A Comprehensive Evaluation of an Offender-Focused Domestic Violence Policing Strategy Using the EMMIE Framework

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A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF AN OFFENDER-FOCUSED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICING STRATEGY USING THE EMMIE FRAMEWORK

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE

by
Sara C. McFann

2021
To: Dean John F. Stack, Jr.
Green School of International and Public Affairs

This dissertation, written by Sara C. McFann, and entitled A Comprehensive Evaluation of an Offender-Focused Domestic Violence Policing Strategy Using the EMMIE Framework, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

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Date of Defense: March 23, 2021

The dissertation of Sara C. McFann is approved.

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Andrés G. Gil
Vice President for Research and Economic Development
and Dean of the University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2021
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to life’s hurdles (especially you, 2020) that made a hard thing that much harder. Thank you for the “character building,” as Mom likes to say.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express gratitude to my dissertation committee chair, Dr. Stephen F. Pires, and my committee members, Dr. Rob T. Guerette, Dr. Tim Goddard, and Dr. Amy Paul-Ward, for their invaluable contributions and guidance in support of this project. My evolution as a scholar and scientist has been a direct result of their efforts, and each provided a different perspective and alternative avenue for approaching my research. Without my early experiences contributing to research projects with Dr. Pires, I may not have unlocked my passion for research and exploration that led me to where I am today and will lead me to pursue endeavors in practical research in the future.

To the FIU Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice faculty and staff, it has been an exciting experience to be part of the first cohort of the International Crime and Justice Ph.D. program. I was fortunate to learn from and interact with a diverse range of scholars, advisors, administrators, and other personnel who were all ready to help build this program from the ground up, something in which we should all take pride. Being the first in anything is always a unique challenge. Still, I hope that my experiences helped pave the way for future ICJ students to blaze even brighter paths to bring FIU to the forefront of the field of international criminology.

To the Hollywood Police Department, I am deeply grateful for the rare opportunity I was given to peer inside the inner workings of a police department, embedded almost as if I were part of the agency. In a gesture of openness that showed a willingness to display its policies, procedures, personnel, data, and work to an outsider – an academic with no law enforcement experience, nonetheless – Chief Chris O’Brien and
his department went above and beyond to ensure that this study was conducted with the highest level of authenticity, candor, and integrity. Special thanks to Sergeant Rhett Cady, who not only presented me with this research opportunity but was integral to understanding the program and its purpose. Also, I am grateful for the contributions of Tara Hazel, Lieutenant John Marino, Lieutenant Selina Hightower, and all of the command staff, management, officers, and civilian staff who voluntarily contributed invaluable insight, expertise, and effort to this project over several long years.

I greatly appreciate those in my work life outside of academia who offered immense support, understanding, and flexibility as I completed my dissertation while working full-time in Ukraine. I fear that without the empathy of my bosses, John Montanio and Timothy Janowick, and the support of my colleagues at ICITAP, my Ph.D. journey may have come to a premature end. Also, I appreciate the opportunity Dr. Robert Peacock gave me to experience the wonderfully engaging world of international development in the field of law enforcement, demonstrating that it is absolutely possible to be a practitioner and an academic at the same time.

Finally, I thank my family and friends whose encouragement helped me to complete this project. Without the support of my mother, sister, and father, it would not have been possible. I am thankful for the motivational drumbeat of my family and friends cheering me on from wherever they were – in the same classroom, across the country, or on the other side of the world – with an endless supply of empathy, compassion, and excitement that saw me through the most challenging times. It is finally OK to ask me how my dissertation is going.
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF AN OFFENDER-FOCUSED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICING STRATEGY USING THE EMMIE FRAMEWORK

by

Sara C. McFann

Florida International University, 2021

Miami, Florida

Professor Stephen F. Pires, Major Professor

As the emphasis on increasing the body of evidence for (or against) policing interventions grows, so does scholars' responsibility to identify not only what works but why, for whom, and in what contexts. An emerging police approach to domestic violence (DV) using offender-focused strategies has grown in popularity. However, the evidence base is small and does not explore inside the black box of the main strategic activities. To address this evidence deficiency and provide the first-ever primary study of this type of program, a comprehensive evaluation of a focused deterrence-based policing intervention for DV situated around the EMMIE (Effects, Mechanisms, Moderators, Implementation, and Economics) framework (Johnson et al., 2015) was conducted. A mixed-methods design was used to assess the framework's five elements.

The study consisted of process and impact evaluations of the Offender-Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI) implemented in Hollywood, Florida, between 2015 and 2019. Police administrative data, including DV reports and arrests and UCR offense data, were used to identify DV trends in the city between 2008 and 2019. These trends were then compared to those in nearby jurisdictions. Domestic offender activity
was analyzed to assess whether the program influenced offending patterns and recidivism. Thirty interviews and seven ride-alongs with on-duty officers were conducted to understand how the program was implemented across the department. Finally, a direct cost analysis was conducted to assess the financial burden of the intervention.

The findings show that Hollywood experienced a sharp, statistically significant decline in the number of DV police reports filed during the study period. However, mixed-effects linear modeling indicated that the intervention was not associated with this decline; the region experienced a similar decrease in DV during the same period. Additionally, Cox Hazard Modeling showed that offenders who received the primary deterrence treatment implemented as part of the program, a letter, were likely to reoffend quicker than those who did not. Despite these negative results, the intervention was found to offer other benefits to police and the community that warrant further consideration for police departments seeking progressive, cost-effective strategies to reduce and prevent DV.
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### ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<th>Description</th>
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<td>BSO</td>
<td>Broward Sheriff’s Office</td>
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<td>CCJ</td>
<td>Criminology and Criminal Justice</td>
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<td>DV</td>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
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<td>HPD</td>
<td>Hollywood Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPV</td>
<td>Intimate Partner Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNSC</td>
<td>National Network for Safe Communities</td>
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Chapter I: An Emerging Policing Strategy for Domestic Violence

As police departments seek out progressive approaches to preventing and reducing violent crime after struggling to get results from mainstream policies, there has been a recent growth of interest in offender-focused policing initiatives (International Association of Crime Analysts, 2018). Such strategies can be as simple as creating a chronic offender list that prioritizes offenders based on their level of risk to society used in-house by a police department or as complex as a focused deterrence program that involves stakeholders from across public service sectors, including police, social services, religious organizations, schools, and courts. While such strategies have been increasingly applied to tackle violent criminals generally, few have been applied to offenders of domestic violence (Hanmer et al., 1999; Morgan, 2004; Sechrist & Weil, 2017; Sechrist et al., 2012). Even fewer have been evaluated for their impacts and analyzed for why, how, and for whom those impacts may occur.

As with many interventions in criminal justice, offender-based programs can be highly complex and involve multiple elements that function concertedly in varying degrees of effort, dosage, and organization. The goal of the current study is to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the effects, outcomes, and costs of an Offender-Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI) in Hollywood, Florida. This policing strategy is an adaptation of the increasingly popular focused-deterrence approach to handling and preventing domestic violence (Kennedy, 2009). The strategy’s main features include offender notification letters, increased police attention to domestic calls for service, and offender prioritization, among several other elements that are not standard in police
approaches for domestic violence. The six objectives to reach the goal of this comprehensive evaluation of the OFDVI are based directly on the EMMIE framework, and will be answered using a mixed-method approach: (1) determine the effect size and direction of the program; (2) identify the mechanisms through which the program works; (3) identify the moderating variables and context that influence the program activities; (4) identify implementation successes and failures; (5) identify the program’s financial costs and benefits; and (6) demonstrate application of the EMMIE framework to an offender-focused program evaluation.

Policing Strategies for Domestic Violence

Police and law enforcement interventions for domestic violence have evolved dramatically since it was reframed as a public health and safety issue in the 1960s. It transitioned from a personal matter to one that required police intervention in the form of mediation and, later, enforcement of laws created to protect victims and families with a reliance on sanctions (Buzawa, 2012; Parnas, 1967). Approaches have involved a combination of policing, social work, counseling, victim’s services, legal sanctions, and healthcare. Batterer treatment programs, mandatory arrest policies, and other approaches have been implemented, and considerable research exists that assesses the effect of these and other common interventions. However, domestic violence remains one of the crime types most resistant to influence from law enforcement, despite robust changes in strategies over time. While violent crime generally has decreased significantly in the U.S. and Europe in the last three decades according to common reporting measures (Farrell et al., 2014), a study on violent crime and victims in the U.K. indicates that domestic violence has lagged behind when high-volume repeat victimizations are counted in the
overall crime statistics (Walby et al., 2015).¹ In the U.S., the number of incidents is capped at 10 in the National Crime Victim Survey, with high-volume serial victimizations left uncounted beyond that threshold (Lauritsen et al., 2012).

In the face of this dilemma, and since police departments and local government administrators are held responsible for crime trends in their jurisdictions, the drive to reduce domestic violence, particularly domestic homicides, makes new, promising approaches more attractive. However, many of these resource-intensive interventions are out of reach for departments lacking funding and organizational capacity to overhaul their existing standard operating procedures (SOPs). Considerable funding is available from organizations including the U.S. Department of Justice Office on Violence Against Women (OVW, 2019), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Department of Health and Human Services, state-run grant programs, and other local organizations; research shows that federal grants, such as the COPS grants for hiring new officers and innovative programming (Mello, 2019; Zhao et al., 2002), are associated with reductions in violent and property crimes. However, even the resources required to write grant proposals, attain buy-in from all relevant leadership and stakeholders, and administer grants successfully are roadblocks for some departments.

Due to these considerable hurdles and limitations, some police departments are choosing to implement new interventions on their own that are based on the well-funded

¹ Domestic violence victimization survey data are typically coded in a way that reduces the highest volume victims (i.e. 6 or more victimizations) because the data are capped at 5 incidents per victim, thereby losing all of the additional victimizations in the official count. Walby, Towers & Francis (2015) were specifically referring to surveys conducted in the UK, but this also occurs in the US.
models being implemented in other jurisdictions, albeit without the extra funding. Such adaptations are designed to fit the needs of the department and do not require hundreds of thousands of dollars in grant funds, but they lack the guidance and expertise associated with grant funds. Little research exists on these in-house adaptations. This makes it difficult to determine if they are as likely to succeed and meet the goals of the department as the well-funded programs. While these in-house adaptations can address any crime problem, the current study focuses on how one such adaptation has been applied in a jurisdiction in South Florida with a pernicious domestic violence problem.

_The Importance of Domestic Violence_

Of all crime types, domestic violence is one of the most controversial types that has been the source of evolving assumptions, beliefs, and myths perpetuated in academic literature, social programs, society, and police practice. Its opaqueness lends itself well to blanket statements and policies that are based less on science and more on intuition or rash decision-making. Therefore, it is essential to understand the nature of policing of domestic violence and why a police department would view a domestic violence policy overhaul as a justifiable investment of time and resources.

Literature in recent decades has attempted to explore, describe, and explain domestic violence from a wide array of perspectives, but the focus here will be on applied research on police practices related to domestic violence. Various claims about domestic violence will be explored, and an assessment of the validity of these claims will be approximated based on existing literature. These beliefs are the drivers of domestic violence program theory, whether acknowledged or not by decision-makers. The
underlying assumption of this assessment is that domestic crimes are a critical piece of the crime prevention and reduction algorithm for police, and they deserve more attention and resources than they are typically afforded.

**History of Police Strategies for Domestic Violence**

To understand modern approaches to handling domestic violence, it is helpful to acknowledge the evolution of law enforcement approaches to domestic violence over the last half-century. Generally, domestic violence as a crime problem experiences a similar trajectory over time across many diverse cultures around the world. The issue grows in prominence as societies address gender inequality and women’s issues (Johnson & Brunell, 2006). Historically, it begins as a private matter that is considered the business of the family rather than law enforcement or social services. In some cultures, there is support for using violence against women and other family members as a justifiable response to certain transgressions or dishonorable acts. At a minimum, these cultures deny the existence of violence and place a higher value on upholding traditional sex roles in relationships, using force if necessary (Finn, 1986; Lansford et al., 2014; Speizer, 2010). Over time, the issue of domestic violence then takes on a label of a social problem that is considered a culturally inappropriate interaction within families best treated using social services including anger management, marriage counseling, and psychotherapy for the offender. This phase involves a heavy emphasis on safety-based avoidance responses for victims and their children (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Humphreys & Absler, 2011; Pence & Paymar, 1993).
Once it is acknowledged that the crime of domestic abuse has continued despite the increased availability of these services, it then becomes the responsibility of the police to intervene, stop the violence, and hold offenders accountable for their crimes. This can take the form of strict police responses such as mandatory arrest (Sherman & Berk, 1984). Then, there is an evolution to the more recent approaches being implemented in the U.S. and Western Europe that encompass increasingly progressive and modern responses involving multi-pronged, evidence-based approaches that incorporate law enforcement, the justice system, social services, education, and repeat offender identification (Dobash et al., 1999; Fisher, 2004; Kennedy, 2009). These contemporary strategies include offender-focused policing, like focused deterrence, as a way to reduce domestic violence. A detailed description of focused deterrence and offender-focused domestic violence programs begins on page 8 of the current study.

In the U.S., the evolution of domestic violence approaches has followed the general path outlined above. Alongside the U.K. and Australia, the U.S. has been at the forefront of domestic abuse response reform among developed nations (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2017). These reforms have been occurring in developing nations at varying degrees due to the increasing international recognition that domestic violence is a serious issue that can impede a society’s development. In addition, adherence to contemporary standards of human rights, such as implementing an adequate nationwide response to prevent gender-based violence, is required for inclusion into international institutions like the European Union (Council of Europe, 2018).
The U.S. response to domestic violence before the major feminist-driven reforms began in the late 1970s resembled that of a number of developing countries currently, suggesting that the development of effective responses is contingent on the slow modification of deeply-entrenched social norms (Straus, 1978). In the 1960s, law enforcement considered family abuse as quite insignificant, though scholars were beginning to acknowledge that domestic calls for service expended a large amount of police time and effort because they were so prevalent and were particularly dangerous for officers (Parnas, 1967). The response involved what Parnas referred to as “adjustment without arrest” (p. 915), meaning a responding officer should mediate and advise the victim and aggressor to attempt to diffuse the immediate situation, with guidance to use arrest only if all other strategies did not bring a solution. There was very little, if any, police training on family violence, as exemplified by the Chicago Police Department’s 1965 cadet training curriculum. The curriculum did not have any instruction dedicated to family violence during the fourteen weeks of training. Furthermore, in practice, domestic offenders were treated relatively lightly throughout the court system, with few attorneys willing to prosecute the cases and hold offenders accountable (Berk et al., 1980). While laws may have existed that officially banned abuse, the action necessary to enforce them was rarely taken.

As more scholars delved into research on domestic abuse and attempted to define and quantify the problem (Gelles, 1980), the early 1980s saw an increase in interest in bolstering the police response to domestic violence (Berk et al., 1980) and identifying rehabilitative, therapy-based treatments for offenders (Eisikovits & Edleson, 1989). A handful of formative, highly influential experiments and pilot programs were carried out
during the 1980s that effectively shifted the burden of responsibility for handling domestic abuse from the victims and perpetrators to law enforcement (Pence, 1983; Sherman & Berk, 1984). It was during this time that updates in the social norms that would allow domestic violence response reform were accelerated through drastic policing, law enforcement, and social service response changes.

**Focused Deterrence and Domestic Violence**

As police responses to domestic violence evolved, some practitioners and academics sought to use existing research on violent offenders and violent crime to develop a better way to police domestic violence. Because the prevailing strategies were not resulting in the desired reductions in domestic violence, experts began to focus on high-risk individuals, repeat offenders, and repeat victims. Some approaches that emerged and continue to emerge from this “pracademic” integration include risk assessments like the Maryland Lethality Assessment tool (MNADV, 2012), Domestic Violence High Risk Teams (DVHRT, 2020), and focused deterrence-based approaches like the Offender-Focused Domestic Violence Intervention (OFDVI) and the Intimate Partner Violence Intervention (IPVI) (NNSC, 2018).

*The Offender-Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI) Model*

Specifically related to the present study, the development cycle of focused deterrence as a framework for law enforcement and the justice system to prevent violent

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2 Briefly, focused deterrence is a policing and law enforcement framework for crime prevention that uses a suite of targeted crime deterrent policing activities, including direct, clear contact with offenders, to reduce offender engagement in specified criminal activities (Kennedy, 1997). A more comprehensive discussion of focused deterrence can be found in Chapter 2 of the current study.
crime led practitioners to consider its application for domestic violence. As one of the most stubborn varieties of violent crime that requires disproportionately high levels of system-wide resources, domestic violence tends to be unaffected by typical crime reduction approaches (Sechrist & Weil, 2017); domestic violence was a crime problem in need of some creative solutions. Focused deterrence was adapted to domestic violence policing strategies and was first implemented in High Point, North Carolina. This model, referred to as the Offender-Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI), was conceptualized as a blend of the focused-deterrence model developed in Boston’s Operation Ceasefire and a repeat victimization strategy developed in the U.K. (Hanmer et al., 1999). The program’s main goal was to identify repeat offenders early in their criminal lifecycle to prevent escalation of violence and additional offending (Sechrist et al., 2016).

The OFDVI program adopted a graded response approach for repeat domestic violence offenders first developed in Killingbeck, Leeds, England, in the late 1990s in which both the “victimised woman and the offending man” were intended to receive equal attention from law enforcement (Hanmer et al., 1999, p. v). In the Killingbeck program, there was a clear, specific focus on intimate partner violence (IPV) perpetrated by men against women. Offenders were placed in one of three levels based on the severity of their offenses and the resultant amount of police intervention and attention they required (Hanmer et al., 1999).

Based heavily on Routine Activities Theory, the Killingbeck Project was meant to make the victim less suitable, the offender less motivated, and the guardianship more
capable, thereby disrupting the crime triangle (Hanmer et al., 1999). The identification and reduction of the number of chronic offenders was a key element of the program. The process of identifying chronic offenders also allowed police to profile career criminals, whose identification is an integral step in proactive, resource-efficient policing. Doing so also focuses resources on collecting better evidence to create stronger cases against perpetrators in court. Victims were offered extra support in the form of increased police attention, a list of services to contact, the possibility of targeted police patrol activity in the neighborhood, and other benefits that increased their sense of security and encouraged them to seek assistance. The Killingbeck Project led to several desired outcomes; the number of one-time police attendances, or the number of times police responded to a call for service, increased from 60 percent to 85 percent, indicating that the number of repeat visits to the same address decreased during the study period. Similarly, the program was associated with an increase in the time between repeat calls for service (Hanmer et al., 1999).

Based on the tenants of the Killingbeck Project and focused deterrence programs for other crimes, the High Point OFDVI program, developed in 2012, simultaneously sought to increase law enforcement pressure on IPV offenders, eliminate their anonymity, and demonstrate to victims and offenders that High Point police were taking domestic violence seriously (Sechrist & Weil, 2017). The OFDVI model implements a unique approach to deterrence that relies on written and verbal messages to offenders in the form of letters and face-to-face contact with an officer to discuss the incident and dissuade future offending. Both the victim and offender see that the police are concerned about domestic violence and take it seriously, which may affect future behavior. Similar to the
Killingbeck Project, the High Point program focused specifically on offenders of IPV and did not include offenders of non-IPV in the program. In an evaluation of the program, Sechrist and Weil (2017) found that between September 2011, five months before the program began, and the end of the post-intervention period in December 2014, a 20 percent reduction in IPV calls for service (CFS) was seen.

Since its initial development and promising early evaluations between 2012 and 2014, other jurisdictions have piloted programs very similar to High Point under the umbrella of federally funded high-fidelity focused deterrence domestic violence programs. The National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC), which piloted the High Point OFDVI, has supported or currently supports programs in Kingston, New York (Friedrich, 2020; Patillo, 2018) and wider Ulster County, New York, Chula Vista, California, Jackson County, Missouri (Rice, 2019), Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Henderson County, South Carolina, and Lexington, North Carolina (Sechrist et al., 2016). Variations of the High Point model have been implemented independently of federal funding sources in Roanoke, Virginia (Friedenberger, 2014) and Spokane, Washington (Spokane Police, 2020), among a number of other jurisdictions across the country. In these adaptations, departments modify the focused deterrence model to fit the needs and capacities of their agencies. Doing so is not unlike the way the High Point model was itself a combination of two separate approaches – Killingbeck’s model for repeat domestic offenders and victims and focused deterrence for gangs and other group-based offenders. No official reports or evaluations could be found on the processes or impacts of these independently implemented programs, and there are very few publicly-available reports on the NNSC-sponsored programs (Sechrist and Weil; 2017).
Purpose and significance of the study

This study seeks to evaluate the emerging approach of focused deterrence for domestic violence as it is independently implemented at the Hollywood, Florida Police Department. It will be the first-ever evaluation of an Offender-Focused Domestic Violence Initiative targeting offenders of family violence, not just IPV perpetrated by men against women. This project is a continuation of preliminary research conducted between April 2017 and October 2017 (McFann, Manuscript in preparation). By applying AutoRegressive Integrative Moving Average (ARIMA) parametric statistical analysis using SPSS, the preliminary study assessed the effect of the OFDVI intervention, the independent variable, on the monthly number of domestic violence reports in the city, the dependent variable. Findings from the initial analysis indicated that the program had a strong, statistically significant negative effect on the number of domestic reports, with a 16 percent decrease in the monthly number of reports being filed after implementation of the program when controlling for domestic arrests. The study proposed that the letter delivery element of the program may have had a significant effect on domestic offending, though the various elements of the program that were simultaneously being carried out were considered for their potential impact, as well. However, the preliminary study did not include counterfactuals to assess whether the decrease in domestic violence seen in Hollywood was unique to the jurisdiction or whether it was part of a larger regional trend. The study also lacked a deep investigation into how the program was being implemented, nor did it identify the full program theory driving the procedures related to the program.

The current study expands on this previous work in several critical ways. First, the current study seeks to identify whether Hollywood alone experienced a significant
decline in domestic crime (and if the decline continued through 2018) or if nearby jurisdictions also experienced a decline. With this finding, I can better assess the extent to which the OFDVI played a role, if any, in domestic crime rates in the city of Hollywood. Furthermore, this study dives into the details of program implementation, mechanisms, and effects to identify why and how the program may influence domestic offenders. Finally, the current study considers the financial elements of the program to provide a cost estimate and an analysis of the value of the potential program benefits.

**Study Implications**

As a policing program that deals with violent offenders, the findings of the current study of the domestic violence policing initiative can have immediate and practical implications for violent crime reduction strategies. The links between domestic violence and tragic, violent events, such as mass shootings that have increasingly plagued the U.S. and other nations, have become a source of heightened attention in recent years. As society seeks answers for why these events occur, some research shows a common thread between many of the perpetrators of mass violence; namely, a history of domestic violence (Fan, 2015). This hits home especially hard in Broward County, Florida, where the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting took place in Parkland on February 14, 2018. The gunman of what became the deadliest high school shooting in U.S. history, Nikolas Cruz, had considerable prior contact with police due to a high number of calls for service to his family’s home in the years prior to the shooting for a variety of problems,
including domestic violence. Observers wonder whether the murderous rampage in Parkland could have been prevented had police done more to address the ongoing domestic violence occurring in the home. While many experts agree that police alone cannot end domestic violence, it is worth considering whether the status quo for the police response can be changed and improved. The current study provides a look at an alternative approach for how police handle domestic offenders and victims at a jurisdiction not far from Parkland, FL, where administrators are exploring what else the police can do to address repeat domestic violence.

Aside from the practical significance of researching new approaches to policing and violence prevention, the current study aims to add to the literature on focused deterrence to improve understanding of how such a framework may induce change. The prevailing approach to the evaluation of most focused deterrence policing strategies is a “black box” approach, which considers the program effects as enough evidence for identifying if it “works” or “does not work” (Brunson, 2015; Trinkner, 2019). However, there is a deficiency of comprehensive evaluations on such programs, especially those targeting domestic offenders, which may offer explanations for what it is about the programs that bring about any changes that occur. This can directly inform criminal justice theory and policing policy, improve existing programs, and help develop more effective programs in the future. Furthermore, as Hollywood’s OFDVI is an adaptation of

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4 Calls for Service Log from the Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO). Retrieved from: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4388938-Cruz-Call-Details.html
the ideal focused deterrence domestic violence initiative model, this study seeks to
determine whether it is, indeed, worthwhile for departments to pick and choose among
the elements of the ideal Focused Deterrence models while omitting some of the
signature elements (Saunders et al., 2017).

Theoretical Framework

While not a theory on its own, the EMMIE framework provided the underlying
epistemological architecture around which this study was built. As a relatively recent
addition to the growing field of criminological evaluation, the framework is an
amalgamation of several prominent theoretical perspectives about the nature of policing
research, including realism and positivism, mixed-methods research, and evidence-based
policing. Using EMMIE as a guide for the current preliminary study, these and other
theories will play important roles in guiding and situating the evaluation within
criminology. These theoretical components are discussed further in Chapter 3.

Overview of Methodology

Just as EMMIE is itself not a theory, it is also not associated with or bound to a
specific methodological approach. The determination of which methods to use to fulfill
the requirements of EMMIE is the responsibility of the researcher and depends on the
intervention being studied. To meet the needs of an EMMIE-based evaluation, a mixed-
methods design was used to conduct process and impact evaluations of the Hollywood
OFDVI. This included employing an array of quantitative analyses of crime data,
qualitative methods involving interviews and observations, and a cost estimate of the
program.
The selected methods were applied to the current study for several reasons. First, because the OFDVI had been implemented for three years at the time that this study began, it was not possible nor sensible to conduct an experiment. The elements of the program had been thoroughly engrained in the normal procedures of the department by then, so a purely experimental approach would have been impossible in Hollywood. Second, the program theory, as described by the initial program implementers, relied heavily on the program that was implemented at the High Point Police Department, despite the differences in actual implementation between the two agencies. Qualitative methods, including interviews and observations, were necessary to accurately capture and describe Hollywood’s particular program theory and how that manifested itself in policies and procedures. A third reason mixed methods were used is because of the challenges inherent in determining if a certain crime type has actually gone down or if reporting of the crime has gone down; this challenge is amplified when attempting to identify why any changes in crime statistics may have been seen. Absent of conducting victim interviews, which was deemed outside the scope of the current study, the qualitative data provided a look, albeit indirect, at the effect of the program on victims, their reporting behavior, and their interactions with police. A brief display of the methods and analyses used as they relate to each element of EMMIE can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Study Methods and Related EMMIE elements

<table>
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<tr>
<th>EMMIE Element</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effects</strong></td>
<td>ARIMA (Domestic Calls for Service and Reports Over Time)</td>
<td>Interviews with HPD personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Linear mixed modeling/Difference-in-differences analysis with comparison</td>
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<td></td>
<td>jurisdictions’ domestic data</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mediating Variables (Mechanisms)</strong></td>
<td>Analysis of letter deliveries</td>
<td>Interviews with HPD personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ride-alongs with officers</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Moderating Variables (Contexts)</strong></td>
<td>Regression analysis of gender, race, and age of offenders</td>
<td>Interviews with HPD personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neighborhood socioeconomic analysis</td>
<td>Ride-alongs with officers</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td>Analysis of letter deliveries</td>
<td>Interviews with HPD personnel</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Observation - ride-alongs with officers</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economics / Costs &amp; Benefits</strong></td>
<td>Cost-Benefit Tool (Manning &amp; Vorsina)</td>
<td>Interviews with upper management and crime</td>
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**Overview of the Study**

Chapter 2 consists of a literature review of the policing of domestic violence. It begins with a brief overview of the history and evolution of policing interventions and approaches to responding to, preventing, and reducing domestic violence. Then the discussion shifts to an examination of the prevailing assumptions or beliefs that police and police agencies hold about domestic violence. These assumptions or beliefs drive not only the police response to domestic violence but also the program and policy changes related to this response. The review also includes a background of focused deterrence theory and how it has been applied to domestic violence.

In Chapter 3, an in-depth discussion of the EMMIE framework provides a look into how the approach can improve evaluations in criminology and criminal justice. As a
combination of positivism and realism schools of thought originally developed as a method for conducting systematic reviews, EMMIE provides a robust structure for evaluators to develop primary studies that can later be more informative and useful for inclusion in systematic reviews.

Chapter 4 provides a process evaluation of the Hollywood OFDVI to meet four main research objectives. This section includes a detailed account of the information collected through interviews and ride alongs during one month of study on-site at the Hollywood Police Department. The findings cover the initial program development and implementation as it occurred in 2014 and 2015, the various policies and activities involved in the program, and consideration of the mechanisms that may be responsible for any program effects that occurred. The four objectives of this section are to (1) provide a description of Hollywood’s OFDVI model as it was implemented in 2019; (2) to determine a program logic and program theory of the OFDVI; (3) to explore the possible mechanisms for the various activities involved in the program; and (4) was to identify practitioner-focused findings that could be helpful for program improvement or replication in other departments.

In Chapter 5, the results of an impact evaluation provide data about the effects of the program using several different data analysis methods. First, ARIMA is employed to examine Hollywood’s domestic violence offenses over time to determine if the intervention caused any significant change in the monthly number of reports filed after the program was implemented. Second, linear mixed modeling was used to perform a difference-in-differences analysis comparing Hollywood’s yearly UCR-reported domestic
violence offense rates to those of neighboring jurisdictions. This test was used to
determine if the intervention was associated with a significant change in Hollywood
compared to the surrounding area. Finally, survival analysis was conducted to analyze the
patterns in re-offending of individuals involved in the program. This also involved an
analysis of the characteristics of domestic aggressors and offenders on any offender list
(D through A) in Hollywood.

In conclusion, Chapter 6 consists of a comprehensive discussion of the main findings
of the current study and the implications of these findings. It ends with a conclusion that
summarizes the needs for future research related to this study.
Beliefs About Domestic Violence in Policing

There exist a number of common beliefs or assumptions held by police officers and the agencies they work for about domestic violence. These assumptions drive policy, shape the formation of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and steer police activity in relation to the crime of domestic violence. While some assumptions may be acknowledged, others are implicit, poorly defined, and may lack evidential support; whether rooted in fact, anecdotes, or personal experience, or longstanding myths, these assumptions should be explored for their role in framing domestic violence laws and law enforcement policies. They are, in effect, the underlying motivations for choosing to implement one intervention over another.

Here, four assumptions or beliefs about domestic violence will be explored, which were selected due to their direct influence on police responses to domestic violence and are as follows: (1) domestic incidents are the most dangerous calls for service that officers respond to; (2) domestic calls for service are among the most numerous types of calls most departments receive; (3) domestic offenders are very different from perpetrators of other types of crime; and (4) intimate partner violence (IPV) is more serious than other forms of domestic violence.

The first claim about domestic violence to assess is that domestic incidents are the most dangerous calls for service that officers respond to. This belief is perpetuated not only by anecdotal practitioner-based evidence from the field but also by reports from official law enforcement organizations (Breul & Keith, 2016; LEOMF, 2019; Bard,
1970). It has encouraged a large number of procedural changes for police responses to domestics (Eigenberg, Kappeler & McGuffee, 2012), such as policies that require two or more officers to respond to domestic calls, parking marked vehicles out of sight and limiting the use of lights and sirens in the vicinity, employing de-escalation and crisis-intervention communication strategies, separating all parties before conducting interviews, and inquiring about the presence of weapons at the scene, among many other best practices (IACP, 2019). It also provides motivation for departments to reduce the number of domestic calls for service – the fewer the calls, the lower the risk to officers.

Research on officer safety related to domestic violence was thrust into mainstream consciousness with the publication of Bard’s (1970) seminal study that begins with the statement that domestic calls were among the most fatal types for officers; forty percent of officer line-of-duty disability time off was related to responding to domestics. The article describes a two-year experiment at the New York City Police Department to test the effect of specialized crisis intervention training on a small unit of officers tasked with responding mainly to domestic calls for service. The study found that no officers involved in the specially-trained unit, and just one from the test jurisdiction, were injured related to domestic calls for service during the study period “despite their greater exposure to family disturbance” (p. iii).

Around the same time, the FBI published UCR data and reports that showed that domestic calls were the most dangerous to officers (referenced in Parnas, 1967). These

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5 Hollywood Police Department personnel often referred to domestic incidents or domestic calls for service as “domestics.” This phrase will be used throughout the current study.
findings appeared to influence the nature of the training officers received to handle domestic incidents, with a focus on maintaining officer safety by providing case studies from police reports in which the officer was assaulted during domestic calls. However, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) released a report in response to this messaging that indicated that the threat posed by domestic calls to officers had been “overstated” (Garner & Clemmer, 1986, p. 2). The report showed that domestics were among the least deadly types of calls for service when they analyzed homicides of on-duty officers for each type of call in Kansas City. The authors argued that a danger index is a more accurate measure of the dangerousness of a specific call type because it accounts for time (and the number of times) officers spend responding to different call types when ranking dangerousness. Using this danger index, Garner and Clemmer (1986) confirmed that domestic calls for service are relatively safer situations for officers than many other call types.

However, Uchida, Brooks, and Kopers (1987) produced a rebuttal to Garner and Clemmer’s article using different methods to calculate the relative risk to officer safety among all call types in Baltimore County between 1984 and 1986. The authors’ findings countered those of the original report, indicating that domestic calls are among the most dangerous when considering assault rates of officers and are the most dangerous when calculating the rates of assaults leading to officer injury. The results continued to be mixed for these types of studies, so no clear answer existed for this debate for decades.

In more recent years, the issue had still not been resolved, but the prevailing belief throughout law enforcement was that domestics were, indeed, potentially very dangerous situations for officers. In 2016, the Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office
released a report that stated that 29% of officer line of duty deaths occurred during domestic calls, making it the deadliest call among all fatal calls between 2010 and 2015 (Breul & Luongo, 2017). Likewise, the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund 2019 Preliminary Report lists domestic disturbances as one of the three top circumstances (all tied for the highest) in which an officer was fatally killed with a firearm in the United States (LEOMF, 2019). One hundred twenty-eight officers were killed in the line of duty in 2019, and seven of the forty-nine killed with a firearm were related to domestic disturbances. However, the report does not indicate the total number of fatalities by any cause related to domestic calls; in 2018, just two officers were killed by beating, strangulation, stabbing, or falling, which cover the other most likely causes of domestic-related fatality an officer may face, indicating other non-firearm causes of domestic fatalities are very rare for officers.

In comparison to the LEOMF report, the FBI’s 2018 Report on Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA, 2018) shows that out of the fifty-five officers feloniously killed in 2018, just one death was related to an officer responding to a domestic incident. Other circumstances that were far more dangerous included carrying out other investigative or enforcement duties (i.e., tactical situations, investigating crimes, traffic stops, etc.), pursuits, and officer ambush. Interestingly, the annual report on officer assaults provides data only for the less-granular call category of disturbance, making it impossible to separate domestic calls from all other types of non-domestic disturbances (Meyer & Carroll, 2011). In 2018, there were 18,232 officers assaulted when responding to a disturbance call out of 58,866 total reported officer assaults.
In contrast to the policing literature that supports the belief that domestic calls for service are more harmful to officer health and wellbeing than other types of calls, there may be enough counterevidence to reconsider the validity of this belief. The findings from a considerable body of research conflict with the findings of practitioner-focused reports, case studies, and attitudes based on anecdotal experience referenced by practitioners. In a recent analysis of NIBRS data, Nix and colleagues (2019) found that when accounting for all calls for service police responded to in 2016, officers were significantly less likely to be harmed when responding to domestic incidents than all other types of calls. Previous research supports these findings (Hirschel et al., 1994; Johnson, 2008; Meyer & Carroll, 2011).

While this finding runs contrary to a commonly held belief within law enforcement, it is possible that the safety measures implemented by police officers and maintaining a heightened sense of danger awareness, specifically when responding to domestic calls, prevent officer injury or death in these situations (Zaiser & Staller, 2015). Nevertheless, officers are kept on high alert when responding to domestic calls, and the claim that domestics are inherently more dangerous to them continues to be engrained via training and other official messaging. While improved safety measures may keep officers safer, it may be unnecessary for departments to mandate measures beyond a certain threshold of expense and effort that are being recommended by some organizations, including the COPs Office (Nix et al., 2019; Breul & Luongo, 2017). This includes measures such as encouraging three or more officers to respond to domestic calls, among others.
Given the stark differences between the findings of academic-focused research and practitioner-focused reports, it is difficult to confirm or reject the claim that domestic calls for service are inherently more dangerous to police officers than other types of calls. Nevertheless, the additional safety measures incorporated into the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of many departments for domestic calls are firmly cemented into mainstream policing policies and may improve officer safety overall. Indeed, the amount and quality of training that officers receive, the levels of enforcement of SOPs, and the amount of oversight of officer activities can affect officer safety for the better, independent of the motivation driving the policies. In other words, regardless of whether the domestic violence officer safety issue is based on fact or is simply a long-standing belief, the positive benefits that have emanated from it are undoubtedly helpful to police.

A second popular claim about domestic violence is that domestic calls for service constitute the largest or one of the largest volumes of calls received by most departments. Similarly, domestic calls consume a large proportion of officer time. Statements supportive of these claims can be found in a program evaluation by Hanmer and colleagues (1999) that indicated that one-third of recorded violent crime in Killingbeck, UK were Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). The repeat nature of domestic violence, and the assumption of escalation of violence over time, may be responsible for any especially high call volume. In fact, most instances of IPV are insignificant (Eigenberg, Kappeler & McGuffee, 2012), yet escalation is assumed to occur often. Bland and Ariel (2015) analyzed a data set of 36,000 calls for service in a jurisdiction in the U.K. between 2009 and 2014 to determine whether the violence between the victim and perpetrator (dyads) escalated over time; the authors found that 76 percent of all unique dyads (the same pair
of victim and perpetrator) had no repeat calls, meaning they were one time incidents. Among the dyads that did experience repeat calls, no significant signs of escalation were found. Also, less than 2 percent of the dyads accounted for 80 percent of the harm caused in domestic calls. These findings support the idea that a few chronic offenders are responsible for most domestic violence and may disproportionately contribute to the number of calls received by a department.

A third common assumption made about domestic violence is that the offenders are considerably dissimilar to typical criminals. To begin dissecting this argument, it is important to establish that all domestic offenders are not the same; the population of offenders can be split between one-incident offenders (the strong majority) and repeat offenders; repeat offenders can be further divided into desisters and chronic offenders. Desisters are those individuals who eventually cease their violent behavior against family and intimate partners, while chronic offenders continue their behavior over time, and often with multiple victims as serial offenders (Bland & Ariel, 2015; Robinson, 2017). Across these categories are men and women as diverse as the populations within which they live, and making blanket statements about a hypothetical homogenous population of domestic offenders is unhelpful for creating good policy.

Having established the diverse nature of domestic offenders, there is evidence that shows that domestic offenders, particularly repeat and chronic offenders, are similar to common criminals because they are very likely to be engaged in common criminal activities (Drake et al., 2013; Etter & Birzer, 2007). Therefore, law enforcement approaches that are appropriate and effective for other types of criminals should be
effective for domestic offenders. The belief that domestic offenders are somehow a different category of criminal than people who commit more common street crime (i.e., burglars, robbers, car thieves, regular assailants, etc.) emanates from the idea that domestics are crimes of passion or other irrational behavior (expressive crimes) that dramatically deviate from the financially-motivated (acquisitive) roots of other common crimes (Boxall et al., 2018).

However, mounting evidence suggests that domestic violence offenders do not specialize in domestic offenses but instead are involved in a range of violent and nonviolent criminal activities, resulting in high levels of interaction with police (Feder & Dugan, 2002; Hilton & Eke, 2016; Ouellet et al., 2016; Piquero et al., 2006; Richards et al., 2013). Research shows that domestic offenders are involved in repeat criminal activity that extends beyond crimes that are domestic in nature. In a longitudinal study tracking recidivism of 342 domestic violence offenders in Massachusetts, Klein and Tobin (2008) found that the one-year recidivism rate among the domestic offenders for another domestic violence crime was 32 percent, and any crime was 43 percent. Moreover, after ten years, 60 percent recidivated for a domestic offense, and 70 percent were rearrested for any crime. Forty-three percent of the offenders were arrested four or more times after their initial domestic offense over the 10-year follow-up period. Findings suggest that domestic abusers are not specializing in domestic offenses but exhibit a long-term pattern of general, recurrent criminality. More simply stated, chronic domestic offenders are oftentimes career criminals with extensive criminal histories (Etter & Berzer, 2007; Hilton & Eke, 2016). Indeed, in a review of new media-reported firearm assaults against police during domestic calls for service, Johnson (2008) found
that 88 percent of domestic offenders who assaulted police with a firearm at the scene of a domestic incident had prior criminal arrests.

Despite past reluctance throughout the criminal justice system to treat domestic violence offenders as harshly as ordinary criminals, recent literature indicates a need to reconsider the way we perceive domestic offenders. Findings suggest that perhaps they should be processed through the system in a way that better reflects their tendencies for generalized, repeat offending. Boxall and colleagues (2018) take this approach a step further by arguing that domestic violence crimes can and should be studied from a rational choice perspective due to their similarities to other crime types. Prior research demonstrates that crime prevention, particularly within the framework of situational crime prevention, is effective for reducing crime committed by other types of expressive crimes like terrorism (Clarke & Newman, 2005) or vandalism. This argument lends support to the overarching theory that domestic offenders are more similar than dissimilar to common criminals than often believed.

A fourth commonly held belief within law enforcement and strongly championed by many of the top domestic violence organizations and researchers is that offenders of intimate partner violence (IPV) are different from offenders of other types of family violence (i.e., siblings, grown child to parent, parent to an adult child, extended family, etc.). While popular in the 1970s and 1980s literature, family violence has fallen out of favor for research, with IPV taking its place as a more common research focus. A vast body of research focuses solely on IPV, while scholarship on what was traditionally referred to as family violence that encompasses all the varieties of domestic violence
under most state laws is increasingly rare. Additionally, many programs, including national and state-wide programs for domestic violence, are concerned only with Intimate Partner Violence, particularly that against women. The Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence (FCADV), the organization that has taken responsibility from the Florida Department of Children and Family Services for a large portion of domestic violence prevention and treatment activities, is heavily focused on IPV rather than domestic violence generally.

For example, sibling violence is commonly viewed as less serious or important than other forms of domestic violence, but research shows that it is highly prevalent and harmful to its victims, both in the short-term and the long-term (Button & Gealt, 2010). Noland and colleagues (2004) found that adolescent sibling violence was a predictor for dating violence in college. However, it is often viewed as harmless and normal, and sometimes even a positive factor in the development of boys. Alternatively, in an exploratory study using convenience sample survey data of 335 college students involving questions on sibling abuse, no differences were found between male and female perpetration rates and severity of sibling abuse, and female perpetrators were more likely to commit sexual sibling abuse than males (Morril & Bachman, 2013). These findings support previous studies that indicate that males are not always the abusers as is commonly assumed, especially when it concerns non-IPV family violence (Hamel, 2009; Robertson & Murachver, 2007; Straus & Gelles, 1990).

The effect of family violence, in general, has been shown to negatively impact the development of children. When girls had exposure to family violence, a genetic marker
that affects aging and susceptibility to disease later in life was markedly negatively impacted. This finding indicates that exposure to adversity in the family, regardless of the relationship of those engaged in violence, can lead to poor long-term health outcomes (Stiles, 2002) and poor long-term behavioral outcomes (Holmes, 2013) for children. Even fetuses who experience prenatal IPV have been shown to demonstrate significant negative impacts, such as low birth weight and developmental effects after birth (Alhusen et al., 2015; Charles and Perreira, 2007; Shay-Zapien & Bullock, 2010).

Family violence has not received the same level of attention from law enforcement or criminologists that IPV has in recent years, though it represents a considerable volume of domestic violence that occurs. In Florida, domestic violence offenses involving family members constituted 33 percent of the total domestic violence offenses in the state between 2011 and 2016, including victims that were parents, children, siblings, or other family relations to the offender (FDLE, 2017). Furthermore, this number had insignificantly increased in 2018; FDLE data on domestic violence indicates that offenses in which the relationship of the victim to the offenders was listed as a parent, child, sibling, or other family constituted 34 percent of all domestic offenses reported in Florida that year (FDLE, 2020). This means that one-third of domestic violence offenses are not between intimate partners, and this is a consistent finding in Florida. This is particularly interesting because reporting rates for non-IPV domestic violence are generally lower than for IPV. The risks associated with offenders of domestic violence, regardless of the relationship to the victim, are great.
The literature on IPV does indicate that it is a serious problem around the world. The Killingbeck program previously referenced emerged out of the finding that one-third of recorded violent crime in Killingbeck, UK, was Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). Even legal statutes differentiate between IPV and non-IPV. In Florida, the law specifically states that domestic offenders of non-IPV crimes should not be required to attend court-mandated batterer’s treatment because “it will endanger victims if courts and other referral agencies refer family and household members who are not perpetrators of [IPV].”

Male victims of IPV are an understudied population, which may stem from the fact that men are victimized much less frequently than women. Cho and Wilke (2010) conducted a study using NCVS data on 2,760 victims of IPV, including 298 male and 2,462 female victims, to identify differences in the nature of IPV experienced by each sex. Men clearly reported less victimization than women and received fewer injuries, but any sustained injuries for men were more likely to be more severe. It is important to note that data from same-sex couples were not included in this study.

This trend towards focusing on only IPV may be diminishing the threat that non-IPV domestic violence (or IPV that is perpetrated by a woman against a man or within same-sex couples) poses to its victims and limits the criminal justice, social services, and victims services support of non-IPV DV victims. Perhaps it is the case that IPV offenders are more dangerous. It may be more likely that non-IPV domestic offenders pose a

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6 Florida Statute 741.325 Requirements for batterer’s intervention programs.
similar or equivalent risk to society as do offenders of IPV. In reality, these offenders share similar characteristics and are often the same individuals.

Assumptions in Summary

An exploration of four common assumptions or beliefs about domestic violence was conducted to understand how these beliefs may influence domestic violence policing policy and activities. They were selected due to their direct influence on police responses to domestic violence and included the following: (1) domestic incidents are the most dangerous calls for service that officers respond to; (2) domestic calls for service are among the most numerous types of calls most departments receive; (3) domestic offenders are very different from perpetrators of other types of crime; and (4) intimate partner violence (IPV) is more serious than other forms of domestic violence.

The first belief that domestic incidences are disproportionately more dangerous for officers than other calls was not supported by the evidence. On the contrary, domestic calls did not seem to be any more dangerous to officers, while other routine activities such as traffic stops were far more dangerous. However, it is possible that the precautions implemented in most departments concerning officer safety when responding to domestic calls may contribute to the lower actual risk level associated with them.

The second assumption that was explored was that domestic calls for service constitute the largest or one of the largest volumes of calls most departments handle. While the amount of crime in a jurisdiction will vary widely depending on its population, domestic calls do tend to be repeat calls made by the same small pool of offenders. Indeed, most aggressors and offenders will only ever have one incident. However, due to
the repeat nature of chronic domestic offenders, if a jurisdiction has a large number of repeat offenders, they may be responsible for any especially high call volume that is experienced.

The third assumption addressed was that domestic offenders aremeaningfully different from typical criminals. There is much evidence to refute this assumption, which continues to grow as domestic offenders become the focus of more police agencies for their high propensity for general criminality. Repeat and chronic domestic offenders are very likely to be engaged in common criminal activities, both violent and nonviolent. There is no support for the assumption that because domestic violence can be viewed as a “crime of passion,” domestic offenders are different from common criminals.

Finally, the fourth belief about domestic offenders that was explored was that offenders of intimate partner violence (IPV) are different from offenders of other types of family violence. This assumption leads agencies to focus much more attention on IPV than non-IPV. The research indicates that while IPV offenders may cause more damage overall, it may be difficult to justify this parsing of IPV from other types of domestic violence because of the detrimental effects of both varieties on its victims and other family members. Furthermore, focusing solely on violence perpetrated by a man against a woman limits the access that other non-typical victims, including heterosexual male victims of female violence and LGBTQ persons, have to critical police attention, services, and aid that is more readily available to female victims. Whether these assumptions or beliefs are supported by research, they tend to be the underlying motivations for one intervention over another at a police department.
Studies on Typical Police Approaches to Domestic Offenders

With the emergence of the feminist movement in the late 1970s came an upsurge in attention to the plight of battered women and discussions on gender-based violence (Daly & Chesney-Lind, 1988). Police were thrust to the forefront of the discussion, as they were increasingly considered the first line of defense against domestic violence leading to injuries and deaths. With this role came a number of approaches to policing that were adopted with the intent of improving the police response to domestic violence and ultimately reduce and prevent it.

