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Sexual Offender Residency Issues and Recidivism in South Florida

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SEXUAL OFFENDER RESIDENCY ISSUES AND RECIDIVISM IN SOUTH FLORIDA

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by

Joelle Amanda Lee-Silcox

2020

To: Dean John F. Stack, Jr.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs

This dissertation, written by Joelle Amanda Lee-Silcox, and entitled Sexual Offender Residency Issues and Recidivism in South Florida, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

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Stewart J. D'Alessio

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Jamie L. Flexon, Major Professor

Date of Defense: March 24, 2020

The dissertation of Joelle Amanda Lee-Silcox is approved.

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Florida International University, 2020

DEDICATION

To my mom, who passed away at a young age, thank you for believing in me, for your encouragement, and your unconditional love. Mom, we did it!

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Joelle Lee-Silcox

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

SEXUAL OFFENDER RESIDENCY ISSUES AND RECIDIVISM

IN SOUTH FLORIDA

by

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Professor Jamie L. Flexon, Major Professor

This paper explores registered sexual offender (RSO) residency restrictions, unintended consequences of these restrictions, including clustering, shared sub-culture, and recidivism within the Tri-County area of Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties of Florida. While Florida Statute 775.215 (FLRR) bans RSOs from living within 1,000 feet of any school, childcare facility, park, or playground, individual county and municipal ordinances add-on to these boundaries, effectively banishing some RSOs to slivers of land in clusters. These clusters often settle in socially disorganized neighborhoods that lack informal control, needed treatment and rehabilitative services, and are located away from family and employment opportunities. Through the use of ArcGIS Pro 2.4.2, SPSS 26.0, and HLM 8.0, this paper examines variables associated with violating FLRR, whether or not RSOs in the Tri-County area live in socially disorganized communities, and what effect clustering and homelessness contribute to the recidivism of RSOs. Using FLRR as a guideline, 41% of RSOs in the Tri-County area that violate buffer zones are less likely to be classified as sexual predators, have victims under 18, and are homeless. Furthermore, for every one unit increase in socially

disorganized areas, groups of clustered RSOs are 118% more likely to cluster within those areas. Lastly, the probability of recidivism for a transient RSO to be rearrested increases by 209% over those who reside in a home, and those RSOs who live in a cluster are 14% more likely to recidivate. These unintended consequences of sex offender residency restrictions laws created through a perpetual state of moral panic provide a false sense of security for the public and exacerbate an already complex issue.

Keywords: sexual offender, residency restrictions, transient offenders, social disorganization, unintended consequences, moral panic, subculture theory, inverse weighted distance, hierarchical linear modeling, synthetic clusters, Florida, Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

American Civil Liberties Union	ACLU
American Community Survey	ACS
Association of Maternal and Child Health Programs	AMCHP
Broward County Sheriff's Office	BSO
Colorado Department of Public Safety	CDPS
Combined DNA Index System	CODIS
Department of Justice	DOJ
Federal Bureau of Investigations	FBI
Florida Department of Law Enforcement	FDLE
Florida Geographic Data Library	FGDL
Florida Department of Corrections	FLDOC
Florida International University	FIU
Florida State Statute 775.215	FLRR
Geographic Information Systems	GIS
Hierarchical General Linear Modeling	HGLM
Hierarchical Linear Modeling	HLM
Inverse distance weighted interpolation	IDW

Matthew 25 Ministries	M25M
Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners	MDBCC
Miami-Dade Police Department	MDPD
Minnesota Department of Corrections	MNDOC
Not-in-my-backyard	NIMBY
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability	OPPAGA
Registered sexual offenders	RSO
Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, & Tracking	SMART
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act	SORNA
Sex offender residency restriction	SORR
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences	SPSS
Scientific Software International	SSI
United States Census Bureau	USCB
Violence Risk Scale – Sexual Offender	VRS-SO

I. INTRODUCTION

A handful of publicized cases concerning registered sexual offenders (RSOs) and their residential placement within the community has driven lawmakers to pass heavy residential restrictions on RSOs (Levenson & Cotter, 2005b). For example, Florida State Statute 775.215 (FLRR), residency restrictions for a person convicted of certain sex offenses, restricts RSOs from residing within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, or childcare facilities (Florida Department of Law Enforcement [FDLE], 2015). However, within each county (e.g., Miami-Dade and Broward Counties) and city more restrictive requirements are often imposed by ordinance to 2,500 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, childcare facilities, bus stops, libraries, and other locations children are likely to congregate (Broward County Sheriff's Office [BSO], 2015). These state and local ordinances were passed to protect potential victims, mostly children, by prohibiting RSOs contact with target-rich environments (Agan & Prescott, 2014). Even though there have been countless studies which state that excessive residency restrictions exacerbate and create "danger zones" of clustered sex offenders, counties and cities are continuing to pass more stringent residency requirements (Duwe, 2009; Levenson et al., 2013; Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009; Wartell, 2009; Wilson, 2009).

On November 5, 2015, Florida included over 70,000 RSOs on the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) registry (FDLE, 2015). Once confined, dead, and deported RSOs were removed from this list, about 47,000 RSOs remained (FDLE, 2015). Approximately 4% of those offenders were transient or had absconded, making it difficult for law enforcement to find and maintain tabs on this specific population (FDLE, 2015). Nevertheless, with additions to FLRR by counties and municipalities creating

more stringent residency restrictions, transient offenders who try to abide by these restrictions live on the street, often being displaced and upheaved from one neighborhood to another (CBS Miami, 2012; Lantigua, 2009; Levenson et al., 2013; Linhardt, 2009; McCoy, 2014; Rabin et al., 2013). Within the past ten years in South Florida, city officials and law enforcement displaced RSOs from living under a bridge or on a street corner in deplorable conditions, exposed to the elements (CBS Miami, 2012; Duwe, 2009; Hanks, 2018; Levenson et al., 2013; Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; Linhardt, 2009; McCoy, 2014; Odzer & Hamacher, 2012; Rabin, 2014; Rabin et al., 2013; Reutter, 2015; Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009; The Huffington Post, 2012). After local politicians created parks and changed residency restrictions to practically ban RSOs from living in their communities, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) stepped in and sued the local governments on behalf of RSOs (Hanks, 2018; Hearne, 2015).

Adding to this ever-growing high profile regarding the treatment of sex offenders in Florida, several award-winning documentaries portrayed these sex offender enclaves. Sundance Film Fest winner in 2015, the documentary *Pervert Park* (Barkfors & Barkfors, 2015) depicted 120 RSOs, their life, and struggle to live in a mobile home park in St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida (Sundance Institute, 2016). The film put a spotlight on Florida's RSOs again. As the winner of the Albert Maysles New Documentary Director award, Feige uncovers layers of hurt, anger, and confusion surrounding South Florida RSO residence restrictions and the powerful lobbyists behind these laws in *Untouchable* (2016). With *Banished* (Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018), The Marshall Project adds to the ever-growing illustration that in South Florida, RSO's living conditions are deplorable, often resorting to living in makeshift shacks, tents, and in their

cars at night. While the public's reaction might be unsympathetic, academics and law enforcement officers warn the blowback of this destabilization in living environments for RSOs may manifest in the form of clustering, recidivism, and transience, all of which diminish public safety at large (Barnes et al., 2009, Casady, 2009; Minnesota Department of Corrections [MNDOC], 2003).

Currently, a lacuna exists in the literature regarding addressing the totality of this issue within major urban areas like Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties in Florida. Given this dearth of critical information, this study aims to measure if RSOs residing in this Tri-County area are violating FLRR by living within 1,000 feet of a school, childcare facility, park, or playground, establish if clusters of RSOs fall within criminogenic, socially disorganized areas, and determine if these clusters increase the rate of recidivism by promoting a subculture of deviance within socially disorganized areas, both of which are critical factors to recidivism within several studies (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2015).

State and Federal Laws

Given the moral panic surrounding the laws that govern restrictions, permissible areas to live, and the resulting clusters of RSOs that emerge as a result of these laws, studying the unintended consequences of these policies behooves the public and policymakers. Toward this end, a comprehensive look at the history of residency restrictions, laws, and changes over time leads to a greater understanding of public outcry and sentiment surrounding sexual offenders and the progression of these laws on a state and federal level. While there is a multitude of laws about sex offenders, below are the

foremost and salient federal and state laws about RSOs. The review of such will provide significant context to nest the current investigation.

Before 1994, few states required sex offenders to register addresses with local law enforcement offices. That would all change in the passing of the Jacob Wetterling Act, a federal law that began with the highly publicized kidnapping, sexual molestation, and murder of Jacob Erwin Wetterling by a stranger, Danny James Heinrich, on October 22, 1989, in Minnesota. During the initial investigation regarding the kidnapping of Jacob, law enforcement shared with Jacob's mom, Patty Wetterling, that a suspect list, resembling a sexual offender registry, would assist in the initial search and questioning of suspects (Lehrer, 2016). These events, and through Mrs. Wetterling's lobbying efforts, led Minnesota to establish the first public sex-offender state registry (Lehrer, 2016). Three years later, in 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act passed Congress. The Jacob Wetterling Act constructed rules for tracking sex offenders by states. It required states to monitor the residency of sex offenders annually for ten years after their release, or in the case of violent sex crimes, RSOs would need to update their residence every three months for the rest of their lives (Department of Justice [DOJ], n.d.).

As an amendment to the Jacob Wetterling Act and passed in 1996, Megan's Law requires law enforcement to notify the community regarding the residences of RSOs and publishes these records on the internet (DOJ, n.d.; Lehrer, 2016). Megan's Law named memorially for the child victim, Megan Kanaka. In 1994, a neighbor, previously convicted of sexual offenses against children, raped and murdered Megan. Considering the tragic events involving their daughter, the Kanakas lobbied to reform laws regarding

sex offenders citing the lack of public knowledge that a sex offender lived in their neighborhood; and therefore, the Kanakas were uninformed and unprepared to protect their family (Corrigan, 2006; Jerome & Eftimiades, 1995). Under this law, each state determines what information (name, picture, address, offense, etc.) is made publicly available, as well as how community members would receive the information. (DOJ, n.d.).

Under FLRR, law enforcement agencies in Florida, such as the county or city police, are given the discretion to notify the public of sexual predators' residences in a manner they choose toward facilitating public protection (The Florida Legislature, 2015). FDLE maintains and publishes a public registry of sexual offenders and predators in all counties in Florida, including the following information: first, middle, and last names, incarceration status, predator or offender status, sex, race, hair and eye colors, height, weight, birth date, permanent, temporary, and transient addresses, if the victim was a minor, and pictures of the offenders (FDLE, 2015). For example in Collier County, Florida, the Collier County Sheriff's Office uses multiple avenues to deliver community notification besides the internet such as distributing a bulletin with the offender information with their name, photo, and address to school resource officers, district patrol deputies, licensed daycares within a one-mile radius of the offender's address, residents of the neighborhood where the offender will reside, public and private schools, bus drivers, and to the local news media to be broadcast (Collier County Sheriff's Office, 2018). In other Florida counties, like Bradford, the Bradford County Police Department installed large red signs outside of homes where sexual predators reside under the

umbrella of following the public notification clause within FLRR and Megan's Law (Tate, 2013).

In September 1995, South Florida news headlined stories about the kidnapping, violent sexual battery, murder, and subsequent dismemberment of nine-year-old Jimmy Ryce by a stranger. His death and its circumstances prompted an outcry for justice and additional constraints for sexual predators (Presley, 1999). The Florida Legislature passed and enacted the Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and Care Act, also known as the Jimmy Ryce Act in 1998. This Act provides that sexual offenders, even upon release from incarceration, can be indefinitely detained in custody for further evaluation and, if deemed that they posed a risk for re-offense, civilly committed (Correct Care Solutions, n.d.). Currently, these offenders awaiting civil commitment trials reside in Arcadia, Florida, at the Florida Civil Commitment Center (Correct Care Solutions, n.d.). As of 2014, over 70 men at this Center await civil commitment trials, some waiting ten years for their trial (Salzhauer & Gordon, 2014).

In early 2005, in Central Florida, nine-year-old Jessica Lunsford was taken from her home, raped, and buried alive by a sexually recidivistic career criminal. Jessica's father, Mark Lunsford, lobbied for and helped pass the Jessica Lunsford Act or Jessica's Law in the Florida legislature in Florida in late 2005, as well as in forty states subsequently (Frank, 2010). Jessica's Law instituted a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years for those committing specific sexual acts against children up to eleven years old (Hawke, 2005). It also requires sexual predators to register biannually and lifetime electronic monitoring for certain offenders (Hawke, 2005). Additionally, the Act called

for background screenings for non-employees, i.e., contractors working at schools (FDLE, 2018a).

Daughter of one of the most influential lobbyists in Florida, Lauren Book, was molested by her nanny for six years. Once Ron Book, Lauren's father, found out about the abuse, he went on a crusade to increase sex offender residency restrictions. The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, or Lauren's Law, passed in 2005. It creates a 2,500-foot buffer zone around any school, thus prohibiting sexual predators and offenders from having victims under the age of 16 from residing within that area (The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, 2005). Also, RSOs are restricted from being in a county or city park or childcare center when a minor under sixteen years old is present unless the RSO is the parent or guardian of a child in the park or dropping or picking up their child enrolled at the facility (The Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, 2005). Soon after its passage, over 60 other municipalities and counties in Florida followed suit by creating 2,500-foot restrictions, a substantial expansion from the state statute of 1,000-foot residency restriction surrounding schools, parks, playgrounds, public bus stops or childcare facilities (FDLE, 2015; Reischel, 2006; Skipp, 2009). ACLU continues to fight Miami-Dade County and other cities in the Tri-County area, given the lack of allowable living locations under the sex offender residency restrictions (SORRs), and the resulting inhumane living conditions that transient RSOs dwell in attributable to the SORRs (Hearne, 2015).

In another Florida connection, on July 27, 2006, the 25th anniversary of the abduction of six-year-old Adam Walsh from Hollywood Mall located in Hollywood, Florida, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act or Sex

Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). In effect and historically, SORNA became the most comprehensive legislation regarding sexual offenders. Title 1 of SORNA revised the state's implementation of registration and notification (DOJ, n.d.). SORNA increased jurisdiction to federally-recognized Indian tribes, expanded the number of sex offenses that must be maintained through registration, retroactively applied several provisions, and launched the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office) within the Department of Justice to help further and support states with this revised system (DOJ, n.d.). Unlike previous iterations of laws about sex offenders, failure to comply with SORNA by 2010, came with a hefty price - losing up to 10% of a state's Omnibus Crime federal funding:

> For any fiscal year after the end of the period for implementation, a jurisdiction that fails, as deemed by the Attorney General, to substantially implement this subchapter shall not receive 10 percent of the funds that would otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction under subpart 1 of part E of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et seq.) (2006, p. 8248).

However, to date, only 17 states (including Florida), three territories, and 63 tribes successfully satisfied the SORNA requirements (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2014; Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehension, Registration, and Tracking [SMARTb], 2018). Some states fail to comply because the costly overhaul required for implementation is prohibitive (Lyons, 2011). While other states' lawmakers, such as those in Texas and California, declare they know how to handle their RSOs without a federal mandate (Lyons, 2011).

Since SORNA currently presides as the primary and dominant law regarding RSOs, a more in-depth analysis is needed surrounding sections that govern registering and monitoring sex offenders and each state's registry. For each state to be considered SORNA compliant, they must follow guidelines within five areas related to registration and notification of sex offenders: 1) mandated offenses and offenders to be included in the sex offender registry, 2) states must track and penalize absconders from the sex offender registry, 3) community notification must be put in place, 4) offender appearance and verification checks must be conducted, and 5) states must share information across law enforcement agencies (SMART, 2018a).

The first section of SORNA concentrates on offenses and offenders, specifically the inclusion of juvenile crimes, state, tribe, territory, federal and military crimes, and foreign country offenses (SMART, 2018a). Furthermore, the section mandates that each state categorizes types of offenders according to the crimes committed by tier (Tier 1 being the on the lower end of serious crimes, and Tier 3 being the most severe), and adds that before being released from incarceration, the RSO must register on the public registry. Furthermore, SORNA mandates that states must retain the following registration information for each RSO: name including nicknames, pseudonyms, ethnic or tribal names, physical description including any identifying marks or tattoos, dates of birth – reported and actual, social security number – real and any additional used by the RSO, residential addresses that the RSO either resides at, will live at, or is most known to live at, phone numbers including landline, cell phones, and any other phone number habitually used by the RSO, and employment information such as name and address of employer, school name and address. In addition to the items mentioned above, the state

must also retain records about an RSO's criminal history (dates of arrests, dates of convictions, adjudication status, outstanding arrest warrants, DNA sample to be input into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), fingerprints, palm prints to be submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) central database, photocopy of valid driver's license or identification, digitized copies of passports and immigration documents, internet identifiers such as email addresses, instant messaging addresses or names, and any other usernames or monikers used on the internet. Furthermore, the state must record an RSO's information about vehicle information for any land, air, or water motorized vehicles, including license plate number, registration number, description, and temporary or permanent locations of each vehicle, and a photograph of the RSO to be taken by law enforcement every time the RSO makes an appearance. Additionally, SORNA and the SMART office requires that states retroactively apply these standards to those previously convicted (SMART, 2018a, p. 17).

Secondly, each state must try to track suspected absconders and those failing to appear to register. State authorities can also inform local and federal law enforcement, prosecutors, and the original jurisdiction in case the offender fails to appear to register (SMART, 2018a). Each state, tribe, and territory is also required to operate a public registry website (SMART, 2018a). Accordingly, the website must be current and post all SORNA required offenders and their information. Offender information includes name and aliases, residential address, employer address, school address, physical description, photograph, the criminal history of sex offenses, current offense, vehicle information, such as license plate number and vehicle description, is also included. The website allows

for an email notification system to be used by the public when an RSO lives in or moves out of a determined geographic range or zip code (SMART, 2018a).

In tracking offender verification and appearance, SORNA guidelines mandate that for each tier of an offender, RSOs must make in-person appearances to law enforcement agencies to reregister, take a current photograph, and verify information (SMART, 2018a). Tier 1 offenders must appear and register once a year for fifteen years, and Tier 2 offenders must appear and register every six months for twenty-five years. Tier 3 offenders are required to register every three months for the rest of their lives (SMART, 2018a).

Whenever an RSO registers or updates their registration, SORNA further requires that each state must immediately notify each jurisdiction where the RSO will reside, resides, is an employee or a student, or will be an employee or a student. Such notice includes notifying local law enforcement, prosecutor offices, probation agencies, or any other agency that conducts employment background checks (SMART, 2018a). Law enforcement agencies completing community notifications within their jurisdictions regarding the RSOs must also be notified (SMART, 2018a).

On May 18, 2010, the Department of Justice declared that Florida "substantially implemented" SORNA, and as a result, would not be penalized because of compliance with the federal mandate (Office of Justice Programs, 2010). In Florida, the job of housing and maintaining the State's Registry falls on the FDLE. Per SORNA guidelines, FDLE hosts and maintains a website with RSO information (FDLE, 2015). Information about RSOs including neighborhood searching capabilities of RSOs, absconded RSOs, a subscription alert system regarding notification of RSOs within a given area, and a

multitude of additional pages connected to the site regarding laws surrounding RSOs, alerts, etc. is available (FDLE, 2018).

Maintaining and implementing changes to the Florida Sex Offender and Predator Registry according to SORNA guidelines can be costly in time, money, and resources. Recently, the Florida Legislature approved $7.1 million for the first of three upgrades to the registry database maintained by FDLE (Ciabotti, Byrd, & Clark, 2018). Additionally, each county or municipal law enforcement agency conducts at least one in-person address verification per year per RSO (Ciabotti et al., 2018). In the cases of sexual predators, law enforcement performs three or more in-person address verifications per year (Ciabotti et al., 2018). Furthermore, RSOs must register with their local law enforcement agency within 48 hours of release from prison. Depending upon their classification of either a sexual offender or sexual predator, they are required to re-register two or four times a year with their local law enforcement agency (FDLEb, 2018). If any information changes, such as a vehicle, address, or any of the required fields as determined by SORNA, RSOs must update their record; failure to do so can result in registry violation with punishments ranging from fines to incarceration (Ciabotti et al., 2018). Also, some law enforcement agencies charge RSOs fees to register ($19-$75), re-register ($5-$25), and update their records ($5-$10); and failure to pay these fees results in sending the fine to collections (Ciabotti et al., 2018). Transient offenders pose another level of investment in time and resources for law enforcement agencies, as transient RSOs must check in every thirty days with local law enforcement (Ciabotti et al., 2018). Conducting in-person address checks prove difficult as transient offenders may be living in the woods or have

their address listed as a street corner if they sleep on the sidewalk or under a bridge (Ciabotti et al., 2018; Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018).

Another layer of SORNA compliance includes community notifications, which law enforcement agencies deliver in several different ways, including, through their website, distribution of posters or flyers, using third-party software like Offender Watch, face-to-face conversations, emails, phone calls, and or letters (Ciabotti et al., 2018). In addition to complying with SORNA, the Florida Department of Corrections (FLDOC), State Attorney's Office, Public Defender's Office, local law enforcement, and in some cases, treatment providers work to supervise an RSO's probation, conditional release, and community control supervision. These terms entail monitoring treatment, conducting house, work, and electronics checks, electronic monitoring devices on RSOs, and frequently working together to ensure the RSO fulfills all the conditions of release. However, in most instances where the state attorney or public defender is required to provide supervision, a lack of skills, staffing, and experience are a concern (Ciabotti et al., 2018). Furthermore, in some counties, RSOs required to attend treatment facilities might not have a provider within their county or cannot afford to pay for treatment, which results in a violation of the terms of their release and is punishable by fines or jail time (Ciabotti et al., 2018). While these costs allegedly aid in the prevention of future crimes through deterrence, sex offender registration does not decrease sex crimes to minors or reduce recidivism rates (Tewksbury et al., 2011). However, there likely is an increase in violations related to compliance with SORNA and other ordinances designed to control sex offenders.

In addition to the state and existing severe county residency restrictions, on January 23, 2018, Miami-Dade Commissioners passed an ordinance banning camping within the county (Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners [MDBCC], 2018). While most homeless can go to a shelter instead of being arrested when stopped by law enforcement, because RSOs are not allowed to be in a shelter due to residency restrictions, police can arrest RSOs for camping (MDBCC, 2018). Effectively, this law bans transient RSOs from camping anywhere within Miami-Dade County under the threat of arrest. Within the ordinance, the previous month's meeting notes stipulate that this ordinance was designed to eliminate an RSO enclave with over 230 RSOs camping in an industrial area. Notably, Ron Book, Lauren Book's father, lobbyist, and Chairman of the Miami-Dade County Homeless Trust supported this ordinance and was outspoken throughout the process, calling for the removal of the 230 RSOs from that area (MDBCC, 2018). Opponents argued that RSOs made transient through the law could contribute to instability, absconding, or violation of FLRR, causing them to go back to jail and creating an undue burden on law enforcement (MDBCC, 2018). While not overtly a law about sex offenders, this ordinance unequivocally impacts the transient RSO population in Miami-Dade County as transient RSOs face possible immediate arrest for camping within the county (Gomes, 2017b).

