67379ccb9c2f/>.

²⁰¹ See *National Security Council and Records Management Office*, “Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia/20527 [May 17, 1993]” *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed February 2, 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

tougher UN sanctions, and the European allies, led by France and Britain, rejected the proposed policy, arguing that “lift and strike” would put the UN protection forces (UNPROFOR) in great danger - the majority being from the European countries and without any participation of U.S. troops.²⁰² Despite that the Clinton administration adopted “lift and strike” as its official stance, by the end of May 1993, the proposed policy was abandoned.

Another significant attempt “to put military strength in the service of diplomacy” came with NATO starting to enforce a UN imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia aiming to prevent bombardment of civilian targets and to support UN troops if under attack. As a part of this policy, in August 1993, NATO threatened air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs if they did not ease the siege of Sarajevo.²⁰³ In response, the Bosnian Serbs threatened that “the attack would trigger a huge battle and chaos.”²⁰⁴ The confrontation

²⁰² As quoted in Jakobsen, President Yeltsin stated on April 26, 1993, “Russia is not going to protect those who oppose the will of the international community. The Serbian nationalists and all the other parties that use force will encounter a strong UN response.” See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War*, 87. Regarding the European allies, see for example, Mark Matthews, “U.S. Bosnia policy shifting toward European view French plan calls for U.S. troops to join beefed-up U.N. deterrence force,” *The Baltimore Sun*, May 15, 1993, <https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-05-15-1993135003-story.html>.

²⁰³ In July 1993, Bosnian Serb forces captured MT *Igman* and MT *Bjelasnica*, two strategic peaks overlooking Sarajevo. See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, 91.

²⁰⁴ Karadzic issued a threat: “If a single bomb strikes a Serbian position, there would be no more talks. We would have an all-out war and catastrophe. (...) There would be tremendous suffering on all three sides. I would (...) lose control of the central command;” as cited in Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, 91.

was eventually resolved peacefully.²⁰⁵ But due to the fear of possible Bosnian Serb retaliation (such as taking the UNPROFOR troops as hostages) and NATO bombing errors, the European allies, led by Britain and France, insisted on a “dual key”, requiring approval from both the UN civilian leadership and NATO military leadership before strikes could occur, limiting coercive effects.

By late 1993, all attempts by the UN and EU (previously EC) to negotiate peace in Bosnia, including the Vance-Owen peace plan, had failed.

3.5 Phase III: The Contact Group Peace Plan and the Escalation of Diplomatic Pressure (February 1994- April 1995)

The Bosnian Serb attack on Sarajevo’s crowded open-air marketplace, which, in February 1994 killed at least 66 people and wounded over 200 people, brought a subtle shift in U.S. policy in Bosnia.²⁰⁶ President Clinton was explicit that “more must be done to stop the shelling of Sarajevo and the murder of innocents.” However, he also insisted that the conflict should only be resolved by the warring parties and he ruled out any unilateral use of American military power.²⁰⁷ The subtle shift meant that, militarily, the

²⁰⁵ Jakobsen points out that “it was the carrot employed by the West which induced the BSA [the Bosnian Serb Army] to withdraw, not the threats of air strikes which enjoyed no credibility whatsoever.” See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, 92.

²⁰⁶ See Tony Smith, “Shelling of Sarajevo Market Place Kills 66; More Than 200 Wounded,” *Washington Post*, February 6, 1994, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/bosvote/market.htm>.

²⁰⁷ See Douglas Jehl, “Conflict in the Balkans; Clinton Outlines U.S. Interests in Bosnia Air Strikes,” *New York Times*, February 10, 1994, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/10/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-clinton-outlines-us-interest-in-bosnia-air-strikes.html>.

United States would now threaten NATO air strikes should the Bosnian Serbs not cease shelling, should they not remove their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, and should they not respect the UN's mandated no-fly ban. The goal was to use 'decisive air strikes' to coerce the Bosnian Serbs. However, the Clinton administration would, eventually, settle for 'limited air strikes' with a 'dual key' limitation (the NATO air strike had to be approved by the UN civilian leadership as well as by the NATO military leadership) and without much coercing power.²⁰⁸

On the diplomatic front, the Clinton administration made two significant achievements: First, the administration negotiated a cease-fire between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, and the two groups, in March of 1994, agreed to form the (Muslim-Croat) Bosnian Federation.²⁰⁹ The two groups would also, in the future peace talks, negotiate as one delegation. Second, in April 1994, the United States, along Russia,

²⁰⁸ Despite NATO threats and despite NATO taking down four Bosnian Serb planes in February 1994 for violating the non-fly zone, the Bosnian Serbs only briefly complied with the Sarajevo cease-fire, but continued to shell, among other towns, the UN safe area of Gorzde. See Michael R. Gordon, "Conflict in the Balkans; NATO Craft Down 4 Serb Warplanes Attacking Bosnia," *New York Times*, March 1, 1994, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/01/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-nato-craft-down-4-serb-warplanes-attacking-bosnia.html>. Sarajevo was again under siege by July 1994.

²⁰⁹ Watkins and Rosegrant note that after the agreement "Croatia revived a pipeline of third-country arms shipments to Bosnia through Croatian territory, in violation of the UN embargo. (...) Few heavy weapons got through, but the pipeline helped equalize the military balance in the Balkans." See Watkins and Rosegrant. *Breakthrough International Negotiation*, 236. See also Congress, "H. Rept. 105-804-Investiagtion into Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia," 105th Congress (1997-1998), <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/105th-congress/house-report/804/1?s=1&r=51>. See also "Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy," *Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training*, March 19, 1999, 164-165, <https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Galbraith-Peter-W.pdf>

was a leading force in the creation of the Contact Group, comprised of the United States, Russia, France, Germany, and Great Britain. The Contact Group's goal was in the line with the ICTY's goal: To end the war in Bosnia. However, its approach was different; it would employ bilateral negotiations, where the United States was responsible to bring the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims to the negotiating table and Russia was responsible to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. In May 1994, the Contact Group proposed a peace plan that partitioned the territory with 51 percent going to the Muslim Croat Federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs, and the Contact Group plan, as opposed to the Vance-Owens plan, allowed the Bosnian Serbs to retain their government and to form independent diplomatic relations with Serbia. On the other hand, the Bosnian Muslims would have to share their territory with the Croats, but the Contact Group plan gave the Bosnian government an access to the sea.²¹⁰

With the goal to compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group peace plan, the Clinton administration again proposed a "lift and strike" policy, threatening to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Federation Army and strike the VRS [the Bosnian Serbs Army] with NATO air power.²¹¹ The Russians, as well as major NATO allies, rejected the "lift and strike" policy, denying the proposed peace plan necessary coercive leverage. The Bosnian Serbs rejected the Contact group peace plan.²¹²

²¹⁰ See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 99.

²¹¹ Jakobsen points out, "It was another 'least-worst' option designed to enable the U.S. to 'do something' with small cost." See Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, 93.

²¹² See Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 101.

After this debacle, Milosevic, under economic and political pressure from Russia as well as the West, increased public pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, especially on Karadzic and Mladic, to accept the Contact Group peace plan.²¹³ One can argue that Milosevic was not sincere and played a “double-game,” a nationalist with the Bosnian Serbs and an internationalist with the U.S. and Russia.²¹⁴ However, one can also point out that the balance of power favored the Bosnian Serbs (the militarily strongest party among the three in Bosnia), and the economic pressure from Milosevic and Russia, without any credible military threat, was not sufficient for the Bosnian Serbs to concede to a 51/49 partition since they, at the time, held 70 percent of Bosnia.

As the peace negotiations continued, the fighting in Bosnia continued. Under increasing pressure to accept a peace agreement, most notably from Milosevic, and as Bosnia’s harsh winter was approaching, Karadzic initiated a cease-fire proposal that was mediated, on Karadzic’s insistence, by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Karadzic

²¹³ “The Milosevic-Karadzic Break: Stalemated for Now,” *CIA*, November 23, 1994, <http://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1994-11-23.pdf>.

²¹⁴ Milosevic’s nationalism seems to be based more on opportunism and less on conviction. Milosevic encouraged the Bosnian Serbs (as well as the Croatian Serbs) in their attempts to establish Republika Srpska (and Republika Krajina in Croatia), but Milosevic’s support fluctuated publicly, depending on Serbia’s internal politics as well as international political and economic pressures; for Milosevic, the goal was to stay in power. Milosevic, who had control over the media in Serbia, initially was persistent in blaming the international community for Serbia’s economic hardship (that is, Serbia being “unfairly punished”). But Milosevic eventually changed the theme, accusing the Bosnian Serbs being responsible for the economic hardship in Serbia because they were not willing to accept the Contact Group peace plan. See “A Troubled Year of Consolidation Ahead,” *CIA*, January 1994, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1994-01-01A.pdf>; “The Milosevic-Karadzic Break: Stalemated for Now,” *CIA*, November 23, 1994, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1994-11-23.pdf>.

agreed to reopen the Sarajevo airport and to stop the harassment of UN personnel in return for a four-month cease-fire and the recommencement of serious negotiations.²¹⁵

The cease-fire held until May 1995.

3.6 Phase IV: The U.S. Leads: Backing Diplomacy with Military Force (May 1995 - November 1995)

In the spring of 1995, as the Bosnian Federation forces were growing stronger, the Bosnian Serbs decided that going on the offensive would help them end the war on their terms.²¹⁶ On March 8, 1995, Karadzic, the President of Republika Srpska, issued

²¹⁵ See, for example, John Pomfret, "Carter Gets Bosnian Foes to Agree to a Cease-fire," *Washington Post*, December 21, 1994, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/12/21/carter-gets-bosnian-foes-to-agree-to-a-cess-fire/b51ed360-4c88-482e-8f02-d71b94f01dbd/>.

²¹⁶ Ivo Daalder argues that "The Bosnian Serb objective was clear: to conclude the war before the onset of the winter." However, based on the evidence, one can conclude that the Bosnian Serbs went on the offensive before the military balance turned against them. It is important to note that in addition to the Bosnian Federation military strength build up, the military strength of Croatia grew significantly between 1994 and 1995. In 1994 Croatia spent an estimated \$1 billion on arms; allowing Croatia to arm itself, despite the UN arms embargo, was one of the important segments of the Clinton administration's Balkan policy during 1994 (one goal being to alter the balance of military power among three parties in the Bosnia war). It is significant for the war in Bosnia that "Croatia became the chief conductor for weapons to the Muslim-led Bosnian Army," where Croatia also profited from this by "taking 30 percent of all [military] shipments." During 1994, the Croatian Army leadership, at the request by Croatian Minister of Defense, Gojko Susak, also received significant military training from a company called *Military Professional Resources Inc.*, based in the United States. Ed Soyster, a retired U.S. lieutenant general and one of the company's vice presidents, argues that this "is the greatest corporate assembly of military expertise in the world." See Roger Cohen, "U.S. Cooling Ties to Croatia After Winking at its Buildup," *New York Times*, October 28, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/28/world/us-cooling-ties-to-croatia-after-winking-at-its-buildup.html>. Peter Galbraith, Former Ambassador to Croatia, stated that "even if we had told them [the Croatian Officials] that they should respect the arms embargo they would (...) had no intention of respecting it. (...) The irony is that the country that was most adamant in insisting that the arms embargo stay was Russia (...)

“Directive 7,” which “ordered complete the physical separation of Srebrenica and Zepa [UN protected] enclaves as soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals between the two enclaves.” Karadzic also ordered “[b]y planned and well-thought-out combat operation, create an unbearable situation (...) with no hope of further survival of life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica or Zepa.”²¹⁷ The goal was to finish ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnia by taking over the Bosnian Muslim populated eastern enclaves.

At the beginning of May 1995, Sarajevo, despite being one of the UN protected areas, came under intensified attacks by the Bosnian Serbs. When on May 11, 1995 Bosnian Serbs shelled the center of Sarajevo killing eight civilians and wounding 40, the Bosnian Serbs seemed to cross the line of what could be called “acceptable behavior.”²¹⁸ Lieutenant General Rupert Smith of Britain, the UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo, warned that fighting had to stop. However, fighting as well as harassment of UNPROFOR troops continued. When on May 24 the Bosnian Serbs forces stole heavy

whose nationals were most busy violating the arms embargo [by selling arms to Croatia].” “Ambassador “Peter W. Galbraith interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy,” *The Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training*, March 19, 1999, 164-165, <https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Galbraith-Peter-W.pdf>.

²¹⁷ “Case No. IT-04-80-I: The prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Zdravko Tolimir, Radivoje Milietic, Milan Gvero,” *ICTY*, February 8, 2005, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tolimir/ind/en/tol-ii050210e.htm>.

²¹⁸ See John Pomfret, “Bosnian Serbs Shell Sarajevo Suburb, Launch Attacks on Catholic Churches,” *Washington Post*, May 8, 1995, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/08/bosnian-serbs-shell-sarajevo-suburb-launch-attacks-on-catholic-churches/0fb3a0b2-38bd-4e08-9efc-48ddf4f33f03/>.

weapons from two UNPROFOR-guarded depots, Lieutenant General Smith issued an ultimatum demanding the Bosnian Serbs to return stolen weapons or face the air strikes. As prescribed by the dual-key air strike authorization protocol, the air strike had to be approved by the UN civilian authority and the NATO military leadership. When the noon deadline passed, Yasushi Akashi, the senior UN official supervising operations in Bosnia, reluctantly approved pinprick strikes, and NATO bombed the weapon depots near the Bosnian Serbs' capital Pale.²¹⁹ The Bosnian Serbs responded by shelling the UN protected areas and taking nearly 400 UN hostages, who were chained to potential NATO targets and televised around the world.²²⁰

After two days of selective bombing, fearing the potential spread of war and being aware that the UN troops would be forced to cross so-called 'Mogadishu line' or become an easy target for the Bosnian Serbs troops, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali refused to approve the third day of selective air strikes. After weeks of negotiations all UN hostages were released, but the Bosnian Serbs became more confident in the

²¹⁹ See Stephen Engelberg and Eric Schmitt, "Conflict in the Balkans: The policy; NATO Bombing and Serb Hostage-Taking Now Mark Turning Point in War," *New York Times*, July 6, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/16/world/conflict-balkans-policy-nato-bombing-serb-hostage-taking-now-mark-turning-point.html>.

²²⁰ Ibid. See also Jadran Pandurevic, "Serbs Take Peacekeepers Hostage After NATO Air Raids," *AP News*, May 26, 1995, <https://apnews.com/article/e6f1e380aa74c92d71bfd1837ec9e3a0>. Richard Holbrooke writes, "(...) handcuffed (...) to trees and telephone poles. The world's press was invited to film these men standing miserably in the broiling sun. (...) The television pictures were appalling. That the world's greatest powers would be brought to their knees by such thugs seemed to me inconceivable." Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 64.

limitations of NATO power and the vulnerability of UN troops.²²¹ The UN was humiliated and the NATO members, especially those which contributed troops to the UN mission in Bosnia, were angered.²²² It was confirmed again that the UN troops in Bosnia were a soft target for the Bosnian Serb forces. In their attempt to protect their own troops participating in the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, Britain and France initiated the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force, which would be “equipped with artillery and armor for a real military action.”²²³ However, a disadvantage was that it would take weeks before these troops could be operationalized.

In late May, as the events were unfolding, President Clinton started pressing his National Security Council for a new policy in the Balkans.²²⁴ Although this was not the

²²¹ Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, commander of the UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, who was replaced in January 1995 by Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, coined the phrase “Mogadishu line” which described the need to maintain “neutrality in the face of all provocation for fear of becoming an unwilling participant in a civil war.” In other words, not to cross the Mogadishu line, “the same one which the U.S. troops had crossed in Somalia several months earlier” becoming combatants, instead maintaining their role of peacekeepers, with very unfortunate results: A death of 18 U.S. Army Rangers on October 3-4, 1993. See Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, 1-3, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/node/1109918>. See also, Roger Cohen, “Conflict in the Balkans: The U.N. Mandate; Peacekeeping vs. and Intractable War,” *New York Times*, June 11, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/11/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-the-un-mandate-peacekeeping-vs-an-intractable-war.html>.

²²² Especially horrified was newly elected French President, Jacques Chirac, seeing French soliders waving white flags. See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 64.

²²³ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 49.

²²⁴ See, for example, Thomas W. Lippman and Ann Devroy, “Clinton’s Policy Evolution,” *Washington Post*, September 11, 1995, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/09/11/clintons-policy-evolution/008683c3-44ea-4857-ad47-cdd1787370b2/>.

first time that President Clinton asked the National Security Council to review the policy, this time the President instructed his team to provide strategies for more activist U.S. policy that would, once for all, end the war and force the warring sides to the bargaining table; the “endgame” strategy.”²²⁵

Publicly, President Clinton defended the NATO air strikes and warned that “taking hostages, as well as the killing of civilians (...) is totally wrong and inappropriate and it should stop.” He expressed his support for further NATO airstrikes by positioning an “aircraft carrier and three other warships in the Adriatic [sea] within 50 to 100 miles of the Bosnian coast.” However, the dual key, which was still necessary for the activation of air strikes, as well as President Clinton’s reluctance to commit U.S. troops discredited the threats. When asked by the press if he knew about President Boris Yeltsin’s reaction to the NATO air strikes, he responded that he did not and mentioned that “I would ask him [President Yeltsin] to call Serbs and tell them to quit it and tell them to behave themselves.”²²⁶ However, the Bosnian Serbs did not take President Clinton’s warning as

²²⁵ The Presidential Review Directives (PRD) series was a mechanism used by President Clinton to direct specific review and analyses to be conducted by the departments and agencies and used to promulgate presidential decisions of national security matters. One of the first PRDs that President Clinton issued was in January 1993, asking the state and defense departments as well as the CIA to review U.S. policy toward the Balkans. The National Security Council (NSC) Principals, used to meet prior to the full-scale NSC meetings. John M. Goshko and Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. to Study Wider Options on Balkans,” *Washington Post*, January 28, 1993, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/01/28/us-to-study-wider-options-on-balkans/01c27f08-8d48-4c16-b85f-67379ccb9c2f/>. Also, see Stephen Engelberg, “How Events Drew U.S. Into Balkans,” *New York Times*, August 19, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/19/world/how-events-drew-us-into-balkans.html>.

²²⁶ See Alison Mitchell, “Conflict in the Balkans: The Diplomacy; Clinton Defends NATO Air Strikes in Bosnia and Calls on Serbs to Free U.N. Hostages,” *New York*

credible. On July 6, 1995, the Bosnian Serbs launched an attack on Srebrenica, one of the three UN-protected enclaves in eastern Bosnia, surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces since the beginning of the Bosnian war.²²⁷ The outnumbered and lightly armed UNPROFOR troops asked for NATO air strikes, but eventually withdrew from Srebrenica or were taken as hostages by the Bosnia Serbs.²²⁸ By July 16, 1995, Srebrenica was in Bosnian Serb hands, the UNPROFOR troops were humiliated and defeated; and the death toll of Bosnian Muslims (civilians and prisoners of war) executed by the Bosnian Serb forces was 7,079.²²⁹ The fall of Zepa on July 20, 1995 stunned the Clinton administration and its NATO allies.²³⁰

Times, May 27, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/27/world/conflict-balkans-diplomacy-clinton-defends-nato-air-strikes-bosnia-calls-serbs.html>.

²²⁷ It is disputed whether the Bosnian Serbs launched the offensive encouraged by their victories in May and June, with the goal to erase this enclave populated by the Bosnian Muslims and be able to claim the territory as theirs or to counterattack counterattack the sporadic provocations by the Federal forces that eventually turned into a mass killing.

²²⁸ See John Darnton, “Conflict in the Balkans: Policy—Allies Warn Bosnian Serbs of ‘Substantial’ Air Strikes if U.N. Enclave is Attacked; Accord in London,” *New York Times*, July 22, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/22/world/conflict-balkans-policy-allies-warn-bosnian-serbs-substantial-air-strikes-if-un.html>.

²²⁹ Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 70. Also, on July 25, 1995 Mladic and Karadzic were indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on charges of: Genocide; crimes against humanity (“by prosecuting Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians on national, political and religious grounds”); and being “criminally responsible for the unlawful confinement, murder, rape, sexual assaults, torture, beating, robbery and inhumane treatment of civilians.” It was amended in November 1995 to include charges of genocide and crimes against humanity in relation to Srebrenica. See “Milan Martić, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić Indicted Along with 21 Other Accused,” *ICTY*, July 25, 1995, <https://www.icty.org/en/press/milan-martice-radovan-karadzic-and-ratko-mladic-indicted-along-21-other-accused>.

²³⁰ See Chris Hedges, “Conflict in the Balkans: In Bosnia; Second ‘Safe Area’ in Eastern Bosnia Overrun by Serbs,” *New York Times*, July 20, 1995.

On July 21, 1995, an emergency conference in London was attended by the NATO leaders, the UN envoy, and a Russian representative. After the conference, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said, “The Bosnian Serb leaders are now on notice that an attack against Gorazde will be met by substantial and decisive air power. (...) There will be no more pinprick strikes.” This was a clear military threat; retaliation if the Bosnia Serbs try to take over Gorazde This threat was extended on August 1, 1995, on other UN protected areas, including Sarajevo.²³¹, the last UN-protected enclave in eastern Bosnia. A pivotal change, contributing to the credibility of military threats, was that UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali agreed to delegate UN strike authority (that is, his veto and approval power) to the overall military commander for UNPROFOR, French Lieutenant General, Bernard Javier. This made the NATO-UN coordination of air strike approval and execution significantly better and faster. President Clinton gave his support by stating, “That was the right decision for him [UN General Secretary] to take, and it shows that he [General Secretary], too, is concerned that the United Nations cannot

<https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/20/world/conflict-balkans-bosnia-second-safe-area-eastern-bosnia-overrun-serbs.html>. It is important to note that the control of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde (three UN-protected enclaves) would give “the Bosnian Serbs all the territory between the Bosnian capital and the Serbian border.” The UN had committed itself to protect six “safe areas,” the three in eastern Bosnia, plus Tuzla, Sarajevo and Bihac, in the north east.

²³¹ See “Press Statement by the Secretary General Following the North Atlantic Council Meeting on 1st August 1995,” *NATO*, August 1, 1995, <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1995/s950801a.htm>. Holbrooke writes that “General Joulwan and [U.S.] Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, (...) forced NATO Council to broaden the terms to engagement to include Sarajevo.” See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 72.

express a commitment to protect the security of people and then walk away from it.”²³²

Deterrence succeeded, since Bosnian Serbs did not take over Gorazde; however, when on August 28, 1995, a mortar bomb hit a marketplace in Sarajevo, killing thirty-seven civilians, it was clear that coercive diplomacy had failed. The Bosnian Serbs denied responsibility for the marketplace attack; however, the UN spokesperson in a public statement acknowledged that that the shelling was done from a southern position, that is one held by the Bosnian Serbs.²³³

Moreover, in western Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs’ forces were on offense. The (Croatian) Krajina Serbs joined this offensive on July 19, 1995, when they attacked Bihac, the Muslim enclave in the northwest Bosnia.²³⁴ On August 4, 1995 Croatia’s flash offensive *Operation Storm* put an end to the Krajina, Serb-ruled separatist territory of Croatia. At this point, the balance of power started to visibly change.²³⁵ The fall of the

²³² See Barbara Crossette, “Conflict in the Balkans: At the U.N.; U.N. Military Given Right to Approve Attacks,” *New York Times*, July 27, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/27/world/conflict-balkans-un-un-military-aides-given-right-approve-attacks.html>. It is important to note that this warning not to attack UN protected enclave of Gorazde was, in the following weeks, extended to cover Sarajevo. This would be important in the NATO/UN decision to start Operation Deliberate Force as a response to Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo.

