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HISTORICAL GEOPOLITICS OF KASHMIR: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF CIVILIZATIONAL

FRAMINGS

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

Thomas J. Liguori

2020

To: Dean John F. Stack, Jr.
       Green School of International and Public Affairs

This dissertation, written by Thomas J. Liguori, and entitled Historical Geopolitics of Kashmir: A Discourse Analysis of Civilizational Framings, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

_____
Harry Gould

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Iqbal Akhtar

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Thomas Breslin

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Benjamin Smith

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Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor

Date of Defense: March 16, 2020

The dissertation of Thomas J. Liguori is approved.

_____
Dean John F. Stack, Jr.
Green School of International and Public Affairs

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Andrés G. Gil
Vice President for Research and Economic Development
and Dean of the University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2020

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Ascher blessed me with his presence in the world in 2013. He made me appreciate the wonder of life and rectified my questioning of my life choices in embarking on a Ph.D. I love you, m'hijo.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

HISTORICAL GEOPOLITICS OF KASHMIR: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF CIVILIZATIONAL

FRAMINGS

by

Thomas J. Liguori

Florida International University, 2020

Miami, Florida

Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor

This dissertation attempts to locate the intractable issue of Kashmir within a global

context. The global setting utilized here is constituted and shaped by multiple levels,

none of which is purely discrete, and which act upon each other with differing degrees

of salience. Taking a discourse analytic approach, political positions can be seen as

activating (acting upon, mobilizing, or challenging) existing discursive material in a given

political context and then deploying it. This dissertation aims to show how the Kashmir

problem has: 1) come about; that is, how it has been constituted and the (discursive)

contexts which shaped the available political positions and respective power

relationships attained, and 2) changed, tracing the changes and continuities of how the

Kashmir issue has been defined, and within wider political contexts (communal, state,

national, regional, international, global, etc.). This is done primarily through utilizing a

constellation of discourses roughly conforming to the triad of state-nation-territory,

which is (imperial) liberalism (for state), civilizationalism (for nation), and geopolitics (for

territory). The three-fold combination of discourses analyzed across historical periods

shows how the present has been heavily shaped by the colonial legacy of this discursive

triad, and how postcolonial states, here India, have shaped, altered, and at times

challenged, but have not fundamentally transcended, these discursive boundaries. This

is shown in the situation of Indian-administered Kashmir, which can be seen as a

neocolonial manifestation in India's attempts to script people, territory, and the role of

the state.

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Introduction

0.1 Overview of the Problem / Background and Context

The region of Jammu and Kashmir has been ensconced in a territorial dispute with India and Pakistan for over seventy years now, since the two countries' celebration of independence and the evacuation of the colonial British Empire in 1947. Jammu and Kashmir presented a unique problem to the subcontinent, but its resolution was embedded within an interstate system whose rules were determined by colonial powers and whose new Pakistani and Indian entrants were among the first postcolonial states in the post-World War II international order. The situation of Jammu and Kashmir was that of a princely state given internal autonomy on conditions granted by the suzerain British Empire, namely the dilemma of acceding to India or Pakistan, without the possibility of independence. After over two months of vacillation post-independence, and while personally preferring some degree independence and retention of his monarchical status, the Maharaja Hari Singh opted to accede to India, fearing the repercussions of an invasion of non-state actors coming from the Northwest Frontier Province which compounded already existing revolts taking place in the southwest of the princely state in the region of Poonch.

Jammu and Kashmir's situation was also unique due to the fact that there was no preexisting formula for the incorporation of the princely states, of which there were 565 on the eve of independence. Some rough combination of territorial contiguity, popular will, and/or the will of the princes were said to be the determining factors. Being that popular will was not clearly ascertainable, as many of the princely states were insulated

from the democratization taking place within the British Raj, there was often an

imputation of popular will based upon the confessional identities of the constituents.

Three states proved especially problematic: Junagadh, now in the state of Gujarat,

whose ruler, the Nawab Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III was Muslim and preferred

accession to Pakistan, but whose population was majority Hindu; Hyderabad, whose

ruler, the Nizam Osman Ali Khan, Asaf Jah VII preferred accession to Pakistan as well,

but the population was again majority Hindu; and Jammu and Kashmir, whose ruler was

Hindu, but whose population was majority Muslim, and, in contrast to both Hyderabad

and Junagadh, would be contiguous to both India and Pakistan.[1] Cued by the Maharaja,

Indian forces invaded the princely state and war broke out between India and Pakistan.[2]

The result of the war left the princely state partitioned between India and Pakistan. The

status of Jammu and Kashmir was referred to the United Nations Security Council during

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[1] The princely state of Jodhpur also presented a unique problem. Its ruler, the 24-year-old neophyte Maharaja Hanwant Singh, was Hindu and the majority of the population of the state was also Hindu, wished to accede to Pakistan due to the assurances of greater autonomy that was promised by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Pakistan. After a dramatic meeting with the minister in charge of securing the accession of the princely states for India, V. P. Menon, during which the maharaja threatened Menon at gunpoint, Menon eventually succeeded in securing Jodhpur's annexation to India (Menon 1961).

[2] The chronology is a little sketchy as to whether the maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession before or after the deployment of Indian armed forces to Jammu and Kashmir. Alastair Lamb and Victoria Schofield (Lamb 1991, pp. 135-137; Lamb 1994, pp. 81-103; Schofield 1996, pp. 144-152; Schofield 2003, pp. 52-59) hold that given the timing of the maharaja's flight out of Jammu, he could not have arrived in New Delhi until the morning of October 27th. However, his signature on the Instrument of Accession was dated October 26th, positing a concern with the "legality" of the Indian deployment (Schofield 1996, pp. 144-152). Indian national accounts of the matter hold that the maharaja was able to make it to New Delhi by October 26th and uphold that date, whereas Pakistani national accounts, stressing the "illegality" of the accession, hold that the maharaja arrived in New Delhi on the 27th. For an account stressing the 26th see Jha (1997). More important for our purposes in this dissertation are the implications of the focus on the legality or illegality of the accession with respect to the timing, which is posited as a saving grace to rectify all other concurrent and subsequent considerations, obscuring wider contextual issues and the conditions around the construction of what counted as "legality," let alone any reference to popular will.

the course of the war, on December 31, 1947. Since that time, India and Pakistan have

fought four wars (two directly involving Jammu and Kashmir, the third having strong

implications for the dispute, the fourth prompted by a limited incursion into the state by

Pakistan). Both countries wage a persistent ideational battle and represent Jammu and

Kashmir as theirs. Further, since May 1998 when both countries tested nuclear

weapons, the interstate rivalry has added a possibly apocalyptic element.

Caught up in all of this is the fate of Jammu and Kashmir's inhabitants, who

endure the quotidian effects of, and effectively provide the self-legitimation for, the

presence of the Indian military, presently estimated at somewhere between 400,000 to

700,000 troops.[3] On the eve of the 1947 Indian-Pakistani war, there were popular

revolts against the monarchical regime of Hari Singh, which were spearheaded by two

major political parties, the Muslim Conference, which favored accession to Pakistan, and

the National Conference, which favored a limited accession to India. In the aftermath of

the partition of the princely state, the Muslim Conference was largely linked to Jinnah's

Muslim League in Pakistani-held Jammu and Kashmir, while the National Conference

took control of governance in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir.

The ruling National Conference party, led by Sheikh Abdullah, succeeded in

establishing one-party rule after the 1951 election, where all 75 Legislative Assembly

seats were won by National Conference. As Sheikh Abdullah began to bring up the issue

of a plebiscite for the state, something that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru

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[3] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2018).

promised to hold during the 1947-48 war once law and order were reestablished, Nehru had Abdullah sacked and dismissed in August of 1953, replaced within the National Conference party by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed.

The rest of the history of Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir has been a gradual whittling down of the internal autonomy granted to the state under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Even before but especially at the forefront since the outbreak of the "insurgency"/*tehreek* in 1989, there was the suspension of the general rule of law, a virtual state of emergency, and rule by exception in the Kashmir Valley. Since 1989 over 70,000 Kashmiris have been killed, and over 8,000 "disappeared" by the Indian state: a limbic status, behind which, in most cases, lay dead victims of military and paramilitary force, but whose deaths were not explicitly acknowledged and who left "half-widows" without the ability to legally and financially claim widowhood, not to mention the untold emotional damage wrought on children, parents, and spouses.[4] Kashmiris since the 1990s have come to represent terrorist or fifth-column elements, a perpetual threat to the idea of India yet its inclusion within India is central to the Nehruvian ideal of a secularist, multiethnic state.

The prevailing Hindu nationalism under the ruling BJP has further exacerbated this tension. After the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and

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[4] The figures of those killed vary, from official Indian estimates, usually around or slightly above 40,000, and Hurriyat estimates which place the number at over 100,000. The number use above is that of the human rights umbrella NGO Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society. The International Peoples' Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian-Administered Kashmir and The Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons. *Structures of Violence: The Indian State in Jammu and Kashmir* (2015).

the subsequent launch of the United States-led War on Terror, India experienced an attack on its parliament on December 13, 2001, which left the five attackers and nine others dead. This provided additional justification for the Indian state to hitch its armies' deployment into Kashmir onto the global war on terror. The alleged attackers and plotters being part of a group active in Kashmir helped India to situate "terror" in Kashmir, and with it, a seemingly perpetual state of exception. Despite the novelty of the coincidence of aims with the United States, this can be seen as a mere continuation of the policies in the Kashmir Valley throughout the 1990s.

Looking at the brutal suppression and crackdown in Kashmir by Indian armed forces, and the emergency ordinances put into place, this dissertation traces continuities from the period of British colonial rule to the present situation in Kashmir. These continuities foreground discourses on civilization, imperial liberalism, and geopolitics, and present the thesis that Indian rule in Kashmir represents a form of postcolonial imperialism.

0.2 Statement of Problem/Research Question

The intractability of the Kashmir dispute over the past seventy years, and the heavy-handed occupation of the Indian-held portion of Jammu and Kashmir prompted me to think about the conditions that created the possibilities for this situation. Why has there been a bilateral standoff between India and Pakistan for over seventy years? Why is Kashmiri self-determination not considered a viable option by any major party? What prompts India's extreme insecurity over the internal situation of the Kashmir Valley, which is translated into its heavy-handed responses and an occupation that has

entered its fourth decade? In short, what are the conditions that have led to the current state of affairs in the Kashmir Valley, which have compounded the volatile Indian-Pakistani relationship?

0.3 Hunches in Lieu of Hypotheses

Asking questions about conditions that caused a seventy-year-long dispute might obviously imply taking a historical focus on the question. I am not searching for some monocausal stimulus whose spark was lit in 1947 and from which there is no return; to borrow a common line attributed to Jalaluddin Rumi, at "[e]very moment the world is renewed."[5] I consider the dispute from the perspective of process ontology, which "analytically embeds the existence of objects in an unfolding set of transactional mechanisms and relations that have the effect of reproducing the object from moment to moment."[6] Process ontology places emphasis on contingency, and the multi-vectored directions that actions can take. The historical objects of analysis here are discourses which create the conditions of possibility for certain actions to be taken, and even conceived. Specifically, these are discourses which correspond and overlap with the state-nation-territory trinity, that is: 1) liberalism and its relationship with imperialism; 2) civilizationalism, and a subset of civilizationalism, orientalism; and 3) geopolitics.[7]

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[5] The quote is from Rumi's *Mathnawi/Masnavi*, taken from Saeed Zarrabi-Zadeh. *Practical Mysticism in Islam and Christianity: A Comparative Study of Jalal Al-Din Rumi and Meister Eckhart*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, p. 140. This is a line that also harkens back to the occasionalism of earlier Ash'arite theology, which is not employed here.

[6] Jackson (2010), p. 183.

[7] For the state-nation-territory triad see Abraham (2014).

While these three discourses are certainly not set up in any grand theoretic terms as to be all-explanatory, they do much to help explain guiding frameworks within which state practices are conceived in late-modern international relations. And they are not self-subsisting, enclosed discourses, but combine with, complement, and contradict each other at various stages.

The starting point for this study begins around 1846, when, through two treaties, the British sectioned off a piece of the Sikh Empire after the First Anglo-Sikh War, and then granted it recognition as a princely state under the suzerainty, or "paramountcy," of the British East India Company. The princely state was granted to a high-ranking defecting raja within the Sikh Empire, Gulab Singh, Raja of Jammu. The year 1846 provides us an interesting slice into all three of these discourses: liberalism as an intellectual and political project was getting its footing; the notion of "civilizations" had entered into common parlance, and in tandem with the project of orientalism (in full swing by the early nineteenth century) set the contours for discussions of the civilizations of the West and East, later being disaggregated into different Eastern civilizations; and the period, roughly 1831 to 1907, of imperial contestation for land between the British and the Russian Empire known as "the Great Game," which in many ways presaged the development of modern geopolitics at the turn of the twentieth century.

Tracing these discourses over one hundred and seventy-odd years focuses on the shifts, reassembling, and resemblances maintained by these discourses. Certainly "liberalism" did not quite connote the same thing to mid-nineteenth-century

Manchester industrialists as it would to a bourgeois Delhiite today. With respect to the discourse on liberalism, the focus here is on its relationship with imperialism, at times actively abetting it, at others tenuously tolerating it or outright rejecting it. The relationship was often maintained or augmented by discourses on civilizational superiority and inferiority—leading to notions of liberal imperial tutelage, or development—and/or geopolitical necessity.[8] In extending the analysis over this long period, highlights on particular moments may recede from view, but this allows us to see resemblances and reconstitutions that can illuminate continuities over time, and inconsistencies within these discourses.

Due to the associations and connotations of neo-positivistic monocausality, in lieu of a formal hypothesis I will posit here strong guiding research intuitions or hunches that these three formative discourses of late-modern (post-c. 1830) international relations created the contours which not only delimited possibilities of British imperialism (chapter two) in its liberal, civilizational, and geopolitical forms, but also framed the conditions for acceptable articulations of resistance against colonialism (anti-colonialism; chapter three), which in turn framed conditions of rule after colonialism (the post-colonial period; chapter four). Following Derek Gregory, it is my

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[8] Much of this work on the relationship between liberalism and imperialism relies on pathbreaking work by a number of scholars, cited in chapter one. For the notion of liberal imperial tutelage, one could do worse than to start with Mehta (1999).

contention that these discourses have laid the groundwork for the condition of "the

colonial present" in Kashmir.[9]

0.4 Literature Review

      This work draws on recent literatures emphasizing each of the three discursive

foci, drawing on postcolonial and de-colonial theories, thus situating itself within a field

of resistance literature against nationalist or state-based readings of the Kashmir issue.

These discourses of liberalism, civilizationalism, and geopolitics will be covered in

greater detail in chapter one. What follows below can be considered something of an

intellectual topography.

      Regarding the discourse of liberalism, this dissertation attempts to draw on the

insights made by a number of theorists who have analyzed the historical development

of liberalism, its internal contradictions, and its relationship with imperialism. These

works include Uday Mehta (1999), Jennifer Pitts (2005), Karuna Mantena (2010), Beate

Jahn (2013), and Duncan Bell (2016). Sankar Muthu (2003) points to liberal anti-imperial

trends. Christopher Bayly (2012) focuses on the emergence and development of Indian

liberalism and its negotiations with empire. For the political theory of imperialism,

especially British imperialism I draw on the work of Mehta (1999), Armitage (2004),

Metcalf (1995), Pitts (2010), Pagden (1995), and Nexon and Wright (2007). The focus

here, is, however, imperialism within specific liberal contexts, not dealing with neo-

Roman justifications of imperial rule that emerged in the sixteenth through the late

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[9] Gregory (2004).

eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries (Pagden 1995; Armitage 2004). Uday Mehta (1999) sees in liberalism an inherent tendency for intolerance, rooted in its specific geographical and culturalist moorings which it then universalizes, adding along the way stadial histories and anthropologies borrowed from Scottish history and the newly emerging fields of anthropology, focusing especially on John Locke, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill, and their negative valuations of others and views of liberalism as a proper corrective to "backwardness." Karuna Mantena (2010) looks at the rise of indirect rule as a mode the British used to rule much of the empire, itself based on a conception of traditional society that, in a move away from previous liberal imperial ideologies, could be dangerously destabilized or corrupted if it were to come into contact with the "advanced" ways of modern British civilization, focusing on developments made in this direction by Henry Sumner Maine and James Fitzjames Stephen. Mahmood Mamdani (2012) makes a similar argument, also focusing on Henry Maine and the creation of the political category of "the native" as central for the British policy of indirect rule. Thomas Metcalf (1995) argues that imperial legitimation practices oscillated between various arguments premised on either what he calls the "principle of difference" or the "principle of sameness." Eric Stokes's (1959) classic argument holds that British imperial practice in India was guided by utilitarian assumptions about political development and land reform, but Mantena (2010) provides insightful nuance into different and contradictory approaches advocated by figures who equally claim inheritance of the utilitarian tradition; for example, the vociferous disagreement voiced by James Fitzjames Stephen to the earlier positions of John Stuart Mill. In British imperial

historiography, there is also the controversial approach of David Cannadine in his

Ornamentalism (2001): Cannadine argues that the empire was much more guided by

notions of "status," rather than racial difference, pointing to diplomatic relations

seemingly symbolizing equality between high-ranking British officials and local rajas,

princes, and chiefs. While this could prove a quite useful insight into class systems, it is

too dismissive of race as a factor of difference and as a marker which already carried

within it status and class valuations, and combined with British status markers in

multivocal ways. On the existence of manifestations of anti-imperial illiberalism, anti-

imperial liberalism, pro-imperial liberalism, and pro-imperial illiberalism in the United

Kingdom, Hobson (2012) proves quite useful, as it points to possible configurations of

empire and liberalism, which did not have to be deterministically tethered. This

dissertation should also link up nicely with critiques of the particularism of the supposed

universalism of liberal internationalism, such as Keene (2002), Anghie (2004), Hurd

(2018), and Jahn (2013).

Regarding the discourse on civilizationalism, I draw on what has been self-

described as "fourth-generational civilizational analysis" as found in Salter (2002),

Jackson (2006), Bowden (2009), and Hall and Jackson (2007). This strand of analysis

approaches civilizations as processes, things made in and through discourse, through

their continually being posited, re-posited, challenged, and negotiated; ideas positioned

somewhere against somewhere or something else, at some discrete time. Essays in the

edited volumes by Katzenstein (2010) and Arjomand and Tiryakian (2004), and the

monographs by Brett Bowden (2009) and Bruce Mazlish (2006) have also given

instruction to the intellectual histories of the concept of civilization, and the intellectual histories behind the concepts. Here, ignominiously, Huntington's (1993, 1996) "clash of civilizations" thesis and its orientalist underpinnings, specifically in the unsound, reductionist, and essentialist arguments of Bernard Lewis (1990), provide an epistemological foil against which this dissertation's claims react. Bowden (2009) provides a particularly useful analysis of the ways in which the discourse of civilization served the purposes of imperialist policies and justificatory practices. The concept of civilization also carried within it temporal notions of development, the most notorious institution of which was the "standard of civilization." Gong (1984) and Linklater (2016) provide useful histories of the concept and its utilization within the international liberal tradition to justify imperial practices.

One specific manifestation of civilizationalism was the academic, intellectual (and imperial) enterprise of Orientalism, and, here, this dissertation is heavily indebted to Said's (2003 [1978]) pathbreaking analysis of that field and its implications for imperialism. Inden (2000 [1990]) provides a major addition to this field with a specific focus on intellectual representations of India.

Bilgin (2004, 2012), Kuus (2007), Hansen (2006), and Agnew (1998) provide a bridge to geopolitics, utilizing the term "civilizational geopolitics" to refer to geopolitical practices that use civilizational arguments as justificatory, thus not only giving an identity directionality with respect to policy, but also involving in a host of other processes including othering, the creation of imaginative geographies, creating new forms of identity and linkages. Neumann's two books (1996, 1999), looking at the

interplay between articulations of selfhood and the implications for wider foreign

policymaking also inform this part of the dissertation. Mesbahi's (1993, 1997, 2010,

2011) work looking at the relation of culture with geopolitics ("geocultural" (2010)) and

focusing on the interplay and cross-fertilization of geopolitical, normative/cultural, and

economic elements (2011) within a state recognized as simultaneously unitary and

composite, and constantly undergoing rearticulation, provides a key backdrop for this

project. The focus of this dissertation, however, looks more directly at the discursive

interplay between geopolitics, civilizationalism (Mesbahi's "normative/cultural"

component), and statecraft, or contestations over its articulation, and less directly at

the national and transnational economic components.

      With respect to geopolitics, this dissertation seeks to locate itself with the camp

of critical geopolitics. This includes the tracing of "effective and critical histories" of

geopolitical thought (Kearns 2009, 2011), locating guiding geopolitical assumptions

behind the practice of domestic and international politics—and, in fact, the policing of

the domestic/international boundary (Agnew 1994, 1998, 2003; Agnew et al. 2003;

Ashley 1987; Dodds 2007; Dodds and Atkinson 2000; O Tuathail 1996a; O Tuathail et al.

1998)—and in the creation of imaginative geographies, as utilized in the work of Derek

Gregory (2004) who in turn draws upon the concept as originally deployed by Edward

Said (2003 [1978]). Also, this dissertation sets out to trace how the geopolitical practices

of the imperial era continue to inform geopolitical assumptions of statecraft in the

present. This is amply demonstrated in Gregory's (2004) notion of the "colonial

present," and in those tracing the histories and the continuity of British imperialist

geopolitical thought into post-colonial India (Abraham 2014; Chaturvedi 2000, 2005a, 2005b, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Thakur 2014). Part of this assessment of the salience of geopolitical thought, comes with the notion of the "territorial trap" elaborated by John Agnew (1994) and how the notion of state as tied to territory comes to assume its importance in late modernity. The broad histories provided by Elden (2013), Ruggie (1993), and Kratochwil (1986), and well as the particular South Asian application of these ideas in the works of Mishra (2008), Barrow (2003), and Edney (1997), specifically with regard to mapping, cartography, and the creation of territory in the British Raj, are also informative here.

With respect to Kashmir, the historical work tracing the emergence of Kashmiri identity has been especially important, in particular, the seminal works of Mridu Rai (2004) and Chitralekha Zutshi (2004). The second part of chapter four draws on the resistance literature of critical Kashmir scholars, Mona Bhan, Ather Zia, Haley Duschinski, Shrimoyee Nandini Ghosh, Huma Dar, Goldie Osuri, Mohamed Junaid, Inshah Malik, Nitasha Kaul, and Dibyesh Anand, emphasizing notions like Giorgio Agamben's (2005) state of exception in Kashmir (Duschinski 2009, 2010; Duschinski and Hoffman 2011a, 2011b, 2014; Duschinski and Ghosh 2017), Achille Mbembe's (2003) necropolitical existence for Kashmiris under occupation (Junaid 2013; Zia 2018), geopolitical "postcolonial informal empire" or the "(post)colony" (Anand 2012 and Osuri 2017, respectively), and other works countering Indian nationalist narratives by focusing on spectacular violence or portrayals of Kashmiris (Navlakha 1991, Kak 2013; Kabir 2009; Faheem 2016; Ali et al. 2011; Duschinski et al. 2018).

Within the broader ambit of South Asian studies, there is stress on the fluidity of identity and the forces that call upon and shape it, particularly in Ayesha Jalal's (2000) work on the emergence of a pan-South Asian Muslim identity. Partha Chatterjee (1986) focuses on ideas of nationalism in India as rooted in borrowed concepts from the Western imperial powers, requiring those very concepts for the validation of the nationalist project of self-determination. Also, Chatterjee (1993) looks at the multivocality of identity that Indian nationalism attempts to bring into consonance.

Further, this dissertation's guiding ontological and epistemological commitments are informed by postcolonial and decolonial studies, which seek to interrogate the supposedly non-particularized universalisms, their laden and implicit modes of hierarchy and the epistemic operations of the power/knowledge nexus in the colonies. Edward Said is often claimed to be the forebear of postcolonial studies, by virtue of his breakdown of essentialist constructions of identity and the way that they are shaped, often by outside forces, and devalued through its comparison with some putatively superior identity. Implicit here is that identity constructions never operate in power vacuums, but are themselves the operations of power, and are the results of, and productive of, power inequalities.

Following the insights of Robert Cox (1981) and E. H. Carr (2001 [1946]), the rules of the international order are created by and for the most powerful, thereby setting up ostensibly neutral normative standards which are often practically inaccessible or impossible for those in lower positions of power. The point of departure for many who see themselves within the "decolonial" camp, is that the aspirational goal

for the less powerful should not be their inclusion within what is seen as a

fundamentally unjust international order: the goal should be the destabilization of the

foundations of that international order, in order to bring about a more emancipatory

condition. For them, this is considered to be the problem of post-colonialists who may in

fact be no more than Third World nationalists in fashionable garb. Fanon's "The Pitfalls

of National Consciousness" (2004 [1961]) gestures strongly in this direction when he

cautions nationalist movements against the native bourgeoisie simply assuming the post

of the former colonial bourgeoisie and replicating the anteceding hierarchies.

0.5 Methods, Research Design, and Methodological Baggage Claim

This dissertation approaches the problem of Kashmir through a historically

informed discourse analysis. This involves tracing (imperial) liberalism, civilization, and

geopolitics as self-contained and intersecting discourses. Firstly, discourses are treated

as ontological entities in their own right, without a putative "reality" existing outside of

discourse. Ontological entities do not matter or play any explanatory importance insofar

as they are not already ensconced in some discursive assembling within which they

acquire a specific meaning. The discourse analytic approach of this dissertation follows

in the vein of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Foucault (1972). Applications of this variant

of discourse analysis in the discipline of International Relations can be seen in the works

of Roxanne Doty (1996), Lene Hansen (2006), Patrick Jackson (2006), and Laura Shepherd (2008).[10]

(Imperial) liberalism is treated as a discourse, signifying the imperial condition of liberalism, especially specific imperial manifestations of liberalism, but even post-imperial versions of liberalism which seek to implement its preferred form of rule by imposition (e.g., conditionalities or forceful implementation of liberal structures). The parentheses around the modifier imperial signify the contingency of the relation, holding questions of the intrinsic nature of liberalism's ties to imperialism in abeyance. For here, there will be made reference to specific anti-imperial liberalisms and the use of contradictions within liberalism to argue both for and against imperial rule. Also, imperialism is not at all limited or intrinsically tied to liberalism, but liberal political discourse marks a specific moment in theories of imperialism, which become couched in liberal vocabularies. Legitimations of imperialism in the immediate pre-liberal period harkened back to Roman justifications of empire (Armitage 2004; Pagden 1995).[11]

Civilizationalism brings forth a host of associations involving race, class, gender, nation, religion, ethnicity, supra-national affiliations, teleological history, all of which are laden which valuations of superiority or inferiority. The term "civilization" was first coined in the mid-eighteenth century, and through linkages made with incipient ethnology and stadial history—at first in its Scottish conjectural variant—in the late

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[10] For a great how-to guide consulted while writing this dissertation, see Neumann and Dunn (2016). Also, Milliken (1999), Dunn (2008), and Neumann (2008).

[11] See Skinner (1998) for a more internal/domestic focus on neo-Roman imperial theory in this period.

eighteenth and through the nineteenth centuries, came to signify supremacy and its

anthropological and temporal other, barbarism (or savagery). Civilizationalism worked

to augment the imperial facets of liberalism, in its more malleable iterations, in the form

of paternalist tutelage into proper modes of conduct and governance; in its more rigid

iterations, it essentialized others as irredeemable or perpetually in need of direction,

thus coming dangerously close to violating central tenets of liberalism (a danger averted

by policy of indirect rule and the creation of the concept of "native society" under Henry

Maine). The discourse of civilization also required objects to reify, and distinct peoples

and ethnicities were provided by the enterprise of Orientalism. Edward Said's (2003)

classic treatment of Orientalism overlooks the political dispute that emerged between

the Orientalists and the "Anglicists" in early nineteenth century British India, the former

seen as more sympathetic to the Indians and the latter as less tolerant. But his

treatment accurately shows how the textual method adopted by Orientalists helped to

construct an idealized version of the object under study (in Said's case, "the Arab," "the

Muslim," or "Islam"). Most empirical manifestations of these idealizations were seen to

be defective or inferior to the idealization, creating a classist rift and a privileging of the

literati and clerical classes. Further, the creation of the ideal images sought to manage

differences within, so that aberrant empirical manifestations might be more definitively

ordered. The Orientalist ordering of the other provided (imperial) liberal theorists with

the ethnological material to work with, which was accomplished by the related

discipline of anthropology. The foil for this dissertation will be provided by substantialist

(of which the most conspicuous are essentialist) treatments of civilizational identity as

something pre-given and apolitical, most notoriously Samuel Huntington's "clash of

civilizations" thesis, which has prompted myriad refutations on methodical, ontological,

and empirical bases, but is sadly alive and well in the political discourse of not only

"Western" states, but, importantly for this study, others, including India.

Geopolitics is similarly treated as a discourse, not a pre-given set of necessary

rules guiding state action. Here, drawing on the critical geopolitics literature, this

dissertation emphasizes how practice is always already embedded in discourse, the

self/other dichotomy being central. In this sense every geopolitics is an imaginative

geopolitics, as there are no deracinated, axiomatically necessary postulates flowing

from and dictating state policy; at root are always the questions of who are we? And

who do we seek to be?[12] This critical perspective will be used in assessing the imperial

geopolitical discourses, especially looking at how Kashmir's geographical location (at its

closest point less than thirty miles from Russian Tajikistan) functioned in British imperial

policy, which acted on ideas of geographical determination, in the strategic sense (that

is, a given territory has importance solely because of its geographic location, proving

especially vulnerable or invulnerable to invasion) and in the ethnological sense (the

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[12] For imaginative geopolitics, I am primarily referencing Edward Said (2003), credited with coining the phrase, and Derek Gregory (2004). The question "who are we?" alludes to Samuel Huntington's (2004) conspicuous use of the phrase in his anxiety over the possible loss of a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant national identity for the United States. See also Campbell (1998), among others, on the relation between identity and geopolitical perspective.

people of a given territory are a certain way because of where they are located and the geographical features around them).[13]

These three discourses concatenate and operate on each other, and this study traces the way in which these dynamics change and create the possibilities for enunciations of positions in response. Far from neglecting empirical material, it is attentively detailed in this dissertation, but the political salience of events only becomes interpretable through the lenses of the available discursive frames. This approach thus disavows any easy distinction between the material and the ideational, for the two are always already co-imbricated. This may bespeak a philosophical ontological commitment to "monism." The notion of the "social world" already implicates interpretation, and interpretation is not self-willed, free, and autonomous, but is only possible through the preexisting intellectual elements available, whose presence is in part due to material conditions of knowledge production and distribution. The philosophical ontological commitments made here, while not needing to be foregrounded, takes a similar approach to that of process philosophy, emphasizing flux and change over the substantialist commitment to pre-given entities.[14]

With regard to agency and structure, the approach taken here emphasizes the presence of discursive material as presenting available options for actors to use, in either a limited or a more creative capacity. Although the availability of, and access to,

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[13] Discussed in chapter two. For a strategic geographical determinism of Kashmir see Mackinder (1922). For an ethnological geographical determinism of Kashmiris see Huntington (1906).

[14] See Nexon and Jackson (1999); Emirbayer (1997); Rescher (2000).

discursive material is channeled through power (more empowered actors have a greater

access to and ability to creatively deploy and redeploy discursive resources),

straightforward imposition of forms of rule always undergo some degree of change,

whether by actors resisting, or creatively reinterpreting the discursive material. Thus, in

a departure from some overly deterministic Marxist accounts, and Third World

nationalistic accounts masquerading as post-colonial, which bifurcate actors into those

with power and those without, this approach, while certainly cognizant of power

inequalities, takes a more graded approach to the possession of power.[15] In a similar

move, this approach is sympathetic to a broadly "scalar" dismantling of the levels of

analysis problem, recognizing the legal and political primacy of the state, but

incorporating sub-state legal-political entities and non-state individuals and groups.[16]

In order to make fuller sense of the discursive field in which Kashmir and the

tehreek ("freedom movement") are embedded, I undertook two "field" visits to

Srinagar, in the summers of 2014 and 2015. During the course of the field visits, I was

able to gain a fuller appreciation for the significations of notions like occupation and

resistance. While there, I was able to meet with and interview a number of prominent

figures in the resistance movement, including: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

chairperson Yasin Malik; Jamiat-e-Islami and All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (Geelani or

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[15] This is in line with Hobson's (2012) approach. For an example of avowedly Indian nationalistic account of the Kashmir problem professing (and failing) to transcend state-centrism and Western-centric IR, see Behera (2000, 2006).

[16] See Abraham (2014) for a scalar approach. For an account of the state in line with the approach taken here, see Mitchell (1991).

hardline faction) chairperson Syed Ali Shah Geelani; Dukhtaran-e-Millat chairperson Asiya Andrabi; and All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (Mirwaiz or moderate faction) leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. I was also able to interview prominent civil rights activist Parvez Imroz, founder and president of the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS), as well as a number of journalists, including the editors of two of the most widely-read newspapers in Kashmir, Zahir-ud-Din of the *Kashmir Reader*, and the recently-assassinated (June 2018) Shujaat Bukhari of *Rising Kashmir*. Among "mainstream" politicians I was able to interview the General Secretary of the National Conference party, Ali Mohammad Sagar. I am also thankful for the academics willing to speak with me at Kashmir University, including Professors Baba Ahmed Noor and Aijaz Ashraf Wani.

0.6 The Course of the Work and Chapter Layout

The metaphor of lenses on a microscope may help illuminate the outline of this dissertation, starting from a very wide, broad focus, and gradually zooming in on the more specific, local dimensions of the Kashmir conflict, proceeding in a dialogical back and forth. Chapter one provides the theoretical backdrop of the dissertation in the approach to international relations from 1846 to the present. Chapter two looks at British imperialism in India and the Anglo-Russian geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia from roughly 1846 to 1947. Chapter three focuses on anti-colonial responses to British rule in India, from the late nineteenth century to 1947. The first part of chapter four looks at independent India, its situation in the new international context, and its

relations with Kashmir. The second part of chapter four looks at the Kashmiri resistance to India.

The first chapter is the theoretical chapter, which defines the terms used in the dissertation in greater detail, teasing out their conceptual histories and their application to the present study. In this chapter, attention and detail is paid to the guiding concepts of this dissertation, namely, civilization, geopolitics, and imperial liberalism. Engaging with the literature that has come into abundance since, and taking its cue from, the ignominious "clash of civilizations" thesis of Samuel Huntington, the section on civilizationalism looks at the history of the concept of civilization since the later period of the European Enlightenment (mid- to late eighteenth century to the present), and the ways in which the essentialism utilized by Huntington, who is taking Bernard Lewis's claims about Islam, Muslims, and Islamic civilization as his point of departure, smuggles in a particular variant of white European Enlightenment superiority, whereby the ideology of Western European liberalism (as conceived of by Huntington and Lewis) is seen as the pinnacle of civilization-in-the-singular. This assumption thereby dictates that the geopolitics of the West (as a singular entity) must be defensive against these other civilizations (in the plural) which lack the prestige of civilization (in the singular) as manifested in the West. Although, it may seem to many scholars that these theses of Huntington and Lewis have been largely discredited and not taken seriously by the majority of academicians in the social sciences. Bruce Gilley's defense of colonialism in the *Third World Quarterly* affair in 2017 and the popularity of British imperial apologist Niall Ferguson provide, perhaps, the most visible exceptions to this claim. Moreover,

these claims are prevalent in policy-making circles and among the resurgent right-wing

ethnonationalists and liberal defenders of the American and Western European polities,

which, with its liberal capitalist, majoritarian, secular ethos are embedded within the

particularity of the nationalist conception of selfhood, and thus defensive against

corrosive immigrant challenges, especially when "Muslim" is coded as a threat to

peaceful secularism, or the racialized poor (from Africa, the Middle East, Latin America)

as a threat to the livelihood of the (white) liberal welfare state.[17]

In the case of India, a similar formula applies with a little code-switching. With

the rise of Hindu nationalism, amplified by the electoral victory of the right-wing

Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 and 2019, and in prominent state elections (Uttar

Pradesh 2016), Muslims, especially rebellious Kashmiri Muslims, are seen as threats to

the ethnonationalist (read Hindu majoritarian) state. Similarly, Indian liberals, especially

the Indian National Congress (INC), wish not to hedge on the threats to the state or

nation itself, but rather try to paper over the dispute by positing a (majoritarian)

multicultural Indian nationalism inclusive of, but not addressing the particular concerns

of, Kashmiri Muslims, while gradually moving closer to Third Way liberal capitalist

approaches.[18] So, via majoritarian democratic liberalism, whether right-wing

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[17] Gilley (2017); Ferguson (2003, 2004, 2011), and Nigel Biggar.

[18] The shift from the socialism of Nehru to more of a liberal capitalist approach has been a gradual one, with a key inflection point being the latter period of Rajiv Gandhi's tenure as prime minister (1984-1989) and the Congress's electoral victory of 1991.

ethnonationalist or Congress-liberal, Indian rule becomes converted to a variation of

Indian imperialism over Kashmir, in defense of Indian liberalism and/or the Indian state.

This is indicative of the history of the application of liberal theory across colonial

and imperial settings, and thus why I deploy the bimodal term imperial liberalism, to

signify its Janus-faced character. Liberalism has consistently been deployed by the

British in order to justify imperialism. So, in this sense, liberalism justifies imperialism,

but to invert the terms in operation, imperialism worked to justify liberalism. So not

only was imperialism discursively deployed in order to create good colonized liberal

subjects who would later inculcate and display their good liberal characteristics in an

international setting, but, importantly, imperialism was deployed to make the world

safe for liberalism. This plays on a constant fear of otherness implicit in much liberal

discourse, but also constitutes a challenge for liberalism. While it plays into the

civilizationalism and temporal progressivism of liberalism, it also threatens it with

possible boomerang effects (a key fear first expressed by Edmund Burke in the Hastings

trial).[19] To be sure, this does not mean that imperialism is a logically necessary corollary

of liberalism, however, the deployment of both throughout the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries has sustained their conjoined discursive histories.

Geopolitics is also discussed as a discourse and practice, not as a logically

necessary correlate of statecraft. Here, it is seen as rooted in the imperial contestations

of the nineteenth century, and whose present deployments are seen as throwbacks to

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[19] Mehta (1999), p. 185.

this period. Imperial geopolitics thus provides a foundation for post-World War I

international relations/International Relations. Rooted as it is in imperial practice,

considerations of civilization are never far from the surface in geopolitics.[20] At the core

of every consideration of geopolitics is an imaginative directionality, rooted in

considerations of both being and becoming, as related to selfhood: who "we" are and

who "we" aim to be. Geopolitics thus implicitly codes territory as belonging to one or

another group of people (expressed through their states), by virtue of mythologized

history or civilizational groundings.

These three interconnected, guiding discourses are all tied together in

discussions of international hierarchy and the origins of the discipline of International

Relations within the international imperial context of the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries.

Chapter two moves on to discuss the particular deployments of these three

discourses in the imperial period of British rule over India, and thus also, Kashmir. The

civilizational orientation of this period focuses on the racialization of difference as it

emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century and as it evolved into the scientific

racism of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Distinct from, but closely

related to this stream within civilizationalism, is the discipline of Orientalism. Both

played important roles in essentializing populations, and folding religions and linguistic

groupings into nations and races. In contrast to caricatures of Orientalism, the early

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[20] Cf. especially Agnew's "civilizational geopolitics" (1998).

Orientalists were actually the more sympathetic of the British imperialists towards the colonized populations, with the less tolerant Whiggish "Anglicists" (stressing assimilation to English customs) as their principal opponents. Nevertheless, early Orientalists did play an indispensable role essentializing religions, grouping populations together and drawing boundaries between them, privileging texts over practices, and in enshrining hierarchies within populations. Orientalism was also an indispensable industry in the creation of the "others" against whom the British would self-identify and was in operation as the discourse of Western European civilization was being elaborated.

Liberalism, seen as a progressive political idea and accomplishment of a temporally advanced civilization, was then included as a part of the British self-identity. Indians, representing backward civilizations, thus required tutelage in the ways of the advanced mode of liberalism. This tutelage was the euphemism for imperialism. But imperialism also took the form of territorial contestation, played out (most importantly for our purposes here) in the Great Game in Central Asia. Thus, geopolitics entered as a necessity through which the British could not only defend the glory and prestige of the empire, but also as justifying the hopes that Indians would eventually become more advanced liberal subjects, lest they fall prey to the despotic (and racially suspect) Russians, or worse, Asiatic despots.

Chapter three proceeds from chapter two, in dialectical fashion as a counterposition in which the terms of the British imperial hegemony are challenged. Here, we see the emergence of self-articulated variants of civilizations, including various

forms of pan-"isms." These include the Pan-Asianism of Tagore, Pan-Islamism of al-Afghani, and different articulations of Pan-Indianism. These eventually fold into the nationalisms that end up guiding the partition of India in 1947. These articulations, however, are directed against imperial civilizational scriptings positing non-Europeans as backwards and in need of guidance. As articulations against European superiority narratives, deployed either instrumentally or authentically, they end up utilizing terms consolidating blocs of populations, even while employing the strategy of paradiastole. The effect of even instrumental deployments of the terms of civilizationalism end up ossifying in discourse, and later get taken (or mistaken) for essences. So the valorization of Indian modes of being expressed by anti-imperial nationalists, might challenge the evaluative dimension of that term deployed in discourse (what was seen as a vice is now seen as a virtue), but does not fundamentally challenge the position of term as an integral part to the selfhood depicted in that discourse. Thus, while the terms of "Indianness" or "Muslimness" might be rearranged, the idea that there is a fundamental character of "Indianness" or "Muslimness" goes unchallenged in the discourse, irrespective of whether or not the speaker was aware of the internal plurality of each grouping.[21]

Liberalism, even if a specifically autochthonous mode of liberalism, and geopolitics then follow from these civilizational groupings, and in some respects channel the direction of civilizationalism. This is shown in one specifically Gandhian

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[21] This discussion follows from Chatterjee (1986).

conceptualization of geopolitics by S. Srikanth Sastri, who stresses civilizational

geopolitics in the deployment of a prospective civilizational ordering of Asia, and other

such aspirational geopolitical orderings, in particular the "Greater India" society.

Alternatives to statist renderings are posited, but as statism gradually eliminates other

possibilities, the civilizational orderings take the form of prospective alliances rather

than federations.

      As civilizational orderings take hold, the prospective state of Pakistan plays an

important role as a homeland for Indian Muslims. Hindu nationalists and some strands

of Pan-Islamists thus see it as a different civilizational ordering, requiring a different

geopolitics from that of Hindu India. However, Pan-South Asian Islamists, Pan-Indianists,

Pan-Asianists, and some strands of Pan-Islamists were powerful correctives to that view.

With that cleavage in mind, Kashmir comes to take importance as a (Huntingtonian)

"fault-line." This conceptualization of Kashmir as a crux is, however, a holdover from the

importance attached to it as a frontier zone in the imperial geopolitics of the Great

Game, and its attributed status as an indispensable part of the nation was primarily

crafted in the statist contestation over it between India and Pakistan. Its insertion into

the debate as part of Hindu India or "the Muslim world" was, however, part of

secondary debates over the terms of nationhood in India and Pakistan.

      An important point to note is that there is not a straightforward dictation from

the empire to the anti-imperial articulations of civilizational belonging and selfhood. The

anti-imperialists change the terms of debate in important ways through this dialectical

engagement. The ways in which they are able to change the terms of debate function as

the next iteration of hegemony, in the postcolonial context of India and Pakistan, and in

the novel deployment of hierarchies, selfhood, belonging, and policy. This theme is

addressed in the next dialectical progression of the dissertation, chapter four. Central

focus is placed Indian policy in the period after independence, but Pakistani debates

over selfhood and claims over Kashmir are also addressed (albeit in less detail, as the

main focus of this dissertation is Indian-held Kashmir). Conforming to the dictates

established by the international community, the norm of territorial integrity is

foregrounded at the expense of self-determination for the Kashmiris in this period.

Debates on nationhood and geopolitics are also center stage.

Nehru played a role as a towering figure in the Third World movement, for

nonalignment and decolonization. Domestically, he managed a diverse cabinet,

espousing at times directly contradictory positions. Special attention is paid to his inner

coterie of advisers, specifically the influence played by Gandhi, who was assassinated

only five and one-half months after independence, V. K. Krishna Menon, K. M. Panikkar,

and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. Whereas this group espoused particularly anti-colonial

positions, they nonetheless fell into the re-essentialization of the Indian nation in

different ways. And interestingly, despite their roles as provocateurs and revolutionaries

carving out a new way for the moralistic geopolitics of Nehru, they nonetheless saw no

contradiction between this position and the suppression of independentist ambitions in

Kashmir.

The liberal socialism of Nehru thus gradually came to endorse a policy of quasi-

imperialism over Kashmir, in defense of the multicultural liberal project of Indian

statehood. However, this was quite different from other forms of imperialism of Kashmir called for by Hindu nationalists, such as Syama Prasad Mukherjee and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who coded the land of Kashmir itself as Hindu, implicitly positing that Kashmiri Muslims were anti-national.

The chapter then focuses in on Kashmir, and the opposition to, and collaboration with Indian rule. It first details the Kashmiri nationalist movement, whose inflection point usually is dated to the protests of 1931, and the differing conceptions of Kashmiriness elaborated in the 1930s and 1940s. Then it details the aftermath of the partition of Kashmir and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1947-48, in which Sheikh Abdullah emerged as the prime minister, until he was ousted by Nehru in August 1953. The language of *Kashmiriyat* ("Kashmiri-ness") begins to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s, but interestingly drew on certain tropes highly congruent with Nehruvian nationalism, particularly, the conception of Kashmiri nationhood as tolerant and Sufi. The deployment of Sufism as a tame version of Islam led to positing Muslims reacting against Indian rule as extremists and terrorists who are intolerant of Hindus and will subvert liberal institutions safeguarding minority Hindus and Sikhs (paradoxically, this is done while simultaneously not paying much attention to the condition of Muslims in Hindu nationalist India).

The version of Kashmiri nationalism espoused by both Nehru and Abdullah apotheosizes a pristine peaceful golden age of Kashmir in the fifteenth century, particularly associated with Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin (reigned c.1420-1470), whose tolerance is often compared in a wonderful light to that of Mughal Emperor Akbar

(incidentally, conqueror of Kashmir), and under whose reign thrived Rishiism, a particularly Kashmiri syncretic Sufism which incorporated elements of mystical Kashmiri Hinduism. This multicultural, mystical, tolerant Kashmir was posited by Sheikh Abdullah and by Nehruvians, who portrayed Kashmir as much more pleasantly disposed to Indian multiculturalism than narrow Pakistani religio-nationalism. This scripting, however, led to labelling rebels upset with the status quo as subversive anti-nationals (in both the Indian and Kashmiri sense).

This chapter also attempts to grapple with the Kashmiri *tehreek* as an anti-geopolitical rebellion.[22] This draws on imaginaries of resistance employed by those who see themselves as involved in the *tehreek* within a context that is framed as a space of exception, as formulated by Agamben (2005). The space of exception is established by laws suspending habeas corpus, the omnipresence of security personnel, mass disappearances, and rule by impunity in Kashmir by the Indian state. Resistance, here, thus functions as a field of potentialities, whose actualization may take many forms, but are circumscribed by the power of the state. It is thus deterritorialized, or not-yet territorialized, in the sense employed by Deleuze and Guattari, however the forces of the Indian state or international order work to territorialize it.[23] This section will deal with these modes of territorialization (comprehending *tehreek*, casting it as something against something else, demonizing it, reifying it) and how they are working to display

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[22] For anti-geopolitics, see O Tuathail (1996b); Routledge (1998).

[23] Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987).

the *tehreek* in a certain light, and deterritorialization (obfuscation, pluralization) in a space of exception which is characteristic of colonized spaces. This is done to demonstrate the primary thesis of this dissertation, which is, that Indian-held Kashmir is a case of *postcolonial imperialism*. Through interviews conducted and surveys of resistance literature, deterritorializing flows are analyzed here as alternative geopolitics, anti-geopolitics, and aspirational states of being.

The conclusion recaps some of the main points of the dissertation, reflects on possible implications for International Relations and the many subfields addressed, and points to future directions of research while honestly and humbly acknowledging some shortcomings unable to be addressed here, as directions for further research.

Chapter 1: Liberalism, Civilizationalism, and Geopolitics as Core Constituents of International Hierarchy

1.0 Chapter Overview

This chapter seeks to contribute to the revisionist literature on International Relations historiography and set the theoretical parameters within which this dissertation will situate itself.[1] It will begin with an analysis of international hierarchy and analyze the post-1919 international order in terms of continuities and emendations from the pre-1919 "age of empire," rather than seeing 1919 as a complete watershed that demarcates an imperial past and liberal international present.[2] The chapter will proceed to arrange these continuities in the form of three intersecting, synthetic, complementary discourses, which will go on to thematically frame the rest of the dissertation.

The first discourse addressed will be that of "civilizationalism" and its more specific manifestation of Orientalism, with respect to British India.[3] Civilizationalism refers to

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[1] This emerging literature includes a questioning of the normative caricature referred to as "spirit of 1919." In recent years there has been an explosion of this literature, see Ashworth (2002, 2011, 2014), Quirk and Vigneswaran (2005), Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson (2011), Buzan and Lawson (2014), Vitalis (2005, 2015). The collection in Brian Schmidt's (2012) edited volume provides many essays re-examining this starting point. Research being done in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century international political thought often makes explicit the continuities across the 1919 watershed, see Schmidt (1998), Bell (2007, 2016), Sylvest (2009), Schmidt and Long (2005), among others.

[2] The phrase quoted is from Hobsbawm (1989).

[3] For "civilizationalism" as used here see Jackson (2006); the approach to Orientalism used here is largely rooted in the groundbreaking work of Edward Said (2003), but from which it will make something of a departure, viz. Said's characterization of Orientalism as a relatively stable intellectual accompaniment to the imperial project. This dissertation seeks to highlight some of the contestation within and between Orientalism and imperialism.

both the element of civilizations as units, a block tied together by myths of cultural and historical unity, and the idea expressed by the notion of being "civilized," that is, not barbarous, that manifested itself in the Western liberal criterion of the "standard of civilization," whereby certain (non-European) cultures were seen as lacking civility and inhabiting an earlier temporal status on a broadly linear progressive teleology. The discourse of civilizationalism was marked by an ontological substantialism, viewing civilizations as set blocks whose content just needed to be filled out (a task performed by the disciplines of Orientalism and later anthropology).

The stabilization of the content defining a civilization marked the transition into essentialism. Whereas the discourse of civilization was taken up by the anticolonial movement in order to assert their rights to self-determination and inclusion into the comity of nations, and subsequently made its way into post-colonial South Asian nationalisms, the discourse of Orientalism carried with it an essentialist ontology tethered to an epistemological textualism. This essentialist outlook of Orientalism combined with a Eurocentrism that led to a valorization of Western modes of culture, society, and politics and a concomitant denigration of Eastern modes of culture, society, and politics.

The textualism of Orientalism lent itself to the idealized essentialism—that which most closely corresponds to the delineated "sacred texts" of Eastern peoples represented the apotheosized "authenticity" of certain religious groups; the boundary markers of the religious groups, the authenticity of the sacred texts, and the delineation of the sacred texts themselves were entrusted to Western authorities (individuals and

institutions), albeit through conferral with entrusted local informants. The institutionalization of this idealized authenticity favored the clerisy and higher castes, as guardians of authenticity, and helped to further entrench their high social positions.

Civilizational discourse often combined with Orientalism in order to bring forth a self-articulation of civilization and an auto-Orientalism, ironic but attendant with the essentialist trappings of its European precursor. The ironic auto-Orientalist maneuver was an empowering one, articulating an anti-colonialism that took Orientalist stereotypes seen as vices and transformed them into virtues: however, this maneuver neither challenged what Chatterjee and Abdel-Malek call "the thematic" nor "the problematic," that is, (much of) the specific content of these stereotypes nor their epistemological bases, respectively.[4]

The next discourses analyzed are imperialism and liberalism, looking at their co-imbrication, combination, and contradiction. In line with the historical outline of the section on civilization, the line definitively separating liberalism from imperialism is not crystal clear. This section looks at the evolution of liberalism, specifically in its British and Indian manifestations from the mid-nineteenth through the twentieth centuries. Liberalism has proven itself to be a most multivocal, shifting, accommodating, and contradictory political discourse, and this section will provide the definitions being used here for liberalism and imperialism, which will be employed in later chapters.

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[4] Chatterjee (1986); Abdel-Malek (1963).

Taking my cue from the growing literature looking at the combinations of liberal imperialism, and following Jahn's immanent critique, here liberalism will be analyzed as a set of changing practices, norms, and institutions.[5] Notions in liberalism of development and tutelage sustained the imperialist project in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and combined neatly with civilizational temporalities forestalling the full acquisition of liberal agency for colonial subjects. Certain civilizations were deemed ready or not for liberal self-government based upon the degree of civilization displayed by its inhabitants. Often the criteria for self-government were arbitrary, resting on an impossibility of perfect mimesis of the colonizing country and its norms, practices, and institutions. While liberalism has sustained the imperial project, the argument here is not for the recognition of an inherent imperial impulse within liberalism, as will be shown through articulations of anti-colonial aspirations using the vocabulary of liberalism, especially as manifested through the writings and speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru. Nevertheless, liberalism has proven itself amenable to manifestly non-universalizable ideologies of difference and hierarchy, such as the civilizationalism and imperialism explored here. In chapter four, this dissertation will explore the manifestation of a contemporary form of liberal imperialism as mobilized against the movement for Kashmiri self-determination.

With respect to imperialism, its justifications and ideologies to a large degree exist in a dialectical tension with governing justifications and ideologies in the

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[5] Bell (2016), Mehta (1999), Pitts (2010), Jahn (2013), Hobson (2012).

metropole proper. Thus, the liberalism that took hold in the mid-nineteenth century simultaneously resorted to paternalistic justifications to legitimize imperial rule. Two major legitimizing forces for imperial rule came in the forms of geopolitics and the discourse on civilizationalism, the former stressing the integrity of the territorial foundations (territory, here, symbolizing power) of the empire, the latter the position of superiority of Britons vis-à-vis their subjects and the necessity of bestowing upon them British virtues. Imperialism will be analyzed here both in the formal institutional structure of the British Raj and the earlier political rule entrusted to the East India Company, as well as discursive legitimation practices establishing a formal difference between colonizers and colonized, in large measure sustained by the discourse of civilizationalism.

The discourse of geopolitics, while only formally given its coinage in 1899 by Rudolf Kjellén, here, is treated as not limited to the specific and self-conscious doctrine bearing its name, but the discourse of territorial management and its attendant conceptions of control, danger, possession, and zero-sum game within a closed system. It is an eminently statist discourse and practice rooted in territorial control by a state or state-like entity, and emerged in the context of European imperial rivalries, whereas non-European polities were treated as little more than pawns in a "Great Game," harkening to Curzon's infamous and oft-cited "chessboard" analogy in 1892. The Great Game, Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry from roughly 1831 to 1907, provides the backdrop for the analysis of geopolitics, here, specifically with the endowments given to Kashmir by virtue of its strategic location and British imperial practices in the princely state of

Jammu and Kashmir at the height of geopolitical Russophobia from the 1880s to the decade of the 1900s. Geopolitics, here, can be shown to foreground imperial territorial concerns at the expense of political concerns of non-metropolitan colonized populations. Continuities from the imperial era into the "post-imperial" era can be shown in similarities of territorial management in the era of empire-building and that of state-building.[6]

The chapter concludes with a brief look at the ways in which imperial territorial management (that is, geopolitics), discursive constructions of the colonized and colonizing populations, and political forms of rule coimbricate and complement each other, and why this needs to be taken seriously in the study of International Relations. Chapter two then moves on to a specific look at these processes in the period of British rule over India.

1.1 International Hierarchy and the Imperial Origins of International Relations

 "Contemporary claims about intellectual traditions are caught between an awareness that dominant myths of origins—all those stories, about a move from backward to advanced, from passionate to rational, from barbarism to enlightenment—harbor an embarrassment of subtexts (ethnocentrism, racism, the arrogance of empires, the butchery of wars and extermination camps) and a

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[6] Drawing on David Armitage's (2004) work showing the rough synonymy between empire-building and state-building in the context of British "composite monarchy," p. 25, 60.

realisation that these stories still inform the most basic categories through which we understand and act in the world"—R. B. J. Walker[7]

As an intellectual legitimating practice, International Relations has engaged in its own auto-disciplinary mythmaking, telling itself its own self-justifying origin stories. One of these stories in the founding of the study of International Relations and the "spirit of 1919."

One of these histories, so the story goes, is the birth of IR in the spirit of 1919 with the founding of the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, at the benefaction of a forward-thinking wealthy industrialist and Liberal Member of Parliament, David Davies (1880-1944). This happened alongside Wilson's presence at the Paris Peace Conference, and the formation of a new liberal world order dedicated to international peace and justice. In 1940, Ted Carr (1892-1980) went on to offer a sweeping account of the crisis of the preceding twenty years (1919-1939), seeing it as mired in high-minded utopian ideals disconnected from the actual workings of international politics, a main target of his being the liberal concept of a "harmony of interests" (a political economic tradition extending from the late eighteenth century to Carr's own day; from Smith to Kant to Bentham to Ricardo to Cobden and Bright to Angell).[8] Carr then goes on to distinguish

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[7] Walker (1993), p. 28.

[8] Carr (2001).

between status quo and revisionist powers, but in a revealing and important omission, leaves out colonial world. Carr sets up an antagonism between normative "utopianism" and a grounded realism, singling out the disastrous consequences of the former without the latter and coming to a rough synthesis where analytic clarity is given by the realist and normative direction is given by the idealist (what Carr calls "sound political thought"). In this interesting way, while displacing the analytical preeminence of the "utopians" it simultaneously affirms the notion of a normative foundation to the study of International Relations.

Since Carr, this has become standard fare in IR Theory courses and textbooks, and the origin story has been recycled in different versions by esteemed figures in the discipline over the years, but has come under serious scrutiny in a slew of revisionist disciplinary history since the mid-1990s.[9] At core of this revisionism has been the idea that the "utopians" never existed in quite the caricature that Carr creates; in fact, many of the tenets that the so-called "utopians" held can be seen as commensurate with "realist" thought. Further, this "great debate" actually never occurred in the fashion of an exchange and defense of ideas, as has been pointed out in a number of works belonging to this revisionist history. And, even if we are to accept that there were these normative ideals upon which the field of International Relations was grounded, we would have to come to terms with an early-twentieth-century liberalism grounded in an

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[9] Bull (1972). Key to this revisionism has been Long and Wilson (1995), Wilson (1998), Schmidt (1998), Osiander (1998)

acceptance of imperialism and racial/civilizational hierarchy, erecting a League of Nations which enshrined rather than transcended these.[10]

After taking down the claim of Carr about this tense battle between realists and utopians, the revisionists proceeded to fill in the gaps about interwar IR Theory. Some stressing the overlaps with realism (Wilson 1998), some with political geography and geopolitics (Ashworth 2011, 2013, 2017), some with liberal imperialism (Bell 2016; Sylvest 2009), some pushing the founding date further into the future, into the post-World War II era and the debate over the role of behavioralism in political science (Guilhot 2011). What emerges is a multifaceted picture of the approach to international relations, complicating the realist-idealist caricature. In complicating this picture, I wish to focus on elements of imperialism and international hierarchy that framed the study of international relations in the early twentieth century. Doing so highlights the ways in which the rules governing international relations were infused with power hierarchies, both legal-political and sociological-civilizational. Thus, in order to gain legitimate acceptance into the international fold, colonized political entities aspiring for independence had to mimetically appropriate liberal political forms, national attributes, and a capacity to enforce rule within delimited territorial boundaries.

The realist-idealist "debate" which then emerged from within the largely Anglo-American proto-discipline of International Relations must be situated within the

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[10] Vitalis (2005, 2015), Thakur (2018). For a good overview of the literature on international hierarchy, see Barder (2016).

intellectual context of the early to mid-twentieth century. Further, the development of

Realism as a theory of International Relations in its own right, owed its theoretical

individuality and autonomy in large measure to this origin story. Realism was further

able to establish its own theoretical space with ideas about the autonomy of the

political (that is, not reductive to economistic logic), the focus on the international as

opposed to the domestic, the political to the exclusion of the moral or economic. But, as

noted by Richard Ashley, Beate Jahn, and Robbie Shilliam, these were strands already

present within earlier liberal political philosophy, that is to say, "realism is a product of

the internal tensions of liberalism and their competitive relationship in fact

complements, justifies, and helps reproduce the former."[11] Ashley notes how neo-

realism's central concerns of state-centrism, utilitarianism (as rational individualism),

and positivism are all present within earlier liberal political philosophy.[12] And Shilliam

focuses on the "tragic liberalism" of Hans Morgenthau, who sought to focus on an

implicit bifurcation created within liberal political philosophy between conceptions of

the international and the domestic spheres: thus, his very "illiberalism" emerged from

tensions implicit in the broader liberal political philosophy.[13] In fact, we can see the

broader realist response to liberalism as endorsing the latter's internal inconsistencies,

and carving out for itself the international, political, amoral elements as proper to the

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[11] Jahn (2013), p. 175; Ashley (1984); Shilliam (2007).

[12] Ashley (1984).

[13] Shilliam (2007).

study of International Relations itself, rather than dealing with internal domestic authority structures.[14]

But the liberalism from which Realism was emerging, rife with internal fragmentation along the lines of issue areas, varieties in historical implementation, and theoretical plurality as it was, also carried with it a specific tension in its ideas about the potential universalizability of its political program. This tension was specifically manifested with respect to non-Western peoples within the discursive field of civilization, marking both some kind of political and cultural attainment that could be measured vis-à-vis European civilization, and as a kind of supra-national grouping of peoples displaying enough cultural characteristics in common to be lumped together. For the former measure, the "standard of civilization" was invoked in the nineteenth and twentieth century to forestall granting political independence to colonized populations. The latter, supra-national grouping (Jackson's "civilizations-in-the-plural"), in most cases, showed striking conceptual congruity to the racial theories being developed throughout the nineteenth century.