Residency Restrictions in Florida

Laws stemming from heinous crimes committed against children, sex offender residency restrictions (SORRs), dictate where sex offenders can reside. These SORRs emerge from the concept of Cohen and Felson's (1979) routine activities theory where a target, motivated offender, and absence of a capable guardian allow for a crime to occur.

The logic follows that if the target (i.e., a minor) no longer exists in the equation, then crime will not happen. Also contributing to the philosophy behind SORRs, the idea of distance decay asserts that proximity to an offender has a positive relationship to victimization, meaning that the closer a possible target is to an offender, the higher the chances of victimization (Rengert et al., 1999). However, SORRs only limit the time of occupancy near these spaces between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., the time when most children are asleep, and RSOs are free to roam about during the daytime.

Moreover, studies suggest that social proximity determines the selection of victims and not residential or geographical vicinity (Duwe, 2015). Social or relationship proximity concerns the relational distance between the offender and the victim. Proximity relationships would include youth with a family friend, a single parent's new boyfriend or girlfriend, a babysitter, a trusted teacher, or a coach. Mostly, an offender in close social proximity can have contact with a child to form a trusting bond. In the case of repetitive abuse, sexual offenders can groom the child. Grooming looks like continuous access to the child, start with appropriate behaviors and then escalates to inappropriate touching, and the ability to reassure the victim that the behavior that they are engaging in is healthy and enjoyable. Nevertheless, public outcry, stemming from a handful of cases, steered focus and resources away from the most common contexts of sexual abuse (e.g., close social or relational proximity) toward a call to create and enact laws restricting areas where sex offenders can reside. This distorted orientation, then, reflects an inflated fear of stranger sexual predators over the most common and likely victimization scenario, which ultimately drives policy.

FLRR restricts RSOs that committed acts against minors from residing within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, or childcare facilities (FDLE, 2015). However, each county and city within the Tri-County area (Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach) impose additional SORRs through passing ordinances increasing SORRs ranging from 1,500 to 2,500 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, childcare facilities, bus stops, libraries, and other locations children are likely to congregate (BSO, 2015). These additional municipal ordinances started with the City of Miami Beach enacting a 2,500 feet SORR in 2005, which consequently prohibits RSOs from living there (Wernick, 2006). The City of Miami followed suit, and adjacent towns and neighborhoods received an influx of RSOs and a cascading effect of "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) policies followed throughout the Tri-County area (Wernick, 2006). As previously mentioned, Ron Book helped to pass these laws within 60 cities and counties within Florida, and other states after his children's nanny sexually abused his daughter Lauren (Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009). Additionally, if a transient population cropped up within an allowable area, politicians erected "pocket parks" to force them out of that area under SORRs (Rabin, 2014).

The collateral consequences of severe SORRs for RSOs, especially within urban cities, is an increase in homelessness, lack of job opportunities or ability to hold a job based on being homeless, broken family ties, and struggling financially to make ends meet which promotes recidivism (Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability [OPPAGA], 2018). Additionally, the areas deemed livable often do not have affordable housing, are situated in industrial areas, or considered inhabitable places such as under bridges, which result in homeless encampments. Arguably, the RSO will

already be under strain from having to deal with the SORNA requirements, and with the added pressure of not being able to find a home, desperation regarding their situation might cause recidivism or the commission of new crimes (Kustura, 2015). Even Patty Wetterling, Jacob Wetterling's mother, worries about SORRs that create homelessness, "If an offender ends up with no residence, that shouldn't make any of us feel safer. What they need is stability, support, counseling, and treatment" (Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009, para. 15).

FLRR defines a transient offender address as a place where an offender lives for more than three days within a calendar year and does not have a specific address (i.e., homeless and living in an abandoned lot). In 2018, OPPAGA reported that Broward and Miami-Dade Counties have the second and third highest RSO rates with transient addresses within Florida. The report maintains that both counties have double the State's average of offenders with transient addresses at 17.34 and 16.14 per 100,000 people. In comparison, Palm Beach County, with a SORR that matches the FLRR, came in eleventh place around the state average at 8.25 per 100,000 people (OPPAGA, 2018).

These laws promote homelessness, increased absconding, and strains law enforcement to track and monitor transient RSOs. Furthermore, they undermine the original intent and purpose of the registry, which is the ability for law enforcement and the public to know where RSOs live (Levenson, 2018). Also, SORRs within major cities and urban areas create clusters of homeless offenders by banishing them to small slivers of land that they are allowed to inhabit (Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018). In a few instances, these pieces of land might have access to running water, bathrooms and a roof, like a trailer park or motel, but often, RSOs erect makeshift tents and sleep in cars in the

small areas in which they are allowed until they are kicked out by law enforcement. If RSOs can find housing within a neighborhood, multiple RSOs might live within one house. Occasionally, caused by the scarcity of affordable housing within an area, a more substantial portion of the county's RSOs can live within one community, as was the case in Broadview Park in Broward County (Broward Sex Offender & Sexual Predator Residence Task Force Report [BTFR], 2009).

Notorious Clusters of RSOs in South Florida

Even though the laws, as mentioned earlier, are aimed to promote and foster protection from RSOs for communities and neighborhoods, the collateral consequences of these laws for RSOs can mean many RSOs become transient trying to stay within the guidelines of these SORRs. In the case of stringent municipality SORRs, they leave little land which RSOs can occupy, resulting in clusters in their makeshift communities. The next section will examine a few well-known examples where these SORRs created clusters within the Tri-County area over the past decade.

An infamous example of SORRs and the inability to find places to live within Miami, Florida, is the Julia Tuttle Causeway Tent City. Hailing from lobbyist Ron Book's efforts to address molestation committed by his nanny on his eleven-year-old daughter Lauren, Miami-Dade tightened residency laws in 2005, from 1,000 feet away from schools, playgrounds, and parks to revise the boundary to include an additional SORR of 2,500 feet from schools under Lauren's Law. This severely impacted where RSOs could live, and in some cases, eliminated entire cities within the county as possible options (Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009). As a result, Tent City, sometimes called "Bookville" after Ron Book's lobbying efforts, became home to a cluster of RSOs,

ranging from 80 to 140 RSOs at a given time (Lantigua, 2009; Levenson, 2018; Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018).

From 2006 to 2010, under the Julia Tuttle Causeway (I-195), probation officers would recommend the site or drop off newly released sex offenders. Traceable to severe SORRs, makeshift shacks, and tents popped up under the bridge housing the RSOs who found themselves without available, affordable housing options within the city (Rabin, 2014). After national exposure and embarrassment over shacks and tents crawling with roaches and insects, reeking of human feces caused by a lack of running water or sewage system, the City of Miami removed the RSOs and in conjunction with the Homeless Trust, ironically with chairman Ron Book at the helm, attempted to provide temporary housing for those RSOs (Hanks, 2016). Notably, the City of Miami installed parks near the area, which would prohibit RSOs from returning to legally live within the area under Lauren's Law (Bene, 2009; Rabin, 2014; Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009).

After the national shaming regarding the Julia Tuttle Causeway Tent City, severe SORRs still prohibited RSOs from living in most of the county. Between 2011 and 2012 and after being evicted from temporary housing or motels, some of the displaced RSOs, from the Julia Tuttle Bridge encampment, started living on a lot on the corner of 10th Avenue and Northeast 79th Street, in the Shorecrest neighborhood in Miami-Dade County (The Huffington Post, 2012). After exhausting other living options, and some declare under the advisement of parole officers, twenty or more RSOs lived on the Shorecrest lot (Lilly, 2012). RSOs would sleep in cars, chairs, or tents overnight and leave at dawn when the curfew is up (CBS Miami, 2012). To stop the influx of RSOs in the neighborhood, Miami-Dade County Commissioner Marc Sarnoff constructed Little

River Pocket Park, a small, underfunded, and unattractive park in Shorecrest (Rabin, 2014). Sarnoff proudly proclaims creating the park to keep sex offenders out of the abandoned lot, “You can't be within a thousand feet of a park under state statute, so [Department of Corrections] can no longer drop off any sexual offenders, predators, on 10th Avenue and 79th Street,” (Odzer & Hamacher, 2012, para. 5). While Sarnoff admitted to the skimpy, existing playground equipment in Little River Pocket Park, he cited a rush on the project for the lack of equipment (Lilly, 2012). To date, the park still lacks designated parking, benches, and trash bins; also, the location of the park is in a flood zone that floods several times a year (Goodman, 2018).

The Julia Tuttle encampment disbanded members went to other locations as well. In 2010, up to 30 RSOs who previously lived under Julia Tuttle Bridge became homeless again after being evicted from the Homestead Studio Suites in Miami-Dade County. The corporate office did not want them on the premises after living there for just a few months (Lebovich & Beasley, 2010).

In 2013, more than fifty RSOs were living in River Park, a trailer park in the Allapattah neighborhood in Miami-Dade County. Some of them were initially displaced from the Julia Tuttle Bridge encampment. Unbeknownst at the time, the Miami Bridge Youth and Family Services, which services and houses troubled kids, is within 2,500 feet of the trailer park and ergo, a prohibited space for RSOs to live (Rabin et al., 2013). Coincidently, Homeless Trust Chairman Ron Book’s staff contacted the Department of Corrections (DOC) to ensure that DOC updated their records and listed The Miami Bridge Youth and Family Services as a gathering spot for children, and thus falling under Lauren’s Law conditions of residency restrictions for RSOs (Rabin et al., 2013).

Subsequently, law enforcement evicted RSOs out of the trailer park, with RSOs receiving a maximum of five days' notice to pack up and find a new residence that complied with the county's SORRs (Puls, 2016; Rabin et al., 2013). Because of the restrictive SORRs, most of the RSOs moved from the trailer park to the train tracks adjacent to a parking lot and surrounding streets in Westgate, an industrial area (Rabin, 2014).

Since the eviction of RSOs from the Allapattah Trailer Park about mid-year 2013 to May 2018, over 250 RSOs called an industrial parking lot in the Westgate neighborhood, near Hialeah, home, at least between the hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. every night (Reutter, 2015). In the quest to find suitable and affordable housing for RSOs that correspond to Lauren's Law, the Westgate area in Hialeah is just another stop in the "Sex Offender Shuffle," as depicted by California artist Scott Gairdner (2009). The song parodies the 1985 Chicago Bear's "Super Bowl Shuffle" and makes a commentary on Miami-Dade County's frequent upheaval and removal of sex offenders from location to location (Lipscomb, 2018b). Located on NW 71st Street and 36th Court in Miami-Dade County, RSOs camped in a parking lot and surrounding streets situated in an industrial area with no running water, bathroom, or electricity (McCoy, 2014). After local coverage regarding this development and deeming the encampment as a public health and safety hazard, Miami-Dade County notified the transient RSOs that they had forty-five days to vacate the premises or be arrested by May 6, 2018 (Lipscomb, 2018a). However, the ACLU and Legal Services of Greater Miami filed a lawsuit against Miami-Dade County to dispute the constitutionality of the county ordinance regarding residency restrictions and spoke against the overnight camping ordinances to no avail (Lipscomb, 2018b).

While the lawsuit temporarily halted the eviction process of the RSOs from the area, Miami-Dade County set a new date of eviction to June 11, 2018 (Lipscomb, 2018c).

Once again, the Homeless Trust and its chairperson, Ron Book, tried to help RSOs find temporary housing. However, early reports claim that only one RSO from the encampment had been placed (Hanks, 2018). Book claims that any RSO that asked for help from the Homeless Trust received it, and those who say that the organization did not help them with finding homes were "lying" (Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018, para. 38). In an attempt to offer alternative locations to live, Miami-Dade County Police Department (MDPD) sex crime unit located another campsite near Krome Avenue, by the Everglades, as a possible relocation area (Hanks, 2018). Flyers of the new address in southwest Miami-Dade County with a map were passed out throughout the RSOs in the Westgate cluster. However, the same pervasive issue of no running water or bathrooms persists in this new location (Hanks, 2018). Without an adjustment to the residency restrictions, the ACLU and Legal Services claim that offenders will relocate to another corner, and the cycle will keep repeating itself (Iannelli, 2018).

The aftermath of this situation is still playing out. The Westgate cluster attracted global attention and became another stain on Miami-Dade County and the treatment of RSOs and the stringent SORRs (Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018). The award-winning multimedia story by The Marshall Project's Schwartzapfel and Kassie's documentary *Banished* (2018) brought worldwide attention on the juxtaposition between homeless RSOs, local politicians Deputy Mayor Maurice Kemp and Ron Book, the MDPD and their views on RSOs issues and displacement (The Marshall Project, 2019). Additionally, residents in the Kendall community, near the proposed relocation site of

RSOs to Krome Avenue, already protested the move of RSOs near their families (Rodriguez & Lopez, 2018).

The issues do not just exist in Miami-Dade County. Broward and Palm Beach Counties also deal with the clustering of RSOs associated with broad-reaching SORRs. In several of these instances, these clusters increased in size in the wake of the dismantling of the Julia Tuttle Tent City as well as the release and reentry of RSOs into the area.

In 2009, in Broadview Park, a community that comprised less than 1% of the total landmass of Broward County, housed about 100 RSOs, or almost 8% of the county's total RSOs (BTFR, 2009). Randy Young, an RSO and owner of Habitat for Sex Offenders, helps RSOs to find housing within the SORRS. He discovered and leased several houses in Broadview Park that abided by FLRR and did not have a municipal ordinance regulating buffer zones (Aleksander, 2010). He then would sublease these houses to RSOs. Some of the RSOs that live in Broadview Park were part of the original Julia Tuttle Bridge cluster and were living in close quarters with as many as 24 people to one house (Aleksander, 2010). The influx of RSOs from four RSOs in 2007 to over one hundred in 2009 prompted outrage and a demand for change from the community. Commissioner John Rodstrom proposed a temporary SORR mandating a 2,500-foot buffer zone of schools, parks, daycares, and school bus stops before the Broward County Commission (Wyman, 2009). The Commission passed an emergency ordinance to increase the buffer zones to prevent other RSOs from moving into the neighborhood (Aleksander, 2010; Wyman, 2009). While this prohibited new RSOs from moving into the area, those existing could continue to live in the community.

Additionally, in 2011, at the Fort Lauderdale Budget Inn located in Broward County, the Sun-Sentinel called the owner of Budget Inn for a comment regarding the 24 RSOs staying at the hotel. The owner, Glen Patel, did not realize that RSOs resided there and initiated the evection process of the RSOs (Hendley, 2011). Patel cited the safety of his other guests as the reason for the eviction. Even, probation officers tried to reason with him because having the RSOs live there allows for easier monitoring of the RSOs within a commercial district, away from neighborhoods containing families (Santana & Williams, 2011). Some RSOs had been living there for about a year, with the records indicating that an additional 36 RSOs called this Budget Inn home between 2007 and 2011 (Santana & Williams, 2011).

Conversely, in Palm Beach County, some RSO communities are emerging in the wake of the housing need for RSOs. Established in 2009, Matthew 25 Ministries (M25M) own several houses within Miracle Village located in Pahokee, Florida, in Palm Beach County (Matthew 25 Ministries [M25M], 2015). With over 150 RSOs in the community, some of the residents previously lived in the Julia Tuttle Causeway cluster (M25M, 2015; Schindler, 2018; Worford, 2013). M25M helps to provide low cost, shared rooms, reentry classes, and counseling for RSOs (M25M, 2015). Miracle Village boasts success, arguing that RSOs need support and the proper tools to reenter society successfully (M25M, 2015). In early 2019, Matthew 25 Ministries formed a new company, Restoration Destination, charged with the sole purpose of running this reentry program (Witherow, 2019).

Weekly, the ministry receives between ten to twenty applications (Pressly, 2013). M25M rejects applications of RSOs who have a history of drug abuse or violence, as well

as those with diagnosed pedophilia, which are sex offenders only aroused by prepubescent children (Pressly, 2013). Additionally, applicants must take responsibility for the crimes they committed (Schindler, 2018). Many residents in the program attend treatment programs, church, have jobs in town, and continue to rebuild their lives, sometimes even dating (Pressly, 2013; Wolford, 2013). In the village, there is a 7 p.m. curfew for RSOs. Many RSOs wear GPS ankle bracelets, are subject to random drug tests, and some cannot use the internet or own a smartphone (Sandburn, 2014). While Restoration Destination starts a newly released RSO off with a furnished apartment and other items to get started, residents pay the monthly rent of $550, which includes utilities (Kornfield, 2019).

Initially, residents of the small city of Pahokee were not so understanding or accepting of a neighborhood filled with sex offenders. Turning this portion of the city into residential housing for sex offenders provoked fear and outrage from the mayor, calling it “risky” to community members. The belief was that no one from outside of the city cared if all the RSOs ended up in their small, removed town (Wolford, 2013). Surprisingly, some members of the community try to accept RSOs into various activities, including an all-adult church service at the First United Methodist Church, where clearly defined rules are established ahead of time with a zero-tolerance policy (Wolford, 2013).

This alternative community of RSOs attracted international attention through a photojournalist article in the South German Times (Christie, 2014), and then again with a book by Sofia Valiente showcasing twelve residents of Miracle Village (Valiente, 2014). Most recently, in 2018, a BBC documentary premiered with Stacey Dooley on a visit to Miracle Village (Chan & Lankston, 2018). While this housing arrangement might be

more attractive concerning living conditions for RSOs, these villages may promote an alternative subculture due to the ostracization from the surrounding community and, ultimately, increase recidivism.

Residency Restrictions and Recidivism

Prevention of recidivism through community awareness, monitoring by law enforcement, and the registry acting as a deterrent and shame factor are primary goals for compiling a public registry and creating SORRs. The expected outcome of Sex Offender Registration and Notification (SORN) laws and SORRs should be to decrease the opportunity for RSOs to have contact with minors and, ultimately, reduce recidivism. However, complex issues arise when discussing recidivism among RSOs. While studies show that recidivism for RSOs is low (Langan et al., 2003; Sample & Bray, 2003), others allude to the dark figure of crime or not counting parole violations within recidivism numbers hindering an accurate count regarding recidivism (Przybylski, 2015).

One of the most extensive studies of sex offender recidivism was completed by Langan and colleagues (2003). In that work, male sex offenders were compared across 15 states to male non-sex offenders released from prison in 1994. Results showed only 3.5% of sex offenders recidivated within three years of being released. Moreover, when looking at the rearrest rates of sex offenders and non-sex offenders, sex offenders possessed an overall lower rearrest rate by 25% over the three year study period (Langan et al., 2003). Another large study by Sample and Bray (2003) also determined that the overall recidivism rate of sex offenders was lower than most other categories of offenders. Under-reporting of sex offenses to law enforcement may be impacting recidivism rates. On the other hand, the RSO might have committed a nonsexual crime,

such as parole violation, as discussed above (Przybylski, 2015). Both scenarios can obscure accurate sex offense recidivism estimates.

The next section explores the possible factors that can trigger recidivism. Levinson & Cotter (2005b), in a qualitative study of RSOs in Florida, ascertained that residency restrictions hurt RSOs, including, but not limited to, decreased stability and possibly triggering re-offenses. Hanson, Harris, Helmus, and Thorton (2014) maintain that sexual recidivism among RSOs can vary based on the severity of the risk to re-offend determined by the Violence Risk Scale – Sexual Offender Version (VRS-SO). Additionally, they claim recidivism may also vary depending on whether RSOs receive treatment and support, and the time they were able to remain offense-free within society, similar to aging out of crime process. In previous studies, Mustaine, Tewksbury, and Stengel (2006, 2008) determined that in five different counties (Duval, Seminole, Jefferson, Fayette, and Cook) in over three different states (Florida, Kentucky, and Illinois), RSOs lived in more socially disorganized areas than what is present within the state as well as the country.

Furthermore, Socia (2016) analyzed 53 census tracts in Upstate New York and found that RSOs disproportionally live in socially disorganized and disadvantaged neighborhoods. Furthermore, there are additional studies regarding the areas in which RSOs live. Zgoba, Levenson, & McKee (2009) analyzed housing availability after considering residency restrictions in Camden County, New Jersey, to determine that few options for housing exist for RSOs outside of the exclusionary zones guided by local and state law.

Other studies surrounding recidivism and clustering of ex-offenders propose that it is a combination of individual characteristics of an ex-offender, as well as neighborhood characteristics, including social disorganization, that determine the likelihood of recidivism (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015). D. S. Kirk (2015) argues that having a neighborhood with a concentration of ex-offenders leads to significantly higher rates of recidivism. Social ties, parole policies, as well as limited housing opportunities, contribute to stressors that keep ex-offenders in their old neighborhood (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2015). By placing ex-offenders with other ex-offenders in a concentrated area, it is reasonable to question whether the criminal behavior of a group affects an individual's criminal conduct in the neighborhood. By applying this rationale, the question then becomes, would there be a lower recidivism rate if RSOs could live dispersed throughout the counties versus being clustered ascribable to residency restrictions? This research seeks to examine this issue.

To date, only one study looked at the spatial clustering of RSOs and recidivism rates within neighborhoods. Socia (2013) examined RSO recidivism rates in 52 counties in Upstate New York and found that there was a nominal positive relationship with rates of recidivistic sex crimes against adult victims. However, the author acknowledges that because the study was only over twelve months, this limited the number of variables for the study. The current research seeks to overcome this situation by analyzing RSO clusters, measure social disorganization and deviant subculture, and recidivism of RSOs within these clusters for a three-year timeframe, instead of twelve months.

Significance of the Study

Florida, in particular, South Florida, is a hotbed of discussion surrounding sex offenders. From high profile cases which lead to a change in laws, like Jessica Lunsford and Lauren Book, to the ramification of those laws such as RSOs sleeping under bridges and on the side of the street in industrialized areas, laws in South Florida governing RSOs developed into a national story and a center of controversy. Questions and narratives surrounding RSOs such as whether it matters where RSOs live and how close is too close continue to drive the conversation of SORRs within Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties in South Florida. Paired with concerns about transient RSOs sleeping on a corner in a community to not-in-my-backyard ordinances, local law enforcement, and politicians find themselves caught in between enforcing the law and understanding that everyone needs a place to sleep. While academic research shows severe SORRs facilitate situations that possibly enhance recidivism, promote homelessness, cause difficulty for law enforcement to track transient offenders, and a host of other unintended consequences, the laws still stand.

The current investigation is significant as the research surrounding clustering for RSOs can provide crucial information regarding the policy. Even though there are several studies regarding social disorganization and registered sexual offenders, there remains a gap in the research regarding the combination of RSOs, socially disorganized areas, clustering RSOs, subculture theory of urbanism, and the effect on recidivism rates. This study proposes that the totality of residency restrictions, the socially disorganized areas in which RSOs live, the clustering of RSOs, and the subculture theory of urbanism will provide a more comprehensive look at the reasons behind recidivism. This more holistic

approach moves beyond just analyzing the area and the lack of support and facilities that contribute to an individual's success or recidivism by examining the scope of the environmental and ecological factors such as the positive reinforcement of subcultures within clusters of like-minded RSOs that are key in determining rehabilitation or recidivism. From the perspective of social disorganization theory, monitoring RSO clustering shows the areas in which treatment facilities, public transportation, and other social services should be located to reduce the likelihood of recidivism. From a subcultural theory of urbanism perspective, analyzing residency restrictions would help determine if these restrictions are contributing to recidivism rates by creating clusters of deviant subcultures and are therefore ineffective and paradoxically criminogenic.