²³³ See Sava Radovanovic, “Serb Commander Says no Immediate Plans for Attacking Gorazde,” *AP*, July 27, 1995, <https://apnews.com/article/aef29a30bb0449e12e7067339acd8b28>; Roger Cohen, Shelling Killings Dozens in Sarajevo; U.S. Urges NATO to Strike Serbs,” *New York Times*, August 29, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/29/world/shelling-kills-dozens-in-sarajevo-us-urges-nato-to-strike-serbs.html>.

²³⁴ Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 70-72.

²³⁵ The humanitarian toll of the Croatian military offensive was high. As a consequence of the Croatian military action, thousands of Croatian Serbs, despite Croatian government assurances that Serbs could stay without fearing for their lives, fled to the parts of Bosnia

Krajina strategically weakened and demoralized Bosnian Serbs. As the events were unfolding, and fights intensified, the status-quo became untenable; the Clinton administration, concerned with its reputation and the reputation of the United States decided to take the lead.²³⁶

controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. John Pomfret, “Thousands of Serb Refugees Flee Croatian Army Advance,” *Washington Post*, August 7, 1995, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/08/07/thousands-of-serb-refugees-flee-croatian-army-advance/2912317d-a965-449e-9c97-62ca900dc6a6/>.

²³⁶ In the memo to President Clinton, Anthony Lake, his National Security Advisor, wrote “Our European allies (...) not only exposed the bankruptcy of their policy, but (...) caused serious erosion in the credibility of the NATO alliance and the United Nations. Worse, our continued reluctance to lead an effort to resolve a military crisis in the heart of Europe has placed at risk our leadership of the post-Cold War world.” See “1995-08-05, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy,” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12366>.

Also, for example, Newt Gingrich, at the time the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, judged Srebrenica the “worst humiliation for the Western democracies since the 1930s;” as cited by Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 71. Daalder, argues that at the policy level “the Clinton administration’s Bosnia strategy had lost virtually all credibility. (...) events on the ground and decisions in allied capitals as well as on the Capitol Hill were forcing the administration to seek an alternative to muddling through.” See Ivo H. Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” *Brookings*, December 1, 1998, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/>. Warren Zimmerman gives another perspective by arguing that “[t]he impending [presidential] elections undoubtedly played a role in this change of heart;” see Warren Zimmerman, “Yugoslavia: 1989-1996,” in *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*, edited by Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin (Washington, DC: RAND, 1996).

3.6.1 The “Endgame” Strategy

In late May President Clinton requested that the National Security Council review the Bosnia policy.²³⁷ After the fall of Srebrenica, the Bosnia “endgame” strategy schematic was forwarded at the request of Sandy Berger, Deputy National Security Advisor, to the members of the National Security Council for a discussion. The goal of the “endgame” strategy was a diplomatic settlement of the Bosnian War. The conditions for success were listed as “Bosnian Serbs decide to negotiate rather than continue military campaign.” The ways to achieve this goal was for NATO to demonstrate will and capability to use sufficient military power to affect the balance of power between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Federation. And the West to induce Milosevic, through sanctions, carrots and sticks, to recognize Bosnia (as one state) and support peace process.²³⁸

Based on the input he received from the NSC principals, Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, suggested to President Clinton that a political settlement in Bosnia should “adhere to central principle of the Contact Group plan” (the “51-49” principle, where 51 percent of the territory goes to the Croat-Muslim Federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs), but “with a more realistic map.” The map had to include more flexibility from all three sides. Lake stressed that it would require the United States to

²³⁷ See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 73. Also, see “1995-07-24A, Office of the President, National Advisor Chart re Schematic of Bosnia Endgame Strategy [C05960754],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12505>.

²³⁸ See “1995-07-25A, Office of the Vice President, National Security Advisor Chart re Schematic of Bosnia Endgame Strategy [C05960754],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12505>.

take a leadership role in the negotiations.²³⁹ Furthermore, two additional factors were identified: First, the pivotal role of military pressure to compel the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a suitable peace settlement. Second, Russia as the prime diplomatic obstacle, where the U.S. goal should be to minimize Russian support for Serbs and avoid Russia's veto in the Security Council.²⁴⁰ After the final deliberation on August 8, 1995, by President Clinton and the National Security Council, the "endgame" strategy was finalized: Diplomatic initiative backed by NATO's air strikes, this time headed by the United States.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Most notably, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright argued that "America must take the lead." Regarding the American reluctance to commit its ground troops, she stressed that "our commitment to use American ground forces to extract UNPROFOR on the one hand or implement a peace plan on the other means that this conflict will be "Americanized" sooner or later." See "1995-08-03B, UN Ambassador Memo re Bosnia Endgame Strategy [A328]," *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12511>.

²⁴⁰ See "1995-08-05, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy," *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12366>. Also it is significant that this new plan did not exclude the use of U.S. ground troops as the previous reviews of U.S. Bosnian policy did; see, "1993-02-05, Minutes of the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993," *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12307>; "1993-05-06, Summary of Conclusions of NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 6, 1993 [20482]" *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>; "1994-05-20, Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals Committee [20641]," *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>; "Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy," *Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training*, March 19, 1999, 164-165, <https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Galbraith-Peter-W.pdf>.

²⁴¹ According to Holbrooke, the final plan had seven points: (1) a comprehensive peace settlement; (2) three-way recognition among Bosnia, Croatia, and FR Yugoslavia; (3) the full lifting of all economic sanctions against Yugoslavia if a settlement was reached, and a program to equip and train the Croat-Muslim Federation forces if there was a settlement; (4) the peaceful return to Croatia of eastern Slavonia; (5) an all-out effort to

Regarding the diplomatic initiative, it had two stages: First, presidential emissaries (Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, and Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State) went to Russia and six European countries and presented a framework for peace. One of the requirements of the *CD Triangle*, the model proposed in this dissertation, is to have an international environment that favors the coercer, that is, the coercer should identify and engage the potential regional or global competitor (potential “spoilers”), giving the target no option to balance the coercer’s threats by external forces.²⁴² Therefore, by identifying and engaging Russia, the Clinton administration fulfilled one of the three factors identified in *CD Triangle*.

In the second stage Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Undersecretary of State, had the task of persuading the three warring parties, most notably Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, to accept the peace plan for Bosnia.²⁴³

pursue a cease-fire or an end to all offensive operations; (6) a reaffirmation of support for the so-called Contact Group [51-49] plan; (7) a comprehensive program for regional economic reconstruction. See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 74. Arguably, the policy change was a slow process; it took 21 meetings from June to August 8, to make the change in policy; see Thomas W. Lipman and Ann Devroy, “Clinton’s policy Evolution,” *Washington Post*, September 11, 1994, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/09/11/clintons-policy-evolution/008683c3-44ea-4857-ad47-cdd1787370b2/>.

²⁴² Ibid. Also see Alessandra Stanley, “U.S. and Russia Seek Balkan Accords,” *New York Times*, August 14, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/14/world/us-and-russia-seek-balkans-accord.html>. Most notably Lake met with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev to seek the Russian support for President Clinton’s newest peace proposal. Russian President Boris Yeltsin offered to be a host to an international peace conference in Moscow. The Lake’s trip also included a “round of private consultations in France, Germany and England.”

²⁴³ See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 74.

3.6.2 The U.S. Leads: Holbrook, Milosevic, and the “Endgame” Strategy

As the peacekeeping drama was unfolding in May of 1995, a month-long attempt by Robert Frasure, a U.S. Envoy to Bosnia and former Contact Group negotiator, to negotiate with Milosevic ended unsuccessfully.²⁴⁴ Under the framework proposed by Frasure, Milosevic was asked to recognize the Bosnian Federation, take steps to assure that the Bosnian Serbs did not smuggle supplies from FR Yugoslavia, and commit himself to securing Bosnian Serbs’ approval of an international peace plan. In exchange, economic sanction imposed on FR Yugoslavia by the UN would be suspended. The disagreement came over how sanctions would be reimposed in the event Milosevic did not comply. Milosevic insisted that he should be guaranteed a full year without sanctions. Also, in case of possible non-compliance, Milosevic insisted that UN General-Secretary, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, should make recommendation to the Security Council on whether they should be reposed, not the UN Security Council members.²⁴⁵ After Frasure’s

²⁴⁴ See Christine Spolar, “U.S. Envoy Aborts Belgrade Mission,” *Washington Post*, May 24, 1995, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/24/us-envoy-aborts-belgrade-mission/4fc11e38-1382-4f00-bc2e-6029690bdf0b/>. Also, interview with Rudolf Perina, Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade from 1993-96, “Slobodan Milosevic and the Road to Dayton,” *Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training*, November 24, 2014, <https://adst.org/2014/11/slobodan-milosevic-and-the-road-to-dayton/>. See also, Steven Greenhouse, “Robert C. Frasure, 53, Envoy on Bosnia, is Killed,” *New York Times*, August 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/20/obituaries/robert-c-frasure-53-envoy-on-bosnia-mission-is-killed.html>.

²⁴⁵ Christine Spolar, “U.S. Envoy Aborts Belgrade Mission,” May 24, 1995, *Washington Post* <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/24/us-envoy-aborts-belgrade-mission/4fc11e38-1382-4f00-bc2e-6029690bdf0b/>; Stephen Kinzer, “Conflicts in the Balkans: In Bosnia; U.S.-Serb Talks Suspended,” *New York Times*, June 8, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/08/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-in-bosnia-us-serb-talks-suspended.html>.

unsuccessful attempt to persuade Milosevic to recognize the republic of Bosnia, Carl Bildt, the EU negotiator, continued to negotiate with Milosevic through July 1995. However, the negotiations did not produce any concrete results.²⁴⁶

Milosevic, despite the economic hardship and occasional dissent among hard core nationalist or democratic forces within Serbia, still had control over Serbia and FR Yugoslavia. Most notable he controlled the security service, senior offices in the VJ (Yugoslav Army), and most of the media.²⁴⁷ Although recognized by the West as one of the main actors and instigators of the wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia, Milosevic, with more or less success, had played an international and domestic game of “not me, but them.” The economic hardship in Serbia he blamed on the West. As the events were unfolding, he gradually shifted blame to the Bosnian Serbs and their unwillingness to accept a peace plan. However, as time passed, the costly war in Bosnia as well as economic sanctions placed on FR Yugoslavia by the UN were putting significant pressure on all strata of Serbian society and on Milosevic’s capability to sustain his position. When in September 1994 Holbrook became the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, he argued that U.S. policy of isolating Milosevic was not working, and he proposed that U.S. should make an attempt to engage with Milosevic in a “more

²⁴⁶ “1995-07-25B, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia July 25, 1995 [C05960753],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12506>; “1995-07-31A, BTF Report re Impact of Bildt’s Position on Serbian Sanctions [C0595561010],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12507>.

²⁴⁷ “1995-08-16, BTF Report re Serbia’s Milosevic Still on the Negotiating Track,” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12516>.

positive” way. Milosevic’s ultimate objective was to stay in power, and the Clinton administration wanted to end the war in Bosnia.²⁴⁸ To Holbrooke, Milosevic was “the key to everything.”²⁴⁹

3.6.3 Holbrooke-Milosevic Meeting, August 17-18

Holbrooke met Milosevic, for the first time, on August 17 in Belgrade. This meeting, which was called by Holbrooke, lasted almost six hours. After initial attempts by Milosevic to “charm” Holbrooke and attempts by Holbrooke to “charm” Milosevic, the meeting ended without any concrete results.²⁵⁰ The next morning, Holbrooke decided to meet Milosevic again. This time Holbrook believed that to move the negotiations forward the sticks and carrots were not the right tools, but a “hammer” or a “sledgehammer.”²⁵¹ The meeting lasted two hours, and Holbrooke was clear: Milosevic had to produce results or face the consequences.²⁵² The first step was to have Milosevic commit himself to represent the Bosnian Serbs and eventually accept the peace plan.

²⁴⁸ See, for example, Aleksa Djilas, “A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (1993), 81-96.

²⁴⁹ See George Packer, *Our Man: Richard Holbrooke And The End of the American Century*, (Alfred A. Knoff: New York, 2019), 327. Also, Hill, *Outpost*, 51.

²⁵⁰ See Packer, *Our Man*, 328-329. Also, as Packer noted based on the Christopher Hill and Steven Engel’s interview with Rudy Perina, the U.S. diplomat in Belgrade, this meeting with Milosevic was “just word games, with Holbrooke, the latest partner.” See Packer, *Our Man*, 328-329.

²⁵¹ Holbrooke cited in *Ibid.*, 349.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 328.

After these two initial meetings with Milosevic, Holbrooke was convinced that diplomacy alone, without the decisive support of air power, would not achieve more than what had been done in the previous attempts to persuade the Bosnia Serbs to accept the peace plan.²⁵³ On August 27, Holbrooke, although not knowing that NATO would be engaging any time soon, declared to the press, “If this peace initiative does not get moving, dramatically moving in the next week or two, the consequences will be very adverse to the Serbian goals. (...) [O]ne way or another, NATO will be heavily involved, and the Serbs do not want that.”²⁵⁴

On August 28, 1995, a mortar bomb hit a marketplace in Sarajevo, killing thirty-seven civilians. When UNPROFOR troops confirmed that the Bosnian Serb forces were behind this attack, the Clinton administration called for the UN to approve NATO air operations.²⁵⁵ Having in mind the remaining UNPROFOR troops in Gorazde, Operation Deliberate Force started on August 30, giving the UNPROFOR troops sufficient time to

²⁵³ Holbrooke disagreed that lessons learned in Vietnam (“airpower would be ineffective unless backed by ground troops”) applied to Bosnia. Holbrooke argued that air power should be sufficient to get diplomacy working in Bosnia; that is, bombs without boots on the ground. See Holbrook, *To End A War*, 92.

²⁵⁴ See Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Officials say Bosnian Serbs face NATO Attacks if Talks Stall,” *New York Times*, August 28, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/28/world/us-officials-say-bosnian-serbs-face-nato-attack-if-talks-stall.html>. See also Holbrook, *To End The War*, 92. Holbrooke appeared on NBC *Meet The Press*.

²⁵⁵ Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador at UN, was working on getting assurances that the NATO air strikes would not be vetoed by the UN’s military or civilian officials. This was confirmed by Kofi Annan, UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, on August 29, 1995, at 11:45 am. Therefor the decision for air strikes was solely in the NATO hands. See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 99.

withdraw before the NATO air campaign. The operation lasted two weeks, involving 3400 sorties.²⁵⁶ The demands were clear: the Bosnian Serbs had to move heavy weapons away from Sarajevo and they had to stop threatening other UN “safe areas.”²⁵⁷

3.6.4 Holbrooke-Milosevic Meeting, August 30

The day Operation Deliberate Force started, Holbrooke and his team arrived in Belgrade.²⁵⁸ Holbrook believed that the bombing campaign was essential in moving the stalled negotiations with Milosevic, and *Operation Deliberate Force* worked in Holbrooke’s favor. Holbrooke expected a cold welcome from Milosevic, but the reception was warm. Milosevic expressed sympathy over the death of Robert Frasure and the other two American diplomats who died in a car crash on their way from Belgrade to Sarajevo. Then Milosevic turned to Holbrooke and presented a two-page document, the Patriarch Paper, which officially authorized Milosevic to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, and was witnessed by Patriarch Pavle, the leader of the Serbian Orthodox Church. This was a significant step forward in getting not just the Bosnian Serbs to

²⁵⁶ See Roger Cohen, “Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo; U.S. Urges NATO to Strike Serbs,” *New York Times*, August 29, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/29/world/shelling-kills-dozens-in-sarajevo-us-urges-nato-to-strike-serbs.html>.

²⁵⁷ See Roger Cohen, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview; NATO Jets Attacks Serbian Position Around Sarajevo,” *New York Times*, August 30, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/30/world/conflict-balkans-overview-nato-jets-attack-serbian-positions-around-sarajevo.html>.

²⁵⁸ The members of Holbrooke’s team were Jim Pardew from Pentagon, Wesley Clark from the Joint Chiefs, Don Kerrick from the NSC, Bob Owen and Christopher Hill from the State Department; see Hill, *Outpost*, 88.

participate in negotiations but also Milosevic, who in the past would argue that he did not have control over the Bosnian Serbs.²⁵⁹

Milosevic, in his attempt to show his willingness to cooperate, went a step forward and suggested for Holbrooke to convene an international peace conference where Milosevic could meet “Izetbegovic [the president of Bosnian Federation] and Tudjman [the president of Croatia] and ‘settle everything.’”²⁶⁰ Holbrooke, reminded Milosevic that Sarajevo was still under the siege and NATO planes would remain in the air over Bosnia until the siege of Sarajevo is ended.²⁶¹ At this point, Milosevic called his aid, Goran Milinovic, and instructed him to immediately contact Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military commander. During the dinner, Milinovic returned with Mladic’s answer that the Bosnian Serbs would stop the siege if there were given assurances that NATO and Bosnia Federal forces would stop their attacks.²⁶² Holbrooke perceived this a common tactic by Mladic and Karadzic to condition their compliance with the demands. At this point Holbrooke was clear, he would not negotiate with the indicted war criminals; the NATO bombing would stop only if Milosevic could guarantee “an end to the siege of Sarajevo.”

²⁵⁹ Holbrooke calls the Patriarch paper, “the letter which makes the Dayton [peace agreement] possible.” See “Bosnia Proximity Peace Talks: 10/30/95 Briefing by Holbrook” *U.S. Department of State Archive*, <https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/boshol.html>.

²⁶⁰ See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 106. See also, for example, Hill, *Outpost*, 89.

²⁶¹ See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 107-8.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, 107.

Holbrooke looked at Milosevic and said, “Karadzic and Mladic are your problem.”²⁶³

Milosevic was reluctant to take the full responsibility for Karadzic and Mladic’s move on the ground, but he was willing to cooperate. He insisted that the Patriarch Paper be made public. He was ready to take his new role, a peacemaker, publicly for domestic and international purpose. It is significant that Holbrooke ended this meeting with Milosevic by saying, “We’ll be back Mr. President, but remember NATO planes are in the air over Bosnia as we speak.” Milosevic replied, “Yes, Mr. Holbrooke, [a]nd you have the power to stop them.”²⁶⁴

On August 31, one day after Holbrooke’s meeting with Milosevic, UNPROFOR commander Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier requested from NATO a twenty-four-hour bombing pause to review the Bosnian Serb forces conditional acceptance to withdraw heavy weapons from Sarajevo under the guarantee that the Bosnian Federal Army would not take over the abandoned territory. The conditional acceptance was refused.²⁶⁵ The same day Holbrooke and his team met in Belgrade with the British,

²⁶³ Ibid. Also, it is significant that Madeleine Albright suggested in February 1995 that an international war crimes tribunal could be used as a tool of coercion. See “1993-02-05, Minutes of the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993,” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12307>.

²⁶⁴ As cited by Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 108. Hill notes in his account of the meeting that Milosevic’s “English was pretty good” and Milosevic did not have a translator during the meeting. Hill also noted that during the meeting, Holbrooke occasionally took the phone call, which he would describe to Milosevic as “coming from the White House.” As Hill notes “most of us [from the Holbrooke’s team]” suspected they are from his wife, Kati, in New York.” See Hill, *Outpost*, 90.

²⁶⁵ See Daniel Williams, “NATO Continues Extensive Bombing Across Bosnia,” *Washington Post*, August 31, 1995, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/nato.htm>.

French, German, and Russian representatives to inform them about the meeting conducted with Milosevic.

On September 1, NATO suspended its air campaign in Bosnia giving UNPROFOR commander General Janvier additional time to negotiate with Bosnian Serb commander Mladic to lift the siege of Sarajevo.²⁶⁶ On the diplomatic front, the Clinton administration announced that the meeting of the Balkan Foreign Ministers, the first since September 1993, was scheduled for September 8 in Geneva. Although publicly cautious about the prospects for the permanent settlement of the Bosnia war, Holbrooke's team started to work on the outlines of an interim agreement.²⁶⁷ As a part of Holbrooke's strategy, Milosevic, in the weeks following their meeting, was undergoing transformation in the U.S. press. Milosevic metamorphosed from war criminal into a peacemaker. The Clinton administration reinforced this perspective. Nicholas Burns, a State Department spokesperson told reporters, "President Milosevic is a respected leader among the Serbs and for him to come out and dedicate his government to the peace process is a positive sign."²⁶⁸ Holbrooke's strategy helped cast Milosevic in a new light: A charming rogue rather than a "butcher" of Yugoslavia and a mastermind of the Balkan war. Holbrooke admitted that there was a Milosevic-centered strategy, "[b]ut not to make him a good

²⁶⁶ See Holbrook, *To End A War*, 113.

²⁶⁷ See Dean E. Murphy and Tracy Wilkins, "Balkan Foes Agree to Discuss Peace Plan, Envoy Says (...)," *Los Angeles Times*, September 2, 1995, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-09-02-mn-41571-story.html>.

²⁶⁸ See, for example, Elaine Sciolino, "Conflict in the Balkans; What Price Peace?" *New York Times*, September 9, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/09/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-what-price-peace.html>.

guy.”²⁶⁹ It was Holbrooke’s attempt to build the trust between him and Milosevic, Milosevic, according to Holbrooke, being the key to ending the war in Bosnia.

On September 8, the Clinton administration, led by Holbrooke and his team, made one more significant step towards ending the war; the Bosnian Federation, Croatian and FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) delegations met in Geneva and agreed to basic principles for a Bosnia settlement. Accordingly, Bosnia will “continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition;” it will consist of two political entities: the Serbian Republika Srpska (with 49 percent of the territory) and the Croat-Muslim Federation of Bosnia (51 percent of the territory).²⁷⁰

On September 9, taking advantage of the NATO airstrikes the Croat and Federal forces launched an offensive in northwest Bosnia. The next day NATO expanded its air strikes against Serb radar and missile sites. As the bombing was entering its second week, NATO, committed not to strike so-called level three targets (which could harm civilians), was running out of military targets (ammunition depots and command-control centers). Although one of the goals of NATO air operation was to alter the military balance

²⁶⁹ As cited by Michael Watkins and Susan Rosegrant, *Breakthrough International Negotiation: How Great Negotiators Transformed the World’s Toughest Post-Cold Conflicts* (San Francisco: Josset-Bass, 2001), 249. Also, for example, Elaine Sciolino writes, “The key to Mr. Holbrook’s strategy is the political reinvention of Mr. Milosevic into star spokesman from potential war criminal.” Elaine Sciolino, “Conflicts in the Balkans: The Implications: Sarajevo Pact: Diplomacy on a Roll,” *New York Times*, September 15, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/15/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-the-implications-sarajevo-pact-diplomacy-on-a-roll.html>.

²⁷⁰ See Michael Dobbs, “Pursuing Peace at High Volume,” *Washington Post*, September 22, 1995, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/09/22/pursuing-peace-at-high-volume/fb8869c5-a359-40fd-b00c-972cb7f93acc/>.

between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand the goal was also not to threaten fragile alliance with Russia by looking pro-Federation. Taking into consideration these two factors, there were indications that NATO bombing would soon halt.

Holbrooke did not want the bombing to end without the Bosnian Serbs' full compliance, but he had reasonable doubts that the British and French would support an expansion of NATO targets.²⁷¹ On September 11, during the NSC Principals' meeting in the White House, President Clinton, who was under the pressure from the NATO allies to end the NATO air campaign, asked the NSC if the bombing was hurting the peace process.

