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After Deterrence: Policy Choices during Crises of Conventional and Nuclear Direct Deterrence Failure

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FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Miami, Florida

AFTER DETERRENCE:

POLICY CHOICES DURING CRISES OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR

DIRECT DETERRENCE FAILURE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

Yang Gyu Kim

2019

To: Dean John F. Stack, Jr.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs

This dissertation, written by Yang Gyu Kim, and entitled *After Deterrence: Policy Choices during Crises of Conventional and Nuclear Direct Deterrence Failure*, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

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Florida International University, 2019

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DEDICATION

To the glory of God,

To my beloved parents for their relentless love and prayers, and

To Myeongsuk, Yunkyeol, and Tae-Eun, the greatest blessings in my life

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Writing this dissertation has been an exciting, exhausting, lonely, and rewarding journey. Looking back, however, I acknowledge that navigating these difficult waters and completing this voyage would not be possible without the support of my exceptional teachers, mentors, and friends who were there for me through it all.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

AFTER DETERRENCE: POLICY CHOICES DURING CRISES OF
CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DIRECT DETERRENCE FAILURE

by

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Florida International University, 2019

Miami, Florida

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Despite a plethora of research on the conditions of successful deterrence, the literature has been remarkably silent on the aftermath of its possible failure. Especially in the situation of direct deterrence where the defender's people and territory are at stake, the defender experiences tremendous pressure and stress when a challenger defies the former's threat. Due to the high interest at stake, direct deterrent threat is regarded as the most credible type of deterrence and, according to the literature, is most likely successful. How could an intrinsically credible threat fail? What should the defender do when direct deterrence fails and its reputation is decisively in jeopardy? What happens next when the defender chooses a certain policy after the failure?

This dissertation addresses the question by emphasizing the significance of the feasibility of punishment and belief updating. It highlights that challengers would consider even the most determined defender's threat non-credible if it is militarily and politically infeasible for the defender to implement the punishment. Also, the challenger's defiance against the defender's credible deterrent threat would lead the

defender to identify the challenger as a determined aggressor. This belief updating will encourage the defender to modify its level of resolve accordingly and will, thus, choose less aggressive policies fearing a war that may ensue. In this regard, direct deterrence failure would not result in war in numerous instances of direct deterrence failure.

This research uses a mixed-methods approach by incorporating regression analysis and process tracing. The research hypotheses are tested first against the population of direct deterrence failure, a total of 192 cases. This study uses logistic and ordered logistic regression techniques as dependent variables are either binary or ordinal. Case studies, then, follow to determine the most decisive factor among explanatory variables in deciding short- and long-term outcomes of the five selected crises: the 1936 Rhineland Crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1969 Sino-USSR Border Dispute, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Falklands War.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CIA.....CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CINC..... THE COMPOSITE INDEX OF NATIONAL CAPABILITY
COW..... THE CORRELATES OF WAR
DEFCON.....DEFENSE READINESS CONDITION
EEC..... EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
EXCOMM.....THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FKR FRONT CRUISE MISSILE
FROG..... FREE ROCKET OVER GROUND
GDR..... GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
HMS..... HER/HIS MAJESTY’S SHIP
IAF ISRAELI AIR FORCE
ICB..... INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BEHAVIOR
IDF..... ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES
IRBMSINTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE
JCSJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
KGBCOMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
MAD..... MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION
MEZ..... MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE
MRBMS..... MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE
NATO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NSC..... NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

OAS ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
PLA PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
SAM SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE
UN..... UNITED NATIONS
U.S. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
USSR..... UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

The history of humanity is littered with instances of deterrence failure. From biblical depictions of Adam and Eve eating the forbidden fruit, to the case of Mytilene, a member of the Delian League, revolting against Athens around 428 BC, and in contemporary times from the North Korean bombardment of South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 in defiance of the armistice agreement, to the Assad regime crossing President Obama's "red line" with the use of chemical weapons in 2013; deterrence has failed repeatedly and will likely continue to do so in the future.

Faced with failure, the defender in different contexts confronts a similar question: What should a defender do when deterrence fails, and its reputation is in jeopardy? Based on rich and sophisticated empirical research, deterrence literature provides practical advice on making a credible and successful deterrence threat.¹ However, the literature is remarkably silent on the issue of formulating a desirable policy after failure.² My dissertation aims to address this lacuna in the literature.

¹ The rational deterrence perspective, the prominent approach in the literature, suggests three models with regard to deterrence success: (1) the *Classical Rational Deterrence*; (2) the *Costly Signaling*, and (3) the *Inherent Credibility*. For the exemplary works in each model, see Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (1990): pp. 466-501; Frank C. Zagare, and D. Marc Kilogue, *Perfect Deterrence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Vesna Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002). They share one fundamental assumption: the defender's deterrent threat is most likely to succeed when the opponent considers it credible. Divergence emerges from how each model defines threat credibility. This will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2.

² Notable exceptions are Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (1988), pp. 29-45; and Samuel S. G. Wu, "To Attack or Not to Attack: A Theory and Empirical Assessment of Extended Immediate Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34 (1990), pp. 531-52.

1. **Background: Why Should We Care about Direct Deterrence Failure?**

This project stems from my personal experience with the Yeonpyeong crisis, which occurred on November 23, 2010. As a participant in the reserve forces training when the North Korean artillery attacked the South Korean island, I vividly remember the tense, perplexed, and confused atmosphere in the South Korean Army as it struggled to implement the President's ambivalent guideline: "sternly respond" yet "make sure that the situation would not escalate."³ Similarly, when various intelligence reports confirmed that the Assad regime challenged President Obama's "red line" by using chemical weapons, the President refused to punish the regime immediately and changed his wording: "I didn't set a red line; the world set a red line."⁴ These cases explicitly reveal the problem with an atheoretical approach: making security policies without a consistent, coherent, and sophisticated guiding principle.

The Yeonpyeong crisis is a case of direct deterrence failure, and this type of deterrence failure is an especially perplexing one. As explained in the next section, direct deterrence aims to prevent attacks against the defender's territory, not that of its allies. Due

³ *The Guardian*, "North Korea fires on South Korea – live coverage," November 23, 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/23/north-korea-condemned-south-korea> (accessed on March 27, 2019).

⁴ The White House, "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Reinfeldt of Sweden in Joint Press Conference," September 04, 2013, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/04/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-reinfeldt-sweden-joint-press-> (accessed on October 1, 2018).

to the high interest at stake, the “endowment effect,”⁵ and the human propensity to “loss aversion”⁶; the defender is more likely to follow through on the threat after its deterrence failed. Hence, in all likelihood, the direct deterrent threat will be considered credible by the defender’s potential challenger. Its failure, in this regard, should be an anomaly. However, there has been ninety-seven deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 to 1984, thirty-four of them were direct deterrence cases, and fourteen direct deterrent attempts (about forty-one percent) failed.⁷ The sheer number of failures illustrates a reoccurring pattern as opposed to an exception, which warrants our close attention.

According to the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature, direct deterrent threats should be considered the most credible to potential challengers and thus successful. Its failure, in this context, would make the defender greatly perplexed and confused. For example, as described in Chapter 5, President John F. Kennedy said it was “a goddamn mystery” to him that Moscow deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba despite his clear deterrent threats. Does it mean that the Soviet Union was ready to start a nuclear war? Without a proper guide of valid theories, it would be tremendously difficult for policymakers of the defender to navigate the right path under this extreme stress. This dissertation precisely

⁵ Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries? No Common Knowledge,” in T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz eds., *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2009), p.67.

⁶ Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk” *Econometrica* 47, no.2 (1979): pp. 263-291.

⁷ Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, “The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism,” *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): pp. 609-623.

seeks to address this puzzle of direct deterrence failure and to suggest alternative theories that would potentially assist in devising effective security policies.

2. Limitations in the Deterrence Literature

Deterrence theory is a security perspective that posits the prevention of aggression, invasion, and violence by denial or threats of punishment.⁸ Successful deterrence, thus, requires the *defensive capability* that could physically frustrate any external challenge to the sovereign integrity of a nation-state or *offensive power* to retaliate and impose unacceptable cost against attempts to make changes in the status quo. The emergence of deterrence studies parallels the development of atomic bombs as nuclear wars cannot be won and should be averted.⁹ The horrors of a potential U.S.-Soviet showdown and subsequent nuclear holocaust infuse urgency and a keen interest in policy circles, academia, and the general public. The “four waves”¹⁰ of deterrence literature advanced our understanding of the conditions for successful operation of the deterrence strategy.

The level of theoretical and scientific maturation of deterrence literature advances a robust knowledge basis for four types of deterrent threats: “direct deterrence (protecting the

⁸ Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 14-16.

⁹ Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p.76; Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 4-8.

¹⁰ Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (1979): pp. 289-324; Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no.1 (2010): pp. 1-33.

territorial and political integrity of a *defender*);” “extended deterrence (defending *allies*’ sovereign integrity);” “general deterrence (dissuading a *potential* crisis from occurring);” and “immediate deterrence (preventing the degeneration of an *actual* international crisis into open warfare).” These four prototypes of deterrence form four types of deterrence in actual cases: direct-general, direct-immediate, extended-general, and extended-immediate deterrence.¹¹ The scholarship, however, still shows the following shortcomings.

First, deterrence is a study of non-events, and it is almost impossible to identify the *population of general deterrence success*. Deterrence is a defender’s strategy to prevent its opponent from doing something, and the potential challenger might decide not to disrupt the status quo “for reasons independent of deterrent threats.”¹² This uncertainty poses serious challenges to the validity of deterrence studies as it could lead to “false negatives” (excluding actual cases of deterrence success) or “false positives” (including spurious success cases).¹³ It renders deterrence dynamics only clearly observable in the aftermath of failure. Subsequently, attempts to test deterrence theories against empirical cases during the third wave¹⁴ focused on immediate deterrence cases.¹⁵ However, the “selection effect”¹⁶ reveals

¹¹ Paul Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999), p. 27.

¹² Frank P. Harvey, *The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), p. 33.

¹³ Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models,” *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 1 (1993), p. 62.

¹⁴ Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” p. 302.

¹⁵ Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” p. 27.

¹⁶ James D. Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining,” *American Journal of Political Science* 33, no.4 (1989): pp. 941-72; James D. Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” *International Interactions* 28 (2002), pp. 5-29.

that the causal effects of independent variables derived from general deterrence cases cannot be expected to bring out the same result in the immediate deterrence situation. Studying conditions for immediate deterrence success, in this context, does not help us understand the factors that lead to general deterrence success.

There have been efforts to solve this problem by turning to “enduring rivalries,”¹⁷ “politically active dyads,” and “sample of defense pacts.”¹⁸ They suggest interesting ways to identify the population of deterrence success, the cases of “dogs that did not bark.” As they all admit, however, even these creative methods have not fully solved the problem, and their selection still includes “false negative” or “false positive” deterrence cases. Studies of general deterrence, in this regard, still await more creative ways to solve this problem.

Second, while it is understandable that third wave deterrence studies can only focus on conditions of successful immediate deterrence policy, they fail to recognize that this approach falsely assumes that states would respond to the general deterrence failure with additional deterrent attempts.¹⁹ In fact, the defender holds at least three options: (1) punishing the challenger extensively by the retaliatory use of force; (2) initiating a bargaining process by making a subsequent threat (the Immediate-Deterrent or Defensive-Compellent threat), turning to non-violent military measures or economic sanctions, and

¹⁷ Huth and Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals”; Harvey, *The Future's Back*.

¹⁸ Jesse C. Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds, and Ahra Wu, “Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence,” *International Interactions* 41, no. 2 (2015): pp. 309–36.

¹⁹ For example, Danilovic identifies 153 cases of general deterrence failures among major powers but 105 cases (68.63 percent) did not escalate into immediate deterrence cases. Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*, p. 61

offering inducements; or (3) backing down and acquiescing to significant changes in the status quo. The issue of what makes a defender choose a certain course of action after deterrence failure receives scant attention in the literature.

Third, scholarly works on deterrence failure are severely lopsided towards a particular type of failure. That is extended deterrence failure. This type of deterrence failure might be a lot more frequent than direct deterrence failure. However, direct deterrence is not only the prototype deterrence dynamics, but also its failure often causes pivotal international crises such as the 1936 Rhineland crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, the Yom Kippur War, the Falklands War, the 1999 Kargil Crisis, and the 2010 Yeonpyeong crisis. For example, when Pyongyang initiated artillery attacks on Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2010, it was crucially important for policymakers in Seoul to know which policy option would lead to the optimal result: deterrence restoration at a minimum cost. Deterrence theory, however, continuously fails to provide viable policy recommendations concerning this important real-world problem.

Fourth, there is a sharp divide in deterrence studies between Rational Deterrence²⁰ and Psychological/Cognitive Deterrence camps.²¹ There has not been a serious attempt to learn from both approaches simultaneously. They both suggest compelling coding rules

²⁰ John Orme, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," *International Security* 11, no. 4 (1987): pp. 96-124; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): pp. 496-526; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation"; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory."

²¹ Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (1989): pp. 208-224; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," *World Politics* 42, no.3 (1990): pp. 336-369.

and reliable datasets²², and it is difficult to conclude that any stance is falsified. This difficulty in identifying the valid proposition might be because, in reality, different decision-makers are divergently rational.²³ Some people are “hedgehogs” who rarely update their thinking; while others are “foxes” who are “open to competing arguments.”²⁴ If so, it is more indispensable to formulate a comprehensive model that can be used to analyze diverse types of policymakers that are not equally rational.

Fifth, the question of whether possession of nuclear weapons is conducive or irrelevant to deterrence success is not fully answered yet. We do not have enough empirical data to test these theories. The sanction of dropping nuclear weapons occurred only once in human history. Of course, this can be strong evidence that nuclear weapons have a tremendous deterrent effect. It could be indeed a “nuclear revolution”²⁵ after all as it almost has terminated systemic or general wars among great powers. Theoretically speaking, nuclear proliferation should not be a bad thing.²⁶ Inversely, however, this might imply that nuclear deterrence cannot be credible as it has continued to be off the table. As Boulding emphasizes, “If [deterrence] were really stable [...] it would cease to deter.”²⁷ Empirically, nuclear powers frequently failed to deter their adversaries in Berlin, on the Korean Peninsula,

²² Harvey, *The Future's Back*, p. 38.

²³ Lebow and Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory,” p. 208

²⁴ Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries,” pp. 64-65.

²⁵ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*; Rober Powell, *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

²⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewed* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), pp. 3-45.

²⁷ Kenneth Boulding, “Confession of Roots,” *International Studies Notes* 12 (1986), p. 32.

during the Arab-Israel wars, and in the Falklands.²⁸ Statistical findings also support the irrelevance of nuclear weapons in deterrence success.²⁹

Sixth, the deterrence literature suffers greatly from conceptual complications. There remains a troublesome and defective conceptual ambiguity between immediate deterrence and defensive compellence. A deterrer's subsequent set of threats in the aftermath of a general deterrence failure to stop or undo the challenge is identified as an immediate deterrent threat by some scholars but a (defensive) compellent threat by others.³⁰ This confusing use of multiple concepts to identify the same international process needs to be addressed, repaired, and refined further.

3. Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following research question to address those six gaps in the literature. What should the defender do when its direct-general deterrence fails? Whether the fact that the threat involves conventional or nuclear weapons would make any difference? This research proposes to shed light on this central, but overlooked, question, by focusing on (1) causes for a challenger to defy the defender's direct deterrent threat, (2)

²⁸ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, pp. 28-29.

²⁹ Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; Huth and Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation." Recent studies also reveal that nuclear weapons have no statistically significant impact on compellence success. Todd S. Sechser and Mathew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 72-95.

³⁰ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: a conceptual analysis* (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1983); Alexander George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994).

conditions for the defender's certain policy choice in the aftermath of the deterrence failure, (3) short- and long-term outcomes of each policy option and (4) whether introduction of nuclear weapons would change the prototype direct deterrence dynamics.

Question 1: Why does the challenger defy the defender's direct deterrent threat?

The cause of the direct-general deterrence failure needs to be identified first to devise appropriate countermeasures against the challenger's defiance. The gravest challenge in answering this question is the above-mentioned problem of identifying the population of deterrence success. Considering that addressing the issue is extremely difficult, this dissertation selects only deterrence failure cases. As this selection introduces another problem of a non-varying dependent variable, this research identifies the different *degree of deterrence failure*. The degree of failure is defined by unpacking the challenger's strategy of defiance against the defender's deterrent threat into its specific policies: *gradual escalation*, *hedging*, and *rapid escalation*. These types of defiance are defined based on the degree of aggressiveness in the challenger's strategic movement. Specifically, gradual escalation implies its use of non-military (i.e., verbal/political/economic) measures in challenging the status quo, hedging means its use of military force in a non-violent way, and rapid escalation indicates the challenger's violent use of military force.

Classifying challenger's unitary strategy of defiance into its three different subtypes is especially important for studying direct deterrence failure. As threat credibility is

generally considered as a sufficient condition for deterrence success,³¹ there is a tendency in the literature to demonstrate “the fallacy of equating the credibility of the threat with its effectiveness.”³² In other words, given that significantly high interest is at stake for a defender in the direct deterrence situation, its threat should be considered credible and subsequently most likely successful according to the deterrence literature. The failure of direct-general deterrence, in this regard, seems puzzling and difficult to be reasoned out by the Rational Deterrence perspective, as explained in detail in Chapter 2.

One simple answer to this problem is that the challenger is a determined aggressor that maintains a “very low assessment of the value of the status quo.”³³ Making a *capable threat* impossible in this case, as the challenger’s preference order is rigid and it relentlessly prefers defying the status quo to acquiescing with it, whatever the defender does to preserve it.³⁴ Under this condition, deterrence is bound to fail however *credible* it may be. This approach suggests a black-and-white picture: direct-general deterrence always succeeds, and it only fails when the challenger is extremely resolute to revise the status quo. If so, the defender has only two choices after direct-general deterrence failure: peace by submission or war by standing firm.

In case this all-or-nothing situation is the true reality that the defender faces all the time, then we do not need alternative theories or additional studies like this dissertation,

³¹ Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” p. 29.

³² Jack S. Levy, “When Do Deterrent Threats Work?” *British Journal of Political Science* 18, no. 4, (1988), p. 500.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 500.

³⁴ Zagare, and Kilogue, *Perfect Deterrence*, pp. 81-82.

and policymakers can choose either the path of humiliation or destruction. However, the paucity of research on this issue of direct-general deterrence failure hardly makes it possible for us to jump to such conclusions. As argued in Chapter 2, this dissertation's *feasibility of punishment model* illustrates that direct deterrence could fail not only because the challenger is a determined aggressor rather than the defender's threat is not credible despite its high interest at stake. This threat incredibility may result from the lack of military and political feasibility to follow through on the threat. To test this hypothesis, we need to redefine the non-varying dependent variable of deterrence failure into three ordinal variables and observe the impact of variance in the independent variable on the value of the dependent variable.

Question 2: Under what conditions does the defender choose a certain policy option?

Dependent variables for this question are countermeasures of the defender after direct-general deterrence failure. As discussed earlier, numerous studies presume that the defender would turn to an immediate deterrence strategy in the aftermath of general deterrence failure. This project, however, points out that the defender can choose to escalate or de-escalate the crisis by turning to divergent levels of punishment, which leads to four ideal types of action: *rapid escalation*, *hedging*, *gradual escalation*, and *de-escalation*. Similar to the challenger's strategic options, defender's choice of rapid escalation indicates the defender's use of military force to respond to the deterrence failure; hedging means its use of military force in a non-violent way to employ it as a bargaining chip; and gradual escalation implies its use of non-military measures. What is distinct about

the defender's strategy is that it can back down: de-escalation by choosing a non-action path and surrendering what it possessed before.

Identifying factors that cause the defender to choose certain strategies after direct-general deterrence failure is crucial in this study because it is closely related to the true credibility of the defender's deterrent threat. By definition, credible threats are "conditional declaration of hostile intention" that is "worthy to be believed."³⁵ Thus, if a defender did make a credible threat; it should follow through on its threat facing a challenger's defiance of it. In this regard, *conditions for the defender to escalate the crisis* after the general deterrence failure can also be indicators for evaluating the *true credibility* of its threat. For example, when the defender rapidly escalates the crisis by retaliating against the challenger's non-compliance to its deterrent threat, the former's direct-general deterrent threat was indeed a very credible one. If the defender gradually escalates the crisis by imposing economic sanctions against the challenger and initiates a bargaining process by making immediate deterrent or compellent threats, then the former's threat was somewhat credible. If the defender backs down, however, its threat was au fond non-credible.

However, before accepting this self-evident relationship between the defender's credibility level and its action in the aftermath of deterrence failure, the researcher should be mindful of the action-reaction problem or "paradoxical logic of strategy."³⁶ For example, even in a case that the defender is an authentically credible type, it may be refrained from rapidly escalating the crisis given that the challenger chooses to defy the defender's direct-

³⁵ Online Etymology Dictionary, https://www.etymonline.com/word/credible#etymonline_v_29040; https://www.etymonline.com/word/threat#etymonline_v_13258 (accessed on March 28, 2019).

³⁶ Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), p. 18.

general deterrent threat. The challenger's action increases the possibility that it is a capable and resolved aggressor and ready to fight a war for revising the status quo. This *belief updating* of the defender should greatly affect its decision-making process. The challenger, on the other hand, might choose to bluff and initiate a crisis even though it is not capable or resolved to risk a war, anticipating that the defender would back down being influenced by this belief updating or action-reaction effect. This action-reaction problem is a serious challenge in establishing linear causal models for answering the second question (possibly even the first question), which should be addressed properly through a careful research design.

Question 3: What are the ramifications of each policy choice?

The reformulation of the defender's choice into four strategies (*rapid escalation, hedging, gradual escalation, and de-escalation*) is conducive on both the overcoming rigidity in the previous deterrence theories' binary model and the tracing of outcomes of each policy choice. The most significant factor that influences the decision-making process after the deterrence failure would be what happens next when crisis actors take a certain course of action. Revealing the ramification of each choice, thus, is crucial in addressing the ultimate question of this dissertation: What should the defender do when direct-general deterrence fails?

In answering the third question, this dissertation study traces both *short-term* and *long-term* outcomes of the defender's policy choices. The short-term ramification is closely related to how the crisis terminated, and there can be two types of termination: (1) intensity

of violence (from no-violence to full-scale war) and (2) content of the result (victory of the defender, compromise, stalemate, and defeat of the defender). Both types of crisis outcomes are significantly important in answering the third question as the policy choice of decision-makers should care not only whether the choice would lead to war but also who would be victorious in the crisis. However, the winner of the crisis would be decided by complex factors such as military balance, economic strength, national morale, tactics in the battlefield, and even pure luck especially when the crisis ended up with war. As the previous strategic moves of the challenger and the defender hardly decide these factors, this dissertation solely focuses on the first aspect of short-term outcome: intensity of violence.

Concerning the long-term outcome, this research focuses on the following aspect after the termination of the crisis: deterrence collapse (another crisis occurred among the principal actors) or deterrence restoration (no additional crises occurred). This outcome also could be determined by various unsystematic factors. However, this issue is directly related to the matter of threat credibility. The deterrence literature actively debates on the long-term impact of a defender's reputation for standing firm, and this project analyzes this long-term ramification of the defender's policy choice as well.

Question 4: What kind of impact does the possession of nuclear weapons have on the short- and long-term outcomes of direct deterrence?

Due to their appalling destructive capability, the literature on international crisis has considered nuclear weapons as “the ultimate security guarantor.”³⁷ Nuclear weapons, thus, will add a definitive calming effect and buttress stability of deterrence. The revolutionist school – a group of scholars who believe nuclear weapons have revolutionized deterrence dynamics – emphasizes that development of nuclear weapons has concurred with the absence of direct nuclear war between two superpowers throughout the Cold War.

However, in the eyes of Rational Choice theory, the condition of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD)³⁸ makes a defender’s deterrent threat hardly credible. Since the nuclear war has a somewhat “negative infinite utility,” an outcome without nuclear war for sure should be always more preferable to “any lottery that gives any nonzero probability of nuclear war.”³⁹ Subsequently, unless it is an extreme national security problem of survival (i.e., the opponent’s imminent nuclear attack on defender’s densely populated cities), a rational defender should back down whenever a challenger attempts to revise the status quo under MAD.⁴⁰

³⁷ Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 51.

³⁸ This means that both sides in a conflict secure the second-strike capability and are capable of maintaining the retaliatory power to completely destroy the other after absorbing its adversary’s initial nuclear attack. This “mutual vulnerability” is the crux of nuclear revolution. Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, p. 14.

³⁹ James D. Morrow, *Game Theory for Political Scientists* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 31.

⁴⁰ Some argue that nuclear deterrence still can be credible under MAD considering the automatic, universal, immediate instinct for revenge. The retaliatory action after receiving attacks from the challenger would lead the defender to “feel good.” This emotional satisfaction can make nuclear deterrence very credible even in a case that decision is not supported by cost-benefit analysis. Rose McDermott, Anthony C.

This fundamental credibility problem of nuclear deterrence is manifested by the “stability-instability paradox”⁴¹ in cases of conventional wars between two nuclear powers (i.e., Sino-Soviet border clashes and the Kargil War), and proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam. Nuclear weapons might have little impact on preventing limited/minor armed conflicts or indirect wars. As mentioned earlier, quantitative studies also find the statistically non-significant causal effect of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence and compellence success.

Some argue that possession of nuclear weapons might matter in the direct deterrence situations, especially when the nuclear balance is non-MAD: *nuclear disparity* or *asymmetry*.⁴² However, as the Falklands War and the Yom Kippur War show, nuclear weapons did even fail to deter armed conflicts between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Recent studies on “nuclear taboo”⁴³ and “self-deterrence”⁴⁴ suggest an interesting explanation to this anomaly that, under nuclear asymmetry, nuclear retaliation is politically and normatively very costly, which makes nuclear weapons continuously off the table

Lopez, and Peter K. Hatemi, “Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It: The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” *Texas National Security Review* 1, no.1 (2017): pp. 69-88.

⁴¹ Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury ed., *The Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965): pp. 184-201.

⁴² Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 72. Here, the *nuclear disparity* implies that both sides in a conflict possess nuclear weapons yet one maintains the second strike capability while the other does not. The *nuclear asymmetry* means nuclear superiority or monopoly: while one side is a nuclear power, the other is not.

⁴³ Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005), pp. 5-49; Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁴⁴ T.V. Paul, “Self-deterrence: Nuclear weapons and the enduring credibility challenge,” *Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 71, issue 1 (2016): pp. 20-40.

during crises. In this regard, nuclear war possibly has not occurred not because of the ultimate deterrent effect of nuclear weapons but of their *inapplicability*. The possession of nuclear weapons, thus, might not matter much in deterrence dynamics. This possibility warrants our close attention that whether the possession of the weapons has any impact on policymakers' decision-making after direct-general deterrence failure.

4. Research Design

This dissertation project utilizes a mixed-methods approach, incorporating regression analysis and process tracing. Arguably, a mixed-method research design that combines quantitative and qualitative methods is a stronger form of inquiry than the single-method approach.⁴⁵ The mixed-method approach not only helps demonstrate the average causal effects of variables but also illustrates the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of dependent variables.⁴⁶ This study, thus, first tests the research hypotheses against the population of direct deterrence failure, which will be followed by two full-length (the 1936 Rhineland Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis) and three mini case-studies, namely, the 1969 Sino-USSR Border Conflict, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Falklands War.

⁴⁵ Sidney Tarrow, "Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide," in by Henry E. Brady and David Collier eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2010), pp. 101-110.

⁴⁶ James Mahoney, "Toward a Unified Theory of Causality," *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no.4-5 (2008): pp. 412-436.

4.1 Statistical Analysis: Logistic and Ordered Logistic Regression

First, a statistical analysis is performed to capture the average causal impact of the two independent variables (*feasibility of punishment* and *possession of nuclear weapons*) on dependent variables (challenger's policy, defender's policy, and short- and long-term crisis outcomes) in the population of direct deterrence failure.⁴⁷ One hundred ninety-two cases of direct deterrence failure are identified from the "International Crisis Behavior" project's actor level dataset (ICB2, Ver. 12).⁴⁸ The number of observations is a lot greater than previous studies because cases of invasion and territorial disputes are coded as direct deterrence failure in this project as long as there were implicit actions (i.e. establishments of defensive garrisons along the border) of the defender to maintain the status quo.

The analysis turns to *logistic* and *ordered logistic regression* techniques as dependent variables are either binary (deterrence restoration vs. deterrence collapse) or ordinal (non-action, non-military escalation, non-violent military escalation, violent escalation). This project runs multiple regression models to control the impact of confounding variables such as the probability of victory, interests at stake, and audience cost. For addressing the above-mentioned action-reaction problem between the policy choices of challenger and defender, the "two-stage logistic regression model"⁴⁹ is used for

⁴⁷ These hypotheses are discussed in detail in the following chapter.

⁴⁸ Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, Patrick James and David Quinn, *International Crisis Behavior Data* (ICB), Version 12 (2017), <http://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/data-collections/>.

⁴⁹ Mijung Kim, "Two-stage logistic regression model," *Expert Systems with Applications* 36 (2009): pp. 6,727-6,734

testing hypotheses for the third question. The variables used in this analysis are as presented in Table 1.⁵⁰ Chapter 3 explains those indicators used for measuring each variable.

Table 1: Variables for the Regression Analysis⁵¹

	Dependent Variables	Independent Variables	Indicators
Research Question 1	Challenger's policy choice (Rapid escalation, Hedging, Gradual escalation) [#]	H1: <u>Defender's</u> feasibility to follow through [#]	(1) Military feasibility* ; (2) Political feasibility ^{†, ‡}
		R1: <u>Challenger's</u> level of resolve [#]	(1) Probability of victory*; (2) Interest at stake [†]
Research Question 2	Defender's policy choice after the failure (Rapid escalation, Hedging, Gradual escalation, De-escalation) [#]	H2: <u>Defender's</u> feasibility to follow through [#]	(1) Military feasibility*; (2) Political feasibility ^{†, ‡}
		R2: <u>Defender's</u> level of resolve [#]	(1) Probability of victory (COW CINC)*; (2) Interest at stake ("the object of gravest threat") [†]
Research Question 3	Short-term outcomes ("intensity of violence") ^{#, †}	H3-1 and R3-1: <u>Policy choice of the defender</u> [#]	Rapid escalation, Hedging, Gradual escalation, De-escalation
	Long-term outcomes ("escalation or reduction of tension") ^{†, ‡}	H3-2 and R3-2: <u>Policy choice of the defender</u> [#]	Rapid escalation, Hedging, Gradual escalation, De-escalation
Research Question 4	Challenger's policy choice, Defender's policy choice, Short-term, and Long-term outcomes	H4: <u>Level of Nuclear capability</u> ("nuclear capability") [#]	Degree of advancement in nuclear capability [#]
		R4: <u>Possession of nuclear weapons</u> (Yes vs. No) ^{†, ‡}	Possession of nuclear weapons ^{†, ‡}

⁵⁰ Each symbol signifies as follows; (1) [†]: nominal variables, (2) [‡]: binary variables, (3) [#]: ordinal variables, (4) *: interval variables.

⁵¹ If not stated otherwise, all values of variables used in this statistical analysis come from Brecher et al., ICB Version 12.

4.2 Case Studies: Process-tracing

Case studies and process-tracing method will be used to test the causal impact of the *belief updating* variable and to determine the most decisive factor among explanatory variables in deciding short- and long-term outcomes of the five selected crises. This research selects them from the population of the direct deterrence failure dataset. The process-tracing method involves four empirical tests⁵² to identify a causal mechanism: (1) “straw in the wind,” (2) “hoop,” (3) “smoking gun,” and (4) “doubly decisive.”⁵³ The method usually works as a “method of elimination,”⁵⁴ and the process tracing technique tries to eliminate as many alternative/rival explanations as possible by turning to four different tests: straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive ones. These tests, especially the hoop test, will help this study to address the potential confounding effects of third variables.

The proposed research will conduct two full-length and three mini case studies that involve divergent policy choices of the deterrer for the sake of maximizing the

⁵² First, passing the *straw in the wind* test implies that the hypothesis is relevant to explain the phenomenon but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish causation with the variables used. Second, the *hoop test* is related to necessary but not sufficient conditions for the causation. Passing this test affirms the relevance of the variable in causal mechanism but does not confirm the hypothesis. Failing to pass the test, however, leads to rejection of the explanatory model. Third, the *smoking gun* test is for identifying sufficient but not necessary conditions: the factor is indeed the cause for that phenomenon but there might be other variables that can explain this. Passing this test confirms the hypothesis but failing to do so does not result in the elimination of it. Lastly, passing the *doubly decisive* test indicates that the variable is both necessary and sufficient condition for causation: the factor is the cause and it is impossible to explain the event without it. It is very unlikely to find evidence that can pass the doubly decisive test in social science. Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” in Henry E. Brady and David Collier eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010): pp. 207-20.

⁵³ David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 44, no. 4 (2011): pp. 823-830; James Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences,” *Sociological Methods and Research* 41, no.4 (2012): pp. 570-597.

⁵⁴ Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” p. 827.

representativeness of the population.⁵⁵ The first two full-length case studies include (1) the 1936 Rhineland Crisis (France’s policy choice of *de-escalation*⁵⁶ against Germany; both France and Germany were non-nuclear powers), and (2) the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (the U.S.’s decision to *hedge* against the Soviet challenge by enacting a naval blockade and suggesting a missile trade; the U.S. and the USSR were under the condition of MAD). The three abbreviated case studies analyze (1) the Sino-USSR Border Conflict in 1969 (the Soviet choice of taking *rapid escalation* path against China; nuclear disparity favoring the Moscow), (2) the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (Israel’s move to take *rapid escalation* route against Egypt and Syria; nuclear asymmetry – Israel as a nuclear power vs. non-nuclear Arab powers), and (3) the 1982 Falklands War (Britain’s policy choice of *gradual escalation* path against Argentina; nuclear asymmetry – United Kingdom as a nuclear power vs. non-nuclear Argentina).

The reason behind conducting mini-case studies for the latter three crises is that while unclassified primary sources can be easily accessible for the Rhineland and the Cuban Missile Crises, it is quite challenging to acquire the equivalent level of archival data

⁵⁵ This selection strategy will be also conducive to the test validity of research hypotheses as it allows the dependent and independent variable to vary which is significantly important for (1) establishing a causal model while avoiding a selection bias and (2) increasing the generality of the model. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 129-139.

⁵⁶ After German remilitarization of the Rhineland, the French government did appeal to its allies and the League of Nations, and technically; this is not a case of de-escalation but that of gradual escalation. The ICB dataset also identifies that major response of the defender was a “political act” (coded as 3), not “no response-inaction.” However, the case study analyzes this crisis as a de-escalation path because: (1) the French government’s first choice of action is “no isolated action,” which is close to inaction than political action; and (2) the crisis was terminated with non-action of any parties involved after all. Chapter 4 discusses this in detail.

for the other cases. The three cases, thus, mainly function as testing grounds for rejecting certain causal models rather than confirming them.

5. Organization of the Dissertation

In the following chapter (Chapter 2), the dissertation discusses the current status of Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature and its limitations. A new theory is suggested to address the gap in the literature by emphasizing two factors: the *feasibility of punishment* and *belief updating*. Research and rival hypotheses are formulated based on explanatory variables suggested by the deterrence literature and the new theory with regard to the question of (1) causes of direct deterrence failure, (2) conditions for a policy choice after the failure, (3) the short-term outcomes of each policy choice, and (4) long-term significance of reputation in the aftermath of crisis termination.

Chapter 3 tests the validity of research and rival hypotheses against the population of the direct deterrence failure. This statistical analysis demonstrates general trends in direct deterrence dynamics and reveals the average causal impact of individual independent variables (feasibility of punishment, nuclear capability, and defender's policy choice) suggested by deterrence literature and this project. The belief updating variable is omitted from the regression models because the standard regression analysis hardly captures the dynamic properly.⁵⁷ This chapter concludes with reporting the result of the regression analysis and discussing its theoretical implications.

⁵⁷ The Bayesian updating is an assumption in the standard game theoretic and statistical analysis rather than a variable that is tested explicitly.

From chapter 4 to 6, five cases of the direct deterrence failure are discussed to reexamine the causal effects of independent variables demonstrated by the regression models and to test the impact of belief updating. Chapter 4 organizes evidence found from the study of the first selected case, the Rhineland Crisis, using the process tracing technique. This crisis is a case of *de-escalation* where the defender chooses the inaction option and does not punish the challenger. The chapter also discusses the implication of the qualitative evidence for evaluating the validity of theoretical models of this project.

Chapter 5 examines the second case, the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the strategy of *hedging* was a chosen policy in the aftermath of direct-general deterrence failure. This chapter reports the survived explanatory models from the hoop and the smoking gun tests and identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the policy choice of Washington's *hedging* strategy, more specifically, the combination of *non-violent military measures* (blockade) and *de-escalation* (surrendering missile bases in Turkey) paths.

In chapter 6, this study describes the Sino-USSR Border Dispute, the Yom Kippur War, and the Falklands War cases by identifying the sequential development of the events. Due to the difficulty in collecting declassified primary sources for these three cases, research and rival hypotheses are tested against actual behaviors of challengers and defenders during the crises using the process-tracing technique. It is impossible, thus, to single out the cause for the challenger or defender's choice during the crises. Subsequently, the hoop test, rather than the smoking gun test, is used as the primary tool in this chapter to identify the possible rationale of policymakers behind their choices of *rapid* or *gradual escalation* in these three cases.

Chapter 7 reviews and summarizes the key findings of the dissertation. After discussing the theoretical implications of the study, this chapter explains how this project adds to the existing literature on deterrence failure. Also, the chapter suggests specific policy recommendations formulated based on the result of this study and then concludes by examining the limitations of the dissertation project.

CHAPTER II

A NEW THEORY OF DIRECT DETERRENCE FAILURE

Direct deterrence failure is a perplexing event. Among different types of deterrence⁵⁸, direct deterrence threat is considered the most credible as it aims at “preventing an armed attack against a country’s territory,”⁵⁹ not against that of its allies. Due to the high interest at stake,⁶⁰ “endowment effect,”⁶¹ and the human propensity to “loss aversion,”⁶² both Rational and Cognitive deterrence studies predict that the defender is most likely to resolve to follow through on the direct deterrent threat if it is challenged. Hence, in all likelihood, the direct deterrent threat will be considered credible by the defender’s potential challengers. If so, the threat would work in most cases as threat credibility is generally considered a sufficient condition for deterrence success.⁶³ When, then, can this particular type of deterrence fail? What should the defender do if it fails? Would the involvement of conventional or nuclear weapons make any difference?

⁵⁸ The deterrence literature generally agrees that there are four types of deterrence: “direct deterrence (protecting the territorial and political integrity of a defender);” “extended deterrence (defending allies’ sovereign integrity);” “general deterrence (dissuading a potential crisis from occurring);” and “immediate deterrence (preventing the degeneration of an international crisis into open warfare).” Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” p. 27.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁶⁰ Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*, p. 4.

⁶¹ Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries?” p. 67.

⁶² Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory”; Robert Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” *Political Psychology* 13, no. 2, (1992), p. 193.

⁶³ Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” p. 29.

In this chapter, I aim to suggest a theoretical framework that can be used to explain the cause of direct deterrence failure, policy choices of the defender in the aftermath of the failure, and the outcome of these choices. First, the chapter introduces rational and cognitive deterrence theories and discusses their implications. Next, it identifies limitations in these theories and presents alternative models that can address these problems. The third part of this chapter asks what kind of impact the possession of nuclear weapons has on direct deterrent outcomes. Lastly, rival and research hypotheses are formulated based on this discussion. These hypotheses will be tested against the empirical data in the following chapters.

1. The Rational and Cognitive Deterrence Literature

Deterrence literature is quite extensive. It is not an exaggeration to say that the emergence of strategic studies in IR corresponds with the advancement in deterrence research.⁶⁴ However, regarding deterrence failure, most works are limited to the study and analysis of extended deterrence failure and the conditions for successful immediate deterrence threats. The first possible reason behind this apparent disinterest in direct deterrence failure is that, during the Cold War era, failure was considered the endpoint for strategic exchanges: nuclear war and the annihilation of the human race. More importantly, according to rational and cognitive deterrence studies, direct deterrence would hardly fail due to its inherently high level of credibility. Its failure, thus, is an anomaly and possible

⁶⁴ Jan Ludvik, *Nuclear Asymmetry and Deterrence: Theory, Policy and History* (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2016), p. 5.

only when the challenger is extremely dissatisfied with the status quo and determined to revise it. This section reviews the rationale behind this explanation provided by both rational and cognitive deterrence theories.

1.1 The Origin of Failure: When Does Direct Deterrence Fail?

There are two major dimensions in the deterrence literature: *Rational* and *Cognitive* perspectives. Although both approaches argue that direct deterrence failure would be a rare event, the mechanisms they provide behind this uniform prediction are different. The Rational Deterrence perspective provides three general models⁶⁵ for deterrence success and failure: (1) the Classical Rational Deterrence, (2) the Costly Signaling, and (3) the Inherent Credibility models. They share one fundamental assumption: The defender's deterrent threat is most likely to succeed when the opponent considers it credible. Nonetheless, divergence emerges through the definition of threat credibility among each model.

First, the *Classical Rational Deterrence* model⁶⁶ argues that deterrence fails due to not meeting one or more of the four prerequisites: (1) clear definition of undesirable behavior, (2) explicit commitment and signaling, (3) capability to defend the commitment and (4) resolve to implement the punishment in case adversaries fail to comply. While some scholars

⁶⁵ Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*, pp. 9-21.

⁶⁶ Orme, "Deterrence Failures"; Paul K. Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): pp. 423-443; Huth and Bruce Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation"; Frank P. Harvey, "Practicing Coercion: Revisiting Successes and Failures Using Boolean Logic and Comparative Methods," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 no. 6 (1999): pp. 840-871.

argue that deterrence can fail by not satisfying a single element of four prerequisites,⁶⁷ others emphasize that a deterrent threat would most likely succeed when it is considered *credible* by the target state.⁶⁸ This threat credibility is secured “if the defender possesses the military *capabilities* to inflict substantial costs on a challenger in armed conflict and if the challenger believes that the defender is *resolved* to use its available military forces.”⁶⁹

Between the *capability* to impose enormous pain and the *resolve* to use that capability, the first and the second waves of deterrence literature⁷⁰ focus more on the importance of the former, especially the short-term military capability, for the success of deterrence strategy.⁷¹ The recent trend, however, inclines towards the significant role of the resolve (i.e. “balance of interest”) in making a successful deterrent threat.⁷²

For example, Harvey⁷³ finds that, according to his analysis of the three datasets⁷⁴ using Boolean truth table, “a lack of resolve is independently sufficient for failure in 100 percent of relevant cases” whereas its presence “was found to be independently necessary

⁶⁷ Orme, “Deterrence Failures”; Harvey, “Practicing Coercion.”

⁶⁸ Huth and Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory”; Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict.”

⁶⁹ Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” p. 29.

⁷⁰ Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited.”

⁷¹ John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War”; Charles L. Glaser and Chairn Kaufmann, “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure it?” *International Security* 22, no. 4 (1988): pp. 44-82.

⁷² Maria Sperandei, “Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: an Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy,” *International Studies Review* 8 (2006), p. 265.

⁷³ Harvey, “Practicing Coercion,” p. 863.

⁷⁴ Lebow, *Between Peace and War*; Lebow and Stein, “Deterrence”; Frank P. Harvey, “Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic,” *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (1998): pp. 675-707.

for success in 100 percent of the relevant cases.” Morgan also points out that whereas the cost of retaliation is real, the cost of not responding is hypothetical. This burden of escalation could prevent the deterrer from carrying out retaliatory measures that it committed itself to conduct. What matters the most, thus, is the strong will to follow through on the threat and escalate the crisis, rather than the capability to inflict sufficient suffering on the challenger.⁷⁵

This general trend within Classical Rational Deterrence literature is greatly strengthened by the proliferation of deterrence studies applying game theory. The bargaining literature of deterrence suggests the *Costly Signaling* model. It also attributes deterrence failure to the non-credibility of threats.⁷⁶ This approach, however, criticizes the classical model for conflating two completely separable issues – capability and credibility –and subsequently has caused much confusion. Although the capability is the necessary condition for deterrence success, capability, and credibility are two very different concepts that need to be analyzed separately.⁷⁷

Zagare and Kilgour⁷⁸, for instance, point out that credibility is the issue of rationality: a state’s preference for executing threats over backing down. Capability, however, is related to the aspect of physical ability (1) to follow through on the threat, and (2) to inflict enough

⁷⁵ Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 19.

⁷⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*; James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994): pp.577-592; Zagare and Kilogue, *Perfect Deterrence*; Branislav L. Slantchev, *Military Threats: the Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

⁷⁷ Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Deterrence theory: Where Do We Stand?” *Review of International Studies* 37, issue 2 (2011), p. 761.

⁷⁸ Zagare and Kilogue, *Perfect Deterrence*, pp. 65-84.

tain to make the target state prefer the status quo to an armed conflict. Similarly, Slantchev argues that “a threat is credible if the actor is willing to carry it out.”⁷⁹ Based on these clarifications, they drop the capability dimension in defining the concept of threat credibility. Threats can be “credible without necessarily being capable”⁸⁰ in this regard.

This reduction of the concept of threat credibility to the degree of defenders’ resolve makes this model turn its attention to estimating and influencing the target’s intention.⁸¹ Deterrence will be successful when the defender demonstrates that it prefers conflict to retreat by “burning bridges” or “sinking costs.” Empirically, however, leaders have been quite reluctant to pursue these tactics either because (1) they limit the freedom of action⁸² or (2) they involve a cost that had to be paid regardless of the outcome.⁸³

In this context, the Costly Signaling model suggests the “tying hands” strategy as the most efficient, effective, and viable option.⁸⁴ The strategy indicates a maneuver to create costs that “would be paid *ex-post*” if the defender fails to follow through on its threats⁸⁵, or an act of increasing “the expected payoff from war relative to the expected payoff from capitulation.”⁸⁶ States can meet this requirement (1) by increasing the cost of

⁷⁹ Slantchev, *Military Threats*, p. 18.

⁸⁰ Zagare and Kilogue, *Perfect Deterrence*, p. 83.

⁸¹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 35.

⁸² Slantchev, *Military Threats*, pp. 45-46.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

⁸⁴ James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (1997): pp. 68-90; Slantchev, *Military Threats*.

⁸⁵ Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” p. 82.

⁸⁶ Slantchev, *Military Threats*, p. 47.

backing down (i.e. rendering audience costs) and subsequently decreasing the capitulation payoff, or (2) by decreasing the cost of war or increasing the probability of victory in war and thus increasing the war payoff.

The third model, *Inherent Credibility*,⁸⁷ however, expresses doubts about the relevance of tying hands strategy in deterrence success. If the interest at stake is low for the defender, any manipulative tactics, however sophisticated they may be, would not help its deterrent threat to be regarded as credible. Based on their eleven case studies of major U.S. deterrence efforts between 1948 and 1963, George and Smoke argue that “the task of achieving credibility is secondary to and dependent upon a more fundamental question regarding the nature and valuation of interests.”⁸⁸

Danilovic demonstrates statistic evidence which supports the claim that “the national interest, shaping the inherent credibility of threats, sets the limits to the impact of the other two factors on the opponent, i.e., a deterrer’s capacity to carry out its threat and manipulative strategies it uses to communicate a strong resolve.”⁸⁹ In other words, the interest at stake “shapes the opponent’s perception of the deterrer’s resolve.” There is no way to enhance the credibility of a deterrent threat if it is to protect low interest at stake, and thus inherently incredible.

⁸⁷ Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*.

⁸⁸ George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, p. 559.

⁸⁹ Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*, pp. 4-5.

The competing approach to these three models in the Rational Deterrence perspective is the Cognitive Deterrence perspective⁹⁰ which suggests the *Impaired Rationality* model.⁹¹ This model emphasizes the role of misperception or lapse of rationality. Based on evidence from laboratory experiments, Jervis identifies key cognitive defects of humans, such as overconfidence in their cognitive capability, incapability to see value trade-offs in their decision, assimilation of new information to their preexisting beliefs, and “defensive avoidance.”⁹² All of these common deficiencies in human cognition can make causal models developed by the Rational Deterrence perspective irrelevant in some cases. For example, policy-makers may intentionally dismiss all indications of an adversary’s resolve by employing denial, selection, or any other psychological techniques if “they feel compelled to act.”⁹³

Stein also highlights that people have a preference for simplicity, aversion to ambiguity, “cognitive dissonance,” fundamental defect in probabilistic thinking, the propensity to loss aversion, and are vulnerable to “endowment” and “framing” effects.⁹⁴ While Rational Deterrence theory treats them as some deviations that would not pose serious threats in formulating a general model, she argues that “these deviations are so pervasive and so

⁹⁰ Lebow, *Between Peace and War*; Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” *International Security* 7, no. 3 (1982/1983): pp. 3-30; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*; Lebow and Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory”; Lebow and Stein, “Deterrence”; Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries?”

⁹¹ James L. Richardson, *Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 16.

⁹² Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” pp. 299-301; Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” pp. 19-30.

⁹³ Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, p. 275.

⁹⁴ Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries.”

systematic that it is a mistake to consider rational models of deterrence as empirically valid.”⁹⁵ More importantly, the nature of the policy-maker also plays a role, and they are neither equally rational nor similar in their cognitive styles. Some are “hedgehogs” who like to infer from their knowledge on a specific domain to understand other areas and discount evidence that is not consistent with their theory. Others are “foxes” who are skeptical of deductive reasoning, open to alternative explanations, and averse to extending a specific knowledge to other domains.⁹⁶

These human cognitive deficiencies make an attempt to generalize decision-makers’ strategic thinking in deterrence dynamics almost futile. What matters, according to the Cognitive deterrence perspective, is to grasp “the other side’s values, beliefs, and perceptions and to understand the motivated and unmotivated biases.”⁹⁷ Besides, it is crucial to understand the process of preference formulation and reformulation during the crisis and domestic political consequences of policy choices that complicate expected utility calculation of both defender and challenger.⁹⁸ Every deterrence failure, in other words, is most likely a *sui generis* event.

Due to this methodological, possibly epistemological, cleavage between the two competing approaches in deterrence literature, formulating a comprehensive model that combines both rational and cognitive deterrence perspectives is quite difficult, if not impossible. Nonetheless, it is important to make efforts to learn from both bodies of

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 67.

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 64-65.

⁹⁷ Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein eds., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 33.