Research Questions & Hypotheses

1. Are RSOs within Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties in Florida violating the law by living within 1,000 feet of a school, childcare facility, park, or playground, according to Florida State Statute 775.215?

   Hypothesis 1: As a consequence of the concentration of schools, childcare facilities, parks, and playgrounds and the extent of the buffer zone around these areas, RSOs are not 100% compliant to Florida State Statute.

2. Within Miami-Dade, Broward, & Palm Beach Counties in Florida, do clusters of RSOs fall within socially disorganized areas?

   Hypothesis 2: Past clusters would indicate that groups of RSOs in compliance with the statute would be located near industrial areas, trailer home parks, motels, and other socially disorganized areas. RSO clusters that might violate the statute could be located

near a new development of a school, childcare facility, park, or playground and have not had a chance to relocate.

3. Subsequent to these residency requirements, are there unforeseen and unintended consequences for the community at large when RSOs are clustered within a census tract in the form of an increased rate of recidivism?

   Hypothesis 3: There is a direct correlation between recidivism and clustering since the residency restrictions push RSOs to live in limited, socially disorganized areas with RSO deviant subcultures, which are detrimental to their successful reentry progress. A higher rate of recidivism of RSOs will occur where RSOs live closer together in clusters.

Theoretical Framework

In explaining the steadfast and increasing sexual offender management policies, the moral panic theory describes the law-making process. Cohen (1972/2002) and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994/2009) discuss moral panics as the public's reaction to an event or perceived notions concerning the behavior of a fringe group. Media coverage follows the public's opinion, and law enforcement or those in power seek to address the concerns which can lead to a change in policy (Cohen, 1972/2002; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994/2009). When heinous crimes like those committed against Jacob Wetterling, Megan Kanaka, Jimmy Rice, and Jessica Lunsford severely impact a community and the media extensively covers the incident, creating and reinforcing the idea of a monster who perpetrated these acts on an innocent victim, panic persists. As a result of this socially constructed monster, the media forms a divided us-versus-them mentality and calls upon policymakers to change existing laws or create new ones to prohibit similar events from happening. Ultimately, this leads to stricter criminal laws, prompted from an emotional,

knee-jerk reaction to memorialize a victim, even if the new policy might not be practical (Critcher, 2006; Surette, 2007).

Furthermore, as new victims fall prey to these seemingly similar sex offenders, again, panic ensues, media heightens and propagates fear through continued coverage, and policymakers construct new laws with increased punishments. The panic from the first event does not have a chance to dissipate before the next incident happens. With each event, the cycle of public outcry, the social construction of the incident, and the offender and the reaction of lawmakers heightens, producing a perpetual state of panic (Burchfield et al., 2017).

When policymakers make a snap decision, utilizing old habits and old policies, or base policy on personal interests or values, unintended consequences occur (Merton, 1936). Severe SORRs can generate clusters of RSOs within socially disorganized areas (Colorado Department of Public Safety [CDPS], 2004; Socia & Stamatel, 2012). Additionally, expanding SORRs can almost banish RSOs from cities altogether, causing RSOs to fail to register, abscond, or fail to update their address on file with law enforcement (Chajewski & Mercado, 2009; Zandbergen & Hart, 2009; Zgoba et al., 2009). These outcomes defeat the purposes of sex offender management policies meant to track RSOs and foster public awareness of RSOs whereabouts. To compound the situation, SORRs cluster RSOs within socially disorganized areas that do not possess the level of informal controls that an affluent community does (Bursik, 1988). Furthermore, socially disorganized areas lack the support that RSOs need to form prosocial relationships, become gainfully employed, and access treatment facilities (Lee-Silcox,

2016, Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006, Rolfe, Tweksbury, & Schroeder, 2017).

Correspondingly, while socially disorganized areas deter prosocial relationships (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006), clusters of ex-offenders within these areas encourage criminal activity and distrust of law enforcement (D. S. Kirk, 2015). With stressors of finding housing, becoming employed, facing shame and ridicule for themselves and their family, ex-offenders might bond with those in a similar situation (Holt et al., 2010). Moreover, clustering ex-offenders within an area exacerbates the availability of bonding with like-minded criminals, which can reinforce subculture behaviors (Gomes, 2017b; D. S. Kirk, 2015). Clustering leads to increased opportunities for criminal activity as well as reinforce criminally deviant behavior and a disregard for law enforcement, which can lead to recidivism (D. S. Kirk, 2015). The combination of clustering RSOs in socially disorganized areas, the feeling of shame and embarrassment from SORN, and dealing with reentry barriers results in the increased likelihood of recidivism by RSOs.

Overview of Methodology

Study 1: Measure RSOs in conjunction with FLRR within Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties

Study 1 consists of looking where RSOs within the study live in relation to the critical elements within FLRR: schools, childcare facilities, parks, and playgrounds. Secondly, it determines if any of the RSOs' home addresses violate FLRR and identifies these areas. In order to look at these critical factors, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) will be utilized in the form of ArcGIS Pro by Esri to visually map out the

residences of the RSOs, as well as the locations of schools, childcare facilities, parks, and playgrounds with a buffer of 1,000 feet to determine the boundaries according to FLRR. From this visualization, violators of FLRR will be identified as it pertains to the residency requirements set forth.

Study 2: Clusters of RSOs within socially disorganized areas

Study 2 explores the clusters of RSOs found within Study 1 and determines if the areas fall within the category of socially disorganized areas. Study 2 contributes to the discussion of reentry and recidivism of RSOs. Previous studies established that recidivism is more likely if former prisoners live within socially disorganized areas as there is a limitation of services, such as transportation, employment opportunities, treatment centers, and proximity to family members that would help the reentry process and decrease the likelihood of recidivism (Barnes et al., 2009; Casady, 2009; Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; Levenson & Hern, 2007; MNDOC, 2003; Socia, 2012a). This study replicates and extends this idea because the examination is within several major metropolitans, high population density areas.

Study 3: The unintended consequences of residency restrictions: Looking at the subculture of urbanism, communities of RSOs, and recidivism risk

Study 3 seeks to determine if one of the unintended consequences of residency restrictions of RSOs is increased recidivism linked to the subculture created within clusters. Since residency restrictions of RSOs were put into place to curb and eliminate potential targets, i.e., children, studying the recidivism rates of RSOs that live within these confines is of great importance to understanding if this policy is effective or counterproductive. By measuring the inverse distance between RSOs and several

neighboring RSOs, the unintended impact of the residency restrictions, mainly if the RSOs are clustered within communities, on recidivism will be measured.

Delimitations of the Study

The Tri-County area encompassing Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties in Florida selected for examination in the present study. Intensive, globally publicized clusters of transient RSOs coupled with excessive SORRs within urban areas, led the researcher to choose these areas in Florida. These three counties reflect similar population characteristics, including some of the state's highest rates of RSOs and transient RSOs, which also guided their selection while limiting the inclusion of other counties and states in the study.

The time constraints of a three-year snapshot of recidivism were because FDLE does not keep historical listings of the sex offender registry. While this is also a limitation, the researcher chose to move forward with the study as it could still address a gap in the literature discussing the clustering of RSOs and rates of recidivism. Additionally, since a limited period exists within the study, the researcher elected rearrests as the measurement for recidivism.

Chapter Summary

The topic of sex offenders, where they reside in geographical proximity to child-centric locations, and laws governing residency restrictions, sparks controversy, emotional arguments, and an us-versus-them stance. While the state of Florida implemented a residency restriction on sex offenders of 1,000 feet from schools, parks, playgrounds, or childcare facilities, municipalities expanded these areas by passing auxiliary ordinances. As a result of these SORRs, the Tri-County area of Miami-Dade,

Broward, and Palm Beach faced global scrutiny for practically banishing RSOs to live under bridges, in empty lots, and within the largest designated sex offender colony in the world in Pahokee, Florida.

As time passed, panic grew with a few highly-publicized cases of children being kidnapped, raped, and killed by sex offenders. This moral panic erupted in public outcry, extensive media coverage, a call to action from the victim's family and community, and politicians responding by passing memorial laws designed to honor the victim's memory and prevent these types of incidents from reoccurring. However, amid emotional arguments and intense pressure to be tough on crime, the laws passed often resulted in unintended consequences such as undermining the protection that the new policies were to afford. As the requirements become increasingly more restrictive, the blowback intensifies.

The backlash of increased SORRs caused transient RSO clusters throughout South Florida. The constant displacement and banishment to areas that do not have any running water or shelter from the elements intensify the stressors to RSOs trying to abide by the municipality's SORRs. Additionally, the clusters created by the SORRs show signs of RSOs bonding over shared experiences and hardships. These relationships, coupled with living in socially disorganized areas lacking in informal and formal controls, may ultimately lead to increased criminal activity and recidivism. However, more research is needed to determine whether these associations hold up to further scrutiny when evaluated over an extended period. Hence, this study seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature by determining if RSOs are living in clusters within socially

disorganized areas and analyzing if the spatial proximity of RSO clusters impacts the rate of recidivism within metropolitan areas with severe SORRs.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Mass Incarceration

In the 1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson pronounced a "war on crime" and dubbed the urban policeman as a "frontline soldier" within this mission, essentially militarizing local law enforcement (Hinton, 2015). In the 1980s, fear and panic over ballooning violence, crack cocaine, the death of basketball star Len Bias, and the war on drugs prompted mandatory minimum prison sentences (Zimring, 2005). In the mid-1990s, the highly publicized murders of teenagers Polly Klaas and Kimber Reynolds by repeat offenders who were out on parole prompted three-strikes laws on state and federal levels (Vitiello, 1997). These "get tough on crime" laws over the past 50 years stem from tragic, widely publicized events, which ultimately contributed to mass incarceration (Mallicoat & Gardiner, 2014).

The fallout from these sentencing reforms and laws impacted not only the offender, but they also affected their family, neighborhood, and as noted, resulted in a ballooning mass incarceration problem in the United States (Currie, 1998/2013; Mallicoat & Gardiner, 2014; Mears & Cochran, 2015). Since the institution of these laws, the United States is now the number one incarcerator in the world, with an average of 698 people out of every 100,000 people behind bars (Wagner & Sawyer, 2018). This number constitutes over two million people annually. The consequence of mass incarceration is the inability of states to provide safe, constitutional, government-run facilities, and the ability to keep up with the rate of incarceration of offenders, even though the crime rate has decreased over the past thirty years (Mears & Cochran, 2015).

With these high rates of incarceration, funding and budgeting shifted on a national level from education to imprisonment. However, what happens to these prisoners once they have served their time and released? National-level estimates indicate that, on average, 67% of those who have been released end up behind bars again within three years, and approximately 75% end up in the prison system within five years (James, 2015). The overwhelming majority recidivate, either committing new crimes or violating a condition of their probation.

Reentry

Once an offender is released, barriers to a successful reentry remain present. Sizeable obstacles to successful reentry exist for ex-offenders, including, but not limited to, a lack of housing, employment, stressed family circumstances, lack of resources for treatment, law enforcement supervision, and disenfranchisement (Figure 1). Disenfranchisement refers to the elimination of the right to vote, limited or restricted access to student loans, loss of parental rights, inability to serve on a jury, denial of government welfare, and the suspension of other civil liberties (Mears & Cochran, 2015).

When ex-offenders leave prison, housing issues also arise. Some newly released inmates might not have family willing to take them into their house or unable on account of welfare restrictions, and others do not have enough money to provide themselves adequate housing (La Vigne et al., 2006; Mears & Cochran, 2015).

Figure 1

Barriers to Reentry



RSOs face the barriers mentioned above and more. In addition to possibly having strained relationships with family and friends, their houses are typically off-limits to RSOs due to the extreme SORRs in South Florida. Severe SORRs result in the inability to stay with family members and others who could have assisted with offender reintegration. Being effectively banned from living with relatives is not experienced by other ex-convicts that are re-entering society as they can stay with their family and friends. Additionally, studies show that RSOs who live with and maintain support from family and friends have a significantly lower number of violations than RSOs without

help, even if they live with friends and family (CDPS, 2004). Furthermore, finding a residence that conforms to enhanced SORRs in the Tri-County area can be challenging since many communities enacted 2,500 feet restrictions from any school, daycare, park, and bus stops. Thus, there is a substantial difficulty for an RSO to find a residence outside of a restricted zone with affordable rent and a landlord willing to rent to them (Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; OPPAGA, 2018).

Once an RSO finds housing, a street corner, or encampment to live, that address is publicly available for anyone to obtain (FDLE, 2018b). Additional information on each RSO, such as a picture, name, birth date, physical description, address, car description and tag number, and charges, are also publicly available on FDLE's website (FDLE, 2018b). As a result of this public exposure on the registry website, RSOs experience regular harassment such as garbage and bottles being thrown at them (Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Reischel, 2006; Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009).

Obtaining a job can be a challenge for ex-offenders because of multiple factors like lack of stability of housing, not having reliable transportation or a license, and low educational attainment (Mears & Cochran, 2015; Zgoba et al., 2009). Additionally, most job applications contain a question or a checkbox asking whether the applicant was previously convicted of a crime. As an ex-felon, an RSO faces the possibility of discrimination by checking this box and the possibility of not being hired (Zgoba et al., 2009). While studies show that this practice often disenfranchises ex-offenders, eliminating or "banning the box" can show a decrease in discrimination based on previous convictions, increase the employability of those reentering society, and owning

to the stabilizing qualities of employment result in an overall reduction in crime (D'Alessio, Stolzenberg, & Flexon, 2014).

Also, those who are released often have a significant need for either drug treatment or mental health treatment and services. Lack of monitoring and treatment for such persistent issues also cause a higher rate of recidivism (CDPS, 2004; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006; Mears & Cochran, 2015). As previously discussed, ex-offenders experience denial of welfare benefits leaving housing or food stamps out of reach (Mears & Cochran, 2015). The added layer of supervision by law enforcement, while being utilized to ensure that ex-prisoners are on the straight and narrow, might constitute a hindrance versus help because of the “Big Brother” feeling ex-offenders may perceive after already serving their time (Mears & Cochran, 2015).

Notably, severe SORRs cause most, if not all, RSOs to live in socially disorganized areas where support systems often do not exist (CDPS, 2004). Equally of concern, these neighborhoods do not contain the treatment facilities or work opportunities for RSOs, which increases the amount of travel time and distance and present yet another barrier to successful reentry (CDPS, 2004; Hipp, Petersilia, & Turner, 2010; MNDOC, 2003). Additionally, these neighborhoods limit access to transportation, pro-social relationships, employment opportunities, and treatment centers (D. S. Kirk, 2015; Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006, Rolfe et al., 2017). If ex-offenders moved into a socially disorganized neighborhood, the lack of informal controls within a socially disorganized neighborhood prevents the effective policing of further criminal activity by the members of the community and exposes residents to possible victimization (Socia & Stamatel, 2012).

Broken relationships with family and friends, lack of housing, few employment prospects following SORRs, being listed on the public registry, and other stressors impact RSOs (Levenson, 2018; Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Mercado et al., 2008; Monjeau, 2011; Mulford et al., 2009; Tewksbury & Lees, 2006) and their families (Farkas & Miller, 2007; Levenson & Tewksbury, 2009). Consequently, the stressors that RSOs face on a consistent and daily basis can lead to recidivism (Tewskbury & Lees, 2006; Tewksbury & Mustaine 2009). Studies warn that these collateral consequences from severe SORRs and public registries not only contribute to recidivism, they also can influence RSOs failing to register (Levenson et al., 2010) and absconding, (Levenson et al., 2013) which entirely defeats the purpose behind SORN and SORR laws. Notably, the Colorado Department of Public Safety (CDPS) (2004) discerned that RSOs who maintained support and prosocial relationships, employment, and housing violated parole less versus RSOs who lacked these resources.

Recidivism

Above the national average, Florida averages 883 out of every 100,000 people incarcerated within the state system (Wagner & Sawyer, 2018). However, Florida's recidivism rate is lower than the national average (Gelb & Velazquez, 2018). Annually, the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) releases recidivism reports discussing the different cohorts by year and the recidivism rates (defined as reincarceration) and rearrest rates (for any crime). The three-year recidivism rates from each of the cohorts released in 2009 to 2015 range between 24.5% and 26.3% over the years for the State, decreasing yearly (FDOC, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). Hence, over 25,000 prisoners per year would return to Florida's jails and prisons within three years of their release. At $18,000 per

year per prisoner, this amount quickly accrues, and the state often finds itself struggling to shift dollars from prisons to other areas of the budget where the money is needed, like education (Florida Department of Corrections [FDOC], 2014). Moreover, as time passes, each cohort's recidivism rate steadily increases, but the overall recidivism rates for each cohort decrease (e.g., 2009 cohort's recidivism rate increased from 26.3% at three years to 35.5% at five years, while 2010's cohort's recidivism rate at three years was 25.7%). Decreasing by year, five-year recidivism rates (based on incarceration) from cohorts released in 2009 to 2013 range between a total of 34.2% to 35.3% of former prisoners returned to incarceration within the state of Florida (FDOC, 2019). While the rate of rearrests has been declining over the years, the figures are still significant, with the three-year rearrest rates from 2009 to 2015 cohorts ranging between 60.2% to 65.2% and decreasing over time (FDOC, 2018, 2019).

Sex Offender Management Policies

Despite the public's misconception that recidivism rates regarding sexual offenders are high and historically elevated, (Sample & Bray, 2003; Tewksbury & Jennings, 2010), recidivism rates regarding sexual offenses consistently maintain at low levels (Bench & Allen, 2013; Harris & Hanson, 2004; Howard, 2011; Langan et al., 2003) even before sex offender management policies were put into effect (Levenson & Zgoba, 2016). Hanson and Bussire (1998) performed a meta-analysis of over 60 studies of sex offender recidivism totaling 28,972 offenders. The study, which looked at recidivism rates after a 4 to 5 year period, found sexual offenses accounted for 13.4% and depended on rates of sexual deviance and other criminological factors like prior arrests age, etc. (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998).

Another study examined a sample of 4,724 sexual offenders across three countries (United States, United Kingdom, and Canada), and measured sexual recidivism at 5, 10, and 15 years, without controlling for risk (Harris & Hanson, 2004). In that study, Harris and Hanson (2004) discovered that recidivism declined over time as the offender was out of jail, ranging from 14% at initial release to less than 4% after fifteen years. This finding becomes particularly noteworthy since recidivism, among other crimes, tends to increase over time.

When compared to other criminal types, sex offenders recidivate at lower levels (Langan et al., 2003; Sample & Bray, 2003, 2006). Written in 2003, Langan et al. authored one of the most comprehensive studies regarding recidivism and sexual offenders as compared to other crime types and offenders. Spanning information from fifteen states and tracking 9,691 sex offenders from their release from 1994 to 1997, the study measured the rearrest, reconviction, and reimprisonment rates of sex offenders and compared them to non-sex offenders. The findings indicated that rearrest and reconviction rates were lower than those of non-sex offenders (Langan et al., 2003).

Similarly, in their studies, Sample and Bray (2003, 2006) found that during the five years after release, less than 7% of sex offenders recidivated for sex offenses while property offenders exhibited the highest rate of recidivism at almost 39%. Additionally, sex offenders showed a lower rate of general recidivism across the board in comparison with other offenders (Sample & Bray, 2003, 2006). Studies also show that the majority of sex offenders will either not spend any time in jail or prison, spend minimal time incarcerated, and eventually be released back into the community (CDPS, 2004; La Vigne et al., 2006a).

While the rates of recidivism differ for sex crimes than other crimes, management policies might not influence recidivism. Levenson and Zgoba (2016) looked at the average yearly repeat arrests in Florida by crime type from 1990 to 2010, with the intervention year of 1997, when sex offender management policies including public registry, civil commitment, SORRs, mandatory minimum sentencing, and electronic monitoring began. They showed that sex offense rearrests rate by year pre- and post-sex offender management policies were consistently lower than other violent crime types (Levenson & Zgoba, 2016). Nevertheless, the rate of rearrest for sex offenders show a moderate but significant increase after the intervention year when sex offender management policies launched. Simultaneously, other crimes' rearrest rates increased as well after the intervention year. Nonetheless, the authors cannot confirm that these sex offender management policies prevented sexual re-offense.

Sex Offender Residency Restrictions

SORRs can severely limit where RSOs can live and impact recidivism. Zgoba et al. (2009) determined that of 211 registered tier 2 and tier 3 offenders and non-offenders in Camden County, New Jersey, there is not a significant difference between where RSOs and non-offenders live concerning proximity to schools and daycares when looking at buffer zones of 1,000 feet and 2,500 feet. Instead, housing choices seem to be in line with practicality to the location of housing, as 80% of residences are also within 2,500 feet of schools and daycares (Zgoba et al., 2009). Ergo, housing for RSOs would be minimal if a 2,500-foot law would be enacted (Zgoba et al., 2009). Instead, a 2,500-foot SORR would hinder successful reentry to the community and possibly increase the likelihood of recidivism. As the development of housing complexes in an area increases, communities

also expand the number of schools and daycares into a part of the process of growing neighborhoods. In turn, existing SORRs become relevant to that area as well.

Furthermore, other studies show SORRs are ineffective as a deterrent (Blood et al., 2008; CDPS, 2004; MNDOC, 2003; Nobles et al., 2012; Socia, 2012b, 2015; Tewksbury & Jennings, 2010). With the understanding that the goals of SORRs are to prevent abuse, protect children, and reduce overall offending, the Division of Criminal Justice and Juvenile Planning in Iowa compared the number of charges twelve months prior the implementation SORR of 2,000 feet and the two years following the implementation (Blood et al., 2008). In fact, Blood and colleagues (2008) found that the number of charges for sex offenses against minors increased year after year, leading to the conclusion that implementation of the 2,000 feet buffer did not decrease potential child victims. Correspondingly, on an aggregate level (Socia, 2015), state-level (CDPS, 2004; MNDOC, 2003; Socia, 2012b), and whether looking at recidivistic or first-time sex offenders (Nobles et al., 2012), these studies concurred that SORRs does not act as a deterrent and should not be a method for controlling recidivism by sex offenders.

Further evidence suggests that larger buffer zones for SORRs are not a deterrent. A study by Zandbergen, Levenson, and Hart (2010) looked at recidivistic arrests in the state of Florida over two years to determine if living within 1,000, 1,500, and 2,500 feet of schools or daycares predicted a reoccurring event. This study also sampled non-recidivistic RSOs who previously victimized a minor and committed a similar number of crimes as the recidivistic sample. Overall, this study compared a high-risk group to another high-risk group versus a random sample (Zandbergen et al., 2010). Zandbergen and colleagues (2010) found that it did not matter if RSOs lived closer to schools and

daycares (1,000 feet away) or if they lived farther away (1,500 feet or more). Distance did not affect reoffending rates.