These two notions of civilization were combined and read on to a teleological history, largely indebted to the stadial histories of the Scottish Enlightenment, and civilizations were placed either in "backward" or "advanced" temporal stages. Both liberal and what we may retroactively label "realist" positions displayed ambivalence

[14] Jahn (2013), pp. 174-175; Walker (1993). Realist authors, beginning with Morgenthau, seeking to legitimize Realism as an International Relations theory, went on to construct a notion of ahistoricity and attach it to Realism, as it was able to access timeless principles about the nature of power and violence.

with respect to civilizational difference and how they conceptualized civilizational hierarchy, but, in the words of John M. Hobson "beneath that sound and fury of this imaginary 'great debate' lay the humdrum consensus on the need to defend and celebrate Western civilization as the highest normative referent in world politics."[15]

Most, though certainly not all, liberal approaches to civilizations-in-the-plural held the possibility of tutelage or paternalist development to bring those in "backwards" states of being further into the future, approximating the temporal positions of the civilized states. Differences emerged between positions advocating for the granting of greater or lesser degrees of self-government, which often reflected deeper understandings about the capacity of civilizations or races to develop and approximate Western standards. The development of what came to be called the "standard of civilization" was codified through the international legal theories of James Lorimer in 1883 and John Westlake in 1894, rooted in political and philosophical justifications on the need for non-intervention for civilized states, but positive intervention for non-civilized or barbaric states vocalized by John Stuart Mill, Richard Cobden, and John Bright in the 1850s, and also William Ewart Gladstone's horrifically Islamophobic, racist 1876 pamphlet on the Bulgarian crisis.[16] Implicit here was the unquestioned, taken-for-

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[15] Hobson (2012), p. 136.

[16] Mill (1984 [1859]). For Cobden (1804-65) and Bright (1811-89), here, see Hobson's (2012) discussion, pp. 35-40. Gladstone (1809-98) was Liberal Prime Minister from 1868-1874, 1880-1885, 1886, and 1892-1894. He was a Conservative MP before defecting from the party with Prime Minister Robert Peel in 1846, in whose Cabinet he served as Secretary for War and the Colonies, over the issue of free trade. Although generally viewed as a liberal scion now, Gladstone first entered Parliament as a Tory in 1832 opposing

granted assumptions about racial and civilizational difference. There were, however, disagreements with respect to the mutability of this difference, and that, in large measure, informed different colonial policy prescriptions. These assumptions were at their most pronounced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and were front and center in the deliberations in the aftermath of the First World War.

What emerged through the Mandate System, created under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, was a recognition and institutionalization of the civilizing project, recognizing the goal of colonial rule to be development to towards an eventual state of self-government on par with Western standards of statehood. The Mandate System thus recognized the civilizational current of thought (as opposed to more racial exclusionist positions which desire that colonized peoples not be formally included into the new international system at all) with its the attendant notion of stages, manifested in the "A," "B," and "C" categories.[17] However, racial exclusionism

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both the extension of the franchise and the abolition of the slavery, from which his father profited handsomely. On

> what the Turkish race was and what it is. It is not a question of Mahometanism simply, but of Mahometanism compounded with the peculiar character of a race. They are not the mild Mahometans of India, nor the chivalrous Saladins of Syria, nor the cultured Moors of Spain. They were, upon the whole, from the black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity. Wherever they went, a broad line of blood marked the track behind them; and as far as their dominion reached, civilization disappeared from view.

Gladstone (1876), p. 10.

[17] Louis (1984); Anghie (2004; 2006); Bowden (2005). While Bull and Watson (1984) and Watson (2009) point to the "expansion of international society," Bowden (2009) rightly points out that this significantly underplays the conflict, contestation, and asymmetry of that expansion. Bowden (2009), similarly levels that charge at Gong (1984), who, more directly for our purposes here, completely omits John Stuart Mill

was expressed through the opposition to the Japanese proposal for a resolution of racial equality, most vocally by Prime Minister Billy Hughes, upholding his country's "White Australia" policy, but also rejected by United States President Woodrow Wilson, whose Fourteen Points are often held up as emblematic of the "spirit of 1919."

Robert Vitalis has pointed out that much of early International Relations was concerned with the question of race management and colonized populations.[18] For instance, the first journal to carry the discipline's name, the *Journal of International Relations*, in 1919, it so happens, (which became *Foreign Affairs* in 1922), was originally launched as the *Journal of Race Development* in 1910. Aside from the racial and civilizational hierarchy (civilization, here, albeit in many ways commensurate and even

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from the discussion of the standard of civilization. Jahn (2005) points out this omission, crucial, for "the emergence of culturally based international theory and practice in the nineteenth century for which Mill must count as an outstanding representative," p. 600n3. Even still, Hedley Bull's (1984) foreword to Gong's work gives an indication of the relative reluctance to engage in this type of research, citing the incapacity or inability of many non-European societies in the nineteenth century to meet basic standards of performance or engage in reciprocal relations, and noting that conceptions of European superiority were not special: "[t]he arrogance of many Europeans, in equating civilization with the particular civilization of Europe, was no less than that of the Chinese, nor was the belief of Europeans that their religion was the one true faith any less than that of the Muslim peoples with whom they came into contact." Further, even though the "standard" led to unjust treatment,

> the demand of Asian and African peoples for equality of rights in international law was one that the latter did not put forward until they had first absorbed ideas of the equal rights of states to sovereignty, of peoples to self-determination, and of persons of different race to individual rights, which before their contact with Europe played little or no part in their experience.

This signified the blessings bestowed on non-European peoples precisely because of the hierarchy based on the standard of civilization, while simultaneously paying no attention to how power worked to invest this asymmetry. Bull (1984), p. ix.

[18] Vitalis (2005, 2015).

congruous with the notion of race, carried with it other hierarchical categories,

especially, class, gender, and confession), another contributing mode of thought to

conceptions of hierarchy was Social Darwinism, which combined with these other forms

of hierarchy.[19]

A belief, either implicit or explicit, in the superiority of Western forms of

civilization (politics, society, history, economics) was helped along by a Social Darwinism

which, in a Thrasymachean turn, basically used the existing status quo as a moral

justification of itself. This Social Darwinian justification of the status quo led to a

valorization of what in International Realtions theory is often called social or ideational

characteristics, which in circular fashion led Social Darwinists to valorize the particular

cultural and societal forms of the Western world. Contra Wendt, the relationship

between social/ideational and material, as treated here, is much more coimbricated, so

much so that the analytical separation of these categories can never be maintained: the

material is always already ideational, and vice versa. They are constituted in and

through discourse.

The circular logic of the Social Darwinists' valorizing an existing state of affairs

was attacked by G. E. Moore in 1903, taking a cue from David Hume's treatment of the

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[19] However, confessional differences within civilizational discourse tend to become racialized, for example, the Catholic Irish being heavily Celticized whereas the Anglo-Saxon elements of the Protestant Irish tend to get emphasized, or at least mitigate the Celtic influences. For the ways in which Muslims become racialized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Aydin (2017). For the racialization of Irish Catholics see, among others, Painter (2010).

"is-ought" problem, as the "naturalistic fallacy."[20] As Social Darwinism emerged, it was

written on to a crystallizing discourse of scientific racism in the mid-nineteenth

century.[21] Social Darwinism, drawing on Malthus's 1798 *Essay on Population*, worked at

first to justify hierarchies domestically (class, gender, race).[22] Through often explicitly

bellicose formulations—as in Benjamin Kidd's (1858-1916) *Science of Power* (1918) for

example—these hierarchies were extended as justifications for British and American

Anglo-Saxon Protestant superiority.[23]

It should be noted, however, that a Social Darwinist outlook did not produce a

unitary political vision. Differences emerged among Social Darwinists who rejected any

state intervention in the economy, stressing an absolute laissez-faire policy in order to

determine the fittest in the population (the position of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)),

and those who stressed the need for the state to intervene elevate those whose race

was deemed superior, but had fallen on hard times and thus were not able to put their

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[20] Moore (1903)

[21] The discussion of Social Darwinism, here, draws on Claeys (2000).

[22] Salter (2002) points out how this discourse resulted in a racialization of the poor. This played upon earlier notions of the poor as being racialized, or of "inferior stock," for example French authors going back to Henri de Boulainvillier (1658-1722), but incorporated into the new "scientific racism" of Arthur de Gobineau (1816-82), and Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1854-1936), who averred that the French nobility were actually Teutonic and Aryan, whereas the peasantry were Celtic and Iberian, or Alpine (also using "indicators" like head-shape and hair color) (Painter 2010). Brazilian racial theorist Oliveira Vianna (1883-1951) extended the same argument to the Iberian peninsula, and the countries later colonized by the Iberians.

[23] The French and other Catholic colonizing countries adapted the confessional tone, but kept the racialized aspects of their civilizational superiority. But in dealing with British India in this dissertation, the emphasis is placed on the British, who were considered the global hegemonic power throughout the mid- to late nineteenth century.

racial superiority on display (the position of Karl Pearson (1857-1936)). Similarly, a

difference emerged as to what the state's role should be with respect to eugenics:

Pearson advocating for a more positive eugenics of the state in order to aid depressed

Anglo-Saxons, whereas Spencer preferred a more negative eugenics, allowing the fittest

to survive on their own without state intervention.[24]

Connections between the tenets of Realism and the tradition of geopolitics have

been made in scholarship on early International Relations theory, focusing on the

struggle for state power and survival, endemic qualities of the state and its surroundings

leading to perpetual conflict, and power as a means in itself—in the geopolitical

tradition, linked with the ideas of territorial aggrandizement, augmentation, and control

of strategic locations: all of these, in the service of state power.[25] Geographers looking

at the thought of the geopoliticians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

have also stressed the linkages between Social Darwinism and Geopolitics in this

period.[26] Ratzel and, to an extent, Mackinder, performed a theoretical biologization of

the state, endowing it with attributes of a living organism. Furthermore, they situated

the state in an atmosphere marked by a struggle for survival, the need for "living space"

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[24] Claeys (2000).

[25] Ashworth (2011; 2013; 2017); Rosenboim (2015)

[26] For the Social Darwinism of Halford Mackinder's thought, see Kearns (2009), esp. chapter 3, "Making Space for Darwin," pp. 63-90. For the Social Darwinism of Friedrich Ratzel, see Heffernan (2000) and O Tuathail (1996a). For that of Alfred Thayer Mahan, see O Tuathail (1996a), p. 30.

(*Lebensraum*), the constant competition of which would lead the fittest states to survive and dominate.

In an address delivered to the Royal Geographical Society in 1887, Mackinder averred that "communities of men should be looked on as units in the struggle for existence, more or less favoured by their several environments."[27] Thus, if the struggle for survival; power competition as being rooted in human nature; states as large unitary bodies driven toward violence with other states in the quest for power and resources; and violence as this expression of state power were all basic tenets of Social Darwinism that were brought into the study of geopolitics. And if all of these tenets made their way into what became known as Realism in International Relations by way of geopolitics, we may reasonably conclude that Social Darwinism, even if indirectly, influenced the academic study of International Relations, specifically in Realist theory in the early to mid-twentieth century.[28]

The point of the preceding discussion is to emphasize the hierarchical orientation present in the conceptions of ordering international relations in the early twentieth century in contrast to the story of normative foundations and anarchical settings. What became known as Realism and Liberalism in International Relations theory were influenced by different conceptions and justifications of these hierarchies:

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[27] Mackinder's 1887 address to the Royal Geographical Society, "The Scope and Methods of Geography," quoted in Kearns (2009), p. 71.

[28] A key transitional figure here is Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943), who was the founding director of the Yale Institute for International Studies from 1935 to 1940.

the former drawing on Social Darwinist and geopolitical understandings of power as self-justificatory, which, in contrast to the supposed amoralism of Realism, goes on to justify the very values that were understood to permit the powerful states, civilizations, and races to rise to preeminence; for Liberalism, it was the "softening" values of civilization, emphasized against the barbarism of non-Western states and peoples that allowed them to enshrine particular values of the Western states in international legal theories and international institutions, like the League of Nations, taking for granted some, albeit mutable, essential difference between civilizations. Both were beholden to what John M. Hobson calls "the Eurocentric Conception of World Politics," while differing in attribution of essentiality, mutability, and aggressiveness or defensiveness in response to these differences.[29]

This Western civilizational superiority also directly fomented sentiments of Oriental inferiority, manifested through auto-Orientalism and other essentialisms (received and ironic). This will be addressed later in the dissertation in responses to colonialism, but one interesting response was in how many Muslim, Hindu, and Indian intellectuals read material power distributions onto civilizational achievements, seeing the relative power of Western empires vis-à-vis the Muslim empires and situation of Muslims and Hindus living under Western empires as the result of some cultural or civilizational shortcoming, or "Islamic Dark Age." An interesting ironic reversal of this, seen in the thought of Gandhi, Aurobindo, and Vivekananda, was to view the material

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[29] Hobson (2012).

superiority as indicative of, or compensatory for, a civilizational or moral shortcoming, whereas despite the austere humility of the majority Easterners' material situation vis-à-vis Western empires, they were the ones who were spiritually or morally superior.

As International Relations was staking out its disciplinary autonomy, focusing on the outside as opposed to the inside, to take Rob Walker's phrase, it was complicated by the situation of the colonies and colonized populations, not fully inside nor outside, existing at the *limes*.[30] This omission has brought about significant theoretical implications. In a manner similar to the "realist-idealist" debate, notions about the ethical correction of this system of imbalance that have emerged from within the camp of postcolonialism have also displayed another version of this fractal opposition, that is, the emergence of a group of scholars identifying themselves as postcolonialists and seeking to rectify the existing international asymmetry between Western developed and non-Western developing states, without divesting themselves of state-centrism or a commitment to rectify existing inequalities which may be amplified with the international enshrinement of state legitimacy. [31]

This has direct bearing on the situation in Kashmir, whereby Indian (or Pakistani) nationalist scholars may appropriate these calls for a rectification of the international status quo without addressing any claims put forth by Kashmiris calling for self-determination or a proper political outlet for the expression and redress of their

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[30] Walker (1993).

[31] A veritable industry has been created around the production of nationalist literature seeking to affirm either the Indian or Pakistani position vis-à-vis Kashmir.

grievances.[32] A rough analogy may be made to a more complex form of identity politics,

which, without a redress of structural propensities toward hierarchy will simply result in

the replication of hierarchies with alternating pieces occupying different levels;

however, in this particular case, Kashmiris are at this point denied even a political

identity separate from the states which claim sovereignty over them. The problem is not

only political, it is also conceptual. While the call to take seriously a broader inclusivity

of voices into the discipline and study of International Relations is in itself a laudable

and worthy step to take, without taking seriously problems of reification and

essentialism rampant within so much positivist methodology this will ensure the

replication of categorical reification and essentialism.

     Whereas the thrust of much of the scholarship going under the label of

"postcolonial" has set up an easy asymmetric opposition between East and West, with

the latter's power predominating over the former, some of that scholarship has been

subject to the pitfall of reification, leading to antagonisms, categorical exclusivity, and

often tending toward homogenization and in the worst cases, essentialization. The

tendency towards homogenization can be seen in the privileging of one national

discourse over the multiple competing claims for the nation, which, in turn, is reified as

a distinct entity, rather than a process-in-formation consisting of the many nationalities

and sub-nationalities vying for recognition in the postcolonial nation. Internal

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[32] The parenthetical inclusion of Pakistani represents the equal ability of Pakistanis to co-opt the discourse yet is placed in parentheses because the main focus of this dissertation is on the Indian-administered side of Jammu and Kashmir.

contestation within postcolonial circles has led to divisions over whether to either: a)

retain the label "postcolonial" in reference to its animating ethos, namely, the

interrogation of the structures of colonial domination erected over the course of

modernity; or, b) in order to make such a differentiation clear, opting instead for the

label "de-colonial," referring to the ethical goal of the animus undergirding this area of

scholarship, which adds, by way of differentiation, the epistemological fact that "post-,"

as a simple temporal register, may not come to grips with the ways in which structures

of the colonial past inflect the present.

The purpose of this dissertation is not to necessarily take a position on which

name to go by, but to make it clear that the ambition of this work is to operate on the

common ground between these two, in stark contrast to post-colonial nationalist

projects. For the purposes here, postcolonial as a single term will refer to the project of

destabilizing the structures of power that were erected by the project of colonial

modernity, whereas the hyphenated post-colonial will refer to the time period after the

period of formal colonialism has ended. This work, then, seeks to deploy the

genealogical thrust of Foucault's work, destabilizing continuous, linear understandings

of the present, alongside the more particular postcolonial critique of the continuities

and geometric transformations rooted in the period of colonialism that continue to

inflect the present.[33]

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[33] Foucault (1984). Gregory (2004), p. 265n13. By geometric transformation I am referring to the geometrical processes of reflection, rotation, dilation, or translation in which the original shape is not

This debate over the persistence of imperial structures might naturally call to mind Marxist accounts of imperial domination and the critique of power. Robert Young, drawing largely on Fanon (especially, the latter's caution against simply replacing colonial bourgeois agents of rule with native bourgeois agents), argues that postcolonial critique emerged from Marxist critique, but shifted its focus to deal with different dimensions of power.[34] I think that Young rightly points to a convergence in the two forms of critique, but this dissertation will take a more cautious approach, and not take up his line of inquiry. Some forms of Marxist critique are certainly amenable to the postcolonial critique advanced here, however, Marx's own position on colonialism and civilizations, and that of many strands of Marxism, nevertheless were ensconced within a Eurocentrism and teleological historical understanding which stressed the ultimately emancipatory and ameliorative effects of the colonial project.

The rest of this chapter focuses on three different discourses establishing hierarchies, that of civilization, imperial liberalism, and geopolitics. Each of these discourses will be addressed here with respect to their internal development and elaboration.

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altered in any way, only mirrored, turned, made larger or smaller, or moved to another position, respectively. This is similar to the discursive strategy of metaphor as described by Max Black (1954).

[34] Fanon (2004 [1961]); Young (2001).

1.2 Civilizationalism

"There is no document of culture [civilization] which is not at the same time a document

of barbarism"—Walter Benjamin, "On the Concept of History"[35]

1.2.1 Begriffsgeschichte: From Mirabeau to Huntington

This section will provide a *Begriffsgeschichte*, or "conceptual history" of

"civilization." This amounts to an archaeology, in the Foucaultian sense, or an

excavation of the deployment of these concepts from circa 1756 through the present as

well as the tracing of breaks and discontinuities. The modern concept of civilization

emerged in the later eighteenth century and developed throughout the nineteenth

century, attaching itself at first to teleologies of temporal development through

engagement with Scottish stadial history, and later to the ethnologization of difference.

The former can be seen as part of the development of what Jackson calls "civilization-in-

the-singular" (or for Bowden "civilization as ideal",) and the latter as his "civilizations-in-

the-plural" (Bowden's "civilizations as fact"), but their histories have converged and

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[35] Benjamin (2003 [1940]), p. 392. The original translation by Harry Zohn has the quote as "culture" rather than civilization, but the quote has often been rendered as "civilization," for example, in the epigraph to chapter four of Gregory (2004), ""Civilization" and Barbarbism"" and in Cannadine (2013). The usage of the quote also departs from how Benjamin deployed it, referring to scholars of ancient history (Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, in particular) excavating precious artifacts and attributing them to some high-minded notion of past cultural or civilizational achievement, without giving due recognition to the structures of expropriation of labor power ("barbarism"). In this way, Benjamin's quote rather sees what has been called "civilization" as "barbarism" due to its exploitative practices. The way that the quote, however, has often been used, is to point out the structural binarism of the term "civilization," which simultaneously denotes its opposite ("barbarism") (cf. Salter (2002)). Here, the multivalence is retained.

amalgamated, so that the civilizations that came to be identified were written onto stadial histories of development.[36]

This ethnologization of difference was originally an elaboration of Orientalist philological developments spearheaded by Orientalists working on matters of linguistic family resemblances in British India. The philological findings were then incorporated into what Trautmann calls the eighteenth century "Mosaic ethnology," a Biblically-based ethnological mapping that was all but a holdover from the European (and Islamic) medieval period, using Aristotelian arguments grounded in the descent of Noah.[37] The nineteenth century, then, saw the further anthropologization and racialization of civilizational difference, coming to a high point in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The civilization-in-the-singular notion was elaborated throughout the nineteenth century and became wedded to notions of progress and advancement. The notions of progress and advancement were crucial elements in the development of liberal political philosophy in the nineteenth century, and civilization-in-the-singular was easily incorporated into this liberal progressive history. However, this notion existed in tension with the idea of civilizations-in-the-plural, which argued the question of civilizational

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[36] Jackson (2006); Bowden (2009).

[37] Trautmann (1997) notes the similarity of the Mosaic ethnology of the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Orientalists in British India and ethnologies similarly based on descent from Noah in the eleventh century Muslim philosophers Said al-Andalusi (1029-1070) and Abu Rayhan Muhamamd al-Biruni (973-1050) and the early-seventeenth-century history Persian-Indian philosopher Firishta, also known as Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah (1560-1620).

difference on a spectrum from immutable to malleable; the positions tending toward

the latter pole adopting a more interventionist colonial position, toward the former a

more cautious non-interference policy, one example of which was Henry Sumner

Maine's idea of "indirect rule."

The modern coinage of the term "civilization" has been attributed to French

physiocrat Victor de Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau (1715-1789) in 1756, and carried with

it a religious sensibility of a softening of the heart and manners.[38] There had been

earlier usages of similar words rooted in the Latin *civitas* and *civis*, and its cognates in

French, by the fourteenth century "*civilité*," by the sixteenth century the jurisprudential

verb "*civiliser*," defined in 1743 as an "act of justice or judgment that renders a criminal

trial civil."[39] After Mirabeau's usage, it gradually acquired a notion of a softening of

manners, and an ongoing process away from a state of moral indiscretion and savagery,

as in what Lucien Febvre originally identified as the modern origin of the term, Nicolas

Antoine Boulanger's (1722-1759) *Antiquity Unveiled*, posthumously published in 1766.[40]

The emergence of the new term was ably put to use with respect to earlier notions of

barbarous or savage peoples who were either excluded from the fold of natural law, or

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[38] The discussion of the eighteenth-century origins of the term, here, is based on the work of Mazlish (2004) and Bowden (2009). Both use the work of Jean Starobinski and Émile Benveniste to update Lucien Febvre's 1930 identification of the origins of the term a decade later.

[39] As defined in the Trevoux *Dictionnaire universel*. Mazlish (2004, p. 7); Bowden (2009, p. 26)

[40] "When a savage people has become civilized, we must not put an end to the act of *civilisation* by giving it rigid and irrevocable laws; we must make it look upon the legislation given to it as a form of *continuous civilisation*" quoted in Bowden (2009, p. 27).

only included after much debate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, seeing them as lacking in civilization.

The term quickly caught on in English. Samuel Johnson incorporated it (after much prodding by James Boswell) into his 1772 *Oxford English Dictionary*; Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) used it in his 1767 *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (and perhaps a few years earlier, as indicated in a letter from David Hume to Adam Smith in 1759 on Ferguson's "treatise on Refinement").[41] Mazlish sees one reason for the remarkably rapid usage of the new term as the South Seas Expeditions of James Cook, pointing to the deployment of the neologism in their encounters with different peoples, as one of the first examples of an explicit ethnologization of the term. Specifically, we see this in the *Voyage Round the World* (1777) of Georg Forster (1754-1794), a naturalist like his father, Johann Reinhold Forster (1729-1798), whom he accompanied on James Cook's second voyage (1772-1775). Georg Forster sees civilization as a way of conceptualizing others (as either having or not having civilization) and as having a universal application detached from the particular moorings of European thought (whereby the Europeans, however, still exemplify the pinnacle of civilization).[42]

The discovery and elaboration of a rough ethnology of "savage" peoples led to a conception of a universal teleology of civilization, which proceeded in stages, elaborated

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[41] Bowden (2009), p. 31.

[42] Mazlish (2004), pp. 38-41.

early on by the thinkers associated with the Scottish Enlightenment.[43] Adam Ferguson

showed this progression running from a state of "rudeness" to a "refined," "polished"

state, in his 1767 work. Later, in his 1792 *Principles of Moral and Political Science*, this

position is amended, referring to the "polished" state as including the sociopolitical and

legal organization associated with contemporary Europe.[44] We already see the

combination of teleology and ethnology in his 1767 oeuvre, which sees the American

savages' present condition as a mirror "to the features of our own progenitors."[45] The

association of a stadial theory of civilization allowed Western Europeans to incorporate

backward peoples into their own universal histories, a feature that liberalism took as

providing the basis for its principles of tutelage later in nineteenth and twentieth

centuries. Ferguson was drawing primarily upon the work of the Jesuit priest Joseph-

Francois Lafitau (1681-1746) in his writings on Amerindian peoples.[46] Adam Smith also

drew on Lafitau in developing his four-stage theory of development—the Ages of

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[43] In particular, William Robertson (1721-93), Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, John Millar (1735-1801), Dugald Stewart (1753-1828). Although not directly associated with the Scottish Enlightenment, the stadial model was used by two others Scottish writers dealt with here, James Mill, writing about a generation later, who studied under Dugald Stewart (himself a student of Adam Ferguson) at the University of Edinburgh, and Charles Grant, associated rather with the Clapham Sect.

[44] Bowden (2009), p. 33.

[45] Bowden (2009), p. 48.

[46] Specifically, Lafitau's 1724 *Customs of the American Indians compared with the Customs of Primitive Times*.

"Hunters," "Shepherds," "Agriculture," and "Commerce"—displayed in his 1762-1763 lectures.[47]

However, an important caveat must be inserted, in that the by the end of the eighteenth century, the usage of "civilization" was not unequivocal in its association of "rudeness" with non-European barbaric or savage peoples: in Edmund Burke's 1790 *Reflections on the Revolution in France* he sees the French revolutionaries as attacking "[o]ur manners, our civilization, and all the good things which are connected with manners and civilization," and, as elsewhere, couches his own concerns with the "rudeness" and "refinement" of civilization being written onto class.[48]

The Scottish/British elaboration of stadial development found its cognate in developmental models being elaborated in France, particularly through Anne Robert Jacques Turgot's (1727-1781) four-stage theory in his "A Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind" (1750) and the Marquis de Condorcet's (1743-1794) ten-stage model in his 1794 *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*.[49] The Comte de Volney, Constantin François de Chassebœuf (1758-1820), further echoed Ferguson in equating civilization with proper (read: European) state-like government, and harkened back to John Locke, saying "*civilisation* is nothing other than

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[47] Blaney and Inayatullah (2006). John Millar (1735-1801) of the University of Glasgow and Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) of the University of Edinburgh were influential in propagating Smith's stadial theory, cf. Trautmann (1997), pp. 120-121.

[48] Mehta (1999) who, successfully, paints Burke as a more positive and sympathetic figure to the colonized Indians than the liberals, especially John Stuart Mill, hints at but largely overlooks the role of class as conditioning Burke's thought, cf. pp. 167, 172.

[49] Bowden (2009), pp. 60-63.

a social condition for the preservation and protection of persons and property etc."[50]

François Guizot's (1787-1874) 1828 *The History of Civilization* for Bowden, represents

the completion of the universalization of the teleological conception of human history.[51]

For Guizot, "[t]he idea of progress, of development, appears to me the fundamental

idea contained in the word, civilization."[52] Guizot made the connection between

progress and European history clear, and invokes Christian Providence to substantiate it,

in the process denigrating Muslim civilization. For Guizot, European supremacy was

rooted in its Roman heritage, Christianity, and the "German" idea of liberty and

individuality that allowed feudalism to overcome the barbarism after the fall of the

Roman empire.[53] Mazlish credits Guizot with offering "an ideological defense of

European supremacy as a civilization that… was to become the prevailing gospel of the

nineteenth century."[54]

    Back in Great Britain, James Mill (1773-1836) set out in his monumental *History*

of British India in 1817 (on which there will greater detail in the next chapter) the task of

ascertaining the "true state of the Hindus in the scale of civilization," linked to a broader

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[50] Quoted from Bowden (2009), p. 30.

[51] Bowden (2009) opens with a reflection on Guizot's question as to the universality of civilization: "whether it is an universal fact, whether there is an universal civilization of the human species, a destiny of humanity… For my own part, I am convinced that there is, in reality a general destiny of humanity, a transmission of the aggregate of civilization; and, consequently, an universal history of civilization to be written," p. 1.

[52] Quoted in Mazlish (2004), p. 52.

[53] Mazlish (2004), pp. 53-54.

[54] Mazlish (2004), p. 55.

project of establishing a scale of civilizational hierarchies, directly contradicting William

Robertson's claim in 1791 that India's past was marked by "ancient splendor."[55] The

explicitly political purpose was for attacking the foundations of the Orientalist project in

general, and their education scheme stressing vernacular learning in particular. The

implication was that Indian civilization was in a rather degraded state, from which uplift

was only possible by inculcation of British values, an assimilationist position that came

to be known as "Anglicism," most clearly and forcefully stated in Thomas Babington

Macaulay's (1800-1859) "Minute on Indian Education" in 1835, amid debate on the

education system to be employed in British India. However, in attacking Robertson's,

and the Orientalists' (particularly, William Jones), estimation of India's civilizational

status, Mill employed the model of social evolution used by Robertson and the other

Scottish stadial theorists. Mill's son, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), while employed by

the East India Company (from 1823 to 1858), more fully elaborated the concept of

civilization. His 1836 article "Civilization," notes the word's "double meaning. It

sometimes stands for *human improvement* in general, and sometimes for *certain kinds*

of improvement in particular."[56] In one sense advancing "in the road to perfection… But

in another sense it stands for that kind of improvement only, which distinguishes a

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[55] Quoted in Trautmann (1997), p. 120; Mehta (1999), p. 91. In making the claim against Robertson, Mill drew on the work of Charles Grant, who in a 1796 pamphlet explicitly denounced the idea, cf. Trautmann (1997), pp. 101-109.

[56] Mill (1977 [1836]), p. 119.

wealthy and *powerful* nation from savages or barbarians."[57] He similarly remarks on the

requirements of proper political society for civilization, following Volney.

In the mid-nineteenth century, we see English-language authors taking the idea

of civilization in a few different ways. These included legal and political usages, as well

as ethnological and/or racial usages. With respect to the legal-political usage of

civilization, the key text emphasized is usually John Stuart Mill's 1859 "A Few Words on

Non-Intervention," which simultaneously sets up a defense of state sovereignty in the

international order while constricting that international order to "civilized nations":

> nations which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during which it
>
> is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in
>
> subjection by foreigners. Independence and nationality, so essential to the due
>
> growth and development of a people further advanced in improvement, are
>
> generally impediments to theirs.[58]

This tract on non-intervention also emphasizes the possibility of national self-

determination, however, in conditional form: "[t]hough it be a mistake to *give* freedom

to a people who do not value the boon, it cannot be but right to insist that if they do

value it, they shall not be hindered from the pursuit of it by foreign coercion."[59]

Presumably, barbarous peoples do not properly value freedom, and this can be shown

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[57] Ibid. Emphasis in original.

[58] Mill (1984 [1859]), pp. 118-119.

[59] Mill (1984 [1859]), pp. 123-124. Emphasis in original.

by their untrustworthiness with respect to reciprocity: "barbarians will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives."[60] Mill, while far from being the most harsh or unsympathetic to the cause of the non-Europeans, nevertheless furnished the intellectual topography on which later European supremacists would stake their positions.

The legal-political line was furthered by the work of Henry Maine (1822-1888), in which we see a most explicit linkage between ancient society and undeveloped, backwards peoples, specifically in his 1861 *Ancient Law*. Maine came to argue for a distinctive quality of ancient society that abstracted it from any political conquest, and, rooted in his understanding of the Sepoy Revolt of 1857, argued that transposing modern, civilized, Western institutions onto ancient societies will only result in a violent reaction to the uprooting of the traditional lifestyle.[61] Maine's position, in the aftermath of 1857 and the formal imposition of the British government's rule over British India, was an attack on the earlier liberal utilitarian position of direct interference and imposition of British institutions in India, espoused earlier by James Mill and Macaulay.

In the development of international law, we see the creation, rooted in John Stuart Mill's ideas about the inability of barbarians to reciprocate, of the classical standard of civilization. This is most clear in James Lorimer's (1818-1890) 1883 *The*

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[60] Mill (1984 [1859]), p. 118.

[61] Mantena (2010). The next chapter will deal with Maine in more detail as it relates to British India.

Institutes of the Law of Nations, which saw humanity as divided into three concentric zones or spheres, "that of civilised humanity, that of barbarous humanity, and that of savage humanity."[62] "Barbarous humanity" for Lorimer primarily referred to China and Japan, societies that possessed complex state structures, but were lacking in Western-style forms of civilized governance. Drawing on the next line of civilizational thought outlined below, Lorimer exclaims: "[n]o modern contribution to science seems destined to influence international politics and jurisprudence to so great an extent as that which is known as ethnology, or the science of races."[63] He justifies the French conquest of Algeria, and to "talk of the recognition of Mahometan States as a question of time, is to talk nonsense" because "in order to be entitled to recognition, a State must… possess" both "the will… [and] the power to reciprocate the recognition it demands," extending John Stuart Mill's thoughts on reciprocity and barbarism.[64]

In 1894 John Westlake (1828-1913) follows the earlier equation between civilization and proper (Western-style) governmental institutions, and equating "international society" with the "society of states, having European civilization." To quote Brett Bowden, "[a]n explicit distinction between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized'

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[62] Quoted in Linklater (2016). Lorimer was Regius Chair in Public Law at the University of Edinburgh from 1862 to 1890.

[63] Quoted in Bowden (2005), p. 18.

[64] Ibid.

peoples in the eyes of international law gained such currency in the work of so many

publicists that it was virtually beyond contention."[65]

The civilizational concept was also racialized, beginning in the mid-nineteenth

century. Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882), in his four-volume *Essay on the Inequality of*

Races (1853-1855), followed Guizot in his assertion of European supremacy, but

divorced it from Guizot's justification of Divine Providence blessing Christian, Roman,

Germanic Europe, and secularized it, focusing rather on a racial justification of Teutonic

supremacy. Civilizational success was a result of whiteness or Teutonism, and

civilizational decline was attributed to inferior stock or admixture. Gustave Le Bon

(1841-1931) furthered the race-civilization nexus in the 1880s, drawing on the work of

Gobineau, and stressing the link between barbarians and the lower classes in Europe.

According to Mazlish, "[r]acial distinctions could replace the faltering aristocratic ones

as a justification for hierarchy" and

> [w]ith the advent of the concept of civilization in the eighteenth century, race
>
> could find a host on which to fasten itself. Conjectural history, with its stages of
>
> development from savages and barbarians, via nomads and agriculturalists, to
>
> commercialists and civilization, supplies the general model. Now race became
>
> the master key by which to turn that lock of history.[66]

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[65] Ibid., p. 17. Westlake was Whewell Chair of International Law at the University of Cambridge from 1888 to 1908.

[66] Mazlish (2004), p. 62.

In the United Kingdom, the racial conception of civilization was taken up by the infamous Robert Knox (1791-1862) in his *Races of Men* (1850).[67] Nineteenth-century racial science was simultaneously building upon the work of Gottingen-based Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840), who composed *On the Natural Variety of Mankind* in 1776, and reacting against the philology of the Orientalists, who had been positing versions of Indo-European unity since William Jones laid out his thesis on the common linguistic heritage of Latin, Greek, Gothic, Celtic, Persian, and Sanskrit in 1786. Jones's philological discoveries were enframed within a Biblical chronology (specifically, the Ussher chronology, dating the world's creation to 4004 B.C.), and for him, linguistic unity belied an ethnology of common descent. James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848), drawing heavily on both Blumenbach and Indological writings in his 1813 *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind*, laid out a claim for the originary unity of mankind, whereby differences in civilization caused the manifestation of different races (against the climatological thesis). Drawing on Prichard, Sanskritist Friedrich Max Müller laid out his claim for Aryan unity, Indian and European, by common linguistic descent. However, even within this framing, Henry Maine in his 1875 *The Effects of Observation of India on Modern European Thought*, adopting the ethnological thesis of Indo-European linguistic unity, nevertheless is able to account for differential civilizational attainments by

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[67] Knox, needing bodies for anatomical dissection, paid providers without inquiring into their methods of acquisition. Of the providers were William Burke and William Hare, who went on a killing spree in 1828 in order to provide such bodies. Hare turned king's evidence and confessed, and Burke was convicted of sixteen murders.

claiming that some branches of the Indo-European family are progressive (Greeks and Romans) and others are stagnant (those in India).[68]

Prichard and his followers formed the Ethnological Society of London, and in response to the "monogenist" program of this institution, drawing on the work of polygenists Robert Knox and Paul Broca (1824-1880), James Hunt (1833-1869) and Richard Burton (1821-1890) founded the Anthropological Society of London in 1863. The racial theorists sought to loosen the connection between Western Europeans and Indians and eventually succeeding in doing so. While Darwin's 1859 *Origin of Species* levelled a significant blow to the polygenist account, it also rendered the Ussher chronology ultimately unreliable.

The paradoxical impact of this was that although the polygenist account was upended, the lengthened human chronology allowed for greater time for supposed races to develop, minimizing the conceptual impact of the philological on the ethnological, and carving out intellectual space for race to be studied under biology.[69] This allowed space for the Social Darwinist arguments to enter, explaining differential civilizational attainment due to selective fitness and competition. Gregory Claeys notes how Social Darwinism inserted "a new definition of race directly attached to skin color, in which ideas of racial hierarchy and supremacy were wedded to earlier notions of

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[68] Trautmann (1997), pp. 205-206.

[69] Trautmann (1997), pp. 165-183. The Ethnological Society of London merged with the Anthropological Society of London in 1871, forming the Royal Anthropological Institute.

"fitness." Race was now assumed to be a determinate, independent factor in human evolution."[70]

Claeys argues that by "the mid-1860s Darwin himself became a Social Darwinist, and came increasingly to hope that the optimal outcome of human natural selection would be the triumph of the "intellectual and moral" races over the "lower and more degraded ones," which was not a necessary outcome of the logic of the *Origin of Species* per se, but he was persuaded by a number of authors influenced by, and including, Herbert Spencer. [71] This is seen in Darwin's 1871 *Descent of Man*, where, in an interesting turn, but in keeping with the core tenets of Social Darwinism, he argues for the success of moral superiority, which allows for group cooperation, rather than just material superiority, a view echoed in Walter Bagehot's 1872 *Physics and Politics*.[72] This is an attribute that Darwin sees particularly in prominence among Western Europeans, but lacking among Orientals.[73]

By the close of the nineteenth century, the discourse of civilization had taken on an explicitly racial dimension, however, was not conceptually exhausted by race.[74] Race,

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[70] Claeys (2000), p. 238.

[71] Claeys (2000), p. 236. These included William Rathbone Greg, Alfred Russell Wallace, and Darwin's cousin Francis Galton.

[72] The "progress of *man* requires the co-operation of *men* for its development," "man can only make progress in 'co-operative groups,'" but the "members of such a group should be similar enough to one another to co-operate easily and readily together." Quoted in Bowden (2009), p. 64. Emphasis in original.

[73] Mazlish (2004), p. 68.

[74] In the words of Mazlish (2004), "racism in connection with the concept of civilization was an all-pervasive feature of the nineteenth century in Europe," pp. 69-70.

in its amalgamation with civilization, also mutated. We saw above notions of how the

"racialized" poorer classes in French and British theories originated in lesser stocks—in

France, the superior Germanic aristocracy and the lower Celtic peasantry. Race also

mutated across ethnic boundaries: in Scotland, the Presbyterian lowland Scots were

described by Robert Knox and Isaac Taylor as Saxon, in contrast to the Celtic highland

Scots. John Beddoe (1826-1911) studied what he saw as the different *Races of Britain* in

1862, and in the second and third editions of the work (1885, 1905) included an "index

of nigrescence" (of which Halford Mackinder availed himself), showing the commonality

of dark-haired people across the British Isles, supposed to correlate with Celtic

populations and the working class.[75]

The discourse of civilization was also highly gendered, both in the sense that

certain races and civilizations were seen as masculine or effeminate, and in the sense

that civilization can provide a corrective to excessive ("beastly") masculinity. This was

evidenced in standards of how women were expected to be treated and expected to

behave.[76] In India, this was seen in the martial race discourse, averring that some races

were naturally more inclined towards bellicosity, and some more effeminate. The

majority of India was classified as being effeminate, especially the Bengalis, over whom

the British first ruled. This was in line with the climate science that stressed that tropical

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[75] Kearns (2009), p. 73.

[76] Abrahams (1998); Bederman (1995). On the treatment of women as a marker of civilization, see Towns (2007), Narayan (1997), esp. chapter two "Restoring History and Politics to "Third-World Traditions": Contrasting the Colonialist Stance and Contemporary Contestations of *Sati*," pp. 41-80.

climes created lassitude. John Crawfurd, then-president of the Ethnological Society of London used this trope in an 1861 article to refute Friedrich Max Müller's hypothesis of Indo-Aryan unity: "I can by no means, then, agree with a very learned professor of Oxford, that the same blood ran in the veins of the soldiers of Alexander and Clive as in those of the Hindus whom, at the interval of two-and-twenty ages, they both scattered with the same facility."[77]

The notion of European racial-civilizational superiority was first put in question in the aftermath of the Battle of Tsushima and the resulting Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Inaugural Wilson Professor of International Politics, Alfred Zimmern (1879-1957), in 1905 a young classics lecturer at Oxford, said he put aside his class's lesson aside that day to speak "about the most important historical even which has happened, or is likely to happen, in our lifetime; the victory of a non-white people over a white people."[78] At the same time in Bengal, at his Patha Bhavana school in Santiniketan, Rabindranath Tagore, upon receiving the news, overjoyed, led his students out of class to an impromptu victory march.[79] The battle showed signs of the instability of discursive structure of international hierarchy, Zimmern's anxiety and Tagore's overjoyed optimism.

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[77] Quoted in Trautmann (1997), p. 181.

[78] Tinker (1977), p. 39.

[79] Mishra (2012), p. 225.

The German discourse on civilization, however, took a rather different turn than the French and British iterations, and importantly for our purposes, later converged with them, especially in delimiting specifically "Western" civilization. The Germans had two words that emerged in the eighteenth century, *Kultur*, which after 1750 came to refer to social and moral cultivation, and *Zivilisation*, which, in contrast to the thick, organic nature of *Kultur*, came to represent thin superficialities; *Kultur* was associated with a sense of national being, *Zivilisation* was associated with urban and political life, tinged with French influence.[80] *Kultur* was associated with intellectual and artistic endeavors, morality and the higher goals of moral cultivation, *Zivilisation* with mere good behavior, as described by Immanuel Kant in his 1784 *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent*: "For the idea of morality belongs to culture; and yet using this idea only in reference to semblances of morality, e.g., love of honor and outward propriety, constitutes mere civilization."[81]

This association endeared *Kultur* to another German concept, that of *Bildung*, roughly intellectual and moral development. This was deployed by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) in his *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (1784-1791), and his conception of progress was strictly rooted in the particularities and grounding of specific cultures, lending himself to a cultural pluralism. Jackson notes how the French *civilisation*, and thus the German *Zivilisation*, lent itself to universal historical

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[80] Bowden (2009), pp. 34-40; Schäfer (2004), pp. 74-75.

[81] Kant (1983 [1784]), p. 36.

development and the idea of "civilization-in-the-singular," and how *Kultur* was precisely

the answer provided to the idea of "civilizations-in-the-plural."[82] However, a rift opened

up on the notion of progress and development, as shown in Kant's critical review of

Herder's work in 1785, which stressed Kant's own commitment to universal markers of

cultural achievement as exemplifications of reason, rather than the cultural relativism

Herder was charged with espousing.[83] For Kant, universal history was rather the gradual

advance from conditions of barbarism to nationhood.

In the next generation, we see Hegel combining the principles that reason can

reveal universal truths and that communities have unique values.[84] For Hegel, Reason's

unfolding constitutes the progress of Universal History, Universal History belongs to the

realm of Spirit, whose essence is freedom, which is seen as "the recognition and

adoption of such universal substantial objects as Right and Law and the production of a

reality that is accordant with them—the State."[85] The State is thus seen as the actuality

of the ethical Idea of Freedom, wherein we see the reconciliation of "the particularity of

each individual person with the general imperatives of the group."[86] But his recognition

of History is seen as an unfolding from the Greco-Roman world toward the north and

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[82] Jackson (2006), p. 86.

[83] See Kant's "Review of Herder's *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*, Part Two (1785)," in Eze (1997), pp. 66-70.

[84] One is tempted to posit an analogical relationship to Hegel on the order of *Zivilisation* : *Kultur* :: *Mortalität* : *Sittlichkeit*.

[85] Bowden (2009), p. 67.

[86] Jackson (2006), p. 87.

west, Europe is seen as "the end of world history, just as Asia is its beginning."[87] Asia, and India in particular, is written out of history, seen as an absence of the actuality of the nation in the state, due to its lack of internal political unity. Thus, through the colonial project, India can be brought back into History, but not as an author, at least not until after a nation and state form have been created.[88] Marx later extended a version of this argument to his teleology of historical materialism, similarly justifying colonialism for bringing history to India and elsewhere.

Much of German culture was enthused with a general spirit of philhellenism that abounded in the 1820s during the Greek War of Independence. The spirit of philhellenism brought on by the Greek War was conceptually tied up with a denigration of Muslimness (specifically, the Muslimness of the Ottomans), which underwent a process of racialization with the gradual emergence of a distinct concept of a Muslim civilizational unity from the 1820s to the 1880s.[89] Thus, in an interesting coincidence of geopolitics and academic civilizationalism, the idea of "Western civilization" came into popular consciousness in definitional and political opposition to the Muslim other. The

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[87] Ibid.

[88] Inden (2000), pp. 7-8.

[89] "On balance, however, the Greek rebellion helped catalyze a shift in European public opinion against the Ottomans. European empires mobilized in support of Greek nationalism, despite the antinationalist principles of the Congress of Vienna," Aydin (2017), pp. 51-52. On the specific delimitation of Muslim civilization, and the racialization of this otherness, see chapter two. The aspect of racialization comes in the form of both "Semitic" philological ethnology and distinct religious difference. On the utilization of the same kind of essentialist language deployed to frame Muslim civilization in order to counteract European imperial aims and voice calls for political protections, rights, and self-determination, see chapter three. This is in general support of the thesis in Said's *Orientalism* (2003), that the Orient was a negative image against which the West defined itself.

phenomenon of philhellenism sees its rise in Germany with the turn of the century

Romantic works by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), Friedrich von Schiller

(1759-1805), and in Germaine de Staël's (1766-1817) *De l'Allemagne* (1810-13).[90] The

philhellenism of the German Romantics was institutionalized educationally in the

program set for the newly founded University of Berlin by Prussian education minister

Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1810, which tied Greek learning to *BIldung*.[91] Jackson sees this

philhellenism connected to *Bildung* in the emergence of a category (formed in political

opposition to the ideas of French Revolution) referring to the unity of Europe (for

Novalis (1772-1801) it was "Christendom"; for Burke and Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821)

Europe was "a notion of a spiritual or cultural unity that underlay a number of countries

and excluded some others").[92] In this context, the emergence of the "evening land"

(*Abendland*) or "West" emerged, the precise boundaries of which were in flux, but "one

thing is quite unambiguously clear: the heart of the *Abendland* is Christianity…

understood as a *whole*, a unit."[93]

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[90] Painter (2010), pp. 59-71, 91-103. Painter sees the art historian Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-68) contributing to the philhellenism through the idea of Greek beauty.

[91] Jackson (2006), pp. 90-93.

[92] Jackson (2006), p. 94n21.

[93] Jackson (2006), pp. 93-94. Emphasis in original. Jackson probably overemphasizes the totality of Christianity, especially the inclusion of eastern churches. This discussion also impacted Russian notions of belonging either to part of the Western Christian civilizational milieu or a distinctive Slavophilic Eastern Europe. Neumann (1996) situates a crucial defining point in the emergence of this debate in Russia to the same period, namely the Decembrist Revolution of 1825, between the Westernizing European Decembrists and the Romantic Slavophiles. Geographer Conrad Malte-Brun (1775-1826) at this time contended that Russian geographers had "proved" the Urals to have formed the Europe-Asia boundary line, thus proving Russia's incorporation into continental Europe. Lewis and Wigen (1997), p. 217n47. Contrarily, however, Slavophiles pushed for the acknowledgment of a Eurasian region, the definition and boundaries of which often shifted. Lewis and Wigen (1997), p. 222n98. This can be seen as an example of

In the lead-up to World War I, Jackson further distinguishes between the rhetorical deployments of the German *West*, associated with France, Great Britain, and *Zivilisation*, whereas *Abendland* was associated with "an encompassing community" including all sides of the conflict.[94] In the aftermath of the war, Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* (1918) saw a new elaboration of the concepts of *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*, the former seen as the animating spirit of a people, the latter as its reified, ossified form before shattering and falling: as Spengler put it "the living body of a soul and the mummy of it," respectively.[95] In interwar Germany there were further elaborations of the *Kultur-Zivilisation* antagonism: Thomas Mann (1875-1955), Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936), and Alfred Weber (1868-1958) viewed *Kultur* as pure spirituality or "a set of normative principles, values, and ideals," and *Zivilisation* as mere mechanization, or conquest over nature.[96] In 1930 Sigmund Freud elaborated his idea of civilization as a thin veneer over our more brute passions.[97] Later, in 1939 Norbert Elias historicized this, framing the "civilizing process" as within a historical context of manners and the transition from courtly to bourgeois society.[98] Further, Elias critiqued the European assumption in the nineteenth century that civilization was just an inherent

a general thesis of this dissertation: civilizational scriptings are political acts, and never done in the abstract, but are always territorialized.

[94] Jackson (2006), p. 97.

[95] Quoted in Schäfer (2004), p. 77.

[96] Bowden (2009), p. 37; Schäfer (2004), pp. 77-78.

[97] Mazlish (2004), pp. 78-84.

[98] Mazlish (2004), pp. 84-88.

part of European society, and the European extension of the civilizing process through imperialism.[99] For Elias, the "concept of *Kultur* delimits" and "places special stress on national differences and the particular identity of groups", whereas "the concept of civilization plays down the national differences in between peoples," but not extending generally to non-European peoples.[100] But Spengler's viewing *Zivilisation* as the destiny of *Kultur* helped erode the antagonism, and in the aftermath of World War II was used as a way to link West Germany to the other nations in the West, or more precisely, the *Abendland*.[101] Romanticist Germans stressing *Kultur* stressed its distinctiveness from the West of *Zivilisation*, nevertheless the *Abendland* was seen as inclusive of Germany, but in most cases exclusive of the Russian east, stressing at this time German connections with Greek. During World War II, commentators in the West, saw Nazism as an incarnation of Eastern barbarism or subversive Eastern ideas, and carried this over to the Cold War, forming an alliance on this idea with Western German politicians in both major political parties. In the words of Konrad Adenauer in March 1946, "Asia stands at the Elbe."

The concept of *Bildung* merged with the notion of the West in United States universities, specifically as inculcated by students in "Western Civilization" courses and *Bildung*-inspired liberal arts programs, stressing a "heliotropic" course of history from

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[99] Linklater (2016).

[100] Bowden (2009), p. 38

[101] Jackson (2006), pp. 104-111.

the Greeks, through Europe, and to the United States. Jackson dates this to Charles Eliot

Norton's (1827-1908) fine arts survey at Harvard in 1873, and then more concretely to

the "Contemporary Civilizations" general education course at Columbia that began in

1919. In his words, "[t]hese courses took over and furthered the *Abendland* notion of

'the West' that had emerged in the German academy, modified only by the insertion of

the United States into the same historical sequence."[102] President of Columbia

University Nicholas Murray Butler who served in this capacity from 1902 to 1945,

pushed for a unificatory liberal arts program there, and the technique for doing this, as

in German educational system, was an emphasis on unity of the cultural world to which

the students belonged, including its ancient origins.[103] This adopted the German

philhellenic understanding of Greece as the origin of the West. The basic framework of

the course spread to other United States universities, including Harvard (under the title

"Western Thought and Institutions"), Chicago, and Stanford. John Erksine's (1879-1951)

Great Books course converged with the spirit of Contemporary Civilization, providing

primary sources for the study of Western civilization. By the mid-1940s, in the aftermath

of World War II, there had developed a clear and coherent notion of what the West was,

and it had been thoroughly assembled, its history actively written. Thus, in the Cold War

period, "civilization-in-the-singular" came to be identified with Western civilization, and

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[102] Jackson (2006), p. 100.

[103] "[T]he antidote to specialization was occidentalism." Jackson (2006), p. 101.

Western civilization had been thoroughly filled in and contrasted to other civilizational

entities.

For the colonized world, especially British India, World War I put the incivility of

the West on full display.[104] This was further compounded in British India with the

Rowlatt Act, extending emergency measures in March 1919, the Jallianwala Bagh

massacre during protests against this act in April 1919, and the insufficiencies of the

Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of December 1919. The liberal program of self-

determination further placed an urgency on defining a people as a nation, and on

demonstrating "civilization," or a capacity for self-government.

In the aftermath of World War II, the discourse of civilization generally gave way

to that of modernization and development, Rostow's five stages of economic growth

being an exemplary case.[105] A notable exception is in the figure of Arnold Toynbee, who

sought to synthesize the two earlier notions of civilizations. His twelve-volume *A Study

of History* (1934-1961) sought, along Spenglerian lines, to enumerate a number of

civilizations which go through a cyclical rise and fall. Spengler specified eight

civilizations: Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, Mesoamerican, Classical/Greco-

Roman, Magian/Arabian, and Western/Faustian. Toynbee enumerates a total of twenty-

eight, through stages of rise, fall, and in many cases collapse, resulting in four remaining

dominant civilizations of Western (including "Orthodox" Russian), Islamic, Hindu, and

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[104] Adas (2004).

[105] Rostow (1960).

Far Eastern. In Toynbee's *Civilization on Trial* (1948) he states that "[c]ivilizations have come and gone, but Civilization (with a big 'C') has succeeded" or endured.[106] But World War II had significantly dented his optimism in Western civilization, which he had increasingly equated with modernity. Aydin argues that this equation by Toynbee was picked up by Islamicist theorists, stressing anti-modernist political programs as a part of anti-Western political orientations, retrenching towards a conceptualization of an authentic non-Western and therefore non-modern tradition.[107] Mian Mohammed Sharif, in his "Introduction" to the landmark work *History of Muslim Philosophy* in 1966, takes up exactly Toynbee's thesis of the rise and fall of civilizations.[108] Sharif also borrows Western characterizations that associated Muslim material power with civilizational achievements, labelling the period of 1700 to 1850 a "Dark Age."

While the notion of civilization-in-the-singular was largely displaced in favor of modernization and development during the Cold War, seen as an atavism of the bygone colonial era, it reemerged with ferocity during the soul-searching that took place in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The Western triumphalism that emerged in Fukuyama's notorious "end of history" argument can be read as a defense of civilization-in-the-singular, equated with a broad and selective teleological reading of

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[106] Quoted in Bowden (2009), p. 40.

[107] Aydin (2017), p. 197.

[108] Sharif (1966).

Western European and North American history.[109] The pages of *The Atlantic* proved

fertile to post-Cold War speculations. While John Mearsheimer pointed to the rise of

multipolarity and the return of nationalism in August 1990, the next issue had Bernard

Lewis musing on a specific manifestation of this nationalism, but broadened, racialized,

and de-secularized as "Muslim rage."[110] Four years later in the same periodical, Robert

Kaplan announced "the coming anarchy," rooted in a Malthusian anxiety but specifically

directly at the Third World, and Africa in particular.[111] As Kevin Dunn puts it, "[t]he

symbolic linchpin in his argument was the collapse of civilisation in Africa."[112]

It is to the article by Lewis that credit, or blame, is given for coining the phrase

"clash of civilizations," which Samuel Huntington picked up and deployed in his article

and book of the same title.[113] Huntington based his conception of civilizational blocs on

the earlier models of Spengler, and especially Toynbee, enumerating "seven or eight

major civilizations" (Western, Confucian/Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-

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[109] Fukuyama (1989).

[110] Mearsheimer (1990); Lewis (1990).

[111] Kaplan (1994). Simon Dalby points out that Kaplan does not simply apply Malthusian principles to the current environmental and population pressures but smuggles in a host of assumptions about the inability of Africans to develop along Western lines, and the complications for the security United States represented by this. Dalby (1998).

[112] Dunn (2004), p. 484.

[113] Huntington (1993, 1996). "This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both," Lewis (1990). Huntington sees it fit to accept Lewis's authority on the matter and uses this block quote, and more, in both his article (1993, p. 32) and book (1996, p. 213).

Orthodox, Latin American, and "possibly African").[114] Huntington, while focusing on

civilizations-in-the-plural, however, accepts as his standard for civilization-in-the-

singular the tenets established by his "Western" civilization, as when he points to "the

greater clash, the global "real clash," between Civilization and barbarism."[115] His

civilizations are reified and constituted as "*objects* with essentially continuous core

features."[116] Shapiro locates in Huntington's thesis "a moral geography, a security-

oriented ethico-political initiative aimed at protecting an enclave whose civilizational

integrity is more a function of the way he tells the story than it is of stable cultural or

civilizational difference."[117]

For all of its empirical falsities, the ways in which essentialisms smoothly gloss

over internal contestations of the posited civilizations, the lack of attention to change

within and exchange between civilizations, and the spate of academic literature refuting

the factual basis of civilizations, let alone the assumptions about an inherently hostile

Islamic civilization, and a projected future of conflict between civilizational blocs, it has

proved remarkably influential in articulating racial and civilizational anxieties felt

amongst a certain sector of the (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) American population; in

the words of Michael Shapiro, "Huntington an articulate exemplar of those who think

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[114] Huntington (1993), p. 25; (1996) pp. 45-47.

[115] Huntington (1996), p. 321; Jackson (2007), ""Our civilization" easily becomes "civilization,"" p. 47.

[116] Hall and Jackson (2007), p. 6.

[117] Shapiro (1998).

that the United States – as part of an entity called "the West"—is threatened by the

increasing presence of cultural Others."[118] In Huntington, much of the conceptual

spillovers of race and civilization are in evidence, for Ali Mazrui "the conflicts may be as

much *racial* as *cultural*, as much *intra*-civilizational as *inter*-civilizational."[119] John M.

Hobson points to how Huntington shares

> with the racist cultural-realists—Stoddard, Grant and Pearson—an overarching
>
> desire to maximize the distance between East and West, especially by curtailing
>
> non-white, non-Western immigrants and by policing and protecting the
>
> boundary between white and non-white, Western and non-Western,
>
> civilizations.[120]

Much of this anxiety is in evidence today among a resurgence of right-wing

cultural nationalists, including United States President Trump, and a host of European

political parties whose central platforms revolve around anti-immigration and anti-

Muslim policies, based on an imagined nostalgia for a culturally homogeneous and

impossibly prosperous society.[121] This is in evidence elsewhere in Huntington's oeuvre,

as in his *Who Are We?* (2004), lamenting the rise of a Catholic, Hispanophone United

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[118] Shapiro (1998).

[119] Mazrui (1997), p. 37. Emphasis in original.

[120] Hobson (2012), p. 284.

[121] A Venn diagram would show an enormous degree of overlap between the anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments, but with slivers being retained for opposition to immigration from other ethnicities, and for foreign policy positions which project this anti-Muslim sentiment. Much of this antagonism, immigration as precluding broad-based working-class prosperity, conveniently displaces economic grievances onto cultural ones. See Connolly (2017).

States, pointing to Miami as the harbinger of Anglo doom in the rest of the country.[122]

Thus, while often disconnected in large measure from verified empirical realities, and

having his concepts obfuscated, or defined, by reifications and selective focal points,

Huntington nevertheless is able to articulate an anxiety which largely corresponds to the

anxieties that resulted in the elevation of Donald Trump to the United States

presidency, and, importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, the rise of the

Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India.[123] A foreign

policy manifestation of Huntington's "clash" thesis can be clearly seen in Trump's

speech in Warsaw, 6 July 2017, stressing the "extremist" threat of "radical Islamic

terrorism" against "our civilization," "the West."[124]

A neo-imperialist take on Huntington can be seen in imperial apologist Niall

Ferguson, whose equation of the West with the concept of civilization is painfully

conspicuous in his book's title, *Civilization: The West and the Rest*.[125] A more productive

response to the "clash" thesis emerged in the form of an advocacy for a "dialogue of

civilizations," put forth by Iranian President Mohammed Khatami to the UN General

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[122] Huntington (2004). On Miami as a doomsday prophecy for the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant United States, see pp. 247-251. This section was rooted in his *Foreign Policy* article published in 2004 entitled "The Hispanic Challenge."

[123] Huntington closes his book stressing a disconnect between cosmopolitan elites and "The overwhelming bulk of the American people [who] are committed to a national alternative and to preserving and strengthening the American identity that has existed for centuries," p. 366.

[124] Lozada (2017). There is much slippage between "our civilization" and "civilization itself" in the speech, primarily written by Stephen Miller, with much conceptual resonance to then-senior advisor Steve Bannon.

[125] Ferguson (2011a).

Assembly on September 21, 1998, and proposed designating the year 2001 as the "Year of the Dialogue of Civilizations." His proposal retained a notion of reified civilizational entities as distinct, similar to Huntington, but proffered a position of positive recognition and multicultural tolerance, rooted in Habermasian communicative rationality, rather than retrenchment and conflict.[126]

In intellectual history, the defense of Western civilization has often taken the form of the defense of Enlightenment values and tradition, which often takes a reductive and selective reading of the movement, as evidenced in the work of Stephen Pinker, especially his progressivist teleological *Enlightenment Now*, with its untrammeled faith in the betterment of humankind and the rationality of market forces.[127]

Hamid Dabashi sees the recent return of the discourse of "civilization" as the death throes of empire.

> The re-emergence of civilizational thinking at the last two decades of the twentieth century and at heart of capitalist modernity is a defense mechanism, a futile attempt to salvage an outdated mutation of capital and culture at the commencement of the project early in the eighteenth century.[128]

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[126] Petito (2007).

[127] See Guilhot (2018) for a good critique of Pinker's book. Irfan Ahmed's *Religion as Critique* (2017) anthropologizes the European Enlightenment, viewing it as a manifestation of cultural particularism.

[128] Dabashi (2004), p. 245.

1.2.2 Ontological Matters: Viewing Civilizations as Processes, Destabilizing Civilizational

Substantialism

While the above telling traces the development of the concept of "civilization,"

this dissertation focuses on the shifts which occur in both how civilization and

civilizations are conceptualized, and how specific civilizations have been delineated

apart from and against others. In most of the authors above, civilization "as ideal" or

"in-the-singular" was aspirational and abstracted from particularist upper-class,

masculinist, Western Christian practices, sometimes unknowingly, other time making

the connection explicit. It was associated with advancement, progress, modernity

against retrograde forms of living. Civilizations "as fact" or "in-the-plural," rested upon

an ontological substantialism: the supposition that such civilizations do independently

exist. This carried with it the further implication that if such a civilization did exist, it

would have a significant amount of common identifiable features that would be able to

constitute its basic identity.