⁹⁸ Lebow and Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory,” pp. 211-218.

literature in establishing a theory of direct deterrence failure. Fortunately, both perspectives suggest a similar prediction about what happens next when direct deterrence fails. The similarity allows us to have a more sophisticated framework by synthesizing the two approaches.

The four models of deterrence success/failure proposed by rational and cognitive deterrence studies purport that a direct deterrence threat should be very credible and thus most likely to succeed. First, whatever the interest at stake is, such as territorial integrity, compliance with a treaty, or a specific action of the opponent, it should be directly related to the defender's national security in the direct deterrence situation. On the other hand, regardless of which rhetoric the challenger may turn to, it has lived without the strategic asset at stake before initiating a crisis. In this regard, the balance of interest favors the defender, and the defender would be more likely to prevail in the end.

Second, because of the significant importance of the crisis at stake, the defender should pay the enormous audience cost if it retreats from its deterrent commitment. Third, according to Prospect Theory, people will become more risk-acceptant in choices involving sure losses but risk-averse when it is related to sure gains.⁹⁹ The defender, in this regard, should be risk-acceptant when direct deterrence fails as it is anticipating or experiencing significant loss. Fourth, the "endowment effect"¹⁰⁰ and the logic of "vengeance"¹⁰¹ also

⁹⁹ Kahnemann and Tversky, "Prospect Theory."

¹⁰⁰ Stein, "Rational Deterrence against 'Irrational' Adversaries?" p. 67.

¹⁰¹ McDermott, Lopez, and Hatemi, "Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It."

predict that the defender would strongly resist challenger's attempt to deprive of what the former currently possesses.

Therefore, the defender would most likely follow through on the direct deterrence threat when it is challenged either due to its rational calculation of expected utility or irrational impetus of loss aversion or vengeance. If so, for a challenge to defy the defender's direct deterrent threat, the former should be as *resolved* and *capable* as the latter. The challenger can be so for a good reason (i.e. high interest at stake due to irredentism, high probability of victory in war, low war cost, or high audience cost) or due to its cognitive defects (i.e. framing the issue as a loss-aversion, motivated reasoning, or strong hostility). It suggests a linear prediction that when a challenger becomes extremely resolved and capable, it would choose aggressive policies even when such a policy will surely make the defender retaliate militarily, and subsequently, a war should ensue. Deterrence is bound to fail in this case as the challenger is merely seeking a *casus belli*.

1.2 Conditions for Choices: What Will the Defender Do in the Aftermath of the Failure?

As mentioned earlier, there are not many works focusing on conditions for policy choices of a defender after deterrence failure. A few notable exceptions are Huth and

Russett,¹⁰² Wu,¹⁰³ and Danilovic.¹⁰⁴ They work on extended deterrence cases and follow the linear prediction of Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories: the more credible the deterrer is, the more likely it will respond to the failure with crisis escalation and, ultimately, a war. The defender will become more resolute when a short-term balance of forces favors the defender, its expected utility of war exceeds the capitulation payoff, and if there is high interest at stake due to alliance ties and other possible arrangements in extended deterrence situations. If we apply this theory to direct deterrence cases, the defender's action in the aftermath of direct deterrence failure would most likely to be solely determined by its military capability as the interest at stake is assumed to be high.

Accordingly, the defender might not hastily jump into a route of punishing the challenger when the short-term balance of forces is disadvantageous to it. It would be quite difficult for the defender to do nothing facing the failure considering high interest at stake, yet it is possible to make an additional deterrent threat (i.e. stop defying me otherwise I will punish you more severely) and postpone the imposition of punishment to prevent further deterioration of its strategic position.

There is a conceptual ambiguity in the literature in the way in which we define the defender's move. According to the most widely accepted definition provided by Schelling, deterrence is "a threat intended to keep [the opponent] from starting something" and compellence as "a threat intended to make an adversary do something."¹⁰⁵ If so, the

¹⁰² Huth and Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation."

¹⁰³ Wu, "To Attack or Not to Attack."

¹⁰⁴ Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*.

¹⁰⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 69.

defender's follow-up threats to stop further challenge after initial deterrence failure (or general deterrence failure) is deterrence or compellence?

Some scholars identify them as “immediate deterrence”¹⁰⁶ while others define them “(defensive) compellence.”¹⁰⁷ These uses of different terms for indicating the same phenomenon is because the demand to *stop* what the target is already embarking on is an act of *reversing* the status quo. The intent of this threat is defensive while the content of it is offensive. It would be more accurate, thus, to see that followed rounds of bargaining process after deterrence failure as a mixture of deterrent and compellent strategy or a choice of a line segment on the continuum of coercive diplomacy.

In this context, the causal models provided by *Compellence* literature¹⁰⁸ are relevant in explaining the behaviors of a defender after deterrence failure. It is possible to assume that states will be more incentivized to respond to direct-general deterrence failure with follow-up compellent threats when they are expected to be successful.

Unfortunately, compared to deterrence literature, studies on compellence have not formulated a systematic theory of compellence success. The limitation in Compellence literature is because, dissimilar to deterrence; each compellent threat involves specific

¹⁰⁶ Morgan, *Deterrence*, 28; Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” pp. 26-27.

¹⁰⁷ Alexander George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), p. 5.

¹⁰⁸ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*; Gary Jr. Schaub, “Compellence: Resuscitating the Concept,” in Lawrence Freedman ed., *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 37-60; Robert J. Art and Patrick Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004); Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*.

types of demand and assurance, which makes it difficult to be generalized.¹⁰⁹ Different studies provide divergent lists of favorable conditions for compellence success. George and Simmons suggest one of the most comprehensive lists. The list includes eight conditions: (1) clarity of the object, (2) strength of motivation, (3) asymmetry of motivation (by demanding only the vital interests to protect or offering inducement), (4) sense of urgency, (5) strong leadership, (6) adequate domestic and international support, (7) unacceptability of threatened escalation, and (8) clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis.¹¹⁰

Other studies tend to emphasize the causal impact of a couple of factors among the eight rather than adding more variables to the list. For example, Schaub underscores that “relative balance of interest” (variable # 3 in the George and Simmons’ list) and “relative military capabilities,” especially “forces that can be brought to bear quickly on the geographic nexus of the dispute” (variable #7),¹¹¹ are the two most important independent variables. Art finds that “escalatory fears” (#7) and “motivational asymmetries” (#3) are the two critical ingredients for compellence success.¹¹² Sechser and Fuhrmann emphasize the impact of the compeller’s “relative military strength” (#7), asymmetry of “crisis stakes” (#3), and “balance of war cost” (#7, but more specified).¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 268.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 279-287.

¹¹¹ Schaub, “Compellence,” pp. 46-57.

¹¹² Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 372.

¹¹³ Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 30-34.

These key independent variables for compellence success are remarkably similar to those suggested by Rational Deterrence literature. The three Rational Deterrence models emphasize the importance of five variables for deterrence success: “*military capability*” that can increase the “*probability of victory*” in case of a war, “*interest at stake*,” “*war cost*,” and “*audience/reputation cost*.” Although studies on compellence do not have a consensus on the list of variables that are conducive to compellence success, most of them agree with the two most important factors: “*relative military capability*” and “*balance of interest*.” Both Rational Deterrence and Compellence literature acknowledge the importance of threat credibility for deterrence and compellence success.

Rational Deterrence and Compellence theories, thus, suggest a linear model in predicting the defender’s policy choice after the deterrence failure: the more credible the defender is, the more likely it will punish the challenger. Given that balance of interest favors the defender and subsequently, it pays higher audience costs in direct deterrence situations, the defender is likely to be more resolved than the challenger. Cognitive Deterrence perspective also suggests human psychological defects and inherent cognitive predisposition such as loss-aversion, endowment effect, and logic of vengeance that would generally make the defender very resolved when direct deterrence fails.

In this regard, all Rational and Cognitive Deterrence perspectives and Compellence literature merge in predicting the defender’s policy choice in the aftermath of direct deterrence failure. The defender will most likely not back down but will escalate the crisis through either directly attacking the challenger militarily or impose non-violent punishments while making additional threats with graver penalties to prevent its further defiance. Assuming that both the interest at stake and the audience cost are pretty high for

the defender in the direct deterrence context, the defender's degree of escalation will be decided by the two factors: (1) the *war cost* the defender should pay; and (2) the defender's *probability of victory* in war.

1.3 Policy Outcomes: What Happens Next When the Defender Chooses a Certain Policy?

Concerning the *short-term outcome* of direct deterrence failure, both Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories predict escalation of a crisis into war. Given that the defender is more likely a resolute crisis actor, the direct deterrence failure is possible only when the challenger is also a determined aggressor. Once deterrence fails, the defender is most likely to follow through on the threat. Since both sides are strong-willed to escalate the crisis, the direct deterrence failure will, in most cases, escalate to war.

In terms of *long-term outcome*, would this defender's decision to stand firm against the challenger's attempt to revise the status quo grant the former a *reputation* of strength? Although reputation has been the central element of deterrence theory since Schelling first argued the "interdependence of commitments," it is "the least developed component" of the theory¹¹⁴ due to insufficient evidence to support the claim. Both rational and cognitive deterrence perspectives, thus, suggest divergent predictions and inconclusive answers.

Schelling points out that deterrence depends on the adversary's expectation about the defender's future moves, and because of this, threats are interdependent: "we have to

¹¹⁴ Paul Huth, "Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment," *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997), p. 97.

react here because, if we did not, they would not believe us when we say that we will react there.”¹¹⁵ Threats, thus, are connected spatially and temporally: “Few parts of the world are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves, [...] but defending them or running risks to protect them may preserve one’s commitments to action in other parts of the world and at later times.”¹¹⁶ Due to its strong internal logic and clear policy implications, this theory has guided U.S. foreign policy – namely, containment strategy – throughout the Cold War and even today.¹¹⁷

The approach to assume the existence of a strong “interdependence of commitments,” however, has been criticized by numerous scholars mainly because it fails to present strong empirical evidence to support the claim besides deductive logic. They argue that reputation does not exert a consistent impact over universal cases of deterrence, and threat credibility is highly dependent on a specific context of the strategic exchanges.¹¹⁸ Reputation, thus, does not matter much and target states are not likely to infer the credibility of a deterrer’s threats from its past behavior. Huth includes works of Maxwell,¹¹⁹ George and Smoke,¹²⁰ and Jervis¹²¹ within this group, but if we use this label to indicate a stance

¹¹⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 55-56.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

¹¹⁷ Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*, pp. 16-17.

¹¹⁸ Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” p. 32.

¹¹⁹ Stephen Maxwell, “Rationality in Deterrence,” *Adelphi Papers* 50 (1968): pp. 1-19.

¹²⁰ George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*.

¹²¹ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

that criticizes Schelling's argument in general, we can add studies of Hopf,¹²² Mercer,¹²³ (1996) and Press¹²⁴ to the list.

Hopf finds that thirty-eight Soviet losses and gains against the United States in the Third World from 1965 to 1990 had not influenced much on Moscow's expectation about Washington's future moves in Europe or East Asia. Mercer argues that reputation is not a "property concept" (a dispositional feature) but a "relational concept," and shows through his three case studies that different leaders have different explanations about the same act of a state and subsequently past behaviors do not form a consistent reputation for a state's resolution or irresolution. Press examines the appeasement policy during the interwar period, the Berlin crises, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, and points out that countries assess the credibility of other states' threats by calculating the current interest at stake and the balance of power, not by inferring from their past behaviors. This Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus predicts that reputation would not have a systematic causal impact. If it is true, then a defender's past behavior of punishing its challenger even risking a war in direct deterrence situation would not help the former to restore the deterrence and prevent other challenges from occurring in the future.

Although this Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus makes a strong argument against the relevance of reputation to the credibility of future deterrent threats, some countering

¹²² Ted Hopf, *Peripheral Vision: Deterrence Theory in American Foreign Policy in the Third World: 1965-1990* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).

¹²³ Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

¹²⁴ Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

empirical findings make this debate interesting. For example, Huth and Russett¹²⁵ find that while a reputation for strong resolve indeed matters little, past irresolute behaviors do invite more provocations and have a negative and statistically significant impact on the future crises. Recent works further refute that reputation can be transferable for similar enough cases (i.e. proximity in time, same potential challenger, same region/issue-area/regime, etc.) and will exert a significant impact on its future behaviors and that of others when the interest at stake is high.¹²⁶ Therefore, it is still premature to reject the significance of reputation in deterrence dynamics from the Rational Deterrence perspective.

Cognitive deterrence theory also suggests inconclusive predictions. Schelling's theory of "interdependence of commitments" is equivalent to Jervis' term, the "domino belief" as it implies that "a defeat or retreat on one issue or one area of the world is likely to produce [...] further demands on the state by its adversaries and defections from its allies."¹²⁷ Policymakers regard retreats from their commitments as falling dominos because they establish *precedents* from which others would draw inferences.

According to the Cognitive perspective, the domino belief would most likely become strong when (1) international system is favorable for the belief (i.e. offense is more advantageous than defense, superpowers' becoming sensitive to their reputation due to

¹²⁵ Huth and Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation."

¹²⁶ Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, no. 3 (1992): pp. 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic, "Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29, no. 1 (2012): pp. 3-27; Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton, *Fighting for Credibility: US Reputation and International Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).

¹²⁷ Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior" in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 22.

mutual possession of second-strike capability, and bipolarity), (2) specific situation encourages the idea (i.e. failure to protect crucial, interconnected, or legitimate interests), and (3) decision-makers' belief in the hostile nature (i.e. insatiable expansionist) of their opponents.¹²⁸

Jervis, however, adds further complexity to this dynamic by introducing two paradoxes. First, actors will be incentivized to demonstrate to their opponents that the domino is not falling after experiencing defeats. A defeated state, such as the United States after the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion, would become “particularly unyielding” in the next confrontation, the Cuban Missile Crisis, to restore its reputation. Second, contrariwise, in case the defender pays too much cost to prevent the fall of a domino, as the U.S. did during the Vietnam War, the potential aggressor, the Soviet Union, might doubt that the former is likely to embark on a similar path in the future.¹²⁹ These paradoxes show that domino beliefs can produce both self-defeating and self-fulfilling prophecies. If these contradictory tendencies dominate the post-crisis dynamics, reputation will not bring out any systematic consequences, and everything will depend on a *sui generis* inference that each state makes.

¹²⁸ Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” pp. 33-34, 39-40; Jack Snyder, “Conclusion” in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 278-279.

¹²⁹ Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” pp. 36-39.

2. A New Model: Feasibility of Punishment and Belief Updating

Although rational and cognitive deterrence theories suggest coherent and persuasive logic and provide plausible predictions about the policy choices of defenders in the direct deterrence situation and their short-term outcomes, there are some clear limitations in their models. This section examines its weaknesses and suggests an alternative model.

2.1 *Alternative Definition of Threat Credibility: Is Direct Deterrent Threat Born to Be Credible?*

It is difficult to argue against the deterrence literature's claim that securing threat credibility is a nearly sufficient condition for deterrence success. How could a challenger decide to defy a defender's deterrent threat and escalate the crisis while believing that the defender will most likely punish its action severely and violently? Except for the case that the challenger is extremely resolved and seeking merely a *casus belli*, which should be rare in real-world politics, a credible deterrent threat would most likely buttress the stability and defend the status quo. This study, thus, agrees with the Rational Deterrence perspective that the key issue is to identify the condition when the deterrent threat would be considered credible. However, the dissertation doubts the validity of the previous models' definition of threat credibility due to the reason that follows.

As the Costly Signaling model rightly points out, the offensive capability to impose an unacceptable cost to the challenger is not necessarily related to the notion of credibility.

Rather, this is the issue of making *capable* threats: whether changing the opponent's preference order is possible. However, it is difficult to fully agree with the Signaling model's approach that equates the *strong resolve* to execute the threat with the *credibility* of the threat. It is even more difficult to agree with the Inherent Credibility model that considers *high interest at stake* as a sufficient condition for making a credible threat because it is only one element among many factors in deterrence situation that decides the level of resolve.

The limit of audience propositions is a classic example that reveals the weakness of this position. Since Fearon introduced the concept of audience cost,¹³⁰ numerous scholars have questioned the validity of the claim.¹³¹ Hypotheses based on the audience cost theory often fail to survive empirical tests.¹³² There can be many explanations for this, but one important implication is that, in most cases, credible signaling of strong resolve does not linearly bring about a higher level of credibility.

¹³⁰ Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes."

¹³¹ For the criticism on the prediction that democratic regimes pay more audience costs than authoritarian regimes, see Joe Clare, "Domestic Audiences and Strategic Interests," *Journal of Politics* 69, issue 3 (2007): 732-745; Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (2008): pp. 35-64; Jonathan N. Brown and Anthony S. Marcum, "Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy," *Security Studies* 20, no. 2 (2011): pp. 141-170. For the discussion on relevance of the audience cost variable in general, see Marc Trachtenberg, "Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis," *Security Studies* 21, issue 1 (2012): pp. 3-42; and Jack S. Levy, "Coercive Threats, Audience Costs, and Case Studies," *Security Studies* 21, issue 3 (2012): pp. 383-390.

¹³² Slantchev, *Military Threats*, pp. 54, 150; Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (2011): pp. 437-456; Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser, "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *International Organization* 66, issue 3 (2012): pp. 457-489; Graeme A. M. Davies and Robert Johns, "Audience Costs among the British Public: The Impact of Escalation, Crisis Type, and Prime Ministerial Rhetoric," *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (2013), pp. 735-736; Chungshik Moon and Mark Souva, "Audience Costs, Information, and Credible Commitment Problems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 3 (2016): pp. 403-33.

Therefore, we need a more rigorous definition of the term threat credibility. Goertz's conceptual pyramid that consists of three levels – the *basic level*, the *secondary level*, and the *indicator/data level*¹³³ – provides a useful framework that can help us to address this problem. First, the “basic level” of the concept (that is, threat credibility) has continuous variations in its degree: zero to full. By employing the “missing attributes” approach, we can formulate the “diminished subtypes” of it.¹³⁴ In other words, based on how many secondary-level attributes the concept has, missing each attribute will lead it to move a step from its positive pole (a credible threat) to the negative pole (a bluffing).

The “secondary level,” the attributes of threat credibility, is crucial in this regard. One obvious necessary condition for credibility that the literature has continuously overlook is the *feasibility of punishment*. The very first work that acknowledges this variable is Zagare and Kilgour's book. They argue that the “capability to execute a threat” is a *necessary condition* for making a credible threat.¹³⁵ In other words, if the threatener is physically constrained to *deliver* any detriment specified in the consequent part of its threat, the degree of its credibility should go down to zero. In analogy, this is similar to the situation when a robber or a cop, who suffers from a fractured index finger and, thus, is physically incapable of pulling the trigger, pointing a gun at you and screams menacingly: “Give me your wallet!” or “Freeze!” If the receiver knows this condition, then his threat would be incredible however aggressive intention and destructive power in his possession.

¹³³ Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts: a User's Guide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 6, 27-94.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 80-83; David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997), pp. 437-442.

¹³⁵ Zagare and Kilgour, *Perfect Deterrence*, p. 82.

This analogy attests that (1) the *military capability* to reach the opponent's territory and deliver the offensive power to inflict described costs, (2) the *political ability* to implement the punitive measures against its opponent overcoming domestic and international opposition, and the *normative strength* to legitimize the imposition of significant suffering to the challenger, are the threshold of making a credible threat. Surprisingly, though, Zagare and Kilgour stop here and do not examine further the causal impact of this feasibility variable as if it were an uninteresting or unimportant variable.¹³⁶ Moreover, subsequent studies in the deterrence/compellence literature have not discussed it either.¹³⁷ This project seeks to address the gap in the literature by thinking the elements of threat credibility.

Logically, challengers would deem a defender's threat credible only when the defender maintains not only the *capability* to impose punishments but also the *resolve* to implement it. The state's willingness to carry out the threat depends on two factors: cost-benefit calculation and emotional impetus.¹³⁸ The tying-hands strategy can credibly signal the defender's strong resolve to the challenger because carrying out the threat is a cost-effective business due to the low payoff of backing down (high audience cost) or high payoff of war (high interest at stake, high probability of winning the war, or low war cost). Besides,

¹³⁶ Roseanne McManus, *Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 23.

¹³⁷ McManus's work is the sole exception. She acknowledges this loophole in the literature and emphasizes the need for developing a better understanding of 'what the ability to follow through consists of and how various observable factors can influence it.' McManus defines the ability to follow through on statements of resolve as an 'absence of major obstacles and unacceptable risks.' The relevant factors include (1) military strength, (2) hawkish domestic veto players that would not stand in the leader's way to execute threats, and (3) security in office. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-42.

¹³⁸ In bargaining models, these two types of calculations should be jointly considered in the name of rationality.

strong “internal forces,” such as hostility, can make a state willing to punish the challenger even in the case that the cost of implementation is too high to be supported by rational cost-benefit analysis.¹³⁹ When the aggregate benefit outweighs the total cost or strong emotional impetus demands vengeance, the defender will have sufficient willingness to deliver the punishments.

In many cases of international crises, however, simply building a substantial level of offensive capability often imposes tremendous threats to others. The “security dilemma”¹⁴⁰ is a classic example that demonstrates this point. Offensive Realism also argues that the combination of anarchy, some offensive military capabilities of other states, and uncertainty about the intention of other states is a sufficient condition for a rational state to pursue regional hegemony for its survival.¹⁴¹ According to these perspectives, the *absence* of a state’s *willingness* to follow through on the threat would not diminish its credibility significantly as long as it is *feasible* for a defender to deliver the punishment.

In this context, the feasibility of punishment is the necessary condition for threat credibility, but arguably, a high level of resolve is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for it. The level of resolve only matters when the feasibility condition is satisfied. This identification of sufficient and necessary conditions for the term leads to the continuum of threat credibility that consists of three types: credible, semi-credible, and

¹³⁹ H. H. Kelley, *Attribution in Social Interaction* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1971); Robert B. Mogy and Dean G. Pruitt, “Effects of a Threatener’s Enforcement Costs on Threat Credibility and Compliance,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 29, no.2 (1974): pp. 173-180; McDermott, Lopez, and Hatemi, “Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It.”

¹⁴⁰ Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no.2 (1978): pp. 167-214.

¹⁴¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

non-credible threats. Having both feasibility and resolve leads to the *full credibility* of the threat. Missing resolve would make a threat *semi-credible*. Missing feasibility, however, makes a threat *non-credible*.


Lastly, the “indicator level” includes the following elements for each attribute. First, regarding the indicators for the *feasibility of punishment* variable, it is possible to start with McManus’ model: military strength, hawkish domestic veto players, and security in office. Her model, however, presents some limitations. First, since she tests her model only against a single crisis actor, the United States, the observable factors used in her research (especially factors such as “hawkish veto players” and “security in office”) are not designed for analyzing cases of authoritarian regimes. We need more relaxed indicators for measuring the threatener’s political feasibility to punish given that there are various types of political regimes besides representative democracy like the U.S. Second, her way of using the military capability variable is not specified enough to be tested against other deterrence/compellence models. Military strength could have an impact on (1) ability to inflict an enormous cost on the challenger, (2) probability of victory in war, and (3) war cost. Notably, the last two are important independent variables in the Costly Signaling deterrence model for calculating rationality of punishing the adversary. To establish a new model that can compete with other models suggested in the literature, we need to define military feasibility more precisely.

In this context, this dissertation argues that the defender can secure the *feasibility* of implementing punishments when it meets two conditions: (1) *power projection capabilities* to overcome geographic obstacles (i.e. oceans, large rivers, and mountains) that exist between the defender and its potential challengers, and the challenger’s defensive capability that could neutralize the defender’s punitive offense; and (2) absence of *strong domestic/international*

political oppositions (i.e. dovish veto players, low approval rating, severe and chronic anti-government demonstrations, or unsupportive alliance partners) and *normative obstructive environment* (i.e. policies violating international law or against the decision of the United Nations, non-use principle of weapons of mass destruction) that could impede or delay the policy execution.

Second, the defender attains a high level of *resolve* in either situation. First, the cost-benefit analysis supports carrying out the threat (i.e., the *interest at stake* is high; the *probability of victory* in case of a war is high; the *war cost* is low, or the *audience/reputational cost* for backing down is high). Second, the level of antagonism between the threatener and its adversary is exceedingly high (i.e., the existence of serious *war/conflict history* or *cultural/ethnic hostility*) and it defeats or distorts the standard cost-benefit analysis by making it feel so good to retaliate against the opponent however devastating cost it accompanies. Figure 1 summarizes the discussion thus far.

Figure 1: The Three-Level Diagram for the Concept of Credible Threat



What is the theoretical implication of this new definition of threat credibility? It highlights that the challenger would consider even the most resolved defender's threat non-credible if it is physically infeasible to implement the punishment due to lack of power projection capability or strong political/normative oppositions. In other words, high resolve does never compensate for relatively low feasibility. Even though it is true and common knowledge that a defender is *resolved* to follow through on its direct deterrent threat if the deterrence fails, this should not always make the threat credible as Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories predict. If its potential challenger believes that the defender fails to secure feasibility to implement the punishment, direct deterrence threat can be regarded as non-credible and fail even when the challenger is not a determined aggressor but a mere opportunist.

2.2 When a Linear Prediction Fails: the Belief Updating Model and the Paradoxical Logic of Action-and-Reaction

As explained in the previous section, four models in the deterrence literature suggest a linear prediction: the more credible the deterrer is, the more likely it will respond to the failure with crisis escalation.

The “selection effect”¹⁴² makes this simple reasoning problematic. It signifies that rational actors “select themselves into crises”¹⁴³ according to their prior beliefs about their opponents. If a challenger challenged the status quo even though it had acknowledged that the defender’s general deterrent threat was credible, this implies that the challenger should be strongly motivated to risk armed conflict for the interest at stake. Subsequently, the follow-up deterrent threat (or immediate deterrence) to prevent further aggravation of crisis is likely to fail again. Subsequently, “hypotheses that are valid for general deterrence” appear “exactly reversed if we look at cases of immediate deterrence.”¹⁴⁴ A similar point is also made by Luttwak, who suggests the notion of “paradoxical logic of strategy” that underscores the action-reaction problem in the strategic calculation that fails linear prediction.¹⁴⁵ An attempt to use the same independent variables of general deterrence theory to predict the outcome of the immediate deterrent threat, assuming that the same

¹⁴² Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence”; Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve.”

¹⁴³ Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” p. 6.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁴⁵ Luttwak, *Strategy*, p. 18.

causal relationship should continue in an immediate deterrence situation, is wrong in this regard.

What is, then, the implication of this “selection effect” and “paradoxical logic” of action and reaction for the defender’s policy choice after direct deterrence failure? It seems self-evident that a credible (or capable and resolved) defender should escalate the crisis when the challenger defies its credible deterrent threat. The defender, however, may be refrained from doing so as the challenger’s action to defy the credible deterrent threat increases the probability that the challenger is a determined aggressor that is ready to fight a war for the strategic interest at stake. This Bayesian inference or *belief updating* by the defender should greatly affect its decision-making process and might even cause it to change its type from a resolved defender to an irresolute one. This belief updating model rejects linear prediction of the Rational Deterrence perspective and predicts that direct deterrence failure is most likely to encourage the defender to be more cautious and less bellicose.

Nonetheless, Cognitive Deterrence literature makes a counter-argument to this prediction. If the defender *understands* the mechanism of the selection effect or the action-reaction problem, then the “paradoxical logic” twists the linear strategic thinking as explained earlier. That is, the credible defender does not hastily jump to escalate the crisis due to its updated belief that the challenger might be an extremely resolved type given that the latter challenged the former’s credible threat. Unfortunately, inherent limitations in human cognition impede people to do well in this probability calculation.¹⁴⁶ Also, everyone

¹⁴⁶ Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries?” p. 65.

treats new information differently, and the direction and degree of updating depend on the strength of his/her initial belief.¹⁴⁷ It is highly likely that the defender is *not aware* of this action-reaction mechanism or *strongly influence by its initial belief*, and makes choices based on a simple calculation of comparing their level of resolve and capability with those of their opponents without updating their belief about their opponents' type based on their previous actions.

In this context, for some policymakers who update their belief based on the challenger's action in the previous stage of the crisis, they would update their type accordingly. However, the linear causal models would still explain and predict correctly the policy choice of others who do not understand this action-reaction mechanism. It is, thus, still premature to reject that those independent variables developed by four models in the deterrence literature will be irrelevant in determining the behaviors of the defender after the deterrence failure due to the selection effect. This issue requires further studies of the empirics.

2.3 Feasibility of Punishment, Belief Updating, and Policy Outcomes

Unlike Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories, the *feasibility of punishment* model raises the possibility that direct deterrence can fail even when the challenger is not an extremely resolute aggressor. An opportunistic challenger can defy a resolved defender's direct deterrent threat when the latter is believed to lack feasibility to implement

¹⁴⁷ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1976] 2017), pp. xlvii-lii.

the punishment. If the defender indeed fails to secure this feasibility, it would have to back down even if it is strong-willed to punish the challenger. Also, the *belief updating* model predicts that the defender is more likely not to punish the challenger violently due to its Bayesian inference that the challenger is most likely a determined challenger given that it defies the defender's credible deterrent threat. Concerning the short-term outcome of direct deterrence failure, both the feasibility and belief-updating models predict that the failure will not be likely to escalate into an armed conflict between the defender and the challenger.

Concerning the long-term outcome of the failure, however, the two models suggest divergent predictions. As mentioned earlier, the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus asserts that challengers would not draw inference from the previous actions of the defender. The *feasibility model* concurs with this position and predicts that challengers would continue to examine how feasible it is for the defender to implement punishment rather than extrapolate the latter's move based on its moves in history.

Notwithstanding, it is critical to consider that most direct deterrence cases involve enduring rivalries.¹⁴⁸ Under this condition of sustained tension and conflict will make direct deterrence failures "similar enough cases"¹⁴⁹ and shape a strategic environment where domino belief dominates because of crucial and interconnected interests at stake and the mutual antipathy between the defender and the challenger.¹⁵⁰ In this case, the

¹⁴⁸ Huth and Russett, "General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals."

¹⁴⁹ Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi, "System Uncertainty"; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Harvey and Mitton, *Fighting for Credibility*.

¹⁵⁰ Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," pp. 33-34, 39-40; Snyder, "Conclusion," pp. 278-279.

defender's policy choice of non-action or backing down will establish a negative precedent and invite more provocations in the future.

The *belief updating* model supports this direction of reasoning. If direct deterrence cases involve the same players, one player's strategic move in the previous information set is a signal to its opponent, and the latter should update its belief about the former. Therefore, the defender's policy choice of de-escalation is most likely to cause deterrence collapse because the action leads the challenger to update its belief about the defender's type.

3. Impact of Introducing Nuclear Weapons

Due to their destructive power, students of IR have considered nuclear weapons as unconventional weapons that have an idiosyncratic logic about their potential and actual use, which is very different from that of conventional weapons. What happens if the defender or the challenger possesses nuclear weapons in direct deterrence situation? What are the implications of it for the success/failure of the direct deterrent threat, policy choices in the aftermath of the failure, and the short- and long-term ramifications of each choice? This section examines competing views in the nuclear deterrence literature – *Revolutionist* vs. *Pessimist*, and discusses why the feasibility of punishment model supports the Pessimist perspective.

3.1 Nuclear Weapons in Deterrence: Revolutionist vs. Pessimist Perspectives

Since the invention and the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945, there have been two competing views in the literature in regards to their implications. One is the *Revolutionist* perspective,¹⁵¹ a dominant approach in the literature, which argues nuclear weapons changed the world once and for all. The other is *Pessimists* who believe that these weapons either only reinforce traditional elements in strategy¹⁵² or are infeasible or redundant forces that would not affect much the outcome of coercive diplomacy.¹⁵³ The key difference between the two perspectives comes from a disagreement over (1) what nuclear weapons can do (more specifically, whether nuclear war can be won); and (2) whether a nuclear threat can be credible (or whether states use nuclear weapons in confrontation).

Concerning the first disagreement, the *Revolutionist* perspective argues that due to their unprecedented capability to inflict harm upon the adversary quickly and dreadfully,¹⁵⁴ nuclear weapons have made military victory no longer possible. As long as the defender

¹⁵¹ Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon*; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*; Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*; Powell, *Nuclear Deterrence Theory*; Waltz, "More May Be Better."

¹⁵² William L. Borden, *There Will Be No Time* (New York: Macmillan, 1946); Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 34, no. 2 (1956): pp. 187-188; Colin Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham: Hamilton Press, 1986).

¹⁵³ Paul, "Self-deterrence"; Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*.

¹⁵⁴ They can effectively destroy "social and industrial heart of the enemy, so producing internal collapse and obviating the need for a traditional battlefield victory." Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 3. A small nuclear warhead (20-kiloton) is estimated to have 10,000 times more destructive power than a 1-ton conventional explosive. The damage would be increased by ten times if it is dropped in densely populated cities. Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should be Done?" *International Security* 16, no. 1 (1991): pp. 5-41.

and the challenger maintain “second-strike capability,”¹⁵⁵ any military offense could escalate to exchange of nuclear bombs between the conflicting dyad, which should bring about mutual annihilation and a nuclear holocaust. Defense becomes irrelevant because there is not much hope that technological development would make deterrence by denial ever possible in nuclear age¹⁵⁶ and penetration of only a small quantity of nuclear weapons should bring sufficient devastation to the society.¹⁵⁷

Under this condition, both military balance (including the nuclear balance) and prospect for the successful military campaign become meaningless. What matters is not *nuclear superiority*, but *nuclear danger* since having more nuclear weapons or options will not help to terminate a war.¹⁵⁸ Subsequently, strategic thinking of policymakers in the nuclear era will no longer suffer from miscalculation and an illusion of victory which often led states to engage in an unnecessary war.¹⁵⁹ As if looking into a “crystal ball,”¹⁶⁰ the

¹⁵⁵ Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 2 (1959): pp. 211-234.

¹⁵⁶ Charles L. Glaser, *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 104-105. For example, it is important to note the success rate of missile defense test because ballistic missiles are the most common delivery system for deploying nuclear weapons. The most recent report on missile defense technology shows that about eighty-two percent of hit-to-kill intercepting attempts succeed. Missile Defense Agency, “Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record,” Fact Sheet (April 2019). <https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/testrecord.pdf>. This means that out of ten missiles launched by its opponent, two will manage to penetrate the missile defense system and hit the targeted cities.

¹⁵⁷ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 36.

¹⁵⁸ Jervis argues that Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁵⁹ Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1988).

¹⁶⁰ Albert Carnesale et al., *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Bantam Books, 1983), p. 44; Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, pp. 7-8; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Waltz Responds to Sagan,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewed* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003b), pp. 114-115.

outcome of nuclear confrontation is easy to be foreseen. This unmistakable prospect of mutual vulnerability is the crux of the nuclear revolution. Both challengers and defenders should be extremely vigilant and prudent as if treading on eggs. Subsequently, nuclear weapons will bring about peace, the preservation of the status quo, and the infrequency of crises.¹⁶¹

Some early *Pessimists* disagree and contend that nuclear war can be won even under the mutual possession of second-strike capability or Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). They believe that states would most likely be restrained from using weapons against adversary's cities¹⁶² and one side should be able to end up ahead even in nuclear confrontation if there is a sufficient margin of nuclear capability.¹⁶³ Considering the destructive power of hydrogen bombs and calamitous political repercussions of absorbing an initial nuclear attack, however, it is quite difficult to agree with this view.¹⁶⁴ This absurdity in continuing the nuclear fight after absorbing the adversary's first nuclear strike is why the revolutionist perspective is the dominant stance in the deterrence literature, and this dissertation study also sides with the revolutionists on the first issue. Nuclear war cannot be winnable, and this fact has brought a revolutionary change in the way of strategic thinking.

Surprisingly, however, the prediction of the revolutionist school that nuclear weapons contribute peace and stability, more specifically, deterrence success, often fails

¹⁶¹ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, pp. 23-38.

¹⁶² Border, *There Will Be No Time*.

¹⁶³ Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy."

¹⁶⁴ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, pp. 18-19.

to survive empirical testing.¹⁶⁵ For example, George and Smoke show that U.S. general deterrent threats have repeatedly failed regardless of its nuclear capability.¹⁶⁶ Huth and Russett reveal that the causal impact of the nuclear weapons capability variable is not statistically significant in determining outcomes of extended deterrence.¹⁶⁷ They confirm this finding again in their later study on extended-immediate deterrence cases.¹⁶⁸ Betts's study on East-West crises also finds that nuclear weapons have not demonstrated a uniform impact on the outcome of blackmail strategy for deterring the Soviet or Chinese military actions.¹⁶⁹ Geller finds that nuclear weapons do not discourage crisis escalation.¹⁷⁰ These empirical findings are at odds with the convincing argument of the revolutionist approach.

A part of the reason for this anomaly is possibly the inherent difficulties in achieving success in extended deterrence situations. As this type of deterrence aims to protect the defender's allies, not its territory, challengers might always tend to discount the credibility of an extended deterrent threat. However, cases of direct deterrence failure even when the defender possesses the strong nuclear capability, namely the 1969 Sino-USSR Border Dispute, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Falklands War, refute this argument.

¹⁶⁵ Harvey provides excellent summary of these empirical findings. Harvey, *The Future's Back*, pp. 22-32.

¹⁶⁶ George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*.

¹⁶⁷ Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"

¹⁶⁸ Huth and Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation."

¹⁶⁹ Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987).

¹⁷⁰ Daniel S. Geller, "Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 2 (1990): pp. 291-310.

A more fundamental reason behind this dissonance between theory and empirical trends is related to the second issue mentioned earlier: can nuclear deterrent threats be credible? If the defender was facing an imminent nuclear attack against its major cities, then it could make a credible deterrent threat that involves massive nuclear retaliation. But what about all the other less significant issues, such as a security of small island remote from the defender's main territory, compliance with a security regime, or continuation of a certain security policy? For similar reasons, security experts harshly criticized the doctrine of Massive Retaliation when the U.S. government adopted it in the 1950s. As the punishment is far too great for the peripheral nature of the provocation in most cases, the threat is hardly credible, so it should be ineffective.

The Costly Signaling model contends even further that nuclear retaliation is rarely if ever rational in all circumstances, not only when interest at stake is marginal but even when it is for protecting the vital interest of the defender such as its national survival. This intrinsic irrationality of the second strike is especially true under MAD as the retaliatory attack would surely lead to mutual annihilation.¹⁷¹ Jervis points out the absurdity of nuclear retaliation after absorbing nuclear attack using Eisenhower's words: "the only thing worse than losing a global war was winning one."¹⁷² Then, how could a nuclear deterrent threat be credible when following through on the threat would inevitably bring about its destruction? As McDermott et al. rightly argue, the nuclear threat can be credible only

¹⁷¹ Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, pp. 46-48; Frank C. Zagare, "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-Examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 16, no. 2 (2004): pp. 107-141.

¹⁷² Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, p. 4.

when it “rests on a biological and psychological foundation of revenge, which feels so good that it overrides the cost-benefit analysis.”¹⁷³

The Revolutionist scholars suggest a couple of ways to solve this credibility problem of nuclear deterrence under MAD by (1) incurring “autonomous risk” through “threats that leave something to chance”¹⁷⁴ or (2) employing “limited retaliation” that keeps the adversary “left with something more to lose.”¹⁷⁵ Historically, the United States and the Soviet Union tried to meet this credibility challenge by (1) establishing a reputation of resolve through actively defending insignificant interests (i.e. Vietnam and Afghanistan); (2) increasing risk of autonomous escalation (i.e. nuclear alerts and delegation of the authority to launch nuclear attack to local commanders); (3) building unnecessary weapons to demonstrate nuclear superiority; and (4) increasing defense expenditure.¹⁷⁶

The empirical data mentioned above, however, was collected while Washington and Moscow actively pursued all these efforts. In other words, whether the actors in crises possess nuclear weapons did not matter much in deciding the deterrence outcome in spite of all those efforts and significant investment to make the deterrence work. This irrelevance of nuclear weapons in deterrence outcomes despite the extraordinary measures should be profoundly puzzling trends for revolutionists. How could we explain these trends in the empirical data that shows limited impact of nuclear weapons on deterrence success or

¹⁷³ McDermott, Lopez, and Hatemi, “Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It,” p. 73.

¹⁷⁴ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

¹⁷⁵ Powell, *Nuclear Deterrence Theory*, p. 17.

¹⁷⁶ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, pp. 193-202.

maintenance of the status quo even though they certainly simplified the strategic calculation of crisis actors thanks to their “crystal ball effect”?

3.2 Nuclear Pessimists and the Feasibility of Punishment Model

More qualified Pessimist arguments provide interesting theories that help us to answer this question. First is Snyder’s famous paradox of “strategic stability-tactical instability.”¹⁷⁷ As fighting at high-level violence involving nuclear exchange is almost impossible under MAD, turning to lower levels of assault could become safer and more feasible. MAD could encourage risk-taking behaviors and initiation of crises because “each side’s nuclear weapons cancel out the influence of the other’s.”¹⁷⁸

According to Jervis, although the logic itself is “impeccable,” this idea is “flawed” and “unrealistic.”¹⁷⁹ He emphasizes that escalation can occur even when “no one wants it to” and “people have been killed playing Chicken.” In this world of uncertainty, thus, a slim possibility of nuclear war, even if it is considered extremely unlikely, should be sufficient to constrain any opportunistic actors.

One obvious counterargument to this, however, is that some risk-acceptant policy-makers might decide to play this high-risk game betting on the retreat of their opponents. In a strategic situation, a successful “course of action cannot persist indefinitely”¹⁸⁰ and

¹⁷⁷ Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” pp. 184-201.

¹⁷⁸ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, p. 20.

¹⁷⁹ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁸⁰ Luttwak, *Strategy*, p. 18.

deterrence would cease to work if it “were really stable.”¹⁸¹ Why should leaders like Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, or Kim Jong-il be worried about nuclear holocaust when it seems almost certain that their democratic opponents lack any gut to go the full distance and their adamant provocations would surely consolidate domestic support for their regimes? Paradoxically, enormous strategic stability established by the nuclear revolution might incentivize these audacious leaders to revise the status quo at the tactical level without crossing the nuclear threshold.

Second, the logic of “preventive war” could make nuclear dynamics unstable in non-MAD situation and balance of conventional forces, rather than that of nuclear weapons, would become much more significant during this time of instability. Superior nuclear power possibly seeks to destroy the nascent nuclear arsenal of an emerging power, especially when the former misperceive that the latter’s nuclear attack is imminent and unavoidable.¹⁸² As this preventive attack would most likely involve conventional weapons capable of surgical strikes, conventional forces explain crisis outcomes better than nuclear capability.¹⁸³ This argument parallels with Sechser and Fuhrmann’s point that nuclear weapons are redundant in many cases.¹⁸⁴ Most nuclear powers secure sufficient

¹⁸¹ Boulding, “Confession of Roots,” p. 32.

¹⁸² Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewed* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003).

¹⁸³ Lyle J. Goldstein, *Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

¹⁸⁴ They focus on limited efficacy of nuclear weapons in coercion due to their unnecessary destructiveness for serving the specific purpose of compellence (i.e. transfer of sovereignty of certain territory). Although the scope of their research is not deterrence but compellence, their point can be applied to some direct and extended deterrence cases where the challenger’s defiance against the defender involves less aggressive actions such as violation of a clause in a security regime rather than massive invasion. Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 47-48.

conventional forces that could serve much more controlled and sophisticated purposes than nuclear bombs.

Third, nuclear powers would be “self-deterred” because of enormous economic, political, normative costs involving the use of the horrible bombs.¹⁸⁵ Due to their unprecedented capability to wipe out non-combatants instantly and disproportionately,¹⁸⁶ the use of nuclear weapons easily violates all kinds of international norms, namely Just War principles, the UN Charter, and Nuremberg principles.¹⁸⁷ This gruesome nature of the weapons led the international community to stigmatize their use as a taboo.¹⁸⁸ Subsequently, using the weapons could lead to political isolation, loss in foreign investment, domestic backlash, a coalition of balancing force, and even nuclear attacks by others.¹⁸⁹ The reputational concerns created by “tradition of non-use,” “morality of nuclear weapons use,” and “legal concepts” refrain nuclear powers from turning to the weapons for the sake of restoring deterrence.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁵ Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb”; Paul, “Self-deterrence”; Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*.

¹⁸⁶ A famous quote from Truman reveals this point very clearly: “I don’t think we ought to use this thing unless we absolutely have to. It is a terrible thing to order the use of something [...] that is so terribly destructive, destructive beyond anything we have ever had. You have got to understand that it isn’t a military weapon [...] It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. So we have to treat this differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that.” Paul, “Self-deterrence,” p. 30.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-39.

¹⁸⁸ Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” pp. 14-32.

¹⁸⁹ Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 48-50.

¹⁹⁰ Paul, “Self-deterrence,” pp. 28-29.

These explanations provided by the Pessimist camp, especially the logic of self-deterrence, are supported by the feasibility model that this project suggests. The model predicts that challengers might consider not only the *most resolute* deterrent threat (i.e., direct deterrent threat) but also the threat supported by the *most dreadful offensive power* (i.e. nuclear weapons) *non-credible* if it is *infeasible* to *deliver* this tremendous and authentic punishment upon the challenger. Nuclear deterrent threats, thus, should be backed by the defender's military, political, and normative capability to follow through.

First, although Revolutionists do not pay much attention to the level of nuclear capability or the type of nuclear balance in the conflicting dyad, whether the deterrer secures and maintains a reliable nuclear strike capability is essential for the credibility of the nuclear threat. Possessing nuclear bombs does not mean anything if the defender lacks power projection capability that penetrates the challenger's defense and delivers the asseverated harms. This military feasibility of nuclear punishment is the first precondition that the defender should meet to make a credible nuclear threat.

Second, Snyder's stability-instability paradox, the preventive war logic, and the proposition of self-deterrence are closely related to the idea of political/normative feasibility of nuclear punishment. The stability-instability paradox indicates that the overly destructive power of nuclear weapons is not appropriate for punishing minor challenges attempted below the threshold of national survival. The preventive war logic also demonstrates the unfitness of nuclear weapons for serving the purpose of a surgical strike on nascent nuclear facilities of the challenger. The self-deterrence proposition makes an even more striking argument that nuclear weapons are nearly unusable in any circumstances considering the daunting political, economic, and normative costs the actual

use of them incurs. As taboo is extremely strong normative hurdle, use of nuclear weapons would be hardly justified except for retaliation against adversary's nuclear strike.

These explanations turn to the point that nuclear weapons are inappropriate for serving as a tool for the specific degree of punishment that the defender pursues. You cannot give the death sentence for theft. It is difficult to find the appropriate level of defiance that deserves nuclear punishment. Even if it is militarily feasible to sanction the challenger with nuclear weapons, its inherent nature of overkill makes them politically and normatively not a very feasible tool for punishment in this regard. Therefore, the backbone of deterrence success is more feasible capabilities like conventional weapons, not nuclear bombs.¹⁹¹

Table 2 summarizes the theoretical implications of competing perspectives on direct deterrence failure discussed so far.

¹⁹¹ This point is emphasized by the early classical realists in IR such as Raymond Aron (1967, 202) and Hans Morgenthau ([1948] 2005, pp. 31-32).

Table 2: Competing Theories of Direct Deterrence Failure

Previous Theories		
Issue	Theory	Implications
Cause of Direct Deterrence Failure	Rational Deterrence	#1. A direct deterrent threat is inherently credible due to high interest at stake and high audience cost of backing down which should make the defender resolve to follow through on the threat if it is challenged. #2. The direct deterrence failure is possible only when the challenger is as much resolved as the defender.
	Cognitive Deterrence	#1. A direct deterrent threat is most likely credible due to endowment effect, human propensity to loss aversion, and emotional impetus of vengeance which should make the defender resolve to follow through on the threat if it is challenged. #2. The direct deterrence failure is possible when the challenger is determined to revise the status quo (due to framing the issue following the logic of loss aversion or motivated reasoning).
Policy Choices of the Defender	Rational Deterrence	#1. The defender is resolved in direct deterrence situation, so it will not likely to de-escalate the crisis. #2. The degree of escalation depends on war cost and probability of victory.
	Cognitive Deterrence	The defender is resolved in direct deterrence situation, so it will not likely to de-escalate the crisis.
Short-term Outcome	Rational Deterrence	As both the defender and the challenger are resolved, crisis escalation will most likely lead to war.
	Cognitive Deterrence	As both the defender and the challenger are resolved, crisis escalation will most likely lead to war.
Long-term Outcome	Rational Deterrence	#1. In general, the past behavior of the defender (or reputation) will not have a systematic impact on its future credibility. #2. Reputation might matter for similar enough cases or when the interest at stake is high.
	Cognitive Deterrence	#1. Domino beliefs can produce both self-defeating and self-fulfilling prophecies (not systematic impact). #2. Domino belief would become strong when the offense has an advantage over the defense, under MAD, if interest at stake is high, or with the existence of hostile perception about the opponent.
Possession of nuclear weapons	Revolutionist	Nuclear weapons buttress direct deterrence stability (make deterrence failure and/or crisis escalation not likely).
	Pessimist	Nuclear weapons would not matter much due to the inherent incredibility of nuclear punishment.
New Theories		
Issue	Theory	Implications
Cause of Direct Deterrence Failure	Feasibility of Punishment	Even the most resolved deterrent threat can be considered as non-credible and fail if it is infeasible for the defender to implement punishments.
Policy Choices of the Defender	Belief Updating	Given that the challenger defied the defender's credible deterrent threat, the defender would update its image about the challenger as a determined aggressor and be refrained from escalating the crisis.
Short-term Outcome	Feasibility of Punishment	As the defender more likely choose less aggressive policies due to its updated belief about the challenger, direct deterrence failure would most likely not lead to war.
Long-term Outcome	Belief Updating	The Defender's de-escalation after deterrence failure will make the challenger update its belief about the defender and invite more provocations in the future.
Possession of nuclear weapons	Feasibility of Punishment	Nuclear punishment involves enormous economic, political, normative cost, and thus it is not feasible. Subsequently, a nuclear deterrent threat is not credible and will fail.

4. Research Hypotheses and Predictions

Based on the theoretical discussion thus far as to Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theories, nuclear Revolutionist/Pessimist, and the two new models – feasibility of punishment and belief updating – we can formulate following rival and research hypotheses that can be tested against the empirics. They suggest tentative answers for the four research questions: Why does the challenger defy the defender's direct deterrent threat? Under what conditions does the defender choose a certain policy option? What are the ramifications of

each policy choice? What kind of impact does the possession of nuclear weapons have on the outcome of direct deterrence? Answers for these questions help us to formulate desirable policies for the defender when it faces direct deterrence failure.