During the same time, various psychology-based interventions targeted towards correcting offender behavior emerged. These approaches were meant to go hand-in-hand with the increased efforts from police by compelling arrestees to attend treatment. Much of the focus has been on these rehabilitation-focused approaches, along with victim assistance. One of the first, and still most popular, of such treatment programs are based on the Duluth model (Pence & Paymar, 1993), which gained popularity in the 1980s. The approach involves identifying power- and control-creating behaviors men use against their victims. It focuses on teaching offenders about alternatives to these dominating behaviors, changing attitudes about partner abuse, and creating awareness of harmful behaviors in instances of denial (Herman et al., 2014). Batterer treatment programs based on the Duluth Model, also referred to as a feminist psychoeducational approach, and similar psychoeducational approaches continue to be popular today. However, research does not show that they are effective in reducing domestic violence (Babcock et al., 2002; Feder & Dugan, 2002; Feder & Dugan, 2004; Herman et al., 2014; Stover et al., 2009).
Similar, albeit mixed, findings exist for other types of batterer’s treatments like cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). Landenberger and Lipsey (2005) found that CBT treatments that involved elements focused on anger management and interpersonal problem solving led to the greatest improvement in recidivism rates, while those that included victim impact awareness and behavior modification led to less improvement. Alternatively, Stover and colleagues (2009) found little to no effect on recidivism rates when comparing mandatory arrest, Duluth model treatments, and CBT, with all three approaches approximating a 30 percent recidivism rate after six months according to victim reporting. The researchers cautioned that victim-based reporting for these studies suffered from high rates of attrition, which may have considerably impacted the reported recidivism rates.

Despite a robust body of evidence revealing the unimpressive outcomes of these offender rehabilitation approaches, they have become engrained in the expected and typical response for domestic violence crimes. In Florida, batterer’s treatment is mandated for domestic violence offenders, which is still based on Duluth-model or CBT programs.

*Mandatory Arrest*

Around the same time that the therapy-based batterer’s treatments were developing in the 1980s, an extremely influential study was conducted in Minneapolis, Minnesota called the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, which dramatically changed the way police agencies across the country handled incidences of domestic violence (Sherman & Berk, 1984). The study sought to determine which form of police
response to a domestic violence incident had the largest effect on future domestic violence reoffending. Officers were put in one of three groups based on how they would handle the suspect in a DV situation involving a simple (misdemeanor) assault. The three potential responses were to arrest the offender, require counseling, or send the offender away for a few hours. Results indicated that mandatory arrest led to the lowest rates of recidivism for DV offenses (13 percent) compared to physical separation (26 percent), so it was deemed the most effective response. These findings supported arrest as an effective deterrent to domestic violence.

The policy implications of Sherman and Berk’s experiment were drastic and immediate, if unintended by the authors. The former Director of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), James K. Stewart, noted in 1986 that in the two years since the publishing of the Minneapolis Experiment article, forty-five percent of mid- to large-sized police departments had adopted new SOPs for domestic offenses that favored arrest (Garner & Clemmer, 1986). By 2011, mandatory or pro-arrest policies existed in twenty-nine states in the U.S., with others holding discretionary policies (American Bar Association, 2011).

Despite the original experiment’s findings, replications of the Minneapolis experiment in six U.S. cities resulted in divergent results; they showed support for the effectiveness of mandatory arrest on domestic violence recidivism in just two of the six cities (Exum et al., 2010). While subsequent replications found only low to modest support for mandatory arrest, they found moderating effects of “social bonding” of suspects, differences in effects between married and unmarried couples, employed and unemployed perpetrators, and perpetrator age and number of prior arrests (Maxwell,
Garner, & Fagan, 2001; Schmidt & Sherman, 1993; Williams, 2005). Arrest appeared to have variable effects on different types of domestic offenders in different cities. Overall, mandatory arrest as a policy for reducing offending and re-victimization was not well-supported by the studies (Schmidt & Sherman, 1993; Xie et al., 2012). Furthermore, a longer-term analysis of offender recidivism showed that arrest might reduce re-offending in the short-term, but it can increase recidivism in the long-term (Schmidt & Sherman, 1993). This finding raised serious questions about the value of arrest as the main deterrent tool to secure the safety of victims and reduce the abusive behavior of offenders.

While considerable literature exists that does not show support for mandatory arrest, including a more recent meta-analysis (Hoppe et al., 2020), there are some studies that offer a contrary view in support of the protective value of arrest. Cho and Wilke (2010) found that when analyzing NCVS data over time, perpetrator arrest was associated with a significantly lower risk of revictimization compared to when perpetrators were not arrested. Regardless of the findings of existing research, mandatory or preferred-arrest policies existed in thirty states in the U.S. as of 2019, with the remainder having what is described as discretionary policies (Chin & Cunningham, 2019).

The effect of mandatory arrest laws and other police and legal interventions on the reporting, whether by victims or other individuals, of domestic violence is the focus of considerable research. National Crime Victimization Survey data indicates that 56 percent of domestic violence incidences are reported to the police (Reaves et al., 2017; Truman et al., 2014). Arrest policies differ among states and jurisdictions, and these
policies can influence reporting trends for domestic abuse (Truman et al., 2014). A common hypothesis held by critics of mandatory arrest policies or those that involve increased police activity against the perpetrator is that they will dissuade victims from reporting violence, which may lead to more violence. Iyengar (2009) tested this hypothesis using data from the FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports from 1976 to 2003 and the National Crime Victimization Survey to determine how the implementation of mandatory arrest or preferred arrest laws affected domestic homicide, both intimate partner and general familicide. The analysis indicated that those states with pro-arrest laws saw an increase in intimate partner homicide and a decrease in other family homicides; in cases where the victim most often reported their own abuse (i.e., intimate partner abuse), reporting decreased and homicides increased, while in cases in which people other than the victim, including other family members, friends, teachers, doctors, or nurses, reported most abuse, reporting did not change significantly and homicides decreased, though not significantly.

It is important to note that an updated analysis using similar data and methods as Iyengar’s 2009 study found not only conflicting results but also identified methodological flaws in the original study that resulted in inaccurate findings (Chin & Cunningham, 2019). Chin and Cunningham found that mandatory or preferred arrest laws did not, in fact, have any significant impact on the number of intimate partner homicides in a state. Alternatively, the authors found that discretionary arrest policy states experienced a significantly reduced number of intimate partner homicides.
Other studies have sought to determine which variables and contexts may affect a victim’s decision to report or not to report violence. The effect of mandatory arrest policies on the decision to seek law enforcement assistance in intimate partner violence incidences can lead to a higher likelihood of the victim calling the police if the victim supports the mandatory arrest policy and a decline in the likelihood of calling if the victim does not support the policy. This may be leading to fewer victims reporting IPV to police rather than an actual decline in incidents (Novinsky & Peralta, 2014). According to Reaves and colleagues (2017), some reasons victims provided for not reporting domestic violence to police were to maintain personal privacy, protect the offender, considering the crime minor, and fear of retribution.

In a longitudinal study of NCVS data from 2,564 victims of IPV between 1992 and 2002, reporting incidences of domestic violence reduced recidivism and therefore acted as a strong deterrent for reoffending (Felson, Ackerman, & Gallagher, 2005). Arrests were not associated with a statistically significant reduction in recidivism, while not reporting an incident was associated with an 89 percent increase in the likelihood of a repeat offense. Offenders with prior offenses reoffended after 35 percent of unreported incidents but reoffended only 22 percent of the time after incidences that were reported to the police that did not result in arrest. Offenders with no prior DV history re-offended after 10 percent of incidences that were unreported to police and only 5 percent after a reported offense not resulting in arrest. Similar results were found for offenders who committed both misdemeanor and felony DV offenses, and the findings are not affected by race factors. This study lends support to policies that encourage reporting and officer discretion and do not rely on mandatory arrest for DV incidences.
Beyond Mandatory Arrest

As the evolution of police responses to domestic violence progressed, a more nuanced approach to handling offenders emerged, especially due to concerns that victims were reporting abuse less often to the police due to these harsh policies. While research continues on the effects – both positive and negative – of mandatory arrest, progressive police departments have been exploring other approaches to reduce and prevent domestic violence. Both research and the realities of police experience cast doubt on the ability of mandatory arrest to represent a consistently effective deterrent for domestic crime. Some examples of these newer approaches include establishing dedicated domestic violence units, second responder programs to help victims, bolstering reliance on traditional yet typically underutilized or underenforced criminal justice tools such as protective orders, offender monitoring, making warrantless arrests, and repeat offender identification.

A common concept that has been implemented by departments for better handling domestic violence is to stand up a specialized unit. Dedicated domestic violence units, which are often found in larger police agencies, provide police with more resources to fighting domestic violence by having dedicated domestic sergeants and officers and a more comprehensive approach to implementing community outreach programs (Xie, Laurinsten, and Heimer, 2012). Approximately 90 percent of large police departments have a dedicated full-time domestic violence unit (Reaves et al., 2017). There may be crime-reduction value in having such units; the size of a police agency in relation to the population it serves can affect rates of IPV victimization, with jurisdictions with more sworn officers having lower rates of victimization than those with fewer officers (Xie, Laurinsten, and Heimer, 2012).
Evidence on the effect of domestic violence units is generally supportive. Charlotte, North Carolina, stood up a domestic violence unit in 1995 (Exum et al., 2010). An impact evaluation of this approach, which combined intensive investigation and victim assistance for mostly intimate-partner violence cases deemed high priority by the unit’s sergeant, found significantly lower rates of recidivism for domestic violence offenses; Offenders processed through the domestic violence unit recidivated 50 percent less often at 18 and 30-month intervals after the initial offense than those who received a standard patrol response (Exum, Hartman, Friday, & Lord, 2010).

With the increase in dedicated domestic violence units came an interest in second-responder programs in which a victim specialist would visit the victim at home a short time after a domestic incident. In an experiment on family violence prevention in New York City based on education and victim specialist’s secondary home visits, there was an increase in calls to police for the intervention group, but victim interviews of both the control and intervention groups indicated there was no change in the amount of domestic violence occurring in either group (Davis & Taylor, 1997). The authors interpreted these findings to mean that victims felt more comfortable or were more willing to call the police in instances of abuse.

In contrast to those findings, a similar experiment for a program to reduce elder abuse with the same combinations of education and specialist home visits resulted in an increase in calls to the police for abuse in conjunction with an increase in the amount of abuse experienced, according to victimization interviews (Davis & Medina-Ariza, 2001). The authors interpreted these unexpected effects by offering three potential explanations: the program had sensitized victims to abuse and, therefore, interpreted more actions as
abuse, the program made victims more willing to report abuse to police and interviewers, or receiving the treatments caused more abuse. Further support of these findings is found in a meta-analysis of ten studies on the effects of secondary responder home visits on repeat abuse, which found that such programs did not result in a significant decline in the rates of repeat domestic violence (Davis et al., 2008).

Another popular approach to responding to domestic violence is the Coordinated Community Response (CCR), which involves deliberate, organized collaboration among various service providers to create a “system-wide response” for handling and preventing domestic violence (FCADV, 2019). In fact, the Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence (FCAVD) promoted this approach in its 2019 annual review, urging communities to include additional training for the service-providers engaged in their CCRs’ domestic response activities. However, this approach, like many of the other domestic-focused interventions that have developed in the last two decades, typically handles IPV only. Furthermore, existing studies do not show support that CCRs bring about the desired effects on communities and specifically women in those communities (Post et al., 2010; Shorey et al., 2015).

In a move towards identifying more progressive and effective policies for domestic violence, some police agencies have adopted discretionary policies that provide the responding officer flexibility in how he or she handles a domestic violence incident based on the specifics of the situation. Variables that significantly influence the likelihood of arrest can include the severity of the offense, whether a weapon was used, whether the victim suffered an injury, and if a third party reported the incident (Hirschel
& Buzawa, 2013). Other findings indicate that officers were more likely to arrest offenders if physical violence occurred or the offender had substance abuse problems, while officers were more likely to relocate the victims if the offender had mental health problems or children were present (Nesset et al., 2017). In support of policies that allow more officer discretion, Zeoli and Webster (2010) found that when state laws allow police to make warrantless arrests of Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO) violators, intimate partner homicides were reduced by 16 percent. Alternatively, laws that mandate the arrest of DVRO violators were not significantly associated with a decline in intimate partner homicide.

Law enforcement strategies for domestic violence offenders that involve a strong multi-front approach that takes advantage of the criminal justice system beyond traditional policing have shown promising results. Some court systems issue bond conditions, high bond amounts, protective orders, GPS ankle monitors, and other tools for domestic offenders. While some courts may prefer applying bond conditions to a defendant’s case during the pre-trial phase, other experts argue that protective orders are better tools to use to protect the victim (Pierce & Quillen, 2012). The process of applying for and following through with the filing of a protective order, including the evidentiary hearing, is a key step for victim safety; it may help to stop the cycle of violence and alter the power dynamics in the relationship while also establishing the legal precedent for additional police support and intervention should the offender violate its terms (Pierce & Quillen, 2012). Support for the effectiveness of protective orders in reducing violence was found in a systematic review using the EMMIE framework, where a small but significant reduction in re-victimization against victims who filed protective orders in
Australia was seen (Dowling et al., 2018). However, other research suggests that women who need protective orders the most may be the least apt to obtain them. For example, Fernandez and colleagues (1997) found that the more dependent the woman was on the abuser, and the more severe the abuse, the less likely she was to follow through to secure an order (as cited in Etter & Berzer, 2007). Federal law shows a trend towards encouraging the use of protective orders through the passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which provides states with funding for legal assistance, protective order execution, and violation enforcement (National Network to End Domestic Violence, 2017; Pierce & Quillen, 2012).

Over time, a growing body of research helps determine which police responses are effective, which are ineffective, and which may work in certain circumstances. It also offers better-informed definitions, characteristics, and *modus operandi* of domestic offenders; however, it has become clear that there exists no singular police activity or legal policy that can meaningfully reduce and prevent domestic violence. Instead, comprehensive, multi-agency strategies that acknowledge that all domestic offenders are not the same, nor should they all receive the same treatment, are growing in popularity both among police leadership and community-level stakeholders. This acknowledgment has led to the development of a wide variety of complex interventions, and lively discussion, interest, and funding have been increasingly surrounding the Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI) model that serves as an example of such a program. Based on the theory of focused deterrence (Kennedy, 1996), the OFDVI model incorporates the culmination of what police know about criminal offenders, and specifically domestic offenders, and applies simultaneous pressure and assistance across
multiple community organizations to deter offending. When deterrence is ineffective, the strategy aids police in systematically identifying and handling chronic offenders in a way that best utilizes police resources and ensures victim safety using officer discretion, shifts in officer responsibilities, and all legal avenues that may be available. The OFDVI model, as it is implemented in Hollywood, FL, is the focus of the current evaluation.

Focused Deterrence Theory

To understand how the OFDVI model is intended to work, it is important to understand the underlying theory program theory, focused deterrence, and how it developed and evolved in both academia and in its practical application as a law enforcement strategy. The basic principles of focused deterrence make it an attractive, albeit unorthodox, approach to crime-fighting for police agencies. Initially theorized and implemented in the mid-1990s, focused deterrence theory proposes that violent crimes can be reduced using an offender-based targeting strategy that harnesses the power of the entire criminal justice system in conjunction with social services, community stakeholders, and assumptions of offender rationality and social pressure to create a strong, clear, and credible deterrent force to discourage offending (Kennedy, 1996). For more than two decades, police agencies have been implementing focused deterrence, or “pulling levers policing,” to harness the power of a strong deterrence message alongside collaboration with multiple levels of community stakeholders to create a comprehensive, crime-specific reduction program for violent crimes; the approach has shown moderate crime-reduction capabilities (Braga et al., 2018; Braga & Weisburd, 2012). This type of initiative was first implemented in Boston, Massachusetts, as a youth gang homicide reduction program. It has since been applied to other acute crime problems such as open-
air drug markets and criminal group violence, both domestically and internationally (Felbab-Brown, 2013).

At the core of the strategy is the acknowledgment that it is impossible for police agencies to completely stop all types of criminal offending due to the realities of resource limitations that exist for all departments at varying degrees (Kennedy, 1996). Instead, the strategy identifies specific types of offending, such as homicide, that will receive the most resources to address. Integrally, targeting the high-risk, high-level offenders who are responsible for most of the violence is a powerfully impactful policing strategy that deters or incapacitates the worst offenders who otherwise would represent the largest burden on police resources (Braga et al., 2018; Felbab-Brown, 2013).

Due to the novelty of various elements of focused deterrence strategies which represent a departure from mainstream, traditional policing strategies, it would seem worthwhile to identify the specific ways in which focused deterrence strategies may reduce crime. However, very few studies do so, despite calls for research that focuses on identifying the mechanisms of such programs (Braga et al., 2018). As complex strategies that involve a wide range of policing, social service, community, and justice system-wide activities, analysis of these elements individually is critical for understanding the mechanisms at work in each program, but such research is limited (Engel, 2013; O’Shea, 2007; Wallace et al., 2016). In general, findings are mixed for studies that analyze the effects of individual program elements because activities expected to provide significant value to a program may not prove to be as valuable in their impact on crime reduction and recidivism. Several process evaluations exist that identify potential points of success
of focused deterrence programs related to administration and implementation, offering insight into what works and leads to desired program outcomes (Sechrist et al., 2016; Scott, 2017); these necessary elements include strong support from all necessary stakeholders, quick implementation to avoid stalling, and the involvement of a “champion” to drum up support and lead all stakeholders in the right direction (Saunders et al., 2016). Demes and colleagues (2020) describe a program champion as a person who is capable of persuading and leading groups or organizations while exhibiting characteristics like empathy, accountability, and the ability to inspire and create a collective vision to successfully facilitate program implementation. Champions are also highly dedicated to the cause and encourage learning.

Focused deterrence strategies have been identified as causing a sufficiently pronounced shift in risk of apprehension that they may effectively reduce crime through deterrence (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011). Evaluations of focused deterrence strategies demonstrate significant declines in the targeted violent crime behaviors. Generally, offender-focused policing has shown promise in its usefulness in reducing crime (Ratcliffe & Kikuchi, 2019). More specifically, Boston’s Operation Ceasefire resulted in a 31 percent reduction in total shootings involving gangs that received the treatment compared to those that did not receive the police treatment (Braga, Hureau, & Papachristos, 2014).

A systematic review of evaluations of ten focused-deterrence initiatives conducted between 2001 and 2010 targeting gang or group violence, individual crimes, and drug market violence showed statistically significant reductions in targeted violent crimes in nine out of ten of the cases (Braga & Weisburd, 2012). The authors noted that
research design was considered a limitation for this review, as with much evaluative research in criminal justice, as none of the studies included used a rigorous randomized experimental design and instead employed quasi-experimental designs involving matching with comparison groups or non-equivalent matching quasi-experimental designs (Braga & Weisburd, 2012). The systematic review was updated (Braga et al., 2018), and among the twenty-four quasi-experimental studies identified, a moderate significant crime reduction was associated with the interventions. The study estimated the overall mean effect size of the twenty-four studies using a random-effects model, which found an effect size, or Cohen’s d, of .383 (p < .05). The authors interpreted this as a moderate effect size compared to the norm for other criminal justice programs.

Alongside the supportive research for these types of programs exists a segment of research that indicates that there may be a reason to question the effectiveness of focused deterrence programs. Saunders, Robbins, and Ober (2017) caution that program success is dependent on a wide array of variables, and what works in one city may not work in another, as evinced by the mediocre results of a seven-site replication study of the Drug Market Intervention based on a successful intervention in High Point, North Carolina. Just four of the seven replication sites achieved full implementation of all the five steps defined by the High Point model (Saunders et al., 2016), and only one site saw a significant reduction in crime after one year – a 56 percent decrease in drug crime and a 28 percent decrease in crime overall (Saunders et al., 2017). Furthermore, Norris (2014) conducted an analysis of the original High Point Drug Market Intervention using survival analysis and did not find any significant difference between the recidivism rates of intervention participants and non-participants when analyzed at the individual level.
More recently, Fox and Novak (2018) analyzed a group-based focused deterrence program for homicide and gun violence in Kansas City using data from the first three years of the program implemented from 2014 through 2016. Using a time-series analysis that captured 60 months of pre-implementation crime data (2011 through 2013) and 36 months of post-implementation data, the program was found to be associated with statistically significant declines ($p < .05$) in all homicides and gun-involved non-domestic violence aggravated assaults and a non-significant decline in gang member-involved homicides in the first year. However, these effects faded over time so that by the third year, the number of homicides and gang member-involved homicides were similar to pre-intervention levels, and gun-involved aggravated assaults significantly increased above pre-intervention levels. The authors note that no research indicates that focused deterrence strategies are effective in the long-term. These studies offer an alternative, more cautionary perspective on focused deterrence programs outside of the mainstream hype that has developed surrounding the popular programs and their most prominent proponents. Most of all, they make it clear that there are elements of the programs, both concerning implementation and mechanisms, that remain poorly understood.
Chapter III: Evaluating policing strategies: Applying the EMMIE framework to a primary mixed-methods study

**Conceptualizing the EMMIE framework**

When evaluating an intervention, there are countless approaches, models, perspectives, and methods to choose from to answer the specific research questions of a given study. This chapter seeks to explore the current state of evaluations in criminal justice, with a focus on two opposing perspectives that dominate the field – positivist and realist perspectives. It will end with a recommendation for an adjusted approach that combines these two schools of thought into a form that has relevance for both science and policy – the EMMIE framework (Johnson et al., 2015).

While originally developed to improve the applicability of systematic reviews for policy decision-making, EMMIE’s creators also indicated that the framework can and should be used to design and implement primary evaluative studies of programs and interventions. Within criminology and criminal justice, the EMMIE framework is based on five elements that provide a streamlined methodology for identifying and assessing evidence in both systematic reviews and primary evaluation studies. The five elements are as follows: (1) determine the effect size and direction of the program; (2) identify the mechanisms through which the program works; (3) identify the moderating variables and contexts that influence the program activities; (4) identify implementation successes and failures; and (5) identify the program’s economics, or financial costs and benefits. To demonstrate the model’s applicability for conducting a primary mixed-methods
evaluative study, the EMMIE framework was chosen as the model for the current evaluation.

**Why is there a need for an adjusted approach to evaluations?**

The last two decades have seen an increase in requirements from funding agencies for evaluations of programs and interventions in law enforcement. This trend is resulting in the expansion of evaluation theories, with the two predominant perspectives emanating from positivist and realist schools of research. The positivist approaches, situated within the sub-field of evidence-based policing, draw from evidence-based policy in other fields, such as medicine, healthcare, and education, while the realist approach is based on early works of social scientists and philosophers. Though the perspectives are often laid in stark contrast to one another, recent attempts have been made to reconcile the differences between them; the result would be a comprehensive yet evidence-based form of program evaluation that may offer the explanatory power required to develop effective, widely adoptable policies in policing and law enforcement.

Proponents of both camps admit that there are weaknesses inherent in either approach; a combined approach for evaluation can offer a balance between the rigorous quantitative requirements of evidence-based approaches and the comprehensive, theory-driven basis of realistic evaluation. Doing so can help researchers to capture more fully the *what, how, and why* of a program, simultaneously driving theory and policing strategy development that is neither too context-specific nor blind to contextual considerations. Literature exploring the emergence, development, and reconciliation of these contrasting
perspectives in evaluation will be discussed, with a look at the EMMIE framework as an example of the merger of the two schools of thought.

The growing expectations and requirements for program evaluation to establish program effectiveness in criminal justice in recent years relates to a trend in evidence-based criminology; funding organizations and agencies want to know what is happening with resources, specifically, money, devoted to crime reduction and prevention activities amid resource scarcity and increased public scrutiny of law enforcement agencies (Ekstrand & Rezmovic, 2003; Martin, 2015; Myers & Spraitz, 2011). Past reliance on process evaluation of programs rather than impact evaluations, particularly of federally-funded programs in the US, provided little in the way of guidance for administrators to choose between the abundant choices available for handling a particular crime problem in the most effective and efficient way (Sherman et al., 1997). Since the lack of informative evaluations was recognized as an impediment to developing sound criminal justice policies, the branch of evaluation within criminology and criminal justice has undergone an expansion into a considerable specialization that seeks to establish best practices for assessing program effectiveness in law enforcement.

*Literature Review*

*Background*

To begin a discussion on the various approaches emanating in response to the current trend under consideration, a description of the context in which it has developed will aid in understanding the emergence of the various perspectives. In between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, program evaluations in criminology and criminal justice were
generally limited to non-experimental designed studies. A select few seminal experimental studies that were published during this time, including the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (Sherman & Berk, 1984), the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al., 1974), the Kansas City police response time experiment (Pate et al., 1976), and the Intensive Supervision Probation/Parole (ISP) experiment (Petersilia & Turner, 1993). These studies greatly contributed to the actualization of experimental methods in evaluation based on evidence rather than hunches, intuition, or anecdotes of police administrators (Travis, 1994). These studies did, and in some cases continue to, highly influence policing policies in significant ways.

A decade later, between 2002 and 2003, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified weaknesses in design and implementation of federally-funded outcome evaluative studies of criminal justice programs, which was resulting in considerable waste of government resources, as well as hampering any usefulness the evaluation may have had in informing policy (Ekstrand & Rezmovic, 2003). These findings, in addition to others from a variety of literature on the state of evaluation in criminal justice (Nutley et al., 2000; Vaessen & Leeuw, 2010), increased demands for accountability in law enforcement, from both funding agencies as well as from the communities being served; they simultaneously increased the attraction towards scientifically-based decision-making in policing. This shift mirrors those that have also occurred in other fields, with evidence-based practice spreading through the fields of education, health care, social services, and medicine (Lumsden & Goode, 2016).
Among scholars in Criminology and Criminal Justice, the trend towards increased reporting and evaluation requirements is manifesting as an expansion of interest in and emphasis on the evaluation stage or component of a project or intervention, an oft-ignored or forgotten step in the program life cycle (National Research Council, 2005). The early experimental studies in criminology and criminal justice demonstrated how replications of original experiments could complicate assessments of determining which interventions “worked” or “did not work” because they oftentimes could not reproduce the findings of the original study (Travis, 1994). Evidence of this phenomenon can be found in a number of studies and their subsequent replications, such as Sherman and Berk’s (1984) Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (Iyengar, 2009; Maxwell et al., 2001; Schmidt & Sherman, 1993; Stover et al., 2009; Williams, 2006), the D.A.R.E. youth drug and alcohol abstinence program (West & O'Neal, 2004), and the more recent HOPE probation program (Lattimore et al., 2018).

An experiment that exemplifies the challenges faced early in the emergence of experimentation in criminal justice is found in the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment. Debate continues more than thirty years after Sherman and Berk’s (1984) original study and numerous subsequent replications about whether arrest, particularly in the context of mandatory arrest policies, is an effective deterrent for domestic violence. In contrast to the study’s original, highly-lauded findings of arrest being a recommendable response, further study has muddied the initial findings and created skepticism about the value and wisdom of mandatory and pro-arrest policies for domestic violence offenders (Iyengar, 2009; Schmidt & Sherman, 1993; Stover et al., 2009; Williams, 2006). Yet, in a re-analysis of evidence from the replications, Maxwell,
Garner, and Fagan (2001) found that the interventions showed modest support for the effectiveness of arrest in reducing repeat domestic violence, though other factors were found to be more influential on the likelihood of reoffending. Chin and Cunningham (2019) found that mandatory and preferred arrest policies had no significant impact on the number of intimate partner homicides in a state.

However, despite the authors’ cautions against taking the original study’s findings as an unequivocal endorsement of one policy or another, the Minneapolis Experiment had an immediate, dramatic influence on domestic violence policy across the country (Schmidt & Sherman, 1993), and its impacts continue to be seen in current policies (Chin et al., 2019, Iyengar, 2009). Twenty-three states had mandatory or preferred arrest policies in 2019 (Chin et al., 2019). The Minneapolis Experiment is just one of many examples of the use of experiments in criminology that contributed to the uptake of experimental research by demonstrating the attractiveness of scientific evidence within law enforcement policymaking. The study also demonstrated the risks involved in applying such methods in social science research. Specifically, it demonstrated how influential one single study could be in policymaking, especially if decision-makers are desperate for a solution for a specific crime problem. Research on domestic violence policing policies continues to demonstrate the importance of avoiding this type of policy bandwagoning and instead basing policy decisions on a more rigorous, robust evidence base. Additionally, most post-hoc evaluations of mandatory arrest policies have focused on whether they work but have largely ignored investigations into how or why they do or should work.
Several developments at the beginning of the 21st century contributed to the continued rise of interest in evidence-based policies and the types of evaluations that would best support them. One development that offered detailed, specific guidance for researchers conducting systematic reviews came from the creation of the Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice Group (Farrington & Petrosino, 2001). Shortly thereafter, the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP, 2018) was established at George Mason University, offering resources on evidence-based policing, place-based policing strategies, systematic reviews, and criminal justice policy. In 2013, a British academic consortium established the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction (WWCCR) as a clearinghouse for evidence-based research on crime prevention and law enforcement strategies for open-access by police officers, policymakers, and academics (College of Policing, 2017). These organizations, in addition to others, not only provide resources for police and administrators to learn about effective policing strategies but also create platforms for dissemination of and collaboration in evidence-based policing research. This push for the professionalization of law enforcement through the identification and implementation of validated strategies coincided with a growing interest in applying popular theory-based evaluation techniques to the field of criminal justice, resulting in the emergence of two main perspectives in criminal justice evaluation – positivism and realism.

**Perspectives in Evaluation**

Various academic perspectives have emerged with guidance on what is necessary and appropriate for a legitimate evaluative study. The perspectives of interest for the current project are those rooted in positivism, such as evidence-based policing,
experimental criminology, and crime science, and the realist perspective promoted in Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) *Realistic Evaluation*. A combined approach will be more valuable for the current study than conventional evaluation methods for two reasons; *first*, it will help fill the void of theory-driven evaluation in focused deterrence literature, especially concerning domestic violence initiatives, to provide better insight into how these programs may work, while simultaneously determining if the program was effective in reducing crime. *Second*, this project will provide the first-ever application of a combined approach intended for systematic reviews to a primary evaluative study to demonstrate its applicability and value in primary research. By simultaneously offering an evaluation of the program’s processes and outcomes, this EMMIE-based study can provide a broader understanding of the program being evaluated. To better understand the differences between the two perspectives and to justify the need for a combined approach, it is necessary to thoroughly discuss each perspective and identify the contributions to evaluation research in criminal justice made by proponents of each school of thought.

*Positivism & Evidence-Based Policing*

In the early 2000s, strong proponents of positivist evidence-based policing pushed for increased reliance on more rigorous methods for criminological research. These scholars sought to reduce the potential for bias, such as that inherent in observational or other qualitative research, in the process of developing evidence for effective crime control strategies (National Research Council, 2005). The perspective then took hold in the U.K. after major cutbacks on funding for law enforcement occurred in reaction to the 2008 recession, which required agencies to function effectively with fewer resources.
One way to do that was to home in on policing strategies that worked well yet were cost-effective (Lumsden & Goode, 2016). As research began to show that traditional policing strategies based on random patrol and mostly reactionary responses were not effective for crime prevention (Weisburd & Eck, 2004), there was an increased interest in identifying progressive strategies that were effective.

Within the scope of the evidence-based policing perspective lie experimental criminology and crime science (Brown et al., 2018). Experimental criminology is a specialization which attempts to determine crime control strategies that are scientifically shown to be effective through the use of rigorous experimental designs and methodologies (Sherman et al., 1997). Crime science is a perspective that seeks to apply science to crime prevention, with a focus on outcomes of interventions rather than the root causes of crime, which sets it in contrast to mainstream criminology (Laycock, 2008). Crime scientists use interdisciplinary approaches to identify strategies and test them empirically, with many of the crime problems and solutions based on environmental criminology and situational crime prevention (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). In general, these approaches have most commonly been applied to place- and time-based crime.

Experimental criminology considers randomized controlled experimental designs the most appropriate and strongest approach to gaining reliable knowledge about which crime control strategies work or do not work. Alternatively, evaluations that only draw a correlation of the implementation of a program with a measure of crime at one point in time are considered the weakest and least reliable (Sherman et al., 1997). The basis for valuing more rigorous methods, and further rejecting non-experimental methods, is
rooted in the consistent, moderate, and significant findings that less-rigorous methods are more likely to show larger effects, while more rigorous methods are less likely to show significant effects (Weisburd et al., 2001; Welsh et al., 2011). However, when studies using a true experimental design are not feasible or available for review, rigorous quasi-experimental designs are an acceptable alternative within this perspective (Braga et al., 2012).

A selection of notable research conducted from the experimental criminology perspective has informed or continues to attempt to inform police administrators of effective policing activities, strategies, and tools to improve the profession. These studies include those on the effects of body-worn cameras by police officers (Ariel et al., 2015; Jennings et al., 2015), hot spots policing (Braga, Papachristos & Hureau, 2014; Weisburd & Green, 1995), alley-gating (Bowers et al., 2004), community-oriented policing (Gill et al., 2014), and crime displacement (Bowers et al., 2011; Guerette & Bowers, 2009). Equally as important are those experimental studies that fail to produce the intended results; studies that do not support the effectiveness of the intervention being tested can help researchers identify which interventions may not work as intended (Santos & Santos, 2016). However, it is generally acknowledged that there are far fewer studies published with negative findings that do not support the intended results than there should be, likely due to publication bias (Franco et al., 2014).

Criticisms of experimental criminology stem from various sources of skepticism or epistemological disagreement; some are related to negative perceptions of or attitudes towards the use of experiments in criminology from ethical or moral arguments
(Weisburd, 2003), while some relate to differences in the value of various forms of evidence (Brown et al., 2018). Lumsden & Goode (2016) cite divergence on what constitutes useful research as a drawback of evidenced-based practice, arguing that the marginalization or de-legitimization of qualitative research in the field may result in a major loss in the knowledge that would hinder effective policy-making. Furthermore, some have noticed a reluctance or resistance to replicating previous studies that can demotivate stakeholders, particularly police administrators, from participating in experimental research that is necessary for building an evidence base (Huey, 2015).

Other criticisms of evidence-based policing may relate to norms and available resources within the field of criminology. For scholars, especially students and early-career researchers, the lack of exposure to, comfortability with, and funding for experiments have been identified as barriers to their use (Lum & Yang, 2005). A study by Lum and Yang (2005) on researcher decisions about which methodology to use for evaluations of crime reduction interventions suggests that experimental research methods were used less often by criminologists when compared to psychologists and sociologists. These differences may have stemmed from disciplinary norms, formal education, and informal training, including mentorship and influence from colleagues and pressure from funding agencies demanding quick answers to pressing policy questions. It is apparent that experimental designs are not as common in criminology as in other fields (Kleck et al., 2006), though their use since Lum and Yang’s 2005 study has likely increased for several reasons, including the growth of evidence-based policing, which promotes their use (Weisburd, 2003). Indeed, prominent scholars in the field concede, based on the findings of a systematic review of randomized experiments in criminology, that there are
two critical elements needed for conducting such studies and increasing their prevalence; there needs to be access to federal funding and the support of a stronger network of skilled experimental criminologists willing to mentor graduate students to grow the social capital of a field dominated by a small number of scholars (Braga, Welsh, Papachristos, Schnell, & Grossman, 2014).

Realist Evaluation in Policing

Around the same time that evidence-based policing has been growing in popularity, an alternative perspective referred to as realist (or realistic) evaluation has been gaining momentum. Practitioners and scholars in this school of thought seek to determine the causal mechanisms underlying the changes (or lack thereof) related to program implementation to explain why a program may or may not have had the intended effect (Astbury & Leeuw, 2010; Pawson & Tilly, 1997). As Johnson and colleagues (2015) explain, the realist perspective, as opposed to the positivist perspective of evidence-based policing, posits that high-quality evaluations that go beyond measuring one or two effect sizes are necessary for not only identifying what “has worked” or what “can work,” but what “will work”; they are about going deeper to determine the how and why something may have worked (or failed), and what conditions are necessary for a program or activity to be effective and efficient. As previously discussed in reference to the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (Sherman & Berk, 1984), what may work for one jurisdiction at one time, under certain circumstances and leadership, should not be expected to produce similar effects in a different jurisdiction under inevitably different circumstances without evidence indicating as much (Mihalic & Irwin, 2003).
The modern realist perspective in criminology is credited to Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) book, which lays out the tenants of realism in evaluation research based on the work of Popper (1945) and Campbell (1999), highlighting some criticisms of positivist perspectives on social science research. Core principles underlying the perspective include a concern with identifying the unseen causes of outcomes of police activities and building theory based on the accumulation of tests of various theories during an iterative evaluation process. The goal is to establish theories that are neither too inclusive nor too ambitious, yet broad enough to contribute to criminological progress outside of a specific situation (Pawson & Tilley, 2004). The approach eschews the suggestion that a radical change may be a consistently achievable outcome universally. Realist evaluation can be carried out using the most appropriate methods for the project at hand, and the use of mixed-methods is encouraged (Tilley, 2016). As a theory-driven approach, the theories developed at the onset of research are just as important, or more so, than the research methods chosen to test them (Chen & Rossi, 1987).

Methods of the realist evaluation perspective require considerable effort spent on identifying the theories underlying the intervention’s activities before attempting to assess its impact (Pawson & Tilly, 2004). Rather than identifying one theory on which to base an intervention, realism begins with the development of multiple hypotheses based on multiple different theories. Using these theories, the researcher attempts to explain how an intervention works as a combination of simultaneous activities functioning at the same time. This is done by identifying the mechanisms through which an intervention creates change and the contexts in which the intervention is operating. These kinetic chains of activities and reactions are termed Context-Mechanism-Outcome-
Configurations (CMOC) theories, and their identification is crucial to the understanding of a program or program element (Tilley, 2010).

**Doctrines in Comparison**

With a comparable interest in identifying successful interventions, the focus of experimental criminology differs greatly from that of realist evaluation. Both rely on the accumulation of research findings from multiple studies and replications to develop a body of evidence from which to draw conclusions about the efficacy of an intervention or strategy. However, the differences in how practitioners of each perspective would establish, develop, and assess that evidence are considerable. One difference is epistemological, with positivists on one hand who take the results of rigorous experimentation as evidence that something works based on successful outcomes. Alternatively, realists consider no single study as sufficient for establishing a sound theory and, rather, require iterative testing, adapting, and re-testing in cycles of research about the same phenomenon to develop a middle-range theory that is acknowledged as fallible and ever-changing (Merton, 1968; Pawson, 2000; Tilly, 2010).

Another difference is found in which methods are acceptable for evaluating an intervention; as previously noted, evidence-based criminology does not highly value qualitative research, rather pushing for rigorous experimental or quasi-experimental methods. In contrast, realist evaluation can involve the best combination of methods necessary to test the theories relevant to the program, including both quantitative and qualitative methods (Tilley, 2016). There has been a recent softening of the hardline position of some researchers in evidence-based policing due to the limits of experimental
criminology and crime science to offer comprehensive solutions to some of criminology’s most complex research questions. These questions may require methods held outside the boundaries of these perspectives (Brown et al., 2018).

To better elucidate the differences between experimental criminology and realist evaluation, the debate over whether arrest is an effective deterrent for domestic violence offenders provides an example. The first experiment to investigate the effect of arrest on domestic violence reoffending after an initial incident (Sherman & Berk, 1984) was a classic randomized controlled experiment with three potential police responses: (1) the traditional response of sending the offender away for eight hours to cool off; (2) advise the couple to get counseling or seek assistance to resolve their issues; or (3) arrest. In short, the act and experience of arrest at the time of a probable domestic violence crime was hypothesized to deter a repeat offense. Over the study period of six months, results indicated that arrest led to a fifty percent reduction in the likelihood of the same victim being assaulted by the same offender after arrest, with the other responses being less effective.

In reaction to these results, states acted swiftly to implement mandatory arrest policies. However, subsequent replications in six states using larger sample sizes and a mix of variations in alternative responses returned results that did not support the original finding (Schmidt & Sherman, 1993). It was found that arrest affected particular offenders differently, and backfire effects were seen for certain groups of offenders. It was only after the failure of the replications that consideration for why the intervention worked for some but not for others was begun. It was through these post-hoc considerations that two
conclusions were drawn. First, victims abused by unemployed offenders were at greater risk of future abuse under a mandatory arrest policy because arrest affected unemployed offenders differently than employed offenders. Second, mandatory arrest may have reduced recidivism in the short-term but increased it in the long-term.

While these findings were informative for future research, the aforementioned studies failed to explain why arrest had the varying effects that it did, thus demarcating a major difference between experimental criminology and realist evaluation. In contrast to the randomized controlled experimental design implemented in the Minneapolis Experiment and its replications, a realist evaluation would have sought to identify the Context-Mechanism Outcome Configurations (CMOCs) of the intervention and then to determine the best methods to test them. In the case of the Minneapolis Experiment, this would have meant identifying those contexts that inhibited program effectiveness, such as offender and victim socioeconomic, employment, and marital status, cultural norms, offender criminal history, and others, before beginning any evaluation and hypothesizing how the contexts may affect program outcomes. Doing so may not only lead to more effective interventions but also help to identify negative backfire effects that could arise from certain contextual realities.

In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the mechanisms, as opposed to the activities, responsible for program effects are pre-conceived and therefore testable against a theory. The mechanisms in the Minneapolis Experiment that led to the desired outcome of a reduction in reoffending may have included (1) deterrence of the offender, (2) offender incapacitation, and/or (3) a reduction in victim reporting of abuse. In addition,
the mechanisms that may have led to unintended outcomes or additional abuse may have included (1) offender aggravation and retaliation against the victim, (2) low stake-in-conformity, or (3) social isolation of the victim leading to a lack of social network. This approach may have led to a more well-rounded assessment of the situations in which arrest would be helpful and the identification of offenders for whom arrest was a deterrent, rather than a broad statement about whether arrest “worked” to prevent reoffending.

Despite the protracted “paradigm war” between proponents of the two perspectives (Morris et al., 2020), both offer benefits to scholars seeking to evaluate an intervention or program. Experimental criminology enjoys the backing and prestige of the scientific community based on an established history of using randomized controlled trials for evaluation in other fields (Lumsden & Goode, 2016). Many researchers in criminology assert that true experimentation is the best method to determine what works and what does not due to the clarity of the scientific process and the ability to rule out alternative hypotheses by using control conditions and manipulating independent variables (Weisburd, 2003). The results of an experiment can be clearer than those of qualitative research (i.e., the treatment had an effect or it did not, what direction the effect was in), making the finding conducive for dissemination in the form of a quick summary that can be easily digested by a wide audience of experts and non-experts alike (see The Campbell Collaboration, 2018; The Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy, 2018; The What Works Centre for Crime Reduction, 2017). Additionally, experimental findings can be more easily comparable across studies, such as in systematic reviews and meta-analyses, than those found in non-experimental studies, especially due to the value
rankings applied to the various quantitative research designs (Farrington & Petrosino, 2001).

However, there may be a reason to temper excitement for the findings of many studies in criminology, for Barnes and colleagues (2018) explain that the field may be entering into a crisis of confidence due to the low statistical power of many existing studies. While studies will likely provide the statistical significance of an analysis, the statistical power of the study is not always indicated, and Barnes’ study finds that it would likely be quite low; more than half of the 270 eligible statistical test results included across 81 meta-analyses that were analyzed for reported effect and sample sizes were found to be low or very low in statistical power. Highly significant findings in studies with low statistical power can over-inflate findings and lead to overstated confidence in the effect of an intervention. As was seen in the early literature on the Minneapolis Experiment and other exuberantly promoted programs, one or two studies that show fantastic results may, in reality, be too good to be true. Better care should be taken to simultaneously consider the tenants of positivism and realism to arrive at a more sensible, trustworthy approach.

There are two strategies that can be taken to improve criminological evaluations. First, as Sherman and colleagues (2007) and Weisburd (2003) argue, robust methods will move the field closer towards scientifically identifying effective crime reduction strategies. Second, as Merton (1968), Pawson (2000), and Tilly (2010) recommend, the field would benefit the most from the identification of middle-range theories, as opposed to those on the extremes, which are expected to be modified, corrected, and built upon
over time. Therefore, confidence in research in criminology and criminal justice may
grow with the expansion of studies that seek to inform reasonable theories (and their
related interventions) using methods and reporting that accurately reflect the real-world
(i.e., relative) significance of any intervention, including both results that support and do
not support the studies’ given hypotheses. A comparison of the perspectives is provided
in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Evaluation Perspectives in Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Both Perspectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Experimental results-driven</td>
<td>Theory-driven</td>
<td>Develop evidence base for interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Randomized controlled experiments</td>
<td>Mixed-methods</td>
<td>Value reproduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytics</td>
<td>Quantitative methods</td>
<td>Iterative</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seeks to Determine</td>
<td>Effects &amp; outcomes of activities</td>
<td>“Middle-range theory” Effects of underlying mechanisms</td>
<td>Policing policies that will prevent and reduce crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reconciling Positivism & Realism Using EMMIE**

Recently, there have been a number of proponents of establishing a more
balanced approach to research and evaluation in criminology that identifies the most
valuable elements of both positivist and realist perspectives while loosening the more
restrictive and limiting elements of each (Graham, 2011; Greene, 2014; Johnson et al.,
2015; Van der Knaap et al., 2008). In what may be considered an attempt to meld the
tenants of experimental criminology with those of realist criminology, a novel framework
around which primary studies and systematic reviews of existing research can be
conducted and evaluated has been developed. The EMMIE framework establishes a blueprint for how criminological research for crime prevention strategies should be carried out, with emphasis on both the mechanisms and contexts of an intervention and a preference for rigorous experimental methods for testing and evaluating interventions (Johnson et al., 2015).

With the rise of evidence-based policing has come the realization that a relatively small proportion of studies available to practitioners qualify as practically-useful high-quality evidence. Even expertly designed and conducted experiments can suffer from low external validity due to the highly variable nature of crime, criminals, police, and the environments in which they operate (Brown et al., 2018). An experiment alone, even if replicated, cannot provide sufficient information for practitioners about how to effectively police, making its results only partially useful. Aside from the rather limited number of well-implemented randomized experiments in policing, studies involving weaker designs, less-rigorous methods, small sample sizes, lack of consistent reporting of effects, devoid of assessments of other elements of a program outside of the targeted crime measure, neglect of implementation and processes, and other pitfalls can reduce the value of a study from this perspective of research (Brown et al., 2018). Additionally, low-quality evidence may ignore the contexts and mechanisms of a program, providing a blanket statement of the efficacy of an intervention without offering much-needed insight into how the program worked and for whom. In practice, these limitations are not dramatically different from those of a context-specific, randomized-controlled-trial that lacks details about implementation, scalability, costs, and other factors that ultimately affect intervention outcomes. Low-quality evidence also makes identifying key elements
of implementation and dosage that may have highly influenced program outcomes impossible (Graham, 2011).

Sampson (2010) proposes that both experimental and observational research can be used in combination to improve both science and policy in criminal justice, and this requires that the assumptions and limitations of both methods be carefully considered in every study. The EMMIE framework is well-positioned to resolve these tensions by advocating a mixed-methods approach based on sound scientific principles, with a preference towards using the most rigorous methods possible based on the research questions being asked. The goal is to reach a balance between evidence-seeking for determining program effects and explanation of outcomes and their causes for unveiling a deeper understanding of programs and their activities (Johnson et al., 2015).

Perhaps one of the most valuable benefits of expanding the framework’s popularity lies in its potential to encourage researchers to think more deeply about why and how a policing intervention might work. Thornton and colleagues (2019) conducted a review of seventy systematic reviews and meta-analyses on crime reduction interventions and found that 64 percent included little to no mention of the mechanisms of the interventions being studied, with some providing a general blanket statement of how an intervention could have produced a certain outcome. A clear theory of change or a full theoretical model was provided in 21 percent and 11 percent of studies, respectively, and just two reviews included an empirical test of the proposed mechanisms. Some scholars argue that advancing the scientific approach in criminology will require significantly more detailed consideration for and testing of mechanisms (and their underlying
theories), rather than relying so heavily on test results to tell the whole story about what works in policing (Cowen & Cartwright, 2019).

The EMMIE framework is based on five main elements that intend to offer a comprehensive evaluation of evidence of five key components of a program, as identified by Johnson and colleagues (2015): (1) effect size and direction; (2) mechanisms/mediating variables through which the program works; (3) moderating variables/context that influence the activities; (4) specific implementation successes and failures; and (5) economic evaluation. Previous studies and evaluations of policing paradigms offer little in the way of identifying specific mechanisms that are responsible for certain effects, such as a decline in the targeted crime, a reduction in offender recidivism, or an improvement in community-police relations (Weisburd et al., 2015). This includes a lack of detailed information about and consideration of program implementation, which is often the case in impact-focused evaluations.

Another benefit of the EMMIE framework is that it may provide a better platform from which to develop evaluations of interventions that are not place-based but rather offender-based. As previously discussed, evidence-based policing literature most often addresses the spatio-temporal characteristics of crime, including environmental criminology, situational crime prevention, and other crime problems that are commonly addressed within problem-oriented policing. Thus far, the EMMIE framework has been applied to place-based and situational crime prevention interventions (Perkins et al., n.d.; Sidebottom et al., 2016). The current study seeks to demonstrate that the framework can
be used to evaluate offender-based policing interventions that have little to do with places and everything to do with people.