As these features became enumerated and defined, they were taken as the

essential building blocks of the civilization, without which it would not have enough

conceptual stability to exist. These features necessarily privileged certain segments of

the society of which they were elaborating, often the clerisy, literati, and upper classes.

These agents were actively involved in defining and elaborating the constituent

elements of the civilization in question. In colonized societies, this conceptually works

against the idea that civilizational identity was an active imposition by a forceful

colonizing agent against a passive colonized subject. While power asymmetry must be

accounted for, politically, materially, and ideationally, collaborating agents benefitting

from imperial Western rule did actively contribute to, albeit in differing degrees, the

delineation and definition of civilizational membership.

Thus, in recognition the circulation of power, this dissertation agrees with

Edward Said's contention "that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed

over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient's

difference with its weakness."[129] However, in both auto-Orientalism and nationalist

"post-colonialism," the role of colonized agents is completely erased. The succeeding

chapters read in dialogical fashion, where we have elaborations emanating at first from

the British, then adaptations, adoptions, and reworkings in the anti-colonial movement,

then a re-imposition of definitions in their period after colonialism on a sub-national

group (Kashmiris), and finally the modalities of the Kashmiri response.

Pinar Bilgin, writing against Khatami's notion of the "dialogue of civilizations,"

avers that civilizations ought to be conceptualized as dynamic processes in the making,

rather than as stable, stagnant unities.[130] In the process, this helps to destabilize

conceptual state-centrism. Thus, in line with the process philosophy of Mustafa

Emirbayer, this dissertation focuses on the shifts and changes within articulations of

civilization and civilizations, rather than treating them as reified entities.[131] Linklater

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[129] Said (2003 [1978]), p. 204.

[130] Bilgin (2012).

[131] Emirbayer (1997); Nexon and Jackson (1999).

holds that this is much in line with the thinking of Norbert Elias, who traced patterns

and manners across courtly societies into bourgeois ones in Western Europe.[132]

The enactments and deployment of the discourse of civilizationalism (both "as

fact" and "as ideal") has been justificatory in the West of "Western" supremacy and has

been viewed as the moral accompaniment of European imperialism. Bowden holds to

the claim that "civilization and hierarchy go hand-in-hand."[133] The next two sections

briefly recapitulate the ideas of imperial liberalism and geopolitics, and how they

combine with civilizationalism.

1.3 Liberalism and Empire

Much of this section of the dissertation draws on the pathbreaking work of

scholars working on the combination of liberalism and empire in the period after the

end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, there emerged debates about the

definitional difference between hegemony and imperialism, and with it, some calling for

a renewed version of imperialism, often couched in humanitarian terms, as with

Michael Ignatieff.[134] Personalities like the historian Niall Ferguson, who figured the

British Empire for a moral enterprise, stressed how Britain was able to bring

enlightenment and development to otherwise backwards peoples, especially focusing

on India. His attempt was to reconstruct the debate about imperialism as a moral one,

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[132] Linklater (2016).

[133] Bowden (2015).

[134] Ignatieff (2003).

crediting all progress in South Asia to British intervention, and all problems as resultant

from uppity anti-colonials resisting full implementation of British schemata in favor of

local autonomy, however misguided. The political purchase is clear and explicit, as he

urges the United States to be the twenty-first century incarnation of the British Empire

and further, elides the distinction between hegemony and empire. Ferguson's account is

disingenuous in the extreme toward the capacity of non-Western development, with

attendant moral implications, and the connection between liberal imperialism and

civilization is clear, if not completely convergent.[135] Thankfully, in combating this facile

and reductionist Eurocentric narrative, much fruitful scholarship has emerged in the

past two decades, or so, largely beginning with Uday Mehta's *Liberalism and Empire* in

1999.

Duncan Bell presents a typology of this work on the connections between

liberalism and empire: either rejectionist, of necessity, or contingent. The rejectionist

line of the connection between liberalism and empire posits that empire is a corruption

of and deviation from liberal principles, and that true liberalism cannot be imperialist.

The argument of necessity holds that imperialism is inextricable from liberalism, which

must spread and proselytize, in the form of instruction and tutelage. The argument from

contingency locates the relationship in a broad middle-ground, wherein the connections

between the two are teased out and made explicit, but these are specific entanglements

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[135] Ferguson (2003; 2004); For a lively and heated exchange, see Pankaj Mishra's (2011) eviscerating review of Ferguson's *Civilisation*, pointing to the racial Eurocentric hierarchy and Islamophobia implicit in the work. Ferguson responded by threatening Mishra with libel charges (2011b).

in specific moments, and broader questions about intrinsic relationship between the two are left aside.[136] This work, focusing as it does in chapter three on anti-colonial manifestations of liberalism, most prominently in the voice of Nehru, is located in this contingent conceptual middle-ground. However, chapter four's focus on the quasi-imperial and/or imperial relationship between Indian liberalism and Kashmir, highlights the fact that most incarnations of liberalism, while preaching universalism, nevertheless smuggle in particularisms. This is due to the plastic, malleable character of liberalism; in the words of Bell, "[l]iberalism was a protean phenomenon, a shape-shifting amalgam of philosophical arguments and political-economic practices encompassing diverse views on the self, society, economy, and government."[137]

1.3.1 Liberalism

Figuring centrally, here, will be an attempt to define liberalism and point to the particular constellation that has allowed it to converge and justify imperialism. Beate Jahn, in her immanent critique of liberalism, points to its fragmentary nature, as allowing for contradictory manifestations throughout history, complicating any straightforward normative assessment: "[t]he power of liberalism in history is driven by its contradictions and fragmentary dynamics, not by the universal validity and gradual realization of its principles—it is, in short, both beneficial and destructive."[138] Further,

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[136] Bell (2016), p. 21.

[137] Bell (2016), p. 19.

[138] Jahn (2013), p. 187.

liberalism's fragmentations preclude its very goals: "[s]ince the fragmentary dynamics of liberalism entail the constitution of nonliberal forces, the attempt of a universal realization of liberal principles is bound to fail."[139]

Jahn's immanent critique focuses on the historical elaboration of the disjuncture between liberal politics, economics, and norms, and between these components' function in liberal theory as opposed to liberal practice. She seeks the foundation for these liberal principles in a grounded reading of John Locke, who, she argued, presented "the historically specific interests of a small group of his contemporaries in private property, individual freedom, and government by consent as natural principles of human life, " and stresses that the fragmentation of liberalism on an intellectual level resulted from an abstraction from this historically specific articulation.[140] For Locke, the political democratization of liberalism was "only possible once the majority of the population has acquired a positive stake in upholding liberal institutions. Hence, the maintenance and strengthening of liberal democracy requires the continued provision of material benefits to the population, that is, it required economic growth."[141] T

he same argument is picked up and elaborated by other core constituents to the liberal tradition, including Adam Smith (1723-1790), David Ricardo (1772-1823), and Thomas Babington Macaulay, articulating anti-democratic sentiments based on having

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[139] Jahn (2013), p. 9.

[140] Jahn (2013), p. 53.

[141] Jahn (2013), pp. 95-96.

an economic stake in the governing scheme, which animated Ricardo's and Macaulay's opposition to franchise extension.[142] Jahn traces a straight line from Locke through Smith and Ricardo, pointing to Locke's claim that private property constitutes natural right of all individuals disposed to trade; the market then produces equilibrium between supply and demand, which will lead to increased production and a rise in absolute incomes; this prosperity then comes to constitute liberal individuals, liberal political culture, and provides the conditions for liberal democracy to develop; government then functions to provide a legal framework, but through minimal intervention; and Ricardo's comparative advantage pushes for a division of labor which then internationalizes economic liberalism, wherein it entails interdependence and, then, peaceful co-operation.[143] Jahn connects this through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into contemporary liberal and neoliberal international theory.

Her purpose, then, is to account for these wild disjunctures between this liberal harmony of interests and the existence of exploitative systems of imperialism and dependence, which she sees as *contingent* manifestations of a fragmentation *necessary* to the existence of a unified liberal theory: "the fallacy or basic problem of liberal political approaches, both in theory and practice, is indeed one of fragmentation and of misattributing the core characteristics of liberalism to one of its contingent expressions:

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[142] Jahn (2013), p. 108.

[143] Jahn (2013), pp. 109-110.

democracy and liberal political institutions more generally."[144] And all of these

problems, again, result from abstracting from Locke universal principles which were in

fact grounded in particular interests of Whiggish aristocracy, leading

> to the restriction of political rights to property owners, to the exclusion of
>
> communities from property rights, to the codification of these inequalities in
>
> law, to the restriction of this law to particular communities (that is, to the
>
> establishment of states), and ultimately to the restriction of the rights of states
>
> to those communities powerful enough to successfully claim it.[145]

Mehta, similarly, takes Locke as his prime exemplar of liberalism and his

particularist elaborations as the font from which later liberal justifications of imperial

practices spring. In particular, he homes in on the notions of progress or temporal

development, and tolerance of difference, specifically, cultural difference. His study of

liberalism, in the estimation of Duncan Bell, "comes close" to endorsing the necessary

entailment of liberalism and imperialism. In one line, in the "Introduction" to Mehta's

book it looks like outright endorsement of this position: "[t]he claims I make about

liberalism are, I believe, integral to its political vision and not peculiar amendments or

modifications imposed on it by the attention to India."[146]

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[144] Jahn (2013), p. 100.

[145] Jahn (2013), p. 170.

[146] Mehta (1999), p. 9.

For Mehta, Locke provides the basis for the development of a theory of time, as progress and maturity. Focusing especially on Locke's 1693 *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, he sees liberalism as developing ideas of tutelage and immaturity: "India is in a condition of tutelage. Like Lockean children, it is born to freedom but not yet capable of exercising it."[147] Further, "[t]he central axis on which nineteenth-century liberal justifications of the empire operate is time, and its cognate, patience. It is the historical time of the past and the political time of the future."[148] The notion of progress and civilizational attainment is rooted in a kind of analogic Lockean recapitulation theory, for Mehta, wherein cultural development is anthropomorphized as individual development. This allows for a withholding of the granting of political rights, under the framework of tutelage and wardship, into an indefinitely and continually forestalled future.

Mehta then proceeds to read nineteenth-century liberal justifications of imperialism as developments of this general Lockean notion, now read through particularism of nineteenth-century British thought and tied up with notions of civilizationalism. He points to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Walter Bagehot (1826-1877):

> who, notwithstanding—indeed, on account of—their reforming schemes,
>
> endorse the empire as a legitimate form of polit and commercial governance;
>
> who justify and accept its largely undemocratic and nonrepresentative structure;

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[147] Mehta (1999), p. 162; for his treatment on *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, see pp. 59-63.

[148] Mehta (1999), p. 106. He references John Seeley's quip, "politics and history are only different aspects of the same study," which was later echoed by Edward Augustus Freeman.

who invoke politically relevant categories such as history, ethnicity, civilizational

hierarchies, and occasionally race and blood ties; and who fashion arguments for

the empire's at least temporary necessity and foreseeable prolongation.[149]

With Mehta, as for Jahn, the particularism and the abstraction of universal

principles from the particularism of the development of liberalism, allows for the

application of metrics of mimetic maturation, which carry with them problems for the

very possibility of fully assimilating difference. Aside from assimilation, Mehta, holds

that, in effect, liberalism is unable to tolerate difference, to truly appreciate the "other"

in all of their "singularity," and their "modes of experience."[150] Thus, he holds, that

liberalism, by virtue of its intrinsic qualifications of progress and assimilative cognitive

dispositions, is unable to truly appreciate cultural difference, and lends itself quite easily

to imperialist practices.[151]

While the above treatments of liberalism by Jahn and Mehta are outstanding in

their own respects, Duncan Bell raises a crucial question: what if Locke was not a

liberal? The implication would certainly complicate readings of liberalism rooted in the

foundational figure of Locke. Bell takes a "summative conception" of liberalism, that is,

that "the liberal tradition is constituted by the sum of the arguments that have been

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[149] Mehta (1999), p. 2. Further, "the British Empire in India is understood squarely from within the normative framework of liberal thought, along with its reliance on history and civilizational standing, where both were understood as linked to the imperatives of progress," p. 88.

[150] Mehta (1999), pp. 25, 49.

[151] Mehta points to Burke as a rectification to liberal intolerance, whose textured understanding of the other's lived "modes of experience" can serve as a caution against the application of thin abstract universals, see esp. pp. 153-189.

classified as liberal, and recognized as such by other self-proclaims liberals."[152] Placing

this conception with a Skinnerian contextualist approach to liberalism, he sees the

political deployment of the term only being used in Britain beginning in the early

nineteenth century, first being borrowed from the Spanish *Liberales* of the Constitution

of 1812 and derogatorily used against the Whigs. In the 1820s, the term was reclaimed

by radical Whigs "to characterize individuals and policies dedicated to non-revolutionary

reform," but "liberals" were not firmly defined until the 1850s and 1860s, when the

"fissile coalition" of radicals, Whigs, and free-trading Tories formed the party of that

name.[153]

Texts of liberal auto-historiography, or canonical history, only began to be

written in the late nineteenth century, and, in earnest, from the turn of the century, but,

interestingly, Locke does not figure in the texts of this period at all, let alone as a

founding figure. Ideas of liberal foundations were seen to be resultant of the rise of

democracy and/or the period of revolutions, namely the industrial (usually dated to the

1760s), the American, and the French.[154] In the late nineteenth and very early twentieth

centuries, Locke's political philosophy was taken for an outdated natural rights theory

and contractualism, and usually denigrated as anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian

Whiggism: a product of his political time and circumstances. It was only beginning in the

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[152] Bell (2016), p. 70.

[153] Bell (2016), p. 74.

[154] Bell (2016), p. 75.

1930s, and consolidated by the 1950s, that an earnest attempt began to not only

incorporate Locke into the liberal canon, but to establish elements of his political

philosophy as foundational to the liberal tradition. This fit the circumstances of the mid-

twentieth century, "as liberalism was reconfigured as the ideological other of

"totalitarian" ideologies, left and right."[155]

 This dissertation is in basic agreement with the outlines of Jahn and Mehta,

however, a few distinctions must be made. Rather more in line with Jahn, and against

Mehta, there are certainly elements of liberalism which lend themselves to either post

factum imperial justification or even positive manifestos for the imperial project itself,

but this is perhaps not a necessary element of liberalism and might rest more on the

specific discursive circumstances of its elaborations. Marxist theories are apt to adopt

the necessitarian position, wherein any elaboration of liberal capitalism is inclined

towards some form of imperialism, and the definition of imperialism in these Marxist

theories is usually quite broad, not restricted to some form of extra-territorial conquest

and withholding of political rights enjoyed in the metropole.[156] Liberal apologists, dating

back to Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), usually hold the rejectionist line, averring that

the spread of liberalism will extinguish the atavism of imperialism.[157]

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[155] Bell (2016), p. 81.

[156] Hardt and Negri (2000); Harvey (2003)

[157] A more recent position, more popular in non-academic spheres, however, is taking up the question of empire as an ethical question, usually done in a rather crude, unsystematic utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, which deploys particular valuations and brackets possibilities for alternative histories or developments. Bruce Gilley and Nigel Biggars made waves in 2016, arguing for the positive effects and benefits of civilization brought by imperialism. Shashi Tharoor's address to the Oxford Union in 2015

Much of this, however, rests on the specific definitions of imperialism utilized, which will be treated below. Also, against Mehta and Jahn, who perform the same retrojective process applied by the liberal canonists who sought to incorporate Locke into the canon, we can see the same fragmentary qualities and contradictions of liberalism in its nineteenth-century articulations, rather than trying to mine Locke for its origins. For Mehta, who also focuses heavily on John Stuart Mill, nineteenth-century liberal notions of difference and temporal development function just as significantly and militate against a pure democracy premised on a universal application of individual rights protected by governing structures. Thus, much of the content for liberalism can be mined from its nineteenth-century elaborations, and does not require referring back to the liberal principles of Locke. While distant echoes of tutelage and progress can be heard from Locke, these are articulated in novel, quasi-democratic ways in the later nineteenth century.[158] Further, this dissertation does not argue that imperialism is inherent in liberalism, despite the fact that much of liberal theory presupposes a unilinear historical development, precisely because of the multivocal character of liberal theory.

An example of this dissertation's departure from the necessitarian position, will be in chapter three, which focuses on anti-colonial movements in India, wherein Jawaharlal Nehru, among others, plays a significant role in articulating an anti-colonial

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stressed the brutality of British imperialism in India and made the case for reparations to be paid by the United Kingdom to India.

[158] See Ashworth (2014) on Richard Cobden and John Bright, pp. 77-78; Sylvest (2009).

liberalism, stressing the contradictions and withheld promises of British liberalism.

Chapter four, then looks at how the potentialities of this non-imperial liberalism were

dissolved in the dispute over Kashmir, through a gradual whittling away of its

asymmetrical federal status. This turn, it is argued, was resultant of specific facilitating

conditions of the international system in the post-World War II era, in particular the

development of an international norm of territorial integrity, which amplified a

"postcolonial insecurity" felt in both India and Pakistan, further exacerbated by the

binational rivalry between India and Pakistan over the area.

1.3.2 Imperialism

Imperialism, like liberalism, is generally ill-defined within the discipline. Definitional

imprecision usually has it bound up with either hegemony, unipolarity, or, for Marxists,

general exploitative relations, territorialized or otherwise. Nexon and Wright provide a

useful physicalist description, seeing it as combining "*rule through intermediaries* and

heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political

communities."[159] Further, "[i]deal-typical empires comprise a "rimless" hub-and-spoke

system of authority, in which cores are connected to peripheries but peripheries

themselves are disconnected—or segmented—from one another."[160] For Nexon and

Wright, this provides a crucial difference between international systems of unipolarity

and hegemony. And while useful as a guide this *divide et impera* definition does not

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[159] Nexon and Wright (2007), p. 253. Emphasis in original.

[160] Nexon and Wright (2007), p. 254.

address the systems of political legitimation within which empires are justified; in the words of Jennifer Pitts,

> central to the lives of all empires have been the ways in which they have been
>
> constituted through language and their own self-representations: the discourses
>
> that have arisen to describe, defend, and criticize them, and the historical narratives
>
> that have been invoked to make sense of them.[161]

For the purposes here, there is an imperative to distinguish theories of imperialism elaborated in different periods. This dissertation deals mainly with imperialism from the nineteenth century to the present. The political fact of imperialism at this time had to grapple with its legitimation in an increasingly liberal United Kingdom, wherein this usually happened through discourses of civilizational difference and necessary tutelage, and also self-justifications. Bell, again, provides a useful way to conceptualize this background information as social imaginaries. And for Bell, "'Civilization,' the meta-concept of the modern imperial imaginary, is the term most frequently employed to characterize this stratification."[162]

Bell breaks down justificatory arguments for and against imperialism into five: commercial-exploitative, realist-geopolitical, liberal-civilizational, republican, and

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[161] Pitts (2010), p. 226. To their credit, Nexon and Wright (2007) note that empires have problems legitimating their control, but their study is directed more towards characterizations of international systems, rather than the political conditions of imperialism itself.

[162] Bell (2016), p. 96.

martialist.[163] The commercial-exploitative argument was based on the benefits or

exploitations granted through systems of commercial exchange. Key figures featuring

here are Karl Marx, who, despite his reservations about the violence of the colonial

project, saw it as transformative in bringing Asiatic states forward into history; John

Hobson, who saw capitalist imperialism as a corrupted, "insane" form of capitalism that

was driven by social inequalities;[164] Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941), who saw the

implementation of protectionist trade barriers advocated for by Friedrich List, among

others, creating a surplus wealth ("finance capital"), which was then invested into new

markets, especially Africa and Asia, and then closed off to free-exchange by the

colonizing state;[165] and Vladimir Lenin, who, drawing heavily on Hilferding's and

Hobson's analyses, but departing from their stress of the contingency of the convergent

iterations of capitalism and imperialism, elaborated his conception of imperialism as the

necessary outgrowth of, and thus, "the highest stage of capitalism."[166] This type of

imperialism is said to subsist in modern international relations by exploitative

commercial practices by empowered states, as elaborated in dependency theory and

World-Systems theory, as well as a number of Marxist approaches (specifically, those

looking more at territorial manifestations of this).

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[163] Bell (2016), p. 101.

[164] See Ashworth (2014), pp. 119-120, 216-219; Kearns (2009), pp. 137-142.

[165] Hilferding (2002 [1910]).

[166] Lenin (2010 [1916]).

Bell's definition of liberal-civilizational is largely in alignment with what has been stated in this dissertation so far. Republican and martialist arguments are rooted in character development of the individuals engaged in imperial activity, the former looking at more collective notions of virtue instilled in the polity, and the upholding of national honor and glory, while the latter looks at the role of violence in shaping individual and collective character. Realist-geopolitical justifications are focused on power politics and comparative power differentials, wherein "[a]n underlying assumption is that scale translates into status."[167] But a shortcoming of this approach is that it often obscures the wider ideological currents in operation. This dissertation sees geopolitical understandings as rooted in the social imaginary backdrop of civilizational arguments, and primarily focused on the augmentation of territorialized state power.

A constant anxiety in the background of imperial theorists is how tenets of imperialism could destabilize liberal, or "civilized" principles of government in the metropole. For Burke, there was a fear that young, presumably lower class, civil servants in India would learn to govern by despotic ways, and return to Great Britain and enter politics, and carry those same despotic dispositions back to the metropole, and work toward crafting a more despotic government.[168] Similarly, Benjamin Constant feared the "spirit of conquest" would corrupt republican virtues and the achievements of

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[167] Bell (2016), p. 101.

[168] Metcalf (1995), pp. 19-20. William Pitt the Elder harbored the same misgivings. Stokes (1959), p. xi.

civilization.[169] In his 2015 *Empire Within*, Alexander Barder looks at the colony as a site

for the enactment of violence, as a laboratory for experimenting with novel forms of

governmentality and the violence appended to it.[170]

In looking at the imperialism enacted on British India, there are a number of

justificatory arguments corresponding to the different periods in which they were

enacted. The early period of British imperialism in India can be dated to the first

acquisition of territorial management in 1757 after the Battle of Plassey, and more

directly after the grant of land revenue collection and administration of civil justice

(*diwani*) by the Mughal emperor, Shah Alam II, in 1765. Liberal arguments started to

make inroads into imperial justifications as soon as they were elaborated in the

metropole and colored the debate about Anglicization versus Orientalism in the 1820s

and 1830s, with the Anglicization position eventually winning out. Debates then took

place *within* the context of justifying liberal imperialism. These debates were often held

in tension with, but at other times complemented geopolitical arguments. A common

cry of British imperialists seeking consolidation over the frontier during the Great Game

was the argument that it would be better for the British to rule over the people of these

areas than the despotic tsars of Russia, or worse, the barbaric rajas, emirs, and chiefs.[171]

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[169] Constant (1988 [1814]); Bell (2016), pp. 98, 112.

[170] Barder (2015).

[171] This is an example of what Bell (2016) calls "the comparative gaze" within imperial justifications, pp. 96, 99-100. Halford Mackinder's (1922) treatment of the geography of India as being susceptible to invasion, and the majority of Indians being less inclined towards bellicosity, is an example of this.

The geopolitical Russian threat exacerbated the urgency to consolidate the weakly controlled frontier regions later in the century.

Much of the debate within liberal imperialism concerned the degree of intervention into local societies. Henry Maine is largely credited with formulating the principle of "indirect rule" in the aftermath of the Sipahi Revolt of 1857. Concurrently and complementarily, he developed the sociological concept of "traditional society," which should be best left unaltered by the governing structures of the imperial power; but this very concept rendered the societies labelled "traditional" stagnant and apolitical, incapable of progressive development, forever stuck in an archaic past.[172] This understanding militates against that of John Stuart Mill, whose negative valuation of Indian society as occupying a lower level of civilization was nonetheless tempered by an idea of progressive elevation, pending the right governing institutions and educational systems to inculcate the development of civilizing qualities. A further challenge to the charge given to liberal imperialism was rendered by James Fitzjmes Stephen (1829-1894), who exploited the authoritarian and egalitarian tensions within liberal imperialism during the uproar over the Ilbert Bill in 1883. The Ilbert Bill proposed to allow for Indians to preside over Britons tried in rural courts in Bengal, a significant move in the direction of legal equality. For Stephen, and the many detractors of the bill, this brought to the fore ideas of racial difference and superiority, Stephen pressed for

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[172] The preservation of these traditional societies, more or less as living museums, Mantena argues formed the basis for an "alibi of empire" (2010).

the assertion of the autocratic and hierarchical principle, rather than the move in the direction of legal equality.[173]

The tensions between the hierarchical and egalitarian principles in imperial liberalism, and the "principle of difference" and "principle of sameness" that Metcalf avers formed the basis of imperial liberalism in India were later exploited by anti-colonial movements, many of them articulating their cases in the liberal idiom.[174] While the Indian state was premised on a liberal representative schema, elaborated through the development of provincial representative assemblies, the management of difference presented a difficulty to overcome. The liberal civilizational multinationalism emblematic of Nehru was a major force in counteracting this. Nevertheless, geopolitical tensions between India and Pakistan, and the generation of "postcolonial insecurity" and anxiety caused in parvenu, decolonized states more generally, and India and Pakistan, in particular, exacerbated the need to consolidate Indian control over Kashmir.[175] *This geopolitical imperative, while seeking to uphold the principles of Indian liberalism, nevertheless resulted in, and perhaps even required, the suspension of the application of these principles to Kashmir* in a manner strikingly reminiscent of British imperial liberalism. This points to an analogy Armitage highlights in his analysis of the

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[173] Mantena (2010); den Otter (2007). According to Eric Stokes, "[i]t was India which most clearly exposed the paradox in utilitarianism between the principle of liberty and the principle of authority, and it was Fitzjames Stephen, on his return to India, who challenged the intellectual basis of J. S. Mill's political doctrine and sought to rally the Utilitarian tradition to the principle of authority and the maintenance of empire," (1959), p. vii.

[174] Metcalf (1995).

[175] Krishna (1999); Muppidi (1999).

early development of the British empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,

that is, of the continuity of state-formation and empire-building, albeit, altered by

liberal legitimations in the later period covered here.[176]

1.4 Geopolitics and Territoriality

"Geography was not something already possessed by the earth but *an active writing of*

the earth by an expanding, centralizing imperial state. It was not a noun but a verb, a

geo-graphing, an earth-writing by ambitious endocolonizing and exocolonizing states

who sought to seize space and organize it to fit their own cultural visions and material

interests"—Gearoid O Tuathail[177]

The intellectual field of geopolitics was born in the era of empires and, in its

early incarnations, is seen as having an express interest in the furthering and

consolidation of imperial ambitions. Gearoid O Tuathail, in his landmark *Critical*

Geopolitics, links the origin of geopolitics as a tradition to governmentality and the

political organization of space, that was tied to the emergence of the modern state.[178]

His study begins with an analysis of the extension of imperial power from Elizabethan

England into Ireland in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This strategy

of territorial management acquires a hue much more closely resembling the

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[176] Armitage (2004).

[177] O Tuathail (1996), pp. 1-2. Emphasis in original.

[178] O Tuathail (1996).

international characteristics which common parlance today often ascribes to geopolitics

in the nineteenth century, specifically with respect to the imperial rivalry of the major

European powers. So, while "geopolitics" is not given a formal name and label until its

coinage by Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922) in 1899, it drew upon existing conceptual material

about the spatialization of power and territorial management. Kjellén himself drew

upon the ideas Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), especially the organic metaphors of the

state. Ratzel, originally trained in zoology, applied the notion of *Lebensraum* to the state

(a position taken up by Kjellén as well), using Social Darwinist neo-Lamarckian ideas of

the struggle for survival and space as directing the state's will.[179] The idea of the state

imbued with these natural and organicist metaphors was a central feature of this

earliest generation of geopolitical thinkers, the foundational figures usually listed as

Ratzel, Kjellén, the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the British

geographer Halford Mackinder (1861-1947).[180]

     A central tenet of what has come to be called "critical geopolitics" is that the

writing of space is never a pure exercise of intellectual abstraction, but always imbued

with a political purpose. The cultural writing of space to signify inclusions and exclusions

is a determined political act, even (especially) if the cultural similarities are taken for

granted and not self-reflexive. This is clearly in evidence with this first generation of

geopolitical thinkers, for whom political space was not empty of cultural contents.

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[179] Heffernan (2000).

[180] O Tuathail (1996a), pp. 16-43.

Mahan was expressively anxious about the rise of the "yellow peril" in Asia, and Mackinder took for granted cultural essentialisms and an expressly racist hierarchical ordering of peoples.[181]

Mackinder expressly advocated for a geopolitics at the service of the British imperial project and he drew directly on the work of Herbert Spencer, transforming Spencer's notions of time, space, and organism into his own ideas of history, environment, and race.[182] Gerry Kearns attributes this to the broadly Social Darwinist character of humanities at Oxford in the 1880s, reinforcing assumptions of racial inequality upon which the Empire rested, including the separation of self-governing dominions from directly ruled dependencies. At Oxford, Mackinder took up question of evolution within human society. This is readily apparent in his 1887 address to the Royal Geographical Society, "The Methods and Scope of Geography" where he states that "communities of men should be looked on as units in the struggle for existence, more or less favoured by their several environments."[183] His later work continued to hold fast to racial geography of peopling of Europe, and he cited favorably John Beddoe's distribution of the differing "races of Britain." "Races were, for Mackinder, relatively stable identities that grew out of the long-term shaping of personality by environment": Slavs were the products of open steppes, followed strong leaders, and tended towards

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[181] For Mahan, see Hobson (2012), pp. 126-127; for Mackinder, see Kearns (2009).

[182] Kearns (2009), pp. 62-63.

[183] Mackinder quoted in Kearns (2009), p. 71.

political systems of authoritarianism; Teutons stemmed from a similar racial stock as

Britons but never enjoyed the environmental advantage of insularity and thus retained

an expansionary drive; Britons, by contrast gave up expansionary ambitions once they

colonized their own island, and developed self-governance and non-interference in

affairs of powerful continental neighbors.[184] In Mackinder, then, we see a direct line of

environmental and racial influence on political form.

Mackinder saw the English gift to "world civilization" as "Responsible

Government," and a further purpose of the Empire was the need to protect this vital

English bloodline. Geographical education thus served to teach the English masses to

"value the Empire as the protection of their manhood": "[h]erein, half consciously, lies

the reconciliation Colonial Liberalism with protection, the exclusion of coloured races,

and imperialism."[185] The protection of English stock required social reform at home,

imperialism abroad, tariffs around imperial production, and racial hygiene throughout.

He equated territory with sustenance just as he equated racialized nations with species,

and saw history as a struggle between races, or racialized nations.[186]

In expressly racist, masculinist terms, in Mackinder we see the combination of

imperialism, civilizationalism, and geopolitics. Geopolitics functions as an instrument for

Mackinder for the purposes of securing imperialism and a civilizational order of the

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[184] Kearns (2009), p. 231.

[185] From Mackinder's 1905 "Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength," quoted in Kearns (2009), p. 75.

[186] Kearns (2009), p. 76.

world. However, geopolitics need not be intrinsically connected to imperialism nor civilizationalism. As a strategy for territorial management we can say that it rests on certain assumptions about ordering principles, for the most part, inclusionary and exclusionary, but these ordering principles need not be expressly civilizational or in defense of empire. The civilizational geopolitics of Samuel Huntington and others purports to defend Western liberalism, for example. In their different ways, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Ruggie, and Richard Ashley stress the specifically modern character of geopolitical reasoning, resting on territorial exclusionism as against alternative modes of spatial ordering, like zones, frontiers, spheres, or *limes*.[187]

Mackinder has had an enormous role in the development of the study of geopolitics, including mid-twentieth century figures such as Isaiah Bowman (1878-1950), Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903-2002), Hans Weigert (1902-1983), Owen Lattimore (1900-1989), Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943), and, to Mackinder's chagrin, the German geographer Karl Haushofer (1869-1946). In the estimation of Or Rosenboim, "in the 1940s many American geopolitical thinkers found in Mackinder a provocative source of inspiration and used his thesis as the foundation for a new world order."[188] In particular, "Spykman perpetuated an imperial view of world order in which hegemonic power acquired direct or indirect control of areas of strategic interest, largely in disregard of

[187] Kratochwil (1986); Ruggie (1993); Ashley (1987). For a wonderfully thorough survey of conceptions of territory in Western thought see Elden (2013).

[188] Rosenboim (2015), p. 358.

local communities," directly drawing on Mackinder's geopolitical ideas.[189] In the interwar years Bowman promoted study of geography in the United States and underpinned the political and moral exceptionalism of the United States in geopolitical terms, highlighting its unique mission as a global leader.[190]

Bowman was also influenced by Ellen Churchill Semple (1863-1932), who introduced Ratzel's ideas of political geography to American audiences in her 1911 *Influences of Geographic Environment*. In the view of Lucian Ashworth, she furthered the move in the direction of geographical determinism, glossing over Ratzel's distinctions between environmental determinism and agency, "to produce an approach to political geography that was fundamentally and explicitly environmentally determinist."[191] This direction was further consolidated with the extreme determinism of Yale geographer Ellsworth Huntington (1876-1947).

During World War II, writers started to detach "geopolitics" from "political geography," because of former's association with Haushofer and the Nazis. "Geopolitics" fell out of common currency in the United States and was seen as a nefarious perversion of "political geography." "Geopolitics" only re-entered American political and academic discourse after Henry Kissinger's usage the term in the 1970s to

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[189] Rosenboim (2015), p. 366.

[190] Rosenboim (2015), p. 358.

[191] Ashworth (2013), pp. 140-141.

present a Realpolitik understanding of international relations against liberal idealism

and ideological anti-Communism.[192]

Contrary to the purported program of geopolitics, old and new, it has never been

strictly limited to territorial management in a decontextualized setting. Geopolitical

practices, theories, and policies of territorial management are suffused with power

relations. In this sense, there is always a filtered geopolitics, and a prevalent filter in

geopolitical discourse, analyzed here, has been civilizationalism. While many perceive

geopolitical imperatives as operating in a realist or imperialist direction, contrary to

liberalism, geopolitics can be seen as safeguarding whichever order from which it is

deployed. Further, we can trace earlier incarnations of geopolitics to the time before the

term itself was coined. One could extrapolate international, and civilizational

geopolitical management around the federation of Christian monarchs proposed by the

Abbé de Saint-Pierre in 1713, safeguarding their welfare against barbaric outsiders; or,

similarly, with Kant's federation of free republics.[193] Geopolitics as spatial management

may be by necessity exclusionary and predicated on an otherness, usually interpreted as

threatening, but it is expressive of the particular institutional, political, and cultural

settings from which it emanates.

John Agnew divides geopolitics into three main ages: 1) civilizational geopolitics,

in the period 1815 to 1875, which was connected to European uniqueness and

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[192] O Tuathail (1996a), p. 45; Kearns (2009), p. 24.

[193] Saint-Pierre (2002 [1713]); Kant (1983 [1795]).

superiority as a civilization, and a belief that the roots of this European distinctiveness was in its past;[194] 2) naturalized geopolitics from 1875 to 1945, which "represents the human entirely in terms of natural processes and phenomena… Rather than a feature of civilization, geopolitics was now largely determined by the natural character of states that could be understood 'scientifically' akin to the new understanding of biological processes that also marked the period"; [195] and 3) the ideological geopolitics that marked the Cold War.[196] O Tuathail, Dalby, and Routledge divide the time sequence up into imperialist geopolitics (with its strong elements of "civilizational racism"), Cold War geopolitics, and new world order geopolitics.[197] Since, Huntington's "clash" thesis, a number of scholars have sought to resuscitate the idea of "civilizational geopolitics" as a category of analysis.[198]

This dissertation traces the development of geopolitical doctrines regarding South Asia, and Kashmir, in particular, from the early nineteenth century through the present. In this period of late modernity, we see the fusing of discourses of imperial liberalism, geopolitics, and civilizationalism. The next chapter looks at British imperial geopolitics in the period of imperial rivalry between the British and Russians, known as

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[194] Agnew (1998), p. 88.

[195] Agnew (1998), p. 94.

[196] Agnew (1998), pp. 105-119.

[197] O Tuathail, Dalby, and Routledge (1998)

[198] Bilgin (2004); Kuus (2007); Hansen (2006) restricts the phrasing to "civilizational politics" in her account of the Balkan conflict, but the scope of what she discusses overlaps with the territorial notions of geopolitics.

the Great Game, from roughly 1831 to 1907. In this period, Kashmir enters as the British

lop off a large section of the Sikh Empire and grant it to a defecting raja from Jammu,

the Dogra ruler Gulab Singh, in 1846; this domain was referred to as Jammu and

Kashmir. Direct intervention by the British was undertaken beginning in 1877 under fear

of imminent Russian invasion. The maharaja was deposed in 1889 and the British

became directly involved in the affairs of the state, waging a number of frontier wars,

delineating the border with the buffer state of Afghanistan in 1893, creating the new

North-West Frontier Province in 1901.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, George Curzon elaborated a

geopolitical orientation that centered on imperial integrity and the defense of British

India. This will be covered in greater detail in chapter two, but despite carrying with it

attendant notions of British civilizational superiority, it laid out the definitive

understandings for the practice of geopolitics in British India, as well as independent

India. Curzon laid out a three-tiered system of imperial space, with a British Indian

heartland at the core, indirectly ruled uncivilized tribal borderlands on the frontiers, and

then infrastructurally underdeveloped and physically challenging buffer states.[199] He

saw the demarcation of the border as "an essentially modern conception," different

from the practices of the ancient or "oriental world":

> In Asia, the oldest inhabited continent, there has always been a strong instinctive
>
> aversion to the acceptance of fixed boundaries, arising partly from the nomadic

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[199] Curzon (1907), pp. 41-42.

habits of the people, partly from the dislike of precise arrangements that is typical of the oriental mind.[200]

Civilizational conceptions aside, Sanjay Chaturvedi and Itty Abraham credit Curzon with setting the stage for what became Indian border practices: "[t]he Indian state has inherited its discourse as well as practices on borders or borderlands from the imperial powers."[201] Abraham avers that neither Home Secretary Vallabhbhai Patel nor Prime Minister Nehru "would question the deep logic of geopolitics or the importance of holding on to the strategic legacy of a colonial empire."[202]

> The dominance of the Curzonian view led directly to the postcolonial imperative of defending the northern mountain frontiers through the logic of territorial expansion that required the political subordination of the sovereign states of the Himalayas and saw the clash of empires as inevitable outcome of this logic.[203]

Both Nehru and a close adviser of his, K. M. Panikkar, were familiar with Mackinder's geopolitical arguments about the frontiers of India as well. Curzon's oft-quoted chessboard analogy with respect to the "Persian Question" found resonance in the post-Cold War-era with former United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.[204] Another British geopolitical thinker who influenced postcolonial Indian and

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[200] Curzon (1907), p. 49.

[201] Chaturvedi (2000); see also Chaturvedi (2005a)

[202] Abraham (2014), p. 115.

[203] Abraham (2014), p. 129.

[204] Brzezinski's (1997) book title *The Grand Chessboard* is a direct reference to Curzon's allusion: "Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia—to many these names breathe only a sense of utter

Pakistani geopolitics was the Indian Civil Service agent, and governor of the North-West

Frontier Provinces from 1946 to 1947, Olaf Caroe.[205]

An added qualification to the adoption of geopolitical notions about territory,

defense, and strategy needs to be made with respect to the rise of the norm of

territorial integrity and the postcolonial predicament. Sankaran Krishna points to India's

extreme "cartographic anxiety" as "a facet of a larger postcolonial anxiety—of a society

suspended forever in the space between the ex-colony and not-yet-nation."[206] This

partially results from the post-World War I conditions for nationhood and civilizational

attainment placed on colonies by the imperial powers, which posited India's extreme

internal diversity as disqualifying it from being a coherent, singular nation; and partially

from the international norm of territorial integrity that emerged in the post-World War

II era, as enunciated in the UN Charter and other international charters, and,

importantly, the 1960 UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries

and Peoples.[207] These facilitating conditions prompted postcolonial India and Pakistan to

fall victim to the "territorial trap," and with it bound Kashmir's territorial fate to be

ruled over by them.[208] However, while these were facilitating conditions, determinate

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remoteness... To me, I confess they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for dominion of the world" (1892), pp. 3-4.

[205] Brobst (2005).

[206] Krishna (1996), p. 194.

[207] Zacher (2001); Elden (2009).

[208] Agnew (1994). See also Mishra (2008) for how the territorial trap came to be enacted in South Asia's borders.

acts made over the succeeding seven decades gradually resulted in the current problem

in Kashmir, and India's postcolonial colonialism over Kashmir.

As mentioned in the previous section, civilizational scriptings are political acts,

and never done in the abstract, but lend themselves to territorialization. The

territorialization of civilizational identities brings forth a geopolitics, and the quest for

the stability of the civilizational referent, which, when sought under the political

conditions of liberalism, can result in imperial policies in defense of that same liberalism.

Chapter two will show the specific enactments of imperial liberalism in British India, and

the civilizational and geopolitical scriptings of Indians and India that accompanied it.

Chapter three will focus on responses to this, mobilizing civilizational geopolitics in an

anti-colonial liberal direction. Chapter four will look at the civilizational scriptings of

Kashmir within post-colonial India, and then move the focus to the anti-Indian

insurgency in Kashmir, and the potentialities of civilizational geopolitics mobilized

therein.

1.5 Conclusion: Mutual Intertwining of Liberalism/Imperialism, Geopolitics,

Civilizationalism in Late Modernity

The reason for the focus on each of these three groupings is for their discursive

complementarity within the framework of state, territory, nation, or the orderings of

governing apparatuses, territoriality, and particular groupings of people, respectively.

This complementarity discursively intertwines each of these categories with one

another. In this respect, liberalism in the metropole undergoes a tension justifying its

liberalism per se within an imperial framework that amounts to illiberal despotism over

the colonies. This justification achieves its solution by recourse to the discursive frameworks of geopolitics and civilizationalism.

Civilizationalism throughout the nineteenth century became a justification for withholding political liberalism from those civilizations deemed "not-yet-civilized," thus requiring imperial tutelage. This was done through an anthropological-cum-historical assessment that hierarchically and teleologically ordered peoples on the basis of their achieved levels of civilization. The metrics and bars used to assess these levels were set by the Western European Enlightenment liberal culture (with all the particular classist, religious, cultural, racial, gendered, and sexual associations that implied). Thus, it was justified as not being properly liberal to bestow liberal institutions on a people that had not achieved proper liberal culture.

The geopolitical framework is similarly marked by an inattentiveness to the political and legal aspirations of the peoples who are being ruled. The overriding interest within the dominant geopolitical modes of thought is territory and territoriality, the latter term implying assertion of territory and a bellicose or defensive posturing to formally incorporate that territory into a self of selfhood: the British Empire became territorial as a result of incorporating the territory it possessed (directly or through subsidiary alliances) into its sense of itself, and this is especially pronounced in the case of India, "the crown jewel of the British Empire." Territory becomes justificatory in itself, imperial interests become vested in the maintenance and consolidation of territory, acquisition of territory quickly becomes viewed as a zero-sum game, and the perception

of the augmentation of imperial power gets tied to trends of territorial acquisitions or

losses.

Geopolitics, in this sense, lends itself directly to imperial ends, and an implicit

hierarchical structuring. Actors are accorded a ranked agency with respect to their

ability to take part in international relations and geopolitical restructuring: the United

Kingdom, Russia, France, and the Western imperial powers are accorded a top-tier

position; on a lower level, lesser "civilizations," whose power is nonetheless worthy of

some degree of respect, like the Ottoman Empire and China (the declining power of

these two in the nineteenth century is tied to the lessened status accorded to them by

the first-tier imperial powers), buffer states (like Persia/Iran and Afghanistan, the former

accorded slightly more respect than the latter, but nevertheless viewed by the British

and Russians as a buffer state that needed to be managed), and then lesser political

entities which were only accorded recognition as subsidiaries per their suzerain alliance

agreements, including the often rebellious "tribal areas" along the Durand Line.

Combining with this lessened status accorded to those non-Western geopolitical actors

is a racializing of those actors which justifies their exclusion from geopolitical affairs,

which works within the discourse of civilization to further solidify their backward

status.[209] Geopolitics thus gets accorded the status of high politics, only to be exercised

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[209] Bowden (2009) points to the embassy of Lord George Macartney in 1793 to Emperor Qianlong as
signaling a move among the British and Europeans of downgrading the status of China.

by those powerful and purportedly competent imperial powers tasked with keeping the world safe by enforcing a territorial ordering of the world.

Thus, liberalism's professed universalistic imperatives get mediated through the discourses of geopolitics and civilizationalism. Geopolitics is deployed through the discourses of the prevailing political institutional arrangements in a given setting. And civilizationalism classifies people and orders their groupings in a ranked system and carries with it attendant notions of territoriality and hierarchy.

The discourses of liberalism, civilizationalism, and geopolitics are at once three separate discourses each with its own internal developments and histories, and simultaneously intertwined with each other in late modernity, so much so that their function refers back to concepts drawn from the other discourses which serve to legitimate claims made in the originating discourse. This is especially so with respect to liberalism and civilizationalism: liberalism becomes a project only accessible by civilized states, and its proper enactment requires that it be withheld, in the form of a euphemistic tutelage (imperialism) until standards of civilization have been reached in backward areas. Mastery of geopolitics, and further, participation in geopolitics is also an arena demarcated by the civilized states, and for the consolidation of state power.

The entwined discourses are a feature of international relations in the period of late modernity, from the early nineteenth century to the present, tying together nation (civilizationalism), state (liberalism and imperialism), and territory (geopolitics). The problem of Kashmir is here treated from its emergence as a princely state in 1846. Civilizationalism as a discourse of progress and categorization of supranational

groupings was crystallizing in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Liberalism as a

political project came into coherence by the mid-nineteenth century. While geopolitics

as a distinct field of study did not come into being until the close of the nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries, it drew on a series of imperial practices developed

throughout the nineteenth century. The problem of Kashmir is a problem of the

territorial ordering of international practice that is representative of late modernity,

resting on exclusionary ideas of nation and civilization, exclusionary territorializing

practices of these states, and a regime of liberalism amenable to exclusions,

suspensions, and imperial manifestations.

Chapter 2: Colonial Civilizational Geopolitics in the Dogra Age, c.1846-1947

2.0 Introduction

This chapter takes as its main focus Kashmir in the period of 1846 through 1947,

when it was placed into a suzerain relationship with the British Empire through the

policy of indirect rule with the Dogra princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The princely

state came into existence through a pair of treaties concluded in the aftermath of the

First Anglo-Sikh War of 1845-1846. The first treaty, the *Treaty of Lahore*, signed on

March 9, 1846, detached the territories that would, in the following week, come to be

identified with the princely state. The second treaty, the *Treaty of Amritsar*, signed on

March 16, 1846, conferred recognition of rule over these territories to Gulab Singh and

his descendants, in exchange for a subsidiary agreement wherein Gulab Singh was to

forfeit conduct of foreign policy and control over transportation and communication

linkages with British India to the East India Company and a monetary sum.

The central point of this chapter is to show the process of inscription, and

naturalization, of Kashmir into the geo-body of British India, and later into that of the

two successor states of India and Pakistan.[1] The practices for doing so were grounded in

the colonial period's inscription of a set, stabilized identity of Kashmiri, which was itself

seen as one subset—among many—of an Indian identity, and also inscribed as made up

primarily of South Asian Muslims. In the anti-colonial movement and postcolonial

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[1] The concept of "geo-body" derives from Winichakul (1994).

period, the status of Kashmir and Kashmiris as South Asian was written into the narratives of Indian and Pakistani state identity.

The period highlighted in this chapter represents something of a convergence between these intersecting discourses that would come to be definitive of the modern state-system, the beginning of "late modernity." Although geopolitics as a discourse was not given its formal disciplinary appellation until the fin-de-siècle, the practices it calls for, the assumptions underlying it (territoriality, peoples, and whether or not they possess civilization), and the accepted state forms, were in evidence throughout Congress of Vienna system, more explicitly in the colonial territories. The "Great Game" for imperial control of northwest India and Central Asia between Russia and the United Kingdom rested on a host of assumptions about civilizational attainment, power, and responsibility that effectively eliminated non-European powers from contention, at best relegating them to some autonomous "buffer zone" status (for Persia and Afghanistan) as later elucidated by Curzon. The generally accepted dating of the Great Game firmly entrenches it within what would be referred to as the Congress of Vienna system and the incipient phases of late modernity, that is, from about 1830 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.[2]

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[2] Hopkirk (1994) notes the heightened tensions between the United Kingdom and Russia in the late 1820s, particularly from the Moorcroft and Trebeck expedition to Bukhara in 1825, and the dispatching of Conolly and Burnes to survey possible invasion routes from Afghanistan and Central Asia, at the end of 1829 and the beginning of 1831. The founding of the Royal Geographical Society, in 1830, is also concomitant with these developments. Arthur Conolly is credited with coining the term "Great Game" in 1840.

A generally oversimplified reading also dates the rise of explicitly Anglicizing, utilitarian, liberal justifications of British imperialism in India to the tenure of Lord William Bentinck as Governor-General, 1828 to 1835. That reading will be complicated in this chapter but does serve as a general tuning fork for the era. The Anglicist-Orientalist debates intertwine justifications of rule and civilizational evaluations about status, attainment, and the capacity for improvement, showing the arguments about governing forms, civilization, and geopolitics to be inextricable and mutually reinforcing.

The chapter begins with a general overview of the Great Game and Kashmir's central importance in the Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry. The next section discusses the imperial ethnology of scripting India and Indians, before moving into the more specific treatment of Kashmiris. This serves to embed the discourse about Kashmir within the broader British discourse about India. The final part of this chapter looks at governance practices in India, and the tensions and complements of imperialism and liberalism.

2.1 Territorializing British India and Kashmir to 1846

The British advent in India and the East India Company's transformation from a trading company to an entity charged with territory, revenue collection, and the dispensation of justice took place in the mid-eighteenth century. Allowing for the rise of British power was the disintegration of the Mughal Empire in the decades after the rule of Aurangzeb, due to a multiplicity of factors beyond the purview of this dissertation: including palace intrigue (in which the Sayyid brothers figure prominently), empowered military generals and enriched *subahdars* (provincial governors) asserting their autonomy, and the rise of external challenges (Marathas, Afghans, the invasion of Nader

Shah of Persia from 1736-1739).[3] These events coincided with the rise of British

territorial control in India, generally dated either to the defeat of Nawab Siraj-ud-Daulah

in the Battle of Plassey, 1757, or to the intricate alliance system in place during the

Carnatic Wars in the late 1740s and early 1750s.[4] In August 1765 Robert Clive (1725-

1774) secured for the East India Company the grant of the *diwani*, or responsibility for

revenue collection in the area taken by the British, from the Mughal emperor Shah Alam

II, in the aftermath the British victory at the Battle of Buxar (October 1764). In 1773 the

British parliament passed a regulating act, confirming the East India Company governor

of Bengal, Warren Hastings, as Governor-General, politically uniting the three

presidency towns over which the East India Company had control, directing affairs from

Calcutta.[5] The British, through the East India Company, gradually accumulated

territories through conquest and cession, in wars against Mysore (1767-1769, 1780-

1784, 1790-1792, 1798-1799), the Marathas (1775-1782, 1803-1805, 1817-1818), and

Nepal (1814-1815), and the gradual extension of the subsidiary alliance system —

developed by Richard Wellesley during his tenure as Governor-General, from 1798 to

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[3] Muzaffar Alam (2013) convincingly makes the argument that, rather than the accepted British history of India which stressed the economic decline of the Mughal state, it was rather a windfall to the provincial governors which allowed them to effectively secure their own autonomy.

[4] Penderel Moon (1989) makes the case that it was during the Carnatic wars in the late 1740s that British designs on territorial conquest were effected, a policy shift which led to the Battles of Plassey and Buxar in Bengal.

[5] The other two were Madras, the site of Fort St George, and Bombay, which was given to the British by the Portuguese as a part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza in her marriage to Charles II in 1661.

1805—to an increasing number of "native states."[6] By 1818, with the defeat of the

Marathas, the British were the predominating force on the subcontinent with the sole

exception of the Sikh Empire in the northwest, with whom the East India Company had

signed a treaty of friendship on April 25, 1809.[7]

Concern for the possible expansion of the Russian Empire into Central Asia,

threatening the British hegemony in India, took hold among the British in the 1820s. The

ill-fated Moorcroft expedition to Bukhara left Company-controlled territory in March

1820; William Moorcroft (1767-1825) and George Trebeck (1800-1825) died of illness

during their return in Afghanistan in late August of 1825. During this expedition, they

passed through Kashmir in 1823, where they recorded information on the land and

inhabitants in a series of dispatches to the Company. These were later collected, edited

by the eminent Orientalist Horace Hayman Wilson (1786-1860), and published in

London in 1841—this description would play a formative role in the development of

colonial discourse on Kashmir and Kashmiris.[8] A few years later, Lord Ellenborough

(1790-1871), the President of the Board of Control (1828-1830) in the Wellington-Peel

ministry, picked up on the alarmist Russophobic writings of Colonel George deLacy

Evans (1787-1870) concerning the possibility of a Russian invasion from the northwest.[9]

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[6] Richard Wellesley was styled the Earl of Mornington until 1799, afterwards Marquess Wellesley.

[7] Grewal (1990), pp. 101, 247. See Schwartzberg (1992), p. 55 for detailed maps depicting the gradual expansion of British power in the subcontinent to 1819.

[8] Moorcroft and Trebeck (1841). Among other members of their party was a medical assistant, George Guthrie, who also succumbed to illness in Afghanistan shortly after Moorcroft.

[9] Hopkirk (1994), pp. 116-119.

This was in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Persian War, which, through the

Treaty of Turkmenchay (February 10, 1828), resulted in the Russian annexation of

several South Caucasus regions, and of the Russo-Turkish War, which, through the

Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829), among other things resulted in further

Russian expansion into the South Caucasus.

The geopolitical significance of the northwest would continue to play a role in

British thinking about India throughout the colonial period, thus augmenting the

significance of Kashmir. Orientalist writings continually stressed the effeminate nature

of (Hindu) Indians and their inability to deter the invasions coming from the northwest.

This Orientalist geopolitical orientation scripted invading Huns, Arabs, Turks, Persians,

and Mongols coming in across the plains into Punjab and Sindh from the northwest,

thus styling Muslims as non-natives and invaders, and Hindus as natives—never mind

some of these movements and "invasions" taking place a millennium or more prior. This

geopolitical narrative was one in which this difference was effected and written into

colonial forms of rule. The plains of the northwest were thus perceived as vulnerable to

external invasion, yet, simultaneously, internal insurrection as well.

This trope of the history of the vulnerability of the northwest is repeated

throughout histories of India in the colonial period—where the anti-colonial geopolitical

naval focus of K. M. Panikkar proves an important corrective[10]—but to give this

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[10] See the discussion in Abraham (2014), pp. 118-119.

particular trope a geopolitical pedigree, one could turn to Halford Mackinder (1861-

1947):

> [i]n all the British Empire there is but one land frontier on which war-like
>
> preparation must ever be ready. It is the north-west frontier of India…[It] lies
>
> through a region whose inhabitants have been recruited throughout the ages by
>
> invading warlike races. Except for the Gorkha mountaineers of Nepal, the best
>
> soldiers of the Indian army are drawn from this region, from the Rajputs, the
>
> Sikhs, the Punjabi Musalmans, the Dogra mountaineers north of the Punjab, and
>
> the Pathan mountaineers west of the Punjab. The provinces along this frontier,
>
> and the Afghan land immediately beyond it, are the one region in all India from
>
> which, under some ambitious lead, the attempt might be made to establish a
>
> fresh imperial rule by the overthrow of the British Raj. Such is the teaching of
>
> history, and such the obvious fate of the less warlike peoples of India, should the
>
> power of Britain be broken either by warfare on the spot, or by the defeat of our
>
> navy.[11]

Here, Mackinder deploys not only the trope of the vulnerability of incursion of the

northwest, but in a vein eerily close to the geographical determinist line he walked

throughout his career, also plays on the "martial races" trope of British colonialism. It

bears mentioning that this stress on northwestern vulnerability: 1) synecdochally

privileges northern India as India; 2) attributes some static unity to this region; 3)

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[11] Mackinder (1922), pp. 26-27.

attributes militaristic intentions to the movements of peoples coming in from the northwest (e.g. as an "invasion"); 4) conveniently ignores the European mode of conquering India, which was naval, and, for the British, empire-building in India began in the east of India.

Attention was continually mounted on the northwest of British India, especially after the defeat of the Marathas in 1818 and territorial consolidation of the subcontinent under the British. The "hegemonic text" of nineteenth-century British imperialism in India, James Mill's 1817 *History of British India*, similarly remarks, "[i]t appears that the people of Hindustan have at all times been subject to incursions and conquest, by the nations contiguous to them on the north-west."[12] This book was made required reading for Company officials trained at the East India Company College at Haileybury, and got Mill and his son, John Stuart, employment with the Company.

To return to the discussion of the increased geopolitical interest in the northwest, Ellenborough tasked Governor-General William Bentinck—a follower and devotee of the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill—with finding a route to Afghanistan, and this job was given to a young Arthur Conolly (1807-1842), who did so via the Russian Caucasus, Persia, Herat, and Kandahar into Balochistan from autumn 1829 until arriving in January 1831.[13] He pointed to the Bolan and Khyber passes as susceptible to invasion.

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[12] Mill (1817, v.1), p. 481. Inden (1990): "I would consider his *History* the oldest hegemonic account of India within the Anglo-French imperial formation," p. 46.

[13] At his farewell dinner, Bentinck is said to have remarked to James Mill, "I am going to British India, but I shall not be Governor-General. It is you that will be Governor-General." Stokes (1959), p. 50. There is

Just before his return, Governor of Bombay, John Malcolm (1769-1833) tasked

Alexander Burnes (1805-1842) with a similar fact-finding mission up the Indus river,

then in the territory of the Sikh Empire.[14] He took up another mission in 1832, with the

approval of Bentinck, to assess the military and political situation in Kabul, and returned

in January of 1833, after being favorably received at the court of Emir Dost Mohammed

(1793-1863) of Afghanistan.

A brief synopsis of events in the subsequent decade will serve to illustrate the

increasing attention paid to this region. The Persian government laid siege to Herat from

November 1837 to September 1838, where British Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger (1811-

1843) was present. With a small British force Pottinger helped Emir Dost Mohammed

expel the Persian forces, coupled with the aid of a larger British naval threat in the

Persian Gulf. After the souring of ties between the British and Emir Dost Mohammed

over the former's position toward the Sikh Empire, and the latter's reception of a

Russian ambassador, the British, in London and Calcutta, devised a plan to overthrow

him and place the more well-disposed Shah Shuja (1785-1842) on the Afghan throne in

1838. This led to the First Anglo-Afghan War, which was ultimately disastrous for the

intended British policy and resulted in Dost Mohammed retaking the throne in 1842.

During this war, the British negotiated a subsidiary alliance with the Khan of Kalat, Mir

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debate over the extent to which Bentinck fully understood and applied utilitarian doctrines while ruling as governor-general.

[14] Malcolm was Governor of Bombay Presidency from 1827 to 1830, and a Tory MP for the rotten borough of Launceston from 1831 to 1832.

Mehrab Khan (d. 1839), who was seen to be the supreme leader in the Balochistan region, in 1839. Revolt against the British by local sardars in Balochistan led to punitive British action and the killing of Mir Mehrab Khan. The British negotiated for his replacement to be the fourteen-year-old Mir Shah Nawaz Khan. Mir Shah Nawaz Khan was overthrown in 1841 by Mir Mehrab Khan's son, Mir Nasir Khan II (d. 1857), with whom the British negotiated a subsidiary alliance. Per Brian Spooner, "[e]ssentially, the khan had secured British support for local Baluch autonomy under conditions similar to his historical relationship to the Afghans."[15] Further, in 1843 Major-General Charles Napier led an expedition to suppress "rebels" in Sindh, and through two major battles at Miani and Hyderabad in February and March, respectively, he managed to subdue the province and annex it to the Bombay Presidency.

We will shift the focus now to the geopolitical situation of Jammu and Kashmir, two territories with independent historical trajectories. Kashmir's history has been portrayed as succession from pre-Vedic Naga peoples, to a Vedic, Brahminical period, followed by a period in which Buddhism predominated, from the time of the Mauryas until at about mid-way through the first millennium of the "Common Era," followed by the reestablishment of Brahminism, and the rise of Muslim rulers in the fourteenth century. The Islamization of the Kashmir Valley took place in the following two centuries, due largely to the syncretic Rishi tradition and the widespread activities of

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[15] Spooner (2010).

Sufis from Khorasan and Persia.[16] The invasion of the Mughal emperor Akbar in 1586, and his eventual annexation of Kashmir in 1589 is popularly seen as the beginning of a long period of occupation of Kashmir by outside rulers continuing up until the present. This is interestingly in divergence from Indian—in its generally "Nehruvian" incarnations—and Pakistani historiographies, which incorporate the Mughal Empire into their own histories. The Mughals ruled Kashmir as a *subah* (province) within the Empire until 1751, when Ahmad Shah Durrani annexed it to Afghanistan. Ranjit Singh was able to capture Kashmir from the Afghans in 1819, and it was incorporated into the Sikh Empire.

Jammu's political history was largely convergent with the other hill states in the surrounding area. Earlier referred to as Durgara (from which the term "Dogra" derives), political power was earlier located in Bahu. A succession dispute in the mid-sixteenth century led to two separate ruling families and a division of the state into the area under the control of Bahu, and that under Jammu (both under Mughal overlordship), which eventually reunited towards the close of the seventeenth century under the ruling line from Jammu. Jammu attained considerable autonomy during the decline of Mughal power in the eighteenth century, after which the Afghans asserted suzerainty from circa 1752, followed by Sikh suzerainty from the 1780s. It was finally incorporated into the Sikh Empire in 1808.

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[16] Khan (2005).