Holbrooke insisted that the NATO air campaign should continue. He argued that it was hurting the Bosnian Serbs, but it was getting the Bosnian Serbs close to the negotiating table. Holbrooke insisted that Bosnian Serbs should be aware that leaving the negotiating table would be less profitable than staying at the table and try to compromise to end the war in Bosnia.²⁷² President Clinton concluded that the air campaign should be better

²⁷¹ Holbrooke notes that as the military targets were getting close to the Bosnian Serbs' main towns, especially Banja Luka, de facto the capital of Republika Srpska, Karadzic became increasingly desperate and he sent the letters to Presidents Clinton, Chirac, and Yeltsin calling the attacks against Banja Luka "barbaric." President Yeltsin wrote to President Clinton on September 7 expressing his concerns. Also, U.S. NATO allies Spain, Canada, Greece, and France criticized use of the Tomahawks cruise missiles. See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 142. Regarding the international environment, it is important to note that post-Soviet Russia was weak, and President Yeltsin was willing to let the United States to take the lead in Bosnia. However, the prolonged NATO air campaign in Bosnia was increasingly seen in Russia as the war against Russia's fellow Orthodox Slavs.

²⁷² According to the intelligence report from September 8, 1995, there were no indications that the Bosnia Serbs were willing to withdraw their heavy weapons from Sarajevo. They believed that by withdrawing the heavy weapon, and ending the siege, the Bosnian Serbs would lose that narrow leverage they had against the Federal forces. See "1995-09-07, BTF Memorandum re Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia September

coordinated with the diplomatic efforts. As NATO was running out of “Option Two” targets in Bosnia, Holbrooke was running out of time to settle the war in Bosnia.²⁷³

3.6.5 Holbrooke-Milosevic Meeting, September 13

Holbrooke and his team met with Milosevic in Belgrade on September 13. Milosevic complained that NATO “planes are giving close air support to the Muslims and Croats,” clearly taking sides, and the bombing should stop. Holbrooke insisted that the Bosnian Serbs had to end the siege of Sarajevo. At this point, Holbrooke although a great supporter of further bombing, expected NATO to halt bombing in a day or two. Therefore, he had a strong incentive to support the initiative expressed by Milosevic to negotiate a settlement that evening. As Milosevic said, “the situation on the ground needed calming.”²⁷⁴ The meeting lasted eleven hours, and it ended by Mladic, Karadzic and Milosevic signing the paper agreeing to end the siege of Sarajevo and to remove the heavy weapons. The assurances were made that the Russian UNPROFOR troops would

8, 1995,” *Clinton Digital Library*,
<https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12532>.

²⁷³ As Holbrooke noted Christopher Hill, Anthony Lake, Madeleine Albright and him supported Hill’s argument that “the Serbs must be impressed with our willingness to bomb on a continuous basis if necessary.” On the other hand, Admiral Owens, the Vice Chairman of the JCS stated that it should be taken into consideration that NATO would in two or three days run out of new authorized “Option Two” targets. The option was to hit old “Option One” targets since it was clear that NATO allies would not approve bombing of “Option Three” targets. Admiral Owens was signaling that bombing is coming to an end. Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 145-146.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 148.

take over the positions vacated by the Bosnian Serbs. NATO suspended air strikes on September 14, initially for seventy-two hours and then permanently.²⁷⁵

Despite NATO having suspended air strikes, the Croat-Bosnian Federation ground offensive continued taking over the large portions of western Bosnia. Holbrooke, whose goal was to enter formal peace negotiations with the Contact Group's "51/49" partitioning of the territory, encouraged the Croat-Bosnian Federation forces to continue seizing territory but was clear that Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serbs largest city and *de facto* capital, should not be taken.²⁷⁶ By end of September 1995, the Croat-Bosnian Federation offensive, without the NATO air support, had stalled.

With the Federation and Bosnian Serbs each controlling half of Bosnia, which was Holbrooke's goal, on October 5 Holbrooke secured a cease fire agreement between the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serbs. This time it was signed by Milosevic, Izetbegovic, and Tudjman. President Clinton announced that the ceasefire would officially start at one minute after midnight on October 10, with peace talks to take place

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 150-152. Also, for example, Elaine Sciolino, "Conflict in the Balkans: The implications; Sarajevo Pact: Diplomacy on the Role," *New York Times*, September 15, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/15/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-the-implications-sarajevo-pact-diplomacy-on-a-roll.html>.

²⁷⁶ Milosevic begged Holbrook for Banja Luka not to fall into the hands of the Federal forces. The possibility of hundred thousand of refugees pouring into Serbia from Banja Luka was obvious threat to Milosevic's regime. Richard Holbrooke interviewed by Christopher Hill and Steven Engel, *Dayton Oral History Project*, June 18, 1996; as mentioned by Packer, *Our Man*, 365.

at the end of October in the United States, following by the full-scale peace conference in Paris.²⁷⁷

3.6.6 The “Endgame” End: Dayton Accords

The peace negotiations, which commenced at Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio, on November 1, 1995, concluded with a formal signing of the Dayton Accords in Paris on December 15.²⁷⁸ The focus in Dayton was on the Bosnian constitution and a final map, including unified Sarajevo.²⁷⁹ An early agreement between Milosevic and Tudjman resolved the pending issues of the Croatian war, that is, the return of eastern Slavonia to Croatia. Milosevic agreed to turn over eastern Slavonia to Croatia, and Tudjman, in return, supported the Bosnian peace negotiations.²⁸⁰ The challenging aspect of the negotiations was the internal border between the Federation and the Republika Srpska. Milosevic conceded on two key territorial issues. First, he agreed to give the Bosnia Serb-controlled parts of Sarajevo to the Croat-Muslim Federation as well as the territory in eastern Bosnia to provide the Croat-Muslim Federation with an access route

²⁷⁷ See Michael Dobbs, “Bosnia Cease-Fire Agreement Reached,” *Washington Post*, October 6, 1995, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/10/06/bosnia-cease-fire-agreement-reached/ccd0d891-c695-40f3-8452-736ded52ee42/>.

²⁷⁸ See Elaine Sciolino, “Clinton Pledges U.S. Troops To Keep Peace,” *New York Times*, November 22, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/22/world/balkan-accord-overview-accord-reached-end-war-bosnia-clinton-pledges-us-troops.html>.

²⁷⁹ See Hill, *Outpost*, 109.

²⁸⁰ Milosevic, who in the past argued that he did not have power over the Serbs in Slavonia, was finally willing to negotiate in their name. Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 238.

to Gorazde. Second, he agreed that a decision over the Brcko corridor should be delayed for a year and eventually submitted to international arbitration.²⁸¹ In return, the Republica Srpska kept hold of 49 percent of Bosnian territory, received recognition as a separate political entity within Bosnia, retained its military (excluding heavy weapons) and had the right to directly interact with Serbia. Milosevic emerged from Dayton with two achievements, he gained a reputation as a peacemaker and he finally succeeded in having UN sanctions against FR Yugoslavia terminated.²⁸² As he guaranteed to Holbrooke, Milosevic secured the signature and cooperation of both Karadzic and Mladic when he traveled to Bosnia following conclusion of the Dayton Accord.²⁸³ President Yeltsin gave public support for the peace agreement, pledging Russia's participation in post-war rebuilding of Bosnia.²⁸⁴

3.7 The CD Triangle and the U.S. Coercive Strategies in Phase IV

As discussed in Chapter 2, the *CD Triangle* predicts that if in asymmetric military coercion the following factors are present, coercive diplomacy will succeed: First, the

²⁸¹ See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 286 & 291.

²⁸² See, for example, "U.N. Lifts Sanctions Against Former Yugoslavia," *CNN*, November 22, 1995, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/nov95/11-22/un/index.html>.

²⁸³ During the conversation with Milan Milutinovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of FR Yugoslavia and member of Milosevic's team at Dayton, Holbrooke's team learned the Bosnia Serbs would not agree on the map proposed in Dayton. When approached by Holbrooke, Milosevic reply, "I guarantee you that I will have the signature within twenty-four hours of my return to Belgrade." [And he did]. Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 310.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 311.

target perceives the threats as credible, that is, the coercer succeeds in communicating the will to use force. Second, the target perceives assurances as credible, that is, the target trusts that the coercer will not change its objectives and will not change its demands. Third, the international environment favors the coercer, that is, there are no global or regional spoilers willing to balance the coercer's threats.

In phase IV, as opposed to phases I, II, and III, the United States took the lead in bringing the war in Bosnia to an end and attempted different coercive strategies to coerce the Bosnia Serbs and Slobodan Milosevic to the negotiating table (see Table 3.1). From the available evidence one can conclude that in phase IV the international environment favored the coercer, where key potential spoiler Russia was willing to let the United States take the lead in Bosnia, without any attempt to balance U.S. threats against the Bosnian Serbs or Milosevic. However, the perceptions by the target regarding the credibility of threats and assurances differed. In May 1995, Robert Frasure, U.S. Envoy to Bosnia, was unsuccessful in using non-military coercion (lifting/extending economic sanctions) to persuade Milosevic to recognize the Bosnian republic and stop support for the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic insisted on assurance that the United States was not willing to make, and negotiations failed.

In July 1995, Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, used military threats (decisive NATO air strikes) to successfully deter the Bosnian Serbs taking over Gorazde. However, he failed to compel the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. As predicted by the *CD Triangle*, credible threats and the international environment favoring

the coercer without credible assurances were not sufficient for successful coercive diplomacy.²⁸⁵

In August 1995 Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and U.S. negotiator in Bosnia, by using military threats and assurances, succeeded in coercing Serbian President Milosevic to officially represent the Bosnia Serbs at the negotiating table. Operation Deliberate Force, that is the use of decisive NATO air strikes (limited military force), was used by Holbrooke to successfully signal the United States would use military force and to signal commitment to end the siege of Sarajevo and to end the war in Bosnia.

Furthermore, the international environment favored the coercer; Russia accepted the United States leading role in the negotiating process, and the assurances were perceived as credible by the Bosnian Serbs that the Russian UNPROFOR troops would take over the positions vacated by them. These three factors made military coercion successful and brought an end to the war in Bosnia. However, it is important to note that the evidence shows the Bosnian Serb leaders were willing to acquiesce to the demands (to stop the siege of Sarajevo and windrow the heavy weapons) even before the limited force was used, but only if they were given assurances that the territory, after their withdrawal, would not be taken by the Bosnia Federal forces. One important factor that was missing from the strategy used by Holbrooke on August 30, was his unwillingness to provide the assurances to the Bosnian Serbs; however, the assurances were extended on

²⁸⁵ As discussed in Chapter 1, deterrent threats are designed to discourage the target from taking a course of action; on the other hand, the goal of compellent threats is to change the target's behavior.

September 14. The Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic agreed to stop the siege of Sarajevo after all three conditions, as postulated by *CD Triangle*, were present.

It is significant that coercer’s past actions (in phase I, II or III) did not influence target’s perceptions of coercer’s threats in phase IV. However, the target’s past action and reputation did influence the coercer’s decision to continue to use limited force in phase IV despite the target’s willingness to acquiesce to the demands if given the assurances, that is, Holbrooke insisted on the “51-49” principle on the ground.

Table 1. Summary of U.S. Coercive Strategies in Bosnia, Phase IV (May 1995-November 1995)

Row No.	Episode of Coercion	CT	CA	ISE	Outcome CD	Outcome MC	Outcome D	Comments
1	Bosnia-Phase IV: U.S./NATO-Bosnian Serbs, July 21/August 1, 1995	1	0	1	0 (NA)	0 (NA)	1	Threat of NATO air strikes, if Gorazde would have been attacked; successful deterrence.
		1	0	1	0	0 (NA)	NA	On August 1, the coercive threats were extended on other three UN protected areas, including Sarajevo; unsuccessful coercive diplomacy.

2	Bosnia-Phase IV: U.S. (Holbrooke) -Bosnian Serbs/Milosevic, August 30-31, 1999 (The "Endgame" Strategy)	1 (LF)	0	1	0 (NA)	0	0	Holbrooke-Bosnian Serbs/Milosevic: To end the siege of Sarajevo and remove the heavy weapons. The U.S. initiated Operation Deliberate Force. Mladic insisted on conditional termination; the assurances were not sufficient.
3	Bosnia-Phase IV: U.S. (Holbrooke) -Milosevic, September 14-17, 1999 (The "Endgame" Strategy)	1 (LF)	1	1	0	1	0	Mladic, Karadzic, Milosevic agreed to end the siege of Sarajevo and to remove the heavy weapons. Assurances that the territory would not be taken by the Federal forces; successful military coercion.

*CT: Credible Threats; CA: Credible Assurances; ISE: International Strategic Environment Favoring Coercer; CD: Coercive Diplomacy; MC: Military Coercion; D: Deterrence. ** 1=Success without the use of limited force; 1(LF)= Success with the limited use of force; 0=Failure; NA=Not attempted.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter examined U.S. coercive strategies in Bosnian crisis and war. The U.S. participation is divided into four phases. In phase I the Bush administration supported the UN/EC diplomatic initiative and the use of economic sanctions as a way to isolate Milosevic and neutralize his support for the Bosnian Serbs. This strategy was unsuccessful as the crisis escalated to war.

Despite President Clinton's rhetorical toughness during his presidential campaign, in phase II the Clinton administration continued the politics of not using force and diplomatic support for the Vance-Owens peace plan. This strategy was unsuccessful in ending the war in Bosnia. In phase III, the Clinton administration initiated the formation of the Contact Group, extended diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic to accept the Contact Group plan, and implicitly supported the Croatian and Bosnian Federation's attempts to change the balance of power favoring the Bosnian Serbs. This strategy was unsuccessful in ending the war and bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. In phase IV, after the war in Bosnia escalated to the point that U.S. credibility as a global superpower and, at the time a *unipol*, was put in question, the United States took the lead, employed the "endgame" strategy and succeeded in persuading the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic to end the war in Bosnia and negotiate peace. The "endgame" strategy comprised all three components that are postulated as necessary by *CD Triangle*.

CHAPTER IV: THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND U.S. COERCIVE STRATEGIES (1998-1999)

After a brief overview of the events that preceded the Kosovo crisis and a brief overview of the four phases of the U.S. involvement in the Kosovo crisis, this chapter focuses on the second, third, and fourth phase. In these three phases the United States applied the strategy of coercive diplomacy and military coercion to persuade the Serbian regime, led by Slobodan Milosevic, to stop state-violence against the Kosovo Albanians. The *Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle*, introduced in Chapter 2, is used to analyze success and failure of U.S. coercive diplomacy and military coercion.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the *CD Triangle* predicts that if the following factors are present coercive diplomacy will succeed: First, the target perceives threats as credible, that is, the coercer succeeds in communicating by using a threat of force (coercive diplomacy) or by using limited force (military coercion), that the coercer has the will to pay the cost if the threats fail. Second, the target perceives assurances as credible, that is, the target trusts that the coercer will not change its objectives and will not change its demands (there will be no “more demands tomorrow”) after the target acquiesces to the coercer’s demands. Third, the international environment favors the coercer, that is, there are no global or regional spoilers willing to balance the coercer’s threats. Similarly, failure of coercive diplomacy is expected if: The target does not perceive the coercer’s threats as credible; and/or the target does not trust the coercer that its assurances are credible, leading the target to look for regional or global spoilers to balance the coercer’s threats without acquiescing to the coercer’s demands.

4.1 Origins of the Kosovo Crisis

Kosovo, primarily settled by an ethnic Albanian population, for Serbs has been considered a historical birthplace of their nation, the “Serbian Jerusalem,” a Holy Land, a heartland of medieval Serbia and the site of some of the sacred Serbian monasteries and churches.²⁸⁶ While Serbs are convinced that they are the region’s indigenous people, Albanians argue that they descended from the ancient Illyrians, who, according to Albanian claim, inhabited the region centuries before the arrival of the Slavic Serbs in the seventh century.²⁸⁷

The Battle of Kosovo, which dates back to June 1389 and which Serbs lost to the superior Ottoman Empire force, has been often described as the cradle of Serbian nationhood.²⁸⁸ Although Serbs often explain this battle, fought at Kosovo Polje in

²⁸⁶ See, for example, Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, (London: Yale University Press, 2000), 1-3; Warren Zimmermann, “Yugoslavia: 1989-1996,” in *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*, edited by Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1996), 179. According to the 1981 census, the last universal census before SFR Yugoslavia was dissolved, the total population of Kosovo was 1,585,000 of which 77 percent were Albanians and 13 percent were Serbs. General estimates in May of 1999 were that the population of Kosovo was between 1,800,000 and 2,000,000 of which approximately 85-90 percent were Kosovo Albanians and 5-10% Serbs; see “Case No. IT-39-77, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojadac, and Vljako Stojkovic,” *ICTY*, May 22, 1999, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ii990524e.htm.

²⁸⁷ See Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 1-2.

²⁸⁸ On June 28, 1989, at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic delivered the “Gazimestan speech” at Gazimestan, the place in central Kosovo, where the Battle of Kosovo was fought. This speech, given in front of the huge crowd was significant in launching his post-Communist political career marked by jingoism. See, “O Srbima, bitkama, i Jugoslaviji: Govor Slobodona Milosevic na Gazimestanu, 28 June, 1989 [“About the Serbs, Battles, and Yugoslavia: The speech by Slobodan

present-day Kosovo, as the one where Albanians (including Kosovars, who are ethnic Albanians) fought on the side of the Ottomans against the Serbs, Albanians almost certainly fought alongside the Serbs, resisting the Ottoman attempt to conquer the Balkans.²⁸⁹ Under the Ottomans, the majority of Albanians, who initially practiced Christianity, converted, for different reasons, to Islam, either because they were forced to, or to avoid taxes or to qualify for jobs in Ottoman ruled society. The Ottoman rule in the Balkans started to decline in the nineteenth century. After World War I, and the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1918, the Serbs dominated Kosovo. This would change during World War II, when Kosovo became a part of Greater Albania, a puppet state under the sponsorship of Nazi Germany and Italy.²⁹⁰ After World War II, and the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo became a province of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, one of six Yugoslavia's republics, and the Serbs again dominated Kosovo.

The tensions between two ethnic groups, Serbs and Albanians, have been present since the very creation of SFR Yugoslavia.²⁹¹ The SFRY Constitution of 1974 had given Kosovo the autonomous status within Serbia, that is, it gave this province, along with

Milosevic at Gazimestan, 28 June, 1989”],” *Vreme [Time]*, June 25, 2009, <https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=872091>.

²⁸⁹ See, for example, Christopher Hill, *Outpost: A Diplomat At Work* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 120; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 6-8.

²⁹⁰ See Jonathan Eyal, “Serbs See Kosovo as Their ‘Jerusalem,’” *Irish Times*, April 8, 1999, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/serbs-see-kosovo-as-their-jerusalem-1.171453>.

²⁹¹ See David Binder, “A Return to Yugoslavia,” *New York Times*, December 25, 1983, <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/25/magazine/a-return-to-yugoslavia.html>.

Vojvodina (which has a substantial Hungarian population and is historically linked to Hungary), the same rights as any of the six republics in SFR Yugoslavia had, but without officially becoming a republic.²⁹² In 1989, as SFR Yugoslavia was dissolving, Serbia, under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, revoked Kosovo's far-reaching autonomy and its status as a federal entity of Yugoslavia with rights similar to those of the six republics.²⁹³ Under the constitutional changes Serbia gained full control of police, courts and civil defense in Kosovo.²⁹⁴ By May 1991 Kosovo Albanian language media were closed and about 150,000 Kosovo Albanian workers, including all Kosovo Albanians police officers and all Kosovo Albanian professors, were expelled from their jobs.²⁹⁵ When in August 1991, the Conference on Yugoslavia, established by the European Community (EC), negotiated the relations between six federal republics of SFR

²⁹² See Hill, *Outpost*, 120. Serbia was one of six Yugoslav republics, including Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Among other things, the new SFRY Constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo greater control over its educational system and judiciary.

²⁹³ Hosmer argues that Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power and his credibility as a nationalist leader stemmed largely from his promotion of the Serb hegemony in Kosovo. See Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, (RAND, Santa Monica: 2001), xii. See also Stjepan Mesic, *The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir*, (Central European University Press, New York: 2004).

²⁹⁴ See Barney Petrovic, "How Milosevic Stripped Kosovo's Autonomy: Yugoslav Reforms Will Not end Ethnic Strife," *Guardian*, November 26, 1988, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2019/mar/20/how-milosevic-stripped-kosovos-autonomy-archive-1989>.

²⁹⁵ See "Ibrahim Rugova," *ICTY*, accessed March 26, 2020, <https://www.icty.org/en/content/ibrahim-rugova>; Anna Husarska, "Milosevic Shows His True Colors on Education Accords," *New York Times*, September 8, 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/05/opinion/IHT-milosevic-shows-his-true-colors-on-education-accord.html/>.

Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia), Kosovo, as a province of Serbia, was left out (see Figure 7). However, the state violence against the Albanian population in Kosovo continued as well as attempts by the Kosovo Albanians and their leader Ibrahim Rugova to regain autonomy for Kosovo.²⁹⁶ As Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, points out, both parties have claims over the same territory for different reasons; “[t]he Serbian claim to hegemony is based (...) on the historical/cultural principles-the Jerusalem argument. The Albanian claim to independence is based largely on the demographic principle-the majority argument.”²⁹⁷

²⁹⁶ See, for example, “Case No. IT-39-77, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojadic, Vlatko Stojkovic,” *ICTY*, May 22, 1999, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ii990524e.htm.

²⁹⁷ See Warren Zimmerman, “Demos of Kosovo,” *National Interest*, June 1, 1998, <https://nationalinterest.org/article/the-demons-of-kosovo-637>.

Figure 7. Map of Serbia and Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia)²⁹⁸



On December 25, 1992, during his final days in office, President George H. W. Bush issued the “Christmas Warning” to Milosevic, at the time President of Serbia and *de facto* leader of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).²⁹⁹ President Bush declared that Milosevic should not abuse the human rights of the Albanians of Kosovo, and the

²⁹⁸ This map is adopted from “Map: Serbia and Montenegro [Created/Published: 1999]” *Library of Congress Digital Collection*, accessed June 28, 2020, <https://www.loc.gov/resource/g6850.ct001569/?r=-1.357,-0.01,3.714,1.74,0>.

²⁹⁹ In late April 1992 Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the (two-republic) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) with *de facto* dominance of Serbia and its leader Slobodan Milosevic. The two republics declared their independence in June 2006.

United States would act against Serbia if violence broke out in Kosovo and could be attributed to Serbia. However, Bush was explicit that Kosovo was part of Serbia, and the territorial integrity of Serbia/FR Yugoslavia would be respected.³⁰⁰ The Clinton administration would not “activate” the Christmas warning until the late 1998, following the escalation of violence in Kosovo.

During the 1995 Dayton peace negotiations, in their attempt to stop the war in Bosnia and to gain Milosevic’s assistance in controlling the Bosnian Serbs, the U.S. negotiators, led by Richard Holbrooke, excluded the demands from the Kosovo Albanians to renegotiate the status of Kosovo.³⁰¹ Milosevic was adamant that Kosovo was an internal problem, a Serbian problem, not even a FR Yugoslav problem.³⁰²

³⁰⁰ See *Frontline*, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>. Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note that Warren Zimmerman points out that it was puzzling that President Bush took a much firmer stance regarding the situation in Kosovo as opposed to the situation in Bosnia (that is, the Bosnian crisis in the early 1990s, which was analyzed in Chapter 3). Zimmerman points out that two factors could have had a great impact on President Bush’s decision to issue the Christmas Warning: First, an issue of human rights, that is, a massive abuse of the minority rights by the Serbian authority, which attracted the attention of the U.S. Congress in 1989. Second, the effect of the ethnic lobbies on the U.S. Congress, where the Albanian-American lobby proved to be very skillful in reaching influential legislators such as Senator Robert Dole. On the other hand, Zimmerman points out that the Serbian-American lobby, despite its larger size, was divided in its support for Milosevic as well as not being successful in gaining support of influential legislators. See Zimmerman, “Yugoslavia: 1989-1996,” 180-181.