As with many interventions in criminal justice, offender-based programs can be highly complex and involve multiple elements that function concertedly in varying degrees of effort, dosage, and organization. In general, findings are mixed for studies that analyze the effects of individual program elements, as activities expected to provide significant value to a program may not be as valuable as expected in their impact on crime reduction and recidivism (Engel et al., 2013; Norris, 2014). This may also be true for program elements that are unintentional or result from official activities. For example, a program that involves increased levels of police contact with offenders may actually increase the propensity for future offending for those individuals, based on findings that more police contact among juveniles can lead to increases in offending and deviant attitudes (Liberman et al., 2014; Wiley & Esbensen, 2016). Additionally, the level of dosage of interventions can be highly influential in the program outcomes, with weak interventions causing a backfire effect due to insufficient levels of intervention intensity (Linning & Eck, 2018). At higher levels, a seemingly ineffective intervention may have a significant desired effect. Identifying specific activities that can work and those that increase harm, and determining how and why a given outcome occurs, is critical for understanding how to effectively reduce crime (Pawson & Tilley, 1997).

An example of an opportunity to demonstrate the value of a combined approach to evaluation is the application of the EMMIE framework to the current evaluation of an offender-based focused deterrence policing initiative for domestic violence. Despite the
lack of precedence for conducting an EMMIE-based primary evaluation for a complex program such as focused deterrence, it offers the potential to help develop the theories behind these programs that currently suffer from a deficit of substantial theoretical discourse. To echo the dilemma that evaluators of focused deterrence programs encounter regularly, evaluations rarely include standardized effect sizes and suffer from “reporting validity,” which impedes comparability and inclusion in meta-analyses and systematic reviews (see Braga & Weisburd, 2012). In addition, there is little consideration of the mechanisms outside of deterrence theory that could be working in focused deterrence strategies (Braga et al., 2018; Braga & Weisburd, 2012). For example, letters and targeted written notifications, as well as verbal notifications in the form of “call-in meetings,” are integral parts of focused deterrence programs, as if they are assumed to cause some specific effect; however, little research has assessed this effect or the role letters play in deterrence strategies. As part of the EMMIE evaluation framework, these and other activities would need to be analyzed for their underlying mechanisms and the associated theoretical explanations for how they may cause a change in offenders’ behavior.

*Process and Impact Evaluations in the Context of EMMIE*

Because the EMMIE framework inherently includes elements that cover what would traditionally be broken down into process and outcome evaluations, it creates an expectation for evaluators that a complete assessment must include both. Program effects and implementation appear to be given the same weight as its effects and costs, prompting investigators to provide enough information to satisfy all the requirements of the framework. This is good news for the state of policing program evaluations because, as Manning and colleagues (2016) indicate, a very small proportion of criminal justice
evaluation research involves cost considerations for implementing programs. Further, putting all of the attention on impacts without sufficient consideration of the processes and contexts involved in an intervention can be limited in value, or even inappropriate, given the vast influence these elements can have on the success or failure of a program (National Research Council, 2005). The current study seeks to satisfy the requirements of an EMMIE study by dividing the framework’s elements into two distinct sections – a process evaluation and an impact evaluation.

Conclusion

Though the two perspectives of evaluation identified here continue to prompt scholarly engagement in epistemological discourse, the recent efforts to reconcile the best features of each perspective into a concise framework create an attractive option for program evaluators. Among the most prominent scholars on both ends of the spectrum, there are strong indications that the framework receives support from realists and positivists alike, in a sign that reconciliation of the two schools may be possible and practical in criminology. For example, Tilly (2016) advocates for the application of EMMIE as a pragmatic approach to program evaluation in policing, stating the following about the evidence base for criminal justice interventions assessed from the perspective of the EMMIE evidence rating system:

It has been sobering to find how thin the evidence base is. It is clear that primary studies have not been designed to meet EMMIE needs and …. they are thereby of rather limited use to [programmes, policies, and practices (PPP)] decision-makers.
Primary evaluation studies would better meet PPP decision-maker needs if framed in EMMIE terms (p. 310).

Ronald V. Clarke, the original architect of situational crime prevention, states that there is a “clear affinity between realistic evaluation and situational crime prevention” which can be exploited to improve current approaches to criminological inquiry (Clarke, 2019, np). The EMMIE framework should be applied to a wider variety of intervention types outside of place-based crime prevention efforts to demonstrate its applicability to many forms of policing and law enforcement interventions and programs. Doing so would encourage researchers to spend more time considering what exactly may be leading to the results they find during the course of their study (Thornton et al., 2019).

As laid out in the current discussion, taking evaluation to this more comprehensive level has myriad benefits, but two are particularly salient in the present law enforcement environment. First, law enforcement agencies are typically unable or unwilling to implement expensive, resource-intensive interventions without grants – federal or otherwise – and once grant money is spent, it is likely that intervention activities eventually fade out or get dropped altogether due to lack of resources. Therefore, it should be a priority to identify which activities are sustainable and worth the investment because they lead to improved crime outcomes with justifiable resource requirements. Doing so would also require evaluators to identify those interventions that do not provide results that are commensurate with their costs, risks, and manpower requirements. Programs under the umbrella of focused deterrence require large amounts of grant money to develop and implement, but it remains unclear how all of the
simultaneous activities under such financially hefty programs lead to the benefits that might result from them. If less costly yet effective elements of the framework can be adopted, more departments would have access to the benefits associated with the tenants of focused deterrence without the large financial burden of implementing the entire suite of program activities.

Second, simply testing whether or not an intervention can reduce crime is insufficient for informing policing policy; evaluators should go beyond “what works” to develop a nuanced explanation for how a program may work, why, for whom, and in which contexts. In the end, police administrators and policymakers, who are the ultimate consumers of policing research, deserve to receive guidance on how to reduce crime in their jurisdictions that is rooted simultaneously in science and real-world actualities.
Chapter IV: The Hollywood OFDVI: Process Evaluation

Introduction

Within the structure of the EMMIE framework is a requirement compelling researchers to consider program processes, or (I)mplementation, in the overall program evaluation. As has been reiterated throughout the current study, a program evaluation that offers only effects without processes is of limited use to practitioners and academics alike; the processes involved in program implementation are integral to its outcomes. These processes can be further analyzed for their underlying (M)echanisms that may explain how and why the program affects its targeted population and the (M)oderating contexts that can influence program effects. Therefore, the following chapter will provide an evaluation of the processes and mechanisms involved in the implementation of the OFDVI in Hollywood, FL.

Because this is the first known primary comprehensive program evaluation to employ the EMMIE framework, the current study is considered to be a primary evaluation intended to be included in a systematic review at a later date. Therefore, the current study considers the EMMIE-Q scale to be a guide for producing a useful product that meets the high-quality thresholds whenever possible. The EMMIE-Q evidence quality rating is a five-point scale used to assess the quality of evidence used to inform the five EMMIE components (Johnson et al., 2015). Evidence for each component is rated from zero to four, with zero being the weakest and four being the strongest, based on its level of robustness, comprehensiveness, and usefulness in serving its purpose to inform a research question. In association with each EMMIE-Q score, Johnson and
colleagues list various types of evidence, or EMMIE-E, that can be used to answer research questions related to the five EMMIE components. These evidential elements are then rated on the EMMIE-Q scale to find a score with which to define the evidence. To facilitate the use of this study in a potential future systematic review and to demonstrate the practical application of the EMMIE approach to a primary study, I will provide a self-assessed EMMIE-Q score to the evidence presented for each element.

There is a specific EMMIE-Q rating for evidence of each of the five components of the framework. The evidence, or EMMIE-E, for (I)mplementation is described as including “a list [or] statement of [the] key components necessary for implementation of [the] … intervention” and the “key components deemed necessary for replication elsewhere.” The highest-rated evidence for the (I)mplementation element, Level 4, requires a “complete evidence-based account of expected levels of fidelity to program” and “[a description of] expected obstacles and specification of elements necessary for replication elsewhere.” (p. 465). The second-highest rating, Level 3, describes the study as incorporating a “detailed evidence-based account of expected levels of fidelity to program, policy or treatment plans” (p. 465). Descriptions of lower-rated evidence can be found in the same article for further reference. Using the EMMIE-Q scale as a guide, the existing evidence for process evaluations of offender-focused domestic violence programs, while not abundant, generally rates well on the scale. This is because the few evaluations that do exist include detailed accounts of early program implementation processes and activities, alongside problems and areas for improvement (Hanmer et al., 1999; Morgan, 2004; Sechrist et al., 2012). However, except for Morgan’s evaluation of a DV program implemented in Australia, these studies do not explicitly specify the
necessary elements a police department would need to replicate the programs in other jurisdictions. The evidence used in the current process evaluation is assessed to be Level 3-rated evidence, with efforts to satisfy some of the requirements of the Level 4 rating.

Process Evaluation Literature Review

In the context of the social sciences, a process evaluation is the systematic study of the way in which a program is designed and implemented to determine if the program was carried out in accordance with its stated goals and activities. Such an evaluation may seek to determine how well a program followed guidelines laid out in a program manual for existing programs, or it may compare the implementation of several replications across different sites to later inform impact evaluations of those program replications. Alternatively, a process evaluation can be used to understand how a new program functions, from its conception as a program logic model to its initial implementation, through its application in the field by those who are responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the program’s elements. Whatever the goal of a process evaluation, the information uncovered can invaluable for understanding how a program is meant to work, how it can manifest in an array of actions carried out by various participants, and why it may have an effect on its intended recipient(s).

According to the Medical Research Council, a process evaluation is “a study which aims to understand the functioning of an intervention, by examining implementation, mechanisms of impact, and contextual factors. Process evaluation is complementary to, but not a substitute for, high quality outcomes evaluation” (MRC, p. 8). While an impact study is critical for determining the value of a program, it cannot
provide a comprehensive assessment of a program without a corresponding investigation into its implementation. Similarly, the World Bank concluded that a process or implementation evaluation provides critical, correspondent findings that aid researchers in determining whether any failures of a program are related to its design or its implementation (Bamberger et al., 2010). It may be the case that a program is based on a faulty set of assumptions or program theory, or it was designed in a way that was doomed to failure regardless of how well it was implemented. In this case, the program’s effects reveal only a small fraction of the whole story and, in turn, explain very little about the value or effectiveness of the program to solve the targeted problem. Therefore, an adequate investigation into how a program is implemented is a key, inextricable component to a meaningful, comprehensive program evaluation. For the current study, the implementation evaluation serves to document the program’s activities, with a consideration for how its implementation could affect its outcomes.

Existing Process Evaluations of Offender-Based Domestic Violence Interventions

As previously noted, there are three existing process evaluations of programs similar to Hollywood’s OFDVI. These works address the implementation of offender-based programs in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the U.S. The first program, referred to as the Killingbeck Program, was implemented in 1997 in a district of the West Yorkshire Police that served a population of approximately 150,000 residents with 277 sworn officers and 31 civilian staff (Hanmer et al., 1999). The Killingbeck program was designed to reduce the repeat victimization of women by male intimate partners, meaning it was only focused on IPV. The report provides an extensive account of the details of the program implementation, with insights gained from both quantitative and qualitative
methods. The report also provides a clear, succinct account of the findings related to the process evaluation portion of the comprehensive evaluation, which included the following (p. vi):

- The intervention systematically identified chronic offenders and allowed for the career profiling of male offenders.
- The program established which female victims were at risk for repeat police attendances due to repeat victimization.
- All officers in the Division were involved.
- Few additional resources were required to implement the program.
- It established the accuracy of recording domestic violence and developed reporting categories for domestic violence.
- The evenness of police service delivery to victims and offenders was improved.
- Intra-agency communication and inter-agency cooperation improved.
- Victims considered the letters delivered to low-level aggressors as effective, indicating that “They acted as a formal condemnation of domestic violence by a public authority and they also demonstrated the ability of the police to monitor past and future attendances”.
- Women identified consistency and swiftness of police response as a critical need for effectively deterring offenders from future abuse.
- Half of all police attendances for domestic violence were not recorded.
The second intervention for which there is a process evaluation available is the NDV one-year pilot that was implemented in two jurisdictions in South Australia between 2000 and 2001 as a follow-on project to the Killingbeck project (Morgan, 2004). One of the main findings of this evaluation was that there were critical elements of the project that needed to be reworked before it could be successfully scoped out to larger jurisdictions. In other words, the project was able to meet some of its intended outcomes at a small scale, but a large-scale roll-out would prove to be problematic. Using qualitative and quantitative methods, Morgan’s NDV project process evaluation resulted in the following findings:

- While the project included interviews with victims to collect data about their experiences related to the project, the response rate was just eight percent.
- In group meetings with men, they had mixed reactions to offender letters, including that the receipt of such a letter would make them angry, serve as a “wake up call,” or that they would ignore it. Victims perceived the letters more negatively.
- Surveys with police showed that consistent training was not maintained with as many as a quarter of the officers after nine months of the pilot. However, training was deemed an aspect of the project “with great

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7 The article could not be located online, so I contacted the author, Dr. Frank Morgan, directly via email. Dr. Morgan provided helpful context for the NDV project, though he was unaware that his evaluation had been referenced in three separate studies since it was completed. In contrast to the positive assessments of the NDV project in those articles, Dr. Morgan did not consider the project very successful. The challenges he seemed to be referring to were described in the evaluation.
potential” for improving intervention outcomes by the evaluator, as long as it is started early and reinforced consistently.

- Sixty-three percent of officers said that the project “made a difference to police practice surrounding domestic violence, and it was rated a 7.2 out of 10 in perceived value.

- There were many incidents that were categorized as exceptions due to victim or offender characteristics which were treated differently (little or no treatment) than incidents with typical offenders and victims, indicating the model may not be suitable or appropriate for handling certain groups of subjects (i.e., intellectually disabled, victims or offenders who live outside of the jurisdiction, dual offenders with no clear victim and aggressor, homeless or drug-abusing offenders, possibly homosexual couples, indigenous persons, etc.).

- Recording of domestic violence incidents improved due to the program, but systematic recording and report production was never fully realized.

The third known process evaluation of an offender-based domestic violence policing intervention is an evaluation of the High Point, NC OFDVI program (Sechrist et al., 2012). In this document, the authors highlighted the reliance on the Killingbeck study (Hanmer et al., 1999) to design and implement the High Point model. Key findings from this study, which covered just the first six months of the program’s implementation, included the following:
• The High Point Police Department had already implemented focus deterrence-based programs that were successful, which meant there were existing partnerships, a high level of buy-in from stakeholders, and familiarity with the model’s operational requirements. This included a close relationship with the courts and victim services providers.

• Department personnel viewed the program positively, despite its increased workload for line officers, which was attributed to their familiarity with focused deterrence programs for other crime types.

• A Domestic Violence Unit was put in place to accommodate the needs of the project.

• A new call code was created for IPV calls (the program was IPV-only);

• Every IPV call was recorded with either a field contact sheet, an incident report, or an arrest report.

• The OFDVI at High Point was developed over ten years and was considered to be the flagship for the model. An official workgroup was established to guide the program implementation, which was an integral element of program implementation.

• Victims were categorized into lists like offenders were, and a high level of follow-up contact with victims corresponded with their assigned list (D through A, which corresponded to the list the offender was on).

• Project development and implementation were labor-intensive.

• Contacting victims was difficult at times.
These three process evaluations provide a substantial foundation upon which to base the current evaluation of Hollywood’s OFDVI. The documents also provide a look into the evolution of repeat offender programs for domestic violence, which has shifted from a heavier focus on victims in the Killingbeck program to Hollywood’s heavier focus on offenders in its program. Also, the findings from these studies can be compared to those of the current evaluation to identify similarities and differences in the experiences of implementing these types of programs. Over time, these comparisons can accumulate to build a larger body of knowledge about offender-focused domestic violence programs.

**Objectives of the Process Evaluation**

This process evaluation of the OFDVI was conducted to meet several goals of the overall evaluation. First, this chapter provides a description of Hollywood’s OFDVI model as it was implemented in 2019. Because data collection took place over one month in early 2019, only first-hand historical accounts of initial program implementation were possible to collect. Fortunately, many Hollywood personnel who participated in the study were working at the department in 2014 and 2015 when the program started. These accounts were collected to describe how the program emerged and first began. Detailed descriptions of how the program functions and the specific activities involved were collected to map out the program as clearly as possible.

From the details gathered about how the program was implemented in 2019, it was also important to determine how well the program participants, or Hollywood

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8 The Hollywood Police Department’s OFDVI program will be referred to in the current study as “Hollywood’s program,” “Hollywood’s OFDVI,” or, if appropriate, simply “the program.”
personnel, followed the program’s SOPs at that time, four years after the program started. Information about the extent to which Hollywood personnel understood and embraced the spirit of the program helped to identify positive aspects of the program that were well received as well as aspects that were viewed poorly. The line officers were among the most impacted position by the program, so their perceptions of it were integral to understanding the dynamics of the program from within, not just from a superficial look from upper and middle management.

The second objective of the process evaluation was to determine a program logic and program theory of the OFDVI. Prior to the current study, no official program theory was found for the OFDVI model. Implicitly, any crime prevention program is assumed to have an effect on victims and offenders so that the targeted crime problem is reduced. However, it is less common to dissect such a program with the specificity required to build an accurate theoretical model that goes beyond the basic assumptions surrounding policing, deterrence, and crime prevention (Thornton et al., 2019). Furthermore, complex programs with many elements are particularly prone to theoretical oversimplification despite incorporating an array of various theoretical assumptions, whether acknowledged or not, into a cohesive package.

The third objective of this process evaluation is to explore the possible mechanisms for the various activities involved in the program. These mechanisms tie in directly with the program theory(s) and are key to explaining how a program functions. Not only is it necessary to identify, or at least propose, the mechanisms of a program, but one must also
provide some possible theory-based explanations for how those mechanisms might affect some change.

Finally, the fourth and more practical objective of this element of the study was to identify practitioner-focused findings that could be helpful for program improvement or replication in other departments. Since Hollywood has not conducted its own evaluation of the program, middle and upper management may be unaware of certain elements or activities that were functioning particularly well or particularly poorly. With a number of other police agencies interested in implementing or having already implemented their own adaptations of an OFDVI-based program, some implementation-related findings may help inform their policies and procedures.

*Overview of the Program*

Focused deterrence has become an unofficial brand of policing that has developed and expanded from its original theoretical conception as a solution for youth-involved gun violence in Boston in the 1900s. It is essentially an amplified version of deterrence theory that is heavily focused on crime prevention rather than reactive strategies (Kennedy, 1996). The approach’s growing popularity has resulted in a divergence between those programs that are sanctioned and directly supported by the National Network for Community Safety (NNCS), which houses the experts behind the development of the framework and its subsequent manifestations in policing initiatives, and those that are picked up by departments independent of the NNCS. Hereafter these two forms of the framework, the officially NNSC-sanctioned focused deterrence programs and the theory of focused deterrence and programs based on it yet not
supported by the NNSC. The brand of focused deterrence provides guidelines for interventions for a wide variety of crime problems, including group violence, drug markets, prison violence, individual gun violence, and intimate partner violence (NNSC, 2018). Those programs with NNCS support are considered high fidelity and involve most, or all, of the elements and activities of the ideal focused deterrence framework. Conversely, those that are not may involve a selection of focused deterrence activities that a department deems feasible and appropriate for its own unique constraints, capacities, and crime problems, but they generally do not embody the full focused deterrence suite of intervention activities. Despite this deviation, the ideas manifested in focused deterrence have become popular among departments big and small.

Using High Point as a model (also see chapter 1), a high-fidelity domestic violence initiative adheres to a specific design and collection of activities that are expected to work simultaneously to reduce and prevent domestic violence, generally consisting of the following five elements. First, the program focused specifically on Intimate Partner Violence rather than including other broader types of family violence. Second, a strong level of cooperation and buy-in from relevant stakeholders is developed and maintained, including police, community and social service providers, the district attorney, a representative from the US Attorney’s office, and experts from local research institutions. Third, offenders are rated on their domestic offense history and placed in one of four tiers of priority, from the lowest risk in the D-List and the highest risk in the A-list. Fourth, offenders in the D-, C-, and B-Lists are contacted by police, and high-risk offender call-in meetings are conducted on a regular basis to engage the most serious offenders in a face-to-face group setting with law enforcement, resource providers, and
community leaders. Fifth, the “levers” of the local and federal law enforcement and legal systems are “pulled” to apply pressure to listed offenders to deter them from continuing their criminal behavior. Due to the high level of coordination among stakeholders, it is expected that authorities will have more resources and opportunities to sanction offenders; for example, invoking the power of federal statutes\(^9\) that are typically not enforced can offer more creative avenues for identifying “levers” with which to sanction offenders who otherwise have been successful at evading legal intervention. It should be noted that what was referred to as the OFDVI in High Point and Lexington, North Carolina, is now referred to by the NNSC as the Intimate Partner Violence Intervention (IPVI) (NNSC, 2020); nevertheless, the programs follow the same guidelines.

Hollywood’s OFDVI is an example of a focused deterrence-based program not supported by the NNSC that developed from within the department using the High Point model as inspiration. Therefore, it involves several of the main activities of the focused deterrence model, but not all; some features deviate considerably from their original manifestations in the High Point model. Table 3 displays the main differences between the two programs as they relate to the five tenets just described. These deviations are further described in the Program Theory section later in this chapter.

\(^9\) An example would be 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), which prohibits the possession of a firearm after conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. In practice, few law enforcement agencies strictly enforce this statute and rely on opportunistic confiscations of firearms, though. However, there is a growing trend in departments dedicating units specifically to enforcement of firearm-related laws for domestic offenders. Also see 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9); The King County, WA Regional Domestic Violence Firearms Enforcement Unit.
Table 3: Main Tenets of Hollywood and High Point OFDVI Programs in Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Tenet</th>
<th>Hollywood OFDVI</th>
<th>High Point OFDVI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime Type</td>
<td>All types domestic violence as defined by FL State law</td>
<td>Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buy-In from All Stakeholders</td>
<td>Low-to-Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offender Ratings/Lists</td>
<td>D (lowest risk) to A (highest risk), case-by-case discretion for threshold definitions for offender list designations</td>
<td>D (lowest risk) to A (highest risk), strict threshold definitions for offender list designations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call-In Meetings with Offenders</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Several with D, C, &amp; B-Listed Offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local, Regional, &amp; Federal Levers “Pulled”</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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First, in contrast to the specific focus of model OFDVIS on IPV, Hollywood includes all forms of violence that are defined as domestic or dating violence under Florida State Law. Not only does this differ from the High Point program, but it goes against the current trend of teasing out IPV from other forms of domestic (family) violence. This delineation of two classifications of domestic violence for enforcement and victim service approaches has become a point of significant deviation between Hollywood and domestic violence experts. For example, the National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV, 2017) describes itself as “a social change organization dedicated to creating a social, political, and economic environment in which violence against women no longer exists,” clearly demonstrating the organization’s focus on male perpetrated violence against women. A similar specification is built into the NNSC’s Intimate Partner Violence Initiative (IPVI), the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), and many more domestic violence programs and organizations.
A second deviation that must be highlighted is one that is most notably absent from Hollywood’s program and which may set it apart the most from high-fidelity programs; this difference is the lack of offender call-in meetings.\textsuperscript{10} There have never been call-ins at Hollywood despite it being one of the hallmark elements of the OFDVI model and focused deterrence approaches generally. In addition, court-level buy-in from prosecutors and judges is low,\textsuperscript{11} the level of direct coordination with community services is limited, and high-level offenders are not engaged in the same way as the model would intend. Despite these two major variations, Hollywood maintains that it uses a focused deterrence strategy, as do other departments that have implemented adaptations of the framework in various ways independent of the NNSC.

Because each focused deterrence program is built and implemented differently, the unique characteristics, activities, and processes involved in each should be considered not only to provide a thorough description of a program’s implementation but also to determine which activities may be responsible for different program outcomes. Proponents of high-fidelity focused deterrence programs may argue that adaptations that omit various elements of the ideal model are lacking in crime prevention capability or may even cause more harm to victims. However, it does not discount the possibility that

\textsuperscript{10} Based on conversations with representatives from the NNSC, the absence of the call-in meetings is not recommended and is considered a significant deviation from the ideal model of the program.

\textsuperscript{11} One major difference between High Point, NC and Hollywood, FL is the level of cooperation and embeddedness among the county’s various criminal justice and social service entities. High Point benefitted from a high level of coordination among these entities, while Hollywood is just one police jurisdiction working within the larger structure of Broward County. This prevented Hollywood from approaching a similar level of cooperation and data sharing as High Point.
programs employing a subset of activities could see reductions in crime and successfully meet other program goals.

The following section provides a process evaluation of the Hollywood OFDVI. The text will describe in detail the program logic, program theory, its initial inception and implementation, and how the Hollywood OFDVI was being implemented after three years of operation. To satisfy the needs of a comprehensive EMMIE-based evaluation, the potential (M)echanisms and (M)ediating contexts will also be identified.

**Qualitative Research Methods and Police Program Evaluation**

As has been noted several times throughout the current study, the research related to evaluations, and focused deterrence programs more specifically, indicates that understanding how a program is implemented is critical to discovering the ways in which it may lead to the outcomes associated with it. Without a program blueprint or specific guidance from a presiding organization such as the NNSC, processes are carried out by police agencies to varying degrees with little in the way of tracking them, ensuring fidelity, or acknowledging how transitions in management, leadership, and personnel may affect how the program functions; monitoring and evaluation is an often-omitted element of program implementation in these situations (Piza et al., 2018). Simply tracking crime statistics over time is a common but insufficient way to assess the effects of an intervention and whether they are in line with the program’s intended goals. As will be described below, there is a wealth of information to be collected and analyzed about program implementation that could improve how police agencies begin, sustain, and improve crime reduction programs using their own in-house capabilities and resources.
Two key factors that can help develop an understanding of how a policy is developed can be uncovered by a process evaluation – why the policy originated and who was responsible for implementing and sustaining it. In contrast to what purely evidence-based assessments may attempt to assert, the details about why a program failed or succeeded are nearly as important as its outcomes. Differences in the way these programs come about may influence how effective they are and how well they are sustained. Morris, Smith, and Fox (2020) provided three examples of mixed-methods intervention evaluations in which the outcomes of the randomized trials conducted were explained only by the data collected from qualitative methods such as interviews and focus groups. The qualitative data helped to explain the experiments’ results by identifying implementation failures, backfire or unintended effects, and other unseen factors that were impossible to learn about through experimentation alone yet had enormous implications for the success or failure of the intervention being evaluated.

Additionally, the person or people responsible for implementation can strongly influence the trajectory of the program (Piza et al., 2018). Therefore, qualitative analysis of the OFDVI implementation was indispensable to gain insight into these crucial facets of the program. Research was conducted using interviews with not only the front-line officers and detectives working domestic cases, but also the middle- to upper-management, non-patrol personnel, and the Chief of Police. These interviews were supplemented with observations in the form of shadowing conducted during ride-alongs with officers working their typical shifts. These methods are described in further detail below.
Evaluation experts recommend that qualitative research be conducted using more than one technique, especially when the objective is to get inside “the black box” of interventions (Astbury, 2010). To properly and thoroughly identify, and eventually understand, the underlying mechanisms of a program’s activities, gathering data from those who are directly involved in the daily implementation of the activities is invaluable. As Astbury (2010) notes, all of those involved in the program and those looking at it from an outside perspective hold implicit and explicit assumptions about how and why it works, which may or may not reflect the actual mechanisms acting on the program recipients. Because mechanisms are often invisible (Pawson & Tilley, 2004), reconciling these implicit assumptions with what occurs in reality may aid in uncovering some of the ways a program induces change. By using mixed methods and including a qualitative approach, a researcher can help stakeholders clearly define their assumptions about how a program works, identifying what is also known as the program theory (Chen, 2006). The process of mapping program theory is unlikely to emerge from quantitative analysis alone.

The qualitative methods of this study involved interviews with police department personnel and observational ride-alongs with on-duty officers. It is necessary to highlight one important limitation that may affect the value of conducting interviews with officers at the time of on-site data collection. Because this evaluation was conducted on an ongoing program that was subject to unavoidable changes over time, including personnel turnover, changes in leadership, and intentional or unintentional implementation alterations, interviews in early 2019 may not be informative for how the program functioned in its initial months or years. Rather, they were informative for how the
program existed at the time of data collection. Nevertheless, these interviews are a key component to this evaluation and provided critical data for completing the process evaluation.

EMMIE-based primary evaluations, as stated by its creators, should incorporate a variety of methods to evaluate the five different EMMIE elements. With the framework’s goal of using the most rigorous yet best-suited methods to find answers to the questions being asked, employing qualitative methods is necessary to answer many of the questions proposed in the current evaluation. Because this evaluation is not a randomized controlled trial but rather an evaluation of an existing and continuing program, qualitative methods were necessary to collect data to inform the assessment of many parts of the EMMIE framework, including the (E)ffects, (M)oderating variables, (M)ediating variables, (I)mplementation and Economics. Qualitative data can also help to identify the program theory, which provides insight into the beliefs, culture, and leadership of the department that led to the implementation and continuation of the program. Furthermore, mechanism identification and testing for the current study necessitated the use of qualitative methods. Thornton and colleagues (2018) note that mechanism identification for program activities is rare, as is creating the full theoretical models of these activities (CMOCs) in a primary study. Relying on experimental methods to evaluate a complex program with many simultaneous mechanisms cannot provide sufficient evidence to identify and explore the theoretical models for mechanisms. Unless experiments are conducted to test the effects of each individual mechanism separately, experiments do not allow researchers to assess the contributions of each activity and its associated mechanisms to the overall program effectiveness. Metaphorically, this would be like a
baker not understanding the purpose and effects of each ingredient in her cake, in addition to the influence of oven temperature, altitude, and baking time, which combine to result in the finished product.

*Interviewing Officers Literature Review*

*Leadership and Program Implementation*

Among the most influential factors in the success of a policing program is the level of support and motivation from top leadership within the agency to implement and sustain the program (Saunders et al., 2016). This argument can be broken down further by differentiating success in implementation from success in meeting the program’s goals. A program that has a robust evidence base that shows it is effective in reducing a certain crime or solving a specific safety issue, or what could be considered an effective evidence-based program, may not lead to the desired outcomes if it is poorly implemented and short-lived (Lipsey et al., 2006). Conversely, a program that has little-to-no evidence base to show it is effective may be implemented very well but does not lead to the desired outcomes due to a flawed program theory or the influence of unforeseen outside contexts. There may be considerable implications for evidence-based policing of the tenants of what is referred to as “evidence-based management,” which finds that sufficient evidence in support of a policing intervention may not translate into its effective implementation and management within the larger organization of a police department (Saunders et al., 2016; Sherman, 2015). Translating principles of what works, either in policing or management, into practice is the challenge (Rousseau, 2006; Piza et al., 2018). Effective leadership and stakeholder buy-in have been identified as critical factors in the successful, long-term implementation of acclaimed policing initiatives,
particularly focused deterrence; without them, initiatives have failed to take off or failed as soon as there was a transition in management (Sherman, 2015).

Police departments, as with all organizations, do not operate in a vacuum, making it vital to include analysis of the people-centric (social) elements of a program that can have consequential impacts on the success or failure of a program. As Sherman (2015) states, those practitioners who choose to implement evidence-based policing are doing so “against a tide of indifference or resistance” from the seasoned officers who are comfortable with the status-quo (pp. 13). This entails the intention of a “powerful advocate,” or champion, for a certain course of action to be motivated to swim against that tide. In the case of domestic violence prevention, this resistance emanates from years of officer experience that have reinforced certain attitudes about the nature of domestic violence and its victims and offenders (Monckton-Smith, Williams & Mullane, 2014). Indeed, analysis of officer perceptions of domestic violence incidents offers a conceptualization of this resistance that requires more than a simple policy change to alter. Rousseau (2006) writes that turning evidence-based principles into action-based solutions is a “metaskill” (pp. 266). Despite the resistance they may face, these advocates within the department are important for moving the profession of policing forward. They may recognize the benefits of evidence-based policing and deem them as worth the effort necessary to induce change. Sherman (2015) notes that the benefits of adopting better policing practices based on research can include fewer violent encounters between citizens and police, improved public perception of police and their work, and reductions in crime and disorder.
Personnel from other ranks and positions in the department are also key factors to the implementation and success or failure of a program. How the front-line officers perceive changes in their day-to-day work and whether they attribute those changes to a specific program or policy could affect the way they implement (or fail to fully implement) a program’s related activities (Haberman & Stiver, 2019). While there is limited research on officer buy-in about new policies, the existing research indicates that officers have more positive perceptions of programs when they buy-in to the change (Snyder et al., 2019). Officer interviews may offer unique insights into how the program is implemented. Interviews of officers have proven so useful that they have been used to guide the implementation of new programs, such as a hot-spots policing initiative in Dayton, Ohio (Haberman & Stiver, 2019). Additionally, the existence or absence of certain personnel, such as a crime analyst or a crime scene investigator, could affect both short- and long-term outcomes of the program. To properly assess their contributions to the department and the program being evaluated in particular, interviews with other personnel should include in-depth job descriptions, discussions of common challenges, and efforts to gain alternative perspectives of the daily activities related to domestic violence.

Very little research exists that explores the role of crime analysts in police departments, despite the growing acknowledgment that they are key drivers for crime reduction (Guerette et al., 2020; Piza et al., 2018). Due to the large amount of analysis involved in focused deterrence initiatives, the crime analyst plays an especially important role. However, research shows that resistance within the field of policing to accept the
value of data analysis or lack of understanding of the potential value impedes the full potential of crime analysis in many departments (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Cope, 2004).

From this review of the literature surrounding the influence of leadership, supervision, and key roles in program implementation success or failure, several main points are apparent. First, department leadership is responsible for the critical task of paving the path forward for any new program it seeks to implement. Without strong leadership, and supervisors able to manage personnel to follow that path, a program is less likely to be implemented well. This leads to the second finding, that indicates that program implementation can vary widely in fidelity to its intended form, and this variability can affect program outcomes in ways that are often overlooked by much evaluation research in criminology. Third, and most importantly, discovering these details about personnel and program implementation, from the line officer to the Chief and every rank in between, are critical to understanding how program implementation occurred and how it may influence program outcomes. The following qualitative study seeks to illustrate how Hollywood’s OFDVI is implemented, what congruencies or disparities may exist between management and front-line officers related to the program’s Standard Operating Procedures, and how police personnel of all responsibility levels perceive the program.

Methods: Qualitative

Department Orientation

Preparations for conducting the research on-site at the Hollywood Police Department (HPD) began one month before research activities began. The research
schedule consisted of one month of on-site data collection at HPD. Approval from the Florida International University (FIU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) was received, which included approved consent forms for ride alongs and interviews. Before initiating data collection, the lieutenant of the HPD Criminal Investigations Division, which includes the Domestic Violence Unit, who assisted me in coordinating research efforts within the department also helped me to prepare the department for the upcoming research activities. Henceforth, the lieutenant of the HPD Criminal Investigations Division will be referred to as the ‘department coordinator.’

Early in the first week, a kickoff meeting was held with all relevant command staff and some management, including the Chief, Assistant Chiefs, the Major of patrol, the crime analyst, and the department coordinator. At the meeting, I discussed the purpose and goals of the interviews and ride alongs and received assurances of support from the command staff. Soon after the kickoff meeting, the department coordinator facilitated the required background check and paperwork for me to gain access to a security card that would allow me to come and go throughout the department without an escort. The ride-alongs also required that I sign a Hold Harmless Agreement, which would prevent me from being able to take legal action against the officer or department in the case of an incident that occurred during the ride-along. He also initiated the process to get me access to National Crime Information Center (NCIC)/Florida Crime Information Center (FCIC) and the Records Management System to allow for the independent collection of the department’s crime data. This process required taking an online assessment and receiving a certificate from NCIC/FCIC to gain access to the system, which the department coordinator also facilitated. The system access process took longer
than anticipated, leaving just over one week for me to access the database while on-site at the department.

*Interviews with officers*

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 personnel from the Hollywood Police Department to gather data on police activities, perceptions, and processes surrounding the implementation of the OFDVI. Six different interview protocols were developed for different job descriptions, including front-line patrol officers, detectives, middle and upper management (sergeants, lieutenants, and majors), the crime analyst, a crime scene investigation technician, and the Chief of Police. These protocols were used to guide the interviews, simultaneously allowing for a flexible interview structure while providing loose guidance to ensure all key questions were covered in each interview. The interviews were between eight and fifteen questions, depending on the job description of the interviewee, and were refined using the interview refinement protocol described by Castillo-Montoya (2016). The interview protocols can be found in Appendix B. It was estimated that each interview should require between thirty and sixty minutes, and the majority were conducted within this time frame. I conducted the interviews in private rooms within the police station, such as an empty conference room or interview room, with no other HPD personnel present to encourage candid answers.

With interviewee consent, 27 out of 30 interviews were recorded using an audio recording device. I explained to each interviewee the measures that I would take to ensure responses were kept confidential so that answers would not be associated with him
or her, and that final reporting of the analysis of responses would not include names or other identifying information to obscure identities. All interview and consent materials were approved by the FIU IRB.

A diverse cross-section of participants was interviewed. The 30 interviewees, consisting of 20 males and 10 females, had a range of law enforcement-related experience that spanned from 3 to 30 years with an average of 15.36 years and a median of 16.5 years. Most interviewees spent their entire law enforcement career with the HPD; the range of time spent working at the HPD was from one to 28 years, with an average of 13.73 years and a median of 15 years. The rank or position of the interviewees at the time of the interview is detailed as follows: One representative from upper management, 4 Lieutenants, 5 Sergeants, 2 Detectives, 14 Line Officers, and 4 personnel that held non-sworn positions. While the shift schedule changes periodically, the stated shifts worked by the interviewees at the time of the interview were indicated as the following: 3 Alpha, 8 Bravo, 7 Charlie, and 12 daytime or regular business hours.\footnote{The Hollywood Police Department Patrol Unit works on a 3-shift schedule, divided into Alpha ("midnight") from 22:00 – 8:00, Bravo ("day shift") from 07:00 – 15:00, and Charlie – 13:30 – 23:30. Detectives, administrators, and personnel in other units can also work during regular business hours, from approximately 8:00 to 18:00.} Depending on the shift, officers worked 4 or 5 days in a row, followed by 2 or 3 days off. Interviews were conducted within the expected time frame, with interviews ranging from 19 to 81 minutes, with an average of 36.3 minutes and a median of 31.5 minutes. Table 4 below displays the characteristics of all interviewees, including job title/rank, sex, age, number
of years in law enforcement and at HPD, the duration of the interview, and whether or not audio recording was permitted.

Table 4: Interviewee Descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Role</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Shift</th>
<th>Years at HPD</th>
<th>Years of LE Experience</th>
<th>Audio Recording</th>
<th>Duration (min.)</th>
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**Ride-Alongs**

During the same time that I was conducting interviews, I collected observational data during seven ride-alongs with front-line officers. These observations covered all shifts and most days of the week using an observer-participant technique termed ‘shadowing’ (McDonald, 2005; Quinlan, 2008). Over the course of the ride-alongs, 23 hours and 6 minutes of audio recording data were collected, and a total of 57 hours of
observation were completed. Five ride-alongs were done during the three regular shifts for patrol officers – midnight (Alpha), daytime (Bravo), and afternoon (Charlie) shifts – during days of the week that were identified by the crime analyst to be high-volume domestic call days – Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. Two ride alongs were taken during non-regular shifts; one was done with a Neighborhood Team Lead (NTL) officer who worked a flexible schedule based on the needs of his job, and the other was with two officers assigned to letter deliveries, which were conducted during a short time within a regular Bravo shift.

Shadowing, while less common than other qualitative data collection methods, provides an opportunity for the researcher, or the “shadower,” to understand how an organization (or program) functions from the point of view of the person being shadowed, or the “shadowee.” This is accomplished not only in the physical act of following the shadowee in what McDonald (2005) describes as “shadowing as a means of recording behavior” (p. 461), but also through the experiential elements that make shadowing a particularly valuable data collection method for gaining an understanding of job roles, policy implications, and opinions. Such elements include the constant negotiation and dialogue between the shadower and the subject that leads to the development of a unique relationship that engenders self-reflection from both parties (Vásquez et al., 2012). Shadowing is a particularly useful qualitative research method for collecting data about roles within an organization that involve complex systems and processes that allows the researcher to capture behaviors and opinions within the same moments to arrive at deeper explanations for decisions and actions made by the participant (Quinlan, 2008). Quinlan notes that shadowing results in a large amount of
rich data, for which analysis is time-consuming and onerous, which may make it less attractive than traditional observation or interviews.

The interest in using a shadowing technique for the current project originated from my experiences during two ride-alongs in the summer of 2017 during the internship at the Department. Much like how Quinlan (2008) described her experience shadowing nurse practitioners, this method involves embedding within an organization with one specific person to the point that daily activities and routines are interspersed with “debriefing sessions” in which the informant expands on and explains events that had occurred or decisions that were made in a manner more akin to casual conversation rather than a formal question-and-answer format (p. 1486). In an echo to the purpose of realist evaluation, and the subsequent justification of using the EMMIE framework, discussed in Chapter 2, shadowing is used to discover not only what an informant does, but how, why, and in what contexts these activities and decisions occur.

When using shadowing, a researcher should also be aware of the common concerns surrounding researcher-involved methods, such as the Hawthorn Effect, lack of generalizability of an individual’s opinions, actions, and decision-making to the larger population, and ethics (Bartkowiak-Theron & Sappey, 2012). During Quinlan’s (2008) shadowing experience, the researcher gained access to unanticipated participants who were not covered in the approved institutional review board project proposal, meaning the rich, unique data that may have been collected during those moments could not be used included in the study. Quinlan’s account highlights a challenge of shadowing, which stems from the near impossibility of being able to anticipate the direction of an
interaction with an informant; being unable to anticipate these unexpected deviations from a structured, predictable schedule, coupled with the high level of candidness by the informant and inclusion of the researcher into his or her day-to-day activities, makes receiving the required permissions beforehand difficult or impossible.

Participant Selection

As is typical in many police departments, most patrol line officers are responsible for taking domestic violence calls for service as part of their normal duties. This provided ample opportunity for participant selection for ride alongs since it was expected that most officers would be suitable for meeting the goals of the research. Before participant selection began, I stressed that the main purpose of the ride alongs was to be able to observe the entire process of officers handling domestic calls for service, also referred to by the code ‘38’, including dispatch, arrival, on-scene activities, report-writing, and, if necessary, offender arrest and processing. It was also important to ride with both male and female officers. The crime analyst pulled domestic violence report data to identify the days of the week and the shifts that experienced the highest volume of domestic calls, in addition to the high-activity zones. The department coordinator then selected two officers on two different shifts for the first ride alongs based on the data provided by the crime analyst. The first shifts that were selected were the Charlie shift (13:30 to 23:30) and Alpha shift (22:00 to 8:00). He then sent an email to all relevant HPD personnel to explain the plan while also explaining that the assigned officers were encouraged to focus on domestic calls during their shift. I was then introduced briefly to the officers working the same shift at rollcall when the shift began. This was done again for the next two ride alongs, which were scheduled for the Bravo shift (7:00 to 15:00) and another Charlie
shift. The ride alongs covered the two sides of the jurisdiction, which is divided into East and West sides, split by I-95 that runs north and south through the city.

While efforts were made to be paired with officers working zones with high numbers of domestic calls for service, discretion for which officers I was paired with was afforded to the shift patrol lieutenant at roll-call on two occasions for the final two ride alongs. The lieutenant chose appropriate officers based on experience and other considerations that were discussed with me in varying degrees. While the last-minute nature of these two assignments may have been less strategic, I considered them helpful for maintaining a level of anonymity for the research participants. Four of the ride-along participants were well-known due to the emails that were sent out about them to the command staff, while two were more or less anonymous due to the way they were selected. It is unlikely that any one person working at the management levels or within the command staff would be able to identify who all of the ride along participants were, and this was beneficial to my study. The lack of clarity on the part of the HPD supervision about who participated in the study would increase the anonymity of the study findings included herein.

Additional factors were considered during participant selection for the ride alongs. Efforts were made to be paired with an officer not known to be highly proactive to ensure data informs the evaluation on all types of officers, not only the most well-regarded, enthusiastic, and proactive ones. This need to shadow a variety of different

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13 This was deemed necessary after casual conversation about officer selection involved a middle-manager referring to “lazy” cops as those who would not be ideal participants in the study. On the contrary, this sort of officer could offer uniquely meaningful data for an objective, comprehensive evaluation.
officers was discussed with several different lieutenants. Capturing the inherent variation of responses from different ‘types’ of police officers would offer a more realistic view of Hollywood’s overall approach. Doing so acknowledged the heterogeneity of any police departments’ personnel that is often viewed as one homogeneous unit of like-minded actors rather than the complex arrangement of interrelated cultures and personalities that it is. While the purpose of this study was not to explore the culture of the Hollywood Police, acknowledging the existence of a wide variety of officer motivations, personalities, levels of satisfaction with their employer, years of service, feelings of appreciation or disregard, and a multitude of other factors that can influence job performance would add to the richness and validity of the findings. I was never explicitly told whether or not a certain officer was considered among the less proactive or less enthusiastic officers on a given shift, though comments were made about particularly “good” or proactive officers. It was anticipated that during the course of each 10-hour shift, a sufficient number of domestic incidents would occur for adequate data collection. However, there was a chance, based on my previous ride-along experiences, that no or very few domestic incidents would occur during a shift.

Data Collection

The ride alongs began after I had already conducted several interviews with department personnel. This created an iterative cycle for data collection of interviewing and shadowing that helped guide questioning during interviews and ride alongs simultaneously as new information was uncovered and information gaps were revealed. I completed a total of 61.75 hours of observation during this time. Most of the time spent observing was during a) ride-alongs; b) roll call; and c) a City of Hollywood commission
meeting. A total of seven ride alongs were conducted, which included the six that were originally planned and one additional unexpected event that was dedicated to delivering D-letters to offenders at their homes. Ride alongs totaled 57 hours in shadowing-based observation time and 23.1 hours of audio recorded data. Text notes were typed at the end of each event to capture richer commentary on the experience.

Before starting the ride-alongs, the consent forms were discussed with and signed by the main participant at the beginning of the shift. Depending on the shift, several or many of the officers on the shift were aware of the research being conducted and what the general purpose of the ride-along was. Throughout the shift, verbal consent was received from several officers who agreed to be recorded while carrying out their normal duties. As a safety and liability measure, I decided to stop recording in the event that a non-domestic related call for service or incident was being handled because that audio data would not be pertinent to the current study. This also provided additional peace of mind to the officers, some of whom were concerned with legal liabilities that could arise should the audio recording be subpoenaed by the court. Upon reflection after conducting the study, this also served as legal protection for myself in the case of a subpoena or an unexpected incident. Relatedly, I did not collect data on any civilians present during the shadowing. The restrictions of my study prohibited me from engaging with people outside the department for the purposes of my research.

In addition to the ride alongs, I attended eleven roll calls, which totaled 3.75 hours of observation.\footnote{Approximated based on average time for each roll call to be 15 minutes.} During roll call, the shift lieutenant provided a map of the patrol zones
to officers, provided any departmental updates, and gave a briefing about current crime or safety issues the officers should be aware of. This included a mention of any new Out of Custody Arrest Affidavits (or NICs) that were submitted during the prior shift or two. During several roll calls, detectives, lieutenants, or the department’s legal advisor provided short in-service training on relevant issues. This is also when either the department coordinator or another member of the upper management introduced me to the on-duty officers and explained my purpose of being there, either to notify them of a ride-along or interviews.

One city commission meeting was attended at City Hall concerning a vote on high-profile budget issues for the city of Hollywood that was of particular interest to HPD, which totaled one hour of observation time and 26 minutes of recorded audio. HPD strongly encouraged as many of its personnel to attend the meeting as was operationally feasible, especially those who were off duty at the time. Several roll-calls dedicated time to announcing the meeting and encouraging the officers to show up. Large numbers of police and fire and rescue personnel were in attendance because there was to be a vote on a long-contested pension readjustment that would help to remedy major cuts that occurred in 2011. The 2011 pension cuts, in addition to other controversial fiscal austerity measures that the City of Hollywood implemented around the same time, were a source of tension and resentment among some members of the Department.

Analysis

Qualitative data analysis was guided by best-practices set forth in seminal works on qualitative research, including Berg and Lune (2011) and Lamont and White (2008),
in addition to an online course offered through Udemy on how to use Nvivo™ 12 for organizing and coding data (Kriukow, 2020). Coding and context analysis of interviews and open-ended survey questions was NVivo™ version 12 Pro. NVivo™ is a popular software tool that aids in the analysis of interviews, open-ended survey questions, field notes, and other free text qualitative data used commonly in research in medicine, health science, and the social sciences (Woods, Paulus, Atkins, & Macklin, 2016). This software aided in data management, coding, and analysis to identify themes and concepts present in the data, as well as identify relationships among concepts and participant characteristics. A guide on how to code qualitative research was also referenced (Saldaña, 2015).