4.1 Direct Deterrence Failure: Policy Choice of the Challenger

As pointed out in Chapter 1, deterrence is a study of non-events, and it is almost impossible to identify the population of deterrence success. The absence of a challenge against a defender's deterrent threat can be caused by factors that have nothing to do with the credibility of the threat. Once we select only the cases of deterrence failure to overcome this "false positive" problem,¹⁹² then we face another challenge: the dependent variable does not vary.

One way to solve this problem is by switching the non-varying dependent variable (defender's direct deterrence failure) to *challenger's policy choices* in defying the deterrent threat. This reformulation will allow the success/failure binary variable to transform into an ordinal variable that has different degrees of failure. The challenger's choice over three ideal types of crisis escalation defines the degree of deterrence failure: *rapid escalation* (violent use of military force), *hedging* (non-violent use of military force possibly along with political measures to moderate the aggressiveness), and *gradual escalation* (use of non-violent measures). As values of the dependent variable vary with this reformulation,

¹⁹² Huth and Russett, "General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals," p. 62.

empirical testing of causal models becomes possible without expanding the research scope to include deterrence success cases.

Even though they suggest divergent causal paths, all four models provided by Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories predict that the defender is determined to follow through on the threat in direct deterrence situation. The challenger's choice of crisis escalation against this credible threat, thus, should be caused by its high level of resolve: the challenger is as much resolute as the defender to take hold of what is at stake over the crisis. Due to high *interest at stake*, high *probability of victory*, low *war cost*, and high *audience cost*, the challenger is determined to revise the status quo. Deterrence is bound to fail in this case. The challenger is merely seeking a *casus belli*. This linear prediction is the rival hypothesis provided by the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature that this study tries to refute.

Rival Hypothesis 1: If the challenger is more *resolved* to revise the status quo, it will choose the more aggressive policies.

Granted, this possibility for the challenger's high level of resolve can be a cause of deterrence failure. This dissertation, however, doubts the validity in the assumption of an extremely resolute challenger. War is a costly business, and it would be truly difficult to seek a revision of the status quo voluntarily risking formidable destruction unless the leadership of the challenger thirsts for blood. War can never be Pareto-efficient.¹⁹³ A more likely

¹⁹³ James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): pp. 379-414.

scenario is that the challenger is an *opportunist* who has no intention to initiate a war over the interest at stake but decides to defy the deterrer's threat due to its *non-credibility*.¹⁹⁴

This point does not imply that the causal models suggested by Rational and Cognitive deterrence theories are wrong. The dissertation agrees with the literature that the defender should be highly resolute in the direct deterrence situation. As the *feasibility of punishment* model predicts, however, this dissertation argues that the defender's deterrent threat can be regarded non-credible even if the defender is authentically determined. The punishment against defiance would seem non-credible when it is physically infeasible for the defender to follow through on the threat due to limitations in its power projection capability (*military feasibility*) or strong political/normative opposition (*political feasibility*) to the implementation of the punishment. As this feasibility is a necessary condition for making a credible threat, it will most likely be used as an "information shortcut"¹⁹⁵ by both the challenger and the defender to estimate their opponents' true types. The Independent Variable, therefore, is the defender's *feasibility* of threat implementation, and the Dependent Variable is the challenger's policy choice.

¹⁹⁴ Logically, it is also possible that the challenger might defy the defender's credible deterrent threat as the action will make the defender update its belief about the challenger's type and possibly decide to retreat fearing that any escalatory reaction might lead to a war. The "paradoxical logic of strategy" suggests this possibility for the challenger's policy choice of bluffing to induce capitulation of the defender. This expectation, however, is based on a hypothetical condition – the defender would update its belief about the challenger based on the latter's previous behaviors. Therefore, it is simply too risky to be implemented by a serious politicians in reality. Therefore, this research does not include this possibility in formulating hypotheses.


¹⁹⁵ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, p. xxii.

Research Hypothesis 1: If it is more *infeasible* for the defender to implement punishment, the challenger will choose the more aggressive policies.

4.2 Policy Choice of the Defender after Direct Deterrence Failure

The previous chapter points out conceptual ambiguity in analyzing the policy choice of the defender after deterrence failure. This dissertation, thus, regards deterrence as a specific type of threat strategy and defines the threat strategy as a *continuum* centered on different types of demands that the deterrer or compeller articulates concerning the status quo (Figure 2). First, the most aggressive type of threat is “offensive compellence.” It seeks the immediate revision of the status quo and demands the opponent to act when it may be reluctant to do so. Second, a lesser form of assertive threat is “defensive compellence.” It attempts to restore the status quo before the challenge and demands the adversary to “undo” the changes that it has made. The third is “offensive deterrence” that makes an assertive threat for managing the crisis by preventing further escalations. This threat demands the opponent to “stop” at once the progress of its aggressive action. Lastly, the most defensive strategy, “defensive deterrence,” pursues stability and demands from potential challengers to avoid attempts to change the status quo.

Figure 2: Four Types of Threat



Two clarifications about these four types of threats are in order. First, the threat is not the actual implementation of force but the potential use of it. The difference between the two is that, while the former aims to achieve the policy goal forcefully, the latter makes an effort to induce its opponent. For example, defense aims to *resist* and subsequently to frustrate the enemy's attempt to obtain its goals. Deterrence, however, pursues to *dissuade* the adversary from proceeding in its course of action by signaling to the potential challenger that such action would (1) certainly fail due to superior defense capability of the deterrer; or (2) bring great suffering to the challenger as the deterrer will punish its action enormously.

Second, there are equivalent terms in the literature that imply four types of threats: (1) “blackmail strategy,”¹⁹⁶ (2) “coercive diplomacy,”¹⁹⁷ (3) “immediate deterrence,”¹⁹⁸ and (4) “general deterrence.”¹⁹⁹ The earlier discussion in this chapter uses these terms. However, from this point on the new names for the four types of threats will be used not only for the sake of greater conceptual clarity and coherence but also to demonstrate more lucidly the continuous nature of these threats.

In the previous discussion, the degree of the challenger’s aggressiveness defines its ideal types of policy choices. Similarly, defender’s countermeasures can also be categorized into four types based on the level of punishment and the direction²⁰⁰ of strategic movement: *rapid escalation* (violent use of military force to respond to the failure), *hedging* (non-violent use of military force possibly combined with political measures), *gradual escalation* (use of non-violent measures), and *de-escalation* (non-action by surrendering what it possesses).

Rational and Cognitive deterrence as well as the Compellence literature, suggest a linear model in predicting the defender’s policy choice after deterrence failure: the more credible the defender is, the more likely it will punish the challenger heavily. The literature

¹⁹⁶ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 7.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁹⁸ Morgan, *Deterrence*, p. 28.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²⁰⁰ As Snyder and Diesing point out, the international crisis is an “intermediate zone between peace and war.” Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 10. Thus, in crises, all strategies of states should be related to either increasing the odds of war or decreasing them.

assumes defender's high level of resolve because: (1) balance of interest favors the defender, (2) the defender should pay higher audience cost, (3) the tendency of loss aversion and the endowment effect will make the defender become a risk-acceptant type, and (4) the logic of revenge would dominate strategic thinking of the defender. The defender, thus, will not take the de-escalation route. The literature predicts that the two factors decide the degree of escalation; (1) the *war cost* and (2) the *probability of victory* in war. As these two variables are highly correlated and influenced by a single factor (the power gap between the two), the following chapters focus on testing only the causal impact of the power gap variable.

Rival Hypothesis 2-1: If the defender becomes more *resolved* in the deterrence situation, the defender is less likely to take no action.

Rival Hypothesis 2-2: If the defender becomes more *resolved* in the deterrence situation, the defender is likely to take more aggressive policies.

The *belief updating model* argues against this linear model. Given the challenger decided to revise the status quo despite the defender's credible defensive deterrent threat, it is more probable that the challenger is a determined aggressor. Anticipated that the challenger is ready to fight a war, the defender might be willing to update its type and surrender some of its strategic assets to avoid the war especially when it is playing a weak hand. In other words, if the defender understands the mechanism of "selection effect," it would become more inclined to take less aggressive policies.

Second, the *feasibility of punishment* model predicts that the deterrer might be forced to back down when it is physically not feasible to retaliate against the challenger due to the military, political, and normative hurdles that impede the policy execution. In sum, the Independent Variables are (1) the *updated belief* that the challenger is a determined aggressor due to the defender's Bayesian thinking and (2) the defender's *feasibility to punish*. The Dependent Variable is the defender's policy choice after the failure of direct defensive deterrence.

Research Hypothesis 2-1: If the defender *updates* its belief and perceives that the challenger is a determined aggressor, it will not likely take violent measures.

Research Hypothesis 2-2: As it becomes more *infeasible* for the defender to implement punishment, the defender will choose less aggressive policies.

4.3 Short- and Long-term Policy Outcomes

Concerning the *short-term outcome* of direct defensive deterrence failure, Rational and Cognitive deterrence perspectives suggest a uniform picture: (1) direct deterrence failure is only possible when the challenger is determined to risk a war; and (2) the defender would most likely escalate the crisis after the failure. As both challenger and defender are resolute to escalate the crisis, *war should break out* when deterrence fails.

On the other hand, this research underscores two points. First, even an opportunistic challenger may decide to defy the defender's direct defensive deterrent threat when it is

infeasible for the defender to implement the punishment. Second, the defender might choose to de-escalate the crisis if it lacks the feasibility to punish or when it updates its belief about the challenger's type based on the fact the latter defies the former's credible deterrent threat. These two dynamics working in the aftermath of the direct defensive deterrence failure will encourage both sides to avoid aggressive policies when crisis gets escalated, and *war will be less likely to break out* after direct defensive deterrence failure. The Independent Variable is, thus, the defender's policy choice and the Dependent Variable is the short-term outcome of direct defensive deterrence failure.

Rival Hypothesis 3-1: If the defender becomes *more resolved* in deterrence situation, the failure of its deterrent threat will most likely end in war.

Research Hypothesis 3-1: If it becomes *more infeasible* for the defender to implement punishment and the defender *updates its belief* about the challenger as a resolute defier, the failure of its deterrent threat will *less likely* end in war.

For the *long-term effects* of each policy choice of the defender, Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus predicts that reputation would not matter much, and the defender's policy choice would not have any systematic impact on the occurrence of future crises. This dissertation's *feasibility model* also makes similar anticipation and argues that deterrence restoration depends on the defender's feasibility to follow through on the threat rather than its policy choices during the previous crises. It is important to note, however, that most of the direct defensive deterrence cases involve enduring rivalries. In this regard, a recent rebuttal to the

Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus deserves out close attention in formulating hypotheses. The reputation will matter in estimating the defender's threat credibility if it involves the same challenger, the consistent issue, or crucial interest at stake. The *belief updating* model supports this prediction. The challenger would update its belief about the defender if the latter decided to de-escalate after the deterrence failure. The defender's retreat, thus, would most likely invite more challenges in the future. The Independent Variable, thus, is the defender's policy choice, and the Dependent Variable is more or fewer provocations/conflicts in the future.

Rival Hypothesis 3-2: *Regardless* of which policy choice the deterrer makes after the direct defensive deterrence failure, it will *not be* likely to invite more provocations in the future.

Research Hypothesis 3-2: If the deterrer chooses *less aggressive* policies after the direct defensive deterrence failure, it will invite *more* provocations in the future.

4.4 Possession of Nuclear Weapons and Policy Choices of Challenger, Defender, and Their Ramifications

The Revolutionist perspective argues that possession of nuclear weapons will dramatically change the direct deterrence dynamics. First, direct deterrence would hardly fail if the defender possesses nuclear weapons. However resolved the challenger may be,

it should refrain from defying the defender's deterrent threat or at least from taking a *rapid escalation* route, due to the possibility that the action might lead to the defender's nuclear retaliation. This basic causal model should work both under MAD, and asymmetric nuclear balance as the slim chance of punishment involving nuclear weapons is sufficient to activate the "crystal ball effect."

Second, the same logic will affect the defender's strategic thinking when it deliberates on its response to direct defensive deterrence failure. As the war cost is enormous and victory is impossible as long as the challenger retains some nuclear capability that can reach the defender's territory, it would be extremely difficult for the defender to choose the *rapid escalation* path regardless of what type of nuclear balance exists in the dyad.

Third, as both sides would forgo escalation paths, the crisis either will not occur at all or terminate quickly without war. With regard to the long-term outcome, both the challenger and the defender would make every effort to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence like the U.S. and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War era, and subsequently, nuclear weapons would promote peace, stability, and infrequency of crises not only in the short-run but also in the long-run.

Rival Hypothesis 4-1: When the defender possesses *nuclear weapons* (regardless of the type of nuclear balance within the dyad), the challenger will *not* likely take a violent policy in its attempt to revise the status quo.

Rival Hypothesis 4-2: When the challenger possesses *nuclear weapons* (regardless of the type of nuclear balance), the defender will *not* likely take a violent policy in punishing the challenger.

Rival Hypothesis 4-3: When the crisis actors possess *nuclear weapons* (regardless of the type of nuclear balance), the crisis will likely be terminated quickly *without war*, and the occurrence of additional crises becomes highly *unlikely*.

This dissertation argues that nuclear weapons do not contribute much to deterrence success in most cases on two grounds. First, possession of nuclear weapons per se does not bring any changes in strategic calculations until the crisis actors secure full power projection capabilities, such as missiles and strategic bombers, which can deliver this enormous destruction to the challenger. This military feasibility of nuclear punishment is the threshold for making credible deterrent threats involving nuclear punishment.

Second, nuclear weapons are hardly usable because nuclear weapons' intrinsic nature of overkill makes their use nearly impossible to be justified politically and normatively in most cases. Under Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the impossibility of fighting at a high level may encourage attempting provocations of low-level violence. As it is not justifiable to give the death sentence for theft, the defender would hardly be able to punish challenger's minor assaults with nuclear weapons. If a significant nuclear imbalance exists in the dyad, the more advantageous side would be tempted to destroy the nuclear arsenal of its potential enemy following the logic of preventive war. But when it

does so, the former would turn to conventional weapons rather than nuclear weapons to seek a surgical strike for minimizing the political and military repercussions of such an attack. Lastly, the asymmetric nuclear balance would strengthen the logic of self-deterrence, as nuclear power should pay enormous economic, political, normative costs if it uses nuclear bombs against non-nuclear states.

Therefore, nuclear weapons would hardly change the direct deterrence dynamics as it is highly unlikely that the defender would use the weapons. The ultimate *infeasibility* of implementing nuclear punishment makes nuclear deterrence non-credible in most cases. In other words, for nuclear weapons to become a relevant factor in deterrence failure situations, crisis actors need to address the weapons' inherent infeasibility problem. The following three cases would meet this condition. First, the crisis actors secure full power projection capability to deliver the weapons. Second, the crisis actors have destroyed or are about to destroy densely populated cities of their opponents. Third, the defender or the challenger is isolated from the international community (i.e. North Korea) and has no reason to be self-deterred. The Independent Variable, thus, is the crisis actors' *military feasibility to implement nuclear punishment*, the *degree of aggressiveness* in the crisis actors' policy choices, and the crisis actors' *degree of openness* to the international community. The Dependent Variable is the challenger's policy choice, the defender's policy choice, and the short- and the long-term outcome of the crisis.

Research Hypothesis 4-1: If the crisis actors do *not* secure *full nuclear capability* with reliable power projection capabilities, the possession of nuclear weapons will *not likely* have any systematic impact on the challenger's policy

choice, the defender's policy choice nor on the short- and the long-term outcome of the crisis.

Research Hypothesis 4-2: If the crisis actors do *not* choose to incur a great number of civilian casualties by avoiding raiding on major cities of their opponents, the possession of nuclear weapons will *not likely* have any systematic impact on the challenger's policy choice, the defender's policy choice, nor on the short- and the long-term outcome of the crisis.

Research Hypothesis 4-3: If the crisis actors are *more open* to the international community, the possession of nuclear weapons would *less likely* have an impact on the challenger's policy choice, the defender's policy choice nor on the short- and the long-term outcome of the crisis.

CHAPTER III

STATISTICAL TRENDS

In the previous chapter, this project establishes a new theory on direct defensive deterrence failure and challenges rival theories such as the Rational and the Cognitive Deterrence perspectives. The rival models argue that: (1) direct defensive deterrence failure would occur only when the challenger is a determined aggressor; (2) the defender would most likely respond to the challenge with a severe punishment; (3) the crisis would, thus, escalate into a war between the two; and (4) the defender's deterrence would be restored if it defeats the challenger. On the contrary, the feasibility of punishment model suggests that: (1) direct defensive deterrence failure would, in most cases, have been caused by the defender's infeasibility to punish the challenger's attempt to revise the status quo; (2) the defender would be restrained from taking aggressive policies in responding to the challenge; (3) the crisis would not escalate into an armed conflict; and (4) the defender's deterrence would collapse if it fails to address this infeasibility problem.

This project first tests rival and research hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 against the population of direct defensive deterrence failure. This statistical analysis aims to demonstrate general trends in the deterrence dynamics by capturing the average causal impact of the independent variables²⁰¹ on the dependent variables²⁰² in those cases of direct

²⁰¹ Independent variables include probability of victory, interest at stake, military and political feasibility of punishment, nuclear capability, aggressiveness in the crisis actors' policy choices, and the crisis actors' openness to the international community.

²⁰² Dependent variables include the challenger's policy, the defender's policy, and the short- and the long-term crisis outcomes.

defensive deterrence failure.²⁰³ The main technique used in the analysis of statistical trends includes logistic and ordered logistic regressions since the dependent variables are either binary or ordinal. It also includes a two-stage logistic regression model used to address the issue of endogeneity that arises with some of the independent variables (i.e. aggressiveness in the crisis actors' policy choices).

The first section of this chapter explains how 192 cases of direct deterrence failure are derived from the ICB2 dataset (Ver. 12) and defines the variables used in the statistical analysis. The subsequent section reports the results of the regression analyses and suggests evidence for the relevance of the military and the political feasibility variables in explaining the dynamics of the aftermath of direct defensive deterrence failures. The last section discusses the implication of the findings from the regression analysis.

1. Direct Defensive Deterrence Data

1-1. Direct Defensive Deterrence Cases, 1918-2015

The dissertation constructs an original dataset of direct defensive deterrence failure drawing from the ICB2 dataset. The ICB2 dataset is the actor-level data of the “International Crisis Behavior” project. It defines a foreign policy and an international crisis as “an increase in intensity of *disruptive* interactions [...] between two or more states” caused by “*a threat*

²⁰³ As mentioned earlier, the belief updating model is not tested in this statistical analysis due to the difficulty in reflecting the Bayesian updating in a standard regression models. The predictions established by this belief updating model will be tested against five selected cases from Chapter 4 to Chapter 6.

to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of *finite time for response* to the value threat, and a *heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities* [emphasis in the original text].”²⁰⁴ This dataset provides information on the complete process of crises from their outset to the termination and their aftermath. Besides, the ICB2 data presents summary of each crisis that describes the context and development of it, which is essential for identifying the population of direct defensive deterrence failure.

As discussed in Chapter 2, direct defensive deterrence aims to protect the defender’s territory and people, and demands from potential challengers not to make any changes to the status quo that could jeopardize the defender’s national security. There are three conditions of direct-defensive-deterrence-failure crisis: (1) both the challenger and the defender are *state actors*; (2) the defender is seeking *territorial integrity* and *security of its citizens* rather than those of its allies; and (3) the crisis is triggered by the challenger’s *willful non-compliance* with the defender’s demand not to revise the status quo. This coding rule excludes (1) the cases involving non-state actors; (2) extended deterrence cases where the defender tries to protect its allies; (3) followed-up crises that occurred in conjunction with other previous conflicts; and (4) crises provoked by unintended spiral of violence in the border area.

This exclusion is necessary because, first, it is not only rare to find empirical data on non-state actors but also they might follow distinctive and *sui generis* logic in choosing their options, which is difficult to generalize. Second, the calculation of third party players should be qualitatively different from those actors whose national security is at stake. Third,

²⁰⁴ Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 3-4.

inclusion of the follow-up crises in the dataset would likely increase the impact of the “selection effect.”²⁰⁵ Lastly, by definition, a crisis not initiated by a willful decision of the challenger should not be considered a deterrence failure.

This dissertation, however, assumes that the direct-defensive-deterrence-failure crises should include both cases where the defender makes its demands implicitly and explicitly. For example, if the defender makes the deterrent threat verbally (i.e. “Don’t do x”) and the challenger defies the defender, then it is a case of explicit deterrence failure. The 1936 Rhineland Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were classic examples of this type of failure. When the defender makes the threat non-verbally (i.e. mobilization of forces, reinforcing the standing army) and the challenger makes an aggressive move regardless, it is an implicit failure. We can think of the 1979 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Falkland War, and the 2010 Yeonpyeong Crisis as an implicit type of deterrence failure. This dissertation treats both types of failure as the same cases of direct defensive deterrence failure.

The dissertation project assumes that what makes direct defensive deterrence interesting and unique is not the way it occurred but the significance of the interest at stake. By aggregating implicit and explicit failures together, this project includes all cases of invasion and most territorial disputes in the population of direct defensive deterrence failure. Some other cases of the challenger’s non-compliance with the defender’s demand are identified as the deterrence failure crisis only when it is related to serious national security challenges (i.e., the 1991 Yugoslavia Crisis, the 2002 North Korean Nuclear Crisis). Accordingly, the number of observations in this statistical analysis does not include crises

²⁰⁵ Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence.”

such as the sinking of U.S. destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 or the killing of two U.S. soldiers during the Poplar Tree crisis in 1976.

With using these coding rules, this study identifies 192 cases of direct defensive deterrence failure from 1918 to 2015. The unit of analysis is an international crisis of deterrence failure. The rationale behind this choice is that sometimes the information on a challenger in a crisis dyad is missing in the ICB2 dataset. By its coding rule, the dataset does not include the challenger as an actor in case the challenger does not perceive “a threat to one or more basic values” during the crisis. For example, cases of the 1936 Remilitarization of the Rhineland, the 1940 Fall of West Europe, and the 1941 Barbarossa crises in the ICB2 dataset do not include Germany as one of their crisis actors because its opponents failed to pose a threat to the basic values of Berlin. It is; thus, better to use the deterrence failure crisis as the unit of analysis rather than to use the dyad data in the ICB2 to avoid issues of missing values.

In this dissertation’s deterrence failure dataset, each crisis includes information on both the defender and the challenger. When there are more than one challenger or defenders in a crisis, I included all of the different combinations of the dyad to reflect the crisis actors’ values accurately. For example, for the 1967 Cyprus II crisis and the 1973 October-Yom Kippur war, the direct defensive deterrence dataset respectively encompasses the Turkey-Greece and the Turkey-Cyprus, as well as the Israel-Syria and the Israel-Egypt dyads as separate observations.

1-2. Defining the Dependent and the Independent Variables

This project has four dependent variables. The first variable is the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE (variable name: *CHAPOL*). It measures the degree of aggressiveness in the challenger's policy choice to defy the defender. This variable is drawn from the "TRIGGER TO FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS" variable (variable name: *TRIGGR*) in the ICB2 dataset. It is the "trigger or precipitating cause of a foreign policy crisis refers to the specific act, event or situational change which leads decision-makers to perceive a threat."²⁰⁶ While this original variable has nine values from one ("verbal act") to nine ("Violent act"), I trichotomize the variable to test the prediction of this project's theories: one ("non-military measures"), two ("indirect military and non-violent military measures"), and three ("violent military measures").

The second dependent variable is the DEFENDER'S POLICY CHOICE (variable name: *DEFPOL*). Similar to the challenger's policy choice, it gauges the aggressiveness in the defender's reaction to the challenge. It is drawn from the ICB2 dataset's "MAJOR RESPONSE TO CRISIS TRIGGER" (variable name: *MAJRES*) and recoded as an ordinal variable that has four values: one ("inaction"), two ("non-violent actions"), three ("non-violent military action"), and four ("violent actions"). For the third and fourth dependent variables, the short- and the long-term outcomes, I use ICB2 dataset's "INTENSITY OF VIOLENCE" (variable name: *SEVVIO*) and "ESCALATION OR REDUCTION OF

²⁰⁶ Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, Patrick James and David Quinn, *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, Version 12* (August 23, 2017), <http://people.duke.edu/~kcb38/ICB/ICB2Codebook-v12.pdf>, pp.4-5.

TENSION” (variable name: *OUTESR*) variables. The “INTENSITY” variable has four values from “no violence” to “full-scale war,” which indicates the maximum degree of violence the crisis actors employed throughout the crisis. The “TENSION” variable is a binary one that assesses the influence of crisis outcome on the level of tension in the aftermath of the crisis termination: either “tension escalation” (reoccurrence of crises among the principal adversaries within five years) or “tension reduction” (non-reoccurrence of those within five years). As these variables fit well with the project’s third and fourth dependent variables, I do not make any adjustments.

The dissertation constructs independent variables to test rival and research hypotheses established in Chapter 2. The feasibility of punishment is the main variable for this project. This feasibility variable has two dimensions: military and political feasibilities. As defined in the previous chapter, MILITARY FEASIBILITY is the *power projection capabilities* to overcome geographic obstacles and the challenger’s defensive capability that could neutralize the defender’s punitive offense. Although there is a published work that makes an enormous effort to rigorously measure this state’s ability to project force over distance, the dataset used in this research is not accessible.²⁰⁷ To accurately measure this projection capability, it requires detailed information on each crisis actor’s naval and air power such as battleships, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and long-range strategic bombers/missiles from 1918 to 2015.

²⁰⁷ Lee, Michael J., and William R. Thompson, “Major Powers vs. Global Powers: A New Measure of Global Reach and Power Projection Capacity,” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (July 15, 2019). <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-610>

Due to the time and funding constraints, this dissertation selects the “IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION” variable (variable name: *IRST*) in the COW National Material Capabilities dataset (Version 5.0)²⁰⁸ as a proxy index for measuring MILITARY FEASIBILITY. First, the IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION index is widely used to measure the industrial strength of states, which is essential for those crisis actors to develop the projection capability. Second, there is good reason to believe that a state’s production of iron and steel is highly correlated with its naval and air powers considering that most materials needed for building the relevant weapon systems are iron and steel.

To test hypotheses on the impact of nuclear weapons on deterrence failure situations, we need to measure the MILITARY FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT. The analysis turns to ICB2 data’s “NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF CRISIS ACTOR” variable (variable name: NUCLEAR)²⁰⁹ for measuring the variable. The NUCLEAR CAPABILITY is recoded as two binary variables. The first variable (variable name: DNUCLEAR_BI, CHNUCLEAR_BI) measures whether the crisis actor has or does not have nuclear weapons. The second binary variable (variable name: DNUCLEAR_MILFEA, CHNUCLEAR_MILFEA) is coded one if the crisis actor is a developed nuclear power securing the second strike capability, and zero otherwise. As the possession of the second strike capability indicates that the actor can deliver its nuclear weapons to its adversary, this

²⁰⁸ David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965.” in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 19-48. The variable name DIRST implies defender’s IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION while CHIRST means that of the challenger.

²⁰⁹ *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook*, p. 41. The variable names DNUCLEAR and CHNUCLEAR indicate the nuclear capability of the defender and that of challenger respectively.

binary variable is a proxy index for MILITARY FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT.

The second dimension of the feasibility variable is POLITICAL FEASIBILITY. A positive value in this variable implies absence of strong domestic/international political oppositions and normative obstructive environment that could impede or delay the policy execution. As it is difficult for a large-N study to accurately capture the political and normative debates and processes occurring in each country during the crisis, I create a proxy index to measure POLITICAL FEASIBILITY. This index is based on six relevant variables in the ICB2 dataset: (1) “DURATION OF POLITICAL REGIME” (variable name: *DURREG*),²¹⁰ (2) “ECONOMIC STATUS OF ACTOR” (variable name: *ECONDT*),²¹¹ (3) “REGIME REPRESSION” (variable name: *REGREP*),²¹² (4) “SOCIAL UNREST” (variable name: *SOCUNR*),²¹³ (5) “MASS VIOLENCE” (variable name: *MASSVL*),²¹⁴ and (6) “GOVERNMENT INSTABILITY” (variable name: *GVINST*).²¹⁵ First, I recode these six

²¹⁰ This variable measures the “number of years from the last change of regime until the date of the crisis is reported.” *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook*, pp. 39-40.

²¹¹ It is a variable that demonstrates a “summary indicator of the economic status.” *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook*, p. 47

²¹² This variable measures “the level of repression exercised by the regime of the crisis actor preceding the crisis period.” *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook*, p. 47

²¹³ It is a variable assessing “the level of societal unrest in the crisis actor as evidenced by assassinations, terrorism, general strikes, demonstrations, and riots.” *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook*, p. 48

²¹⁴ The variable assesses “the level of mass violence present within the society of the crisis actor, as evidenced by insurrections, civil war, and revolution.” *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook*, p. 48.

²¹⁵ It is a variable measuring “the level of governmental instability in the crisis actor, as evidenced by executive changes, constitutional changes, legal changes, and administrative structure changes.” *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook*, pp. 48-49.

variables to dichotomous ones: coded zero if the problem gets decreased or is maintained at a normal level, and one otherwise. Then, these binary variables aggregated into a composite index (variable name: *POLFEA*). The scores of this index are treated as if interval variables.

This project uses World Bank's "TRADE (% OF GDP)" index (variable name: *ECOPEN*)²¹⁶ to assess the POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT. The assumption made for adopting this index for measuring POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT is that if the crisis actor's economy is more dependent on the global market, it would be politically more difficult to use nuclear sanctions. As the use of WMD is a taboo in the international community, an export-oriented economy should fear the backlash of nuclear punishment such as political isolation, loss in foreign investment, and economic sanctions led by the UN.²¹⁷

The control variables are included in the analysis to test rival hypotheses centered on the resolve of crisis actors. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Rational Deterrence literature calculates the expected utility of escalating the crisis to measure the crisis actors' level of resolve. The level of their resolve, thus, is a function of the INTEREST AT STAKE, the PROBABILITY OF VICTORY in case of a war, the WAR COST, and the AUDIENCE/REPUTATIONAL COST for backing down. Indices for measuring these variables are: (1) "ISSUE OF CRISIS" (variable name: *ISSUE*) in the ICB2,²¹⁸ (2)

²¹⁶ World Bank, "Trade (% of GDP)," World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS> (Accessed on July 16, 2019) The defender's economic openness is measured in the variable name of DECOPEN while that of the challenger is measured in CHECOPEN.

²¹⁷ Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 48-49.

²¹⁸ *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook*, p. 42.

Beckley's power index of "GDP \times GDP PER CAPITA"²¹⁹ (variable name: *PGAP_BECK*), and (3) the ICB2's "POLITICAL REGIME OF CRISIS ACTOR" variable (variable name: *REGTYP*).²²⁰

The first ISSUE variable identifies "the most important initial issue area of the crisis as perceived by the crisis actor," which includes the values from one ("military-security") to four ("cultural-status"). I dichotomize this variable by coding one if it is a matter of military-security and zero otherwise. This variable is a good index for measuring the level of INTEREST AT STAKE for crisis actors during the crisis. Secondly, Beckley's GDP \times GDP PER CAPITA index is used to measure the power gap between the defender and the challenger in each crisis. It is an indicator of these crisis actors' PROBABILITY OF VICTORY and their WAR COSTS. Lastly, I recode REGIME variable in the ICB2 dataset and create a binary variable (variable name: *REGTYP*): one ("democratic regime") and two ("authoritarian regime"). The rationale behind using this variable for measuring the AUDIENCE COST is Fearon's theory that the democratic regime pays higher audience costs than the authoritarian regime in general.²²¹ The next section reports the result of regression analysis using the variables explained in this section.

Before moving on to the statistical analysis, it is important to mention two things. First, the control variables used here do not necessarily include factors that the Cognitive

²¹⁹ The power gap between the defender and the challenger is calculated by dividing GDP \times GDP per capita of the defender into the sum of GDP \times GDP per capita of the challenger and the defender. For the advantage of using this index compared to COW CINC, please see Michael Beckley, "The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters," *International Security* 43, no. 2 (2018), pp. 7-44.

²²⁰ *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook*, p. 39. DREGTYP is the defender's regime type and CHREGTYP is that of the challenger.

²²¹ Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,"

Deterrence theory emphasizes. The Cognitive approach suggests a different logic in explaining the crisis actors' level of resolve, such as the human tendency of loss aversion, the endowment effect, and the logic of vengeance. However, it has proven difficult to find indices for measuring these factors in the accessible datasets. The following regression analyses, thus, zero in on independent variables suggested by the Rational Deterrence approach, and accordingly, these analyses do not test the Cognitive Deterrence theory. Second, as mentioned earlier, the next section does not examine the belief updating model either because the Bayesian updating process is difficult to capture by a standard statistical analysis.

2. Empirical Analysis

2-1. The Challenger's Policy Choice

Out of 192 international crises with direct defensive deterrence failure, challengers chose “non-military measures” in 37 cases (19%), “indirect military and non-violent military measures” in 50 cases (26%), and “violent military measures” in 105 cases (55%) to revise the status quo defying those defenders' deterrent threats. Given that the majority of deterrence failure crises were initiated by the challenger's policy choice of violent measures, the prediction of rival hypothesis and the Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theory seems right: The direct deterrence fails when the challenger is a determined aggressor. While the research hypothesis and the feasibility of punishment model do not reject this possibility, they point

out that the more frequent cause of failure is that it was not feasible for the defender to punish the challenger.

I employ ordered logistic regression models to test these hypotheses. Table 3 presents the results. First, I examine the impact of the defender's military and political feasibility on the challenger's degree of aggressiveness in defying the former's direct defensive deterrent threat. According to the statistical analysis, the defender's military and political feasibility to punish the challenger is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the aggressiveness in the challenger's policy choice when considered alone (Model 1a). When tested in a fully specified model (Model 1b), only MILITARY FEASIBILITY is statistically significant.²²² The challenger's level of resolve, however, is partially supported by the analysis and the only statistically significant variable is ISSUE when it shifts from "military-security" to "All the other" (Model 1c).

²²² The p value for the POLITICAL FEASIBILITY is 0.052.

Table 3: Origins of the Challenger's Policy Choice, 1918-2015

Variables	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c
Military Feasibility (Defender)	-0.0000189** (0.00000727)	-0.0000296** (0.0000109)	
Political Feasibility (Defender)	-0.207* (0.105)	-0.269 (0.138)	
Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)		1.593 (1.958)	-1.471 (1.508)
Interest at Stake (Defender & Challenger)		1.006 (0.594)	1.501** (0.503)
Audience Cost (Challenger)		0.451 (0.470)	0.141 (0.398)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	153	97	127
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>	0.0001***	0.0005***	0.0105**
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0.0568	0.1097	0.0432

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$; All tests are two-tailed.

2-2. *The Defender's Policy Choice*

For the defender's policy choice in the aftermath of direct defensive deterrence failure, the defender chose violent military measures in most of the cases (81 out of 192 cases: 42.19%). The defender took non-violent military measures in 53 cases (27.60%) and non-violent political and economic measures in 57 cases (29.69%). The defender chose not to react to the challenger's defiance only once (0.52%) according to the data. The defender's penchant for aggressive reaction seems to correspond well with the prediction of rival hypothesis and the Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theories. Again, this prediction

does not contradict the research hypothesis based on the feasibility model.²²³ What the rival and research hypotheses disagree on is the sufficient condition for a strong reaction by the defender. While the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence perspectives argue that the defender prefers to severely punish the challenger due to its high level of resolve, the feasibility model points out that the defender is allowed to take aggressive measures only when it secures military and political abilities to follow through on its threat.

I again employ the ordered logistic regression model to test these hypotheses as the dependent variable is ordinal. Table 4 reports the result of this regression analysis. The statistical analysis shows that the defender's military and political feasibility to punish the challenger have no statistically significant impact on the defender's degree of aggressiveness in punishing the challenger when they are considered alone (Model 2a) and tested in a fully specified model (Model 2b). The challenger's level of resolve also has no statistically significant impact on the defender's policy choice (Model 2c). Furthermore, the p values for all three models are too high, and thus none of independent variables included in them should be considered to have a causal impact on the dependent variable.

²²³ This prediction, however, goes against the belief updating model. Yet, as the model is not tested in the statistical analysis, this chapter does not discuss it.

Table 4: Origins of the Defender’s Policy Choice, 1918-2015

Variables	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c
Military Feasibility (Defender)	-0.00000124 (0.00000584)	-0.00000482 (0.00000642)	
Political Feasibility (Defender)	-0.126 (0.0973)	-0.176 (0.106)	
Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)		1.099 (1.497)	0.397 (1.275)
Interest at Stake (Defender)		0.911 (0.512)	0.285 (0.433)
Audience Cost (Defender)		-0.459 (0.358)	-0.0196 (0.293)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	153	153	192
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>	0.3250	0.1836	0.9039
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0.0065	0.0219	0.0013

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.

This intriguing trend demonstrates that neither the Rational Deterrence nor the feasibility models can adequately explain the origin of the defender’s policy choices. One possible explanation for this is that, as the belief updating model argues, the level of aggressiveness that the challenger demonstrated earlier greatly has influenced on the defender’s policy choice. We can test this possibility by employing a two-stage logistic regression model (Model 2d). This model includes (1) the defender’s MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY to punish the challenger’s attempt to revise the status quo, (2) the defender’s resolve to do so (the defender’s PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, INTEREST AT STAKE, and AUDIENCE COST), and (3) the CHALLENGER’S

POLICY CHOICE as independent variables. It also treats the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE as an endogenous variable influenced by the challenger's level of resolve.

Table 5 reports the result. In Model 2d, the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE and the defender's MILITARY FEASIBILITY variables are statistically significant and positively correlated with the defender's choice. The significant factors that have an impact on the challenger's policy choice are the defender's MILITARY FEASIBILITY and its AUDIENCE COSTS. The defender's PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL is negatively correlated with the challenger's policy choice, while the defender's REGIME TYPE is positively correlated with the challenger's choice.

Table 5: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) Origins of the Defender's Policy Choice, 1918-2015

Variables	Model 2d	Variables (cont.)	Model 2d (cont.)
Defender's Policy Choice			
Challenger's Policy Choice	1.549*** (0.188)	Challenger's Policy Choice	
Military Feasibility (Defender)	0.0000110* (0.00000495)	Military Feasibility (Defender)	-0.00000794* (0.00000335)
Political Feasibility (Defender)	0.0219 (0.153)	Political Feasibility (Defender)	-0.0632 (0.0496)
Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)	-1.102 (1.204)	Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)	0.520 (0.778)
Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)	-0.411 (0.413)	Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)	0.353 (0.227)
Audience Cost (Defender)	-0.737 (0.477)	Audience Cost (Defender)	0.347* (0.175)
		Audience Cost (Challenger)	0.0957 (0.179)
Constant	-2.494** (0.845)	Constant	1.825*** (0.494)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	97		
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>	0.0000***		
<i>Wald Chi-Square test</i>	138.71		

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.

2-3. *The Short-term Outcome*

According to the direct defensive deterrence failure dataset, the majority of crises (86 out of 192; 44.79%) terminated *without any violence*. In 30 crises (15.63%), the defender and the challenger experienced “minor clashes.” The 36 deterrence failures (18.75%) led to “serious clashes,” and 40 cases (20.83%) ended with a “full-scale war” between the two crisis actors. This dominant trend of peaceful crisis termination is fascinating, considering that the most frequent policy choices both the defender and the challenger made as their initial moves were “violent military measures.” This contradiction implies that either the defender or the challenger, or both of them, backed down and chose a de-escalation path after they chose an aggressive route in the early stage of the crisis.

This short-term outcome of deterrence failure goes against the prediction of rival hypothesis and the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories. By definition, taking the de-escalation path indicates the crisis actor’s level of resolve is low. How could they be resolute actors and simultaneously choose to retreat? One possible way to make sense of this contradiction is by introducing the notion of feasibility. Even if they genuinely desire to maintain their aggressive course of action, they could not do so when they lack military and political abilities to implement their escalation policies.²²⁴

An ordered logistic regression model is used to test this hypothesis, and Table 6 shows the result. The statistical analysis reveals that the DEFENDER’S POLITICAL

²²⁴ Another way to explain this is that the crisis actors changed their types from resolute to irresolute ones due to their *updated belief* about their opponents’ types. The possibility is not discussed in this chapter as the belief updating model is not tested in the statistical analysis.

FEASIBILITY to punish the challenger has a statistically significant impact on and negatively correlated with the short-term outcome of deterrence failure crises when it is considered with the DEFENDER'S MILITARY FEASIBILITY (Model 3a), when tested in a fully specified model (Model 3b), and when included in trimmed models (Models 3d and 3e). In Model 3b, those variables of the INTEREST AT STAKE and the challenger's AUDIENCE COST (the challenger's regime type) also have statistically significant impact on the short-term crisis outcome.

The challenger's level of resolve has a statistically significant impact on the short-term (Model 3c) as well. Relevant factors in explaining the short-term outcome of deterrence failure crises in Model 3c include the DEFENDER'S PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS (the defender's power share in the aggregated power of the dyad) and the challenger's AUDIENCE COST. However, the power gap and the challenger's regime type variables lose their significance when they are nested within trimmed models (Models 3d and 3e). The only two variables that always maintain their significance in all five models are INTEREST AT STAKE and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY.

Table 6: Origins of the Short-term Outcome of the Deterrence Failure, 1918-2015

Variables	Model 3a	Model 3b	Model 3c	Model 3d	Model 3e
Military Feasibility (Defender)	-0.00000804 (0.00000750)	-0.0000136 (0.0000106)			
Political Feasibility (Defender)	-0.263** (0.0969)	-0.307* (0.135)		-0.343** (0.123)	-0.422*** (0.114)
Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)		-1.460 (2.393)	-5.293** (1.903)	-3.321 (2.075)	
Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)		1.463* (0.739)	0.436 (0.525)	1.454* (0.734)	1.505* (0.729)
Audience Cost (Defender)		-0.459 (0.358)	-0.0196 (0.293)		
Audience Cost (Challenger)		1.136* (0.503)	1.066** (0.413)	0.965* (0.471)	0.763 (0.448)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	153	97	127	105	105
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>	0.0018**	0.0007***	0.0004***	0.0001***	0.0001***
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0.0334	0.0931	0.0602	0.0897	0.0801

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.

2-4. *The Long-term Outcome*

As for the long-term outcome of the deterrence failure crisis, the principal adversaries of the 93 crises (48.44%) did not experience another crisis during the subsequent five-year period while crises between them recurred in 88 cases (45.83%). The remaining 11 crises (5.73%) occurred too recently to measure whether the tension gets increased or decreased after the crisis. The dataset, thus, shows that the possibility of resulting in *deterrence collapse* or experiencing another crisis with the same crisis actors within five years after the termination of the deterrence failure crisis is about 45 percent, slightly less than 50 percents.

This trend matches well with the rival and research hypotheses' prediction. Both the old theories (the Rational and the Cognitive Deterrence theories) and the new theories (the feasibility of punishment and the belief updating models) of deterrence make divergent predictions regarding the long-term outcome of the direct defensive deterrence failure. Some of them argue that the past and the crisis actors' reputation for standing firm does not matter much for future crises (i.e. the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus, Cognitive Deterrence theories, and the feasibility of punishment model). The others claim that their reputation would have a significant impact on the calculation of potential crisis actors if they involve the same actors/issues or when the interest at stake is high.

To confirm which theory provides a better explanation, I first dichotomize the ESCALATION OR REDUCTION OF TENSION variable and employ the logistic regression model. However, I could not find any variables that have statistically significant causal impacts when the DEFENDER'S POLICY CHOICE and the CONTENT OF

CRISIS OUTCOME are considered in the model. This result could imply simply that the defender's policy choice during the direct defensive deterrent failure has no systematic impact on future crises. However, as shown in the earlier regression analysis of the defender's policy choice, it might be because the model does not consider it that the DEFENDER'S POLICY CHOICE variable is endogenous.

A two-stage logistic regression model (Model 4), thus, is established in this regard. This model includes the DEFENDER'S POLICY CHOICE, the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE, and the CONTENT OF CRISIS OUTCOME as independent variables, and treats both the DEFENDER'S POLICY CHOICE and the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE as endogenous variables. These endogenous variables are influenced by (1) the defender's feasibility to follow through (its MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY), (2) the defender's level of resolve (the defender's PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, INTEREST AT STAKE, and AUDIENCE COST), and (3) the challenger's resolve (the challenger's PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, INTEREST AT STAKE, and AUDIENCE COST).

Table 7 reports the result of the regression analysis. Even with the two-stage logistic regression model, policy choices of the defender and the challenger have *no significant impact* on the long-term outcome of the crisis. The analysis, thus, fails to reject the null hypothesis that the defender's policy choice during the deterrence failure crisis, or its reputation for standing firm, has no systematic impact on future crises. The only relevant variable is CONTENT OF CRISIS OUTCOME when the crisis terminated with "STALEMATE," or no clear outcome. This result is not very interesting as it is

commonsensical for the crisis actors to have additional crises when the previous crisis did not come to a conclusion and the issue over which they had a conflict remained unresolved.

Table 7: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) Origins of the Long-term Outcome of the Deterrence Failure, 1918-2015

Variables	Model 4	Variables (cont.)	Model 4 (cont.)	Variables (cont.)	Model 4 (cont.)
Long-term Outcome		Defender's policy choice		Challenger's policy choice	
Defender's Policy Choice	-0.519 (0.505)				
Challenger's Policy Choice	-0.215 (0.374)				
Content of Crisis Outcome		Content of Crisis Outcome		Content of Crisis Outcome	
<i>compromise</i>	0.129 (0.357)	<i>compromise</i>	-0.190 (0.212)	<i>compromise</i>	0.0131 (0.196)
<i>stalemate</i>	0.813* (0.349)	<i>stalemate</i>	0.172 (0.212)	<i>stalemate</i>	0.0246 (0.197)
<i>defeat</i>	0.0721 (0.475)	<i>defeat</i>	-0.138 (0.284)	<i>defeat</i>	0.303 (0.262)
Military Feasibility (Defender)		Military Feasibility (Defender)	-0.00000530 (0.00000354)	Military Feasibility (Defender)	- 0.00000859 ** (0.00000331)
Political Feasibility (Defender)		DEFENDER'S Political Feasibility	-0.0795 (0.0516)	DEFENDER'S Political Feasibility	-0.0602 (0.0489)
Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)		Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)	-0.654 (0.903)	Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)	0.983 (0.820)
Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)		Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)	0.308 (0.250)	Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)	0.362 (0.228)
Audience Cost (Defender)		Audience Cost (Defender)	-0.455* (0.193)	Audience Cost (Defender)	0.348 (0.181)
Audience Cost (Challenger)		Audience Cost (Challenger)	0.106 (0.194)	Audience Cost (Challenger)	0.0752 (0.179)
Constant	1.767 (1.456)	Constant	3.855*** (0.572)	Constant	1.541** (0.542)
<i>Number of Observations</i>		96			
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>		0.043*			
<i>Wald Chi-Square test</i>		11.46			

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.

2-5. *The Impact of Nuclear Weapons*

The final set of tests is related to the impact of nuclear weapons on the four dependent variables mentioned above. As discussed in the previous chapter, the nuclear revolutionist approach argues that the introduction of nuclear weapons into the calculation of the crisis actors would bring the “crystal ball effect” and contributes to maintenance of status quo as well as suppresses the magnitude of escalation during the crisis. The nuclear pessimists, however, claim the increasing irrelevance of nuclear weapons in the international crisis because of the stability-instability paradox, the logic of preventive war and the lack of practicality in using the weapons, and the logic of self-deterrence mainly activated by the nuclear taboo in the international community. This project’s feasibility of punishment model sides with the nuclear pessimists as it is difficult to secure military and political feasibility of nuclear punishment in responding to most of the challenger’s defiance against the defender’s deterrent threat.

First, I employ ordered logistic regression models to test whether the defender’s possession of nuclear weapons has any impact on the *challenger’s policy choice*. Table 8 presents the results. According to the statistical analysis, the DEFENDER’S NUCLEAR MILITARY FEASIBILITY is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the aggressiveness in the challenger’s policy choice when it is considered with the DEFENDER’S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS and the DEFENDER’S MILITARY FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT (Model 5a). When tested in a fully specified model, the DEFENDER’S POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT, the DEFENDER’S MILITARY FEASIBILITY, and the DEFENDER’S

MILITARY FEASIBILITY and the DEFENDER'S PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS have statistically significant impact on the challenger's policy choice (Model 5b). Meanwhile, the only significant variable in the model for the challenger's policy choice without considering the nuclear weapons variable (Model 5c) is the DEFENDER'S MILITARY FEASIBILITY.

Table 8: Defender's Nuclear Capability and the Challenger's Policy Choice, 1918-2015

Variables	Model 5a	Model 5b	Model 5c
Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)	-0.212 (0.551)	0.491 (0.804)	
Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)	-2.647** (0.941)	-17.47 (1160.8)	
Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)	0.666 (0.543)	2.284* (0.939)	-3.284** (1.237)
Military Feasibility (Defender)		-0.0000460* (0.0000212)	-0.0000296** (0.0000109)
Political Feasibility (Defender)		-0.406 (0.219)	-0.269 (0.138)
Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)		5.304* (2.602)	1.593 (1.958)
Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)		0.186 (0.715)	1.006 (0.594)
Audience Cost (Challenger)		0.353 (0.581)	0.451 (0.470)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	115	69	97
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>	0.0001***	0.0000***	0.0005***
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0.084	0.276	0.110

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; All tests are two-tailed.

Second, as I expected a similar problem would occur in testing the impact of the challenger's nuclear capability on the *defender's policy choice*; the analysis turns to the two-

stage logistic regression model assuming the influence of the challenger's policy choice on the dependent variable. This model's independent variables include: (1) the CHALLENGER'S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, (2) the CHALLENGER'S MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT, and (3) the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE. The CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE is treated as an endogenous factor influenced by the DEFENDER'S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, the DEFENDER'S MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT, the DEFENDER'S MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY, the DEFENDER'S PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, the INTEREST AT STAKE, and the CHALLENGER'S AUDIENCE COST.

Table 9 shows the result of this two-stage logistic regression model (Model 6). The regression analysis reveals that the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE is the only statistically significant variable and is positively correlated with the defender's policy choice. The two statistically significant variables influence this challenger's policy choice: the DEFENDER'S MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY TO IMPLEMENT NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT. The challenger's nuclear capability does not influence the defender's policy choice. In the end, it is defender's military and political ability to implement nuclear punishment against the challenger's defiance that decides the defender's policy choice after deterrence failure.