³⁰¹ See, for example, Packer, *Our Man*, 401.

³⁰² See, for example, Hill, *Outpost*, 122. It is important to note that Milosevic succeeded in getting the UN sanctions against FR Yugoslavia removed in October 1995. However, the United States maintained a unilateral policy of upholding a so-called “outer wall” of sanctions against FR Yugoslavia that “holds full diplomatic relations and U.S. economic benefits, as well as U.S. support of FR Yugoslavia’s full membership in international organizations.” These limited, “outer wall,” sanctions were to remain until the FR

After the unsuccessful attempt to get the Kosovo issue on the Dayton negotiations agenda, Ibrahim Rugova, a head of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and “unofficial president” of Kosovo Republic, had been perceived by many Kosovo Albanians as a weak leader who could not secure their interests by using and promoting non-violent means against the repressive Serbian regime.³⁰³ On the other hand, Milosevic continued to use violent means, with less or more intensity, to suppress the Albanian majority in Kosovo.³⁰⁴

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), also known in the Albanian language as *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës* (UÇK), emerged in early 1996, a few months after the Dayton agreement was signed in Paris. The KLA was advocating armed resistance to the

Yugoslavia demonstrated progress in “cooperation with the war crimes tribunal and with respect to the situation in Kosovo.” See Dianne Rennack, “CRS Report for Congress: Economic Sanctions and the Former Yugoslavia: Current Status and Policy Considerations Through 1996,” *Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress*, December 16, 1996
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19961216_9720_92de1e618a5d683521ce8f1eb5d8f7cbf212d9c8.pdf

³⁰³ Ibrahim Rugova was a pacifist and a prominent Kosovo Albanian scholar during the SFR Yugoslavia. He was also the most prominent Kosovo Albanian politician during the 1990s. In 1989, Rugova founded the political party Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), also known in Albanian language as *Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës* (LDK). The LDK, at the time, had 90 percent support of the Kosovo Albanians. In May 1992, in unofficial elections, Rugova became the “President” of a “parallel state,” Republic of Kosovo, that provided basic social services, such as health care and education (organized in the basements and garages), to the Kosovo Albanians. See “Ibrahim Rugova,” *ICTY*, accessed March 26, 2020, <https://www.icty.org/en/content/ibrahim-rugova>.

³⁰⁴ See, for example, “Case No. IT-39-77, “The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojadac, Vlatko Stojkovic,” *ICTY*, May 22, 1999, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ii990524e.htm

Serbian authority with the ultimate goal of Kosovo's independence from Serbia.³⁰⁵ As the KLA was gaining more support among the Kosovo Albanians and as the small weapons started to flow from neighboring Albania to Kosovo, a mostly peaceful political resistance to Serbian repressive rule was transformed into an armed insurgency.³⁰⁶ The Serbian response to the rise of the KLA was increased pressure and violence against the civilian population, which provoked more Kosovo Albanians to join the KLA.³⁰⁷ As the tensions were escalating, in September 1997 Rugova, who was searching for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis, and Milosevic, who was trying to show the West that he was willing to negotiate with the Kosovo Albanians, negotiated and signed a so-called "school pact," or education agreement.³⁰⁸ This agreement "called for the normalization of the educational system of Kosovo" providing, on paper, that the Kosovo Albanian students would have an opportunity to start a new school year in schools and universities,

³⁰⁵ See, for example, Hill, *Outpost*, 123.

³⁰⁶ Ibid. As Christopher Hill points out, by March 1997 the Albanian government, due to the severe financial crisis, was in a state of collapse and Albania was in "complete chaos, as cities began to fall into the hands of well-financed gangs." What was significant for the Kosovo crisis was that the government armories were looted and, by the time the order was restored in Albania, "an estimated three million [small] weapons had been looted and found its way to Kosovo and the members of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLM)." See Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Holbrooke argues that the Serb military forces' provocations and violent actions "made Milosevic the KLA's best recruiting office." See *Frontline*, "Interview: Richard Holbrooke," *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

³⁰⁸ See, Roksana Nincic, "VREME: The First Signature of Milosevic and Rugova: School Can Start," *Transitions*, July 9, 1996, <https://tol.org/client/article/17182.html>

instead of basements and garages, and giving the opportunity to Albanian professors to return to Albanian language schools and universities.³⁰⁹

Despite the signed agreement and a personal promise by Milosevic that it would be fulfilled, by late October 1997 there was no progress on implementation of the education agreement. Therefore, the Kosovo Albanians, like many international observers including the United States, perceived this agreement as another empty promise given by Milosevic.³¹⁰ The Kosovo Albanian students responded by organizing peaceful protests. In February 1998, Robert Gelbard, the U.S. Special envoy to the Balkans, urged Milosevic to begin implementing the school agreement, as a first step towards a peaceful resolution to the Kosovo conflict.³¹¹ However, the implementation of the agreement did not move forward.

As the KLA gained more support among the Kosovo Albanian population and as the insurgency intensified, the repression by Serbian forces intensified too. In March 1998, Serbian forces and paramilitary attacked the Kosovo Albanian villages in the Drenica Valley (central Kosovo) on the premise that the Drenica Valley was a center of

³⁰⁹ See, for example, Anna Husarska, "Milosevic Shows His True Colors on Education Accords," *New York Times*, September 8, 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/05/opinion/IHT-milosevic-shows-his-true-colors-on-education-accord.html>.

³¹⁰ For example, Husarska argues that Milosevic decided to sign the educational accords to convince "the Americans" to lift the "outer wall" of sanctions against FR Yugoslavia; without actually having any intentions to implement it. See Anna Husarska, "Milosevic Shows His True Colors on Education Accords," *New York Times*, September 8, 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/05/opinion/IHT-milosevic-shows-his-true-colors-on-education-accord.html>.

³¹¹ See Burg, "Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans," 75.

the KLA. As a result, hundreds fled their homes, and, according to estimates, between fifty to sixty people were killed, among them women and children.³¹² Rugova issued a statement calling this “ethnic cleansing.” The Serbian interior minister justified the killing by stating that the Serbian paramilitary units and the police destroyed a “terrorist base.”³¹³ As the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating, and the escalation of the crisis intensified with a perceived potential to escalate into a regional war, the Clinton administration intensified its search for the viable strategy to bring the crisis in Kosovo to an end.³¹⁴

³¹² The exact number of people killed in the Drenica Valley was unknown because reporters were not allowed to enter the areas guarded by the Serbian police. See, Chris Hedges, “Serbs Bombed Ethnic Albanians; Many are Feared Dead,” *New York Times*, March 7, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/07/world/serbs-bombed-ethnic-albanians-many-are-feared-dead.html>. Also, see “Nations Weight Possible Sanctions Against Yugoslavia,” *CNN*, March 9, 1998, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9803/09/kosovo.diplomacy/>.

³¹³ See Hill, *Outpost*, 125. Also, Steven Burg points out that “the characterization of KLA as terrorist organization, during the early 1998 [by Robert Gelbard]” reflected the U.S. hope that “negotiations between Serbs and the LDK (and their leader Rugova) might be fruitful.” The goal, therefore, was not the escalation of violence, but de-escalation of violence in Kosovo. See Burg, “Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans,” 76. Also, Robert Gelbard, in his attempt to clarify his comments made in February 1998 that the KLA committed terrorist acts, said in March 1998, “while [the KLA] committed terrorist acts, it has not been classified legally by the U.S. Government as a terrorist organization.” Gelbard also said, “terrorist acts have occurred (...). But (...) there is no question at all that the overwhelming, brutal, repressive, despicable violence—the criminal actions (...) committed by FR Yugoslavia here—are responsible for the tragedy we have at hand right now.” See Philip Shenon, “U.S. Says It Might Consider Attacking Serbs,” *New York Times*, March 13, 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/world/us-says-it-might-consider-attacking-serbs.html>.

³¹⁴ See, for example, Hill, *Outpost*, 126. With most notably Albanian and Turkey supporting the Kosovo Albanians and Greece and Russia supporting FR Yugoslavia/Serbia.

4.2 Phases of U.S. Involvement in the Kosovo Crisis as Related to the Use of Coercive Strategies (1998-1999)

The United States involvement in Kosovo crisis can be divided into four phases. Phase I: The United States supports non-military coercion and the Contact Group lead, resulting in escalation of the crisis. Phase II: A temporary success of U.S. coercive strategy and signing of the October Agreement. Phase III: Use of coercive diplomacy to coerce Serbia/FR Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanians to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement resulting in unsuccessful Rambouillet and Paris peace negotiations. Phase IV: Three-phased military coercion, Russia's diplomatic initiative, and Milosevic accedes to the G8 peace agreement.

4.3 Phase I: The United State Supports Non-Military Coercion and the Contact Group Leads

Following the events in the Drenica Valley, in March 1998, Robert Gelbard, the U.S. Special envoy to the Balkans, met with Milosevic and warned him that the international community would not stand idly by while his forces were committing atrocities against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population. The Clinton administration's first "instrument," in its attempt to coerce Milosevic, was economic sanctions.³¹⁵ As thousands of Kosovo

³¹⁵ Robert Gelbard stated that the United States would use "every possible economic sanction or other kind of tool we have diplomatically, but [the United States is] not ruling anything out" to end human rights abuse against the Kosovo Albanians. See, Philip Shenon, "U.S. Says It Might Consider Attacking Serbs," *New York Times*, March 13, 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/world/us-says-it-might-consider-attacking-serbs.html>; also see Jane Perlez, "U.S. Warned Serb Leader Not to Crack Down on Kosovo Albanians," *New York Times*, March 15, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/15/world/us-warned-serb-leader-not-to-crack-down-on-kosovo-albanians.html>; William Drozdiak and John F. Harris, "U.S. Backs Europe on

Albanian demonstrators took to the streets in Pristina, Kosovo's regional capital, to protest the brutality of the Serbian regime, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for the Contact Group (comprised of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States) to impose sanctions.³¹⁶ The Contact Group responded by demanding an end to violence against civilians, the withdrawal of special units from Kosovo, and condemned terrorism. The Contact Group demands were strengthened by an arms embargo against FR Yugoslavia, visa restrictions, and the suspension of financial assistance, as well as the freezing of FR Yugoslavia funds held abroad.³¹⁷ The UN Security Council Resolution 1160, adopted on March 31, 1998, incorporated the Contact Group actions as well as condemned the use of force by all actors.³¹⁸

Milosevic responded by organizing a state referendum on foreign mediation to assist in solving the Kosovo crisis, in which a majority of Serbs voted against the mediation. However, the Serbian government also sent a letter to Rugova proposing direct "talks about talks." This proposal for direct "talks about talks" was refused by

Serbia," Washington Post, June 9, 1998, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/serbia060998.htm>.

³¹⁶ "Nations Weight Possible Sanctions Against Yugoslavia," *CNN*, March 9, 1998, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9803/09/kosovo.diplomacy/>.

³¹⁷ "London Contact Group Meeting, 9 March 1998: Statement on Kosovo," *U.S. Department of State Archive*, https://1997-2001.state.gov/travels/980309_kosovo.html.

³¹⁸ "Resolution 1160 (1998)/adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th Meeting, on 31 March 1998," *UN Digital Library*, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/252117?ln=en>.

Rugova, who insisted on third-party participation.³¹⁹ The Clinton administration, in addition to being committed to the implementations of sanctions, decided to give diplomacy another chance. Christopher Hill, who was at the time U.S. Ambassador to North Macedonia, was appointed a U.S. envoy to Kosovo. He was joined by Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. envoy to Bosnia and, at the time a private consultant to the Clinton administration, to assist Hill to convince Milosevic to start negotiations with Rugova.³²⁰

Hill and Holbrooke met with Milosevic in Belgrade, in early May 1998. Milosevic denied any existence of the crisis in Kosovo. Milosevic insisted, “There is no crisis. There are just a few Albanian separatists that the American media is fond of talking to, and our security services are dealing with.”³²¹ However, Milosevic was willing, upon Hill and Holbrook’s insistence, to meet with Rugova. The following day, Rugova accepted, on Hill and Holbrook’s insistence, to meet with Milosevic. Under the sponsorship of the United States, on May 15, 1998, Milosevic and Rugova met in Belgrade. This meeting, however, ended without any significant progress or agreement.

³¹⁹ “International Crisis Group (ICG): Again, the Visible Hand, Slobodan Milosevic’s Manipulation of the Kosovo Dispute,” *Refworld/UNHCR*, May 6, 1998, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6d38.html>.

³²⁰ See, Hill, *Outpost*, 126.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 127. Also, see *Frontline*, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

Following the meeting in Belgrade, on May 29, 1998, Rugova met with President Clinton in the White House.³²² President Clinton and Rugova agreed that both sides supported a negotiated political solution to the Kosovo conflict, but Rugova also expressed his disillusion with Milosevic's promises to commit himself to a negotiated political solution to the Kosovo crisis. Rugova, furthermore, asked President Clinton to increase pressure on Milosevic to stop violence against the Kosovo Albanians. While President Clinton and Rugova were meeting, the Serbian forces attacked a Kosovo Albanian town, claiming that it was a KLA stronghold.³²³ What followed was a violent crackdown on the KLA by FRY/Serbian military, paramilitary, and police units that produced 500,000 homeless.³²⁴

As the violence was escalating in Kosovo, on June 11, 1998, NATO defense ministers agreed that NATO should conduct air exercises in the region to send Milosevic a signal that NATO was concerned about the escalation of violence in the region and committed to act if necessary. Following the meeting, on June 15, NATO conducted Operation Determined Falcon (ODF).³²⁵ This military exercise over Albania and

³²² See Steven Erlanger, "Clinton Meets Delegation from Kosovo Seeking Talks," *New York Times*, May 30, 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/30/world/clinton-meets-delegation-from-kosovo-seeking-talks.html>.

³²³ See Burg, "Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans," 77.

³²⁴ See Justin Brown, "Can Serbia Go? Some Serbs Doubt 'Greater Serbia' Goals," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 17, 1998, <https://www.csmonitor.com/1998/0617/061798.intl.intl.4.html>.

³²⁵ See "Statement by NATO Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana, on Exercise 'Determine Falcon,'" *NATO*, June 13, 1998, <https://www.nato.int/DOCU/pr/1998/p98-080e.htm>.

Macedonia included a variety of aircrafts provided by NATO members and it was designed, in the words of U.S. defense secretary William Cohen, to “demonstrate (...) that NATO is united in its commitment to seek a cease-fire and a cessation to hostilities [in Kosovo] and demonstrate its capacity to rapidly mobilize some very significant lethal capability.”³²⁶ As much as it was a clear evidence of NATO’s capability to launch air strikes against FRY/Serbia, disagreement within the Contact Group over air strikes, especially from Russia (a traditional ally of Serbia), diminished the coherence of Western resolve, and, therefore, the effectiveness of the potential threat of force.³²⁷

On June 16, 1998, President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, in coordination with and approval by the Contact Group, met with Milosevic in Moscow.³²⁸ During this meeting President Yeltsin presented a set of the Contact Group’s demands to Milosevic. The demands included to end “all actions by Serbian security forces against civilians, access for international monitors and humanitarian organizations, the rights of refugees to return to their homes,” and return to dialog with the Kosovo Albania leadership.³²⁹

Milosevic committed himself to restart the negotiations with Rugova, or, as Milosevic pointed out, with the moderate fraction of Kosovo Albanians. However,

³²⁶ As quoted in Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton, *Fighting for Credibility: U.S. Reputation and International Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 122.

³²⁷ “International Crisis Group (ICG): Again, the Visible Hand, Slobodan Milosevic’s Manipulation of the Kosovo Dispute,” *Refworld/UNHCR*, May 6, 1998, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6d38.html>.

³²⁸ Russia was a traditional Serbian ally, as well as a member of the Contact Group.

³²⁹ “Contact Group: Serbia Must End Crackdown in Kosovo,” *CNN*, June 12, 1998, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9806/12/contact.group.kosovo/>.

Milosevic refused to negotiate with the KLA, or a military fraction. Milosevic also agreed to allow foreign observers to visit Kosovo, also known as the Kosovo Diplomatic Observers Mission (KDOM). Milosevic, however, did not agree to any official monitoring activities or international mediation, and he refused to pull Yugoslav army (VJ) and Serbian special forces from Kosovo. The meeting was a partial success, where Milosevic was eager to state that “all actions of Serbian police were only against terrorist groups, not against civilians” and he also claimed that NATO’s show of air power, that is Operation Determined Falcon, conducted on June 1, “had no effect on his talks with [President] Yeltsin.”³³⁰ In her statement, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright welcomed the progress, but she also pointed that it was insufficient if “the killing of civilians and depopulation of villages continues.”³³¹

4.3.1 The U.S. Peace Strategy and the KLA Factor

By June 1998, the Clinton administration was convinced that the KLA had become an important part of both the Kosovo crisis and its solution. During the NSC Principals meeting on June 19, 1998, it was agreed that the United States, as a part of its peace strategy, should continue to work with the Contact Group and allies to achieve a political resolution to the Kosovo crisis. However, it was also agreed that while increasing pressure on Milosevic through international sanctions, the United States should also

³³⁰ See Richard C. Paddock, “For Yeltsin, Milosevic Yields a Bit for Kosovo,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 17, 1998, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-jun-17-mn-60788-story.html>.

³³¹ *Ibid.*

broaden and strengthen the Kosovo team by bringing the KLA into the political process. Therefore, the KLA would be offered the place at the negotiating table as a part of the Kosovo team, but, at the same time, that the KLA would face “sticks” if it did not agree to participate in the political negotiations and proceeded with violent provocations.³³²

On June 22, 1998, the NSC principals agreed on Richard Holbrooke’s mission, whose goals included “stressing to Milosevic that he must satisfy all Contact Group demands, not only those accepted in Moscow” and it should be made clear to the KLA, or in Albanian language the UCJ, that the United States would not accept “violent pursuit of independence.”³³³ Holbrooke noted, “Whether they [the KLA] espoused a violent solution or not, you could not ignore them [the KLA], because they were imposing their presence on relationship. But Rugova, the acknowledged leader of the Albanians (...) was the person we [the United States] dealt with publicly.”³³⁴

On June 23, 1998, Holbrooke, in the capacity of U.S. envoy to the Balkans, met with Rugova in Skopje, a capital of North Macedonia, and with Milosevic in Belgrade, to

³³² “Declassified Documents Concerning National Security Council (NSC): Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, June 19, 1998 [20552; pp.11-14],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197>. The summary also noted that for the Kosovo Albanians “sticks” would include “no protection from proportionate FRY/Serbian violent provocations, disruption of UCK [KLA] financing and logistics, lifting of UNSCR 1160 to permit re-supply of FRY/Serbian weapons.”

³³³ “Declassified Documents Concerning National Security Council (NSC): Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, June 22, 1998 [20555; pp.15-16],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197>.

³³⁴ See *Frontline*, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

share his concerns regarding the escalation of violence in Kosovo.³³⁵ Holbrooke also took a brief tour of western Kosovo. When the photo of Holbrooke sitting alongside of one of the KLA members appeared in the world news, Holbrooke downplayed this meeting by stating that it was an incident, where men in “camouflage uniforms” joined his meeting with the village elders.³³⁶ However, it was perceived by many observers as a sign that the KLA, with its fast-growing membership and support among the Kosovo Albanians, was taken as a serious player in any peace settlement. It also angered Milosevic, who was adamant not to negotiate with the KLA and who considered the KLA a terrorist group. Holbrooke, anticipating that the photo of him and the KLA member would have a potential negative influence on Milosevic’s willingness to cooperate, sent Ambassador Christopher Hill to meet with Milosevic. Hill convinced Milosevic that the “mediators should talk to all sides,” but Hill also stressed that the photo and the meeting with the

³³⁵ “World: Europe U.S. Envoy Warns Against Kosovo War,” *BBC*, June 23, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/118881.stm>. Although there was no official statement about the success or failure of Holbrooke’s talk with Milosevic, Holbrooke, in his interview to *Frontline*, said, “I told Milosevic (...) “You know, you are the best thing that ever happened to the KLA. You are making a monumental error by not negotiating with the moderates.” See, *Frontline*, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

³³⁶ See Adam Brown, “Holbrooke Meets with Kosovo Rebels,” *AP*, June 24, 1998, <https://apnews.com/article/a171a35c427106ed8f6900aa183fb978>. Christopher Hill gives an account of this meeting as an incidental one, where Holbrooke and Hill were not aware that the KLA would show up during their meeting with the village elders. See, Hill, *Outpost*, 132. However, one can also conclude that the meeting with the KLA members “fit” in the peace strategy proposed by the NCS Principles to engage the KLA in the political process and peace negotiations.

KLA members were not intentional, but incidental.³³⁷ As the FRY/Serbian forces were attempting to gain control over the territory lost to the KLA and intensified and broadened their offensive, the number of internally displaced Kosovo Albanians increased drastically, as well as the number of refugees who flooded neighboring countries.³³⁸ During the joint news conference Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, despite their differences regarding the potential NATO intervention in Kosovo, agreed that humanitarian catastrophe had to be prevented.³³⁹

4.4 Phase II: Coercive Diplomacy and the October Agreement

On September 23, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1199, which called for all parties in Kosovo conflict to cease hostilities, maintain a ceasefire, and start

³³⁷ See Hill, *Outpost*, 133. Hill also writes that Milosevic in one moment stated, “I like Deek [as he called Richard Holbrooke]. But for the sake of [his] career, he would eat small children for breakfast.” However, at the end of the meeting with Hill, Milosevic seemed to be ready to “let it go.”

³³⁸ See, for example, “World: Europe UN Aid to Kosovo Refugees,” *BBC*, August 2, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/142465.stm>. Also, Timothy W. Crawford, “Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why the Holbrooke Agreement Failed,” *Brookings*, April 1, 2001, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pivotal-deterrence-and-the-kosovo-war-why-the-holbrooke-agreement-failed/>. According to Daalder and O’Hanon, the Serbian offensive in Kosovo, which started in July 1998 in and around Oraovac, Kosovo, “forces up to 300,000 Kosovar Albanians out of their homes.” See Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 228. Christopher Hill points out “(...) Serbs began new tactic: Clear out the villages along the main trunk lines, (...). [It] brought them the enmity of the world while doing nothing to enhance their security.” See Hill, *Outpost*, 140.

³³⁹ See “Text of Clinton-Yeltsin News Conference,” *CNN*, September 1, 1998, <https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/09/02/lewinsky.01/transcript.html>.

a dialog without any preconditions.³⁴⁰ Despite the fact that UNSC Resolution 1199 did not authorize the use of force, it was backed by the Activation Warning (ACTWARN), for both a phased air campaign and a limited air option in Kosovo, issued by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana.³⁴¹ Secretary Solana pointed out that the ACTWARN is an “important signal of NATO’s readiness to use force if it becomes necessary to do so.” He also reiterated that Milosevic must stop his repressive actions against the population; must seek a political solution to the Kosovo crisis based on negotiations; and must take immediate steps to alleviate the humanitarian situation.³⁴²

It is significant that on September 30, 1998, the NSC principals proposed the following strategy: To pressure NATO to authorize, by October 2, the issuing of an Activation Request (ACTREQ) for the limited air operation and phased air campaign, that would be followed by a public statement by the NATO Secretary General explaining the decision was made as a result of Belgrade’s non-compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199.³⁴³ A meeting of the Contact Group on October 3 to discuss the elements of political

³⁴⁰ “Resolution 1199 (1998)/adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th Meeting, on 23 September 1999,” *UN Digital Library*, accessed August 20, 2019, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/260416?ln=en>. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199 with four out of five permanent members voting for the resolution and China abstaining.