I transcribed all audio recorded interviews (N = 27) within NVivo™. The goal of transcription was to capture exact words spoken while omitting most repeated or filler words (i.e., “um,” “you know”) unless they were perceived as adding meaning. Later, when quotes were used in the study, the text was smoothed to improve readability and ease of comprehension, with an emphasis on maintaining the original tone and meaning of the excerpt. The written notes for non-recorded interviews (N = 3) were typed as a Word document and imported into NVivo™. I also transcribed all audio recordings from the ride-alongs (N = 6). An audio recording was made during the seventh unplanned ride-along, but it did not include any relevant audio content.

After all the interviews were transcribed, I coded the text. Coding of the interviews began before coding of the ride alongs. The coding process involved reading each transcript, looking for key terms or topics that were related to the research goals of
the study. Some major topics of interest included the following: any reference to the proposed mechanisms (i.e., letter deliveries, offender lists, and the Repeat Offender Log), Not in Custody Arrest Affidavits, officer responsibilities on-scene, and report writing; program theory; references to key personnel (i.e., crime analyst, DV Sergeant); officer perceptions and opinions of the OFDVI; responsibilities of supervisors; and a number of other main topics. I was already familiarized with the content of the interviews and ride alongs, and the topics of interest were already established. Each line or section was highlighted and given a code, or what is referred to in NVivo™ as a node to denote what it is about. Many lines or sections were coded with multiple nodes because they related to multiple topics of research.

Findings

This section will cover the findings from the Hollywood OFDVI process evaluation, which consists of both qualitative and quantitative data. The findings include a description of the program logic, program theory, and assumptions about how the program works as defined by its implementers. In addition, the program activities and specifically how the program is carried out will be defined. Finally, the contexts within which the program operated, and the potential mechanisms of the program will be explored. This section of my study seeks to illustrate how Hollywood’s OFDVI was implemented, what congruencies or disparities may have existed between management and front-line officers related to the program’s SOPs (program fidelity), and how police personnel of all responsibility levels perceived and reacted to the program.
**Program Logic, Theory, and Assumptions**

It goes without saying that every new intervention, program, or policy change is associated with a set of theories and assumptions about how it will improve some outcome or meet a goal for a certain targeted group of people. Whether the logic, theory, and assumptions about a program are identified and established or not, they exist. Ideally, these elements would be well-defined before a program begins. In practice, the process of identifying these elements may not occur until long after a program starts, if ever (Thornton et al., 2018). Chen (2006) notes that qualitative research is usually required to clarify the program theory with the implementers and stakeholders. According to the demands of realist and theory-based evaluations, most implementers do not invest enough effort in mapping the specifics of these elements, which can impede the evaluation process.

The general program logic, theory, and assumptions for Hollywood’s OFDVI were described by the implementers of the original High Point OFDVI in the years prior to and during the implementation in Hollywood. Even before the High Point program, the Killingbeck repeat victim program laid the theoretical groundwork upon which the OFDVIIs were built. The theoretical basis for the Killingbeck program, as described in Chapter 2, was based heavily on routine activities theory (Hanmer et al., 1999). While this theory took a subordinate position to focused deterrence in the High Point model, it continued to manifest itself in the underlying (unacknowledged) program theories of High Point and Hollywood.
What became the overarching program theory for both High Point, and later Hollywood, was focused deterrence. This framework is described in detail in Chapter 2. However, the framework, which is rarely, if ever, referred to as a theory, is not sufficient as a description for the purposes of this study; it will need to be dissected and investigated further to derive a true program logic and theory. Focused deterrence also carries with it a number of assumptions about crime, offenders, victims, and crime prevention that must be elucidated in conjunction with those that preexisted in Hollywood when they chose to implement the program. Based on the findings of this study, a number of other theories and assumptions in combination made up the driving force behind the OFDVI implementation.

A document that provides insight to the early theories of Hollywood’s OFDVI is a narrative submitted for the 2017 Herman Goldstein Problem Oriented Police Award (POP Center, n.d.). While the program was not selected as a finalist or winner of the award, the document serves as a starting point from which to derive information about the theory driving it. The document was provided to me early in the research process. The main beliefs or assumptions established justification of why the OFDVI was implemented include the following, according to this document: (1) domestic violence offenders are generalists; (2) “many of the most violent criminals have been arrested or involved in incidents of Domestic Violence” (p. 1); (3) domestic incidents consume a large proportion of police and justice system resources; and (4) domestic violence affects a large number of victims every day. It is from these basic tenets that the OFDVI is justified for implementation at the Hollywood PD. Later, the program theory and
assumptions evolved into a more comprehensive theory about domestic violence and domestic offenders generally, which will be discussed at a later point in this chapter.

These four tenets align with those provided as a justification for the original High Point pilot program. However, Hollywood’s adaptation involved some notable and important deviations. First, the Hollywood OFDVI considers all crimes (and incidents that do not reach the threshold of a crime) defined as domestic violence under Florida law as a qualifying activity for offender (or aggressor) inclusion into the program. Unlike the High Point model and the Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) Interventions that emerged from it, Hollywood did not parse IPV from domestic violence. Herein lies another key program theory that sets Hollywood apart from its predecessors; domestic violence can take any form, and any form of domestic violence should be considered a serious crime. While it is true that the majority of domestic violence involves violence perpetrated by a man against a woman with whom he shares or has shared an intimate relationship, more than one-third of reported domestic violence in Florida is not of this sort (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2020).

When discussing the differences between IPV and other forms of domestic violence, several officers stated that they considered IPV as being more serious than non-IPV, while one believed that IPV is more repetitive than sibling violence. Another interviewee described her experience with working different varieties of domestic violence:

[Incidents involving non-IPV domestics] are so rare, like every once in a while, you’ll get two brothers or a mom and—. The majority of it is people in relationships. So, husband and wife, boyfriend, girlfriend - girlfriend -
boyfriend, you know, it? It’s rare that you get a family domestic… I’ve had a couple where it’s girl on girl, and I don’t even know that I’ve had any that’s male on male.” (Non-sworn, Interview 23)

A common sentiment expressed by several interviewees related to the issue of siblings fighting, particularly male siblings. This tendency for people to associate sibling violence with stereotypes of sibling rivalry, family roles, “healthy” aggression, and other ways of differentiating or excusing sibling rivalry. This concept was explored further in Chapter 2. The following excerpt from an officer interview describes how some people who engage in sibling violence do not realize or understand that their actions are legally defined as domestic violence. By not recognizing it as such, it lessens the perceived severity of the activity. As one officer stated:

Brother-brother violence is the different one because it’s more-- it seems more acceptable to them to like, wrestle or fight… Not realizing, like, well, technically, you’re committing domestic violence. (Line Officer, Interview 4)

Overall, there was a collective sense among most, but not all, participants that IPV had the potential to be more common and serious than non-IPV domestics. This aligns with the arguments made by DV activists and some police administrators in favor of treating IPV as a special form of domestic violence that deserves heightened attention. One officer noted that there is “no obligation to stay” in a non-IPV situation, “so they can leave if they want to” (Line officer, Interview 3). Other participants indicated that most non-IPV domestic calls for service are trivial.

Interviewer: Do you see a lot of [cases] where it’s not intimate partner, it would be just other family members? Does that happen often?
Participant: Most of those are like the bullshit ones. Like, Grandma can’t control the kid, runs away, kind of thing. (Line Officer, Interview 5)

From what I’ve seen, the domestics that are with [intimate] relationships are worse; they’re way worse, those are bad. Whenever it’s a family relationship, besides that one rare one where the dad shot the kid, family ones are most of the time bullshit. Usually, it’s the kid being an asshole… So yeah, the ones with families are never that bad. (Line Officer, Ride Along)

There was also a sense that IPV could be more serious because the victims did not have a way to escape their situation.

It’s the intimate partners who feel like they can’t get away because if I’m in a, let’s say, my husband and I, I feel like I don’t have anybody, I can’t leave. But my sister is arguing with my husband. Well, she has her own house, she has her own place she can go. I think it’s where you live-- who you live with; if you can’t get away from that person, then yeah, it’s probably going to escalate. When you're with someone a lot more, then things are going to escalate more. (Line Officer, Interview 8)

On the other hand, several other interviewees stated that they did not consider IPV especially different from other forms of domestic violence.

A second deviation from the High Point model’s theory concerns the prescribed activities for the high-level offenders; in this case, those offenders will be referred to as B- and A-Listers. The High Point model, in alignment with all other high-fidelity focused deterrence programs, was designed with special treatment for these offenders who had been identified as chronic, dangerous domestic offenders. The B-Listers are summoned to notification meetings where they “are offered community resources to assist them and are
given a firm message from the community and law enforcement that the violence must stop. B-list offenders are also made aware of the enhancements they may face during prosecution if they re-offend” (Sechrist, Weil, Shelton & Payne, 2016, p.26).

In Hollywood, no offenders are invited to call-in meetings; no group meetings are held for offenders. This deviation is simultaneously a result of a difference in the assumptions made about chronic domestic offenders in the Hollywood program and an adaptation made due to resource constraints that Hollywood faced which were not factors in High Point. As it relates to assumptions, Hollywood deemed the most serious offenders too volatile to engage with outside of traditional police-based activities. The department deemed these meetings to be beyond the available resources and perhaps not worth the potential risks involved in engaging serious offenders so heavily, or what could be referred to as “poking the bear.” Holding call-ins, according to some interviewees, would require additional protections for victims who may find themselves targets of retaliation after these meetings. When asked why Hollywood does not hold call-in meetings, one interviewee explained that the individualized nature of domestic violence, rather than a group-based crime, made the call-in seem less appropriate for using on offenders.

I think the call-ins are successful when you're dealing with gangs, or you're trying to reduce crimes involving firearms, because there's more peer pressure that can come from the outside, right? The community members and stakeholders. I think when it comes to domestic violence, it's more intimate, right? It's more-- it's not occurring out in the open, there's not really a lot of people aware of it. And, and the only person really affected by it - is the victim. (Command Staff, Interview)

Overall, Hollywood’s adaptation of High Point’s OFDVI is similar to the original program, but it was designed with some important differences. The main beliefs or
assumptions of the domestic violence approach are also similar and posit that domestic
violence offenders are generalists, many criminals have perpetrated domestic violence,
domestic incidents require high levels of police resources, and domestic violence affects
a large number of victims every day. It is from these basic tenets that the OFDVI is
justified for implementation at Hollywood, with two key modifications. First, Hollywood
does not hold call-ins, which are an integral part of high-fidelity focused deterrence
programs. Second, Hollywood widens the scope of the type of domestic offenses that are
included in its program, not only targeting perpetrators of IPV but of all forms of
domestic or dating violence. Additional findings concerning the B- and A-Lists as they
function in Hollywood are described in the program Activities section below.

Program Logic Model

Based on the collective analysis of the data discussed herein, including the
assumptions about domestic violence that were presented in the Goldstein proposal,
interviews with the program implementers, department staff, and management, the
program theory for Hollywood’s OFDVI can be identified. First, it was helpful to
develop a Program Logic Model to create an overview of the main goals of the program.
Figure 1 outlines the general program logic of the OFDVI. The Program Logic Model
below displays the short-, medium-, and long-term outcomes and resulting impacts that
are intended from the program in a concise format that captures the high-level features of
the program.
In the short-term, the OFDVI is intended to lead to a number of immediate outcomes that affect both victims and offenders. First, the program is meant to stop violence from escalating in the moment it is occurring, thereby protecting victims from further harm. For offenders, the program is designed to put offenders “on notice,” alerting them to the fact that Hollywood Police take domestic violence seriously and hold a no-excuses approach towards domestic crimes. The program also allows the department to systematically record all encounters with aggressors or offenders who engage in domestic violence, preventing offenders from falling through the cracks of their law enforcement efforts. Finally, the program is designed to ensure that all offenders who commit a crime (or are reasonably believed to have committed a crime) of domestic violence are arrested.
Like the previous output, this is meant to reduce or eliminate the opportunities for offenders to evade arrest and sanction.

In the intermediate term, the Program Logic Model asserts that several outputs are expected from the program’s implementation. Due to the program, victims are expected to increase their use of the various services provided to them through the police department and other organizations outside of the department. For offenders, the program is meant to ensure guilty offenders receive sanctions for their crimes, such as jail time or court-mandated batterer’s treatment, in contrast to evading sanctions. For the Department’s uses, the program will help identify repeat offenders in a systematic way based on their domestic incident history. Furthermore, doing so is intended to result in the identification of the highest-risk offenders who will be faced with a zero-tolerance approach from the police.

Based on the Program Logic Model, the long-term outcomes of the OFDVI apply to both victims and offenders, in addition to officers. First, the main goal of the program is to reduce domestic-related injuries and homicides. Secondary to this reduction is a reduction in the number of domestic calls for service that is anticipated to stem from a reduction in violence resulting from the program. A more general expected outcome of the program is a reduction in the number of violent crimes and/or UCR Part 1 crimes in Hollywood. Finally, the expected effect on manpower and department resources is that domestic violence will require less officer time, less detective time for misdemeanors and typical felonies, and fewer police resources to handle effectively. Relatedly, the program
will reduce the safety risks to officers related to responding to domestic violence calls for service.

Finally, the Program Logic Model identifies two main impacts that are intended to result from the OFDVI. First, repeat domestic offenders cease their criminal activity, including but not limited to domestic violence. Going beyond simple deterrence in which an offender is de-motivated or dissuaded to offend, an ultimate, lasting impact of the OFDVI is offenders becoming desisters who no longer commit domestic crimes. The second impact that is hoped to be achieved by the program is that the victim is no longer abused. Whether he or she successfully leaves the offender, the offender desists, the offender is no longer able to access the victim, or some other outcome resulting from the program, the victim is safe and no longer experiencing abuse.

Program Theory

Using the Program Logic Model as a starting point, the following section will present and describe the Program Theory for the Hollywood OFDVI. The Program Theory will later be used in this chapter to deconstruct the program into its individual activities. These will then be matched with several potential mechanisms that are hypothesized (or assumed) to be causing some specified program output. Finally, these activity-mechanism hypotheses will be constructed into individual Context-Mechanism-Outcome Configurations (CMOCs) to map out precisely how the program is intended or believed to work (Tilley, 2010). Instead of creating a comprehensive program theory diagram that includes an overwhelming array of program inputs, outputs, outcomes, and multiple activities and mechanisms with different directionalities, the program theory will
be displayed as individual CMOCs. Doing so improves clarity and specificity, as the intended program targets (i.e., domestic offenders and victims) are not always the actual recipients of the program effects, as will be further explained in the following text. The CMOCs provided represent only a small portion of the plethora of potential pathways through which the program functions.

As a complex program, the OFDVI involves a number of activities that involve different participants, occur simultaneously, and are meant to influence different program recipients. Within the large program theory exist a number of sub-theories that combine to form the Hollywood OFDVI Program Theory. To provide a visual map of the theory, the proposed CMOCs I developed for each program activity will be visually displayed at the end of each activity section. The various elements will be discussed individually below.

To begin, the most apparent theory (or framework) that drives the OFDVI is focused deterrence. A more detailed discussion of this approach can be found in Chapter 2. Founded on deterrence theory, focused deterrence strategies are multi-faceted suites of program activities that are implemented simultaneously and are rarely studied in isolation (Trinkner, 2019). The approach melds deterrence theory with problem-oriented policing, repeat offender identification, consistent communication with potential and actual offenders, procedural justice and legitimacy, and coordination with outside agencies. It also brings with it a number of beliefs about offenders and criminality that shape how the framework is designed.
Because Hollywood’s OFDVI is an adaptation of focused deterrence, it does not follow a high-fidelity model of the approach and therefore incorporates its own blend of other program elements or theories. For this reason, the Program Theory delineates what is considered focused deterrence, while everything else would be considered particular to Hollywood’s OFDVI. Two main elements are missing from Hollywood’s program theory that would be included in a focused deterrence-based program theory – the absence of offender call-in meetings and the strong coordination with outside agencies. As noted previously, Hollywood does not hold meetings with any offenders in what are referred to as call-in meetings in focused deterrence literature, despite their perceived importance to the successful implementation of the model by focused deterrence scholars and practitioners (Trinkner, 2019; Wallace et al., 2016). Likewise, Hollywood has been unable to establish tightly coordinated relationships with outside partners, such as social service organizations and the courts, due to the structure of the local government. Hollywood is but one agency within the Broward County legal system, meaning the close cooperation and changes in policy and procedures seen in the self-contained civil and legal systems of High Point were impossible to achieve in Hollywood in most instances. While some buy-in and coordination were secured with the State Attorney’s office, the countywide domestic violence survivor support provider, bond court, and other agencies, the cooperation was not as integrated as it would ideally be in a focused deterrence program. A diagram that displays the general relationships between HPD and outside agencies and entities with their roles related to domestic violence crime, victims, and offenders is provided in the Agency/Organization Map in Figure 2 below.
Because of these missing elements in Hollywood’s program, the focused deterrence model offers only a broad framework for the program theory. Other theoretical drivers must be at play in the program theory of change, perhaps offering more specific theoretical foundations of the various program elements.

*Initial Program Implementation, 2014*

When attempting to understand and how a program was implemented, it is valuable to uncover an account of its emergence initially as an idea and then its evolution into an official set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) embraced by the department. Doing so not only aids in deepening a researcher’s understanding of the initial program theory, but it also helps to identify the conditions and actors that existed at the time. Unfortunately, many programs are implemented but fall apart much sooner than intended; by characterizing the first days of a program, one might be able to pinpoint
factors and conditions that are more or less favorable to program success and sustainability. This is independent of the program’s effectiveness. Here, the *process* is the focus. As previously mentioned, a program may be implemented very well yet not reach the desired outcomes; the alternative may also be true, albeit rare. What is valuable in tracking the process of implementation is assessing the process, identifying key factors that contribute or detract from an ideal implementation, and determining whether the program was implemented as intended by all of its participants.

With these goals in mind, the following text will provide an account of the events that occurred in 2014 and 2015 at the onset of the Hollywood OFDVI program. To begin, in 2014, a Sergeant at HPD, who was in charge of the robbery unit before he left, attended the 132\textsuperscript{nd} Administrative Officers Course (AOC) training event at the Southern Police Institute (SPI) in Louisville, Kentucky (SPI, 2020). The SPI is a law enforcement professional development training institute for advanced education for middle- to upper-management, situated within the Criminal Justice Department at the University of Louisville.

As a condition of attending the twelve-week college-level course, the Sergeant indicated that there was an expectation that he brings back something valuable from the course upon return to the Hollywood Police Department.

Generally speaking, when people go to the school, they’re asked to bring something back to implement. There are only 100 officers selected each year to go to this program. So, when you come back, you have to give an executive
summary to the command staff, and you pick a topic to then try to implement as an initiative in the department if it’s selected. (Sergeant, Interview 10)

While at the SPI, the Sergeant learned that he would be supervising the Domestic Violence Unit upon his return; he turned his focus towards ideas surrounding domestic violence prevention. In one of the classes, the Sergeant learned about focused deterrence as a promising crime prevention and reduction approach. In addition to describing the framework’s implementation as an initiative to reduce gun violence and open-air drug market violence, the course covered the High Point OFDVI that was being implemented for domestic violence. It was there in that course that he found his inspiration for the new idea to present when he returned to Florida.

Back in Hollywood, the DV Unit Sergeant presented the OFDVI to a receptive audience of the command staff, which included Majors, Assistant Chiefs, and the Chief, who supported his idea. Here, the circumstances of the personnel in upper management at the department at the time may have been highly influential to the sustainment of the program, even after new Chiefs took office. All of the future Chiefs of the Department attended the presentation, as well as a significant portion of the Command Staff that was in place throughout 2018. This continuity is a noteworthy factor when considering the longevity of the program and its levels of support throughout the period of study. As noted by the Chief at the time of this research, the influence of the Command Staff was integral to the program’s success. If there was strong leadership in rolling out the program from the top down, the program had a chance to be successful.
Leadership is a huge component to making sure this program's successful, and there has to be buy-in from the top down. [...] Leadership... plays an extremely important role. There has to be buy-in from the officers. And specifically, we filter that down through our supervisors. (Chief of Police, Interview)

These comments imply that the inverse would not result in success. Weak, unsupportive leadership would not have been conducive to program success because it would not lead to buy-in from the officers responsible for day-to-day implementation. A Lieutenant explained her experience with this phenomenon, highlighting the critical role of supervisors in relaying the reasoning behind new SOPs to increase compliance and support from their subordinates.

I mean, you gotta explain to them, that's the thing a lot of departments do not do, they push stuff down. And just like, “this is how you do it.” Well, if you explain to them why, and you have to do these extra steps and how it benefits them. And it benefits you know, like, the benefits of it, then I think you're more able to get them motivated, involved. It's when we just “now you're going to do this.” And a lot of departments do that because up here, you know, the command staff as they push stuff down, they're busy and they ain't got time to explain every little thing. So, it's really on the sergeants and lieutenants to explain to the people doing all the work, why we do what we do, because they're the ones that are actually doing it. And if you explain it to them, make it in a way that they understand, they're more likely to give you the outcome you want. (Lieutenant, Interview 13)

The Lieutenant’s comments also indicate that it is not effective for supervisors (or department leadership) to expect buy-in from line officers by simply creating new SOPs and commanding officers to fall in line. Indeed, while officers indicated that they knew they were expected to do things a certain way, some did show signs of resistance even several years after the program began. These deviations will be discussed further in a subsequent section.
As an adaptation of a focused-deterrence program, the OFDVI was designed to involve a large number of stakeholders outside of the police department in program implementation. Inter-agency coordination is one of the tenets of the high-fidelity Focused Deterrence programs supported by the NNSC, and Hollywood attempted to secure cooperation with a number of outside organizations to fulfill that requirement. One key stakeholder for the success of the OFDVI was the State Attorney’s Office. The DV Sergeant described the working relationship between HPD and the State Attorney’s Office related to domestic violence cases as “very good over time.”

We held a summit […] we invited federal prosecutors and every outside entity that High Point had recommended to come in […], and I put on a training. They were very receptive to it. […] Out of that came several factors that we bonded with and grew great relationships with. Probation was one of them, which we still work with. The bond court attorney, [name omitted], was phenomenal. The chief prosecutor with domestics was very good, [name omitted], when she did everything she could that would try to help us with the program. At the time, Judge [name omitted] was a bond court judge – he was receptive to it. So, we were getting a lot of people that were receptive, the federal prosecutors are receptive, but there was a minimal opportunity to work with them […], but we tried. (Sergeant, Interview)

Once support was secured from the Command Staff and relevant City authorities, the process of garnering support from the rest of the department began. Here is where the role of the program “champion” becomes salient. The DV Unit Sergeant 1 visibly worked to help everyone at the department understand the program.

[DV Sergeant 1] was down in our lineups all the time trying to explain the process and answering phone calls and, you know, responding to questions.

(Command Staff, Interview 1)

The DV Sergeant 1 was not the only supervisor who guided implementation at the
line officer level. Other interviewees indicated that they had been part of explaining the program to their officers.

I: And how did you find it most effective to kind of let them know what [the program was]?

P: Explaining it, talking to talking to one-on-one if they ask, or going down to lineups and explaining it, showing them the numbers that, you know, we are showing a reduction.

It became apparent that the program was closely associated with the DV Sergeant and the crime analyst. Some interviewees even referred to the OFDVI as the DV Sergeant’s program, even though by that time, there had been multiple other Sergeants in charge of the DV Unit since he moved to a different position. Eleven participants referenced the DV Sergeant 1 by name twenty-seven different times during interviews or ride alongs. Seven participants referenced the crime analyst by name forty-five times. This large volume of references to not only specific job roles but specific people indicates that both the DV Sergeant and the crime analyst were and continue to be key personnel for the OFDVI. The following three participants provided specific references to the crime analyst:

Thank God, we have our analyst, [Crime Analyst], and she's super, super good. If we had mediocre analysts, this wouldn't have-- it wouldn't have gotten off the ground because you have to have a good analyst that's dedicated and motivated, because I don't know if you've seen that extensive list that she has, it's huge.” (Lieutenant, Interview 13)

Let's be honest, the real work that's done there is [Crime Analyst]. [Crime Analyst] is indispensable. [Crime Analyst], and [the DV Unit Sergeant 1]. The two of them are the ones that created this program. (Sergeant, Interview 6)
I'm surprised more people in the county haven't modeled the, you know, the Not-in-Custody and the letters and everything like that, but I don't think they ha-- some of the people don't have the ability, they don't have… [Crime Analyst]. (Lieutenant, Interview 9)

These references, in addition to many more that came up during interviews or ride-alongs, indicate the strong association that department personnel made between the program and these two people. In the following section, the breadth of their contributions to OFDVI implementation is clarified.

*Creating the Repeat Offender Log*

From the very start of the OFDVI development, the crime analyst benefitted from a pre-existing department policy on domestic report writing that provided her with robust data to use domestic reports to inform the repeat offender log. Responding officers were required to write a report for all domestic incidents they attended to, regardless of the severity or outcome. As noted previously, this requirement was in place well before the OFDVI began, perhaps since at least 2010. There were mixed opinions of the report writing rule for domestics, but one officer who had worked for an agency in a different state argued that the mandate increased accountability among offenders (Line officer, Interview 11).

This continuity in report writing policy made incident reports a reliable tool for tracking all domestic incidents attended to and known to police. In contrast to departments that do not require reports for every domestic call for service, Hollywood’s policy provided the analyst and the DV Unit Sergeant with a stable measure of police and citizen activity as it relates to domestic violence.
In the Hollywood program, as in the High Point initiative, domestic offenders were categorized into four levels based on their propensity for violence and the risk they posed to their victims and society. In the five months before the start of the program, in December 2014, the crime analyst began building the Repeat Offender Log (ROL) by categorizing all individuals who were identified as the aggressor in every new Hollywood domestic incident report that came through the department. This process of compiling all domestic reports from the previous day will be referred to as batching, and the list of reports that must be reviewed will be referred to as a queue. On Fridays, the crime analyst batched the domestic reports to review offender crime histories and began building the log with repeat offenders. Here, the term offenders can refer to those individuals who were arrested for an offense or someone who was identified as the aggressor in a domestic incident, according to the report. While offenders and aggressors may have different legal definitions, the terms are used interchangeably for the purposes of the current study.

Upon review of the incident report and the offender’s criminal history, the crime analyst decided where to place the offender. She performed a criminal background check in the department’s SunGard ONE Solution Record Management System (RMS) to establish a domestic criminal profile used to determine the appropriate action to take with the aggressor. The RMS database houses criminal records for eight jurisdictions in South Florida.\textsuperscript{15} If an offender did not meet the threshold of being placed in a category —

\textsuperscript{15} The eight jurisdictions included in the RMS database are Broward Sherriff’s Office (BSO), Hollywood, Coconut Creek PD, Fort Lauderdale, Hallandale, Margate, Sunrise, and Wilton Manors.
generally because he or she had only one low-level non-arrest domestic incident and no apparent history of violence — he or she was not included on a lettered list (D through A) but was placed on a separate list that held all offenders in the log. This list will be referred to as the List of Repeat Offenders and is the first sheet of the ROL excel workbook.

Otherwise, especially once the list grew, offenders were placed into one of four categories, from D to A, with D being the lowest risk and A being the highest risk, once they met the threshold for that list. As previously noted, these lists were originally defined in the Killingbeck repeat victim program and later in High Point’s IPVI. However, Hollywood’s Repeat Offender Log was an Excel spreadsheet that started from scratch, so specific definitions for the lists and what thresholds would need to be met for offenders to be included in the Log needed to be specified from the start. The crime analyst described the challenges of building the nascent ROL.

I was already tracking repeat burglars. So, I was thinking it would be similar to that program. But the threshold with repeat burglar[s] is three or more burglary arrests... And they have to live within the city of Hollywood and be arrested by us basically, to be tracked in that program. So that was initially how I thought this was going to roll out... what's the threshold? Do you want three or more domestic[s] or whatever? And [the DV Sergeant] said, “No, no, this is a completely different animal…If they have more than one domestic, then they are technically a repeat domestic offender.” So, we hammered that sort of stuff out, I built [an]… Excel spreadsheet with the information we thought we would need. Obviously, things have been added to that over time. And then I started basically reading all of the domestic reports. (Non-sworn, Interview 15)

The crime analyst, in coordination with the Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant, applied the definitions for offenders of each list to each offender as the report came up in her queue. While most offenders were listed according to the typical definitions described
below, the process also allowed the analyst and the DV Sergeant discretion to place or not to place offenders on a certain list based on the details of their incidents and criminal history; this was particularly true at the beginning of the log development process. These definitions developed over time as the log grew. The crime analyst provided additional insight into the lengthy, time-consuming process that she undertook to identify repeat offenders in the beginning.

[The DV Sergeant] said, “… maybe we need to try to identify some A-listers… it's based on their criminal history.” So, I had to – we had to start somewhere. So initially, I just sorted my log to see who had the most incidents, and I ran the top 20 people’s histories just to get an idea. And were some of them A-listers? Maybe, I don't remember now. But just because you've had 20 domestics doesn't necessarily mean that you've had any sort of physical violence; you could be just argumentative. So, then we realized that I needed to run all those criminal histories. And yes, I had at minimum 800 criminal histories that I had to run, and I needed to do it quickly. So, I had started running all the new names on like, Fridays, like I do now. But I still had to run the backlog of 800. I ran as many as I could. They did give me some overtime to get it done. Just because it was going to be so time-consuming. I came in on Saturdays. I came in early. I stayed late. I read as many criminal histories as I could in a day. And it took me about a month. (Non-sworn, Interview 15)

The crime analyst’s narrative of how the log development process unfolded early in the program highlights how, despite having a blueprint for the intervention and a clear set of goals for the program, program theory was constructed and fleshed out over time. While it appears that the parameters were defined in a somewhat unstructured way, with definitions building as the project expanded, they reached a certain level of finiteness that served as guidelines for reference. The crime analyst’s role during the program development also becomes a main theme throughout the implementation and sustainment of the program. It is clear from the very start of the evaluation that the crime analyst held a major role in the program, and everyone knew it. The program did not develop in a
vacuum; awareness of what was unfolding reached across the department. The crime analyst added that she was named “Employee of the Month” due to her work developing the log. Soon, the entire department would come to learn about the program and the new roles and responsibilities associated with it.

One participant provided additional clarification on how to decide whether or not an incident meets the parameters of the OFDVI. Child custody issues that do not involve direct in-person contact between the guardians, she says, do not qualify as a domestic incidents under the program, but the incident may be recorded in the log.

> It could just be a child custody dispute… dispatch will classify it as a domestic, but it's one party on scene, the other person who was supposed to drop off their kids didn't show, they're late, whatever. To me, that's not a domestic incident for the program, per se. Is it domestic-related? Absolutely, because they share a child. But it's not a domestic incident for the program because there's no interaction between the two of them. Now, does it go on the log? Sure. But is that person going to get a letter? Probably not. Now, if they're arguing on-scene, both parties are on scene, and it's a habitual thing that they're arguing every time that they're exchanging the kids or something, then yes, that could definitely trigger a letter. So just kind of like, you have to take into account reading all of their history of domestics and see if – Do you think this is going to escalate? Do you think it needs to be addressed? (Non-sworn, Interview 15)

Other types of calls or incidents that are coded as domestics that do not align with the purposes or parameters of the program involve parents and children. Sometimes, parents call the police because of disciplinary issues, such as the child refusing to go to school or being disobedient. Several officers also noted that, while these incidents may be coded as domestics, they are outside the scope of domestic violence issues for the program. These are not included in the log. Alternatively, some children have called the

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16 According to the 2015 Annual Report, the crime analyst received Employee of the Year in 2015 (p. 18).
police on their parents after experiencing what they deemed overly-harsh punishment, and these calls are coded as domestics. However, one civilian interviewee described the difference between a domestic incident and a family matter involving non-criminal activity in the following:

Is that a domestic? Not if it falls within the threshold of disciplining your child. Not saying you can beat the snot out of your kid, but corporal punishment is not against the law. You can spank a child. You can take a cell phone away. (Non-sworn, Interview 15)

Repeat Offender Identification & Prioritization

The list of Repeat Offenders includes all repeat aggressors and offenders known to Hollywood. This includes offenders who have more than one (usually) domestic incident report in which they are identified as the aggressor but have not reached the threshold of being placed on a lettered list. At any given time, there may be 100 or more people listed on this sheet that are marked to receive a D Letter upon their next incident, if it should occur. The person is flagged in the list with an indicator, so anyone who references the log can see that he or she will have met the D-List threshold if involved as an aggressor in an additional domestic report. The Repeat Offender list also includes listed aggressors/offenders who are on the D, C, B, or A Lists. Therefore, the Repeat Offender list can reasonably be described as a master list of individuals who are responsible for the majority of repeat domestic violence in Hollywood and those with the potential for escalation.
While there may be some concern over net-widening by collating an individual’s low-level, non-crime incidents in this way, there is a justification for this approach. It is true that HPD may capture more domestic incidents in official police reports than other agencies due to their strict report writing rule, but the benefit to the crime analyst for pattern recognition in aggressor behavior is a valid pursuit. As one officer noted, most people never have the police called to their house because of a domestic dispute. Therefore, it can be considered abnormal behavior to be involved in more than one incident where police had to respond. Whether these incidents ultimately lead to the aggressor being put on the D-List is up to the discretion of the crime analyst and the DV Sergeant. The officer described this justification in the following excerpt:

P: Look, you've called the police five times. There's a problem. Stop! You know, like, how many times have police been to your [addressing interviewer] house for domestics?
I: Never
P: Never. Right, exactly. You know how many [times] they've been in mine? Never. Ok. Normal people don't get the police at their house for domestics. When you've got—now, can a fluke happen to anyone? Sure. Six times? There's a problem. (Sergeant, Interview)

To better illustrate how the ROL is organized and what the relative composition of offenders on each list is compared to the rest of the log, Figure 3 displays a diagram of all five parts of the Log, including the Repeat Offender list and offenders on the D-through A-Lists. In the diagram, the Repeat Offender list is the large gray component within which the D, C, B, and A lists are situated. Each rectangle represents the population of offenders contained in each List group, and each is approximately proportionate to the number of offenders in that group. Of particular interest is the small subset of offenders who are contained within all four lists, where all of the rectangle
overlap. Theoretically, these offenders could be considered the individuals who received the most treatment by moving from the D-List up to the C-, B-, and A-Lists, yet continued to offend, making them the highest-risk individuals due to their unending propensity for violence. It is important to note, however, that a large number of offenders were placed immediately on the A-List without cycling through the lower levels due to their violent criminal histories or a charge for an egregious domestic violence crime. A table representing the offender level descriptions is presented in Table 5.

Figure 3: Repeat Offender Lists of the Repeat Offender Log Diagram
Table 5: Offender-Level Descriptions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification &amp; Characteristics</th>
<th>D-List</th>
<th>C-List</th>
<th>B-List</th>
<th>A-List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol responds to a DV call and files a report for every incident</td>
<td>Arresee for a DV crime upon first charge</td>
<td>Progress from C to B level based on escalation of violence or other high-risk triggers upon assessment by the crime analyst</td>
<td>At DV sergeant discretion, previously unknown DV offenders with an especially violent criminal background will automatically be placed on A-list after first incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Triggers an evaluation of the offender by the crime analyst who runs primary aggressor in RMS to view criminal history</td>
<td>Must be offender’s first domestic violence charge since strategy implementation</td>
<td>Does not meet threshold of risk for A-List</td>
<td>Offender who commits a particularly serious DV offense will be placed on A-list at Sergeant’s discretion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary aggressor involved in more than one DV call to which patrol officers responded, but no arrest was made</td>
<td>Ability to listen to notification messaging and make rational choices¹⁸</td>
<td>Dangerous and not amenable to police contact</td>
<td>Dangerous and not amenable to police contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary aggressor has no DV criminal history available that would warrant placement in a higher level</td>
<td>Amenable to police contact¹⁹</td>
<td>No notification</td>
<td>No notification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Notification                     | Re-contacted by specially-trained police officers within one week of incident | C-letter hand-delivered by an officer at time of arrest or jail booking or mailed | No notification                                                             | Investigated for immediate prosecution |
|                                 | Deterrence message to the primary aggressor will be specific to his or her situation and will warn him or her of pending police attention and sanctions if he or she has another DV incident |                                                                                  |                                                                                        |                                                                                        |
|                                 | Once official notification is made, offender will be flagged in ROL as being a notified D-level offender |                                                                                  |                                                                                        |                                                                                        |

| Monitoring                      | Crime analyst will flag the offender in the ROL as being D-level offender and indicate whether a notification was successfully delivered or not | Once official notification is made, crime analyst will flag the offender in the ROL as being notified C-level offender | Any offender who reoffends will be reviewed by the DV Unit for designation | Monthly bulletins within police department to notify entire agency of A-lister status |

¹⁷ Table adapted from Sechrist & Weil (2017), pp. 10-11.

¹⁸ For example, individuals with serious mental health concerns may not meet this criterion.

¹⁹ Amenable, as deemed by the crime analyst and DV Sergeant based on report detail and offender behavior towards law enforcement.
- Any additional non-arrest domestic incidents will be recorded in the log
- Any offender who is arrested will be designated as the next level offender (C-list offender)

- Activities will continue to be reported to law enforcement by community, criminal justice and service providers.
- Any offender who reoffends will be reviewed by the DV Unit for designation for the next list level(s) (B- or A-list)

- A-list sent to State Attorney’s Office each month
- Premise warnings at offender’s Last Known Address
If the offender was already in the ROL, the analyst would take one of two actions. She would update the offender’s profile if it was a non-crime incident report, or she would determine an appropriate list on which to place the individual; these would then be forwarded to the Domestic Violence Sergeant for approval. The profile for each listed offender included name, date of birth, last known address, number of domestic incidences in RMS, summary notes of domestic incidences in Hollywood, and the date of the most recent incident. An incident was either a report for a non-arrest domestic call that was attended to by an officer or a domestic arrest.

The lowest level offenders, referred to as “D-Listers” or offenders on the “D-list,” typically had two or more non-criminal domestic incidents in their criminal history, including the incident for which the most recent report was written. Offenders who were arrested but did not have a history of serious violence were placed on the “C-list.” Those offenders who were re-arrested after being on the “C-List” or were arrested once and had serious violent criminal backgrounds were placed on the “B-List.”

The “A-list” was made up of the most serious, violent offenders, many of whom were convicted felons, who posed acute, immediate dangers to society. The database consisted of mostly repeat offenders, but there were some offenders included in which a single arrest was their only incident, and they were placed on the C-list. During the initial database creation, the analyst also identified A-List offenders who would come through the queue due to an incident she needed to review. If an offender (or aggressor if no arrest was necessary) had a history of unusually violent criminal behavior, including murder, attempted murder, sexual assault, strangulation, or other egregious acts, he or she could
be categorized as an A-List offender. The criminal history may or may not involve an arrest in Hollywood, but it would involve major red flags that indicate the individual is a high-risk offender with a proven record of violence.

After creating this initial repeat offender database, the various program activities began to be implemented. Letter deliveries began in May 2015 for D-Listers and June 2015 for C-Listers as they began to move up a level after an arrest. Each level of offender received a different amount of police attention and action based on the focused deterrence framework, but only D- and C-Listers received letters during the study period. Letters for offenders on the B- and A-List were planned to be phased in later but were never implemented. The procedures for B- and A-Listers are discussed in detail below.

Once an offender was identified as a D-Lister by the analyst and approved by the Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant, he or she was added to the database. A personalized D-Letter was drafted and printed out by the crime analyst within 48 hours of the incident. This letter, printed on official City of Hollywood letterhead and addressed to the offender, explained that in accordance with the new program, the recent domestic incident involving the individual led police to place him or her on a “watch list,” and he or she would be under increased police scrutiny. The letter also clearly stated that the Hollywood police department was taking domestic violence seriously, and “unannounced police checks” on the residence may be conducted. Additionally, the letter explained that the department “consider[ed] this fair warning so [the offender could] avoid criminal charges, court appearances, and possible imprisonment” in an explicit deterrence message. The officer also provided the offender with a full-color two-sided pamphlet
filled with resources that may help ease some of the common stressors that can contribute to domestic issues, including job training and placement, social services, counseling, substance abuse assistance, and anger management groups. The brochure can be found in Appendix A.

Three attempts were made by a uniformed officer to deliver the letter in person to the best-known address of the offender as soon as possible, ideally about a week after the incident. If the officer was unable to find the individual, the individual was uncooperative and avoided police contact, or the officer was otherwise unable to deliver the letter by hand, it was sent via certified mail. A considerable number of D-Letters were never delivered, and mailed letters were occasionally returned to sender. D-List letter delivery began in May 2015. A detailed analysis of letter deliveries, including metrics concerning the number of delivered letters and method of delivery, is included in the Implementation Analysis of the Letter Deliveries Activity section in the current chapter, beginning on page 148.
"D" List Letter

Date: 10/3/2017

Offender Name,

I am writing to let you know that members of the Hollywood Police Department are taking a new focused approach in preventing future acts of domestic violence. Because of the domestic related call involving you on [incident date], this letter is your official notice that your name has been added to a watch list. The watch list will be reviewed daily by detectives assigned to the Hollywood Police Domestic Violence Unit, who will be looking for any additional complaints regarding domestic violence-related activity involving you. Domestic Violence Detectives will consider complaints from any source: officers, neighbors, family members, a witness, a friend or the victim.

Domestic violence related crimes include threats, trespassing, damage to property, simple assaults, simple battery, harassment, stalking, sexual battery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery and all violations of court ordered injunctions related to you as a respondent (to include pretrial/post bond release agreements).

Tomas Sanchez, Chief of Police, has ordered that our number one priority will be to focus on domestic violence offenders. Unannounced police checks on your residence may be conducted. Further incidents involving you will be documented, reviewed and acted upon by every legal means necessary.

Consider this letter as notice of our commitment to identifying and apprehending those who engage in and are responsible for acts of domestic violence. You need to be aware that it is our policy that an officer will make an arrest whenever probable cause exists. We consider this fair warning, so you can avoid criminal charges, court appearances and possible imprisonment.

The Hollywood Police Department does understand that numerous circumstances outside the scope of your domestic relationship may have contributed to your current status on our list. Please see the included brochure which will better explain our program and offer assistance programs at the City, County and State levels.

Sincerely,

Sergeant Rhett Cody
Domestic Violence Unit
Hollywood Police Department
The procedure for the C-Listers deviated from that of the D-Listers due to the nature of the incidents, which were criminal and resulted in an arrest. At the time of a domestic arrest, the responding officer was responsible for reaching back to the crime analyst to determine if the offender was already on a list. If it was the offender’s first arrest since the start of the program in May 2015, he or she was immediately placed on the C-List. Offenders on the D-List who were arrested were moved up to the C-List. A C-Letter was printed up and hand-delivered to the offender while in custody for the vast majority of cases. In certain cases, the letter was not delivered until sometime after the arrest for a variety of reasons. The text of the C-Letter, available in Figure 5 below, was more cautionary than that of the D-Letter, and clearly stated that the offender was “closer to a possible prison sentence” and should “stop [his or her] violent actions now.” It also explained Federal and State law that states that any individual convicted of a crime of domestic violence or who is under an Injunction for Protection Against Domestic/Dating or Repeat Violence may not possess a firearm. The C-Letter included important information for the offender to know about his or her status as a C-Lister and urged the offender to refrain from violence in the future. C-Letter delivery began one month after D-Letters in June 2015.
Because of your arrest in the most recent domestic related incident on [date of incident], I am writing to let you know that members of the Hollywood Police Department are taking a new focused approach in preventing future acts of domestic violence. This letter is your official notice that your name has been added to a watch list for "C" list offenders. The watch list will be reviewed daily by detectives assigned to the Hollywood Police Domestic Violence Unit, who will be looking for any additional complaints regarding domestic violence-related activity involving you. Domestic Violence Detectives will consider complaints from any sources: officers, neighbors, family members, a witness, a friend, or the victim.

Your status as a "C" list offender brings you closer to a possible prison sentence. This status with the Domestic Violence Unit means you are now being targeted for closer attention, scrutiny and/or penalties by our agency. We will continue to look systematically for any complaints about domestic violence related activity involving you. Stop your violent actions now.

Understand that under Federal and State Law, individuals under an injunction For Protection Against Domestic/Dating or Repeat Violence, a Pre-Trial Release Agreement, or who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence cannot have in their care, custody, possession, or control any firearms or ammunition. Officers who believe probable cause exists that an offense of domestic violence took place must make an arrest. This includes incidents which create a well-founded fear that without an arrest, a future act of violence may occur. We consider this fair warning so you can avoid additional criminal charges, court appearances and possible imprisonment.

Domestic violence related crimes include threats, trespassing, damage to property, simple assaults, simple battery, harassment, stalking, sexual battery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery and all violations of court ordered injunctions related to you as a respondent, (to include pretrial/post bond release agreements). Thomas Sanchez, Chief of Police has ordered that our number one priority will be to focus on domestic violence offenders. Unannounced police checks on your residence may be conducted. Further incidents involving you will be documented, reviewed and acted upon by every legal means necessary.

It's time to stop and preserve your freedom.

Sergeant Rhett Cady
Domestic Violence Unit
Hollywood Police Department
The procedures for offenders on the B-List were less defined, and I was unable to clarify the purpose of the B-List. It was never determined exactly why, but the higher-level offenders did not receive a letter. There was a generalized lack of clarity surrounding the B-List for all participants who were asked about it, which the DV Sergeant admitted he would have omitted if he could revise the original ROL structure. The B-List appeared to serve as a step up from the C-List, but the individual did not quite reach the threshold of an A-Lister. As part of High Point’s model, the B-List was perhaps carried into Hollywood’s model without critical consideration of its purpose. Unlike High Point, Hollywood did not hold call-in meetings with the offenders on these two lists.

For the A-List, the OFDVI had a better-defined set of procedures or activities meant more to prevent serious violence than rely on deterrence to influence the offender. Similar to B-Listers, A-Listers did not receive a letter, either via mail or in-person delivery by a uniformed officer. A-Listers did not receive a letter in the High Point program, so this is perhaps one reason why they did not receive a letter in Hollywood. Through interviews, it seemed that letters were considered ineffective tools for these offenders because they were already serious criminals and would not care about a letter. A further discussion about the letter delivery activity as it relates to A-Listers can be found in the Activities and Mechanisms of the OFDVI section below.
Implementation Analysis of the Letter Deliveries Activity

Analysis of the letter delivery program was conducted to identify several key implementation metrics. Table 6 below describes the various desired findings, the data analyzed, and the related outputs of the analyses. These metrics were also used to calculate the estimated costs of the letter delivery element of the OFDVI in the Cost-Benefit Analysis section in Chapter 5 of this study. The department’s crime analyst recorded the delivery date for each letter in the Repeat Offender Log and usually indicated whether it was delivered in-person or by mail. The total number of letters produced (printed), delivered, and never delivered after several attempts due to an inability to locate an offender were calculated. The time between the triggering incident and the subsequent letter delivery, how many letters were hand-delivered, and how many were delivered by mail only were analyzed to assess the letter delivery process. These findings are displayed in Table 7 below.

Table 6: Repeat Offender Log Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Finding</th>
<th>Data Analyzed</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of letters delivered</td>
<td>Count number of confirmed delivery dates</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of time between triggering incident and letter delivery</td>
<td>Incident Date 1. 1. Incident Date 2. Delivery attempts made 3. Delivery date</td>
<td>1. Mean, median, and mode of number of days to successful delivery 2. Mean delivery attempts made before successful delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of time between letter delivery and an additional incident</td>
<td>Delivery date 1. 1. Delivery date 2. Date of additional incident</td>
<td>Mean, median, and mode of number of days to additional incident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7: D and C-Letter Deliveries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>In-Person</th>
<th>Mailed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful Deliveries</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>85.34</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Letters Delivered</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>74.93</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Letters Delivered</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>89.05</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed Delivery Attempts</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>33.69</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Delivery Attempts</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>88.81</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Twenty-five percent of D Letters were delivered by mail, while three-quarters were delivered in-person. Only 27 percent of in-person deliveries were successfully executed within a week of the triggering incident. The average amount of time it took to hand-deliver a D Letter was 46 days, though one or more unsuccessful delivery attempts may have been made before a successful delivery. Officers visited letter recipients at their last known residence 818 times; of those visits, the officers were unable to deliver the letter 560 times for a number of reasons usually indicated in the ROL. This indicates that D Letter deliveries were successful just 31 percent of the time. For mailed D Letters, several were sent out within a week of the incident (12 letters or 14 percent), while most were mailed three weeks or more after the incident. Thirteen letters were returned to the sender. The longest time between an incident and letter mailing was 366 days, with an average of 71 days. Many letters were sent out after one or more unsuccessful in-person delivery attempts; it was not the preferred method.

Eleven percent of C Letters were delivered by mail, while most were delivered in-person. The majority of hand-delivered C Letters were delivered at the time of arrest (702 letters or 73.8 percent), and 80 percent (760) were delivered within three weeks of the
arrest. The remaining 20 percent of in-person deliveries took between 22 and 826 days, at an average of 198 days. The department mailed 104 C Letters, and seven mailed C Letters were undeliverable and were returned to sender.