Similarly, another study done in Jacksonville, Florida, determined that the increase over the state SORRs from 1,000 to 2,500 feet did not have a significant effect on sexual recidivism or sex crime arrests (Nobles et al., 2012). Furthermore, Stucky and Ottensmann (2016) showed that the number of RSOs living within a section of the city with buffers of 1,000, 1,500, and 2,500 feet did not determine the number of sex offense incidents. Instead, they deduced that above average violent crime counts in areas are more determinant of sex offense incidents (Stucky & Ottensmann, 2016).

SORRs and Housing

The least restricted areas often possessed the lowest available, affordable housing; hence, rural areas might remain the areas where RSOs could live (Socia, 2011). Chadjewski and Mercado's (2009) study of New Jersey counties and SORRs in rural and urban regions observed that within urban areas, the more stringent the restricted zones are, the increased likelihood RSOs were banished from living within particular counties. For example, under a 1,000 feet restriction in urban areas corresponded to almost 65% of RSOs being restricted from living within that area; at 2,500 feet within an urban or rural setting, nearly all RSOs (100% rural and > 98% urban) could not live in the area (Chajewski & Mercado, 2009).

In urban settings with high population density areas and more restrictive SORRs, calling for greater distances from schools, daycares, and parks, housing for RSOs appears to be even more challenging. In particular, a study of housing availability in Miami-Dade County, Florida concerning the 2,500 feet county SORR revealed only 43 possible units

in the entire county that were available to rent in July 2009 (where the rent was $1250 or less per month) out of the 424,136 residential units in Miami-Dade in the same price range (Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). However, while the results show 43 possible units available for rent for $1,250 or less, the question remains if the landlord would rent the unit to an ex-felon, particularly to an RSO.

RSOs and Socially Disorganized Neighborhoods

RSOs, like other ex-offenders, move into socially disorganized areas upon release (Clark & Duwe, 2015; Hughs & Burchfield, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006). Hughes and Burchfield's (2008) study discovered that roughly 50% of the RSOs resided in a restricted area, with most living in a socially disorganized neighborhood. Socia and Stamatel (2012) found RSO residences cluster in socially disorganized areas, particularly in specific areas with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, ethnic heterogeneity, and in areas with less informal control mechanisms.

While the main focus of SORN laws consists of making information readily available to the public to help them police their neighborhoods, within socially disorganized areas, these extra layers of social controls are lacking (Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2008; Socia & Stamatel, 2012). Within these neighborhoods, the underuse of public registries might occur as a result of a lack of access by inhabitants of the area. As described previously, socially disorganized areas lack the ability to possess informal control and less collective efficacy, which, in turn, increases anonymity (Socia & Stamatel, 2012). Hence, SORRs relegate RSOs to these communities, which allow them to blend in among residents (Socia & Stamatel, 2012; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008).

Clustering of RSOs and Recidivism.

Moreover, as a result of SORRs, within these socially disorganized areas in urban environments, RSOs live in clusters, affecting neighborhoods with the least amount of resources, lack of access to information, and low social control to bear the brunt of dealing with RSOs. Studies show concentrations or clusters of ex-offenders breed criminal activity within socially disorganized areas (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). Additionally, Kubrin and Stewart's (2006) study of ex-offenders shows that RSOs who reenter into disadvantaged communities recidivate more than those who live in affluent neighborhoods, regardless of other individual-level factors. Similarly, Hipp et al.'s (2010) study, which examined the social structural context of census tracts, found that parolees were returning to socially disorganized communities and determined that higher concentrated disadvantage and disorder within these neighborhoods increased recidivism.

When clustering ex-offenders within a particular area, Chamberlain and Wallace (2015) state that associating with ex-offenders and lack of pro-social relationships can be a factor in recidivism and neighborhood crime. This mutual tie might bring offenders together as others in the community, shun them (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015). Moreover, if ex-offenders return to a socially disorganized community with a cluster of ex-offenders, they vie against each other for housing, employment, and treatment (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; Vischer & Farrell, 2005).

Clustering ex-offenders within a neighborhood might also facilitate legal cynicism and distrust of law enforcement (D. S. Kirk, 2015). Furthermore, these clusters hamper the formation of prosocial customs and activities that would decrease criminal

behavior and instead encourage criminal subculture (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). Another possible consequence of clustered offenders proffers that criminals learn new skills from others (Sutherland, 1947), and additional criminal opportunities exist in clustered neighborhoods (Osgood, Wilson, O'Malley, Bachman, & Johnston, 1996).

Recent work adds credence to these suppositions. After the displacement of ex-offenders caused by Hurricane Katrina, D. S. Kirk (2015) measured recidivism rates (based on reincarceration) of ex-offenders released just Post-Katrina and then a second cohort released a year after Katrina. Post-Katrina, areas of Louisiana experienced substantial damage to a predominant amount of houses within the city of New Orleans. As a result, parolees dispersed throughout the state and sometimes out of the state. D. S. Kirk (2015) captures this displacement from the treatment areas and controls for areas that did not experience a shift of parolee concentration. The results indicated that as the parolee concentration number (per 1,000 people) increased, the reincarceration rate during the one-year measurement period also increased, showing a positive correlation between the clustering of parolees and recidivism. As such, D. S. Kirk (2015) contended that the geographic displacement of parolees would bring about an overall reduction in recidivism.

Intentional Enclaves as a Solution

However, a limited number of planned enclaves of RSOs seem to work in reducing recidivism. In Colorado, RSOs on probation enter into Shared Living Arrangements (SLAs) and allow for supportive prosocial relationships with peers and those in charge of treating and monitoring them (CDPS, 2004). Such SLAs with adequate

support such as these can, therefore, have a positive impact on recidivism. Probation officers and treatment provider's approval of the residence and roommates, and as a stipulation of living in an SLA, maintain that offenders who live with each other hold their roommates accountable and report a roommate's actions or behaviors if they are inappropriate (CDPS, 2004). Coupled with mandatory treatment for each RSO, RSOs living in SLAs must account for all of their time adding an extra layer of the behavioral monitoring. Additionally, probation officers also conduct frequent check-ins with the treatment providers and the RSOs (CDPS, 2004).

Located in Pahokee, Florida, Restoration Destination facilitates a comparable experience like that of Colorado's SLAs with access to housing, treatment, ability to form pro-social ties to the community, and ease of law enforcement to check on several RSOs in a confined area (M25M, 2015). However, key differences seem to be the extra layer of behavioral monitoring by peers and the open and direct lines of communication between treatment providers and law enforcement. Those that run the facility coach RSOs as to what they should say to law enforcement or what they do not have to share with law enforcement when asked questions (J. Kirk, 2015). While the community of RSOs boasts a low recidivism rate, in 2012, one of its residents pled guilty to raping and killing Ophelia Redden, 52, and leaving her body under a tree near the community (Duret, 2012). Redden's mother brought a lawsuit against those involved in renting the facilities and Matthew 25 Ministries claiming that they recruited sex offenders to live within the community, putting the population at risk by failing to monitor the RSOs adequately or provide security for the neighborhood (McCue, 2013). However, over the years, more than 500 RSOs lived in Miracle Village under the care of Matthew 25

Ministries/Restoration Destination with very few incidents with local law enforcement considering it a model community (Schindler, 2018).

Geographic Proximity Versus Relationship Proximity

As discussed in the previous chapter and in tandem with the above studies, research shows that in the cases of child sex offenses, geographic distance is not the issue, but rather, social proximity needs to be the focus of concern. In research by Duwe, Donnay, & Tewksbury (2008) of recidivistic sex offenders in Minnesota between 1990 and 2006, those RSOs reincarcerated for a new sex offense did not contact anyone at the prohibited places (schools, parks, daycares) covered by the SORRs. Most of the victims of the new sex offenses (almost 80%) seem to be someone that the victim knows or met through their social circles (Duwe et al., 2008). Additionally, Colombino, Mercado, Levenson, & Jeglic (2011) examined adult male sex offenders released from New Jersey prison between 1996 and 2007 on where they met their victims. Colombino et al. (2011) found that about 87% of those sex offenders knew their child or adult victim before the sex offense.

The Gaps in the Literature

Previous studies single out South Florida as an area of concern for RSOs. South Florida, specifically Broward, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach, represent counties with a large portion of the state's population, as well as a substantial portion of the State's RSOs (FDLE, 2015). However, even more concerning is the number of studies that discuss the fallout of SORRs in the area including lack of housing for RSOs (BTFR, 2009; Zandbergen & Hart, 2009), the collateral consequences of RSOs not being able to find employment and housing in Florida (Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; Levenson et al., 2015),

clustering of RSOs within neighborhoods (Lee-Silcox, 2016), and the disproportionate rates of transient RSOs to overall population and homelessness imputable to severe SORRs (Levenson et al., 2013).

However, previous studies regarding clustering and SORRs do not look at the effect clustering has on individual recidivism rates. An exploratory study looked at where RSOs live within South Florida and where groups lived (Lee-Silcox, 2016). Other previous research regarding the impact of SORRs and RSO clustering discusses the notion that while SORRs might increase clustering of RSOs within the first two years, after two years, the levels per census block return to normal (Socia, 2012a). However, Socia (2012a) states that a limitation of this study can be the geography of the study area (upstate New York) and its makeup and that generalizing these finding should be limited to similar areas. This study aims to look at a tri-county area containing major metropolitan cities with extensive state and municipal SORRs and whether these SORRs cause RSOs to cluster in socially disorganized areas resulting in a higher likelihood to recidivate.

Summary of Literature Review

Within this literature review, the ideas and impact of mass incarceration, reentry, and recidivism on RSO are discussed. While these factors impact all ex-convicts, RSOs deal with additional barriers to reentry with the added pressures of the public registry, SORRs, and law enforcement monitoring. In particular, SORRs can prevent RSOs from living with family members, finding stable housing, lack of access to treatment due to geographic location, and lack of employment opportunity. In turn, all these factors can promote increased recidivism, RSOs failing to register, and absconding.

The literature review also addresses RSO recidivism rates and public misconceptions. While thought to have a high recidivism rate, historically, RSOs generally recidivate at a lower rate than any other category of offender. Specifically, a study in Florida by Levenson & Zgoba (2016), show that the rearrest rates for sex offenders are lower than other offenders, regardless of when sex offender management policies became law. Additionally, SORRs do not deter RSOs from living in buffer zones (Blood et al., 2008; CDPS, 2004; MNDOC, 2003; Nobles et al., 2012; Socia, 2012b, 2015; Tewksbury & Jennings, 2010), nor does it impact recidivism or arrests of RSOs (Nobels et al., 2012).

SORRs impact RSOs trying to find affordable housing, and the more densely populated an area is, the harder it is to find housing or a landlord willing to rent to them (Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). These factors also contribute to RSOs living in socially disorganized areas in clusters (Clark & Duwe, 2015; Hughs & Burchfield, 2008, Mustaine et al., 2006; Socia & Stamatel, 2012). Socially disorganized areas lack the resources, social control, collective efficacy, and pro-social relationships that ex-offenders need in order not to recidivate (Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2008; Socia & Stamatel, 2012). Moreover, when ex-convicts cluster, it encourages the formation of criminal subcultures, distrust of law enforcement, and increased criminal activity and recidivism (D. S. Kirk, 2015). While intentional enclaves like Restoration Destination try to promote a place where RSOs can live in harmony with the surrounding community, a formal evaluation of the program does not exist.

Furthermore, while laws focus on geographic proximity and restrictions to prevent child sex offenses, the RSO's social proximity or previous relationship to the

victim proves to be the abundant method of contacting and choosing a victim in about 80% of the cases (Duwe et al., 2008). While there SORRS limit housing options, which might include living with family or friends and, as a result, possibly limit access to potential victims, further research in this area would need to be studied. SORRs appear to be a smokescreen, put in place by lawmakers in response to public outcry and a handful of cases, but do not offer actual prevention or protection from sex offenses. This false sense of security and collateral and unintended consequences will be further explored in the next sections.

Theoretical Orientation

The next section deals with the theoretical framework for this study. Since this study deals with multiple questions, it contains several layers of theories as to its blueprint and foundation. First, the author discusses moral panic and the formation of laws and the social construction of sex offenders. Next, the unintended consequences of moral panic examine existing regulations governing sex offenders. Third, social disorganization theory is used to nest the discussion concerning the impact or lack of effects neighborhoods have on the recidivism of sex offenders. Finally, the subculture theory is used as a framework to determine if clusters of sex offenders influence the recidivism rate of sex offenders. All these theoretical approaches integrate seamlessly with one another and are well-suited to couch an investigation of this type.

Moral Panic

When looking at sex offender laws ranging over the past few decades, moral panic often rears as a possible starting point for the call for more and

stricter laws about sex offenders. Moral panics are described in the following way by Cohen (1972/2002):

> Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself (p. 1).

A moral panic occurs in five stages: 1) a group threatens social norms or community interests, someone, or something, 2) the media portrays this threat in a simplistic form or symbol, 3) this symbol and its portrayal cause public concern, 4) authoritative figures, such as law enforcement or policymakers respond to this, and 5) the uproar and panic over this issue cause changes within the community (Cohen, 1972/2002). Initially, a moral panic lasted for a brief amount of time, possibly expiring at a faster rate than its rise to social concern (Burchfield et al., 2017). In the recent, third version of *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, Cohen (2002) explicitly addresses the decades-long moral panic surrounding crimes against children, especially kidnapping, molestation, and murder committed by sex offenders, and the concept of a sex offender registry. Cohen (2002) states that these crimes, "Strikes a depth of horror in us all," and stir up feelings of vulnerability and empathy (p. xviii). Cohen classifies sex offender registries under one of the most common and predictable moral panics (2002). Events

involving children and sex offenders continually stir up attention, the media expresses its outrage and constructs the image of the sex offender as a monster, the public calls for change, and the officials respond by passing laws as a safeguard against future events (2002).

Social Constructionism

While Cohen's definition of a moral panic is rooted in a sequence of events and interplay, Goode & Ben-Yehuda (1994/2009) approach defining moral panics by attributes known as social constructions. First, a heightened level of concern exists over the behavior of a particular group. Then, an increased level of hostility evolves toward those deviants who are threatening the mores and norms of society (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994/2009). Next, society reaches the consensus that this group and its members engage in harm towards society and are a threat. Additionally, there is a level of disproportion where the concern or outrage is in excess concerning the actual damage (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994/2009). Finally, panics will ebb and flow, rising and leaving in roughly the same amount of time (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994/2009).

Media's role within the creation of a moral panic and its symbology materializes under social constructionism. Media and its portrayal of events directly impact public perception and are integral in social constructionism, the change, creation of laws, and judicial policies (Surette, 2007). In *Media, Crime, and Criminal Justice*, Surette (2007) defines social constructionism as, "A theoretical view that knowledge is socially created...Social constructionism studies the shared ideas, interpretations, and knowledge that groups of people agree to hold in common" (p. 224). Here, media contributes to a moral panic in several ways. The press may agenda set, deciding who or what is

noteworthy, convey assertions made by claim-makers and associated rhetoric, or make the actual claim with headlines proclaiming moral outrage or moral righteousness (Cohen, 1972/2002). According to Critcher (2006), fear and anger generated through the above process prompt an "us" versus "them" mentality, where distortions and emotion inform the social construction of an issue. This influence is evident in cases of creating harsh, stricter crime laws over the past 50 years to address the war on drugs, repeat felons, getting tough on crime, and sex offenders (Critcher, 2006; Surette, 2007).

In the case of sex offenders, emotions range from a heightened sense of vulnerability and caution to anger and outrage. At the center of these controversies, the press finds itself in the middle of the upheaval, often igniting and maintaining debate and helping to sustain emotions (Cohen, 1972/2002; van den Bosch, 2017). The general public fears and is repulsed by a sexual offender, and they group all sex offenders into one category of the violent, "stranger danger" sex offender, irrespective of that fact that these types of offenders are the least likely sex offender on the registry (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994/2009; Harper et al., 2017). The media plays their part in this panic by falsely labeling sex offenders as being untreatable and guaranteed to recidivate if they have the opportunity (Bradford et al., 2013) and exploit this exaggeration to the public and lawmakers through headlines whenever possible (Garland, 2008). In turn, politicians respond to the public outcries not only ascribable to their constituents' concern but are also motivated by political self-preservation as they are elected officials, and any action deemed to protect children and be tough on crime remains popular (Casady, 2009). For politicians, the tough on crime stance, continual media headlines, and responding to public outcry keeps the moral panic around sex offenders in the limelight and a topical

and permanent state of fear, where the programmed reaction to any policy dealing with sex offenders is punitive as evidenced below.

Memorial Criminal Justice Policies. Memorial criminal justice policies are symbolic legislation meant to assuage public fear and named after a victim of a tragic event having massive media attention and rotation. Such policies are a direct result of public outcry for reform and change and bring about more stringent laws and stricter guidelines. The aforementioned Federal and State Laws in the previous section show this linkage as all are named in memoriam of victims: Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act of 1994, Megan's Law (1996), Jimmy Ryce Act (1999), Jessica's Law (2005) Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance (2005), and Adam Walsh Act (2006). Additionally, the statutes declare their purpose by listing the crimes of notable cases. For example, within the Adam Walsh Act of 2006, 17 victims and brief details of their deaths, covering twenty-five years, are listed, including Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, Pam Lychner, Jeseta Gage, Dru Sjodin, Jessica Lunsford, Sarah Lunde, Amie Zyla, Christy Ann Fornoff, Alexandra Nicole Zapp, Polly Klaas, Jimmy Ryce, Carlie Brucia, Amanda Brown, Elizabeth Smart, Molly Bish, and Samantha Runnion.

In all the above instances named, the offender killed their victim, which dangerously infers that sex offenders often kill their victims (Sample, 2006). These handfuls of cases are outliers that problematically drive public policy from an emotional standpoint, usually from outraged parents of the victim and their communities. Additionally, these policies put forth in the victim's names might not have even prevented these tragedies. In many cases, several of the perpetrators traveled to different

neighborhoods from where their registered residences were to violate their victims (e.g., as in the case of Jessica Lunsford and Dru Sjodin) or were omitted as sex offenders because they had never been convicted of a sex offense (e.g., Danny James Heinrich, Jacob Wetterling's killer). Consequently, policymakers create and pass laws from an emotional perspective without fleshing out the possible unintended outcomes as they bend to their constituents' outcry that is informed by media's depiction of these heinous but small numbers of crimes.

Unintended Consequences

Laws stemming from these moral panics seemingly redraw ethical boundaries and reestablish norms (Burchfield et al., 2017). However, under the inherent disproportionate nature of a moral panic, the actual outcome and the intended outcome might not align. Furthermore, unintended consequences and blowback occur, including but not limited to, the difficulty for RSOs to reintegrate into society, as well as minimal impact on sex offender recidivism (Burchfield et al., 2017; Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson & Hern, 2007). While the laws mentioned above intended to protect society, unintended consequences occurred, such as lack of available housing, homelessness, clustering of RSOs, and absconding sex offenders as a result of the restrictions.

Sociologist Robert Merton described the clash between actions and the unexpected outcomes of those actions in *The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action* (1936). These consequences arose out of the initiation of the action, or in this case, because of the launch of residency restrictions and other governing laws. Merton discussed five reasons why these outcomes would be unanticipated. The first factor inhibiting a full understanding of the issues at hand is knowledge, ignorance,

whether it was a result of snap decisions for the need of expediency (i.e., time constraints), or an infeasibility of comprehensive study resulting from financial limitations (i.e., fiscal constraints) (Merton, 1936). In the case of memorial criminal justice laws regarding sex offenders, the public and the media demanded sex offender registration, community notification, residency restrictions, and more. Policymakers quickly responded by passing these laws, forever immortalizing victims as the face of public safety and a warning to all of those who dared speak against these laws. Arguably, the efficacy of these policies was a separate matter.

While these policies intended to keep the public safe, they also increase the burden on law enforcement and their resources (BTFR, 2009). The increasing transient population and differing residency restrictions within Florida made it increasingly more difficult for law enforcement to track RSOs (Monjeau, 2011). SORRs compel law enforcement to identify RSOs that fall under FLRR, monitor them, detect violators, and help the State Attorney's office with the prosecution (BTFR, 2009). Additionally, the Department of Corrections reports that probation officers spend a substantial amount of time with RSOs trying to solve housing problems and running dozens of potential addresses to try to find one that will be compliant for each RSO and existing SORRs (BTFR, 2009). Furthermore, Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) reports that on most nights, a team from the Sexual Predator and Offender Unit drives through the county with a list of addresses, trying to find transient RSOs and verifying addresses (Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018). Maintaining the database of RSOs, staffing the registration, and funding patrol units for address verification diverts the workforce and

time from other areas that could be addressed. All take a toll on law enforcement departments and the public at large (BTFR, 2009).

Merton's (1936) second reason for these results is an error; error in observation of the situation, in dealing with the circumstances, in determining what should happen, or in the execution of the plan. A mistake can also occur associated with habitual decisions. Policymakers recycle previously successful solutions erroneously believing them to work across all situations. According to Merton (1936), such generic applications are unlikely to work as social environments change both temporally and spatially. An example of an error out of habit in Florida is municipalities creating additional residency restrictions beyond those outlined in the FLRR. By doing so, in most cases, it further narrowed possible areas for RSOs to live. In other instances, passing these SORRs made their municipality challenging to be inhabited by any RSO that did not fit in the grandfather clause.

Linked to the trend of municipalities enacting stricter residency restrictions for RSOs than that of the state or county, tensions arose between counties and cities as RSOs relocated to neighboring areas with the least restrictive residency constraint (Monjeau, 2011; Wernick, 2006). The Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) movement tried to banish sex offenders entirely from communities, which triggered challenges as to the constitutional validity of these ordinances by RSOs and neighboring municipalities (Wernick, 2006). By undermining state law, these municipal laws increased transient RSOs and absconding rates of sex offenders who were released but failed to register or re-register considering the mounting residence restrictions. In Palm Beach County, the unintended consequences of RSOs finding a place to live compelled legislators to roll back the RSO restrictions

from 2,500 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate to 1,000 feet from these designated areas (Laird, 2015). Subsequently, municipalities within Palm Beach County enacted their NIMBY laws and reverted to the 2,500 feet restrictions for RSOs.

Thirdly, the *imperious immediacy of interest*, the stakeholder's interest, or cultural values can trigger tunnel vision, looking only at immediate consequences versus looking at long-term benefits or solutions (Merton, 1936). For example, in the case of all the previously listed legislation, specific instances of brutal violence against a child spawned an urgency to create laws that would help to protect and prevent cases like these from reoccurring. These value-driven decisions and subsequent legislation seek to protect the innocent but, paradoxically, can increase victimization risk through creating a housing crisis for RSOs that induces recidivism.

As another side-effect of these nascent residency restrictions, scarce, small pockets of places where RSOs could legally reside developed and, in turn, created clusters of RSOs (Wernick, 2006). However, in other cases, the deficiency of affordable, legal housing for RSOs triggers homelessness for a large portion of RSOs, particularly in densely populated areas like those in South Florida (Ciabotti et al., 2018; Laird, 2015; Skipp, 2009). These residence restrictions uproot families, make it difficult to find legal, affordable housing. In turn, the lack of housing options causes difficulty in maintaining a job or a family, which increases the risk for recidivism (Chajewski & Mercado, 2009; Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson & Hern, 2007; Mercado et al., 2008). While these laws were enacted to enforce public safety by creating a sex offender registry and residency restrictions, the unintended consequences of these policies (i.e., increased

transience, instability, increased risk factors for recidivism), negate the original intent of knowing where sex offenders live for effective monitoring and recidivism prevention (Chajewski & Mercado, 2009; Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson & Hern, 2007; Mercado et al., 2008; Wernick, 2006).