³⁴¹ The three-stage NATO authorization protocol for the military air campaign: (1) Activation Warning (ACTWARN); (2) Activation Request (ACTREQ); and (3) Activation Order (ACTORD).

³⁴² See “Statement by the Secretary General Following the ACTWARN Decision; Vilamoura, September 24, 1998,” *NATO*, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980924e.htm>.

³⁴³ See “Declassified Documents Concerning National Security Council (NSC): Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, June 22, 1998

settlement, to be followed up with a demarche in Belgrade by the United States, Russia and EU Presidency ambassadors. The UN Secretary-General should issue his report on compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199 no later than October 5. The goal was also to keep Russia “on board,” by continuing diplomatic engagement, while making clear to Milosevic that the Alliance was prepared to act. On October 7, NATO should authorize the issuing an Activation Order (ACTORD) covering both the limited air option and the phased air campaign. Following the issuance of the ACTORD and prior to execution of air strikes, Ambassador Holbrooke would be dispatched to Belgrade to confront Milosevic with a clear set of demands aimed at attaining full compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199.³⁴⁴

4.4.1 Coercive Diplomacy Implementation

As was proposed during the NSC principals meeting, the NATO issued an Activation Request (ACTREQ) for the limited air option and phased air campaign on October 1,

[20844; pp.25-27],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197>. Richard Holbrooke, who was present during the NSC Principals Committee meeting on June 22, in his interview to *Frontline/PBC*, stated, referring to the massacre of the Kosovo Albanians in Obrinje, a village in Kosovo, that “*The Times* [magazine] sat in the middle of the oak table in the middle of the situation room like a silent witness of what was going on. (...) the terrible photograph of that dead person in that village (...), (...) it had a very real effect on the dialogue. That was the meeting in which it was decided that I should go to Belgrade (...).” See, *Frontline*, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

³⁴⁴ “Declassified Documents Concerning National Security Council (NSC): Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, June 22, 1998, [20844; pp.25-27],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197>.

1998. UN Secretary General Koffi Annan issued a critical UN Security Council report on FRY/Serbia not complying with UNSC Resolution 1199. The Contact Group issued a statement demanding Milosevic to comply with UNSC Resolution 1199. This threat was backed by NATO's "promise" to use force against FRY/Serbia in the event of noncompliance. On October 12, NATO adopted an Activation Order (ACTORD) authorizing the NATO force to carry out the attack but delayed its implementation for ninety-six hours in order to allow Milosevic to demonstrate compliance. NATO Secretary General Solana, in his attempt to convince Milosevic that this time the threats would be executed if Serbia did not comply with the demands, stated, "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has still not complied fully with UNSC Resolution 1199 and time is running out. (...) the use of military force can be avoided. The responsibility is on President Milosevic's shoulders."³⁴⁵ The Clinton administration dispatched Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to persuade Milosevic to comply with UNSC Resolution 1199; at the same time, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was dispatched to Moscow to "keep the Russians on board."³⁴⁶

³⁴⁵ See "Transcript of the Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana [October 13, 1998]," *NATO*, October 13, 1998, <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013b.htm>. Also, as pointed out by Burg, some saw this as an attempt to "sidestep Russia's opposition to the use of force and willingness to employ its veto power" in the UN Security Council. See Burg, "Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans," 80.

³⁴⁶ See *Frontline*, "Interview: Richard Holbrooke," *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>. It is important to note that Russia officially announced that it would veto a UN Security Council resolution to authorize use of force in Kosovo. However, from the diplomatic exchanges between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin and Russia's dependence on economic support from the West, it was also understood that Russia would not interfere militarily if NATO proceeded with limited air strikes without a UN mandate. See Celestine Bohlen,

4.4.2 The October Agreement

Richard Holbrooke's team included Christopher Hill and Jim O'Brien from the State Department. U.S. General Mike Short, the NATO commander in charge of NATO military intervention in FRY/Serbia was called, by Holbrooke, to join the meeting with Milosevic. Holbrooke's goal was for General Short to make it clear to Milosevic that NATO military threats were real by giving Milosevic a clear choice between complying with UNSC Resolution 1199, which would be monitored by NATO (that is monitored by "U2s" and other aircrafts for intelligence gathering and reconnaissance), or being bombed by NATO (that is, by "B52s" and other strategic bombers).³⁴⁷ According to Holbrooke, General Short's answer to Milosevic's question "(...) you are the man who's gonna bomb us?" was "Mr. President, I have B52s in one hand, and I have U2s in the other. It's up to you which one I am going to have to use."³⁴⁸ However, General Short also pointed that he told Milosevic "Well, I hope that won't be the case. I have a plan to propose to your

"Russia Vows to Block the U.N. from Backing Attack on Serbs," *New York Times*, October 7, 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/07/world/russia-vows-to-block-the-un-from-backing-attack-on-serbs.html>; also, for example, *Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President*, "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, August 14, 1999 [pp.384-389; 393-396]," *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569>.

³⁴⁷ Holbrooke told Milosevic, "Mr. President, as General Short said, he has a plan for doing reconnaissance in Kosovo. It will allow the international community to confirm that you are doing as you say you are doing-that you are not conducting ethnic cleansing (...)." See, *Frontline*, "Interview: General Michael C. Short," *PBS*, assessed July 23, 2019, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html>.

³⁴⁸ See *Frontline*, "Interview: Richard Holbrooke," *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>. Also, see *Frontline*, "Interview: General Michael C. Short," *Frontline PBS*, assessed July 23, 2019, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html>

generals that will prevent your country from being bombed, but in essence, you're right."³⁴⁹ Holbrooke and Milosevic talked for additional 15 minutes and Holbrooke closed the conversation by saying, "Mr. President, as General Short said, he has a plan for doing reconnaissance in Kosovo. It will allow the international community to confirm that you are doing as you say you are doing—that you are not conducting ethnic cleansing (...)." ³⁵⁰

The negotiations between Holbrooke and Milosevic produced the October agreement. Milosevic agreed to have an international presence in Kosovo, that is, the agreement established an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) verification mission on the ground in Kosovo (OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission or KVM). Milosevic also agreed to the withdrawal of the FRY/Serbian troops, keeping only the pre-March 1998 level of the troops in Kosovo. The main goal of the agreement was to stop violence in Kosovo and enable the refugees to return to their homes.³⁵¹ However, the

³⁴⁹ See *Frontline*, "Interview: General Michael C. Short," *PBS*, assessed July 23, 2019, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html>. General Short also mentioned in the interview that after meeting with Milosevic he met with the FRY/Serbian military staff and "showed them a map of the area where [NATO] intended to do reconnaissance (...)." The next day, General Short got a response from the "general in charge of the Serb air force" who said, "What you have proposed violates everything I have stood for throughout my career (...). I would break my promise with the Serb people if allowed NATO to come into our country." General Short responded by saying, "If you force me to go to war against you, and they find out that war could have been prevented if you accepted our very reasonable terms for unobtrusive reconnaissance regime over your country (...) instead [you] chose to have them bombed, as opposed to me taking pictures in Kosovo, I think the Serb people will be very, very disappointed in you. (...) Belgrade and your country will be destroyed if you force me to go to war."

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁵¹ See *Frontline*, "Interview: Richard Holbrooke," *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>. As

agreement was short lived. When Milosevic addressed the nation, he stated that the agreement with Holbrooke “removed the threat of military intervention,” and his office issued a statement that the agreement with Holbrooke “guarantees Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia.” However, Holbrooke stated that he hoped the “deal would lead the way to autonomy and self-determination” for the people of Kosovo,” and he also stressed that he never mentioned that he, and the United States, guaranteed territorial integrity of FY Yugoslavia.³⁵² Therefore, the assurances that Milosevic assumed were given to him by Holbrooke, and the United States, came into question. Furthermore, a representative of the KLA, in a public statement, replied, “anything short of full Kosovo independence was unacceptable.”³⁵³

As the FRY/Serbian military forces were pulling out from Kosovo, keeping only the pre-March 1998 force, and refugees were returning to the villages, the KLA was

Holbrooke points out, over 2,000 members of the OSCE KVM, headed by U.S. Ambassador William Walker, were scheduled to be dispatched to Kosovo. See also Hill, *Outpost*, 143.

³⁵² See “World: Europe Agreement in Belgrade,” *CNN*, October 13, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/192453.stm>. However, it is controversial if Holbrooke, during the negotiations in October 1998, gave a document to Milosevic committing the United States not to support independent Kosovo and to support the territorial integrity of FR Yugoslavia. It was never mentioned or confirmed by Holbrooke or the American negotiating team that the document existed. However, the document, according to *Serbija Danas* [*Serbia Today*] was seen by Milosevic’s wife, Mira Markovic, and some other not identified members of Milosevic’s political collaborators. The document, according to *Serbija Danas* was destroyed during the NATO bombing campaign of Belgrade in 1999. See, “Sto je Holbruk GARANTOVAO Milosevicu uoci bombardovanja SR Jugoslavije 1999. Godine? [What did Holbrooke Guarantee to Milosevic (...)?] November 3, 2017, *Serbija Danas* [*Serbia Today*] <https://www.srbijadanas.com/vesti/info/sta-je-holbruk-garantovao-milosevicu-uoci-bombardovanja-sr-jugoslavije-1999-godine-2017-11-03>.

³⁵³ See “World: Europe Agreement in Belgrade,” *CNN*, October 13, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/192453.stm>.

coming back too.³⁵⁴ The KLA was not consulted on the agreement, was not satisfied with the agreement, and did not respect the ceasefire. The sporadic provocations by the KLA provoked a severe military offensive by the Serbian/VJ forces.³⁵⁵

As the security situation in Kosovo was deteriorating, James Padrew, a U.S. special representative for Kosovo, met with Milosevic on December 22, 1998. Padrew reminded Milosevic of his commitments to stop the violence against civilians and cooperate with the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (OCEKVM). Milosevic, as he did

³⁵⁴ See R. Jeffrey Smith, “A Turnaround in Kosovo,” *Washington Post*, November 18, 1998, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/11/18/a-turnaround-in-kosovo/eaef78d81-304f-4fda-8fd5-e0e80e02f2c8/>.

³⁵⁵ Rudolf Scharping, Defense Minister of Germany, argues that Operation Horseshoe was organized by Milosevic and its advisors in November 1998; the operation had a clear objective “to ethnically cleanse Kosovo and remove the whole civilian population.” General Wesley Clark, NATO’s supreme commander of European forces, denied knowing about the operation. See, “Did NATO Miscalculate?,” *BBC*, April 23, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/326864.stm>. William Walker stated that he was not able to confirm that Operation Horseshoe actually existed, “but there was (...) a plan (...) in which troops and equipment would move very quickly into Kosovo (...)” See, *Frontline*, “Interview: William Walker,” *PBS*, access July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/walker.html>. *Washington Post* reported about Operation Horseshoe and linked Milosevic’s decision to fire VJ General Momcilo Perisic, in November 1998 over a disagreement regarding the plan. See, R. Jeffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, “Serbs’ Offensive Was Meticulously Planned,” *Washington Post*, April 11, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/04/11/serbs-offensive-was-meticulously-planned/0b70e691-8155-40b0-8404-acf16039e6f5/>. Milan Milutinovic, President of Serbia from 1997 to 2002 and Milosevic’s collaborator, denies the existence of the plan or any document that would support that such plan existed. Milutinovic points out that the document presented by the Bulgarian diplomats to Joschka Fisher, Foreign Minister of Germany, detailing Operation Horseshoe was a fabrication. See, “Bugari I Njemci Smestili Srbiji NATO Bombe: Operacija “Potkovica” Najveca Laz Usmerena Ka Nasoj Zemlji [Thanks to the Bulgarians and Germans NATO Bombed Serbia: Operations Horseshoe the Biggest Lie Directed Against our Country,] ,” *Reuplika.rs/Tanjug*, May 23, 2019, <https://www.republika.rs/vesti/srbija/135591/bugari-nemci-smestili-srbiji-nato-bombe-operacija-potkovica-najveca-laz-usmerena-nasoj-zemlji>.

during the previous meetings, denied any charges of excessive use of force against civilians in Kosovo and denied any failure to cooperate with the OSCEKVM and international community.³⁵⁶

The implementation of U.S. strategy, initially, included all three requirements of the *CD Triangle*, the model proposed in this dissertation: Credible threats, that is, NATO demonstrated a will to carry out the threats; credible assurance, which were according to Milosevic given by U.S. envoy Holbrooke during their meeting; and the international environment that favored the coercer, that is, the Clinton administration engaged with Russia, a potential “spoiler,” diplomatically and economically, giving Serbia/FRY no option to balance the coercer’s threats by external force. However, the October agreement fell apart when Holbrooke publicly denied giving the assurance to Milosevic that the demands would not be expanded in the future (Kosovo’s autonomy as mentioned in the agreement versus Kosovo’s independence) and that territorial integrity of Serbia/FR Yugoslavia was guaranteed by the United States. As the KLA was retaking the territory, the Serb/VJ forces retaliated in a disproportionately violent manner.

4.4.3 The Racak Massacre

As the violence continued, on January 17, 1999 forty-five Kosovo Albanian civilians were brutally murdered by Serb forces near the village of Racak, central Kosovo.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁶ See Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 98.

³⁵⁷ See, for example, “Britain Calls for Urgent Meeting on Kosovo Massacre,” *CNN*, January 18, 1999, <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9901/18/kosovo.reax.01/index.html>.

Despite the Serbian claim that the victims were the KLM fighters, they included elderly men, women, and a child.³⁵⁸ After the massacre, William Walker, the chief of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCEKVM) and U.S. diplomat, visited the scene and called the massacre an “unspeakable atrocity” and “a crime very much against humanity.” Walker made it clear that Serbia was responsible for the committed crimes.³⁵⁹ Milosevic responded by denouncing Walker’s report about the Racak massacre and expelling Walker from FY Yugoslavia.³⁶⁰

After Walker’s report about the Racak massacre was published, Milosevic refused to take Holbrooke’s call on the premise that Holbrooke was supporting the KLA and Holbrooke would not be trusted.³⁶¹ However, Milosevic agreed to meet with General

³⁵⁸ See, for example, Jeffrey Smith, “Attempt to Cover up Racak Massacre Revealed,” *Irish Times*, January 29, 1999, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/attempt-to-cover-up-racak-massacre-revealed-1.1258467>.

³⁵⁹ See *Frontline*, “Interview: Ambassador William Walker,” *PBS*, access July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/walker.html>. In the same interview Walker also noted that “The bodies were so torn up by shots, by bullets (...). It was absolutely horrible. All you could think is how could one human being do this to another human being.” See also Hill, *Outpost*, 147.

³⁶⁰ See, for example, “Expelled Head of Peace Mission is a Veteran U.S. Diplomat,” *Irish Times*, January 20, 1999, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/expelled-head-of-peace-mission-is-a-veteran-us-diplomat-1.125686>.

³⁶¹ See *Frontline*, “Interview: Ambassador William Walker,” *PBS*, access July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/walker.html>. Also, commander of the Yugoslav Third Army General Pavkovic, responsible for the overall prosecution of the war in Kosovo and known Milosevic loyalist, stated that “we actually came to know that he [Holbrooke] was actually supporting the terrorists; [he] was there to help them.” See *Frontline*, “Interview: Commander [of the Yugoslav 3rd Army, General] Nebojsa Pavkovic,” *PBS*, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html>.

Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who was sent to Belgrade to persuade Milosevic to end the violence. More precisely, General Clark presented Milosevic with three demands: To allow Hague Tribunal Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour into Kosovo to investigate the Racak massacre; to allow William Walker, who was ordered to leave Serbia after he called the Racak massacre “a crime against humanity,” to stay in Kosovo; and to insist that Milosevic deliver on his October promise to reduce Serb forces in Kosovo. According to General Clark, Milosevic was “belligerent” and extremely “stubborn” and vehemently shouted, “These people [the KLA] are terrorists.” When, after six hours of negotiations, General Clark said he would have to inform NATO that Milosevic rejected all of his demands, Milosevic yelled, “Serbia is democracy-You are threatening -You are a war criminal.”³⁶² General Clark pointed out that “after the outburst” he spent additional two hours persuading Milosevic to accept the three demands, but without any success.³⁶³ It is significant that Milosevic met with Christopher Hill, a U.S. special envoy to Kosovo, in late November 1998. After reading the draft presented by Hill, which “banned the Yugoslav military stepping foot in Kosovo,” Milosevic stated, “You might as well ask for my head.”³⁶⁴ Milosevic was convinced that pulling the Yugoslav army out from Kosovo meant that the KLA would

³⁶² General Clark told Milosevic, “Please understand, Mr. President, that if we carry back your answer to NATO, they are going to tell us to start moving aircrafts. They are going to ask, who is this man who is destroying his own country, who had crashed democracy (...), forced university professors to sign the loyalty oaths. (...) Please do not leave it this way.” See Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 161.

³⁶³ Ibid. Also see Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 294.

³⁶⁴ Hill, *Outpost*, 144.

take over the territory, as the KLA did after the October agreement was negotiated between Holbrooke and Milosevic, and after Milosevic argued that Holbrooke guaranteed the territorial integrity of Serbia, which was, *ex post*, denied by Holbrooke. Milosevic did not trust Holbrooke that the United States supported the autonomy of Kosovo. On the contrary, Milosevic was convinced that the United States was supporting an independent Kosovo. For Milosevic, losing Kosovo meant losing the support from an ultraright segment of the Serbian population, which was an important part of his hold on power.³⁶⁵ It meant losing his “head.”

4.5 Phase III: Coercive Diplomacy and Rambouillet/Paris Peace Negotiations

In the aftermath of the Racak massacre, it was obvious that the October agreement collapsed without providing a solution to permanently quell the violence. Given the international attention that the Racak massacre received, as well as Milosevic’s decision to reverse the initial compliance with the three proposed demands, President Clinton decided to change the approach to the Kosovo crisis. Secretary of State Madeline Albright proposed a strategy where both sides, Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, would be given an ultimatum to accept the political agreement with a specific deadline for compliance, backed by the threat of NATO airstrikes if the parties did not comply with

³⁶⁵ Notably Milosevic chose in 1998 Vojislav Seselj’s ultraright Serbian Radical Party (SRS) as a coalition partner for his Socialist Party of Serbia. See, Tamara Skrozza, “Dva Ratna Druga [Two War Friends],” *Vreme [Time]*, August 25, 2005, <https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=425934>; also, “Milosevic: Déjà vu All Over Again? Briefing on Yugoslav Leader’s Latest Maneuvers,” *International Crisis Group (ICG)*, December 23, 1998, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6d414.html>.

the demands. The strategy was to focus on military threats to coerce Milosevic to comply with the previously signed October agreement. On January 21, 1999, the U.S. NSC deputies agreed that an ultimatum should be issued “as soon as possible,” it should be backed by the threat of NATO air strikes, and it should, in its core, consist of “a demand that Belgrade fully comply with its commitments under the October agreement,” including “stricter restrictions on Serb security forces.”³⁶⁶ James O’Brian, Albright’s senior advisor, and Jonathan Levitsky, from the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, crafted a detailed political agreement that would be presented to the Contact Group Ministerial Meeting scheduled for January 29, 1999, and, if approved, it would be presented to the two warring sides in Kosovo.³⁶⁷

At the Contact Group Ministerial meeting on January 29, 1999, the Contact Group demanded that the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs “accept its framework agreement [initially proposed by the United States] and summoned them to proximity talks in Rambouillet.”³⁶⁸ Secretary of State Albright argued that Rambouillet was the last diplomatic chance before going to war. However, she stressed that the goal was not a

³⁶⁶ See “Declassified Documents Concerning National Security Council (NSC): Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, January 21, 1999, [0398; pp.159-160],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197>.

³⁶⁷ See Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo*, p.100. Also, “Declassified Documents Concerning National Security Council (NSC): Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, January 21, 1999 [0482; pp.161-162],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197>.

³⁶⁸ As quoted in Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 102.

war.³⁶⁹ Richard Holbrooke points out that the massacre in Racak, based on the October agreement signed by Milosevic, would have justified an immediate NATO military response, but the Clinton administration decided, rather than “bombing the Serbs immediately,” to summon both sides, Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, to Rambouillet.³⁷⁰ Secretary Albright in a key public speech in early February 1999, argued that the United States was committed to bring the Kosovo crisis to an end. She argued that the U.S. interests were to strengthen democratic principles and practices in the region, to prevent a massive refugee crisis and the spillover of the conflict, especially to Albania and Macedonia, with the potential involvement of Greece and Turkey, both NATO allies. After all, Secretary Albright stressed that it was in the U.S. interest to preserve NATO’s credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe.³⁷¹ On January 28, speaking at NATO headquarters in Brussels, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, indirectly endorsed the NATO threat to use force by saying that a “combination of force and

³⁶⁹ Madeleine Albright said, two days before the conference in Rambouillet commenced, “The core of what we are proposing has not changed and will not. We aim to put in place a durable and fair interim agreement that will create a peaceful political framework for Kosovo while deferring the question of Kosovo’s status for several years. The people of Kosovo must be able to govern themselves democratically without interference from Belgrade while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are maintained.” See “Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Press, 2004. Remarks and Q&A Session at the U.S. Institute of Peace Washington, D.C.,” *U.S. Department of State – Archive*, February 4, 1999, <https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1999/990204.html>.

³⁷⁰ See *Frontline*, “Interview: Richard Holbrook,” *PBS*, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interview/holbrppk.html>.

³⁷¹ “Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Remarks and Q&A Session at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1999,” *U.S. Department of State Archive*, <https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1999/990204.html>.

diplomacy” is “the key to peace in the Balkans,” but pointed out the “need to use force, when all means have failed.”³⁷²

4.5.1 The Rambouillet Conference

The international conference began at Rambouillet, a chalet about thirty miles outside Paris, on February 6, 1999. The goal was to coerce two warring sides, the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, to accept the “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo.”³⁷³ French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine and his British counterpart, Robin Cook, had the facilitator’s role, with the direct involvement of the United States, Russian, and EU diplomats, represented by U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill, EU diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch, and Russian Ambassador Boris Mayorsky.³⁷⁴ However, even before the conference began, it was clear that one of the main actors, Slobodan Milosevic, would not be present. Milosevic, who was at the time the President of FR Yugoslavia, refused to attend the conference. One excuse given by Milosevic was that Kosovo was a part of Serbia and therefore negotiations should be with Serbian President Milan Milutinovic.³⁷⁵ However, Milosevic also feared that he was secretly indicted for war crimes and could be

³⁷² See “Statement by Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations [January 28, 1999],” *NATO*, January 28, 1999, <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm>.

³⁷³ See “Rambouillet Agreement: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,” *U.S. Department of State-Archive*, accessed February 22, 2020, https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_ambouillet_text.html.