The Sikh Empire was formed from the supremacy of the Sukerchakia *misl* of

Ranjit Singh (1780-1839) over a federation of other Sikh *misls* in 1801. It is from within

this political entity that Gulab Singh (1792-1857) rose to prominence. Gulab was a junior

collateral descendant from the ruling family of Jammu.[17] He joined the army of Ranjit

Singh in 1809 and quickly rose through the ranks, earning land grants and titles after

victorious battles undertaken on behalf of the Sikh maharaja. He recruited his younger

brothers, Dhyan (1796-1843) and Suchet (1801-1844), who similarly gained esteem

within the court of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Dhyan being made his lord of the privy

chamber. In 1820 Gulab Singh was granted governance over Jammu, the area from

which he and his family hailed, and to this was added hereditary conferral of rule in

1822. The aftermath of Ranjit Singh's death on June 27, 1839 presented the problem of

powerful rivalries between empowered officials in the Sikh Empire, with the Dogra

brothers at the center. Ranjit's successor was his eldest son, Kharak Singh (1801-1840),

and a dispute between Chet Singh Bajwa and Dhyan Singh led to the deposition of

Kharak Singh and the elevation of Kharak's eldest son, eighteen-year-old Nau Nihal

Singh (1821-1840) as a *de facto* ruler. Returning from Kharak Singh's funeral on

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[17] Gulab's paternal great-great-grandfather was Dhrov Dev, who ruled Jammu from 1703 until 1735, by way of Dhrov Dev's younger son Mian Surat, whose elder brother was Jammu ruler Ranjit Dev, who ruled from 1735 until 1781. Doubt upon Gulab's lineage was caste in the immediate aftermath of his accession to the position of Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, most notably by Joseph Davey Cunningham (1812-1851) in his *History of the Sikhs* (1849). Cunningham charged both Gulab and the British with opportunistic, ignoble, backstabbing actions during the First Anglo-Sikh War. For Cunningham's accusations, he was reprimanded and severely demoted. Panikkar (1930) and Diwan Kripa Ram (1977 [1876]) vouch for the legitimacy of his lineage, even if the latter is a panegyric and the former veers close to hagiography. See Hutchison and Vogel (1921) for a general history of Jammu.

November 5, 1840, Nau Nihal and his escort, Gulab Singh's son Udham Singh, were killed when a gate collapsed on them.

A dispute emerged over the successor to Nau Nihal, which divided the Sikh army. On one side was the Maharani Chand Kaur, erstwhile spouse of Maharaja Kharak Singh, who claimed regency for the Empire while Nau Nihal's wife, Sahib Kaur, was pregnant. On the other was Sher Singh, a son of Ranjit Singh. Sher Singh emerged as maharaja in January 1841. The Sandhanwalia sardars, who had aligned on the side of Chand Kaur, had Sher Singh, his son Pratap Singh, and his key supporter Dhyan Singh murdered in September 1843. The Sandhanwalias wished to have the five-year-old Dalip Singh on the throne, with his mother Maharani Jindan as regent, playing the role of *éminence grise*. However, Dhyan Singh's son, Hira Singh, stormed the palace with his forces, leading to over a thousand people being killed in the melée, including the leading orchestrators of the murder of Sher Singh and Dhyan Singh, the Sandhanwalias Lehna Singh and Ajit Singh. Hira Singh kept Dalip on the throne and placed himself in the role of *wazir* (akin to prime minister or majordomo). Suchet Singh tried to overthrow Dalip and install himself as *wazir* but was killed in a battle on March 27, 1844.

Unrest caused by the attack of his opponents at a religious center, combined with dissatisfaction in his army, led to Hira Singh's murder on December 21, 1844. Murdered with him was Gulab Singh's son Sohan Singh, who was at the Lahore court "virtually as a hostage." Gulab Singh, along with Maharani Jindan and other dissenters against the army, reached out to the British, the former offering cooperation in exchange for being recognized as a ruler over his territories, the latter for the purposes

of restoring order to the Sikh Empire. The British prepared for attack but waited for the

Sikhs to cross the Indus first, and as false information about British offensive designs

spread, the Sikh army crossed the Indus on December 11, 1845. The British had

decisively defeated the Sikhs by February 1846.[18]

Gulab was rewarded for giving the British information about the Sikh army and

keeping his forces from engaging the British. He negotiated two treaties with the British,

the *Treaty of Lahore* on March 9, 1846, and the *Treaty of Amritsar* on March 16, 1846.

The *Treaty of Lahore*, between the British and the Sikh darbar, effectively separated the

domains that were to be administered by Gulab Singh from the Sikh Empire; whereas

the *Treaty of Amritsar* conferred recognition to the rule of Gulab Singh and his

successors over the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir in exchange for a payment of

7,500,000 rupees and an annual tribute.[19] In line with the subsidiary alliances, Gulab

was granted autonomy within his territory, but was required to consult with the British

for arbitration of "any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the

Government of Lahore [the Sikh Empire] or any other neighbouring State" (which was

interpreted broadly to mean to relinquishing independent conduct of foreign affairs).

There was also the civilizational/racial stipulation that the maharaja was "never to take,

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[18] Grewal (1990), pp. 119-124.

[19] Aitchison (1863, v.2). The annual tribute consisted of twelve shawl goats (six male, six female), a horse, and three shawls. That was later amended in 1884 to ten pounds of pashm, twelve pounds of picked and assorted wool (four pounds of each, grey, black, and white) and a pound of each of the three best qualities of white yarn. Aitchison (1909), p. 265. It is not clear whether the maharaja ever made the payment, and the British likely cancelled it after an exchange of territories the following year. See Aitchison (1909), p. 249.

or retain in his service, any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state, without the consent of the British Government."[20]

The territory now granted to Gulab Singh was the result of campaigns and conquests undertaken under the Sikh Empire. In addition to the territories included through suzerain relations with Jammu was Kashmir (conquered in 1819), Ladakh and Baltistan, conquered by Zorawar Singh (1786-1841) in 1834 and 1840, respectively. In 1842 the Lahore Darbar's Governor of Kashmir, Sheikh Ghulam Mohiuddin, was petitioned by Karim Khan, brother of the slain ruler of Gilgit, to help him reclaim the throne and expel the Puniali ruler Gohar Aman. The Sheikh Ghulam Mohiuddin deputed commander Nathu Shah and successfully installed Karim Khan on the throne, who thereafter entered into a suzerain relation with the Sikh Empire.[21] Thus, in 1846 the basic contours of the state were drawn, but the actual exercise of political control from the princely center was not able to make itself felt for some time. The Dogra rulers were only able to effect their rule over the area granted to them gradually.

2.2 Imperial Empirical Geopolitics

The geopolitics analyzed here had to do with the knowledge and control of British Indian territory, securing it from external encroachment and internal disruption. Knowledge and control of territory went hand-in-hand for the British in India. From the years immediately after acquiring the *diwani* in Bengal, Clive assigned James Rennell

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[20] Article VII of the treaty. A similar condition was placed onto Maharaja Dalip Singh of Lahore in the Treaty of Lahore, Article XI.

[21] Chauhan (1983), pp. 6-7; Hassnain (1978), pp. 27-28.

(1742-1830) the responsibilities of conducting land surveys, leading to the practice of

mapping India for the purposes of effective revenue management and political

control.[22] To quote David Ludden in this context, "[c]olonialism reorganized India

politically and empirically at the same time, and the two reorganizations supported one

another."[23] The extension of colonial control was tied to an empiricist epistemological

orientation which sought to know and thereby manage territory and people in the

colony: "[o]bservation and measurement by Englishmen supplanted 'secondhand,'

'hearsay,' and 'traditionary' native accounts."[24] Rennell, in 1808, looking back on his

days as surveyor-general, noted "[a]t that day we were compelled to receive

information from others respecting the interior of the country, but in your time you

explored for yourselves."[25]

This was after the establishment of the Great Trigonometrical Survey in 1802, a

massive project whose goal was to accurately map the entirety of British India. The

Great Trigonometrical Survey would be completed by 1871, with Jammu and Kashmir

being one of the last territories mapped, an effort completed there in 1864. In 1895,

then-President of the Royal Geographical Society, Clements Markham, credited James

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[22] Rennell's *Map of Hindoostan* was the culmination of his work as the surveyor-general of Bengal, a position he held until 1782.

[23] Ludden (1993), p. 255

[24] Ibid.

[25] Quoted in ibid.

Rennell with being "undoubtedly the first great English geographer" and placing

geography on a solid, modern scientific footing.[26]

Problems emerging from this epistemological orientation arose with the

empirical "facts" that were established. Once established, and known, these "facts"

calcified and became reified. The dynamic, relational qualities of events and entities

were muted, and as these "facts" came to be deployed within prevailing ideological

structures, they provided the basis for evaluation, valuation, and essentialization. As we

will see in the section on Orientalism, this led to static qualities and essentialisms to be

deployed regarding groupings of Indian peoples. And while "Anglicists" and

"Orientalists" would differ regarding their evaluation and valuation of the merits of

Indian civilization or Indian peoples, they would be, nevertheless, sure that there was an

ousia, or nugget, of the "Hindu mind" or the "Muslim mind." The problem would just be

one of how to go about accessing that nugget and acquiring that information—a

problem of method; further, what value is to be ascribed to the essential qualities of

"the Hindu," "the Muslim," "the Indian," et cetera? And what were the secondary

qualities, or attributes, of the essentialized object-person, with which governance

should concern itself in order to better—what betterment consisted of was another

evaluation made from the subject-position of the colonizer—the colonized.[27]

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[26] Markham (1895), p. 7.

[27] The dichotomous language of colonizer/colonized here refers to the prevailing modes of thought of the ruling classes. It is perfectly possible, and in fact encouraged, for colonized persons to ascribe to colonial justifications through "false consciousness." See Fanon (1967 [1952]; 2004 [1961]).

One result of this was to treat the colony as a laboratory for policing experiments to be brought back to the metropole.[28] Among other things, one could point to the development of fingerprinting by William Herschel in India from 1858.[29] The essentializing mode of inquiry used by the colonial authorities also led to the identification of criminal tribes, whose character had an inherent disposition towards criminality.[30]

This empirical scientific orientation also guided the founding of the Royal Geographical Society in London in 1830, which stated that its Committee would "observe that every species of information, connected either with Physical Geography or Statistics, if it have only accuracy to recommend it, will be acceptable."[31] This was in recognition of the fact that much of what constituted geographical knowledge at this time was travel writing. The guiding themes for the RGS was to provide consummate and precise global knowledge; in effect, to make empirical knowledge imperial and all-consuming: "[i]t has been well observed, that 'the man who points out, in the midst of the wide ocean, a single rock unknown before, is a benefactor of the human race;' and scarcely less so is he, who, after careful examination, is able to decide that a rock or

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[28] Barder (2015).

[29] Cohn (1996), pp. 10-11.

[30] Metcalf (1995), pp. 120-126. The *thagis* are the infamous group that the British associated with inherent criminality.

[31] "Prospectus of the Royal Geographical Society" (1831), p. x.

shoal which appears on a chart is either misplaced, or has no existence."[32] This slew of

data was collected and arranged according to what the RGS understood as its guiding

scientific principles. This manner of assembling and arranging geographical knowledge

would inform the compilations of gazetteers, one of two primary genres through which

early European knowledge of Kashmir would be generated, the other being travel

writing.

2.3 Territorializing Kashmir

From the inception of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, it was placed

front and center in the Great Game of Russo-British imperial territorial rivalry. Gulab

Singh was placed in charge of a large princely state yet did not exercise any actual

political control over much of the region. This was immediately apparent after his

installment as maharaja, as the central territory of his princely state, the Kashmir Valley,

was in open rebellion against him throughout 1846, under the leadership of the

erstwhile Sikh Empire's governor of the region, Sheikh Imamuddin. Gulab was only able

to subdue the revolt, with some British assistance, at the end of 1846.

British knowledge of Kashmir in the colonial period was generally gleaned from

travel writing or official gazetteers. Early European travelers provided some details on

the physical geography and inhabitants of the region, and the first accounts to reach

Europe about Kashmir were largely the work of seventeenth-century Jesuit missionaries.

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[32] Ibid. Interestingly, for our purposes, the very first volume of the *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* published some of the late William Moorcroft's papers concerning his voyage to Bukhara through Kashmir. Moorcroft (1831).

Jerome Xavier of Navarre (1549-1617) and Bento de Goes of Portugal (1562-1607), based in Portuguese Goa, were granted an audience with the Mughal Emperor Akbar in 1595 in his quest to understand more about the Roman Catholic religion. In 1597 they travelled with Akbar to Kashmir. Jerome's account of "Caximir" was later published in Antwerp in 1605, through which European audiences first became familiarized with the region.[33] Francisco Pelsaert (c.1595-1630), a Dutch merchant, was present at the Mughal Emperor Jahangir's court from about 1620 until 1627, wrote a brief account of the region, in the style of a commercial report intended for his superiors at the Dutch East India Company. Pelsaert may himself never have actually visited Kashmir and rather based his (somewhat uncharitable) reports on information gleaned from others.[34]

François Bernier (1625-1688), the French doctor, philosopher, and student of Pierre Gassendi, performed the role of medical doctor in the retinue of the Prince Dara Shikoh, and after his murder, for his brother, Emperor Aurangzeb. Bernier visited Kashmir with Aurangzeb in 1665 and described its grandeur and beauty in glowing terms, as an earthly paradise. A half-century later the Jesuits Ippolito Desideri of Tuscany (1684-1733) and Manoel Freyre of Portugal (b. 1679) visited Kashmir, from November 1714 to May 1715, on their way to Tibet to establish a Jesuit mission there. In the *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses* of 1716, a French compilation of early writings on

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[33] Keenan (1989).

[34] Pelsaert (1925). Keenan (1989) expresses this doubt.

India (and a key conduit through which much eighteenth-century knowledge of India was made available in Europe), Desideri repeats Bernier, saying that "Kascimir is called by everyone in Mogul *Beheset*, which means 'Terrestrial Paradise.'"[35] Later in the eighteenth century, the English traveler George Forster (d. 1792) added to the paradisiacal trope, remarking on the beauty of Kashmir upon his visit in 1783.

The poet Thomas Moore (1779-1852) is given primary credit for implanting of the image of Kashmir into the popular imagination of the British in his 1817 *Lalla Rookh*:

Who has not heard of Cashmere

With its roses the brightest that earth ever gave

Its temples and grottos, and fountains as clear

As the love-lighted eyes that hang over their wave.[36]

Like James Mill, who wrote his "hegemonic" account in the same year, Moore never went to Kashmir nor India. He relied on mainly on Bernier's and Forster's accounts of Kashmir, and found in them "an exotic land, and managed to create a compelling image of the fabled beauty of Kashmir, an image that inspired many European travelers to journey to this distant land."[37] In 1849, looking back on *Lalla Rookh*, Moore noted the acclaim his work had received among officials in British India, including John Malcolm.

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[35] Keenan (1989).

[36] Moore (1849 [1817]), p. 240. The work is in the genre of Oriental romance, centering on a princess, Lalla Rookh, the daughter of Aurangzeb, who is to be betrothed to the king of Bukhara. Along the way, she is told fantastic stories by a poet in the caravan escorting her to Bukhara. She falls in love with him, and later finds out that the poet is actually the king to whom she is to be wed.

[37] Ahmad (2011), p. 172.

He relates a story where a "Colonel W---s, the historian of British India"—presumably Mark Wilks (1759-1831)—upon finding out that Moore had never been to India, remarked "[w]ell, that shows me… that reading over D'Herbelot is as good as riding on the back of a camel."[38] With the popularity of Moore's work, Kashmir became renowned for its beauty.

The mid-1850s mark the emergence of Kashmir as a place of romance—the happy Valley—replete with the imagery of Moore's verse. Kashmir was not simply a respite from life on the plains but became for displaced Europeans the Eastern equivalent of Western places of leisure: "Venice of the East," "Playground of the East," "Switzerland of the East."[39]

However, at the same time that Kashmir entered the geographical imagination of the British as serene, pristine, and vulnerable to attack, Kashmiris began entering this geography as well, as singularly unworthy of this beautiful valley. Kashmir the territory was feminized, rendered inert, passive, and an object of desire and romance, the and (male) Kashmiri was deficient, effeminate and lacking in masculinity, as compared to the masculinized British.[40]

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[38] Moore (1849 [1817]), p. 13.

[39] Macdonald (2003), p. 671. See also Ahmad (2011), p. 173.

[40] See Kabir (2009). This develops the imagery and mystique described by Moore and travel writing. In *The Discovery of India* (1985 [1946]) Jawaharlal Nehru draws on the same trope of feminine Kashmir, desire, and possession, and in the postcolonial era can be seen in the Bollywood genre of Kashmir romances.

Laurence Hope's (nom de plume of Adela Florence Nicolson (1865-1904)) *Garden of Kama* in 1901 contained an amorous "Kashmiri Song," set to music by Amy Woodforde-Finden (1860-1919) in 1902, which achieved a degree of popularity, most notably as sung by Peter Dawson (1882-1961). The song's line "pale hands I loved beside the Shalimar" brings to mind BJP MP Vikram Saini's recent (August

Bernier had written mostly positive accounts of Kashmiris, praising their intelligence and ingenuity. But starting with Moorcroft and Trebeck, travelers began to give descriptions of Kashmiris proving them to be deficient in character, superstitious, conniving, untrustworthy, and, most frequently, distinctly cowardly.

> In character the Kashmirian is selfish, superstitious, ignorant, supple, intriguing, dishonest, and false: he has great ingenuity as a mechanic, and a decided genius for manufactures and commerce, but his transactions are always conducted in a fraudulent spirit, equaled only by the effrontery with which he faces detection. The vices of the Kashmirian I cannot help considering, however, as the effects of his political condition, rather than his nature, and conceive that it would not be difficult to transform him into a very different being.[41]

Generally, the descriptions of the Kashmiris as such would continue to color British perceptions of them throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries. The last sentence points to Moorcroft and Trebeck's assessment that Christian missionary activity and British rule could have a valuable prospect in Kashmir. There

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6, 2019) call, in an address to BJP workers in the immediate aftermath of the Indian government's decision to scrap Article 370, that now young Indian men would be able to marry Kashmiri "gori ladki," fair girls; although, in the former instance Kashmir functions as a getaway for white European romances, and in the latter, Kashmiri women are exoticized as fair northern girls, a prize for Indian men. "BJP Workers Excited to Marry Fair Girls From Kashmir, Says UP MLA," *The Wire* (2019).

[41] Moorcroft and Trebeck (1841), v.2, pp. 128-129.

would, however, be differences in assessing what exactly is the cause of the "Kashmirian's" deficient character.[42]

Moorcroft and Trebeck had passed through Kashmir on their way to Afghanistan and Bukhara in 1822-1823. In the 1830s, a few more travelers made their way into Kashmir. Victor Jacquemont (1801-1832) of France made his way through in 1831, describing Kashmir as an "ugly picture in a magnificent frame," a description which met with agreement by the British resident in the Punjab and chief negotiator of the Lahore and Amritsar treaties, Henry Lawrence (1806-1857) in 1846.[43] In 1832, in his search for, and hopeful conversion of, the lost tribes of Israel, the German-English Joseph Wolff (1795-1862) made his way into Kashmir. In 1835 Baron Charles von Hügel (1795-1870), who would later become a prominent diplomat for the Kingdom of Austria, and Godfrey Vigne visited Kashmir. The first volume of Hügel's account was published in 1840 in German and was translated into English in 1845. Godfrey Vigne (1801-1863), the lawyer and cricketer, produced a much-cited description of Kashmir in 1842. Vigne had some of his letters published by the Royal Geographical Society in 1839. Moorcroft and Trebeck's work reached a London publisher in 1841.

These writings continued the trope of painting Kashmiris in a negative, undeserving light while showing the Kashmir Valley itself to be unrivalled throughout British India in its beauty. After the *Treaty of Amritsar* and the subsidiary alliance

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[42] Ellsworth Huntington (1906) points to environmental determinism of the seclusion within the Kashmir Valley.

[43] Ahmad (2011), p. 176.

between the newly enthroned Maharaja Gulab Singh and the British, Kashmir was made more readily available to European travelers, and became a resort destination. The influx of European tourists led to the British establishing an Officer on Special Duty at Srinagar in 1852 for the supervision of these tourists for six months per year. This was the first incursion of British governance into Kashmir.

In 1851, Chilas, a tributary state of Gilgit in the northwest of the state, rose in rebellion against the Dogras. Gohar Aman, who ruled Yasin and Punial, at this time joined Chilas in rebellion, and they were then joined by Darel. In 1852, Gulab Singh sent an expedition to quell the rising of the northwestern states of Gilgit. It was defeated, and the rebellious states then stormed Gilgit fort and took the city. From 1852 to 1860, Dogra rule did not extend to the Gilgit region.

In 1856 Gulab Singh abdicated the throne in favor of his son Ranbir Singh (1830-1885). As the Sipahi Revolt, known to the British as the Sepoy Mutiny, broke out throughout India in May 1857, Ranbir, on Gulab's advice, maintained Dogra loyalty to the British, aiding the latter by providing troops. Ranbir then undertook an invasion of the rebellious territories in Gilgit and was able to subdue them and procure from the local rulers an oath of loyalty in 1860.[44]

Geopolitical security concerns, however, still animated British policy towards Kashmir. As an extension of the all-encompassing power/knowledge project of mapping British India, the Great Trigonometrical Survey was carried out in Jammu and Kashmir

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[44] Chohan (1983); Hassnain (1974), p. 63; Hassnain (1978), p. 30.

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under Captain Thomas Montgomerie (1830-1878) from 1855 to 1864, mapping Kashmir

and rendering it knowable.[45] In 1864 tensions with respect to Russia were again rising as

Russia began expanding to the south, through Central Asia, annexing Chymkent in 1864,

followed by Tashkent in 1865, and Samarkand in 1868. In 1868 Bukhara was made a

Russian protectorate, followed by Khiva in 1873, and Khokand in 1875. The annexation

of the three major Central Asian Khanates (Khiva, Bokhara, Khokand) aroused British

geopolitical anxiety. Russia and the United Kingdom agreed to set a southern boundary

to the recent annexations, recognizing Afghan sovereignty over Wakhan in January

1873.

This geopolitical anxiety over Russian expansion was manifested in more

assertive policies in the nominally autonomous princely state. The British started

preparing fact-finding missions for the acquisition of knowledge about Russian designs

and ways of possible invasion. Captain Thomas Montgomerie, spurred by Major Edmund

Smyth, proposed the idea of using Indians to survey land routes and access points into

British-controlled India, and to acquire information on possible Russian designs. This led

to the creation of the "pundits," a group of native intelligence officers, often under the

disguise of pilgrims, equipped with prayer beads (for counting precisely measured

paces) and prayer wheels which held geographical surveying instruments for calculating

latitude and position.[46] While native informants were used by the British before this, for

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[45] Meyer and Brysac (1999), p. 209.

[46] Waller (1990). The Anglicized spelling of "pundits" is here retained for the native informants for British India, both in regard to the compilation of geographical information, and with respect to translation,

example by Moorcroft and Burnes—and especially notable was Mohan Lal Zutshi (1812-1877), also known as Mohan Lal Kashmiri, during the First Anglo-Afghan War—here they were being deployed for intelligence and surveying strategies (and were magnificently underpaid for their efforts).[47]

Maharaja Ranbir Singh was involved in the process of attempting to consolidate his hold on the northwestern sections of the state in the 1860s. He organized a punitive expedition to Yasin in 1863, and in September 1866 deputed a larger mission against the northwestern states of Hunza, Nagar, Punial, and Darel, acquiring recognition of loyalty from them by 1869. The maharaja had also expressed interest in cultivating commercial relations with Central Asia, had established a Russian language school at Srinagar, and concluded a commercial treaty with Yarkand in 1867. The British, worrying about his loyalty, made a series of gradual incursions into the princely state's ruling structure. In 1867 they established a temporary agent at Leh, originally for one season only, but this agent became a permanent feature after 1869 (retitled as commissioner in 1870).[48] The British also made an agreement with the maharaja in 1870 to allow a party to pass through in order to establish commercial contacts with Yarkand, which they undertook in two missions under Douglas Forsyth (1827-1886), in 1870 and 1873. During the

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compilation, and codification of Hindu doctrine for the purposes of British legal decisions. The spelling "pandit" will be retained for autochthonous Indian uses and titles, largely reserved for Brahmin scholars, and for the Kashmiri Hindus, who are referred to as Pandits.

[47] Meyer and Brysac (1999) note that Nain Singh and his cousin Mani Singh, two of the first "pundits," were paid a starting salary of sixteen rupees per month, pp. 210-211. While pay rates rose for native intelligence officers, they were never given equal pay or status to their white European colleagues.

[48] Yasin (1984), pp. xix-xx.

second Forsyth expedition, he and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Edward Gordon (1832-

1914) took note of the passes in the northwest of the princely state, in Chitral and Yasin,

the Baroghil and the Ishkaman passes, respectively, and how Russia could easily traverse

these passes and invade India.[49] Forsyth recommended establishing a political agent at

Gilgit. Captain John Biddulph (1840-1921), who was part of the second Forsyth

expedition, was sent in 1876 to inquire about the accessibility of the passes, and

susceptibility to invasion of Gilgit, Yasin, and Hunza, which confirmed the fears earlier

relayed by Forsyth.[50]

At the same time, Major General Charles MacGregor (1840-1887) had given

orders to Captain Charles Ellison Bates (1839-1906) to compile a systematic survey of

the land and peoples of the princely state, which resulted in the 1873 *A Gazetteer of*

Kashmir and the adjacent districts of Ishtwar, Badrawar, Jamu, Naoshera, Punch, and

the Valley of the Kishen Ganga, intended solely for political and military use.[51] In it,

while offering his opinions on Kashmiris, rehearsing much of what had been said by

Moorcroft and Vigne earlier, he meticulously details eighty-seven possible routes of

access into the princely state from a possible Russian invasion via Afghanistan; some

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[49] Chohan (1983), pp. 41-43. Biddulph (1880).

[50] Chohan (1983), pp. 43-44; Teng (1973), p. xx.

[51] Bates (1873).

routes personally surveyed himself, some gathered from conversations with locals.[52] In

detailing the Kashmiri people, he notes, following Moorcroft, that

> Those who have best considered the character of the Kashmiri have been
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> inclined to attribute his manifold failings rather to his political condition and
>
> surroundings than to any inherent viciousness of nature; and it cannot be
>
> doubted that a people possessed of such intellectual powers, descendants of a
>
> warlike race, though now the greatest cowards in Asia, whom centuries of the
>
> worst oppression have not succeeded in utterly brutalising, must be capable of a
>
> moral regeneration.[53]

The attribution of politics as the chief cause of the constitutional failings of Kashmiris

played usefully into the British hands. Whereas in Moorcroft's time, the aim was to

establish British political control and evangelize the Kashmiris into Christianity, by

Bates's time "Kashmir misgovernment" was coming to stand for the British taking

greater involvement in the affairs of the princely state against an increasingly

untrustworthy maharaja, without evangelism figuring as prominently.[54]

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[52] Bates (1873), pp. 409-530.

[53] Bates (1873), p. 37.

[54] The British government had largely abandoned patronizing missionary activity in the aftermath of the Sipahi Revolt. Conservative Party leader Lord Derby in December 1857 remarked on the "the somewhat hopeless task of Christianizing India." The secular mode of education espoused by Thomas Babington Macaulay, James Mill, and other "Anglicists" in the 1830s was seen as a way of inculcating the basic characteristics of British Christianity without the uprooting of a formal conversion process. Quote from Metcalf (1995), p. 47. Although, there were plenty of evangelists still undertaking missionary work across India. The very term "Kashmir misgovernment" was evocative of Anglican missionary Arthur Brinckman's (1838-1913) *Wrongs of Cashmere* of 1870 and Robert Thorp's (1838-1868) *Cashmere Misgovernment*, also published in 1870. Remarking on this work, Mohan Krishen Teng notes that "[u]nderneath the sharp invective against the transfer of Kashmir to the Dogras lurks the deep sense of the loss of the climatically

In 1874, the period of stay of the the Officer on Special Duty stationed in Kashmir was extended from six months to eight and the Officer was also charged with dealing with Central Asian affairs. On November 17 and 18, 1876 the Viceroy Robert Bulwer-Lytton (Lord Lytton; 1831-1891) reached an agreement with Maharaja Ranbir Singh to station an agent in Gilgit, for the purposes of ensuring peace and security on the frontier, with assurances that the agent would not interfere in the maharaja's government. The original agreement was for the agent at Gilgit to stay for one period, from 1877 to 1881. John Biddulph was selected to be the first agent at Gilgit, and he arrived there in December 1877.

Elsewhere, Captain Robert Sandeman renegotiated the treaty with the Khan of Kalat in 1876, establishing the British-administered Balochistan Agency the following year. In 1878, Biddulph succeeded in getting the Mehtar of Chitral, Aman-ul-Mulk (1821-1892), to recognize the suzerainty of Dogras.

In September 1878, the Emir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali Khan (1825-1879), rebuffed a British diplomatic mission while, under pressure, accepting a Russian embassy earlier in July.[55] The British threatened invasion, and Sher Ali reached out to the Russians for assistance. The Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, Konstantin von Kaufman (1818-

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temperate region which offered real prospects of colonisation." Teng (1973), xxxiii-xxxiv. While there is merit to this assertion, Teng significantly downplays the autocratic character of Dogra rule. Nevertheless, this sentiment did not find widespread popularity in the upper policy circles of British India.

[55] The Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, Konstantin von Kaufman, threatened to support Sher Ali's nephew and rival for the throne, Abdur Rahman Khan, if he did not accept the embassy. Hopkirk (1994), p. 380.

1882) informed him that Russian assistance would not be forthcoming and advised him to make peace with the British. On his way back to Afghanistan, Sher Ali Khan died on February 21, 1879, leaving his son Mohammad Yaqub Khan (1849-1923) to succeed him. British Major Louis Cavagnari (1841-1879) got Emir Mohammad Yaqub Khan to sign the Treaty of Gandamak on May 26, 1879, which effectively rendered Afghanistan a protectorate of the United Kingdom, adding that a resident would be placed at Kabul. An uprising in Kabul erupted on September 3 and Cavagnari was killed. General Frederick Roberts then mounted an invasion, with the approval of the Emir, and hanged dozens in Kabul in October, then brutally slaughtered thousands of Afghans marching on Kabul in December. Meanwhile, Mohammad Yaqub Khan abdicated the throne in October. The British then offered the throne to his cousin, Abdur Rahman Khan (d. 1901). Mohammad Yaqub's brother, Ayub Khan (1857-1914), however, made his claim to the throne. The British joined forces with Abdur Rahman Khan to defeat Ayub Khan, who fled into Persia, and later took refuge in British India.[56]

Russian expansion continued southward, with the annexations of Turcoman Geok Tepe, from December 1880 to January 1881, and Merv in March 1884. A joint boundary commission was agreed upon by the British and the Russians, which was supposed to meet in October of 1884, but did not do so until summer 1885, by which time the Russians had invaded and annexed Panjdeh, in Afghan territory, in February

[56] Hopkirk (1994), pp. 384-401.

and March of 1885. The boundary commission completed the territorial delineation in summer 1887.[57]

In 1881, after the Afghan War and the suppression of an uprising in Yasin by Pahlwan Bahadur in the previous year, the political agent at Gilgit was withdrawn. That same year in which *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* was published, a massive project undertaken at the direction of William Wilson Hunter (1840-1900), which synthesized various provincial gazetteers where available. For Kashmir, Hunter relied heavily on Bates, Moorcroft, Vigne, and Frederick Drew (1836-1891), an English geologist in the employ of the maharaja from 1862 to 1872. Major-General Charles MacGregor released his *The Defence of India* in 1884, an alarmist pamphlet circulated to members of the India Council and senior government and military officials. In it, he argued that if Russians were to attack, they would do so at five points simultaneously—Herat, Bamian, Kabul, Chitral, and Gilgit—and averred that "there can never be a real settlement of the Anglo-Russian question till Russia is driven out of the Caucasus and Turkistan."[58]

Ranbir Singh died in September 1885, and upon the accession of his son Pratap Singh (1848-1925), the British required that a resident be attached to his court, to which the new maharaja acquiesced. On April 17, 1889, Pratap Singh was divested of power and replaced by a State Council consisting of his two brothers, Amar Singh and Ram

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[57] The Russian government argued that Panjdeh was an extension of the territory of Merv. Ibid., pp. 428, 430-431.

[58] Quoted from ibid., p. 423.

Singh, and two ministers, Pandit Suraj Koul and Rai Bahadur Bhag Ram. The British then

began to enact land reforms, undertaken by settlement-commissioner Walter Lawrence.

The Government of India decided in March 1889 that the Gilgit Agency was to be

reestablished, and Algernon Durand (1854-1923) was chosen for the position of agent

there. He arrived on July 27, 1889. While in Gilgit, he focused intently on improving

existing roads and constructing new ones. In May 1891, Uzar Khan of Nagar, the son of

the ruling Raja Jaffer Khan, in concert with the Thum of Hunza, Safdar Ali Khan, rose in

insurrection against the British and seized Chalt fort. Durand returned with troops by

the end of November, and a three-week campaign ensued, resulting in the submission

of Raja Jaffer Khan of Nagar to British rule, the flight of Uzar Khan and Safdar Ali Khan

from the area, and the installation of Muhammad Nazim Khan, the half-brother of

Safdar Ali Khan, as the ruler of Hunza.[59] After a minor rising in Chilas in March 1893,

Durand left Gilgit and was replaced as agent. Amar Singh Chohan has said that the

tenure of Durand in Gilgit

> rested upon 3 main props:-- 1. a firm belief in the invincible strength of the
>
> British Empire; 2. an unquestioning assurance that the British officer, and
>
> especially the Political Agent, was a creature of superior clay, whose voice must
>
> be hearkened to and obeyed, as [if] it were the voice of a god; 3. a policy
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> towards the people of the political districts of the Agency and their rulers based

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[59] Hassnain (1978), p. 77; Chohan (1983), pp. 96-115; Durand (1977 [1899]), p. 260.

on liberality, justice and courtesy, with a minimum of interference, by which

their contentment should be secured.[60]

Durand presents an interesting image of himself as a frontier agent in the grander

imperial project. He is aware of a broader picture, of which his role is just a part, using

language evocative of Curzon's "grand chessboard": "For the man on the Frontier sees

but his own square on the chessboard and can know but little of the whole game in

which he is a pawn."[61] He also presents his stay as agent at Gilgit as simultaneously an

exercise of sporting masculinity: a well-established trope among "players" of the "Great

Game," as the very name would indicate, most effectively captured in Rudyard Kipling's

coming-to-manhood novel set on the northwest frontier, *Kim*;[62] and a struggle to

maintain moral rectitude in a country rife with slavery, corruption, butchery, and

treachery, indicative of just how superior English manners and mores were.[63] The good

and decent native, here, was always portrayed as the exception to the rule.[64]

The final frontier rising to the concern of the British in the "Great Game" was in

Chitral in 1895 and resulted in the territory being severed from the rest of the Princely

State in 1896. The Mehtar, Aman-ul-Mulk, died on August 30, 1892 and his son Afzal-ul-

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[60] Chohan (1983), p. 130.

[61] Durand (1977 [1899]), p. ix. Curzon (1892), pp. 3-4.

[62] Said (1987); Kaul (2002); Kipling (2002 [1900]).

[63] See especially the chapter "First Visit to Chitral," Durand (1977 [1899]), pp. 44-73.

[64] On native troops: "Some of the officers were keen, but peculation and corruption were rampant; the honest men, if they existed, had no chance, and the condition of the force was deplorable." Durand (1977 [1899]), p. 39.

Mulk (1867-1892) seized the throne while his other son Nizam-ul-Mulk was stationed in

Yasin as governor. Afzal-ul-Mulk was then killed by his uncle, Sher Afzal (1841-1923).

Nizam-ul-Mulk (1861-1895) sought to retake the throne, and did so with Durand

approving, and was able to force Sher Afzal out at the end of 1892. On January 1, 1895,

while hunting, Nizam-ul-Mulk was killed, at the instigation of his brother Amir-ul-Mulk

(1877-1923). Amir-ul-Mulk was backed by the ruler of Swat, Umra Khan (d. 1903). The

new political agent at Gilgit, Major George Robertson (1852-1916), then organized an

invasion of Chitral, entering in early March 1895 and having pushed out Amir-ul-Mulk

and Umra Khan by April, and then placed Shuja-ul-Mulk (1881-1936) on the throne.

British opinion was divided on what to do after the revolt was suppressed. The Liberal

government under Lord Rosebery and Indian Secretary Henry Fowler favored

withdrawal from Chitral, but after the general election of July and August 1895 placed

the Conservatives in the majority under Lord Salisbury, course was reversed. Chitral was

dissected in 1896, with the districts west of the Shandur range (Yasin, Koh, Ghizar,

Ishkoman) placed under the Gilgit Agency, and a separate British Indian agency was

placed over Dir, Swat, and the rest of Chitral.[65]

     Algernon Durand's brother, Mortimer Durand (1850-1924), Foreign Secretary in

the Governor-General's Council, had reached an agreement delineating the border

between British India and Afghanistan in November 1893. The Durand Line, as it would

come to be known, was extended to the borders with Russia in 1895, where it created

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[65] Chohan (1983), pp. 132-178; Hassnain (1978), pp. 88-91; Hopkirk (1994), pp. 483-501.

the Wakhan Corridor as an Afghan controlled buffer zone. Pratap Singh was restored to

the position of maharaja in 1905 by Viceroy George Curzon (1859-1925), and Curzon

also created the North-West Frontier Province in 1901.[66]

The Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907 is seen as marking the end of

the Great Game. It divided Persia into two spheres of influence with a neutral zone in

between; created Tibet as a buffer state where neither state was to interfere; and

recognized the United Kingdom's sphere of influence over Afghanistan, whereby the

Russian government was to conduct all relations with Afghanistan through the United

Kingdom.

2.4 The Geopolitics of George Curzon, Halford Mackinder, and Olaf Caroe

At the turn of the twentieth century the discipline of geopolitics came to take

form, heavily shaped by the imperial context. Much of the British policy on the frontier

was driven by an anxiety, and a need to control territory, as stated by George Curzon in

announcing his chief reason for choosing the topic of "Frontiers" for his Romanes

Lectures, delivered at Oxford on November 2, 1907:

> although Frontiers are the chief anxiety of nearly every Foreign Office in the
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> civilized world, and are the subjects of four out of every five political treaties or
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> conventions that are now concluded, though as a branch of the science of
>
> government Frontier policy is of the first practical importance, and has a more

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[66] Curzon is most infamous for his partition of Bengal in October 1905, shortly before departing for England.

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profound effect upon the peace or warfare of nations than any other factor, political or economic.[67]

In this address, Curzon elucidated the principles of Great Game geopolitics, noting how "the sale of Kashmir to a protected chief carried the strategical Frontier into the heart of the Himalayas" and how annexations led to "a new Frontier problem… and a new ring of Protectorates was formed. The culminating point of this policy on the western side was the signature of the Durand Agreement at Kabul in 1893."[68] In laying out his theory of the extent of territorial power projection, he lists "promise" (an alliance by a weaker power), "buffer state" (a diplomatic agreement between two stronger powers),[69] "Hinterland," "Sphere of Interest," "Sphere of Influence," and "Protectorate."

> [T]he uniform tendency is for the weaker to crystallize into the harder shape. Spheres of Interest tend to become Spheres of Influence; temporary Leases to become perpetual; Protectorates to be the forerunners of complete incorporation. The process is not so immoral as it might at first sight appear; it is in reality an endeavour, sanctioned by general usage, to introduce formality and decorum into proceedings which, unless thus regulated and diffused, might

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[67] Curzon (1907), p. 4.

[68] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[69] "[A]n expedient more or less artificial, according to the degree of stability which its government and institutions may enjoy, constructed in order to keep apart the Frontiers of converging Powers." Ibid., p. 29.

endanger the peace of nations or too violently shock the conscience of the world.[70]

For Curzon, the practice of territorial management was a distinctly European and imperial affair, the key to which was precision, an attribute he sees as lacking in the "oriental mind":

> In Asia, the oldest inhabited continent, there has always been a strong instinctive aversion to the acceptance of fixed boundaries, arising partly from the nomadic habits of the people, partly from the dislike of precise arrangements that is typical of the oriental mind, but more still from the idea that in the vicissitudes of fortune more is to be expected from an unsettled than from a settled Frontier.[71]

For "ultra-imperialists" like Curzon, the chief benefit of empire would be in its shaping the character and virtue of the individual taking part in official duties.[72] Curzon was part of a group of committed imperialists that harkened back to the glory, honor, and prestige that empire brought with it. It was made through hard work, diligence, and a keen ear to the ground. This was something he thought was increasingly being done away with, in favor of the aggrandizement of wealth and luxury, and with it,

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[70] Ibid., p. 47.

[71] Ibid., p. 49.

[72] See Cain (2007).

complacency towards empire. It was above all, a moral enterprise in the shaping of virtue and character for Curzon.[73]

And it was India that was central to the maintenance of the empire, and the frontier was the most important theater where (white) men's display of character and virtue could be honed. The colony was a theater for the performance of masculinity and the display of the superiority of British character and virtues, where Britons could earn their mettle; and it was on the frontier where these qualities were amplified and honed. This was a benefit to the British and the Indians alike, who could emulate the superior character and virtue of former.

> [O]n a widely different arena, but amid kindred travail, the British Empire may be seen shaping the British character, while the British character is still building the British Empire. There, too, on the manifold Frontiers of dominions, now amid the gaunt highlands of the Indian border, or the eternal snows of the Himalayas, now on the parched sands of Persia or Arabia, now in the equatorial swamps and forests of Africa, in an incessant struggle with nature and man, has been found a corresponding discipline for the men of our stock.[74]

Curzon also points to the "influence of Frontier expansion upon national character, as illustrated in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race," making an allusion to, but not

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[73] Ibid.

[74] Curzon (1907), p. 56.

naming, Frederick Jackson Turner's "frontier" thesis.[75] As Edward Said points out, Kim, in

Rudyard Kipling's work on the frontier, is only able to take full responsibility as a player

in the Great Game when he finds for himself an identity, an awareness of being a white

man as opposed to just another Indian.[76] Nevertheless, what often goes unquestioned

here, is the notion of racial and cultural difference, which was ubiquitous in the minds of

late-nineteenth-century imperial commentators, and social Darwinism provided an

idiom for its expression beginning in those last decades of the nineteenth century.[77]

Race came to assume a role of central importance in another important early

British geopolitical thinker, namely Halford Mackinder.[78] Mackinder's "Pivot Area" thesis

of 1904 pointed to the importance of Russian expansion, which similarly signaled the

importance of India as a bulwark on the "world island." Empire was central for Disraeli's

Conservatives, the Liberal Imperialist faction of the Liberal party led by Lord Rosebery

(Archibald Primrose), and the Liberal Unionist party which broke with the Liberal Party

in 1886 over Gladstone's espousal of Irish Home Rule. Mackinder was part of the new

Liberal Unionists and was a committed supporter of Joseph Chamberlain's Tariff Reform

League after it was formed in 1903.[79] Race and empire were indispensable elements of

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[75] Ibid. Turner (1893).

[76] Said (1987), p. 40.

[77] See Heffernan (2000) on vitalism and Friedrich Ratzel, pp. 40-47.

[78] As mentioned above, European superiority was a central marker of geopolitical discourse at this time, evidenced by its being virtually unquestioned, and in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, often enunciated in explicitly racial terms.

[79] Mackinder was a Liberal imperialist, along the lines of Rosebery's faction. He stood for MP in 1900 for Warwick-and-Leamington but lost, and was offered the College Division, Glasgow as a Liberal MP in 1902

Mackinder's geopolitics, and social Darwinism provided the framework within which these were couched. To quote Gerry Kearns,

> Mackinder read space as environment and argued that, over the longer term, the variety of the physical and biotic environments created the pattern for the emergence of different sorts of human societies as races and racialized nations. Over the shorter term, the disposition of land and sea, and of natural resources, provided the strategic setting for the unavoidable struggle between these incompatible races.[80]

For Mackinder the protection of the English stock required social reform at home, imperialism abroad, tariffs around imperial production, and racial hygiene throughout. A constant fear of Mackinder and other imperialists was colonialism leading to miscegenation and the denigration of the "Teutonic" race. Thus, for Mackinder, it was important for Englishmen to be imbued with notions of their racial superiority in order to avert the possibility of miscegenation.[81]

A final imperial geopolitical thinker dealt with here is Olaf Caroe (1892-1981). Caroe was an India hand whose rise was primarily related to his tenure in the North-West Frontier Province, where he served as chief secretary 1933-1934 and Governor

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but turned it down. He finally left the Liberal Party in 1903, instigated by his friend and associate Leo Amery (Colonial Secretary in Baldwin's ministry, 1924-1929 and Indian Secretary in Churchill's war ministry, 1940-1945) and Joseph Chamberlain's Tariff Reform League. Mackinder sat as Unionist MP from Glasgow Camlachie from January 1910 to November 1922.

[80] Kearns (2009), p. 68.

[81] Kearns (2009), pp. 71-78.

1946-1947, as well as serving as the Foreign Secretary in British India throughout World War II. In Peter John Brobst's study of Caroe, he notes that the latter's views "reflected a certain amount of romanticism and a more definite paternalism typical among British administrators in South Asia."[82] In 1942 he formed the Viceroy's Study Group for the study of the future of the Great Game.

In terms evocative of Curzon, Caroe pointed to an inner ring of defense which "consists of a series of tribes or minor States from the Persian frontier around the perilous north-west to Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the Assam frontiers"; and an outer, ring primarily countries recognized as independent or autonomous, namely, Persia/Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet, with Burma seen as inner politically and outer strategically.[83] The outer ring consisted of buffer states and Caroe stressed the future of China as a great power at a time when most British geopolitical strategists did not, leading him to stress the role of Burma as a buffer state, as important as Afghanistan, Persia, or Iraq, which would supplant Siam as the "cockpit of international competition and power balancing in Southeast Asia."[84]

Caroe lamented lack of attention to naval frontiers and pointed to the rise of Japanese power as a means to help "to correct the old landward ideas." Brobst notes,

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[82] Brobst (2005), p. xix. Caroe remarked in 1949 that Kipling's *Kim* "gave birth to the old romance of the North-West Frontier." Quoted in Brobst (2005), p. 99.

[83] The quote is taken from a 1942 paper, quoted in Brobst (2005), p. 77. Also, Brobst (2005), p. 36. The international nomenclature of Persia had changed to Iran by this time, but many British writers, including Caroe, continued referring to it as Persia.

[84] Brobst (2005), p.39. Panikkar was in line with Caroe here, as elsewhere, in stressing the future rise of China.

however, that "in Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, Caroe found the most sophisticated and

arguably the most important Indian exponent of a forward policy aimed at control of the

Indian Ocean."[85] His Indian Ocean theater and Central Asian land-mass theater

overlapped "somewhere near Kabul and Peshawar in the land of the Pathans," with

Balochistan as the subcontinent's "front-door" and the Northwest Frontier as the "side-

door" but also "the entrance where there may be more immediate trouble, because the

people are much more difficult and it is possible for a fifth column and other

organizations to stir up trouble there rather than further south."[86]

He saw India as the centerpiece in an Asiatic system and his ultimate goal was to

ensure that the subcontinent remained a secure base of power in the wider Asian

balance, and this was something that he wished to maintain after the eventual partition

of the subcontinent. Caroe was a fervent opponent of the partition on the geopolitical

grounds that it would weaken the region to future fragmentation and dismemberment.

Brobst notes, regarding the Cripps mission to India in 1942, how "Caroe was frustrated

by the extent the Cripps offer ignored geopolitics."[87] He was against any Dominion

status or independence for India without a thoroughgoing frontier defense policy, and,

importantly, the maintenance of ties with the United Kingdom—a position that found

much favor with Leo Amery, now Secretary for India. For Caroe, the near-term interest

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[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid., p. 99.

[87] Ibid., p. 6.

"was to allow a friendly successor state in India to consolidate its authority on its own terms and on its own time… as free as possible from any outside pressure."[88]

Brobst characterizes Caroe's views during the Cold War as "a fossilized Russophobia."[89] In the aftermath of partition he came to see Islam as a force of resilience against communism and secularism that would be advantageous to Western interests. He sought to shift the importance attributed to Turkey to Pakistan: "Pakistan was the linchpin in Caroe's emerging vision of a Western-backed alliance of Islamic states to maintain a favorable balance in the Great Game for power in Asia." Caroe felt that Pakistan "inherited two priceless legacies": the link to the British through the Commonwealth, and "a government and an administration based on Western liberal ideas." Through this inheritance, Pakistan could "give lead to other Islamic countries without incurring suspicion or giving offence."[90] He developed this argument through series of lectures and articles from 1948 to 1950, which resulted in his 1951 book *Wells of Power*, which focused on the growing importance of the Persian Gulf in the balance of global power: the "hub of the Muslim world," a region in which three "theaters of power" intersected (the European, the Central Asian Land Mass, and the Indian Ocean).[91]

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[88] Ibid., p. 36.

[89] Ibid., p. 50.

[90] Ibid., p. 128

[91] Ibid., p. 129.

Caroe became a member of The Round Table after leaving British India in 1947 and was fêted in Washington in the early 1950s. Susan and Lloyd Rudolph give Caroe credit for influencing the United States State Department and the shift to Pakistan under Eisenhower:

> we can say that Sir Olaf Caroe used the circumstance of India's Partition to help launch Pakistan on a 50-year career as the vehicle of America's practice of offshore balancing against Indian hegemony in the south Asia region. While this outcome was not necessarily Caroe's overt objective, he did mean to make Pakistan the fulcrum of his strategy to protect the "wells of power" and contain Soviet Russia and he did mean to sideline Jawaharlal Nehru's India.[92]

Brobst doubts the extent to which Caroe had actual influence in the United States State Department, given the importance he placed on Afghanistan which was ignored by the Department, but it is clear that some of his ideas regarding the importance of Pakistan as a bulwark against the Soviet Union were picked up, even if applied selectively.

With this geopolitical orientation, he came to see Kashmir as the "point d'appui for forces of the future."[93] "It is convenient," he wrote in 1967, "to see all Central Asia in the focus of Kashmir. It is the focal point at which China, the U.S.S.R., India, Pakistan, and indeed Afghanistan in the Wakhan 'pan-handle,' meet. There are few points in the

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[92] Rudolph and Rudolph (2006), p. 706.

[93] Brobst (2005), p. 79.

world more strategically situated."[94] Earlier, however, he did hold out the possibility of

Kashmir maintaining a degree of autonomy and functioning as a mediating point for

some reconciliation between India and Pakistan. In 1954, Josef Korbel, who was earlier a

member of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan until being unseated

as Czechoslovakia's representative by Gottwald's Communist government, pointed to

Kashmir as the possible entry point for the Soviet Union in India, decrying the rise of

leftist political ideas under Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference. In his not very muted

words, "Kashmir is on the road to a radical left-wing totalitarian dictatorship."[95]

Caroe also thought that if the United States was more properly attuned to the

realities of geopolitics, it would not be so insistent that the British move towards

decolonization.[96] For Caroe, geopolitics was a science to be treated cautiously, and in

this sense, required imperialism, or at least quasi-imperial ties, in order to safeguard

territory. Again, Korbel seems to evoke the echoes of Caroe's imperialism in the Cold

War era when he states that although Nehru shares with the West the belief in personal

freedom, political democracy, and the rule of law and sees the best way to combat

Communism as combatting poverty through economic and social reforms, he does not

see any direct danger to India from without; "[a]nd because he underestimates the

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[94] Quoted in ibid., p. 142.

[95] Korbel (1954), p. 198.

[96] Brobst (2005), p. 6.

outside threat to India, he does not recognize the utter necessity of settling the Kashmir

conflict."[97]

Caroe's thought also proves interesting for the continuities it shares with Indian

geopolitical thought in the aftermath of partition, especially for the central geopolitical

importance it places on Kashmir. The geopolitical thought of K. M. Panikkar, a close

confidant of Nehru and a key member of his foreign policy staff, as mentioned above,

also borrows much from Caroe. Caroe's imprint was also left on a former colleague of

his in the North-Western Frontier, K. P. S. Menon (1898-1982), who was the first Indian

admitted to the Foreign Department of the Political Service in 1925, and independent

India's first Foreign Secretary, from 1948 to 1952.[98] Itty Abraham notes that "Curzon's

geopolitics was the most formal and explicit vision of a land-defined territory of India,"

and mediated through figures like Olaf Caroe, these views became institutionalized in

the territorial imaginaries and bureaucratic practices in the colonial British Indian state

as well as the Indian and Pakistani successor states.[99] Further, Abraham notes how

imperial geopolitics had oriented the state's gaze northward towards the Himalayas,

envisioned as the natural boundary, and marginalized the importance of sea-borne

approaches to India.

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[97] Korbel (1954), pp. 272-273.

[98] Brobst (2005), pp. 30-34. Menon was also the Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1952 to 1961.

[99] Abraham, pp. 113-114.

The dominance of the Curzonian view led directly to the postcolonial imperative

of defending the northern mountain frontiers through the logic of territorial

expansion that required the political subordination of the sovereign states of the

Himalayas and saw the clash of empires as inevitable outcome of this logic.[100]

This view derives no small part from "scientific" metaphors that naturalize spatial

relations tying land and state power, "[m]aking these relations appear inevitable and

thereby producing territorially overdetermined ways of imagining and defending the

Indian state."[101] It is also important to note that all of these boundary extensions and

disputes show the mobility of borders, which has since come to attain mythical

importance in Indian territorial discourse as the natural geo-body of India.

In the imperialist setting the domain of geopolitics, and its imperatives, was

generally associated with Conservatives and the ultra-imperialists, and placed in

opposition to liberalism. Liberals throughout the nineteenth century pressed for political

reforms and the greater participation of Indians in self-government, but only after a

period of tutelage or paternalistic assessment of the inculcation of liberal values. In the

early twentieth century, calls for political participation fell on more sympathetic liberal

ears, but there was nevertheless opposition grounded in the language of the capacity to

extol liberal qualities. Geopolitics, seen as the highest and most serious form of politics,

was even further sequestered from Indian participation. The stress here, while not

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[100] Ibid., p. 115.

[101] Ibid.

necessarily incommensurate with liberalism, was on virtues and character, qualities

harkening back to an earlier era. This was, paradoxically, a moment of a slight opening in

the British class structure for the geopolitical Conservatives. Whereas, in the late

eighteenth century, Edmund Burke decried uppity Company agents coming back to

Great Britain with a fortune but lacking the proper manners of an aristocrat in the late

eighteenth century, and Curzon in the early twentieth century could similarly stress

manners over wealth. However, in Curzon's time, civil servicemen in India from middle-

class backgrounds, through proper training and an appreciation for the necessity of

empire, could exemplify the character necessary for an upstanding upholder of imperial

might. This was partially the result of an anxiety coming from an increasing ability to

attain wealth in the nineteenth century for classes for whom it was all but prohibited in

earlier centuries, and the increasing importance these perceived uncouth poor people

would play in politics with the franchise extensions of 1832, 1867, and 1884, and, with

the notable exception of women until 1918, the rise of popular politics in the United

Kingdom was unsettling for the older upper classes.[102]

2.5 Defining and Cataloguing Indian Civilization

As with Kashmir the territory, the Kashmiris became known to the British

through the works of travel writers, colonial administrators, and professional

Orientalists throughout the nineteenth century. The characteristics described by

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[102] The franchise was extended to women over 30 in 1918, and further extended to women over 21 in 1928.

Moorcroft and Trebeck stuck as the established tropes of the Kashmiri "selfish, superstitious, ignorant, supple, intriguing, dishonest, and false," also effeminate and cowardly. With the rise of the imperial ethnological project, the Kashmiri was seen to occupy an in-between position: the overwhelming majority of Kashmiris were Muslim, which from the dominant works of European scholars on India, had been coded as "invaders" and foreigners, not native Indians.[103] This was coupled with a recognition that not all Muslims had come into India from outside, and that significant conversion had taken place. However, linguistically and through the Hindu religion Kashmir was seen as related to the rest of India. This led a number of imperial ethnologists and philologists to see the Kashmiri Hindu as more authentically Kashmiri than the Kashmiri Muslim, who probably had a great deal of ancestry in Central (Turk or "Tartar") or Western Asia (Arab or Persian). British colonial authorities and scholars treated Muslims and Hindus as separate peoples and employed prevailing ethnological assumptions in order to account for this difference. Still, here, Kashmiri Muslims were seen as an "essentially Hindu" people, despite the outward manifestation of Muslim practices. This ambiguous position of the Kashmiri complicated their position within the classificatory ethnography as civilizational entities began to be territorialized and mapped in the anti-colonial movement.

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[103] Mill (1817); Smith (1914 [1905]); This can even be seen, if unintentionally, in Arthur Basham's enormously influential *The Wonder That Was India* (1968 [1954]), which ends before the establishment of Muslim rule and whose title might convey a sense of fall from wonder.

Early descriptive attempts to portray the Indians include Abraham Rogerius's

Open Door to Secret Heathendom (1651) and the collection *Lettres édifiantes et*

curieuses, periodically disseminated throughout the eighteenth century. Before the

predominating presence of European power in India in the eighteenth century, Indians

had been largely conceived of within an ordering of difference along the lines of

religious membership: Islam was treated as a familiar heresy and the various Indian

were religions lumped together as "pagan" or "heathen." The ethnological project of

categorizing, reifying, and assigning a place to Indians originally grew out of the field of

philology, and the study of India in the eighteenth century was originally approached

through the lens of the study of Persian. It was in the seventeenth century when the

European study of Persian was given sustained linguistic attention for the first time,

largely developing out of the move to extend polyglot Bibles to Persian. From there

emerged a comparative philology which drew attention to the lexical, grammatical, and

syntactic similarities between Persian and European languages. As Ludovicus de Dieu

(1590-1642) was compiling his elementary Persian grammar in Leiden in the 1630s, the

first of its kind in Europe, Johannes Elichman (1601/02-1639), also in Leiden, was

simultaneously developing the outlines of a comparative theory, pointing to the

similarities between Persian and European languages.[104] This theory, which would come

to be known as the "Scythian theory" when developed more fully by Claude de

Saumaise (1588-1653) and Marcus Zuerius van Boxhorn (1612-1653) (both also working

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[104] Bruijn (2011) [1995]; Van Hal (2010).

in Leiden), pointed to the common origins of both Persian and European languages, apart from Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic.[105]

When attention turned to India in the mid-eighteenth century, Europeans drew on this knowledge of Persian to comprehend India. The Frenchman Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731-1805), based in Surat, devoted his attention to the translation of the *Zend-Avesta* in 1771, which he was able to do with the help of local Parsis; Alexander Dow (1735-1779) translated Ferishta's Persian *History of Hindostan* in 1768; John Zephaniah Holwell relied on Persian sources to compose his *Interesting Historical Events, relative to the provinces of Bengal* in 1767; in 1776, at the urging of Governor Warren Hastings, Nathaniel Brassey Halhed (1751-1830) compiled *A Code of Gentoo Laws*, for which he had to rely on a Persian translation of a Sanskrit digest of Hindu law compiled by pandits on commission from the East India Company.[106] In Halhed's *Code of Gentoo Laws*, he remarks upon the similarity between the Sanskrit language and Greek. Two years later, in his *Grammar of the Bengal Language*, he posited that Sanskrit formed something of an original classical language, out of which Bengali developed as a vulgar language.

Bernard Cohn points to the era from 1770-1785 as the formative period during which Britons successfully began the program of appropriating Indian languages to serve as crucial components in the construction of the system of rule. They began producing

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[105] Van Hal (2010).

[106] Ferishta, or Mohammad Qasem Hindu Shah Astarabadi (fl. 1600), was a Persian in Deccan India, and wrote his history at the request of the Adil Shahi sultan, Ibrahim (r. 1580-1627).

grammars, dictionaries, treatises, class books, and translations about and from languages of India: "The production of these texts and others that followed them began the establishment of discursive formation, defined an epistemological space, created a discourse (Orientalism), and had the effect of converting Indian forms of knowledge into European objects."[107]

The enumeration, study, and later reification, of Hindu religious texts was intimately tied to the colonial project of establishing rule over the Indians. As Governor-General of Bengal, Warren Hastings (1732-1818) called for finding the sources of Hindu and Muslim law so as to codify respective legal doctrines. This led to the translations in Halhed's *Code of Gentoo Laws* in 1776, Francis Balfour's *Herkern* in 1781, Abu'l-Fazl's *Ain-i Akbari* by Francis Gladwin from 1783 to 1786, and Charles Wilkins's *Geeta* in 1785. In particular, Halhed's *Code of Gentoo Laws* and Wilkins's *Geeta* "were translations thought to be keys with which to unlock, and hence make available, knowledge of Indian law and religion held tightly by the 'mysterious' Brahmins."[108] Hastings made his ruling position clear: "[w]e have endeavoured to adapt our Regulations to the Manners and Understandings of the People, and the Exigencies of the Country, adhering as closely as we are able to their ancient uses and Institutions."[109] Hastings was trying to define what

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[107] Cohn (1996 [1985]), pp. 20-21.

[108] Cohn (1996), p. 21. Abu'l-Fazl (1551-1602) was the wazir to Mughal Emperor Akbar (reigned 1556-1605). The *Herkern* was a translation of epistolary practices by professional scribes compiled by Har Karan ibn Mathurdas Kamboh Multani at the end the 1620s.

[109] Ibid., p. 26. This was from a letter Hastings sent to Court of Directors, November 3, 1772.

was "Indian" and create "a system of rule congruent with what he thought to be indigenous institutions," but this system would also be taking into account British notions of justice, proper discipline, and forms of deference that should mark relations between ruler and ruled.[110]

The British came to value what they classified as "classical" languages (Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic) over the "vulgar" languages, and came to entrust legal rulings of what is in proper accord with Muslim or Hindu law with elevated literati: qazis, muftis, maulavis, and pandits. This came to privilege textual interpretation and standardization, if given a modicum of flexibility, over local practices. Nevertheless, the British were uneasy about having to rely on intermediaries through the idiom of Persian, intermediaries which were considered, qua Indian, as untrustworthy. This led to the more extensive study of Sanskrit, particularly in the figure of William Jones (1746-1794).

Jones was something of a wunderkind Orientalist in England, composing the most updated *Grammar of the Persian Language* in a European language in 1771, and a history of the Persian ruler Nader Shah in 1770. He was working as a barrister in England when called over to Bengal to serve on the Supreme Court there in 1783. Jones was initially reluctant to learn Sanskrit, but found Indians to be utterly untrustworthy and not properly suited to develop legal doctrine, favoring interpretations which would better their positions and castes, so he made it incumbent upon himself to studiously

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[110] Ibid., p. 61.

take up Sanskrit.[111] With the active patronage of Hastings, the Asiatick Society, a

professional organization of Orientalists, was established in 1784, led by Jones.[112] It was

at his Third Anniversary discourse to the Asiatick Society in 1786 where he delivered

what has since come to be referred to as the "Indo-European" proof, pointing to an

umbrella family of languages which included Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, old Persian, and

perhaps a few more, which all developed out of a common source language (later

termed an *Ursprache* by German philologists). Reflecting back on the developments

made from this hypothesis in 1875, Henry Maine (1822-1888) remarked "the new

theory of Language has unquestionably produced a new theory of Race."[113]

William Jones approached the origin of languages through the lens of the Biblical

story of the Tower of Babel and the postdiluvian dispersal and used as foundational a

chronology of the world which more or less conformed to the one developed by James

Ussher (1581-1656), Bishop of Armagh in 1650. The major reference works that he fell

back on here were Isaac Newton's *The Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms Amended* from

1728, and Jacob Bryant's (1715-1804) three-volume *A New System or Analysis of Antient*

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[111] In his later project to develop a Digest for Hindu law, along the lines of Justinian's, he told Governor-General Cornwallis in 1788 that he did not want Brahmans and pandits to "deal out Hindoo law as they please, and make it at reasonable rates, when they cannot find it ready made." Quoted in Cohn (1996), pp. 69-70.