Lastly, Merton quandaries that since the flawed decision will be part of future prediction of the subject, the future prediction is inherently flawed (Merton, 1936). At any level, errors impact the next steps or decisions in policies. If there is an initial erroneous assessment of the current condition of the situation, an inaccurate evaluation of the current conditions that can impact the future outcomes, an error in determining a course of action, or an issue within the implementation, the result from these errors will always be flawed (Merton, 1936; Payne & DeMichele, 2011). In other words, each step within the policymaking process can impact the outcome, and if there are errors within the process, the future predicted result would also be flawed.

In the context of sexual offenders, a highly publicized case with emotional triggers and violation of social norms generate a frenzied panic, with immediate and impetuous solutions created as a result. Society feels as if these new memorialized laws will prevent the same situation from ever happening again; however, this is not the case. Instead, if the law was created under flawed conditions, the result and future results will be erroneous as well. Creating flawed laws without looking at short-term and long-term ramifications repeat this cycle of a self-defeating prophecy (Merton, 1996).

While most of these laws memorialized minors who were accosted by strangers, in most cases, sex offenders that commit acts on children are relatives, family friends, or someone who has consistent contact with the child (Casady, 2009; Colombino et al.,

2011; Hamilton et al., 2005). In more than 80% of the cases, children know their attackers, which conflicts with the public portrait of the sex offender as the boogeyman, ready to jump out of the shadows when least expected. The "stranger danger" sex offender represents a minority of cases, and existing studies concur (Alexander, 2014; Hamilton et al., 2005; Sperber et al., 2010). For example, a study by Colombino and colleagues (2011) determined RSOs whose victims were children met them mostly in residences (67%) and very few in public places where children congregate (4%). RSOs whose victims were adults met within a public location like a workplace or bar. As previously noted, most of the offenders, about 87%, knew their victim before the attack (Colombino et al., 2011).

Misinforming the public about who is the more likely threat for committing sexual predation (i.e., stranger vs. known) undermines and detracts from meaningful messaging for the bulk of cases (Mancini, Shields, Mears, & Beaver, 2010). "Stranger danger" warnings can create a sense of false security. While a parent might be warning their child about the RSO on the other block thinking they will be safe if they are avoiding the stranger, the undermined messaging is that parents need to prepare their child for the possibility that someone they know or will know might assault them (Hampson, 2013). Thus, this moral panic and view of the stranger being the danger prohibit a shift in thinking and policy regarding RSOs even in the face of unintended consequences.

Social Disorganization Theory

Another of the unintended consequences stemming from RSO residency restrictions can be that RSOs live in socially disorganized areas. Developed as a socio-

ecological theory by the Chicago School and popularized by Shaw & McKay (1942), social disorganization describes a fractured community, unable to attain shared values, norms, or social control; and when presented with a problem, finds it challenging to come up with a solution (Bursik, 1988). Upon studying the distribution of juvenile delinquency, Shaw and McKay (1942) discovered that crime clustered in specific areas, concentrating near the city center. Once they mapped their results, they determined that the areas with the highest crime rates correlated to the communities that were the most impoverished with high residential mobility. They overlaid their findings with the concentric zone model designed by Park and Burgess (1925) and found that as the distance from the city center increased, crime decreased. Most crimes take place in the transitional zone, just outside the business district on the fringe of the residential area. These types of interstitial spaces are also where the offenders would live (1942). The transitional zones would exhibit high population turnover, poverty, population heterogeneity, struggle to obtain informal social controls, cannot regulate antisocial behavior, and allow for delinquency to occur (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Consequently, as the economic deprivation of a community and population turnover increases, so does social disorganization, and the ability of the neighborhood to self-police diminishes (Bursik, 1988; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Thus, these areas will always be neighborhoods where high rates of crime occur.

Conversely, organized communities display solidarity, cohesion, integration, and exist in the residential and commuters zones (Kubrin et al., 2008; Park & Burgess, 1925; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Solidarity constitutes an agreement of mores and standards, and community members desire and value similar goals, such as keeping their neighborhood crime-free (Kubrin et al., 2008). Cohesion refers to bonding amongst neighbors and

manifests in residents knowing and liking members of the community (Kubrin et al., 2008). Lastly, integration represents consistent and frequent social interaction with neighbors (Kubrin et al., 2008). Solidarity, cohesion, and integration of a neighborhood cultivate informal social control, which, in turn, prevents crime. Additionally, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) amplified cohesion within a community by including collective efficacy, an inclination to intervene and act on behalf of the neighborhood to prevent illegal activity. These informal mechanisms to prevent crime heavily rely on trust and solidarity (Sampson et al., 1997).

Within socially disorganized neighborhoods, informal social control such as surveillance by community members, guardianship, and direct intervention seems to disappear (Greenberg et al., 1982). Informal control signifies, "the casual but active observation of neighborhood streets that are engaged in by individuals during daily activities. It includes recognizing and paying careful attention to strangers in the neighborhood and keeping an eye on neighbors' homes and property" (Greenberg et al., 1982, p. 9). These informal control actions that residents of the community display to combat crime within their communities add to the informal surveillance and deter criminals from continuing to act (Kubrin & Wo, 2016). Ultimately, informal control can lead to formal control, i.e., a neighbor witnesses a theft and calls law enforcement. However, in socially disorganized areas, interceding on behalf of neighbors or those in the community are less likely to occur (Bursik, 1988).

Furthermore, neighborhood characteristics (poverty, residential instability, racial/ethnic heterogeneity) indirectly affect crime through their influence on the formation of social bonds and informal social control (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw &

McKay, 1942). For example, high-levels of transience adds to reducing formal social controls within a socially disorganized area (Sampson et al., 1997). Rapid population shifts, or residential mobility, diminishes social controls as forming cohesion through fostering relationships within a neighborhood take time; ergo, homeownership, and residential tenure are vital components to preserving social control (Sampson et al., 1997). Furthermore, concentrated disadvantage decreases collective efficacy as it adds to population turnover (i.e., residential mobility) because able residents would leave the community in search of one with better conditions (Andresen, 2014). High levels of immigration concentration within a neighborhood can also contribute to ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity and disrupt the realization of similar values and goals among residents. The lack of social bonds hinders collective efficacy and, as a result, weaken informal social controls (Sampson et al., 1997).

The concepts behind social disorganization intersect with environmental criminology, as they both analyze place and space as contributing factors to delinquency. Specifically, Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) harken to Shaw and McKay's (1942) ideas regarding social disorganization and affirm the supposition that space and place indeed tie offender and delinquency. Additionally, in crime pattern theory, an individual's awareness space and activity space determine if and where misconduct will occur (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). Awareness space refers to an individual's areas which they are familiar with or a "comfort zone" (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981; Rossmo et al., 2005). Furthermore, an individual's activity space signifies nodes of activity that means where they work, live, and play and identify the paths they travel to and from these activities (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). Crime pattern theory uses

the awareness and activity spaces in conjunction with routine activities theory and rational choice theory to synthesize a comprehensive explanation of crime and understanding offender and victim's behavior patterns where space and place play a crucial role (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981).

Shaw and McKay's original theory of social disorganization includes a combination of low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and family disruption, which leads to neighborhood disorganization and increased crime. Sampson and Groves (1989) tested this model by looking at two different surveys in Great Britain, covering 21,935 residents and 538 neighborhoods. In both instances, Sampson and Groves (1989) found support for Shaw and McKay's social disorganization theory in determining that social bonds have an inverse relationship with crime rates (i.e., communities with more robust social bonds have lower crime rates). Moreover, low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and family disruption contributed to the overall structure of the neighborhoods and informal controls exerted (Sampson & Groves, 1989). These findings not only support Shaw and McKay's theory, but the study also shows that it is generalizable to other countries and cultures (Sampson & Groves, 1989).

In another study, Sampson et al. (1997) surveyed 8,782 residents and studied 343 neighborhoods in Chicago, Illinois, to determine if collective efficacy would reduce violence. The multilevel analyses showed that as the levels of concentrated disadvantage, immigration concentration, and residential instability increase, collective efficacy within a neighborhood decreases (Sampson et al., 1997). Respectively, when controlling for variances in neighborhood, composition, prior violence within a neighborhood, and high

rates of collective efficacy predicted communities with lower rates of violence (Sampson et al., 1997).

By publicizing the sex offender registry, the broad assumption is members of the community can make an informed choice of where to live, where to avoid, monitor RSOs in their neighborhood, and exhibit informal controls (Socia & Stamatel, 2012). Simultaneously, another purpose of making the information available to the public is to act as a deterrent for RSOs because those around them will be informed and act as guardians (Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2008). However, a study conducted by Socia and Stamatel (2012) determined that RSOs are more likely to reside in socially disorganized neighborhoods with less collective efficacy and increased anonymity. Additional studies support that RSOs move into socially disorganized areas (Clark & Duwe, 2015; Hughs & Burchfield, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006). Thus, if an RSO lived, worked, and played in a socially disorganized area and opted to recidivate, the lack of social controls in that neighborhood could promote further offenses. Such a scenario represents an unintended consequence of residency restrictions (Socia & Stamatel, 2012).

Unfortunately, unintended consequences compound when RSOs live in socially disorganized areas. Even though RSOs are associated with some of the lowest recidivism rates, experts concur that recidivism rises as RSOs reside in socially disorganized neighborhoods (Levenson et al., 2013; Mercado et al., 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006; Wartell, 2009; Wilson, 2009). SORRs can force offenders to live in socially disorganized areas or rural areas, which limits access to public resources, like transportation and geographic access to treatment centers that make up integral parts in aiding reentry and prosocial relationships (Lee-Silcox, 2016; Wartell, 2009; Wilson, 2009). Besides, living

within these confines diminishes employment prospects and can create a snowball effect of homelessness and transience (Duwe, 2009; Levenson & Cotter, 2005). The ability to live in a home with the support of their family, to have a job, and be able to go to treatment centers are critical for successful reentry and to reducing recidivistic crimes among released offenders, particularly for RSOs (Duwe, 2009; Preston, 2009; Youstin & Nobels, 2009). Subsequently, RSOs in South Florida following SORRs, often end up living in transitional zones in clusters like those seen under the Julia Tuttle Causeway, a trailer park in Allapattah, an industrial parking lot in Hialeah, and more within the Tri-County area (Rabin, 2014). In most of these instances and as previously discussed, the RSOs live in inhumane conditions without electricity, running water, shelter, or a bathroom (McCoy, 2014). Moreover, these transient RSOs repeatedly get evicted and banished from the location after location after the city or town passes a NIMBY law or add in a park to prevent RSOs from living in the area (Duwe, 2009; Lee-Silcox, 2016; Levenson et al., 2013; Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009; Wartell, 2009; Wilson, 2009).

Subculture Theory of Urbanism

Another unintended consequence of instituting residency restrictions is that there are concentrations or clusters of RSOs, possibly leading to higher recidivism rates. Fischer's (1975) subcultural theory of urbanism argues that large cities enhance, create, and allow deviant subcultures within large urban areas. Fischer (1975) outlines this idea through four key points, "The more urban a place, the greater its subcultural variety, the more urban a place, the more intense its subcultures, the more urban a place, the more numerous the sources of diffusion and the greater the diffusion into a subculture, and the more urban a place, the higher the rates of unconventionality" (pp. 1324-1328). The first

contention discusses the idea that greater diversity in people exists on account of the scope of a city and those drawn to migrate there (Fischer, 1975). The second proposition regarding the intensity of subcultures relates to the ability to organize a group as a result of the sheer number of members who believe in the same beliefs, values, norms, and customs (Fischer, 1975).

Additionally, because of the number of members, there are more opportunities to interact with each other within the city (Fischer, 1975). Diffusion relates to the adoption of each other's beliefs and behaviors into group behavior and subsequent acceptance of all the views and practices (Fischer, 1975). Lastly, the larger the population, the higher the chance for a wider variety of interests and unconventional, or not socially normative, groups (Fischer, 1975).

Correspondingly, studies show that neighborhoods with clusters of ex-convicts impede the creation of pro-social norms and behaviors that would assist in criminal desistance and promote criminal behavior and subculture (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). The social network created within clusters of former prisoners can be one of injustice and mistrust in the criminal justice system, which can lead to spreading the message of distrust of law enforcement and increase illegal activity (D. S. Kirk, 2015). Taking into consideration all of Fischer and D. S. Kirk's key points, in areas of higher concentrations of deviant subcultures, such as those within RSOs clusters, one might believe that it is the formation, strength, on-going internal support, and modeling of behaviors and beliefs that cause higher rates of recidivism within these clusters of RSOs. This complements cultural transmission theory within socially disorganized neighborhoods where criminal traditions are shared and

generationally passed down (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Moreover, Katz (1988) contends those of a subculture learn and share “motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes,” which add to the subculture and the overall shared way of life (p. 90).

D. S. Kirk’s (2015) study regarding clustering parolees in Louisiana post-Katrina found that parolee concentration significantly impacted reincarceration. Furthermore, by needing to disperse parolees throughout the state of Louisiana and out of the state, there was a reduction in reincarceration when parolees’ concentrations existed at a lower rate (D. S. Kirk, 2015). Other criminology studies support subculture theory claims regarding commonality and strength of participation and message. For example, one study analyzed the connection of members of deviant pedophile online communities and concluded that these deviant subculture groups, "can connect in ways that validate and support their [deviant] actions" (Holt et al., 2010, p. 20).

Permeated by scorn and fear by society through SORRs, the fringe grouping of sex offenders causes an extra layer of stigma versus other ex-convicts who do not have to deal with residency restrictions, public registries, or the idea of a civil commitment (Higgins & Rolfe, 2017; Tewksbury, 2005; Zgoba et al., 2009). As a result, RSOs experience exclusion from housing, employment, social circles, and frequently family due to SORR restrictions (Esser-Stuart, 2018; Higgins & Rolfe, 2017; Huebner et al., 2014; Socia & Stamatel, 2012; Tewksbury, 2005). Furthermore, some RSOs cannot utilize the internet and, therefore, cannot interact in a virtual world with their social circles even when geographically distant (Higgins & Rolfe, 2017).

This stigma, isolation, and marginalization, which all RSOs experience, regardless of the tier of offense, bonds this unique group and promotes a subculture with

shared experiences, everyday struggles, and a united sense of injustice regarding their treatment within society in comparison to other ex-convicts. On this point, a 2010 qualitative examination by Holt, Blevens, and Burkert (2010) studied five web forums run by and for pedophiles. The scholars found that the forums supplied a way for offenders to connect and offer support to each other in a way that they could not engage with the rest of society. Notably, users of these forums not only traded birthday wishes and day-to-day ongoings within their lives, the trust between users led to sharing an us versus them tone as well as messages discussing pedophilia in terms of child love, boy love, and girl love to denote their feelings of acts that society deems illegal and immoral (Holt et al., 2010).

Clusters and encampments within the Tri-County area of South Florida are long-standing. While some of the encampments temporarily disband because of evictions, groups of RSOs keep re-forming in different areas out of a shared desire to maintain community and social ties. The number of RSOs within these clusters also keep growing from about 100 RSOs in 2010 living under Julia Tuttle Bridge, to over 260 RSOs in 2018 living in the Westgate streets. The clustering causes increased access to criminal capital, and the severe SORRs in the Tri-County area make it practically mandatory and almost guarantee that RSOs live near each other (Tolson & Klein, 2015). These forced clusters, stemming from SORRs, compel RSOs to live together, either in sparse housing options or in the streets. With minimal alternatives for socialization with non-RSOs, they band together, helping the infirm get to a bathroom, looking out for each other, forming their subculture based on an amalgamation of sexual deviance and marginalization from society (Gomes, 2017b). The sentiment that RSOs feel like outcasts and they can only

depend on each other was expressed by residents from the Westgate cluster, “We look out for each other because no one else does” (Gomes, 2017a, para. 17). Additionally, anecdotal evidence sometimes depicts occasions when RSOs try to keep each other in line connected to a fear of law enforcement and reincarceration or additional unwanted attention to the RSOs (D. S. Kirk, 2015; Kustura, 2015).

A possible exception for a deviant subculture of RSOs might be a formal enclave. Evidenced in Restoration Destination in Pahokee, Florida, RSOs apply for entrance into the community. Once approved, they have a place to live, opportunity for consistent psychological treatment, and a job following these stabilizing factors. These RSOs are also surrounded by those committed to treatment and have social contact with non-RSOs, who also believe in their treatment. As such, RSOs are allowed to be a part of the community. As previously discussed, RSOs living in Restoration Destination apply to get into the facility, and they do not accept violent offenders, pedophiles, or those convicted of other crimes such as burglary, robbery, etc. Also, the facility sets up the newly released RSO with necessary supplies, a room, and some things to help them out as they transition to their new life, providing positive social reinforcement and hope that RSOs will be able to be a part of the community regardless of their status (J. Kirk, 2015). However, while not documented widely, instances still exist within this community that validates residents looking out for each other to avoid recidivism. The following exchange documents this practice, “Do you invite somebody to look at your computer? No! Never! Especially when you know you got porn on it! Gentlemen, I’m gonna tell you this: Start using your brains” (J. Kirk, 2015, para. 92). This sticktoitiveness sometimes

worries law enforcement that RSOs might foster, collaborate, or even cover up for each other and ultimately recidivate (OPPAGA, 2018).

III. METHOD

This study explores three research questions regarding registered sex offenders (RSOs), Florida state residency restrictions, and the unintended consequences of passing additional guidelines at the municipality-level. This section will outline each question, accompanying hypothesis, the data, independent and dependent variables, and the analytical methods employed to examine each question. Additionally, each question originates with the RSO sample below from the FDLE and the geocoding process outlined below.

RSO Sample

Available publicly through a website and per SORNA, FDLE maintains a comprehensive listing of RSOs in Florida. The original listing from November 5, 2015, includes sexual predators and offenders, those who have died (kept on file for one year as public notice), absconded, confined, deported, released, and still needing to register. This list also contains those under the supervision of the State of Florida and the federal government through their terms of probation (FDLE, 2015). The listing catalogs first, middle and the last names, race, sex, hair color, height, weight, birthdate, Florida Department of Corrections' (FLDOC) number, permanent, temporary, or transitional address, if the victim was a minor, status as either a sexual offender or sexual predator, and has a link to the offender's mug shot. While there are statutory and definition differences between registered sex offenders and predators that are linked to the age of the victims as well as the number of instances, for this study, when the term RSO is utilized, both terms are included.

This study explores the RSOs listed within Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties located in South Florida. According to the FDLE listing of RSOs on November 5, 2015, in the Tri-County area, 4,411 RSOs live in Miami-Dade (n = 2094), Broward (n = 1281) and Palm Beach (n = 1036) Counties (FDLE, 2015). However, the nature of this study dictates the list-wise deletion of any RSOs in the study that are classified as deceased, confined, deported, and those who have absconded, as their location was either no longer a threat to the community or they could not be tracked. As a result, the total number of relevant and trackable RSOs in the Tri-County area is 3,892, located in Miami-Dade (n = 1767), Broward (n = 1157), and Palm Beach (n = 968).

Geocoding & Buffering Process

To answer the three research questions posed, all of the RSO addresses will be geocoded within ArcGIS Pro, version 2.4.2 (Environmental Systems Research Institute [ESRI], 2019). For this study, the researcher chooses to use street centerline address ranges to geocode versus parcel data. Parcel data has been deemed as the higher standard in geocoding due to the higher level of precision in pinpointing an exact address (Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). However, frequently, an RSO address can be a street intersection or omit an exact address or unit number, which makes parcel coding of those addresses as guesswork (Zgoba et al., 2009). Using street centerline address ranges omits the need for guesswork that parcel data would require in the event of incomplete address specifying exact units. For that reason, street centerline address ranges provide the most consistent method in geocoding this study's sample addresses (Zandergen & Hart, 2009; Zandbergen et al., 2010; Zgoba et al., 2009).

To maximize the number of geocoding matches from the street address, the researcher cleaned up the permanent, temporary, and transient home addresses. This process included checking each address, looking for misspellings, errors, eliminating apartment numbers, and correcting the formatting of cross-streets (by using "&" between street names). As a result of cleaning the data and geocoding using the ArcGIS Online World Geocoding Service, the total RSO sample size for the Tri-County area is 3,826 RSOs in Miami-Dade (n = 1750), Broward (n = 1123), and Palm Beach (n = 953) Counties. The original sample was decreased by 66 RSOs, due to non-matching or unverifiable addresses. This reduction represents less than 2% of the overall sample size, which is minimal and within the standard acceptance level regarding geocoding addresses (Berenson & Appelbaum, 2011; Clontz & Mericle, 2004; Hipp et al., 2011; Hughes & Kadleck, 2008; Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). The following research questions and analysis is based on this RSO sample size (n = 3,826) for Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties in South Florida.

Research Question 1

Research Question

The first research question addresses whether or not RSOs in Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties adhere to the Florida State Statute 775.215, which requires RSOs to live further than 1,000 feet of a school, childcare facility, park, or playground.

Research Question 1 Hypothesis

Based upon prior literature, other states, counties, and municipalities experienced RSOs violating buffer zones regarding residency restrictions (Berenson & Appelbaum,

2011; Grubesic et al., 2007; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008). Due in part to the concentration of schools, childcare facilities, parks, and playgrounds within the study area, and the extent of the 1,000 feet buffer zone around these areas, RSOs are not 100% compliant to Florida State Statute. Furthermore, in a combination of the extensive residency restriction buffer zones and the scarcity of affordable housing within these areas, RSOs violate residency restrictions (Berenson & Appelbaum, 2011; Grubesic et al., 2007; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008).

While the concentration of restricted sites and lack of affordable housing can be neighborhood factors on a macro level, those factors are not controlled by the RSO. Although the literature suggests that the residency restrictions drive and dictate where an RSO lives, this research question seeks to explore if individual factors contribute to deciding on where an RSO resides. As a result, this first research question studies an RSO's status as an offender or predator, whether or not the victim at the time of the incident was a minor, and if the RSO residential classification is transient (homeless).

Under more scrutiny than the classification of offenders, those classified as predators and convicted of more heinous crimes, have an extra layer of registration protocols, including, but not limited to an increase in the frequency of checking-in and updating their RSO profile with local law enforcement, additional residency restrictions, and added employment restrictions (The Florida Legislature, 2019). Since predators receive extra attention and restrictions, predators will be less likely to violate FLRR.

Furthermore, as previously discussed, communities and states passed residency restrictions to protect minors within their neighborhoods. With that in mind, this study analyzes whether or not the RSO's victim was a minor at the time of the incident and if

that plays into an RSO violating the FLRR buffer zones. Again, with the increased scrutiny that RSOs receive in South Florida, RSOs convicted of a sex crime with a victim who was a minor would not violate FLRR.