Table 9: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) the Challenger's Nuclear Capability and the Defender's Policy Choice, 1918-2015

Variables	Model 6	Variables (cont.)	Model 6 (cont.)
Defender's Policy choice			
Challenger's Policy Choice	1.039** (0.391)	Challenger's Policy Choice	
Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Challenger)	-0.0153 (0.607)	Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Challenger)	0.403 (0.396)
Nuclear Military Feasibility (Challenger)	0.550 (0.879)	Nuclear Military Feasibility (Challenger)	-0.470 (0.605)
Nuclear Political Feasibility (Challenger)	-0.355 (0.596)	Nuclear Political Feasibility (Challenger)	-0.471 (0.294)
Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)	-	Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)	0.381 (0.359)
Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)	-	Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)	-1.435** (0.483)
Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)	-	Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)	1.377** (0.452)
Military Feasibility (Defender)	-	Military Feasibility (Defender)	-0.00000317 (0.00000814)
Political Feasibility (Defender)	-	Political Feasibility (Defender)	-0.116 (0.0679)
Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)	-	Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)	1.853 (1.275)
Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)	-	Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)	-0.0475 (0.263)
Audience Cost (Challenger)	-	Audience Cost (Challenger)	0.196 (0.227)
Constant	-2.520** (0.819)	Constant	1.195 (0.900)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	42		
<i>Wald Chi-Square test</i>	10.90		
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>	0.0278*		

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.

Third, as for the causes of the *short-term outcome* of the direct defensive deterrence failure, I employ ordered logistic regression models to test the impact of the nuclear capability of the defender and the challenger on the short-term outcome. Table 10 reports the results. The data reveals that both the DEFENDER'S and the CHALLENGER'S POSSESSION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS and their NUCLEAR MILITARY FEASIBILITY are statistically significant when considered with the POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT of the defender and the challenger (Model 7a). In a more trimmed model, the DEFENDER'S POSSESSION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, the DEFENDER'S MILITARY FEASIBILITY of NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT and the DEFENDER'S POLITICAL FEASIBILITY are significant (Model 7b). When tested in a fully specified model, however, only the DEFENDER'S POSSESSION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS variable remains to be significant (Model 7c). Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, significant variables for the short-term outcome without considering the nuclear weapons factor are the DEFENDER'S POLITICAL FEASIBILITY, INTEREST AT STAKE, and the CHALLENGER'S AUDIENCE COST variables (Model 7d).

Table 10: Crisis Actors' Nuclear Capability and the Short-term Outcome, 1918-2015

Variables	Model 7a	Model 7b	Model 7c	Model 7d
Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)	3.251** (1.260)	3.317* (1.317)	3.851* (1.756)	
Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)	-3.172* (1.574)	-3.955* (1.787)	-2.290 (2.461)	
Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)	0.922 (0.871)	1.725 (0.991)	1.587 (1.312)	
Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Challenger)	-2.631* (1.288)	-2.503 (1.340)	-1.355 (1.836)	
Nuclear Military Feasibility (Challenger)	3.893** (1.480)	2.798 (1.595)	3.535 (2.483)	
Nuclear Political Feasibility (Challenger)	-0.214 (0.791)	-0.772 (0.874)	-1.176 (0.979)	
Military Feasibility (Defender)			-0.000125 (0.000108)	-0.0000136 (0.0000106)
Political Feasibility (Defender)		-0.464* (0.227)	-0.0963 (0.254)	-0.307* (0.135)
Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)			2.627 (5.522)	-1.460 (2.393)
Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)		1.643 (1.197)	1.964 (1.429)	1.463* (0.739)
Audience Cost (Challenger)			1.382 (1.108)	1.136* (0.503)
Audience Cost (Defender)			0.908 (0.841)	-0.184 (0.479)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	52	47	42	97
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>	0.0382*	0.0087***	0.0181*	0.0007***
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0.099	0.168	0.232	0.093

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; All tests are two-tailed.

Lastly, Tables 11 and 12 provide the results of the two-stage logistic regression analyses for the deterrence failure's *long-term outcome*. The first regression model (Model 8a, Table 11) includes the DEFENDER'S POLICY CHOICE, the CHALLENGER'S

POLICY CHOICE, and the CONTENT OF CRISIS OUTCOME as independent variables, and treats both the DEFENDER'S POLICY CHOICE and the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE as endogenous variables. The crisis actors' nuclear capability (their POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DEFENDER'S NUCLEAR MILITARY FEASIBILITY, and the DEFENDER'S NUCLEAR POLITICAL FEASIBILITY) has impact on these endogenous variables.

The second model (Model 8b, Table 12) also has the DEFENDER'S POLICY CHOICE, the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICE, and the CONTENT OF CRISIS OUTCOME as independent variables. This model, however, fully specifies the factors that could affect the policy choices of the defender and the challenger. These factors comprise (1) crisis actors' nuclear capability, (2) the defender's feasibility to follow through (its MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY), (3) the defender's level of resolve (the defender's PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, INTEREST AT STAKE, and AUDIENCE COST), and (4) the challenger's resolve (the challenger's PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, INTEREST AT STAKE, and AUDIENCE COST).

When only nuclear capabilities are considered, as shown in Table 9, the DEFENDER'S and the CHALLENGER'S POLICY CHOICES are statistically significant, and they both are negatively correlated with the long-term outcome. The crisis termination with the "STALEMATE" outcome also has a significant impact on the long-term outcome as discussed earlier. The challenger's policy choice is influenced by the DEFENDER'S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS and its MILITARY FEASIBILITY TO IMPLEMENT NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT. The defender's policy choice is affected by the STALEMATE outcome, the DEFENDER'S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS and the CHALLENGER'S MILITARY FEASIBILITY TO IMPLEMENT
NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT.

In the fully specified model (Table 12), however, neither the defender nor the challenger's policy choices have any impact on the long-term outcome. Furthermore, the p-value for the model itself is too high. Given that this model as a whole fails to reject the null hypothesis, any variables that are statistically significant in the model should not be interpreted as they have any real causal impact.

Table 11: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) Crisis Actors' Nuclear Capability and the Long-term Outcome, 1918-2015 (Model 8a)

Variables	Model 8a	Variables (cont.)	Model 8a (cont.)	Variables (cont.)	Model 8a (cont.)
Long-term Outcome		Defender's Policy Choice		Challenger's Policy Choice	
Defender's Policy Choice	-1.375* (0.599)				
Challenger's Policy Choice	-1.305* (0.508)				
Content of Crisis Outcome		Content of Crisis Outcome		Content of Crisis Outcome	
<i>compromise</i>	0.0252 (0.449)	<i>compromise</i>	0.0952 (0.175)	<i>compromise</i>	-0.0763 (0.189)
<i>stalemate</i>	0.996* (0.409)	<i>stalemate</i>	0.420* (0.168)	<i>stalemate</i>	0.219 (0.182)
<i>defeat</i>	0.786 (0.700)	<i>defeat</i>	0.480* (0.225)	<i>defeat</i>	0.134 (0.244)
Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)		Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)	0.472* (0.218)	Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)	-0.443* (0.221)
Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)		Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)	-0.372 (0.225)	Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)	0.412* (0.202)
Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)		Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)	-0.0438 (0.156)	Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)	0.110 (0.162)
Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Challenger)		Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Challenger)	-0.345* (0.157)	Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Challenger)	0.368 (0.200)
Nuclear Military Feasibility (Challenger)		Nuclear Military Feasibility (Challenger)	0.466 (0.246)	Nuclear Military Feasibility (Challenger)	-0.326 (0.308)
Nuclear Political Feasibility (Challenger)		Nuclear Political Feasibility (Challenger)	-0.0184 (0.125)	Nuclear Political Feasibility (Challenger)	0.0778 (0.126)
Constant	0.513 (0.442)	Constant	0.101 (0.153)	Constant	0.292 (0.168)
<i>Number of Observations</i>		52			
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>		0.0000***			
<i>Wald Chi-Square test</i>		62.86			

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; All tests are two-tailed.

Table 12: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) Crisis Actors' Nuclear Capability and the Long-term Outcome, 1918-2015 (Model 8b)

Variables	Model 8b	Variables (cont.)	Model 8b (cont.)	Variables (cont.)	Model 8b (cont.)
Long-term Outcome		Defender's Policy Choice		Challenger's Policy Choice	
Defender's Policy Choice	-0.388 (1.246)				
Challenger's Policy Choice	0.241 (1.265)				
Content of Crisis Outcome		Content of Crisis Outcome		Content of Crisis Outcome	
<i>compromise</i>	-0.0737 (0.607)	<i>compromise</i>	0.0360 (0.159)	<i>compromise</i>	-0.145 (0.176)
<i>stalemate</i>	0.668 (0.705)	<i>stalemate</i>	0.233 (0.154)	<i>stalemate</i>	0.0178 (0.170)
<i>defeat</i>	-0.447 (0.952)	<i>defeat</i>	0.325 (0.201)	<i>defeat</i>	0.122 (0.222)
Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)		Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)	0.305 (0.203)	Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Defender)	-0.279 (0.225)
Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)		Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)	-0.718* (0.292)	Nuclear Military Feasibility (Defender)	0.0167 (0.327)
Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)		Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)	0.462* (0.209)	Nuclear Political Feasibility (Defender)	0.804*** (0.228)
Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Challenger)		Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Challenger)	0.0396 (0.232)	Possession of Nuclear Weapons (Challenger)	0.544* (0.259)
Nuclear Military Feasibility (Challenger)		Nuclear Military Feasibility (Challenger)	0.0225 (0.299)	Nuclear Military Feasibility (Challenger)	-1.044** (0.337)
Nuclear Political Feasibility (Challenger)		Nuclear Political Feasibility (Challenger)	-0.254 (0.176)	Nuclear Political Feasibility (Challenger)	-0.234 (0.199)
Military Feasibility (Defender)		Military Feasibility (Defender)	0.000000833 (0.00000468)	Military Feasibility (Defender)	0.00000205 (0.00000513)
Political Feasibility (Defender)		Political Feasibility (Defender)	-0.0942 (0.0670)	Political Feasibility (Defender)	-0.0696 (0.0714)
Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)		Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)		Probability of Victory & War Costs (Defender)	1.230* (0.504)
Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)		Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)	0.243 (0.260)	Interest at Stake (Defender and Challenger)	-0.140 (0.287)

Audience Cost (Defender)		Audience Cost (Defender)	-0.417** (0.131)	Audience Cost (Defender)	0.0673 (0.145)
Audience Cost (Challenger)		Audience Cost (Challenger)	0.173 (0.138)	Audience Cost (Challenger)	0.215 (0.152)
Constant	-0.478 (0.620)	Constant	0.401 (0.522)	Constant	0.395 (0.573)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	42				
<i>Probability > Chi-Square</i>	0.6443				
<i>Wald Chi-Square test</i>	3.36				

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$; All tests are two-tailed.

3. Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, the dissertation examines the impact of the defender's military and political feasibility to punish the challenger on the challenger's policy, the defender's policy, the short- and the long-term outcome of the direct defensive deterrence failure. The ordered logistic and two-stage logistic regression models find that this feasibility variable matters in almost every stage of the deterrence failure. First, the defender's military and political feasibility to punish has a statistically significant impact on the challenger's policy choice. One unit increase in this feasibility variable always leads to a decrease in the challenger's level of aggressiveness.²²⁵ Although the political feasibility loses its significance when it is tested in a fully specified model considering all the relevant variables that the rival hypothesis suggests, the military feasibility holds its significance even after controlling for them. This

²²⁵ One unit increase of the military feasibility causes 0.00189 percent decrease and that of the political feasibility leads to 18.68469 percent decrease in the challenger's level of aggressiveness.

result implies that the defender's military feasibility to punish its potential challenger seeking the revision of the status quo is one of the main factors that lead to deterrence failure.

Second, the defender's military feasibility not only has a significant impact on the challenger's policy choice but also affects the former's calculation. While one unit increase of the military feasibility leads to a decrease in the challenger's aggressiveness, that increase brings about an increase in the defender's aggressiveness in its policy choice. Third, the defender's political feasibility to punish its adversary is a statistically significant predictor for the short-term outcome of the deterrence failure. One unit increase in the defender's political feasibility decreases the intensity of violence in the short-term outcome by 23.14604 percent. This finding holds even after it is tested with other control variables.²²⁶ Fourth, the regression analyses do not find any significant variables that influence the long-term outcome of the deterrence failure except for the contents of the crisis outcome. It was more likely to experience other crises between the same crisis actors when the deterrence failure crisis had terminated in stalemate without clear victors.

This significance of the feasibility variable holds after controlling the impact of the nuclear capability variable. It is the defender's military feasibility to implement nuclear punishment, not the possession of the weapons itself, that decreases the challenger's aggressiveness in defying against the deterrent threat. When the defender's economic openness to the international community increases, which theoretically implies that its political feasibility to implement nuclear punishment against the challenger has got decreased, the challenger chose more violent policies. While the defender's policy choice is

²²⁶ In the fully specified model, it decreases the violence level of the short-term outcome by 26.44472 percent.

not affected by the challenger's nuclear capability, it is greatly influenced by the challenger's policy choice. This challenger's policy choice, however, is mostly caused by the defender's military and political feasibility to use nuclear sanctions against the challenger. The defender's military feasibility of nuclear punishment continues to matter in deciding the short-term outcome decreasing its intensity of violence. The analysis fails to find any relevant factors that influence the long-term outcome of the deterrence failure even with the consideration of the nuclear capability variable.

CHAPTER IV

DE-ESCALATION: FRENCH RETREAT DURING THE 1936 RHINELAND CRISIS

The statistical analysis on the population of direct deterrence failure in the previous chapter confirms that the feasibility of punishment is a relevant factor in explaining the policy choices of the challenger and the defender as well as the short-term outcome of deterrence failure crises. On the contrary to the previous Rational and Cognitive Deterrence models' prediction, the statistical analysis finds that war is not the most frequent short-term outcome of the crises. The regression models also confirm that nuclear weapons become a significant factor only when the defender secures the military and political feasibility to implement them as a tool for punishment. As emphasized earlier, however, the regression analyses do not test the impact of the belief updating variable throughout the deterrence failure crisis, and those findings from the statistical analysis do not show how decisive the feasibility variable is in causing the crisis actors to choose a certain policy

To address these shortcomings, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 turn to case studies and the method of process-tracing. The technique helps researchers eliminate as many rival hypotheses as possible²²⁷ and determine the most relevant independent variable that determines the value of the dependent variable in the selected case. The following three chapters test the validity of the *feasibility of punishment* and the *belief updating* models against five cases, namely, the 1936 Rhineland Crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the

²²⁷ David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *Political Science and Politics* 44, No. 4 (2011): pp. 823-830. See also James Mahoney, "The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences," *Sociological Methods and Research* 41, No.4 (2012): pp. 570-59; and Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel, *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014).

1969 Sino-USSR Border Dispute, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Falklands War. As discussed beforehand, this project conducts mini-case studies for the latter three crises due to unavailability of acquiring sufficient declassified primary sources.

All five case studies ask the same set of questions: (1) Why did the challenger decide to defy the defender? (2) Why did the defender choose to respond in a particular way? (3) How did the crisis end? (4) What happened after the crisis termination? (5) Did possession of nuclear weapons (i.e. their potential/actual use) matter throughout the crisis? In this chapter, the German and the French policymaking process during the Rhineland Crisis are closely analyzed based on diplomatic documents and testimonies of political elites in Berlin and Paris. As neither Germany nor France possessed any nuclear weapons capabilities in 1936, this chapter focuses on answering the first four questions.

1. Causes of Failure: Why Did Germany Decide to Defy the Rhineland regime?

1-1. Background of the Crisis: the Rhineland Regime

The Rhineland regime was an outcome of the compromise between resentful France and the reluctant U.S. and Britain. It was France that suffered the most from the Great War. Thirty-nine percent of all allied forces' combat casualties and twenty-nine percent of the total wounded came from France.²²⁸ Decision-makers in Paris believed that crippling

²²⁸ James T. Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis* (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1977), p. 19.

Germany permanently²²⁹ was the only way to address the “German Question”²³⁰ and to prevent another devastating war in Europe. Washington, however, wanted to solve the problem by ending the malicious balance-of-power diplomacy and building a new system of collective security. In this context, Wilson believed that “too much success or security on the part of Allies will make a genuine peace settlement exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.”²³¹ London also believed that German revival was necessary to rebuild the post-War European economy, and to check the emerging threat of Bolshevism from Russia.²³² This tension between the two camps and the mutual compromise led to the establishment of the Rhineland regime.

The regime installed a demilitarized zone that extended fifty kilometers to the East and the West from the Rhine (Map 1). The fact that Rhine River was “the only natural barrier to another invasion”²³³ was an important reason for setting this zone. The demilitarized zone not only made the German military advance towards France or the Low Countries nearly impossible, but it also left Germany’s west flank unprotected for France and the Little

²²⁹ See Peter Jackson, “Politics, Culture, and the Security of France: A Reinterpretation of French Foreign and Security Policy after the First World War,” *French Historical Studies* 34, no. 4 (Fall 2011): pp. 577-610 for the detail schemes of France for implementing this.

²³⁰ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), pp. 209-210.

²³¹ Stephen A. Schuker, “The Rhineland Question: West European Security at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,” in *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after Seventy-five Years*, edited by Manfred Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 278.

²³² Clement Leibovitz and Alvin Finkel, *In Our Time: The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), pp. 132-134.


²³³ Stephen A. Schuker, “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936,” *French Historical Studies* 4, no. 3 (1986): pp. 299-339.

Entente countries to create a two-front war for Germany easily.²³⁴ On account of these specific security considerations behind the establishment of the Rhineland regime, it was still a direct defensive deterrent attempt for Paris even though the Rhineland was still part of German territory. In other words, for France, the demilitarized zone was the front line that it had to protect in order to constrain the German expansion towards the east or the west, whereas for Germany it was the shackle that needed to be removed first in order to accomplish its strategic goal of securing *Lebensraum*, the living space for the German people.²³⁵

²³⁴ Gerhard L. Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 239.

²³⁵ Hitler wrote in his *Secret Book* that: "An additional 500,000 square kilometers in Europe can provide new homesteads for millions of German peasants, and make available millions of soldiers to the power of the German people for the moment of decision. The only area in Europe that could be considered for such a territorial policy therefore was Russia." Adolf Hitler, *Hitler's Secret Book* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 74. Thus, remilitarization of Rhineland was essential to take his next step, which leads to the Czechoslovakia Crisis, and finally to the great war with Russia and other European states.

Map 1: The Rhineland Demilitarized Zone²³⁶



Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles prescribed a demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, and article 44 stipulates that a violation of articles 42 and 43 will be considered as a “hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty,” and disrupting “the peace of the world.”²³⁷ This article meant that the violation of the treaty was the “equivalent

²³⁶ Samuel W. Mitcham Jr., *The Rise of the Wehrmacht: The German Armed Forces and World War II* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 60.

²³⁷ Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, “The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919: Part III” <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partiii.asp> (accessed on March 4, 2018).

to resort to war.”²³⁸ Article 44 was confirmed later by the five signatories of the Locarno Treaty: Italy, Belgium, Britain, France, and Germany.²³⁹ The treaty allowed France to take “immediate action” and receive military assistance from Italy, Belgium, and Britain in case of a German “flagrant breach” of terms. The Rhineland regime, thus, was built on a threat of war against Berlin to prevent Germany from challenging it.

However, Germany retained “the most technologically skilled population in Europe” even after the War, and permanent disarmament of this mighty nation was as much a fantasy as “the tooth fairy.”²⁴⁰ Since Hitler seized power in 1933, Germany concentrated its national energy to build up its armed forces at an astonishing pace. In March 1935, Hitler declared that Germany would reintroduce conscription, which was strictly banned by the Versailles Treaty.

His next target was to restore full sovereignty over the Rhine. He wanted to challenge the regime as the demilitarized zone was the “sole remaining major domestic symbol of Germany’s second-class status.”²⁴¹ More importantly, Hitler calculated that even though the German army would be “considerably stronger” in the spring of 1937, Germany’s transient strategic superiority over others—France, Britain, and especially Russia—would be diminished by 1937 because their adversaries had begun their

²³⁸ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, 20

²³⁹ Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, “The Locarno Pact; October 16, 1925” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/locarno_001.asp (accessed on March 4, 2018).

²⁴⁰ Schuker, “The Rhineland Question,” pp. 275-6.

²⁴¹ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, p. 74.

rearmament programs in 1935.²⁴² Furthermore, it seemed clear that German economic conditions would never be able to sustain the rapid rearmament program as planned.²⁴³ Considering its lack of raw materials and scarce level of foreign currency reserves, *ad hoc* measures such as currency controls, barter arrangements, and production of synthetic substitutes under the Four Year Plan would never be enough “to balance the demands made by the arms buildup.”²⁴⁴ This possibility for unfavorable power shifts in the near future provided a great motivation to challenge the Rhineland regime as soon as possible so that Germany could absorb the strategic resources in the area, especially the coal and the population to consolidate its military power.²⁴⁵

But Hitler’s ambition should have been deterred by the French threat of war that was supported by other signatories of the Locarno Treaty. What did make him and his staff members believe that they should challenge the regime despite the French deterrent threat? Was it because Berlin was a determined aggressor and very resolved to revise the status quo risking a war as Rational and Cognitive Deterrence models predict? Or, was it because German policymakers were not ready to start a war but estimated that France would not

²⁴² *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (hereafter *DGFP*), Series C (1933-1937), Vol. IV (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1966), p. 1142.

²⁴³ Worsening economic condition in Germany led the slogan of National Socialism party to be changed from “Freedom and Bread” to “Guns or Butter” in January 1936. Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany*, pp. 245-246.

²⁴⁴ Kennedy points out that these chronic economic conditions encouraged Hitler “to resort to war in order to obviate such economic difficulties.” So it was a war “for the plunder of manpower and materials.” Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, pp. 307-309.

²⁴⁵ The demilitarized zone was vast. It was 18.5 percent of Germany’s total land area which was populated with 15,400,000 people (twenty-four percent of total German population). It was larger than the nation of Austria. Mitcham, *The Rise of the Wehrmacht*, p. 59.

react violently given the latter's military, political, or normative infeasibility to punish German defiance?`

1-2. *Who Was Responsible for the Choice to Remilitarize the Rhineland?*

Before we move on and discuss the rationale behind Berlin's decision to challenge the Rhineland regime, it is necessary to identify who was responsible for this decision among policymakers in Germany. According to Emmerson, it was barely four weeks before the actual execution of the remilitarizing operation that Hitler started to discuss the matter with his staff members openly.²⁴⁶ Weinberg points out that the actual consultation with his advisers occurred around Christmas 1935 at the latest.²⁴⁷ Regardless of the actual timing for initiation of the group discussion in Berlin, unclassified diplomatic records show that a very handful number of political and military elites were involved in the decision-making process. They were the Führer Hitler, Commander in Chief (of the *Luftwaffe*, or Air Force) Göring, Propaganda Minister Goebbels, Ambassador (Plenipotentiary at Large) Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister Neurath, State Secretary Bülow, War Minister Blomberg, Commander in Chief (of the Army) Fritsch, Ambassador (in Italy) Hassell, and Ambassador (in France) Forster.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, p. 72.

²⁴⁷ Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany*, p. 242.

²⁴⁸ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, p. 101.

We now know that it was Hitler and Neurath²⁴⁹ who consistently upheld the policy choice of the coup against the Rhineland regime betting on French inaction, or at best economic sanctions. Ribbentrop was also supportive, but he was a yes-man, “enthusiastic echo-chamber” and the alter ego to Hitler.²⁵⁰ Fritsch agreed with the plan under the condition of not involving any hostilities²⁵¹. Ambassadors Hassell and Forster’s role was mainly limited to providing Hitler with up-to-date information on Rome and Paris. Meanwhile, Göring was “terrified by the Chancellor’s decision”²⁵² and Blomberg hesitated to support the path and later on proposed partial withdrawal of troops in the demilitarized zone.²⁵³ In this regard, it was Hitler who sat on the driver’s seat, and Neurath provided confidence to the Führer sitting in the passenger seat throughout the crisis.

We should take note that, at the end of the day, it was Hitler who was in charge. Testimonies of German political and military elites at the Nuremberg war crimes trial repeatedly confirm Hitler’s extremely authoritative communication style. Since Hitler became the head of state, debates in the cabinet were “stopped altogether.” The ministers were “not allowed to feel that they were political ministers” and “large-scale political

²⁴⁹ *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (hereafter *TMWC*), XVII (Nuremberg, Germany, 1948), p. 41; Zach Shore, “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no.1: pp. 6, 10. On the contrary, Emmerson argues that it was not a passionate approval but resignation as he believed the demilitarized zone would disappear peacefully within a year or two and the direct challenge to the regime would make already isolated Germany even more isolated. Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, p. 83.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 82; Michael Bloch, *Ribbentrop: A Biography* (London: Crown, 1992)

²⁵¹ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, p. 82.

²⁵² Shore, “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine,” p. 9.

²⁵³ Shore, “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine,” p. 17.

decisions were certainly made by him [Hitler] alone.”²⁵⁴ It was difficult for his staff to suggest any opinion during the cabinet meetings as Hitler takes over “the entire discussion and to exhaust the subject entirely from his point of view.”²⁵⁵ Coming back to the subject again after his long sermon, of course, was a very onerous task. If an adviser wanted to present a second opinion to Hitler, he should do so in private since opposing a superior in rank was “unbearable” to the Führer.²⁵⁶ Most staff in the Reich Cabinet were not even informed of the march towards the Rhineland until it happened.²⁵⁷ For example, von Manstein, Chief of the General Staff at the headquarters of Wehrkreis III, had been given only afternoon time to complete the preparation order for the remilitarizing operation which was supposed to happen the next morning.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁴ *TMWC*, IX, pp. 39-40; *TMWC*, XX, p. 601.

²⁵⁵ *TMWC*, X, p. 483.

²⁵⁶ *TMWC*, X, p. 484.

²⁵⁷ *TMWC*, IX, p. 39.

²⁵⁸ *TMWC*, XX, p. 603.

1-3. *Hitler's Rationale: Betting on French Non-violent Reactions*

Considering that it was Hitler who was ultimately responsible for the German decision to send troops to the demilitarized zone, it is important to determine what he knew before making this decision and what information was crucial for him during the process to understand the rationale behind his policy choice. As Hitler killed himself before the fall of Berlin, he left neither memoirs nor testimonies at the Nuremberg trial. Fortunately, Ambassador Hassell sent a report about his meeting with the Führer on the Rhineland issue to Foreign Minister Neurath on February 14, 1936, to help the Minister compete with his rivals by having the information on Hitler's thinking ahead,²⁵⁹ and left memorandum to record his second interview with Hitler on February 20, 1936.²⁶⁰ Arguably, these two documents are almost everything that we have now which can be used to analyze Hitler's reasoning behind his decision to send troops to the demilitarized zone on March 7, 1936.

On February 14, During the first interview between Ambassador Hassell and Hitler, the Führer first said the French ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact would provide grounds for denouncing the Locarno Treaty and the Rhineland regime. He first believed that the right timing for remilitarizing the Rhine would be around the spring of 1937 when the German army would become substantially stronger, and Russo-Japanese conflict would

²⁵⁹ Shore, "Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine," p. 17; *DGFP, C/IV*, pp. 1142-1144.

²⁶⁰ Neurath and Ribbentrop were participating in this meeting as well. *DGFP, C/IV*, pp. 1163-1166. Apparently, there was another meeting on February 12, 1936 in which Neurath, Ribbentrop, Blomberg and Forster participated. During this meeting, Hitler asked Forster whether France would retaliate against German coup. The Führer got agitated and concerned when Forster replied in negative regarding the possibility of the policy success. Shore, "Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine," p. 12.

add a further favorable context. Hitler, however, changed his mind and argued that the coup against the regime should occur as soon as the Soviet Pact gets ratified even though Germany was still weak and militarily “not yet ready.” His rationale behind this judgment was as follows.

First, other parties, especially Russia, had embarked on the rearmament program, and they would become stronger as well by 1937. Second, Russia currently has no intention to have any conflict with the West; Great Britain is “in a bad state militarily” as well as distracted by other problems; France is disturbed by serious domestic political issues. Third, public opinion in Britain and France is also not very sympathetic to the Russian Pact, which should be regarded as the German advantage. Based on these observations, he concluded that dispatching troops to the demilitarized zone would not “be answered by military action – though perhaps by economic sanctions.”²⁶¹

The second discussion followed on February 20, 1936. In the morning, Hassell met Italian Ambassador to Berlin Attolico and confirmed that Italy was prepared to break away from the Locarno obligations. After this meeting, he went to Neurath, who again predicted that other powers would not militarily retaliate against the German challenge. But the Foreign Minister was concerned about the negative implications of the remilitarization for German foreign relations, especially with Britain which was preparing for “working agreement” among London, Berlin, and Paris. Hassell replied that he was also worried about possible shifts in Rome’s position with regard to the Locarno Treaty given that Italy was less likely to receive intensified economic sanctions led by Britain. Then both Hassell

²⁶¹ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 1142.

and Neurath visited the Führer around 12:15 PM and found that Ribbentrop was there as well. In this meeting, Hitler replied to their concerns by emphasizing the below five points.

First, it is important to remember that the Rhineland regime could become “a sort of inviolable institution” as time goes by. Second, Italy’s recent military success in Ethiopia would harden London’s foreign policy against Rome. Third, Mussolini would not seek compromise with Britain after his success in Ethiopia. Fourth, given that the two Fascist states encircled by democratic regimes “tainted by Bolshevism,” passivity could not be the right path in the long run and “attack [...] was the better strategy.” Fifth, to address the negative ramification of German coup for its relations with other states, it is important to “deprive” Locarno powers of the possibility of acting against Berlin. Hitler, thus, underscores the necessity of simultaneously offering series of peace treaties, such as re-establishment of demilitarized zone on *both* France/Belgium and German sides, Three-Power Western air pact, and long-term non-aggression pact with France.²⁶²

²⁶² *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 1165. After hearing this, Hassell warned that “ninety-five per cent of the French, and probably most of the British too, would [...] be conscious of the threat involved in the occupation,” but the Führer “made no reply.” *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 1166.

1-4. The Origin of the German Challenge: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses

Hitler's nine points emphasized in Hassell's reports provide crucial evidence that allows us to test rival and research hypotheses of this project. As discussed in the previous chapters, Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature predicts that direct deterrence can only fail when the challenger is as resolute as the defender. The factors that decide the former's level of resolve are (1) probability of victory in war, (2) level of interest at stake, (3) war cost, (4) audience/reputational costs for not challenging the status quo, and (5) cultural/historical hostility. Direction and degree of these variables would determine the challenger's policy choice: the more resolved the challenger is, the more aggressive policies (from gradual escalation to rapid escalation) it would choose in defying the defender's direct deterrent threat. It seems possible, thus, to argue that the failure of the French direct defensive deterrence against Germany in March 1936 was because Hitler was a determined aggressor.

Specifically, first, Hitler calculated that an unfavorable power shift might occur in spring of 1937 due to rearmament programs in Britain and Russia and he decided to challenge the Rhineland regime in early 1936 when the power balance was still advantageous to Germany to increase the probability of victory in a possible war. Second, as the Führer emphasized that denouncing the regime was necessary for restoring full sovereignty of Germany, the demilitarized zone was framed as "loss" rather than "gains" for German people, which should have made the policy circle in Berlin more risk-acceptant. Third, thanks to its rapid rearmament and military modernization programs, especially its

mechanized ground forces and Air Force squadrons manufactured by the latest technology, Hitler thought the Reich troops could quickly repel forces of Locarno Powers without sacrificing too much German blood. Lastly, due to what happened during the interwar period, such as the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, Germans hated the French. Berlin, in this regard, was an extremely resolved challenger which was why France's credible deterrent threat failed.

Indeed, there is some truth in this argument. However, archive evidence does not support this explanation of the rival hypothesis based on Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories, hence, the hypothesis fails to survive the smoking gun, the hoop, and the straw-in-the-winds tests.

First, according to Hassell, Hitler precisely stated on February 14 that he decided to move up the timing of the remilitarizing the Rhineland from the spring of 1937 to early March 1936 because of two reasons: (1) 1937 would be more disadvantageous for Germany in terms of relative military balance; and (2) Russia, Britain, and France was not prepared to punish German violation in early 1936.²⁶³ As the first reason fits well with the prediction of the rival hypothesis, it seems that the explanation should pass the smoking gun test. In addition to these two points, however, the Führer pointed out that Reich was still “not yet ready” for a general war in Europe in 1936. Hitler, thus, was not very confident that Germany could win a great war in Europe if it broke out in 1936. In other words, his rationale inclined to the high likelihood of *non-action* of his adversaries rather than that of

²⁶³ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 1142.

the *German victory* in a general war against Locarno Powers. The rival hypothesis, thus, fails to pass the smoking gun test.

Second, a famous quote from Hitler suggests that the rival hypothesis fails to survive the straw-in-the-wind test either. He said during his Berchtesgaden speech on February 12, 1938, that “when we entered the Rhineland with a handful of battalions, I risked a lot. If France had marched then, we would have had to withdraw, perhaps about 60 kilometers; even then we would have held them.” We should not take his remarks at face value as the Führer always sought to impress his listeners by using hyperbole. But it is not difficult to confirm that this remark tells some level of truth considering that Hitler hesitated at the last moment before ordering his troops to march on the demilitarized zone by asking his adjutant Colonel Hossbach to find out at what moment it would become impossible to call off the operation.²⁶⁴

Lastly, if the rival hypothesis is valid, Germany must have a detailed war plan to defeat French and other signatory powers’ forces. Four army corps and 13 infantry divisions were alerted when Hitler sent his 19 infantry battalions and 13 artillery units to the demilitarized zone, and he issued specific defensive schemes to three battalions among – Aachen, Trier, and Saabrücken – in case French troops advanced to the zone.²⁶⁵ Navy fleets and air force squadrons were also relocated in preparation for contingencies.²⁶⁶ Arguably, however, this is far from a plan for a full-scale war against Locarno powers. It is merely a

²⁶⁴ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, pp. 93-102.

²⁶⁵ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, pp. 97-98; Mitcham, *The Rise of the Wehrmacht*, pp. 61-62; Schuker, “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland,” pp. 304-305;

²⁶⁶ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, p. 99; *TMWC*, XXXIV, pp. 645-646.

defensive plan for a possible contingency. The focus of the military planning, as explained more in detail in the following paragraphs, is not on preparing for war but on carefully designing the formation of troops to make them seem non-aggressive and symbolic. The rival hypothesis, in this regard, fails to survive the hoop test and thus should be rejected.

On the contrary, the research hypothesis argues that direct deterrence can fail even when the challenger is not a resolved aggressor, but the defender's deterrent threat is regarded non-credible because of the latter's infeasibility to follow through on its threat. This problem of infeasible punishment occurs when (1) geographic obstacles, (2) domestic regime instability, (3) normative constraints, or (4) unsupportive alliance partners prevent the defender from imposing punishments against the challenger. Hitler, thus, decided to defy the Rhineland regime not because he could and would like to revise the status quo risking a war, but it seemed highly likely that Germany could get away with punishments of France and other signatories of the Locarno Treaty.

This argument passes the smoking gun test because, as discussed earlier, the central reason for Hitler's decision to renounce the Rhineland regime in early 1936 was his expectation of non-actions in Russia, Britain, Italy, and France.²⁶⁷ What did Hitler know about the strategic context that Germany was facing in February 1936? What did lead him to predict that Locarno powers would not violently react to German violation of the treaty?

First, the Führer was aware of the weakness in the Soviet military power.²⁶⁸ His military attaché in the Soviet Union reported that tremendous works should be done,

²⁶⁷ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 1142.

²⁶⁸ Technically, the military alliance between Paris and Moscow was not effective until March 27, 1936 when the Soviet Union exchanged the ratification. However, the German challenge against France's one

especially “in the spheres of the armaments industry and transport,” for Russia to have some offensive capability. The Russian policy of peace and security, thus, was recognition that “they are not yet capable of attack.”²⁶⁹ This estimation about the Soviet military readiness was not a sole personal opinion of the German military attaché in Moscow. Many British political elites, including King George V, First Lord of the Admiralty Monsell, and War Minister Cooper, also emphasized that Russia presented no military threat to Germany as they were “poor in military matters” and could “at best be set in motion eastwards.”²⁷⁰

Second, it seemed obvious that Italy would no longer side with Stresa powers²⁷¹ as long as London tries to thwart Italian success in Ethiopia. Hitler vigorously sought to secure the endorsement from Rome that the Locarno obligations would not bind Italy. Ambassador Hassell did not fail him on this. Italians were most grateful for Germany’s non-participation in the British-led economic sanctions, and many influential elites in Rome expressed that “the Stresa structure today certainly no longer corresponds to the Italian ideal.”²⁷² Mussolini himself declared that “Stresa was dead” and Italy “by no means wished to return to Stresa.”²⁷³ He confirmed that the world would not witness “any diplomatic or political opposition by Italy if Germany were to denounce the Locarno

of the most important security apparatus could trigger violent reactions from Moscow considering that the crisis could be regarded as the first testing ground for newly established alliance partnership.

²⁶⁹ *DGFP*, C/IV, p. 20.

²⁷⁰ *DGFP*, C/IV, pp. 1061-1062, 1065-1066.

²⁷¹ Stresa conference was organized under the leadership of Paris to condemn Hitler’s declaration of conscription and reaffirm Locarno obligations. France, Great Britain, and Italy participated in this conference. Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, pp.41-42.

²⁷² *DGFP*, C/IV, p. 959.

²⁷³ *DGFP*, C/IV, pp. 1013, 1044

Pact”²⁷⁴ and Rome “would not participate in any counter-reaction which might be called forth by a German reaction to the ratification [of the Franco-Soviet Pact].”²⁷⁵

Third, Hitler believed that it would be difficult for London to come to Paris’ aid due to the domestic opposition the British government faced. Policymakers in London rejected the view that Britain should rigidly adhere to treaty obligations²⁷⁶ and British public opinion was refusing to support the French attempt to transform the League of Nations into a one-sided organization opposing Germany.²⁷⁷ The Foreign Secretary Eden clarified that none of the Anglo-French negotiations were to oblige London to defend Paris over the German-French frontier.²⁷⁸ This unfriendly response was possibly due to “widespread annoyance about French unreliability” in London as French behaviors over the Mediterranean crisis disappointed British people.²⁷⁹ The guiding idea of British foreign policy, thus, was far from supporting France to the end but avoiding being “drawn into war with Germany again” in any circumstances.²⁸⁰ Great Britain rather wanted Germany to “be

²⁷⁴ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 1161.

²⁷⁵ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 1219.

²⁷⁶ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 671.

²⁷⁷ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 733.

²⁷⁸ *DGFP, C/IV*, pp. 972, 1039.

²⁷⁹ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 807.

²⁸⁰ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 906.

brought back into an international system for securing peace,”²⁸¹ and tried to construct German-British-French cooperation.²⁸²

Also, the Führer knew that London was in “a bad state” of military readiness.²⁸³ The British Ambassador in Berlin verified this by stating that the British Air Force base was located at “too great a distance to be able, if necessary, to intervene in the event of Britain having to fulfill her obligation to render assistance against Germany.”²⁸⁴ This statement implied that London was not only reluctant to be bound by Locarno obligations but also failed to maintain sufficient power projection capabilities to support France when Paris needed to level up her coercion against Germany or punish Berlin for its attempts to revise the status quo.

Lastly, and most importantly, Hitler kept abreast of French domestic politics and learned that Paris would face severe political opposition at home in punishing German coup against the Rhineland Regime. The French government warned Germany many times that there is a strong political consensus in the French government to stand firm against any German provocation.²⁸⁵ It was, however, confirmed by French Foreign Minister Laval that

²⁸¹ *DGFP*, C/IV, p. 907.

²⁸² *DGFP*, C/IV, p. 1208.

²⁸³ *DGFP*, C/IV, p. 1142.

²⁸⁴ *DGFP*, C/IV, p. 918.

²⁸⁵ Forster, German Chargé d’Affaires in France, reported Hitler that French Foreign Minister Flandin warned him that France would mobilize “in the event of a flagrant breach” of the Rhineland Pact. *DGFP*, C/IV, p. 1112.

the French public opinion was willing to fight only for the “defense of French soil” and opposing “under all circumstances, to military action beyond their frontiers.”²⁸⁶

Furthermore, although it is not clear whether Neurath shared this report with Hitler,²⁸⁷ Aschmann, Chief of the Foreign Ministry’s Press Division, wrote a report that very accurately understood what was going on in Paris regarding the Rhineland issue. In this report, he pointed out that French politicians passed the buck to the Army General Staff when it came to the preparation of countermeasures for possible German coup in the demilitarized zone. Military leaders, on the other hand, divided into two groups: one that saw no strategic value in the Rhineland regime due to extraordinary advancement in military motorization, and the other that believed the necessity to maintain the zone until France’s defensive garrisons, such as fortifications along the Maginot Line, were improved. Under this disunity in the French government, Aschmann predicted that “one is neither ready nor willing unhesitatingly to go to war over the eventuality of a German reoccupation [underlined in the original text].”²⁸⁸

All the above mentioned documentary evidence proves that Hitler was aware of political and military obstacles that France and other Locarno powers were facing, which should make it not very feasible for them to punish German violation of the treaty. Hitler

²⁸⁶ *DGFP, C/IV*, pp. 851, 916, 926.

²⁸⁷ Shore argues that there is no documentary evidence that Neurath shared Aschmann’s report with Hitler and he believes that it is highly likely that he did not. Shore, “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine,” pp. 6-7. But this should not make much difference as Neurath continuously provided Hitler with confidence that France would not react militarily. Similar points, thus, should have emphasized throughout the February meeting he had with Hitler before March 7.

²⁸⁸ This report does not appear in *DGFP*, but Shore found it the East German State Archives which were transferred to Berlin Lichterfelde in 1996. Shore, “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine,” p. 6.

precisely linked this strategic context with his decision to advance his plan by one year and challenged the Rhineland regime on March 7, 1936. The research hypothesis, thus, survives the smoking gun test.

The hypothesis based on the feasibility model also survives the hoop test. If it was because of the expected infeasibility of France and other signatories of Locarno Treaty to follow through on their threat, Germany should have exerted every effort to make it more infeasible, or at least keep it as difficult as it was, for Locarno powers to punish Berlin's defiance against the status quo. Emmerson shows that Berlin took exactly this path and worked along the line for three weeks before the remilitarization of the Rhineland.²⁸⁹

Germany did not participate in the economic sanctions imposed by the League of Nations and kept open Italy's economic supply line. By doing so, Berlin sought to buy support from Italy. The German foreign office, *Auswärtiges Amt*, tried to make British-German relations appear as cooperative as possible by following-up the bilateral naval agreements and suggesting air pact negotiations. As mentioned earlier in Hassell's report on February 20²⁹⁰, Hitler himself spelled out his scheme to simultaneously offer the most comprehensive peace treaties ever suggested by Reich when German troops marched into the Rhineland to maximize the opportunity cost of punishing Germany and subsequently made it politically very costly for Locarno powers to choose that route.

²⁸⁹ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, pp. 84-96.

²⁹⁰ *DGFP, C/IV*, p. 1165. For the actual seven propositions made by German government after the remilitarization, see *DGFP, C/V*, pp. 18-19. They include creation of demilitarized zone on both sides of Germany and France/Belgium, non-aggression pact between Germany, France, Belgium, Lithuania, air pact among Western Powers, and German return to the League of Nations.

Besides, Berlin worked out a very precise method in challenging the regime: creating *fait accompli* but making it a non-flagrant violation. Hitler sent infantry battalions and artillery units, a total of 22,000 men, to the demilitarized zone on March 7, 1936. Emmerson underscores that Hitler renounced the regime by not simply incorporating the police forces (*Landespolizei*) already within the zone into the army and declaring it, but sending the considerable number of army forces. Subsequently, to coerce the withdrawal of these troops, France should also mobilize the appropriate level of forces. However, the Reich troops were purposely not armed with offensive weapons such as tanks and bombers. This move made it very difficult to proclaim that the *casus foederis* was satisfied and France was authorized to take immediate retaliation while receiving military support from the treaty signatories.²⁹¹

All these carefully prepared diplomatic and military measures indicate that Hitler bet on the high likelihood that Italy, Britain, and the Soviet Union would not come to France's aid in punishing German attempts to renounce the Rhineland regime and France could not do much if Paris should shoulder the burden all by herself. Again, his rationale behind the choice of defying the French deterrent threat lay not in his confidence in achieving a rapid and easy military victory over Locarno powers, but in renouncing the regime at a very little cost or avoiding any punishment. Hitler was not a determined aggressor in spring 1936, but the French direct deterrence failed anyhow.

²⁹¹ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, pp. 96-98.

2. Conditions for Choice: Why Did France Decide to De-escalate?

2-1. *The French Expectation of the German Challenge*

The first warning found in diplomatic documents about the possibility of a German coup against the Rhineland regime is War Minister Daladier's note to French foreign office on September 4, 1933. He believed that the German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone would deeply jeopardize "the foundation of our national defense."²⁹²

By that time, growing worries about the rapid re-emergence of German power was widespread in the French military. The second rise of Germany was much more alarming considering that French military capabilities had got seriously deteriorated in the 1930s. Under the cumulative budget cut in defense spending from 1932 to 1935, the French army was short of modern equipment and merely maintaining offensive capabilities of "mothballed World War I leftovers" and "canvas relics."²⁹³ The unfortunate state of the French military led its leadership to come up with "Plan D," series of precautionary measures before general mobilization that allowed the deployment of the "covering units" in 23 days²⁹⁴ because any punishment measure required a major recall of reserves under this condition.

²⁹² Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *France and the Nazi Threat: the Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939* (New York: Enigma Books, 2004), p. 117.

²⁹³ Peter Jackson, *France and the Nazi Menace: Intelligence and Policy Making 1933-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 168; Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," p. 320.

²⁹⁴ Duroselle, *France and the Nazi Threat*, p. 123. This included (1) "Simple Alert" level (*Mesures d'alerte*) – regular army units go to their areas including the Maginot Line; (2) "Reinforced Alert" level (*Mesures d'alerte renforcé*) – border reservists are called up (call-up of about 35,000); (3) The "Security" level (*Mesures de sûreté*), allowing the call-up of many regulars and reservists to set up a

In 1935, Paris started to predict that the German renouncement of the Rhineland regime was imminent. On March 22, 1935, the French High Military Committee discussed the likelihood of abolishing the demilitarized zone. In April, War Minister Maurin stated that the Locarno regime had effectively disappeared as soon as Germany built “the strongest military power in Europe.” Foreign Minister Laval warned that in case Paris failed to respond appropriately to German violation of the Rhineland regime, France would lose all her allies and suffer “German peace.”²⁹⁵ Hitler’s speech on May 21, 1935, which argued that “the military alliance between France and Russia” would result “an element of legal insecurity has [without doubt] brought into the Locarno Pact,”²⁹⁶ proved right about this general fear in Paris and informed that Berlin would use the Soviet Pact as a pretext for their challenge.

In January 1936, General Colson, General Gamelin’s deputy, asserted that Germany could “place France brutally before at a *fait accompli*” by simply declaring the incorporation of the *Landespolizei* into the German army.²⁹⁷ On March 2, French military intelligence office Deuxième Bureau advised that France would face a *fait accompli* in the Rhineland as soon as the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact in the Chamber and these German forces would not withdraw unless they were defeated in a battle.²⁹⁸

“solid defensive front” (call-up of 120,000); (4) The “Coverage” level (*Mesures de couverture*) – three available classes and many reservists (call-up of 1 million). Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Documents diplomatiques français* (hereafter *DDF*) 1932-1939, 2^e Series, vol. I (Paris, 1963), p. 291.

²⁹⁵ Schuker, “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland,” p. 322.

²⁹⁶ *DGFP*, C/IV, p. 173

²⁹⁷ Schuker, “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland,” p. 326.

²⁹⁸ Jackson, *France and the Nazi Menace*, p. 170.

All these documentary evidence indicate that French policymakers had ample time of discussion, at least a year, before the actual German challenge against the Rhineland regime on March 7, 1936. What did they know about the strategic environment that France was facing in 1936? Which factors led different groups within the policy circle in Paris to come up with different countermeasures against the German coup? Which explanation for the rationale behind French policy choice of retreat does survive when it is tested against the documentary evidence?

2-2. *The February Meetings in 1936: "No Isolated Action"*

According to the note published by the French Foreign Office on February 1, 1936, Quai d'Orsay believed that the organization and development of *Landespolizei* in the Rhineland had already violated the Locarno Treaty. The Foreign Office, however, could not actively respond to Berlin's piecemeal violation of the treaty because it had the impression that Britain did not want to open this debate prematurely.²⁹⁹ The lukewarm attitude of London was crucially worrisome for French policymaking as they interpreted that the Locarno Treaty obliged Paris to take the issue of German violation to the League of Nations. It was too risky, thus, to make it an international issue without British blessing. The Foreign Office thought, in this regard, Paris should prepare for the possibility of direct German challenge against the zone by formulating precautionary or retaliatory measures in advance. As these measures were considered a "technical problem (*problèm technique*)," Quai d'Orsay requested the Ministry of War to submit proposals regarding the matter.

²⁹⁹ *DDF*, 2/I, pp. 174-176

Meanwhile, the office reviewed the viability of imposing an economic sanction against Berlin, which dropped from further consideration due to enormous damage it would cause to the members of the League in general.³⁰⁰

In reply to the Foreign Office, War Minister Maurin anticipated that Berlin would attempt to renounce the Rhineland regime within the time zone from the spring of 1936 to the beginning of 1937 under the pretext of the ratification of the Franco-Russian Pact. Imposing a *fait accompli*, he added, should not be a problem for Germany as *Landespolizei* was ready to be incorporated into the regular army and many barracks in the demilitarized zone were in good condition and ready to be used at once. General Maurin suggested possible countermeasures that Paris could take in case of German coup against the Rhineland regime: (1) *political measures* – reporting German violation to the League; and (2) *military measures* – setting up active troops nearby the border and preparing for interruption of the German communications.³⁰¹

Foreign Minister Flandin agreed that Paris should immediately appeal to the League if the Reich reoccupied the demilitarized zone and the French Army should do whatever seemed necessary for the defense of national security. He, however, underlined that Paris should provide not only retaliatory plans against German violations but also precautionary measures to discourage Hitler from engaging in such provocative actions.³⁰²

³⁰⁰ *DDF*, 2/I, pp. 244-245.

³⁰¹ *DDF*, 2/I, pp. 245-247.

³⁰² *DDF*, 2/I, pp. 277-278.