[112] Restyled "The Asiatic Society" in 1825.

[113] Quoted in Trautmann (1997), p.1. The quote is from Henry Maine's *The Effect of Observation of India on Modern European Thought*. It should be noted that developments were already being made in this direction, as noted above with Halhed's observations, but also in the work of Gaston-Laurent Cœurdoux (1691-1779), who made a note on the similarity between Sanskrit, Latin, and Greek in 1767, but was not published until after his death. Cœurdoux also used the framework of postdiluvian dispersal. Ibid., p. 54.

Mythology (1774-1776), and though he disagreed with the etymological method of Bryant, he embraced the latter's conclusions, which traced linguistic diversity to the descendants of Noah.[114] This twinned ethnology and philology would lend itself to racialized understandings with the development of scientific racial theories.

Despite the linguistic commonality between Persia and India, the people and customs were seen as markedly different from those of the more familiar Orient. As articulated by Hegel in *The Philosophy of History*, which drew heavily on James Mill's *History of British India*:

> Asia separates itself into two parts—Hither [*hinter*] and Farther [*vorder*] Asia;
> which are essentially different from each other. While the Chinese and the
> Hindoos—the two great nations of Farther Asia, already considered—belong to
> the strictly Asiatic, namely the Mongolian Race, and consequently possess a
> quite peculiar character, discrepant from ours; the nations of Hither Asia belong
> to the Caucasian, i.e., the European Stock. They are related to the West, while
> the Farther-asiatic peoples are perfectly isolated. The European who goes from
> Persia to India, observes, therefore, a prodigious contrast. Whereas in the
> former country he finds himself still somewhat at home, and meets with
> European dispositions, human virtues and human passions—as soon as he

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[114] Ibid., pp. 42-52.

crosses the Indus (i.e., in the *latter* region), he encounters the most repellent

characteristics, pervading every single feature of society.[115]

For Hegel, the term "Caucasian" was something of a neologism in his day, only having

been coined as a designation for Europeans by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach in 1795.[116]

Warren Hastings was recalled from his position as Governor-General, soon to

face an impeachment trial in London for his conduct in that office.[117] He was

(eventually) replaced by Charles, the 2nd Earl Cornwallis in 1786, under the terms of

Pitt's India Act of 1784, which sought to bring the administration of India under more

direct governmental supervision through the office of the Board of Control. During

Cornwallis's tenure, William Jones sought to improve upon what he saw as the

shortcomings of Halhed's *Code*, and sought to compile a complete digest of Hindu and

Muslim law, writing to Cornwallis in March 1788 that he hoped for Cornwallis to

become "the Justinian of India" (and Jones, by implication, his Tribonian).[118] Jones

completed the compilation for this project, but died before he was able to fully carry out

the translation, in 1794. It was eventually completed in 1797 by Henry Thomas

Colebrooke (1765-1837), and published as *The Digest of Hindu Law on Contracts and*

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[115] Hegel (1956), p. 173. Emphasis in original. Also quoted in Inden (2000), p. 51.

[116] In his third edition of *On the Natural variety of Mankind*. See Painter (2010), pp. 72-90.

[117] Marshall (1965). This famous trial featured Burke leading the charges of impeachment against Warren Hastings, instigated in part by Hastings's rival on the Supreme Council of Bengal, Philip Francis. The feud between Hastings and Francis was so bitter that it led to a duel between the two on August 17, 1780, in which Francis was wounded.

[118] Cohn (1996), p. 70.

Successions the following year, which served to standardize and rigidify sources and interpretations.[119] A major motivating impulse for the *Digest* was to free British judges from the meddling of Hindu and Muslim intermediaries.

There emerged both sympathetic and condescending sentiments to the Indians in England, which influenced governing policy. A central impulse for the removal of Hastings had been the accusation of despotic rule in India, central to Edmund Burke's lampooning of Hastings during the latter's lengthy impeachment trial.[120] However, by this time the trope of despotism as the type of rule fundamentally fitted for Indians had been established. This trope was solidified earlier in the century with Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* of 1721 and, having become a staple trope by the late eighteenth century, Dow referenced it with respect to India. The debate which then emerged was whether to ground rule of India on what were seen to be established local practices, often with connotations of despotism, or on a higher British standard. In the debate of 1833 this divide would take the characterization of Orientalists versus Anglicists, respectively. Compromises in between these positions were reached along the way, as evidenced by the 1793 permanent settlement of Governor-General Cornwallis, on which Thomas Metcalf notes "the idea of restoring the 'ancient institutions of the country' by

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[119] In the estimation of Bernard Cohn "Jones, and especially his successor, Colebrooke, established a European conception of the nature of Hindu law that was to influence the whole course of British and Indo-British thought and institutions dealing with the administration of justice down to the present." "More than any Englishman, Colebrooke fixed an interpretation of variation in the legal texts that was to become standard in the British courts." Ibid., p. 70, 72. Jones would go on to have a great relationship with Cornwallis's successor as governor-general, John Shore (in office 1793-1797).

[120] See Mehta (1999) on this point.

the award of property concealed a commitment to European, and Whig, conceptions of

the proper ordering of society," reconceiving the zamindar as an "improving"

landlord.[121]

A key group of agitators for the reform of British Indian policy at this time were

the evangelicals. A central text for this group was Charles Grant's "Observations on the

state of society among the Asiatic subjects of Great Britain, particularly with respect to

morals and the means of improving it," published in 1796, but, per Grant, "chiefly

written in 1792."[122] Grant (1746-1823) was a company servant in India from 1767 to

1790, and upon his return to England joined the Clapham Sect, an evangelical

organization later famed for its espousal of abolitionism, but also for its assertive

positions on the spreading of Christian doctrine, particularly in India.[123] Trautmann

notes that the "Observations" "makes the case for an aggressively Anglicizing and

Christianizing stance toward India and its culture."[124] Among the Clapham Secters was

Governor-General John Shore (1751-1834), who served in this capacity from 1793 to

1797, and joined the Clapham Sect upon returning to England; also, Zachary Macaulay

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[121] Metcalf (1995), p. 21.

[122] Trautmann (1997), pp. 101-109. Grant would later serve as an MP for Inverness-shire from 1802 to 1818.

[123] Leading member William Wilberforce, famed for his abolitionism, noted that the opening of India to missionary activity was "that greatest of all causes, for I really place it before Abolition." Stokes (1959), p. 28.

[124] Ibid., p. 101.

(1768-1838) and William Wilberforce (1759-1833).[125] Wilberforce, an MP from 1780 to 1825, was vocal in his denunciation of Hinduism and non-Christian culture. Grant's "Observations" were re-circulated in the debate on the 1813 Company Charter Bill and Wilberforce's pejorative lambasting of Indian culture was at a pitch.[126] The Clapham Sect's understanding of India was a country populated by heathens and degenerates, whose only salvation would come through conversion to Christianity. The Clapham Secters relied heavily on the trope of Oriental despotism, but for them this was not an inherent aspect of the Indian's being due to ethnic or racial difference, but cultural and religious difference, and could be rectified with conversion. Nevertheless, Grant argued for segregation until Indians had successfully assimilated to British ways.[127]

Grant wrote in opposition William Robertson's progressive teleological history and argued that savagery was not the initial condition of the human race, but a fall from initial civilization. The opposing, nascent liberal position in the debate was that Indians were somehow stuck in the past, unable to develop and progress. In 1833, common

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[125] Shore endorsed Jones's and Colebrooke's projects of compiling a digest of Hindu and Muslim laws for rule while serving as governor-general. He was created Baron Teignmouth upon his return to England in 1798. In 1805, after joining the Clapham Sect, he wrote a biography of William Jones, emphasizing his Christian belief and editing out any of his sympathetic defenses of Hinduism, or any elements of radical Whiggism in his politics that could be seen as unpatriotic—like his opposition to the use of the army to suppress riots or his support for extending the franchise to all adult males except paupers. Ibid., pp. 75-76. Zachary Macaulay was the father of Thomas Babington Macaulay.

[126] In the debates on the 1813 bill, on June 22, Wilberforce described Hindu divinities as "monsters of lust, injustice, wickedness and cruelty. In short, their religious system is one of grand abomination." Grant noted that "we cannot avoid recognizing in the people of Hindostan, a race of men lamentably degenerate and base; retaining but a feeble sense of moral obligation; yet obstinate in their disregard of what they know to be right, governed by malevolent and licentious passions." Stokes (1959), pp. 30-32.

[127] Trautmann, pp. 109-110. Grant appears to be less than entirely consistent here.

cause was made between utilitarians, free-marketers, and evangelicals in opposition to the "Orientalists." The former camp, collectively referred to as the "Anglicists," can be summed up by leading figure Thomas Babington Macaulay's (1800-1859) stated goal in his 1835 "Minute on Education" of creating an elite "class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect." Infamously, Macaulay also stated "I am quite ready to take the oriental learning at the valuation of the orientalists themselves. I have never found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia."[128] The utilitarians made common cause with the evangelicals for the purpose of advancing European learning in India, but did not back the latter's program for mass conversion.

Although the evangelicals ultimately failed in their attempts to make India wholly Christian, the utilitarian program of liberal English education served the function of inculcating English Christian values without the straightforward interference in categorically religious matters, as alluded to in the quote above by Macaulay. In the debate on the 1833 Charter Bill, Macaulay stressed the twinned purposes of education and legal reform along the liberal model, "that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that, having become instructed in knowledge, they may, in some future age, demand European institutions."[129]

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[128] Macaulay (1920 [1835]).

[129] Macaulay (2008 [1833]).

Rooted in a liberal understanding of the secular project, many British administrators sought to remake Indian society through education and legislation, in a manner that partitioned the spheres of the religious and the secular, and meant to render Islam and Hinduism as a hollow shell. So, while British administrators made a point of an enforced non-interference policy in matters of religion, educational intervention took the form of the great works of English historical literature (later influenced by the educational reforms of Thomas Arnold).[130]

By this time, centers of learning on Indian matters were moving to the metropole from the colony. Early attempts at developing institutions for the study of Indian religion and culture were tied to Hastings's goal of establishing the British in India as custodians of indigenous knowledge. The first two attempts, a madrassa for "Mahamadan law and other sciences" in 1780 and a Sanskrit College in Benares in 1791 (spearheaded by Jonathan Duncan) were aborted.[131] In 1800 the Asiatic Society was instrumental in setting up the College of Fort William in Calcutta, termed by Governor-General Wellesley as his "University of the East." Wellesley intended for the college to train young Company men, who he hoped would transition from being seen as agents for commercial concerns to "ministers and officers of a powerful sovereign."[132]

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[130] Metcalf (1995), pp. 39-41. See also Viswanathan (1989).

[131] Jonathan Duncan (1756-1811) was the Company's resident at Benares and would later be the Governor of Bombay from 1795 to 1811. The reasons had to do with misappropriations and budgetary issues.

[132] Cohn (1996), p. 48.

Wellesley undertook this initiative on his own, without the approval of the Court of

Directors, which cut back on the curriculum and funding of the institution upon learning

of its existence, and worked to replace it, at the instigation and advice of Charles Grant,

with what became the East India Company's training college at Haileybury in 1806. It

was for this training college that James Mill wrote his *History of British India*.

Mill's *History of British India* not only served to denigrate the supposed

achievements of Indian civilization but showed those achievements as reaching their

zenith in Gupta northern India of the sixth century, and afterwards being rendered

stagnant. Mill was a key proponent of the position which became identified as

"Anglicist" and thought that the "Orientalists" were too partial to Indians. But, as

Thomas Metcalf notes, however much William Jones and James Mill may have disagreed

on policy towards Indians

> together they accepted without question their division into Hindu and Muslim.
>
> By the early nineteenth century authoritative conceptions of the two faiths, and
>
> the character of the adherents, had been set firmly in place… More importantly,
>
> the British came to believe that adherence to one or the other of these two
>
> religions was not merely a matter of belief, but defined membership more
>
> generally in a larger community.[133]

This drew on earlier works in the eighteenth century, pointing to essentialized

differences between the two communities, as elaborated by figures like Robert Orme

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[133] Metcalf (1995), p. 133.

(1728-1801), Alexander Dow (1735/36-1779), and Luke Scrafton (1732-1770), and

echoed in Mill's *History*, which described Muslims as invading conquerors from

"Tartary."[134] This led to the establishment of essentialized differences between Hindus

and Muslims, among other tropes, in the work of Dow and Orme pointing to the

establishment of Muslims as despotic and violent, Hindus as indolent, passive, and

effeminate.[135] British administrators later complicated this image with the emergence of

a discourse on "martial races" that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, pointing

especially to Rajputs, Punjabis, and Gorkhas as martial exceptions to Hindu

effeminacy.[136] Either through the violent fanaticism of the Muslims, or the Hindu

indolence inviting it, these works—together with Grant's "Observations"—combined in

Mill's *History* to build on the image of oriental despotism.[137]

After the Sipahi Revolt of 1857, British administrators, drawing on suspicions

that the revolt was primarily instigated by Muslim opponents of British rule, began

investigating the question of whether or not Muslims were bound by Islam to rebel

against European rule. A young Alfred Comyn Lyall (1835-1911) attributed the

insurrections to "a great Mahometan conspiracy, and the sepoys are merely tools in the

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[134] This is seen in Orme's 1753 *Government and People of Indostan*, Scrafton's 1763 *Reflections on the Government of Indostan*, and Alexander Dow's 1768 *History of Hindostan*. For Orme, see Delgoda (1992).

[135] Metcalf (1995), p. 9. Orme wrote a tract dedicated to this topic, "On the Effeminacy of the Inhabitants of Indostan" in 1761. A chief theme running through Orme's writings in the reliance on climatic determinism, presumably influenced by Montesquieu.

[136] Streets (2004).

[137] Vincent Smith's 1905 *History* extends this.

hands of the Mussalmans." John Lawrence (1811-1879), then Chief Commissioner of the

Punjab, and later (1864-1869) Viceroy of India, noted that the Muslim rebels possessed

"a more active, vindictive, and fanatic spirit" than the Hindus, but this was to be

expected as these traits were "characteristic of the race" and had their origin in the

nature of Islam.[138] William Muir (1819-1905) in his *Life of Mohammed* (1858-1861) and

his later *The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline, and Fall* (1891) "helped foster the myth of the

Muslim as always armed with the sword in one hand and the Qur'an in the other."[139]

This culminated in William Wilson Hunter's ethnological investigation *The Indian*

Musulmans in 1871, which, although coming to the conclusion that Muslims were not in

fact inherently predisposed to rebellion by virtue of their religion, made it clear that

Muslims were marked by not just religious, but ethnic and cultural differences from the

Hindu population.[140] This was later represented in census enumerations.

 The rise of race science led theorists to analyze differences between Muslims

and Hindus in racial terms, drawing on differences between Semites and Aryans, but

also making sure that similarities between European Aryans and Indian Aryans would

not point to convergence. This can be seen in the work of Henry Maine (1822-1888). Per

Karuna Mantena

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[138] Hardy (1972), pp. 61-70.

[139] Ibid., p. 63. In Muir's *Life of Mohammed* he says that "the sword of Muhammed, and the Kor'an, are the most stubborn enemies of Civilisation, Liberty, and the Truth which the world has yet known." Quoted in Hourani (1967). Muir was Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces from 1868 to 1874 and principal of the University of Edinburgh from 1885 to 1903.

[140] Hunter (1876 [1871]).

while this filiation grounded India's epistemological centrality for the comparative study of institutions, it also construed India as representing the "living past" of Europe. The study of contemporary Indian social and political institutions, especially the customs of village-communities, casts light upon the evolutionary history of Aryan societies and peoples precisely because Indian society was assumed to have stagnated, arresting development of institutions at an early stage, and, thus, preserving their ancient character. Therefore, alongside the claim to a deep affinity, Maine asserted the radical difference between Indian and English institutions… Thus, Maine's historicism was accompanied by an anthropological sense that viewed native society as functional wholes, ordered by dictates of primitive custom.[141]

Maine's imperial sociology also worked to justify the policy of indirect rule. A central lesson that Maine took from the rebellion of 1857 was that the British had interfered too much in native society, the modernizing moves produced an overwhelming cognitive dissonance for the Indians who could not process these changes in any way other than to violently express their rejection.[142]

The Ilbert Bill controversy in 1883, revolving around a proposal by Law Member of the Viceroy's Council, Courtenay Ilbert to extend the right to try cases involving

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[141] Mantena (2010), p.51.

[142] This is central to both Maine's treatment of India in *Ancient Law* (1861) and *Village-Communities of the East and West* (1871). For Maine, a key purpose for the study of ancient Roman and Greek societies was what it could tell British administrators about present-day Indian societies.

Europeans to native magistrates in rural districts, sparked further racial anxiety on the part of the British, vociferously voiced by James Fitzjames Stephen (1829-1894), who had earlier occupied that office under Lord Mayo's viceroyalty. For Eric Stokes, Stephen's response epitomized the strain of authority, as opposed to liberty, within the imperial utilitarian position.[143] In a letter to *The Times* Stephen noted the character of British rule over India:

> It is essentially an absolute government, founded, not on consent, but on conquest. It does not represent the native principles of life or of government, and it can never do so until it represents heathenism and barbarism. It represents a belligerent civilisation, and no anomaly can be so striking and so dangerous as its administration by men, who, being at the head of a Government founded on conquest, implying at every point the superiority of the conquering race, of their ideas, their institutions, their opinions and their principles, and having no justification for its existence except that superiority, shrink from the open, uncompromising, straightforward assertion of it, seek to apologize for their own position, and refuse, from whatever cause, to uphold and support it.[144]

Racial science worked to displace the earlier evangelicals and utilitarians seeking to reform Indians, and probably reached its pinnacle with lead administrator for the 1901 census, Herbert Hope Risley (1851-1911) and his investigation into caste. Risley

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[143] Stokes (1959).

[144] Quoted in Mantena (2010), pp. 40-41.

conducted an extensive anthropometric survey, chiefly concerned with the shape of noses. This craniometry was predicated on an understanding of caste endogamy, which, for Risley, would allow him to see racial developments in the form of castes.

Jones's linguistic investigations into what later became termed the "Indo-European hypothesis" gave way to racial science. The Muslim-Hindu divide became further complicated by the existence of a number of non-"Aryan" languages in India, chiefly in the South. Investigations by Francis Whyte Ellis (1777-1819) led him in 1816 to establish a separate group of languages that would become known as the Dravidian family. This was given further credence with Robert Caldwell's (1814-1891) 1856 *Comparative grammar of the Dravidian or South-Indian family of languages* which also established Munda as a part of a separate group of languages. By the time of Caldwell's study there had emerged a "unity of aborigines" hypothesis, associated primarily with the work of Brian Henry Hodgson (1801-1894) and John Stevenson (1798-1858) in the 1840s and 1850s, which posited the existence of a unified group of aboriginal Indians prior to an Aryan "invasion."[145] This played into theories that Indian Aryans had become degraded by mixing with dark-skinned natives to the subcontinent. George Campbell's 1866 *Ethnology of India* turned Hodgson's and Stevenson's unity of aborigines hypothesis into a hierarchical racial scheme, whereby racial appearance denoted civilizational capacity.[146]

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[145] Trautmann (1997), pp. 155-160.

[146] Campbell (1824-1892) would serve as Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal from 1871 to 1874 and as a Liberal MP from Kirkcaldy Burghs from 1875 to 1892.

Much of this was took off from the ethnological research of James Cowles

Prichard (1786-1848), whose 1813 *Researches into the Physical History of Man*, heavily

influenced by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's *De generis humani varietate*, set the tone

for nineteenth-century ethnology.[147] Prichard put forward the argument "that race is a

sign of civilization because civilization is the *cause* of race."[148] William Wilson Hunter,

who undertook the massive *Imperial Gazetteer* project, was heavily influenced by

Hodgson, and dedicated his 1868 *A Comparative Dictionary of the Languages of India*

and High Asia, with a Dissertation to him. In that work, and the *Imperial Gazetteer*,

Hunter held to the "unity of aborigines" hypothesis. He tried to strike a comparatively

sympathetic tone in the preface to the *Comparative Dictionary*, but stressed the

linguistic-thus-racial mixing theme, noting that "pre-historic," non-Aryan races

> have permanently affected the language, religion, and political destiny of the
>
> composite Hindus whom they combined with their conquerors to form…. But in
>
> order to civilise, it is necessary first to understand them, and this book, for the
>
> first time in the history of India, places the governing race in direct
>
> communication with eighty millions of its non-Aryan subjects and neighbours.[149]

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[147] Prichard's *Researches* was based on his 1808 dissertation at the University of Edinburgh which carried the same title as Blumenbach's work.

[148] Trautmann (1997), p. 171. Emphasis in original. Prichard's system had humans as originally dark-skinned but became lighter as they acquired civilization. The unpopularity of the thesis of originary blackness to white audiences caused him to gradually backtrack in later editions.

[149] Hunter (1868), p. xi.

There emerged a dispute between philological Sanskritists and racial scientists. Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), representing the former camp, reacted against the prevailing thesis that Aryan invaders became uncivilized by mixing with the "aboriginal" inhabitants of India by instead arguing that Aryans were conveyors of civilization. For Max Müller this was a nearly completed task in the north, as the original inhabitants primarily were seen to be confined to the lower castes, whereas the upper castes represented the Aryans. In his 1847 "On the relation of the Bengali to the Arian and aboriginal languages of India" he developed a two-race thesis on India, with a Japhetic/Caucasian northern and upper-caste race ("Aryan") and a largely southern and lower-caste Cushite, Hamite, or Negro race. In establishing the unity of Aryans thesis, Max Müller was attempting to advocate for the commonality between (northern and upper caste) Indians and Europeans. This was met by hostility from racial scientists, most notably John Crawfurd (1783-1868), who in his 1861 paper "On the Aryan or Indo-Germanic Theory" responded "I can by no means, then, agree, with a very learned professor of Oxford [Max Müller], that the same blood ran in the veins of the soldiers of Alexander and Clive as it those of the Hindus whom, at the interval of two-and-twenty ages, they both scattered with the same facility.".[150]

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[150] Crawfurd (1861), p. 286. This peppered in the common trope of Hindu effeminacy. Crawfurd was also a vocal opponent of miscegenation. He graduated with a medical degree from the University of Edinburgh in 1803 and joined the East India Company as a surgeon, then went to Penang in 1808 to study Malay, and later served as a diplomat in southeast Asia until 1826. Upon returning to Scotland he unsuccessfully ran for Parliament as a radical three times in the 1830s and was later president of the Ethnological Society of London in 1861.

The racial science position would be divided between polygenists and monogenists, which led to to the former camp breaking off from the dominant trend of monogenism within the Ethnological Society

The battle between racial scientists and Sanskritists was eventually settled in the racial theory of Indian civilization… which by the century's end had become a settled fact, that the constitutive event for Indian civilization… was the clash between invading, fair-skinned, civilized Sanskrit-speaking Aryans and dark-skinned, barbarous aborigines. It was a local application of the double binary that guided all nineteenth-century European ethnologies.[151]

As noted, this combined uneasily with the existence of a large Muslim minority in India, racially conceived of by the British as Semitic or Turkic and essentially different from the Hindu population. The racialization of Muslims accelerated in the nineteenth century, associated with the Mosaic dispersal and Shem, "Semitic" being the label used by Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752-1827) and August Ludwig von Schlözer (1735-1809) at Gottingen from the 1780s onwards. The most infamous philologist credited with racializing the Semitic language family was Ernest Renan (1823-1892), notably in his 1848 *Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques*. As noted by Said, Renan's "Semitic" was meant both as a contribution to Indo-European linguistics and to differentiate varieties of Orientalism.[152]

In response to European Orientalist scriptings of Muslims as a unified civilizational and racial entity, Muslim reformers of the late nineteenth and early

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of London and forming the Anthropological Society of London in 1863 before eventually reconciling as the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1871.

[151] Trautmann (1997), p. 194.

[152] Said (2003), p. 141.

twentieth centuries began to stress a "golden age of Islam" and Muslim contributions to European civilization, especially in al-Andalus. However, "this strategy of contesting inferiority by upholding a narrative of Islamic civilization only reinforced the European racial discourse in which Muslims were united—and divided from others—by their religion and heritage."[153]

This racialization of Muslimness in the nineteenth century was more generally tied to the surge in interest in racial science, accelerated by key events such as the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s—which, among other things, accelerated philhellenism and the rise of the concept "Western civilization"—the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, the Crimean War, the Sipahi rebellion in 1857, and the "Bulgarian Horrors" of 1876.[154] The epitome of this line of thinking is seen in the eugenicist Lothrop Stoddard's *The New World of Islam* (1921) and *The Revolt against Civilization* (1923), which posited Muslims as a barbarous force of brown fanatics threatening white civilization.[155]

In British India the census cemented identitarian differences, and with the granting of proportional representation in the Government of India Acts of 1909 and 1919, it created the basis for antagonistic popular contestation in geographically

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[153] Aydin (2017), pp. 8-9.

[154] Aydin points to the work of Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-1912), Liberian diplomat and professor at Liberia College, who, in his 1875 "Mohammedanism and the Negro Race," points to the tied futures of Muslims, seen as a racial category, and black-skinned peoples in opposition to that of white Christians. Aydin (2017), p. 38.

[155] Hobson (2012), pp. 142-149.

demarcated constituencies.[156] Kenneth Jones averred that census reports solidified two

facts: "from the very beginning religion was a fundamental category for organizing data

and for attempting to understand" Indians, and that

> the census reports provided a new conceptualization of religion as a community,
>
> an aggregate of individuals united by a formal definition and given characteristics
>
> based on qualified data. Religions became communities, mapped, counted, and
>
> above all compared with other religious communities.[157]

With the enactment of representative reforms on the all-India level across the Raj, the

census helped create and cement pan-South Asian Hindu and Muslim identity by tying

their respective representative fortunes together.

2.6 Kashmiris in Imperial Ethnology

Kashmir presented an ambiguity for the British. Territorially, it represented a

vulnerable reach of the Raj. Through the cooperation with the maharajas—Ranbir Singh

extended aid to the British during the Rebellion of 1857—British policy sought to

effectively take control of the external policy of the princely state, while leaving the

internal structure to the Dogras. However, problems regarding internal policy began

emerging in the 1870s, which amplified the territorial security concerns of the British

from the preceding decade. Attaching a permanent representative to the Dogra court in

1885 was a beginning move in this direction, and the divestment of power of Maharaja

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[156] Cohn (1987).

[157] Jones (1981), p. 84.

Pratap Singh in 1889 a decisive moment. The British appointed a settlement officer,

Andrew Wingate (1846-1937), to carry out a land settlement "to bolster the authority of

the state through the foundation of a peasantry determined to defend their lands

against encroachments, and willing to pay land revenue."[158] Wingate was replaced in

1889 by Walter Roper Lawrence (1857-1940), who sought to implement a land

settlement aimed at eliminating exploitative middlemen without entirely dismantling

the established privileges of the Kashmiri Pandit community.[159]

Lawrence's land reforms had the unintended consequence of more fully

entrenching Hindu land rights in the agrarian hierarchy.[160] The self-consciously Hindu

Rajput styling of the Dogra dynasty led them to discriminately employ Hindus, mainly

non-Kashmiri Hindus, until the 1920s in the upper echelons of the governing structures.

After the revolt in Srinagar of July 13, 1931, the British sent Bertrand Glancy (1882-1953)

to investigate the depressed social situation of Muslims in Dogra-ruled Kashmir.

Glancy's commission issued a series of reforms the following year, including

recommendations for representative government.

In terms of people, the dominant view of Kashmiris by the British was through

the recurring pejorative adjectives of feeble, effeminate, indolent, untrustworthy, and

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[158] Zutshi (2004), p. 91.

[159] Rai (2004), pp. 148-150. Lawrence would later serve as private secretary to Viceroy George Curzon from 1898 to 1903, was granted a baronetcy in 1906, and served on the Council of India from 1907 to 1909.

[160] Rai (2004), pp. 159-174.

cowardly. In the earliest European attempts to catalog Kashmiri difference, we see

François Bernier pointing to the possibility of Kashmiris being descendants of the

Hebrews, singling out the popularity of the name "Mousa" (Moses), place names like

the "Throne of Solomon" (*takht-i sulaiman*) and that "the inhabitants in the frontier

villages struck me as resembling *Jews*. Their countenance and manner, and that

indescribable peculiarity which enables a traveler to distinguish the inhabitants of

different nations, all seemed to belong to that ancient people."[161] In the 1891 English

translation of Bernier's *Travels in the Mogul Empire* Archibald Constable (1843-1915)

remarks in a footnote that the "Jewish cast of features of many of the inhabitants of

Kashmir is noticed by many modern travelers."[162] Other prominent travelers making this

observation were Baron Charles von Hügel, who visited Kashmir in 1835; Francis

Younghusband (1909), Great Game officer and British resident in Kashmir from 1906 to

1909; and the aforementioned Godfrey Vigne.[163]

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[161] Bernier (1914 [1670]), p. 430. Emphasis in original.

[162] Ibid.

[163] Hügel: "Whoever has once seen this race of men, will never fail to recognise them by their white skin, their clear though colorless complexion, their long, projecting, almost Jewish features, with dark brown or black hair and beard, which distinctly point them out." Hügel (1845), p. 55.

Younghusband (1863-1942) remarked on Kashmiri women: "strikingly handsome… with clear-cut features, dark eyes, well-marked eyebrows, and a general Jewish appearance"; and, referencing the Ahmadiyya belief that Jesus died in Kashmir, "[w]hen the people are in appearance of such a decided Jewish cast it is curious that such a theory should exist; and certainly, as I have said, there are real Biblical types to be seen everywhere in Kashmir… Here the Israelitish shepherd tending his flocks and herds may any day be seen." (1909), pp. 125-126, 130.

Vigne notes the physical resemblance of Kashmiris to Jews, but abstains from making an identification due to the linguistic dissimilarity: "Supposing there were less doubt on the subject, I could easily be persuaded to judge only from appearance, that some of the Kashmirians were originally descended from a Jewish stock." Vigne (1842), p. 396.

The British study of Kashmir and Kashmiris began picking up after the development of travel-writing literature in the 1820s and 1830s, and especially after the establishment of the princely state in 1846. In effect, Kashmir became tied to, and conceptualized through India, by way of British imperial expansion. The dominant work informing the government on Kashmir was Bates's *Gazetteer* in 1873, and then other gazetteer cyclicals, until the emergence of Walter Roper Lawrence's *Kashmir* in 1905. In breaking down Kashmiri society, Bates, Hunter, and Lawrence all stress the fact that many of the Muslims in the Valley are relatively recent converts from Hinduism. Following from Moorcroft and Trebeck's expedition, there then gets enshrined the litany of associations of Kashmiris, ultimately "Hindu at heart," effeminate, and unlike other martial Muslim peoples. This served in a way to naturalize their subservience to the Dogra rulers, who were self-styled, and recognized, as martial Rajputs—through a deliberate project to evoke imagery of Rajput lineage under Ranbir Singh's rule, from 1856 to 1885.

Works on language also served as indicators of Kashmiri ethnological identification and placement. In this linguistic analysis, Kashmiri Muslims were rendered less authentically Kashmiri than Kashmiri Hindus, which reflected not only the supposition that Kashmir was Indian, but also a caste privileging of Brahmins as the traditional custodians of culture. Remarking on how Kashmir was approached, Ananya Jahanara Kabir notes that "the Indologists had increasingly privileged Kashmir not

merely as a Hindu enclave within a degenerate Muslim population, but, in retrospect rather shamefully, as a "pure," Brahmin Hindu enclave."[164]

Beginning perhaps with Godfrey Vigne in 1842, there emerged a trope about the composition of the Kashmiri language: he states "I was told on good authority that out of 100 Kashmiri words, 25 will be found to be Sanscrit, or a Pracrit, 40 Persian, 15 Hindustan, 10 will be Arabic; some few will also be Tibetan."[165] Reverend Thomas Russell Wade (1839-1914) who was in Kashmir from 1876 to 1882 composed *A Grammar of the Kashmiri Language* for the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge in 1888. In describing the composition of the Kashmiri language he keeps the proportions laid out by Vigne (however, renders the last group "Tibetan, Turki, and others 10"), but notes that Kashmiri Pandits draw much less on Persian and Arabic than the Muslims, and after consulting with "[s]ome pundits in Kashmir," gives that following proportion for them: Sanskrit and Prakrit 35; Urdu, Hindi, and Punjabi 20; Persian 25; Arabic 10, "Ladaki, Turki, and others 10."[166] The same year fellow missionary James Hinton Knowles, in divulging contributors to his *Folk-Tales of Kashmir*, says "all classes of people have contributed to this collection—the officiating governor, the poor farmer, the learned Pandit, the ignorant Mussulman."[167]

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[164] Kabir (2009), pp. 89-90.

[165] Vigne (1842), p. 368.

[166] Wade (1888), p. 109.

[167] Knowles (1888), p. ix.

In 1899, linguist George Grierson (1851-1941), who superintended the Linguistic

Survey of India, which began in 1894 and took over thirty years to complete, sought to

extend Wade's Kashmiri *Grammar* with his own. In laying out his methods, he notes that

he used the Kashmiri language of the Hindus, as the language of the Muslims was

"freely using Persian and Arabic words. For this reason," he goes on to say that the

dialect of the Hindus "is much more purely Kaçmiri than that of the [Musalmans]."[168]

Settlement commissioner Walter Lawrence, who wrote the definitive imperial account

of Kashmir in his 1895 *The Valley of Kashmir* similarly draws on this trope, emphasizing

the Sanskrit pedigree of the Kashmiri language: "Kashur, the language of the Kashmiris,

is said to be a Prakrit of the pure and original Sanskrit."[169]

However, Grierson later came to have doubts about the Sanskrit pedigree of

Kashmiri in his 1906 study and he later confirmed this in the *Linguistic Survey of India*.

Grierson came to identify Kashmiri as belonging to a subset of Indo-Aryan languages

which fell neither into the Indo-European nor Iranian branches, a branch identified in

1867 by Gottlieb Leitner as "Dardic," which, nevertheless "has been powerfully

influenced by Indian culture and literature."[170] Grierson bends over backwards to assure

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[168] Grierson (1899), p. x.

[169] Lawrence (1895), p. 454. He follows the proportion given by Vigne, amending the last ten to be "Tibetan, Turki, Dogri, and Punjabi."

[170] Grierson (1919), p. 253. Grierson made the identification of the Kashmiri language with the other Dardic languages in his 1906 *The Pisaca Langauges of North-Western India*. He disliked Leitner's term "Dardic" and preferred instead the label "Pisacha," but retained the use of Dardic in the *Linguistic Survey*, as the latter had Sanskritic connotations of cannibalism.

Leitner (1840-1899) identified Shina, "Arnyia" (Khowar), Kalasha, and "Khajuna" (Burushaski) as the Dardic group of languages, and labelled the region bordered by Badakhshan, Kabul, and Kashmir as

Kashmiri Hindus, whose speech he still considers "much purer than that of their Musalman brethren,"[171] that they may still claim a Sanskritic pedigree: "It in no way follows from this that the Brahman inhabitants of Kashmir are of Pisacha origin. The contrary is almost certainly the case. Tradition, ethnology, and linguistics unite in asserting that they are representatives of an early immigration from India."[172]

As noted above, the Dogras self-consciously aimed at styling themselves as distinctively Hindu. The Rajput lineage of Gulab Singh was established in Diwan Kripa Ram's (1832-1876) 1875 panegyric, *Gulabnama*. Ranbir Singh also issued the *Dastur-ul-Amar* proclamation in 1882, emphasizing "Hindu-ness" and tradition as the basis of Dogra rule, and established the Ain-i-Dharmarth in 1884, which regulated the performance of religious rituals.[173] This was extended under Pratap Singh's reign (1885-1926), with the establishment of the Archaeological and Research Department of Jammu and Kashmir, which through its privileging of antiquity, was able to point to a

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"Dardistan." Leitner (1876). Leitner was also the maternal uncle of later Colonial Secretary (1924-1929) and Indian Secretary (1940-1945) Leo Amery. Biddulph (1880) casted doubt upon Leitner's claim that "the tribes which he has classed under the name of Dard are all of the same race" (p. 8) and sough to exclude Burushaski from the other Dardic languages.

[171] Ibid., p. 234.

[172] Ibid., p. 241. Grierson (presumably) alludes to the seventh-century *Nilamata Purana* to lend credibility to his claim, and so as not to unduly offend Kashmiri Pandits:

> Kashmiris themselves maintain that their territory was formerly inhabited by Pisachas, who were ultimately overcome by Aryan immigrants from India, and this tradition is borne out by features presented by their language. That the literary activity of the country and the imported Indian culture should not have reacted on the native speech of the inhabitants is impossible. It has reacted most powerfully, and under that influence the language has become deeply imbued with forms and idioms derived from the language of India proper.

[173] Rai (2004), pp. 109-127.

number of shrines that were deemed to be originally Hindu. Further, Pratap Singh's

darbar used the Archaeological Department to appropriate a number of contested or

shared spaces as Hindu spaces, and systematically withheld funds for the preservation

of Muslim sites.[174] One important departure from this period of withholding, was in the

mediation of a dispute between the two mirwaizes of Srinagar at Jama Masjid and

Khanqah-i-Mualla, granting funds to the former in 1906.[175]

Pratap Singh also gave patronage to the Archaeological Department's Kashmir

Series of Texts and Studies from 1911, edited by by Jagdish Chandra Chatterji, then-

director of the Department and a Cambridge-educated Bengali brahmin. The series

played up the idea of a brahminical Hindu Kashmir.

It was this privileging that the Dogras seized, themselves neither Kashmiris nor

Brahmins but eager to ally with the latter as joint custodians of a heritage buried

under centuries of Muslim intervention and avowed decay. Their calculated

exploitation of Indology's love affair with Brahminism is evident in their

willingness to showcase, through the Kashmir Series, the Shaivite Hinduism of

the Kashmiri Pandits—somewhat unexpected given their own Vaishnavite

practice.[176]

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[174] Rai (2004), pp. 192-207.

[175] Rai (2004), p. 209.

[176] Kabir (2009), p. 90.

The first two works in this series were devoted to Kashmiri Shaivite philosophers,

Vasugupta (ninth century) and Ksemaraja (eleventh century).[177] Further, the Series

served to Hinduize Lal Ded (1336-1405) through the *Lalleswari-Vakyani* edited by

Mukund Ram Shastri in 1919.[178]

By the close of the nineteenth century, the Great Game, depicted in Kipling's *Kim*

as a coming-to-age of masculinity and of imperial whiteness, prowess, and

responsibility, was now seen to be beyond the purview of Kashmiri participation. While

Kashmiri pundits in the past had provided useful information, as they could pass with

ease as travelers, they came to be seen as a nuisance when it was imperial powers that

were concerned. The Great Game and imperial journalist Edward Frederick Knight

(1852-1925), who visited Kashmir in 1891, revived the trope of Oriental despotism in his

Where the Three Empires Meet (1893):

> The firm rule of the Mussulman and Hindoo conquerors, who have successively
>
> oppressed this peaceable, not to say cowardly, race, the terrible penalties that
>
> used to be inflicted for any offence against the person or property of travelers,
>
> the excellent Oriental custom by which a whole district is made liable for crimes
>
> committed with its boundaries, have produced this result.[179]

He further distinguishes between Kashmiri Hindus and the Dogras:

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[177] Ibid.

[178] Accardi (2018). Chatterji was in conversation about the *Lallesvari-Vakyani* with Grierson, who, with Lionel Barnett the following year, published their own *Lalla-Vakyani*.

[179] Knight (1893), p. 16.

> The Hindoo Dogra rulers of this country belong to a manly, warlike race, which one can respect and admire: but the native Hindoo is a despicable being. These Kashmiri Hindoos are always known as pundits—why I am unable to say, for it is an utter misuse of that term, which is supposed to imply learning, a quality very scarce among these people.[180]

And because there was just something essentially cowardly about the Kashmiri, this applied to distinguish Kashmiri Muslims from other Muslims:

> A Kashmiri will unresistingly take a blow from anyone… I had been a good deal among Mahomedans in others countries, and had always associated dignity and courage with the profession of that creed, so was disagreeably surprised to discover this cowardly, cringing, cackling race among the followers of the Prophet. Tartars, Tibetans, Moguls, Afghans and Sikhs have all in turn overrun the Happy Valley, whose inhabitants have always quietly submitted to each new tyranny.[181]

Another reproachable description of Kashmiris was by the Yale geographer, environmental determinist, and eugenicist Ellsworth Huntington (1876-1947). In 1905 and 1906 he set out to Kashmir and central Asia to investigate the relation of physiography to life "especially human life and history." We see Huntington again playing up the idea of Kashmir as a splendid land ("interesting but not beautiful")

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[180] Ibid., p. 18.

[181] Ibid., p. 27. The cowardly Kashmiri trope is peppered in continually throughout this work.

against a singularly unworthy Kashmiri people. For him, Kashmir, because of its high

mountains and what he considered to be a lack of outside contact, produced an

endogeneity, and thus the play of genes as they "have been largely left to work out their

own destiny in response to whatever racial characteristics they originally brought with

them." However, "though isolation may have made the Kashmiris cowardly, they have a

certain amount of moral fibre capable of cultivation," thus opening the door for

missionary activity to do this work.[182]

Here, he was probably alluding to the work of the new principal at the Church

Missionary Society School, Cecil Earl Tyndale Biscoe (1863-1949).[183] The Church

Missionary Society took up the call earlier made by Moorcroft to attempt to evangelize

in Kashmir, to scant success. However, a large part of the project that was taken up,

specifically following from Macaulay's "Minute on Education" during the debates on

missionaries and education in 1835, aimed to replace overt Christian evangelism with

British-style education in an alternative attempt to make Indians over as Britons.

Tyndale Biscoe specifically spearheaded this effort in Kashmir through the Church

Missionary Society's primary and secondary school in Srinagar, which later achieved a

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[182] Huntington (1906). Huntington's method accepts stereotypes about Kashmiris and seeks social and environmental explanations, as when he says: "[i]t seems as though the ease with which a living can be made were the chief cause of the reputed idleness and laziness of the people; and laziness, aided, perhaps, by the opportunities for dishonesty afforded by the large amount of local traffic and barter which the abundant waterways foster which may be responsible for much of the untrustworthiness which is said to be so prominent a trait of the Kashmiri," for him, much like other Indians.

[183] Tyndale Biscoe, a graduate of Jesus College, Cambridge, first arrived in Kashmir in 1890 as a missionary with the Church Missionary Society. In 1905 he was appointed principal of the Church Missionary Society School, a position he held until his retirement in 1940. Afterwards, it was renamed Tyndale Biscoe School, which has served as the educational institution of many high-ranking Kashmiri politicians.

great degree of success and prominence and was renamed after him. Tyndale Biscoe was deeply steeped in the muscular Christianity associated with Thomas Hughes's *Tom Brown's School Days* (1857) and Rugby school under the headmastership of Thomas Arnold (from 1828 to 1841), and his mission as principal was to thoroughly remake Kashmiris as "men": to remake their character completely.[184] In his estimation Kashmiris' cowardly character was deeply ingrained in their being qua Kashmiri: "[t]o call a man a Kashmiri is a term of abuse, for it stands for a coward and a rogue, and much else of an unpleasant nature… I must say that the ordinary Kashmiri such as I have known for thirty years is a coward, a man with no self-respect, and deceitful to a degree."[185]

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[184] His motto while principal of the school was "In all things be men."

[185] Tyndale Biscoe (1922), pp. 78-79. Writing the introduction to Tyndale Biscoe's *Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade*, Major-General Lionel Charles Dunsterville (1865-1946) speaks of Tyndale Biscoe's success in thoroughly remaking Kashmiris into strong men and followers of (English) Christian ideals, even if not marked by formal conversion. He relates a story in order to thoroughly praise Tyndale Biscoe for his efforts:

> I was walking with a rather corpulent companion in Kashmir some years ago when we came to a small stream about ten yards across and about two feet deep. I had on rough shooting boots and putties, and I do not mind getting my feet wet, so I crossed without further ado. My friend, however, disliked wet boots and looked about for some way out of the dilemma. A rather frail-looking Kashmiri arrived at this juncture, and my heavy friend suggested in rather rough language that he should act as a beast of burden and covey his bulky form over the water. Without hesitation the Kashmiri obeyed the request, crouching before the heavy gentleman to enable the latter to place himself comfortably on his shoulders. With legs rather bending beneath his burden the docile carrier crossed the stream and placed my companion dry-shod on the opposite bank.

> Translating his gratitude into pecuniary form the Englishman offered a silver coin to the late beast of burden and was surprised to receive the following answer in very good English:-- "No, thank you, sir. I am one of Mr Tyndale Biscoe's masters and I am glad to have helped you."

For Dunsterville, this perfectly conveyed the imperial ideal of proud, strong, servile acceptance of inferior status. Dunsterville (1922 [1921]), pp. 10-11.

2.7 Conclusion

Here we see the attempt through the late eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries to craft an imperial ordering of people and control of territory. Liberal governance was held in abeyance, for the most part, suspended by civilizational, racial, and assimilative criteria. The liberalism of John Stuart Mill required civilizational capacity; Henry Maine's liberalism subsisted perfectly alongside a notion of differential time development schemes which necessitated policies of indirect rule; James Fitzjames Stephen's liberalism with a straightforwardly authoritarian principle. In all instances, liberalism coexisted with a notion of racial difference and distance and was often presented as a saving grace from the despotic proclivities of "orientals."

Geopolitics and territorial management required extensive empirical knowledge, undertaken most prominently with the Great Trigonometrical Survey. As high politics, it was seen as reserved for imperial authorities. The problems of geopolitics were never a straightforward application of logical principles, but always assigned meaning to land and territory, suffused with threat and security, and cultural attachment. The geopolitical enactments of territorial boundary-making served to naturalize the boundaries of British India, its successor states of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Through this geopolitical imaginary, conceptions of the geo-bodies of India and Pakistan later came to naturalize Kashmir, conceived of as the Princely State, within the national imaginaries of those two states.

The civilizational ordering of India through the imperial ethnological framework served to catalog the differences within India and place them on a temporal scale of

development. The catalogued differences created hardened boundaries between

different entries, most prominently between Hindus and Muslims.

Chapter 3: Anti-Colonial into Post-Colonial Geopolitics

3.0 Introduction: The Thematic and the Problematic

In Anouar Abdel-Malek's 1963 article "Orientalism in Crisis," in what could be seen as a response to the later twentieth-century critiques of orientalist apologists against Said's *Orientalism*, he makes the claim that both the academic orientalists and the professional orientalists—"an amalgam of university dons, businessmen, military men, colonial officials, missionaries, publicists and adventurers, whose only objective was to gather intelligence information in the area to be occupied, to penetrate the consciousness of the people in order to better assure its enslavement to the European power"—operate with shared undergirding ideological presupposition about the content, or "objects" of study and the epistemological underpinnings—Abdel-Malek charges orientalism here with an essentializing modality.[1] Abdel-Malek labels these two conceptual categories the "thematic" and the "problematic." Partha Chatterjee extends this, identifying the former with the "claims of an ideology, i.e. its identification of historical possibilities and practical or programmatic forms of its realization," and the latter with

> its justificatory structures, i.e. the nature of the evidence it presents in support
>
> of those claims, the rules of inference it relies on to logically relate a statement

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[1] For Abdel-Malek, the academic orientalists will express this essentialism "through a characterized ethnist typology," whereas the non-academic professional orientalists "will soon proceed with it towards racism," p. 108. Many critiques of Said emphasize the fact that he was not dealing primarily with academic orientalists, but included the non-academic professional orientalists, whom the former camp would not consider to be representatives of orientalism. South Asianist critics of Said include Frykenberg (1996) and Kopf (1980).

of the evidence to a structure of arguments, the set of epistemological principles

it uses to demonstrate the existence of its claims as historical possibilities, and

finally, the set of ethical principles it appeals to in order to assert that those

claims are morally justified.[2]

Chatterjee's following argument, which will be taken up here, is that anti-colonial

nationalist thought fails to transcend the thematic and problematic impositions

deployed by the earlier orientalists. On the level of the former, "the 'object' in

nationalist thought is still the Oriental, who retains the essentialist character depicted in

Orientalist discourse. Only he is not passive, non-participating. He is seen to possess a

'subjectivity' which he can himself 'make'." With respect to the problematic,

nationalist thought accepts and adopts the same essentialist conception based

on the distinction between 'the East' and 'the West', the same typology created

by a transcendent studying subject, and hence the same 'objectifying'

procedures of knowledge constructed in the post-Enlightenment age of Western

science.[3]

Here, we will see how the failure to transcend this orientation, allowed anti-colonial

nationalists in British India to stress their claims as subjects defined in a manner

consistent with a catalogued, internally consistent, exclusivist notion of community

identity. This, in turn, was reflected geopolitically, with the rise of national self-

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[2] Chatterjee (1986), p. 38.

[3] Ibid.

determination, territorial integrity, and statehood defined by clear black lines on a map.

A number of the figures discussed in this chapter play within this structure, through

ironic subversions, as with the oft-quoted (and probably apocryphal) quip by Gandhi on

his thoughts of Western civilization: "it would be a good idea;" and paradiastole, when a

number of thinkers, such as Gandhi, Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan, and a

number of other nationalist thinkers attempt to reframe stereotypes about Western

material superiority and Eastern spirituality as signifying the moral depravity of the

former. Further, the inability to transcend these limitations led to the necessary

imposition of the state structure over the South Asian region, which became India and

Pakistan in August 1947, with eventually catastrophic effects for Kashmir. Kashmir was

framed as existing not only at the geographical intersection of the new states, but also

the national and civilizational intersection. With the rise of the state structure in South

Asia, Kashmiris had to negotiate their identities vis-à-vis the controlling states, while

being separated from Kashmiris on the other side of the border.

3.1 Road to Statehood: Background

The identification of linguistic and ethnic peoples led to an essentialization of

those people as irretrievably different, but also allowed for the British to frame their

rule as one over a diverse group of differentiated peoples. Without British imperial

authority ensuring a unified order, the alibi went, these different groups would descend

into communal violence. With the rise of the principle of national self-determination,

coming first from John Stuart Mill and seeing its international institutionalization with

the Paris Peace Conference, a prerequisite for self-determination not only required the

liberal educative principle of capacity for self-government, but also the stipulation of

unity. Colonial administrator John Strachey gave voice to this sentiment, when

answering the question "What is India?": "There is no such country, and this is the first

and most essential fact about India that can be learned… India is a name which we give

to a great region including a multitude of different countries."[4] Further, "there is not,

and never was an India, or even a country of India, possessing, according to European

ideas, any sort of unity, physical, political, social, or religious; no Indian nation, no

"people of India," of which we hear so much."[5] Regius Professor of History at

Cambridge, John Robert Seeley, had earlier expressed this sentiment in *The Expansion of*

England: "the fundamental fact then is that India had no jealousy of the foreigner

because India had no sense whatever of national unity, because there was no India and

therefore, properly speaking, no foreigner."[6] Churchill echoed the sentiments in the

House of Commons in 1935, regarding the Government of India Act, 1935, saying there

was "no real practical unity in India apart from British rule… liberty for India only means

liberty for one set of Indians to exploit another."[7]

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[4] Strachey (1888), p. 2. Strachey (1823-1907), was Chief Commissioner of Oudh from 1866 to 1868, on the Governor-General's Council from 1868 to 1874, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces from 1874 to 1876, again on the Governor-General's Council from 1876 to 1880, and a member of the council for the Indian Secretary from 1885 to 1895. His *India* was based on a series of lectures he delivered at the University of Cambridge in 1884.

[5] Ibid., p. 5.

[6] Seeley (1894 [1883]).

[7] Quoted in Metcalf (1995), p. 231.

This was the general framework against which Indians seeking self-determination were forced to counter. Political mobilization, begun initially at local and regional levels, resulted in the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. In the aftermath of the Partition of Bengal by Viceroy Curzon in 1905, widely seen as an attempt to divide Muslims and Hindus.[8] The uproar in the aftermath of the partition of Bengal led to the establishment of the Muslim League in 1906. Muslim landlords from northern Indian within this newly formed party, led by Aga Khan III (1877-1957), pressed for separate electorates for Muslims, which was formalized in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, which granted "communal" electorates. This was an enormous step in the development of a pan-Indian Muslim identity.[9]

Discourses on pan-Asianism emerged to counter European imperialism in Asia and the Middle East in the late nineteenth century, which was further amplified in the aftermath of the Japanese victory at the Battle of Tsushima against the Russians on May 28, 1905.[10] World War I revealed deep flaws in the ideal of enlightened European civilization, and in the aftermath of the war, which saw heavy participation by Indian soldiers, especially in the Mesopotamian theater, the Indian National Congress pressed for greater concessions of self-government. Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu

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[8] Herbert Hope Risley, now Home Secretary to Viceroy Curzon, put this perhaps a little too succinctly in this often-quoted statement: "Bengal united is a power; Bengal divided would pull in different ways." Bose and Jalal (2011), p. 98.

[9] For a comprehensive analysis of the development of a pan-South Asian Muslim identity from 1857 to 1947, see Jalal (2000).

[10] See Duara (2001).

(1879-1924) declared in 1917 that the ultimate goal of British rule in India was "the

progressive realization of responsible government," but what eventually came to

fruition as the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 fell far short of the aspirations of

Indians for self-rule.[11] This, coupled with the vain denial of the Wilsonian call for self-

determination in the aftermath of World War I, intensified the already uneasy situation.

Mohandas Gandhi (1869-1948), who had recently returned to India in 1915, led a

number of protests against the British and quickly ascended in Indian political leadership

throughout 1917 and 1918. In March 1919 the British promulgated the Rowlatt Act, also

known as the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act of 1919, which extended the

wartime emergency ordinances; the following month saw one of the worst one-day

massacres, when General Reginald Dyer (1864-1927) fired on a crowd of civilians, killing

nearly 400 and injuring about 1,200 others.[12] For this, Dyer was protected and even

lauded by Lieutenant Governor of Punjab Michael O'Dwyer.[13] Instructively, in the public

debate in England which followed this capricious act of mass-murder, metropolitan

British society broke down along the lines of how they viewed the Empire: defenders of

Dyer (of which there were many), emphasizing his difficult situation and the need for

order against lawlessness; critics of Dyer saw him as an exceptionally misguided or

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[11] Bose and Jalal (2011), pp. 104-110.

[12] The Hunter Commission, chaired by Lord William Hunter (1865-1957), reported 379 killed and about 1,200 injured. Bose and Jalal (2011), p. 113.

[13] Metcalf (1995), pp. 228-229.

depraved officer, someone who did not at all, and could not, represent the benevolent

British Empire.[14]

Gandhi then led protests on an all-India level. The same year saw the emergence

of the Khilafat Movement on an all-India level as well, which sought to pressure the

British to preserve the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire as they were before the

war.[15] The Khilafat Movement, led by the brothers Mohammad Ali (1878-1931) and

Shaukat Ali (1873-1938), reached an alliance with Gandhi, and together launched an all-

India non-cooperation movement against the British. Gandhi called off his non-

cooperation movement after the Chauri Chaura incident in February 1922, which saw

the death of twenty-two policemen after the police station was lit ablaze by protesting

peasants. The non-cooperation movement faltered without the support of its leader.

The Khilafat movement similarly lost steam after the loss of the Gandhian wing of the

non-cooperation movement, then suffered a nearly fatal blow when the newly

constituted Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the sultanate in November 1922

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[14] Metcalf (1995), pp. 228-230. Metcalf sees Montagu as someone who rather recognized the problem of empire as marking India for this space of exceptionality. On the colony as a space for exceptional rule, see Hussain (2003) and Mbembe (2003).

[15] Minault (1982), p. 1. Minault stresses anti-colonial nationalism as the guiding motivation of the Khilafat movement: "The Khilafat movement was primarily a campaign by a particular group of Indian Muslim leaders to unite their community politically by means of religious and cultural symbols meaningful to all strata of that community. As such, it can be viewed as a quest for 'pan-Indian Islam,'" p. 2. Aydin (2017) points to how the movement "reflected genuine anxiety about the destiny of the Muslim world and the Muslim race, which could no longer be represented by an independent empire ruled by a caliph," p. 125.

and was finished when the same body abolished the caliphate in the beginning of March 1924.[16]

Agitation picked up again in 1928 and continued until the granting of independence in 1947. During this time, the Muslim League began to articulate a more forceful development from the separate electorate system. Three major moments from 1930 to 1940 in this development were: 1) Muhammad Iqbal's (1877-1938) call in December 1930 to the Muslim League for the creation of a Muslim state out of the Muslim-majority regions in the northwest of India, within a broader all-India federation; 2) the circulation of a pamphlet, "Now or Never," in 1933, written by Cambridge student Choudhary Rahmat Ali, calling for a united and separate "Pakistan," an acronymic appellation for the Muslim-majority provinces of northwestern India; and 3) the Lahore Resolution of March 1940 when Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) made the call for a federation Muslim-majority provinces in both the northwestern and northeastern India, on the grounds that the Muslims of India constituted a separate nation from the Hindu majority.[17]

The Government of India Act of 1935 further extended governance to Indians, and the election of 1937 saw a widespread Congress victory—eventually able to secure majority rule or leading coalitions in eight of eleven provinces—and poor performance by the Muslim League, which was only able to form one government as a junior partner

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[16] Ibid., pp. 201-203.

[17] Rahmat Ali (1969 [1933]).

in a coalition with the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal. After the British declared war on

Germany in 1939, the Viceroy of India, Victor Hope, 2nd Marquess of Linlithgow (1887-

1952) announced India's support for Britain's war effort. The Congress party, outraged

at not having been consulted on this matter, resigned from government. Protests

against the British mounted, leading to the Gandhi-led Quit India movement of 1942.

Meanwhile, the Muslim League began stressing its claim for Muslim-majority

provinces, albeit, within a confederation of India.[18] Attempts at reconciliation were

made: from Chakravarti Rajagopalachari's ("Rajaji") offer of Muslim majority districts,

rather than provinces, within a broader Indian confederation in 1943 and 1944—an

overture which received the support of Gandhi; to the failed Simla Conference in June

and July of 1945. In the January 1946 elections, the Muslim League fared much better,

but was still only able to lead governments in two provinces, Sind and Bengal. British

policy towards Indian independence shifted markedly in the aftermath of the British

general election of July 1945, which brought the Labour party under Clement Attlee to

power. Churchill, as leader of the Conservatives, was staunchly opposed to any

concession of independence to India in the parliamentary debates of 1946 and 1947.

The British deputed a Cabinet Mission in March 1946 to bring about a possible

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[18] Ayesha Jalal and Sugata Bose note that in 1941 "every Muslim Leaguer… interpreted Pakistan as consistent with a confederation of India for common purposes like defence, provided the Hindu and Muslim element therein stood on equal terms." (2011, p. 146). For a more general reference, see Jalal (1985).

independence solution, and was still unable to bring about a compromise between Jinnah's Muslim League and the Congress party.[19]

Jinnah's central concern was that Indian Muslims, making up about a quarter of the total Indian population, would be subject to majoritarian rule unless reservations were put into place in order to safeguard the position of Muslims as a minority community. Jinnah primarily pressed his claim forward through the language of nationalism and his "two-nation theory." Communal riots broke out in August 1946 in Calcutta, leaving thousands dead, and in later months communal riots would break out elsewhere in British India. The British then pressed for a quick exit, Clement Attlee announcing in February 1947 that the India would be independent by the end of June 1948. On June 2, 1947, Viceroy Mountbatten released the partition plan for India and announced that the timeline would be moved forward: to August 1947.

The partition plan divided the states of Punjab and Bengal, parts of which would go to a contiguous western Pakistan and parts of which would go to a (more or less) contiguous eastern Pakistan—although the Radcliffe line dividing Pakistan was not made known until two days after independence.[20] This, however, did not settle the matter of the princely states. V. P. Menon (1893-1965), working as secretary to the Congress

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[19] Bose and Jalal (2011) consider the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny of February 1946 to be a major spur to this, p. 136.

[20] Due to landholding leases and contracts, primarily in Cooch Behar, the Bengal border was rife with territorial enclaves, counter-enclaves, and, in the case of Dahala Khagrabari, the world's only third-order enclave (Indian land, surrounded by Pakistani (later Bangladeshi) land, surrounded by Indian land, surrounded by Pakistani/Bangladeshi land). In July 2015, India and Bangladesh exchanged territory to settle the enclaves issue.

Home Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel (1872-1950), was tasked with acquiring the accessions of the princely states.[21] Most of the states easily signed onto either India or Pakistan, but three especially proved troublesome: Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir.[22] In all of these cases, the ruler was from a religion different from the majority of the subjects.

3.2 The Freedom Movement in Kashmir: Background

Kashmiri histories of *azadi*—loosely, "freedom," associated with the resistance to Indian military occupation—portray the Kashmiri movement for independence as differently positioned than the independence movement in India, in that the primary goal of the majority movement in Kashmir was not directly preoccupied with the exit of the British, but instead, primarily focused on removing the Dogra monarchy and establishing a more democratic system of representation in the state. Standard histories and discussions of Kashmir too often subsume the freedom movement in Kashmir under the broader Congress-led India movement and pro-Pakistan movements, but this occludes political and social factors internal to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and also reduces their politics to the alliances that were forged with the broader all-Indian parties, which was only done in the mid-1940s. Further, the socioeconomic cleavages in society often mediated a group's relationship with movements outside of the state, with

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[21] Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958), former Congress president who would be the first Indian education minister (1947-1958), wished to see a united India, and blamed Mountbatten and Patel for pressing Nehru to accept partition in his *India Wins Freedom*.

[22] Technically, four. The Maharaja of Jodhpur memorably pulled a gun on Menon during accession talks. Menon (1961).