Lastly, the research question investigates if being a part of the transient RSO population would be a predictor in violating FLRR. Prior literature maintains that homeless RSOs are inherently homeless due to adhering to the severe residency restrictions (Levenson & Cotter, 2005b). This study expects to find similar results.

Research Question 1 Data and Sample

This research question uses the above mentioned geocoded sample of RSOs in the Tri-County area. While there are different residency restrictions regarding types of offenders (predator or offender) and variances based on municipality, for this study, Florida's residency restriction requirement of 1,000 feet will be used. In order to determine if RSOs live in violation of FLRR, geocoded shapefiles for public, private, and charter schools, childcare facilities, parks, and playground sites for the study's counties were acquired from Florida Geographic Data Library (FGDL), a public database under the University of Florida GeoPlan Center (Florida Geographic Data Library [FGDL], 2019).

Next, to simulate FLRR boundaries, 1,000-feet buffers will be added around each site where children congregate as dictated by law. Overlapping buffers will be dissolved to create connecting buffer boundaries surrounding the restricted places where children congregate. Then, the point intersections between the buffer zones and any RSOs residences intersecting within the buffer zones will be aggregated by count.

Research Question 1 Variables

Dependent variable

For the first research question, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure, dummy-coded, of whether an RSO, within the sample, did (n = 1) or did not (n = 0) violate FLRR within Miami-Dade, Broward, or Palm Beach Counties as of November 5, 2015. In the present study, 41% of RSOs violated FLRR.

Independent variables

The independent variables within the first research question measure individual-level characteristics of an RSO, which might impact if they would violate FLRR. An RSO's status is a dichotomous variable as predator (yes = 1; no = 0), which constituted 12%, whether or not the victim at the time of the incident was a minor (yes = 1; no = 0) which consisted of 78% of the cases, and if the RSO residential classification is transient (homeless) (yes = 1; no = 0), which comprised of 19% of RSOs. Subsequently, this research question controls for other demographic variables such as race where White RSOs for the study area accounts for roughly 62%, 38% Black RSOs, and nominal amounts of Asian (n = 9) and Native (n = 8) RSOs. Since the categories of Asian and Native are nominal, and other questions within the study address Blacks as historically possessing a larger disadvantage, for the sake of continuity, the race will be coded as Black is encoded "1" and all other races encoded as "0". Furthermore, age is a continuous interval variable in years based on the inception of the study on November 5, 2015, with a median age of 51 at the time of the study. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics regarding this research question.

Research Question 1 Analytic Strategy

Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, the analysis will use a logistic regression model to determine what individual variables are associated with violating the 1,000-foot buffer zone residency restrictions from the prohibited sites. At its core, multiple logistic regression helps to predict a dichotomous categorical variable based on a set of the independent variable(s). Multiple logistic regression maintains that at least 20 cases are needed for each variable, data is cross-sectional, and causality runs in one direction. Also, micro (individual-level) data, such as this study's sample, may be used in this model.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 1

Variable	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
RSO violators of FLRR[a]	.41	.49	0	1
Sexual predator[a]	.12	.33	0	1
Victim under 18[a]	.78	.41	0	1
Transient RSO[a]	.19	.39	0	1
Age	50.64	13.53	17	95
Black[a]	.38	.49	0	1

Note. N = 3,826. [a] Means for variables that are dichotomously coded can be interpreted as proportions.

Research Question 2

Research Question

The second research question explores if clusters of RSOs fall within socially disorganized areas within the Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties by looking at nested individual and neighborhood variables.

Research Question 2 Hypothesis

Previous studies conclude that RSOs live within socially disorganized areas upon reentry. Past clusters in the Tri-County area (i.e., Julia Tuttle Causeway, Westgate) would indicate that transient groups of RSOs in compliance with the statute would be located near industrial areas, trailer home parks, motels, and other socially disorganized areas. Additionally, the literature claims that finding stable housing is a critical component in the reentry process. However, studies demonstrated that the existence of severe residency restrictions inherently promotes the clustering of RSOs since it restricts the amount of affordable RSO housing options (Barnes et al., 2009; Zandbergen & Hart, 2009; Zgoba et al., 2009). While other studies address RSO clustering (Grubesic et al., 2007; Hughes & Burchfield, 2008; Hughes & Kadleck, 2008; Lee-Silcox, 2016; Mustaine et al., 2006; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008) and spatial distribution within urban and rural areas (Chajewski & Mercado, 2009; Socia, 2011, 2012a; Socia & Stamatel, 2012), those studies do so solely on a macro, neighborhood level, and do not use a nested model controlling for individual factors.

Research Question 2 Data and Sample

For this research question, neighborhood and individual factors will be collected and analyzed. Census tracts for the tri-county area will be used as an alternative measure for neighborhoods, which is prevalent within previous studies in this field (Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). Neighborhood data acquired from the 2010 United States Census (U.S. Census) and the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) via the public database American FactFinder (United States Census Bureau [USCB], 2010, 2012) will also be utilized in the current study. Census tract shapefiles for the tri-county area will be acquired from another public database maintained by the USCB, TIGER/Line (USCB, 2015). As part of the geocoding process for this research question, the data from the 2010 U.S. Census, the 2012 ACS, and tri-county shapefiles will be added in ArcGIS Pro to the aforementioned original sample data.

Additionally, using the original sample data geocoded within ArcGIS Pro, creating a spatial weights matrix file by calculating the inverse weighted distance of each RSO to the nearest five RSOs determines distance decay.

Research Question 2 Variables

Dependent variable

For the second research question, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether an individual RSO lives within a cluster of RSOs, as defined by a positive inverse distance weight (distance decay) z-score (yes = 1; no = 0). Further information regarding inverse distance weighing and distance is forthcoming in the Analytical Strategy section for this research question. In the present study, 24% of the RSO sample lives in clusters.

Independent variables

As noted, this research question looks at individual-level variables nested within neighborhood-level variables to determine if RSOs cluster within socially disorganized areas.

Individual-level. In this study, these individual-level variables are accounted for: an RSO's status is a dichotomous variable as predator (yes = 1; no = 0), whether or not the victim at the time of the incident was a minor (yes = 1; no = 0), if the RSO residential classification is transient (homeless) (yes = 1; no = 0), if the RSO violated FLRR (yes = 1; no = 0), and if the RSO recidivated (rearrested) between November 5, 2015 and November 5, 2018. Subsequently, while some of these predictors are not utilized within this research question, common demographic variables are also included. Race variables account for roughly 62% White RSOs, 38% Black RSOs, and nominal amounts of Asian (n = 9) and Native (n = 8) RSOs. Since the categories of Asian and Native are nominal, and this question addresses Blacks as historically possessing a larger disadvantage, for the sake of continuity, the race will be coded as Black is encoded "1" and all other races encoded as "0". Additionally, age is a continuous interval variable in years based on the inception of the study on November 5, 2015, with a median age of 51-years-old at the time of the study. Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics regarding this research question.

Table 2

Individual Level Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 2

Variable	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
IDW[a]	.24	.43	0	1
RSO violators of FLRR[a]	.41	.49	0	1
Sexual predator[a]	.12	.33	0	1
Victim under 18[a]	.78	.41	0	1
Transient RSO[a]	.19	.39	0	1
RSO arrested[a]	.23	.42	0	1
Age	50.64	13.53	17	95
Black[a]	.38	.49	0	1

Note. N = 3,826. [a]Means for variables that are dichotomously coded can be interpreted as proportions.

Neighborhood-level. In this research question, the primary neighborhood-level variable being examined is social disorganization. Comprised of a calculation of concentrated disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability, social disorganization measures the economic deprivation and collective efficacy within a neighborhood. These factors contribute to and can determine levels of informal social control within communities. Three other census tract variables will be used as control variables, the number of RSOs within a census tract, the population density (based on total population divided by the land area in square miles), and the housing density (based on the number of houses divided by the land area in square miles). Since Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach contain rivers, lakes, or coastal lands, the current study looks at density rate based on the landmass to capture population and housing density. Table 3 elucidates the descriptive statistics regarding this research question.

Table 3

Synthetic Clusters Census Tract Level Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 2

Variable	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
Social disorganization	0.14	0.56	-0.93	1.13
Number of RSO FLRR violators	30.50	17.02	5	74
Number of RSO arrests	16.69	20	1	131
Total number of RSOs	74.46	52.75	19	295
Population density (based on land area)	3881.63	2122	89	8424
Housing density (based on land area)	1699.73	968.41	28	4226

Note. N = 52.

Research Question 2 Analytic Strategy

For this research question, due to the nested variables, Hierarchical General Linear Modeling (HGLM) using synthetic clusters will be conducted utilizing IBM's Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 26.0 (International Business Machines [IBM], 2019) and Scientific Software International's (SSI) HLM 8.0 software (Raudenbush et al., 2019). HGLM will be used to decipher the relationship between the recidivism to individual and neighborhood socioeconomic factors to answer the pertinent research questions. HGLM allows for the studying of connections between two levels in the analysis and keeps the possibility for variability related to each level of the hierarchy.

For this model, since the dependent variable is dichotomous, a Bernoulli distribution will be utilized and assumes that the only possible outcomes are 0 and 1, versus using a Gaussian, which would dictate a normal distribution of continuous measurement (Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot, 2017). By using logistic regression with a Bernoulli distribution, this method employs logit linear transformation and computes the inherent logarithmic odds of an observed relationship when the dependent variable does not fit in a normal distribution (Schroeder, Sjoquist, & Stephan, 2017).

However, one of the stipulations of utilizing HGLM is the need to have at least 20 independent observations in the Level 1 category that nest within the Level 2 category (Clarke & Wheaton, 2007). In this research question, RSOs will be the Level 1 unit, and census tracts will be the Level 2 units. There are several census tracts with less than 20 RSOs. Nonetheless, by utilizing synthetic clusters, this allows for the grouping of like census tracts and combines the overall number of RSOs in order to fit the HGLM model.

Synthetic clustering can be used as an option when wanting to study several groups, but those groups might have a smaller quantity of individual data per group or data sparseness. Clarke & Wheaton's (2007) study examined the validity of utilizing synthetic clusters and concluded that synthetic clustering is a valid method. However, they cautioned that researchers should try to keep the integrity of the group size (Level 2). Additionally, other studies concur with Clarke & Wheaton that as the group size decreases through manipulation, this can reduce contextual effects (Maas & Hox, 2005; McNeish, 2014). Additional information regarding the clustering method forthcoming within this section.

For this research question, the sample census tracts containing RSOs (n = 890) will be grouped based upon concentrated disadvantage z-scores, which encompass the percent of the individuals below the poverty line, percent of individuals on public assistance, percent unemployed, percent less than age 18, and the percent of female-headed households within each census tract (The Association of Maternal & Child Health Programs [AMCHP], 2014). Based on previous studies, hierarchical cluster analysis will be initially conducted in SPSS 26.0, utilizing Ward's method to calculate the similarity between clusters with a general measure of a squared Euclidean distance for *k*-nearest neighbors (Cutrona et al., 2000). From the range of results, the researcher chooses the cluster grouping that combines the least amount of census tracts to obtain a minimum of 20 RSOs in each synthetic cluster. Initially, the researcher chooses the closest grouping with at least 20 Level 1 observations per Level 2 group and will manually match the smaller clusters containing less than 20 RSOs with other groups in order to fill the

requirements to run an HLM model. The process resulted in 52 synthetic clusters with 20 or more RSOs in each census tract synthetic cluster.

Social Disorganization

The factors that make up social disorganization are concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity. For this research question, the Association of Maternal and Child Health Programs' (AMCHP) definition and calculation of concentrated disadvantage is utilized (AMCHP, 2014). In analyzing concentrated disadvantage, AMCHP takes into account the following elements from the 2012 ACS (for aligning with the 2010 U.S. Census figures): the percent of the individuals below the poverty line, percent of individuals on public assistance, percent unemployed, and percent less than age 18. Also, the percent of female-headed households will be acquired from the 2010 U.S. Census. By using all of the information from the census tracts, each of the variables will be transformed into a z-score and then averaged to come up with the final concentrated disadvantage z-score. Those z-scores, which fall at and above the 75^{th} percentile of values, define areas of high concentrated disadvantage (AMCHP, 2014).

Traditionally, in the criminal justice field and its literature, concentrated disadvantage includes the above factors as well as the percentage of Blacks within the area of analyzation (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997). However, in determining concentrated disadvantage factors, AMCHP (2014) decided that including race seemed mismatched as the other factors are predominately economically driven. AMCHP contacted Robert J. Sampson, a recognized expert regarding social disorganization, whose works are rooted in Chicago neighborhoods (which are highly

segregated). Sampson "agreed that there is nothing inherent in racial composition that is disadvantageous" (AMCHP, 2014, p.4). The article continues with both the AMCHP and Sampson discussing the need for the researcher to determine the interpretation of concentrated disadvantage without race as an indicator based on the geographic area of study and the possibility of segregated communities.

In the past 50 years, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties' population and demographics have drastically shifted (USCB, 2019; World Population Review, 2019). Experiencing high rates of population and financial growth, the tri-county area and its residents are ever-changing. While there were pockets of segregated communities, based more on ethnicity (e.g., Little Havana and Little Haiti) in the 1990s and 2000s, the growth of the area in population and real estate needs drastically shifted the demographics of the residents of these areas (Florida International University [FIU] Metropolitan Center, 2014). As a result of the ever-changing demographics within the study area, the concentrated disadvantage will be a variable focused on the economic means of a census tract, versus the race of the residents.

This is not to say that in other parts of the country or even within parts of this study area that racial segregation and lack of opportunity based on race does not exist at differing levels. Instead, the individual researcher should look at the total geographic area of study, patterns of growth, and changes in demographics and residency to make the best determination as to what would be the appropriate course for their research.

Residential instability is calculated using two factors: homeowners that have lived in their residence less than five years and renters within a census tract. Within social disorganization, residential instability serves to measure social bonds within a

neighborhood (Anderson et al., 2015; Kubrin & Wo, 2016; Sampson et al., 1997). Scholars reason that homeowners are more invested in the neighborhood and are more likely to practice informal social control, and therefore, deter criminals from committing crimes within the area for fear of being caught or reported or reduce crime rates due to more vigilant oversight by the community members (Sampson et al., 1997). Just like concentrated disadvantage, the factors will be transformed into z-scores and averaged to produce residential instability value.

Ethnic heterogeneity is calculated using the percentage of Hispanic and the percentage of foreign-born population within each census tract. Under the theory of social disorganization, the measurement of ethnic heterogeneity is associated with neighbors sharing the same mores and values due to similar race and cultural backgrounds (Kubrin & Wo, 2016). In turn, this cohesiveness within a neighborhood translates to increased informal social control and a negative correlation with crime. To be in line with concentrated disadvantage, both factors are z-score transformed and averaged to produce the ethnic heterogeneity value.

Social disorganization is the culmination of concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity. While studies differ regarding weighing each factor, for this research question, each element retains its value without additional emphasis. Due to the synthetic clustering of census tracts for the overall calculation of social disorganization, the values for concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity for individuals census tracts will be aggregated and averaged to the new synthetic census tract.

Inverse Distance Weighted Interpolation and Clustering

In this research question, for the dependent variable, which is dichotomous, clustering is defined as having a positive inverse distance weighted interpolation (IDW)/distance decay z-score (yes = 1; no = 0). Distance decay describes the effect of distance on relationships and surmises that the spatially closer two things or people are, the more they are related. Conversely, the distance decay holds that the more distance between two locations, people or things, the more dissimilar and less influential on each other (Pun-Cheng, 2016). When looking at methods of clustering, studies used the five closest people or choices to be a universal number when measuring the similarity of people (Ajzen, 1991; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017; Jeh & Widom, 2002; Miller, 1956; Yang et al., 2011) or the distance between RSOs and the nearest number of RSOs (Socia, 2013). Inverse distance weighted interpolation tool in ArcGIS Pro also assumes that closer proximity points equal more significant similarity versus points that are further apart (ESRI, n.d.). IDW allows for a higher value assigned to the closest data point or neighbor.

The first step in generating this variable is to utilize the original sample of RSOs and its geocoding and mapping to calculate the inverse weighted distance of each RSO to the nearest 5 RSOs within a spatial weights matrix file in ArcGIS Pro. While prior research focused primarily on where the RSO clusters are within an area (Grubesic et al., 2007; Hughes & Burchfield, 2008; Hughes & Kadleck, 2008; Lee-Silcox, 2016; Mustaine et al., 2006; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008), one scholar who examined the effects SORRs and clustering utilized the next nearest neighbor analysis of each RSOs to the closest five RSOs (Socia, 2012a, 2013). Each RSO's IDW value depicts the measurement

of the five closest RSOs to each RSO. These values will be transformed to z-scores and dummy coded to reflect an individual RSO living within a cluster of RSOs (1 = clustered; 0 = not clustered).

Research Question 3

Research Question

The third research question addresses if unforeseen and unintended consequences of residency restrictions for the community-at-large result when RSOs cluster within a census tract in the form of recidivism.

Research Question 3 Hypothesis

There is a direct correlation between recidivism and clustering since the residency restrictions push RSOs to live in limited, socially disorganized areas in clusters of other RSOs with exposure to deviant subcultures, which is detrimental to their successful reentry progress. Previous studies show that groups of ex-convicts in neighborhoods encumber pro-social behavior and customs and instead, encourage criminal behavior and subculture (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). Additionally, the social network generated within clusters of former prisoners can possess and stir up feelings of injustice and distrust in the criminal justice system, which can lead to an increase in illegal activity (D. S. Kirk, 2015). In looking at friendship networks, studies show that people are close friends with a select few people, ranging from 3 to 5 close friends (Dunbar, 2010; Marsden, 1985; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears, 2006; van der Horst & Coffe, 2012). Furthermore, the similarity in deviant habits (Katz, 1988; Steglich, Snijders, & Pearson, 2010), and geographic proximity (Ebbesen et al., 1976; Preciado et al., 2012) matter in creating and maintaining friendships. As a result of

shared deviant beliefs coupled with geographic proximity to foster and cultivate those friendships, a higher rate of recidivism of RSOs will occur where RSOs live closer together in clusters.

Research Question 3 Data and Sample

Using the original November 5, 2015, RSO sample data list, new information was requested from the FDLE by using their Department of Correction's number and birthdate to obtain a listing of those RSOs who have been rearrested between November 5, 2015, and November 5, 2018. As this study is measuring a snapshot of recidivism, this number would only be indicative of RSOs who were compelled to register before November 5, 2015, and not any RSOs after the time, as mentioned in the above period. For this research question, since it is such a constricted time-period, recidivism will be defined as a new arrest within 36 months between November 5, 2015, and November 5, 2018.

Research Question 3 Variables

Dependent variable

For the third research question, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether an RSO recidivated, as defined by a new arrest after November 5, 2015, and on or before November 5, 2018, (yes = 1; no = 0).

Independent variables

For this research question, the following individual levels are accounted for according to the study's sample as discussed earlier in the chapter: an RSO's status as determined by FDLE is a dichotomous variable as a predator (yes = 1; no = 0), which is 12% of the sample, if the RSO residential classification is transient (homeless) (yes = 1;

no = 0), or 19% of the sample, if the RSO violated FLRR (yes = 1; no = 0), which is 41% of the sample, and the inverted weighted distances which are transformed to z-scores. Control variables include race and age. Race variables account for roughly 62% White RSOs, 38% Black RSOs, and nominal amounts of Asian (n = 9) and Native (n = 8) RSOs. Since the categories of Asian and Native are nominal, and other questions within the study address Blacks as historically possessing a more substantial disadvantage, for the sake of continuity, the race will be coded as Black is encoded "1" and all other races encoded as "0". Also, age is a continuous interval variable in years based on the inception of the study on November 5, 2015. Table 4 illustrates the descriptive statistics regarding this research question.

Research Question 3 Analytic Strategy

Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, the analysis will use a multiple logistic regression model to determine what individual variables are associated with recidivism. Inherently, logistic regression helps to predict a dichotomous categorical variable based on a set of the independent variable(s). As noted for the previous question, logistic regression maintains that at least 20 cases are needed for each variable, data is cross-sectional, and causality runs in one direction. Also, micro (individual-level) data, such as this study's sample and calculated IDW from Research Question 2, will be used in this model.

IDW allows for a higher value assigned to the closest data point or neighbor. This measurement operationalizes distance decay and friendship networks between neighboring RSOs. The higher the IDW value, the more clustered each RSO is to five

other RSOs. Determining spacial proximity to other members with a similar proclivity to commit like deviant acts assess friendship networks and subculture theory.

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 3

Variable	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
RSO arrested[a]	.23	.42	0	1
IDW	.00009	1.00	-.49	2.37
RSO violators of FLRR[a]	.41	.49	0	1
Sexual Predator[a]	.12	.33	0	1
Victim under 18[a]	.78	.41	0	1
Transient RSO[a]	.19	.39	0	1
Age	50.64	13.53	17	95
Black[a]	.38	.49	0	1

Note. N = 3,826. [a] Means for variables that are dichotomously coded can be interpreted as proportions.

IV. ANALYSIS

Divided into three parts and covering each research question, this chapter presents the results of the current study.

Research Question 1

The first research question analyzes whether or not RSOs in Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties adhere to FLRR, which requires RSOs to live further than 1,000 feet of a school, childcare facility, park, or playground. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous and captured if the RSO violated FLRR (encoded 1) or did not violate the buffer zone as dictated by FLRR (encoded 0), a logistic regression model was used with robust standard errors to determine the coefficients of the RSO's characteristics. The coefficients generated in the initial equation do not hold any interpretive value. Presented in odds-ratios, exponentiated coefficients subtracted from one and multiplied by 100 represent the percent change in the likelihood that an RSO will violate FLRR.

Because the omnibus chi-square test for the full model is statistically significant ($x^2 = 191.483$, $df = 5$, $p < .001$), the current model with the independent variable is substantially better than the simple baseline model. Per the Nagelkerke R^2 value of 0.066, the independent variables included in the logistic regression account for approximately 6.6% of the variation in the likelihood of an RSO violating FLRR. The results of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test for goodness of fit for the logistic regression model finds that the model with the associated variables is a suitable fit ($x^2 = 4.761$, $p > .05$). Additionally, a correlation analysis of the variables in regards to multicollinearity and no issues exist.

The independent variables in the first research question study the deterrent effects of FLRR in testing if sexual predators, those with minor victims, and homeless RSOs violate FLRR while controlling for age and race. Sexual predators (encoded 1) versus sexual offenders (encoded 0) usually commit more severe sexual acts, sometimes multiple times or on multiple victims. The second independent variable looks at each RSO's case and records if the victim is a minor (encoded 1) or not (encoded 0). The third independent variable takes into account an RSO's housing stability and denotes if the RSO is homeless (encoded 1) or not homeless (encoded 0). Additionally, the model for research question 1 utilizes the control variables of age and race. As previously mentioned, Table 1 shows descriptive statistics, and additionally, Table 5 displays the results of the analysis and shows that five out of the six variables are extremely significant ($p < .001$).