War Minister Maurin, then, responded that even in the case Germany sent regular troops to the demilitarized zone and fortified garrisons there, it would be against French national interest if Paris repelled the Reich army and forcefully reoccupied the zone. This military move should make France appear an aggressor. He emphasized that any military measure should be applied only with the full support of London and in close consultation with other Locarno powers and the League. Under this condition, he suggested four steps of mobilizations specified in the “Plan D” (*mesures d’alerte, alerte renforcée, sureté, and couverture*) to prevent enemy penetration further into the French territory. In the long run, he recommended the French government should invest its national efforts in perfecting French defensive organizations, reinforcing the density of French forces, and developing manufacture capability that could provide the army with necessary materials.³⁰³

Flandin replied to Maurin, complaining that he was not answering his question. The Foreign Minister again explained the difference between “reactionary measures of long-term rearmament plan (*des ripostes sur le plan de réarmement, à échéances lointaines*)” and “precautionary measure that Paris can take immediately (*précaution qui pourraient être prises immédiatement*),” and emphasized that what he asked for was the latter. Maurin’s letter, however, did not say anything about the measures Paris could take to “coerce Berlin to back down (*intimider l’adversaire ou pour le faire reculer*).” And he corrected Maurin’s error by pointing out that France did not have the right to reoccupy the

³⁰³ *DDF*, 2/I, pp. 290-293.

zone anyway under the Locarno Treaty. Paris was only authorized to make recourse to the League.³⁰⁴

It seems clear that Flandin failed to read between the lines in Maurin's letter. The War Minister was implying that it was not possible to prevent Germany from doing what Berlin wanted within her borders,³⁰⁵ and it would be detrimental for French interest if Paris took immediate measures to repel the Reich forces in the demilitarized zone. That was why he emphasized the importance of working closely with Britain and other Locarno Powers as well as reinforcing the French defensive capability by recalling reserves following the four steps of Plan D to discourage further penetration of German forces beyond the border.

We could infer this from the fact that the Ministers of Navy, Air Force, and Army Chief of Staff thoroughly discussed possible *precautionary measures* for compelling Germany to retreat. They emphasized the necessity in the presence of troops of Locarno Powers, such as Britain, in France's northeastern border. Along with French air forces, the Ministers of National Defense also believed that British Air Force squadrons and Royal Navy fleets could be used to demonstrate the resolve of the signatories of the Locarno Treaty.³⁰⁶ After all, however, they concluded that these measures would not obtain evacuation of the Reich forces.³⁰⁷ If so, what really could be done against German remilitarization of the Rhineland was either (1) immediately and forcefully driving out

³⁰⁴ *DDF*, 2/I, pp. 317-318.

³⁰⁵ This was clearly stated by Gen. Gamelin during the Chief of Staffs' meeting on February 19, 1936. *DDF*, 2/I, p. 301.

³⁰⁶ *DDF*, 2/I, pp. 299-302; 377-8.

³⁰⁷ *DDF*, 2/I, p. 300.

Reich forces from the zone with the blessing of Locarno Powers yet still risking a general war against Germany; or (2) holding fast the defensive lines along the border and bringing the issue to the League. Maurin supported the second path. Flandin, on the other hand, believed there was a third way: German retreat from the zone caused by a demonstration of strong and united resolve of the Locarno powers.

In the end, the cabinet meeting on February 27, 1936, decided to take “no isolated action (*aucune action isolée*).” While it was confirmed that French Government reserved the right to take any preparatory measures, including military ones, Paris decided to communicate with the British, Belgian and Italian Governments immediately to organize joint action following the League of Nations pact and the Locarno Treaty. The French policymakers made this decision about a week before the crisis, and Paris exactly followed the path when Hitler finally sent German troops to the demilitarized zone on March 7, 1936.

2-3. *The Cabinet Meetings on March 8 and 9, 1936: Politicians vs. Military Leaders*

As German forces unexpectedly marched into the Rhineland on Saturday morning, the first cabinet meeting could only be held the next day in the morning. Multiple sources confirmed that there were numerous ministerial-level meetings in Paris from March 8 to 11, 1936. Unfortunately, the absence of formal records and non-chronological descriptions

in the testimonies of French policymakers at the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry³⁰⁸ make it quite challenging to figure out what happened during the first post-crisis deliberation week in the French government.³⁰⁹ In this regard, this section constructs the rationale of key decision-makers of French policymakers by cross-checking their memoirs and testimonies at the Parliament. As it is generally agreed in the literature, and demonstrated in the pre-crisis discussion in Paris as well, that French military leaders were not eager to follow through on the threat whereas French politicians were resolved to take the punishment path.³¹⁰ The following paragraphs review and compare the position of Pierre Étienne Flandin (Foreign Minister), Joseph Paul-Boncour (Minister of State and Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations), Albert Sarraut (Prime Minister), Louis Maurin (Minister of War), and Maurice Gamelin (Army Chief of Staff).

Flandin argues that he had advocated the immediate punishment route only to be confronted by reluctant Ministers of National Defense and their staff in February 1936. War Minister informed the cabinet that the French military had been entirely prepared for defensive missions and lacking any offensive assets needed for such military operations Flandin suggested. When the Foreign Minister asked for the possibility of blocking German

³⁰⁸ *Les événements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945, rapport fait au nom de la Commission chargée d'enquêter par M. Chalres Serre* (hereafter *Les événements*), Tome I-VI (Imprimerie de l'assemblée nationale, 1951).

³⁰⁹ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, p. 104; Duroselle, *France and the Nazi Threat*, p. 130. This dearth of official records is mainly because Prime Minister Sarraut destroyed considerably large bundles of papers that he could not take with him when he left Paris on the night of June 12, 1940, before German entry to the city, to evade possible investigation of German police. *Les événements*, III, p. 605.

³¹⁰ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, pp. 104-110; Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," p. 317; Duroselle, *France and the Nazi Threat*, 131; Norrin Ripsman and Jack Levy, "The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s," *Security Studies* 16, no. 1 (January–March 2007): pp. 32-67.

ports of Bremen and Hamburg, Minister of Marine responded that it was infeasible without the support of the British navy. Then Minister of Air claimed that any aerial bombardment operation would cause devastating results as the German Air Force would penetrate the French anti-aircraft defense and consequently, imperil lives of civilians. The military leadership, however, did not commit to addressing this issue except for reporting this embarrassing state of the French army, Flandin complained.³¹¹

He describes that the cabinet meeting after the German coup against the Rhineland regime on March 7 was in “lamentable disarray (*lamentable désarroi*).” British government urged Paris not to take any action until Locarno powers convened. Minister of War proclaimed that Paris required general mobilization for intervening in the zone militarily. Other ministers cried out that “General mobilization six weeks before the election? It is madness!” French public opinion, both right and left, was also against immediate action. Only four members in the cabinet were in favor of immediate military action: Sarraut, Mandel (Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones), Paul-Boncour, and himself. Flandin admitted that immediate military action should involve internal and external difficulties, but he criticized that other cabinet members did not take into consideration the importance of inflicting a failure on Hitler. The council concluded that France should seize the League and secure support from London by not taking any immediate military measures.³¹²

³¹¹ Pierre Étienne Flandin, *Politique française: 1919-1940* (Paris: Broché, 1947), pp. 195-196.

³¹² Flandin, *Politique française*, pp. 196-205; *Les événements*, I, pp. 148-149.

Paul-Boncour tells a similar story. He argued that the purpose of the Rhineland clause in the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno was precisely for allowing immediate action in case of German violation. If France was obliged, by the treaties, to bring the issue to the League before taking any action, it is reversing the order of operation and would endanger the League to confront the *fait accompli*. He acknowledged that it would be imprudent to decide against the will of Britain, but he was certain that London would respect the treaty obligation and walk with Paris.³¹³ Unfortunately, it was only Mandel, Flandin, and himself who supported the immediate military action in the cabinet meeting.³¹⁴ As Flandin did, Paul-Boncour also criticized that this was because Maurin demanded the blank check of total mobilization, without providing any detailed information on the size and nature of Reich troops in the Rhineland, to take any military action against the German challenge. Ministers at the cabinet meeting were frightened and failed to realize the fatal consequence of the remilitarization that paralyzed the French alliance relationship with Poland and Czechoslovakia.³¹⁵

Sarraut also testifies that Flandin and Paul-Boncour advocated delivering military riposte along with appealing to the League of Nations and he was all the more in agreement

³¹³ He said “As they are loyal people, holding Locarno treaty in their hands, they would have walked if we had walked (parce que ce sont des gens loyaux, texte de Locarno en main, ils auraient marché si nous avions marché).” *Les événements*, III, p. 799.

³¹⁴ Paul-Boncour adds that Jacques Stern (Minister of Colonies) and Henri Guernut (Minister of National Education) were also hinted that they were sympathetic to this policy recommendation. But he also blames Flandin for surrendering to other ministers and suggesting to Sarraut that “Mr. President of the Council, I see that we should not insist (Monsieur le Président du Conseil, je vois qu’il ne faut pas insister).” *Les événements*, III, p. 799.

³¹⁵ Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres: Souvenirs sur la IIIe république*, Vol. III (New York: Brentano’s, 1946), pp. 33-38; *Les événements*, III, pp. 798-800.

with them.³¹⁶ However, the majority of cabinet members were reluctant to disregard London's request to a concert with Britain before taking any military actions and were skeptical about whether there was *casus foederis*. Locarno Treaty stipulated that "invasion" or "a flagrant violation of the demilitarized zone" as the condition for authorizing immediate military action against the challenger. More seriously, Chiefs of Staff warned the cabinet that any military action in the zone might lead to war.³¹⁷ The international community would blame France if war broke out after Paris blindly launching an offensive operation without consulting other signatories. Of course, Minister of War's request for a general mobilization played an important role in discouraging cabinet members from supporting the immediate military action, this fear of being stigmatized as an aggressor and an initiator of another major war had a significant impact as well according to Sarraut. Enormous pressure from the public opinion that unanimously clamored for "Above all, no war!" was also a great obstacle to following through on the deterrent threat.

In sum, Flandin, Paul-Boncour, and Sarraut all agree that it was the French military leadership that was responsible for Paris' choice not to take any immediate military measures after the deterrence failure. Although they emphasize different aspects of the military leaders' arguments – Maurin's call for total mobilization (according to Flandin and Paul-Boncour) versus General Staff's warning of an outbreak of war (according to Sarraut) –, Ministers of National Defense demonstrated clear lukewarmness taking unilateral military riposte and this was a major blow to cabinet member's support for the

³¹⁶ *Les événements*, III, pp. 576, 581-4, 643.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 622.

immediate action. Although Maurin and Gamelin assert that it was “coverage level (*Mesures de couverture*)” not a total mobilization,³¹⁸ they do not deny they were not supportive of the route of immediate military action.³¹⁹ Why did they take such a passive and hesitant approach? What was their rationale? We will test the rival and research hypotheses in the following section and compare the explanatory power of deterrence theories and the feasibility of punishment and belief updating models that this dissertation suggests.

2-4. *The Origin of the French Retreat: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses*

The Rhineland Crisis is absolutely anomaly to rational and cognitive deterrence theories. The defender should be resolute in the direct deterrence situation where their national security is at stake. The defender pays enormous audience costs if it backs down from its commitment to protecting its people and territory. The logic of vengeance and “loss aversion” also would not allow the defender to acquiesce in the revision of the status quo. The defender, thus, would not take the de-escalation route, and the level of *war cost* or the *probability of victory* in war would decide the degree of escalation. If Paris took the limited escalation path or non-violent punishment route such as economic sanctions, the deterrence theories would still be able to explain it: France chose gradual escalation strategy in fear of defeat in the war against Germany. However, Paris decided not to take

³¹⁸ *Les événements*, IV, 907; Maurice Gamelin, *Servir: Le Prologue du drame, 1930-août 1939*, Vol. II (Paris: Plon, 1946), 2003.

³¹⁹ *Les événements*, IV, p. 909.

any “isolated action,” yet in effect, they chose the non-action route. This French reaction is difficult to be explained by rational and cognitive deterrence theories.

As discussed in the previous section, diplomatic records and testimonies of decision-makers in Paris during the Crisis consistently attest that it was military leadership that was reluctant to take any immediate military measure, and thus mainly responsible for French policy choice of non-action. According to the new theory of deterrence failure, this dissertation suggests, this tepidness in the French military should come either from (1) non-feasibility of punishment or (2) belief updating. In other words, military elites wanted to deliver military riposte against German violation of the Locarno Treaty but could not recommend this option as they were aware of the absence of any military assets that were ready to be projected to the demilitarized zone. Alternatively, this might be due to their fear that Berlin was a determined aggressor given that it challenged against France’s credible deterrent threat.

First, the feasibility model passes the smoking gun test. According to Sarraut’s testimony, what ultimately prevented him from taking the immediate military measure was “the incapacity or unpreparedness of the military instrument at our disposal for the immediate act (*les inaptitudes ou les impréparations de l’instrument militaire à notre disposition pour le geste immediate*).”³²⁰ After the cabinet meetings on March 8 and 9, Sarraut wanted to press further on the isolated military riposte. Accordingly, he gathered only Ministers of National Defense, and not any of civilian cabinet members, on the evening of March 9. Sarraut insisted that if France succeeded and defeated Hitler’s bold

³²⁰ *Les événements*, III, p. 583.

move, Britain and Belgium would thank Paris, and he believed that this limited expeditionary or “a military police operation (*une opération de police militaire*)”³²¹ would quickly cross the border and push back Reich forces without risking a general war. Then, War Minister Maurin replied as follows.

Impossible! Our army is an army *designed for the defense* behind fortified stronghold, the Maginot Line, and has *no independent units* like the one you are saying. As the active forces and the reserve forces are tightly connected, it is impossible to detach some elements from the whole without disrupting it. Any attempt to use a unit more than its function as a part of the machine will cause stress to this coherent and organic mechanism. Everything fits! So if you want to do something, you have to order a mobilization, whichever operation you are thinking of: taking something as hostage or entering the Rhineland. We must mobilize immediately, even for simply holding something in pledge, several ranks, and about a million and a half troops. However, we should use caution when anticipating the reaction of a powerful adversary, *possibly a war*. It is necessary to consider the implementation of the general mobilization without delay. [emphasis added]³²²

Maurin emphasized that the French army was lacking any expeditionary forces for immediate military action against Germany. Gamelin also asserted a similar point by suggesting that air force might be the only effective asset that France could turn to for any offensive operation.³²³ They were both claiming that the French army was designed for defense as exemplified in the Maginot Line. Building small and agile forces for the offensive mission was unnecessary because advancing beyond the fortified defense line

³²¹ Ibid., p. 604.

³²² Ibid., 604.

³²³ *DDF*, 2/I, pp. 444-6.

after spending billions of francs on constructing the line was an “absurd idea” according to Maurin.³²⁴ Considering the enormous advantage in defense manifested during World War I and continued sharp budget cuts in military spending after the Depression, it is not easy to criticize him.

Sarraut lamented to have “brave enough, but obsessed and contaminated for too long by a purely defensive conception of the military system”³²⁵ as the War Minister. He excoriated Maurin for reconstructing the French army in a way that left “*nothing in hand to undertake an immediate and determined action.*”³²⁶ His reformulation of the military units forced Sarraut to use “*a hammer to strike a fly*” or to put the hammer in a way which to make it “*too heavy and too dangerous to handle, without killing the fly* [emphasized in the source].” As this is specifically Sarraut’s rationale why the evening ministerial meeting on March 9 ended up with the choice of no immediate military action, the feasibility hypothesis survives the smoking gun test.

Second, the belief updating model survives the hoop and smoking gun tests. If the model is correct, the French military must believe that war should break out once the French army marched into the Rhineland. As mentioned earlier, French Ministers of National Defense repeatedly demonstrated their serious concerns for the possibility of war in case Paris decided to deliver military riposte against Germany. In fact, during the Chiefs of Staff meeting on March 8, Gamelin argued that as soon as the French army entered the

³²⁴ *Les événements*, I, p. 95.

³²⁵ *Les événements*, III, p. 603.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 645.

area, a war would ensue.³²⁷ When Paul-Boncour mentioned at the cabinet meeting on March 9 that French recalling of the available should constitute a threat that might lead to Hitler's retreat, Maurin rejected this possibility as dictators would hardly back down. He, subsequently, believed that the French choice of immediate military action should inevitably cause war.³²⁸ He added that precisely the weakness in French antiaircraft defense (*défense contre les aéronefs* or D.C.A.) caused him not to be very positive about the idea of punishing Germany militarily.³²⁹ According to Sarraut, whenever Ministers of National Defense asked for general mobilization in the discussion of taking immediate military measures against Berlin, their rationale was the risk of war.³³⁰ All this evidence shows that the belief updating model survives the hoop test.

More importantly, the explanation also passes the smoking gun test. In the note published by Chiefs of Staff on February 19, 1936, they underscore that even combined forces of the British and French Army and Navy would not constitute a sufficient condition for obtaining Reich's evacuation in the Rhineland. What lay behind this pessimistic view was that Berlin "passed the Rubicon at its own risk (*passait le Rubicon à ses risques et périls*)." In this context, they recommend that the first line of action should focus on "political measures" in response to a German violation of the Locarno Treaty. This record clearly shows that belief updating logic was working among military elites in Paris: given

³²⁷ *DDF*, 2/I, p. 444.

³²⁸ *Les événements*, IV, p. 907.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 909.

³³⁰ *Les événements*, III, p. 605.

that Berlin challenged the treaty risking violent response from France, it would be highly likely that Germany was a resolved revisionist.

The French military leadership might be exaggerating the risk even though they did not genuinely believe the actual likelihood of war. For example, Jackson points out that, since Germany started to rearm its forces rapidly under the leadership of Hitler, the French high command constantly inflated the German threat and distorted intelligence to serve their agenda: securing enough defense expenditure for rearmament and modernization of French military. Although French Army, Air Force, and Navy were cognizant of a fundamental weakness in the Reich forces,³³¹ Chiefs of Staff intentionally disclosed this intelligence to “impress on civilian leaders the need for a large-scale rearmament program.”³³²

Their relentless efforts started to bear some fruits as France initiated its rearmament program in early 1936. The two-year military service was agreed to be resumed, light tanks, anti-tank vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, and some new artillery were scheduled to be introduced. However, French military planners still believed that they were facing more fundamental challenges: (1) sorry state of French industrial capabilities lacking mass production capabilities of heavy tanks and state-of-the-art aircrafts; and (2) collapse of military cooperation with Rome in the aftermath of the Mediterranean crisis and subsequent difficulties in devising any offensive plans.³³³ In this regard, it is difficult to

³³¹ Namely, this includes short of trained officers, unpreparedness of reserves, industrial limitation in producing planes as planned, temporal superiority of French Navy and air force. Jackson, *France and the Nazi Menace*, pp. 171-177.

³³² Jackson, *France and the Nazi Menace*, p. 173.

³³³ Schuker, “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland,” pp. 323-325.

deny the possibility that French military leadership continued on their joint efforts to raise a purse for rearmament by exaggerating the risk of war and the possibility of French defeat during the Rhineland Crisis.

However, this explanation contradicts General Gamelin's lamentation about the loss of the last opportunity in his memoir. He specifically writes that France "had missed the last opportunity" for either avoiding war "by breaking the morale of Hitler's Germany" or at least starting a war "under conditions that would have been exceptionally favorable to France without a doubt."³³⁴ Gamelin, thus, believed that it was better to fight a war against Germany in March 1936 than in any period after the crisis. If so, what good is securing funds for building forces to overpower its adversary in the future endgame when it seems possible to defeat the foe now? In this context, the hypothesis of French military leadership's exaggerating the risk of war for securing resources for rearmament does not survive the hoop test, assuming that Gamelin is telling the truth.

However, identifying what French military leaders genuinely believed in March 1936 is neither the goal of this research nor the matter that can be objectively proven. What matters is, according to the official records, France decided not to take unilateral and immediate military measures against Germany mainly due to hesitation and reluctance of Ministers of National Defense in executing the measures. They claimed that the action would most likely bring about a war, and thus, Paris should implement general mobilization to follow through on the path. Their rationale behind these assertions was: (1) dictators

³³⁴ "Il n'en demeure pas moins que la France avait laissé passer la dernière occasion: soit d'éviter la guerre en infligeant à l'Allemagne hitlérienne un grave échec moral, soit, tout au moins, d'entamer la campagne dans des conditions qui eussent été, sans nul doute, exceptionnellement favorables."

rarely back down (according to Maurin); (2) Berlin crossed the Rubicon by challenging the Locarno Treaty (according to the Chiefs of Staff); and (3) French military lacked any power projection capability like agile expeditionary forces that could be swiftly deployed to expel the Reich forces in the zone due to its defensive doctrine, planning, and investments (according to Gamelin and Maurin).

Paris, thus, decided to take the pre-determined countermeasure, “no isolated action,” and chose not to implement any punishment before consulting other signatories of the Locarno Treaty, especially Great Britain. Civilian political leaders’ eagerness to punish German coup against the Rhineland regime faced major blow by military elites’ anticipation of war and demand for general mobilization for taking any military action to follow through on the deterrent threat. This position of Ministers of National Defense came from the *updated belief* in German determination given that it crossed the Rubicon and *non-feasibility* of punishment due to the purely defensive establishment of French forces. The French policy choice, thus, fits well with feasibility and belief updating models’ predictions. This French choice precisely reveals the limitation in the explanatory power of rational and cognitive deterrence theories by demonstrating the case of defender’s taking non-action path after direct deterrence failure in spite of its desire to punish the challenger.

3. The Short-term Outcome: a *De Facto* Retreat of Locarno Powers

3-1. *The French Diplomatic Expedition from March 12 to 18, 1936*

Foreign Minister Flandin was authorized to negotiate in London and Geneva, based on the cabinet decision of “placing French military sanctions against Germany at the League’s disposal” and subsequently seeking “British assistance in accordance with the Locarno obligation.”³³⁵ During the first phase of his diplomatic expedition (from March 12 to 14, 1936), he thus focused on securing support from the Locarno Powers, especially Britain³³⁶, in coercing Germany to withdraw from the Rhineland and imposing military or economic sanctions in case of Berlin’s refusal. Unfortunately, this effort was largely unsuccessful. Flandin, then, shifted his emphasis to extracting as much compensation as possible from London for abdicating her responsibilities during the second phase of negotiation (from March 16 to 18) in fear of returning to Paris with empty hands.³³⁷

London had every reason to reject the French request to support its military riposte against the Reich. Most British people in the street saw no reason why Hitler would be prohibited from doing things that he would like to do in his own garden. Conservative

³³⁵ Flandin, *Politique française*, p. 197.

³³⁶ Italy was also a very important security partner and one of Locarno powers yet Abyssinian crisis made it almost impossible for Paris to seek support simultaneously from London and Rome. France, thus, chose Britain over Italy before the Rhineland Crisis. Schuker, “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland,” p. 339. After the German coup, Mussolini sent clear message to both London and Paris that Italy would not take any action against Berlin. *DGFP, C/V*, p. 66.

³³⁷ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, 177.

politicians were more concerned about the rise of Bolshevism than fascism.³³⁸ However, official records attest that the central reasons for British unwillingness³³⁹ were: (1) the German forces were capable of setting up “very determined” resistance if Germany confronted an attack on a single front; (2) German retaliation against Britain, particularly the one using its Luftwaffe bombers, for any support from London for French military action in the zone would be devastating³⁴⁰; and (3) British Army, Navy, and Air forces were simply incapable of fulfilling the Locarno obligation. London first needed to buy time to address severe military deficiencies of its forces before supporting the French struggle against Germany.³⁴¹

Other members of the League were reluctant to punish Berlin most importantly because the German breach of the Locarno treaty as its challenge had done without “resort to war” stipulated by article 16 of the League Covenant, and subsequently *casus foederis* did not occur.³⁴² They showed tepidness even for taking any non-violent measures, such as financial or economic sanctions because Germany was the third-largest market in the world in 1936. 40.5 percentage of foreign trade in Greece and Turkey was conducted with

³³⁸ Ibid., pp. 142-7.

³³⁹ Ibid., pp. 134-8.

³⁴⁰ As it was pre-radar era, bombers were expected to “always get through.” CP 105(36) and CAB 18(36). This made London consistently fearful of German air forces and pursue “air pact” with Berlin in 1930s at the expense of the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. See for example, Anthony Eden, “Germany and the Locarno Treaty,” CP 73 (36), March 8, 1936, CAB 24/261/3; Cabinet 15 (38), May 18, 1938, CAB 23/93; and Cabinet 46(34), December 12, 1934, CAB 23/80.

³⁴¹ For the detailed discussion of explaining British appeasement policy toward Germany in 1930s in the line of “buying time strategy” see Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,” *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): pp. 148-181.

³⁴² Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, p. 165.

Germany. The half of Bulgarian trade and one-fourth of Yugoslavian import-export totals were dependant on the German market. Berlin was the second most important trading partner for Chile, Estonia, Portugal, and Spain. For too many member states of the League, it was considered suicidal to impose economic sanctions against Germany.³⁴³

This overall reaction of Locarno powers and members of the League of Nations to the Rhineland Crisis was satisfactory for Berlin and disastrous to Paris. In the absence of either significant opposition or military preparations for an offensive operation everywhere including Paris, Hitler felt there was no need to take any further conciliatory gestures such as promising not to establish fortifications in the zone. On the contrary, France had no choice left except for changing its strategic goal from securing support for military or economic sanctions against Germany to obtaining assurances and security guarantee from Britain that could compensate for the annulment of the Rhineland Pact. Paris also made every effort to avoid the situation that the guilt for the crisis to be laid in France as much as Germany by allowing the establishment of demilitarized zones on both sides or station of international forces both in French and German territories.

3-2. The Decision of the League on March 19 and Germany's Delaying Tactics

Disturbed by German stiffness displaying zero efforts to make further positive gestures as well as greatly motivated to avoid the dishonor of non-fulfillment and loss of confidence, London was willing to help France on this front. At the same time, however,

³⁴³ Ibid., pp. 171-173.

British policymakers wanted to avert any formal military alliance that could drag the United Kingdom to others' war, especially when she needs at least three years of peace for rearmament. London also was determined not to take any measures that could provoke German withdrawal from the peace negotiations which would forfeit the hard-won opportunity for the general settlement of Western European security.³⁴⁴

Seeking these seemingly contradictory goals of satisfying both Paris and Berlin or avoiding audience cost for forsaking its treaty obligations as well as a total breakdown of the peace negotiation, Britain dexterously pursued a middle way: condemning German treaty violation while promoting non-aggression and mutual assistance pacts.

First, London joined France and Belgium in submitting condemnation of German action to the League for posing "a threat to European security" by unilaterally breaching Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. Second, the German government was invited to subscribe to provisional arrangements suspending further actions in Rhineland such as dispatch of additional material and troops or fortification of the zone. Third, Britain acknowledged Franco-Belgium demand for the establishment of "contacts between the General Staffs" that could replace the Rhineland Pact and guarantee immediate assistance from guarantors in case of German aggression. Fourth, London also took note of German proposals and invited the League to discuss a revision of the status of the Rhineland "on the basis of equality of rights of neighboring States." The memorandum prepared by the British Foreign Office initially suggested these points, and they were finally presented as

³⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 184-197.

the “Text of Proposals” on March 19 to the League members.³⁴⁵ As a result, the League almost unanimously decided to condemn German violation of treaties of Versailles and Locarno.³⁴⁶

This condemnation of the international community was an unpleasant surprise for Berlin. After diplomatic exchanges with the majority of member states, however, Hitler learned that Italy had no intention to ratify the proposal and seven neutral powers in Europe decided not to take note of the document. Germany, then, announced that it would submit counter-proposals by the end of March.

Meanwhile, the British government was squeezed by domestic politics that strongly refused to attach any military value to the Anglo-Franco-Belgian General Staff talks, which resulted in the marginalization of the talks where even exchange of operation plans was proscribed. On the contrary, Hitler received 98.8 percent approval in the Parliamentary election and referendum on March 29. Consequently, the German counter-proposals published on April 1 included nothing new. Two-day General Staff talks held in mid-April only concluded to make no further demands for a positive gesture from Berlin. Sarraut government, then, was replaced in May by the cabinet of Lèon Blum that was occupied with more conciliatory and cooperative, or “naïve and weak” according to senior British diplomat Robert Vansittart, ministers. The Rhineland Crisis officially ended when Paris’s decision to abandon the idea of punishing Germany was released as an official

³⁴⁵ CP 79(36); CP 86(36).

³⁴⁶ Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis*, p. 170.

communiqué on July 23. The *fait accompli* that Germany imposed on March 7 survived and left Hitler as the sole winner.³⁴⁷

3-3. *The Short-term Outcome of the German Version of Peace: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses*

As emphasized earlier, the Rhineland Crisis is a falsifying case for Rational and Cognitive deterrence theories. French policy choice of “no isolated action” was followed by lukewarm supports from Locarno Powers and members of the League of Nations which resulted in a mere verbal condemnation of German action and perfunctory staff talks among Britain, France, and Belgium. Sanctions of any kind had not seriously considered or implemented by signatories of the Locarno Treaty and Germany successfully got away with its coup against the Rhineland regime. The *German fait accompli* survived, and the crisis terminated without war. This short-term outcome contradicts with the deterrence literature’s prediction: the failure of direct defensive deterrence will more likely end up in a war between the defender and the challenger in the short-run as both the challenger and the defender most likely choose aggressive policies.

The failure of direct defensive deterrence in Rhineland did not end up in a war as precisely predicted by the belief updating and feasibility of punishment models. The belief updating model indeed demonstrates some explanatory power over the conciliatory policy choice of Locarno powers in fear of a premature war with Germany and resulted in Hitler’s

³⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 202-236.

roaring success. This explanation especially fits well with the rationale behind the French military elites' policy recommendations. However, it is not clear whether this line of thinking was prevalent in London or other members of the League as they all showed no hesitation in condemning Hitler's action as a threat to European peace.

For this Rhineland Crisis, in this regard, the feasibility of punishment model suggests a more convincing explanation. Neither Paris nor London could take any punitive measures against Germany because of their economic difficulties, the absence of any support from the public, and most importantly, lack of offensive capability that they could swiftly project to the zone.³⁴⁸ Both countries just started rearmament and needed more time to have such forces. Of course, they could implement general mobilization and punish Germany militarily, but this should have cost enormous treasure and political support of voters. Even economic sanctions against Germany could be devastating due to the high dependence of the European economy on the German market, the third-largest one in Europe by the time. Considering the fact both France and Britain officially and unequivocally condemned Hitler's unilateral violation of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno, they genuinely wanted to do something about it. London was already leading economic sanctions against Rome following the League's denunciation of the latter's invasion to Ethiopia. They, thus, couldn't do the same to Berlin simply because taking retaliatory measures against Germany was not feasible.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 218-219.

4. The Long-term Outcome: Deterrence Collapse

4-1. *Deterrence Collapse: Austria, Munich, and War*

In the aftermath of the *de facto* retreat of Locarno powers,³⁴⁹ British and French appeasement policies were followed one after another, which were continuously reciprocated by German attempts to revise the status quo in succession. Defensive deterrence, thus, collapsed and French security conditions went from bad to worse as Paris repeatedly chose de-escalation path along the way.

First, Belgium declared its armed neutrality on October 14, 1936. This declaration made France face the challenge of defending the unfortified northern defense lines, which provided Germany a potential route for her attack forces. This possibility, of course, led to dramatic debasing of the Maginot Line's strategic value and shook the very foundation of France's defensive strategy. The collapse of the Rhineland regime and the Belgium withdrawal from the French alliance system made the Paris-led Western security superstructure to check German aggression by imposing a two-front war for Berlin inoperative. The Little Entente states lost confidence in the value of allying with France. How could they turn to Paris "if she does not defend herself"?³⁵⁰ For example, Yugoslavia concluded a non-aggression agreement with Italy in March 1937 signifying its intention to

³⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 234-254; Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (New York: First Anchor Books, 1995), pp. 361-382.

³⁵⁰ Paul-Boncour testifies that his friends from the League personally asked him during the post-crisis consultation in Geneva that "comment voulezvous que nous croyions que la France viendra nous défendre, puisqu'elle ne s'est pas défendue elle-même?" *Les événements*, III, p. 800.

take a nonalignment route. Czechoslovakia wanted to have a similar arrangement with Germany. The French security system as a whole started to fall apart after the Rhineland Crisis.

These developments do not mean that both London and Paris were so naïve, weak, and inconsiderate and blindly sought to make piecemeal concessions to Berlin to avoid war. Britain did increase its defense spending substantially, a 387 percent increase from 1936 (186 million pounds) to 1939 (719 million pounds),³⁵¹ and France followed the same path by announcing the expansion of defense budget for Army and Air Force as well as allocating further budget for purchasing battleships and cruisers. In other words, they endeavored to prepare themselves for the imminent endgame with Berlin during the time of temporal peace. France and Britain, however, had to sacrifice Austria in March 1938 and Czechoslovakia in September 1938 along the way of buying time for rearmament. Especially, the Munich Conference and Neville Chamberlain's famous statement of "Peace for Our Time," is widely considered as a diplomatic fiasco or "a corrupted policy of compromise."³⁵² The Munich Analogy has haunted policymakers around the world in different contexts of defensive deterrence failure, as discussed in the following chapters.

³⁵¹ Robert Paul Shay, *British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits* (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 297. During the same period, British aircraft production also rocketed from 1,877 to 7,940, which was a 423 per cent increase. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 324.

³⁵² Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 61.

4-2. *Explaining the Deterrence Collapse: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses*

As discussed in Chapter 2, the deterrence literature is divided on the issue of the long-term effects of the defender's policy choices. The Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus predicts that reputation is not a variable that produces a consistent pattern, and past retreat of defenders would not necessarily cause further challenges in the future. The feasibility of punishment model endorses this view as reputation would not matter at all if it seems currently infeasible for the defender to follow through on its deterrent threat. The challenger would defy the defender's direct defensive deterrence regardless of the latter's behaviors in the past.

However, it is also true that most direct defensive deterrence cases involve enduring rivalries and significant interest at stake. As a recent rebuttal to the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus argues, reputation should matter in estimating defender's future threat credibility if the crisis involves the same challenger, the consistent issue, or crucial interest at stake. The belief updating model supports this claim: the defender's strategy of de-escalation makes the challenger update its belief about its opponent and would most likely result in inviting more aggressive policies from the latter in the future.

Interestingly, the declassified official records contain evidence that supports both claims of rival and research hypotheses, and we cannot reject any of them. First, the research hypothesis passes the smoking gun test as Hitler predicted French inaction in the future based on the fact that the Sarraut cabinet chose not to act during the Rhineland Crisis

due to British refusal to assist France.³⁵³ He also assured his military staff in November 1937 that London would not retaliate against Berlin even if Germany attempted to revise the status quo in Austria and Czechoslovakia because Great Britain did not act against German coup in March 1936.³⁵⁴

At the same time, however, Hitler was not entirely sure about the French reaction to the German challenge in Czechoslovakia. He predicted that Paris would not act alone without British blessing and support not because of the Sarraut government's policy choice of inaction during the Rhineland Crisis, but the Blum cabinet was facing serious domestic political challenges that could lead to "civil war at any time."³⁵⁵ This point shows that rival hypothesis also survives the smoking gun test: Hitler's rationale behind his choice of defying the French defensive deterrence in 1938 was precisely based on calculating the French feasibility of punishment *at the time* rather than Paris' *past behavior* of backing down.

This finding corresponds well with the statistical trends discussed in the previous chapter: no variable show statistical significance in predicting the future outcome of deterrence restoration or collapse. For the Rhineland Crisis specifically, both the feasibility of punishment and the belief updating worked toward the same direction at the same time: it was not only infeasible for Paris to punish Germany in 1938, but also France had decided to retreat in the previous crisis in 1936. Perhaps it would be safer to conclude now that

³⁵³ *DGFP*, D/I, pp. 35-38.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 38.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

long-term ramifications of defender's policy choice after deterrence failure is not consistent as the shadow of the past is cast distinctively on different policymakers in diverse contexts

CHAPTER V

HEDGING: U.S. BLOCKADE AND THE MISSILE TRADE DURING THE 1962

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

In Chapter 4, through analysis of the declassified primary sources, we confirmed that the feasibility of punishment model adequately explains: (1) Hitler's decision to defy the French direct defensive deterrent threat, (2) the Sarraut Cabinet's decision of "no isolated action," (3) the short-term outcome of peaceful crisis termination, and (4) the long-term outcome of deterrence collapse. The case study finds some evidence that the belief updating mechanism was also working during the French decision-making process in the aftermath of the deterrence failure and Hitler's move to provoke further challenges in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Compared to the causal impact of the feasibility variable, however, the Bayesian inference did not play a decisive role. The process-tracing analysis of the Rhineland Crisis, however, fails to test rival and research hypotheses on the impact of nuclear weapons because both Berlin and Paris did not possess the weapons.

This weakness in the case study of the Rhineland Crisis makes the Cuban Missile Crisis a highly valuable source for hypothesis testing. It is a classic example of direct defensive deterrence failure involving the full-blown nuclear capability of the challenger and the defender. It is a remarkably rare case in which the human race may have been on the brink of a nuclear holocaust and the possibility of mass extinction. This case, thus, provides researchers an exceptional laboratory for testing various hypotheses on crisis escalation/de-escalation as well as deterrence and compellence involving nuclear threats. President John F. Kennedy contributed to elevating the academic significance of this crisis

even further by recording almost all of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) meetings that took place during the crisis, which allows scholars to open the black box and to analyze the decision-making process of the crisis actor at the critical juncture. This chapter tests all the rival and research hypotheses suggested in Chapter 2 against the Soviet and the American policymaking during the Cuban Missile Crisis by investigating declassified primary sources, the Kennedy Tapes, and memoirs of the political elites in Moscow and Washington.

1. Causes of Failure: Why Did the Soviet Union Decide to Deploy Nuclear Missiles in Cuba?

1-1. Background of the Crisis: the Bay of Pigs, the Vienna Summit, and the Berlin Wall

As the very name of the crisis attests, the Cuban Missile Crisis would not have occurred without the rise of hostility between Washington and Havana since Fidel Castro came to power in January 1959. John Kennedy came to office after the previous Eisenhower government had exchanged bitter blows with the Castro regime such as Cuban nationalization of U.S. oil companies' refineries, U.S. retaliation on Cuban sugar, Castro's further nationalizing 850 million American assets, and Eisenhower's announcement of U.S. trade embargo on Cuba.³⁵⁶ CIA tried to convince the new president of the necessity to

³⁵⁶ Don Munton and David A. Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 7-13.

overthrow the Castro regime with covert paramilitary operations. To do so, they had to satisfy Kennedy's precondition for the approval of such operation: the minimum likelihood of the Cuban opposition. CIA managed to find a proper spot along the Bay of Pigs. Unfortunately, this isolated location was vulnerable to Castro's counterattack without any accessible escape path. On April 14, 1961, the Cuban refugees landed on beaches along the Bay with the help of U.S. forces, but the offensive led by this Cuban brigade ended in a devastating defeat. Only 14 of the exiles were rescued while 114 were killed and 1,189 men were captured.³⁵⁷

Although Premier Nikita Khrushchev preferred Kennedy to Richard Nixon as his counterpart, in fact the Soviets even tried to help the Democrats win the election,³⁵⁸ the Bay of Pigs incident left a deep and lasting impression that the new president was weak, inexperienced, and easily swayed by his hawkish advisors. Khrushchev intended to exert maximum pressure on Kennedy to secure favorable outcomes along the lines of the Soviet-American clash, especially over the Berlin issue. They first met on June 3, 1961, in Vienna.

Khrushchev lectured Kennedy on the revolutionary version of the history that hinted at the similarities between the rise of Castro in Cuba against the Western world and the establishment of 1815 Concert of Europe system against the Holy Alliance. The Premier emphasized that the world revolutionary movements had nothing to do with Moscow but Washington desperately sought to build "dams against the flow of ideas." In

³⁵⁷ Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 83-85, 92-96; Alice L. George, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Threshold of Nuclear War* (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. xii-xiii.

³⁵⁸ Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 237-239.

response, Kennedy mentioned the danger of “miscalculations” that could have catastrophic consequences when the two superpowers possessed the capability to destroy one another. Khrushchev exploded with anger knowing that Americans repeated this “damned word” over and over again, and for urging the USSR “to sit like a schoolboy with his hands on his desk.” After the summit, Khrushchev told his advisors that Kennedy was far less of a leader than Eisenhower, in terms of the scope of thinking and statesmanship.³⁵⁹

Contrary to Khrushchev’s optimism, the situation in Germany was not promising for the Communist bloc. The massive exodus of people from East to West Germany led the population of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to be reduced by 1.2 million during the decade of the 1950s. The Ulbricht government asked Moscow for emergency aid of 50 million dollars worth cash and hundreds of tons of consumer goods such as butter and meat, which were in extremely short supply even in the Soviet Union. Although it meant a humiliating propaganda defeat for the USSR, Khrushchev ended up separating the internal border between East and West Berlin with barbed wire on August 13, 1961. The Kennedy administration protested but did nothing, which greatly disappointed the Adenauer government. Amid this tug of war between Moscow and Washington over the Berlin matter, especially the famous two-day stand-off at the Checkpoint Charlie, Kennedy again “blinked” first through opening of a backchannel, between his brother Robert Kennedy and Soviet intelligence agent Georgi Bolshakov.

The Berlin crisis again reinforced Khrushchev’s conviction that the new American president was feeble and shaky. The more Khrushchev went through his counterpart; the

³⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 237-246.

more worried the Premier had become. Kennedy seemed no match for the powerful military-industrial complex, and he would not be able to control “the dark forces” in Washington. Khrushchev started to see an ominous shadow in the future of Cuba. It may just be a matter of time for the “faction of war” to dominate the Kennedy administration and to invade Cuba to take revenge on what happened in Berlin.³⁶⁰ The confirming evidence was everywhere. Although they did not know that Kennedy approved the initiation of Operation Mongoose, both the Cuban and the Soviet intelligence noticed clandestine activities of counterrevolutionary groups rocketed since October 1961.³⁶¹ Khrushchev believed he had to do something about these worrisome developments in Cuba to protect the fellow revolutionary regime.

1-2. Who Was Responsible for the Choice to Deploy the Soviet Missiles in Cuba?

In his memoir, Khrushchev states that it was during his visit to Bulgaria from May 14 to 17, 1962, when his idea of secretly deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba first came to his mind.³⁶² His son, Sergei Khrushchev, more precisely confirms that his father told him it was when Khrushchev was having a brief rest on the shores of the Black Sea at Varna on May 17.³⁶³ Khrushchev first unveiled this idea to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on

³⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 248-258.

³⁶¹ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 159.

³⁶² Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 493.

³⁶³ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2000), p. 483.

his way back to Moscow on May 20. Gromyko did not express any doubts or concerns to the Premier possibly due to the “Stalinist school of diplomacy instilled obedience.”³⁶⁴ Later that they, he discussed this idea thoroughly with other members in the Presidium of the Central Committee, namely, Andrei Gromyko, Anastas Mikoyan, Rodion Malinovsky, Frol Kozlov, and Alexander Alekseev.³⁶⁵

It is not easy to place blame on the Soviet decision to deploy missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba because there are so few sources left that reveal the details of the discussion that took place in the meetings of this decision. For example, the official record of the Presidium meeting on May 21, 1962 only includes less than ten lines, and that for the next meeting on May 24 includes merely two lines.³⁶⁶ However, this dearth of records on the Soviet deliberation might be due to “there were no deliberations.”³⁶⁷ Multiple sources testify that it was Khrushchev’s plan and no one except for Mikoyan “dared to contradict him.”³⁶⁸ Neither the Soviet nor the Cuban intelligence expected that the U.S.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., 485.

³⁶⁵ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 179.

³⁶⁶ “Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol (hereafter “the Presidium Protocol”) No. 32,” May 21, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI, F. 3, Op. 16, D. 947, Ll. 15-16. Translated and edited by Mark Kramer, with assistance from Timothy Naftali. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115065> ; “The Presidium Protocol No. 32 (continued),” May 24, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI, F. 3, Op. 16, D. 947, Ll. 15-15 ob. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116885>

³⁶⁷ Robert Jervis, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: What Can We Know, Why Did It Start, and How Did It End?” in Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis: a Critical Reappraisal* (New York: Routledge, 2015): p. 7.

³⁶⁸ Sergo Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November*, ed. by Strobe Talbott (Chicago: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 92; Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 486.

invasion of Cuba was likely, which denied the core necessity of this plan.³⁶⁹ Sergei Khrushchev explains how the atmosphere was like in the Soviet Presidium during the days of Premier Khrushchev.

During that period the Presidium generally relied on Father. His word was final. It wasn't even a matter of personality. Everything was determined by the structure of centralized power, which was just beginning to change. Everything depended on the top person. Even Presidium members tried not to push themselves forward unless their vital interests were gravely affected. Those interests were not necessarily personal, but perhaps affected areas where a particular Presidium member felt himself to be in charge. [...] But Cuba didn't affect anyone's interests.

Therefore, it was ultimately Khrushchev's call to arm Cuba with Soviet nuclear missiles and "throw a hedgehog into Uncle Sam's pants."³⁷⁰ Why did he believe he should do this? Wouldn't this irritating provocation to put a hedgehog into Uncle Sam's pants surely lead to his intense reaction? After all, didn't Uncle Sam also have some hedgehogs, bigger and thornier ones, which can be used to retaliate against Moscow?

³⁶⁹ Muntton and Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 29-30.

³⁷⁰ Khrushchev told this phrase to his staff when he first unveiled his plan. Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 89.

1-3. *Khrushchev's Rationale: Depriving of the American Retaliation by Secretly Imposing a Fait Accompli*

While the literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis does not agree on Khrushchev's true motive behind his decision to start the most dangerous crisis ever in human history, most scholars generally concur that numerous causes moved him. Specifically, the literature suggests following six reasons: (1) defending Cuba, (2) narrowing the missile gap, (3) triumphing over the great ideological war, (4) seeking Western concessions in Berlin, (5) outdoing China and winning against the rival in the Communist world, and (6) gaining momentum for reforms in domestic politics.³⁷¹ Taubman argues that Khrushchev considered all these elements before he made his decision, and we can identify his move as “a cure-all, a cure-all that cured nothing.”³⁷²

As Jervis rightly points out, it is fascinating to see that while “almost no one expected Khrushchev to take this action,” researchers so easily find “lots of motives” afterward. This interesting phenomenon is a common cognitive mechanism of humans to bolster the decision they have made by adding further considerations ultimately for maintaining their cognitive consistency.³⁷³ The crucial challenge in historical analysis, thus,

³⁷¹ Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, pp.258-266; Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 179-183; William Taubman, *Khrushchev: the Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), pp. 530-546; Munton and Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 22-24; Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp.94-103; George, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 31-35; and Jervis, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 7-13.

³⁷² Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 532.

³⁷³ For the detail discussion on how rationally and irrationally people maintain cognitive consistency, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, pp.143-202.

is not simply stating that multiple impulses caused a certain action, but to “establish their relative weights and how they combined.”³⁷⁴ This dissertation tries to determine the relative weights of six different motivations mentioned above using the process-tracing technique in the next section. Before that, it is essential to identify how Khrushchev laid out his rationale to his staff in late May 1962.

In his memoir, he emphasizes three points. First, his principal goal was to defend Cuba from the U.S. invasion as it was the USSR’s “obligation to do everything in our power to protect Cuba’s existence as a Socialist country and as a working example to the other countries of Latin America.”³⁷⁵ Second, given the “sausage” shape of the island and the short distance between Cuba and the U.S., defending the island through installing surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles would be almost infeasible.³⁷⁶ Third, subsequently, the sole way to defend Cuba was turning to familiar deterrence logic. The Premier states that;

My thinking went like this: if we installed the missiles secretly and then if the United States discovered the missiles were there after they were already poised and ready to strike, the Americans would think twice before trying to liquidate our installations by military means. I knew that the United States could knock out some of our installations, but not all of them. If a quarter or even a tenth of our missiles survived – even if only one or two big ones were left – we could still hit New York, and there wouldn’t be much of New York left.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁴ Jervis, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” p.8.

³⁷⁵ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 493.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 495.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 493-494.

Khrushchev, however, acknowledged that he also had the balancing logic in his mind. After underlining the main purpose of defending Cuba through turning to the deterrence logic buttressed by the nuclear second-strike capability, he adds the below passage.

In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call “the balance of power.” The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine. And it was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land and her own people threatened.³⁷⁸

Khrushchev’s these two main points in his memoir are quite similar to his son’s recollection of the evening walk with him someday in May 1962. According to Sergei Khrushchev, his father told him that, first, that although the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba did have “certain strategic importance,” the principle aim of the operation was to “defend the Cuban revolution.” The temporal strategic advantage “did not justify the expenditure of money and material resources” that needed for implementation of the deployment operation. Second, this operation would work because “As soon as the missiles were on the island, it would be just as dangerous for the Americans to attack Cuba as to attack the Soviet Union itself.”³⁷⁹

³⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 494.

³⁷⁹ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 489.

Sergo Mikoyan, Anastas Mikoyan's son, also attests that his father told him about how often Khrushchev reiterated that it would take less than a week for the U.S. to overthrow the Castro regime if they invaded the island. The deployment mission, thus, was for preventing "its adversaries' attempts to impede with military force the worldwide victorious march for socialism."³⁸⁰ Considering this consistency among numerous testimonies of the Soviet policymakers, it would be valid to accept that (1) "defense of Cuba," (2) "advancement of the worldwide Socialist triumph," and (3) "narrowing the missile balance" were the three main reasons for the Premier Khrushchev to decide to deploy the nuclear missiles in Cuba.

1-4. The Origin of the Soviet Challenge: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses

How well do the dissertation's rival and research hypotheses explain the Khrushchev's rationale? As explained in Chapter 2, Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature argues that due to the inherent high credibility of the threat, direct deterrence can fail only when the challenger is as determined as the defender. The factors decide the level of resolve are (1) probability of victory in war, (2) level of interest at stake, (3) war cost, (4) audience/reputational costs for not challenging the status quo, and (5) cultural/historical hostility. When the value of these five variables turns the challenger's resolve into the point where it prefers war to the status quo, even direct deterrence can fail. The model, thus, makes a linear prediction: the more resolved challenger will likely to take the more

³⁸⁰ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p.95.

aggressive policies. In this regard, the rival hypothesis explains that Khrushchev decided to throw a “hedgehog” into “Uncle Sam’s pants” because he was strongly resolute in protecting Cuba even risking a war with the U.S.