Kashmiri Pandits and landowning Muslims more likely to form connections with the subcontinent, the former with Congress, the latter with the Muslim League.[23]

Usually, Kashmiri political mobilization is dated to the July 13, 1931 riots and protests, however, these were developments from movements in the previous three decades. Literacy, which was appallingly low for the Muslim community in the late nineteenth century, rose in the early twentieth with the establishment of a number of schools and institutions of higher education. Zutshi gives the number of educated Muslims in 1910 and 1921 as 1.5% and 1.9%, respectively, whereas that statistic for Hindus was 45.3% and 50.8%, respectively.[24] Aside from the Tyndale Biscoe's school, Mirwaiz Rasool Shah founded the Anjuman-i-Nusrat-ul-Islam in 1899 and attached Islamia School to it in 1905; Annie Besant of the Theosophical Society started a Hindu College in Srinagar in 1905 that was later taken over by the government and renamed Sri Pratap College in 1911. Grievances were given by Muslim elite in Srinagar to Viceroy Reading upon his visit to the city in 1924, which included demands for Muslim access to government jobs, educational facilities for Muslims, ownership rights for the peasantry, the abolition of *begar* (corvée labor), and the restoration of all mosques under the durbar.[25] The 1920s also saw a growth in political activity in the form of social clubs,

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[23] Hussain (2017); Faheem (2016).

[24] Zutshi (2004), p. 183.

[25] Rai (2004), pp. 254-256.

societies, and organizations (*anjumans* and *sabhas*), which grew from twenty in 1919 to one hundred in 1927.[26]

As Kashmiri Pandits were far better off than the Muslim Kashmiri population, but still lacked access to the higher posts of government, many Pandits began agitating for special rights for "state subjects": "Kashmir for Kashmiris." This eventually resulted in the definition of "state subjects" as property owners in Kashmir in 1912, and the maharaja was further forced to clarify "Hereditary State Subject" in 1927, which restricted ownership of land to residents of the state.[27]

A further exacerbating condition was the meager state of the economy in 1930, owing in part to a fall in agricultural produce and a rise in land tax in southern Jammu, and also saw a rise in unemployed Mirpuris and Poonchis, who had served in World War I.[28] Throughout the 1920s there also developed a number of "reading rooms" across the urban areas in Kashmir. In April 1930, a twenty-four-year-old newly graduated student from Aligarh Muslim University, who boasted of being the first Kashmiri Muslim to receive a Master of Science degree (in chemistry), returned home to Kashmir: Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. He quickly found employment as a teacher and just as soon entered into political discussion in Srinagar. He became a member of the reading room

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[26] Ibid., p. 231.

[27] Ibid., pp. 249-253. This was later enshrined in the Constitution of India as Article 35A.

[28] Copland (1981). These are demonyms for people from Mirpur and Poonch in the western portions of the Jammu region. These areas provided some of the highest percentages of recruited soldiers for the British from British India during the two World Wars. Snedden (2013), pp. 30-32.

at the house of Mufti Ziauddin in the Fateh Kadal neighborhood of Srinagar, and the members there formed a Reading Room Party in 1930.[29]

An alleged act of sacrilege against the Qur'an by a police constable in Jammu on June 6, 1931 further provoked tensions, and on June 25, a rather unknown figure named Abdul Qadir, presumed to be a Pashtun from the North-West Frontier Province, delivered an incendiary speech at the Jamia Masjid. He was arrested for sedition and as he was to be tried, on July 13 a mob gathered around the Central Jail where he was held, protesting his prosecution. Police fired into the crowd, killing twenty-two demonstrators (one policeman was also killed).[30] The events from July 13 are annually commemorated in Kashmir as "Martyrs' Day."[31] The event was followed by riots throughout the state. In the neighboring state of Punjab, this elicited the active support of two contending parties, the Majils-i-Ahrar-i-Islam ("Ahrars") and the All-India Kashmir Committee, led by the khalifa of the Ahmadiyyas, Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmed (1889-1965) and supported by Muhammad Iqbal.[32] Due to the leadership of the Kashmir Committee, the Ahrars tried to tarnish the reputation of the former by labelling them as all Ahmadiyyas, which was a tactic that would be carried over to the Ahrars' allies in

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[29] Abdullah (2013 [1986]).

[30] Rai (2004), p. 258; Jalal (2000), p. 354.

[31] Sheikh Abdullah drew the comparison to the massacre at Amritsar: "The 13 July 1931 event has the same importance in our freedom struggle that the 1919 Jaliyanwala Bagh event had in the freedom movement of India," (2013 [1986]), p. 77.

[32] The Ahrars were led by Ataullah Shah Bukhari. Jalal (2000), p. 356

Kashmir, led by Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, against his rivals, led by Sheikh Abdullah.[33] The

Ahrars found initial support in Jammu, but that soon waned, and the Kashmir

Committee found support among Muslims in the Valley. The Ahrars pressed for an

investigation into the condition of Muslims in Kashmir and the Kashmir Committee

called for an inquiry into the July 13th massacre. The Minister for Political Affairs, G. E. C.

Wakefield (1873-1944) urged the maharaja to call for the appointment of a commission,

which he did.

Bertrand J. Glancy (1882-1953) put together a commission made up of one

Hindu and one Muslim from Jammu, and one each from the Valley. The commission set

out in November, and came back with recommendations to remedy to depressed status

of Kashmiri Muslims, including legislative representation: to the chagrin of the more

culturally anxious Kashmiri Pandits, the Pandit representative on the commission who

endorsed its recommendations was someone who would go on to be the most

prominent socialist voice in the Pandit community, Prem Nath Bazaz (1905-1984).[34]

Sheikh Abdullah rose to prominence in the aftermath of the July 13th massacre,

and the following year spearheaded the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.

The maharaja called for a constitution in 1934, which would consist of a legislature with

75 seats, 33 of which were elected, and of those, 21 reserved for Muslims, 10 for

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[33] Jalal (2000) notes "[d]iscrediting the committee as an outpost of Qadian proved ineffective since at most only nine of its sixty-three members could be identified as Ahmadis," p. 356.

[34] Zutshi (2004), pp. 238-243.

Hindus, and 2 for Sikhs.[35] However, the franchise was limited to men paying at least

twenty rupees per year in land revenue or grazing taxes, which significantly limited the

participation of poor Muslims. Prem Nath Bazaz had joined the Muslim Conference and,

with Sheikh Abdullah, started an Urdu newspaper, *Hamdard*, in 1935. Bazaz pressed for

Sheikh to take a wider appeal beyond just the Muslim community, which resulted in the

renaming of the Muslim Conference as the National Conference in June 1939.

Meanwhile, the division between Sheikh Abdullah and Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah was healed in

1932 with the establishment of the Muslim Conference, only to be torn open again in

1933 as Sheikh started appealing to a wider national Kashmiri base.[36] Mirwaiz Yusuf

Shah then formed the Azad Muslim Party Conference in 1933.[37] In 1938, the then-

Muslim Conference published its manifesto, "National Demand," calling for the

implementation of substantive reforms to bring about a "Responsible Government" in

the state, however, leaving the maharaja in place.[38]

In the September 1944 National Conference session, the party submitted Naya

Kashmir as their platform: a far-reaching progressive manifesto stressing women's

enfranchisement and ability to run for parliament, equal pay and employment

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[35] Rai (2004), p. 274.

[36] Sheikh Abdullah had formed an alliance in 1931 with Mirwaiz Ahmadullah Hamadani, who was descended from a younger brother during a mirwaiz-succession dispute in the early nineteenth century. Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah (1894-1968) was educated at Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband and had recently taken up the position of mirwaiz upon his father's death in March 1931.

[37] Zutshi (2004), p. 230.

[38] Bose (2003), p. 20.

opportunities, welfare, paid maternity leave, childcare, the abolition of landlordism.[39]

The Dogra regime then announced further legislative reforms in October 1945, including

a legislature with 40 out of the 75 seats being elective, and two ministerial posts, one

Hindu and one Muslim. The Muslim Conference rejected the offer and boycotted the

legislature, while the National Conference joined the government. However, in May

1946, the National Conference withdrew from the assembly as Sheikh Abdullah

launched his Quit Kashmir campaign, inspired by Gandhi's Quit India movement.

By this time alliances were beginning to form, with the Muslim Conference—

reconstituted in 1941 by defecting members of the National Conference, led by

Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, bringing Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah and his followers on board as

well—gravitating towards the Muslim League, and the National Conference moving in

the direction of the Indian National Congress. Sheikh Abdullah was arrested for his Quit

Kashmir agitation shortly after it began and was imprisoned. Nehru was able to

persuade the maharaja to free him in September 1947.

The partition of the subcontinent had occurred on August 14/15, 1947, and the

maharaja had yet to choose a side. While he was mulling over his options, he offered

"standstill agreements" with both India and Pakistan, which was rejected by the former

and accepted by the latter. The conventional story, in both Indian and Pakistani

methodologically nationalist accounts, is that there may or may not have been an

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[39] See "Naya Kashmir: A Socialist Document" in Butalia (2002); also Kanjwal (2017). Whitehead (2018) avers that "Communists were responsible for the 1944 'New Kashmir' document," pointing to the principal writer B. P. L. Bedi.

uprising in Poonch district—this point is usually not presented;[40] afterwards, there was

an invasion by Pashtun tribesmen, who may or may not have been calling for a *jihad*;[41]

which either had the logistics and support of Pakistan, or about which Pakistan was just

simply aware, but unable to do anything in response.[42] Absent from nearly all accounts,

however, was the ethnic cleansing that took place against Muslims in Jammu.

Communal riots and massacres had been taking hold throughout much of the

subcontinent. Jammu and Poonch were parts of the state in which communal tensions

were particularly elevated. In Poonch in August 1947, a number of villagers began

agitating against the local enforcement agents of the maharaja, expelling them from the

area. These rebels began calling the liberated territory the Provisional Azad

Government, later known as Azad Kashmir—perhaps taking its cue from the Muslim

Conference's May 1946 manifesto entitled "Azad Kashmir."[43] The maharaja responded

to this uprising with utmost brutality, killing scores in either late August or early

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[40] A methodologically Indian nationalist account which does mention the uprising is Behera (2000) and (2006).

[41] An influential Indian nationalist account stressing the jihad would be Swami (2007), but there are dozens of other accounts like this.

[42] A standard line can be seen the Pakistani Secretary, later Prime Minister (1955-1956), Chaudhry Muhammad Ali:

> On October 21, Liaquat Ali Khan told me in a state of unusual excitement that a tribal lashkar [army], some thousands strong, was on the way to Kashmir. I asked him if he had informed the Quaid-i-Azam [Jinnah] and he said, not yet, he had just received the report. There was nothing the Pakistan government could do about it. An attempt to prevent the tribesmen from performing what they conceived to be a religious duty would have set the whole frontier ablaze. The Pakistan army was neither fully organized nor adequately equipped.

Muhammad Ali (2014 [1967]), p. 775.

[43] Snedden (2013), p. 37.

September.[44] As communal violence broke out throughout the Jammu region—a region which was 61.2% Muslim and 37.1% Hindu in the 1941 census, with the Muslims more heavily concentrated in the west—Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs were all subject to targeted pogroms.[45] However, the force of the state came down deliberately in Poonch, a region which was 90% Muslim and where the rebels were almost exclusively Muslims. Poonchis then formed local militias and the princely state escalated its suppression. When large numbers of Pashtun tribals did arrive in the state on October 22, this was the situation they were responding to.

The invasion of the tribesmen thrusted additional urgency to make a decision upon the maharaja, who reached out to India to supply forces to help. Nehru responded that they could only do so if the maharaja were to accede to India. The maharaja agreed and signed the Instrument of Accession on either the October 26 or 27, and support was rendered on the 26th. It is not entirely clear when this was signed, although many accounts of his and V. P. Menon's schedule and the route taken to Delhi from Jammu do seem to indicate that it would have been the 27th.[46] More importantly, is how nationalist historiographies have come to place such stress on the timing, signifying the legality, of signing of the Instrument of Accession—Indian accounts stressing the 26th, Pakistani ones the 27th.

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[44] Snedden (2013), p. 42.

[45] Census of India (1942).

[46] For example, Schofield (2003).

3.3 Civilizational Geographies

Here, we will take a cross-section of a few different major anti-colonial thinkers

and their civilizational geopolitics, whether implicit or explicit.

Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838/39-1897)

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, an Iranian from Asadabad, who presented himself as an

Afghan, made a name for himself from the 1870s onwards as an assertive anti-

colonialist writer and activist.[47] By the early 1870s he had already travelled through, and

spent significant time in, Iran, British India, Afghanistan, the Ottoman Empire, and the

Khedivate of Egypt. In the later 1870s he turned decisively towards the development of

a Pan-Islamism, but not to the exclusion of alliances with Hindus in British India.[48] In

1884, with his protégé, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), he started the first pan-Islamic

periodical, *al-Urwat al-Wuthqa* ("The Firmest Bond"). Cemil Aydin avers that Afghani

was primarily responding to his context, that is the racializing civilizational mission of

the Western imperial powers: "[i]t was only in response to this chauvinistic assertion

that Muslim intellectuals fashioned a counter-narrative of Islamic civilization… These

Muslim opponents of European imperial ideology—of the white race's civilizational

superiority over Muslims and other coloured races—were the first Pan-Islamists."[49]

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[47] Biographer Nikki Keddie postulates that one reason for doing this would be to pass as a Sunni in regions where that was the majority sect. Keddie (1972), p. 428.

[48] Cf. his 1882 "Lecture on Teaching and Learning," extolling the virtues of Indian "philosophic thought," in Keddie (1968), pp. 101-108.

[49] Aydin (2018).

His 1879 article "The True Reason for Man's Happiness" rebutted British

defenses of imperialism in India, which rested largely on material growth and

betterment, saying that improved transportation and communications systems were

installed and used in order to benefit the British in the metropole, rather than altruistic

conferrals on Indians. In a book review he published later the same year, he casted

further aspersions on Western-style schools, seeing them as mere vehicles to turn the

colonized into cogs in the colonial regime, pointing to English learning in the Indian Civil

Service.[50]

Yet, he stressed the need for widespread education and learning, in order for not

only self-strengthening and material development, but also for the spiritual and moral

strengthening necessary to maintain autonomy and respond to European imperialism.

Two very public debates with two very prominent figures allowed Afghani to elucidate

his position. In 1880 he met Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), the educational reformer

who founded Aligarh Muslim University in 1875, on the model of the Universities of

Oxford and Cambridge. In the aftermath of the Sipahi uprising of 1857-1858, Muslims

were singled out as the key agitators behind the widespread revolt throughout India. In

the words of Aziz Ahmad, Sayyid Ahmad Khan's "lifelong mission" after this "had been

to salvage the wreck of his community on the raft of loyalism."[51] In 1858 he wrote the

defensive "Causes of the Indian Revolt," which worked to exculpate the broader Muslim

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[50] Keddie (1972), pp. 104-107; Mishra (2012), p. 83.

[51] Ahmad (1967), p. 125.

community from association with the revolt. Both he and Afghani were committed to reformism, but differed on "the final aim and end of a reformism, which for Sayyid Ahmad Khan meant a final adjustment with the west, but for al-Afghani an eventual and inevitable confrontation with western imperialism."[52] Afghani saw the interests of the Indian Muslim community as inseparable from those of the rest of the Muslim world, and he viewed the lack of unity and solidarity as a cause of the civilizational decay of the Muslim world. In part, the debate may have been a political one, for while Sayyid Ahmad Khan had urged the British government to support the Ottomans in their conflicts with the Russians, when it became abundantly clear that the British were not going to do so, Sayyid Ahmad Khan nevertheless professed his unambiguous loyalty to the British. Afghani's tract, called "Refutation of the Materialists," stresses the creative potential of religion in its espousal of rationalism, against any reductionist materialism or naturalistic theology.[53] He goes on to extol the social utility of religion in its elevation of human reason, its espousal of community over individualism, and its emphasis on moral betterment.

The other debate was in 1883 after meeting racist Orientalist Ernest Renan (1823-1892) in France. In "Islam and Science" Renan had argued that Arab culture and mentality was stultifying and incapable of reason, and that the only philosophers that the Muslim world could boast of were Persian, whose remnants of Aryanism and pre-

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[52] Ibid., p. 127.

[53] "Materialists" is also rendered as "Neicheris" or "Nayshariyya," the name of the group around Sayyid Ahmad Khan, an Urduization of "naturalism." In Keddie (1968), pp. 130-172.

Islamic ideas were able to shine through an otherwise stupefying Islamic culture. In any

case, even the Persian contribution to philosophy had long since seen its sun set since

the invasions of the Turks, and the overwhelming of Persians with Semitism: he was

dismissive of any contributions to science that Muslims after the twelfth or, at the

latest, thirteenth century, had made.[54]

In his response, Afghani accepted the current dismal state of Arabic civilization,

but stated that this was only a phase, through which Islam would pass after going

through a period of reform. He further rebuts Renan's claims about the quashing of

reason by Semitism and Islam, citing not only Arabic philosophers, but how Persians like

Ibn Sina engaged in philosophy primarily through Arabic texts.

Afghani's two texts have often been counterposed to point to theoretical

inconsistencies in his valuation of religion as a source of creativity and reason, whereas

he faults "orthodox" dogmatists in the latter and extols their virtues in the former.[55]

Margaret Kohn uses this discrepancy to try to reconcile the two viewpoints through

Afghani's view of civilization, influenced primarily through a creative reworking of Ibn

Khaldun (1332-1406) and François Guizot (1787-1874).[56] Afghani uses Ibn Khaldun's

notion of *asabiyya* ("group solidarity"), to call for a broader pan-Islamic unity to counter

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[54] Renan (2011 [1883]).

[55] Keddie (1972). Mishra (2012) says that Afghani "was not a systematic thinker, and seems to have developed his ideas on the run; he was consistent only in his anti-imperialism," p. 118.

[56] Kohn (2009). Albert Hourani (1983 [1962]) notes "The idea of civilization is indeed one of the seminal ideas of nineteenth-century Europe, and it is through al-Afghani above all that it reaches the Islamic world," p. 114.

the forces of Western imperialism. In Guizot, he saw an affinity with his own conception of morality as a key to progress. And with respect to the rise of reason in the Europe that Guizot pointed to, Afghani saw in Islam as a source of critical reflection against *taqlid* (blind obedience).

Afghani thought that the "Muslim countries were weak because Muslim society was in decay."[57] This admission required an acceptance of the premise of "decay," itself an assertion by Western proponents of civilizationalism, who, if they could point to the achievements of Islamic society, did so in a way so as to emphasize their role primarily as transmitters of Greek knowledge during the Dark Ages, so that it could spark a creative innovation of the European Renaissance. Orientalists who took the knowledge of Marco Polo and other earlier adventurers with them to Asia and Africa almost entirely would up disappointed with the state of Oriental "civilization," falling far short of their expectations.[58] The equation of material development and advancement is also a common trope used by proponents of Western civilization—even today—to express the outward material abundance and prosperity as symbolic of an inner merit: moral, spiritual, and intellectual.[59]

These were concessions which were not straightforward or necessary. Nonetheless, Afghani provided a framework for thinking about pan-Islamism generally,

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[57] Hourani (1983 [1962]), p. 114.

[58] Said (2003 [1978]) points to a number of examples. See Heffernan (2001) on European exploration to Timbuktu.

[59] See Adas (1989).

and particularly in the subcontinent. His enormous impact influenced later figures such as Muhammad Iqbal and Abul Kalam Azad.

Choudhry Rahmat Ali's Pakistan

Choudhry Rahmat Ali coined the term Pakistan, but made it clear that he was taking a position distinct from that of Muhammad Iqbal, in that the latter proposed the idea of majority-Muslim states within a broader Indian federation, and Rahmat Ali made it clear that he was calling for an independent state altogether.[60] The term "Pakistan" had the double appeal of being both an acronym for the majority Muslim state in the northwest of India—Punjab, Afghania, Kashmir, Sind, Balochi*tan*—and having the connotation of pure ("pak"). In 1935 he released *Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation*, which laid out in copious detail his conception for the future state of "Pakistan." In it, he creatively retells the history of the "Pak" people, who existed on the continent of "Dinia"—an anagrammatic reworking of India and a blend of the Islamic concepts of *din* (religion) territorialized by *dunya* (earthly matters), to symbolize a pureness of the land and people. Here, the Paks lived in harmony amongst themselves until the invasion of the "Caste Hindoos" who "broke up their civilization and blighted their institutions… divided them into castes, and exploited them ruthlessly."[61] The Paks then converted to Buddhism, which worked for a while in combating "Caste Hindooism," but its renunciatory spirit proved too weak to overcome it.

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[60] Rahmat Ali (1969 [1933]).

[61] Rahmat Ali (1947 [1935]), p. 175.

The Paks were on the frontlines of expelling Alexander from "Dinia" and faced

numerous other invasions throughout the centuries. Divine Providence then came to

the rescue of the Paks in the form of Islam, which has sustained and kept the Paks

together throughout the centuries, taking them to this trying moment within British

imperialism, and Western imperialism across much of the Muslim world.[62]

Rahmat Ali poses the choice "re-construction in Asia" or "re-destruction

in 'India.'"[63] For him "Indianism," or the push towards a united India will result in

a domination over the minority communities, including Dravidians, "depressed

classes" ("akhoots"), Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Parsis.[64] He also envisages

the creation of several smaller Muslim states dotting the continent of "Dinia."

The answer to the domination of "Indianism" has to be independence and

consolidation with the Muslim world: "Pakistan is a Muslim land and as such it

primarily belongs to the Muslim world."[65] After the independence of Pakistan,

there should be a cordial relationship of "fraternity" with all other Muslim

countries, Iran and Afghanistan consolidating together in the broader "cultural

orbit of Pakasia."[66] He further pushes for closer relationships with the Muslim

countries in the region of Central and West Asia.

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[62] Rahmat Ali (1947 [1935]), pp. 173-204.

[63] Ibid., p. 239.

[64] Ibid., pp. 243, 313.

[65] Ibid., p. 331.

[66] Ibid., pp. 95, 229.

Earlier, in 1918, the Aga Khan III also proposed the creation of a South Asian and West Asian union, and denied that there was any conflict between being Muslim, Indian, and Asian.[67] However, the Aga Khan promoted this position from within the framework of British loyalism.

In constructing the "Pak" *millat* (people or nation) and territory, and writing from Cambridge, he notes: "[i]t is a notorious fact that the rise and ascendancy of European civilization is synonymous with the revival and reassertion of racialism in the modern world—racialism which in effect is the cult of castology run amuck."[68] In responding to those asking about the "ethnical stock" of Paks, he points to the six different major groups comprising the population, "whose ethnical diversity finds spiritual unity in Islam and makes Pakistan a miniature Muslim world."[69] For good measure, he also throws in a dash of Mackinder: "he who holds the Hindoo Kush commands Pakistan and controls Pakasia."[70]

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[67] Stolte and Fischer-Tiné (2012), p. 72.

[68] Rahmat Ali (1947 [1935]), p. 149.

[69] Ibid., pp. 150-151. The six groups he lists are

> the Turko-Iranian type, comprising Afghans and Balochs; the Dino-Aryan (Indo-Aryan), consisting of the Panjabis and Kashmiris of the Vale; the Scytho-Dravidians, represented by some small numbers scattered all over the country; the Aryo-Dravidian, living in the Delhi Division and the cis-Jamna Strips; the Mongolo-Dravidian, met with in areas of the most northerly region of Jabaliya; and, lastly, the Mongoloid, inhabiting the Lahul and Kullu tracts in Kangra District, Panjab, and the Laddakh and Baltistan territories of Kashmir.

Phrasing it as a response to the questions concerning self-determination, it is clear that for Rahmat Ali, one does not have to get hung up on racial origins in the discussion of nationalism. Further, the multiethnic heritage of Pakistan is something lauded here, as opposed to the standard European tropes of hierarchy and miscegenation.

[70] Ibid., p. 38.

Jinnah's Forced Nationalism

Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) endorsed the project of Pakistan but made a number of retreats from the position of Rahmat Ali. He noted that he was only using the word Pakistan because it had caught on so well with other Muslim Leaguers. He is credited with devising the idea of the "two-nation theory" in his Lahore Address of March 1940, calling for a federation of majority-Muslim states:

> They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of your troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.[71]

This casting of different nations was a response both to the pressures of self-determination and unitary nationhood cast upon South Asia by Western European conceptions of nationhood, and to the internal disputes within British India, specifically as enunciated by the growing Hindu nationalist movement from the 1920s through the 1940s. Jinnah, as a pragmatic statesman, did not necessarily have to believe that this

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[71] Jinnah (2014 [1940]), p. 502.

was the case—his own family background proved it was far from so, the deployment of the trope of nationhood played into an already fervent discursive ambience, which was pushed further along due to his stature and the platform of enunciation from which this emanated and was taken.

More than likely used as a useful expedient to press for greater reservations for the Muslim community, the two-nation theory has had particular salience over Kashmir. From the immediate aftermath of partition, Kashmir has been held up by India as a refutation of the two-nation theory. After the December 1971 secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, liberal Indian nationalists saw the death-knell of the two-nation theory. Right-wing Hindu nationalist discourse, however, affirms the idea of two-nation theory and has used it to charge Muslims with being fifth-column agents of Pakistan and de-legitimize their Indian citizenship.

The sense in which Jinnah deployed the two-nation theory was in order to protect minorities and did not have any theocratic connotations. However, once in office, Jinnah attempted to extend pan-Islamism to foreign policy and set up Pakistan, as the largest independent Muslim state, as the leader of the Islamic world, which was undercut largely by India's concurrent outreach under the guise of anti-imperialism.[72]

Gandhian Geopolitics

Gandhi also stressed the clear distinction between Western and Eastern civilizations, following the established association of the former with materiality and a

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[72] Aydin (2017), p. 183. Aydin argues that Pakistan's pan-Islamist approach was not ripe for the late 1940s.

lack of spirituality, and the latter with the reverse qualities. For Gandhi, Indian

civilization was primarily related to morality, which through his dharmic understanding

of the concept, had a cosmic (*rta*) quality, akin to natural law.[73] For Gandhi, it was

crucial not to conflate material progress with moral and spiritual development: he held

that quite often these stood in an inverse relationship.

Gandhi stressed the necessity of Hindu-Muslim cooperation in order to achieve

home rule, but importantly, this cooperation rested on his determination of the means

employed to do so: the satyagraha movement. This was an approach to "truth through

action," but thoroughly infused with meanings drawn from dharmic traditions, like

karma yoga.[74] He displayed defensiveness over the leadership of Congress-led home

rule movement when Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan ("Badshah"/"Bacha") (1890-1988) took

up his Congress-allied nonviolent protest movement, Khudai Khidmatgar. In October

1938, visiting the North-West Frontier Province Gandhi said of the Khudai Khidmatgar

movement: "their nonviolence was sincere but incomplete."[75] Gandhi also stressed

ideas of vegetarianism, fasting, and home labor to instill a true sense of nonviolence,

whereas the Badshah Khan rather framed the nonviolence of the Khudai Khidmatgar

movement in the Qur'anic vein of "*sabr*" (restraint, forbearance, steadfastness).[76]

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[73] Iyer (1973).

[74] "Action" yoga, or the practice of selfless action.

[75] Bala (2013), p. 138.

[76] Eknath Easwaran (1999), p. 243.

Further, the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, though closely allied with the Indian

National Congress and the goal of home rule, was primarily responding to the

socioeconomic conditions of the North-West Frontier Province.[77]

Further, as a helpful byproduct—for Gandhi was anything but an instrumental

actor—the alliance with the Khilafat movement helped win Muslim allies internationally.

In 1924 he remarked: "The Indian support of the Khilafat has, as if by a magic wand,

converted what was once the Pan-Islamic terror for Europe into a solid wall of friendship

and defence for India."[78] As outlined in *Hind Swaraj* ("Indian Home Rule"), a tract

Gandhi wrote from South Africa in 1909, a unitary nationalist position meant that no

minority group was to be excluded

> India cannot cease to be one nation because people belonging to different
>
> religions live in it. The introduction of foreigners does not necessarily destroy the
>
> nation, they merge in it. A country is one nation only when such a condition
>
> obtains in it. That country must have a faculty for assimilation. India has ever
>
> been such a country… If the Hindus believe that India should be peopled only by
>
> Hindus, they are living in dreamland. The Hindus, the Mahomedans, the Parsees
>
> and the Christians who have made India their country are fellow countrymen
>
> and they will have to live in unity if only for their own interest.[79]

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[77] Bala (2013).

[78] Quoted in Medha (2016).

[79] Gandhi (1997 [1909]), pp. 52-53.

However, despite Gandhi's professed dedication to forge a single united India and his fasts meant to protect Muslims from communal violence, his reliance on Hindu symbolism and ideas alienated Muslims who saw the Congress as a party dominated by Hindus. Hindu nationalists, meanwhile, saw his overtures to Muslims as alienating. According to the trial testimony of his assassin, Nathuram Godse (1910-1949), the reason he assassinated Gandhi was that his fasts were his way of holding the Hindus hostage, and that his policy of nonviolence (*ahimsa*) would "result in the emasculation of the Hindu Community and thus make the community incapable of resisting the aggression or inroads of other communities, especially the Muslims."[80]

As noted by Priya Chacko, Nehru drew much of his inspiration for his vision of India on Gandhian principles, including the notion of international friendship.[81] However, a major difference between the two was Gandhi's commitment to what he viewed as traditionalism, and Nehru being much more influenced by nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberal and socialist political approaches, such as Fabianism. Gandhi saw the processes of industrialization and mechanization as undermining central ethical principles, in favor of materialism. Nehru saw Gandhi's reactionary traditionalism as an untenable escapist nostalgia.

In 1943 a professor of history at the University of Mysore and a self-professed Gandhian, Sondekoppa Srikanta Sastri (1904-1974), penned a pamphlet entitled

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[80] Godse (2014 [1948]), p. 440. Godse claimed that his thinking on the Hindu nation was primarily inspired by Savarkar.

[81] Chacko (2012).

Geopolitics of India and Greater India.[82] In it, he draws on the language of geopolitics

and tries to reconcile geopolitical knowledge with a Gandhian Indian politics in a future

independent India, ideally a unified, non-partitioned India, stressing ideas of justice,

morality, and culture. He stakes his claims primarily in contrast to Mackinder and

Curzon, and, against the ideas of geography determining policy, notes that

> the doctrine of 'Organic frontiers' may have some justification in an organic
>
> theory of the state, but is easily made an excuse for barefaced [territorial]
>
> expansion as was done by Curzon who wanted to fix the western frontier of India
>
> near the Persian Gulf. The history of the north west frontier province of India
>
> clearly shows the futility of trying to establish frontiers by force instead of
>
> trusting [it] to gradual change by peaceful and natural means… The frontiers
>
> depend more on international cooperation and understanding than on
>
> geographical factors and virtues.[83]

He also draws on the notion of Greater India, developed by the Indian Colonization

Society and others, in calling for a supra-Indian union, a "new Jambu Dvipa" from the

Hindu Kush and Afghanistan to Indochina, the Philippines, and Indonesia. He goes on to

also call for a "supra national union" including an "independent [united] India and the

Far East," which will be able to transform the world into a cooperative commonwealth,

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[82] It was unearthed by a former student of his, the well-known Indian sociologist M. N. Srinivas (1916-1999) and published in 1989. Sastri (1989 [1943]).

[83] Ibid.

drawing its sustenance primarily from the virtues of Eastern spirituality, conceptualized in a Gandhian vein.

Crafting Hinduism: Radhakrishnan

Vivekananda (1863-1902) often presented essentialized depictions of the East and West as essentially different, from modes of thought to modes of being. An important platform that he was given to enunciate this difference came at the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. Ten years earlier, Keshub Chandra Sen (1838-1884) in a speech entitled "Asia's Message to Europe," stressed the idealism and spirituality of the East, from which the West should learn.[84] Aurobindo Ghosh (1872-1950) carried on this depiction, and for him the devastation of World War I represented the moral depravity of Western civilization. He thought socialism would be a better alternative for India than capitalism but saw Indian spiritual and a "resurgent Asia" were necessary to check socialism's tendency to increase the mechanical burden of humanity.[85] This was symbolic of the broader general idea Aurobindo held about synthesizing the best of Western and Eastern civilizations. Importantly, in his early speeches in 1908 and 1909 he stressed that nationalism would have to draw its strength from religion, meaning "the Sanatan Dharma" ("eternal dharma" and the true religion):

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[84] Stolte and Fischer-Tiné (2012), p. 58.

[85] Quoted in Adas (2004), p. 54.

for Aurobindo, "the Hindu religion is the eternal religion, because it is the universal religion which embraces all others."[86]

We see this further taken up, in the manner of a philosophical reification, in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975). Radhakrishnan was a philosopher academic who would later become the first vice president (1952-1962) and second president of India (1962-1967). A Telugu Brahmin from Madras Presidency, he taught at Madras Presidency College, then the University of Mysore, then in 1921 was appointed King George V Professor of Mental and Moral Sciences at the University of Calcutta, Vice-Chancellor at Andhra University from 1931 to 1936, and Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions at University of Oxford from 1936 to 1952. He was selected in 1926 to give the Upton Lectures in Oxford, which were later published as *The Hindu View of Life* and in 1929 and 1930 he delivered the Hibbert Lectures at the University of Manchester and University College, London. He served as India's representative to UNESCO from 1946 to 1952, and as ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1952. He was also one of Nehru's closest advisers throughout the latter's tenure.[87]

Radhakrishnan extended the image of India as focused primarily on spirituality to its philosophical bent. In *An Idealist View of Life*, he points to the traditions of the East (dealing primarily with Hinduism) as focused on creative intuition as a mode of knowing, as opposed to the West's heavy focus on critical intelligence and discursive reasoning:

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[86] Aurobindo (2014), pp. 271-282, esp. pp. 280-282.

[87] Sarvepalli Gopal (1989).

"[f]or the Hindus a system of philosophy is an insight, a *darsana*. It is the vision of truth and not a matter of logical argument and proof."[88] The West sees knowledge as compartmentalized and atomistic, whereas the East treats it holistically.

> As contrasted with Western philosophy, with its analytical approach to reality and experience, Indian philosophy is fundamentally synthetic. The basic texts of Indian philosophy treat not only one phase of experience and reality, but of the full content of the philosophic sphere. Metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, religion, psychology, facts, and value are not cut off one from the other but are treated in their natural unity as aspects of one life and experience or of a single comprehensive reality.[89]

Ultimately, Radhakrishnan makes his case for a dialogic understanding between East and West through perennialism, which he viewed through Advaita Vedanta ontological monism.[90] In his thought, the reality of the empirical world "finds its basis in the Absolute. The Absolute is the source of its many transformations, but these

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[88] Radhakrishnan (1932), p. 100. He backs down from making absolute separations, however: "The distinction is not to be pressed too closely. It is relative and not absolute. It describes the chief tendencies, and there are in fact many exceptions. It is only a question of the distribution of emphasis," ibid., p. 101. This conception of Indian philosophy as *darsana* is to the neglect of the more argumentative tradition of logical reasoning known as *anviksiki*.

[89] Radhakrishnan and Moore (1957), pp. xxvii-xxviii.

[90] Gopal (1989), p. 204. Vedanta is a school of ontology rooted in Upanishadic exegesis. Advaita ("non-dual") describes the relation of the self to the pervading, absolute cosmic principle ("Brahman"); here, stressing that the self is not separate from Brahman.

transformations in the world of the here-and-now do not, in turn, affect the integrity or absoluteness of *Brahman*."[91]

In *An Idealist View of Life*, he points to the many overlaps between forms of idealist Western thought and idealist Indian thought, which point to ways of coming to the same understanding of absolute monistic reality. *An Idealist View of Life*, although self-consciously addressing a Western audience, never mentions any Muslim philosopher or mystic and only mentions Islam once, and briefly. Under a section entitled "what is salvation?" he begins a paragraph "The Hindu theory has many analogies in the West" and runs quickly through Orphism, the cult of Dionysus, Plato's *Symposium*, "Islam describes the bliss of saints as consisting in union with God, a state which the mystics and dervishes wish to attain even in this life. The Neo-Platonists and Spinoza and the mystics of Christianity adopt a similar view."[92] He also mentions the Prophet Muhammad exactly one time, also briefly and grouped with Western thinkers: in the section "personal experience of God," after discussing Jesus and the meaning of faith in Christianity, he says "[t]he life of Mohammad is full of mystic experiences. Witnesses to the personal sense of the divine are not confined to the East."[93]

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[91] Radhakrishnan and Moore (1957), p. 610.

[92] Radhakrishnan (1932), pp. 241-242. He mentions Islam again in a passing tangent on the threat to religion, mentioning Ataturk moving away from Islam.

[93] Radhakrishnan (1932), p. 71.

Further, in *A Source Book on Indian Philosophy*, a tome of nearly 700 pages,

there is no treatment of any Muslim thinkers and the only mention of Muslims is when

he says:

> First the Muslims and then the British assumed control of the country, not only
>
> physically but also in the realm of thought. The Muslims undermined Aryan
>
> culture and thought as far as possible, and the British, in their time, did as much
>
> as they could to belittle the thought of traditional India.[94]

This is not to say that Radhakrishnan harbored any deliberate feelings of denigration

towards Muslims, but here, it is the silences that speak. In the absence of any treatment

of Muslim or Islamic philosophy in these works, he is effectively saying that is not

"Indian," a negation by omission. Again, the question of intention is beside the point, as

the framing of Muslims as non-Indian was able to play into the hands of Hindu

nationalists and fascists.

Appropriating Colonization: The Greater India Society

In 1926, inspired by Tagore's pan-Asianism a group of Bengali academics

gathered in Calcutta to form the Greater India Society, led by Kalidas Nag (1892-1966)

and Prabodh Chandra Bagchi (1898-1956), both of whom had pursued doctoral studies

at the Sorbonne under French orientalists Sylvain Lévi and Jean Przyluski.

Lévi saw India as the great civilizational force of Asia, pointing to the spread of

Hindu and Buddhist culture, spirituality, and material artifacts across Asia. This idea of

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[94] Radhakrishnan and Moore (1957), p. xxi.

India as a civilizational force was extended by members of the Greater India Society, stressing India's role as a hegemonic civilizing entity, bestowing its culture upon lesser civilizations. R. C. Majumdar (1884-1980), a founding member of the Greater India Society, went so far as to call these lesser entities "colonies" of India in his two-volume 1927 *Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East*.

Here was a response to British colonialism and the devaluation of Indian civilization, providing substantive proof of the necessity of self-determination. In the estimation of Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, "[t]he message was clear: India's past as a colonial power raised it to the level of a 'civilized nation.'"[95] Further, "India could position itself as the superior 'colonial power' because its colonizing had been pacifist and benign."[96] Drawing on the established civilizational tropes, India's spiritual strength positioned it to be a better conqueror, a more benevolent imperial power than the European states could ever be.

The re-working of cultural diffusion and Indic colonization allowed the, primarily Bengali, Greater India Society to refute established British colonial stereotypes about effeminate Hindus—as the British framed the work of the colonial project as the zenith of masculinity.[97] Susan Bayly notes that the polemics of the Greater India Society "deployed a vocabulary of process and enactment." Key terms like mission, settle,

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[95] Stolte and Fischer-Tiné (2012), p. 84.

[96] Stolte and Fischer-Tiné (2012), p. 84.

[97] Bayly (2004), p. 712. For colonial masculinity and the trope of the effeminate Bengali, and Hindu more generally, see Sinha (1995).

construct, build, influence, and above all colonize "pervaded its accounts of a dynamic and purposefully creative India, with a continuing world-historical mission to other lands."[98] Nag and Bagchi found in the work of Lévi and French Orientalists "an idea of India which allowed for a far more dynamic contribution from Bengalis and the Bengal region than was compatible with the Indology of Max Müller and his British Orientalist admirers."[99] This required a reworking of Lévi to fit the objective of presenting the Hindu Indian self through its colonizing past. Lévi saw a story of local agency and dynamic interaction with local peoples and cultures. The Greater India Society, especially through the works of Nag and Phanindranath Bose, however, propounded "a simplified, more narrowly nationalist and indeed explicitly India-centred account of overseas 'cultural colonization.'"[100] This accomplished the dual objectives of at once distancing itself from the brutal colonization by force of European colonialism, and Muslim conquest, yet placing Indians as purposeful agents in the forefront of colonization, and doing so through a benevolent spread of culture. For Phanindranath Bose, this demonstrated, against the standard British account of Hindu India decline, that Hindu India never lost its history-making and civilizing energies.[101]

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[98] Bayly (2004), p. 712.

[99] Ibid., p. 718.

[100] Ibid., p. 721.

[101] Ibid., p. 724.

As might be imagined, the Hindu Mahasabha, under the leadership of Vinayak Savarkar, gave full credence to this idea of Hindu civilizational diffusion and linkage with Buddhist Asia, but did not lend much material support to the development of branches of the organization in these areas. In the 1940s, the Hindu right

> had firmly appropriated the concept of Asia as a Hindu-Buddhist continent. The idea that "civilization" was "Hindu-Buddhist" came to carry the connotation that it was "non-Muslim," and the rhetoric was domesticated as a Hindu-nationalist tool.[102]

Hindu Supremacism: Savarkar and Golwalkar

One development out of the assertion of national selfhood against assimilationism and imperial subordination, was the development of Hindu supremacy. Vinayak Damodar ("Veer") Savarkar (1883-1966) and Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1906-1973) give clear enunciations of an ethnic and racialist understanding of Hindu assertion.

Savarkar penned his *Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?* while he was in prison in Ratnagiri in 1922 and published it at Nagpur the following year. A Marathi Chitpavan Brahmin from near Nashik, Savarkar went to London in 1906 and was embroiled in a plot to assassinate Lord Curzon. He was arrested in 1910 and transported back to India. He was released in 1924 on a probationary arrangement where he closely monitored,

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[102] Stolte and Fischer-Tiné (2012), p. 88. Bayly (2004) notes how the Greater India Society moved away from the India-colonizing idea in the aftermath of independence, citing Greater India Society President Suniti Kumar Chatterji's 1954 address, which stresses a less agent-driven diffusionist idea.

and his movement restricted until 1937. That year he became president of the Hindu

Mahasabha, a post he held until 1944.[103]

Hindutva, written against the backdrop of the Khilafat movement, singles out the

foreign allegiance of Muslims: "[l]ook at the Mohammedans. Mecca to them is a sterner

reality than Delhi or Agra."[104] His conception of Greater India, or Bharatakhand,

necessitated a commitment to, and reverence for the territory.[105] Within this

conceptualization, Christians and Muslims would not fit into the Hindu nation.

> Their holyland is far off in Arabia and Palestine. Their mythology and Godmen,
>
> ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently their names and
>
> their outlook smack of foreign origin. Their love is divided.[106]

This, however, was not to say that they could not eventually have a place in India.

Savarkar's main argument in *Hindutva* is that the Aryans who settled in India millennia

ago formed a nation which is now embodied in the Hindus. Their unity lies in their

geographical unity, racial features, and common culture. Hinduism is not limited to

religion per se but is more properly conceptualized as an ethnic community. His

understanding of racial Hinduism was expansive, having the ability to widen its

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[103] See McDermott, et al. (2014), p. 483.

[104] Savarkar (1969 [1923]), p. 135.

[105] Later Hindu nationalists have turned this around into Akhand Bharat (literally, undivided or unbroken India), which is often translated as Greater India, referring primarily to the Vedic cultural heritage lands beyond British India, primarily Afghanistan.

[106] Savarkar (1969 [1923]), p. 113. "Godmen," here, refers to the prophets in the Abrahamic traditions as opposed to the sages, gurus, and founders of religious communities of India.

membership, and holds open the possibility of Muslims and Christians who had originally converted from Hinduism to eventually revert to and assimilate into the cultural practices of the dominant Hindu community. As noted by Christophe Jaffrelot

> Savarkar did not put great stress on racial purity for his racism of domination was deeply influenced by the rationale of the caste system; minorities are required to assimilate, but at a subordinate rank, at least below the Brahmins.[107]

Savarkar's idea of race is seen in his translation of that term as *jati*, which Jaffrelot translates as something akin to species.[108] *Jati* are seen to occupy different ranks in the universe in conformity with the dharmic hierarchy.

Savarkar's history of the Hindus sees it as a fusion between Aryans moving in and indigenous groups already present in India:

> The race that is born of the fusion, which on the whole is a healthy one, because gradual, of the Aryans, Kolarian, Dravidians and all those of our ancestors, whose blood we as a race inherit is rightly called neither an Aryan, nor Kolarian, nor Dravidian—but the Hindu race.[109]

These Hindus are then met with challenges, first by the Buddhists and centuries later by the Muslims. Savarkar compares Shivaji, leader of the Maratha rebellion against

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[107] Jaffrelot (1996), p. 30.

[108] Ibid. Savarkar also uses the two terms together, "race-jati." He defines *jati* as "derived from the root Jan to produce, means a brotherhood, a race determined by a common origin, possessing a common blood."

[109] Savarkar (1969 [1923]).

Emperor Aurangzeb, to Mazzini, and sees Shivaji as rallying and uniting the Hindus against the Muslims. This neatly glosses over the Muslims present in the Maratha contingents and the Hindus in the Mughal ranks, and it is plainly anachronistic to view Shivaji as standing up for Hinduism or some idea of pan-Indian Hindus, but this has ever since provided a rich trope for Hindu nationalists, who often harken back to the Marathas, and Shivaji in particular, as defenders of Hinduism against Muslim domination.

Golwalkar, a Marathi Karhade Brahmin from Ramtek, went to Benares Hindu University for higher education, earning a master's and a bachelor's degree in biology in 1929 and 1927, respectively. He was teaching in the university as a lecturer in zoology in 1931 when he met Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889-1940), the founding leader (*sarsangchalak*) of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh ("RSS"), established in 1925. He joined the RSS that year and would later be named by Hedgewar as his successor as *sarsanghchalak*, upon the latter's death.

In 1939 Golwalkar wrote *We, or Our Nationhood Defined*, which Bruce Graham calls "[t]he first coherent exposition of its [RSS] doctrine."[110] The book was heavily inspired by a pamphlet circulated by Ganesh Damodar Savarkar (1879-1945)—Vinayak's brother—called *Rashtra Mimamsa*. In *We*, he notes the central components of identity, which included territory, racial unity, culture, language, but above all in importance was religion. However, his notion of religion was interpreted in an ethnic light: "[o]ur Race-

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[110] Graham (1990), p. 45.

spirit is a child of our Religion and so with us Culture is but a product of our all-comprehensive Religion."[111]

Golwalkar differed from Savarkar in not seeing Aryans as migrating from elsewhere, "Hindus came into this land from nowhere, but are the indigenous children of the soil always, from times immemorial."[112] However, the rest of his history of India is largely in conformity with Savarkar's, down to British domination. The latest incarnation of this domination over the Hindus is seen with the rise of the Indian National Congress, which was a grand British conspiracy. In a sarcastic tone, he admits

> The Congress, they founded as "a safety valve" to "seething nationalism," "as a toy which would lull the awakening… giant into slumber," an instrument to destroy National consciousness, has been, as far as they are concerned, a success. Our own "denationalization" under the name of Nationality is nearing its consummations. We ave almost forgotten our Nationhood.[113]

Like Savarkar, his notion of race was more expansive than that of Western racialists: "[e]ven if there be a people of a foreign origin they must have been assimilated into the body of the mother race and inextricably fused into it."[114] However, failing this

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[111] Golwalkar (1945 [1939]), p. 26.

[112] Ibid., p. 12.

[113] Ibid., pp. 18-19. Golwalkar is here pointing to British founding members of the Indian National Congress, namely the Theosophist Allan Octavian Hume (1829-1912), the Scottish civil servant William Wedderburn (1838-1918), and the English civil servant Henry Cotton (1845-1915). However, it would be a far cry to link the operations of the Congress to central command of the British Empire, to say nothing of the scores of Indians involved in its founding.

[114] Ibid., p. 25.

assimilation, these groups "may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment—not even citizen's rights."[115] He considered those who did not "subscribe to the social laws dictated by the Hindu Religion and Culture" as *mlecchas*, or outsiders.[116]

The crucial thing that Hindus needed, according to Golwalkar, was unification and consolidation. For him, Nazi Germany provided the best model for a future Hindu nation. He lauded the Nazi emphasis on the primacy of society, or the social organism, rather than the acquisition of state power.[117] Further,

> [t]o keep up the purity of the Race and its culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the semitic Races—the Jews. Race pride at its highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how well[-]nigh impossible it is for Race and cultures, having difference going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn and profit by.[118]

He believed that the Nazi model was one to emulate in India, with respect to Muslims.[119]

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[115] Quoted in Jaffrelot (1996), p. 56.

[116] Ibid.

[117] See the discussion in Jaffrelot (1996), pp. 58-62.

[118] Golwalkar (1945), pp. 40-41.

[119] Jaffrelot cites an interview, not conducted by him, that was done with an RSS cadre in New Delhi in December 1951 that may have echoed Golwalkar's musings. The RSS member said that Hitler failed "because he did not elevate his program to the spiritual plane and he favored foolish aggression in Europe." Jaffrelot (1996), p 64. A case could be made for Deendayal Upadhyaya (1916-1968) filling this

Contrasting India to other nations, he says that "it seems as if we never were uncivilized."[120] Nevertheless, he sees European national consciousness as something to aspire towards, for Hindus. He references a few European and American political thinkers but draws especially on Swiss law scholar Johann Caspar Bluntschli's *The Theory of the State* (1885) and American political scientist John W. Burgess's *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* (1890) for their respective definitions of race and nation.[121] As did Savarkar, Golwalkar also drew on the idea of Akhand Bharat as the territorialized civilizational area of the Hindu people.

Tagore: Stepping Stones

Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) drew on Vivekananda's division of a mechanized and soulless West against a spiritual East but did so in a way that did not

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void with his Hindu philosophical musings of "integral humanism." Upadhyaya is a figure constantly lauded by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

[120] Golwalkar (1945), p. 8.

[121] Jaffrelot (1996), pp. 53-54. "With Burgess Nation means 'a population having a common language and literature, common customs and common consciousness of rights and wrongs, inhabiting a territory of geographical unity." Golwalkar, p. 21. Bluntschli's definition of race that he finds so appealing is

> a union of masses of men of different occupations and social states, in a hereditary society of common spirit, feeling and race bound together especially by a language and customs in a common civilization which gives them a sense of unity and distinction [...] from all foreigners, *quite apart from the bond of the state*.

Golwalkar, p. 21, emphasis in original. Earlier, the Hindu nationalist Lala Lajpat Rai also drew from German racial theorists for his vision of a Hindu nation. In an October 1909 speech, he railed against the nationalism propounded by the Congress that the nation should be equated with universalist or territorial nationalism. He defers instead to the German usage: "[i]n that language it connoted what is generally conveyed by the English expression 'people' implying a community possessing a certain civilisation and culture." Jaffrelot (1996), p. 30.

emphasize such sharp breaks, where a possible communion could arise, when the time was right. That is, when both East and West could approach each other as equals.

Tagore was critical of the violence that seemed to be inseparable from nationalism, a problem that he saw as endemic to European countries, from the imperial expansion and colonial practice, to the Boer War, to World War I. He took an active role in Bengali politics during the Swadeshi movement, but stepped back from political activity after 1908, dismayed at the ravages of nationalism in Bengal, and he turned his focus to more cultural matters.

Tagore met with Okakura Tenshin (1862-1913), a major Japanese architect of pan-Asianism and Okakura's notion of a unified East, "Asia is one," immediately struck a chord. Tagore would look to Japan as a central focus for pan-Asianism, and visited there three times in between 1916 and 1929.[122] In his address delivered to the Imperial University of Tokyo, he emphasized the materialist West as a threat to all Asian peoples, and cautioned that "the appropriation of European modernity should occur only highly selectively and under permanent consideration of one's own cultural heritage."[123] It was the mission of the East to endow the West with the necessary spiritual qualities to stem its self-destruction.[124] Tagore further warned about the dangers of nationalism:

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[122] Stolte and Fischer-Tiné (2012), p. 77.

[123] Quoted in Stolte and Fischer-Tiné (2012), p. 78.

[124] Stolte and Fischer-Tiné (2012), pp. 76-82.

Japan had all her wealth of humanity, her harmony of heroism, her depth of self-control and richness of self-expression; yet the Western nations felt no respect for her till she proved that the bloodhounds of Satan are not only bred in the kennels of Europe but can also be domesticated in Japan.[125]

In the 1930s, Tagore lost his optimism about Japan. When Japanese poet Yone Noguchi wrote to Tagore in 1935, asking for his endorsement of the Japanese war effort, as it would bring about an "Asia for Asians," Tagore declined.

When I protested against "westernization" in my lectures in Japan, I contrasted the rapacious imperialism which some of the *nations* of Europe were cultivating with the idea of perfection preached by Buddha and Christ, with the great heritages of culture and good neighbourliness that went [in]to the making of Asiatic and other civilizations. I felt it to be my duty to warn the land of *bushido*… that this phase of scientific savagery which victimized western humanity and led their helpless masses to a moral cannibalism was never to be imitated by a virile people who entered upon a glorious renascence and had every promise of a creative future before them. The doctrine of "Asia for "Asia" which you enunciate in your letter, as an instrument of political blackmail, has all the virtues of the lesser Europe which I repudiate and nothing of the larger humanity that makes us one across the barriers of political labels and divisions.[126]

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[125] Tagore (1917 [1916]), p. 102.

[126] Tagore (2014 [1935]), pp. 315-316. Emphasis in original.

His notion of pan-Asian solidarity was as a notion of self-strengthening, in order to converse on an equal footing with industrialized Europe: "before we are in a position to face other world cultures, or cooperate with them, we must build up our own by the synthesis of the diverse elements that have come to India."[127] Ultimately, though, straightforward refusal to interact with the West would be doomed. He wrote to a friend that Gandhi's struggle to do just that was "spiritual suicide."[128]

But this a was a learning process which had to go both ways. "We must find our voice to be able to say to the West: "You may force your things into our homes, you may obstruct our prospects of life—but we *judge* you!"[129] One way he did so was by refusing knighthood in the aftermath of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre.

In a letter to Kalidas Nag, responding to the latter's question about Hindu-Muslim relations, Tagore chides traditional boundary-making and exclusivity, reserving most of his ire for the walls and barriers raised by Hindus against welcoming Muslims into their communities.[130] He sees these barriers as having been built up in the minds of people, requiring removal, which can be done through education and spiritual practice: "[w]e have to understand that the wing is bigger than the cage."[131] But, ever cautious, he notes that the time has to be right.

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[127] Quoted in Rao, (2010), p. 125.

[128] Quoted in Mishra (2012), p. 237.

[129] Quoted in Mishra (2012), p. 238. Emphasis in original.

[130] Tagore (2014 [1922]), pp. 469-471.

[131] Ibid., p. 471.

Rao, following Isaiah Berlin, reads Tagore as espousing a variant of cultural

nationalism

as "a necessary, but necessarily temporary, stage thorough which subaltern cultures

must pass before they could interact on equal terms with other cultures on the world

state."[132]

Tagore provides us with a good example of the idea that it was not simply that

respondents could not articulate responses outside of the nationalist framework.

However, it was the political structures erected in the period of colonial rule which

privileged responses that could be institutionally formalized.

3.4 Summing Up

From the presentation of the above list of writers and activists, we see an

implicit, if not explicit geopolitics bound up in the anti-colonial struggle. Pan-Islamism

and its hampered, post-Khilafat vestiges pointing to natural alliances with Muslim

states, sometimes in combination with a broader-based anti-imperial coalition,

extending to pan-Asianism. With Gandhi and Tagore we see attempts to build solidarity

throughout Asia, differing on essence and the meaning of tradition. Radhakrishnan

moves in the direction of essentializing and reifying differences between East and West,

and in so doing, manages to establish an exchangeable synonymy between India and

Hindu, although, in his *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy* he seeks to moderate this with

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[132] Rao (2010), p. 126; Berlin (1997).

the inclusion of "heterodox" schools (Carvaka, Jainism, and Buddhism).[133] We see the

essentialization taken further with the Greater India Society, proposing Hindu culture as

a purposive agent of colonization, albeit in a distinctly "Eastern" fashion, bestowing its

culture on other, lesser, civilizations. Again, we see an identification of Indian culture

with Hinduism, and Indian Buddhism here, to the exclusion of Islam. This is taken to the

level of India for Hindus, with Savarkar, who sees the subcontinent as the civilizational

space of Hinduism. Savarkar points to the divided territorial loyalties of Muslims, whose

civilizational space lies to the West. This is taken to potentially genocidal extremes with

the musings of Golwalkar on the program taken up by Hitler against the Jews as a way to

purify the nation, rooted in the same language of India for Hindus.

In Susanne Rudolph's treatment of Indian civilization, she breaks the concept

down into four varieties: 1) Orientalists, in which are placed William Jones, the Asiatic

Society of Bengal, and the British romantics, 2) Anglicists, in which she places Thomas

Babington Macaulay and James Mill, who stress assimilation to English ways; 3) from the

mid-nineteenth century on, Indians vocalizing a liberal nationalist inclusionary self, in

which she places Vivekananda, Nehru, and Amartya Sen, who emphasize the great past

heroes, like Ashoka and Akbar; and 4) Hindu nationalism primarily singling out

Golwalkar, but also Ram Madhav—national spokesperson for the RSS from 2003 to 2014

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[133] Radhakrishnan and Moore (1957).

and National General Secretary for the BJP from 2014—in his restatement of

Huntington's manifesto for white American nationhood, *Who Are We?*.[134]

The past two chapters have been an attempt to complicate that a bit,

demonstrating how colonial ethnologies were developed, how they enumerated and

catalogued different groups, writing language and history onto race and ethnicity, which

was then territorialized.[135] This territorialization of ethnicity mediated between past and

present, current locations of people and their ethnic "origins." This then created the

space for contestation between different anti-colonialist groupings as they attempted to

reclaim and rework these histories and Indian territory.

As the international order in the aftermath of World War I was thoroughly

infused with racial-cum-civilizational understandings of identity, liberal imperial states

made stipulations of unitary nationhood requisite. Disappointments on the international

stage during the Paris Peace Conference 1919 amplified the need to develop a

nationalist identity. Thus, the 1920s through the 1940s saw the attempt to create pan-

South Asian Hindu, pan-South Asian Muslim, and pan-Indian identities in order to press

claims for independence. These pan-South Asian identities often extended beyond

national boundaries and carried with them implicit civilizational geographies. This can

be seen in calls by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohandas Gandhi, and Rabindranath Tagore

to extend affiliative ties to various other "Easterners," with whom Indians were lumped

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[134] Rudolph (2010).

[135] The equation of liberal and tolerant nationalism will also come under scrutiny in the following chapter, with respect to India's policies towards Kashmir.

together with through imperial orientalism and the development of the racial-

civilizational notion of the West.

However, as noted by Cemil Aydin, "this strategy of contesting inferiority by

upholding a narrative of Islamic civilization only reinforced the European racial discourse

in which Muslims were united—and divided from others—by their religion and

heritage."[136] In giving ground to the discursive terrain of civilizational approaches, over

time, essentializations become no longer strategic, but entrenched. Common to the

Indian nationalist, Pakistani nationalist, pan-Asianist, and Hindu supremacist

conceptualization of a future nation here is that they all subsume Kashmir within their

fold: Pakistani approaches because Kashmir is majority-Muslim, Indian nationalist

approaches because it is part of British India, Hindu nationalist and supremacist

approaches because the land was at one time populated primarily by Hindus. In

differing ways, these approaches all draw on and extend both orientalist ethnologies in

trying to claim Kashmir as part of their common civilizational space.

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[136] Aydin (2017), pp. 8-9.

Chapter 4: Kashmir in Post-Colonial India's Geographical Imagination

4.0 Introduction

In the aftermath of partition, Jammu and Kashmir became a disputed issue between India and Pakistan, taken up by the United Nations from January 1, 1948. The agreement that was reached between Sheikh Abdullah and Indian Prime Minister Nehru was a linkage of Jammu and Kashmir to India on terms similar to those which existed between the Princely State and the British Raj, in which internal autonomy would reside with the state while foreign affairs, defense, and communications would be reserved for India. This agreement was formalized with Article 370 of the Indian Constitution—which would take effect on January 26, 1950. However, the Indian state gradually whittled away the autonomy reserved to Jammu and Kashmir from the time of the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah by the center in August 1953. The final blow was the evisceration of the article by the Modi government in August 2019.

Two dominant narratives which have emerged with respect to Kashmir generally. The first takes the form of a paternalistic liberalism, associated with the Congress party. This emphasizes the need to make Kashmir safe for democracy and secularism, with the implication that Kashmiris themselves cannot be trusted to enact responsible democratic, secular, tolerant Indian principles. This can be analogized to imperial liberal justifications. The other narrative, which has existed since before partition, but has risen sharply since the 1980s, associated with the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is the Hindu civilizational argument, stressing Kashmir as an originally Hindu land. The BJP narrative stresses Hindu claims on territory, and specifically highlights the suffering of

Kashmiri Pandits, the overwhelming majority of whom have been displaced since 1990,

to the neglect of the Kashmiri Muslim population, who are generally labeled as

secessionists, anti-nationalists, or terrorists. The BJP has maintained the position of its

earlier incarnation as the Jana Sangh, calling for the removal of Article 370. In between

these two narratives, and overlapping with them, is what could be called "neo-

Gandhian" nationalism. Its propoponents similarly stress unitary nationhood, but harps

on authentic Indian expressions of nationhood, albeit in a manner not quite as

exclusionary as the Hindu nationalists.[1]

Both the BJP and Congress operate within the discourse of Indian nationalism in

decrying what they see as separatism. Both major narratives have unique renderings of

what is considered appropriate Kashmiri identity, or "*Kashmiriyat*," which is folded into

a broader conception of Indian nationalism. For the Congress, *Kashmiriyat* is seen as the

authentic expression of unique cultural beliefs and patterns of Kashmiris and is wholly

consistent with the notion of a multicultural Indian nation. For the BJP, *Kashmiriyat* is

similarly expressed, but is largely undergirded by consonant Hindu themes like tolerance

and peacefulness. For both, resistance against Indian national policies is seen as an

abnegation of *Kashmiriyat*, as scripted by the respective national parties. *Kashmiriyat*

here is defined by the Indian center, and any Kashmiri resistance is rendered, from the

incipience of its enunciation, as inauthentic.

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[1] See Kinnvall (2007).

The discourse of nationalism within which both the Congress and BJP operate is indicative of a response to the international system that India found itself thrown into upon independence. In a system which had stressed nationality and territoriality, the contested and incomplete identity of the Indian state prompted a situation of postcolonial insecurity, manifested as territorial anxiety. As Sanjay Chaturvedi notes, the "cartographic anxiety of the Indian state is at its best—or perhaps at its worst—in Jammu and Kashmir."[2]

This chapter traces Indian actions towards Kashmir, and Kashmiri responses against those actions, since 1947 with respect to these Indian—liberal and narrowly Hindu—nationalist discourses of civilization and territoriality. The utilization and deployment of these discourses, which frame policy proposals and actions, demonstrate the replication of colonial discourses in the postcolonial era, most clearly with respect to the capacity for self-government, but also with respect to the ways in which territoriality became inextricably linked to security.[3]

This also points to the ways in which modern state-building has historically been linked to empire-building; and to the precarious temporal positioning in which postcolonial states find themselves.[4] As Krishna points out, they are post-colonies yet

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[2] Chaturvedi (2000), p. 219. "Cartographic anxiety" is a phrase coined by Sankaran Krishan (1994a), and a play upon Richard Bernstein's "Cartesian anxiety," referring to the sense of selfhood rooted in territorial representational practices.