FLRR focuses on places where children congregate and use environmental criminology, specifically routine activities theory, to operationalize distance decay from a criminological perspective in that the further away an RSO lives from where children congregate, the less likely they would commit an act against a child. In analyzing predators, the appearance of minor victims, and homeless RSOs, research question 1 seeks to understand what individual-level variables, if any, contribute to violating FLRR.

Predators

Predators constitute 12% (n = 472) of the overall sample, and in the current model, appear as extremely statistically significant ($p < .001$). Controlling for other independent variables included in the model, the odds of a predator violating FLRR is approximately 44% lower than an RSO classified as an offender.

The Victim is Under 18

Out of the 3,826 RSOs, 78% of the cases reported victims under 18 (n = 2,995). In the current model, those cases with minor victims emerge as extremely statistically significant ($p < .001$). Controlling for other independent variables included in the model, the odds of an RSO with a previous conviction with a minor victim violating FLRR is approximately 33% less than an RSO with a non-minor victim.

Transient RSOs

Homeless RSOs represent 19% (n = 716) of the total sample and show as statistically significant ($p < .001$). Controlling for other independent variables included in the model, the odds of a homeless RSO violating FLRR is approximately 33% lower than an RSO who lives in a home.

Control Variables

Additionally, the control variables of age and race, specifically RSOs who are Black appears as extremely significant ($p < .001$). However, while age shows as statistically significant, the positive odds-ratio of 1.3% is almost negligible. On the other hand, race, dummy-coded as Black (encoded 1) and non-Black (encoded 0), which would include White, Asian, and Native RSOs, also emerges as extremely significant ($p < .001$). Representing 38% of RSOs, Black RSOs account for 1,456 of the overall sample. Controlling for the other independent variables included in the model, the odds of a Black RSO violating FLRR are higher by about 108% over other races (White, Asian, Native).

Table 5

Logistic Regression Predicting the RSO Violators of 1,000-foot Buffer Zones per FLRR for Research Question 1

	B	*SE*	Wald	*df*	*p*	Exp(B)	95% CI	
							LL	*UL*
Predator	-0.586	0.110	28.269	1	0.000	0.556	0.448	0.691
Victim under 18	-0.401	0.081	24.336	1	0.000	0.670	0.571	0.785
Transient RSO	-0.399	0.092	18.904	1	0.000	0.671	0.561	0.803
Black	0.730	0.072	101.899	1	0.000	2.076	1.801	2.392
Age	0.012	0.003	23.235	1	0.000	1.013	1.007	1.018
Constant	-0.820	0.157	27.357	1	0.000	0.440		

Note. N = 3,826. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit

Research Question 2

The second research question examines individual-level variables and census tract synthetic clusters to determine if clusters of RSOs fall within socially disorganized areas. In order to accomplish this goal, the current study utilized a hierarchical generalized linear model (HGLM), which allows for nested analysis of individual-level variables within a neighborhood-level context. For this model, research question 2 analyzed 3,826 RSOs within the Tri-County area nested within 52 synthetic census tracts. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous and designated as an RSO living within a cluster of RSOs, represented by a positive IDW/distance decay z-score, (encoded 1) or did not live in a cluster of RSOs, represented by a negative IDW/distance decay z-score (encoded 0), a population-average model was used with robust standard errors to ascertain the coefficients of the RSO's and neighborhood variables. For the dichotomous outcome variables, the statistical model is based on equations presented in Table 6. In the initial equation, the generated coefficients do not hold any interpretive value. Exponentiated coefficients, depicted in odds-ratios, subtracted from one and multiplied by 100 signify the percent change in the likelihood that an RSO will recidivate.

The level 1 independent variables in research question 2 examine the possible individual-level factors that could contribute to an RSO living within clusters of RSOs. Sexual predators (encoded 1), as opposed to sexual offenders (encoded 0), usually have more stringent guidelines on where they can live. The second independent variable examines if the victim was a minor (encoded 1) or not (encoded 0) as those RSOs with minor victims frequently receive stricter guidelines on appropriate housing areas. The third independent variable assesses if the RSO is homeless (encoded 1) or not homeless

(encoded 0). The fourth variable measures whether or not an RSO violates FLRR (encoded 1) or does not violate FLRR (encoded 0). The fifth individual-level variable records if an RSO was rearrested (encoded 1) or was not arrested (encoded 0). Additionally, a correlation analysis of the variables in regards to multicollinearity and no issues exist.

The level 2 variables in research question 2 examine the neighborhood-level factors that could cause an RSO to live within a cluster of RSOs. The first neighborhood-level variable of social disorganization, transformed into a z-score, measures the level of cohesiveness and informal social control within a community and is operationalized as an interval variable. The second variable measures the total number of RSOs within a synthetic census tract and is expressed numerically with a range of 19 to 295 RSOs per tract. The third and fourth variables, coded as intervals, measure the population and housing density, respectively. Table 7 presents the results of the analysis.

Prior research indicates that RSOs live in socially disorganized neighborhoods (Clark & Duwe, 2015; Hughs & Burchfield, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006). Also, studies show that RSOs living within socially disorganized neighborhoods cause a host of unintended and collateral consequences including barriers to reentry like forming prosocial relationships (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006), lack of neighborhood self -policing in the form of informal social control (Bursik, 1988; Greenberg et al., 1982; Kubrin & Wo, 2016), scarce job opportunities, and scarcity of resources like treatment centers (Lee-Silcox, 2016; Wartell, 2009; Wilson, 2009). In analyzing predators, cases with victims who were minors, homeless RSOs, RSOs who violate FLRR, RSOs who recidivate, as well as social disorganization levels,

the total number of RSOs within each census tract, population, and housing density, research question 2 seeks to understand what nested variables, if any, contribute to clustering of RSOs.

The Victim is Under 18

Out of the 3,826 RSOs, 78% of the RSOs in the sample committed acts against minors (n = 2,995). In the current model, those cases with minor victims emerge as statistically significant ($p < .001$). Controlling for other independent variables included in the model, the odds of an RSO with a previous conviction with a minor victim living within a cluster of RSOs is approximately 11% higher than an RSO with a non-minor victim.

Transient RSOs

Representing 19% (n = 716) of the total sample, homeless RSOs show as statistically significant ($p = .011$) in the current model. Controlling for other independent variables included in the model, the odds of a homeless RSO living in a cluster of RSOs are approximately 7% higher than an RSO who lives in a home.

RSOs Who Violate FLRR

Over two-fifths (41%) of the RSO sample violate FLRR, and within this model, shown as statistically significant ($p < .001$). Controlling for other independent variables included in the model, the odds of an RSO who violates FLRR living in a cluster of RSOs are approximately 12% lower than an RSO who does not violate FLRR.

RSOs Who Recidivate

Signifying 23% (n = 869) of the overall RSO sample, RSOs who recidivate present as statistically significant ($p = .037$). Controlling for other independent variables

included in the model, the odds of an RSO who recidivates is 5% more likely to live in a cluster of RSOs than an RSO who does not.

Social Disorganization

Within this model, social disorganization measures as statistically significant ($p <$ .001). For a one-unit increase in social disorganization within a synthetic census tract, the log odds of an RSO increase by 118%.

Population and Housing Density

Within the model for research question 2, population density and housing density reflect as statistically significant as $p = .002$ and $p = .009$, respectively. However, the odd-ratio for both interval variables is minimal, accounting for less than 1% of a difference per unit of measurement.

Table 6

Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model for the Dichotomous Response Variable (Y)

Hierarchical level	Equation
Individual (Level 1)	Y has a Bernoulli distribution with a parameter ϕ $\log [\phi/(1 - \phi)] = \beta_0 + \beta_1$ predator + β_2 victim under 18 + β_3 transient + β_4 rearrested
Group (Level 2)	$\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}$ social disorganization + γ_{02} total RSOs + γ_{03} population denisity + γ_{04} housing density + u_0

Note. B_is are Level 1 regression coefficients (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). γ_{0j}s (j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) are Level 2 regression coefficients. u_0 is Level 2 random error.

Table 7

Predicting Clustering of RSOs for Research Question 2

	B	*SE*	*t*	*df*	*p*	Exp(B)	95% CI	
							LL	*UL*
Individual-Level								
Predator	-0.013	0.008	-1.678	3769	0.093	0.987	0.973	1.002
Victim under 18	0.108	0.300	3.604	3769	<0.001	1.114	1.050	1.181
Transient RSO	0.064	0.025	2.534	3769	0.011	1.067	1.015	1.121
RSO violators of FLRR	-0.126	0.034	-3.693	3769	<0.001	0.882	0.825	0.943
RSO arrested	0.052	0.025	2.090	3769	0.037	1.054	1.003	1.108
Neighborhood-Level								
Social disorganization	4.769	0.817	-5.836	47	<0.001	117.818	22.760	609.890
Total number of RSOs in census tract	-0.005	0.005	-0.917	47	0.364	0.995	0.985	1.006
Population density	-0.001	0.0004	-3.324	47	0.002	0.998	0.998	0.999
Housing density	0.003	0.001	2.727	47	0.009	1.003	1.001	1.005

Note. Level 1 units (RSOs) = 3,826, Level 2 units (Synthetic Clustered Census Tracts) = 52. All variables are grand mean-centered.
Cl = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit

Research Question 3

The third research question analyzes the effect of these residency requirements. Specifically, it seeks to answer if there are unforeseen and unintended consequences for the community at large when RSOs are clustered within a census tract in the form of an increased rate of recidivism. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous and designated as the RSO was rearrested (encoded 1) or was not arrested (encoded 0), a logistic regression model was used with robust standard errors to ascertain the coefficients of the RSO's variables. In the initial equation, the produced coefficients do not hold any interpretive value. Depicted in odds-ratios, exponentiated coefficients subtracted from one and multiplied by 100 represent the percent change in the likelihood that an RSO will recidivate.

The omnibus chi-square test for the full model is statistically significant ($x^2 = 503.724$, $df = 6$, $p < .001$); therefore, the current model with the independent variables is substantially better than the simple baseline model. Per the Nagelkerke R^2 value of 0.188, the independent variables included in the logistic regression account for approximately 18.8% of the variation in the likelihood of the rearrest of an RSO or recidivating. While the Hosmer and Lemeshow test for goodness of fit for the logistic regression model did prove significant at $p < .01$ ($x^2 = 21.628$), this might be due in part to omitted variable bias and could be related to individual data not analyzed within the current model or available to the researcher, such as the measure of self-control, etc. Additionally, a correlation analysis of the variables in regards to multicollinearity and no issues exist.

The independent variables in research question 3 investigate possible individual-levels factors that might cause an RSO to recidivate in analyzing if sexual predators, those who are homeless RSOs, violators of FLRR, and those who live in clusters recidivate while controlling for age and race. The first independent variable looks at sexual predators (encoded 1) versus sexual offenders encoded (encoded 0) as sexual predators commit more severe sexual acts, multiple times, or on multiple victims. The second independent variable looks at an RSO's housing stability and denotes whether or not the RSO is homeless (encoded 1) or not homeless (encoded 0). Most of the time, homeless RSOs cannot find or afford a residence outside of the buffer zones dictated by FLRR and municipality restrictions. Furthermore, the next variable of whether or not an RSO violates FLRR (encoded 1) or does not violate FLRR (encoded 0) analyzes if those who violate FLRR are more or less apt to recidivate. Next, since prior literature discusses the impact clusters of ex-convicts resulting in high recidivism rates within a neighborhood (D.S. Kirk, 2015) the IDW/distance decay z-score independent variable measures if the RSO lives in a cluster of RSOs (encoded 1) or not in a cluster of RSOs (encoded 0). Also, the model for research question 3 uses the control variables of age and race.

As previously discussed, sex offender residency restrictions like FLRR focus on keeping children safe by creating buffer zones around places where children congregate during the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. However, prior research shows that there is an unintended consequence of ex-offenders living within the same neighborhood in the form of recidivism (D.S. Kirk, 2009, 2015). Furthermore, subculture theory (Fischer, 1975) and recidivism studies (D.S. Kirk, 2015) warn of ex-convicts sharing similar interests,

communicating frustration with law enforcement, and the ease of recruiting and partaking in illegal activities in socially disorganized communities where clusters of ex-offenders reside. In analyzing predators, homeless RSOs, RSOs who violate FLRR, and RSOs who live in clusters research question 3 seeks to understand what individual-level variables, if any, contribute to recidivism. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics, and Table 8 displays the results of the analysis for research question 3.

Transient RSOs

Representing 19% (n = 716) of the total sample, RSOs who are homeless appear as extremely statistically significant ($p < .001$). Controlling for other independent variables included in the model, the odds of a homeless RSO recidivating is approximately two times more likely than an RSO who lives in a home.

IDW/Distance Decay

Representing 24% (n = 910) of the total sample, RSOs who live in clusters show as statistically significant ($p < .01$). Controlling for other independent variables included in the model, the odds of an RSO who lives in a cluster of RSOs recidivating is approximately 14% higher than an RSO who does not live in a cluster of RSOs.

Control Variables

The control variables of age and race, specifically RSOs who are Black appears as extremely significant ($p < .001$). Race, dummy-coded as Black (encoded 1) and Non-Black (encoded 0), which would include White, Asian, and Native RSOs, appears as statistically significant ($p < .001$). Signifying 38% of RSOs, Black RSOs account for 1,456 cases of the overall sample. Controlling for the other independent variables included in the model, the odds of a Black RSO recidivating is 80% higher than other

races (White, Asian, Native). Age also shows as extremely statistically significant ($p <$ .001) with a negative linear relationship to the dependent variable. For every one year decrease in age, the odds of recidivating increases by 4%. However, when looking at this variable and result, one should take into account that the median age of the sample is 51, with the age range of the overall sample between 17-years-old and 95-years-old.

Table 8

Logistic Regression Predicting the Recidivism of RSOs for Research Question 3

	B	*SE*	Wald	*df*	*p*	Exp(B)	95% CI	
							LL	*UL*
Predator	-0.057	0.130	0.195	1	0.659	0.944	0.732	1.218
Transient RSO	1.128	0.103	120.147	1	0.000	3.090	2.526	3.782
RSO violators of FLRR	0.140	0.092	2.297	1	0.130	1.150	0.960	1.378
IDW/Distance decay	0.130	0.045	8.260	1	0.004	1.139	1.042	1.245
Black	0.591	0.086	47.494	1	0.000	1.805	1.526	2.135
Age	-0.039	0.004	125.864	1	0.000	0.961	0.955	0.968
Constant	0.086	0.181	0.224	1	0.636	1.090		

Note. N = 3,826. CI = confidence interval; *LL* = lower limit; *UL* = upper limit

V. DISCUSSION

This chapter reviews the objectives of the current study, including the three research questions and hypotheses investigated within the analysis. Then, the conclusions and implications of the study's results are matched to the existing literature and interpreted. Next, the chapter continues by illuminating the limitations of the study, areas of future research, and policy implications. Lastly, the chapter concludes with the author's final thoughts and calls to action from the academic community and policymakers.

The Present Study

The current study investigated three different but related research questions to address limitations with the existing literature on residency restrictions regarding sex offenders, the unintended consequences of these restrictions, such as the location of their housing, possible barriers to reentry, and recidivism due to these severe restrictions. The first research question probed into which RSOs, if any, were breaking residency restrictions within a snapshot of time during November 2015. The second research question delved into where RSOs lived as of November 2015, and if they clustered within socially disorganized neighborhoods. The third question explored the possibility of whether RSOs clustering and other factors increase the likelihood of recidivation within three years, between November 2015 and November 2018.

The present research expanded the existing literature in three key ways. First, the results of the current study revealed that within major metropolitan areas with more extensive residency restrictions, sex offenders still violate residency restrictions. Secondly, the findings affirmed that RSOs cluster within socially disorganized areas

within populous counties. Lastly, the findings revealed that clustering and homelessness significantly contribute to an RSO's recidivism rate.

The results of the multiple logistic regression analysis for the first research question supported the hypothesis that RSOs violate SORRs and the buffer zones associated with residency restrictions. This outcome further enforces current literature that residency restrictions, even severe residency restrictions (over 1,000-foot buffer zones), do not guarantee safety to potential victims. Instead, having these SORRs in place creates a false sense of security and the illusion of being an effective policy, when, paradoxically, these policies also increase recidivism. These unintended consequences create the worst-case scenario for SORRs, go against the goals and objectives of these laws, and creates severe backlash by increasing recidivism, which will be further discussed in more detail.

Other states and municipalities experienced the same outcomes as those found in research question one (Berenson & Appelbaum, 2011; Grubesic et al., 2007; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008), and the findings of the first research question uphold that RSOs violate SORRs, even in a densely populated area. While Grubesic and colleagues (2007), Berenson and Appelbaum (2011), and Tewksbury and Mustaine (2008) find that RSOs violate SORRs regardless of housing availability within these counties and municipalities outside of buffer zones. Within the studies mentioned above, there is a lack of analysis of RSO individual characteristics, such as demographics and victim types, to determine possible causality.

However, this study analyzed RSO's characteristics and circumstances around the victim. When controlling for race and age, RSO violators of residency restrictions were

not transient, sexual predators, or those with victims that were minors. The results could infer that law enforcement within the study area diligently patrol higher risk offenders, such as predators, to ensure they do not violate FLRR. Furthermore, due to the awareness of heavy patrolling and enforcement by law enforcement and the RSO's individual attempt to follow SORRs, some RSOs stay clear of buffer zones around protected sites.

The second research question attempted to ascertain if clusters of RSOs lived within socially disorganized areas. While previous research found that RSOs live in socially disorganized areas (CDPS, 2004; Huges & Burchfield, 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006, 2008; Socia, 2016; Socia & Stamatel, 2012) only one study by Socia (2012a) attempted to answer that question by measuring clustering on a neighborhood-level. The current study not only looked at neighborhoods, but it also controlled for individual factors in determining clustering within communities. Looking at individual and neighborhood-levels nested within a hierarchical linear model adds another level to the overall literature as the two levels influence each other. Socia (2012a) found that RSOs in counties in upstate New York lived in clusters when municipal SORRs were over 1,000 feet. However, the study states New York does not have a state residency restriction for RSOs. When looking at municipalities without restrictions within the study, RSOs lived further apart. Nevertheless, the present study looks at a tri-county area with a larger quantity of RSOs (n = 3826) in three counties with a higher average per county (n = 1275 RSOs) compared to Socia's study, which looked at 53 counties with an average of 125 RSOs per county, and less populous areas.

While other researchers chose to utilize a percentage of Blacks to determine social disorganization (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997; Socia 2012a), due to

the demographics and make-up of the study area, this researcher chose not to calculate race within the measurement of social disorganization. While this goes against traditional literature within this field and this subject area (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997), South Florida, in recent decades, rapidly evolved demographically and presents as an emerging type of metropolitan area with high immigration rates, quick, upward mobility for immigrants, including Blacks, and urban growth (Broward County Planning and Development Management Division, 2019; FIU Metropolitan Center, 2014; Miami-Dade County Department of Regulatory & Economic Resources, Planning, Research, and Economic Analysis Section, 2016). These conditions, as well as emerging literature regarding unintended consequences of including race in research discussing social disorganization and neighborhood cohesiveness, i.e., White flight, blockbusting, etc. (Meyer, 2000; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson & Bean, 2006), present an opportunity for a different approach for the researcher. This point will be further discussed in the section regarding future research possibilities.

Looking at RSOs and the closest five RSO neighbors present another unique approach to the measurement of clusters of RSOs. Only one other study looks at RSOs and their closest RSO neighbors to determine clusters (Socia, 2012a). While that study took the total distance and aggregated it to the census block to establish clustering, the present study goes a step further by using inverted distance weighted measures to reflect the influence on closer neighbors to each RSO. Using IDW operationalized friendship networks and subculture theory by giving more weight to an RSO living in the same house or on the same corner as another RSO. Friendship networks posit that close interactions between neighbors and friends form a stronger connection based on

proximity. While an overall measurement of the distance of the five closest neighbors does depict a number, it does not account for influence or ties, nor is it reflective of each RSO neighbor. For example, an RSO's total distance to their five neighbors can be ten feet. Nevertheless, that means that the total can reflect several different combinations. Possible iterations include: each RSO neighbor can be equidistant at two feet each (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 10), one RSO neighbor can be extremely far and the others close (0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 10 = 10), or two can be further away and three close (0 + 0 + 0 + 5 + 5 = 10), and so forth (illustrated in Figure 4 in the Appendix). IDW eliminates the guesswork and weights those with zero distance between the RSO and their neighbor with a higher weight than a neighbor living spacially further. Through IDW, a clearer picture regarding the sphere of influence, friendship networks, and subculture theory can be inferred and explored.

Lastly, the results of the multiple logistic regression analysis for the third research question supported the hypothesis that RSO clustering would lead to recidivism due to a lack of pro-social relationships and exposure to deviant subcultures. General recidivism studies show that socially disorganized neighborhoods with clusters of ex-convicts contained increased illegal activity (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). Moreover, shared deviant habits (Katz, 1988; Holt et al., 2010; Steglich et al., 2010) and increased geographic proximity (Ebbesen et al., 1976; Preciado et al., 2012) help in creating and maintaining friendships (Fischer, 1975). As previously discussed, the use of IDW for each RSO to determine the proximity to the five closest RSO neighbors elucidated the possible direct impact of each RSO neighbor, which is similar to that of distance decay theory.

The results of this study also revealed that transient or homeless RSOs were two times more likely to recidivate than those with permanent addresses. This finding speaks directly to the existing literature discussing either a lack of housing (BTFR, 2009; Zandbergen & Hart, 2009) or the collateral consequences of RSOs not being able to find housing (Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; Levenson et al., 2015). These results along with the increased burden on law enforcement officers and their resources to track RSOs (BTFR, 2009; Monjeau, 2011; Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018) confirm that severe SORRs that propel RSOs to live on street corners and outside of buffer zones do not serve the public interest or reduce recidivism. From these findings, one can infer that this type of banishment and clustering within socially disorganized areas exacerbates deviant behavior with transient RSOs who have little to lose and act correspondingly (Levenson, 2018).

While the previous literature discussed law enforcement hardships (BTFR, 2009; Monjeau, 2011; Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018), collateral consequences for RSOs (Levenson & Hern, 2007; Levenson et al., 2015; Rydberg et al., 2014, Zandbergen & Hart, 2009; Zgoba et al., 2009), and general terms regarding housing instability and the impact on recidivism (Chamberlain & Wallace, 2015; D. S. Kirk, 2015; Kustura, 2015; Skipp & Campo-Flores, 2009), this study extends the literature further by quantifying the unintended consequences of severe SORRs by measuring the effect of clustering and recidivism for all RSOs, including homeless RSOs.

Limitations

This study experienced a few limitations concerning using a snapshot of time, mixed SORRs within municipalities, the information provided by individuals through law

enforcement agencies, and missing information from RSOs who absconded. While the use of a distinct period is commonplace within studies, this study uses a segmented period due to a lack of previous records of the RSO address list kept by its assigned record keeper, FDLE. Though SORNA mandates that the state law enforcement agency keeps track of RSOs, it does not require that the agency to keep records of the RSO list at any given time. As such, denial of requests for access to previous lists from earlier years occurred because the records for previous years no longer existed (Missing Persons & Offender Registration, Florida Department of Law Enforcement personal communication, October 14, 2016). While the current list states when the addition of the offender's address occurred, the address information continually changes and updates. Ergo, the researcher cannot account for RSOs that previously resided within neighborhoods before November 5, 2015, or their movements and possible recidivistic activity.