However, the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons should have changed Khrushchev’s calculation decisively. Although the nuclear balance was favoring the U.S., approximately a 17-to-1 advantage,³⁸¹ both Moscow and Washington were cognizant of the fact that they were under MAD. This strategic condition assumes that even after absorbing a nuclear attack, the adversary is still capable of delivering the catastrophic damage to the attacker thanks to its second-strike capability. The probability of victory in war, thus, converges to zero and the war cost approaches a level beyond calculable. Although an escalation of crisis to a certain level would not be impossible,³⁸² both crisis actors under MAD can never be a determined challenger or defender that is ready to start a nuclear war.

Premier Khrushchev was fully aware of this nuclear logic. When his son asked him about the possibility of war between the U.S. and the USSR over Cuba, Khrushchev said: “It’s one thing to threaten with nuclear weapons, quite another to use them.”³⁸³ He emphasized that “Every idiot can start a war, but it is impossible to win this war. [...] Therefore, the missiles have one purpose – to scare them, to restrain them so that they have

³⁸¹ George, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 32.

³⁸² Powell, *Nuclear Deterrence Theory*, pp. 148-173.

³⁸³ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 565.

appreciated this business.”³⁸⁴ The Premier makes it clear that “we had no desire to start a war [...] our principal aim was only to deter America from starting a war.”³⁸⁵

Therefore, the rival hypotheses 1 and 4-1 predict that Moscow would refrain from taking on policies that were too aggressive and would initiate an armed conflict. Admittedly, the interest at stake and the audience/reputational cost for not taking any action were quite high for the USSR considering the significant implication of defending the Cuban revolution in the Western Hemisphere. However, as long as there is a chance of nuclear holocaust, the challenger could never become a determined aggressor in terms of the cost-benefit analysis. Subsequently, Moscow must always contain the level of provocation and make sure not to escalate a crisis into a military confrontation.

On the contrary, despite his sharp awareness of this logic of nuclear deterrence, Khrushchev decided to arm Cuba with nuclear missiles, which would surely provoke an American military retaliation. Jervis also points out that the deployment of nuclear missiles was not necessary for the defense of Cuba given that Soviet ground forces on the island provided sufficient deterrence. They could function as a trip-wire for an American-Soviet confrontation.³⁸⁶ The rival hypotheses, thus, fail to explain Moscow’s reckless and imprudent policy choice. Even under the strategic condition of MAD, the Premier decided to take a military measure which could trigger a nuclear war.

³⁸⁴ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 182.

³⁸⁵ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 495.

³⁸⁶ Jervis, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” p.8.

How can we explain Khrushchev's move? How could a theoretically irresolute challenger choose to take a rapid escalation path? Was it simply a mistake or a delusion? As the *feasibility model* argues that direct deterrence can fail even when the challenger is *not* a determined aggressor, the model has the potential to provide a better explanation than the previous deterrence theories. The defender's direct deterrent threat is regarded as non-credible if it is *infeasible* to follow through on its threat. This infeasibility of following through occurs when (1) geographic obstacles, (2) domestic political opposition, (3) normative constraints, or (4) unsupportive alliances prevent the defender from imposing punishments against the challenger.

However, Cuba was only about a hundred miles away from Florida, and the American Navy and Air Force maintain more than sufficient capacity to deliver a full spectrum of firepower to the island. Kennedy's administration was a unified government, and the opposition party was populated with hawkish Republicans, which should allow the president to enjoy the bipartisan support for his decision to forcefully remove Soviet missiles in Cuba.³⁸⁷ As it is for the national defense and the survival of its people, the U.S. decision to retaliate militarily against the Soviet challenge should be justified by the UN charter.³⁸⁸ In other words, there was nearly no ground to estimate that the U.S. lacked military/political/normative feasibility to punish.

³⁸⁷ Russell D. Renka, "Party Control of the Presidency and Congress, 1933-2010." <https://cstl-cla.semo.edu/rdrenka/ui320-75/presandcongress.asp> (accessed on May 22, 2019)

³⁸⁸ UN Codification Division, Article 51, Chapter VII: "Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," *Charter of the United Nations*. <http://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml> (accessed on May 23, 2019)

Khrushchev, however, did something very unique to make it infeasible for Washington to react. He decided to send the missiles *secretly*! If this secret deployment operation succeeds, then the U.S. will not be able to retaliate not because of military/political hurdles in punishing the challenge rather it's the deficit in information. Furthermore, once the Soviet nuclear missiles become operational, the nuclear logic kicks in and it gets very difficult for Washington to attack Soviet bases in Cuba. The military/political/normative feasibility suddenly decreases almost to zero as soon as the nuclear weapons are ready to be launched. Then, the U.S. would not be able to do anything other than accept the Soviet revision of the status quo.

This explanation passes both the smoking gun and the hoop tests. To begin with, it is precisely the reason why Khrushchev believed his audacious plan should work. The essence of his rationale was it becomes "too late to do anything about them" once the missiles get operational.³⁸⁹ The success of the plan, thus, wholly depended upon that American policymakers were *unaware* of the Soviet missiles on the island until Moscow announced them after the November elections in the U.S.³⁹⁰ This made Khrushchev obsessed with maintaining secrecy. He first ordered to assemble the S-75 anti-aircraft launchers to prevent Washington from detecting the Soviet missiles in Cuba.³⁹¹ However, he later forbade the actual use of them fearing premature initiation of a crisis.³⁹² As

³⁸⁹ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 493-494.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 493; Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, p. 265; Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes*, p. 171; Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 546.

³⁹¹ Ibid., p.107; Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 192.

³⁹² Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 551.

Khrushchev himself attests that his rationale was based on the practicability of *secretly* imposing a *fait accompli*, the feasibility explanation passes the smoking gun test.

Besides, the feasibility model's explanation passes the hoop test. The evidence that confirms the validity of the model includes: (1) Moscow did not have any contingency plan preparing for the U.S.-USSR military conflict; (2) the debate in the Presidium over the policy choice of deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba was mainly over how to keep the operation under the Moscow's hat, and (3) the Soviet Union made significant efforts to maintain its strict confidentiality in executing the plan.

First, Khrushchev's missile deployment plan was nearly lacking any anticipation of the American-Soviet military conflict.³⁹³ Even when there was anticipation, preparing for a possible armed clash with the U.S. was pushed back on the priority list. For example, many military planners advised Khrushchev to contemplate a defense plan for the ships carrying nuclear warheads. The Premier, however, rejected the provision of "any kind of escort" because it would increase the danger of American detection. He emphasized that "our main weapon was camouflage."³⁹⁴ It turns out that Khrushchev had no contingency plan whatsoever preparing for the scenario what should the USSR do if the secret came out and the U.S. forces started to retaliate militarily. Sergei Khrushchev testifies that Moscow "had no carefully thought-out plan of action in case our missiles were discovered prematurely." So when it happened, he thought "we would have to improvise."³⁹⁵

³⁹³ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 103; Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 542.

³⁹⁴ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 539.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 569.

Second, maintaining secrecy of the deployment plan was at the center of policy debate. One of the two main oppositions to Khrushchev's idea of stationing a Soviet missile base in Cuba was zeroing in on whether the secrecy could be maintained or not.³⁹⁶ As mentioned earlier, Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier under Khrushchev, was the only person in the Presidium who opposed the Premier openly. His opposition rested on the impracticability of maintaining secrecy. Mikoyan argued that there were no woods but only palm trees on the island and these "naked trees" provided little coverage. This geographic nature of Cuba should make it almost impossible to hide the missiles from the American air reconnaissance. Once they confirmed the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the U.S. forces could easily wipe them out in several minutes.³⁹⁷ The Soviet intelligence community and Major General A. A. Dementyev, the Soviet chief military representative in Cuba, made a similar point.³⁹⁸

To respond to this criticism, Khrushchev sent Marshal Sergey Biryuzov, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, to Cuba when the Soviet delegation visited Cuba to ask Castro's consent to station missile bases on the island. Marshal Biryuzov's mission was to check whether there would be spots on the island that could be invisible to the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.³⁹⁹ Khrushchev officially adopted the

³⁹⁶ The other issue was whether Castro would accept this Soviet offer given that the regime persistently opposed to any foreign bases in the Western Hemisphere. It was raised by Alekseev, the ambassador-designate to Havana. Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 179. Mikoyan also thought that Castro would refuse Khrushchev's offer because accepting the Soviet missiles would imply the Cuban acknowledgement of becoming a Soviet satellite. Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p.97.

³⁹⁷ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 96-97.

³⁹⁸ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 191.

³⁹⁹ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 97.

deployment plan after Biryuzov reported him the possibility of disguising missiles “as coconut palms.” It would sound absurd to any sensible men, and Sergei Khrushchev could not understand “how Father believed such primitive reasoning.” The Premier, however, dismissed his son’s concerns by emphasizing that “professionals were at work there, and they understood the matter better than we did.”⁴⁰⁰

Third, the Soviets did everything they could do to make sure that the U.S. intelligence would not detect the deployment operation. Maintaining secrecy was one of the first main decisions⁴⁰¹ made during the deliberation process. Khrushchev himself underscored the importance of maintaining secrecy from the beginning.⁴⁰² Most planning documents were handwritten in single copies.⁴⁰³ All of the initial discussions with the Cuban counterpart were conducted either in person or via hand-delivered letters.⁴⁰⁴ The military planners chose the name “Operation Anadyr” to confuse Soviets and other potential foreign observers.⁴⁰⁵ The final destination was informed to the ship captains via sealed envelopes that can be opened in the presence of KGB officers only after they reached

⁴⁰⁰ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 502.

⁴⁰¹ They were “Station nuclear missiles,” “Carry this out secretly; then declare it,” and “Missiles under our command.” “The Presidium Protocol No. 32 (continued),” May 21, 1962.

⁴⁰² Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes*, p.171; Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 505.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 505.

⁴⁰⁴ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 189.

⁴⁰⁵ Anadyr was the name of the river runs into the Bering Sea and the air base located in Siberia. *Ibid.*, p. 191; Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 549.

at designated spots in the Atlantic Ocean.⁴⁰⁶ Soviet soldiers loaded equipment only at night at isolated piers where outsiders could not enter.⁴⁰⁷ The soldiers were ordered to disguise in civilian clothing and allowed to be on deck exclusively at night.⁴⁰⁸ Only agricultural machinery such as trucks and tractors were displayed on deck while all military equipment was stored below.⁴⁰⁹ Later in August when the U.S. started to be uneasy about increasing Soviet shipments to Cuba, Khrushchev tried to divert Washington's attention from it by announcing the abolition of the Soviet commandant's office in Berlin.⁴¹⁰

In sum, Khrushchev believed that the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba could serve a wide range of purposes and considered it a "cure-all." But he was not a resolute challenger who was ready to risk a war over Cuba. The strategic condition of MAD prevented him from being resolved due to the devastating cost nuclear war would bring. The fact that contingency plan was non-existent confirms this explanation.

Despite his understanding of nuclear logic, Khrushchev made a choice that could initiate a nuclear war. Khrushchev made the seemingly contradictory moves because he strongly believed that it was possible to *secretly* impose a *fait accompli*: deploying Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. As long as the secrecy was kept, the U.S. would not be able to react. After successfully revised the status quo, undoing the changes would become

⁴⁰⁶ Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 550; Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p.192; Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p.510.

⁴⁰⁷ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p.510.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 509; Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 549.

⁴⁰⁹ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p.511; Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 549.

⁴¹⁰ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 528.

extremely difficult for Americans due to the activation of the nuclear deterrence. This Soviet confidence in *infeasibility of punishment* – first due to American *unawareness* of the existence of the challenge and later because of *nuclear deterrence* – was the main cause for Khrushchev to choose a path of military defiance against the status quo.

2. Conditions for Choice: Why Did the U.S. Decide to Hedge?

2-1. Kennedy's Deterrent Threats in September 1962

It was difficult for U.S. intelligence and that of its NATO allies not to notice the unusual increase of Soviet shipments to Cuba. Starting in August 1962, a series of reports arrived in Washington about a great increase in the number of commercial ships sailing towards Cuba.⁴¹¹ During this time, the Kennedy administration was reviewing Operation Mongoose, and CIA Director John McCone wanted to obtain presidential sanctions for taking more dramatic military measures in Cuba to remove Castro. He believed that the astonishing boost of Soviet shipments to Cuba might be the harbinger of his worst dream: turning the island less than 100 miles away from the U.S. into Soviet missile bases. He feared that Khrushchev would always be tempted to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba to even the scales of nuclear balance significantly favoring the U.S. McCone first raised this possibility during the Special Group meeting on August 10, 1962, and called for

⁴¹¹ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 198-199; Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, pp. 511-512.

the use of the U.S. military force only to be rejected by the majority of security advisors. He tried to pressure for the military operation again on August 21 yet opposed by others who thought that the danger of Soviet retaliation against Berlin, Turkey, or Italy was too great.⁴¹²

The U-2 flight over Cuba on August 29 found that eight Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites were only one or two weeks from completion and a significant increase in defense capability compared to what the previous reconnaissance flight found on August 5. Instead of following McCone's proposal, however, Kennedy decided to give a fair warning to Khrushchev. On September 4, the White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger read the presidential statement that the U.S. was aware of the presence of Soviet anti-aircraft defense missiles, motor torpedo boats and Soviet technicians on the island. Washington confirmed that they had not found "any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet-bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or other significant offensive capability." However, the statement added that "Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise."⁴¹³ Kennedy reiterated this warning on September 13, 1962, during the presidential news conference.

If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger, or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this

⁴¹² Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 199-204.

⁴¹³ Mark J. White, *The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), p. 151.

country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base⁴¹⁴ of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.⁴¹⁵

How should we define these threats made by Kennedy on September 4 and 13? Was the Cuban Missile Crisis a failure of defensive deterrence, offensive deterrence, or defensive compellence?⁴¹⁶ This case is a classic example that shows the conceptual problem in the literature mentioned in Chapter 1. Alexander George himself sometimes categorizes it as a deterrence case⁴¹⁷, but at other times he identifies it as a defensive compellence or a coercive diplomacy case.⁴¹⁸

Part of the reason is that while President Kennedy utilized defensive deterrence threats twice in September 1962, he made an offensive deterrent and a defensive compellent threat against the Soviets on October 22 once he realized that Premier

⁴¹⁴ When asked by a journalist, Kennedy defined the “offensive force,” as “a capability to carry out offensive actions against the United States.” Ibid., p.156.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., p.155.

⁴¹⁶ Related issue is whether the Cuban Missile Crisis is a *direct deterrence* or an *extended deterrence* cases. Many previous works, namely those of Huth et. al and Danilovic, identify this crisis as an extended deterrence case where the U.S. was a potential challenger, the USSR was a great power defender, and Cuba was a minor power target. Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, “The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes”; Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*. However, this depends on which aspect of the crisis the study focuses on because both Moscow and Washington tried to deter the other side. From Moscow’s perspective, the crisis was about defending Cuba from an American invasion and the Soviets call it “the Caribbean Crisis.” For the U.S., however, it was about defending American people from potential Soviet nuclear threats and Americans name it “the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Jervis, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 7. According to the USSR, thus, it was an extended deterrence case, but from the perspective of the U.S., it was a direct deterrence case.

⁴¹⁷ Alexander George, “The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962,” in George and Smoke eds., *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, pp. 447-500.

⁴¹⁸ Alexander George, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Peaceful Resolution through Coercive Diplomacy,” in George and Simons eds., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 111-132.

Khrushchev did deploy Middle-range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and Intermediate Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in Cuba. His demands, thus, leveled up from “*don’t* deploy offensive capability in Cuba” to “*stop* constructing the offensive assets,” and to “*remove* them.” In other words, the case itself had multiple phases that include both deterrent and compellent moments. As this dissertation project traces the whole process of threat escalation, this should not be a problem.

A more serious issue arises from the fact that, before Kennedy made those threats, Khrushchev already had ordered implementation of the Operation Anadyr and had done things that were described in Kennedy’s list of don’ts. These actions include authorizing deployments of two R-14 IRBMs regiments, three R-12 MRBMs regiments, 33 IL-28 bombers, 33 Mi-4 helicopter, 40 MiG-21s, and four Motorized Rifle Regiments.⁴¹⁹ The first ship carrying SAMs and supporting apparatus for the MRBMs left the Soviet port at the end of July,⁴²⁰ and the first shipment, the *Maria Ulyanova*, arrived in Cuba on July 26.⁴²¹ Khrushchev had already embarked on doing things that Kennedy later warned the former against doing. Kennedy’s threats in September 1962, thus, should be offensive deterrent or defensive compellent threats, rather than defensive deterrent threats, in the eyes of Moscow.

⁴¹⁹ “List of Troops and Commanders to take part in Operation ‘Anadyr’,” June 20, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov papers, 1887-1995, mm97083838, reprinted in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11. Translated by Raymond Garthoff. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113050>

⁴²⁰ Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, “Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *International Security* 14, no. 3 (1989-1990): p. 149.

⁴²¹ Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 550.

However, the main element of Soviet forces that Kennedy was most worried about had not arrived in Cuba when he made his September threats. The first Soviet MRBMs arrived on September 15. It was two days after Kennedy's second threat was made and eleven days after his first warning.⁴²² This fact, thus, still makes the crisis a direct *defensive* deterrence failure. Besides, Washington was not aware of Khrushchev's decision in June and responded to the crisis as if the U.S. direct defensive deterrent threat had failed. Therefore, the deliberation after the detection of the failure should be treated as an example of the strategic thinking process after defensive deterrence failure because the defender *believed* that it was such. Those complications related to the true nature of the failure, thus, would not pose a serious challenge to the validity of this research.

Accordingly, the following sections trace the process of deliberation throughout the ExComm meetings from the point when Washington discovered the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 15 and convened the first ExComm meeting the next day, to the moment when Kennedy decided to take the naval blockade option on October 20. Those sections compare and contrast divergent perspectives within the ExComm and, then attempt to demonstrate which factors suggested in the rival and research hypotheses played the decisive role for policymakers in Washington to choose different countermeasures against the Soviet challenge to the U.S. defensive deterrence threat.

Specifically, these sections focus on the following five individuals as separate sub-cases within the study because they played a significant role in setting out alternatives during the deliberation process and represented the final two approaches that emerged at

⁴²² Allyn, Blight and Welch, "Essence of Revision," p. 152.

the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on October 20.⁴²³ The five figures include, first, McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, second, General Maxwell Taylor, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, third, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, fourth, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and, fifth, President John. F. Kennedy.⁴²⁴ The following analysis is based on the transcription of tape recordings of the ExComm meetings⁴²⁵ and the minutes of the 505th NSC meeting.⁴²⁶

2-2. *The First ExComm Meeting on October 16, 11:40 AM – 1:00 PM*

CIA Assistant Director of Photographic Interpretation Arthur Lundahl and Sydney Graybeal reported to the assembled government officials what they found from the photos taken from the October 14 U-2 flight over Cuba: one MRBM launch site and two newly established military encampments in west-central Cuba (Map 2). There were, however, too many uncertainties surrounding the decision-making process. For example, Washington

⁴²³ The first two supported the “air strike alternative” and the other two suggested the “blockade route.” Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), pp.193-195. May and Zelikow break down these two groups into four perspectives that include: (1) *air strike* (by Special Assistant Bundy and Chairman of JCS General Taylor and), (2) *blockade as an ultimatum* (by Secretary Dillon, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and CIA Director McCone), (3) *blockade as a deterrence* or freezing the Soviet action (by Secretary Rusk), and (4) *blockade as an opening of negotiation* (by Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Stevenson, and Special Counsel Sorensen). May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p. 191.


⁴²⁴ Whenever the following passages mention Kennedy, thus, it indicates the President Kennedy, not his brother Robert Kennedy who also participated in the ExComm meetings as Attorney General.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-167.

⁴²⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963*, Volume XI: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 126-136.

did not know how many other missile sites might have been under construction on other parts of the island, when would these other missiles be operational, whether the missiles had nuclear warheads or if not, where were they stored, and, critically, what was the intention of the Soviets.⁴²⁷ In other words, while it seemed clear that Khrushchev blatantly challenged Kennedy's defensive deterrence posture, the exact degree and depth of the violation was uncertain.

Map 2: Soviet Missile Sites in Cuba during the Crisis⁴²⁸



Secretary Rusk was the first to suggest the possible courses of action in response to the Soviet transgression. First, he defined the missile deployment in Cuba as a “very serious

⁴²⁷ Don Munton and David A. Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: a Concise History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 51.

⁴²⁸ “Figure 4” in Max Holland, “The ‘Photo Gap’ that Delayed Discovery of Missiles,” *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 4 (2005). https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/graphics/figure_4_t.jpg/image.jpg (accessed on May 29, 2019)

development,” which the U.S. should eliminate. He, then, proposed two general courses of action: (1) a surprise attack but not necessarily an invasion of Cuba, and (2) a combination of non-violent measures that could make Moscow give up the missile bases⁴²⁹. Although he was open to both paths (*rapid* and *gradual* escalations), Rusk preferred the second option as the U.S. was believed to face “a situation that could lead to general war” and it would be important to give “everybody a chance to pull away from it before it gets too hard.”⁴³⁰

Secretary McNamara, however, argued that any type of airstrike is only feasible if those Soviet missiles in Cuba were *not* operational. Furthermore, he sustains that if the final course of action were to involve a military measure to take out the missiles, it should be either an invasion of Cuba or an extensive and massive strike that could wipe out all related offensive assets including the missile sites, aircraft and airfields, and potential nuclear storage sites. Before the meeting was over, McNamara emphasized that they should make a decision on three separate issues: (1) whether Washington should inform the public about the discovery of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba (2) whether the U.S. should conduct a military action in tandem with a political action; and (3) how much time should be allocated to prepare for effective military action.⁴³¹ Indeed, similar to Rusk, he was open to both political and military actions, but McNamara’s perspective (*conditional rapid-*

⁴²⁹ The measures include: (1) stimulating the OAS procedure and operate through an OAS inspection team; (2) sending a message to Castro to warn him that Khrushchev would trade Cuba for Berlin; (3) calling up highly selected units less than 150,000 for emergency and reinforcing forces in Guantanamo; (4) creating confusion in Cuba using anti-Castro guerrilla groups; (5) alerting other allies; and (6) calling in General Eisenhower. May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp. 54-57.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58, 73.

escalation) was the most circumspect one among the ExComm members as he strictly set a precondition for the airstrike option: only *before* the missiles became operational.

General Taylor agreed with McNamara on the need to take out all of the missiles once the U.S. air force went into Cuba. He, however, was pessimistic about the possibility of knowing the exact timing when the missiles would be operational. This enormous level of uncertainty made the general suggest that the U.S. should get “all the benefit of surprise” and destroy all the offensive weapons that include missiles, airfields, and nuclear sites as soon as Washington acquired sufficient information on locations of those targets. Simultaneously, two more measures should be implemented: (1) a naval blockade for the sake of preventing further deployment of Soviet missiles to the island, and (2) reinforcement of the Guantanamo naval base and evacuation of dependents from the base. Whether an invasion was necessary or not could be determined after this, he argued.⁴³² His idea was the most aggressive approach (*rapid escalation*) within the ExComm.

Special Assistant Bundy’s position was not clearly defined in this first meeting, but he pointed out that a surgical strike should not be ruled out because of the “substantial political advantage in limiting the strike.”⁴³³ He also demonstrated his inclination to a non-violent track of resolution by saying that the committee needed to work out a contingency on the political measures when Kennedy summarized his staffs’ positions into three

⁴³² Ibid., pp. 58-59.

⁴³³ Ibid., p. 63.

alternatives – an immediate surgical strike, a general airstrike, and the general invasion –, and forgot to include the possible political moves discussed during the meeting.⁴³⁴

In sum, most members in ExComm, except for Taylor, were cautious about going directly to military measures such as an airstrike (either surgical or extensive) or an invasion. But they revealed the varying degree of circumspection: the most reluctant among the three was McNamara, possibly the least hesitant was Bundy, and Rusk in between them. While President Kennedy did express that the U.S. is “certainly going to do number one [the surgical strike on three Soviet bases]”⁴³⁵ in the end and emphasized the importance of making preparations for it, he preferred to listen to his advisor's suggestions rather than to push his stance during this meeting.

2-3. The Second ExComm Meeting on October 16, 6:30 PM – 7:55 PM

When the ExComm meeting convened at 6:30 PM again on October 16, General Marshall Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, brought additional information to the committee based on further readout of photographic evidence reported in the morning. First, there may be sixteen to twenty-four missiles in Cuba. Second, the missiles were believed to be of the solid-propellant type and inertial guidance system which would take about two weeks to be ready yet could be fired on very short notice once they got operational. Third, these missiles were highly vulnerable even to ordinary rifle fire. Fourth,

⁴³⁴ Ibid., p. 72.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., p. 71.

the reconnaissance flight did not find any evidence of nuclear warhead storage. Fifth, they verified again that those missiles were MRBMs that matched the information provided by “IRONBARK.”⁴³⁶ These reports revealed that the USSR not only flagrantly challenged the U.S. deterrent threat that forbade any offensive assets in Cuba, but those facilities were believed to be easily taken out by conventional weapons.

Since the missiles did not appear operational, McNamara backed the airstrike. He, however, opposed any attack that would leave out some nuclear capabilities – missiles, MiG aircraft, airfields, nuclear storage facilities, radar installations, and SAM sites – on the island and specified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) unanimously supported this military option. McNamara explained that the extensive airstrike would require around 700 sorties a day, but that the U.S. Air Force and Navy were capable of conducting the massive strike operation well beyond this level. Taylor concurred with him and claimed that it would be a mistake to take any limited version of the strike as it would attract reprisal attacks. He argued that there might not be a second chance once the U.S. attacked those bases. Taylor underscored that JCS’s position was that Washington would rather take *no* military action at all than to go with a limited strike.⁴³⁷

Rusk, on the other hand, raised the issue of rendering warning, including a compellent threat to Cuba – before the attack. He shared a couple of measures suggested by his people in the State Department namely, (1) sending direct warning message to

⁴³⁶ Ibid., pp. 78-82. IRONBARK was a code name for Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet military intelligence officer, who provided information on Soviet nuclear capabilities to the U.S. He was exposed and arrested on October 22, 1962, and later executed.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., pp. 84-86, 97.

Castro⁴³⁸; (2) indicating the imminent danger rising from Cuba to states in Latin America that were vulnerable to communist revolutionary actions – such as Venezuela, Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico; and (3) letting close allies in Europe know about the situation. But this did not mean that his position was lopsided to the political course of action. Rusk implied that the committee should discuss “what political preparation, if any, is to occur before an airstrike.”⁴³⁹

McNamara opposed this political course of action such as warning Castro or opening the information to allies before the attack because “it almost stops subsequent military action.”⁴⁴⁰ He was open only to an intermediate route that included concurrent execution of a declaration of open surveillance, a blockade, and preparation to attack the Soviet Union immediately. Taylor agreed with McNamara and emphasized that he “can’t visualize doing it [an air attack] successfully that way [announcing the attack]” as the missiles were the mobile type that could disappear to forest easily.⁴⁴¹ Although preferring a limited strike, Bundy also aligned with McNamara on *surprise* attack idea.⁴⁴²

President Kennedy set forth his view from here. He agreed that Washington should do something because he warned Khrushchev twice not to deploy any offensive weapons

⁴³⁸ Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin said the items could be included in the message were: (1) the U.S. discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, (2) severe security threat that these missiles posed to the U.S.; (3) Soviet would bargain Castro away for Berlin; and (4) Washington would take necessary measures in the next day unless Castro took some action to remove those missiles. Obviously, the last point was a defensive compellent threat. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 93.

in Cuba and “when we said we’re not going to [allow it] and then they go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then [...] our risks increase.”⁴⁴³ But his position was different from that of others on two grounds.

First, Kennedy was very reluctant to eliminate the limited strike option as the crisis was “a political struggle as much as military.”⁴⁴⁴ Efforts to destroy too extensive targets were not very different from invasion and would significantly increase “the dangers of the worldwide effects.”⁴⁴⁵ Selective strike, in this regard, was much more “defensible, explicable, politically, or satisfactory in every way.”⁴⁴⁶ Bundy fully agreed on this and said the political advantage of the surgical strike was very strong as it corresponded to “the punishment fits the crime” – “we are doing only what we warned” and “we are not generalizing the attack.”⁴⁴⁷

Second, even though he acknowledged that public warning prior to attack would “lose all the advantages of our strike,” Kennedy wanted to discuss further about the way to inform NATO allies and fragile governments in Latin America, and to make a public statement due to the political merits of expressing Washington’s “desire to restrain.”⁴⁴⁸ Rusk responded that a combined course of action – the limited strike, plus sending messages to Khrushchev and Castro – was feasible. The reason was that the action to take

⁴⁴³ Ibid., p. 92.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 92.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 97.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 94.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 94.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 87, 92.

out the offensive assets was “none other than simply the fulfilling [of] the statement” that Kennedy made earlier.⁴⁴⁹

To sum up, almost every participant in the second meeting, except for Kennedy, leaned towards the *rapid escalation* path. This increase of aggressiveness in the American policy choice was because it turned out that while the level of Soviet’s challenge (sixteen to twenty-four MRBMs under construction) was very serious, it seemed quite feasible for the U.S. to take out those missile bases. They were not operational yet and very vulnerable.

2-4. The Third ExComm Meeting on October 18, 11:10 AM – 1:15 PM

On October 17, President Kennedy resumed his normal schedule to avoid possible suspicions by Moscow. He met the West German foreign minister, attended the luncheon for Libyan Crown Prince, and flew to Connecticut to support the campaign of a Democratic candidate running for the U.S. Senate. Meanwhile, his staff continued to meet and discussed possible countermeasures against the Soviet challenge. CIA Director John McCone returned from his stepson’s funeral and joined the team. The JCS came up with five different groups of targets with necessary numbers of sorties: (1) Target I – missiles and nuclear storages (52 sorties); (2) Target II – Target I plus IL-28s and MiG-21s (104 sorties); (3) Target III – Target II plus other aircrafts, SAM sites, cruise missiles, and missile boats (194 sorties); (4) Target IV – all military targets except for tanks (474 sorties); and (5) Target V – all military targets (2,002 sorties). Key agendas for the ExComm

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., 97.

meeting on October 17 were, first, which type of military action Washington should take; and second, whether political actions were to precede before the attack. Kennedy returned from his campaign trip on Wednesday night but decided to stay out of the discussion until the next day. The meeting went on until midnight.⁴⁵⁰

The next morning, McCone informed the president of new findings from complete readouts of images taken by U-2 flights on October 14 and 15 as well as from additional photographs taken on October 17. First, the reconnaissance mission discovered two more missile sites to the southwest of Havana that showed the pattern of MRBM/IRBM launch complex. Second, the three missile bases discovered earlier seemed to have expedited the development. Now sixteen to twenty-four missiles were to be operational within a week. Third, two more cruise-missile sites were found at Santa Cruz del Norte. Fourth, an airfield for IL-28s was identified at San Julian.⁴⁵¹ These intelligence updates revealed that the situation was much more dangerous than the ExComm members first thought specifically because of IRBMs that placed ninety-percent of the American population in jeopardy.⁴⁵²

It turned out that the Soviets had made an extremely dangerous move and most ExComm members including Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, and Kennedy ruled out the non-action option. Rusk argued that backing down from the clear warning the president made earlier would inevitably “free their [Soviets] hands for almost any kind of intervention” possibly in Berlin and Korea, and should “undermine and undercut the long support [from

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 119-121.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 122-126.

⁴⁵² Muntton and Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 54.

the public] that we need for the kind of foreign policy.” He recommended that Washington should take a major military action with the legal basis of the Rio Pact or by the declaration of war on Cuba. Rusk emphasized that a surgical strike would involve “the greatest risks” because it was to aim at destroying too great number of targets. Nevertheless, he still shared the note⁴⁵³ of Charles Bohlen, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who asserted the necessity of taking diplomatic actions before turning to any military measure.⁴⁵⁴

McNamara, however, sided with Rusk and underscored the need to remove any limited strike option, aiming to destroy only Targets I or II, from the table. The new intelligence indicated that the U.S. should at least destroy Target III. Leaving any Soviet nuclear capability behind would pose an enormous risk to the Guantanamo naval base and the eastern coast of the States after the airstrike on Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. He, however, did not believe that twenty-four-hour warning before the military action would adversely affect the success of the strike operation.⁴⁵⁵

Taylor also fully agreed with Rusk and McNamara on the necessity of extensive strike but disagreed on the impact of warning before the attack. He reminded the committee members of the great vigor and swift progress in the development of Soviet offensive capabilities on the island, and time was not on the Americans’ side. Considering the vulnerable air defense system in the southern part of the States, Washington must destroy

⁴⁵³ Bohlen major concerns over a strike without warning were threefold: the strike (1) would immediately lead to war; (2) might disunite the U.S. allies as the Soviet would choose to retaliate indirectly such as against Turkey, Italy, or Berlin; and (3) would be very difficult to be justified without the proper declaration of war. May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p. 130.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 126-130.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 131-133; 136; 143.

IL-28s. Unfortunately, the new intelligence report showed that these jet bombers were located in ideal and well-protected airfields. Now, U.S. forces should wipe out the SAM sites before attacking those airbases. Also, IRBMs would turn the island into a powerful forward base of the Soviet Union. He was very skeptical about the merit of diplomatic action as it would never be able to stop the Soviets from building up their capability. All the Soviet offensive missiles and IL-28s should be smashed with a massive surprise attack as soon as possible.⁴⁵⁶

This idea of a massive surprise attack, however, was not welcomed by others. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson argued that it would kill a lot of Russians which should arouse public reaction in Moscow.⁴⁵⁷ Under Secretary of State George Ball compared it with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and said: “It is not conduct that one expects of the United States.”⁴⁵⁸

President Kennedy agreed that the U.S. should take some measures to punish Khrushchev for his flagrant challenge against American deterrent threats, but those actions should be conducive to lessening “the chances of nuclear exchange” and maintaining “some degree of solidarity with our allies.” The unannounced attack, in this regard, was too risky. In the same vein, he was reluctant to declare war on Cuba, even if it was merely for providing a legal ground for the blockade, as the term gave an impression that the U.S. objective was an invasion. In contrast, warning Khrushchev might not only lead to

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 131-135.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 137.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 143.

minimizing the Russian casualties but also to Moscow's backing down. Based on these arguments, Kennedy laid out a prospective course of action that included an announcement about the U.S. discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba and limited airstrike to take out only those missiles. He strictly went against the invasion. Instead, Kennedy suggested a possibility of trading missiles in Turkey with those in Cuba.⁴⁵⁹

Bundy sided with the president and elaborated on the idea of a missile trade. Interestingly, he argued that this bargaining process could occur even in a case that Washington made the "sudden strike." During the talk, Bundy said, it would be important to give a message to Khrushchev that the U.S. could understand the Soviet rationale of building these missile bases in Cuba and Washington was open to trading the U.S. base in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba. McCone opposed this trade idea, but Bundy replied that the crisis would eventually lead to the presence of Soviet submarines in the Caribbean, and this was "a political not a military problem."⁴⁶⁰

Based on this discussion, McNamara outlined the two courses of action that Washington could take: (1) "slow introduction to military action" (or *gradual escalation*) that included a political statement and blockade and (2) the "rapid introduction to military action" (or *rapid escalation*), a brief warning to Khrushchev followed by a forceful military attack.⁴⁶¹ Except for Taylor, all the ExComm members believed that Washington should notify Moscow in any way before the U.S. military operation against the Soviet bases in

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 145-146, 148, 152, 154.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., 191.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., 157; 162.

Cuba. Before they closed the meeting, Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy's speechwriter, summarized the discussion that there was a "general but unanimous agreement" that "some kind of representation to Khrushchev ahead of time [before the military action]" was necessary.⁴⁶²

2-5. *The Fourth ExComm Meeting on October 20, 2:30 PM – 5:10 PM*

The meeting started with the intelligence report as usual. This time, CIA Deputy Ray Cline updated the council on missile developments in Cuba. He reported that among those four to five MRBM sites, two of them were believed to be in the state of "limited operational readiness." Also, the reconnaissance mission found two fixed IRBM sites under construction. One site estimated to be operational within six weeks, while the other site would be so between December 15 and 31. The U-2 flight, however, still did not find the nuclear warhead storage but the intelligence team supposed that these warheads should be nearby given that MRBMs and IRBMs would be "ineffective" without them. The report concluded with the estimation that around eight MRBMs were considered to be fully operational and ready to be fired.⁴⁶³

The two courses of action that McNamara summarized before the conclusion of the ExComm meeting on October 18 were developed as a Presidential message or a well-formulated scenario report and submitted to Kennedy. Because the intelligence report

⁴⁶² Ibid., 161.

⁴⁶³ Mary S. McAuliffe, *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Darby: Diane Pub Co, 1995), pp. 221-226; May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, pp. 191-192.

suggested that some of those Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba were operational, McNamara switched his position from rapid escalation to “blockade route” (*gradual escalation*). Rusk, McNamara, Stevenson (U.S. Ambassador to the UN), and Sorensen supported this path. Bundy, on the other hand, converted from gradual escalation to “airstrike alternative” (*rapid escalation*) as he believed that a decisive action might lead to “*a fait accompli*” that is difficult to be reversed by the Soviets.⁴⁶⁴ Taylor, C. Douglas Dillon (Secretary of the Treasury), and McCone endorsed this course of action.

Unfortunately, as the ExComm members convened in the Oval Office, we do not have the tape recording transcripts for this meeting. Instead, we have the minutes for this NSC meeting that are “exceptionally detailed” and included “two-turn exchanges” (e.g., argument and counterargument; question and answer).⁴⁶⁵ However, they still lack “the intensity of exchanges” between the clashing approaches.⁴⁶⁶ This section, thus, briefly discusses the main argument of the two competing perspectives.

First, the “blockade route” was defined as a series of attempts to prevent additional transfer of Soviet missiles to Cuba and to remove the already deployed offensive assets through negotiations (e.g., trading American missiles in Turkey or Italy with those Soviet ones in Cuba, limiting the American use of Guantanamo). If Moscow responded with too risky demands, however, the blockade could be followed by an ultimatum to remove the missiles backed by the punishment of an airstrike. McNamara knew it might take a long

⁴⁶⁴ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p. 189.

⁴⁶⁵ David R. Gibson, *Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 99.

⁴⁶⁶ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p. 202.

time to take out those missiles and would damage U.S. reputation which should have some repercussions for domestic politics and alliance relations. This gradual escalation path, he believed, had at least four advantages: (1) causing less trouble to allies; (2) avoiding a surprise attack that would betray the American tradition; (3) taking the only feasible military action that fitted to “the leader of the free world”; and (4) preventing escalation to a general war.⁴⁶⁷

The “airstrike alternative” was a path to destroy all the missiles and the jet bombers simultaneously. Those who supported this course of action had the following rationale. First, the very existence of those missiles could not be accepted and the longer they remain stationed there, the riskier the situation would be.⁴⁶⁸ Second, this was the last chance for Washington to remove Soviet offensive capability in Cuba because it would become impossible to locate them once the Soviets completed camouflaging the weapons.⁴⁶⁹ Third, even though some nuclear missiles might survive after receiving the extensive American airstrike, Moscow would not retaliate against Washington with the second-strike capability.⁴⁷⁰

The below Figure 3 summarizes the shifting positions of the American policymakers throughout the first four ExComm meetings.


⁴⁶⁷ *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. 11, p. 129.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

Figure 3: American Policymakers' Shifting Positions⁴⁷¹



On average (the line with circle markers), the ExComm members urged more aggressive policies as they learned more about the nature of the Soviet challenge but swiftly toned down their approach as soon as the intelligence team informed them that eight MRBMs had got ready to be fired. Both Rusk and McNamara followed quite a similar pattern of the average fluctuations within the ExComm, though McNamara showed a more extreme change of positions. Bundy demonstrated somewhat divergent tendency in his policy recommendations as he abruptly changed his position from gradual escalation or hedging to rapid escalation accompanying unannounced extensive strike on Cuba. Both Kennedy and Taylor did not display much variation in their policy choices but asserted very stark positions: gradual escalation with political inducements vs. rapid escalation turning to surprise air attack aiming all Soviet assets on the island.

⁴⁷¹ The numbers in the y-axis are dummy variables indicating different degree of aggressiveness in their policy choice. “0” means “Non-action”; “1” indicates “Gradual Escalation”; “2” is “Hedging (Non-violent Use of Military Force plus Political Assurance)”; “3” implies “Unannounced Rapid Escalation but Limited in Scale”; and “4” signifies “Unannounced Rapid Escalation Involving Extensive Strike.”

2-6. *The Origin of the American Hedging: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses*

How can we explain this divergence among those American policymakers? Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature argues that defender's high level of resolve is given in direct deterrence situation because: (1) balance of interest favors the defender; (2) the defender should pay higher audience cost; (3) the human penchant for loss aversion and the endowment effect will make the defender become a risk-acceptant type; and (4) the logic of revenge would dominate strategic thinking of the defender. The defender, thus, would most likely take an escalation path and decide its degree of aggressiveness based on (1) the war cost and (2) the probability of victory in war.

If the challenger possesses nuclear weapons, however, the "crystal ball effect" gets activated, and the defender would not take any measures containing the use of military force. This self-containment is caused by; first, use of violent measures could escalate the crisis into nuclear war; and second, the war cost approaches to negative infinity, and the probability of victory goes down to zero in nuclear wars. In other words, the U.S. would very much like to punish the USSR for deploying offensive assets in Cuba despite Kennedy's explicit defensive deterrent threats. But as soon as Washington detects the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons on the island, the American policymakers should carefully calibrate the degree of violence in devising their countermeasures. They would most likely turn to non-violent measures. This calming effect of nuclear weapons was precisely what Khrushchev had expected. In sum, Rival hypotheses 2-1, 2-2, and 4-2

collectively predict that American policymakers would most likely choose a *gradual escalation* path.

This causal model based on the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature does explain the *general pattern* of American policymakers' shifting positions quite accurately. The model, however, shows clear limitations when it is tested against *actual policy recommendations* each ExComm member made during the initial phase of the crisis. First, the final policy decided by the ExComm was not general escalation but *hedging*: the combination of non-violent use of military force and political assurance. The Soviet nuclear capability on the island did have some "crystal ball" effect and managed to constrain the U.S. from taking massive air assault or invasion routes. Nonetheless, those Soviet nuclear weapons failed to suppress Washington to adjust the degree of violence below the use-of-military-force level. Although the blockade was a milder punishment compared to the extensive airstrike, it did involve use of substantial military power that could trigger a major armed conflict, possibly a nuclear war. What would have happened if the Soviet ships continued on course and the U.S. Navy started to open fire on them? As Jervis rightly explains, the blockade was not merely a signal of the American resolve but "a threat that leaves something to chance."⁴⁷²

Second, the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles failed to deter ExComm advisors from advocating the airstrike option. On the contrary, most advisors asserted the necessity of forcefully removing those Soviet assets as soon as U-2 flights detected Il-28 jet bombers, MRBM/IRBM launchers, and cruise-missile sites on the island. They took it for granted

⁴⁷² Jervis, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," p.15. This theoretical term was invented by Schelling. See Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, chapter 8.

that the U.S. should attack these bases. Their approaches diverged solely on the scope (i.e. surgical strike, general strike, and invasion) and the sequence (i.e. announced vs. secrete) of the strike. It deserves our close attention that the majority opinion was taking the *rapid escalation* path before a major shift occurred during the fourth ExComm meeting on October 20. The “crystal ball” effect only activated when the CIA intelligence personnel informed the national security advisors that some of these nuclear missiles were *operational* and the Soviet bases in Cuba would be able to manage to maintain a second-strike capability after absorbing an American airstrike.

Third, more interestingly, for Bundy and Taylor, even the possibility of the existence of the Soviet second-strike capability did *not* prevent them from advocating the rapid escalation route and urging extensive airstrike on all of the Soviet bases in Cuba. It is fascinating to see that the introduction of nuclear weapons had no impact at all for some of the policymakers in Washington. These individuals believed that blockade only prevented further deployment of Soviet offensive assets to Cuba and had no impact on the missiles already had deployed. The U.S. had only two options: either “going to trade [the missiles] out” or “going to have to go in and get them out ourselves.”⁴⁷³ For those who did not like the idea of trading missiles, the forceful removal was the only option left despite the enormous risk it carried.

Why did the Soviet nuclear capability not have the deterrent effect that Khrushchev expected? Why were some ExComm members recommending the rapid escalation path of wiping out the entire Soviet bases on the island despite the strategic condition of MAD and

⁴⁷³ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p. 283.

the possibility of nuclear holocaust? Shouldn't this extreme risk have enough impact on the U.S. policymakers to choose less aggressive options even though they dislike doing so wholeheartedly? Does this mean these weapons of mass destruction did not exert a significant impact on the U.S. deliberation process? If so, why the American policymakers chose not to destroy the missiles sites in Cuba right away? Why the U.S. decided to take the *hedging* route that included both a military measure and a political assurance of missile trade for responding to the Soviet challenge? How well the new theory of deterrence failure, the feasibility of punishment and the belief updating models, does explain this interesting anomaly?

First, the *feasibility of punishment* model predicts a non-significant role of nuclear weapons in deterrence failure situations because it is very difficult to make nuclear weapons a *feasible tool* for punishment. The most basic threshold for turning them a viable method of sanction is to secure power projection capability that allows the defender to deliver these weapons. Even after securing this delivery system called "Nuclear Triad" (bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs),⁴⁷⁴ the weapons' inherent nature of overkill obstructs them from being used in most defiance cases especially when the challenger strictly turns to conventional forces. In addition, the use of nuclear weapons has become a strong taboo in international politics, and any crisis actor uses these immoral weapons should pay enormous political, normative, and possibly economic costs, which makes the nuclear cane even less feasible tool of punishment. In this context, the feasibility model predicts that Washington would *not* believe that U.S. attempts to forcefully remove the Soviet bases in

⁴⁷⁴ David J. Lonsdale, "The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A Return to Nuclear Warfighting?" *Comparative Strategy* 38, no. 2 (2019), p. 109.

Cuba result in a nuclear war as long as the Americans religiously turn to conventional forces.

This explanation survives the smoking gun test. Discrepancies among policymakers in Washington precisely stemmed from their different estimation about the feasibility of the Soviet nuclear retaliation against a conventional American airstrike. The ExComm advisors recommended Kennedy to take announced or surprise air strikes on Soviet missile sites in Cuba only when they were convinced that Moscow would most likely *not* to use their nuclear missiles in reciprocating the U.S. attack

For example, Rusk argued that as a nuclear attack would inevitably initiate a general nuclear war under MAD, Moscow should become very much restrained.⁴⁷⁵ He, thus, just could not “see the possibility” of the Soviet nuclear retaliation.⁴⁷⁶ McNamara agreed with taking the airstrike option only when it seemed likely to destroy all the possible second-strike capability of the Soviet forces.⁴⁷⁷ Taylor expected that after receiving the American airstrike, the Soviets would retaliate only with “some conventional weapon.”⁴⁷⁸ This prediction allowed him to strongly and persistently support the unannounced massive air strike option throughout the ExComm meetings even though he was certain that destruction brought by the most extensive attack would “never be 100 percent”⁴⁷⁹ and there would always be remaining Soviet nuclear missiles ready to be used for retaliation. It is

⁴⁷⁵ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p. 59.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 86-7.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

fascinating to find that the transcript of the ExComm meetings from October 16 to 18 is full of statements that discredit the possibility of Moscow's decision to use any surviving nuclear missiles in Cuba for reprisal.

Why did the majority of the ExComm members, except for Bundy and Taylor, change their positions and support the hedging path on October 20? Two points deserve attention: (1) McNamara warned of the possibility that Moscow might not have full control over the weapons; and (2) Thompson alerted the consequence of killing a great number of Soviet soldiers on the island with the American air assault.

During the first ExComm meeting on October 16, McNamara argued that Rusk's assumption about the political prudence in using nuclear weapons was misleading because it was uncertain "what kinds of control they [the Soviets] have over the warheads." Specifically, the authority to shoot the missiles might be at the hands of the Soviet military leadership in Cuba rather than the political leaders in Moscow. In such a scenario, if U.S. fighters and bombers attacked the Soviet military command, they might press the nuclear button for defending their bases.⁴⁸⁰ Besides, when the council convened on October 18, Thompson expressed his concerns that the unannounced strike would kill many Russians and the U.S. would "end up the whole way."⁴⁸¹ McNamara concurred with this and said, "If we kill Russians, we're going to have to go in," which should result in escalation to war. If "they [the Soviets] can't stop," then the Americans probably "have to go on."⁴⁸² In other

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 59.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., p. 150.

⁴⁸² Ibid., p. 150.

words, McNamara and Thompson pictured a scenario that nuclear missiles could be launched by the Soviet commander in Cuba when the Soviet death tolls rocked after receiving massive American attacks from the sky.

Although it is not certain whether Rusk or other committee members bought their arguments, similar rationale should have evolved within their mind for them to change their positions rapidly. The only difference from the October 18 ExComm meeting to that on October 20 was the change in intelligence report: from “not-yet operational” Soviet missiles to their state of “limited operational readiness.” The fact that (1) the Soviets could manage to maintain a second-strike capability after receiving the American airstrike; and (2) the American attack would slaughter a myriad of Soviet soldiers was *sufficient* for most advisors in Washington to shift their policy recommendation from rapid escalation to hedging. This explanation passes the smoking gun test for McNamara’s position because he precisely explained his rationale so, and provides the hoop evidence for other ExComm member’s convergence to the blockade option.

The ExComm members, thus, first did not worry much about the possibility of a Soviet nuclear retaliation because, first, the missiles were not yet operational and the Soviets lacked the *military feasibility* to turn to these assets for reprisal attacks; and second, starting a nuclear war was *politically/normatively infeasible*. However, after the U.S. intelligence community revealed that some of the missile sites were already operational, the majority of the council members swiftly changed their position to recommend less aggressive policies. This trend in the American deliberation process attests that the “crystal ball” effect only comes to the fore in case the adversary secured the second-strike capability, not when it simply possesses any level of nuclear capability. Although the political

feasibility of nuclear reciprocation was still very low, the uncertainty in which type of control the Soviet military might maintain over the nuclear warheads should have made Washington very worried once the missiles got ready.

Was this military feasibility of the Soviet nuclear counterattack the only reason for the U.S. not to take a rapid escalation path? The *belief updating* model suggests another mechanism that would encourage the defender to become more cautious and discreet in deciding its policy in the aftermath of direct deterrence failure. Given that a direct deterrent threat is most likely considered credible, the challenger's defiance against this threat indicates that the challenger is presumably a determined aggressor. Anticipating that the challenger is ready to fight a war, the defender might be willing to update its type and surrender some of its strategic assets to avoid the war especially when the war expected to bring a disastrous outcome. The very fact that direct deterrence is intrinsically credible establishes a condition and an impetus for the defender to choose less aggressive policies after its failure. This prediction contradicts the Rational and Cognitive deterrence theories which suggest a linear model: the more credible the threat is, the more violently the defender responds to its failure.