[3] See Samaddar (2005).

[4] Armitage (2004) points to how British state-building and empire-building were "continuous with one another in their origins as in their outcomes," p. 60.

pre-nations, which can be seen "in the discursive production of India as a bounded sovereign entity and the deployment of this in everyday politics and in the country's violent borders."[5] Then, the route to modern nationhood requires the complete colonization of the self, however, "to decolonize the self may mean de-nationalizing the narratives that embody space and time."[6]

The issue was further complicated by the strictures of the international system and the ways in which India, as a post-colony, understood that system. By and large, it was conceived of as: "riven with hierarchy, populated by powerful others who until recently had colonized, pillaged, and impoverished the self and yet who, through their superior science and rationality, would remain the wellspring of Indian regeneration."[7] For Krishna, this drove Nehru's understanding of state-building in India, which appropriated that outside hierarchy within, and infused it with the key tools of development, modernization, science, and rationality, yet in such a way that it would not be charged with "slavish imitation."[8]

Further emphasizing the continuities between the colonial past and the postcolonial present, Itty Abraham highlights how the "practices of postcolonial

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[5] Krishna (1994a), p. 508.

[6] Krishna (1996), p. 209.

[7] Krishna (1994b), p. 193.

[8] Ibid., p. 197.

geopolitics turn out to be wholly consistent with imperial strategies of defending and extending colonial Indian territorial boundaries."[9]

As noted in the previous chapter, difficulties in meeting, and even discerning, the requirements necessary for self-determination in the aftermath of World War I pressed anti-colonial actors in the direction of articulating ideas of national unity. Responding against the colonialist claims that India's pluralism was irreducible, actors came to foreground territorial control and the continuity of Indian territoriality, in some Hindu nationalist incarnations going so far as to attribute sanctity to the subcontinent. Abraham points to the condition of territorial control as being the wedge through which claims to national selfhood could be articulated in the aftermath of World War II, an international context in which he views territory as the definitive condition of new nation-states:[10] "[t]o accommodate Indian diversity, national self-determination had to mean the freedom of the Indian *state*, which could only be defined in territorial terms."[11] Further, wherever possible, "national borders would be inscribed over existing imperial boundaries to reduce the likely disorder of the transition from empire to nation-state."[12]

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[9] Abraham (2014), p. 16.

[10] Abraham (2014), pp. 46-47.

[11] Ibid., p. 61. Emphasis in original.

[12] Ibid., p. 51.

It is this combination of territoriality and civilizationalism, enunciated through

Indian nationalism, that this dissertation claims, pointing to discursive archaeologies of

colonialism in the preceding chapters, represents the condition of postcolonial

colonialism over Kashmir.

4.1 The Idea(s) of Nehru[13]

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) is represented rather enigmatically in the

scholarship about him. His reputation has waxed and waned with different

constituencies at different moments in recent decades, taking a decidedly downward

turn with the Indian right-wing since the 1980s.[14] Analysts looking at his foreign policy

have variously praised his commitment to nonalignment as shrewd realism given the

exigencies of an emerging bipolar world order;[15] or path-breaking idealism,

transcending the colonial and institutional statist strictures of the international

system.[16] Those more of the hawkish or *realpolitik* persuasion have denounced the

same idealism for its naïveté, pointing to the Sino-Indian War of 1962 as the culmination

of his wrong-headed policies.[17] Further, there are those who see him as guided by an

idealist orientation, but tempered by an acute realization of possibilities the

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[13] The title of this subheading is a play on the largely Nehruvian *The Idea of India* by Khilnani (1998).

[14] Guha (2005).

[15] Subrahmanyam (1976).

[16] Chacko (2012).

[17] Pant (2009); Kapur (2006).

international system offered at a given moment.[18] Here, we will be looking at the major images and ideas on which Nehru drew in order to show how his heavy-handed policies with respect to the Indian state can be reconciled with a broader internationalist commitment to decolonization and nonalignment.

India's relation to Kashmir in the aftermath of partition and the first Indo-Pakistani War represents paradoxes and something of a Janus-faced approach, looking simultaneously backward at the colonial past and forward to the postcolonial future. The foreign policies of the Nehru period are seen as making a strong statement and defense of the Third World, the nonaligned movement, and decolonization; yet his policies closer to home, with respect to neighboring Pakistan or potentially secessionist movements show a deep-seated anxiety, as did his excitability regarding the use of force to quell regional dissidence within India.

This is seen in the forceful occupation and annexation of the princely state of Junagadh in November 1947; the horrific brutality of the annexation of the state of Hyderabad in September 1948, which witnessed tens of thousands killed; and the annexation of Portuguese Goa in 1961, and recognition of the annexation of Portuguese Dadra and Nagar Haveli in 1954.[19]

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[18] Krishna (1984) calls him a "pragmatic idealist."

[19] The annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli was done by irregular forces drawn from Bombay State to eject the Portuguese in July and August 1954. The Indian government lent no overt formal support and recognized the annexation as valid but deterred the irregulars from invading Goa. Guha (2008), pp. 177-178.

India's policies towards Kashmir since the ceasefire of the first Indo-Pakistani War were originally premised on a plebiscite and accession. Nehru, himself of Kashmiri descent, strongly conceptualized Kashmir as within the fold of India. Further, the fact that Kashmir was a majority-Muslim state helped lend credence to his espousal of secularism, and his idea for a multicultural Indian nation. This also provided the added benefit of being a direct refutation of the two-nation theory on which Pakistan was founded, for if a majority-Muslim area could be included into the Indian state, this showed that Indian Muslims did not have divided loyalties and could be adequately represented within a majority Hindu India.

As Nehru's policies here can be seen as contradictions, they can also be reconciled within an imaginative geography of Indian unity, whose maintenance was of the utmost importance. Nehru's vision of India, which emphasized its internal diversity and multicultural heritage, had to be balanced with a unifying element, something tying them all together and making them distinctively "Indian," which could be any of a variety of different languages, regional traditions, or religions. This unificatory element, however, was territory: a territory inherited from, and largely crafted by, the British. However, this lineage needed to be disavowed to have any claim to authenticity.[20] For, in fact, the British, from James Mill through John Seeley, John Strachey, and Winston Churchill as shown in the previous chapters, had all used this very same theme of plurality in order to justify British imperial rule over India. One way in which he tries to

[20] Krishna (1999), pp. 6-7.

do this in his *Discovery of India* is by retelling a history of India's parts, and highlighting

their common underlying threads. He notes how "[i]t is fascinating to find how" the

various different regional peoples throughout India

> have retained their peculiar characteristics for hundreds of years, have still more
>
> or less the same virtues and failings of which old tradition or record tells us, and
>
> yet have been throughout these ages distinctively Indian, with the same national
>
> heritage and the same set of moral and mental qualities… Some kind of dream of
>
> unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. That unity
>
> was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a standardization of
>
> externals or even of beliefs. It was something deeper and within its fold, the
>
> widest tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety
>
> acknowledged and even encouraged.[21]

Here Nehru is juggling both diversity and unity, with a thoroughgoing civilizational

perspective providing the underlying substrate. When looking to the "breadth of Central

Asia" in the customs of the Northwest Frontier Province and Kashmir, to counterpose its

range and distance from that of the Tamils, he loops back around to bring it back to

unity: "[y]et, with all these differences, there is no mistaking the impress of India on the

Pathan, as this is obvious on the Tamil."[22]

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[21] Nehru (1985 [1946]), pp. 61-62.

[22] Ibid., p. 61.

In Nehru's recapitulation of Indian history, he points to how India's (male) heroes similarly come from a variety of walks of life. In his *Discovery of India*, he retells a story of Indian history, and looks to Ashoka, Kabir, Guru Nanak, Amir Khusrow, Akbar, and Gandhi.[23] Nehru's vision of the multicultural Indian society weaves together religious, cultural, and historical diversity into its territorial continuity. He makes an entry into this discussion of unifying heterogeneity with a description of India's geographical boundaries.[24] This claim to unity-in-diversity, however, belied an anxious tension, and hypersensitivity, regarding any assertions of autonomy.[25]

With this starting point of a territorial naturalization of India, Nehru then invokes geopolitical tropes about the vulnerability of the "porous" northwestern plains, and the numerous invasions which came into this unitary area designated "India" from that direction.[26] This, again, points to his development of the earlier colonial geopolitical tropes on India's northwestern vulnerability. A key means of resisting this vulnerability, for Nehru, would be internal cohesion. For Nehru, the strength of a united India resided in intellectual fertility and progress rooted in scientific achievement and reasoning, rather than superstition and tradition.[27]

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[23] Nehru (1985 [1946]).

[24] Ibid., pp. 49-51. Chaturvedi (2000), pp. 212-213.

[25] Krishna (1999), p. 16.

[26] Which, of course, says nothing about the maritime European invasion, the beginning of British land acquisition from the east (Bengal), or the empires of the past which had territorial expansion begin from Bengal or elsewhere.

[27] Thakur (2011), pp. 9-10.

K. M. Panikkar (1894-1963), who was a central and trusted figure in Nehru's inner coterie of advisers, maintained a similar position with respect to northwestern vulnerability and geopolitical discourse. This was despite the fact that in his earlier 1945 *India and the Indian Ocean*, he placed more stress on maritime security factors. His 1953 *Asia and Western Dominance* importantly marks a moment of decentering Europe from global affairs but reverts to the established geopolitical axioms about territoriality and the vulnerability of the northwest. In his 1955 *Geographical Factors in Indian History*, Panikkar, in a similar move to Nehru's, points to the necessity of the internal cohesion of a polity as its source of strength against external invasions, recommending political centralization.[28]

Nehru maintained an ambivalent position with the West. On the one hand, he was keen to stake out a position of independence, or nonalignment, a policy he spearheaded along with another key member of his inner coterie of advisers, V. K. Krishna Menon (1898-1974).[29] Krishna Menon conceived of non-alignment as an

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[28] Panikkar (1945; 1953; 1969 [1955]); Nehru (1985 [1946]), p. 222. After graduating from Oxford and being called to the bar, Panikkar returned to India, serving as adviser to a number of princes throughout India, including in Jammu and Kashmir in 1928, in Bikaner, and in Patiala. In independent India, he was a member of India's delegation to the UN in 1947, Ambassador to China from 1948 to 1952, Ambassador to Egypt from 1952 to 1954, and Ambassador to France from 1956 to 1959.

[29] V. K. Krishna Menon was an intriguing character with an apparently unbearable personality to all but Nehru and was a continual thorn in the side of Western diplomats during the early Cold War. The Western press and diplomats—mostly British and American—dubbed him with a number of soubriquets, including "Nehru's evil genius," "the Hindu Vishinsky," "Rasputin," "the devil incarnate," a "snake-charmer," and, my personal favorite, "Mephistopheles in a Saville Row suit." His portrait graced the cover of *Time Magazine* on February 2, 1962, depicted with a nefarious, glaring stare out of the lower-right corner of his eyes against a backdrop of a hand playing a flute and a dancing hooded cobra.

He earned a Bachelor's degree at Presidency College, Madras in 1918—where he linked up with Annie Besant and the Theosophists—an M.A. at University College, London in 1930, and an M.Sc. in political science in 1934, studying there under Harold Laski, who later called him the best student he had

explicitly anti-colonial foreign policy, primarily aimed at the Western bloc during the

Cold War, that would allow India leverage in the international system, as well as

pursuing the aims of decolonization and Third World unity.[30] On the other hand, Nehru

sees modernization in the form of science and rationalism as redemptive. Aware of the

associations between science and Westernization but departing from Gandhi—another

major influence on Nehru's ethical thought—who saw the two as inextricably tied

together, Nehru believed that there is a universalistic core to Western reason, which can

be extracted and then abstracted away from its Western attributes.[31]

In his treatment of Western geopolitical thought—in the subsection of *Discovery*

of India labelled "Realism and geopolitics, world domination or world association: the

USA and the USSR"—he distances himself from the theories Mackinder and Spykman,

which he sees as throwbacks to "the old game of power politics on a gigantic scale."[32]

He quotes a line from Spykman, which he reads as a policy suggestion rather than

analysis:

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ever taught. He was in England from 1924, joining the Labour Party, particularly its more radical left wing, and circulating Congress party literature. After independence, he served as Indian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1947 to 1952, Ambassador to the United Nations from 1952 to 1962—during which time he delivered an eight-hour apologia on the Indian position in Kashmir in 1957, complete with fainting spells à la *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*—and Indian Defense Minister from 1957 to 1962. After the Sino-Indian War of 1962, he was lambasted by the Indian press and opposition politicians for having a too-optimistic assessment of the Chinese policy towards India and resigned his Cabinet post. He stayed in the Lok Sabha until 1967, then resigned from the Congress party in opposition to Indira Gandhi. He returned to the Lok Sabha as an independent, serving from 1969 to 1974. See Hall (2015) and Brecher (1968).

[30] Brecher (1968), pp. 300-312.

[31] Krishna (1999), pp. 11-12.

[32] Nehru (1985 [1946]), p. 538.

the values of justice, fairness, and tolerance… can be used instrumentally as

moral justifications for the power quest but they must be discarded the moment

their application brings weakness. The search for power is not made for the

achievement of moral values: moral values are used to facilitate the attainment

of power.[33]

Nehru sees this as a depraved abnegation of the responsibility of morality in world

politics and links this lust for territorial aggrandizement to Nazi aggression in World War

II.

He then goes on to stake out his own views of world order, one which—as most

of these rhetorical dichotomies go—reaches something of a compromise between the

two positions, but one firmly grounded in morality. The morality to which Nehru

repeatedly returns to is grounded in the *satyagraha* and nonviolence of Gandhi's

approach; in this discussion of realism versus ideals, it is Gandhi who provides this

archetype for idealism.[34] It is this Gandhian morality that Priya Chacko emphasizes in

her *Indian Foreign Policy*, and she sees nonalignment, the Bandung Conference of 1955,

and the Panchsheel agreement with China in 1954 as the central mechanisms for

concretizing this morality in an international setting engulfed in power politics.[35]

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[33] Ibid. The line is quoted from Spykman's *America's Strategy in World Politics*.

[34] *Satyagraha* as deployed by Gandhi links means and ends, in a manner akin to deontological ethics, but rooted in a dharmic framework. Nehru might not have bought into the entirely of the idea of a dharmic order, but nonetheless appreciated a power in *satyagraha* beyond mere instrumentality.

[35] Chacko (2012).

Krishna, however, argues for seeing Nehru as a tragic figure, "a man forced by the inexorable logic of statecraft to separate his personal convictions from the enterprise of building India."[36]

Abraham, Chaturvedi, Krishna, and Thakur all point to the colonial legacies of Nehru's geopolitical thinking and his inability to fully get beyond it, despite supplementing it with elements of moralism.[37] His conception of a unificatory Indian civilization, forged in an atmosphere of necessity and resistance to colonial rule, was similarly rooted in earlier orientalist essentializations.[38] In his construction of nationhood, as mentioned above, he takes pains to construct it as capacious, inviting, and inclusive. Nevertheless, at certain points he fails to offer a more sincere appreciation of Muslim contributions to Indian society, owing to his understanding of the major structures of Indian society having already been erected prior to Muslim arrival. This amounts to something akin to a rehearsal of standard orientalist histories of

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[36] Krishna (1999), p. 15.

[37] Abraham (2014): "[i]n general, however, Nehru's approach to Asia was shaped by imprint of colonial geopolitical thinking… the strong desire to resist efforts by European powers to recover their colonial possessions lost during the war, and what might be called a sense of diplomatic noblesse oblige, that a large state like India bore no small responsibility in assisting the less fortunate people of the region," p. 89; Thakur (2014): "the postcolonial state also inherited boundaries and spaces around which its foreign policy imagination was structured. In terms of geopolitical thinking, Nehru's writings on geopolitics, how India was the centre of the geopolitical setting of Asia, and how other countries would not attack India— not because of some idealistic concerns but based on strict realpolitik—could be thought of as nothing spectacularly new, but the continuation of a certain way of thinking about foreign policy that had origins in colonial space," p. 59; Chaturvedi (2000), "The Indian state has inherited its discourse as well as practices on borders or borderlands from the imperial powers," p. 218.

[38] Per Krishna (1999), Nehru "elides a more political and discomfiting story regarding the origins of India— namely, that its boundaries were determined not so much by the enduring accidents of geography as they were by the ecumene of the British colonial empire in South Asia at the point of decolonization," pp. 6-7.

India. In fact, in Nehru's *Discovery*, he approvingly cites Orientalist and Boden Professor

of Sanskrit at Oxford, Arthur Anthony Macdonnell's (1854-1930) characterization of

India to this effect:

> in spite of successive waves of invasion and conquest by Persians, Greeks,
>
> Scythians, Muhammadans, the national development of the life and literature of
>
> the Indo-Aryan race remained practically unchecked and unmodified from
>
> without down to the era of British occupation. No other branch of the Indo-
>
> European stock has experienced an isolated evolution like this.[39]

Nehru does, however, take a step back to interrogate the general periodization

orientalist historians have given to India, as "Ancient or Hindu, Moslem, and the British

period," but this undermining is done in such a way as to maintain the general

supposition of an underlying continuity, a reinstatement of what Inden calls the

"sponge" metaphor of Indian civilization.[40] Nehru continues, saying this description is

inadequate because

> [i]t deals more with the superficial changes at the top than with the essential
>
> changes in the political, economic, and cultural development of the Indian
>
> people. The so-called ancient period is vast and full of change, of growth and
>
> decay, and then growth again. What is called the Moslem or medieval period

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[39] Nehru (1985 [1946]), p. 88. Inden (2000 [1990]) also points this out, p. 55.

[40] Nehru (1985 [1946], p. 237. Inden (2000 [1990]) quotes Cambridge historian of India, Percival Spear (1901-1982): "Hinduism has been likened to a vast sponge, which absorbs all that enters it without ceasing to be itself," it assimilates and absorbs, "the water becomes part of the sponge. Like a sponge it has no very clear outline on its borders and no apparent core at its center," p. 85.

brought another change and an important one, and yet it was more or less

confined to the top and did not vitally affect the essential continuity of Indian

life. The invaders who came to India from the north-west, like so many of their

predecessors in more ancient times, became absorbed into India and part of her

life. Their dynasties became Indian dynasties and there was a great deal of racial

fusion by intermarriage. A deliberate effort was made, apart from a few

exceptions, not to interfere with the ways and customs of the people. They

looked to India as their home country and had no other affiliations. India

continued to be an independent country.[41]

Here, Nehru is simultaneously reinstantiating and reinvigorating the idea of Indian

civilization in a manner that simultaneously downplays the extent to which it was

influenced by Muslim culture yet makes it clear that Muslims are part of this Indian

civilization, simultaneously refuting Jinnah's "two-nation theory" and the Hindutva

ideologues.

One other gripe Nehru has with Muslims is rooted in his vector of modernity,

seeing Muslims as overly dogmatic, litigious, and religiously scrupulous in a manner

inconsistent with modernization. The Muslim figures that he does hold up as exemplary,

Akbar and Kabir, are so because of their syncretism and Indianness. But this

understanding of Muslim rationalism is also rooted in an orientalist reading of Islamic

civilization, which sees the demise of rational inquiry with the fall of Baghdad in 1258:

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[41] Nehru (1985 [1946]), pp. 237-238.

"[g]radually with the decline of Baghdad and the growth of the Turkish power, this spirit of rationalist inquiry lessened";[42] and then pointing to the fourteenth century when

> Central Asia woke up again and Samarkand and Herat became centres for painting and architecture, reviving somewhat the old traditions of Arab-Persian civilization. But there was no revival of Arab rationalism and interest in science. Islam had become a more rigid faith suited more to military conquests rather than the conquests of the mind.[43]

Nevertheless, his foreign policy made a point to reach out to Muslim states in the interests of forging a nonaligned, Third World coalition. In the words of Gandhi, referring to the alliance with the Khilafat movement, this was in order to build "a solid wall of friendship and defence for India."[44] Panikkar, as then-ambassador to Egypt, and Nehru instrumentally used this in order to build their coalition. For them, anti-colonial solidarity would be incomplete without an incorporation of the Muslim world. This also served to undermine the Pakistani foreign policy strategy in the late 1940s and into the 1950s of pan-Islamic solidarity, especially in the aftermath of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Pakistan in May 1954.[45]

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[42] Nehru (1985 [1946]), p. 233. In his *Autobiography* (1962 [1936]), he also laments the dogmatism of Maulana Mohammed Ali, former Khilafat leader and Congress party president, pp. 117-123.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Medha (2016).

[45] Kux (2001); Hashmi (2011).

Nehru's notion of Indian civilization was heavily influenced by Gandhi and Radhakrishnan, however, he saw himself and his mission for India, as thoroughly modern. He diplomatically deployed the notion of civilization, albeit one mediated through the territorial contours drawn by European empires, in the Asian Relations Conference of April 1947.[46] Nehru also diplomatically deployed appeals to Asian civilizational unity later in Bandung.[47]

4.2 The Nehru Years in Kashmir (1947-1964)

As mentioned above, the territorial anxiety of postcolonial insecurity was perhaps at its most evident in Jammu and Kashmir. To repurpose a quote from Heidegger via Bhabha, "the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing."[48] The ceasefire line established in January 1949 left Pakistan with control of Gilgit and Baltistan—which saw a local uprising by the Gilgit Scouts after they received word of the maharaja's accession to India, claiming accession instead to Pakistan, and extending their area of control to Baltistan. India was left in control of Ladakh. The ceasefire line went through the Jammu region and the Kashmir region, leaving India with most of these erstwhile territories.

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[46] Abraham (2014), pp. 68-70. Abraham (2008).

[47] Abraham (2014) emphasizes Nehru's tempered idealism, against those who charge Nehru with having too-optimistic assessment of Chinese amicability: "Nehru appeared confident that Asian civilizational solidarity existed, as he would propose during the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 and repeat at Bandung, eight years later. But when it came to policy making, he would think like a realist statesman," p. 129.

[48] From Heidegger's "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," quoted in Bhabha (1994), p. 1.

Nehru, after accepting the Instrument of Accession from Maharaja Hari Singh, and after consulting with former Viceroy Mountbatten, stated that the accession would ultimately be confirmed by a plebiscite, in accordance with democratic principles. Nehru then lodged his complaint to the United Nations on December 31, 1947. The UN Security Council issued a series of resolutions from January to June of 1948, namely UN Security Council Resolutions 38 (January 17), 39 (January 20), 47 (April 21), and 51 (June 3), the cumulative effects of which called for the demilitarization of Kashmir and established a fact-finding mission, the UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The Commission, which was originally led by Josef Korbel, who was replaced in the aftermath of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's takeover of Czechoslovak government in 1948, issued its resolution in August of 1948, which called for a "free and impartial plebiscite," pursuant to a ceasefire.[49] The ceasefire between India and Pakistan was implemented on January 1, 1949. Another UN Security Council Resolution, 80, was passed on March 14, 1950, calling for "simultaneous and progressive demilitarization" and for a plebiscite to follow—the earlier UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948, called on Pakistan to first secure its withdrawal, to be followed by that of India.

At the end of September 1947, Nehru prevailed upon Maharaja Hari Singh to release Sheikh Abdullah from imprisonment, where he had been for the previous

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[49] Korbel (1954), p. 151.

sixteen months.[50] As leader of the National Conference party, Sheikh Abdullah initially agreed with the accession to India, but with the maintenance of autonomy which was granted in October 1949 and enshrined in the Constitution of India as Article 370, which became effective with the Constitution on January 26, 1950.

Per UN Security Council Resolution 80, Australian High Justice (and later Chief Justice) Sir Owen Dixon (1886-1972) was positioned as the UN Representative for India and Pakistan. He was unable to secure a mutual agreement on the procedure for and extent of demilitarization between India and Kashmir. A proposal that Dixon put forth a was a "partition-cum-plebiscite" that would hold separate plebiscites for different regions in Jammu and Kashmir, rather than holding a single plebiscite for the entire region. The "Dixon Plan" was rejected with qualification by Pakistan and rejected wholesale by India. Dixon's report led to a further UN Security Council Resolution, 91, on March 30, 1951, which appointed former United States Senator Frank Graham (1886-1972) as lead of the UNCIP, who worked to bring United States Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz (1885-1966) in for the administration of the plebiscite, pending agreement on demilitarization.[51] Graham forwarded his proposals for demilitarization to India and Pakistan, which met with Pakistan's reluctant approval and India's rejection in 1951.[52]

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[50] Bose (2003), p. 34.

[51] The UNCIP had proposed Nimitz as plebiscite administrator in 1949, over the opposition by India. Graham was former president of the University of North Carolina (from 1930 to 1949) and a governor-appointed Senator from North Carolina from 1949 to 1950.

[52] Korbel (1954), pp. 177-191.

Another UN Security Council resolution was passed, number 96, on November 10, 1951, to no avail, followed by UN Security Council Resolution 98 on December 23, 1952, calling for immediate demilitarization—again, to no avail. India mounted strong objections to the extent of demilitarization, pushing Graham to modify the number of armed forces for India in February 1953, which Pakistan forthrightly rejected while India still found Graham's modificaitons unreasonable.[53]

Korbel avers that Nehru's position throughout the UN negotiations was that Kashmir was Indian territory, per the Instrument of Accession and now through the support of Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference party and wanted Pakistan to be called out for being the aggressor in Kashmir.[54] In May 1954 the United States concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan, and later in September, Pakistan joined the United States-led Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the following year joined the United Kingdom-led Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) or Baghdad Pact. This brought Cold War politics into the Kashmir dispute, which, effectively rendered any proposed resolutions dead-on-arrival.[55] Soviet

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] That is, with the exceptions of UN Security Council resolutions 122 (January 14, 1957), 123 (February 21, 1957), and 126 (December 2, 1957) where the Soviet Union abstained from voting. This was due to India's reluctant—after initial hesitation—denunciation of Soviet aggression in Hungary the preceding November.

leader Nikita Khrushchev and premier Nikolai Bulganin visited Kashmir in December

1955 and both voiced their support in considering Kashmir to be a part of India.[56]

As Sumantra Bose notes,

[t]hat the plebiscite was never held is regarded by Pakistanis, and by pro-

Pakistan as well as pro-independence people in J&K, as proof of Indian perfidy.

The typical Indian rejoinder is that since Pakistani forces never vacated the areas

of J&K under their control, the first condition specified by the United Nations for

holding the plebiscite was not fulfilled, and the blame lies with Pakistan.[57]

Importantly, both India and Pakistan, as well as the United Nations, had firmly

entrenched the idea of Kashmir as only possibly joining India or Pakistan. Any possibility

of Kashmiri independence was ruled out in advance. In this context, self-determination

increasingly, and then solely, came to mean accession to either one of these two

countries. The possibility of independence for Indian-administered Kashmir, however,

raised alarms for the state of India, which responded with anxious haste.

During this time in Jammu and Kashmir, there was an interim government set

up, ruled over by the maharaja and the Sheikh Abdullah-led National Conference. As an

emergency administration was set up, Sheikh Abdullah and a few ranking members of

the National Conference were ruling the state of Jammu and Kashmir alongside the

maharaja. During the Indo-Pakistan War after partition, Sheikh Abdullah claims that the

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[56] Bose (2003), p. 71.

[57] Bose (2003), p. 40.

Maharaja Hari Singh and his erstwhile diwan Mehr Chand Mahajan (1889-1967) were

providing RSS members in Jammu with arms.[58] Prem Nath Bazaz (1905-1984), erstwhile

ally of Sheikh Abdullah during the revolt against the maharaja, similarly charged Sheikh's

period of rule with harsh crackdowns on any pro-Pakistani elements.[59]

Nehru, his Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-1950), and Abdullah forced

Maharaja Hari Singh to abdicate, "for reasons of health," on June 20, 1949, and he was

succeeded by his eighteen-year-old son, Karan Singh (b. 1931).[60] In October 1950, the

General Council of the National Conference passed a resolution calling for elections to a

Constituent Assembly the following year. The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and

Kashmir convened for the first time on October 31, 1951, the National Conference party

winning all 75 out of 75 seats, with 13 candidates from the Jammu Praja Parishad party

having their applications rejected.[61]

The make-up of the state was different after the war due to the ceasefire line,

pogroms, massive displacement, and refugee populations—which did not technically

count as refugees per the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as they

had neither Indian nor Pakistani political citizenship before their displacement, so were

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[58] Abdullah (2013 [1986]), p. 321.

[59] Bazaz (2005 [1966]), specifically citing the "Preventive Detention Act and Defence of India Rules," p. 64

[60] Singh (1982), pp. 100-102.

[61] Navlakha (1991), pp. 2957-2958.

not technically deprived of their citizenship.[62] In the aftermath of the war, the demographic shift resulted in Jammu having a definitive Hindu majority.

A major enactment that the National Conference was able to put into effect during this time was the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act and Distressed Debtors' Relief Act of 1950. The former Act had the effect of redistributing land on a massive scale. Despite some problems with how it was implemented, it succeeded in deeply restructuring Jammu and Kashmir socioeconomically. Because of this, the Act, which was seen to benefit poorer Kashmiri Muslims to the detriment of landed Kashmiri Pandits and Hindus in Jammu, it was decried as unduly favoring Muslims.[63] This led to the beginnings of an agitation launched by the Jammu Praja Parishad, led by two Jammu-based RSS *pracharaks* (ranking officers), Balraj Madhok (1920-2016) and Prem Nath Dogra (1884-1972). The Jammu Praja Parishad developed connections with Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the forerunner of the present-day BJP, which was formed in 1951 and led by Syama Prasad Mukherjee (1901-1953). The previous year, Mukherjee had resigned his Cabinet post of Minister of Commerce and Industry, dissatisfied with Nehru's handling of Kashmir and the special status given to the state. A cornerstone of the Jammu Praja Parishad and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the latter of which would absorb the former in 1963, was the absolute revocation of Article 370 for Jammu and Kashmir and the full integration of the state into the rest of India.

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[62] Robinson (2013), pp. 13-15.

[63] Albeit, in Jammu, largely to the benefit of poorer Hindus.

In June and July 1952, Abdullah held talks with Nehru regarding the status of

Jammu and Kashmir and came away with an agreement on July 24th abolishing the

monarchy and installing as titles *sadr-i-riyasat*, or president, for the head of state—for

which the erstwhile Yuvraj ("heir apparent") Karan Singh would be elected in

November—and *wazir-i-azam*, or prime minister, for the head of government. Further,

specific arrangements were agreed upon for Jammu and Kashmir's autonomous status

within India.[64]

The Praja Parishad launched agitations throughout Jammu in 1952, partially

inflamed by Sheikh Abdullah's denunciation of Hindu nationalism at a speech in

Ranbirsinghpura in the Jammu region in April. Syama Prasad Mukherjee then led a

march into the state, demanding full integration, whereupon he was arrested for not

having a permit, in May 1953. While in confinement, Mukherjee had a heart attack and

died on June 23rd.[65]

At the same time, Sheikh Abdullah was pressing forward with demands for a

plebiscite. In June, a special subcommittee of the National Conference convened and

put together four proposals: 1) a plebiscite with an option for independence for

Kashmir, 2) independence for the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, 3) independence

for the state with India and Pakistan to share joint control over foreign affairs, 4) the

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[64] Bose (2003), pp. 60-61.

[65] Tremblay (1992), pp. 160-161.

implementation of the Dixon Plan with an independence option for the plebiscite area(s).[66] This was made public in early July.

The reaction at the center was flat-out rejection. A coup was engineered, which accented cleavages that emerged within the National Conference party against Sheikh Abdullah, and he was deposed and arrested on August 9, 1953.[67] Sheikh Abdullah would spend most of the next twenty-two years imprisoned, save for a few brief spells out of confinement. As prime minister, he was replaced by the Home Minister in his Cabinet, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed (1907-1972).

During Bakshi's tenure, from August 1953 to October 1963, Jammu and Kashmir symbolically, legally, and economically became more closely enmeshed in India. Korbel notes how in December of 1953 a large government loan was granted to the state.[68] On February 3, 1954 the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir passed a resolution ratifying the accession of the state to India. In May of 1954 the Constitution of India (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954 was passed, declaring all people of Jammu and Kashmir to be citizens of India. On November 17, 1956 the Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, declaring that

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[66] Tremblay (1992), pp. 162-164; Behera (2000), pp. 91-99; Abdullah (2013 [1986]), pp. 372-373.

[67] Qasim (1992), pp. 65-67. Syed Mir Qasim, who would later serve as chief minister of Kashmir from 1971 to 1975, was part of the faction of anti-Sheikh National Conference party members during this time and favored the present status of Article 370 and a union with India against Sheikh Abdullah's calls for a plebiscite and possible independence from India. Nevertheless, he notes that the manner in which Sheikh was deposed was not in conformity with the expected protocol, namely, that it was formally done by *sadr-i-riyasat* Karan Singh citing the loss of support within the Cabinet, rather than the Constituent Assembly. Most commentators agree that this was directly instigated by Nehru at the center.

[68] Korbel (1954), p. 248.

"the state of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India."[69]

This phrase would be repeatedly rehearsed by pro-Indian advocates. India's position had

already been moving decisively away from even giving lip-service to the notion of a

plebiscite: Indian Home Minister Govind Ballabh Pant visited Srinagar on July 7, 1955

and declared "Kashmir's accession was a reality which could not be changed because

the people, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, had decided to

remain in India."[70]

The Jammu and Kashmir Constitution of 1956 took effect on January 26, 1957,

the seventh anniversary of India's Constitution Day. Upon promulgation, it also effected

a name change, whereby the erstwhile Constituent Assembly would be rebranded as

the Legislative Assembly, in line with the other states of India. Elections in March 1957

for the Legislative Assembly saw the National Conference party win an improbable 69

seats out of 75, 41 of which were unopposed.[71] One of the less savory inheritances from

Sheikh Abdullah's administration that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed made use of was the

Peace Brigade, which broke up meetings of those gathered for ostensibly anti-state

political purposes.[72] These tactics led to opposition within the National Conference, and

a number of prominent members associated with the left-wing of the party, including

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[69] Quoted in Bose (2003), p. 73.

[70] Quoted in Navlakha (1991), p. 2954.

[71] The Praja Parishad won 5 seats, all from the Jammu region, and a politician representing low-caste Hindus won another seat from Jammu. See Bose (2003), p. 75.

[72] Qasim (1992), pp. 77, 82.

Ghulam Mohammed ("G. M.") Sadiq (1912-1971) and Syed Mir Qasim (1919-2004) peeled off in 1957 to form the Democratic National Conference.[73] The rise of the Plebiscite Front, especially, and the Political Conference in a secondary role, were far more popular anti-establishment organizations than the Democratic National Conference, which was forced to again converge with the National Conference in December 1960.[74]

Against Bakshi's National Conference, a group of four, and later eight, Abdullahites formed an opposition group in the Constituent Assembly in October 1954. In August 1955 they inaugurated the Plebiscite Front, led by Abdullah's confidante, Mirza Afzal Beg (1908-1982) as well as Munshi Ishaq. Four Plebiscite Front presidents were arrested between November 1955 and September 1956.[75] Sheikh Abdullah was briefly released from prison in January 1958, only to be re-arrested under the Kashmir Conspiracy Case on April 29, 1958. The few months were witness to a number of his public speeches and saw a sharp rise in popularity of the Plebiscite Front. In the Kashmir Conspiracy Case, Sheikh Abdullah and his allies were charged with a terrorist plot by Bakshi's government. The charges were later dropped, spurred by Nehru's intervention, in April 1964 and Sheikh was temporarily released from holding again. It was during the

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[73] Bose (2003), p. 77.

[74] Qasim (1992), pp. 84-85, 89-90.

[75] Bose (2003), p. 73.

mid-1960s that the Plebiscite Front perhaps reached the peak of its popularity, but its popularity remained steady up through 1974.

The Political Conference was an opposition group, largely pro-Pakistani in orientation, led by Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra, Pandit Rughonath Vaishnavi (1910-1996), and Pirzada Hafizullah Makhdoomi. It was formed initially in opposition to the National Conference party under Sheikh Abdullah, just a few months before his overthrow in 1953. After the rise of the *moe-i-muqaddas* incident in early 1964 it folded, as it was largely replaced by the Action Committees and the growing popularity of the Plebiscite Front.[76]

February 17th and 18th of 1962 Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections were held. The National Conference party here won 68 seats out of 75. This led to demonstrations held in Jammu city, contesting the results.[77] In October 1963, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed stepped down, reluctantly, as a part of the Congress's Kamaraj Plan. He was replaced by Khwaja Shamsuddin (1922-1999), whose brief tenure witnessed the *moe-i-muqaddas* incident in late December and early January of 1963-1964, in which a relic (a beard hair) believed to belong to the Prophet Muhammad went missing. It mysteriously reappeared eight days later, and its authenticity was later

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[76] Kanjwal (2017), pp. 223-228.

[77] Bose (2003), p.

confirmed by a number of clerics.[78] While this event itself is shrouded in nebulosity, an

important result of it was the mobilization which ensued, including the formation of

Action Committees to investigate the disappearance of the relic, most prominently the

Awami Action Committee led by the Mirwaiz's son and heir, Mohammed Farooq, while

the Mirwaiz himself was in Pakistani Kashmir.

Amidst the widespread uproar, on February 28, 1964 Indian Cabinet minister Lal

Bahadur Shastri went to Jammu and told Khwaja Shamsuddin to step down. He was

replaced as prime minister by G. M. Sadiq, and a new Cabinet was formed with Syed Mir

Qasim, Trilochan Datta, and Durga Prasad ("D. P.") Dhar (1918-1975).[79] Sheikh Abdullah

was again released from imprisonment in April 1964, to massive crowds and popularity,

before being re-imprisoned thirteen months later. One speech he delivered witnessed

him rallying the crowd to resist the imposition of Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian

Constitution in mid-January 1965.[80]

In September of 1964, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed had convinced a number of

his loyalists to move a no-confidence measure against G. M. Sadiq, which ultimately

failed, and led to Sadiq arresting Bakshi under the Defence of India Rules[81]. In December

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[78] Syed Mir Qasim (1992) claims "[t]he theft of the Holy Relic was an act of the conspirators who believed that without generating an anti-Government religious movement they could not achieve their political objectives in Kashmir," p. 93.

[79] Qasim (1992), p. 99. Dhar would later serve in Indira Gandhi's government, being appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1971, and again in 1975.

[80] Bose (2003), p. 80, 83.

[81] Ibid., p. 81.

1964, Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda announced the decision to bring Jammu and

Kashmir under Articles 356 and 357, "which respectively empower the center to dismiss

elected governments of India's states in the event of a breakdown of law and order and

to assume their legislative mandate," whereas this power had previously resided

formally in the hands of the *sadr-i-riyasat*.[82] In January 1965 the working committee

(Sadiq's faction) of the National Conference announced it would dissolve itself and

merge into India's Congress party. In March of that year, the Legislative Assembly of

Jammu and Kashmir moved to replace the post of *sadr-i-riyasat* with "Governor" and

change the title of "Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir" to "Chief Minister," in line

with the other states of the Indian union. Sumantra Bose posits that "[i]t is difficult to

conceive of a more drastic centralizing strategy than what unfolded between December

1964 and March 1965."[83]

Sheikh Abdullah was re-arrested in May 1965 after an international trip, which

involved him making *hajj* in April 1965 and, with Mirza Afzal Beg, meeting Algerian

President Ahmed Ben Bella and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in Algiers, and President

Gamal Abdel Nasser in Cairo.[84] He was accused of attempting to corral international

support for Kashmir against India.

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[82] Ibid., p. 81.

[83] Ibid., p. 82.

[84] Abdullah (2013 [1986]), pp. 509-520.

The major international developments concerning Kashmir that happened in the latter part of Nehru's regime, after the Cold War alliances were forged, included the falling out between China and India, resulting from border disputes in the late 1950s followed by the refuge granted to the Dalai Lama in India in 1959; and then the eventual Sino-Indian War of October and November 1962, which saw China annexing the extremely sparsely populated part of Jammu and Kashmir known as Aksai Chin, and incorporating it into Xinjiang province. The souring of relations between China and India opened up space for discussions between Pakistan and China, which led to the agreement in March 1963 which saw Pakistan cede the Trans-Karakoram Tract, an uninhabited patch of mountains and the Shaksgam Valley.

This period also saw an active remaking of Kashmiri history. Earlier, in the anti-colonial period, Nehru's brother-in-law Ranjit Sitaram Pandit (1893-1944) translated Kalhana's twelfth-century chronicle of Kashmiri kings, the *Rajatarangini* in 1935, focusing on its importance to the tradition of history-writing in the broader Indian context. Earlier Orientalists like Horace Hayman Wilson, who offered a partial translation of it in 1825, pointed to Kalhana's *Rajatarangini* for being an exceptional text of history, for a people, Indians generally, who were for the most part unconcerned with historical development.[85] Pandit attempted to offer his own translation as a means of

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[85] Wilson (1825): "The whole forming a remarkable proof of the attention bestowed by Cashmirian writers upon the history of their country, an attention the more extraordinary, from the contrast it affords, to the total want of historical enquiry in any other part of the extensive countries peopled by the Hindus," p. 3.

assimilating the *Rajatarangini* into an understanding of broad-based Nehruvian

nationalism. In the estimation of Chitralekha Zutshi,

> Asserting the primacy, universality, and continued importance of Sanskrit
>
> through a secular text allowed Pandit to perform the double act of appropriating
>
> this history of a region into the nation's collective literary heritage, thereby
>
> incorporating the region into the nation.[86]

Further evidence of this nationalist appropriation is given by Nehru himself, who wrote

the foreword to this translation, stating:

> Kashmir had been the melting ground of the different cultures of Asia, the
>
> western Graeco-Roman and Iranian and the eastern Mongolian, but essentially it
>
> was part of India and the inheritor of Indo-Aryan traditions.[87]

What is more, on top of the incorporation of a region into the broader Indian nationalist

fold, these projects also mapped onto dominant Eurocentric conceptions, as given

shape through orientalist histories, as to what was considered to constitute proper

historical research, evidenced by the broad elision of other genres of temporal meaning-

making, narrative practice, and story-telling.[88]

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[86] Zutshi (2011).

[87] Quoted in Zutshi (2014), p. 231. For a discussion on how narratives of Kalhana's *Rajatarangini* link to regional or nationalist historiographical appropriations, see Zutshi (2011) and Zutshi (2014), pp. 184-239.

[88] Zutshi (2014) emphasizes the role of *tazkiras* and *tarikhs* in Kashmiri historiography from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries.

The ways in which Kashmiri historiography was written also mapped onto the

dominant politics in Kashmir. Zutshi points to how Prithvi Nath Kaul Bamzai's 1962 *A

History of Kashmir* "was ideologically firmly aligned with the political concerns of the

Indian nation state."[89] For Nehru, this book pointed to the "relative absence of

communal feeling" and "the refusal of the people of Kashmir to accept the so-called two

nation theory" which "had its roots in their long past and the culture they developed."[90]

Zutshi notes how the Jammu and Kashmir government was keenly interested "in

promoting a certain perspective on Kashmir's political and literary history in the 1950s

and 1960s that emphasized Kashmir's syncretistic culture."[91]

> Similarly, Hafsa Kanjwal suggests that this
>
> promotion of *kashmiriyat* by the state government was for two main reasons.
>
> One, the state government had to bring Kashmir in line with the purported
>
> secular ideals of the Government of India and away from the two-nation policy
>
> upheld by the creation of Pakistan. Two, and perhaps more importantly, keeping
>
> in mind the reasons why Kashmiri nationalism adopted a secular framework in
>
> this time, the state government wanted to *preempt* potential discord between
>
> religious communities within the state.[92]

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[89] Zutshi (2014), p. 236. Nehru wrote the foreword to this book as well.

[90] Nehru, quoted in ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Kanjwal (2017), p. 130. Emphasis in original.

A very minor qualification I would make to this statement, citing Toru Tak, would be the absence of the term "*Kashmiriyat*" during this period, even if this is not the case for the conceptual edifice constituting the vocabulary, which sees the assembling of the core characteristics of *Kashmiriyat* from the time of the anticolonial movement in the 1930s through the present, albeit with variations and frequencies on different registers of nationhood, to which Kanjwal very ably points to in the period of Bakshi's rule.[93]

In Jammu and Kashmir during both Sheikh Abdullah's first tenure (1947 to 1953) and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed (1953 to 1963), the construction of Kashmiri nationhood went over and above to display communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir, rewriting history books so as to erase instances of interreligious disharmony. As part of this effort, the new Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir created an Academy of Art, Culture, and Languages in order "to promote the composite culture of Jammu and Kashmir."[94]

Kanjwal notes how these suggestions to promote communal harmony "overlapped with efforts to make Kashmiris "modern," such as promoting activities like sporting competitions, excursions and dramas" which "show the ways in which the quest for modernity was linked to the need for political stability."[95]

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[93] Tak (2013) points to the first political usage of the term *Kashmiriyat* in 1975, directly pertaining to Sheikh Abdullah's post-accord politics.

[94] Zutshi (2014), p. 237.

[95] Kanjwal (2017), p. 133.

Under Sheikh Abdullah, there was more of an emphasis on the history and

heritage of Kashmir over that of India, except to mention the impact of the

Indian freedom movement on that of Kashmir's… This slowly began to change

under Bakshi's government, as more explicit mention was made of India and the

historical ties between India and Kashmir.[96]

Plebiscite Front leader Mirza Afzal Beg noted, in opposition to a prospective textbook,

that it presented Kashmir's history with India as if the former had always relied on the

latter, expressing dismay at the presentation of the Mughals as liberators and the

lugubrious portrayal of local Kashmiri kings.[97]

This shows that while the Indian nationalist project was intent on incorporating

Kashmir into its self-identity, Kashmiri political actors during this time were attempting

to craft understandings of Kashmiri nationhood commensurate with their position on

the relationship between the state and the Indian union, moving along a spectrum from

Kashmir either being a region distinct from, linked to, or part of India.

From this point forward, the common Indian nationalist refrain on Kashmir

became "Kashmir is an integral part of India," a slogan shared by both the Indian

National Congress and, later, the BJP. However, the key distinction between the two

was regarding their positions on Article 370: the Congress party for maintaining its

constitutionality and the state's (eroded) autonomy within India, the BJP seeing the

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid.

integration of Kashmir as incompatible with Article 370, which they have made readily

apparent in their quinquennial twenty-first-century party manifestos. Per Kashmiris in

favor of greater autonomy, the Congress party's commitment to Article 370 has

amounted to little, considering the significant erosion it has endured under that party's

rule.

4.3 1964-1989: Paternalist Secularism

Nehru died on May 27, 1964 and was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri (1904-

1966). In May 1965 Sheikh Abdullah was imprisoned again, after denouncing the

measures taken since 1953, which set off protests in Kashmir. Seeking to capitalize on

the popular discontent in the Valley, Pakistan launched an invasion into India, Operation

Gibraltar, in August, which was ultimately unsuccessful. The United Nations Security

Council unanimously called for a ceasefire on September 27.[98] The peace negotiations

between India and Pakistan were held in Soviet Tashkent in January 1966. The day after

signing the peace agreement, Prime Minister Shastri suffered a heart attack and died.

He was succeeded by Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi (1917-1984). The Tashkent

Agreement saw a small amount of territory swapped between India and Pakistan.

The next year saw simultaneous elections, both to the Legislative Assembly of

Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian Lok Sabha in February 1967, which witnessed

Congress winning 60 out of 75 seats in the former house. G. M. Sadiq would later die in

office in December 1971 and he would be succeeded by Syed Mir Qasim. By this time

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[98] UN Security Council Resolution 214.

there had emerged a resistance group, based in Pakistan-administered Kashmir which

aimed at expelling India from the Indian-administered area of Kashmir. Calling itself at

first the Plebiscite Front, unaffiliated to the other group of the same name, then the

Kashmir National Liberation Front, Alastair Lamb surmises them to have assembled out

of cadres who were previously part of the invasion of India in 1965. This group claimed

responsibility for the hijacking of the "Ganga" Indian Airlines plane on January 30, 1971.

In December 1970, the Plebiscite Front—the group based in Indian-held Jammu

and Kashmir—announced that it would contest the elections to the Indian parliament in

March 1971, and to the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly in June 1972.

However, they were barred from participating and declared an unlawful organization in

January 1971. The 1971 parliamentary elections saw Indira Gandhi emerge from a

schism in the Congress party with a landslide victory, platforming on economic

socialism, secularism, and poor relief.[99] The rhetorical deployment of socialism here

represented less of a commitment to specific policies of economic reform than a signal

of independence from Western-dominated capitalist models of development, per

Krishna: "[t]he linearity of the developmental models and the ignominy of bringing up

its rear were thus mitigated by a (largely rhetorical) commitment to socialism."[100]

The third Indo-Pakistani War broke out in December 1971 over the Indian

intervention to assist the Bangladeshi revolt against Pakistan. Although fighting between

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[99] Guha (2008), p. 440.

[100] Krishna (1999), p. 13.

India and Pakistan in the Kashmir region was minimal, there were far reaching

consequences which resulted from the Simla Agreement, negotiated in July 1972. The

Agreement resulted in a recognition of the Kashmir dispute as a bilateral issue solely

between India and Pakistan, which had the intended effect of excluding international

third parties, but also, by its omission, reflected a general neglect and erasure of any

political agency given to Kashmiris over their future position. A further implication of the

Simla Agreement was that the change in appellation of the "ceasefire line" of 1947 to

the "Line of Control" was taken by India to signify the end of the Kashmir issue and the

formal arrangement of an international border based on the present boundaries, which

differed greatly from the Pakistani understanding of the truce.[101]

A general Indian nationalist reading of the 1971 War was that it spelled the

formal end to the "two-nation theory," with the independence of Bangladesh seen as an

implosion of Pakistan's ability to provide good rule for South Asia's entire Muslim

population.[102]

One way in which Kashmir had been incorporated into the geographical

imagination of India in this period was in the production of a cinema-scape of the Valley,

through a series of Bollywood movies in the 1960s. Ananya Jahanara Kabir denotes this

genre as "love in Kashmir," wherein Kashmir functions as a pulchritudinous backdrop to

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[101] The line is disputed at the Siachen Glacier and the northern extreme of the boundary. The Siachen Glacier witnessed a skirmish between India and Pakistan in April 1984, after which India has claimed control of the glacier. Far more soldiers have died from frostbite, altitude sickness, avalanches, and falling while being stationed there than from combat with the other state's forces.

[102] Behera (2000), pp. 127-128; Varshney (1992), pp. 199-201.

an Indian love affair, reminiscent of the earlier colonial exoticism of the "Happy Valley."[103]

Metropolitan protagonists, both male and female, were shown as travelling to the Valley to play tennis and golf tournaments, on college excursions, or simply to recover from the stress of urban living. In contrast, the Kashmiris they met were depicted in metonymic congruity with the landscape the camera showcased. Placed against the panorama of the Valley's visual splendor, they emerged as representative of a pastoral idyll outside of capitalism and modernity. Being "Kashmiri," signaled particularly through Kashmiri dress, became a signifier of modernity's other; that both needed to be jettisoned and retained as a mirror to the postcolonial nation's emergent sense of self.[104]

One of the most significant inflections points in the relationship between India and Kashmir comes in late 1974 and early 1975, when Sheikh Abdullah, through his representative Mirza Afzal Beg, negotiated an agreement with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, through her representative, Gopalaswami Parthasarathi. The agreement was reached in November 1974 and made public in early February 1975. Navalakha points to the foreclosure of possibilities effected by the 1971 War as a reason for Sheikh Abdullah

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[103] Kabir (2009), pp. 37-45. These films include *Junglee* (1961), *Kashmir Ki Kali* (1964), *Janwar* (1965), *Jab Jab Phool Khile* (1965), and *Bobby* (1973).

[104] Kabir (2018), p. 288.

to come to terms with Gandhi.[105] Kanjwal suggests that it might have been a negotiating tool used in order to secure either greater autonomy or political power for the National Conference party.[106] Sheikh Abdullah noted that in these discussions he "had no quarrel with the centre regarding the accession. My contention was over the extent of the accession."[107] The accord stated the terms of Jammu and Kashmir's relationship to India, foregrounding Article 370—which had been seriously chipped away at since 1953, and allowing Sheikh Abdullah to occupy the position of chief minister upon Syed Mir Qasim's abdication, which took place on February 22. Sheikh Abdullah then reconstituted the National Conference out of the Plebiscite Front and dissolved the latter organization, which had been pressing for a plebiscite with an independence option foregrounded for the previous twenty years. This was met with widespread public rebuke and seen as a capitulation to the Indian center.

The Legislative Assembly elections of July 9, 1977 saw the National Conference take 47 of the 75 available seats.[108] This also saw Sheikh Abdullah's promulgation of the Public Security Ordinance in October 1977, which bore strong symbolic resemblances to the Emergency that took hold of the rest of India under Gandhi from June 1975 to

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[105] Navlakha (1991), p. 2960. Sheikh Abdullah (2013 [1986]) noted that talks with Indira Gandhi had been ongoing from 1972, pp. 535-537.

[106] Kanjwal (2017), p. 246.

[107] Abdullah (2013 [1986]), p. 536.

[108] For those wondering, there was an election in June 1972, which saw the then-dominant Congress party win 60 out of the 75 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

January 1977.[109] The mid-to-late 1970s also saw the rise of resistance movements

against this rapprochement with the Indian center, such as the People's League led by

Shabbir Ahmed Shah and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which formed in

England in 1977, drawing on the membership of the Plebiscite Front and the former

Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front based in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Sheikh Abdullah remained in power until his death in September 1982. During

his second administration—1975 to 1982—public-sphere dialogue witnessed the

emergence of the term *Kashmiriyat* into the narrative public. Toru Tak dates the first

emergence of the term to Urdu newspapers in Kashmir in 1975.[110] *Kashmiriyat*, or

"Kashmiri-ness," a derivation from *Punjabiyat* ("Punjabi-ness"), drew on a host of

concepts which had undergone associational assembling from the anti-Dogra years. As

pointed to above by Kanjwal, the main reservoir of cultural tropes was already made

available in the preceding decades, especially in cultural deployments of the essential

secularism of Kashmir and its distinctive syncretic and tolerant past. Most clearly, we

can see how this mapped on to Nehruvian scriptings of the Indian nation, specifically in

the tolerance and interreligious harmony that Nehru so wished to highlight. For

example, Nehru would point to the syncretism of Emperor Akbar or Kabir, similarly, the

Rishi movement in Kashmir was inserted as the absolute essence of *Kashmiriyat*. The

portrayal of Lal Ded and Sheikh Nuruddin/Nund Rishi as emblematic figures that crossed

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[109] *India Today* (1977).

[110] Tak (2013).

Hindu-Muslim boundaries allowed both groups to claim them. In similar fashion, Sultan

Zain-ul-Abidin, "Budshah," who reigned for half of the fifteenth century, during the

maturity of Sheikh Nuruddin and the development of the Rishi movement, was seen as

an apropos analog to Akbar.

Tak traces the emergence of the political deployment of the term of *Kashmiriyat*

to a defensive maneuver in the aftermath of the Accord of 1975, in order to balance

fears of the eradication of autonomy and the loss of a distinctive identity overwhelmed

by India. During the 1960s and 1970s, Zutshi points to how the Jammu and Kashmir

Academy of Art, Culture, and Languages was

> a state-driven enterprise which aimed intentionally at creating a unified Kashmiri
>
> cultural and literary identity—*Kashmiriyat*—which simultaneously celebrated
>
> Kashmir's uniqueness while also bringing it in line with Indian nationalist
>
> ideas.[111]

This defensiveness regarding the definition of *Kashmiriyat* was elevated under the

succeeding administration of Farooq Abdullah.

Farooq Abdullah (b. 1937), Sheikh Abdullah's son, a medical doctor, and a

political neophyte, succeeded his father in September 1982. He was nominated in

Sheikh's ailing twilight months to the ire of Sheikh's son-in-law, Ghulam Mohammed

("G. M.") Shah (1920-2009) and other long-time National Conference party workers.

Legislative Assembly elections were held the following year. In the campaign of 1983,

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[111] Zutshi (2014), p. 287.

Farooq deployed the term *Kashmiriyat* frequently in defense of the National Conference

platform against the Congress party, led by Indira Gandhi, which wanted to contest the

elections. During the run-up to these elections in June, Gandhi reached out to the

Jammu constituents and sought to mobilize Hindu insecurity, with Congress playing the

role of defender of secularism against narrow Muslim secessionism of the National

Conference.[112] Gandhi used this strategy in a similar way against Sikh secessionists in

Punjab. The insertion into the discourse of the assertion of positive Kashmiri identity—

even when construed, as the National Conference did, to be completely amenable to

the existing political relationship with India—was seen as being somehow anti-national

by virtue of its very assertion. This would have lasting resonances in the near future.

The National Conference defeated the Congress party in the Jammu and Kashmir

elections, the former bagging 46 seats to the latter's 26 out of the 75 available. In the

run-up to and aftermath of the election, Farooq steered the National Conference

towards a national political alliance with opposition parties to the ruling Congress for

the next year's election, hosting a conclave in Srinagar in October 1983, and attending

the Calcutta conclave in January 1984.[113] For Gandhi, this was seen as a break with the

earlier Accord she had reached with Sheikh Abdullah, wherein the National Conference

would support a Congress alliance on the national level. Gandhi reached out to Braj

Kumar ("B. K.") Nehru (1909-2001), the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir (and her

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[112] Tak (2013), pp. 31-32.

[113] Qasim (1992), p. 164.

second cousin) to dismiss Farooq Abdullah. Nehru considered that action outside of his

constituted authority. He then tendered his resignation and was replaced with

Jagmohan Malhotra (b. 1927), who promptly dismissed Farooq Abdullah's government

by engineering a few defections within the National Conference party, inducing their

alignment with the Congress party. Farooq's brother-in-law, G. M. Shah, replaced him as

the chief minister. Responding to an interview question as to whether he thought the

1983 elections were rigged or illegitimate, Jagmohan averred "very much so" citing the

abundance of "anti-Indian propaganda material," including cartoons depicting Kashmiris

as slaves of India.[114] Jagmohan's nationalist reading of the election points to how the

political enunciation of *Kashmiriyat* must only be done in such a way as to stress its

affinity with, and never its difference from, India.

In the 1980s there was a rise in popular mobilization. A few notable events

include the Cricket World Cup held in October 1983 in Srinagar, when Kashmiri crowds

roundly heckled the Indian team, ecstatically cheered for the West Indies team, and

eventually stormed the pitch.[115] The following year, the Hollywood movie *Lion of the*

Desert, starring Anthony Quinn as an ageing Omar Mukhtar rallying opposition to the

Italian invasion of Libya, was screened in Kashmir and quickly became a popular

favorite. Protests in the streets were held after its initial screening in Srinagar.[116]

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[114] *The Insiders* (2012).

[115] Zahir-ud-din (2013).

[116] Faheem (2016); Zahir-ud-din (2013).

In February 1984, Indian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Ravindra

Mhatre was kidnapped and later killed by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

(JKLF). In response, Indira Gandhi ordered the immediate execution of a JKLF leader

being held in New Delhi on death row, Maqbool Bhat, on February 11.[117]

In June 1984, Indira Gandhi called for the invasion of the Amritsar temple to

eliminate Sikh secessionists led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Over four hundred Sikhs

and over eighty Indian soldiers were killed. Gandhi was later assassinated on October

31, 1984 by her Sikh bodyguards, Satwant Singh and Beant Singh, which set off anti-Sikh

pogroms throughout the country.

Indira Gandhi held the Congress party firm to the legacy of Nehru, stressing in

particular socialism and secularism as the guiding national lines. With the exception of

some policies undertaken early in her administration, such as the bank nationalizations

of 1969, the latter part of her administration amounted to little more than lip-service to

socialism, as a political commitment and identitarian positioning independent from

actual policies.[118]

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[117] Maqbool Bhat (1938-1984) joined the Plebiscite Front in the 1950s, before crossing the border into
Pakistan, where he met Amanullah Khan (1934-2016) and formed a Pakistani-administered Kashmir-based
Plebiscite Front and, later Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front, which turned into the JKLF by
1977. He was accused of directing the 1971 hijacking of Indian Airlines "Ganga," and also accused of
murder during a bank robbery. Aziz (2016). Hussain (2019), citing a conversation with Azam Inqilabi,
claims it was a heist-mate who murdered the bank manager. Hussain also points out that Maqbool's
death did not cause a stir at the time in Kashmir, it was only later when it began to be memorialized that
it came to have resonance as a symbol of Indian oppression.

[118] Indeed, Syed Mir Qasim gives this, as well as the Emergency period, as his reasons for leaving the
Congress party during Indira's 1980-1984 administration.

In the 1980s there were a number of developments which altered how secularism was conceived in India, under the administration of both Indira and her son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi (1944-1991). In April 1985, the Supreme Court ruled on an alimony case of a divorcée, Shah Bano. The ruling argued for a common civil code, in negation of her husband's case, which was based upon a three-month alimony rooted in Islamic law. Some conservative sections of Indian Muslim society, led by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, pressed for Rajiv Gandhi to adopt an amendment to exclude Muslims from the disputed section of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 44 of the Constitution. The next year, the Indian Parliament adopted a bill to bring into effect such an exemption. This move upset a number of different political constellations, who responded per their chosen idiom, but led Hindu nationalists to accentuate the line that they had been taking with respect to Congress and Muslims for decades, that the former's version of secularism is mere appeasement of Muslim interests to the detriment of the majority.[119]

In 1980 the BJP was a novel political party, having recently been constituted out of the multiparty unit that was the Janata Party, in 1980, and developing out of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, before that. It had only won two seats in the 1984 parliamentary election. In February 1986, a district judge in Uttar Pradesh ordered the opening of the gates to allow Hindus to access a small shrine inside the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad, "a scheme for federating the sects of Hinduism" and an affiliate

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[119] Jaffrelot (1993), pp. 334-336; Guha (2008), pp. 579-582.

of the Sangh Parivar (the umbrella group of Hindu nationalist organizations), believed Ayodhya to be the birthplace of Ram, and had been agitating to build a Hindu temple over the mosque in the previous year.[120]

Jaffrelot points to the Congress's pivot in the 1980s from their previous pillars of socialism and secularism:

> [t]he party shifted from populist promises, which the Indian electorate treated with less and less respect, to communal categories to attract support… The communalization of politics tended therefore to remove the restraints which the government's promotion of secularism—combined with threats of repression—had hitherto imposed on the Hindu nationalists' instrumentalist strategy… The return to the strategy of ethno-religious mobilisation was precipitated by the renewed Hindu sentiment of vulnerability *vis-à-vis* 'threatening Others'. This in turn set in motion a new strategy of stigmatisation and emulation and accordingly led to a new set of prominent religious figures to rally to militant Hinduism.[121]

The BJP would mobilize this sense of vulnerability and the alleged Congress party appeasement of Muslims in the next election in 1989, which resulted in the replacement of the Congress government with a National Front coalition, within which the BJP was a junior member.