³⁷⁴ See Jane Perez, “Diplomats vs. Rebels,” *New York Times*, February 25, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/25/world/diplomat-vs-rebels.html>.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

arrested during the conference.³⁷⁶ The Serbian delegation, therefore, was led by President of Serbia Milan Milutinovic and it was comprised of about thirty persons, including a representative from every minority in Serbia. The goal was to present Serbia as harmonious multiethnic society.³⁷⁷ During the first day of the conference, it became clear that Milutinovic, or any other member of the Serbian delegation, had no authority to make any decisions.³⁷⁸

The Kosovo Albanian delegation was comprised of the members of the KLA, led by Hashim Thaci, and the members of the LDK, led by Ibrahim Rugova.³⁷⁹ The Kosovo Albanian delegation, was deeply divided, lacked the leadership and did not have one goal, and these factors presented the major obstacles for the attempt by the U.S. negotiators to make the Kosovo Albanian delegation accept the agreement.³⁸⁰ The KLA envisioned Kosovo as an independent state, while the LDK was ready to accept

³⁷⁶ See Peter Beaumont and Patrick Wintour, “Rambouillet: The Last Throw of the Dice,” *Guardian*, July 17, 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jul/18/balkans6>.

³⁷⁷ See Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 102-4.

³⁷⁸ It was observed that Milutinovic used to call Milosevic daily to ask for instructions. See Peter Beaumont and Patrick Wintour, “Rambouillet: The Last Throw of the Dice,” *Guardian*, July 17, 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jul/18/balkans6>.

³⁷⁹ Hashim Thaci, also known by his nom de guerre *Snake*, was *de facto* political director of the KLA and was in constant contact with the KLA hard-liner and spokesman Adem Demachi, who refused to attend the conference. See, Jane Perez, “Diplomats vs. Rebels,” *New York Times*, February 25, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/25/world/diplomat-vs-rebels.html>.

³⁸⁰ See, for example, *Frontline*, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

autonomy, which could eventually lead to independence. At one point, the LDK members told their KLA counterparts, who were not accepting the proposed agreement because it included the autonomy of Kosovo (as opposed to independence), that they would stop the talks indefinitely if the KLA could win the war on the battlefield. However, the KLA, as well as the U.S. negotiators, knew that the KLA had ammunition sufficient only for a few weeks of hard fighting.³⁸¹ The Kosovo Albanian delegation, which towards the end of the conference signaled that they were ready to sign the draft interim agreement, believed that Milosevic would arrive in Rambouillet at the last minute to sign the agreement. When he did not show up, one of the Kosovo Albanian delegation members said, “Milosevic (...) decided to fight.”³⁸²

Nikola Sainovi, a senior member of the Serbian delegation, argued that at Rambouillet the U.S. negotiators, especially Secretary Albright, who was present for the last three days of the negotiations, had a deciding role. Sainovic, who was not pleased by the shuttle diplomacy practiced during the negotiations, pointed that the Serbian delegation was not given a chance to negotiate directly with the Kosovo Albanian delegation. He also stressed that they were given an ultimatum either to sign the agreement or they would be responsible for the war. As he said, Secretary Albright left the agreement on the table, said “sign or you would be bombed,” and left the room.³⁸³

³⁸¹ See, for example, Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 298; Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary* (Miramar Books: New York, 2003), 400-402.

³⁸² As cited in Philips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 104.

³⁸³ In 2016, Nikola Sainovic gave an exclusive interview to Antonije Kovacevic. See Antonije Kovacevic, “Eksklusivna ispovjest, Sainovic: Milosevic je nudio Klintonu da Srbija ude un NATO u zamjenu za nezavisnos Kosova [The Exclusive Confession of

Milan Milutinovic, the leader of the Serbian delegation, argued that there was a possibility for two delegations (Serbs and Kosovo Albanians) to talk directly, but the lack of protocol and disunity within the Contact Group, which, according to Milutinovic, gave the U.S. negotiators advantages, produced the agreement that favored the Kosovo Albanians.³⁸⁴ Milosevic, after all, stressed that the Rambouillet conference was never about negotiations between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, since “the Albanian and Serb delegations never held talks and that his emissaries only met Americans.”³⁸⁵

As the negotiations seemed to reach a dead end, Christopher Hill, the U.S. envoy to Kosovo and the principal U.S. negotiator in Rambouillet, was sent to Belgrade to convince Milosevic to sign the agreement. Milosevic refused to meet with Hill, hoping for a higher-level U.S. delegation to be sent to Belgrade, including Secretary Albright, and insisting on assurances that Kosovo would not become independent. The pressure placed on Milosevic to accept the agreement resulted in what was seen as almost

Sainovic: Milosevic Offered to Clinton for Serbia to Join NATO in Exchange for Independent Kosovo],” *Expres.net*. last modified August 10, 2016, <https://www.ekspres.net/politika/interviju-sainovic-milosevic-je-nudio-klintonu-dasrbija-ude-u-nato-u-zamjenu-za-nezavisnost-kosova>.

³⁸⁴ See the interview given by Milan Milutinovic to *Politica*, a Serbian news outlet; “Nisam Ogorcen I Osvetoljubiv Covek [I am not a Bitter and Vindictive Man],” *Politica.rs*, last modified April 14, 2010, <http://www.politica.rs/sr/clanak/131210/Nisam-ogorcen-i-osvetoljubiv-covek>.

³⁸⁵ See Ron Hatchett, “Yugoslavia: Belgrade; Milosevic Interview,” *AP Archive*, April 22, 1999, <http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/5dd0d6384fcb4c4911d5688703d081c5>.

complete rejection of the agreement, where Milosevic insisted that he would never accept a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo.³⁸⁶

On the other hand, the Kosovo Albanian delegation, deeply divided over the independence versus autonomy of Kosovo, was also under the pressure to sign the proposed agreement. Secretary Albright was clear, “If the talks crater because the Serbs do not say yes, we will have bombing. If the talks crater because the Albanians have not said yes, we will not be able to support them (...).”³⁸⁷ After all, the Kosovo Albanian delegation agreed to sign the agreement, but they wanted additional assurance that after three years there would be a referendum on Kosovo independence.³⁸⁸

³⁸⁶ Milosevic, while refusing to see Hill, met with the rest of U.S. delegation, and told them, “We will not give Kosovo, even if we are bombed.” See Ian Black, “Milosevic Holds Out with Snub to U.S.,” *Guardian*, February 19, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/20/ianblack>.

³⁸⁷ During the press conference Secretary Albright stated, “If we have a yes from both sides, we will have an implementation force. If the talks crater because the Serbs do not say yes, we will have bombing. If the talks crater because the Albanians have not said yes, we will not be able to support them, and in fact we will have to cut off whatever help they are getting from the outside. If it fails because both parties say no, there will not be bombing of Serbia and we will try to figure out ways to continue trying to deal with both sides because this is very important as the outside powers, the Contact Group, the negotiators, have to try to figure out a way to get to yes.” See “Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Press availability on the Kosovo Peace Talks Rambouillet, France, February 21, 1999, as released by the Office of the Spokesman, Paris, France,” *U.S. Department of State-Archive*, <https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1999/990221a.html>.

³⁸⁸ Hashim Thaci insisted that the agreement include a clause calling for a referendum after three years of Kosovo autonomy. Since Kosovo Albanians made up 90 percent of the Kosovo population, the referendum guaranteed that Kosovo would become independent. The agreement proposed by the United States, and approved by the Contact group, guaranteed the autonomy, not independence, of Kosovo. See, for example, Jane Perez, “Diplomats vs. Rebels,” *New York Times*, February 25, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/25/world/diplomat-vs-rebels.html>

On February 23, 1999, after 12 days of mediation and after a 72-hour extension, the Rambouillet negotiations were adjourned; the resumption of the talks was scheduled to be in Paris two weeks later. The same day when the Rambouillet negotiations were adjourned, the U.S. intelligence reported that 6,500 more Yugoslav Army (VJ) troops, along with 250 tanks and 90 artillery pieces were ready to enter Kosovo, prepared for the large-scale offensive.³⁸⁹

Despite the announcement made by the U.S. Defense Secretary, George Robertson, that the United States was sending six B-52 bombers to the United Kingdom, the U.S. negotiators were not unified in their decision to proceed with NATO military action.³⁹⁰ U.S. General and NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark supported a swift use of NATO force if Milosevic moved more troops into Kosovo.³⁹¹ On the other hand, Richard Holbrooke argued that there was “moral ambiguity” about the U.S. position to fight the Serbs in Kosovo, especially to fight on behalf of the KLA, which was “thuggish and scornful of humanitarian law.”³⁹²

³⁸⁹ U.S. military officials estimate that 12,000 tank-backed troops were already in Kosovo, as well as 13,000 paramilitary policemen deployed by the Serbian Interior Ministry. See, Charles Trueheart and Dana Priest, “Peace Talks Adjourn in Disarray,” *Washington Post*, February 24, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/disarray022499.htm>.

³⁹⁰ See Ian Black, “Milosevic Holds Out with Snub to U.S.,” *Guardian*, February 19, 1999, <https://www.theguardiana.com/world/1999/feb/20/ianblack>.

³⁹¹ See Charles Trueheart and Dana Priest, “Peace Talks Adjourn in Disarray,” *Washington Post*, February 24, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/disarray022499.htm>.

³⁹² See Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo*, 105.

In fourteen days between the end of Rambouillet conference and the beginning of the Paris conference there were several failed attempts by the European, OSCE, Russian, and U.S. diplomats to convince Milosevic to sign the agreement. Most notably, Secretary Albright had a phone conversation with Milosevic trying to persuade him to sign the Rambouillet agreement.³⁹³ The Clinton administration also sent Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic. Milosevic's main point for not accepting the agreement was "the [proposed] presence of NATO troops [as Milosevic argued foreign troops] in Kosovo to enforce the deal." However, the Clinton Administration, after many attempts to convince Milosevic to stop the violence in Kosovo, was not ready to compromise on this provision.³⁹⁴ On Holbrooke's departure, Milosevic issued another defiant statement that the "attempts to condition a political agreement on our country's acceptance of foreign troops (...) are unacceptable."³⁹⁵

³⁹³ See Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 400.

³⁹⁴ This refers to the existence of so-called Annex B. This would have provided NATO personnel, vehicles, and aircrafts with unimpeded access to all FRY territory. According to Sell, the annex was actually a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which the United States and NATO forces generally preferred to have in areas where they operate, largely from legal reasons, and, according to Sell and Holbrook was not a primary factor in Milosevic's rejection of Rambouillet. See Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 298-9; *Frontline*, "Interview: Richard Holbrooke" *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

³⁹⁵ As quoted in Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 299.

4.5.2 The Paris Conference

During the negotiations in Paris, which commenced on March 15, 1999, the Kosovo Albanian delegation, after the pressure from the U.S. negotiators and the addendum of the agreement that an international meeting would be organized to decide the future of Kosovo, signed the agreement and the focus was shifted to the Serbian delegation.³⁹⁶ In addition to requesting the changes to the proposed agreement that amounted to revising an estimated 70 percent of the text, in the view of one European negotiator, it was obvious that “Milosevic had (...) instructed Milutinovic not to conclude this or any other deal.”³⁹⁷

On March 18, the process came to its inevitable end: The Kosovo Albanians signed the agreement, the Serbs refused. The U.S. strategy that focused mainly on military threats did not coerce Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement.³⁹⁸ The

³⁹⁶ The United States did not accept the KLA-led wing of Kosovo Albanian delegation’s request for a referendum for Kosovo independence, which was opposed by the Serbs as well as Russia. However, the United States included an addendum of the agreement, where it was stated, “Three years after the entry into force of [the] Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo (...).” See “Article I: Amendment and Comprehensive Assessment” in “Rambouillet Agreement: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,” *U.S. Department of State-Archive*, https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html. Also, former Senator Bob Dole, who was refused a visa by the FRY to travel to Kosovo, traveled to North Macedonia to meet with the Kosovo Albanian delegation in an attempt to persuade them to sign the Rambouillet Agreement. See, *Associate Press*, “Ethnic Albanians Close to Signing pact, Dole Says,” *Desert News*, March 6, 1999, <https://www.desert.com/1999/3/6/19432853/ethnic-albannians-close-to-signing-pact-dole-says>.

³⁹⁷ See Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 299.

³⁹⁸ It is also significant that the Clinton Administration was supporting the NATO air strikes with or without the support from Russia. As U.S. Department of State Spokesman

following day President Clinton issued an open warning to Milosevic stating that Milosevic would face military action.³⁹⁹

4.5.3 Holbrooke's Last Meeting with Milosevic, March 1999

Richard Holbrooke and the group of Western diplomats returned to Belgrade for one last meeting with Milosevic, presenting the ultimatum to Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement or to face NATO bombing. Wanting to make sure that Milosevic had no misunderstanding about the scale of the threat he faced, if he did not go along with the agreement, Holbrooke described the planned bombing as “swift, severe, and sustained.” Milosevic responded by saying, “You are a great country, a powerful country. You can do anything you want. We cannot stop you.”⁴⁰⁰ EU diplomat Joschka Fischer recalled

stated, “We have never expected Russia to be supportive of the possibility of air strikes and NATO Secretary General now has the authority to act based in an assessment on what goes on here at Rambouillet (...).” See, “James Rubin, Department of State Spokesman: Press Briefing on the Kosovo Peace Talks, Rambouillet, France, February 21, 1999,” *U.S. Department of State-Archive*, https://1997-2001.state.gov/policy_remarks/1999/990221_rubin.html.

³⁹⁹ President Clinton said, “I think that the threshold has been crossed. I do not believe that we ought to have to have thousands more people slaughtered and buried in open soccer fields before we do something.” See “Crisis in the Balkans; Statements of United States’ policy on Kosovo,” *New York Times*, April 18, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/18/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-statements-of-united-states-policy-on-kosovo.html>.

⁴⁰⁰ Holbrooke describes Secretary Albright and the president asking him to go back to Belgrade and meet with Milosevic. Holbrooke met with Milosevic twice. During his first meeting Holbrooke was accompanied with several members of US negotiating team, and Milosevic’s answer to proposed agreement was: No. Second meeting was between Holbrooke and Milosevic alone, and his answer was again no to the proposed agreement. See *Frontline*, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” *PBS*, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

Milosevic saying, “I am ready to walk on corpses, and the West is not.”⁴⁰¹ The next morning, just before leaving for the airport, Holbrooke met with Milosevic alone, and he asked Milosevic if he was aware what would happen next. Milosevic responded, “Yes. You will bomb us.”⁴⁰²

Addressing journalists in Belgrade, before flying out, Holbrooke stated that two days of talks did not bring any commitments from Milosevic regarding what the United States considered crucial points. Holbrooke mentioned that, during the talks, he emphasized two things: “[W]e sought evidence that there would be a ceasefire of the military operation going on in Kosovo and secondly a readiness to enter and to prompt actions that would lead rapidly to a NATO-led force in Kosovo in accordance with the Rambouillet accords. (...) A force, I would stress that was neither pro- or [sic] anti- any ethnic group but in favor of peace in the region.” Holbrooke, leaving the press conference mentioned that “Communications are always open even in times of conflict. [Negotiator and U.S.] Ambassador [Christopher] Hill will return to Skopje [Macedonia], and the rest of us go to Brussels and Washington. Belgrade has his phone number.”⁴⁰³

As Holbrooke was leaving Belgrade, the Serbian parliament unanimously rejected Western demands for the deployment of NATO military forces to Kosovo, and Milosevic

⁴⁰¹ See Josef Joffe, “A Peacenik Goes to War,” *New York Times Magazine*, May 30, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/30/magazine/a-peacenik-goes-to-war.html>.

⁴⁰² See *Frontline*, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” PBS, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

⁴⁰³ See Vesna Peric Zimonjic, “Conflict-Yugoslavia: Serbia Parliament Rejects NATO Ultimatum,” *IPSnews.net*, March 23, 1999, <http://www.ipsnews.net/1999/03/conflict-yugoslavia-serbian-parliament-rejects-nato-ultimatum/>.

replaced the supreme commander of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, by General Geza Farkas. This was viewed by some as a signal that Milosevic was in full command of the military. According to allied officials, there were 22,000 Yugoslav Army troops in Kosovo, 14,000 special policemen from the Interior Ministry and 4,000 paramilitary troops, and between 6,000 and 10,000 the KLA fighters.⁴⁰⁴ The NATO forces had 350 planes ready when the bombing began, roughly one-third of the aircrafts NATO finally needed, and one-tenth of the aircrafts used in the Gulf War.⁴⁰⁵

Addressing the nation on NATO airstrikes against FRY/Serbia, on March 24, 1999, President Clinton declared that it was about America's values, but also America's economic interest to take a stand on Kosovo. He said, "If our country is going to be prosperous and secure, we need a Europe that is safe, secure, free, united, a good partner for trading (...). I want us to live in a world where ... we don't have to worry about seeing scenes [on TV] every night for the next 40 years of ethnic cleansing in some part of the world." However, President Clinton also stated, "I do not intend to put our troops in

⁴⁰⁴ See Michael R. Gordon, "Crisis in the Balkan: The Overview; NATO Says Serbia, Fearing Land War, Dig in on Border," *New York Times*, May 19, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/19/world/crisis-balkans-overview-nato-says-serbs-fearing-land-war-dig-border.html>.

⁴⁰⁵ Ivo Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon quoted in David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 444.

Kosovo to fight a war.”⁴⁰⁶ It was a signal that President Clinton would not send ground troops to Kosovo.

Two close political allies of Milosevic, Nikola Sainovic and Milan Milutionvic, pointed out that they did not expect that the bombing would start. Sainovic said that [the Serbian political leadership] did not expect that “[NATO] would go so far.” Milutinovic, who met with Secretary Albright four times during the Rambouillet conference, argued that Serbia tried to avoid war, and he suggested, in the last days prior to bombing, that Albright come to Belgrade; however, she, according to Milutinovic, insisted on a neutral place, and a meeting did not occur.⁴⁰⁷ On the contrary, Commander of Yugoslav 3rd Army General Pavkovic and Milosevic’s loyalists, expected that the intense bombing would last for only three days, not for 78 days, and the ground invasion would follow. General Pavkovic also stressed that they had 150,000 men, which were prepared to die for Kosovo, and it would take NATO as much as twice that many to successfully invade Kosovo.⁴⁰⁸ As Milosevic told Holbrooke during their last meeting in Belgrade, he knew

⁴⁰⁶ See “Transcript: [President] Clinton Addresses Nation on Yugoslav Strikes,” *CNN*, March 24, 1999, <https://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/25/clinton.transcript/>.

⁴⁰⁷ See the interview given by Milan Milutinovic to *Politica*, a Serbian news outlet; “Nisam Ogorcen I Osvetoljubiv Covek [I am not a Bitter and Vindictive Man],” *Politica*, last modified April 14, 2010, <http://www.politica.rs/sr/clanak/131210/Nisam-ogorcen-i-osvetoljubiv-covek>.

⁴⁰⁸ See *Frontline*, “Interview: Commander [of the Yugoslav 3rd Army, General] Nebojsa Pavkovic,” PBS, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html>.

that NATO bombing would follow; the NATO threats were credible. But what Milosevic did not know is how long the NATO bombing would last.⁴⁰⁹

After all, the NATO bombing of selected targets in Serbia did start on March 24, less than 30 hours after Holbrook's departure. The start of the NATO bombing clearly presented a failure of coercive diplomacy, a failure of the efforts to achieve Milosevic's compliance by threatening force without providing credible assurances.

4.6 Phase IV: Military Coercion, Russia's Diplomatic Initiative, and Milosevic Accedes to G8 Peace Proposal

The last, fourth, phase of U.S. involvement in the Kosovo crisis was marked by the three-phased military coercion carried by NATO, also known as Operation Allied Force, and the diplomatic initiative by Russia. The military pressure and diplomatic initiative ended by Milosevic finally acceding to the G8 peace proposal.

4.6.1 Operation Allied Force

The U.S.-led NATO air campaign in Serbia, officially named Operation Allied Force (OAF), lasted from March 24 until June 10, 1999. The political goal of this military operation was to coerce Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement using gradual escalation of a bombing campaign. More precisely, the two main goals were for

⁴⁰⁹ See *Frontline*, "Interview: Richard Holbrooke," *PBS*, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>.

Milosevic to withdraw all Serbian/VJ forces from Kosovo and to accept the key role of NATO as a peacekeeping force.⁴¹⁰

The first phase of OAF, from March 24 to March 27, 1999, took aim at fifty NATO-approved targets, focusing on the integrated Serbian air defense system and military facilities.⁴¹¹ This phase, which included only restricted air strikes and lasted four days, did not coerce Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement.⁴¹² The start of the NATO air campaign, in turn, intensified the Serbian/VJ forces ethnic cleansing operations against the Kosovo Albanians.⁴¹³ The NATO bombing, therefore, initially deepened the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo; within a week, the number of Kosovo Albania refugees in neighboring North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro swelled to

⁴¹⁰ See, for example, *Frontline*, “Interview: Strobe Talbott [U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, 1994-2001],” *PBS*, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/walker.html>.

⁴¹¹ See “Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana and SACEUR, Gen. Wesley Clark,” *NATO*, March 25, 1999, <https://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm>. In the same press conference, General Wesley Clark said that this was not an attack against the Serbian people, and every effort was made to “avoid harm to innocent civilians;” the target was military and security forces and the facilities associated with them.

⁴¹² Commander of the Yugoslav Third Army General Nebojsa Pavkovic argues that “[NATO] wanted to scare us into surrender.” See *Frontline*, “Interview: Commander [of the Yugoslav 3rd Army, General] Nebojsa Pavkovic,” *PBS*, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html>.

⁴¹³ General Pavkovic, who was responsible for the overall prosecution of the war in Kosovo and known Milosevic loyalist, stated that “when the bombing started, we attacked the terrorists [referring to the KLA].” See *Frontline*, “Interview: Commander [of the Yugoslav 3rd Army, General] Nebojsa Pavkovic,” *PBS*, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wghbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html>.

hundreds of thousands.⁴¹⁴ The U.S.-led alliance responded to the escalation of violence in Kosovo by expanding NATO's target list, marking the beginning of phase II of OAF. The targets in phase II included the police, military and security headquarters in Belgrade, TV/radio stations and towers, oil refineries and dual-use factories.⁴¹⁵ The targets also included the headquarters of two political parties led by Milosevic and his wife Mira Markovic.⁴¹⁶ Milosevic's official residence was also removed from the prohibited target list and bombed on April 23.⁴¹⁷ Despite the increased and expanded number of targets, by April 24 the second phase of NATO bombing had not compelled Milosevic to sign the agreement.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁴ On March 24, 1999, EU's humanitarian affairs commissioner, Emma Bonino, said that "between 80,000 and 100,000 refugees (...) have crossed into Albania," and approximately 1,000 Kosovo Albanians found refuge in Macedonia, 4,000 in Bosnia and 5,000 in Montenegro. See, "Kosovo Fighting Triggers Refugee Crisis in Albania: Refugee Aid Efforts Stepped Up," *CNN*, March 29, 1999, <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europ/9903/29/refugees.03/>.

⁴¹⁵ See "NATO: Belgrade Destroying Ethnic Albanian Records; NATO Bombing Targets Expanded," *CNN*, March 31, 1999, www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/31/nato.attack.02/. CNN also reported that, according to NATO spokesman Jamie Shea "The Yugoslav forces (...) [were] destroying the archives of the Kosovar people: property deeds, (...), birth certificates, financial (...) records."

⁴¹⁶ Milosevic's Social Party of Serbia (SPS) and Mira Markovic's Yugoslav Left (JUL) party.

⁴¹⁷ See, for example, John Sweeney, Jen Holsen, and Ed Vulliamy, "NATO Bombed Chinese Deliberately," *Guardian*, October 16, 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/17/balkans>. Sweeney, Holsen and Vulliamy reported that Milosevic's residence was used by the Yugoslav army (VJ) as a "rebroadcast station," and one of the main reasons why it was bombed was due to NATO's attempt to hunt radio transmitters in Belgrade.