This explanation based on the belief updating model matches well with President Kennedy's strategic thinking. At first, the president was eager to take some military measures right away when he first found out that Khrushchev lied to him⁴⁸³ and completely ignored his fair warning. Starting from the second ExComm meeting, however, Kennedy

⁴⁸³ Khrushchev assured Kennedy many times that Moscow only aimed to strengthen the Cuban defensive capability and promised not to take any actions "likely to complicate the international situation before elections to the Congress of the United States." Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 534.

persistently advocated the need to make offensive deterrent or defensive compellent threats *before* initiating a strike on the Soviet bases in Cuba. In this regard, he was the antipode of Taylor. Kennedy was deeply disturbed by Khrushchev's deceitful actions and had a very hard time coming to grips with the Soviet Premier's rationale behind his reckless move. Hasn't Moscow been "awfully cautious" since the Berlin blockade? Didn't Washington make very explicit statements not to make Cuba "an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union"? Why did Khrushchev suddenly make an extremely dangerous move that could lead to a nuclear showdown between the two superpowers? This sudden policy shift in Moscow was "a goddamn mystery" to Kennedy.⁴⁸⁴

Kennedy was greatly agitated because he tried to understand and predict Moscow's move based on what it did in the previous encounter. The president, thus, should have updated his belief about the Soviet Union's type from a non-credible to a *credible* challenger because he made *credible* deterrent threats in the earlier stage yet Moscow decided to defy them. At a minimum, Kennedy was reluctant to agree with other ExComm advisors on that Moscow would never reciprocate the U.S. airstrike with nuclear weapons. He pondered on the most precarious route to deal with Khrushchev's challenge throughout the crisis.

However, Kennedy did not make any statement that linked the *fact* that Khrushchev challenged the U.S. deterrence with his *policy choice* of hedging. In this regard, it is difficult to argue that the explanation provided by the belief updating model survives the smoking gun test. Nonetheless, the causal model survives at least the straw-in-the-wind

⁴⁸⁴ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p. 107.

test, possibly the hoop test as well, considering that throughout the ExComm meetings, he repeatedly and precisely emphasized the following; Moscow challenged the status quo despite explicit deterrent threats made by the U.S. president himself.

Interestingly, however, Kennedy was the only one in the committee who strived to learn from the past. Except for him, no one in the ExComm tried to make sense of the motive behind Moscow's decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba flagrantly defying Washington's fair warning. As Jervis rightly points out, Kennedy realized that "because the established assumptions about Khrushchev's perceived self-interest, calculations, and view of the world had just been disconfirmed," it was necessary to fix these inaccurate premises and put them "on a more secure footing as a prelude to taking action." But the ExComm refused to update their belief about Khrushchev's motives, which "reduced members' sensitivity to some of the diplomatic tools the U.S. could deploy, most obviously a pledge not to invade Cuba."⁴⁸⁵

Special Assistant Bundy's position exemplified the rigidity in the ExComm advisors' strategic thinking that refused the Bayesian updating. While other committee members had mixed views about Moscow's motivation such as aiming for American concession in Berlin or increasing its strategic strength, Bundy raised the possibility that "they made this decision [...] before you [Kennedy] made your statements."⁴⁸⁶ The Soviets, thus, did not ignore Kennedy's threats but had *already initiated* the deployment of missiles

⁴⁸⁵ Jervis, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 3-4.

⁴⁸⁶ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, p. 105.

before the announcement of the threats.⁴⁸⁷ If Khrushchev had not received Kennedy's signal when the former decided to revise the status quo, then it negates the necessity to update the belief about the challenger's type. This is a smoking gun evidence that Bundy, and possibly other ExComm members as well, refused to seriously consider the implication of Khrushchev's defiance against Kennedy's threats in deciding the U.S. policy against the USSR.

To sum up, although the general trend of change in Washington's policy debate in the aftermath of direct defensive deterrence failure follows the prediction of the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence models, these models fail to explain the specific positions of individual advisors at each information set. First, most ExComm members advocated the rapid escalation path until the intelligence team confirmed that some Soviet nuclear missiles had been operational. Second, even after this confirmation, Taylor and Bundy urged Washington to take a rapid escalation path. Third, the final policy decision of Washington was hedging, rather than gradual escalation.

This mitigated impact of the "crystal ball" effect implies that threats backed by nuclear weapons are not credible until the defender/challenger successfully makes the use of these weapons a *feasible* tool of punishment. The ExComm advisors did not "think twice" as Khrushchev had expected until they realized that (1) there might be some surviving nuclear missiles ready to be launched after receiving the extensive U.S. airstrike on the Soviet bases; (2) the control of nuclear warheads might not be at the hands of politicians in Moscow

⁴⁸⁷ This was exactly what really happened. Operation Anadry, the Soviet covert transportation operation to deploy offensive assets such as MRBMs, IRBMs, SAMs, MiG-21s, and Il-28s began on July 15, 1962 and the first shipment arrived in Cuba on July 26. First MRBMs, though, arrived on September 15. George, *The Cuban missile Crisis*, xiii; and Munton and Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 39.

but at those of the local commander; and (3) the considerable size of Soviet ground forces in Cuba would greatly increase the number of Soviet casualties when the U.S. air force strikes the island. The Soviet nuclear weapons finally began to affect the American strategic thinking once these three conditions were met on October 20.

While the feasibility model demonstrates a better explanatory power than the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories, the Cuban Missile Crisis does not support the belief updating model. Kennedy indeed left many remarks that the Bayesian updating greatly influenced his strategic thinking. Other ExComm advisors, however, were zeroing in on identifying the exact offensive capability of the USSR in Cuba rather than trying to make sense of Khrushchev's reasoning and to predict his future moves based on what he did in the past. Considering the majority of policymakers in Washington were not influenced by the Bayesian calculation, the belief updating model shows a clear limitation in explaining and predicting the policy choice of the defender after direct defensive deterrence failure.

3. The Short-term Outcome: Soviet Retreat and the Peaceful Termination of the Crisis

3-1. Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges: from October 22 to October 26, 1962

After Kennedy sent his first letter to Khrushchev and delivered his radio and TV speech on October 22, 1962, declaring initiation of "a strict quarantine on all offensive

military equipment under shipment to Cuba,”⁴⁸⁸ the two top leaderships exchanged five secret and public letters. The American declaration of blockade strangely evoked “a feeling of relief” rather than anxiety because Moscow was expecting the announcement of the U.S. invasion. Before Kennedy made the public speech, the Soviet Premier had authorized General Issa Pliyev, the local commander who was in charge of the Soviet forces in Cuba, to use all available Soviet and Cuban military power except for the nuclear warheads. Disliking the restrictive language of the order, however, the Soviet Presidium prepared the second-order granting General Pliyev use of tactical nuclear weapons against the American assault forces in the event of their landing. The order only prohibited nuclear strikes against the continental U.S. without a direct order from Moscow. Kremlin sent out the first order immediately but withheld the second one to observe the future development of the crisis.⁴⁸⁹ This existence of the second-order authorizing the use of tactical nuclear weapons proves that Kennedy’s belief updating and McNamara’s worst-case scenario were correct. The American invasion of Cuba or massive airstrike on the Soviet bases might end up with a nuclear holocaust.⁴⁹⁰

In response to Kennedy’s declaration of the “quarantine,” Khrushchev sent his first and second letters asserting that it was an “act of aggression,” “the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space,” and “piratical acts.” He warned that “We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and

⁴⁸⁸ White, *The Kennedys and Cuba*, p. 205.

⁴⁸⁹ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 559; Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 242-243; and Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 562.

⁴⁹⁰ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 245.

adequate to protect our rights.”⁴⁹¹ However, au fond, he wanted to avoid major collision with the U.S. Navy given that the USSR Navy did not protect those Soviet merchant ships on route to Cuba and the MRBM sites on the island already started to be operational. The Premier, thus, ordered any ships that had not arrived in Cuba to return to USSR including four ships carrying R-14 IRBMs: the *Almeteevsk*, *Nicolaeev*, *Dubna*, and *Divnagarsk*. To his relief, the *Aleksandrovsk* carrying twenty-four nuclear warheads for the IRBMs and forty-four warheads for cruise missiles managed to arrive in Cuba just a few hours before the initiation of the blockade at 10 A.M., October 24. Consequently, Moscow and Washington managed not to open the very first door to the nuclear war.

As the ExComm worried, the blockade did not affect the Soviet forces, missiles, and the shipments of the *Aleksandrovsk* that had already placed in Cuba. Moscow ordered Pliyev to expedite the construction of missile bases. One more MRBM regiment became operational as of October 25.⁴⁹² Kennedy sent another letter to Khrushchev, third in sequence of date,⁴⁹³ which received by Moscow on the morning of October 25. The letter reiterated his regret about the Premier’s failure to recognize the root cause of the crisis: the Soviet defiance against Kennedy’s plain and unequivocal warning.⁴⁹⁴ Although this two-paragraph message was a mere repetition of Kennedy’s earlier points, Khrushchev interpreted it quite differently due to the three new developments.

⁴⁹¹ White, *The Kennedys and Cuba*, p. 215.

⁴⁹² Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 579.

⁴⁹³ Kennedy’s second letter sent on October 23 was a short response to Khrushchev’s first letter protesting the U.S. declaration of the quarantine. White, *The Kennedys and Cuba*, p. 210.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

First, Khrushchev expressed his willingness to meet Kennedy and resolve the crisis via his letter to the philosopher Bertrand Russell and meeting with the businessman William E. Knox, but Kennedy's letter did not mention this at all.⁴⁹⁵ Second, the Soviet intelligence picked up the fact that, for the first time in the postwar period, the U.S. army raised its alert condition to DEFCON 2. This status was just below the military operation level and put the American forces on nuclear alert.⁴⁹⁶ Third, the chief of the KGB *residentura* in Washington, Aleksander Feklisov, sent a report to Moscow about Georgi Kornienko's meeting with American journalist Warren Rogers on October 25, who was regarded by the Soviets as the "best indicator of Kennedy's intentions." Rogers confirmed that the American military's invasion plan was "prepared to the last detail," and the "attack could begin at any moment."⁴⁹⁷

Washington did not seem to be deterred by the Soviet nuclear MRBMs already operational in Cuba. Even though Khrushchev suspected that Kennedy was determined to initiate a global war, the Premier worried about the possibility that the President had lost control of the hawks. Moscow might have to go through a war with the U.S. if it persists in keeping the "hedgehog" Khrushchev had thrown into "Uncle Sam's pants." As he already discussed the need to defuse the tension during the Presidium meeting on October 25 after receiving Kennedy's disappointing letter, Khrushchev did not reconvene the

⁴⁹⁵ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 256, 259.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 258; Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 579.

⁴⁹⁷ This interview was arranged because at the Tap Room in the National Press Club on October 25, the KGB informant Anatoly Gorsky overheard a conversation between two American journalists, Robert Donovan and Warren Rogers, who was planning to cover the story of the U.S. invasion of Cuba, expected to happen the next day. Gorsky reported this immediately to his boss, Aleksander Feklisov. Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp.257-258, 261-262.

meeting and wrote his third letter, known as the “first letter,”⁴⁹⁸ on his own. It was a very long, “emotional and remarkably candid” letter,⁴⁹⁹ basically proposed the first term of settlement to the crisis: the Soviet bases in Cuba will be removed if Washington gives Moscow a pledge not to invade Cuba.⁵⁰⁰

3-2. *The Shooting Down of the U-2 on October 27 and the Soviet Retreat*

Around the time Khrushchev’s third letter was delivered to the U.S. embassy in Moscow at 5 p.m., Friday, October 26 (10 a.m., Friday, October 26 EST), KGB Station Chief Feklisov met John Scali, the ABC News correspondent, at Occidental Restaurant to exchange their views for the possible terms of settlement to the crisis. Feklisov asked Scali how Washington would respond to Moscow if the Soviets requested the U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba in exchange for the dismantlement of their bases on the island. The Presidium, however, had not authorized him to make such an offer. The KGB station chief in Washington arranged the meeting due to his sense of unsettlement fearing the nuclear holocaust. Even so, the ExComm members believed Feklisov’s suggestion came directly

⁴⁹⁸ Khrushchev sent two letters in a row: one secret letter sent to Washington on October 26 and the other public letter broadcasted over Moscow radio on October 27. These two letters are usually called as Khrushchev’s first and second letters because in his later public letter to Kennedy, Khrushchev changed the proposed terms of settlement. This created a huge confusion in the ExComm as it was not clear to which proposal Washington should respond to.

⁴⁹⁹ White, *The Kennedys and Cuba*, p. 220.

⁵⁰⁰ What Khrushchev actually wrote in the letter was as follows; “Let us therefore display statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will be obviated.” Ibid., p. 225.

from Moscow. They had this idea because Khrushchev's third letter, which finally reached the U.S. State Department around 9 p.m. due to the great length of it,⁵⁰¹ proposed essentially the same thing. The ExComm met at 10 p.m. to discuss this Feklisov-Scali proposal which Khrushchev had confirmed.⁵⁰²

Meanwhile, war clouds were hanging over Cuba. Given various intelligence sources and the warning of the Brazilian president João Goulart, the Soviet and Cuban forces anticipated that the U.S. airstrike would occur during the night of October 26 or at the dawn of October 27. The Soviet commander Pliyev in Cuba had taken measures to "disperse" nuclear warheads and reported Moscow that he would "employ all available means of air defense" in the event of a U.S. attack on Soviet missile installations. Castro authorized his air defense units to fire on U.S. airplanes and thought he should write a letter to Khrushchev to motivate him to take a responsible measure. In his letter, Castro implied the need to use Soviet nuclear weapons preemptively by saying that "the Soviet Union must never allow the circumstances in which the imperialists could launch the first nuclear strike" and "eliminate such danger forever through an act of legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be."⁵⁰³

When the U.S. security advisors gathered to discuss American response to Khrushchev's proposal arrived on the evening of Friday, October 26, it was Saturday morning, October 27, in Moscow. Surprisingly, Khrushchev's mood had changed

⁵⁰¹ It took about eight to ten hours a message to go through from Moscow to Washington and vice versa because it had to be encoded and cabled. This was a time-consuming procedure. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 135.

⁵⁰² Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp.263-267, 269-271.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 271-272.

completely over the night. He felt confident that the American invasion of Cuba was not very likely given that the U.S. had not attacked the island for the past five days after Kennedy's declaration of the quarantine. The premier started to put weight on Walter Lippmann's column in the *Washington Post* on October 25 suggesting a Cuban-Turkish missile swap⁵⁰⁴ and other KGB reports on American journalists' views reached to Moscow on October 27. He disregarded worrisome reports sent by Pliyev warning of an imminent U.S. airstrike on those Soviet missile bases in Cuba. In front of members of the Presidium gathered at noon, Khrushchev asserted that "If we could achieve additionally the liquidation of the bases in Turkey, we would win." He dictated his "second letter," fourth in chronological order, changing the terms of settlement: the Soviets' removal of offensive weapons from Cuba in exchange for the American evacuation of "analogous weapons" from Turkey. The Soviet premier decided to broadcast this offer as it took too much time for his new message to reach Washington via the standard communication procedure.⁵⁰⁵

The rest of the day did not evolve as Khrushchev hoped. Despite his strong assurance in his "second letter" that all Soviet weapons in Cuba "are only for defense purposes," strictly "in the hands of Soviet officers," and therefore "any accidental use of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded,"⁵⁰⁶ an American U-2 was shot down over Cuba, killing its pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson.⁵⁰⁷ This terrible news reached

⁵⁰⁴ "Memorandum of Conversation," November 4, 1962, translated in *Cold War International History Project (CWIHPB)*, no. 5 (1995), p. 98.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 273-277; Taubman, *Khrushchev*, pp. 569-570; White, *The Kennedys and Cuba*, pp. 226-229.

⁵⁰⁶ White, *The Kennedys and Cuba*, p. 228.

⁵⁰⁷ At the moment when Khrushchev's second letter was broadcasted over the radio, Kremlin's defense chief Rodion Malinovsky delivered the Premier's order to General Pliyev forbidding the use of nuclear warheads without direct authorization from Moscow. Shooting antiaircraft missiles were allowed only in

Washington on October 27 at 4 pm. At the time, members of ExComm were preoccupied with devising a countermeasure to Khrushchev's "second letter" suggesting a different term for the settlement before Washington responded to his first proposal of October 26. McNamara pointed out that the committee removed the limited airstrike option from the list of policy alternatives given that Soviet and Cuban anti-aircraft forces started to fire on U.S. reconnaissance planes. Washington seemed to have no choice but to initiate a massive air strike followed by invasion.

But would it have to be now? Was it the right moment to retaliate? Kennedy faced an extremely difficult decision to make. He was confident that American retaliation would invite Soviet counterattacks followed by increased escalation "the fourth and fifth step – and we don't do to the sixth because there is no one around to do so."⁵⁰⁸ He, thus, chose to wait until the next morning and sent his fourth letter to Khrushchev at 8:05 p.m. Following the ExComm advisors' advice, Kennedy ignored Moscow's public demand for the missile trade in this letter, and only mentioned the premier's first letter of October 26.⁵⁰⁹ Kennedy promised that the U.S. would "remove promptly the quarantine measures" and "give assurances against an invasion of Cuba" if the USSR would "agree to remove these

case of a massive strike. Taubman, *Khrushchev*, p. 571; Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p.276; Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 607. At 10:22 a.m. on October 27, Captain Antonyets launched SA-2 rockets and shot down the U-2 aircraft with the authorization of General Pliyev's deputy, Lieutenant General Grechko, and staff chief for military preparedness, Lieutenant General Garbuz because Pliyev could not be reached when the aircraft had been spotted. Mistakenly believed that the photographic images this reconnaissance plane took would be used for the imminent U.S. air assaults on the Soviet bases, they order to launch the missiles. Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 277-278.

⁵⁰⁸ Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), p.98.

⁵⁰⁹ This is well-known as a classic example of Trollope ploy, a negotiation technique to deliberately misinterpret the opponent's offer. Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 122.

weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision” and “to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.”⁵¹⁰

The president, however, disagreed with his advisors on the outcome of disregarding the premier’s second proposal of the missile trade. Kennedy believed that the U.S. would not settle the crisis without placing the Turkish missiles on the negotiation table.⁵¹¹ Due to the impression of selling over its ally to its enemy, however, this missile swap should not be announced publicly nor regarded as a quid pro quo for removing the nuclear threats by the Soviets. He left this delicate task to draw a fine line to his brother. Robert Kennedy met with Dobrynin that night. He warned that there was strong pressure on the president “to give an order to respond with fire” and replied to Dobrynin’s question about Turkey by saying that “If that is the only obstacle, [...] then the president doesn’t see any insurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue.”⁵¹²

When Khrushchev woke up on the morning of October 28, the pressing report was waiting for him. Malinovsky briefed the premier that an American U-2 had been downed over Cuba. This incident was a finishing blow to Khrushchev. He felt that the “situation was slipping out of his control.”⁵¹³ Today, it was a short-ranged antiaircraft missile, but tomorrow, a ballistic missile tipped with a nuclear warhead might be launched without his permission. Fortunately, Kennedy’s letter accepting the premier’s first offer arrived timely because the president had given the letter to the press as Khrushchev did. The premier

⁵¹⁰ White, *The Kennedys and Cuba*, p. 236.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., p.234.

⁵¹² Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 281-282.

⁵¹³ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, p. 608.

convened all of the relevant government officials at noon at the dacha in Novo-Ogaryovo and declared, “In order to save the world, we must retreat. I called you together to consult and debate whether you are in agreement with this kind of decision.”⁵¹⁴

While heavy silence fell over the room after Oleg Aleksandrovich Troyanovsky, the premier’s aide for international affairs, read aloud the Kennedy’s letter, Dobrynin’s report about his meeting with the president’s brother arrived. Khrushchev realized that Washington had reached a critical point and it would explode soon if he delayed further. An intelligence report from Washington arrived, shortly after, informing of the rumor that Kennedy’s speech would take place at 5 p.m. Moscow time. Troyanovsky had more disturbing news. Castro’s letter advocating the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. translated and reached Moscow. The Soviet premier lost his composure. He ordered Pliyev not to obey any order to launch a missile nor install the nuclear warheads.⁵¹⁵ Then he prepared his final letter to Kennedy and broadcasted it immediately over Radio Moscow: “the Soviet government [...] had given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.”⁵¹⁶ The message was beamed at 5 p.m., Sunday, October 28. It was 9 a.m. in Washington.

President Kennedy welcomed the message and lauded it as “an important contribution to peace.” He acknowledged that this positive reply of Moscow to

⁵¹⁴ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 284. This clearly shows that Khrushchev had already made his decision to retreat before Kennedy’s back-channel offer of missile swap arrived in Moscow. The crisis, thus, might have ended without an additional concession. Jervis, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 21, 29.

⁵¹⁵ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, pp. 622-626.

⁵¹⁶ White, *The Kennedys and Cuba*, p. 241.

Washington's offer of October 27 established a firm foundation for cooperation in finishing great tasks from removing quarantine and nuclear missiles to working on issues of disarmament, nuclear test ban, and non-proliferation. The president added that "Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field."⁵¹⁷

3-3. *The Short-term Outcome of the Peaceful Crisis Termination: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses*

Washington, Moscow and the rest of the world were on the brink of nuclear holocaust during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was fortunate for the human race that the crisis ended peacefully. At first glance, the peaceful termination of the crisis seems to contradict the prediction of the Rational and Cognitive deterrence theories': the failure of direct defensive deterrence will more likely end up in a war. However, this crisis involved the two greatest nuclear powers of the time, and the introduction of these dreadful weapons should have added enormous prudence to both policy circles of the challenger and the defender. In this context, the nuclear revolutionist approach explains Kennedy's and Khrushchev's final decisions well. They managed to terminate the crisis relatively quickly without having war, especially because of the formidable cost of nuclear war.⁵¹⁸ As Lebow

⁵¹⁷ White, *The Kennedys and Cuba*, p. 246.

⁵¹⁸ Khrushchev was ready to remove Soviet missiles in exchange for the U.S. pledge not to invade and Kennedy was willing to yield more if Moscow had pushed harder. This was ultimately because they both understood well that "nuclear weapons required an unusual degree of prudence." Jervis, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 29-30.

and Stein rightly argue, Moscow and Washington were “eyeball to eyeball,” and both leaders blinked “out of a wholly commendable fear of war and its consequences.”⁵¹⁹

The revolutionist perspective, however, loses a considerable level of explanatory power when it is tested against individual policymakers and certain phases of the crisis. First, Kennedy was the only member of ExComm who strongly believed in the necessity of giving assurance to Moscow, the Turkish-Cuban missile swap, to resolve the crisis. All the other national security advisors, even McNamara who had initially opposed any strike against the Soviet missile bases in Cuba if they were operational, and advocated for the massive airstrike route after the downing of U-2. To nuclear revolutionists’ dismay, the Soviet MRBMs readiness to retaliate against any possible American assaults did not have much deterrent effect on the majority of ExComm members. Similarly, the most advanced level of American nuclear capability failed to deter the Soviet and Cuban forces from shooting at the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. The rationale of most policymakers in Moscow and Washington except for the president and the premier, thus, is explained better by the Rational and Cognitive deterrence theories than the nuclear revolutionist approach.

Second, and more importantly, the revolutionist model fails to explain the different levels of prudence displayed by Kennedy and Khrushchev. As soon as he perceived the implication of the Soviet missile bases being fully operational, Kennedy persistently demonstrated a high level of caution and discretion. In contrast, Khrushchev sharply changed his estimation of the probability of the U.S. invasion of Cuba after he sent his first terms of settlement on October 26. This modified estimation made him more risk-acceptant and

⁵¹⁹ Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 144.

pushed Washington further by revising the terms the very next day. What triggered the premier to retreat on October 28 was neither Kennedy's offer to trade missiles nor the United States' full-blown nuclear capability. It was the downing of the U-2 and Castro's request to initiate a first nuclear strike against the U.S. that gave him a lost sense of control. We would never know how the crisis might have evolved if these two critical events did not occur, regardless of whether the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence models did not have the ability to explain the divergent degree of prudence demonstrated by Kennedy and Khrushchev.

The feasibility and belief updating models can explain these irregularities, however. First, the *feasibility of punishment* model predicts that nuclear weapons would not have much impact on the policymakers' decision-making process until these weapons are converted into a feasible tool of punishment. Even after securing the military feasibility, or the power projection capability to deliver these weapons; their inherent limitation of overkill prevents them from becoming an effective punishment measure. The feasibility model, thus, explains well why the Soviet nuclear MRBMs could not prevent the ExComm from advocating a massive conventional airstrike option as well as why the American nuclear capability fails to deter the Soviet and Cuban forces from using conventional weapons against the U.S. aircraft. Both Washington and Moscow worried less about their opponents' nuclear capability as long as they strictly turned to conventional measures below the nuclear threshold. It is difficult to find archival evidence that directly supports this explanation. But the explanation logically survives the hoop test because it was impossible to urge or implement such escalatory measures without having confidence that their opponents would not immediately punish their actions with nuclear strikes.

Second, the *belief updating* model predicts that the crisis actors will update those images of their adversaries based on what they did in the past. In direct defensive deterrence failure situations, the defender is more likely to update the type of challenger as a determined aggressor since the latter defied the credible deterrent threat of the former. Contrariwise, the challenger would likely update the defender's type as a non-resolute one if the latter does not stand firm against the former's defiance. The Bayesian updating made Kennedy more cautious while it encouraged Khrushchev to be more risk-taking as the crisis developed. This explanation survives the smoking gun test because the two top leaderships' rationales were precisely based on the belief updating as explained earlier. For example, before his declaration of the quarantine measure, Kennedy said to congressmen on October 22 that "If we invade Cuba, [...] there is a chance these weapons will be fired at the United States." On the contrary, Khrushchev emphasized to his colleagues at the Presidium on October 27 that "It is necessary to take into consideration that the United States did not attack Cuba."⁵²⁰

4. The Long-term Outcome: Deterrence Restoration

4-1. Deterrence Restoration and Détente

After a storm comes the calm. As Khrushchev and Kennedy faced the unprecedented danger of mutual destruction, both leaders confirmed that their opponents

⁵²⁰ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 244, 274.

were genuinely committed to peace. Kennedy nearly “placed his fate in Khrushchev’s hands” when he offered the back-channel term of missile swap and demanded its secrecy.⁵²¹ What would happen if the premier publicly announced this secret deal? Similarly, to Khrushchev’s surprise, this young American leader managed to control the hard-liners in Washington even after the downing of a U-2. It made Khrushchev “very interested in cooperating with Kennedy.” As many point out, “if Kennedy had not been assassinated in November 1963 and Khrushchev not removed from office in October 1964, the Cold War might have ended much sooner than it did.”⁵²²

This unusual trust established between the two leaders helped both countries navigate the troubled water that followed. Washington did not insist on-ground inspection for verifying the dismantlement and withdrawal of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Although some tactical nuclear weapons such as Luna and FKR missiles were secretly left on the island, Khrushchev made further concessions to remove IL-28 bombers when Kennedy categorized them as offensive capability. In return, Kennedy removed Jupiter MRBMs not only from Turkey but also from Italy in the name of “modernizing Alliance missile capability” despite the dissatisfaction and protest of those allies. Although Kennedy intended to replace them with Polaris SLBMs even before the initiation of the missile crisis, both Turkish and Italian governments resented for the fact that Washington had decided without any meaningful consultation with them.⁵²³

⁵²¹ Jervis, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” p.30.

⁵²² Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, p. 145.

⁵²³ Jonathan Colman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: Origins, Course, and Aftermath* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), pp. 171-187.

Although there were remaining grounds for quarrel such as the number of Soviet troops stationed in Cuba, Berlin, and the nuclear rivalry, the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis paved a way to détente and created superpower relations that were qualitatively different from those between 1948 and 1962. In his famous American University speech, Kennedy praised the sacrifice of the Soviets during the Second World War, for the first time in the postwar era, and said: “We can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guards.” Khrushchev highly commended the speech as “the greatest speech by any American president since Roosevelt.” In 1963, Washington and Moscow established the hot-line and signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.⁵²⁴

The most remarkable incident, however, that demonstrates the long-term impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis is the 1970 Cienfuegos Crisis. In late August, U-2 reconnaissance flights detected unusual construction work in Cienfuegos Bay in Cuba. It was confirmed later that the USSR was building a submarine base there by the arrival of a Soviet flotilla and task force in the bay on September 9 and by the additional photo images of U-2 on September 16 that showed military barracks, anti-aircraft SAM sites, and recreation facilities for Soviet personnel such as soccer field.⁵²⁵ This Soviet provocation must have been a déjà vu to U.S. policymakers as the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding forbade any establishment of Soviet offensive capability in the Caribbean yet Washington caught

⁵²⁴ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 336-337; Colman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 195-199.

⁵²⁵ Colman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 212-215; Raymond L. Garthoff, “Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis,” *International Security* 8, no. 1 (1983), pp. 48-49; Asaf Siniver, “The Nixon Administration and the Cienfuegos crisis of 1970: Crisis-management of a Non-crisis?” *Review of International Studies* 34 (2008), pp. 73-74.

the Soviet violation of it again. Generally speaking, the initial stage of the Cienfuegos crisis followed a very similar pattern of what happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Interestingly, however, the crisis ended rapidly through immediate communication. When Washington warned Moscow that the U.S. would forcefully remove the base if the Soviets refuse to do so, the USSR government agreed to end the construction honoring the 1962 understanding. Considering that there were no actual treaty or public statement issued concerning the precise contents of the “understanding,” this prompt retreat of Moscow was an unexpected one. The world did not have to go through another brink of war over Cuba. The (offensive) deterrence was restored. We can confirm this successful working of deterrence by the fact that, first, Soviet submarines occasionally visited Cuba after the incident, but none of them were nuclear-powered SLBMs launching ones; and second, the Soviets had not built the submarine base after all.⁵²⁶

4-2. Difficulties in Explaining the Deterrence Restoration

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus and the feasibility of punishment model predict that reputation does not produce a consistent effect, and past retreat of defenders would not necessarily cause further challenges in the future. What matters the most is not the past behavior of the defender but its current degree of resolve and feasibility to punish any acts of defiance against the status quo. On the contrary, the recent rebuttal to the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus points out that past policy choice of the

⁵²⁶ Garthoff, “Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis,” pp. 52, 58-60.

defender will have a significant impact on the challenger's estimation of the credibility of the defender's deterrent threat in case the former deals with the same opponent, a consistent issue, and a crucial interest at stake. The belief updating model supports this claim: defender's strategy of de-escalation would invite more aggressive policies from the challenger in the future due to the latter's Bayesian updating about the former's type.

Unfortunately, due to the dearth of accessible archives related to this crisis, it is difficult to test these theories against the case and confirm them. None of the literature on this crisis uses Soviet primary sources. Even the published memoirs of the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and President Richard Nixon barely mention this incident.⁵²⁷ What can be said for sure is that those Soviet leaders who replaced Khrushchev after the missile crisis continued to honor the 1962 understanding. It is fascinating that the 1970 Soviet attempts to test the American position on submarine bases in Cuba reinforced, rather than weakened, the understanding.⁵²⁸ This "understanding" projected after the missile crisis "was not really effected until August of 1970, and confirmed publicly (and reconfirmed privately) only in October of 1970."⁵²⁹ It is not clear whether Moscow did so intentionally to strengthen the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. Deciphering the true intention of the Soviet policymakers during the Cienfuegos Crisis requires a further declassification of Soviet primary sources.

⁵²⁷ Dennis A. Crall and Thomas M. Martin, "Cool Hand Nuke: Lessons From the Quiet Diplomacy of the Cienfuegos Non-Crisis," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9 (2013), p. 190.

⁵²⁸ Garthoff, "Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis," p. 52.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

CHAPTER VI
RAPID AND GRADUAL ESCALATION:
THE 1969 SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT, THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR,
AND THE 1982 FALKLANDS WAR

Examining the archival literature using the method of process-tracing, the previous two case-study chapters confirmed the limited explanatory power of Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories for the cases of direct defensive deterrence failure. These chapters also reveal that the feasibility of punishment model better explains the crisis processes of the deterrence failure from the policy choices of the challenger and the defender to the short- and long-term outcomes. While the belief updating model is weakly supported when it is tested against the policymakers of the defender in general, the model explains well the strategic thinking and the policy choices of the crisis actors' top leadership such as Hitler, Kennedy, and Khrushchev.

In this chapter, the dissertation continues to test the relevance of the feasibility and the belief updating models in explaining other cases of deterrence failure: the 1969 Sino-USSR Border Conflict, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Falklands War. Although the Rhineland and the Cuban Missile Crises are different enough cases in many ways, the two crises share one thing in common. They both have symmetric dyads in terms of nuclear capability. While the former crisis in 1936 has crisis actors of non-nuclear powers, the latter 1962 crisis involves fully developed nuclear powers that possessed the second-strike capability. To fairly study the population of direct defensive deterrence failure, thus, it is was to examine other crises that comprise different types of nuclear balance such as nuclear

disparity (a balance decisively favoring one crisis actor) and asymmetry (a dyad consists of nuclear and non-nuclear powers). The selection of those three cases is to represent the full spectrum of the nuclear balance. Due to the dearth of accessible archives and some language barrier of the researcher, this chapter majorly turns to secondary sources and engages in mini-case studies for the selected three crises.


1. The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute in 1969

1-1. The Origin of the Chinese Challenge

Although China and the USSR have an officially agreed borderline between them based on the treaties signed by the Chinese Emperors and the Russian Tsars in the 1800s, they maintained stark differences in interpreting the legitimacy of those treaties and the exact location of the demarcation line (Map 3). China repeatedly denied the legality of the treaties, given that they were forced to weak Chinese Emperors and believed that Russia robbed China of about 400,000 square kilometers of its territory. Also, especially for the eastern boundary between the two countries, it was not clear who owned the hundreds of river islands along the Amur and Ussuri rivers as the Treaty of Peking signed in 1860 listed the rivers as the border.⁵³⁰

⁵³⁰ Michael S. Gerson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969," Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (November 2010), p.10.

Map 3: The Sino-Soviet Border⁵³¹



Despite these differences and ambiguities of the borderline, there had not been much conflict between the two countries until 1963 thanks to their friendly relationship based on the Marxist ideology. The Soviet Union provided economic assistance to China and helped Beijing build modern military capabilities, including atomic bombs in the early 1950s. However, everything changed during Khrushchev's era. As the premier's project of de-Stalinization in 1956 weakened Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong's domestic authority and his regime's legitimacy, the bilateral relationship deteriorated rapidly. Mao criticized Khrushchev for taking the path of "de-Marxification" and "revisionism" and identified him as a "Hitler-type Fascist dictatorship."⁵³² The Soviets reneged on their commitment to

⁵³¹ John B. Allcock et al., *Border and Territorial Disputes* (Essex: Longman Group, 1992), p. 440.

⁵³² Gerson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," pp. 7-8.

support China to build nuclear capability and withdrew Soviet civilian and military specialists from China in 1960.

Beijing started to raise the problem of “unequal treaties publicly” and, in 1963, ignited the Sino-Soviet territorial disputes. Mao’s statement on July 10, 1964, triggered a critical break in their relations as he accused Moscow of holding vast territories that belonged to China only a hundred years ago, such as the east area of Lake Baikal, while still looking for the opportunity to occupy even Xinjiang and Heilongjiang. Although Mao clarified later that he was “firing empty canons” to scare Khrushchev and to reach a favorable settlement regarding the border disputes, Moscow perceived it as proof of Chinese “expansionist aspiration,” similar to Hitler’s *Lebensraum*, and leveled up its pressure to Beijing by taking the following three measures.⁵³³

First, Moscow greatly reinforced its conventional forces along the Sino-Soviet border. From 1966 to 1969, the number of combat divisions along the border increased from 14 to as many as 34. The Soviets also signed a defense treaty with Mongolia that authorized them to station their troops and equipment there. The USSR even deployed Scaleboard (SS-12) tactical nuclear missiles to the border. This great Soviet military buildup along the border potentially opened the third military front for China besides Taiwan and Vietnam.

Second, the Soviet forces in the Far East adopted an aggressive type of patrolling. Although they did not use small arms, they turned to clubs and armored vehicles to evict

⁵³³ Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” *Cold War History* 1, no. 1 (2000), p. 23; Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” pp. 13-14.

Chinese from the disputed islands. A number of civilians and soldiers were injured and killed as a result. The most serious incident occurred on January 5, 1968, in Qiliqin Island in which five Chinese lost their lives. From late 1968, the Soviet patrols fired warning shots at Chinese forces. Third, the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia and announced the Brezhnev doctrine, which proclaimed that Moscow had the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other socialist states.⁵³⁴

China could not tolerate the USSR's assertive moves any longer, especially since Soviet pressure increased along the borderline as Chinese domestic stability deteriorated. From 1966, Mao mobilized students and launched the Cultural Revolution to deal with the growing revisionist tendencies in China. The Chinese government, however, soon lost control of the movement, and before long, 60 to 80 central and provincial officials were purged, and hundreds of thousands of people died. To quell this massive social unrest and restore social order, Beijing brought in military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA) units assumed administrative control of many local areas.⁵³⁵ Considering this serious level of social turmoil in China, it was reasonable for Mao to suspect that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was a prelude to Moscow's intervention in Chinese domestic affairs.

Beijing believed it was time to teach the Soviets a "bitter lesson." Mao ordered PLA's Shenyang Military Region and Beijing Military Region to come up with a plan to launch strikes against Soviet forces. The original plan was prepared after the 1968 Qiliqin

⁵³⁴ Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 19-21; Gerson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," pp. 13-14.

⁵³⁵ Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation*, p. 210.

Island incident. It was an ambush assault consisting of two designated units: using PLA's patrol unit as bait to lure Soviet patrols while a major attack squadron (a size of 300 soldiers) secretly taking position on the island in advance. If the Soviet patrol approached the PLA unit of small size (about 20-30 men) to compel the Chinese soldiers to leave the island, the ambushed squadron would open fire and annihilate the Soviets.⁵³⁶ PLA executed the plan on the Zhenbao/Damansky Island on March 2, 1969, and the Chinese forces killed 38 and wounded about 30 Soviet soldiers destroying one armored vehicle, a command car, and a truck.⁵³⁷

Why did Mao decide to launch an ambush against the Soviet patrol units risking a war? Why did Beijing choose Zhenbao Island for implementing its contingency plan? The literature on the Sino-Soviet Border Disputes generally agrees that the Chinese offense was for preventing "another Czechoslovakia." As the Soviet Union was a much stronger adversary; its military buildup in the eastern border and announcement of the Brezhnev doctrine should pose an enormous threat to China that was undergoing the worst domestic turmoil in its history. Beijing believed that the only way to deter the Soviet intervention in Chinese domestic affairs was to deliver a strong message to Moscow by "publicizing the danger in advance and making clear that any attack will be forcefully resisted by a fearless adversary." It was Mao's famous tactic of "offensive defense, or defense through decisive

⁵³⁶ Yang, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969," p. 28.

⁵³⁷ We do not have sufficient evidence to confirm the actual number of casualties for this conflict. Chinese sources argue that Soviet casualties totaled over 60 including more than 50 deaths. *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 28; Gerson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," p. 23; Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001), p. 118

engagements.” By displaying the “worst-case contingency,” Beijing believed that it could deter Moscow’s offense.⁵³⁸

To serve this purpose, China needed a “limited” and “one-time-only” battle that PLA could (1) “fight quickly,” (2) “avoid entanglement,” (3) achieve an overwhelming victory, and (4) “retreat to a safe location” after the fight with the proof of victory such as pictures and Soviet weapons or equipment. Zhenbao Island was selected as it met these conditions. First, geographically speaking, the island is located closer to the Chinese side of the bank – only about 100 meters away from it while the Soviet bank was approximately 400 meters away –, and the Chinese bank was elevated while the Soviet side lacked any high ground. These geographic features provided the PLA troops a better line of sight for attack.

Second, and more importantly, the Chinese leadership in Beijing anticipated that the Soviets would not be able to launch a large-scale war to avenge their defeat over the island. During the party meeting for planning the operation on Zhenbao, Premier Zhou Enlai emphasized that the Soviets needed a lot more time to turn “the relatively undeveloped Soviet Far East into the bases for attacking China.”⁵³⁹ Beijing’s challenge against the status quo, thus, was based on its confidence that: (1) the PLA could achieve sure and absolute victory over the Zhenbao Island; and (2) the armed conflict between China and the USSR over the island would *not* escalate further into a full-scale war given

⁵³⁸ William Burr, “Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps Towards Rapprochement,” *Cold War History* 1, no. 3 (2001): p. 82; Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan,” p. 118; Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation*, p. 213; Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” pp. 24-25; Yang, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969,” p. 28.

⁵³⁹ Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” pp. 21, 27; Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation*, p. 213; Yang, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969,” p. 31.

the marginal interest at stake and the limited military feasibility of Moscow to launch a major counterattack in the Far East. It was simply a limited warfare to signal Moscow that Beijing would stand firm against the Soviet interference to its domestic affairs.

This strategic thinking demonstrates that Beijing had no intention to start a large-scale war against Moscow. It needed a quick and easy victory in a confined area to signal China's sufficient capability to resist any Soviet challenge and strong resolve to fight if Moscow tried to intervene in its domestic affairs. Zhenbao Island was carefully chosen to accomplish this purpose. Beijing was confident that it was not very feasible for the Soviets to severely punish the Chinese challenge and escalate the crisis into a large-scale war after their defeat on the small island. Therefore, Moscow's low military feasibility to punish Chinese defiance, rather than Beijing's strong will to engage in a full-scale war against the increasingly threatening neighbor, was the main cause for the USSR's direct defensive deterrence failure over the Zhenbao/ Damansky Island.

1-2. The Soviet Response: Rapid Escalation with Conventional Forces and Nuclear Threats

To Mao's disappointment, Moscow received a very different message from the Chinese ambush attack on Damansky Island. Through the foreign ministry press conference and its communication with the GDR leadership, Moscow proclaimed that Beijing established an "anti-Soviet and chauvinist great power course as the general line of Chinese policy," and the latter's provocation proved that China had become "a power hostile toward the socialist countries." To demonstrate its strong resolve to stand firm

against this anti-Soviet challenge, Moscow took two courses of action. First, the USSR continued its military buildup along the Sino-Soviet borderline and tried to make sure other socialist countries, including China, to acknowledge this reinforcement by inviting foreign journalists to the area.⁵⁴⁰ Second, Moscow decided to take a limited but serious retaliatory course by dispatching troops with many more armored vehicles and much stronger firepower to the area to attack Chinese patrols on Damansky Island.

In the morning of March 15, 1969, the Soviet patrol led by Senior Lieutenant Lev Mankovsky, discovered Chinese forces sneaked into the island and decided to attack them to retaliate against the Chinese March 2 assault. When the battle started around 8 to 9 AM, the Soviets found out that China threw more than a regiment (about 2,000 soldiers) on their side of the riverbank and laid out anti-tank mines on the island. There were three waves of Soviet attack until 7 PM involving tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery attacks, and more than a hundred troops.⁵⁴¹

Both sides lost considerable numbers of forces and equipment. The Soviets reported that Chinese casualties amounted to 800 while the USSR lost 60 men, including the border post commander, Colonel D. I. Leonov.⁵⁴² The Chinese sources, however, emphasized that the Soviets lost two tanks and seven armored vehicles and PLA additionally damaged two

⁵⁴⁰ Gerson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," p. 25.

⁵⁴¹ To demonstrate the USSR forces superior firepower, Brezhnev approved the use of most advanced weapon systems such as T-62 tanks the BM-21 "Grad" rockets. Especially, the Grad rocket, truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher with 40 tubes, was first ever used in a combat on this day. Gerson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," p. 26.

⁵⁴² Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes," *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 4 (1972), pp. 1189-1190; Yang, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969," pp. 25-26.

Soviet tanks and four of its armored vehicles. The Chinese side also argued that while PLA suffered 91 casualties (30 killed, 61 wounded), the Soviets suffered more than 200 casualties (approximately 91 killed and 109 wounded) from the two battles on March 2 and 15.⁵⁴³

Robinson points out that this second clash between China and the USSR on March 15 marks the starting point of the Soviet “dual strategy”: a combination of diplomatic and military measures for “giving the Chinese periodic bloody noses” in order to “convince them of the wisdom of border settlement along the lines of the 1964 Soviet proposals.”⁵⁴⁴ Moscow suggested talks on the borderline issue to Beijing on March 29 and April 11 while leveling up its force reinforcement in the eastern border and making nuclear threats via radio address.⁵⁴⁵ China responded about one month later. On April 24, the Ninth Party Congress in Beijing released a lengthy statement that established a precondition for any negotiation for the border issue. Moscow should admit first that “the treaties relating to the present Sino-Soviet boundary are all unequal treaties imposed on China by tsarist imperialism.” And the statement added that “neither a small war, nor a big war, nor a nuclear war can ever intimidate the Chinese people.”⁵⁴⁶

In response, the Soviets continued their diplomatic efforts yet simultaneously leveled up the military threats. In June, Soviet bomber units were deployed to Mongolia

⁵⁴³ Yang, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969,” p. 26; Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation*, pp. 201-202.

⁵⁴⁴ Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute,” pp. 1199.

⁵⁴⁵ After the March 15 incident, the Soviet radio addresses to China in Mandarin warned that the Chinese nuclear capability is far inferior to that of the USSR, and when Beijing faced “the Soviet Union’s unstoppable nuclear rockets,” China could not but let “billions of people die undefended.” Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” p. 27.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-32

and Siberia to engage in military exercises practicing preemptive strikes on Chinese nuclear facilities. From June to July, there were 429 incidents along the Sino-Soviet border, and both sides suffered both civilian and military casualties as well as the burning down of civilian homes. The culmination point was August 13, when a Soviet force of three hundred men with ten tanks and armored vehicles penetrated to Tielieketi (or Zhalanshkol) in Xinjiang province and attacked from ambush killing 20 to 40 Chinese border guards.⁵⁴⁷ On August 27, the editorial in *Pravda* noted that the future Sino-Soviet conflict would accompany both sides' nuclear capability and "would not leave a single continent unaffected."⁵⁴⁸

One very interesting point that deserves our close attention is the Soviet choice of the Tielieketi area for implementing their major retaliatory attack against PLA. As China carefully chose the Zhenbao Island for conducting their limited assault, the Soviet selection of Tielieketi also came from serious strategic calculation. Moscow expected that this retaliatory measure would possibly cause Mao to escalate the crisis even further given that the Chinese leader always underscored "political power comes out of the barrel of a gun." As the escalation might lead to a general war between the two countries, Moscow did not want to choose the eastern parts of the border as their main area of attack considering their limited transportation capability to deliver the Soviet forces and equipment to the Far East.⁵⁴⁹ As Premier Zhou anticipated, thus, the Soviets indeed had some problems with

⁵⁴⁷ Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation*, p. 213; Gerson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," pp. 33-34.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁵⁴⁹ Yang, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969," pp. 33-34.

projecting their power towards the eastern border. To address this potential problem, Moscow chose the Xinjiang area for avenging their relative defeats in two armed clashes in May. The military feasibility to follow through, thus, was the main factor that determined the Soviet reaction towards the Chinese challenge against the status quo over the Damansky Island.

1-3. Short-term Outcome: a Limited War

Beijing's attitude toward Soviet nuclear and military threats rapidly changed in August 1969. Only four months ago, Premier Zhou wrote a memo to Chairman Mao and Defense Minister Lin Biao and claimed that the USSR was a "paper tiger" that made "an empty show of strength, a show that was designed for others to watch."⁵⁵⁰ On August 27, however, the Chinese Communist Party entrusted the premier with preparing for evacuating massive population and dispersing major industries out of large cities. The Chinese government instructed civilians to dig air-raid shelters and stock up essentials. The following day, Mao issued a mobilization order to the border provinces and directed them to "be fully prepared to fight a war against aggression."⁵⁵¹ Even when the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin suggested a meeting to Beijing on his way back to Moscow after attending Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh's funeral, Mao suspected that the meeting was a trick to

⁵⁵⁰ Gerson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," p. 31.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

initiate an air assault on Beijing. He, thus, instructed Zhou to meet Kosygin at the airport, not inside the city, on September 11 while nearby military forces were on alert.

When this Zhou-Kosygin meeting suddenly relaxed the intense tension between Beijing and Moscow, Minister Lin believed that the Soviets were employing a smokescreen tactic like the Japanese special envoy to the U.S. President Roosevelt did before their attack on Pearl Harbor. China, thus, conducted the nuclear test twice in September to deter the Soviet “nuclear sneak attack.” Lin also ordered the entire Chinese forces to enter “first-degree combat readiness” because he firmly believed that Moscow would launch a surprise attack taking advantage of the Chinese national holiday on October 1. As there was no Soviet attack on that day, Mao and Lin were now convinced that the airplane supposed to carry the Soviet delegation for the follow-up meeting on the border issue on October 20 should be loaded with nuclear weapons. Accordingly, on 14 October, the Central Party Committee advised to all military and political leaders to leave Beijing before October 20, and Lin sent a directive to move PLA forces to forward positions and to put the Chinese nuclear forces on alert on October 19, for the first and the last time in the Chinese history.⁵⁵²

The intense 1969 Sino-Soviet border disputes involving numerous and serious armed clashes between the two countries continued for about eight months. The disputes finally began to cool down after the delegations from Beijing and Moscow finally sat down on October 20. The Chinese bargaining position was greatly weakened this time because “above the negotiating table hangs the Soviet atomic bomb.”⁵⁵³ Why those Chinese

⁵⁵² Ibid., pp. 46-52; Yang, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969,” pp. 39-41.

⁵⁵³ Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” p. 52.

policymakers suddenly started to believe the authenticity of the Soviet nuclear threats in August while they disbelieved the threat in April 1969? The literature points out that there are at least two reasons behind this.