There were 1,458 unique offenders in the D through A lists of the ROL. The log recorded 1,045 incidents and 1,080 arrests. The first trigger incident for any offender on the lists occurred on December 30, 2014; that offender was on the A list the longest of any offender at 1,462 days or four years. The first D List trigger event occurred on May 16, 2015, and the letter was delivered eight days later, on May 24, 2015. The first C List trigger event occurred on June 8, 2015, and the letter was delivered the following day.

These findings align with what the data collected on Hollywood’s letter delivery processes has shown. During the seventh ride along, two officers were tasked with making D Letter deliveries. Out of the four letters, none were successfully delivered. Three of the stops at offenders’ last known residences resulted in no contact, while one led to a short discussion with a woman who described herself as the letter recipient’s mother. He was not present at the time, so the letter was not delivered.

Based on the interviews and ride alongs, most officers demonstrated sufficient understanding of the letter aspect of the program and the SOPs related to them. As noted above, almost three-quarters of C Letters were delivered at the time of an arrest, so this indicates a fair amount of compliance. There were only a small number of exceptions. For the C Letters, one officer’s response in an interview to questions concerning letter delivery SOPs indicated that he inconsistently remembered to give arrested offenders C Letters at the time of arrest and rather relied on the crime analyst to ensure it went out.
This officer demonstrated a poor understanding of the letters generally, despite having been an officer for eighteen years at the department and was there throughout the OFDVI program implementation.

Interviewer: Tell me what you know about letter-- the domestic letter deliveries. Have you done any D-List deliveries yourself?
Participant: Um. Yeah. Um, not the deliveries, but I'm required to send them to the suspect. When I arrest the person. I send him a letter C- C- or D letter?
I: If he was arrested, I believe it would be a C letter
P: C letter. I don't know about the D letter. There's a D letter?
I: Um, yeah. So, I guess that would be for offenders who--?
P: Oh, yeah. The repeat offenders. The repeat offenders? Yes. Yes. Um, I would-- one of our liaisons would-- would tell me, “did you send the D letter [sic] and if I forget, I would definitely send it, and sometimes I do. Sometimes I forget. So it's my fault.
I: Okay, now, um, so how do you send it? Do you mean like in the mail?
P: Well, I would have the liaison-- they're the ones that will, “don't worry, I'll take care of it.” Most of the time.
I: Who usually is that?
P: I think it’s Miss [Crime Analyst’s last name]. (Line officer, Interview 21)

As one of the most salient and visible activities of the OFDVI, an analysis of the letter delivery’s implementation aids in understanding how often it was carried out and its scope. As part of fulfilling the EMMIE (I)mplementation element, this section provided practical details about how Hollywood carried out this activity. Next, the following section will investigate the potential mechanisms associated with letter deliveries, in addition to other activities that were part of the intervention.

**Activities & Mechanisms of the OFDVI**

This section will address the element of the EMMIE framework of (M)echanisms, or the underlying causes for program activities to lead to their effects on program recipients (Johnson et al., 2015). As described in detail in Chapter 3, mechanism identification is an integral part of the realist evaluation approach. In the literature on
focused deterrence, mechanism identification is not a priority (Braga et al., 2018); the programs are accepted as packages of activities that cannot or should not be singled out for their individual contributions and effects on crime. The current study offers a counter to this stance by distinguishing an array of potential mechanisms based on theories from criminology, social science, behavioral economics, and other disciplines for each activity of Hollywood’s OFDVI. Several of the mechanisms discussed in the following section were identified prior to qualitative and quantitative data collection. Therefore, it was possible to collect data that would help inform the discussion of program mechanisms.

The ultimate goal of identifying and testing mechanisms is to provide evidence for (or against) specific mechanisms that can lend the greatest returns in crime reduction and community safety. These findings can inform future iterations of similar programs or aid in the development of new ones that rely on activities based on the most impactful mechanisms. In other words, this analysis helps to identify which activities trigger mechanisms that can influence offending or compliance. The OFDVI is made up of a large number of simultaneous activities that could involve an even larger array of different mechanisms. For the current study, a subset of the most prominent and concrete activities and a selection of their possible mechanisms were identified for analysis. The activities for which mechanisms will be identified in the current study, which is not meant to be exhaustive, include the following five activities: letter delivery; report taking and writing for every domestic incident; Not-in-Custody Arrests; the development and use of the Repeat Offender Log (i.e., watch listing); and the shift in duties for patrol officers and detectives. Table 8 displays the OFDVI activities and mechanisms with their associated proposed theories that have been selected for consideration. A table with a
more extensive list of program activities and their possible mechanisms and theories can be found in Appendix C.

As part of the process in analyzing how the program may function and lead to its intended effects, a Context-Mechanism-Outcome configuration (CMOC) is proposed for each activity (Tilley, 2010). For the purpose of clarity and conciseness, just one CMOC was proposed for each activity, though there are likely far more potential CMOCs that could be available for scientific inquiry. The configurations proposed for each activity are those that I considered most likely, among those discussed in the current study. Each CMOC can be found after the discussion of the proposed mechanisms for each activity in the following section.
Table 8: OFDVI Activities, Their Potential Mechanisms, and Associated Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mechanics</th>
<th>Theory(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Letter Delivery</strong></td>
<td>Desistance through conscious, deliberate self-improvement</td>
<td>Identity Theory of Desistance proposed by Paternoster and Bushway (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disrupt power dynamic between aggressor and victim</td>
<td>Cycle of violence (Katerndahl et al., 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interrupts violent habits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remove excuses and increase the risk</td>
<td>Situational Crime Prevention (Clarke, 2009); Routine Activities (Cohen &amp; Felson, 1979); Rational Choice (Cornish &amp; Clarke, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nudge Theory (Thaler &amp; Sunstein, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not-in-Custody Probable Cause Arrest Affidavits</strong></td>
<td>Deterrence through increasing subjective probability of apprehension</td>
<td>Risk perceptions (Apel, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rational choice (Cornish &amp; Clarke, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased officer motivation to arrive on-scene quickly</td>
<td>Behavioral economics theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closing the gap between those who are arrested and those who should be arrested for a crime</td>
<td>Offenders Gone on Arrival (Nelson, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Repeat Offender Log</strong></td>
<td>Reduce anonymity of offender for officers, for offender after notification</td>
<td>Situational Crime Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standardizes offender prioritization, reduces error and bias</td>
<td>Intelligence-Led Policing (Ratcliffe, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Report Writing</strong></td>
<td>Alters perception of victims and offenders of the seriousness of domestic violence</td>
<td>Problem-Oriented Policing; Intelligence-Led Policing (Ratcliffe, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improves data collection, improves analysis capabilities</td>
<td>Procedural justice and legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shift in Duties for Patrol and DV Detectives</strong></td>
<td>Detectives have more time to spend on felony cases &amp; build better cases</td>
<td>Victim time inconsistency/commitment devices (Aizer &amp; Dal Bo, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol officers more successful in securing victim cooperation on scene</td>
<td>Nudge theory (Thaler &amp; Sunstein, 2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Activity 1: Letter Delivery*

As described in the first section of this chapter, a conspicuous element of Hollywood’s program is the delivery of letters to those individuals identified as
aggressors (in non-arrest incidents) and offenders (in case of arrest) of domestic abuse. There has been recent interest in exploring new tools for police to reduce the financial and social burden of arrest and incarceration on communities after acknowledging that incarceration alone is not an effective crime deterrent, especially domestic crime (Bratton, 2011; Sloan et al., 2013). An example is one that is found within focused deterrence programs in the form of notifying offenders via a face-to-face meeting, flyer, text message, or personalized letter. In the context of Hollywood’s program, this notification involves an in-person delivery of a personalized letter by a uniformed officer from the police department.

Few studies have evaluated the deterrent value of informative letters delivered to potential offenders, and just one has explored their influence on domestic offending. Nevertheless, existing research offers mixed support for their use as a cost-effective tool for reducing crime. Green (1985) found that a legal threat in the form of a letter caused television cable thieves to cease illegally descrambling their cable signal to access premium channels, with two-thirds of recipients reacting to the threat of legal action. A follow-up revealed that the deterrent effect continued for at least six months after the initial letter delivery. Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2013) found that legal threat letters significantly increased compliance with public television fee payments in Europe. Similarly, Blais and Bacher (2007) found letters to be an effective deterrent against insurance claim padding, with letter recipients being less likely to exaggerate the value of their claims than the control group that did not receive a letter. These findings suggest that letters sent to actual and potential offenders, either as generic warnings or threats
addressed to a specific recipient, can act as a simple deterrence tool for crimes or deviant behavior.

While letters may offer a significant deterrent effect for some types of crime, they may not influence behavior for all forms of crime, and particularly violent crime—the subject of the current study—and other Part I crimes. For example, burglars were not found to be influenced by personalized, hand-delivered letters from police in a quasi-experimental study conducted in the UK (Dawson & Dangerfield, 2017). In the small-scale study, known offenders with an average of three arrests or charges in the last eighteen months did not show any significant difference in offending rates over the six months after the receipt of a letter compared to a control group that did not receive a letter; some recipients offended more quickly after letter receipt than those in the control group, and others lagged behind in committing a repeat offense by one or two months. The study specifically examined the letters from the lens of nudge theory, which posits that behavior can be influenced to change towards a certain desired behavior through the use of strategic “nudges” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009).

Additionally, the content of the letter appears to affect its usefulness, with threatening letters being more effective than normative or educational messages (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Castro & Scartascini, 2015; Fellner et al., 2013). In a study in Los Angeles on the effect of informational legal letters on the prevention of illegal gun sales, only a limited, uncertain reduction was seen long-term in the number of gun-related homicides and aggravated assaults in the city (Hunt et al., 2017). The letters, which informed new handgun purchasers of their legal responsibilities as owners concerning the
laws on selling or transferring the gun to a third party, were intended to prevent illegal
guns from being used in the commission of crimes. While a cost-benefit analysis of the
letter program demonstrated that even a small reduction in violent crime would offset the
costs of the program, there were no clear findings in support of a direct intervention
benefit.

In contrast to letters with an educational message about laws and sanctions,
research has shown that letters with a normative appeal to a potential offender’s sense of
‘the greater good’ or comparison with peers were not effective for deterring tax evasion,
while a notice of increased audits led to mixed results (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Slemrod
et al., 2001). Similarly, no effect was seen of morally-charged letters for the prevention of
drug over-prescription when delivered to physicians known to prescribe abnormally high,
potentially fraudulent volumes of prescription medications (Sacarny et al., 2016).
However, in a random-controlled trial involving sending peer comparison letters, or what
the authors refer to as a “behavioral nudge,” to the 5,055 highest Medicare prescribers of
an often-over-prescribed antipsychotic drug to elderly and disabled patients, prescriptions
from those doctors were significantly reduced for at least two years (Sacarny et al.,
2018).

The lack of literature on the use or effect of letters on criminal behavior,
especially violent crimes, and the low level of evidence in support of their use as a
deterrent mechanism leaves many questions unanswered about the effectiveness of letters
to deter or prevent crime. This is a common problem within policing and crime
prevention, with programs spreading in popularity and use without enough empirical
evidence demonstrating their long-term and replicable impact; over time, the evidence instead builds against their effectiveness after widespread adoption (i.e., Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE), Scared Straight, the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, etc.) Questions remain about which types of letters could work, which crimes can be reduced by letters, and which offenders would be most influenced by the threat of sanction via a written document. Some scholars have suggested that there may be a backfire effect for some offenders, what Masling (1966) referred to as the “screw you effect,” whereby letter recipients would do the opposite of what they believe is expected of them in response to receiving the treatment (Dawson & Dangerfield, 2017).

A subset of individuals who become involved in the OFDVI program by getting added to the Repeat Offender Log and receiving a notification may be a highly influenceable group of people. They can be considered the lowest risk among the D-Listers and consist of those aggressors who have never been arrested for a domestic incident and therefore have little to no prior experience with the criminal justice system. This group includes juveniles who would be at the beginning of their offending careers and adults who are possible late-onset offenders. The criminal career trajectories of both groups may differ considerably (Thompson et al., 2014), and some research has found that there are substantial differences in personality, normative values, and intelligence between them (Donnellan et al., 2002), which may present better opportunities for law enforcement intervention and crime prevention. In furtherance of the evidence that this group of offenders does exist, McGee and Farrington (2010) found that approximately one-third of the adult-onset offenders (aged 21 and over) in a sample of men in a longitudinal study in the UK were undetected delinquents in their youth, while two-thirds
provided a history of behavior that did not rise to the threshold of delinquency. Perhaps those in the two-thirds of adult-onset offenders are quite different from the one-third that were undetected delinquents.

In a study on the outcomes of a court-mandated batterer’s treatment in Florida, Feder and Dugan (2004) described the differences between program completers and non-completers. The authors argued that non-completers were not deterred by the consequences of missing their mandated treatment session, and they were unlikely to be deterred by the consequences of reoffending. Their explanation of the findings suggested that non-completers, or those that missed at least one session, shared characteristics with offenders who were re-arrested, and those that complete their treatment were characteristically less likely to reoffend with or without treatment. In other words, the two different groups of offenders signaled their concern or lack thereof of being arrested and sanctioned for their actions. This argument is supported by findings in the UK, which indicate that programs for offenders suffer from non-completion rates between 15 and 58 percent, and the characteristics of non-completers are the same characteristics that predict continuing abuse and homicide (Jewell, 2010; Jewell & Wormith, 2010).

It is the group of low-risk aggressors, rather than those with low concern for arrest and sanction, that may be the most receptive to the letters. Three specific mechanisms of the letter delivery activity may be working on this group of individuals. The more serious offenders, such as those who have a propensity for generalized criminal behavior, may not be affected by the letters.
Before delving into the mechanisms related to letter deliveries, it is important to consider whether or not offenders are reading the letters. Based on the way that Hollywood delivers most of the letters – in-person and only to the addressee – there is a fair amount of consistency in ensuring that the offenders are actually receiving the letters. However, whether or not they read the letters is much more difficult to determine. Officers were mixed in their ideas about whether offenders read the letters. Some were unsure whether the letters were read, but delivering them did not seem to result in any adverse effects, stating that “I don't think they're harming anybody, they're sending them out, they're putting people on warning.” (Line officer, Interview 14). Eight participants indicated that they thought offenders read the letters to some extent. One Lieutenant strongly believed that recipients read the letters:

“Listen, if I'm home, if I'm an offender, and a police officer comes and knocks on my door and delivers a letter, I'm reading the letter back and forth. I'm reading the letter three or four times to see what the hell is going on. So yes. I'm pretty certain that offenders read the letters. They may read the letter and throw it-- they ball up and throw it out, but they read they read a letter.”

A patrol officer likened the OFDVI and its letters to stricter seatbelt law enforcement that eventually resulted in most people wearing their seatbelts.

It's almost like the seatbelt law. You know, when officers weren't issuing tickets for seatbelts, nobody really cared, you know what I mean. Why do they have to wear their seatbelts? Well, now it's the whole “click it or ticket,” everybody wears their seatbelt, especially when you see a police officer, and everybody puts on their seat belt. Well, same thing with domestic violence, you know we tell these guys, give them the letters, we're tracking you, know what I mean. So now it's in the back of their mind, “you know what, before I get into an argument before I get
into a fight with my significant other, let me leave.” Because there will be an arrest, you know what I mean. It's not, okay, you know police gonna come out, is going to report and leave. No. Somebody's gonna go to jail, basically. You know what I mean, so. And I think they are aware of that, and it kind of, I guess, prevents a lot of situations. So it is a deterrent. (Line Officer, Interview 22)

Another officer highlighted the effect the letters might have on law-abiding citizens who are afraid of getting caught up in the criminal justice system because they have a lot to lose.

I think it might scare them, you know, it puts them on notice that they're on a list. Because some people have never been arrested before and they're afraid because of their careers and their jobs and their livelihood. And then they're afraid that it might show up on their criminal history, and we advise them it's not. It's just on our list here. (Line officer, Interview 24)

When considering the C Letters, most of them are given to offenders at the time they are booked into jail. Many officers printed it out from their in-car printers and placed it into the arrestee’s belongings, which were returned to him or her once released from jail. Similar to the D Letters, officers generally were not sure whether or not offenders read the letter.

Participant: We just print it off and explain to them that it's going to be in their property and to read it
Interviewer: Ok, you don't get any-- like, they don't ask questions about anything in the moment?
P: I just keep it pretty simple. That's the least of their worries most of the time.
I: Do you think that they read it later?
P: I dunno. I mean, they have to pick it up with their property, and when they get released, so they at least have it.
I: So, it's there, at least. [Laughs] They have to touch it at some point, at least. (Line officer, Interview 25)

Alternatively, there were officers who were clear about their perceptions of the
minimal effect C Letters had on offenders when they were arrested. One officer admitted that “once they get the letter, you know, what they decided to do with it is on them. But we explain it to them. But if they don’t want to read it on their own, then there’s not much we can do” (Line officer, Interview 26). Similarly, another officer offered his view that the letters were most likely not an effective deterrent for many offenders.

Participant: I try and explain [the letter] to them a little bit, you know, cause some people want to know why and what it-- what is this? What is this piece of paper? So, I try to explain it to them. But then some of them, like I said, they like, when I explain it to them, "psh, whatever."
Interviewer: Would you say, more or less like, do people read it? Do you think, or--?
P: No.
I: Okay, so then what purpose would it serve?
P: Killing trees.
I: [Laughs] Okay
P: That’s it. (Line officer, Interview 25)

Another officer provided some insight into why some offenders might not read the letter nor care that they received it. He posited that unless the letter was going to be part of their permanent record or put in some legal file of theirs, they did not care. The mentality of many offenders is one of denial that they did anything wrong. “The thought process for people involved in domestic violence is usually, "I'm not at fault. I've done nothing wrong. And obviously, this isn't gonna happen again” (Line officer, Interview 4). Therefore, receiving a letter related to something they do not take responsibility for might not be impactful.

Officers are split on their opinions about whether offenders read and care about letters. Eleven participants (37 percent) indicated that they doubted that the letters are ever read. Nevertheless, letter deliveries were a key element of the program, and one of the most visible and tangible activities officers carried out. Three potential mechanisms
of letter deliveries are proposed and explored below: (1) the letter delivery activity may trigger the mechanisms of Identity Theory of Desistance (Paternoster & Bushway, 2009); second, the letters may disrupt the power dynamics in abusive relationships; third, the letters may work through the power of opportunity reduction as described by Situational Crime Prevention.

Mechanism 1.1: Desistance through conscious, deliberate self-improvement

While it may be attractive to invoke deterrence theory to explain how the letter deliveries work on recipients, there is reason to avoid relying on the theory here. The letters could be considered a non-traditional form of specific deterrence, but because they do not involve any traditional, tangible law enforcement activity like arrest or sanction, which form the backbone of deterrence theory, they present a unique manifestation of police activity that does not quite fall within the scope of traditional crime deterrence. Alternatively, the activity crosses into the realm of desistance theory, as if the letters were considered a legal cease and desist letter received from an attorney. However, much of the literature on desistance theory posits that people stop offending over their life course, in large part due to major lifestyle changes such as entering into a long-term, stable relationship (Laub & Sampson, 2001). It is clear that domestic offenders still offend when in long-term relationships, though they are debatably stable, so without this main avenue for desistance proposed in traditional desistance literature, another mechanism must be at play.

The Identity Theory of Desistance proposed by Paternoster and Bushway (2009) better captures a potential mechanism at work in the letter delivery activity. The authors
argue that offenders only change their behavior once their failures (here, in the form of having a domestic dispute requiring police assistance) begin to cost more to them than any benefits they may have provided, and they consciously make efforts to change their identity and lifestyle to one that is more prosocial. The theory emphasizes that offenders are active participants in their own self-improvement, and the presence or absence of the agency to make changes will differentiate the desisters from the non-desisters. The letters may accelerate this process for the most impressionable recipients who do not see themselves as ‘domestic abusers’ and therefore change their behavior in positive ways to avoid taking on that identity. Therefore, this theory provides the framework for the first potential mechanism of the letters – identity preservation and improvement through desistance.

**Mechanism 1.2: Disrupt power dynamic between aggressor and victim**

The second possible mechanism at work in the letter delivery activity involves a theory about power dynamic disruption. This potential theoretical pathway is related to the cycle of violence and the potential for police to interrupt or “break” it. Much literature has focused on the ‘cycle of violence’ of domestic abuse and the ‘wheel of power and control’ theory, including popular treatment programs based on these concepts, such as the Duluth Model. Research shows that there are identifiable, albeit complex, patterns in many abusive relationships (Katernahl et al., 2010), and it is possible that these patterns have been ignored or unintentionally encouraged by traditional law enforcement responses. Arrest, because it is a common and expected response to DV for offenders, may not disrupt the cycle. Instead, it could be considered an inevitable part of it for repeat
offenders. The letters and unexpected police presence may somehow disrupt these dynamics in a way that decreases violence.

While other possible dynamic-disrupting interventions such as second-responder visits to victims a day or week after a domestic incident have been shown to be ineffective in some studies (Davis et al., 2010) and effective at improving victim outcomes or use of support services in others (Stover et al., 2010), offender-targeted police interventions may have an effect. Scott and colleagues (2015) found that a second-responder policing intervention for medium- to high-risk domestic offenders in Canada significantly reduced not only their likelihood of committing another domestic offense but also their general recidivism rate and the amount of police contact they received in the two years following the intervention. In contrast to batterer’s treatment programs, which are implemented at levels beyond the immediate police response and over a long period of time, direct contact interventions on-scene or in the immediate period following an incident may have the power to prompt an effect on the offender.

**Mechanism 1.3: Remove excuses and increase the risk**

The third possible mechanism at work in the letter delivery activity derives from Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), which is rooted in Routine Activities (Cohen & Felson, 1979) and Rational Choice Theories (Cornish & Clarke, 2014). Routine Activities Theory is centered around the idea that three elements must be present for a crime to occur, collectively termed the Crime Triangle – a suitable victim, a motivated offender, and lack of a capable guardian. The theory contends that if actions are taken to make the victim less suitable, the offender less motivated, and the guardianship more capable,
crime will be prevented. Rational Choice Theory is based on the belief that criminals engage in rational decision-making when engaging in crime, and the decision to commit a crime can be influenced by the level of perceived apprehension risk or alterations in the calculation of the benefits to offending.

Within the scope of Routine Activity and Rational Choice Theories, SCP is a framework heavily dependent on considerations of the opportunity of offending and the ways in which law enforcement can change or influence an environment or situation to prevent crime (Clarke, 2009). The letters may be acting more on the environment and opportunities than the offender by tapping into the mechanisms identified and defined by the framework. These include ‘removing excuses’ through ‘setting the rules’, ‘alerting the conscience,’ and ‘assisting compliance’ or by ‘increasing the risk’ through ‘increasing guardianship’ and ‘reducing anonymity.’ Some of these mechanisms related to increasing the risk, including ‘increasing guardianship’ and ‘alerting the consciousness,’ may be triggered by the specific text of the letters and manifest in offenders’ perceptions of the situation rather than an actual modification of the situation. The letter advises the offender that domestic violence is a serious matter in Hollywood and indicates that the HPD “are taking a new focused approach in preventing future acts of domestic violence” (C-List Letter, 2017). It indicates that being a C-List offender brings the recipient “closer to a possible prison sentence” and “targeted for closer attention” and that the Department may conduct “unannounced police checks” on his or her residence. These clear statements could affect the way the offender thinks about his or her actions, altering the cost-benefit analysis associated with committing domestic abuse. Also, while the implementation evaluation conducted for the current study did not find any indication
that officers regularly conducted unannounced house checks of known offenders, the
power of the letter indicating that it is a possibility could be enough to alter some
offenders’ sense of capable guardianship being near to influence their calculation.

**CMOC 1, Letter Delivery Activity**

The mechanism selected for the CMOC for the letter delivery activity was

*Mechanism 1.1, Desistance through conscious, deliberate self-improvement.* As the first
of five proposed CMOCs, Figure 6 is provided to offer the contexts of Hollywood and the
HPD that apply to all of the following CMOCs, though it will not be displayed for each.
These contexts are the broader situational descriptors that apply to any police activity in
Hollywood, as they related to the city’s population and the organization itself. When
considering each of the five proposed CMOCs in this section, these contexts do not
change. The associated contexts and outcomes related to the current mechanism under
discussion are proposed in Figure 7 below. It should be noted that while this analysis
concerns the letter delivery activity carried out in Hollywood, similar mechanisms could
apply to the more well-known element of Focused Deterrence programs involving the
call-in notification meetings. These do not occur in Hollywood, so the mechanisms of
that activity would need to be considered in another study, but they may be like those
described here.
Figure 6: Contexts of Hollywood, Florida and the Hollywood Police Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C1</th>
<th>Hollywood, Florida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broward County, South Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population ≈ 150,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City Pop. White (incl. White Hispanic): 73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City Pop. Black: 17%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City Pop. Below Poverty Line: 13%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant transient/homeless population</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large number of tourists and vacationers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oceanside beaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of total personnel (2018): 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfilled officer vacancies (2018): 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has dedicated Domestic Violence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant crime reduction 2015-2018</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: CMOC 1, Letter Delivery Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C2</th>
<th>Subject repeatedly used non-physical (non-criminal) aggression against victim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Little to no violent criminal violence history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate-to-High stake in conformity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hollywood resident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A1</th>
<th>Uniformed officer makes follow-up visit to subject’s last known address after “triggering event” of a non-criminal domestic incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hand-delivers letter to subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provides brief explanation of the letter, explains Hollywood’s focus on domestic violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| M1.1 | Target: Aggressive subject |
|      | Desistance through conscious, deliberate self-improvement |
|      | Identity Theory of Desistance proposed by Paternoster and Bushway (2009) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O1</th>
<th>Subject ceases aggressive behavior against victim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No additional calls for service are received involving the subject as an aggressor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Activity 2: Not-In-Custody Probable Cause Arrests

A unique element of Hollywood’s OFDVI involves the use of Not-in-Custody (NIC) arrest affidavits to arrest offenders, including misdemeanants, who are not on scene when the police arrive. This includes suspects who intentionally flee the scene or those who are not on-scene for myriad other reasons aside from purposefully evading police. Either way, a party to a domestic violence incident is not available for police to question but for whom there is probable cause that he or she committed a misdemeanor.
or felony crime. Upon arrival at the scene of a domestic call, officers are required to locate an offender when there is probable cause that a misdemeanor crime was committed. As previously discussed in Chapter 1, up to 50 percent of domestic perpetrators (or aggressors) flee the scene or are otherwise not at the scene of a call when police arrive (Berk & Loseke, 1980-1981; Buzawa et al., 1999; Dunford, 1990; Feder, 1996; Hirschel & Hutchison, 1992; Robinson, 2000). Also noted was that the traditional response to the offender’s absence was to deem the situation resolved or unable to be resolved in the current moment, and no further action would be taken. However, Hollywood has put an extra emphasis on locating these offenders, ideally as soon as possible. If an offender is unable to be located and the officer has probable reason to believe a misdemeanor or felony was committed, it becomes his or her responsibility to file a NIC probable cause affidavit with a judge, which essentially creates a warrant for the offender’s arrest. Between the Spring of 2015 and December 2018, 537 NIC PC affidavits were filed, and 287 NIC arrests were made (53 percent), though the log where NIC data is recorded did not indicate whether it was for a misdemeanor or a felony charge.

As an activity that involves a complex interaction of events, NIC arrest affidavits may involve one or more mechanisms that work in very different ways. The two proposed mechanisms related to this activity included in this assessment are deterrence through swift and certain response and increased officer motivation to arrive on the scene quickly.
Mechanism 2.1: Deterrence through increasing subjective probability of apprehension

The first potential mechanism at work in the use of NIC affidavits is deterrence through swift and certain response, which alters the offender’s subjective perception of apprehension risk. This is one activity that may be explained by traditional deterrence theory, as it deals with influencing the offender by altering the actual or perceived swiftness and certainty of police action. The most highly influenced subset of offenders, in this case, would be those who had fled or attempted to evade police for a prior domestic incident and were subsequently captured by police either through a NIC affidavit or by the overall increase in the effort expended to capture offenders who flee. To a lesser degree, the activity can provide general deterrence if other potential offenders learn vicariously through peers of the increased difficulty in evading arrest. At the most basic level, deterrence theory posits that offenders, or potential offenders, engage in cost-benefit analysis when deciding to take advantage of an opportunity to commit a crime and, like all rational people, will seek to limit the costs while maximizing benefits.

Ample literature exists on the relationship between crime deterrence and swiftness and certainty of response, and much of the modern criminal justice system relies on the assumptions surrounding these elements. Deterrence effects can be moderated by the perception of the probability of apprehension for a crime, perhaps more so than by the risk of punishment (Apel, 2013). Avoiding apprehension or punishment in the past increases an offender’s confidence in his ability to avoid apprehension for future crimes, thereby increasing or encouraging further offending despite a consistent deterrence message, as is seen with recurrent drunk drivers (Apel, 2013; Anwar & Loughran, 2011). Therefore, increasing the risk of apprehension may boost deterrence considerably. Apel
and Nagin (2011) postulate that certainty of arrest is the main mechanism at work in focused deterrence strategies by causing a sufficiently pronounced shift in risk of apprehension, thereby reducing crime through deterrence.

_Mechanism 2.2: Increased officer motivation to arrive on scene quickly_

The second proposed mechanism of the NIC arrest affidavit activity is increased officer motivation to arrive on scene quickly for domestic calls. Due to the increased workload involved in filing NIC affidavits, which is more than would be involved in an on-scene arrest, officers are more inclined to reduce the amount of time an offender is given to flee (or otherwise leave the scene) after a call to police is made. Doing so would reduce the number of offenders who evade police, thereby reducing the number of NIC affidavits that need to be filed. In the most optimistic scenario, arriving in time to intercept the alleged aggressor gives officers an opportunity to clear up the situation and get the subject’s side of the story. The situation in which an officer arrests a wrongly accused individual was referenced by several interviewees who had either written a NIC for someone who turned out to be innocent, had heard of it happening to a colleague, or have seen officers be required to write NICs for misdemeanor exceptions, which was explained in detail by one officer:

P: There have been incidents that I don't support, like to make an arrest for a simple battery, which is what we consider a misdemeanor exception, which you know – you know about the misdemeanor exceptions?

I: No, I'm not familiar with that.

P: [For] most misdemeanors, an officer cannot make an arrest unless it's an on-view situation for a misdemeanor. They have to see it occur. There are certain exceptions to that rule, and one of them is a simple-- is a battery. You know, just someone punches somebody in the face. But there are requirements that have to be met before-- statutory requirements that have to be met before an arrest is
made. [The]... requirements are there has to be a sign of injury, there has to be a witness - one of those two things to make the arrest. So, of course, we go to a call domestic violence incident. You see the victim, woman or male, with a mark on their face. “Yeah, my husband slapped me or my husband punched me, or my wife, punched me,” you have probable cause. So there's no problem to an out of custody like that. But what I have seen happen here in the past is that-- and I've seen officers call back in to make... being told to do an Out of Custody when there is no injury or witness. Just based on what the woman said occurred, which I don't agree with. You still have to file just because it’s domestic violence you don't have-- you stopped to fulfill the requirements for simple battery, you know, the statutory requirements. So there have been-- I don't say, I'm not saying it happens all the time. But I've seen it happen a couple times.

Perhaps this distaste for the potential situation in which a supervisor requires an officer to file a NIC for this type of misdemeanor exception could make officers more motivated to arrive quickly and locate the accused. Doing so would allow them the opportunity to collect more information to make a better-informed decision. This officer was not alone in his concerns with NIC arrest affidavits being filed based on just the victim’s account of the incident. At least eight interviewees commented on their dislike of the policy. One interviewee did note that the policy was less strict at the time of interviewing (in early 2019) than when the program began in 2015 (Sergeant, Interview 18). Also, several officers, when prompted to offer a better alternative to the policy, could not think of anything at the moment.

As further evidence of this phenomenon where officers appear to be highly motivated to find accused aggressors, officers will help their colleagues track down a suspect that fled the scene as a joint effort to prevent the responding officer from having to go through the process of filing.\(^\text{20}\) It is unknown whether the same effort is awarded to

\(^\text{20}\) Based on conversations with officers during ride-alongs in the summer of 2017.
probable misdemeanants of other crime types, but domestic calls may be the most onerous of all the crime types for officers in Hollywood due to this specific policy. When asked about the potential for the program’s requirements to increase line officers’ workloads, one interviewee stated the following:

But I think the officers quickly realized that it does create a little bit more work sometimes, but sometimes it actually creates less work, and we're taking a violent offender off the streets. (Command Staff, Interview 1)

While the intent of the activity may have been to locate a higher proportion of criminals, it may have had an unintended positive side-effect; fortunately, manifesting as a benefit here of reducing the response time of police. No formal policy existed that requires officers to get on-scene as quickly as possible to domestic calls specifically, but it is possible that response times have decreased as officers seek to prevent an increased workload. This lighter workload could manifest itself in several different ways relating to the benefits of quicker police arrival times. While original studies like the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment indicated that response time did not significantly affect crimes like burglaries, robberies, or auto theft, nor citizen satisfaction with police (Kelling et al., 1974), more recent research indicates otherwise. Modern studies indicate that quicker response times significantly affect arrest rates (Blanes i Vidal & Kirchmaier, 2018), increase the probability that a case is cleared (Blanes i Vidal & Kirchmaier, 2018), may decrease the likelihood of injury (DeAngelo et al., 2020), and increase community satisfaction with police (Lee, Lee & Hoover, 2017). These findings suggest that the
benefits of arriving on scene as quickly as possible, at least to certain call types, could be manifold.

Research has identified situational factors that significantly reduce response time for domestic calls, such as the presence of a weapon at the scene, calls occurring on the weekend and in the evening, and calls in neighborhoods with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage (Lee, Lee & Hoover, 2017). However, no research was found that explored the officer-level motivations (outside of the performance measure literature) that could reduce (or increase) response times, such as the mechanism currently being proposed. In the Kansas City Experiment, the only significant factor related to police response times was the number of other officers present on scene, which was negatively correlated with response time. The authors proposed that this may have been due to officer attitudes rather than distance or rate of driving speed.

Based on this hypothesis, it may be possible to alter officer attitudes about certain call types (i.e., domestics in-progress) in a way that could motivate or encourage them to arrive on scene faster. If this mechanism underlies the NIC policy for domestic calls, officers may be more likely to view arriving on scene quicker as an opportunity to simultaneously prevent violence escalation between parties and intercept the offender before he or she leaves the scene. Doing so not only improves the safety outcomes of the victim but also potentially reduces the workload for the officer because an on-scene offender for which there is probable cause for arrest precludes the need for the lengthy NIC affidavit writing and filing process.
During a ride-along, one officer was asked whether he responded with the same urgency for domestic calls as he would for any other call. He clarified that for a Code 1 call that was “just people arguing” that “sounds basic on the radio” according to how it is coded and communicated by dispatch, he said he would approach it with “normal driving.” However, he expanded on his answer, which further highlights the roles of personal driving habits and that of dispatch and the call code on his driving speed, without any mention of other factors that may affect his thought process at the time a call comes over the radio.

But I never go anywhere normal driving. I go everywhere fucking fast. Everywhere I go, I’m hauling ass… but if a call comes out with, like, [the aggressor] seems very aggressive or they believe it might get physical, or a lot of yelling in the background […] where it sounds like a little bit more than a regular argument, then they’ll usually say Code 3, which is lights and sirens. So we’ll step it up, and we do. We step it up. So we get there quick.

To determine if there was any change in the amount of time it took officers to arrive on scene after the OFDVI was implemented, I conducted a cursory analysis of the calls for service data set. According to the crime analyst, the Department does not regularly track officer response times. Instead, I used domestic calls for service data and found a small yet notable decline in the amount of time it took an officer to arrive on scene in the post-intervention period compared to the pre-intervention period. During the pre-intervention period, the average time to arrive on scene for domestic calls for service after being assigned the call by dispatch was 7 minutes, while the average went down by one minute to 6 minutes in the post-intervention period. The median time to arrival was the same during both periods at 5 minutes. In comparison, based on an analysis of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) data from 2006 to 2015, Reaves (2017)
found that 64% of reported domestic victimizations were attended to by an officer within 10 minutes of notification, and 94% were attended to within an hour.

**Mechanism 2.3: Closing the gap between those who are arrested and those who should be arrested for a crime**

The third proposed mechanism for the NIC affidavits involves elements from the previous two proposed mechanisms; this activity may be increasing the probability of a justice-system response to domestic offenders by closing the gap between those who are arrested and those who should be arrested. One apparent issue related to offender arrest that equally plagues agencies that are bound by mandatory or preferred arrest policies and those that are not concerns cases in which the suspect leaves the scene and is not arrested at the time of the suspected crime. This population includes offenders who flee a scene with the intention of evading police, but also those individuals who are not on scene for other reasons when the police arrive (i.e., went to work, took a drive to “cool off,” or other circumstances not implying police evasion). Previous studies indicate that it is common for subjects to be Gone on Arrival (GOA) when the police arrive.

Very little research exists that explores the issue of subjects and offenders who flee or are GOA, especially in domestic violence incidents; however, this group of offenders may present a particularly risky population, and their evasion of police can severely hamper any police response to domestic violence. It is not unreasonable to assume that the offenders who flee the scene with the intent to evade police are among the most chronic, serious offenders, making their absence ever more concerning. In cases of intimate partner violence, offenders who fled were significantly less likely to ever be
arrested, regardless of the severity of any victim injuries or other victim and offender
characteristics, with offenders who remained on scene being five times more likely to be
arrested than those who fled (Hirschel and Buzawa, 2013). In a study to compare the
effects of mandatory arrest, preferred arrest, and officer discretion laws, with or without a
primary aggressor law, across four states, Hirschel and Deveau (2017) found that in calls
in which the offender was on-scene, an arrest was made in 82 percent of calls. This
contrasts with the finding that on calls in which the offender was not present, an arrest
only occurred in about 50 percent of incidents.

To further highlight the problem of offenders who flee the scene, a special report
by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics on the police response to domestic violence
indicated that in 23 percent of domestic incidents reported to police, the offender was
arrested during the initial police response, but that in some cases, the offender was not
present, so no arrest could be made (Reaves, 2017). No measure was provided for the
number of alleged aggressors who were not arrested due to not being on scene who
otherwise would have been arrested, but the report indicated that officers had follow-up
contact with about one-third of victims, and in one-third of those follow-ups an arrest was
made. In traditional models of police responses to domestic violence, a non-present
offender may have been a solution for the responding officer to the immediate situation,
meaning it was “handled” and no further action was deemed necessary (Berk & Loseke,
1980). While this attitude no longer prevails in most police agencies, non-presence
indeed complicates the on-scene and follow-up processes of the responding officer or
detective and requires additional time and effort.
Non-presence of suspected offenders who should be arrested also had implications for justice system outcomes after police book (or do not book) an arrestee into jail. In California, Nelson (2012) found that, as one of the police-controlled antecedents to criminal case filing (i.e., the discretionary activities police can employ that are typically above-and-beyond a basic on-scene response to a domestic call), finding and arresting the offender increases the likelihood of a prosecutor filing criminal charges to 94 percent of incidents and a conviction being made to 74 percent. Nelson also found that swiftness of action of responding police officers, including locating the offender and filing the report, significantly increases the likelihood of charges being filed and convictions being made.

Police responses that acknowledge this population of offenders have been slow to develop, but research indicates that investing the “extra work” in locating and arresting offenders, including those who flee or are ‘Gone on Arrival’ (GOA), immediately after an incident can greatly increase the chance that a case is prosecuted and finally reaches a criminal conviction in domestic violence cases (Nelson, 2012). Hollywood’s NIC arrest policy may be ameliorating this problem by filling the gap typically left by offenders who successfully evade police interaction at the time of a domestic incident.

**CMOC 2, NIC Arrest Affidavit Activity**

For the NIC Arrest Affidavit policy activity, *Mechanism 2.3, Closing the gap between those who are arrested and those who should be arrested for a crime* was proposed as a likely explanatory mechanism. The contexts and outcomes associated with this CMOC are displayed in Figure 8 below.
Activity 3: Repeat Offender Log

There has been a recent growth of interest in offender-focused policing initiatives and crime analysis techniques to identify high-risk offenders (International Association of Crime Analysts, 2018; Robinson & Clancy, 2020). Such strategies can be as simple as creating a chronic offender list that prioritizes offenders based on their level of risk to society used in-house by a police department, but can also be part of larger, comprehensive initiatives such as focused deterrence programs. Operationally, offender prioritization is said to be cost-effective. Theoretically, the approach is considered better for handling the few offenders who are responsible for most of the crime that occurs in a jurisdiction. In contrast to a model that applies algorithms to offenders that determine a value of their level of risk based on a collection of variables (International Association of Crime Analysts, 2018), Hollywood uses a tiered system that relies on the crime analyst...
and the Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant to determine which of the four tiers an offender should be placed on based on the individual’s history of domestic violence. While the process is more or less standardized, there remains an element of discretion for list placement that may be absent in lists driven by algorithms. Also, police action or enforcement activity is determined and driven by an offender’s level designation, at least officially regarding letter deliveries. Because of this, the Repeat Offender Log is part of a constant feedback loop between the crime analyst, information from incident reports involving offenders, and police, making it very much a living, constantly expanding, real-time system. As a key element of the OFDVI, it is critical to understand how and why it may affect domestic crime in Hollywood.

While officers did not often consult the ROL before attending a call, A-Listers’ last known addresses were flagged in the system with a premise warning. When an officer responded to a call at or near the flagged address, the in-car CAD system would provide a verbal warning, declaring “Premise Warning,” to alert the officer that the location is potentially high-risk. Premise warnings were also created for addresses of individuals who had a Not-in-Custody arrest affidavit filed for an incident they were involved in but who had not yet been arrested. Therefore, indirectly, the ROL led to Premise Warnings for subjects known to be violent, preparing officers for a potentially volatile encounter at that address.

**Mechanism 3.1: Reduce anonymity of offender for officers, for offender after notification**

The first possible mechanism at work in the Repeat Offender Log is that it reduces the anonymity of domestic offenders. Referring again to Clarke’s (2009)
framework of Situational Crime Prevention, the creation and maintenance of the log may ‘increase the risk’ to offenders by ‘reducing anonymity.’ A considerable number of offenders in Hollywood are homeless, transient, or otherwise change residences often; this fact, combined with the private, residential nature of domestic violence, is why Hollywood tracks domestic incidents by the offender and not address like most other crime types. The problems inherent in collecting information on people, such as variations in names, use of nicknames and pseudonyms, providing false information, or cultural variations in name structures, can lead to messy, incomplete files.

Poor records can result in offenders slipping through the cracks or not being associated with past activity. By maintaining the Repeat Offender Log with the most comprehensive and up-to-date information on every repeat offender, police can access the information they need quickly and in a more useable format. This may reduce the anonymity of offenders who otherwise may have “gamed the system.”

**Mechanism 3.2: Standardizes offender prioritization, reduces error and bias**

The second possible mechanism at work in the Repeat Offender Log is that it reduces the reliance on anecdotal police perception of who the “bad guys” are and increases reliance on a standardized, intelligence-led method for identifying the high priority offenders. Intelligence-led policing is expected to improve law enforcement outcomes in several ways, including improving decision-making capabilities, planning, strategic targeting, and crime prevention (Peterson, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2016). Inherent within this idea is the assertion that police should act proactively rather than reactively. While the purpose of the Repeat Offender Log is not to predict the occurrence of future
incidents and the capability to do so is not part of the OFDVI, the crime analyst
nevertheless identifies patterns of offending among those individuals included in the
Repeat Offender Log through the collection of intelligence rather than basic crime
information. As a policy concern, police agencies are looking for ways to reduce their
legal liability in how they carry out law enforcement, and policies that are based on
standardized, intelligence-led methods may present fewer legal risks than those that do
not. Furthermore, domestic offender risk assessment and prioritization have been
developing in recent years in the UK, where a standardized tool is being piloted in three
police agencies to determine the effectiveness of domestic offender prioritization as a

CMOC 3, Repeat Offender Log Activity

The mechanism selected for the CMOC for the Repeat Offender Log activity was
Mechanism 3.2: Standardizes offender prioritization, reduces error and bias. The
associated contexts and outcomes related to this mechanism are proposed in Figure 9
below.
Activity 4: Report Writing

No research could be found that specifically explores how police departments handle writing and filing reports for calls for domestic violence incidents in the U.S. Anecdotally, report-writing policies may be divided into two prevailing standards; one standard is that a report is written only when a crime has been committed, or the incident was severe yet did not rise to the threshold of a criminal offense; and second, a report is written for every domestic call that receives an officer response. This distinction may not capture the realities of police report writing related to domestic violence. In a Bureau of Justice Statistics report, Reaves (2017) found that when police reported to the scene of a domestic crime (either simple or aggravated assault), they took a report just seventy-nine percent of the time. If twenty-one percent of crimes are not being documented in a police
report, it implies that non-crime incidents would suffer from a far lower documentation rate.

As noted earlier in this chapter, Hollywood’s officers write a report for every domestic call they respond to, as long as they determine it is coded correctly as a domestic upon arrival. Alternatively, a call for service coded as another crime type, such as a stalker, may be determined to be a domestic. From a data collection perspective, this approach has substantial benefits over the alternative, both for analyzing crime and assessing offenders. However, such a simplistic view of report-taking and writing would miss some of the mechanisms that may be at work in carrying out this activity. Research indicates that thorough report-writing and the on-scene police activities that are involved in compiling the information for thorough reports are beneficial to those responsible for the next phases of processing an offender (Nelson, 2012). Nevertheless, despite the value of consistent reporting to capture police calls for service, the previous policy at Hollywood (before the mandatory report writing policy was enacted around 2010) and current policies at many departments across the country defaulted to not writing reports unless there was something the officer deemed worthy of reporting.

Based on findings from the current study, police personnel had varying views on the mandate to write reports for every domestic call. A Lieutenant noted that the policy makes it difficult to change the code of a domestic call, or a “signal 38”, to ensure compliance with the report writing requirement. She only named one other call type that required similar permissions to change the code.
If it's dispatched as a-- call it a signal 38 a domestic call, before they change it, reclassify it, they need to get approval from the supervisor. You just can't go and change a domestic to just a regular disturbance – that has to be approved by Sergeant or Lieutenant before you can change the classification, and they know that they need to do a report.

The crime analyst believed the report writing requirement was so critical to the functioning of the program that she unequivocally stated that if another department wants to establish a similar offender-based domestic violence program, they have to adopt the policy first.

In order for you to have accurate record-keeping and for this program to work, you have to take a report on every domestic. Absolutely have to. That was one of the first things that if you don't do that, you have to do that. (Non-sworn, Interview 15)

Another officer who voiced disagreement with some elements of the program conceded that the reporting requirement had value and felt that most officers understood why it was important.

You want to create a paper trail when something occurs. You know what I mean? You know, because you don't want to not do anything and then next thing you know, we have a serious victim that, basically we could have prevented, you know what I mean, by not doing anything or not doing any type of documentation that required a follow-up. (Line officer, Interview 22)
However, some officers did not support the rule. One officer indicated that the strict policy brought some people into the legal system whose actions did not merit being recorded in a crime database:

> You get into arguments with your wife; it happens. Especially when you’re going through a divorce - trust me, it happens. But no violence is occurring. You’re just yelling. It’s not illegal to yell at each other. But somebody will call because you’re getting yelled at, we show up, and now we’re basically mandated to do a domestic disturbance-domestic violence report on you because you had an argument. The reports are bullshit… why does that even need to be documented? Because we are making a difference? Nah, it's a waste of fucking time. And now that person, now when anyone runs him for the rest of his life, his domestic reports are going to show up.

Another officer who worked the Alpha shift (midnights) also criticized the policy, but he noted that domestic calls were not one of the top calls he responded to during his typical shifts, so he was not as concerned about it. When prompted to propose some potential benefits of the policy, the officer stated the following:

> I barely deal with domestics versus the rest of police work. We have to do reports for verbal domestics; BSO doesn’t have to do a report, apparently…. We shouldn’t have to do a report on that. It doesn’t prevent anything. I’m trying to think of why it would help, if I did a report or not. Would it help with a civil thing down the road for you, like a restraining order or a child custody thing, to have all this proof, maybe, of all the times that we showed up and things were said, it helps you out maybe? That’s the only thing I can think of.

Whether officers supported the policy or not, supervisors were tasked with ensuring the policy was followed. Officers seemed acutely aware that if SOPs for domestics were not followed, and these activities were not documented in their reports, they would hear from a supervisor or the Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant. This was the case for incidents involving arrests and NIC arrest affidavits, and general report writing. Also, domestic reports are read by a number of different people after they are filed into the system. First, the Patrol Sergeants reviewed their officers’ reports for accuracy,
completeness, clarity, and ensuring SOPs were followed. The crime analyst read every report to conduct categorization and criminal history reviews of offenders. The Domestic Violence Sergeant reviewed all of the reports and decide which cases will be assigned to detectives in his or her Unit. The Sergeant will also ensure the NIC policy was followed and may identify cases in which an arrest should have been made or a NIC should have been filed. The victim advocates read every report to determine what services the victims may need or are legally entitled to, such as victim’s compensation or help with filing a restraining order. Finally, the detectives read the reports for the cases assigned to them.