⁴¹⁸ During the Washington/NATO summit President Clinton defended the U.S. insistence to make the NATO air campaign more punishing. He was clear that he supported the

During the Washington/NATO 50th Anniversary Summit, from April 23 to April 25, 1999, President Clinton and his NATO allies concluded that the prolonged Kosovo crisis jeopardized NATO credibility and reputation.⁴¹⁹ Therefore, the United States and its NATO allies became even more committed to “victory” in Kosovo. This would include additional economic sanctions on FRY/Serbia, which consequently meant additional economic pressure on the citizens, and a further expanded NATO target list, including air strikes against railways, bridges, and Serbia’s electric grid.⁴²⁰ This marked

bombing of Serb TV stations, despite the criticism that the TV stations were civilian targets. President Clinton said, “Serb television is an essential instrument of Mr. Milosevic’s command and control. He uses it to spew hatred and to (...) spread disinformation. He does not use it to show all the Kosovar villages he has burned, to show the mass graves, to show the children that have been raped by the soldiers that he sent there.” See, John F. Harris, “Clinton Urges Patience With NATO Bombing Campaign,” *Washington Post*, April 25, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/clinton25.htm>.

⁴¹⁹ In the Washington Summit summary, it was stated, “NATO Head of States and Government reiterated their determination to put an end to repressive actions against the local population by President Milosevic’s regime, in the province of Kosovo. (...) The Summit statement on Kosovo reaffirmed that NATO will intensify air operations against the Yugoslav war machine until President Milosevic meets the legitimate demands on the international community.” See, “Washington Summit [April 23, 1999],” *NATO*, last updated November 6, 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_27286.htm?selecteLocale=en.

⁴²⁰ The conflict in Kosovo became a reality for a majority of the residents of Serbia, especially residents of three major Serbian cities (Belgrade, Nis, and Novi Sad) when NATO bombers targeted (successfully) Serbia’s power grid and millions of civilians across the Serbia were without electricity and water. With 80 percent of Serbia’s electric power being interrupted, the Serbian population started to feel the pain of the violence their government was conducting in Kosovo. NATO supreme commander, General Wesley Clark, insisted that NATO’s top priority was to “chase out of Kosovo” the Yugoslav Third Army. However, as was confirmed by NATO senior officials, the NATO goal was also to damage the quality of everyday life and encourage public disaffection with the government of Slobodan Milosevic. It is significant that at the beginning of the NATO bombing campaign the majority of the population blamed the United States and its allies for the hardship, but this would gradually change. The first sign of public

the third phase of OAF, which started on April 25 and lasted until June 10. In May, NATO came closely to doubling the attacks on the targets in Serbia and increased by half the number of missions flown.⁴²¹ As the number and intensity of air strikes escalated, the possibility of potential hitting the wrong target increased too. When, on May 7, a U.S. B-2 stealth fighter, bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese citizens, NATO's official statement, as well as the statements made by President Clinton and CIA Director George Tenet, was that it regretted this mistake.⁴²² As a result, NATO suspended all strikes around Belgrade for three days. However, the bombing of the embassy produced controversial news and reports, one stating that NATO deliberately

dissatisfaction with the government of Milosevic came when several hundred army reservists, scheduled to return to Kosovo, as well as the relatives of those who did not return from Kosovo took to the streets in the Serbian town of Krusevac. Demonstrations, although peaceful, were a sign that the public was slowly breaking away from support for or indifference towards the government of Slobodan Milosevic. However, it was not sufficient to bring any change towards Milosevic's policy in Kosovo. See, for example, Philip Bennett and Steve Coll, "NATO Warplanes Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid," *Washington Post*, May 25, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/Balkans/stories/belgrade052599.htm>; also Steven Erlanger, "Crisis in the Balkans: Belgrade; Milosevic Abruptly Fires A High-Profile Maverick," *New York Times*, April 29, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/29/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-belgrade-milosevic-abruptly-fires-a-high-profile-maverick.html>.

⁴²¹ See, for example, Martin Walker, "NATO Doubling Air Strikes," *Guardian*, May 12, 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/may/13/balkans3>.

⁴²² See Kevin Ponniah and Lazara Marinkovic, "The Night the U.S. Bombed a Chinese Embassy," *BBC*, May 7, 1999, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48134881>. See also John Sweeney, Jen Holsen, and Ed Vulliamy, "NATO Bombed Chinese Deliberately," *Guardian*, October 16, 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/17/balkans>. Sweeney, Holsen, and Vulliamy, quoted U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen, who said, "One of our planes attacked the wrong target because the bombing instructions were based on an outdated map."

bombed the embassy “after discovering it was being used to transmit Yugoslav army (VJ) communications.”⁴²³ The bombing of the embassy also slowed down an attempt by the American and Russian diplomats to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Kosovo.

4.6.2 Russia’s Diplomatic Initiative

Prior to OAF, the Clinton administration hoped that Russia would participate in the Washington summit, as this summit was not just about the future of NATO and NATO-Russia relations, but also about the future of U.S.-Russia relations. Since Russia strongly opposed OAF, no Russian representative was sent to participate in the summit.⁴²⁴ However, on April 25, during the last day of the summit, President Yeltsin called

⁴²³ See, for example, John Sweeney, Jen Holsen, and Ed Vulliamy, “NATO Bombed Chinese Deliberately,” *Guardian*, October 16, 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/17/balkans>.

⁴²⁴ President Clinton phoned President Yeltsin on March 24, 1999, to inform him that Milosevic left NATO without any other choice but to launch airstrikes against the military targets in Serbia. President Yeltsin insisted that the air campaign should be renounced and stressed the negative domestic implications of the NATO military action in Serbia. President Clinton concluded that despite their profound disagreement over OAF, which would proceed, the two presidents should continue to cooperate on all other issues, as well as give diplomacy a chance in an attempt to bring an end to the Kosovo crisis. *Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President*, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, March 24, 1999 [pp.432-436],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569>. Also, during the first two weeks of OAF Russia harshly criticized NATO’s air campaign in Serbia, a sovereign state, in the absence of UN authority and instead that NATO should stop the air campaign. On April 14, Secretary Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov met for the first time since OAF started. However, the meeting ended without any significant agreement. See, William Drozdiak, “Russia, U.S. Still Apart on Kosovo,” *Washington Post*, April 14, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/talks041499.htm>.

President Clinton and they agreed that the Kosovo crisis had to be brought to an end, and Yeltsin assured Clinton that Russia would extend only humanitarian air to Serbia.⁴²⁵ Yeltsin, under pressure from the Russian nationalists and a rise of anti-NATO and anti-American sentiment in Russia, initially insisted that the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo against the fellow Slavs had to stop immediately. After President Clinton reiterated that Milosevic first had to agree to withdraw all Serbian/VJ forces from Kosovo and stop atrocities, Yeltsin argued that more than just airstrikes had to be done to persuade Milosevic to stop the violence in Kosovo. Yeltsin suggested that the Russian presidential envoy to the Balkans Victor Chernomyrdin, also a former prime minister of Russia and Yeltsin's close political ally, work with his U.S. counterpart on a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo conflict. Yeltsin also mentioned that Chernomyrdin met with Milosevic on April 24, and Milosevic was ready to accept four out of five proposed points discussed between Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov. Milosevic, most notably, insisted that the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo should be under UN auspices and

⁴²⁵ See, *Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President*, "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, April 25, 1999 [p.446]," *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569>. During the phone conversation with President Clinton, President Yeltsin said, "(...) after today's conversation we can tell the media that [we] have found a common point of view on how we can solve this problem together (...). I have decided not to send seven military ships to the Mediterranean as we agreed (...). And what assistance we have given to Yugoslavia is only humanitarian in nature (...). Milosevic is insisting that we supply to Yugoslavia the anti-aircraft system S-300, but we shall not give this system to him, and you can believe me on that." It is important to note that President Yeltsin expected significant economic aid to be extended to Russia during the G8 summit in Cologne, Germany scheduled for June 18-20, 1999. See William Drozdiak, "The Kosovo Peace Deal," *Washington Post*, June 6, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/06/06/the-kosovo-peace-deal/8d8de6c4-561c-4bd9-af60-6937ec438028/>.

with Russian participation.⁴²⁶ During the phone conversation, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that a joint diplomatic initiative should be given a chance. However, President Clinton was clear that the United States would not compromise on two issues: The withdrawal of all Serbian/VJ troops (the stress was on ‘all’) and the key NATO role in peacekeeping force in Kosovo.⁴²⁷

On May 4, Chernomyrdin, in capacity of Russian presidential envoy to the Balkans, traveled to Washington to deliver a letter to President Clinton in which President Yeltsin proposed a cease-fire in Kosovo and requested President Clinton to name a U.S. envoy, preferably Vice President Al Gore, to help Russia’s diplomatic effort.⁴²⁸ President Clinton chose Assistant Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, a leading Soviet specialist and President Clinton’s close advisor, as a U.S. envoy.⁴²⁹ On

⁴²⁶ See *Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President*, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, April 25, 1999 [p.458],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569>. Also, see Seamus Martin, “Meeting With Milosevic First Stage in Negotiations, Say Diplomatic Sources,” April 24, 1999, *Irish Times*, <https://irishtimes.com/news/meeting-with-milosevic-first-stage-in-negotiations-say-diplomatic-sources-1.177374>.

⁴²⁷ See *Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President*, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, April 25, 1999 [pp.466-467],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569>.

⁴²⁸ President Yeltsin perceived a well-developed partnership between U.S. Vice President Al Gore and Victor Chernomyrdin as a welcoming precondition for successful collaboration in finding diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis. See, *Frontline*, “Interview: Madeleine Albright,” *PBS*, accessed June 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html>.

⁴²⁹ See *Frontline*, “Interview: Strobe Talbott,” *PBS*, access July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/talbott.html>.

Chernomyrdin's insistence that an additional international diplomat, preferably from a non-NATO country, should join the diplomatic effort of the United States and Russia, Secretary Albright proposed that Martti Ahtisaari, President of Finland, join Chernomyrdin and Talbott. Secretary Albright noted that Finland was a non-aligned country, and, at the same time, a member of the European Union. Furthermore, President Ahtisaari was a person with immense standing in international arena as well as a tough negotiator. Chernomyrdin agreed to Ahtisaari joining this diplomatic initiative.⁴³⁰

As a result of collaboration between Talbott, Chernomyrdin, and Ahtisaari, on May 6 a peace plan was released at a Group of Eight (G8) Foreign Ministers meeting (comprising the United States, Canada, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia). The peace plan, summarized in seven general points, "modified the Rambouillet Accords to allow the UN Security Council determine the make-up of peacekeeping" and to affirm "the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity" for Serbia.⁴³¹ The Foreign Ministers from the G8 nations unanimously agreed that there is a

⁴³⁰ Ibid. See also *Frontline*, "Interview: Madeleine Albright," *PBS*, accessed July 16, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html>.

⁴³¹ See *G7 Information Center*, "G8 Foreign Ministers' Meetings: Statement by the Chairman on the Conclusion of the Meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers on the Petersburg, May 6, 1999," *University of Toronto-G7 Research Group*, accessed March 21, 2021, <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm990506.htm> The seven general principles adopted by the G8 Ministers were: (1) Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; (2) Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; (3) Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presence, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; (4) Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; (5) The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; (6) A political process towards the establishment of an interim political

need for an international military presence to keep peace in Kosovo and accepted the seven-point peace plan.⁴³² This was significant because it demonstrated that Russia supported the effort led by the United States for the international military presence in Kosovo, as opposed to Milosevic's insistence that no international military force would be allowed in Kosovo.⁴³³

Despite that the proposed peace plan was a step forward in the joint attempt to bring the Kosovo crisis to an end, there were significant differences between the United States and Russia in their approach to the Kosovo crisis and these differences had to be bridged. The two main issues being: the composition of the international forces in Kosovo (especially the role of NATO) and the fact that the seven-point agreement did not "explicitly call for the complete withdrawal of Serbian/VJ forces from Kosovo," as favored by Russia, but opposed by the United States. The argument consistently presented by the Clinton administration, including President Clinton and especially Secretary Albright, was that if NATO did not have the key role in peacekeeping in

framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of Kosovo; (7) Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

⁴³² See AP, "Group of Eight's Kosovo Statement," *New York Times*, May 7, 1999, <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/050799kosovo-g8-text.html>.

⁴³³ See Roger Cohen, "Russia in Accord on Need for Force to Patrol Kosovo," *New York Times*, May 7, 1999, <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/050799kosovo-diplo.html>.

Kosovo the KLA would not, out of fear, disarm, and the Kosovo Albanian refugees would be reluctant to return home, therefore, prolonging the refugee crisis in the region.⁴³⁴

On May 20, 1999, Chernomyrdin personally presented the G8 peace plan to Milosevic.⁴³⁵ The follow up meeting between Milosevic and Chernomyrdin was on May 28, 1999, when Chernomyrdin expressed his commitment to negotiations despite Milosevic being indicted for war crimes and despite Milosevic refusing to accept complete withdrawal of Serbian/VJ forces and the key role of NATO in peacekeeping force to follow Serbian withdrawal.⁴³⁶ Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and one of the three main negotiators in this diplomatic effort to bring the crisis to an end, was not pleased by Chernomyrdin's meeting with Milosevic. Talbott stressed that NATO demanded a complete withdrawal of Serbian/VJ forces from Kosovo and Chernomyrdin had to represent not only Russia, but also of the United States and NATO.⁴³⁷

⁴³⁴ See Roger Cohen, "Russia in Accord on Need for Force to Patrol Kosovo," *New York Times*, May 7, 1999, <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/050799kosovo-diplo.html>. See also *Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President*, "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, April 25, 1999 [p.449]," Clinton Digital Library, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569>.

⁴³⁵ See "Crisis in the Balkans; Kosovo Update," *New York Times*, May 20, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/20/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-kosovo-update.html>.

⁴³⁶ See "Chernomyrdin Persists in Quest for Kosovo peace," *CNN*, May 28, www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/28/kosovo.02/. Milosevic was indicted on May 24, 1999, by the U.N. tribunal. Chernomyrdin believed that the indictment of Milosevic came at the wrong time and would not be helpful in ending the war in Kosovo.

⁴³⁷ See Candice Hughes, "Russia Takes Peace Plan to Belgrade," *AP*, May 28, 1999, <https://apnews.com/article/97cdf3970f021d49f2584fe36c6f6191>.

4.6.3 Milosevic Accepted the G8 Peace Proposal

As Chernomyrdin was preparing to make one more trip to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic and to persuade him to accept the G8 proposed peace agreement, he wanted to make sure that the United States, represented by Talbott, would negotiate the “all” word; that is, the United States insisted that “all” Serbian/VJ forces would have to withdraw from Kosovo. After a day of negotiations between Chernomyrdin and Talbott, Russia accepted that the word “all” would have to stay in the agreement. Talbott was clear that Milosevic’s refusal to accept the agreement, which included that “all” Serbian/VJ troops would have to be pulled out from Kosovo, would result in NATO’s next step, moving from “an air war to a ground war.”⁴³⁸

As Chernomyrdin, this time accompanied by Finish President Ahtisaari, was flying to Belgrade, the government of Germany received a letter from the FRY government. The letter stated that President Slobodan Milosevic would withdraw the troops from Kosovo. However, President Milosevic would only accept the United

⁴³⁸ See *Frontline*, “Interview: Strobe Talbott,” *PBS*, access July 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/talbott.html>. Talbott pointed out, in the same interview, “We [the United States] thought that it would be a fatal mistake to signal to Milosevic that all he had to do was hold out long enough that the alliance would not be willing or able to go the next step, which is to say from an air war to a ground war.” It is important to mention that on March 24, 1999, President Clinton announced that the United States was not committing troops to fight in Kosovo. However, by mid-May President Clinton was stating that the U.S. ground troops in Kosovo were an option, backing this by NATO officials exploring a ground invasion; see Dana Priest, “Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War,” *Washington Post*, September 9, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-stv/national/daily/sept99/airwar19.htm>.

Nations presence in Kosovo.⁴³⁹ On June 3, 1999, Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari were in Belgrade meeting with Milosevic. As Chernomyrdin pointed out, Milosevic considered NATO an aggressor and Milosevic did not trust NATO to be an honest broker. According to Chernomyrdin, Milosevic said, “I do not believe Western Alliance. (...) They will occupy Kosovo (...).” Chernomyrdin assured Milosevic that Russia, by participating in the peacekeeping troops, as agreed and compromised by the United States, was also a guarantor that the agreement would be executed.⁴⁴⁰ Ahtisaari read to Milosevic the agreement, line by line, answering Milosevic’s questions and insisting that the agreement was the best offer Milosevic would get.⁴⁴¹ Milosevic finally acquiesced and signed the

⁴³⁹ See Roger Cohen, “Crisis in the Balkans: Diplomacy; Milosevic Letter Shows Two Sides Remain Far Apart,” *New York Times*, June 2, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/02/world/crisi-balkans-diplomacy-milosevic-letter-shows-two-sides-remain-far-apart.html>.

⁴⁴⁰ Chernomyrdin told Milosevic, “That’s why there are conditions about presence of Russian troops in regulation there. USA and NATO agreed with it.” See, *Frontline*, “Interview: Victor Chernomyrdin,” *PBS*, accessed August 20, 2020, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/chernomyrdin.html>.

⁴⁴¹ See William Drozdiak, “The Kosovo Peace Deal,” *Washington Post*, June 6, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/06/06/the-kosovo-peace-deal/8d8de6c4-561c-4bd9-af60-6937ec438028/>. Also see *Presidential Oral Histories: Bill Clinton Presidency*, “Martti Ahtisaari Oral History,” UVA-Miller Center, December 17, 2019, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/martti-ahtisaari-oral-history>. In this interview Ahtisaari mentioned that Milosevic’s “approval” surprised many, but the meeting went “smoothly” and Milosevic “recognized, perhaps, that this was something he had to do.”

G8 peace proposal.⁴⁴² However, President Clinton insisted that the NATO air campaign (OAF) continue until “Serb forces begin a verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo.”⁴⁴³

The NATO air campaign in Serbia officially ended on June 10, 1999, when NATO Secretary General Javier Solana confirmed that Milosevic complied with the demands to withdraw the Serbian/VJ troops from Kosovo and requested the suspension of NATO bombing. On the same day, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 permitting the deployment of the international military (KFOR) and civil forces in Kosovo (UNMIK).⁴⁴⁴

In his address to the nation on June 10, 1999, Milosevic claimed that the country was defended, and the territorial integrity could never be questioned again; it was

⁴⁴² See Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2000), 324. The G8 peace agreement is also known as the Athisaari-Chernomyrdin agreement.

⁴⁴³ John M. Broder and Jane Perez, “Crisis in the Balkans: Washington; In Washington, Wary Reaction But Also Relief,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/04/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-washington-wary-reaction-but-also-relief.html>. See also *Declassified Documents Concerning Russian President*, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, June 9, 1999 [p.483],” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569>. In this phone conversation with President Yeltsin, President Clinton reiterated that “once [Milosevic] begins the withdrawal, then we will stop [bombing].”

⁴⁴⁴ See, for example, “U.N. Endorses Peacekeeping Force for Kosovo,” *CNN*, June 10, 1999, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Europe/9906/10/Kosovo.05/>; “Resolution 1244 (1999)/Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th Meeting, on 10 June 1999,” *United Nations Digital Library*, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/274488?ln=en>.

guaranteed by the G8 nations and the UN.⁴⁴⁵ On June 12, 1999, NATO and Russian ground forces entered Kosovo.⁴⁴⁶

4.7 The CD Triangle and U.S. Coercive Strategies in Phases II, III, and IV

As discussed in Chapter 2, the *CD Triangle* predicts that coercive diplomacy will succeed if the following conditions are present: First, the target perceives the threats as credible, that is, the coercer succeeds in communicating the will to use force. Second, the target perceives assurances as credible, that is, the target trusts the coercer that the coercer will not change its objectives and will not change its demands. Third, the international environment favors the coercer, that is, there are no global or regional spoilers willing to balance the coercer's threats.

In phases II, III, and IV, the United States used military threats and limited force to coerce Milosevic to end the crisis in Kosovo (see Table 4.1). In phase II, U.S. strategy to coerce Milosevic to comply with UNSC Resolution 1199 included NATO issuing an ACTREQ for a limited air option as well as a phased air campaign, followed by an ACTOR authorizing the NATO forces to carry out the attacks in Serbia. The Contact Group statement demanding that Milosevic comply with UNSC Resolution 1199 enhanced the credibility of the threats by showing a united front between the United States and Russia, a potential spoiler/balancer of the coercive threats. The Clinton

⁴⁴⁵ AP, "Slobodan Milosevic Addresses Yugoslavia," *Washington Post*, June 10, 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/june99/textmilosevic.htm>.

⁴⁴⁶ See, for example, "NATO Peacekeeping Commander Arrives in Pristina," *CNN*, June 12, 1999, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/12/kosovo.07/>

administration also dispatched Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to persuade Milosevic that complying with the demands was less costly than to resist them.

Table 2. Summary of U.S. Coercive Strategies in Kosovo, Phases II, III, and IV

Row No.	Episodes of Coercion	CT	CA	ISE	Outcome CD	Outcome MC	Comments
1	Phase II: The October Agreement (October 1998)	1	1	1	1	0 (NA)	Holbrooke-Milosevic: UNSCR 1199 backed by NATO's ACTWARN/ACTEQ; Holbrooke persuaded Milosevic that the military threats were credible, and the assurances were valid. Serbian/VJ troops pulled out from Kosovo to the pre-March 1998 level.
2	Phase III: Rambouillet / Paris Negotiations (February 1999)	1	0	1	0	0 (NA)	U.S. negotiating team (led by Secretary Albright)-Serbian Delegation/Milosevic: Efforts at coercive diplomacy by threatening force. Milosevic refused to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement.
3	Phase IV: OAF-Phase I (March 24-27, 1999)	1 (LF)	0	1	0 (NA)	0	U.S.-led NATO military coercion; Milosevic refused to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement.
4	Phase IV: OAF-Phase II (March 28-April 25, 1999)	1 (LF)	0	1	0 (NA)	0	U.S.-led NATO military coercion; increased military pressure; Milosevic refused to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement.

5	Phase IV: OAF-Phase III/ Russia's Diplomatic Initiative (April 25- June 10)	1 (LF)	1	1	0 (NA)	1	U.S.-led NATO military coercion; Russia's diplomatic initiative and the assurances extended to Milosevic; Chernomyrdin-Athisaari meeting; Milosevic signed the G8 peace proposal.
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*CT: Credible Threats; CA: Credible Assurances; ISE: International Strategic Environment Favoring Coercer; CD: Coercive Diplomacy; MC: Military Coercion
 ** 1=Success without the use Limited Force; 1(LF)= Success with the use of Limited Force; 0=Failure; NA=Not attempted.

Holbrooke, as stated by Milosevic, assured Milosevic that the territorial integrity of Serbia would be preserved, that is the coercer assured the target that the demands would not be changed. As predicted by the CD Triangle, Milosevic acquiesced to the demands and signed the October agreement. However, the October agreement fell apart when the KLA, taking advantages of the ceasefire, regained the territory, and Ambassador Holbrooke publicly denounced giving any assurances to Milosevic.