Secondly, for the sake of continuity for this study, residency restrictions deemed by the FLRR, instead of each municipality, were used to discuss violators to SORRs in South Florida. Within the study's area of Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, 104 municipalities exist with differing SORRs (see Tables 15, 16, and 17 in the Appendix). Additionally, within the research period of this study, several of these municipalities changed their SORRs (Reid, 2014; Weibezahn, 2019). To ensure continuity, the restrictions outlined by FLRR provided stability to the overall study. However, using this as the guideline conservatively estimates how many SORR violators exist within the Tri-County area.

The number of violators of residency restrictions cannot be thoroughly ascertained, which is problematic. Before SORRs passed into law, RSOs owning property

in restricted areas were grandfathered into the laws, which means that while an individual RSO's address present as violating SORRs, they are permitted to live within these buffer zones. Currently, the RSO listing does not account for those RSOs who fall into the grandfather clause of these laws. Consequently, this study cannot discern or exclude these RSOs from being counted as violators to FLRR.

The reported addresses, especially those of transient (homeless) offenders, change over time, and RSOs self-report their addresses. The use of street intersections as addresses and possible missing information from addresses given to FDLE eliminated 66 RSOs from the study as the process for geocoding rejected these addresses due to errors. While these addresses accounted for only 2% of the overall sample, the ratio of geocoded addresses to non-geocoded addresses is deemed acceptable when geocoding (Berenson & Appelbaum, 2011; Clontz & Mericle, 2004; Hipp et al., 2011; Hughes & Kadleck, 2008; Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). Revamping systems to capture addresses, which would automatically generate their longitude and latitude, would further future research and tracking capabilities of law enforcement.

Lastly, this study only used data from a Tri-County area of South Florida, which limits the generalizability of the study's findings. These counties contain major metropolitan cities and possess populations between 1.5 to 3 million people (USCB, 2012). Thus, the generalizability and applicability of these findings are limited to counties like Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. However, as it pertains to studying clusters of RSOs and recidivism, a wide gap in the literature exists, and future research regarding other states would help to validate the findings within the current study.

Policy Implications

Several policy implications flow from the findings of this study regarding residency restrictions for sex offenders. The results of the current study indicate that severe residency restrictions create clusters of RSOs in socially disorganized areas. Additionally, due to SORRs, some RSOs trying to abide by the buffer zones end up homeless. As an unintended consequence of these policies, according to the present study, transient offenders and RSOs who live in clusters are more likely to recidivate. Furthermore, other studies indicate that tracking homeless offenders place an extraordinary and costly burden on law enforcement (BTFR, 2009; MDBCC, 2018). Consequently, part of the rationale and goals of passing these restrictions, keeping the public safer, turns out to be negated by the rate of rearrest of these RSOs.

In the broader scope of the literature, the policy implication of this study and previous research suggests that SORRs need further examination and possible revamping employing evidence-based research. Utilizing GIS to evaluate affordable housing in relation to buffer zones presents a critical starting place to reexamine SORRs (Burchfield, 2011; Casady, 2009; Dumanis, 2009; Mulford et al., 2009; Wartell, 2009; Zandbergen & Hart, 2009). For an RSO to successfully reenter society and diminish the likelihood of recidivism, finding housing is of utmost importance. As previously discussed, the large buffer zones within the Tri-County area of this study often severely restrict where RSOs can live. Coupled with a lack of affordability and a landlord's willingness to rent to RSOs, housing becomes sparse, and some RSOs become homeless.

Differing measurements of buffer zones develop into another burden on law enforcement. In the current study area, a given county may contain a multitude of

municipalities, all with differing SORRs. Having multiple municipalities pass their SORRs, and NIMBY laws create confusion and cause law enforcement to decipher which municipality the RSO lives in and what that city's buffer zones dictate as being off-limits. Also, severe SORRs within municipalities either banish RSOs from the area or produce homeless offenders, which law enforcement officers must check in with those RSOs once a month to verify the provided street intersection address (BTFR, 2009; Schwartzapfel & Kassie, 2018). Furthermore, while this study explores some unintended consequences of extensive SORRs in large metropolitan areas, additional ramifications regarding densely populated areas and SORRs should be explored.

Lastly, failure to address SORRs and these unintended consequences will further exacerbate the situation. Since RSOs in Florida stay on the list for their lifetime, any additional RSO that decides to take residence in the study area must comply with the SORRs in the county and municipality. As the number of RSOs increase, the housing situation and chance of clustering also increases. This study's results suggest that these compounding actions will continue this cycle.

Future Research

This study provides several avenues for future research regarding sex offender residency restrictions and the unintended consequences of such restrictions. Further research regarding homeless RSOs, municipality SORRs, enclaves, changing SORRs, and further studies regarding social proximity and recidivism provides a starting place for areas of potential studies. Also, a dissonance emerged among academics within the analysis of existing literature of social disorganization theory. As there is extensive use of social disorganization theory within the study of RSOs (Duwe, 2009; Levenson et al.,

2013; Mercado et al., 2008; Mustaine et al., 2006; Socia & Stamatel, 2012; Wartell, 2009, Wilson, 2009), conflicting views regarding the makeup and calculation of social disorganization theory need further exploration. This section of the chapter investigates these areas explicitly.

One area of further study would assess the longitudinal growth and rate of recidivism of transient RSOs based on residency restrictions in various municipalities. In effect, studying the rates of homeless RSOs and unintended consequences of SORRs within cities and towns would directly address one of the limitations of this study. Since the present study found significance in recidivism regarding the clustering of RSOs, in particular, transient offenders, further investigation would contribute to the gap within the literature.

Likewise, a longitudinal study of the RSO enclaves in South Florida might provide added insight as to barriers to reentry, which can lead to recidivism. Studying these enclaves would also bring insight to the subculture and social interactions among this group of somewhat exiled ex-convicts. The exploration into possible blowback of SORRs and how it impacts levels of recidivism will hopefully prevent other municipalities from committing actions that would lead to similar unintended consequences. Moreover, further research of municipalities that roll-back residency restrictions and buffer zones, the reasons why, and a longitudinal RSO recidivism study within these areas might assuage the perpetual moral panic around RSOs. Ultimately, a greater understanding of these gaps in the literature will guide policymakers and the creation of future laws.

Social proximity and recidivism pose another area for additional future studies. While several studies explored the relationship to the initial victim (Colombino et al., 2011; Duwe, 2015, Duwe et al., 2008), a review of recidivistic RSOs and victim choice could also prove beneficial. Since SORRs often hinder family support or the ability to live with family, this leaves open the possibility that it helps curb recidivism by maintaining a distance between possible minor victims that the RSO knows. By studying the victim choice of those RSOs who recidivate, this could also help to illuminate other outcomes to SORRs and fill a gap within the literature.

As researchers, there is a fundamental obligation to objectively report our findings, as well as an obligation to communicate findings, including those that help toward eliminating negative, unintended consequences of policy or practice (Williams, 2013). If, while studying and reporting on unintended consequences, our research becomes part of the cycle of determining other flawed constructs, we are contributing to the progression of unintended consequences rather than helping to correct them. Research and world events within the past twenty years dictate that criminologists take another approach to the utilization of race and ethnicity as markers of inherent disadvantage. Automatically including race or ethnicity in studies regarding social disorganization without adequately exploring the history of segregation and neighborhood composition perpetuates stigmas associated with minorities. This assumption and practice irresponsibly socially constructs a view of a neighborhood declining when Black families move into an area, which in turn causes “White flight,” where White residents move out of a community as Black neighbors move into the neighborhood.

Similarly, in major metropolitan areas, such as the study area, utilizing ethnic heterogeneity as a measure might be conceived as antiquated. While culture does influence mores and values, people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds can share the same mores and values. Being born in a different country does not automatically translate with being in an atypical moral stratosphere. A community's cohesiveness can exist if the entire neighborhood comprised of immigrants shares a similar background. For example, Little Havana, an area within Miami-Dade County, is predominantly Hispanic, which acquired its name due to the influx of Cuban immigrants in the 1960s and beyond (Silk, 2015). Thus, if their ethnic heterogeneity is measured based on the percentage of Hispanics and those that are foreign-born and scaled to other communities, they would be weighted to be of a more considerable disadvantage, even though members of the community possess similar backgrounds. The notion that being Hispanic, an immigrant, or having a Hispanic or immigrant neighbor as being inherently associated with a negative connotation and automatic disadvantage is problematic for the same reasons using the percentage of Blacks within an area is discriminatory and fosters harmful socially constructed views.

Within the confines of social disorganization, an argument can be made that while the current calculation of ethnic heterogeneity might be outdated, a variable regarding a mixture of races and cultures within a neighborhood or census tract would help determine some level of cohesiveness. Within the public administrations of major metropolitan cities, a diversity index is being utilized (Fischer & Schwieterman, 2008; Lima & Melnik, 2013; Town of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 2017) and explored as a possible replacement for ethnic heterogeneity in social disorganization. A diversity index is a

measurement of how many different types of races and ethnicities are within a community and if these types are shared or related, which speaks to the roots of ethnic heterogeneity as a concept (Meyer & McIntosh, 1992). A diversity index takes into account not only the percentage of Hispanics versus non-Hispanics but other race categories as well to determine its value. Specifically, USA Today's Diversity Index takes into account the likelihood of two people, chosen at random, would be of different ethnic backgrounds. The higher the number on the scale, the more diverse the area is, and the lower the number, the more homogenous the population of that area (Meyer & McIntosh, 1992). Figure 5 in the Appendix illustrates the diversity index. Additionally, other indices (Shannon index, Simpson index, Gini-Simpson index, and Berger-Parker index) explore diversity measurement as well.

As time passes, metropolitan areas like South Florida with diverse populations and high concentrations of Hispanics and immigrants will continue to push the boundaries of cohesiveness as currently defined by the social disorganization operationalization of ethnic heterogeneity. While these issues might not directly affect every study, the conversation regarding similar metropolitan areas and the calculation and operationalization of social disorganization theory requires further examination.

Conclusion

This study examined numerous issues concerning sex offender residency restrictions and revealed several noteworthy results. Even though this study and those in the previous literature continuously find a plethora of unintended and collateral consequences for RSOs, most sex offender policies remain the same. Law enforcement agencies, the public-at-large, and policymakers need to use this research to make and

evaluate laws with evidence-based studies to avoid these costly mistakes. Additionally, the international community looks to the policies of the United States of America and models some of their sex offender management policies based on those in this country. In this vein, one would hope that those in the U.S. and the international community would not succumb to the moral panic created after a triggering event, like a child abduction or rape. Instead, the media, policymakers, and researchers should work together, while cooler heads prevail to disperse accurate facts regarding RSOs, study the existing sex offender laws, seek to apply best practices in RSO reentry, and continue to evaluate sex offender management policies so that one can avoid unintended consequences and perpetual states of panic.

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APPENDIX

Table 9

Florida Department of Law Enforcement's Legal Status Descriptions for Sex Offenders on Registry

Legal Status	Description
Absconded	No longer residing at the last reported address given to the Florida Sexual Offender Registry.
Civil Commitment	Confined or detained by the Department of Children and Family Services under the Jimmy Ryce Civil Commitment Act.
Confinement	Confined to a state or federal prison facility, county or municipal jail, or in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Deceased	Official report and/or document of death received by the Florida Sexual Offender Registry.
Deported	Officially expelled from the United States.
Released - Subject to Registration	No longer under any form of confinement, supervision, or any other court-imposed sanction. Still required to register in accordance with Florida law.
Supervised - FL Department of Corrections	Serving a court-ordered term of community monitoring under the authority of the Department of Corrections and/or the Florida Parole Commission.
Supervised - FL Department of Juvenile Justice	Serving a court-ordered term of community monitoring under the authority of the Department of Juvenile Justice.
Supervised - US Probation	Serving a court-ordered term of community monitoring under the authority of the United States Probation and Pretrial Services System.

Note. Adapted from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement's (FDLE) Legal Status Descriptions, by FDLE, 2019 (https://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/sops/offenderSearch.jsf). In the public domain.

Figure 2

Overview of Sex Offender Registry by Status for Florida, November 5, 2015



Note. This figure represents the total number of sex offenders (N = 67,713) in Florida listed on the registry on November 5, 2015. From "Sexual offenders and predators by county," by Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), November 5, 2015. Retrieved from FDLE (http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/publicDataFile.do).

Table 10

RSO Study Sample Size by County

Counties	Number of RSOs	RSOs Coded	Number of Census Tracts	Number of Census Tracts with RSOs in study	Percentage of census tracts with RSOs
Broward	1157	1123	363	268	73%
Miami-Dade	1767	1750	518	383	74%
Palm Beach	968	953	338	239	71%
Total	3892	3826	1219	890	73%

Note. Data adapted from "Sexual offenders and predators by county," by Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), November 5, 2015. Retrieved from FDLE (http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/publicDataFile.do).

Table 11

RSO Study Sample Additional Descriptives

Variable	Miami-Dade	Broward	Palm Beach	Tri-County Area
Total number of RSOs	1750	1123	953	3826
Predator	247	105	120	472
Offender	1502	1015	830	3354
Juvenile	1	3	3	7
Victim is under 18	1364	870	761	2995
Men RSOs	1102	1726	921	3749
Women RSOs	21	24	32	77
White	1036	657	660	2353
Black	710	457	289	1456
Asian	3	4	2	9
Native	1	5	2	8
Hispanic	664	151	124	939
Transient	395	233	88	716
Violated FLRR	750	490	339	1579
Rearrested	492	212	165	869
Clustered RSOs	458	263	189	910
Under 18	0	0	1	1
18 to 25	25	15	21	61
26 to 35	209	134	122	465
36 to 45	423	254	220	897
46 to 55	477	332	274	1083
56 to 65	335	248	187	770
66 to 75	180	114	91	385
76 and above	101	26	37	164

Note. Data adapted from "Sexual offenders and predators by county," by Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), November 5, 2015. Retrieved from FDLE (http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/publicDataFile.do).

Figure 3

Sample Status of RSOs by County



Note. N = 3,826. Data adapted from "Sexual offenders and predators by county," by Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) November 5, 2015. Retrieved from FDLE (http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/publicDataFile.do).

Table 12

Residency Restrictions for Registered Sex Offenders for Miami-Dade County and its Municipalities

Municipality	City, Town, or Village	Residency Restriction Requirement
Miami-Dade	County	Per Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance - 2500 feet of any school and 1000 feet from park or childcare center
Aventura	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Bal Harbor	Village	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Bay Harbor Islands	Town	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Biscayne Park	Village	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Coral Gables	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Cutler Bay	Town	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Doral	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
El Portal	Village	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Florida City	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Golden Beach	Town	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Hialeah	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Hialeah Gardens	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Homestead	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Indian Creek	Village	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Key Biscayne	Village	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Medley	Town	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Miami	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Miami Beach	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Miami Gardens	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Miami Lakes	Town	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Miami Shores	Village	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Miami Springs	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
North Bay Village	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
North Miami	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
North Miami Beach	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate

Opa-Locka	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Palmetto Bay	Village	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Pinecrest	Village	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
South Miami	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Sunny Isles Beach	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Surfside	Town	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Sweetwater	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
Virginia Gardens	Village	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate
West Miami	City	2500 feet from schools, 1000 feet from where children congregate

Table 13

Residency Restrictions for Registered Sex Offenders for Broward County and its Municipalities

Municipality	City, Town, or Village	Residency Restriction Requirement
Broward County	County	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground
Coconut Creek	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, childcare facility, daycare, park, playground or other places where children regularly congregate
Cooper City	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground
Coral Springs	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, childcare facility, daycare, park, playground or other places where children regularly congregate
Dania Beach	City	2,500 feet of any school, daycare center, park or playground
Davie	Town	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park (including linear parks), playground or other places where children regularly congregate
Deerfield Beach	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, playfield or sport center
Fort Lauderdale	City	1400 feet of any school, public school bus stop, child daycare facility, park, or playground as described in subsection (a) or other places where children regularly congregate
Hallandale Beach	City	2,500 feet of any public or private schools that have students less than the age of 18; designated public or private school bus stop, daycare center, public park, or public playground
Hillsboro Beach	Town	2,500 feet of any park, playground, beach or other public places where children regularly congregate
Hollywood	City	1,000 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground or any other place where children regularly congregate
Lauderdale Lakes	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare facility, park, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Lauderdale-by-the-Sea	Town	2,250 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, beach or other places where children regularly congregate

Lauderhill	City	2,500 feet of any schools, parks, childcare centers, and daycare centers, playgrounds, or areas where children congregate
Lazy Lake	Village	1,000 feet of any school, daycare center, park or playground
Lighthouse Point	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other private or public recreational facility where children regularly congregate
Margate	City	2,500 feet of any public or private schools that have students less than the age of eighteen (18); designated public school bus stop; daycare center; public park or public playground
Miramar	City	2,500 feet of any school, daycare center, public school bus stop, park or playground
North Lauderdale	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, childcare facility, daycare, park, playground or other places where children regularly congregate
Oakland Park	City	2,250 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Parkland	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park or playground
Pembroke Park	Town	2,500 feet of any school, daycare center, park or playground
Pembroke Pines	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Plantation	City	2,500 feet of any public or private school, childcare facility, library, park, or playground
Pompano Beach	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground
Sea Ranch Lakes	Village	2,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, park, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Southwest Ranches	Town	2,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Sunrise	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground
Tamarac	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
West Park	City	2,500 feet of any school, daycare center, public school bus stop, park or playground
Weston	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, or playground
Wilton Manors	City	2,000 feet of any school, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate

Table 14

Residency Restrictions for Registered Sex Offenders for Palm Beach County and its Municipalities

Municipality	City, Town, or Village	Residency Restriction Requirement
Palm Beach	County	1,000 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Atlantis	City	1,000 feet of any school, childcare facility, park, playground, designated public school bus stop, or other places where children regularly congregate
Belle Glade	City	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Boca Raton	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, private school bus stop registered according to section 9-103, public library, daycare center, park, or playground
Boynton Beach	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Briny Breezes	Town	1,000 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Cloud Lake	Town	1,000 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Delray Beach	City	1,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, or park
Glen Ridge	Town	1,000 feet from any school, park, daycare center, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Golf	Village	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Greenacres	City	1,500 feet of any public or private school, public library, daycare center, specifically including residential or home-based daycare operating under a valid city occupational license; park, playground, community center, day camp, or other places where children regularly congregate
Gulf Stream	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Haverhill	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute

Highland Beach	Town	1,000 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or other places where children regularly congregate
Hypoluxo	Town	1,500 feet of any school, designated public or private school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, library or other places where children regularly congregate
Juno Beach	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Jupiter	Town	1,000 feet of any school, public school bus stop or sign, private school bus stop registered according to this article, public library, daycare center, park, playground, community center, day camp, or other places where children regularly congregate
Jupiter Inlet Colony	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Lake Clarke Shores	Town	1,500 feet of any school, public school bus stop, private school bus stop regulations according to this section, public library, daycare center, park and areas designated for use as parks, playground, community center, day camp, or other places where children regularly congregate
Lake Park	Town	2,500 feet of any public or private school, designated public school bus stop or sign, private school bus stop (including daycare centers) registered under section 16-9, public library, daycare center, park, playground, community center, day camp, or other places where children regularly congregate
Lake Worth	City	1,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground or library
Lantana	Town	1,500 feet of any school, designated public or private school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground or library
Loxahatchee Groves	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Manalapan	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Mangonia Park	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
North Palm Beach	Village	1,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground or public pool facility
Ocean Ridge	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Pahokee	City	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute

Palm Beach	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Palm Beach Gardens	City	2,500 feet of any school, designated public or private school bus stop, childcare facility, park, playground, or library
Palm Beach Shores	Town	1,000 feet of any school, designated public or private school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground, or library
Palm Springs	Village	1,500 feet of any public or private school, designated public school bus stop or sign, private school bus stop (including daycare centers) registered according to section 39-5, public library, daycare center, specifically including residential or home-based daycare operating under a valid village occupational license; park, playground, community center, day camp, or other place where children regularly congregate
Riviera Beach	City	2,500 feet of any school, public school bus stop, daycare center, park, playground or other places where children regularly congregate
Royal Palm Beach	Village	1,500 feet of any school, daycare center, park, playground or library
South Bay	City	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
South Palm Beach	Town	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute
Tequesta	Village	1,000 feet of any public or private school, designated public bus stop or sign, private school bus stop (including daycare centers) registered under section 54-29, public library, daycare center, home operated daycare center with a village occupational license, park, playground, community center, day camp, or other places where children regularly congregate
Wellington	Village	2,500 feet of any educational institution, designated public school bus stop, private school bus stop designated by a private school servicing Wellington residents or park
West Palm Beach	City	1,500 feet of any school, designated school bus stop, childcare facility, park, playground, community center, or other places where children regularly congregate.
Westlake	City	None specified, defaults to State of Florida Statute

Figure 4

Explaining Inverse Distance Weighted Interpolation



Each RSO neighbor can be equidistant at two feet each (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 10)



One RSO neighbor can be extremely far and the others close (0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 10 = 10)



Or two neighbors can be further away and three close (0 + 0 + 0 + 5 + 5 = 10)

Figure 5

Explaining the Diversity Index



75% White, 13% Black, 13% Hispanic represents a Diversity index of .41



75% Hispanic, 13% White, 13% Asian, represents a Diversity index of .41



25% White, 25% Hispanic, 25% Asian, 25% Black, represents a Diversity index of .75

VITA

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2010 – 2011	Certificate, Paralegal Studies University of Miami Miami, Florida
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SELECTED PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

Guerette, R. T., Lee-Silcox, J., Przeszlowski, K. (2019). *From Research Partner to Embedded Criminologist: A Synthesized Taxonomy and Reflections from the Field*. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice.

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Gilmer, B., Torrins, J., Lee-Silcox, J. (2016). *Analysis of the Fisherfolk Registration Data in Somalia*. Technical report for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Nairobi, Kenya: UNON.

Lee-Silcox, J., Cruz, E., Torres, C. E., Silcox, J. P. (November 2019). *Crime Movie Database 1970 to 2014.* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *American Society of Criminology*, San Francisco, California.

Lee-Silcox, J., Silcox, J. P., Comerford, C., Herbert, J., Stearn, A. (November 2019). *Live Podcast Taping of You Haven't Seen What? Discussing The Silence of the Lambs (1991).* Thematic panel presentation at the annual meeting of the *American Society of Criminology*, San Francisco, California.

Guerette, R. T., Lee-Silcox, J., Przeszlowski, K. (November 2018). *From Research Partner to Embedded Criminologist: Experiences from the Miami SPI Site.* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *American Society of Criminology*, Atlanta, Georgia.

Lee-Silcox, Joelle (November 2017). *Exploring the Geography of Sexual Offender Residency Issues in Florida*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *American Society of Criminology, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.*