With this many eyes on every single domestic report, it is reasonable to assume that few mistakes or inconsistencies in reporting made it through unnoticed.

I read every single domestic report. The domestic Sergeant should also be reading every single report. If I have any sort of question, I will point out to them, Hey, you know, maybe this one should have been a P--. I don't know, I'm not a sergeant, I'm not a patrol officer. But it states right here that this person had injuries and, you know, the other person wasn't on scene or, you know, whatever. I, know, I wasn't there. I don't know. But then the officer needs to articulate in his report why an arrest wasn't made or why a not in custody wasn't done. (Non-sworn, Interview 12)

As further evidence that Hollywood takes domestic violence reporting seriously, a patrol officer explained his motivation for ensuring he wrote thorough reports and followed SOPs:

I: So, would you say that including more information in your report is valuable for, kind of CYA?21
P: Yes. If you don't, you will be receiving phone calls. Yeah, I heard it from other people in this department that they didn't write enough even though it really-- no crime really occurred, they didn't feel comfortable making it, but they didn't write why in their report and then there – for instance on midnight's you're getting woken up while you're trying to sleep to explain why you didn't make an arrest,

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21 Here, the acronym CYA referred to ‘Cover Your Ass’ or doing what is necessary to protect oneself from future criticism or fault.
why you didn't do certain things. Whereas if you'd just write it in the report, nobody's going to bother you.

Similarly, another officer described his motivation for writing detailed reports that was related to court depositions. He believed that because he wrote high-quality reports with specific details, he never got called into depositions. (Line officer, Ride along). Another officer said that because of the high expectations for report quality of many Patrol Sergeants, she learned not to cut corners and to document everything (Line officer, Ride Along). She added that while reporting this way can involve a little more work, being thorough made her a better officer and a better report writer because it became a habit, and it got easier and faster. Another officer indicated that he makes sure to include any pertinent information from the Repeat Offender Log if the subject of a report is on it as a way to help the Domestic Violence Unit Detectives do their jobs better.

Participant: After we left the scene… that's [information from the ROL] something we’ll just look up and pull up and throw in there just to kind of keep tabs on.
Interviewer: Okay. Do you know-- Is that something that most officers do? Would they include that?
P: It's not mandatory in the report, but it just kind of helps to get a better picture of whoever, whatever detective might end up reading the report to so that saves them time.
I: Okay, so you like to do that? To add that extra information.
P: Yeah, yes. (Line Officer, Interview 11)

It became clear that reports were an important aspect of police work in Hollywood, and the policies surrounding domestic violence reports appeared to reflect that. The origins of the policy were never identified, and it was not clear why this less common policy was implemented. Regardless, compliance was high, and as a practice that was fully engrained before the start of the OFDVI but was integral to the implementation of the program, its value and impact deserve exploration. Two potential
mechanisms for the report writing activity are explored below and include that it alters the perception of victims and offenders of the seriousness of domestic violence and it improves data collection and crime analysis capabilities.

**Mechanism 4.1: Alters perception of victims and offenders of the seriousness of domestic violence**

The first potential mechanism acting in the report writing activity is that it changes the victims’ and offenders’ perceptions about the severity of the crime of domestic violence at the scene of the incident. If officers show extensive attention to domestic incidents, or at least with the same level of attention as other types of crime, it may change the way victims and offenders view the police response to domestic violence. First-responders, including police and paramedics, traditionally tend to view domestic violence victims as weak, lying, or responsible for their own situation (Monckton Smith et al., 2014), and this inevitably affects their response. At the same time, being thorough on scene may help officers uncover a true picture of what transpired and determine whether one or more people are untruthful. Several officers made references to cases in which the victim caused self-inflicted wounds to implicate their partner in a crime, though these examples seemed to be outliers, albeit memorable illustrations of the realities of policing. At Hollywood, discussion of this phenomenon emerged as a dichotomy between “real” victims and lying victims, but reporting played a role in the process of identifying and documenting both groups of victims.

Real victims won’t lie. If anything, some victims, not all, but some victims are actually shy about it-- or not shy, but like they don't want to talk about it, or they don't want that person to go to jail. So, they won't even want to talk. Period. So, we have to go off of what we do know. Victims that aren't really victims and want
to play up the fucking game and hype it up and shit […] we got to go off of facts and stuff so, I mean, we'll put in there what they say, but this is, you know, at the end of the day this is what they're alleging [...]. If they're saying “I was punched in my face” and, you know, “repeated times,” well then you would have something. You're gonna have like a black and blue eye, you're going to have some type of mark or something, so you know if you don't have any of that, you know I'm going to put in there hey, “they alleged this, but there was no signs of any of this.” (Line officer, Interview 28)

Also, based on some responses from one study participant, consistent, thorough reporting can help determine patterns of offender and victim behavior that improves their decision-making at the scene of a repeat incident. In one case, the officer looked up previous reports to see what has happened between the offender and victim before (Line officer, Interview 2). He found that on two separate occasions with two different officers, the victim changed the story to manipulate the system, according to his assessment. Independent of the potential drawbacks of using previous behavior to inform a new, different incident, it is likely that if Hollywood did not have its report policy, those previous reports might not have existed for reference.

Even if there is concern about the wellbeing of the victim in a specific situation, typical procedures and mechanisms are rarely conducive to meaningful police intervention or action if the victim is unwilling to press charges against the perpetrator (Monckton Smith et al., 2014). However, once the standard police response shifts to one that involves strict report-writing guidelines, including the process of gathering details of every incident, the increase in legitimacy and procedural justice may affect perceived risks for offenders and benefits for victims of a more robust police response.
Evidence of the possible effects of a ‘report for every incident’ policy was found during the current study. One officer viewed it as an effective policy that helped to influence the thought processes of offenders:

I feel like it's effective in a sense of holding everyone accountable, to make sure that they can better determine whether or not they need to still be together if they can't get along, because they know very well that as long as you're in the city of Hollywood, there's going to be a report made for every single incident that there is, even if it's just a verbal argument about, you know, spilling the milk, for example. So, I think accountability is a huge factor. (Line officer, Interview 11)

Another aspect of report writing that emerged during the study involved people using police reports as evidence or support in child custody or divorce cases. Hollywood’s police would offer a reliable paper trail for any individual looking for a way to discredit the other person. One officer indicated that lawyers sometimes encourage parents to call the police for every family incident to help with their child custody cases (Line officer, Ride along). Another officer also noted that reports could be used in child custody or divorce cases, in addition to U-Visa applications by immigrants.

Mechanism 4.2: Improves data collection, improves analysis capabilities

The second mechanism that may be working related to reports is the resultant increase in data available for analysis. The crime analyst, detectives, and other police personnel have access to a larger amount of data that would otherwise not exist under typical reporting procedures, which may be powerful in improving the effectiveness of police. Focused deterrence pulls heavily from Problem-Oriented Policing and Intelligence-Led Policing, which rely on strategic, scientific use of data to improve crime policies and strategies. This increase in data available for analysis relates to the mechanisms proposed for the Repeat Offender Log as part of the iterative feedback loop
discussed in that section. Reports inform the Repeat Offender Log and help the Sergeant determine the appropriate action(s) to take for each repeat offender.

CMOC 4, Report Writing Activity

The mechanism selected for the CMOC for the Repeat Offender Log activity was *mechanism 4.2, Improves data collection, improves analysis capabilities*. The associated contexts and outcomes related to this mechanism are proposed in the CMOC displayed in Figure 10 below.

*Activity 5: Officers Taking on “Detective Duties”*

While much of the existing literature on detectives and their work is limited and outdated (Fallik, 2017), findings consistently indicate that detective workloads are high, and that is a main reason that investigative effort per case is low. Overburdened detectives are disincentivized by the sheer volume of cases in their queues to expend too
much effort on any single case. Detective work has also remained relatively consistent over the last three to four decades, with little in the way of innovation or reframing the position, as noted in the literature (Liederbach, Fritsch & Womack, 2011). This remains the case despite persistently low crime clearance rates (FBI, 2017). However, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that there are ways to make detectives more efficient and effective; one approach involves shifting some of the investigative burden from detectives to patrol officers.

The most time-consuming investigative activities that detectives carry out are locating, contacting, and interviewing victims, complainants, suspects, and witnesses (Fallik, 2017; Liederbach et al., 2011); as much as twenty-five percent of detective time is spent on these activities (Liederbach et al., 2011). In most American police departments, these duties are reserved for detectives as they conduct their investigations. In contrast, patrol officers do not traditionally engage in this sort of data collection when responding to calls for service. These role parameters may exist today simply because that is how these roles have been defined since modern policing developed.

Alternatively, at Hollywood, the role of patrol officers when they respond to domestic violence cases has shifted to include some activities that are traditionally considered detectives’ work. Officers are expected to take on the role of first-line investigators by moving beyond being simply “report writers” to “problem solvers,” as one upper management interviewee described (Interview 1). By tasking the responding officer with gathering as much information as possible on scene, including statements, CCTV footage, and 911 call recordings, and doing as much as possible to locate an
offender who is not on scene, the officer puts together a fuller, more complete picture of what happened. For example, most CCTV footage expires or is written over after a certain period of time, meaning it has a short window in which it can be pulled for review and possibly used as evidence. Therefore, if this task is left to a detective, the window may expire before he or she can get to it. Also, officers are encouraged to involve crime scene technicians to take photographs and call out detectives or other investigators to the scene when the situation requires additional support. This is in contrast to the “report writer” officer, who may fulfill the obligation of detailing the incident but pass the information on for someone else to handle. For misdemeanors, this thorough protocol makes it less likely that a detective would need to spend significant time on the case. For felonies, it may help increase the chances of a successful case. Nelson (2012) distinguishes “ordinary cops” and “supercops” by the depth of their on-scene investigation activities:

Often a victim’s statement is sufficient to justify the arrest of a suspect and the allegation of criminal wrongdoing in a written report. Once probable cause has been established, the decision to employ additional police investigative techniques represents extra work. […] ordinary police officers avoid extra work; whereas, supercops take it on. (Nelson, 2012, p. 529).

The shift in officer responsibilities at Hollywood may relate to two potential mechanisms. First, it may afford detectives more time to focus on felony cases so they can build better, more complete cases. Second, it may increase victim cooperation and help to secure more victim statements. As the research is beginning to indicate, the few
studies that have explored detectives’ duties suggest that line officers can and should conduct interviews of victims, complainants, suspects, and witnesses at the scene of a crime because it leads to better case outcomes (Nelson, 2012). This, however, is not standard practice. Nelson (2013) found that officers that were categorized as “routinely lower effort” officers, or those who did the least when responding to domestic violence calls, had their cases rejected in court 270% more often than “routinely higher effort” cops, based on six measures of domestic violence investigation data.

Mechanism 5.1: Detectives have more time to spend on felony cases & build better cases

This shift in responsibilities would have at least two potential benefits, which can be related to this mechanism. First, patrol officers carrying out these activities for cases, especially lower-severity crimes or those in which the suspect is known, could help clear cases faster, thereby lowering detective caseloads (Liederbach et al., 2011). Lower caseloads would free up time for the detective to spend on more severe or complex cases, especially those in which the suspect is not known. Second, when officers conduct a more thorough on-scene protocol for a crime, the case is more likely to lead to prosecution and conviction (Nelson, 2012). By shifting the responsibility of collecting more robust information on scene to patrol officers, what Liederbach and colleagues (2011) refers to as “expanded preliminary investigation” (p. 61), more cases could benefit from several officer-induced outcomes; more cases can be cleared, more arrests could be made, more prosecutions could be successful, and detectives would have more time to work more serious or complex cases. This is particularly important when it comes to locating and arresting suspects as expediently as possible. Relating to Mechanism 2.3 of Activity 2 (Not-in-Custody Arrest Affidavits), officers can close the gap between those suspects
who are arrested and those who should be. If not done at the time of the call by the
officer, any suspect would need to be located and arrested oftentimes through the work of
the detective. Therefore, setting the expectation that officers do everything they can to
located and arrest suspects at the time of the call may reduce the number of arrests that
detectives need to be involved in later.

**Mechanism 5.2: Patrol officers more successful in securing victim cooperation on scene**

It is well-known among those in the criminal justice system that victims of
domestic violence are reluctant or resistant to providing statements or filing complaints
that implicate their abuser in a crime (Felson & Ackerman, 2001). While some victims do
provide statements and file criminal complaints on-scene or at a later time, many do not,
or they recant and refuse to participate in court. Therefore, it is extremely important to
make immediate contact with the victim at the time of the incident to increase the
likelihood of compliance.

One explanation for this phenomenon is referred to as victim time inconsistency
(Aizer & Dal Bo, 2009). In the immediate aftermath of an abusive incident, victims
regard their relationships with the abuser with low value and may cooperate with the
police. However, over time that value increases again, and this higher valuation can lead
the victim to end cooperation and return to the abuser. Based on this theory, officers who
arrive at calls ready to collect an above-average amount of information on scene could
have better outcomes than officers who are unmotivated to engage the parties on scene
during this critical, valuable moment. Assuming the baseline police response to domestic
incidents, especially those in which there is no sign of violence, is to separate the parties
(i.e., advising the aggressor to go take a walk or spend the night somewhere else) and not write a report, this window of opportunity may rarely be capitalized on.

While Aizer and Dal Bo (2009) argued for a commitment device such as a no-drop policy for domestic cases, expedient officers on-scene may be able to benefit from the emotional state of the victim in the immediate aftermath of an incident by getting statements or official criminal complaints from the victim. In the case of Hollywood, where a report is written for every incident, criminal or not, gaining victim cooperation could simply mean collecting an accurate account of the incident from the victim that can be used to inform the Repeat Offender Log. Essentially, if this mechanism is acting due to this theoretical explanation, forcing the officers to write a report means they need to collect certain information for the report, including the victim’s side of the story, during the time it is most likely they will be able to get it. Also, officers at Hollywood knew that if their report did not make sense or indicated that they did not do a thorough job of attempting to uncover the details of the incident, their Sergeant may have questions for them.

A patrol officer who previously worked as a lawyer in the State Attorney’s Office discussed this phenomenon at length during a ride-along. In her experience working with domestic violence victims while in the Domestic Violence Unit, victims often eventually signed a waiver of prosecution, which essentially ends the legal efforts towards prosecution in many cases because there is not a no-drop policy. The realities of economics and basic needs, she argued, would override the risks of future abuse.
It was the unit I liked working in the least. You get the same thing. You know these women are victims, but money drives them. The need to have shelter drives them. The need to have someone who can help watch the children drives them over their safety. (Line Officer, Ride Along)

An alternate theoretical explanation for how the shift in responsibilities may influence victim cooperation can be found in Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge Theory (2009), which was described previously in the discussion of Activity 1 (Letter Delivery). Here, Nudge Theory may help explain how setting victims up for success, which in this case would mean providing a statement or complaint to police and following through with charges against the offender, by being presented with an easier opportunity to do so that limits the effects of the time inconsistency theory described above. By following the SOPs, such as separating the parties and interviewing them independently to collect as much clear information as possible, victims may feel safer to discuss more details of the incident with the officer. Doing so set the stage for both parties to talk. An alternative scenario in which the officers did not have control of the scene could result in chaos, which would not create an environment for meaningful dialogue.

From the perspective of policing, attaining more cooperation from victims is beneficial to the arrest process; what happens after the offender is booked and the victim has time to change his or her mind is not within the purview of this study. As the same patrol officer (Ride Along) explained, as a police officer, she understands what that role entails and what it does not regarding victims, offenders, and arrests.
I always tell officers out here, “we’re not in the business of if they stay in jail. We’re in the business of arresting people and getting them off the street”. A lot of the cops out here, you’ll hear them say, “this guy’s going to be out by tomorrow morning, so it makes no sense to arrest him.” It’s not up to us. It’s up to the judge. If the state finds enough to prosecute them, that’s on them. But … it’s not on us. We’re here to enforce laws. We’re here to provide protection to the citizens of Hollywood and make sure that nobody’s breaking the rules. (Patrol Officer, Ride Along)

**CMOC 5, Officers Taking on “Detective Duties”**

The mechanism selected for the CMOC for the letter delivery activity was

*Mechanism 5.1, Detectives have more time to spend on felony cases & build better cases.*

The associated contexts and outcomes related to this mechanism are proposed in Figure 11 below.

**Figure 11: CMOC 5, Officers Taking on "Detective Duties" Activity**

**Activities and Mechanisms in Summary**

The current section provided an exploration of five activities of Hollywood’s OFDVI and an array of potential mechanisms that may be underlying each activity. As a
reminder, the five activities chosen for analysis included the following: letter delivery to aggressors and offenders; report taking and writing for every domestic incident; Not-in-Custody Arrests, even for misdemeanor crimes; the development and use of the Repeat Offender Log (i.e., watchlisting); and the shift in duties of patrol officers and detectives. While these are only a subset of the activities of the program, they are among the most visible, salient, and widely referenced among officers. As a complex program with many activities acting simultaneously, it is challenging to tease apart individual activities and the possible impacts caused by each. Despite this challenge, there is value in breaking down the program into its individual elements to not only better understand and explain the program, but also to identify the potential mechanisms that may influence program participant behavior. Doing so can help portray the “program” as less of a concrete package of policies and SOPs that must be implemented as a whole, and more of a combination of policing strategies based on the mechanisms those activities trigger. Furthermore, as Tilley (2006) proposed, these “mechanisms are only triggered in given contexts conducive to their activation,” meaning even if the proper activities associated with the proper mechanisms are in place, they will not cause the intended outcomes absent the necessary contexts” (p. 44).

This exploration of the mechanisms and the theories related to them incorporated theories from a range of disciplines, including criminology, psychology, and economics. While most of the mechanisms were proposed to work on the targets of the OFDVI, meaning the victims and offenders, some may have affected the program implementers, including the individual officers and the Department as a cohesive organization.
Process Evaluation Summary

When assessing the efficacy of any program, the value of understanding the program theory, how the program was implemented, and how it functions is high, yet this step is often omitted from the “what works” discussion. Additionally, for the purposes of a process evaluation, there should be an assessment of the implementation fidelity to the program’s stated SOPs and activities. Provided below are two separate assessments of the findings of the process evaluation of the OFDVI. The first offers key findings from the process evaluation that were uncovered throughout the course of research. These findings can help to summarize the major insights, positive and negative, about the program as it was being implemented in February 2019. The second assessment provides a measure of the program implementation fidelity, including dosage of the various elements, adherence to stated policies and procedures, and a general statement about whether the Department implemented the program the way it was intended.

Key Findings

A number of key findings were uncovered from the current process evaluation. Table 9 below displays the main findings of the current OFDVI process evaluation and the actual or potential implications of those findings. The findings are divided into three categories: Positive, Critical, and Evaluation Process findings.
Table 9: Main Findings of the OFDVI Process Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive Findings</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most interviewees expressed approval of the OFDVI, with one main reservation.</td>
<td>The program received enough support from officers, their supervisors, and the Command Staff to result in a more sustainable and effective long-term program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronounced shift in responsibilities for line officers responding to domestic violence</td>
<td>HPD altered the responsibilities of line officers to include more “detective duties”, which increased their workload but freed up detectives to spend more time on other cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of theory about criminal propensity, domestic violence, and crime</td>
<td>Drug offenders may not be the most high-impact criminals to focus on when seeking wide-ranging crime reduction. Repeat domestic offenders may instead be the “spoke” of the wheel and deserve additional law enforcement attention typically reserved for drug offenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The OFDVI was sustained for several years through leadership changes</td>
<td>From the inception of the idea of the OFDVI (late 2014) to the end of the study period (December 2018), three different Chiefs supported the program. This continuity contributed to the sustainment of the program with little-to no-change despite leadership changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two program “Champions” were associated with the program, even after one moved out of the DV Unit</td>
<td>The key roles of program Champions to implement and sustain the program cannot be understated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPD provided consistent and timely training for officers on the SOPs</td>
<td>Constant communication and clarification about the new SOPs, officer decision-making, and the impacts of the officers’ efforts helped to increase understanding of the program, leading to more buy-in across all levels. Micro-trainings during roll-call were key to delivering information to Patrol officers consistently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crime Analyst played a key role in implementation and sustainment.</td>
<td>The Crime Analyst role would be integral to any type of offender-focused, data-driven program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report quality and consistency was an essential program element heavily monitored by HPD supervisors</td>
<td>Hollywood’s mandatory report writing requirement for every domestic call an officer responded to combined with the higher level of scrutiny and review each domestic report received resulted in an unusually strong focus on domestic reports.</td>
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</table>
This may help to standardize policing practices and improve data collection and analysis capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regardless of officers’ personal views of domestic violence, they typically act with urgency and a high level of concern when responding to domestic calls for service</th>
<th>The expectations for how officers should handle domestic calls seem clear to most officers, and they appear to take domestic violence seriously. This attitude may improve officer safety, victim safety, and crime reduction.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Critical Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The program theory was not sufficiently refined during the program development and implementation stages, which resulted in a lack of clarity for the purpose of certain activities or elements.</th>
<th>At the nascent stages of program development, the program theory should be thoroughly developed before implementation begins. This may help improve not only program implementation and outcomes but also monitoring and evaluation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Offender Lists could be pared down to 3 categories from 4 because the B List did not serve a meaningful purpose.</td>
<td>The B List was a legacy feature from High Point’s OFDVI but was unnecessary within the structure of HPD’s program and should not have been part of the Repeat Offender Log.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A strategy for program Monitoring and Evaluation (M&amp;E) was not incorporated into the project.</td>
<td>The lack of a robust monitoring mechanism that went beyond tracking internal (only Hollywood) crime statistics impeded the Department’s ability to assess its domestic crime trends in relation to the regional trends. Also, the program was not designed in a way that facilitated evaluation, limiting the success of the current evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The value of delivering letters to aggressors and offenders remains unclear, as are the mechanisms related to it. There was no indication of backfire effects.</td>
<td>This activity would lend itself well to a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to determine its effect, if any, on offender behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NIC Arrest Affidavit policy for misdemeanor exceptions was viewed negatively by most officers.</td>
<td>Most participants disagreed with the strict NIC arrest policy due to concerns over civil rights, false accusations, and liability issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Evaluation Process Findings

| HPD leadership was highly supportive of research and facilitated a high level of researcher access to personnel, data, and facilities. | The Chief, the rest of the Command Staff, and the managers were almost all visibly supportive of the researcher’s work and actively facilitated her in carrying it out. The high level of access was helpful in conducting the current study. |
| Interviews and ride-alongs with researcher shadowing were effective data collection methods. | A large amount of data was collected using multiple methods, which aided in triangulation. The iterative process of interviewing and shadowing officers on duty helped to fill information gaps that were only discovered during the data collection process. |
The findings described in Table 9 represent only a subset of the findings discovered as a result of the process evaluation conducted as part of the current study. They are addressed in-depth in the final discussion chapter, Chapter 6. Here, two of the main findings that relate to the core principles of the OFDVI program deserve additional consideration due to their importance and salience in how the program was implemented and how it functions. First, the shift in responsibilities of line officers represented a significant alteration to “business as usual,” which affected how officers and detectives carried out their daily duties. Second, the evolution of the program theory from what was thought to be “Focused Deterrence” to a more nuanced theory about how domestic violence fits into the larger criminogenic framework that guided policing activities at Hollywood.

*Shift in Officer Responsibilities*

What may be helpful in characterizing the approach of Hollywood’s OFDVI lies not in what elements or responsibilities are *added* to the traditional functioning of a domestic violence police response; rather, the answers may be found in the *shift of responsibilities* that resulted from the approach. As discussed above, officers, detectives, supervisors, and the crime analyst all acquired a new (or different) set of responsibilities that had previously been associated with other roles. Most prominently, the officers took on some responsibilities that would be considered detective duties. Rather than simply taking a report that gets sent to a detective, the line officers were asked to take statements, call for crime scene to take photographs, locate suspects who were not on scene, and canvas neighbors or witnesses to collect as much information on scene as
possible. They were asked to file NIC arrest affidavits, even for misdemeanors. Much of this is usually considered detectives’ work, and it was shifted to the officers.

Meanwhile, the detectives, who were spending less time handling misdemeanor cases that officers were now handling, were expected to spend more time on the felony cases. More time allotted to working cases is thought to result in more cases being prosecuted and more offenders being convicted and sentenced. While data on case prosecutions and convictions was outside the scope of the current study, the logic holds based on two facts; 1) detectives are known to have unmanageable caseloads due to the high number of cases they are assigned; 2) there are more misdemeanor domestic violence cases than felonies, so reducing the number of misdemeanors would imply more time to handle the more serious cases. Detectives may have more time to locate individuals for statements, such as a reluctant victim or family member witness, collect more complete evidence, and bring a well-compiled case to the State Attorney’s Office.

Another set of roles that saw their responsibilities shift were sergeants. Patrol sergeants became responsible for ensuring that the various requirements of the OFDVI were being carried out by the line officers they supervised. This included writing reports for every domestic incident, writing reports that were clear and detailed, and indicating the on-scene activities conducted (i.e., calling the crime scene technician for photographs, canvassing neighbors, and giving C-Letters to arrested offenders at the time of arrest). As stated by the officers, different supervisors had different standards for report writing, either for clarity, detail, grammar, or otherwise, and officers tended to err on the side of being too detailed and clear as opposed to not enough. Sergeants only went on-scene
when there was a particularly complicated or serious incident, leaving the on-scene decision-making to the officers on scene.

**Evolution of Program Theory**

As previously noted in the Program Theory section above, an investigation into Hollywood’s program theory uncovered some noteworthy elaborations on the early beliefs about domestic offenders that influenced the way the program evolved. In a personal communication with the Sergeant of the DV Unit who started the program, he offered a striking theory on criminals that is outside the mainstream views on crime and those who commit it.

I used to think that drugs were the spoke of the wheel that generated all crime. That it all spun off narcotics. And once I started to dive into this and really become involved in domestic violence, I started to realize that domestic violence is actually the spoke. If you’re involved in domestic violence at a high level and a repeat offender, it’s almost guaranteed that you are a violent subject in society. Whether it be drugs, or burglary, or robbery or rape, or aggravated battery. If you can’t behave yourself in your house, you’re probably not behaving yourself in public. (DV Unit Sergeant, Personal Communication, March 24, 2019).

The Sergeant had come to view chronic domestic offenders as the most important nodes in criminal activity; While the generalist tendencies of domestic offenders had been a key component of not only Hollywood’s program but the High Point intervention before it, it seems that the Sergeant’s theory attempts to place domestic offenders ahead of all other types of offenders as the riskiest and most dangerous to society.

Other officers provided additional support for this line of thinking. When explaining how she could gain buy-in from a reluctant patrol officer who does not like the additional work that may be required of him or her due to the program, a Lieutenant offered the following example of a justification she would provide the officer:
The majority of your domestic violence offenders aren't just being violent in the home, they're being violent outside of the home. So, if you take that into consideration, you know, the guy that just robbed the CVS is also beating up his girlfriend, now you've just taken a violent felon, not just out of a home, you've taken him off the street. (Lieutenant, Interview 13)

When asked whether people who are chronic domestic offenders are also just as violent in other aspects of their lives, one officer parsed his answer out based on the offender lists. This simultaneously demonstrated an understanding of the differences between the levels of offenders in the Repeat Offender Log, and an understanding of the violent tendencies of those on the A- and B-lists.

So, if your A- and B-listers are more violent offenders, more than likely, your A-listers are going to be the ones that are like, “this is how I am all the time.” This is just how they are, with anybody, with anything they do. Is your D lister like that? Or is your C-lister or like that? No, not necessarily. They're probably going to be like your normal person. They just had a situation that day, and it's not, you know, might never happen again. But then, you know, obviously, your A and B-Listers – definitely your A – that's like a consistent like, this is what they do all the time. And that's how they probably are all the time. (Line officer, Interview 28).

Another officer brought up a possible repercussion of this connection between domestic offenders and other violent crimes. If the chronic domestic offenders, namely the B- and A-Listers, are such seasoned criminals, they are not concerned with the possibilities and realities of sanction because they already know what happens. And what happens in most cases is that jailed offenders get released very quickly, and the case is eventually dropped. It is a pattern of learning through experience with the criminal justice system that helps offenders become more accurate in their perceptions of risk, as discussed by Apel (2013). When asked whether he believed the OFDVI was effective in
reducing domestic violence, he stated the following, highlighting his acknowledgment of the limits of police to stop violent offenders from reoffending:

I don't think it really helps at all because it doesn't change their mindset. They know-- a lot of these people are criminals. That's not typically just domestic-related issues. They know that, okay, already 'what's the worst that they could do? Throw me in jail, and I'll be out in the morning'. Is typically the mindset of a lot of these people. And it's sad because we know that they're even going to be out in the morning. (Line officer, Interview 29).

This officer’s perspective was shared by some others within the Department, but it is important to acknowledge the bounds of responsibility for police in the larger criminal justice system. As described by one officer on page 199, the role of the police is to enforce the law. What happens to arrestees after they are booked into jail is beyond the scope of police work, specifically that of line officers. Therefore, while this sentiment of futility was present, it did not change the onus on each officer to carry out their law enforcement activities in accordance with the Department’s SOPs.

*Implementation Fidelity*

The second assessment developed as a result of the process evaluation provides a measure of the program implementation fidelity, including the dosage and intensity of the various elements, adherence to the stated policies and procedures, and a general statement about whether the Department implemented the program the way it was intended. There is often a difference between how a program is meant to work in an ideal scenario and the way in which it is implemented in real life. There are a number of factors that can affect implementation fidelity, both positively and negatively, and some of these were highlighted in the *Key Findings* section above. In this section, the stated or intended activities of the program were matched with the observed actions of the Department
personnel to assess the level of program fidelity. It should be stressed that these assessments were based on observations, interviews, and ride-alongs that occurred in February 2019, and any differences that may have existed prior to or developed after the data collection period were not considered for the purpose of this assessment.
Table 10: Implementation Fidelity Assessment of the OFDVI Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Prescribed SOP</th>
<th>Assessment of Fidelity to Prescribed SOP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High/Moderate Fidelity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offender Categorization</td>
<td>The crime analyst, in consultation with the DV Sergeant, reviewed all DV reports to categorize aggressors/offenders on the ROL.</td>
<td>The crime analyst consistently reviewed all domestic reports every week and updated the ROL as necessary, with constant communication with the DV Sergeant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat Offender Log (ROL) creation</td>
<td>The crime analyst, in consultation with the DV Sergeant, built the ROL to categorize aggressors/offenders.</td>
<td>The format of the ROL as an Excel document seemed to satisfy the immediate, short-term needs of the program. However, it did not concisely capture historical information, and much important data for analysis was written over or not included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not-in-Custody Arrest Affidavits</td>
<td>If there is probable cause for an arrest for a domestic crime, but the suspect is not on scene, the responding officer must draft and file a Not-in-Custody (of Out-of-Custody) Arrest Affidavit to facilitate immediate arrest of that individual upon locating him or her.</td>
<td>Due to the high level of oversight for domestic calls for service and officers’ responses to those calls, this SOP appeared to be followed in the large majority of instances. Both line officers and their supervisors, in coordination with the DV Sergeant, allowed little-to-no leniency for this policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locating alleged offenders who are not on scene (GOA)</td>
<td>Officers should make a concerted effort to locate suspects who have allegations of domestic abuse being raised against them by the victim.</td>
<td>Most officers indicated that they made attempts to locate suspects who were GOA, sometimes enlisting the help of their colleagues. These efforts included making phone contact, canvassing the neighborhood, or, in the case that someone offered potential whereabouts, checking a possible known location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing a report for every domestic call</td>
<td>Officers should document each domestic incident (arrest or non-arrest) in a report, regardless of severity or frequency (if repeat calls for the same parties).</td>
<td>Due to the high level of oversight for domestic calls for service and officers’ responses to those calls, this SOP appeared to be followed in nearly all instances. It was difficult to change a call type from a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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22 Multiple individuals indicated to me that the strictness of this policy can vary based on who is the Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant at any given time. Some Sergeants may be more lenient than others.
domestic (‘38’) to another type without supervisor approval, so this policy appeared to be widely followed.23

| Writing thorough, clear reports | Officers should document each domestic incident in clearly written, detailed report. | This policy was followed well, with report writing being one of the most-discussed topics in interviews and ride-along. Some officers appeared to take pride in their high-quality reports, and most indicated that they knew this was a necessary part of their job (if only to avoid future questioning, untimely phone calls from supervisors, or additional work). |
| At least two officers must respond to DV CFS | For officer safety, at least two officers must be present when responding to a domestic call. | Officers consistently demonstrated awareness of this policy. More often than not, more than two officers would respond to the same domestic call if they were available to do so. It appeared there was a sense of wanting to support each other on scene. |

**Low Fidelity**

| D-Letter Deliveries (Timely) | After an aggressor triggers his or her labeling as a D-Lister upon incident review by the crime analyst and DV Sergeant, a personalized letter should be drafted and hand-delivered by a uniformed officer within two weeks. | D-Letter deliveries were not often successful and, if successful, took weeks or months to execute. The average amount of time it took to deliver a D-Letter was 46 days from the incident. In-person delivery attempts were successful just 31 percent of the time. |
| D-Letter Deliveries (Efficiency) | Officers are assigned to D-Letter delivery duty during a shift that is maximally staffed (i.e., “fat days”), which allow special assignments due to the increased number of officers on duty. | Letter delivery duty did not appear to be an efficient use of officer time, as two officers were required to go together, and the delivery rate was poor. Most deliveries were conducted during the Bravo shift (morning to early afternoon), meaning many people would be away from home (i.e., at work), so no delivery could be made. |
| C-Letter Deliveries | After consulting the Repeat Offender Log, if the offender is not already in log on the C- | Most officers gave offenders the required C-Letter at the time of arrest or booking into jail. However, one officer indicated that he relied on |

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23 The Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant who implemented the program indicated that this policy had become more flexible over time. Call types were not as difficult to change later in the program than in the earlier years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>the time of arrest</th>
<th>List (or higher), officers should print C-Letters and give them directly to arrestees at the time of arrest and booking into jail.</th>
<th>the crime analyst to do so later. The letter delivery analysis indicated that 20 percent of C-Letters took more than three weeks to be delivered.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referencing the Repeat Offender Log when responding to DV CFS</td>
<td>Officers should reference aggressors in the ROL once they have identified them to determine if they are a) on the log already, b) are high-risk as an A-Lister. Knowing this information should help inform their response based on what is already known about the offender.</td>
<td>Officers rarely knew the status of aggressors/offenders when they arrived on scene. They would usually only reference the ROL after the incident was resolved and they were writing their report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being aware that an offender was an A-Lister (officers)</td>
<td>Officers should be familiar with who the A-Listers are, either by name, appearance, or both. Seeing the flyers, referencing the ROL, hearing them referenced in roll-call and on a slide deck that runs during roll-call should familiarize the officers with the approximately 120 A-Listers.</td>
<td>Officers did not demonstrate an awareness of who the A-Listers were. The large number of flyers for offenders with active NIC arrest affidavits meant there were many faces circulating the Department at any given time. Officers stated that they would not be able to recognize an A-Lister if they encountered one. The slide deck that used to run during roll-call was no longer displayed at the time of the study, but it was referenced as something that may had been helpful in the A-Lister familiarization process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert from teletype that the offender is an A-Lister</td>
<td>When an officer runs an offender (i.e., looks up the individual’s detailed criminal history), Teletype should notify the officer if cross-referencing the individual in the ROL indicates that he/she is an A-Lister.</td>
<td>This did not occur.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As with the *Key Findings* in the previous section, the activities included and assessed in Table 10 above constitute a subset of the overall OFDVI implementation activities and SOPs. In general, the line officer-level activities were implemented with high fidelity. Officers appeared to have a clear understanding of the responses expected of them to various situations and a strong awareness of the consequences of not following the SOPs. This indicates that there was a high level of accountability for officer actions and decisions. If an officer did not follow the SOP, it was highly likely that his or her supervisor would be notified, which would then result in the supervisor subsequently contacting the officer, perhaps at an inconvenient time or while off duty, and requesting additional effort to clarify or remedy the error.

Other program activities that were carried out according to the stated SOP involved the creation and maintenance of the ROL. The crime analyst worked in close coordination with the DV Unit Sergeant to build the ROL from the ground up starting in late 2014, and they both set the thresholds and process for determining where offenders should be placed. All domestic reports received a high level of scrutiny, with several people reviewing each one for various purposes. The crime analyst expended a considerable amount of her work week to updating the ROL and other DV-related activities. Most importantly, the crime analyst and whoever the DV Unit Sergeant was at the time, as this role was filled by at least three different Sergeants over the lifetime of the program, stayed in close contact and communicated on a regular basis.

In contrast to the success of the seven activities assessed as having high implementation fidelity, six were implemented with low fidelity. The activities related to
offender letter deliveries were implemented with much less fidelity to the ideal, with low
delivery success rates and inefficient use of manpower. While D- and C-Letters are one
of the most prominent elements of the OFDVI, the implementation of the letter deliveries
was poor. This may have been due to a number of factors. For the D-Letters, the timing
of the delivery attempts, usually during the Bravo shift, was inappropriate. Most people
would be away from their homes during the working day, assuming that most people are
at work. It is also possible that certain individuals had moved away from their last known
address and were no longer living in Hollywood or were arrested for another offense and
were incarcerated. In the worst case, some individuals were intentionally evading police
and were not willing to speak with an officer to receive the letter. The ROL indicated that
this occurred with some individuals who made it clear that they were not interested in
additional police contact.

The C-Letter deliveries were also found to be implemented with less success than
intended. While most of the C-Letters were given to offenders at the time of arrest, 20
percent of letters were not delivered within three weeks. With arrestees, the best window
for ensuring that offenders received the letter was at the time of arrest while in police
custody. After that time, C-Letters were not hand-delivered to the arrestee’s residence
like a D-Letter would be, so they were always mailed. Mailing letters proved to be an
inefficient exercise due to two main factors. First, a high proportion of mailed letters
were returned to the sender, which required additional legwork and time to identify an
updated address. Second, there was no way for the Department to know if the offender
received and opened the letter unless he or she called the Department to get more
information. A number of interviewees indicated that they did not believe that offenders
read the letters, whether D- or C-Letters, and did not see a lot of value in them. Some added, however, that there was no harm in delivering the letters on the off chance that they had an effect on some individuals.

Conclusion

This process evaluation helped to uncover the theoretical basis for Hollywood’s OFDVI program that had previously been underdeveloped, or at the least, underarticulated. In summary, the program is based on the premise that identifying repeat and chronic domestic aggressors and offenders, communicating directly to those offenders, and applying a graded policing approach based on their propensity for violent crime will reduce domestic violence. Though many questions remain unanswered about the program and how it may influence domestic offenders and victims, the current study sought to initiate the process of breaking down a complex, multi-faceted crime reduction program to determine the intended effects of each activity, how those intended effects might come about, and how they relate to the larger, pre-existing interdisciplinary theoretical base. No policing program works in a vacuum, and few ideas are ever genuinely original. To move policing, and in this case policing of domestic violence, in a more progressive and effective direction, programs and their activities should be considered not because they have been shown to “work” in another jurisdiction but because there is a body of evidence that can explain how and why they can “work” and for which populations under which circumstances. While it is clear that more investigation is needed on the various activities and mechanisms that make up the OFDVI and similar programs, the current study provides an exploratory look inside the proverbial “black box” of a complex policing program. It attempted to identify the hows
and propose some possible *whys*, and link these findings to what is already known about policing and its impact on offenders to drill down on what we still need to learn.
Chapter V: Impact Evaluation

Introduction

As a complement to the process evaluation described in Chapter 4, an impact evaluation was conducted to determine the (E)ffects of the OFDVI in Hollywood, Florida. An impact, or outcome, evaluation is an assessment of whether a program reached its intended outcome and what the specific effects of the intervention were (Lipsey et al., 2006). It is valuable for several reasons, but foremost it will provide an assessment of whether a program “works” or not. That is, whether the intended outcomes of the program are realized or if the outcomes did not meet expectations. In conjunction with the findings of the process evaluation, the impact evaluation’s results can be used to determine a program’s value, which can inform policy creation or alterations related to the program or intervention.

Within the scope of the EMMIE framework, Johnson, Tilley, and Bowers (2015) describe the (E)ffects element as “the overall effect direction and size (alongside major unintended effects) of an intervention and the confidence that should be placed on that estimate” (p. 463). Not only does this require the evaluator to include an assessment of the program outcomes in the final product, but also a standardized effect size that can facilitate comparison with outcomes of other programs with similar intended effects. Moreover, the framework demands that the evaluator include any unintended effects of the intervention, whether good, bad, or neutral, to offer a full picture of the overall impact of the program’s activity(s).
It is the responsibility of the evaluator to provide the clearest, most accurate, and most reliable understanding of the program, its implementation, how it works, whether it worked, and at what cost to achieve its intended outcomes in the contexts of the program. By following this guidance, the evaluator will satisfy the needs of policy makers who will decide the fate of the program under consideration while also providing a transparent, streamlined primary study that can be included in future systematic reviews. Ultimately, the purpose of this study is to contribute to the formation of a Middle-Range Theory about how police can influence the offending trajectories of domestic violence offenders, improve the outcomes for victims, and sustain a domestic violence policy that benefits all stakeholders involved. The specific parameters outlined by Johnson and colleagues (2015) to determine study quality are discussed in detail below.

**EMMIE Evidence Rating Parameters for Study Quality**

While no legitimate approach to evidence-based research would suggest that all evidence is equally useful or beneficial, EMMIE takes a more specific approach to defining what qualifies as strong evidence and what is weak evidence. Evidence should help determine the overall effect direction and size, by way of finding the effect size, analyzing moderators, and measuring unanticipated or unintended effects of a program. The EMMIE-Q ratings for the (E)ffects element of the framework are based on the number of the required components defined by Johnson and colleagues (2015) that would inform the assessment of effect sizes (see Johnson et al., 2015, p. 464 for a table displaying these components) and are as follows. A score of 0 is given to studies that consider none of these components include the following: calculating effect sizes, analyzing heterogeneity, using random-effects models, addressing the issue of
dependency, appropriately weighing individual effect sizes when calculating mean effect sizes, considering potential publication bias, inter-rater reliability considerations, and assessing the influence of statistical outliers. Some of these components are not appropriate for a primary study (i.e., publication bias, inter-rater reliability) and are likely meant for use in systematic reviews. A score of 1 through 3 is given to studies that include one to three (or four) of the components, respectively. A score of 4 is given to studies that include five or more of the components.

Methods: Evaluating the OFDVI Program Impact

Due to the challenges inherent in determining real changes in crime, as opposed to changes seen in official crime statistics, several quantitative analyses were conducted on a number of various data sets to offer a comprehensive picture of domestic crime trends in Hollywood over time. Additionally, the current study provides analysis of multiple data types to accommodate future systematic reviews by offering the best possible range of data, analysis, and effect sizes for a variety of crime measures. To conduct the current evaluation, five elements of the program were separately assessed based on guidance provided by the EMMIE framework, as described by Johnson and colleagues (2015): (1) effect size and direction; (2) mechanisms/mediating variables through which the program works; (3) moderating variables/context that influence the activities; (4) specific implementation successes and failures; and (5) economic evaluation. The current section will focus on the EMMIE elements of effect size and duration (E), moderating variables (M), and (E)conomic costs. For the effects and moderators components, three major analyses were conducted using different data from different sources with the intent of painting a picture of domestic crime trends in Hollywood over the course of the study.
period. Finally, a cost estimate for the OFDVI program was conducted so satisfy the remaining EMMIE component.

**Analysis I: ARIMA and Monthly Domestic Reports**

First, a time-series analysis was conducted on the number of domestic reports over time, controlling for domestic arrests, to determine if there were intervention effects on the number of monthly reports. AutoRegressive Integrative Moving Average (ARIMA) parametric statistical analysis was conducted to assess the effect of the intervention, the independent variable, on the number of monthly reports, the dependent variable. ARIMA is often used when there is a large amount of time-series data, especially count data with a suggested minimum of 50 pre-intervention measurements at equally-spaced points in time, such as 50 monthly counts of reports, to effectively establish a reliable model (Box et al., 2015). It allows for not only analysis of different types of intervention effects (i.e., immediate, lagged) but also forecasting of effects into the future. It is particularly useful for time-series data because it allows the researcher to control for pre-existing trends, seasonal variations (seasonality), and autocorrelation that can be challenges for using other methods of analysis. SPSS Version 26 (IBM, 2019) was used to generate the ARIMA model through its iterative model-building strategy to determine whether the series had a constant variance over time, whether it was trended or drifted in either direction, or whether it displayed seasonal fluctuations.

**Data**

Administrative data from the Hollywood Police Department was collected from the SunGard ONE Solution Record Management System (RMS), which houses criminal
records for eight jurisdictions in South Florida. The bulk of the crime data was collected by the author after receiving permission and access to the RMS to conduct the data collection. The time period of data collected was from January 1, 2011, to December 31, 2018 (8 years or 96 months). This data consisted of all domestic reports filed and arrests made for domestic offenses in Hollywood.

Dependent variable

Crime reports are a generally accepted measure of crime in a city, but reporting practices can vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from year to year. This is particularly true for domestic violence due to variations in policies on the threshold for reporting incidents. In Hollywood in particular, as previously discussed in Chapter 4, a report is written for every domestic call for service that an officer responds to. This policy has been in place since 2010, making it a stable measure of the number of domestic incidents known to the police before and during the OFDVI implementation. Crime reports for domestic incidents, regardless of the outcome, are included in the current analysis and will henceforth be referred to as “crime reports.” Crime report data includes the sex, race, and age of the individual(s) identified as the aggressor(s) in each incident, in addition to the address of the incident. Crime reports were aggregated by week, month, and year. During the study period, there was an average of 369 reports per month for a total of 35,454 reports.

24 The eight jurisdictions included in the RMS database are Broward Sherriff’s Office (BSO), Hollywood, Coconut Creek PD, Fort Lauderdale, Hallandale, Margate, Sunrise, and Wilton Manors.
The intervention was coded using a dichotomous step-function for 96 data points over time, with the 52 months included in the pre-intervention period (January 1, 2011, to April 30, 2015) coded as 0, and the 44 months included in the post-intervention period coded as 1 (May 1, 2015, to December 31, 2018).

Analysis

If Hollywood’s program was associated with a reduction in reported domestic violence, it was anticipated that there would be a significant decline in the number of reports during the intervention period while controlling for domestic arrests. Arrests alone may have an effect on reporting through an incapacitation effect, leading to fewer calls for service and reports following an arrest; to best accommodate this effect, arrests will be included as an independent variable. However, it is important to note that most arrests are followed by only a day or two in jail, after which the subject is released on bail, so the incapacitation effect may not be a significant factor. However, the arrest may lead to other outcomes like no-contact orders, which may have incapacitation effects. Because the current study does not include court-level data, this possible effect will not be included in the analysis.

Results

Visual inspection of the graph in Figure 12 shows a sharp, immediate, and sustained decline in the monthly number of domestic violence reports after the implementation of the OFDVI in May 2015, indicated by the vertical dashed line. Though there is a marked increase in reports seen between the spring of 2013 to the spring of 2015, the monthly report totals between 2016 to 2018 decline to below the
lowest pre-intervention monthly report count and remain there through the end of the study period.

Figure 12: Domestic violence reports in Hollywood, FL, by month, January 2011 - December 2018

While visually displaying the actual number of monthly reports is helpful to identify general trends, ARIMA analysis was used to determine if there was a statistically significant relationship between the intervention and the monthly report counts over time. Using the SPSS Expert Modeler function, the ARIMA model of the pre-intervention report data was determined to be ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,0,0). The Ljung-Box Q test was not statistically significant (p= .370), meaning the model and data are independently distributed and do not demonstrate autocorrelation.
The first parameter in the model, the autoregressive parameter, or ARIMA($p,d,q$), is 0. This indicates that an autoregressive parameter was not used in the model. Instead, a moving average was used. The third parameter in the model – the moving average – or the number of lags of the errors in the equation, or ARIMA($p,d,q$), is 1. Some series experience a random shock from one observation to the next, which persists shortly and then disappears. A $q$ of 1 indicates that the error of one previous observation was used to calculate the current observation and results in smoothing of the trend-cycle. In other words, the moving average process was conducted using a lag of one month.

The second parameter in the model, the integrated or differenced parameter, or ARIMA($p,d,q$), is 1. This indicates that the series was trended, meaning there was a systematic trend in the data, so the model was differenced (first-order differencing) to make the data stationary (i.e., non-trended). A stationary time series is one in which the mean and variance are constant over time. All variables were differenced. Doing so also removed any existing autocorrelation.