In phase III, the U.S. negotiating team, led by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, used military threats to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement; most notably, to accept the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Insisting on a NATO air campaign in Kosovo with or without Russia's approval enhanced the credibility of military threats; however, it alienated Russia and signaled to the target (Serbia) that Russia could be persuaded to balance against the coercer. Although Milosevic perceived the military threats as credible, Milosevic did not trust the U.S. negotiators; Milosevic perceived that the U.S. demanded a NATO presence in Kosovo as

a step towards Kosovo's independence. Milosevic insisted on assurances that Kosovo would gain autonomy, but not independence; assurances the United States was not willing to extend. The coercive strategy employed by the United States in phase III, as predicted by the *CD Triangle*, failed to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement.

In phase IV, the U.S.-led NATO air campaign in Serbia, officially named Operation Allied Force (OAF), had a primary goal of coercing Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement. From the available evidence one can conclude that the international environment favored the coercer. Although Russia, a potential spoiler, officially announced that it would veto a UN Security Council resolution to authorize the use of force in Kosovo, President Yeltsin signaled that Russia would not interfere militarily if NATO proceeded with limited air strikes without a UN mandate.

OAF had three phases: Efforts at military coercion in phase I of OAF (March 24-27, 1999), focusing on the Serbian air defense system and military facilities, did not coerce Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement. It initiated Serbian/VJ offensive in Kosovo and deepened the humanitarian crisis. In phase II of OAF (March 28-April 25), the target list was expanded to TV/radio stations and towers, oil refineries and dual-use factories. However, Milosevic refused to sign the Rambouillet agreement. In phase III of OAF (April 26-June 10), the NATO target list was further expanded, including air strikes against railways, bridges, and Serbia's electric grid. In this phase, Russia's diplomatic initiative supported by the United States, produced the modified Rambouillet peace agreement, known as the G8 peace proposal. Most notably, under the G8 peace proposal, the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo had to be under UN auspices and with

Russian participation. Russia's negotiator Chernomyrdin assured Milosevic that Russia, by participating in the peacekeeping troops, was also a guarantor of the agreement, most notably by increasing the cost for the United States, the coercer, not to comply with its promise. In phase III of OAF, the United States succeeded at coercing Milosevic to sign the G8 agreement. Milosevic acquiesced only after all three conditions, predicted by the CD triangle, were present. However, what made the third phase of OAF unique is that the assurances were not given by the coercer, as predicted by the CD Triangle, but by the third party.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter examined U.S. coercive strategies during the Kosovo crisis. The United States' participation was divided into four phases. In phase I, the Clinton administration supported the Contact Group efforts at non-military coercion. In phase II, the Clinton administration used military threats and assurances to successfully coerce Milosevic to sign the October agreement. In phase III, the Clinton administration's coercive strategy, focusing on military threats, did not succeed in coercing Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement. In phase IV, the Clinton administration used limited force to coerce Milosevic to accept the G8 peace proposal. However, Milosevic acquiesced only after Russia, a third party, provided credible assurances that Russia, by participating in the peacekeeping troops, was also a guarantor of the agreement. The *CD Triangle* correctly expected that Milosevic would acquiesce only after all three necessary conditions (credible threats, credible assurances, and the international environment

favoring coercer) are present. However, the *CD Triangle* incorrectly anticipated that the assurances would be given by the coercer.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the main features of a model for coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crises, recapitulates the central finding of the case studies, suggests avenues for further research and implications for U.S. foreign policy.

5.1 Revisiting the Research Question and Hypotheses

In coercive diplomacy, a coercer employs the threat of force to get a target to change its behavior. Therefore, coercive diplomacy, if applied in asymmetric interstate crises, should be easy for great powers due to their military might. This dissertation began with the perplexed observation that the great powers, including the United States, have a poor record in coercing militarily weaker opponents, who often rejected coercive threats and refused to comply with their demands. Current literature on coercion offers a significant analysis of an asymmetric strategic coercion in general and coercive diplomacy in particular; however, there is little consensus among scholars about why great powers fail to coerce weak states.⁴⁴⁷ Therefore, the key goal of this dissertation is to answer the following question: Why do weak states resist coercive threats from a militarily superior state, and under what conditions do weaker states concede?

⁴⁴⁷ See, for example, Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,” *International Organization* 64, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 627–660; Todd S. Sechser, “Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (June 2016), 1–28; Phil Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015); Dianne P. Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016).

Building upon existing research on coercion, credibility and reputation in international relations, this dissertation proposed the *Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle*, a model for coercive diplomacy in the asymmetric military crises. The *CD Triangle* predicts that if the following three conditions are present, the target/weak state will most likely acquiesce to the demands of the coercer/great power: *Credible threats*, *credible assurances*, and the *international strategic environment* favoring the coercer. Where credible threats are crucial to convince the target that the coercer has the *capability* and *will* to inflict pain, credible assurances are necessary to convince the target that the demands and objectives are limited and true to those stated by the coercer. Moreover, an important component of credible assurances is trust. This dissertation argues that the trust felt by the target that the coercer will not expand its demands shapes the target's behavior in a predictable way. Trust will influence the target's cost-benefit equation in a predictable way. The target will acquiesce to coercer's demands if the target trusts the coercer that it will not change the cost-benefits equation, where expanded demands mean increased cost for the target. If the target does not trust that the coercer's assurances are true, the target will resist to acquiescing to the coercer's demands and the target will look for the regional or global spoiler/s to balance the coercer's threat. The spoilers are those states that may perceive the failure of coercion (that is, escalation of crisis to war) as beneficial to their regional or international standing.

To test the explanatory power of the CD Triangle, this dissertation analyzes U.S. coercive strategies in two case studies: the Bosnian War (1993-1995) and the Kosovo Crisis (1997-1998). These cases share an effort by the United States, a great power, to employ coercive strategies after the Cold War against weaker states.

5.2 Summary of the Findings

5.2.1 The Bosnian War

U.S. involvement in the Bosnian War was divided into four phases. In phases I and II, the Bush administration and the successor Clinton administration supported the United Nation/European Community diplomatic initiative and the use of economic sanctions to isolate Serbia led by Slobodan Milosevic and neutralize his support for the Bosnian Serbs. This strategy was unsuccessful in preventing and ending the war in Bosnia.

In phase III, the Clinton administration initiated the formation of the six-nation Contact Group for the Balkans, extended diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic to accept the Contact Group plan, and implicitly supported the Croatian and Bosnian Federation's attempts to change the balance of power favoring the Bosnian Serbs. This strategy was unsuccessful in ending the war and bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table.

In phase IV, after war in Bosnia had escalated to the point that U.S. credibility was put in question, the United States took the lead. In this phase, there were three distinct episodes of coercion. First, in August 1995, the Clinton administration employed *coercive diplomacy* to coerce the Bosnia Serbs to stop the siege of Sarajevo. This episode of coercion started as a U.S.-led attempt to *deter* the Bosnia Serbs from attacking the UN safe area Gorazde. After the fall of UN safe areas Srebrenica and Zepa, the NATO leaders and the representatives of the UN and Russia met for an emergency conference. After the conference, on July 21, 1995, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared that any future attacks by the Bosnian Serbs on Gorazde would be met by substantial and decisive NATO air strikes. The credibility of this military threat was

enhanced by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's agreement to delegate UN strike authority (that is, his veto and approval power) to the overall military commander for UNPROFOR. This, insisted on by the United States, made the NATO-UN coordination of air strike approval and execution faster. The presence of Russia at the meeting was a signal to the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic that Russia supported the U.S. initiative and diminished the role of Russia as a potential *spoiler*. On August 1, under pressure from the United States, the NATO Council expanded this military threat to Sarajevo, where it was demanded that the Bosnian Serbs stop attacks on Sarajevo and Bihac. However, the fighting in western Bosnia continued as did the siege of Sarajevo. The siege of Sarajevo culminated on August 28, 1995, when a mortar bomb hit a marketplace, killing thirty-seven civilians. The *CD Triangle* suggests that credible threats and the international environment, without the coercer providing credible assurance, were not sufficient for the success of *coercive diplomacy*.

The alternative explanations highlight that the fighting intensified, and coercive diplomacy failed, because: First, the Bosnian Federation military offensive, as well as the Croatian Army *Operation Storm* pushed Bosnian Serbs onto the offensive. Second, the Bosnian Serbs, seeing that war in Bosnia would have to come to an end before the coming winter, were trying to hold onto as much territory as possible before the peace negotiations. However, based on the available evidence one can conclude that in August 1995 the Clinton administration was finalizing its new *Endgame* strategy, which relied on the use of limited force, and the administration did not attempt to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs directly.

Second, the shelling of Sarajevo on August 28, 1995, triggered the employment of the Clinton administration's *Endgame* strategy, that is, a strategy of *military coercion*, to coerce the Bosnia Serbs to stop the siege of Sarajevo and proceed with political negotiations. The strategy had two components: First, use of limited force; that is, the NATO air campaign (also known as Operation Deliberate Force), which commenced on August 30, 1995. Second, the diplomatic engagement with, most notably, Russia, Serbia, and the Bosnian Serbs. The first episode of military coercion was on August 30, when U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke met with President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic, representing the Bosnian Serbs. During this meeting, the Bosnian Serbs did not acquiesce to the demand to end the siege of Sarajevo insisting on assurances that after withdrawal the Bosnian Federal Army would not take over the vacant territory. Holbrooke refused to provide assurances.

Third, the second episode of *military coercion* was on September 14, when U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke met with the Bosnia Serbs and Slobodan Milosevic. This time the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic agreed to stop the siege of Sarajevo after the United States and NATO made assurances that the Russian UNPROFOR troops would take over the positions vacated by the Bosnian Serbs. As predicted by the *CD Triangle*, the target acquiesced after all three postulated conditions were present. The alternative explanations are: First, the Bosnian Federation ground offensive taking over large portions of western Bosnia and resulting in significant territory losses on the side of Bosnian Serbs led to the Bosnian Serbs acquiescing to the demands. Second, Milosevic was eager to have the UN sanctions terminated against FR Yugoslavia/Serbia. However,

the Clinton administration's willingness to provide assurances to the Bosnian Serbs finally made the Bosnia Serbs end the siege of Sarajevo.

5.2.2 The Kosovo Crisis

The U.S. involvement in the Kosovo crisis was divided into four phases. In phase I, the Clinton administration supported the Contact Group efforts at non-military coercion. In phase II, the Clinton administration used a strategy of *coercive diplomacy* and coerced Milosevic to sign the October agreement. In phase III, the Clinton administration's coercive strategy, focusing on military threats, did not succeed in coercing Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement. In phase IV, the Clinton administration used a strategy of *military coercion* to coerce Milosevic to accept the G8 peace proposal. During the Kosovo crisis, there were five distinct episodes of coercion, with the United States as a leading coercer.

First, in October 1998, U.S. strategy to coerce Milosevic to comply with UNSC Resolution 1199 included three components: First, use of military threat (NATO issuing an ACTREQ for a limited air option and a phased air campaign, followed by an ACTOR authorizing the NATO forces to carry out the attacks in Serbia). Second, the Contact Group statement demanding that Milosevic comply with UNSC Resolution 1199 enhanced the credibility of the threats by showing a united front between the United States and Russia, a potential *spoiler*/balancer of the coercive threats. The Clinton administration also dispatched Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic. During the meeting, Holbrooke gave Milosevic the option to withdraw the FRY/Serbian troops from Kosovo, to keep only the pre-March 1998 level of troops, and

to have an international presence in Kosovo (OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission), or to face NATO bombing.

However, Holbrooke also assured Milosevic that the territorial integrity of Serbia would be preserved; that is, the coercer assured the target that the demands would not be expanded in the future. As predicted by the *CD Triangle*, Milosevic acquiesced to the demands and signed the October agreement. However, the October agreement fell apart when the KLA, taking advantage of the ceasefire, retook the territory. Holbrooke publicly denounced giving any assurances to Milosevic, and FRY/Serbian troops started an offensive in Kosovo.

An alternative explanation is that Milosevic, when acquiescing to the demands, miscalculated the presence of KLA and their commitment to an independent Kosovo. However, one can argue that this alternative explanation helps to explain why coercive diplomacy failed, but it does not give a useful insight into why coercive diplomacy succeeded.

Second, in February 1999, the U.S. negotiating team, led by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, used military threats to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement; most notably, to accept, as a part of the peace agreement, the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Insisting on a NATO air campaign in Kosovo with or without Russia's approval enhanced the credibility of military threats; however, it could have alienated Russia, and it could have signaled to the target (Serbia) that Russia could be persuaded to balance against the coercer. Although Milosevic, in his own words, understood the threats to be credible, Milosevic did not trust the U.S. negotiators. Milosevic perceived that the U.S. demanded a NATO presence in Kosovo as a step

towards Kosovo's independence. Milosevic insisted on assurances that Kosovo would gain autonomy, but not independence; assurances the United States was unwilling to extend. The coercive strategy employed by the United States, as predicted by the *CD Triangle*, failed to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement. An alternative explanation is that the Clinton administration was not committed to the success of *coercive diplomacy*, focusing on elevating coercive threat to use of limited force; that is, focusing on the next stage of the coercion. However, one can also conclude from the available evidence that the Clinton administration did not take into consideration Milosevic's "anxiety" about future demands and his distrust after the failed October agreement.

Third, the U.S.-led NATO air campaign in Serbia, officially named Operation Allied Force (OAF), had a primary goal of coercing Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement. Although Russia, a potential spoiler, officially announced that it would veto a UN Security Council resolution to authorize the use of force in Kosovo, President Yeltsin signaled that Russia would not interfere militarily if NATO proceeded with limited air strikes without a UN mandate. Therefore, one can conclude that the international strategic environment in this phase also favored the coercer. The U.S. attempt to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement has three distinct episodes of coercion.

In the first phase of OAF, that is, the first episode of *military coercion* (March 24-27, 1999), the focus was on using limited force; that is, the NATO air campaign targeted the Serbian air defense system and military facilities. The Clinton administration, expecting that Milosevic would acquiesce after three days of the bombing, did not attempt any direct talks with Milosevic.

In the second phase of OAF, that is the second episode of *military coercion* (March 28-April 25), NATO expanded the target list to TV/radio stations and towers, oil refineries, and dual-use facilities. However, Milosevic did not acquiesce to the demands, and the Clinton administration did not attempt any direct talks with Milosevic.

In the third phase of OAF, that is, the third episode of military coercion (April 26-June 10), the NATO target list was further expanded, including air strikes against railways, bridges, and Serbia's electric grid. In this episode, Russia's diplomatic initiative, supported by the United States, produced the modified Rambouillet peace agreement, known as the G8 peace proposal. Most notably, under the G8 peace proposal, the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo had to be under UN auspices and with Russian participation. Russia's negotiator Chernomyrdin assured Milosevic that Russia, by participating in the peacekeeping troops, was also a guarantor of the agreement; most notably by increasing the cost for the United States, the coercer, not to comply with its assurances. In this episode of coercion, the United States succeeded at coercing Milosevic to sign the G8 agreement. Milosevic acquiesced after all three conditions, predicted by the *CD Triangle*, were present. However, the *CD Triangle* did not predict that the assurances would be given by the third party. The alternative explanations why Milosevic acquiesced to the demands are: First, the threat of a NATO ground invasion, which intensified in the third phase of OAF. However, based on the evidence, one has to point out that a NATO ground invasion was evaluated by the Serbian/VJ top commanders and Milosevic as an opportunity for the *Vietnamization* of Kosovo.

Second, the domestic pressure due to economic hardship caused by economic sanctions and NATO bombing. More precisely, pressure from the elite and public on

Milosevic to accept the peace agreement, even if this meant the presence of foreign troops in Kosovo. However, for Milosevic remaining in power was directly linked with his ability to keep Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. Although the pressure on the Serbian population was significant, there was no domestic group that could overthrow Milosevic's regime. Milosevic, despite the intense bombing and economic sanctions, had control of the military and government.

5.2.3 Comparing the Case Studies and the Episodes of Coercion

A comparison of the two case studies and eight episodes of coercion reveals the following:

First, as predicted by the *CD Triangle*, the three conditions (credible threats, credible assurances, and the international environment favoring the coercer) were present when *coercive diplomacy* and *military coercion* succeeded (see Table 3 and Table 4).

Second, *coercive diplomacy* was successful in one out of three episodes of *coercive diplomacy* (see Table 3) with a success rate of 33 percent. *Military coercion* was successful in two out of five episodes of *military coercion* (see Table 4) with a success rate of 40 percent. These success rates affirm the findings that *coercive diplomacy*, defined as the use of military threats only or the use of limited force, in general, has a low success rate.⁴⁴⁸ However, the application of the model for *coercive diplomacy* in

⁴⁴⁸ See, for example, Robert Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 387; Dianne P. Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coercer Weaker States* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 59-70; Phill Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and*

asymmetric military crisis (that is, the *CD Triangle*), shows that unsuccessful *coercive diplomacy* in two out of three episodes led to escalation of coercion from *use of military threats* to *use of limited force* despite the target “believing” that threats were credible and despite the target expressing the “need” for assurance that the coercer would not expand its demands. Furthermore, in all three unsuccessful cases of military coercion, the coercer increased the application of military force, despite the target “believing” that threats were credible and despite the target expressing the “need” for assurance that the coercer would not expand its demands.

Third, the lack of trust was an important issue that influenced the weak state to fear the great power’s intentions. That is, the target’s “anxiety” that acquiescing to the demands would lead to more demands tomorrow manifested in the target’s insistence on assurances. In in the fourth phase of U.S. involvement in the Bosnian War the Clinton administration made a significant attempt to publicly elevate Milosevic from a *war criminal* to a *peacemaker* as a part of the administration’s strategy to ease Milosevic’s “anxiety” that U.S. intentions were to end the war in Bosnia, but not to change the regime in Serbia. However, an unsuccessful attempt to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement points to the Clinton administration refusing to give assurances that the United States was committed to the autonomy of Kosovo, as opposed to independence, as well as what Milosevic saw as broken commitments when the KLA recaptured the vacant territory.

War: Why Weak States Resist the United States, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 5-6.

Table 3. Summary of U.S. Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo

Row No.	Episode of Coercive Diplomacy	CT	CA	ISE	Outcome CD
1	Bosnia, Phase IV: U.S./NATO-Bosnian Serbs, July 21/August 1, 1995	1	0	1	0
2	Kosovo, Phase II: U.S.(Holbrooke)/Serbia (Milosevic) The October Agreement, October 1998	1	1	1	1
3	Kosovo, Phase III: Ramboulliet/Paris Negotiations February 1999	1	0	1	0

Table 4. Summary of U.S. Military Coercion in Bosnia and Kosovo

Row No.	Episode of Military Coercion	CT	CA	ISE	Outcome MC
1	Bosnia, Phase IV: U.S. (Holbrooke)-Bosnian Serbs/Milosevic, August 30-31, 1999 (The “Endgame” Strategy)	1 (LF)	0	1	0
2	Bosnia, Phase IV: U.S. (Holbrooke)-Milosevic, September 14-17, 1999 (The “Endgame” Strategy)	1 (LF)	1	1	1
3	Kosovo, Phase IV: OAF, Phase I, March 24-27, 1999	1 (LF)	0	1	0
4	Kosovo, Phase IV: OAF, Phase II, March 28-April 25, 1999	1 (LF)	0	1	0
5	Kosovo, Phase IV: OAF, Phase III/ Russia’s Diplomatic Initiative, April 25-June 10	1 (LF)	1	1	1

*CT: Credible Threats; CA: Credible Assurances; ISE: International Strategic Environment Favoring Coercer; CD: Coercive Diplomacy; MC: Military Coercion; D: Deterrence. ** 1=Success without the use of limited force; 1(LF)= Success with the limited use of force; 0=Failure; NA=Not attempted.

5.3 Contributions and Suggestions for Further Research

This dissertation contributes to the coercion literature in two respects. First, this dissertation adds to the efforts to analyze the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy by analyzing *when* and *why* weak states acquiesce, and *when* and *why* coercer states decide to escalate coercion from using military threats to using limited force. Second, this dissertation adds to the literature on reputation by showing that the coercer being perceived as “trustworthy” is relevant for the target’s “need” for assurances.

Based on the findings, two broad avenues for further research are suggested: The first relates to the relevance of reputation for determining the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. There has been a significant attempt to research the relevance of reputation for resolve for determining the credibility of coercive threats, as related to the success of coercive diplomacy.⁴⁴⁹ However, the empirical findings in this dissertation point at the relevance of reputation for being “trustworthy” for determining the credibility of assurances as related to the success of coercive diplomacy.⁴⁵⁰

The second relates to the theory of coercion and the concepts employed. Distinguishing between the *use of threats* only and the *use of limited force* has implications for how strategies of coercion are employed. Escalation from *coercive*

⁴⁴⁹ See, for example, Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005); Alex Weisiger and Karen Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics.” *International Organization* 69 (Spring 2015), 473-495; Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton, *Fighting for Credibility: U.S. Reputation and International Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).

⁴⁵⁰ See Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 6.

diplomacy to military coercion usually is an attempt by the coercer to increase the credibility of threats. However, more comprehensive study should be conducted to determine whether the coercer misjudges or disregards the target's "need" for assurances.

5.4 Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

This dissertation analyzes two cases in which the United States employed *coercive diplomacy* and *military coercion* in asymmetric interstate crises in the decade after the Cold War. The United States eventually succeeded in ending the war in Bosnia and ending the crisis in Kosovo, but not before the United States failed in employing *coercive diplomacy*, putting its reputation as a global power in question. Based on the findings, there are two important foreign policy implications that can be drawn from the model of *coercive diplomacy* in asymmetric military crises.

First, the U.S. leaders and policymakers should not underestimate the weak state's concerns that acquiescing to demands will lead to more demands tomorrow. Moreover, when coercion is applied in asymmetric interstate crises, the threats should be combined with credible assurances that the survival of the target would not be put into question if the target complies with the demands.

Second, the leaders and policymakers must understand that *coercive diplomacy* and *military coercion* employ force to *convince* the target to comply with the demands not to *force* the target to comply with the demands. Therefore, the military should not be given the tasks that are diplomatic in nature.

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VITA

DANIJELA FELENDES

- 2012 B.A., International Relations and Political Science
Certificate in European Studies
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
- 2017 M.A., International Studies
Graduate Certificate in Conflict Resolution
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
- 2021 Ph.D., International Relations
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
- 2015-2018 Teaching Assistant
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
- 2018-2020 Instructor
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
- 2020- Present Adjunct Lecturer
Florida International University
Miami, Florida

PRESENTATIONS

Felendes, D., *Reputation for Resolve and Credibility of Threats: U.S. and Chinese Strategic Coercion in the South China Sea*. Paper presented at the annual conference [virtual] of the *International Studies Association*, April 2021.

Felendes, D., *Madeline's War: Identity, Compellent Threats, and International Crisis*. Paper accepted for the annual conference of the *Midwest Political Science Association*, Chicago, April 2020; cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Felendes, D., *Threats, Assurances, and Incentives: Re-examining U.S. Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War (1998-1999)*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *Florida Political Science Association*, Tampa, March 2019.

Felendes, D., *Credibility of Threats in International Crisis: The U.S. and Asymmetric Compellence Failures in Kosovo (1999)*. Paper presented at the annual convention of the *International Studies Association Annual Convention*, San Francisco, April 2018.

Felendes, D., *The New Security Architecture in the Balkans and the Power of NATO Enlargement*. Paper presented at the annual convention at the *International Studies Association*, San Francisco, April 2018.

Felendes, D., *Globalization and Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia*. Paper presented at the annual conference of the *Midwest Political Science Association*, Chicago, April 2017.

Felendes, D., *NATO Enlargement and Russia: The Case of Montenegro*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *Florida Political Science Association*, Orlando, April 2017.

Felendes, D., *Nationalism in the Era of McWorld*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *Florida Political Science Association*, Lakeland, April 2016.