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[120] Jaffrelot (1993), p. 198, 370.

[121] Ibid., pp. 336-337.

In Kashmir, popular demonstrations unsettled any pretensions to stability that G. M. Shah could hope to maintain. He was summarily dismissed by Governor Jagmohan, acting on behalf of New Delhi, in March 1986 and Governor's rule was imposed on the state. In November, Farooq Abdullah negotiated an arrangement with Rajiv Gandhi wherein he would be re-installed as chief minister pending elections in March 1987. They agreed not to run candidates in the same constituencies and to form a coalition in the ruling government.[122] This was popularly seen as yet another case of capitulation to central authorities. The March 1987 election was marred by widespread and systematic irregularities and electoral malpractice.

During the March 1987 election, a number of disaffected groups which had emerged in the 1980s in opposition to the National Conference government and the increasing intrusion of Indian rule coalesced into the Muslim United Front (MUF) in order to contest the elections. The results saw the National Conference taking 40 of 76 seats, Congress taking 26, the BJP 2, and the MUF 4.[123] Indian media outlets praised the National Conference victory as one of the "forces of democracy and secularism" over Pakistan-inspired "fundamentalists arguing for a theocratic state."[124]

Nationalist renderings generally designate what happened next as a period of insurgency, usually starting in the proliferation of violent acts in 1989. Many Kashmiri

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[122] Bose (2003), p. 93.

[123] The other four seats went to independent candidates.

[124] Bose (2003), p. 94.

anti-nationalist characterizations prefer to see it as another iteration of the *tehreek* ("movement"), or the struggle for *azadi* ("freedom").[125]

During this period, from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, the liberal nationalist discursive emplacement of Kashmir and Kashmiri identity portrays India as a land of tolerance, secularism, and liberality, within which Kashmir forms an integral part, extending the diversity of multicultural Indian nationalism. However, the terms stress an articulation of Kashmiri subjecthood which affirms Kashmiri identity as a distinctive sub-identity, subsumed within the broader Indian framework. This is done in such a way as to subject Kashmir to India as a political division under a sovereign national government. At the same time, the territory of Kashmir is written into the imagination of the Indian nation, through cinematic and cartographic representations. And through the cinematic representation of Kashmir as a holiday getaway and a place for love and honeymoons, there also emerges affective, possessive, consumerist understandings of Kashmir's relationship to the national self.

In negotiating their relationship with the center, political leaders in the National Conference leaned on the enunciation of *Kashmiriyat* as a distinct political identity with qualities commensurate with and analogous to Indian nationality, but nevertheless retaining distinct content: Zain-ul-Abidin may be like Akbar, but the latter was an invading conqueror of Kashmir. The Rishis resembled the reformers of the *bhakti* movement, but nevertheless played on a distinctive Kashmiri identity. This allowed the

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[125] Hussain (2017); Faheem (2016)

National Conference to craft a Kashmiri identity which could negotiate its relationship to India: analogous yet different; attached yet internally autonomous.

In the next period, *Kashmiriyat* would be weaponized by the Indian state to render inauthentic any positive assertions of selfhood that did not dovetail with the aims of the Indian state or (shifting) understandings of Indian nationality.

4.4 Tehreek in Exceptional Rule, 1989-present: Narratives of Azadi

Since 1989, the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society estimates there have been over 70,000 deaths and over 8,000 disappearances.[126] In the aftermath of the rigged elections of 1987, mass protests ensued.

Mass protests turned to violent opposition in 1989. The JKLF undertook a number of targeted kidnappings and assassinations. One of the starting points in narratives of the period of "insurgency" is usually the kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed, Indian Home Minister (and later Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister) Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's daughter. She was kidnapped on December 8th and ransomed for JKLF prisoners held by the state government on December 13th. Assassinations in this early period targeted a number of Kashmiri Pandits tied to the exercise of state power, including the judge who sentenced Maqbool Bhat to death, Nilakanth Ganjoo, who was assassinated in November 1989; the director of the Kashmir branch of the Indian state television network *Doordarshan*, Lassa Kaul, who was assassinated in February 1990; and the local BJP chief in Kashmir, Tikka Lal Taploo, who was assassinated in September

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[126] *Structures of Violence* (2015), p. 3.

1989. Alexander Evans notes how "[m]ilitants claimed they were attacking agents of Indian rule but, to Kashmiri Pandits, militant attacks often appeared to be communally motivated."[127] Citing a lack of control over the government, Farooq Abdullah was dismissed by Governor Jagmohan on January 19, 1990. A massive mobilization of the Indian Army into Kashmir ensued, combined with the Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force among a number of other units.

To the Kashmiri Pandits these assassinations appeared to be, and eventually seemed to become, less than targeted. Fearing for their security in this hyperpolarized environment with a number of high-ranking and visible members of the Pandit community assassinated, and amplified by Governor Jagmohan's refusal to assuage their fears—which, by doing so, exacerbated them—Kashmiri Pandits staged a mass exodus from the Kashmir Valley in February and March of 1990, with over ninety percent fleeing.[128] The very real suffering of the Kashmiri Pandits in exile has been given amplified voice by the central government, most especially the BJP, a point which we

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[127] Evans (2002), p. 20.

[128] Evans (2002). The popular understanding is that Governor Jagmohan told a number of Kashmiri Pandits that he could not assure them of their safety and that he was able to provide some high-ranking Pandits with a means of conveyance out of Kashmir. Jagmohan (1994) acknowledges the "cunning techniques of converting hearsay into evidence" claiming "inducements" were given to Kashmiri Pandits to flee but says the actual reason for their fear was "terrorism," p. 701. The situation of the Kashmiri Pandits is complicated by the fact that many of them were placed in government posts, which, in the perspectives of the militants made them complicit in the exercise of state power, even if many of these posts were minor. Despite the many reforms made during the years of National Conference rule, which did effect a number of changes in order to eventuate socioeconomic mobility, Kashmiri Pandits on the whole still represented a socioeconomic status far above that of the average Kashmiri Muslim. This had the effect of folding religio-ethnic identity into status.

will return to. However, this extension of sympathy has generally been to the neglect of the widespread suffering of Kashmiri Muslims.

The first mass killing took place on January 21, 1990 with dozens of civilians killed by the Indian government at Gawkadal Bridge. The next day, about a dozen people were killed by the Indian army at Alamgari Bazaar. Dozens were killed a few days later at Handwara, and dozens more at Zakoora and Tengpora bypass in Srinagar on March 1st, both also carried out by the Indian military. In February 1991 in the village of Kunan Poshpora, over fifty women have alleged mass rape against Indian security personnel during a cordon operation on February 23rd.[129] The chronology of the conflict throughout the 1990s is riddled with massacre after massacre, most of which were perpetrated by the Indian government, but a number were also perpetrated by militant groups coming into Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan.

The mass killings, mass rapes, and massacres, however, mask the more regularized form of occupational rule, wherein the civilian population is put under curfew, their movements monitored by the omnipresence of security personnel, numbering somewhere between 400,000 to 700,000. The security personnel are stationed intermittently at observation posts along the roads, often invisible save for the barrel of an INSAS assault rifle poking through the chicken wire covering an opening in these pillars. The civilian population is subject to random searches and seizures. A large section of the local population is either paid to be, or intimidated into being,

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[129] Asia Watch (1993); Butalia (2002).

informants. Communications are regularly shut down: including cell phone service and internet.

Pakistan, seeking to capitalize on this deep resentment, actively aided and supplied different insurgent groups at different times. At first, it showed preference for the JKLF from 1989, but as JKLF firmly held to an independentist line, as opposed to a merger with Pakistan, the latter began leveraging its support with other groups, which quickly proliferated. The JKLF split over the use of violence in 1994, the section led by Yasin Malik in Srinagar disavowing it as a means to achieve its objectives. By 1992, Pakistan was giving support to Hizbul Mujahidin, a group affiliated with Jamaat-i-Islami and also primarily composed of Kashmiris, which has as its ultimate political aim accession to Pakistan. However, the formally stated aims matter little to the lower-level cadres who often join with the sole purpose of expressing anti-state—India and Jammu and Kashmir—animosity.

The rise in violence against the Indian state in Kashmir coincided with the aftermath of the Soviet evacuation of Afghanistan. The mujahidin there, many of whom were Pakistani and were previously supported by the United States and Pakistan, began providing logistical support to amplify the struggle against India. The first major group to get involved was Lashkar-e-Taiba in the early 1990s. Another group involved in the early 1990s was Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, which split in the late 1990s, the major faction of which became Jaish-e-Mohammed.[130]

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[130] Tankel (2011); Leather (2003)

A major effect of the rise in the activities of these groups was the creation of a feedback loop. The entry of these new groups led to the escalation of the crackdown by India, which worsened the situation for most Kashmiris by subjecting them to greater scrutiny, which worked to produce greater resentment and led many more to take up arms against the Indian state, with no other recourse available to redress grievances against the Indian occupation.

This in turn led to the development of an accusative narrative deployed by Indian nationalists about violent Kashmiris, or really just any Kashmiri clamoring for *azadi*, as being fifth-column agents of Pakistan. This served the purpose of rendering their revolt inauthentic, because they had been corrupted by Pakistan; true *Kashmiriyat* would never engage in such violent actions. This emplacement—that is, of Kashmiris being mere agents directed by Pakistani designs—is given cinematic representational form in the Bollywood action movie *Mission Kashmir*. Directed by Vidhu Vinod Chopra and released in 2000, the film features an evil Pakistani terrorist kingpin, Hilal Kohistani and a younger, aggrieved Kashmiri Altaaf Khan. When he was a child, Altaaf's family was "accidentally" killed in the crossfire of a terrorist raid led by chief of police Inayat Khan, after the latter's son died due to neglectful treatment at a hospital because terrorists issued a *fatwa* against doctors treating policemen and their families. The raid which killed Altaaf's family was portrayed as the terrorists' fault, who held the family hostage during the shootout, and thus a forgivable mistake for the police force. Inayat and his Hindu wife Neelima adopt Altaaf, and once older, Altaaf finds out his family was killed by Inayat. He runs away and finds Kohistani who seduces him to the way of terrorist

jihad against the Indian government. Altaaf, here representing Kashmir, is forced to choose between two father figures, Hilal Kohistani representing Pakistan and terrorist violence, and Inayat Khan representing a loving paternal India, who only uses force to protect his loved ones. A love interest, revealingly named Sufiya, enters the picture, urging Altaaf in the direction of peace, and implicitly towards Inayat. After being torn, he realizes that Kohistani is only using him for to advance his own interests in a war against India, supported by Pakistani intelligence, and that Inayat's love is authentic. He then joins forces with Inayat to stop a terrorist attack on a shrine.

The movie portrays the transmutation of assertions for self-determination into radical Islamic fundamentalism or *jihad* in the service of Pakistan, nullifying any assertions against the Indian state as terrorist. Per Kabir, "within the cinematic representations of the Kashmiri conflict for *aazadi*, it has always already been about *jihad*."[131] The implication is that any resistance against the Indian state is ipso facto an inauthentic expression of *Kashmiriyat*. Chopra ends the movie with a dedication to his children "and for all the children of conflict… May they someday rediscover that valley of love I grew up in, that have of harmony, that paradise called Kashmir."[132] This also plays on the statist trope of a "return to normalcy," which works to delegitimize expressions of *azadi* against the status quo.

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[131] Kabir (2018), p. 290. Kabir notes variations on this theme throughout the "new Kashmir films" of the 1990s and 2000s.

[132] Chopra (2000). Chopra has directed a movie based on the exile of Kashmiri Pandits, written by Pandit activist Rahul Pandita, called *Shikara* due for release in 2020.

The geography of repression is further complicated by the number of *ikhwanis*, or "renegades," disaffected former militants who have come under the pay of the Indian government in order to work as an intimidation force. Often *ikhwanis* have perpetrated attacks in order to justify the Indian security state's crackdown on a certain area, sometimes directed by the state, at other times operating as an independent counterrevolutionary mafia force. *Ikhwanis* were formed in late 1994. One notoriously international event was the kidnapping of six European and American tourists in Kashmir in July 1995, claimed by a hitherto and since unknown group calling itself "al-Faran." One of the tourists, John Childs, managed to escape, while the other five were killed. British investigative journalists Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy concluded in *The Meadow* that the "al-Faran" was actually an *ikhwani* group.[133] *Ikhwanis* are responsible for widespread intimidation, murder, and extortion throughout the Valley.[134]

The space of Kashmir under occupation is marked by the ubiquity of danger and fear, which is embodied differently. Non-Kashmiri tourists who might be worried about the presence of violence in the cities are given relief by security forces who will greet them with a friendly smile and wave. The security forces are sources of relief to these tourists in an area otherwise marked in Indian national media outlets as rife with terror and terrorism. To Kashmiris, the security personnel are a source of dread. Many

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[133] Levy and Scott-Clark (2012).

[134] *Structures of Violence* (2015), pp. 18-32.

Kashmiris go out of their way to avoid the gaze of the security personnel, to avoid being

called or pointed out, and try often to simply "pass" unnoticed, or unmarked. This is

seen in a series of bodily performances that Junaid labels "counter-mapping," in order

to avoid being seen and then interpellated.[135] That is, while the Valley is not under

curfew. For Junaid, this is a symbol of Mbembe's necropolitics in Kashmir, and for Zia

the killable Kashmiri body.[136]

The landscape of Srinagar is marked by this omnipresence of these security

personnel, concertina wire, and rifles emerging from chicken wire openings in

surveillance outposts that intermittently populate roads. Wooden barricades abound

delivering messages of assurance to passersby, yet whose meaning is thinly concealed

by its psychoanalytic inversion. The messages are almost always phrased as if answering

an interrogative accusation, and their meaning is nearly exactly the opposite of their

literal construal. "CRPF is here for people of the Valley" becomes "CRPF is here to

dominate the people the Valley"; "we are for your safety" becomes "we are here to hurt

you." "Your security is our priority. Our only aim is your security": this, coming from the

occupying forces who search and cordon houses, who monitor your every move, who

have the power to make you disappear, or kill you, whose mere presence is an

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[135] Junaid (2019).

[136] Junaid (2013); Zia (2018)

antagonistic reminder of one's own powerlessness—this "security" signifies the absence

of freedom of movement and expression.[137]

The legal atmosphere and the imposition of draconian laws which effectively

suspend the normal operation of law lead Haley Duschinski and Shrimoyee Nandini

Ghosh to point to a state of exception in Kashmir Valley.[138] Nasser Hussain points to the

colonial order as effectively a far-ranging and continuous state of exception, pointing to

a number of regulations passed as well as the ultimate dependence of the British on the

discretionary use of power by its executive and its army during the colonial era.[139] The

main legal instruments used for counter-insurgency purposes which do exactly this job

in Kashmir are the Public Safety Act (PSA), the Prevention of Unlawful Activities Act

(PUAA), the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), Terrorist and Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act (TADA), and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).[140] These

acts effectively give the armed forces extraordinary powers to arrest and detain

individuals indefinitely without notifying them or their families of their crimes.

As might be expected, the legal infrastructure for these emergency laws was

carried over into independent India from the British colonial period. This is most clear in

the case of AFSPA, which was originally promulgated against Mohandas Gandhi's "Quit

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[137] Maqbool (2013) mentions a few of the phrases on these barricades.

[138] Duschinski and Ghosh (2017).

[139] Hussain (2003)

[140] Amnesty International (2011). The Prevention of Terrorism Act was promulgated in 2002 and repealed in 2004. For the colonial origins of these laws, see Kalhan, et al. (2006), esp. pp. 126-131.

India" movement in 1942, then repurposed by Nehru to deal with revolt in the northeast of the country in 1958, before being applied to Kashmir in 1990.[141]

The 1990s were dominated by this approach to Kashmir, which was only compounded in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly in October 2001 by Jaish-e-Mohammed—which killed thirty-eight people plus the three attackers—and on the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001, which killed nine people plus the five attackers. Further exacerbating matters was the heightened tensions brewing between India and Pakistan. Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear weapons capacity in a series of tests following India's own in May 1998. A limited war broke out between India and Pakistan in May and June of 1999 in the Kargil district of Ladakh. India had blamed Pakistani complicity for the attacks on the parliament, and the period from December 2001 to October 2002 there was a near-war crisis scenario between India and Pakistan before tensions finally cooled. All of this only heightened the Indian security state in Kashmir as well as the conflation between terrorists and Kashmiris calling for *azadi*.

Elections were allowed to be held in Kashmir in September 1996, and in October 1996 a government was allowed to form in Jammu and Kashmir for the first time since January 1990. Farooq Abdullah was returned as chief minister, but the government enjoyed virtually no popular legitimacy in the Valley by this point.[142] An outlet beside

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[141] Human Rights Watch (2006).

[142] The National Conference won a majority with 57 out of 87 seats. The BJP took 8, the Congress 7, and the Bahujan Samaj Party took 4.

the "mainstream" political parties associated with the state was formed in 1993, called

the All Parties Hurriyat Conference. It was formed by a number of different political

groups who rejected the "mainstream" political parties in the state. The two main

leaders of the Hurriyat, representing a "moderate" and "hardline" faction, respectively,

are Mirwaiz Umar Farooq (b. 1973) of the Awami Action Committee and Syed Ali Shah

Geelani (b. 1929) of the Jamaat-i-Islami.[143]

The 2002 Legislative Assembly elections led to a change of control from the

National Conference party to a coalition between the Congress party and a new party

calling itself the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The leaders of these two parties

agreed to share the position of chief minister for three years each, Ghulam Nabi Azad (b.

1949) and Mufti Mohammed Sayeed (1936-2016), respectively, with Sayeed serving the

first term. Azad fell short of seeing the completion of his term by a few months due to

the widespread unrest which had taken hold in 2008 amidst the Amarnath land grant

controversy and the loss of support of the PDP, and in July Governor's rule was

reimposed.

In the rise of Hindu nationalism in the mid-1980s during the Ram Janmabhoomi

movement, several shrines were spotlighted by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang

Dal as central to Hinduism. Amarnath shrine, containing a Shiva lingam ("phallus")

stalagmite in an icy cave was recognized. A shrine board for Amarnath was created by

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[143] Mirwaiz Umar Farooq succeeded to the position of Mirwaiz after the assassination of his father, Mirwaiz Muhammad Farooq, in May 1990. On the APHC see Abdul Hakim (2015), pp. 182-189.

the Jammu and Kashmir government, in part due to increasing demand, and in part due to the deaths of a number of pilgrims in a snowstorm in 1996. The number of pilgrims to the shrine before 1985 had historically been low, roughly 10,000 per year, and it had generally been done over 15 to 19 days. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the timing of the *yatra* (pilgrimage) extended to over a month, in 2004 extending to two months. After the establishment of the Shrine Board in 1996, there was also an acute uptick in participation, urged on by Hindu nationalist organizations. The number of annual pilgrims grew to over 100,000 in the late 1990s, nearly 400,000 in 2004, and over 500,000 in 2008. In May 2008 Ghulam Nabi Azad's Cabinet approved a proposal to divert forty hectares (ninety-nine acres) of land from the Forestry Department to the Shrine Board to accommodate the increase in pilgrims. Mass protests against the land transfer were mounted in the Valley, which were met with vocal protests led by the BJP in Jammu and the order was eventually revoked on July 1st.[144]

Writing in the immediate aftermath of the widespread protests and rows in both Jammu and Kashmir, Junaid points to how the amplification—in respect to both the quantity of travelers and importance—of the Amarnath pilgrimage was an attempt to culturally colonize and inscribe Kashmir within the geographical imagination of India:

[b]y bringing in millions of Hindus from across India, facilitating their travel, increasing the number of pilgrimage months, and trying to create permanent

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[144] For a detailed overview of the Amarnath pilgrimage see Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (2017).

bases for them, the state seeks to firmly place Kashmir within the Hindu

imagination, as another point on the sacred map of Bharat Mata ["Mother

India"]. By doing so, Kashmir ceases to be the land of Kashmiris, but becomes an

abode of Baba Bole Nath. The consolidation of this vision, along with parallel

efforts to invent ancient Kashmiri links to India… in effect seeks to integrate

Kashmir with India in its Hindu sense.[145]

This served to further entrench Kashmir in the geographical and sacred imagination of

India.

After the turmoil had sufficiently passed, elections were permitted to run in

November and December 2008 which saw the return of the National Conference, albeit

in coalition with the Congress. The National Conference was now led by Omar Abdullah

(b. 1970), the son of Farooq Abdullah. In May 2009 in Shopian, Kashmir, the bodies of

two young women, Neelofar and Asiya Jan (aged twenty-two and seventeen,

respectively) were found. The public believed them to be victims of rape and murder,

but the official statement held that their deaths were due to drowning. That official

statement, echoed by chief minister Omar Abdullah, sparked widespread protests,

which prompted curfews to be imposed throughout the Valley for over a week. In the

following year there was further widespread unrest, prompted at first by an alleged

"fake encounter"— a situation in which security personnel killed a civilian and claim that

it was in self-defense against a militant. Amidst the unrest, on June 11, 2010, a

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[145] Junaid (2008).

seventeen-year-old student, Tufail Ahmad Mattoo, was shot at close range with a tear

gas canister, killing him. This caused further uproar and unrest which took hold

throughout the Valley over the summer, and over one hundred Kashmiris were killed.

The popular unrest shows how the discourses purveyed by the National

Conference and People's Democratic Parties had entirely broken down and had no

resonance with the Kashmiri public. The scale of violence had decreased significantly

since the early 1990s, when it was perhaps at its peak with respect to casualties, yet the

surveillance state did not taper off at all.

In the November and December 2014 elections the PDP won the most seats,

with 28 out of 87, but needing a coalition to form a government. Rather than reaching

out to the National Conference which finished third with 15 seats, they chose to ally

with the second-place BJP, which had won all of its seats in Jammu. The PDP was led by

Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, who died in January 2016 and was succeeded as chief

minister by his daughter Mehbooba Mufti (b. 1959).

The PDP's essential difference from the National Conference was the former's

platform of "self-rule" for the former as opposed to the "autonomy" platform of the

latter. The National Conference's "autonomy" stance did not, at this point and generally

since 1975, question the accession to India, but its platform called for the restoration of

the autonomy of the state as it existed before Sheikh Abdullah was deposed in 1953,

which is not to say that it amounted to much in practice. Nevertheless, the central idea,

animating the National Conference was this status for the state within the Indian union.

The PDP's "self-rule" platform was deliberately vague so as to engender ideas of

autonomy on the pre-1953 model, or possibly independence, or a plebiscite, but the tactic was to leave the options open-ended in order for the electorate to make the decision, while simultaneously appearing to take a more radical stand than the National Conference. However, the overwhelming presence of the security forces severely attenuated any of these ideals.

In July 2016, widespread protests again gripped Kashmir in the aftermath of the killing of twenty-two-year-old Hizbul Mujahidin commander Burhan Wani. Nearly one hundred people were killed in the following months. The Valley was put on lockdown as curfews were imposed, arrests were made, and internet and cell-phone service was curtailed. Curfews were only lifted in parts of the Valley after fifty-one days; other ostensibly more sensitive areas were under curfew for up to ninety-nine days.

The leader of the BJP in Jammu, Ram Madhav, announced that the party was withdrawing support from the PDP coalition citing widespread protests and "radicalization" in June 2018.[146]

On August 5, 2019 New Delhi revoked of Article 370, converting Jammu and Kashmir into a union territory of India and making Ladakh a separate union territory, made effective on October 31st. Union territories within India are governed from the center, although a provision of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 is to allow for a legislative assembly to convene in the Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory. As might be imagined, this was met with further demonstrations and protests. And they,

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[146] *India Today* (2018).

in turn, were met with lockdowns, curfews, widespread arrests, and the curtailing of communication services, which as of this writing have not been restored.

The widespread public perception of the illegitimacy of the National Conference and PDP points to the ways in which their deployments of "autonomy" and "self-rule" do not coincide with the popular aspiration of *azadi*. These political positions were themselves forged through negotiations with the center, which, in both the Congress party and the BJP have pushed for greater incorporation of Kashmir into India. The Congress's platform from the time of Nehru sought to incorporate Kashmir into the geographical imaginary of India, and this was politically manifested by the gradual whittling away of Kashmiri autonomy and popular deployments of Kashmir as, in terms of both people and territory, part of the liberal kaleidoscope of India. The Congress party gradually abandoned pretenses to socialism in the moves towards the liberalization of India in the late 1980s, however, the ways in which the party's narrative of secularism was developed created the contours within which legitimate Kashmiri self-expression could be vocalized. This was mirrored in how the National Conference party's portrayal of Kashmiri nationalism, especially in the aftermath of 1953, paralleled the "thematic" elements of Indian nationalism. The PDP's tenure in office and inability to effectively counter the Indian militarization of the Valley has led to their deliberately vague claims of "self-rule" to ring equally hollow. This sense of illegitimacy has only been made more apparent with the electoral alliance forged with the increasingly hostile BJP in 2014, exacerbated with the uprisings that took place in 2016, which, in the Kashmiri public perception, showed the Jammu and Kashmir government powerless at

best to do anything about the Center's crackdown, and directly complicit with it at worst.

The next section will deal with the rise of the BJP to national prominence and the narrative placing of Kashmir within the BJP geographical and national imaginaries.

4.5 Kashmir in Modi's India

In the BJP manifesto of 2014, Murli Manohar Joshi (b. 1934), a former RSS *pracharak* and past president of the BJP, laid out the platform of the party, which can, in short, be read as a civilizational manifesto. The manifesto insistently and repeatedly stresses the civilizational character of India. A pervasive and thorough anti-colonialism is established from the outset, as it begins by acknowledging that "India is the most ancient civilization of the world and has always been looked upon by the world as a land of wealth and wisdom," going on to highlight how "[h]istorical records establish the level of progress and prosperity attained by India before the advent of the Europeans" in areas such as mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, physics, and biology. Here, the hard science pedigree is a deliberate attempt to form a linkage with the ethos of neoliberal capitalism and development. Included in this great Indian civilization are key figures associated with India, "the Buddha and Mahavira… Kautilya and Chandra Gupta," "Tilak, Gandhi, Aurobindo, Patel, Bose and others," notably and conspicuously omitting any reference to Nehru, for it was the former figures in the anti-colonial movement who

> had a clear vision of the civilisational consciousness of India. These leaders had
> directed the freedom movement, keeping the Indian ways and thoughts in the
> centre of their action. They had a vision to reconstruct the political and

economic institutions of India as a continuum of civilisational consciousness,

which made India one country, one people, and one nation.[147]

Two things need to be pointed out here. These references deliberately negate

Nehru by omission, with the implication that Nehru, seen as the guiding light of the

Congress party in post-independence India, has betrayed the "civilisational

consciousness" of India by emulating Western ideals, mores, and models.[148] Also, and

the reference is quite deliberate, the slogan of "one country, one people, one flag" was

used by Syama Prasad Mukherjee in his march on Kashmir in 1953. Portraits of

Mukherjee and Deendayal Upadhyaya, the latter a figure adulated by Prime Minister

Narendra Modi as a personal guru of his, adorns the cover page inside the pamphlet.[149]

The document also stresses—and stretches—the notion of Greater India earlier

elaborated by the Greater India Society, emphasizing India's "international outreach

from Korea to Arabia, from Bamiyan to Borobudur and beyond."[150] Almost in

recognition of how the constructed idealization of the nation drives policy, it states that

"[w]hat is needed today is to arrive at a consensus about the 'Idea' of India and also to

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[147] Bharatiya Janata Party (2014), p. 1.

[148] In a rather direct indictment, they charge the United Progressive Alliance, the ruling coalition led by the Congress party from 2004 to 2014, with "[i]nstead of creating a socioeconomic and political paradigm of governance drawn from the civilisational consciousness of India, the leadership tried to follow whatever was being practiced in this or that western country." Bharatiya Janata Party (2014), p. 2.

[149] This is also seen in the BJP's renaming movement. The road on which the BJP headquarters is located was renamed "Deendayal Upadhyaya marg," and the town of Mughalsarai, along with its notable Mughalsarai Junction railway station were renamed, Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya Nagar and Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya Junction, respectively.

[150] Bharatiya Janata Party (2014), p. 1.

think and redesign our approach in consonance with the seekings and preferences of the Indian people."[151]

With respect to Kashmir, in both the 2014 and 2019 manifestos, the BJP notes its continuity on the issue since its incarnation as the Jana Sangh under Syama Prasad Mukherjee: "[w]e reiterate our position since the time of the Jan Sangh to the abrogation of Article 370."[152]

But, also with respect to Kashmir, the BJP has deliberately employed its own rendering of what constitutes proper *Kashmiriyat* since a speech made by former BJP Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1925-2018). On April 21, 2003 in an address to the Lok Sabha, Vajpayee declared "Kashmiriyat, jamhooriyat, insaniyat" (roughly, "Kashmiri-ness, democracy, humanity") as his government's policy towards Kashmir. In the lead-up to the evisceration of Article 370 by way of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act of August 5, 2019, Home Minister and President of the BJP Amit Shah, evoking the phrasing of Vajpayee, made the accusation that it was Kashmiri Muslims themselves who had abandoned the principles of *Kashmiriyat*: "[w]hy did Kashmiri Pandits leave? Why were the Sufis killed when they only spoke on unity? But we will bring them back, and a time will come when Kashmiri Pandits will be praying and Sufis will be seen alongside them in Kashmir."[153] He went on to say

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[151] Ibid., p. 2.

[152] Bharatiya Janata Party (2019), p. 12; Bharatiya Janata Party (2014), p. 8.

[153] "'Congress Ignored J&K But We Gave It Power": Amit Shah in Rajya Sabha" *NDTV*. July 1, 2019.

I agree that we need to preserve Kashmiriyat, but I have a question… Sufism had

once been at the heart of Kashmir, but that is no longer the case… Modi

government's commitment to the policy of 'Jamhooriyat, Insaniyat, Kashmiriyat'

should not be taken to mean that the forces that want to divide India will be

spared. They will be given an appropriate response in their same language…

Kashmiri Pandits—they were thrown out of the state. Were they not part of

Kashmiriyat? When the Sufis were attacked, Sufi saints were murdered, those

who used to talk of Hindu-Muslim unity, they were also thrown out of Kashmir.

Wasn't the Sufi tradition a part of Kashmiriyat… Had anyone protected the Sufis,

who spoke of Hindu[-]Muslim unity, I'd have agreed that the people are

concerned about Kashmiriyat. The Kashmiri Pandits, who had been the carriers

of Kashmiri culture for ages, were driven out and scattered. If we talk about

Kashmiriyat today, we have to think of them too… There will be a time when at

Mata Khir Bhawani temple, Kashmiri Pandits will be praying and Sufis will be

seen alongside them… I am not a pessimist, we speak of humanity.[154]

In the formulation of Modi and Shah, *insaniyat* is seen as development (schools for

children, toilets, electricity, welfare schemes, access to food), *jamhooriyat* is seen as a

democracy, but, for Modi and Shah, it has been withheld in Kashmir under Article 370,

as they have been under separate, Muslim rule.

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[154] "'Insaniyat, Jamhooriyat, Kashmiriyat': Amit Shah's Big Push for J&K." *NDTV*. July 1, 2019.

The equation of *Kashmiriyat* and Sufism can be traced back to the ways in which the Rishi movement was drawn on in order to stress the distinctive, syncretic, tolerant character of Kashmiri Islam in consonance with Nehru's secularism and Sheikh Abdullah's negotiation of Kashmir's political status vis-à-vis India. The distinctive facets of Kashmiri Rishiism are usually folded into a broader reading of Sufism in South Asia within Indian and Pakistani nationalist discourses. However, this casting of Sufism as the central tenet of *Kashmiriyat* is one that renders Kashmiri political identity inert, passive, apolitical, and quietist. Any assertion of Kashmiri political identity is thus made ipso facto a violation of the Sufi ethos of *kashmiriyat*.

In a World Sufi Forum held in New Delhi in March 2016, Modi lauded Sufism, calling it "Islam's greatest gift," especially focusing on its renunciation of violence. He went on to say that "[w]hen we think of the ninety-nine names of Allah, none stands for force and violence."[155] He reiterated this deployment of Sufism the following year in Udhampur, in the Jammu region: "Sufi culture is priceless and if we forget this culture, we will forget our future too. We will push our future into darkness."[156] For Modi, then, resistance to the Indian state is seen as a betrayal to this Indian variety of Islam, and a corruption by fundamentalist Pakistani forces.

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[155] "None of Allah's 99 Names Stands for Violence, Says Modi as He Praises Islam at Sufi Meet." *Business Standard*. March 18, 2016.

[156] "PM Modi Praises Sufi Culture, Says India will Be 'Pushed Into Darkness' Without It." *Huffington Post India*. 3 April 2017.

There has been a tendency to equate the Kashmiri *tehreek* with a turn to violent

"fundamentalist" Islam. While noting the incursion of former *mujahidin* who entered

Kashmir via Pakistan, this casting has been used to delegitimize the entirety of the

Kashmiri opposition to Indian rule and its occupation by security personnel.[157] In the

post-9/11 period, the Indian state has used Kashmir to link its struggle to repress the

tehreek with the broader, United States-led War on Terror.

A part of the BJP's popular writ since coming to power in 2014 has been an

assertive, quasi-vitalist program of strength, largely spurred by its close association with

the RSS, an association Vajpayee sought to downplay during the time he was in power,

and during which the BJP required a broader coalition in order to secure a majority. The

BJP, since 2014 having a comfortable majority, under Modi and Shah have not sought to

maintain that distance. This program is directed against the weak, capitulating

"sickularism" of the Congress government, which is seen as a way to appease Muslims.

The most egregious example of such pusillanimity for the BJP has been the Congress

party's maintenance of Article 370. In a flatteringly anti-colonial misappropriation of an

apocryphal quote which has been in common circulation in India, attributed to, but

entirely out of character with, Thomas Babington Macaulay—who here functions as a

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[157] Political scientist Ashutosh Varshney (1991) has fallen victim to this as well: "[i]n a place known for its quietistic, syncretistic Islam, militant Islamic fundamentalism has acquired a foothold," p. 998. The casting of Kashmiri self-assertion as Islamic fundamentalism is also acknowledged by liberal nationalists, such as Ramachandra Guha (2017), who equivocates with his opposition to Hindu fundamentalism: "In Kashmir, Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to civility, humanity, democracy, but outside Kashmir, in the rest of India, Hindu fundamentalism is more dangerous."

stand-in for the general oppressive British policy—the 2009 manifesto, also written by

Joshi, cites the following:

> I have travelled across the length and breadth of India and I have not seen one
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> person who is a beggar, who is a thief, such wealth I have seen in this country,
>
> such high moral values, people of such high caliber, that I do not think we would
>
> ever conquer this country, unless we break the very backbone of this nation,
>
> which is her spiritual and cultural heritage, and therefore, I propose that we
>
> replace her old and ancient education system, her culture, for if the Indians think
>
> that all that is foreign and English is good and greater than their own, they will
>
> lose their self[-]esteem, their native culture and they will become what we want
>
> them, a truly dominated nation.[158]

Here, the contention is that the British were intensely afraid of Indian self-assertion, and

the manner by which they ruled required Indians internalize their inferiority, for if they

were ever to rediscover their true Indian essence, they could easily overthrow British

rule. As outlined in chapter two, this is entirely out of keeping with how Macaulay

viewed Indian society, which he saw pejoratively as utterly degraded and backwards,

whose elevation would only come about through the inculcation of British manners, in

order to create "a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in

opinions, in morals and in intellect."[159] Nevertheless, the deployment points to a guiding

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[158] Bharatiya Janata Party (2009), p. 4.

[159] Macaulay (1965 [1835]).

principle of the BJP, which is that strength and Indian self-assertion, defined in

consonance with Hindutva geographical and national imaginaries, will lead to prosperity

and give the country a leading role on the world stage.

That self-assertion, however, requires dealing with elements of the nation which

are seen as obstacles to the completion of Hindutva selfhood. In recent months, this is

seen in the Citizenship Amendment Act and the National Register of Citizens in the state

of Assam, the former of which extends citizenship to "persecuted" minorities from

Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; within this categorization, Muslims of every

stripe are conspicuously omitted from this category, whereas Hindus, Christians, Sikhs,

Parsis, Jains, and Buddhists are included by name. Striking exactly the same chord, in the

proposal for the National Register of Citizens, Shah noted that "[w]e will remove every

single infiltrator from the country, except Buddha [Buddhists], Hindus and Sikhs."[160]

One further issue which the BJP has given pride of privilege with respect to

Kashmir has been the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits. The BJP, as evidenced in Amit Shah's

quote above regarding *Kashmiriyat*, follows the Orientalist line in privileging Pandits as

truer representatives of Kashmiri culture, yet depart in its specific elevation of the Hindu

self. For the Hindutva ideologues, the tribulations of the Kashmiri Pandits are the only

type of suffering worth grieving, expressing, and rectifying. Virtually no

acknowledgement is made of the 70,000-plus Kashmiri Muslim deaths, as these Muslims

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[160] Annalisa Merelli. "The BJP's Threat to Restrict Indian Citizenship Unmasks the Ugliest Side of Nationalism." *Quartz India*. April 11, 2019. https://qz.com/india/1591557/bjp-threat-to-restrict-indian-citizenship-targets-muslims/. Accessed on November 3, 2019.

are seen to have more or less forfeited their lives by virtue of their rebellion against

India. The voices of exiled Kashmiri Pandits are elevated and amplified by the BJP. One

example of this is in the overestimation and exaggeration of the numbers of Pandits

who have fled. While the most reliable estimates place the number of those fleeing to

Jammu and India proper at around 140,000 to 160,000, the oft-circulated number that is

used by the BJP and a number of Pandit groups is 300,000 to 400,000, which is far

greater than the number of Pandits who lived in Kashmir.[161] Also, the reasons for the

Kashmiri Pandits' flight have been given as being because of widespread Islamic

fundamentalism and terrorism, which mistakes the reasons for the Kashmiri *tehreek*.

This is not to downplay the very real fear felt by the Pandits for their lives and status,

however, it fails to appreciate the different experiences of Indian rule felt by Kashmiri

Muslims. Some revanchist Pandits have formed an organization called Panun Kashmir

which advocates for a "sanitized" Pandits-only enclave encompassing most of the Valley

and nearly all of the large cities in Kashmir.[162]

This elevation and accentuation of Kashmiri Pandit pain, however, is done in a

manner that suits the BJP's aims and purposes in Kashmir, aims which long preexisted

the Kashmiri Pandit flight, and in which the latter figures as an alibi more than a pretext.

Nitasha Kaul points to how

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[161] Evans (2002), pp. 23-27. The American Kashmiri Pandit group, Kashmir Overseas Association, puts the number at 350,000. See their website at http://koausa.org/site/.

[162] Bose (2003), pp. 90-92. Also see their website at http://www.panunkashmir.org.

> [t]he Kashmiri Pandit issue is used by Hindutva ideologues to bash and demonise
> (Kashmiri) Muslims. Ultimately, for the Hindutva forces, what they see as the
> inherently traitorous nature of Kashmiri Muslims *qua* Muslims is more
> problematic than even a Muslim majoritarian state such as a clearly 'Islamic'
> Republic of Pakistan.[163]

The BJP has long tied Kashmir into the Indian geo-body as an integral part, in which Article 370 has functioned as an obstacle. Highlighting tropes of exoticization and the possessive impulse animating the Hindu nationalist aims in Kashmir, in a speech to party workers immediately after the Indian Parliament took action to scrap Article 370, the BJP MP Vikram Saini said that this would now allow Indians to move to Kashmir and marry "fair girls."[164]

The abrogation of Article 370 and Kashmir forming an integral part of the Indian geo-body has long been central in the Hindu nationalist narratives of Kashmir. The growth of the Hindu nationalist movement and its accession to power in parliament with a decisive majority has given them the opportunity to enact this ideal. The BJP narrative, however, has been aided by the Congress narrative, which also sees Kashmir as a central part of the Indian nation. However, for the BJP, Congress was marked by a thoroughgoing weakness and an appeasement strategy which was not able to secure Kashmir thereby running the risk of losing it to Islamic fundamentalism. Therefore,

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[163] Kaul (2016).

[164] "BJP Workers Excited to Marry Fair Girls from Kashmir, Says UP MLA Vikram Saini." *The Wire*. August 7, 2019.

strong, decisive Hindu strength, animated by its steadfast commitment to its

"civilizational consciousness" needed to be exercised to ensure the future greatness of

the Hindutva nation.

4.6 Conclusion

In the aftermath of decolonization India emerged as a precarious and vulnerable

state, hypersensitive not only to external interference, but especially to internal

fragmentation. This condition of "postcolonial insecurity" and "cartographic anxiety"

required the building up of the nation along the lines of a nationalist imaginary.[165] This

imaginary was quite literally mapped onto India, as the territorial form of British India

provided the outline for a continuity of the Indian nation. For Nehru, the building of the

postcolonial Indian state required both a widespread and inclusive posture towards all

the regions within India, while simultaneously subjecting them to the undergirding

substrate which unifies them, that is, the state of India. On a conceptual level this was

most contentious in Kashmir, which was built into Pakistan's national imaginary as well,

by virtue of its geography and definition of nationhood. The immediate aftermath of

partition saw this conceptual competition manifest materially in the war over Kashmir.

Indian narratives regarding Kashmir have generally stressed one of two general

narratives over Kashmir, with the above noted conceptual overlap: the liberal

nationalism associated with the Congress party and the Hindu nationalist narrative

associated with the various groups of the *sangh parivar*, but most prominently the BJP.

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[165] Krishna (1994a); Chaturvedi (2000); Krishna (1999)

The liberal nationalist line sees Kashmir as emblematic of the diversity of Indian culture and its wide-ranging tolerance. Kashmir has different traditions and customs yet remains identifiably Indian. However, the rise in violence in Kashmir against the Indian state is seen as perpetrated by anti-Indian forces, possibly Pakistanis or Pakistanis who have perverted Kashmiris' self-expression. In order to provide good rule, and a return to "normalcy" for Kashmir, it needs to be entrusted to the central safeguards of Indian liberalism, to ensure that the peaceful, syncretic, *Kashmiriyat* can live on and thrive.

One central justification for Indian rule in Kashmir that liberal nationalists resort to is the internal plurality within Kashmir. The fates of minorities cannot be entrusted to the Kashmiri Muslims, but only to the good, tolerant, practiced Indian nation. This is, in some part, seen to be a broader shortcoming of the Indian Muslim community. To wit, Ramachandra Guha on the tragedy "that there has never been a robust movement of liberalism within the Muslim community. That remains an issue. Liberals must be consistent."[166] Navnita Chadha Behera also gives voice to this liberal uneasiness with granting self-rule to Kashmir: "[t]his plurality must be the uppermost consideration in formulating an appropriate policy framework for the peace process."[167] In a similar vein, stressing the role of women as perpetrators of violence in Kashmir, Swati Parashar points to anti-Indian violence as deployed by women in Kashmir as reactionary and motivated by Islamic fundamentalism, in ardent opposition to Indian liberal values,

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[166] Guha (2017).

[167] Behera (2006), p. 239.

which only plays into the fundamentalist Islamic subjugation of women.[168] This neglects

analyses like Inshah Malik's, which look at the structures of occupation and the

resistance movement within which women find themselves in Kashmir and their

strategies to assert their agency whilst navigating within this context.[169]

The Hindu nationalist narrative sees Kashmir as part of ancient and sacred India,

which has been overrun by Muslims. However, over the centuries, Islam is seen to have

taken from Hinduism the qualities of tolerance and nonviolence, in the form of Sufism.

This can be an appropriate Islam for India so long as it holds tight to its nonviolence and

political quietism. Article 370 was an appeasement strategy for the anti-national Sheikh

Abdullah, and because it was allowed to exist for so long, the Kashmiri anti-national

sentiment was allowed to fester within Kashmir, before eventually erupting in the

Kashmiri "insurgency," which manifested its perverse intolerance and Islamic

fundamentalism in its expulsion of the Kashmiri Pandits. The only rectification for this

state now requires forceful incorporation and quelling of violence.

Within Kashmir, the turn to the PDP was largely made by that party pointing to

the perceived sellouts made by the National Conference party to the Indian center since

1975, beginning with the Sheikh Abdullah-Indira Gandhi Accord, continuing through

Sheikh's crackdown during his tenure, his son Farooq Abdullah's hereditary accession

and the alliance he made with Rajiv Gandhi, eventually leading to the disastrous 1987

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[168] Parashar (2011).

[169] Malik (2015).

elections. The compromises made with New Delhi have worked to delegitimize both mainstream political parties in Jammu and Kashmir, the National Conference and the PDP, with respect to any commitment to the notion of *azadi*. The inability of the state to recognize any arrangement in which self-determination could possibly lead to a different, less New Delhi-centered, settlement of the state of Jammu and Kashmir which existed up until August 2019, has led only to a harsher, insecurity-driven extension of rule by military force. The narrative of the BJP and the steps taken towards Kashmir in the last months of 2019 signal the coming possibilities of mass ethnic cleansing, displacement, and/or an Indian settler colonial project in Kashmir.

Many independentist Kashmiris who see themselves as part of the *tehreek* operate on a temporal register that sees the present as a continuation of resistance against oppression and outside forces, a continual struggle for *azadi*. Kashmir's situation as a borderland region has allowed many of these Kashmiris to point to historical ties and trades routes in Central Asia, pointing to Kashgar, Yarkand, Bukhara, Samarkand, other parts of Khorasan, akin to Muhammad Iqbal's rendering of Kashmir as "Little Iran." This is a move to define Kashmir in opposition to South Asian nationalisms, and a means to reclaim a broader geography for Kashmir in order to destabilize the ossified naturalization of Kashmir as a region within South Asia.[170]

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[170] Kaul (2011) notes how, since the 1990s, "many Kashmiris, if not the largest mass of them, have looked anywhere but to their south for cultural, religious and political orientation," p. 74.

This aspect of the Kashmir question, the brutal crackdown and oppression by the Indian state, and the ways in which Kashmiris seek to define themselves inside of and against this oppression, has been quite inadequately studied in existing International Relations and Political Science literature, with only a very few exceptions. Most often, this is due to a myopic methodological nationalism which proves unable to provide any subjectivity for Kashmiris that would be independent of reductionisms to Pakistan or India.[171] Faheem expresses this frustration when he points to "[e]xperts" who see protests as proxy war by Pakistan to disturb peace in Valley, "or at best, they are impulsive response of Kashmiris' to certain grievances. This understanding presents the Kashmiri population as a set of gullible individuals who are mere dummies. This portrayal refuses to acknowledge Kashmiris as self-affirmed rational actors capable of collective action."[172]

From this portrayal of the two dominant national narratives on Kashmir, it should be evident that the Indian nationalist discourse, liberal or Hindu nationalist, replicates many of the framing devices and features from the colonial period. This has

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[171] The way in which Christine Fair (2019), coming from the perspective of counterterrorism studies and a thoroughgoing commitment to methodological nationalism, in her exuberance to cast all blame on Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalism, despite, in line with standard Indian liberal middle-ground strategies, pointing to some problems with Hindu nationalism, nevertheless, reverts to an espousal of the standard liberal Indian nationalist position on Kashmir. Navnita Chadha Behera (2000; 2006), despite rightly pointing to problems with modernity's state-centrism, does not at all seek to problematize the conceptual epistemological underpinnings, and ends up just reifying sub-state identities, with which majority-Muslim Kashmir cannot be entrusted to safeguard, thus defaulting back to Indian liberal paternalism. Stephen Saideman (2005), in his attempt to understand the Kashmir issue through the problem of irredentism, ends up appearing to shoehorn Kashmir as a case study into his guiding theoretical frame, sacrificing the complexities and valences of the Kashmiri public.

[172] Faheem (2016).

been pointed out explicitly in the works of Goldie Osuri, Nitasha Kaul, Dibyesh Anand, and Suvir Kaul.[173] Osuri points to how the transfer of sovereignty not legitimated by the popular will of the people over which it is exercised can allow us to look at Indian nationalist sovereignty as exercising imperial and colonial techniques of power inherited from the British: "[d]emocracy is made to serve territorial nationalism, a discourse within which occupation, as an ongoing war on the frontiers of the state, plays the role of a kind of nationalistic glue that artificially binds the nation together."[174] Anand compares India's Kashmir policy with the Chinese policy in Tibet, labelling them as instances of "postcolonial informal empire," highlighting the ways in which a nation's internal peripheries at the borderlands, which consist of ethnic others, are "minoritized" by the nationalist programs at the center. With respect to Kashmir, he notes that "[w]hile the mainstream secularist and the rising Hindu nationalist visions differ on what parts of history to use, both draw sustenance from the supposed uniqueness of Indian civilizational history."[175] Suvir Kaul draws attention to how the Indian state

> acts primarily to preserve the boundaries of the union in the form inherited from
> the British empire…. In key areas, however, the Indian state has confirmed and
> enhanced the doctrines and methods it inherited from British colonial law and

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[173] Osuri (2017); Kaul (2011); Anand (2012); In the words of NItasha Kaul (2019), "[t]here's a word for supposed development that comes with assumed moral superiority and economic rationality, in the shadow of the gun, with no input from the people affected, and based on the fantasies of a foreign power… Kashmiris are claimed in the name of democracy and further colonized in the name of development."

[174] Osuri (2017), p. 2439.

[175] Anand (2012), p. 76.

policy. Prime among these is the dogma that once the departing British had defined the external boundaries of the nation (however opportunistically and inexactly), the populations within them were not to be allowed the right to self-determination.[176]

These defenses of boundaries were regarded as of prime importance, against both external enemies and secessionist movements or movements seeking different forms of autonomy, as in Kashmir.[177] Kaul then points to the structure of the state itself in the postcolonial context, deriving from and informed by the logic of the colonial state, which "stunt[s] any possibility of political thought and action that respects modes of collective being other than those defined by a coercive form of national belonging."[178] This points to further problems in works operating within the confines of methodological nationalism, and their inability to grant Kashmiris agency outside of pro- or anti-Indian or -Pakistani political subjectivities. These interventions also prompt reflection on the many continuities between state-building and empire-building projects, such as those demonstrated in this chapter.

This chapter has attempted to show how the dominant Indian nationalist narratives reproduce and rework older Orientalist renderings of Indian civilization. According to these renderings, the conceptual parameters that constitute a civilization

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[176] Kaul (2011), p. 67.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Ibid., p. 71.

and mark its boundaries and differences are largely accepted, yet the specific ways in

which Indian civilization is constituted, and the content by which it is constituted,

becomes a matter of contestation. This debate takes place within a bounded territorial

framework, which provides the underlying geopolitical and civilizational unity to either

this Indian panoply or the dominant Hindutva culture. The international structures of

postcolonial ontological insecurity accentuate a cartographic anxiety regarding any

territorial loss or fragmentation, which would be regarded as a loss of a defining part of

the Indian self and propel a sense of ontological vertigo.[179] The policies undertaken by

Indian nationalists with respect to Kashmir then largely mirror the spectrum of imperial

policies towards the colonies, from imperial liberalism to the fascistic exercise of power

over subjugated dispossessed others that Aimé Césaire located at the core of colonial

project.[180]

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[179] For ontological security in international relations, see Steele (2008).

[180] Césaire (2000 [1950]).

Conclusion

This dissertation has analyzed the situation of Kashmir from within a number of layered discursive framings, specifically using those which conform to the state-nation-territory triad, namely, liberalism/imperialism, civilizationalism, and geopolitics, respectively.

The discourse on Kashmir has set the contours within which policy options regarding Kashmir have been framed and its status vis-à-vis the Indian geo-body. By tracing continuities from the colonial to the postcolonial era with respect to this discursive framing, the argument is made that Indian policy towards Kashmir is effectively one of postcolonial colonialism, which is shaped not merely due to the strategic environment and regional animosity with Pakistan within which India finds itself, but also, its history, shaped by a postcolonial insecurity in a hierarchically structured international arena effectively built by and for powerful and imperial states. The two broad narratives on Kashmir which emerge during the postcolonial period are two variants of nationalism meant to solidify territorial unity, the liberal Congress and right-wing Hindu nationalism.

Chapter one attempted to draw on revisionist histories of the international system in order to explore how the international structures which were erected throughout the twentieth century perpetuated and universalized forms of racial and civilizational inequalities, predicated on an understanding of civilizational attainment rooted in the Western European and settler colonial experiences. This chapter provides the theoretical backdrop for the intervention being made in this dissertation.

The subject matter of this chapter might be considered an intuitive claim that has not been taken up until recently in most histories of the emergence of the discipline of International Relations, that is, that the liberal structures created by mostly European and American individuals with deep-seated senses of selfhood rooted in the notions of race and Western civilization, might have far-reaching consequences for those non-white, non-Western others. This is shown in the chapter by the ways in which an ostensibly universalizable liberalism has combined with racializing and temporalizing anthropologies locating others either in a distant past or otherwise sequestered from the benefits of civilization. The chapter also goes on to show how the twentieth-century state system was grounded in these civilizational understandings as well as ideas of territoriality which received their fullest expression in imperial expansion. It then shows how civilizationalism was intimately tied to territoriality.

Chapter two looked at the specific ways in which discourses of civilization, geopolitics, liberalism, and imperialism intersected and augmented each other in the context of the British colonial enterprise in India. This included mapping practices and ethnological cataloguing which were later written into the geographical imagination of what constituted British India. Liberalism and imperialism had a troublesome relationship but combined in such a way as to either deny or indefinitely delay self-government. Liberal justifications of imperialism were deployed in order to anthropologize or racialize difference, the most pervasive justificatory arguments were rooted in ideas of Indian civilization and the assumed equation between Western civilization ("as fact") and civilizational aptitude ("as ideal"). The section on racialization

and civilization shows how these concepts were linked in the setting of British imperial rule over India. This further shows how the British worked to denominate different civilizational milieus in India, primarily the Hindu and Muslim civilizational blocs, but also sub-civilizational units, like Kashmiris. It also demonstrated how the discussion on civilization drew on racial bases, originally elaborated within a Biblical origin structure, then historicized with reference primarily to language or the later development racial categories. This was intimately tied to the work of the Orientalists in India, who privileged textual, and upper-class and upper-caste representations of denominational groups as ideal types.

Lastly, the chapter shows how the territorial region known as South Asia today was created through the British imperial project during the Great Game. The assignation of unity to the South Asian region produced ideas of about how civilizational milieus mapped onto the region. Kashmir, as a borderland region, then came to be considered as part of the mélange of Indian civilization.

Chapter three looked at a few major anti-colonial figures, analyzing the modes by which their mobilization of collective identity drew on earlier colonialist tropes regarding the parameters of identity. It attempted to show how anti-colonial agitators attempted to valorize their scripted identities, challenging the content but not the contours of the definitions of collective identity. In the phrasing of Anouar Abdel-Malek and Partha Chatterjee, changing the content of the thematic, if not the ethical and epistemological justificatory structures of the problematic.

This chapter looked at some of the ways that anti-colonial agitators in British India responded to these discourses of territoriality, civilizationalism, and liberalism, primarily by stressing civilizational unity present within the grouping for which they wished to proclaim independence. In the writers described here, this came with an implicit geopolitical orientation, largely derived from how they conceived of the territorializtion of civilizations. Afghani pointed to pan-Islamic ties, with possible openings for alliances with other colonized peoples against the conceits of Western civilization. For Choudhry Rahmat Ali, independence for Pakistan came with implicit alliances with other states in the Muslim world. For the Greater India Society, past Indian contact and trade areas were reconceptualized as early colonization efforts, thereby showing Indians as possessing civilization by their ability to colonize. Tagore looked to pan-Asian unity with, perhaps, a selective borrowing from preferred elements of Western civilization. Traditionalists like Gandhi saw Western civilization as degraded and materialistic, and pointed to India's spirituality as its strength. Radhakrishnan went further to establish some central defining qualities of Western and Eastern civilizations, which lent themselves quite easily to reification. Hindu chauvinists drew on the idea of India as an essentially Hindu nation and stressed the need to develop strength and unity in order to achieve a leading role on the world stage, on a par with and aspirationally surpassing Western civilization.

The ideas developed here emerged out of the narratives on Indian civilization established in the second chapter, wherein not only were essential qualities written onto groupings, but the metrics by which civilizational attainment was assessed was also

accepted in large part. Vivekananda, Gandhi, Aurobindo, and Radhakrishnan, could thus question the equation by which the Westerners established their superiority, that is, by their material advancement, but accepted definitions of the Hindu or Eastern self as governed by a different mind and not prone to material advancement, having their primary concern with spiritual matters. Or, contrarily, the acceptance that material superiority somehow connoted advanced civilizational status, as in Afghani's attempt to rectify a supposed Islamic Dark Age.

Chapter four then focused in on the relationship between the Indian state and Kashmir in the years after Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947. The first section looked at the dual personality of Nehru: simultaneously fighting for decolonization and rights of independent expression in the Third World, while bounding Kashmiri self-expression within the confines of the Indian state. The chapter went on to analyze how the twin pillars of Indian identity, secularism and socialism, mutated in the period after Nehru. Similarly, the definition of Kashmiri identity had to negotiate the political relationship within which it found itself vis-à-vis the Indian union. Enunciations of Kashmiri identity during these years drew on tropes of Indian identity, establishing a similarity of contours, if not content. The last sections looked at the period of the *tehreek* in Kashmir, against the state structures in India and Jammu and Kashmir, emphasizing how India's boundedness to its territorial identity prompted an aggressive repression of any Kashmiri enunciation of *azadi*. The chapter ends with a look at the BJP's narrative of Kashmir and its stress on the civilizational identity of India, viewing any assertive articulation of *Kashmiriyat* as illegitimate and inauthentic.

In looking at deployments of *Kashmiriyat* stress was placed on the

correspondence which rendered its definition more or less commensurate with that of

India selfhood. It was pointed out that this rested upon a territorialization of Kashmir,

which we saw carried over from the colonial era, and which was written into the

narrative of Indian national identity. Developing out of that, are the two main narratives

on Kashmir in Indian politics, the paternalist liberalism of the Congress party and the

aggressive and, in the recent years of the Modi administration, fascist moves to

forcefully incorporate Kashmir into India, seen especially with the scrapping of Article

370 in August 2019. Congress narratives worked on developing a Kashmiri identity

compatible with the idea of a broad, multiethnic Indian society. However, this was one

which largely paralleled the Congress's line on Indian identity developed under Nehru.

The Hindu nationalist reading of Kashmir is a reaction against what is seen as Congress

appeasement and preferential treatment given to minorities, which requires

rectification by forceful assertion. The BJP line on Kashmiri identity holds open the

possibility of Kashmiri Muslims being incorporated into the Indian state, but only in the

role of silent Sufis who accept Hindu political control of India.

In large measure, the aggressive policies taken by the Indian state toward

Kashmir in the years after independence have been responses to an international

system which predicated statehood on territorial, and thus national, unity. The

postcolonial cartographic anxiety of the Indian state is further propelled by a fear of

disintegration. Moreover, the policies taken towards Kashmir by the state of India

indicate the vestiges of imperial policy in the present. This also points to the ways in

which modalities of the imperial era have been ingrained into the imperatives of state unity.

In closing, unless sufficiently challenged by forces seeking to redefine Indian nationalism, little will change with respect to India's policy vis-à-vis Kashmir. As Stuart Hall noted with respect to political discourse in Great Britain in the late 1970s, the exacerbation of contradictions, or distances between political positions being enunciated, most often leads to settlement at a point closer to the extremist position than would have been possible before.[1] With respect to Kashmir, this would lead to a fear that the evisceration of Article 370 will not be reversed, but perhaps, the Congress party or coalition, in the event of an electoral victory, will stop short of the settler colonial project, which is presently being endorsed by the BJP.

Positive signs do seem to be emerging from the mass protests held at a number of universities throughout India against the policies of the BJP. But as the BJP increases thresholds of opposition, such as their acts with the recently passed citizenship bill and the national registry, which blatantly favor Hindu populations, the struggle for Kashmiri determination gets lost in the crowd. On the one hand, that MP Kavita Krishnan and several Muslim MPs have been vocally outspoken in opposition to the actions of the BJP in Kashmir is a sign of possible change. On the other hand, the gaping silence across

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[1] Hall (1979). In Hall's case, this is a response to those accelerationist Marxists who optimistically look to more aggressively right-wing capitalist policies in order to bring the contradictions between what these capitalist politicians say to the working classes about the policies they are endorsing and the ways in which the same policies actually affect the working classes into sharper relief.

much of the Congress party, including many Muslim MPs, and the vociferous

denunciation of any opposition as anti-national by the BJP leads one to make a much

more pessimistic prognostication.

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PRESENTATIONS

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"Asserting Religion as a Human Right vis-a-vis the Securitization of Religion in a Secular Age" presented at International Studies Association Annual Meeting, March 17, 2011, Montreal, QC.

"Geopolitics of the Kashmir Issue" presented at International Studies Association Annual Meeting, March 29, 2014, Toronto, ON.

"Critical Geopolitics of Kashmir" presented at Kashmir Studies Preconference at the Annual Conference on South Asia, October 16, 2014, Madison, WI.

""Kashmir Is an Integral Part of India": Interrogating Territorial Integrity with Reference to Sovereignty in the Princely States" presented at International Studies Association-Northeast Annual Meeting, November 8, 2014, Baltimore, MD.

"How "Postcolonial" Was Nehru, Really? Interrogating the Postcoloniality of India with Respect to Kashmir in the Nehru Era" presented at International Studies Association Annual Meeting, February 22, 2017, Baltimore, MD.

"Geopolitics and Civilization: The Discourse Surrounding Kashmir" presented at International Studies Association Annual Meeting, February 22, 2017, Baltimore, MD.

"The Imperial Geopolitical Origins of IR: Curzon, Mackinder, the Great Game, and British India" presented at International Studies Association Annual Meeting, April 5, 2018, San Francisco, CA.

"Liberalism, Civilization, and Geopolitics: Discursive Entanglements in British India and their Aftereffects" presented at International Studies Association-Northeast Annual Meeting, November 3, 2018, Baltimore, MD.

"Turning on the Light? The Role of Optimism in Research and Pedagogy" (roundtable), presented at Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting, March 2, 2019, Tampa, FL.

"Insaniyat, Kashmiriyat, Jamhooriyat: The Indian Delegitimization of Kashmiri Revolt as Religious" presented at International Studies Association-Midwest, November 23, 2019, St. Louis, MO.