The model was found to have a stationary variance, meaning the level of variance did not change over time. Therefore, the data did not require a log transformation. There were no seasonal effects in the data (ARIMA(0,1,1)(0,0,0)), meaning the data did not follow a pattern based on month or time of year. Table 11 below reports the maximum-likelihood coefficients along with standard error to evaluate statistical significance.
Table 11: Maximum Likelihood Coefficients for Domestic Violence Reports Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Parameter*</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>t Value</th>
<th>P Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moving average Lag I</td>
<td>.631</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>7.633</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDVI Intervention Numerator Lag 0</td>
<td>-84.018</td>
<td>21.617</td>
<td>-3.887</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Arrests Lag 0</td>
<td>1.739</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>5.225</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Model: ARIMA (0,1,1)(0,0,0)
Note: All variables are differenced. Ljung-Box statistic (18) = 18.31 (p value = .370).

Analysis II: Linear Mixed-Effects Modeling of Domestic Offenses

While the ARIMA analysis of Hollywood’s domestic crime data is valuable for a number of reasons, another analysis was required to include counterfactuals. A within-jurisdiction effect of the intervention may indicate a significant effect, but a more robust test that includes comparison data was necessary to properly evaluate the intervention.

Data & Variables

UCR data were collected from the Florida Statistical Analysis Center on the Florida Department of Law Enforcement website to aid in the comparison of crime trends among a number of jurisdictions in south Florida (FDLE, 2020). These data included reported domestic violence offenses by Florida jurisdiction, broken down by offense type between 2008 and 2019 for the following eleven jurisdictions: Hollywood, Hallandale, Dania Beach, Fort Lauderdale, Pembroke Pines, Cooper City, Plantation, Davie, Miramar, Miami Gardens, and Aventura. These jurisdictions serve to provide comparisons, or control groups, of jurisdictions that vary in population, area, location, physical and land use features, and demographics. They were chosen for their proximity to Hollywood as neighboring or near-neighboring cities. Descriptive statistics for all
jurisdictions included in the analysis can be found in Table 12, and a map of the locations of all cities included in the analysis can be found in Figure 13.

Table 12: Demographic Statistics of Nearby Jurisdictions Included in Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aventura</td>
<td>Miami-Dade</td>
<td>37,790</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper City</td>
<td>Broward</td>
<td>33,906</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dania Beach</td>
<td>Broward</td>
<td>31,755</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davie</td>
<td>Broward</td>
<td>103,171</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Lauderdale</td>
<td>Broward</td>
<td>182,827</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallandale</td>
<td>Broward</td>
<td>39,054</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollywood</td>
<td>Broward</td>
<td>149,028</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami Gardens</td>
<td>Miami-Dade</td>
<td>113,628</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miramar</td>
<td>Broward</td>
<td>137,107</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pembroke Pines</td>
<td>Broward</td>
<td>165,352</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation</td>
<td>Broward</td>
<td>89,595</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FDLE aggregates all domestic crimes into annual reports, which includes a breakdown of all domestic offenses, as reported to them by each jurisdiction. The offenses included in this data are all domestic offenses, categorized as follows: murder, manslaughter, rape, fondling, aggravated assault, aggravated stalking, simple assault, threat and intimidation, and stalking. The officially reported populations for each jurisdiction each year are also included. Using the yearly number of total domestic crimes and population for each city, the domestic offense rate per 10,000 residents was
calculated for each year for each jurisdiction. This rate was used as the dependent variable. Using the offense rate instead of the raw number of offenses helped to account for the large variation in population between jurisdictions. Initial data exploration indicated the offense rates were right-skewed, so they were square-root transformed to make the distribution more symmetrical.

For the independent variables, three variables were created. The BeforeAfter variable was created to indicate data points that were from the pre-intervention period (between 2008 and 2014) and those that were from post-intervention (2016 to 2019). Because the intervention officially began in May 2015, data from that year were omitted from the analysis for all jurisdictions. A continuous repeated measures variable of Year was included in the data so that each jurisdiction had a data point for each year between 2008 and 2019, omitting 2015. Finally, a binary Intervention variable was included to indicate the intervention jurisdiction (Hollywood) and the non-intervention subjects (all other jurisdictions).

Analytical model

To determine whether the intervention in Hollywood had an effect on domestic crime, I conducted a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis. The OFDVI intervention was not implemented as a randomized controlled trial and was not replicated. The DD analysis approach provides the best-practice quasi-experimental method for testing an intervention effect (Corsaro et al., 2012; Gertler et al., 2016).

The DD approach conceptually is rather simple. For a simple case of one measurement before and one measurement after intervention for a single control and
impact pair, the DD value can be obtained by subtracting the difference between pre-(A) and post-(B) measure and the comparison jurisdictions’ pre-(C) and post-(D) measures (e.g., Gertler et al., 2016):

$$\text{DD impact} = (B - A) - (D - C)$$

If there is no effect of the intervention, then the expected value will be zero. This approach implicitly controls for existing differences between the impact/control samples, but assumes they come from the same statistical population. This assumption is central because there are a range of both observable and unobservable characteristics, or covariates, such as the police departments and their populations, major policy or population changes, and other factors. We assume that Hollywood would have followed a similar temporal trajectory to the other jurisdictions in the absence of an intervention. In this study, this is a reasonable assumption as the jurisdictions all operate within the same County, and an initial graphical examination of crime rates did not indicate Hollywood was unusual among the jurisdictions.

In this study, there were multiple measures before and after the intervention began. In this case, an alternative way of testing the DD model is using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with the following model:

$$\text{Offense rate} = \text{BeforeAfter} + \text{Impact} + \text{BeforeAfter} \times \text{Impact}$$

where BeforeAfter represents whether the measurement was taken before or after the intervention, and Impact represents the intervention treatment (Hollywood vs. other jurisdictions). The key test in this model is the BeforeAfter$\times$Impact term. If this term is
significant, then the Impact had an effect on the Before-After values. This is a classic Before-After Control-Impact design (e.g., Underwood, 1992) and explicitly tests the DD hypothesis.

This dataset presented two challenges in applying the conventional DD approach as implemented in an ANOVA. First, the Impact treatment was not replicated. Hollywood was the only jurisdiction in which the intervention was carried out. However, there were multiple control jurisdictions, so the inference is considerably stronger than a completely non-replicated DD. Second, the classic ANOVA approach assumes the independence of samples in time. As previously noted, the crime data are first-order autocorrelated. The effect of this would be an underestimation of the variance of samples in the before and after groups. The variances of the two groups would show up smaller than they should be and would indicate a larger effect than there really is.

To address the issue of repeated measurements, a linear mixed-effects model was used. This enables the ANOVA test of the DD hypothesis, while accounting for variances that may be structured in some way other than completely independent of each other. Two alternative error assumptions were considered. First, the standard univariate repeated measures assumption that the variance-covariance matrix has *compound symmetry* was considered. This assumes that the variance within the jurisdictions is the same as the variance between them. This approach does not take the serial nature of observations in time, however. Second, the variances were specified as first-order autocorrelated. While this was more likely to be the correct assumption *a priori*, it was instructive to examine and compare and contrast both approaches.
Results

The two analytical approaches gave different results in the key test of whether the Intervention resulted in a change in offense rates. The standard univariate (Compound Symmetry) test indicated there was a significant ($p = 0.036$) effect of the OFDVI intervention (Table 13). However, when serial or temporal correlation was taken into account by specifying autocorrelated errors using the AR1 model, the OFDVI intervention was found to be not statistically significant ($0.241$) (Table 14).

Table 13: Type III Tests of Fixed Effects, Compound Symmetry (CS) Model\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Numerator df</th>
<th>Denominator df</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.049</td>
<td>88.752</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.049</td>
<td>.980</td>
<td>.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BefAft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110.000</td>
<td>40.588</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention $*$ BefAft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110.000</td>
<td>4.511</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Dependent Variable: OffenseRateSqRt.

Table 14: Type III Tests of Fixed Effects, Autoregressive (AR1) Model\textsuperscript{b}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Numerator df</th>
<th>Denominator df</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.786</td>
<td>106.336</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.786</td>
<td>1.076</td>
<td>.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BefAft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>115.870</td>
<td>6.119</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention $*$ BefAft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>115.870</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{b} Dependent Variable: OffenseRateSqRt.

To identify which model is the most appropriate, two approaches were used. First, Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) provides an informal comparison between models.
The analysis with the lower AIC is considered to be the better model. The difference was clear. The AIC of the CS Model was 21.605, and the AIC of the AR(1) Model was 0.524. The autoregressive model was the better of the two.

The second approach was a more formal likelihood ratio test. The compound symmetric model is technically a subset (or special case) of the AR1 model, so when both models are calculated using Maximum Likelihood (cf. the default Restricted Maximum Likelihood), then they can be directly compared. The difference between the -2Log Likelihoods follows a Chi-square distribution and provides the likelihood ratio test with 1 degree of freedom in this comparison. There was a very strong difference between the models (21.081, 1 df, p < 4.4^6). It is clear that the AR1 model was the more appropriate model.

While there was no indication that the Hollywood OFDVI was associated with a significant change in Offense Rates compared to ten neighboring jurisdictions, this does not imply the offending rates were static in time. Across all of the jurisdictions, there was a temporal change over the duration of the study, unrelated to the intervention and even when serial correlation was taken into account. A graph displaying the offense rates for each jurisdiction over time is displayed in Figure 14 below.
Analysis III: Domestic Offender Survival Analysis

As part of the OFDVI and discussed extensively in Chapter 4, domestic aggressors and offenders who meet certain criteria are supposed to receive one of two types of letters from an officer at HPD. The first group of recipients is the individuals who are identified as aggressors (or instigators) in multiple non-crime and non-arrest incidents of domestic abuse. These individuals are supposed to receive a D Letter from HPD within 24 hours to a couple of weeks after the triggering incident. The second group of individuals is identified as offenders who are arrested for a charge of domestic
violence. They are supposed to receive a C Letter at the time of arrest, hand-delivered by the arresting officer. This letter is meant to have a deterrent effect on its recipient so that aggressors or offenders who receive the letter should be less likely to reoffend, and if they do reoffend, it will take more time for them to do so. Detailed implementation and theoretical analyses of this activity are provided in Chapter 4 of the current study.

To identify the potential effect of receiving a letter on the offender’s likelihood of reoffending using a common statistical analysis method, basic survival analysis was conducted. This analysis is meant to provide a graphical view of the influence of letters on offending patterns in the form of a Kaplan-Meier Plot.

Data and Variables

Offender activity and letter delivery data were collected from a unique data set called the Repeat Offender Log (ROL). This is a free-text Excel workbook that houses all of the data collected on repeat domestic offenders in Hollywood, as defined by the OFDVI implementers. The ROL has eight pages, four of which are relevant to the current study that includes D-Listers, C-Listers, B-Listers, and A-Listers. The ROL holds the names and identifying information of all subjects who have ever been identified as a repeat domestic offender by the HPD and put on one of these four lists. This definition is set by the Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant and applied to each individual that is identified as the aggressor in a domestic report, both arrest and non-arrest incidents. The lists compile the subjects who have officially met the threshold for becoming a repeat offender in the OFDVI at any level between D to A. Additional descriptions of the definitions of each level of offender and the procedure used to place offenders on the
appropriate list and move them from one list to the next higher list can be found in Chapter 4, section titled *Repeat Offender Identification and Prioritization* (pp. 136-147).

Within the ROL, a large amount of data is maintained and constantly updated. Upon the receipt of new reports each week, the log is updated and sent out to officers in the field for their reference. The version that the officers use is not maintained in real-time, with a lag of data input and update dissemination of up to one week. Additionally, data is input manually, column-by-column, by the crime analyst, which has resulted in a considerable amount of human error in the form of variation in name spellings, spacing, errors in dates, or omissions of key data. For this reason, the author cleaned the Excel workbook to ensure the following: a) name spelling was consistent across all sheets; b) dates were standardized and correct; c) offenders on multiple lists were labeled as such; d) nicknames and AKAs were separated out to a new column; e) color-coded letter delivery indicators were coded as dichotomous variables in new columns (i.e., Yes/No); and f) color codes that indicated additional incidents were coded as dichotomous variables in new columns (i.e., Yes/No).

For the current analysis, there were three variables of interest. First, whether the offender received a letter or not, or the Delivered binary variable. The second variable is whether the offender had an additional non-arrest incident or arrest after the initial triggering incident or arrest, or the Event/Censor binary variable. The last relevant variable is the number of days elapsed between the first triggering event and any additional event or until the end of the study period (censor), or the TimeElapsed continuous variable.
Analytical Model

Survival analysis using the Kaplan-Meier method was chosen for the current analysis for three reasons. First, this method is common in the health sciences and medicine but is often used in criminology to calculate offender recidivism. The term *survival* does not only refer to living and dying, but it serves as a generic term for the length of time a participant lasts in a study before failure. Failure is study-specific but could be any event of interest such as death, re-arrest, smoking a cigarette, receiving an additional DUI offense, or countless other examples of an end result that a scientist may want to test.

Second, this non-parametric method allows for a simple calculation of survival for participants in two groups who either reach the outcome of interest (i.e., another offense) or censor out by never experiencing another event of interest during the lifetime of the study for various reasons. The censored individuals’ survival times are not included in the survival calculation because it is unknown when they would have failed, if ever. For the current study, censoring occurred if an offender made it to the end of the study period without having another incident or arrest after the triggering event. This could have been due to a number of reasons that were only sometimes indicated in the ROL and included moving away, being imprisoned in another county or state for an unknown offense, or actually not having any new domestic events known to HPD.

Third, the method can handle varying dates when individuals enter the study, rather than all participants starting on the same day. Also, it assumes that those participants who enter the study later (i.e., have a trigger DV event) have the same
probability of survival as those who entered in the beginning. Since the offenders in the current study entered on the date of their triggering domestic event, either an incident or an arrest, this could have occurred at any point during the study period.

In the case of the domestic offenders in the current study, two groups of offenders were compared: (1) Treatment group: offenders who received a letter, and (2) Comparison group: offenders who never received a letter but should have. These two groups were compared by their survival over time by measuring the amount of time it takes for each offender to reoffend. Here, reoffend can refer to having another non-arrest incident or an arrest after the initial triggering event. The initial triggering event can be either a non-arrest incident (for D Listers) or an arrest (for C-, B-, or A-Listers). The main goal of the analysis is to determine whether the treatment group and the control group experienced any differences in time-to-failure.

Using the Survival analysis function in SPSS, the variables were input into the appropriate variable boxes:

   Time variable (duration variable): DaysElapsed
   Status variable: FirstAnalysisBinary(1)
   Factor variable: LetterBinary

Findings

Before conducting the survival analysis to tease out patterns in letter deliveries in relation to domestic incidents, the time between the letter delivery and an additional incident was analyzed. Doing so provides a better understanding of the reoffending patterns of domestic offenders and aggressors, as well as a look at recidivism. Table 15
below provides statistics about the number of additional incidents and arrests that offenders had logged in the ROL.

Table 15: Descriptive Statistics of Offenders with Additional Incident and/or Arrest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Offenders (N = 1,456)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean (per offender)</th>
<th>Median (per offender)</th>
<th>SD (per offender)</th>
<th>Min (per offender)</th>
<th>Max (per offender)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>34.90</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the ROL analysis, there was nearly the same number of non-arrest incidents and arrests involving the repeat offenders in the ROL during the study period. There were 1,042 incidents and 1,078 arrests, for a total of 2,120 domestic events logged in the spreadsheet, displayed in Table 16 below. Here it is important to note the discrepancy between the number of domestic events recorded here and the number of domestic reports that were written during the same period of 35,454. Therefore, just about 6 percent of the total domestic events, including arrests and non-arrest incidents, were accounted for in the ROL. In this case, it is not clear whether using the ROL to analyze offender recidivism is appropriate; however, it is the most robust account of the interactions between offender activities, offender addition to or moving between one or more lists, officer activities (including letter deliveries), and reoffending. A discussion of this finding is provided in Chapter 6.
Table 16: Offender Recidivism Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offender Group</th>
<th>Time Descriptor (in Days)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Offenders</strong></td>
<td>Days Elapsed Between Letter Deliv. and New Offense (Or 12/31/2018)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>679.53</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>399.73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoffend (Any Type)</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>288.18</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>249.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoffend Arrest</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>249.97</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>230.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoffend Incident</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>304.62</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>256.08</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Letter Received</strong></td>
<td>Days Elapsed Between Letter Deliv. and New Offense (Or 12/31/2018)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>632.41</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>387.10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoffend (Any Type)</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>286.43</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>250.22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoffend Arrest</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>251.22</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>231.58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoffend Incident</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>302.26</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>256.59</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Letter Received</strong></td>
<td>Days Elapsed Between First offense and New Offense (Or 12/31/2018)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>942.86</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>365.47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoffend (Any Type)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>330.54</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>240.37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoffend Arrest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>127.0</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoffend Incident</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>347.50</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>242.60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of all offenders from both groups, 78.1 percent were censored. Out of 222 offenders who did not receive a letter, 209 (94.1 percent) were censored, and out of 1,234 offenders who received a letter, 928 (75.2 percent) were censored. This means that a strong majority of offenders in either group never had another incident or arrest before the end of the study period. Depending on when the offender entered the study by having a triggering event, this could have been a duration of between 1 and 1,462 days.
Of the 13 offenders who never received a letter and had another event, 7 (53.8 percent) did so within one year from the trigger event, and all 13 had another event within 687 days (or 1.8 years). In Figure 15 above, this group is represented by the light blue line. Of the 316 offenders who received a letter and had another event, 214 (67.7 percent) did so within the first year after the trigger event. This group is represented by the red line in Figure 15.

The survival analysis indicated that there was a difference in the average number of days elapsed between the first triggering event and any additional event or until the end of the study period (censor), or the TimeElapsed continuous variable. Aggressors or offenders who received a letter (N = 1,235) were significantly more likely to fail (i.e., reoffend) than those who did not receive a letter (N = 221). This difference was
statistically significant at the p < .000 level based on the results of the logrank test, also referred to as the Mantel-Cox test (Chi-Square = 43.911, df = 1, p < .000). Figure 16 below displays the Survival Function Graph for all Domestic Offenders for the entire study period between May 2015 and December 31, 2018. The average amount of time it took for offenders to have another incident after the triggering event depending on whether or not they received a letter is displayed in Table 17 below.

Table 17: Mean Time Elapsed for Domestic Offenders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received Letter</th>
<th>Estimate (Days)</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,068.49</td>
<td>15.26</td>
<td>1,038.57</td>
<td>1,098.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1,391.39</td>
<td>19.19</td>
<td>1,353.77</td>
<td>1,429.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16: Survival Functions Graph of Domestic Offenders, All Time
Analysis IV: Contexts - Offender Demographics

Based on the EMMIE framework, identifying the contexts, or (M)oderating factors, related to a program, including any potential differential effects on various populations, is a critical element of a program evaluation. Characteristics of the implementing body (i.e., a police department) and its implementers, the targeted population, and the situational factors of a program can all affect its outcomes. Identifying the contexts helps to bring more specificity to the impacts, if any, of an intervention, which provides a more informative assessment of what works and for whom.

Referring back to an example of the importance of contexts discussed in Chapter 3 of the current study, the contexts identified in follow-up studies of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment proved key to understanding the differential effects of arrest on domestic offenders (Sherman & Berk, 1984). Mandatory arrest did not affect all offenders the same, as was first implied in the original study. Instead, replications found that arrest was an effective deterrent for future domestic violence for offenders who were employed, while it was ineffective for unemployed offenders. Also, the study included only male offenders, leaving out the small but consequential population of female domestic offenders. Without teasing out these specific effects on various populations involved in the intervention, both the potential benefits and backfire effects for each may be missed.

Sex, Race, and Age Analysis of Arrested DV Offenders

Descriptive statistics analysis for gender, race, and age of arrested offenders was conducted to quantify the characteristics of domestic offenders in Hollywood. Then, by
comparing these variables before and after program implementation, the changes in offender characteristics that occurred were identified. These variables must be analyzed to identify and define the contexts in which the OFDVI operates, determine how the program may affect different offenders with varying characteristics, and establish whether the program is associated with any changes in the demographics of offenders. More specifically, the results of the analyses of these variables can be compared to findings of other studies focused on the demographics of offenders to identify any similarities to or deviations from previous findings to help inform theories about domestic offenders. The unusual inclusion of female offenders in the program and as part of the current study provides an often overlooked or intentionally omitted analysis of female domestic offenders. Also, due to the fact that the OFDVI offenders include perpetrators of all forms of domestic violence, not just Intimate Partner Violence, the findings may differ from those of IPV-only programs or data sets.

Data

The crime analyst provided me with a data set pulled from the Records Management System (RMS) that included details for all domestic arrests that occurred in Hollywood between January 2011 and December 2018. This included 4,736 arrests. Details included for each arrest were the event date and address and arrestee age, sex, and race. Descriptive statistics analysis for gender, race, and age of arrested offenders was conducted to quantify the characteristics of domestic offenders in Hollywood. Then, by comparing these variables before and after program implementation, any changes in offender characteristics that occurred can be identified.
To aid in understanding the demographics of domestic arrestees within the context of Hollywood, specific information from the Department about its policing activities in relation to race will be compared to the findings of the current study. The HPD Internal Affairs Unit conducts what it calls a Bias-Based Profiling Review every year to track the race of individuals who have contact with police, whether due to arrest, traffic stops, search warrants, or otherwise, and the number of Bias-Based Profiling citizen complaints filed with the Department. The 2018 Bias-Base Profiling Review covered the period from October 1, 2017, to September 30, 2018, and included a breakdown of the race of individuals to include the following categories: White, White-Hispanic, Black, Black Hispanic, Indian, Indian-Hispanic, Asian, Asian-Hispanic, Other, Unknown, and No Record. This document is available on the City of Hollywood website’s Document Center (City of Hollywood, 2020).

The key findings of that report that are relevant to the current study include the 2010 US Census data for the demographics of Hollywood’s citizens and the race of arrestees, which covers arrests for any offense. In 2010, Hollywood was 47.5 percent White, 16.7 percent Black, 32.6 percent Hispanic, 2.4 percent Asian, and 5 percent Other race. The race and ethnicity of arrestees in Hollywood (N = 6,476 arrests) was 47.5 percent White, 18.9 percent White-Hispanic, 31.8 percent Black, 1 percent Black-Hispanic, and .25, .1, .5, .01, .03, .01 percent Indian, Indian-Hispanic, Asian, Asian-Hispanic, Other, and Unknown, respectively. Ethnicity was not systematically indicated in the domestic arrest data set, so it was not included in the analysis, while the Department’s report does include it. Therefore, White and White-Hispanic were grouped
into White, and Black and Black-Hispanic were grouped as Black. Other race included the Department’s list of additional races.

There were two citizen complaints related to Biased-Based Policing, but the officer was either exonerated or no further investigation was warranted. No further details were available about the type of call for those complaints, so this information is simply to indicate the low number of complaints the department received related to racial or ethnic bias during the year.

Findings

Based on the analysis of 4,736 domestic arrests, the average age of offenders during the entire study period was 33.69 years. The median was 31, with a standard deviation of 11.86. The youngest offender was 11, and the oldest was 83. There was little change between these figures for arrested individuals in the pre-intervention period from January 1, 2011, to April 30, 2015, and those arrested in the post-intervention period of May 1, 2015, to December 31, 2018. While the difference is statistically significant at the p<.000 level based on an unpaired t-test, there is no practical difference in age. The median age increased by one year, and the range expanded by 3 to include slightly younger and slightly older offenders. Table 18 below displays the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviations for arrestee age over three time periods – the entire study period, pre-intervention, and post-intervention.

Table 18: Age of Domestic Arrestees, Before and After Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Arrestees</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entire Period</td>
<td>33.69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Intervention</td>
<td>33.63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11.92</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Intervention</td>
<td>33.76</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11.82</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is important to note that these figures differ slightly from those included in the section above (see Tables 15 and 16). Table 15 is organized by offender, so each offender is included in the calculations only once. The arrest data described in Table 16 includes all arrests and is therefore including multiple arrests of the same individuals since it was not possible to filter out only unique offenders in this data set. Also, Table 15 describes those individuals who had an arrest and/or an incident as noted in the Repeat Offender Log, not just an arrest. However, the median offender age is the same (31), and the mean is slightly higher at 34.90 for the incident and/or arrest offenders described in Table 15.

The second analysis looked at the sex of domestic arrestees. As displayed in Table 19 below, female arrestees composed a larger percentage of total arrests in the post-intervention period compared to the pre-intervention period. Arrests of female offenders increased by 4.07 percent, from 19.4 percent to 23.47 percent. This difference is statistically significant at the p<.000 level based on a Chi-Square test. Overall, women made up just over 21 percent of all domestic arrests.

Table 19: Sex of Domestic Arrestees, Before and After Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Intervention</th>
<th>Post-Intervention</th>
<th>Full Study Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>1,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,418</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, domestic arrestee race was analyzed. The most common offender race was white, followed by black, with very few arrestees of other races, as displayed in Table 20 below. During the full study period, white arrestees made up 60 percent of all
arrestees, while 39 percent of arrestees were black. Over time, the percentage of black arrestees increased by 3.89 percent from the pre-intervention period to the post-intervention period (statistically significant at the p<.01 level). In other words, there was a slightly lower proportion of white arrestees compared to black arrestees. The percentage of other-race arrestees was essentially unchanged.

Table 20: Race of Domestic Arrestees, Before and After Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Pre-Intervention</th>
<th>Post-Intervention</th>
<th>Change (Pre-Post)</th>
<th>Full Study Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>61.99</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>58.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>37.14</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>41.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,418</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, it is helpful to consider the results of this analysis of the race of domestic arrestees in comparison to the 2018 Bias-Based Profiling Review to identify any trends or notable differences in offender race for all arrests for any crime type and domestic arrests. This comparison is made with the acknowledgment that comparing the domestic arrests over eight years with the trends from this one-year report should not be considered a robust analysis, but it does offer a view into the patterns and potential deviations that could exist for domestic arrests.

One main finding emerged from the comparison of domestic arrests between 2011 and 2018 and all arrests in 2018. There were more Black arrestees and fewer White arrestees for domestic charges than for any charge. A table displaying the percentage of arrestees broken down by race for the full study period of the current study (2011 to 2018) and all arrests from 2017 to 2018 is provided in Table 21 below. In comparison to
the 2010 Census Demographic data for Hollywood, black domestic arrestees are overrepresented by more than two times the race’s demographic representation in the city. This disparity is not as severe for arrests for any charge, indicating that Black people are arrested more often for domestic charges than other crimes.

Table 21: Comparison of Arrestee Demographics: Domestic Charges or Any Charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrestee Race</th>
<th>Domestic Arrests (Full Study Period)</th>
<th>All Arrests (2017-18)</th>
<th>DV vs. All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>60.09</td>
<td>66.34</td>
<td>- 6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>39.04</td>
<td>32.78</td>
<td>+ 6.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>- 0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Arrestee Demographics in Summary*

Based on the analysis conducted on domestic arrestee demographic data over the course of the study period, there are two small yet notable changes that occurred from the pre-intervention period to the post-intervention period. First, women were more heavily represented in the post-intervention period compared to the pre-intervention period. In other words, women were slightly more likely to be arrested after the program was implemented. This may be due to three potential scenarios: (1) HPD was not arresting female offenders who should have been arrested before the program began, (2) HPD’s new policies resulted in more arrests of female offenders, or (3) women were committing more domestic violence in the time after the program was implemented.

The second notable change was the slight increase in Black arrestees compared to White arrestees. Black offenders were already overrepresented in domestic arrests during the pre-intervention period, but this difference grew by nearly 4 percent during the post-
intervention period. There are several potential reasons for this. First, it could be that offenders who were arrested on NIC arrest affidavits were more likely to be black, and therefore they were more likely to be arrested after the new policy was implemented. Alternatively, if the program did have a deterrent message to some offenders, perhaps the message was better-received by or more effective on white offenders than black offenders. Finally, a possible unintended effect of the program could have negatively affected black offenders in a way that increased their propensity for violence, though no evidence of this effect was found during the current study. These possible explanations for the changes in offender demographics during the post-implementation period are discussed further in Chapter 6.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

The final element of the EMMIE framework to be analyzed was the (E)conomics, or the financial costs and benefits of the program. Despite the outsized consideration departments must give financial aspects of any policy or program, especially in light of smaller budgets being stretched to cover a wider mission, little research offers guidance to how the costs of a program should be calculated, much less how those costs should be considered in comparison to the economic benefits of the intended crime reduction of that policy or program. As Tilley (2016) notes, “for the rational… decision-maker[,] best estimates of expected bottom-line net outcomes are important,” and they should be able to make an informed decision about whether a program’s effects will be worth its costs (p. 307). Furthermore, EMMIE was developed to fill the void in program cost considerations, as noted by the following excerpt:
“[…] because practitioners have limited budgets, resourcing one intervention means that something else must be forgone. Moreover, the most effective intervention tested will be of little practical value if it is prohibitively expensive to implement or maintain. Thus, to make good decisions, policymakers and practitioners need information on the overall costs and benefits of particular interventions and their alternatives.” (Johnson et al., 2015, p. 463)

The EMMIE framework offers guidance for researchers to provide an appropriate assessment of a program’s costs that can be later included in systematic reviews to eventually come to an understanding of how program costs should be considered as a factor in feasibility and implementation, depending on a department’s resources. Johnson, Tilly, and Bowers (2015) identify nine types of evidence that would be appropriate to satisfy this element of the EMMIE framework. To achieve the highest evidence rating, a study would need to include an estimate of the “marginal or total opportunity costs (and/or benefits) by bearer (or recipient)” (p. 466). The main goal is to thoroughly enumerate the total costs of implementing a policy with high-quality evidence.

Literature Review

Studies on estimating the costs of crime

In its most basic manifestation, crime is a cost burden on society that rarely receives mainstream consideration of its actual costs. Discourse on the costs of crime is typically discussed in terms of emotion, property or life lost, or general effects on feelings of safety. However, experts argue that each individual crime can be broken down in terms of its actual and intangible costs to society. For example, conservative estimates of the cost, including tangible and intangible costs, of one homicide to the community is around $8 to $9 million (McCollister, French & Fang, 2010), a rape or sexual assault costs $241,000 (McCollister et al., 2010), and one aggravated assault costs $107,000.
(McCollister et al., 2010). In an analysis of the cost of intimate partner violence, Peterson and colleagues (2018) found that the lifetime costs of IPV per each female victim were $103,767, totaling $3.6 trillion in total population costs for the estimated 43 million victims over their lifetime. Medical costs were found to be the largest share of expense types for IPV, constituting 59% of the total lifetime costs.

Studies on calculating the costs of a law enforcement intervention

Of all the criminal justice programs that have been studied and evaluated, studies that investigate the costs and benefits of programs constitute a very small proportion of existing research (Manning et al., 2016). This is surprising, given the unlikelihood of a department implementing a new program without having a cost estimate beforehand, with the understanding that “effectiveness is not a free good” (Horowitz & Zedlewski, 2006, p. 52). While many departments can receive grants from federal, state, or local sources to implement programs, there are many more that do not and need to know the actual costs of implementing interventions to determine the feasibility of trying it out in their own agencies. In 2016, the BJS reported that there were 15,322 general-purpose law enforcement agencies in the United States, with 12,261 (80 percent) of those being local police departments, two-thirds of which served populations of less than 10,000 people (Hyland & Davis, 2019).

Unfortunately, the lack of cost information for police programs is not a problem isolated to just US-based policing studies. For example, in an EMMIE-based systematic review of studies analyzing the effect of protection orders on domestic violence offending published in Australia, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and/or
Canada, only two out of sixty-three included studies provided a cost assessment of the programs or interventions being studied (Dowling, Morgan, Hulme, Manning, & Wong, 2018). In another example, an EMMIE-based systematic review of retail tagging as a tactic to reduce theft found that none of the 50 studies included in the study provided sufficient economic analysis to evaluate the costs and benefits of tagging (Sidebottom et al., 2017). While 32 of the 50 studies did provide some economic information related to the interventions being studied, this information was insufficient for use in an EMMIE systematic evaluation, meaning it was rated too poorly to include. A description of the EMMIE-Evidence and its associated rating scale is included below.8

Among the existing studies that include a cost-benefit element of policing interventions, literature exists that attempts to quantify the actual value of crime prevention or a reduction in the number of offenders that are processed through the criminal justice system due to a policy or program. A bulk of this research emanates from Australia. Some scholars study the potential economic benefits of alternative law enforcement responses outside of arrest and incarceration that could reduce the burden on society through the implementation of less resource-intensive approaches. One such study conducted in Queensland, Australia (population 4.7 million) suggests that replacing harsher responses from police with police cautioning (i.e., official warnings from police for low-level crimes) for first offenses committed by adult-onset criminals could save the state AU $32.5 million (US $22.9 million). Police cautions are often used for first-time juvenile offenders but not for first-time offenders over the age of eighteen. The cost savings emerged due to the 36% difference between costs of processing a police caution and processing a case in court, minus the fines that would have been collected from
offenders that go to court (totaling AU $4.5 million or US $3.2 million). In a similar study, also conducted in Australia, Shanahan and colleagues (2017) found that replacing arrest for minor cannabis infractions with police cautions would result in significant cost savings for law enforcement.

Other sources offer more general insight into how to best conduct economic analysis of programs (Farrell et al., 2004; McDougal et al., 2008). While cost-benefit analyses at the regional or national level are receiving more interest, such analyses for policing programs and interventions at the agency level are difficult to find. This is particularly true for (typically) grant-funded, comprehensive program packages like focused deterrence programs (Burgdorf & Kilmer, 2015) and others such as Domestic Abuse Reduction Teams (DARTs) (a description of DART programs can be found in Chapter One of the current study). Such programs may receive funding from a wide range of sources related to the different services involved, including police departments, victim advocacy organizations, hospitals, psychological and counseling services, shelters, and other community programs, making total program costs challenging to calculate. Burgdorf & Kilmer (2015) navigated this challenge by providing a cost analysis that focused strictly on police activities and expenditures related to a focused deterrence Drug Market Intervention. The authors estimated that in a jurisdiction with a population of approximately 100,000 and a police department budget of nearly $11 million, the intervention required around 4,014 manhours, totaling $120,554 in labor costs, in addition to $25,920 in materials costs.
Intervention costs also rely on the levels of participation by personnel of different ranks and paygrades; patrol officer time spent on a task costs less than detective, criminal investigator, or sergeant time spent on a task. In the DMI cost analysis, Burgdorf and Kilmer (2015) included separate program cost estimates for labor based on the separate assumptions that, a) patrol officers carried out the majority of the program activities, or b) detectives and criminal investigators carried out the bulk of the activities. They found that in scenario ‘b’, the program would cost over 50 percent more in labor compared to scenario ‘a’, indicating that cost estimates should be sensitive to which activities are being carried out by which personnel. The authors caution that due to the study design, it was impossible to separate those activities out which the department would have done anyways, absent of the program, so the estimate should not be seen as a clear distinction between costs incurred when implementing the program versus not implementing the program.

**EMMIE Evidence for Program Costs**

As with all five elements of the EMMIE framework, the (E)conomics portion is based on EMMIE-Evidence that is rated according to its quality, robustness, and value for use in evaluating a program. This rating is determined based on the EMMIE-Q score, which defines what requirements the evidence must meet to receive a score from 0 to 4 (see Johnson et al., 2015, p. 466). Before reviewing the descriptions of each Q-Score, some of the types of evidence that can be used to satisfy the (E)conomics elements include the following, as described by Johnson and colleagues (2015): quantifying intervention inputs; quantifying intervention outputs; calculating the intensity of spending, such as the cost per intervention recipient; and estimating the implementation
costs, among others. To meet the needs of practitioners, a robust cost/benefit analysis would likely need multiple types of economics evidence to show where and how money is expended or saved throughout the different stages (i.e., initial implementation, sustainment, draw-down, or completion) and the different activities or components of the program.

When assessing the value of this evidence, a researcher can determine the EMMIE Q-Score it should receive. The lowest score for Economics is given to studies that do not include any mention of the costs or financial benefits of the program or intervention being evaluated. A score of 1 is given to evidence that estimates only direct or explicit costs and/or benefits. Evidence is rated with a Q-Score of 2 if the study includes estimates of direct and indirect costs and benefits. A score of 3 is given to study evidence that includes an estimate of the “marginal or total or opportunity costs” and/or benefits as determined by the researcher or another entity outside of the agency bearing those costs. A Q-Score of 4 is reserved for such an estimate provided by the bearer or recipient of those costs (i.e., the agency provides a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis of the program).

Methods: Quantitative

Data

The costs of program implementation were calculated using the data from the analysis of the implementation of the letter delivery program, salary estimates for the various personnel involved in implementation, and City of Hollywood financial documents. Job advertisements were used to estimate personnel salaries. The small yet
consistent costs of elements such as printing, postage, officer time spent conducting home letter deliveries, and time spent mailing and resending undelivered letters were identified and calculated. Also included in the cost assessment is the cost of the time officers spend drafting and filing Not in Custody arrest affidavits. For the sake of completeness, all domestic NICs are accounted for in the cost estimate since it is not possible to estimate how many are filed due to the change in the NIC policy. More details about the cost burden of NIC arrest affidavits is included below.

Cost Analysis Findings

Initial implementation began in January 2015, heavily involving the crime analyst and the DV Unit Sergeant. These personnel were already permanent, paid positions before the program was implemented. In fact, no new personnel were hired in relation to the program. While the exact number of personnel working in the Department changed over time and was not information provided to me, the number of budgeted positions declined between the years 2015 and 2018. Based on the City of Hollywood’s annual budget documents, the number of budgeted sworn officer positions decreased by two, from 323 to 321, between 2015 and 2018, respectively. The number of budgeted civilian positions decreased by 59, from 168 to 109 during the same years. The Department’s upper management did confirm that all the budgeted positions were not filled, and several remained open due to a lack of qualified candidates. Table 22 displays the direct cost estimates of implementing the OFDVI in the first four years of the program, from January 2015 through December 2018.
Using salary data from job advertisements to create estimated salaries for officers, detectives, and other personnel, cost estimates for each line item in Table 22 provide an estimate for the various costs of the program. The average patrol officer salary was estimated as $28 per hour in the first 20 months of the program (Years 1 and 2), then $30 per hour in Years 3 and 4. This pay scale was also applied to the crime analyst. The regular salary for the Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant for the first year was estimated as $80,000, which increased for inflation in the three subsequent years.

Table 22: Direct Costs Associated with the OFDVI, by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line Item</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-Person Letter Deliveries</td>
<td>$10,752</td>
<td>$5,376</td>
<td>$5,760</td>
<td>$5,760</td>
<td>$27,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting &amp; Filing NICs</td>
<td>$10,430</td>
<td>$8,512</td>
<td>$8,220</td>
<td>$5,400</td>
<td>$32,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV Unit Sergeant Time</td>
<td>$84,000</td>
<td>$82,400</td>
<td>$84,872</td>
<td>$87,418</td>
<td>$338,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV Unit Detective Time</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
<td>$154,500</td>
<td>$159,135</td>
<td>$163,909</td>
<td>$627,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers Attending Bond Court</td>
<td>$2,293</td>
<td>$3,167</td>
<td>$2,664</td>
<td>$2,160</td>
<td>$10,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Advocates</td>
<td>$52,500</td>
<td>$54,075</td>
<td>$55,697</td>
<td>$57,368</td>
<td>$219,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Analyst</td>
<td>$32,584</td>
<td>$30,510</td>
<td>$31,425</td>
<td>$32,368</td>
<td>$126,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials &amp; Postage</td>
<td>$457</td>
<td>$388,540</td>
<td>$347,774</td>
<td>$354,384</td>
<td>$1,383,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$343,015</td>
<td>$338,540</td>
<td>$347,774</td>
<td>$354,384</td>
<td>$1,383,712</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cost estimates included in Table 22 account for the estimated number of personnel needed for each category. For the in-person letter deliveries, it was estimated that two officers on their normal shift would spend six hours four times a month delivering letters for the first eight months of the program, then four hours twice per month in the subsequent years. At the average patrol officer pay rates indicated above, this activity cost $27,648 over the program lifetime. For the cost of drafting and filing NIC PC affidavits, over the lifetime of the program, 537 NIC PC affidavits were filed. At
an estimated time for completion of 2.5 hours each, at $28 per hour, this activity totaled $32,562.00.

The costliest element of the program were the salaries of the Domestic Violence Unit personnel. Accounting for overtime, the cost of the DV Unit Sergeant for four years was estimated as $338,690. One DV Unit Detective’s regular annual salary was estimated as $60,000. Also accounting for overtime and inflation, two and a half detectives cost $627,544 over four years. There were two victim advocates. One was funded by an outside grant and only worked with domestic violence victims, while the other worked with victims of all crimes, including domestic violence. At an estimated salary of $35,000 for each, the cost of one and a half victim advocates totaled $219,640. To estimate the crime analyst’s costs, one-half of the crime analyst’s working time was allotted to the OFDVI. In the first six months, five percent overtime pay was included to reflect the additional time worked to implement the program initially. The total cost of the crime analyst over the program’s lifetime was estimated as $126,887.

Finally, the other costs associated with the program were estimated. To estimate the cost of officers attending bond court, it was assumed that five percent of arrests would involve this activity, for a total of 118 arrests. If one officer spent three hours carrying out this activity, it would cost $10,284 over the program's lifetime. The nominal costs of

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25 There were three detectives working in the DV Unit, but just two could be considered full-time DV detectives. One detective split his time evenly between domestic violence cases and animal and elder abuse cases.
printing paper and postage were estimated based on the number of letters printed and mailed, totaling $457.

According to statements made by upper management, the costs of implementing the OFDVI are not above and beyond what is the normal cost of operating as a police agency. The program activities are woven within the day-to-day activities of department personnel.

There is a cost of doing business with police work. So, it's no different than if you make a narcotics arrest, and the officer has to show up for court, or has to show up for a depo, there's all these mandatory appearances. So, the cost is extremely minimal. Most of the resources we utilize are utilized by officers that are currently working or on duty. Every once in a while, we'll conduct operations to try to locate a group of individuals that we've been looking for for quite some time. But those are few and far between. So, a lot of this program, the costs are associated with just the normal costs of running a police department. (Command Staff, Interview 1)

Outside of the direct costs of the program, it is important to consider how the various program activities may have affected the cost of policing in other less obvious ways. This could include a change in the amount of time it takes for officers to arrive on scene and the time officers spend on scene when handling domestic calls for service. An analysis of 30,737 domestic calls for service to the HPD between January 1, 2011, and December 31, 2018, revealed that there was not a dramatic change in either measure. As previously noted, the average time it took officers to arrive on scene decreased by one minute, from 7 minutes to 6 minutes, while the medians remained unchanged. When analyzing the average amount of time officers spend on a domestic call, the value increased by one minute from 51 minutes to 52 minutes. However, the median time spent on a call decreased from 36 minutes to 31 minutes between intervention periods.
Based on the City of Hollywood’s 2018 annual budget, the police department’s budget was $87,628,939. Therefore, the total calculated cost of the direct costs associated with the OFDVI in 2018, $354,384, amounted to approximately 0.4% of the total annual budget for just one year. These costs were largely made up of personnel who were permanently accounted for in the budget, whose positions as members of the Domestic Violence Unit or the Crime Analysis office were unlikely to be affected by the existence of the program. Because of this finding, the costs of the OFDVI were, indeed, extremely low when attempting to identify costs unique to the program. Adding to this assessment, the fact that the program was sustained through department-wide cuts in the number of budgeted personnel is further evidence that it is not considered an extra cost on top of the typical cost of police operations.

Summary of Cost Analysis

In an effort to satisfy the EMMIE framework requirement of (E)conomic costs of the OFDVI, a direct cost analysis was conducted. The analysis found that the program was low-cost, and most direct costs incurred were personnel costs that would be expended whether or not the program existed. This analysis did not estimate the opportunity costs (or cost savings) of the program, such as the savings associated with a reduction in domestic crime at the policing, court, and other legal system levels, reduction in healthcare for domestic violence victims, or quality-of-life improvements. One reason for this was due to the fact that the reduction in domestic crime that occurred during the study period could not be directly associated with the OFDVI. Whether the program was responsible for the decline or not, it was found to be a low-cost program.
Chapter VI: Discussion, Implications, and Conclusion

In light of the burgeoning public discourse surrounding how police and police departments in the United States carry out their duties in recent years, progressive law enforcement agencies appear to be eager for policy self-improvement. Riding the emerging trend of evidence-based policing puts these departments at the forefront of new, more scientific approaches to maintaining the safety of their communities. However, the lack of comprehensive evaluations and the dissemination of these evaluations leave police administrators with little guidance on how to implement and sustain new programs or policies, much less which ones to implement in the first place. The current study sought to provide such an evaluation for an under-researched yet increasingly popular approach to domestic violence prevention and reduction that was implemented in a city in South Florida. This study unpacks a number of components to the program, including its underlying theory of change, initial implementation, associated activities, resource and manpower needs, and department personnel attitudes towards the program. Finally, it offers a determination of whether the program resulted in the intended outcomes after three and a half years of implementation.

Based on this evaluation, it is unclear whether the program influenced domestic crime in the city. A significant decline in domestic violence offenses and reports was seen in Hollywood during the study period, coinciding with the start of the Offender-Focused Domestic Violence Intervention in May 2015 and continuing until the end of 2018. However, there was a similar significant decline in domestic offenses in the surrounding jurisdictions. Therefore, despite the ARIMA time-series analysis indicating a
statistically significant influence of the program on Hollywood’s monthly number of domestic reports, the crime reduction cannot be directly associated with the program. Furthermore, survival analysis of offenders to compare those who received a letter with those who did not indicated that those who did not receive a letter were actually less likely to have another incident compared to those who did receive one.

Despite the inconclusive findings related to intended intervention effects, the current study uncovered a variety of other findings related to police approaches to domestic violence. The program may offer alternative approaches to police responses to domestic violence that could benefit not only the victims of domestic violence, but also the police officers and administrators who must answer to the demands of their communities for more legitimate, equal, and fair policing. At the very least, the current study highlights some options that deviate from the status quo that may prove valuable in the long-term, are sustainable, and have the potential for expansion for use across the broader crime prevention approach of an agency.

This chapter provides a review of the objectives of the current study, with an overview of the main research goals and approaches. Next, this chapter will relate the findings of this study to existing literature and the stated research goals, with an intent to explain how the results of the current study fit into the larger fields of policing and police intervention evaluation. This discussion will identify the theoretical contributions made by the current study, several key findings, the challenges faced during the course of the study, the challenges that were identified in the OFDVI, and recommendations for other
departments interested in implementing a similar program. Finally, the chapter will conclude with considerations for future research and suggestions for a way forward.

**Main Findings of Process and Impact Evaluations**

Within the current study, there were two main components of the comprehensive evaluation of the domestic violence initiative – the process evaluation and the impact evaluation. Within each of these components, I sought to answer a number of research questions related to a number of study objectives. The four objectives of the process evaluation component were to (1) provide a description of Hollywood’s OFDVI model as it was implemented in 2019; (2) to determine a program logic and program theory of the OFDVI; (3) to explore the possible mechanisms for the various activities involved in the program; and (4) to identify practitioner-focused findings that could be helpful for program improvement or replication in other departments. The objectives of the impact evaluation were to (1) determine if the intervention resulted in the intended outcomes of the crime reduction program; and (2) to determine if there were any unintended, negative effects that resulted from the intervention.

*Process Evaluation Objective 1: provide a description of Hollywood’s OFDVI model as it was implemented in 2019*

The Hollywood OFDVI, as it was implemented between 2015 and 2019, was a complex program with many elements that functioned collectively as a suite of activities or policies meant to reduce domestic violence. By using a combination of interviews and shadowing officers during ride-alongs, the current study explored the details about how each activity was carried out to determine its potential influence on domestic crime. Considering the inconclusive program effects on domestic violence, it would be
misleading to approach the discussion of OFDVI implementation as a discussion of what works in policing. Instead, the value in describing the program in detail is found in the benefits for future research on not only Hollywood’s program but other similar programs being implemented across the country.

In Chapter 4, the history of how the program came about, the preparations made for its initial roll-out in the winter of 2015, and details of its implementation between mid-2015 and early 2019 were described in detail. This account uncovered the assumptions that drove policy at HPD, which can be compared to the four main assumptions or beliefs surrounding domestic violence and policing of it explored in Chapter 2. As a reminder, those four assumptions discussed are as follows: (1) domestic incidents are the most dangerous calls for service that officers respond to; (2) domestic calls for service are among the most numerous types of calls most departments receive; (3) domestic offenders are very different from perpetrators of other types of crime; and (4) intimate partner violence (IPV) is more serious than other forms of domestic violence.

Each of the four assumptions came up during the current study. First, HPD expressed agreement with the belief that domestic calls are some of the most dangerous calls for officers to respond to, and this belief drove policy. During ride-alongs, officers’ SOPs included treating every domestic call as a potentially serious matter, especially if it was a Code 3. It also included parking a short distance away from the address of a call, waiting for backup to approach a residence, separating all parties on scene, using de-escalation and a calm presence (in most cases) while on scene, and a number of other more or less nuanced strategies that could help to make domestic calls less risky for
everyone involved. These techniques may be standard for many departments in the region or across the country, but it is clear that the sense of danger surrounding DV for officers is ever-present and something they consider worth the extra precautions.

One hypothesis surrounding how the offender lists could be used to improve officer safety was that by knowing that an offender was on the A-List, an officer could take additional precautions with the incident. Because A-Listers have demonstrated a propensity for violence, they should be approached with at least a heightened awareness of this fact. However, this did not appear to be the case because most officers observed during ride-alongs or asked during interviews did not consult the Repeat Offender Log before arriving at the scene of a domestic call. Doing so was considered impractical, especially if they were trying to arrive on scene expediently. Driving safely and communicating with dispatch to collect more information about the call was more important at that time.

Next, the second assumption surrounding domestics is that they are among the most common calls police handle. Indeed, a number of participants cited the repeat nature of domestics and that they can be time-consuming. Alternatively, a small number of officers who worked the midnight shift, or Alpha shift, stated that they did not handle very many domestic calls. Unexpectedly, this was also my experience during the month spent collecting data and being at the station. There were so few domestic calls, or “38s,” that came through during the ride alongs, the need to plan for shadowing additional shifts was considered. The Department Coordinator and I made concerted efforts to coordinate the ride alongs in a way that would maximize the number of potential 38s, using CFS
data to determine the shifts with the most calls and being paired with more proactive officers who on several shifts were assigned to work only 38s. Despite these provisions, the number of 38s that occurred during the six full-shift ride-alongs was far below what was expected. This experience was considered unusual by the Department personnel, and it does not constitute evidence that domestics are less common than police believe they are.

The third assumption about policing of domestic violence is that domestic offenders are somehow different from perpetrators of other types of crime. This assumption was not commonly held in Hollywood. The idea that repeat domestic offenders were often involved in other crimes appeared to be widespread across all levels of the Department, and it formed the theoretical basis of the OFDVI.

The fourth assumption that came up multiple times during the study was that intimate partner violence (IPV) is more serious than other forms of domestic violence. In interviews, I asked most participants if they agreed with this belief. In general, most interviewees agreed. They indicated that non-IPV calls were very rare and usually less serious than IPV between a man and a woman. During a ride-along, one teenaged boy was arrested because he assaulted his mother’s boyfriend, though this man appeared to serve as the boy’s father-like guardian. There was another instance where a grown man and his mother got in a fight, but no arrest was made. With the exception of these two incidents, all 38s were, indeed, IPV of some sort.

While the crime analyst loosely tracks offenders’ histories with IVP and non-IPV domestic violence in the Repeat Offender Log, it is not done systematically, nor in a way...
that is appropriate for analysis. However, if this were tracked more closely, the trends of offender behavior could be identified. Some offenders did not have any IPV-related incidents according to the ROL, which could be due to lack of intimate relationships, young age, or the offender abstains from violence with his or her partners. However, these individuals would have incidents of other forms of DV because they are in the log for domestic incidents.

**Process Evaluation Objective 2: to determine a program logic and program theory of the OFDVI**

**Middle-Range Theory**

Because the current study was based on a strong theoretical premise, one that blended the tenets of realist and positivist perspectives to evaluate the effects of a version of focused-deterrence policing, a number of salient findings related to program theory and criminological theory more generally were uncovered. As discussed in Chapter 3, the realist approach encourages research that seeks to identify middle-range theories that are more likely to move knowledge and best practices in an advantageous direction over time, rather than more extreme, cure-all theories that are less likely to survive the test of time (Merton, 1968; Pawson, 2000; Tilly, 2010).

With this goal in mind, the current study sought to inform a reasonable theory about how police may better-handle domestic violence. Upon review of the findings of the impact evaluation, including the ARIMA analysis of domestic violence reports, survival analysis of offenders, and the Difference-in-Differences analysis, the findings indicate that the program had no meaningful effect on domestic crime in Hollywood. Rather inexplicably, the entire region experienced a significant decline in domestic
violence during the same time period as HPD implemented their intervention, which must be due to other unrelated factors. While this is good news for South Florida, this trend does not automatically translate into a failure for the OFDVI. Failure would look like a regional decline in domestic crime, with Hollywood not experiencing the same downward trend, or even experiencing an increase. In this view, the OFDVI may provide some type of crime reduction benefit, but it is not possible to tease it out with the current data. Therefore, theoretical assumptions about offender-focused policing, focused deterrence programs, and domestic violence offenders remain unanswered.

Domestic Violence and Criminal Propensity

Another theory that emerged from the study relates to crime, criminals, and the assumption of generalized offending discussed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 4 in the Process Evaluation Summary – Key Findings section (pp. 201-217), there was a brief discussion of the Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant’s mentality shift about the role that DV plays in the larger world of crime and offending. He proposed that the central node of crime that links chronic, high-risk offenders across the criminal landscape (i.e., the array of criminogenic characteristics and criminal activities that are known and unknown to law enforcement) is not drug crime, as may be traditionally believed, but rather domestic violence. He explained that he saw DV as a stronger signal of generalized criminality than drug crime, which would place domestic offenders higher on a hypothetical crime risk propensity scale than drug offenders.

Therefore, more effective crime reduction interventions should focus on DV, which may result in a greater return on investment than pursuing drug offenders alone.
To take this line of thinking a step further, if this theory holds true, the DV offenders are likely to be the same offenders involved in drug crimes, along with the typical assortment of other forms of offending. This theory of the generalized offending of chronic domestic offenders is supported by a large body of research (Etter & Berzer, 2007; Hilton & Eke, 2016; Johnson, 2008; Piquero et al., 2006), and it provides the backbone of the focused deterrence model (Kennedy, 1996).

I do not believe the Sergeant was suggesting that drug crimes are not serious or worth the investments made to target them. Instead, if an agency moves more resources to focus on domestic offenders as Hollywood has done, the benefits may ripple through to other crime types more noticeably than an approach that focuses more on drug offenders. If domestic violence crime is the “spoke” of the wheel of crime, as the Sergeant described it, those offenders who repeatedly engage in violence in the home likely have connections to other crimes and criminals. In other words, domestic offenders are the central nodes linked to many other, smaller nodes, and their disruption could have a wide-reaching effect on these smaller nodes. If drug activity is not the tie that binds, then perhaps it is a high propensity for domestic violence that should garner the most concern.

Aside from the lack of clarity surrounding its crime reduction value, the current study suggests that the OFDVI may offer evidence for other theories about policing. First, the program serves as an example of successful program implementation and sustainment. This was made possible through a combination of the determination and input from a “champion” to drive procedural and organizational change, a trusted crime
analyst with the capability and agency to build an analytical strategy from the ground up, continual education for officers and police personnel, new policies that leaned towards standardization and legitimacy of policing, and a number of other factors that are each related to one or more theories about policing.

*Program “Champion”*

One of the most apparent findings of the process evaluation provides support for the importance of key personnel who are willing to take on the bulk of the implementation workload and can effectively attain and maintain buy-in from all the relevant implementation partners. Saunders and colleagues (2016) cited this as a critical element for program success, and there are countless examples of program failures that resulted from a lack of a capable, legitimate “champion” to push, and sometimes skillfully caress, a new program through the process of implementation, adoption, and sustainment.

In Hollywood, this required a simultaneous bottom-up and top-down approach that catered to the needs of line officers and the Command Staff alike. The interviews displayed this dichotomy clearly; some participants argued that the OFDVI worked because early efforts were made to obtain buy-in from the Command Staff, while others believed it was successful only because the line officers were brought into the implementation process in a way that encouraged their buy-in. Line officers required training on new SOPs and domestic violence, not intermittently, but continuously and consistently, with practical, real-life cases of colleagues’ successes or mistakes as examples. Line officers also required consistent guidance from their supervisors on
program elements such as how to write a high-quality report, when to file a Not-in-Custody arrest affidavit, how to deliver D-Letters to offenders’ residences, how to thoroughly handle a call and collect evidence, when to call a detective, and countless other procedural details that went beyond the status quo for the police response to domestic violence. While there remained an undertone of officer dissatisfaction among some officers with the HPD approach to DV at the time of interviewing, the majority of those interviewed and shadowed ultimately considered the approach a good one.

I posit that this level of acceptance was only achieved through the consistency and inclusiveness of the program implementation. If on either end of the spectrum of department personnel, either line officers or the Command Staff, there was a lack of program acceptance, legitimacy, or understanding, it is more likely that the program would have died out and been replaced by more traditional policing practices. This finding was supported by a Lieutenant interviewee who stated, “if you explain it to them, make it in a way that they understand, they’re more likely to give you the outcome you want” (p. 117).

Process Evaluation Objective 3: to explore the possible mechanisms for the various activities involved in the program and any key contextual considerations surrounding those activities

The third objective of the process evaluation portion of this study was to open the “black box” of a complex, multi-part policing program to better understand how it works and why it may have an impact, if any, on its target population. This study dove deeply into the program mechanisms and contexts by harnessing the power of mixed-methods research. Mechanisms in complex programs are difficult to identify using traditional
Random Controlled Trial study designs or even most quasi-experimental methods because they fail to identify the *how* of a program, which rarely rests on the work of one activity.

By using qualitative data collection such as semi-structured interviews and shadowing officers during ride-alongs, I sought to gain insight into the main activities of the Hollywood OFDVI, including letter deliveries, Not-in-Custody (NIC) Probable Cause Affidavits, the Repeat Offender Log (ROL), report writing, and a shift in the duties for patrol officers and DV detectives. Each of these activities was matched with at least two and up to four potential mechanisms that may be acting on program participants. Finally, I proposed explanations for these mechanisms using at least one possible theory that linked the activity and its mechanism to existing interdisciplinary research.

Despite the inability of the study to show that the program induced its intended effects on domestic offenders, the exploration of mechanisms herein was a valuable exercise in in-depth program evaluation. Identifying these mechanisms and exploring possible theoretical underpinnings of each can help lay the foundation for future studies focused on one or more activities that can test for the possible mechanisms at work in each. Doing so is one way to identify which activities are having which effects in a given program. Each activity should have a specific purpose and a targeted effect, which should be monitored over the course of its implementation.
Process Evaluation Objective 4: to identify practitioner-focused findings that could be helpful for program improvement or replication in other departments

As a self-implemented, long-term program, Hollywood’s OFDVI could be considered a success story in the realms of organizational change, police reporting standardization, crime analysis, and several other aspects related to the program’s success. As several scholars have found about full-fledged Focus Deterrence programs, it is quite difficult to achieve high-fidelity when implementing such a program; it is even more challenging to sustain the programs for more than a year or two. Because of this, and other factors like a lack of funding or knowledgeable implementation partners, it may be more attractive for police agencies to pick and choose elements of these programs that might serve their needs and are feasible, leaving out the more challenging or resource-intensive parts. This is what Hollywood did with its OFDVI, and it is what a number of departments across the US are doing or have expressed an interest in doing. Therefore, to help decision-makers decide which strategies will work best for them, data about individual activities are more useful to practitioners than a blanket statement about whether “the program” was effective. The following assessments of several program activities or requirements are intended to provide practitioners, including Police Department Chiefs or city/county administrators who can make and influence police policy, with a collection of lessons learned from Hollywood that may help them if they are considering implementing a similar program of their own.

Mandatory Report Writing for Every Domestic Call for Service

Throughout the entirety of the current study, the importance of reports for the way Hollywood handles domestic violence has been made clear. I agree with the crime
analyst’s assertion that the first thing a police agency should do before implementing any OFDVI-type program is to create a new rule that mandates that officers write a report for every domestic call they attend, regardless of severity or outcome. As previously noted, research indicates that this policy is far from common, with reports being written for just seventy-nine percent of domestic crimes they attend to (Reaves, 2017). This makes one wonder what percentage of non-crime incidents are documented in reports.

By implementing this policy, a department is simultaneously creating a volume of baseline domestic report data that will serve as a comparison for post-implementation figures and improving the standardization of its police response to domestic violence incidents. Without this change, officers will continue to use their own discretion about when to write a report, which would likely sway towards not writing one unless it is mandated in an SOP or by their supervisors. As in Hollywood, there should be clear guidance on when a report is required, which is in most cases; in the rare instance that a Call for Service is incorrectly coded as a domestic-related incident, supervisor permission should be required before the officer indicates this in her records.

*Designate a Crime Analyst to Support the Project*

Another theme that pervaded this study was the immeasurable value of a competent and enthusiastic crime analyst to carry out the project’s most onerous yet critical tasks. Depending on the size of the agency, a department interested in implementing a similar program should designate one or more crime analysts (or intelligence analysts) to manage all data-related matters for the project. As a data-driven
policing approach, an OFDVI requires high-quality data and strategic storage, organization, and usage of that data.

While the crime analyst at Hollywood juggled the OFDVI with her other regular duties and asserted that the workload was not too much for her, I observed that she handled a very large workload each week. If a similarly-sized department (approximately 300 – 350 officers for a city with around 150,000 residents) and an above-average rate of domestic violence has the opportunity to hire an analyst dedicated to an offender-focused program, it may allow the analyst to engage in deeper analysis and pattern discovery. Also, formal training for both the analyst and the officers could help to increase the overall impact and usability of the crime analyst’s products.

**Build Monitoring and Evaluation into the Program from its Inception**

At the onset of the current study, the lack of a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan was an impediment to a swift evaluation. Because the Department only relied on internal crime statistics to determine whether the program was having the desired effect, as most departments do with any new strategy and for their regular reporting metrics, the overall decline in domestic crime in the region was not factored into their assessment of program efficacy. This led to an overestimation of the program effect in what turned out to be an inexplicable, significant decline in domestic violence, and violent crime generally, in the region. If there had been a more robust M&E plan built into the program from its inception, then the Department may have had a more accurate view of the program effects. Here is where a University-Practitioner partnership could be valuable. Criminologists or evaluation experts from a local university could provide training to the
department’s personnel on how to design and implement M&E so that the department can self-sustain most of its evaluation needs.

*Seek Mentorship from Experienced Program Implementers*

The final recommendation being offered as a result of the current study is for interested departments to seek guidance and mentorship from other agencies that have implemented an OFDVI-like program. While there is not a robust body of literature on how to implement these types of programs, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Hollywood received guidance directly from High Point for how to implement the OFDVI, and other departments have sought help from Hollywood for similar programs in their own jurisdictions. In-person or virtual coaching can be a valuable way to avoid the pitfalls of other agencies while identifying the most suitable adaptation of a program for the needs and contexts of the department. Ideally, this could create a network of like-minded agencies that can share best practices, mistakes, or successes, which may spur learning, growth, and identification of the best “middle-range theory” for offender-focused policing based on real-life, ongoing program implementation.

One example of where mentorship could be very helpful is in the creation of the Repeat Offender Log or a similar database to store the large volume of data that accrues as a result of the program. The challenges associated with effective data management were cited in Morgan’s (2004) NDV project evaluation as impediments to effective program implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. While I believe the optimal database management approach has yet to be identified for a program like the OFDVI,
learning what *not* to do from experienced departments could aid in the process of finding one.

*Other Study Outcomes*

*The EMMIE Framework for a Primary Study*

In addition to the four aforementioned study objectives for the two main components of the evaluation, the larger study was meant to serve as an example of applying the EMMIE framework to a primary study. At the time of writing, I was unaware of any other examples of EMMIE’s use in this way, though Johnson and colleagues (2015) explicitly indicated this was one of its intended applications. The decision to use the EMMIE framework to design the current study proved helpful, if not scientifically beneficial, for the study. While it would have been exceedingly more useful to use at the beginning of the intervention development process to allow for proper, consistent monitoring throughout the lifetime of the program, its value in this post-hoc design was still evident.

*EMMIE Evidence*

One of the main benefits that came from using the EMMIE framework to design the current evaluation was that it ensured that all five evaluation components were covered by a sufficient amount of evidence. By designing the study around the five components of EMMIE, I took care to collect data that would best fulfill the requirements laid out by the framework’s creators. It was not an option to do an evaluation that only included three or four of the components; doing so would have resulted in an incomplete study with glaring omissions that would have been antithetical to the spirit of the framework’s
comprehensive, practical goals. Without overreaching by arguing that each element is equally as important as the next, it can be argued that each is integral in its own way to forming a cohesive account of whether the intervention has value. Many scholars agree that such comprehensive approaches to program evaluation in CCJ, and offender-focused policing interventions more specifically, are rare (Brunson, 2015; Thornton et al., 2019).

Not only did using EMMIE as a research guide help to meet the evidential needs of the study, but it also demanded increased attention to the quality of that evidence. To facilitate the use of this study in a systematic review, I proposed a self-assessed EMMIE-Q score for the evidence presented for each of the five elements of the framework. Doing so not only helped me to maintain a critical, realistic view of the value of the evidence presented in this study, but also to strive for increased robustness to achieve a better evidence rating score. If only an exercise in self-reflective research, comparing the quality of the evidence at hand conjured deeper consideration of what would be the most valuable information to include for a hypothetical future systematic review that included this study. Additionally, having a specific list of acceptable evidence types and what can make that evidence weak or robust can help guide future research on offender-focused domestic violence policing programs in a more strategic fashion. By clarifying what is expected, the EMMIE-Q scale exposes any gaps in the evidence, which can bring about an eventual complete (or as complete as would be realistically possible) body of evidence that addresses all aspects of the research questions. If evidence is clearly missing and not available, perhaps the definitions could aid in designing a study that would facilitate data collection in the future.
Mechanisms, Implementer Effects, and a Paradigm Shift

A second benefit that emerged from using the EMMIE framework for the current study was that it required an in-depth investigation into the activities of the program to identify potential mechanisms that were driving action (or inaction). Further, it necessitated consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of the program, which uncovered a complicated tangle of overlapping activities, mechanisms, and theories that may be partially or wholly involved in the intervention. Not only did the program have a potential effect on its intended recipients (i.e., offenders and their victims) but also, and perhaps more so, it affected the officers, detectives, and other personnel responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the program. Only after a considerable amount of qualitative research collection did it become evident how strongly the program’s activities were affecting the program implementers. With the surprising role reversal of implementer-to-participant, the mechanisms and theories associated with those activities had to be reconsidered.

One salient effect of this reversal was how engrained the SOPs of the program had become in the normal business of the Department, to the extent that it was business as usual to most Department personnel. While a number of those interviewed continued to refer to the program using the name of its founding Sergeant, the lack of clarity with where the program’s SOPs began and ended seemed to signal that those activities had blended into the normal expected work of the officers for which the term intervention or program was too limiting. This was made even more reasonable given that there was no overarching grant being used to fund the “program,” nor the addition of outside advisors...
or researchers to oversee its implementation, nor a timeline that would indicate a program end date.

Once this finding emerged, I found it important to understand how the intervention affected the Department itself, which could be an unexpected reflection of how sustainable the program is – if it can be considered a program at all anymore. It could be that the changes in officers’ duties, analyst roles, detectives’ roles, and oversight requirements have caused such a deep shift in the mentality of how the Department conducts its business that instead of being a program, the model has resulted in the elusive paradigm shift sought after by any department seeking to make meaningful, lasting change to its policing approach. Where the line is drawn between a *program* and a lasting *paradigm shift* is unclear. Nevertheless, it is a state that could arise with little fanfare or acknowledgment, yet it would manifest itself in the daily functioning of the agency in, hopefully, positive ways.

_The Crime Analyst_

The qualitative findings from this study highlight the key role of the crime analyst in rolling out the OFDI and keeping it running effectively. An often-overlooked member of many police departments, the crime analyst at Hollywood responsible for building and maintaining the Repeat Offender Log, was one of the most-referenced people in participant interviews. While Hollywood also had two other crime analysts on its staff, this analyst was the OFDVI expert. Officers expected weekly emails from her, and most indicated that they relied on those emails on a near-daily basis as an aid for handling
domestic violence calls and reporting. For the program, she held an integral role and could be considered another “champion” of the program.

The role of a capable and dedicated crime analyst appears to be a necessary component of any focused deterrence program due to the high level of reliance on data to identify repeat offenders. Surprisingly, the role of the crime analyst in the existing offender-focused DV program literature is missing. Some reports do not mention a crime analyst at all (Hanmer et al., 2000; Millbank et al., 2000; Morgan, 2004), while Sechrist & Weil (2017) describe the analysts’ role as one of “pulling data” from the records management system for the researchers to use in data analysis for the program evaluation. In the current study, it would be impossible to describe how the program was implemented and how it functions without mentioning the crime analyst’s contributions and responsibilities.

In recognizing the role of the crime analyst in policing approaches classified as intelligence-led, problem-oriented, or evidence-based, it becomes apparent how much more analysts could do than “pull data” from the RMS, create BOLO\textsuperscript{26} flyers, and map crime incidents. However, Belur and Johnson (2018) found that crime analysts in the UK, where they have instituted a National Intelligence Model to guide crime analysis within their national police system, did not usually have the time or resources to go beyond the basics of crime analysis. While this may be the case in a considerable number of agencies, HPD placed the crime analyst at the center of their domestic violence approach.

\textsuperscript{26} Be on the Look Out (BOLO) flyers are created to alert officers of key information regarding wanted or missing persons, vehicles, boats, or other specific entities they should look for when patrolling.
Role of Police Education

Another factor that could have contributed to the implementation success relates to evidence-based management (Rousseau, 2006), which was briefly discussed in Chapter 4, and police education. The field of organizational management has also joined the evidence-based movement. At its most basic level, policing and management are so integrally intertwined that one could argue that any police policy is simply a management policy. Police managers (i.e., the Command Staff, Lieutenants, and Sergeants) develop and implement policies that dictate how officers should conduct business in a similar way that a C.E.O. and the various levels of management below her dictate business strategies and company policies. Within this perspective, business managers-in-training may go to business school and receive a post-graduate degree, yet police managers in the U.S. do not have an equivalent, standardized educational pathway where they could learn best practices and prove their qualifications.

However, there is a slow, yet pronounced shift towards popularizing police management training, and its value is being displayed as part of the evidence-based policing movement. The Domestic Violence Unit Sergeant that spurred the OFDVI in Hollywood attended the Southern Police Institute (SPI). He learned about the High Point OFDVI in one of the courses at the Institute and brought back his knowledge to Department leadership, who had openly asked for something new to implement. Six years later, the connection is clear between that educational opportunity and the offender-focused, data-driven approach that the Department applies today, for not only DV but other crime types, as well. There is also a link between the willingness of the HPD’s management to invest in education and then experiment with the knowledge garnered
from that education and the successful program implementation. While this scenario may read as commonplace in some fields, within policing, it may not be the norm.

Herein lies the epistemological debate that was the focus of Chapter 3 of the current study: what is the best way to discover the optimal approaches to conducting police business? If experimentation is the best way to collect evidence in support of or against a policy, yet so few police managers are learning about innovative policing in a way that can be translated into action, there needs to be something that can close that gap and bring the science to the practitioners. EMMIE could be part of the answer. By satisfying the needs of both science and practice, EMMIE bridges the divide by ensuring police of all educational backgrounds and opportunities have access to practical yet solidly science-based evidence that they can use.

The current dearth of cost estimates, contextual details, implementation factors, and other critical information in most criminological studies is a handicap that discourages, rather than encourages, innovation in policing. To return to the business school analogy, if Police Chiefs do not work through use cases like any M.B.A. student would to learn how to solve problems, they cannot be expected to run their businesses with more than an average ability to problem-solve crime and safety issues. With the requirements of EMMIE that cater to positivists, realists, and practitioners alike, perhaps the framework offers more educational opportunities for managers to learn about new things and realistically assess if something new could work for them, their department, and their community. While there are countless examples of how education does not automatically translate into improvement, as demonstrated by the number of “bad
managers” that plague offices everywhere or C.E.O.s who run their businesses into the ground, it helps to keep the goal of realism in mind. Incremental improvements brought about by “good” police managers can collectively be more powerful, and perhaps more widely beneficial, than instant fixes and cure-alls that rarely stand the test of time and reality.

Domestic Violence Research & Evidence-Based Policing

As noted in Chapter 3 of the current study, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) is enjoying a recent rise in popularity among criminologists and practitioners alike. However, this increase in interest has manifested itself in research of crime problems that lend themselves well to the quantitative, experiment-based approach to researching crime that EBP promotes (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). Evaluations of policing interventions that are more complex and not place-based, like the OFDVI, are less amenable to the existing approaches to EBP. I argue that this can be changed. In the current study, I offered an example of an approach to combining theory-based and evidence-based research into a holistic package that simultaneously facilitates further investigation into the theories driving the program and exposes the opportunities for conducting experimental research. It is possible to do both at the same time or in an iterative process that builds research goals based on what has already been done.

Scholars have cited common reasons why EBP has been relatively slow to catch on in criminology. Lack of funding and lack of knowledgeable mentors are two of the top reasons (Braga, Welsh, Papachristos, Schnell, & Grossman, 2014; Lum & Yang, 2005). Another common criticism of experimental research within criminology relates to the
potential moral dilemma of providing a social benefit to one group and not the other (Koehler & Smith, 2021; Weisburd, 2003). This risk may be mitigated by conducting thorough, comprehensive research before designing and implementing an experiment to test the effect of the intervention. When considering the study of domestic violence interventions more specifically, EBP and experimental research in general seem to carry added criticism that is not attached to place-based, or even gang, drug, or theft-related, crimes. With domestic violence, the risks of experiments feel larger.

As I previously stated in this study, one of the most valuable benefits of expanding the EMMIE framework’s popularity lies in its potential to encourage researchers to think more deeply about why and how a policing intervention might work. The majority of studies on crime reduction interventions do not mention mechanisms (Thornton et al., 2019), which impedes research meant to test them. If experiments are designed after establishing a thorough understanding of the Context-Mechanism-Outcome Configurations, or at least the proposed CMOCs, of the intervention or program, the research is more likely to be appropriate, informative, and safe because all aspects of the intervention have already been considered (Cowen & Cartwright, 2019; Pawson & Tilley, 1997). The value of an experiment that disregards consideration of these critical elements is lower than some EBP scholars may admit, but that does not mean the sub-field is stuck in this vacuum-type mindset. The emergence of EMMIE and its application for use in several systematic reviews of crime prevention interventions is a promising shift in mentality about how to evaluate policing interventions. Using EMMIE in combination with close collaboration with police administrators and agency personnel, rather than independently of them, is a promising way to build trust and increase
confidence in applied criminological research that is both robust and practical. This may be a helpful avenue for pursuing more robust research on domestic violence interventions like the OFDVI.

**Potential Risks**

While considering the potential benefits of offender-focused policing, including approaches that identify chronic offenders and attempt to rate them based on their propensity for violence, it is critical to consider the potential drawbacks or risks involved in such approaches. Public criticism of some data-driven or algorithm-based policing strategies and repeat offender programs is rooted in concern over the tendency (or potential) of these policing methods to exacerbate existing racial and socioeconomic biases in policing. Justifiable apprehension surrounding such programs stems from the potential for police abuse of power, civil rights violations, and encroachment on citizens’ privacy rights. For example, in 2019, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was forced to end their predictive policing and repeat offender programs after citizen complaints and an audit found a number of concerning issues with the programs, including lack of oversight, inconsistent criteria for offender labeling, and inaccurate location-based findings caused by bad data, among other problems (Puente, 2019).

With the rise in data-driven policing, there exists a risk for overreach, inadequate checks and balances, information leaks, misuse, misinformation, or faulty algorithms inherent in these high-tech approaches. These potential pitfalls may not have been as salient in more rudimentary or traditional methods of crime data analysis, and they can undermine the trust a community has in police. However, HPD’s methods did not rely on
computer-based algorithms to identify high-risk offenders, nor was it ever intended as a predictive policing tool. At least three people were involved in assessing aggressors and offenders, including the responding officer in the case of a C-List offender, the crime analyst, and the DV Unit Sergeant. Also, the race and sex of offenders were not data that was tracked in the Repeat Offender Log. The potential effect of this is unknown, if it had any effect at all on how individuals were tracked or listed.

The HPD has experienced its own level of criticism from some groups in Hollywood over its use of a repeat offender list approach to policing domestic violence. While none of the personnel who were interviewed for the current study could identify specific complaints or legal cases related to the OFDVI or the Repeat Offender Log, there are a few examples available publicly online that indicate that there is at least a latent concern from certain individuals or agencies, including the Broward Public Defenders Office (Christensen, April 11, 2017).

Another potential risk of any offender-focused intervention is that it may unintentionally affect victims in a negative way. One way this could manifest itself is by somehow demotivating victims to call the police when they need help. If the victim fears backlash from the offender after calling the police because the offender’s sense of fear and risk of apprehension is higher due to the program, it could make the victim think twice before calling the police. The victim might also be aware of the increased risk for additional police attention on the offender, which would prevent him or her from calling for help if that meant the offender was more likely to go to jail.
No evidence was found for these negative victim effects during the current study nor in the evaluations of the previous three OFDVI-like programs discussed in Chapter 4. Some officers posited that because victims still call the police for minor domestic issues, such as verbal disagreements over seemingly petty issues or a disobedient child who will not go to school, it is evidence against the backfire effect. If minor issues are prompting 911 calls, major incidents will, as well. The overall number of domestic calls for service has reduced in the region, also supporting the conclusion that Hollywood’s program is not necessarily responsible for any effect on Hollywood’s domestic victims in particular. The best way to test for this effect would be to conduct a study on domestic victims in Hollywood and compare their help-seeking behavior and attitudes towards police to those of victims in other jurisdictions.

**Limitations**

The current study was constrained by several limitations that should be addressed. First, the study design involved a post-hoc evaluation of a program that was still in progress. This made it impossible to obtain an accurate account of exactly how the process of program development and implementation unfolded from its inception to how it functioned before the on-site study period three years later. While the administrative and crime data collected reaches back to years before the program began, the qualitative data was limited by the accounts of people who were present before and after program implementation. These accounts can be influenced by time, perceptions, and inevitable changes in attitudes that can occur over time. However, the rich data sets were robust enough to triangulate accounts of significant details related to the program. The snapshot of the OFDVI available to me was at once influenced by the amount of time that had
passed since the program’s inception and the shift in mentalities of the officers who implemented it over time. Future research that seeks to evaluate a policing program would benefit from involvement in the initial planning and implementation stages. This would facilitate both the monitoring process but also would ensure that real-time data can be collected throughout the life of the program to allow a comprehensive account of what happened and how.

The second limitation of the current study that warrants discussion is the lack of data about victims of domestic violence. As the main goal of the OFDVI was to reduce domestic violence, victims would be the best source of integral data about victimization that is not reflected in officially reported crime data. However, involving victims was beyond the scope and feasibility of the current study for several reasons. Most critically, other studies that have attempted to collect data from victims of domestic violence were met with very low response rates, calling into question the value of this data for victim-based findings. Another barrier to involving victims in the study was the difficulty in access to and securing the safety of victims before, during, and after data collection. Extreme caution is needed when approaching victims, especially of domestic violence, due to the often-precarious nature of their circumstances. Just observing the level of caution that was exercised when Hollywood’s officers engaged with offenders left me with an understanding of how volatile these individuals can be. The current study was not designed nor equipped to engage with the victims of those offenders, many of whom were free and still with their victims.
Potential Future Research

One of the main findings of the current study is that there is a pressing need for more robust theoretical and experimental research concerning the policies that police departments are implementing to reduce domestic violence at the police response level. Programs like Hollywood’s OFDVI are becoming more attractive to police agencies, and the most recent tide of change within the field of policing may push this interest further towards these types of programs. However, there is currently not enough evidence in support of any of the program’s activities that would indicate that it is an effective approach to reduce domestic violence. Therefore, there are numerous avenues for specific future research that would shed light on the efficacy of these policing activities.

One topic of research that would build on the existing literature surrounding offender notifications is investigating how non-criminal domestic aggressors may be influenced by receiving a warning letter from the police. While Dawson & Dangerfield (2017) studied the effects of hand-delivering letters to known burglars who had previously been arrested for a crime, no known research has looked at the effect of letters on those individuals who do not already have a criminal record. It is this population of low-level, not-yet-violent subjects who may be deterred by a more robust threat of apprehension and sanction. However, most research focuses on those offenders who have already experienced arrest and are in the criminal justice system. There may be a considerable difference between the aggressors who are non-violent yet require repeat police assistance and those who are actually arrested. In addition, it may be valuable to investigate whether there is a differential effect between simply delivering the letter and
reading the letter out loud to offenders (or at least providing a minimum required summary of the contents of the letter at the time of delivery).

Another avenue for potential future research relates to how the on-scene police response may affect the riskiness of domestic violence calls for service for police officers and victims. As the literature leans towards rejecting the assumption that domestic violence calls present an unusually high safety risk to officers, there remain many questions surrounding the influence of factors that include officer actions and activities that should be assessed. Such factors include officer arrival time, implementation of various safety measures (i.e., no lights or sirens upon approach to a residence, parking a short distance from the address and approaching on foot, two-person attendances, etc.), separating the parties on-scene before conducting interviews, and a number of other activities or policies that could influence officer safety. Factors that could influence victim safety include officer arrival time, the amount of accurate information provided by dispatch before an officer arrives on scene, input of informal communication among officers about calls, addresses, or the parties involved (i.e., text messages or phone calls between officers to provide insights or potentially helpful information), and many other factors. It may be that the same safety measures officers take to protect themselves could influence the safety of victims in a desirable way.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a need for victim-based research to determine the effects of OFDVI-like programs and their various activities on victims and families. Efforts to engage local domestic violence shelters and advocacy organizations, while unsuccessful in the current study, but acquiring this data in the future could result
in much-needed longitudinal quantitative and qualitative data about victims of domestic violence. Alternatively, a creative approach to collecting data directly from victims could provide insight into the influence that police activities have on victim safety, decision-making, and livelihoods.

**Conclusion**

The current study sought to determine whether an offender-focused domestic violence policing strategy was effective at reducing and preventing domestic violence using a novel approach that incorporated elements from realist and positive evaluation methods. By opening the “black box” of a complex policing program, the current study dove into what proved to be multivariate activities that influenced not only the targets of the intervention but also the people who were involved in implementing it. Based on the findings, it is not possible to determine whether the Hollywood OFDVI met any of its intended outcomes, including its main goal of reducing domestic violence. Despite these inconclusive findings, the study’s extent beyond simply identifying whether the program “worked” or not resulted in a wide array of findings related to other aspects of the program. This included the program’s effects on its implementers (i.e., police officers), what lessons its implementation can offer for the process of police program implementation more generally, program insights that build on existing literature about offender-focused programs, program cost and long-term sustainability, and in-depth consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of the program’s activities, mechanisms, and outcomes. While this approach to evaluation proved to be unpredictable and time-consuming, such research that digs deeply enough into policing strategies to allow both researchers and practitioners to truly understand how they work is critical to developing
effective, sustainable, and fair solutions to some of the most pressing problems facing American society today.
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Appendix A: Domestic Violence Brochure
If you are being physically or sexually abused or threatened by a family member, or household member, or person you are dating, or you fear such abuse, the law protects you if you are being abused or threatened by your spouse, former spouse, or person you are dating, or another family or household member who is or was living in the same household as you. The law protects you from abuse by a person with whom you have a child in common. You need not be married to the abuser or related to be protected under the law.

Peace Project—individual and group counseling in sexual abuse, rape, domestic violence. No charge to victims.

**What Does the Law Say?**
If you are the victim of domestic/dating violence, you may ask the state attorney to file a criminal complaint. You also have the right to go to court and file a petition requesting an injunction for protection from domestic violence which may include, but need not be limited to, provisions which restrain the abuser from further acts of abuse; direct the abuser to leave your household; prevent the abuser from entering your residence, school, business, or place of employment; award you custody of minor child or children; and direct the abuser to pay support to you and the minor children if the abuser has a legal obligation to do so.

**Can This Law Help?**
Yes, if this individual has abused you physically or sexually, or if you have good reason to fear that this person is about to be violent toward you. This special law in Florida enables you to get a judge to ORDER the abuser to STOP. The paper that starts this process is called a Petition or Injunction for Protection against Domestic/Dating Violence.

This explains to the judge whom you need protection from and exactly what protection you need. You can ask for help if you cannot afford to pay court fees. The court clerk will help you in filling out the proper forms. If you have left your home to avoid being abused, you can still file a petition.

**What Can the Judge Do for Me?**
After you file your petition, the judge can sign a temporary or Permanent Injunction, or both. Either type of Injunction, or order, will tell the abuser that he/she may not be violent toward you. A temporary Injunction can be obtained on the same day you file your Petition, without a hearing and without the abuser knowing first. A Temporary Injunction lasts for a stated period of time not to exceed 15 days and is given to you by the judge when you are in immediate danger of being hurt.

A Permanent Injunction can go into effect later. The judge may want to hold a hearing before signing the Permanent Injunction.

**What Does the Injunction Do?**
Some things the judge MAY ORDER in the Injunction are:
- The abuser not commit any acts of violence against you, your children, or others living with you
- The abuser immediately leave the home you share
- The abuser stay away from your home if you are not living together
- The abuser go to counseling

The judge can order other help, depending upon the circumstances. This is why the contents of the Petition and your attendance at all hearings is so important—so that you can tell the judge what you need and why you need it.

**What If the Abuse or Threats Happen Again?**
A person who refuses to follow a judge’s order can be put in jail. If the abuser disobeys the judge’s order, contact the police or sheriff’s department and show them the certified copy of the Injunction for Protection. In some cases the officer will arrest the abuser. Also, you can ask the judge to hold the abuser responsible for not following the judge’s order.

For further instructions and assistance on how to obtain a temporary injunction for protection against Domestic/Dating Repeat Violence call:
- State Attorney’s Office
- Victim Advocate Unit
- 954.765.4133

- State Attorney’s Office
- Family Crimes Unit
- 954.931.7693

**What Can Be Done?**
Catholic Community Service offers crisis individual, family, and couple counseling.
Family Service Agency offers crisis intervention and counseling individuals, families and couples.
Family Violence Outreach Center. Women in Need of Broward County, Inc. offers individual and group counseling for victims and group counseling for abusers.
Family Violence Program Clinics: Nova University Community Mental Health Clinic is a specialized clinic within a comprehensive community mental health center which provides evaluation and treatment of individuals, couples and families where violence has occurred. Crisis, individual, group, couple and family therapy are provided.
Jewish Family Service offers crisis, individual and couple counseling.
Appendix B: Interview Protocol for Police Personnel

FRONT LINE OFFICER INTERVIEW

1. What type of training have you received for handling domestic violence? What about any specialized training related to the OFDVI (letter delivery, talking to victims and offenders, etc)?

2. What comes to mind when you think of responding to a Code 3 38 while on duty? Run me through your typical response when you get a call for one. What about a Code 1?

3. Tell me what you know about the domestic letter deliveries. How do they affect you and your work?

4. How would you describe typical victims of domestic violence? Perpetrators? Do you think these perceptions have any impact on how you handle 38s?

5. Do you think there is a difference between violence that happens between intimate partners, or two people that are romantically involved or share a child together, and other types of domestic violence between other family members?

6. How do you handle highly complex situations? For example, what if there are children present and there’s evidence of violence? What if it is hard to tell who the perpetrator is because there are signs of violence on both sides? Are there other common difficult domestic situations you have to handle that stick out in your mind? At what point do you decide to seek guidance from a supervisor?

7. What are your thoughts on the Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits? Do you think Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits have an effect on domestic victims or offenders?

8. Are you ever aware of whether an individual involved in a 38 you are responding to is in the Repeat Offender Log? For example, do you know if there is a ‘C-Lister’ involved before you get on scene or once ID’s are made on scene? How would you find out?

9. Do you think you could identify an “A-Lister” domestic offender if you saw him or her? Would you approach or treat this offender differently based on the ‘A-List’ status? Can you describe a typical ‘A-Lister’ for me? What about a ‘B-Lister’?

10. In your professional opinion, do you think that the OFDVI has any effect on domestic offenders and victims? If so, what is it about the program that has some effect? If not, what is it about the program that doesn’t work?
11. If you could suggest some changes to the way your department handles domestic incidents, what would they be?

12. Do you have any final thoughts you would like to share, maybe something that I have not thought to ask about?

DETECTIVE INTERVIEW (Only for detectives in the Domestic Violence Unit)

1. How did you come to work in the domestic violence unit? What are your favorite things about working there? Least favorite?

2. What type of training have you received for handling domestic violence? What about any specialized training related to the OFDVI (letter delivery, talking to victims and offenders, etc.)?

3. Run me through your typical day. Run me through your typical response when you get a new domestic violence case. How do you start the investigation process?

4. How do the D- and C-List letters affect you and your work?

5. How would you describe typical victims of domestic violence? Perpetrators? Do you think these perceptions have any impact on how you handle 38s? Can you give an example or two of this you have recently experienced?

6. How do you handle highly complex situations? For example, what if there are children present and there’s evidence of violence? What if it is hard to tell who the perpetrator is because there are signs of violence on both sides? Are there other common difficult domestic situations you have to handle that stick out in your mind? At what point do you decide to seek guidance from a supervisor?

7. What are your thoughts on the Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits? Do you think Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits have an effect on domestic victims or offenders?

8. How are your relationships with patrol officers related to domestic incidents? How would you describe the way you interact with them?

9. For a new domestic case, when would you find out whether an individual involved in the case is in the Repeat Offender Log? How do you find out?

10. Do you think you could identify an “A-Lister” domestic offender if you saw him or her? Would you approach or treat this offender differently based on the ‘A-List’ status? Can you describe a typical ‘A-Lister’ for me? What about a ‘B-Lister’?

11. What role do the victim advocates play in your work? How do you interact with them in your typical work?
12. In your professional opinion, do you think that the OFDVI has any effect on domestic offenders and victims? If so, what is it about the program that has some effect? If not, what is it about the program that doesn’t work?

13. If you could suggest some changes to the way your department handles domestic incidents, what would they be?

14. Do you have any final thoughts you would like to share, maybe something that I have not thought to ask about?

MIDDLE & UPPER MANAGEMENT INTERVIEW

1. How long have you been in your current position? How did you come to be in that position?

2. What type of training have you received for handling domestic violence? What about any specialized training related to the OFDVI (letter delivery, talking to victims and offenders, etc.)?

3. When would you be involved in a 38 call? How do you provide guidance to your officers for handling domestics?

4. Tell me what you know about the domestic letter deliveries. How do they affect you and your work? What do you think about them – do they influence offenders in any way?

5. How would you describe typical victims of domestic violence? Perpetrators? Do you think these perceptions have any impact on how you handle 38’s or advise the officers you manage to handle them?

6. Are there other common difficult domestic situations you have to handle that stick out in your mind?

7. What are your thoughts on the Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits? Do you think Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits have an effect on domestic victims or offenders?

8. Do you think patrol officers could (or should be able to) identify an “A-Lister” domestic offender if he or she saw him or her? Would they approach or treat this offender differently based on the ‘A-List’ status?

9. In your professional opinion, do you think that the OFDVI has any effect on domestic offenders and victims? If so, what is it about the program that has some effect? If not, what is it about the program that doesn’t work?
10. If you could suggest some changes to the way your department handles domestic incidents, what would they be?

11. Do you have any final thoughts you would like to share, maybe something that I have not thought to ask about?

VICTIM ADVOCATE INTERVIEW

1. What’s your educational and professional background? How did you become interested in a position as a victim advocate?

2. Can you run me through your typical day? What are your normal job duties?

3. Do you know how your role here at Hollywood might be different from the role of victim advocates in other jurisdictions? Do they do things differently, or pretty much the same?

4. Do you think that most victims read the information they’re given by officers during a domestic incident? Do they ever have anything to say about the D- or C-List letters given to their abuser?

5. What would you say about the belief that minorities are more likely to be victims of domestic violence than non-minorities? Is this the case in Hollywood?

6. Can you tell me about victims that might not have legal status in the US? What are their experiences like as victims of domestic violence?

7. So the program is called an offender-focused initiative – Some people could say that focusing more on the offender takes away from victim help. What would you say to that? Do you agree?

8. In your professional opinion, do you think that the OFDVI has any effect on domestic offenders and victims? If so, what is it about the program that has some effect? If not, what is it about the program that doesn’t work?

9. If you could suggest some changes to the way your department handles domestic incidents, what would they be?

10. Do you think your department could benefit from an additional advocate?
11. If your department had access to more funding, say $50,000 or $100,000, for domestic violence, what would you suggest should be done with it?

12. Do you have any final thoughts you would like to share, maybe something that I have not thought to ask about?

CRIME ANALYST INTERVIEW

1. How long have you been in law enforcement? What about at Hollywood? What are some of your favorite things about your job? Least favorite things?

2. Tell me about when the new domestic violence program started in 2015. I know you played a big role in developing the Repeat Offender Log and helping get implementation going, but what exactly happened then?

3. What type of training have you received for handling domestic-related crime data? What about any specialized training related to the OFDVI?

4. Run me through the procedure for how you handle domestic violence as a crime analyst. Where in the process do you come in?

5. What proportion of your work involves domestic incidents/crime? Are there things you would like to do but don’t have time for?

6. How would you describe typical victims of domestic violence? Perpetrators? Do you think these perceptions have any impact on how you do your job?

7. What are your thoughts on the Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits? Do you think Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits have an effect on domestic victims or offenders? As an analyst, how do you track these?

8. Do you think most patrol officers could identify an “A-Lister” domestic offender if they saw one? Do you think most officers would approach or treat this offender differently based on the ‘A-List’ status? Can you describe a typical ‘A-Lister’ for me? What about a ‘B-Lister’?

9. To the best of your knowledge, how many of the patrol officers actively track your DV flyers? Are there any officers (you don’t have to name them) that stand out in their awareness or interest in domestic offenders and incidents? Either because they are unusually engaged or noticeably disengaged?

10. In your professional opinion, do you think that the OFDVI has any effect on domestic offenders and victims? If so, what is it about the program that has some effect? If not, what is it about the program that doesn’t work?
11. How would you go about determining if crime is actually going down or if reporting is going down?

12. If you could suggest some changes to the way your department handles domestic incidents, what would they be?

13. Do you have any final thoughts you would like to share, maybe something that I have not thought to ask about?

CHIEF INTERVIEW

1. How long have you been with the Hollywood Police Department (HPD)?

2. What are your thoughts on the Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits? Do you think Not-In-Custody arrest affidavits have an effect on DV victims or offenders?

3. How does the OFDVI affect the way your department handles domestic violence?

4. In your professional opinion, do you think that the OFDVI has any effect on DV offenders and victims?

5. If you were to change the way your Department handles 38’s, what would you change and why?

6. As Chief, what do you think about the focused-deterrence model? Which parts of it do you like most? Are there strategies that you would like to implement to improve or change your Department’s approach to domestic violence?

7. Do you have any final thoughts you would like to share, maybe something that I have not thought to ask about?
## Appendix C: Extended List of Program Activities, Mechanisms, and Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Theory(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disrupt power dynamic between aggressor and victim</td>
<td>Cycle of violence (Katerndahl et. al, 2010)</td>
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<td>Intermits violent habits</td>
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<td>Remove excuses and increase the risk</td>
<td>Nudge Theory (Thaler &amp; Sunstein, 2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not-in-Custody Probable Cause Arrest Affidavits</td>
<td>Deterrence through increasing subjective probability of apprehension</td>
<td>Risk perceptions (Apel, 2013)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Rational choice (Cornish &amp; Clarke, 2014)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increased officer motivation to arrive on scene quickly</td>
<td>Behavioral economics theory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Closing the gap between those who are arrested and those who should be arrested for a crime</td>
<td>Offenders Gone on Arrival (Nelson, 2012)</td>
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<td>Repeat Offender Log</td>
<td>Reduce anonymity of offender for officers, for offender after notification</td>
<td>Situational Crime Prevention</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Standardizes offender prioritization, reduces error and bias</td>
<td>Intelligence-Led Policing (Ratcliffe, 2016)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report Writing</td>
<td>Alters perception of victims and offenders of seriousness of domestic violence</td>
<td>Problem-Oriented Policing; Intelligence-Led Policing (Ratcliffe, 2016)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Improves data collection, improves analysis capabilities</td>
<td>Procedural justice and legitimacy</td>
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<td>Shift in Duties for Patrol and DV Detectives</td>
<td>Detectives have more time to spend on felony cases &amp; build better cases</td>
<td>Victim time inconsistency/commitment devices (Aizer &amp; Dal Bo, 2009)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Patrol officers more successful in securing victim cooperation on scene</td>
<td>Nudge theory (Thaler &amp; Sunstein, 2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crime Intelligence Analyst</td>
<td>Standardizes offender prioritization, reduces error and bias</td>
<td>Procedural justice and legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifies patterns in offender behavior</td>
<td>Problem-Oriented Policing; Intelligence-Led Policing (Ratcliffe, 2016)</td>
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<td>Consolidates expertise about DV offenders &amp; establishes trusted SME</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Task Description</td>
<td>Theory/Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victim Advocate</td>
<td>Improves analysis for investigations while reducing workload of detectives</td>
<td>Intelligence-Led Policing (Ratcliffe, 2016)</td>
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<td>Informs victim of resources and aids in accessing those resources, such as</td>
<td>Empowerment Theory (Zimmerman, 2000)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>victim compensation, shelters, &amp; restraining orders</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lets victim know the police are aware of their situation and care</td>
<td>Procedural justice &amp; legitimacy of police</td>
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