First, Chinese policymakers were shocked by the Tielieketi incident and reassessed their beliefs about the level of Moscow's resolve. Mao believed that the main focus of the Soviet foreign policy always lay in Europe. China, thus, should be able to get away with its limited yet major military success on Zhenbao Island without having a major armed conflict with the USSR. The continued clashes between the two sides along the border, especially the major Soviet offensive in the Xinjiang area surprised Mao and other leaders in the Chinese Communist Party, which enforced them to correct their wrong estimation about their opponent.⁵⁵⁴ Second, Beijing learned that Moscow had been contacting foreign governments to see how they would respond to the Soviet preemptive nuclear strike on Chinese nuclear bases. Especially on August 27, the CIA Director Richard Helms released the information to the press that the Soviets had been approaching the U.S. and other socialist countries to ask about their reactions to the possible Soviet attack on China's nuclear program.⁵⁵⁵ This Soviet move made Mao and other policymakers in Beijing to fear that Moscow was seriously considering the implementation of its nuclear punishment option.

⁵⁵⁴ Yang, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969," p. 35; Gerson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," p. 39.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

1-4. Long-term Outcome: Deterrence Restoration

Although a negotiation on the Sino-Soviet border issue finally started on October 20, 1969, the ultimate settlement of the issue had to wait until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the final agreement between Beijing and Moscow on June 2, 2005.⁵⁵⁶ As China continuously insisted on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from disputed areas along the border and the reduction of the Soviet forces in the area while the USSR repeatedly rejected them, no real progress was made despite the numerous attempts to settle down the matter. While the negotiation was in a stalemate, multiple incidents occurred along the border. For example, A Soviet patrol unit crossed to the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River on May 9, 1978. One Chinese got killed and another wounded by the Soviet soldiers on the Xinjiang area on July 16, 1979. One Chinese and one Soviet civilians were killed on the Argun River on Oct. 5, 1980. Beijing, however, did not choose to take violent military measures again to deal with these incidents.⁵⁵⁷

How can we explain this relatively peaceful relationship between China and the USSR on the border issue after the 1969 conflict? Fravel suggests four main factors behind this. First, Beijing's "war scare" during the summer and fall of 1969 taught them a lesson that their estimation of Moscow's resolve was wrong. The Soviets restored their direct defensive deterrence against China by successfully communicating their military strength,

⁵⁵⁶ *Xinhuanet*, "China, Russia solve all border disputes" (June 2, 2005), https://web.archive.org/web/20090112225410/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/02/content_3037975.htm (accessed on July 30, 2019)

⁵⁵⁷ Allcock et al., *Border and Territorial Disputes*, pp. 446-447.

especially nuclear capability, and their resolve to use them to Beijing after the deterrence failure. Second, since the Zhou-Kosygin talks, both sides agreed to adopt measures to prevent further conflicts instead of concluding a deal on the border issue. The combined efforts of Beijing and Moscow for risk management surely helped them not to fall into the trap of spiral again. Third, China managed to secure *de facto* control over the disputed islands along the Ussuri and achieved its narrow goal on the territorial issue. Fourth, China matched the Soviet reinforcement along the borderline by moving five armies from the south. In addition, the Chinese rapprochement with the U.S. and its increased domestic stability in the 1970s also contributed Beijing to invest more of its political and diplomatic resources to deal with the border issue without hastily turning to military forces.⁵⁵⁸

The above description of the initiation, development, and termination of the 1969 Sino-Soviet Border conflict reveals which model of deterrence failure, namely, Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theories versus feasibility and belief updating models, better explains the case. The following “conclusion” chapter compares the explanatory capabilities of each model more in detail while summarizing key findings of all three mini-case studies. The next section examines the origin, process, and outcome of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and discusses the main factors that led Egypt, Syria, and Israel to choose certain policy options throughout the crisis.

⁵⁵⁸ Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation*, pp. 215-217.

2. The Yom Kippur War in 1973

2-1. *The Origin of Egyptian and Syrian Challenge*

The Yom Kippur War, or the October War in 1973, is the fifth war between Israel and the Arab world from 1947 to 2006.⁵⁵⁹ This series of conflicts between the two sides originated from the two main territorial issues: first, the creation and existence of the Jewish state in Palestine; and second, extensive territories Israel started to control due to the outcome of the Six-Day War in 1967, such as the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights (Map 4).

⁵⁵⁹ Allcock et al., *Border and Territorial Disputes*, p. 345; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel’s Wars.” <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/History/Pages/Israel-Wars.aspx> (accessed on August 9, 2019)

Map 4: The Israeli Territory after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War



The origin of the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs stretched back to ancient times as far as 1,200 years of pre-Christian era according to Zionist historians.⁵⁶⁰ Arguably, however, the actual starting point for serious clashes between them was 1881 when waves of Jewish immigration initially inspired by the Zionist idea to create a Jewish state in

⁵⁶⁰ Allcock et al., *Border and Territorial Disputes*, pp. 325-326.

Palestine. As Palestine had been home to the Arab people⁵⁶¹ since the expulsion of the Jewish community from the region by the Roman Empire in 135 AD, the very existence of the Jewish state in Palestine was a clear violation of the principle of self-determination and thus unacceptable to the Arab world. The region had been under the *de facto* status of war since the “Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel” on May 14, 1948. The conflict between the two sides aggravated when Israel forcefully drove out about 726,000 Palestinians during its nation-building process for ensuring the Jewish majority in the region.⁵⁶²

After the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt over the Suez Canal, the Arab-Israeli conflict got interwoven with the great power struggle as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq sought support from the USSR while the United States backed Israel. The humiliating defeat of the Arab world in the 1967 Six-Day War followed by another defeat of Egypt in the War of Attrition from 1968 to 1971 against Israel, created an image of invincible Israel and the perception of weak, hopeless, and inferior Arab states. Especially during the Six-Day War, Israeli Air Force destroyed all of the air power of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq on the day of the war, and occupied the area including the Gaza Strip, the entire Sinai peninsula up to the Suez Canal, the Old City of Jerusalem, all of Jordanian territory west of the Jordan, and the Golan Heights. These newly captured areas were three times greater than Israel’s original territory before the outbreak of the war. This embarrassing defeat of the Arab states

⁵⁶¹ The Arab population in Palestine maintained its absolute majority until the Israel’s war of independence in 1948. Even when the Jewish population peaked, it was still less than one third of the total population in the region. *Ibid.*, p. 334.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 334- 336.

made Moscow reluctant to provide any further military equipment to them as helping the Arabs seemed whistling into the wind. Even when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat secretly engaged in a peace initiative using the U.S. Secretary Henry Kissinger as a backchannel in early 1973. Both the U.S. and Israel did not feel the need to work on a peace deal with the Arab world given the enormous power gap that existed between the two sides and, thus, rejected Sadat's offer.⁵⁶³

American and Israeli policymakers had every reason to believe that the Arab states would not be able to do anything, and the Rational Deterrence perspective supports their rationale. First, Israel successfully demonstrated that it possessed the superior military capability that can beat even the combined Arab forces of four major countries during the 1967 Six-Day War. In the followed-up War of Attrition, Israel revealed that its will to fight for the newly occupied territory in the Sinai despite the interest at stake was less than intrinsic for them. Israel also successfully demonstrated their superior durability in fighting a sustained artillery battle and confirmed the strength of support it was receiving from the U.S.⁵⁶⁴ In other words, Israel effectively signaled its sufficient capability and strong resolve to its adversaries, and accordingly, its direct deterrence policy would hardly fail in the future. As Kissinger wrote, "the Arab armies must lose; hence, they would not attack."⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶³ Ibid., pp. 339- 346; Anwar al-Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper Collins, 1977), p. 242; Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 188; Uri Bar-Joseph, "Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and its Failure," *Journal of Contemporary History* 41, no. 3 (2006), p. 546.

⁵⁶⁴ Elli Lieberman, "Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars?" *McNair Paper* 45, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies (October 1995), pp. 40-41.

⁵⁶⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 459; Thomas W. Lippman, *Hero of the Crossing: How Anwar Sadat and the 1973 War Changed the World* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), pp. 5-6; Seale, *Asad of Syria*, p. 196.

To Israel's great surprise, however, Egypt and Syria launched a major offensive in the Sinai and the Golan Heights and enforced Israel a two-front war on October 6, 1973. There can be three explanations for the challengers' move. First, the Rational Deterrence theory argues that Egypt and Syria were (falsely) convinced that they could win the war against Israel because of the change in the balance of power thanks to a major improvement in their weapon system with the help of the USSR. Second, the Cognitive Deterrence theory points out that the domestic political conditions of Egypt and Syria jeopardized the regime security of these countries unless they did not challenge Israel. They initiated a war, thus, even though they knew their defeats were certain; yet it was indispensable for them to restore the honor and self-esteem of the Arab world by defying against powerful Israel to ensure the domestic support for their regimes. Third, the feasibility of punishment model explains that Egypt and Syria had confidence in waging a *specific* kind of war if they imposed Israel a battle in certain ways to deprive the latter of its feasibility to punish them. While the first two explanations assume that the challengers were determined aggressors, the third one supposes that they were conditionally resolute or strategically opportunistic.

Which explanation fits best with the rationale of Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad for initiating the war? Numerous studies, including Sadat's memoir and a case study based on the interview with Assad, point out that the two Arab leaders had very different objectives. While Sadat wanted to revive the peace initiative and shape a favorable condition for negotiation, Assad sought to regain its lost territory by force.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁶ Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, pp. 238-249; Seale, *Asad of Syria*, p. 195; Lippman, *Hero of the Crossing*, p. 10; Lieberman, "Deterrence Theory," pp. 41-45; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 460; Elbridge Colby et al., "The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis," Center for Naval

After going through the U.S. and Israeli rejection of his peace initiative, Sadat learned that he should break the widespread perception of the Arab inferiority before working on any peace deal with Israel and the U.S. to regain the Sinai. He wrote;

“It was impossible, as I have always said, for the United States (or, indeed, any other power) to make a move if we ourselves didn’t take military action to break the deadlock. [...] The United States regrettably could do nothing to help so long as we were the defeated party and Israel maintained her superiority. [...] if we could recapture even 4 inches of Sinai territory [...], and establish ourselves there so firmly that no power on earth could dislodge us, then the whole situation would change – east, west, all over.”⁵⁶⁷

This statement shows that he had a very limited goal on October 6: to show the world that Israel was far from invincible and the Arab states had sufficient capability to greatly disrupt not only the regional stability but also the great power relations that were enjoying détente and relatively peaceful times in the early 1970s. Through achieving a short-term but astonishing military victory, Egypt could secure an honorable seat on the negotiation table for comprehensive peace in the Middle East. To accomplish this vision of victory in “the Six-Hour War,”⁵⁶⁸ he carefully devised a specific military plan for a limited war and sought help from Moscow to build necessary strength.

Analyses (April 2013) https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final.pdf (accessed on August 12, 2019), pp. 9-13.

⁵⁶⁷ Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, pp. 238, 244.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

First, Sadat did everything he could do to prevent Israel from initiating a preemptive strike and mobilizing its reserves, the pattern of Israel's sure victory in the 1967 war. His main countermeasure to achieve this goal was deception and strategic/intelligence surprise.⁵⁶⁹ Sadat expelled the Soviet experts in July 1972 to deceive the West that he cut off the supply line for the Soviet military equipment. He then launched a mass media campaign and civil defense measures in May and August 1973 to mislead Israel into believing that the war was imminent. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered full mobilization twice for nothing wasting ten million dollars each time.⁵⁷⁰ Lastly, Sadat chose to launch an attack on October 6, the Yom Kippur Day or the Day of Atonement, the holiest and the most solemn holiday in the Jewish calendar when most soldiers were at home, not on the fortified posts along the Bar-Lev line.⁵⁷¹

Second, Sadat learned from the Egyptian failure in the two previous wars and focused on building countervailing strength that could address Israel's superiority in the air and large-scale armored battles. He was deeply concerned with the possibility of Israel's "deep penetration" and air raiding on Egypt's major cities. Interestingly, however, it is difficult to find archival evidence that he was worried about Israeli nuclear capabilities.⁵⁷² Sadat zeroed

⁵⁶⁹ For the detailed explanation of the Sadat's deception strategy, see Yigal Sheffy, "Overcoming strategic weakness: The Egyptian deception and the Yom Kippur War," *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 5 (2006), pp. 809-828.

⁵⁷⁰ Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, pp. 241- 242.

⁵⁷¹ Lippman, *Hero of the Crossing*, p. 1; Colby et al., "The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973," p. 18

⁵⁷² According to T. V. Paul's interview with Egyptian Field Marshal Al-Gamasi and Egyptian diplomat Bashir President Sadat and his advisors believed that it was hardly likely that Israel would turn to nuclear punishment unless the "Israeli heartland was in grave danger." This was why they did not worry too much about Israeli nuclear capabilities as they decided to launch a limited attack strictly confined to the Sinai. T. V. Paul, "Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no.4 (1995), p. 707.

in on securing Soviet advanced military assets especially anti-tank and air defense capabilities namely, SA-6 Soviet surface-to-air missile, the SAM-7 shoulder-fired missile, the RPG-7 rocket launcher, and the AT-3 Sagger wire-guided missile.⁵⁷³

Assad also had no intention to start a large-scale war against Israel. He wanted to restore the confidence of the Syrian forces by reoccupying the lost Golan Heights.⁵⁷⁴ However, Assad had a far more ambitious aim compared to Sadat's "4 inches of Sinai territory." He was very skeptical about the effects of peace talks or UN resolutions and "wanted to put the clock back to before Israel's conquests in the Six-Day War" by military force.⁵⁷⁵ Assad insisted that;

"The goal was the retrieval of territory which Israel occupied in 1967. [...] it was agreed that Syria's aim was the recovery of the Golan while the Egyptian objective was to reach the Sinai passes in the first stage before regrouping for the reconquest of the whole peninsula. This was what Sadat and I decided and it was on this principle that we went to war."⁵⁷⁶

To achieve this goal, he concentrated 70 percent of the national budget on increasing military strength and concluded \$700 million arms deal with Moscow in 1972 after receiving \$327 million worth military aid. Before the war broke out, the Syrian army

⁵⁷³ Lieberman, "Deterrence Theory," pp. 47-50; Colby et al., "The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973," pp. 12-13.

⁵⁷⁴ Colby et al., "The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973," pp. 11-12.

⁵⁷⁵ Seale, *Asad of Syria*, pp. 185-186.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.197.

was equipped with MiG-21 fighter planes, SAM anti-aircraft missiles, FRUG surface-to-surface missiles, T-62 tanks.⁵⁷⁷ This massive military buildup in Egypt and Syria changed the military balance between the Arab coalition and Israel more favorable to the former. Compared to Arab-Israel military balance of 1.47:1 in the air, 1.71:1 in tanks, and 1.09:1 in manpower during the Six-Day War; Egypt and Syria succeeded in widening the gap to the ratio of 2.54:1 in the air, 2.8:1 in tanks and 2.16:1 in manpower.⁵⁷⁸

With this increased power, however, Sadat wanted to buy bargaining chips for concluding favorable peace deals whereas Assad sought to recover the lost territory by force. The October War, thus, was mainly a “political war” for Sadat while it was a “war of liberation” to Assad. Patrick Seale argues that Sadat deceived Assad and the Syrians “were actually fed false war plans.” The two-front war was a misguided plan for Syria, which was crumbling from the beginning. When Assad realized that Sadat betrayed him, he regretted not setting “less ambitious objectives.”⁵⁷⁹

These testimonies of Sadat and Assad show that while the Rational Deterrence theory explains Syria’s move better and the Cognitive Deterrence theory fits well with the Egyptian policy choice. However, the fact that both Arab states had no intention to start a large-scale war to destroy Israel even with their greatly enhanced military capabilities and pressing needs of domestic politics should deserve our closer attention. Sadat and Assad had a limited goal in launching a war against Israel, and they focused on building capabilities, such as SAM

⁵⁷⁷ Moshe Ma’oz, *Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 122.

⁵⁷⁸ Lieberman, “Deterrence Theory,” p. 46.

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-211.

and anti-tank missiles, which could neutralize Israeli punishment measures. The Egyptian leadership's misperception that they had secured enough capability to negate or at least significantly reduce the Israeli capability to punish their limited war caused the 1973 October war.⁵⁸⁰ The Egyptian and Syrian policy choice of initiating a limited war demonstrates that the actual trigger that determined the timing of the war was the Israeli military feasibility to punish the Arab challenge to revise the status quo.

2-2. *The Israeli Response: Rapid Escalation with Conventional Forces*

During the first few days of the Yom Kippur war, both Egypt and Syria achieved remarkable military success. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was in a dire predicament on both the Sinai and the Golan fronts opened by the two Arab states due to the delay in calling up of reserves until the very last moment. Although they knew about the imminent war on the morning of October 6, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Dayan declined the Chief of Staff David Elazar's request to launch a preemptive strike and call up reserves. Meir and Dayan wanted to create the image of the "opening scene" that Israel was a victim of the Arab provocation to secure strong American and international support.⁵⁸¹

Israel had fortified the Bar-Lev Line along the Suez Canal with 50 feet earth mounds and 35 guard posts backed by artillery and armored vehicles. However, on October

⁵⁸⁰ Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma*, pp. 53-54; Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence I: The View From Cairo," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein eds., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 34-59.

⁵⁸¹ Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: an Israeli Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 172-173.

6, only 16 posts were fully manned, and only 600 IDF troops covered nearly 125 miles long line. After massive air raid and artillery attacks, Egyptian infantry divisions of 90,000 troops armed with effective anti-air and anti-tank weapons crossed the Canal blasting away the sand berm with high-pressure water pumps. Eight hundred fifty tanks and other numerous artillery and armored vehicles followed them. Within 24 hours, Egyptian forces captured all Israeli fortified posts along the Bar-Lev Line.⁵⁸² Along the Purple Line on the Golan Heights, Syria concentrated 60,000 soldiers with 1,300 tanks, 600 artillery pieces, and more than 100 batteries of SAM missiles. This defense line was protected by high earth mounds, minefields, and 112 Israeli fortified posts. By October 8, Syrian forces succeeded in capturing more than half of the Golan and advanced to the point just a few miles from the Israeli population centers in the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan bridges.⁵⁸³

The IDF launched a major armored counterattack on October 8 in the Sinai, and Israeli air forces made every effort to support isolated and outnumbered thin defense lines on the Golan. However, Israel lost 400 tanks, along with General Abraham Mendler, the commander of the Israeli Armored Corps, to Egypt and 100 tanks to Syria. It was indeed the worst defeat in the history of the IDF.⁵⁸⁴ President Sadat proclaimed. “The myth of Israel’s long arm, of her superior, even invincible, air force, armory, and soldiers – was

⁵⁸² Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, pp. 248-252; Colby et al., “The Israeli ‘Nuclear Alert’ of 1973,” pp. 16-17; Lippman, *Hero of the Crossing*, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁸³ Seale, *Asad of Syria*, pp. 203-205; Colby et al., “The Israeli ‘Nuclear Alert’ of 1973,” pp. 18-19.

⁵⁸⁴ Lippman, *Hero of the Crossing*, p. 17.

finally shattered.”⁵⁸⁵ After his visit to the northern front on the Golan on October 7, Israeli Defense Minister Dayan was seriously perturbed and said Israel might face “the collapse of third temple.” He was comparing the situation to the first collapse of holy temple in Jerusalem in 586 BC and the second in 70 AD that coincided with the destruction of the Jewish community.⁵⁸⁶

Given that the Israeli leadership perceived that they were facing an existential threat, playing with coercive diplomacy measures was no longer an option. They had to turn to the actual use of force and switch over their strategic posture from direct defensive deterrence to defense. Israel’s reaction to take the rapid escalation path does not require much explanation in this regard. After the failure of the October 8 counterattack, the Israeli cabinet decided to (1) hold on to the 1967 borderline as much as possible, (2) punish enemy forces, and (3) negotiate a bargain.⁵⁸⁷ An important question we must ask is whether the nuclear capability of Israel affected this decision-making process after October 8. Although it is difficult to confirm with 100 percent certainty due to the deliberate opacity in Israel’s nuclear program, many experts underscore that Israel acquired its first deliverable nuclear weapons on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War.⁵⁸⁸ As mentioned earlier, there is no archival evidence that demonstrates either Sadat or Assad feared the possibility of Israeli nuclear sanctions against the Arab offense. Were they right about this? Did Israel consider the use of nuclear weapons to push back Egyptian and Syrian forces?

⁵⁸⁵ Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p. 255.

⁵⁸⁶ Colby et al., “The Israeli ‘Nuclear Alert’ of 1973,” p. 19; Lippman, *Hero of the Crossing*, p. 16.

⁵⁸⁷ Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East*, p. 177.

⁵⁸⁸ Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Perseus Books, 1998), p. 274.

Under the serious strategic and psychological crisis, Israel had every reason to turn to its nuclear weapons. For example, by alerting the Israeli nuclear forces, it could signal Sadat and Assad that further penetration into Israeli territory would result in nuclear punishment. Furthermore, this move could send a strong message to Washington, which should help Israel to resupply IDF with the U.S. military equipment.⁵⁸⁹ Numerous sources, thus, argue that Meir permitted Dayan to get ready to use the doomsday weapons during the October War.⁵⁹⁰ Most of them agree that the Israeli nuclear alert was for sending messages to the Arab states and the United States. To test this theory, we should confirm whether (1) Israel activated the weapons during the war, (2) Egypt and Syria could receive the warning message of nuclear punishment, and (3) the U.S. policymakers detected the signal and responded to the Israeli move. Through the extensive analysis of primary and secondary sources, interviewing the U.S. and Israeli government officials and carefully cross-checking their statements, Colby, Cohen, McCants, Morris, and Rosenau conclude that none of the three occurred.

First, none of the primary sources of the U.S. declassified archive, and American and Israeli interviewees confirm that Israel attempted to influence Washington with considering the use of its nuclear forces. If the Meir cabinet intended to do so, there should have been “at least some documentary evidence of deliberations.” None was found, however. Only William Quandt, the NSC staff on Middle East issues, asserted that the U.S.

⁵⁸⁹ Colby et al., “The Israeli ‘Nuclear Alert’ of 1973,” p. 21.

⁵⁹⁰ For the summary of literature on the purported argument of Israeli nuclear alerts, see Avner Cohen, “Nuclear Arms in Crisis Under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons of the 1967 and 1973 Wars,” in Peter R. Lavoy et al., eds., *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Nuclear Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 117-124.

had detected Israel's nuclear-related activity in the early phase of the war. However, even he emphasizes that the report of the Israeli nuclear movement did not have any meaningful impact on discussions among U.S. policymakers. Most government officials confirm that they did discuss the issue of alerting American nuclear forces to deter the Soviet intervention in the war. But the Israeli nuclear weapons were not even mentioned during the deliberation process.⁵⁹¹

Second, Egypt and Syria did not have sophisticated intelligence capability to detect Israeli nuclear alerts. The only two countries that had the capability in the world were the USSR and the U.S. Indeed, the Meir cabinet might expect Moscow to convey the worrisome developments to its Arab clients, but why should Israel depend on the Soviets to play the middle man role? If they wanted to send a signal, it should have been more unequivocal to convey a blatant verbal message. Third, numerous Israeli sources confirm that while Dayan did raise the issue during the cabinet discussion on October 7, Meir rejected his recommendation to make nuclear weapons operational. Dayan, thus, might have ready or check nuclear delivery systems as a precautionary step on his initiative, yet he was unable to alert the weapons.⁵⁹²

Why didn't the Meir cabinet consider the use of nuclear weapons? First, the use of nuclear weapons directly contradicts Israel's decade old public commitment as well as the September 1969 agreement between President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir. Considering that the Meir cabinet even delayed the call-up of reserve until the very last

⁵⁹¹ Colby et al., "The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973," pp. 31-39.

⁵⁹² Ibid., pp. 40-48.

moment to secure American support, nuclear punishment might be the very last thing that Israeli leadership would like to take. Second, Israel maintained only modest stockpile of nuclear warheads with very limited delivery systems.⁵⁹³ Third, although the Egyptian and Syrian armies were achieving unprecedented success on both fronts, they had not breached into Israel's post-1949 borders, and subsequently had not crossed the "red line" yet.⁵⁹⁴ Israel and the Arab states were fighting over the land that used to belong to Egypt and Syria.⁵⁹⁵

2-3. *Short-term Outcome: a Limited War*

After this panic of "end of the Third Temple" passed, Israel did not need to consider the nuclear option anymore because the war situation had rapidly changed since October 9. First, Israeli reserve forces joined the war within 36 to 48 hours of the war.⁵⁹⁶ Second, after achieving remarkable victory in the "battle of crossing" and successfully repelling Israeli counterattack on October 8, Egyptian forces oddly switched over to defensive

⁵⁹³ Ibid., pp. 44-46.

⁵⁹⁴ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 237.

⁵⁹⁵ While Aronson argues that Egypt and Syria deliberately chose the battle that drew much blood from soldiers rather than civilians not to trigger the Israeli nuclear retaliation. In this regard, Israel's nuclear deterrence was successful even though its direct defensive deterrence posture failed in general. Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East*, pp. 178-179. However, Evron suggests an argument of the other side of the coin that Sadat did not even consider to achieve any military objective greater than a modest success in a limited war because of his perception of the balance of the military forces favoring Israel. He, thus, "planned and executed in a purely conventional arms mode." Yair Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 72-73.

⁵⁹⁶ Shmuel Tzabag, "Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria: Positions, Decisions and Constraints at Israel's Ministerial Level," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 4 (2001), p. 190.

posture and burrowed. This unusual movement of the Egyptian military indicates that Sadat's war aim was not to initiate a large-scale reconquest operation but to break the stalemate in his peace initiative. Also, Egyptian military leadership opposed the idea to advance beyond the SAM cover which would expose its army to the attack of the Israeli Air Force (IAF).⁵⁹⁷ Falling prey to the superior IAF would repeat the failure of the Six-Day War. The "operational pause" on the southern front allowed Israel to concentrate its main forces to knock down the Syrian forces on the northern front. The Arab's two-front war strategy collapsed.

Even before Egypt changed its operational posture to defensive, Israel devised a plan to terminate the war by breaking Assad's forces first. There were five reasons for this decision. First, Israel forces did not have enough capability to conduct a two-front war. Its reserve house was rapidly depleting especially the ammunition. It was impossible to sustain the war without the massive resupply of the military equipment hopefully by the U.S. Second, as explained earlier, while the Israeli forces had strategic depth in the Sinai,⁵⁹⁸ the Golan front was too close to Israel's main population centers and the Sea of Galilee, the main national source of water. Third, in terms of power, the Syrian army was a lot weaker than that of Egypt. Fourth, Israel needed a major victory on either front to deter Jordan or Iraq from opening a third front. Fifth, if IDF defeated the Syrian forces and penetrated its

⁵⁹⁷ Seale, *Asad of Syria*, pp. 207-208.

⁵⁹⁸ The Sinai Theater was approximately 50 times greater than the Golan Heights. Tzabag, "Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria," p. 187.

territory, Israel believed that it could compensate for some territorial losses on the southern front when the Soviet Union and the U.S enforced cease-fire resolution.⁵⁹⁹

The Egyptian forces' operational pause, thus, helped Israel to accomplish its main military goal more easily. Assad's troops faced "full fury of the Israeli air force," and the northern front turned into an "inferno."⁶⁰⁰ Syria lost about 800 tanks, other hundreds of armored vehicles, and 6,000 men. On October 10, Israel succeeded in recovering the pre-war borderline on the Golan. The Meir cabinet authorized Dayan to penetrate 20 kilometers into Syria to threaten Damascus with long-range artillery. Dayan emphasized the importance of this operation for the termination of the war by saying that "The name Damascus is even more important now than the Bar-Lev line." As Israeli forces advance to Damascus, the cease-fire proposal was submitted to the UN Security Council on October 13.⁶⁰¹ Meanwhile, under the code name "Operation Nickel Grass," the U.S. started to supply Israel with ammunition and weapons on that day.⁶⁰²

Assad repeatedly pled Sadat for immediate Egyptian offensive to ease the Israeli pressure on Damascus and Egyptian forces finally opened attack on October 14. Sadat could not afford the fall of Damascus as it would make him face enormous criticism in the Arab world for its double-dealing and betrayal and cost him losing the lever on the follow-up peace negotiations. Unfortunately, this belated Egyptian advance ended up with a military disaster. Without the proper level of SAM cover, Egypt lost more than 250 tanks

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 190-194.

⁶⁰⁰ Seale, *Asad of Syria*, p. 209.

⁶⁰¹ Tzabag, "Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria," pp. 195-198.

⁶⁰² Lippman, *Hero of the Crossing*, p. 18.

on that day.⁶⁰³ After this battle, IDF successfully crossed the Suez Canal between October 15 and 16, advanced to the western side of the canal, and encircled the entire Egyptian Third Army. By October 22, the 45,000 men of Egypt's Third Army were at "Israel's mercy [...] cut off from their home base and an open prey to the IAF, without food, water or ammunition."⁶⁰⁴

The annihilation of the Egyptian Third Army was unacceptable not only for Moscow, the patron of Egypt and Syria but also for Washington. Neither side wanted to be dragged into a confrontation, especially when they are enjoying the *détente*. The U.S. also sought to reduce the Arab dependence on the USSR, but the destruction of the Egyptian forces would only inflame the Arab world and encourage them to seek more help from Moscow. They came to terms on the cease-fire on October 22, and UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338 on October 22 calling on cease-fire and immediate termination of military activities no later than 12 hours. However, under the connivance of the U.S. Secretary Henry Kissinger, Israel further pressed on both in the Sinai and Syria. For example, Israel managed to recapture the Mount Hermon observation post on the Golan Heights on October 22.

Israel's apparent non-compliance with the UN resolution angered the Soviet Chairman Brezhnev and led him to threaten Washington to unilaterally dispatch the Soviet forces in the area on October 24. The U.S. responded to this threat by elevating its alerting status to DEFCON III, just one level below the defense readiness during the Cuban Missile

⁶⁰³ Seale, *Asad of Syria*, pp. 212-213.

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214; Tzabag, "Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria," pp. 199-200.

Crisis. This increased tension could have brought another nuclear crisis between the two superpowers. The UN Security Council had to pass two more resolutions to stop Israeli forces. On November 1, after receiving hard pressure from Washington, Meir finally agreed to withdraw Israeli forces to the line that existed on October 22.⁶⁰⁵

2-4. *Long-term Outcome: Reassurance and Deterrence Restoration*

Militarily speaking, Israel was the clear winner in the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Despite its initial defeats caused by “self-inflicted setbacks,” IDF managed to turn the tide and was at the brink of slaughtering the Egyptian Third Army and destroying Damascus. Victory in war, however, should be measured not simply by the size of newly gained territories or the number of enemy forces’ casualties but by how much of the country’s main objective is achieved. As Clausewitz’s famous quote goes, “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”

Israel achieved dramatic victory at the expense of the heaviest casualties in its history. More than 6,400 soldiers were killed or wounded, and the figure is far greater than that of any previous wars. Israelites were outraged by the IDF’s inadequate intelligence, problems in military strategy and planning, and incompetence of civilian leadership over the military, which eventually ended the political career of both Meir and Dayan. In the parliamentary election in 1977, the Labor party was defeated by the right-wing Likud which advocated territorial maximalism, for the first time in Israeli history since its

⁶⁰⁵ Lippman, *Hero of the Crossing*, pp. 18-33; Seale, *Asad of Syria*, pp. 219-225.

inception. On the contrary, although they lost the war at the tactical level, the Arab states' achieved most of their goals. They dispelled the myth of Israeli invincibility, restored the self-esteem of the Arabs, and successfully kicked off the peace negotiations after the war.⁶⁰⁶

Thanks to the shared concern of Washington and Moscow for the escalation of conflicts in the Middle East, and especially as a result of Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy," Israel and Egypt concluded two disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975, and finally the peace treaty in 1979. Tel-Aviv evacuated Israeli forces and civilians in Sinai and established the demilitarized zone supervised by the UN forces and the U.S. Air Force. Along the way, Sadat visited Israel in 1977, marking the very first "direct, official and public contact" between Israel and Arab leaders, and gave a speech to the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. While setting forth for his vision of peace in the region, he proclaimed that Egypt, the most powerful Arab state in the Middle East, would acknowledge and accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state. Although the territorial disputes between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights continue even today, the two countries came to an understanding of their mutual actions in Lebanon and enjoyed strategic stability from late 1970 to early 1980s. Most importantly, the Yom Kippur War was the last major armed conflict between Egypt, Syria, and Israel.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁶ Simon Dunstan, *The Yom Kippur War: the Arab-Israeli War of 1973* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007), pp. 205-207; Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 477-481.

⁶⁰⁷ Allcock et al., *Border and Territorial Disputes*, pp. 346-352; Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma*, pp. 54-59; Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*, p. 499.

How can we explain this stability in the region and deterrence restoration in the aftermath of the 1973 October War? Evron suggests two main reasons behind this.⁶⁰⁸ First, in addition to its earlier victories in the large-scale war of 1967 and the war of attrition in 1969, Israel ultimately defeated Egypt and Syria even in the 1973 limited war. This final military victory of Israel deprived the Arab states of any military option of challenging Israel again. Indeed, the myth of Israeli invincibility was shattered yet the fundamental military power gap between Israel and the Arab states was rather confirmed. Especially, Israel convincingly demonstrated that it possessed sufficient military capability to punish any challenge to the status quo by threatening to shell Damascus and annihilate the Egyptian Third Army. The unambiguous display of its feasibility to follow through on the deterrent threat reinforced the Israeli deterrence posture greatly in the aftermath of the 1973 war.

Second, Israel's territorial concessions and political reassurance shifted the balance of interests between Israel and Egypt. Sadat decided to initiate a limited war due to the increasing political cost of the stalemate in his diplomatic initiative to restore its lost territories. In this regard, direct defensive deterrence failed in 1973 not because of the change in the balance of capability but rather due to the shift in the balance of interest over the territorial issue. Egypt politically needed to regain some of their lost territory in Sinai to address the growing public grievance over the issue. After the war, Israel agreed to resolve this problem by making territorial concessions. This attempt to rebalance the relative interest at stake made Israel's deterrence posture against the Arab states even stronger considering that the former already manifested its military superiority through

⁶⁰⁸ Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma*, pp. 54-56.

defeating the latter in all different kinds of war from the 1950s to 1970s. Subsequently, it became very difficult for Egypt to defy against Israel again. This situation brought enormous difficulties to Syria in maintaining the great struggle against Israel as it lost its security partner who was the most powerful Arab state in the region. There were not many things left for Syria to revise the status quo, which further strengthened the stability in the Middle East.

In sum, the feasibility model explains the Egyptian decision to launch a limited war and Israel's policy choice not to use nuclear weapons to punish the Arab states' challenge against the status quo. Chapter 7 further compares the explanatory capability of the rival and the research hypotheses. In the next section, these hypotheses are tested against the Argentine and British decision makings during the 1982 Falklands War.

3. The Falklands War in 1982


3-1. The Origin of the Argentine Challenge

The sovereignty issue over the islands about the size of Wales (or somewhat smaller than the state of Connecticut) that are approximately 7,500 miles away from Great Britain and 300 miles off the coast of Argentina, lies at the center of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War (Map 5). The islands were thinly populated with about 2,000 inhabitants, and almost all of them were of British origin. The issue of sovereignty goes back to the days of the early 19th Century. After declaring its independence from Spain on July 9, 1816, Buenos

Aires took possession of the islands. Unfortunately, after the U.S. navy's assault on the island in December 1831 to retaliate the islands' Governor Louis Vernet's seizure of U.S. ships, majority of Argentine settlements were destroyed. Taking the opportunity, British ship *Clio* arrived in those islands and expelled remaining Argentinians in 1832. While Argentine government proclaimed that the British forces illegally seized and occupied the Falklands, London argued that the territory was *res nullius* or belonging to no one after the U.S. destruction of the Argentine settlements. Argentina has solid grounds for claiming its sovereignty of the Malvinas islands from the legal perspective. However, the effective British occupation of the Falklands over a hundred years and the strong inclination of the islands' inhabitants toward London made it very difficult to solve the territorial disputes between the two countries diplomatically.⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁹ Daniel K. Gibran, *The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1998), pp. 13-44.

Map 5: South Atlantic⁶¹⁰



⁶¹⁰ D. George Boyce, *The Falklands War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), viii.

Taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the decolonization movements in the 1960s, Argentina successfully gained support from the UN General Assembly, and the two countries entered into negotiation in 1966. The talks led to “Memorandum of Understanding” and London agreed to transfer power over the islands to Argentina eventually. However, the Falklands inhabitants lobbied the British government to include the condition that the transfer would only occur when it took into account the “wishes” of the islanders. This condition granted the British-friendly people on the Falklands a veto power against the transfer. In 1976, negotiation was interrupted by the Argentine destroyer’s attempt to intercept the British ship *Shackleton* which was engaging in scientific research in the South Atlantic area. London protested vehemently to the UN Security Council while Buenos Aires accused the ship searching for oil. The UN Resolution 31/49 of December 1, 1976, urged the two parties to expedite the negotiations and urged both countries not to introduce any “unilateral modifications” in the situation.

Argentine-British diplomatic relations resumed after the incident, yet the negotiations were not moving forward especially after the Falkland Islands Legislative Council took part in the rounds of talks in January 1981. The Argentinean government, now under the new military leadership of Leopoldo Galtieri, stated on March 1, 1982, that it would “put an end” to negotiations and “seek other means” to resolve the territorial issue. After the illegal landing of Argentine scrappers led by Constantino Davidoff on South Georgia Island, situated 800 miles east-south-east of the Falklands, on March 18, Britain reversed the decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance*, an ice patrol ship, from the South

Atlantic and ordered to ship to move to the island to put pressure on those Argentines. Buenos Aires responded to this British move by invading the Falklands on April 2, 1982.⁶¹¹

Why did the Galtieri regime decide to invade the Falklands? The literature on historical studies on the Falklands War suggests four explanations. First, the invasion was part of Argentina's grand strategy to achieve regional dominance and to secure an advantageous position in another territorial dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel. As the country which possesses the three islands of Picton, Nueva, and Lennox would have the leverage for expansion into the South Atlantic and Antarctica, the tension between the two countries was getting fierce especially after the international court awarded the islands to Chile in 1977. Argentina refused to accept the verdict and took the path of gunboat diplomacy, which led the two countries at the brink of war in 1978. As Buenos Aires and Santiago agreed to resubmit the case for arbitration to Vatican, the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands was to influence the Vatican's decision.⁶¹² However, this argument lacks solid archival evidence and is not very convincing given that Argentina's aggressive policies in the Falklands would not help much to get favorable reactions from Vatican. Rather, the move would only provide the Chilean government with an opportunity to strengthen its ties with London.⁶¹³

Second, the invasion was simply a follow-up measure after Buenos Aires failed its brinkmanship policy over South Georgia Island. Nearly all of the Argentine press covered

⁶¹¹ Allcock et al., *Border and Territorial Disputes*, pp. 551-556; Jessica L. Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 107-109;

⁶¹² Gibran, *The Falklands War*, pp. 65-66.

⁶¹³ Amy Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands," *Security Studies* 15, no.3 (2006): p. 444.

the mounting tension between London and Buenos Aires over the Davidoff's party on the island by March 26. If the military government backed down, it would cause the junta to pay enormous audience costs especially considering the political consequence of "being shown to be weak in precisely the area where it was supposed to be strong." Given that the military regime repeatedly had promised to the Argentine people that they would restore the islands, the government's backing down from the public pledge might cost the regime security. Besides, the incident seemed to trigger major British military reinforcements in the South Atlantic, which would arrive within a couple of weeks. Buenos Aires, thus, believed that they should occupy the islands before the arrival of the British reinforcements.⁶¹⁴ As Oakes rightly points out, however, this argument cannot explain the fact that the Galtieri regime planned to invade the Falklands in December 1981, two to three months before the South Georgia Island incident. The invasion, thus, was a "deliberate choice" rather than the "unintended consequence" of a brinkmanship strategy.⁶¹⁵

Third, a majority of studies acknowledge that the Argentine invasion of the Falklands was a classic example of the *diversionary war*. Since the military coup in 1976 overthrew the civilian government of Isabel Peron, Argentina was struggling with deep economic downfall and political disorder. The junta's economic policy to promote export and foreign investments failed, and triple-digit inflation, public run on the banks, rocketing foreign debts

⁶¹⁴ Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 67-68; Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein eds., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

⁶¹⁵ Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands," pp. 444-445.

from \$19 billion to \$30 billion within a single year of 1980 drove Argentina into a serious economic recession. Even after the severe and successful repression of human rights or “dirty war” of 1976-1979 under the pretext of eradicating “ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization,” it could not stop people from going for general strikes in the late 1970s.⁶¹⁶ By the time General Galtieri seized power, even the solidarity of the military group was falling due to the growing fear of total failure and collapse of the regime.⁶¹⁷ On March 30, 1982, only three days before the invasion of the Falkland Islands, a major demonstration took place in which about 40,000 people came out to street demanding the end of military rule.⁶¹⁸ The Argentine government, thus, desperately needed a unifying mission to lead people rallying around the junta’s leadership again.

Although this argument seems convincing and historical accounts of the events before the war generally support it, this diversionary war hypothesis has several problems as well. First, the hypothesis cannot explain why the Galtieri government turned to a diversionary conflict for addressing the social unrest problem instead of pursuing further reforms or initiating stricter repressions.⁶¹⁹ Second, as mentioned earlier, the planning to invade Falklands was prepared in December 1981, and the decision to launch the attack was made on March 26, four days before the major demonstration in Buenos Aires. Third, if the invasion was really about seeking “rallying around the flag” effect, why the military

⁶¹⁶ Gibran, *The Falklands War*, pp. 58-64.

⁶¹⁷ Jack Levy and Lily Vakili, “Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case,” in Manus Midlarsky ed. *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (New York: Routledge, 1992)

⁶¹⁸ Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace*, pp. 110-111.

⁶¹⁹ Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands,” p. 448.

leadership did not simply wait for London to escalate further over South Georgia Island? The image of the British navy's forcefully evicting Argentine civilians would have enough positive impact on securing domestic and international support for the Argentine government, and this calculated passivity should have been a lot less risky than occupying the Falklands.⁶²⁰

In this context, all the above mentioned three possible reasons behind Galtieri's choice to invade the islands on April 2, 1982, fail to suggest a sufficient condition for the junta's move to go for a war. The feasibility of punishment model proposes an alternative explanation that can address this problem. Buenos Aires took the path of invasion not because of the rivalry against Chile, the failure of its brinkmanship over South Georgia Island, or the need to provide a unifying mission to the public; but because of the high possibility of London's backing down and subsequent political gains that the adventurous move would bring to the junta. Galtieri believed that if he successfully occupied the Falklands without killing many British soldiers and imposed a *fait accompli* to United Kingdom, then London would accept the change as a new status quo rather than punish his defiance.

On what basis did he believe so? First, United Kingdom demonstrated its decreasing interest in protecting the Falklands since the late 1970s. British aid to the islands was continuously declining from 1976 to 1980. Despite sharp criticism from the parliament and the Islanders (or Kelpers), London pursued rapprochement with Argentina by selling a huge amount of British arms to Buenos Aires from 1978 to 1982. Especially in 1980, the

⁶²⁰ Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace*, pp. 111-112.

British Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted that the Falklands were difficult to defend and more like a liability than an asset, and recommended to discuss “leaseback agreement” with the Argentine government. This arrangement would officially transfer the sovereignty over the islands to Argentina yet would allow Britain to lease the land for a long enough time.⁶²¹

Second, London was believed to be lacking sufficient power projection capability to deal with Argentina’s challenge. In June 1981, the British Parliament upheld the government’s decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance* in 1982. The ship symbolized the presence of the British Navy in the region. The decision had a major impact on Buenos Aires’s strategic calculation.⁶²² Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy Jorge Anaya said, considering her declined navy power, London “lacked the capability to respond 8,000 miles from home.” Withdrawing important navy assets would only aggravate the British power projection problem. London’s nuclear capability, especially 100 Polaris missiles that could reach Argentina from an appropriate distance in the Atlantic, should technically impose a serious threat to Buenos Aires. But Galtieri and his advisors did not believe that Britain would use ultimate weapons to protect a small island lacking any real economic or strategic value for London.⁶²³

Before the invasion of the Falklands, Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez received opinion from Argentine missions in London and New York that Britain

⁶²¹ Gibran, *The Falklands War*, pp. 44-51.

⁶²² Marc Fourches, “Defence Policy and the Falklands War,” in Carine Berberi and Monia O’Brien Castro eds., *30 Years After: Issues and Representations of the Falklands War* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), p. 125.

⁶²³ Paul, “Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts,” p. 709.

would most likely impose sanctions in response to the invasion but would refrain from taking any military measures. Argentine military leaders perceived that London was ready to give up the islands and merely looking for an “honorable way out.” Buenos Aires, thus, regarded that the imposition of a *fait accompli* with the invasion and occupation of the Falklands was doing a favor for Britain to some extent.⁶²⁴

3-2. *The British Response: From Gradual Escalation to Hedging with Conventional Forces*

Argentina launched Operation Rosario, landed on a shallow water beach of the Falkland Islands at 5:40 AM on April 2. Although one soldier was killed and several were injured, the Argentine forces successfully occupied the Government House at 9:25 AM without killing any Royal Marine troops. At 7:15 AM, Buenos Aires launched the second invasion, and South Georgia was occupied on the following day, again, without taking any British lives. The junta accomplished all of its goals without incurring any British casualties and was riding on a massive wave of public support. Now it seemed that Galtieri would only need to wait for London to approach Buenos Aires to resolve the conflict diplomatically. Most likely, Great Britain would accept the *fait accompli* and agree to conclude a term favorable to Argentina.⁶²⁵

⁶²⁴ Ibid., p. 710; Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace*, pp. 108, 114; Gibran, *The Falklands War*, pp. 45-51.

⁶²⁵ Boyce, *The Falklands War*, pp. 39-40.

Galtieri's hope was not ungrounded. Until late March of 1982, London was not determined to go to war, hesitated to punish Buenos Aires by force, and ready to seek a diplomatic solution even if Argentina occupied the islands. When the British intelligence reported compelling evidence that the Argentine invasion of the Falklands was imminent on March 31, government officials from the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense met with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at her room in the House of Commons. First Sea Lord Henry Leach recalls the meeting as follows;

“When I went in, that the sort of advice she [Prime Minister Thatcher] had been getting prior to that had tended to deflect her from doing anything beyond negotiating, and putting the screws on with words again. She had been receiving advice, I think, that under *no* circumstances should she do anything about it, because it was too far away, and much too difficult.”⁶²⁶

The Ministry of Defense was worried that if Britain decided to punish the Argentine challenge militarily, it would require a task force that included at least a carrier given that the force would meet Argentine air and sea attacks as soon as they arrived at the Falklands after three weeks of its sailing. It would be a very expensive mission considering the cost of providing logistics, especially the fuel cost, not to mention creating problems with NATO by taking away the carrier from its assigned mission in Europe. Even on the morning of April 1, Thatcher government's preference was still a diplomatic solution as it notified Washington that London had no intention to escalate the situation.⁶²⁷

⁶²⁶ Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War*, p. 123.

⁶²⁷ Ibid., pp. 42-43; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War*, pp. 122-124.

To Galtieri's great surprise, however, London's position rapidly hardened after the Argentine forces occupied the islands. When the full Cabinet met on the evening of April 2, everyone except for Trade Secretary John Biffen agreed that the Task Force should sail immediately. During the special emergency debate in the House of Commons on the following day, Michael Foot from the Labour Party compared Argentina's "unprovoked aggression" with those of Hitler and Mussolini before World War II. Foot emphasized that it was "a moral duty, a political duty, and every other kind of duty" for London to ensure the wish of Kelpers to be associated with Britain.⁶²⁸

Britain pressured Argentina through passing Resolution 502 in the UN Security Council on April 3. The Resolution urged "immediate cessation of hostilities" and "immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces." London also froze all Argentine assets in Britain, imposed a trade embargo against Buenos Aires, and called for economic sanctions against Argentina. The European Economic Community (EEC) members answered the call and fully supported the UN Resolution. On April 7, London launched Operation Corporate and the Task Force, including two carriers, three submarines, eleven destroyers and frigates, and over 100 logistics ships (50 naval vessels and 54 private ships), was en route for the Falklands.⁶²⁹

How can we explain this British move from gradual escalation to hedging from late March to early April? Why did London rapidly change its policy choice concerning the Argentine's challenge against the status quo? Daniel Gibran lays out four reasons behind

⁶²⁸ Boyce, *The Falklands War*, pp. 45-46.

⁶²⁹ Gibran, *The Falklands War*, pp. 76-81.

the British choice to escalate the situation based on the literature on the Falklands War.⁶³⁰ First, London escalated the crisis stimulated by its nostalgic imperialism to maintain and regain its influence over her previous colonies. This North-South conflict explanation, however, is falsified because, first, the Rio Pact did not discuss concerted defense measures against the British forces (which meant that the South did not consider the Royal Navy as an external threat); and second, Argentine people always identified themselves as white European and citizens of a developed country. Besides, this perspective cannot explain why the Thatcher government's position rapidly switched to hard-line policies on the evening of April 2.

Second, London decided to punish Buenos Aires because of the economic (e.g., minerals and fisheries), geopolitical (e.g. proximity to Antarctica), and strategic importance (e.g. "unsinkable aircraft carrier" near the sea lanes around South America) of the Falkland Islands. However, the intrinsic value of the islands was far from significant as Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges called the Falklands/Malvinas conflict as "two bald men fighting for a comb."⁶³¹ The Falklands had never been mentioned as a defense priority in any British defense reviews or white papers.⁶³² This explanation also fails to identify the cause for the rapid policy turn in London on April 2. Third, Great Britain sought to defend democratic principles of "self-determination" and "liberty" of the Kelpers. This explanation loses validity and even seems hypocritical given that the British troops

⁶³⁰ Ibid., pp. 91-119.

⁶³¹ Michael Parsons, "Still Two Bald Men Fighting for a Comb?" in Carine Berberi and Monia O'Brien Castro eds., *30 Years After: Issues and Representations of the Falklands War* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), p. 60.

⁶³² Fourches, "Defence Policy and the Falklands War," p. 120.

forcefully deported native islanders in Diego Garcia (about the same number of population in the Falklands) against their will in 1966 to turn the island into a U.S. military base.

The only surviving explanation, thus, is that domestic economic and national honor considerations motivated Britain. Given the serious economic recession, massive unemployment, and decrease in real wage incomes in Britain and Thatcher's repeated failure to turn the tide, the Falklands War was a welcome distraction for the government. Furthermore, the widespread and explosive reaction of the British people to the humiliating image of Royal marines lying face down on the ground in front of the Government House in the Falklands hurt the national pride, honor, and prestige of the Englishmen. Willie Whitelaw, a Conservative Party politician, said that "if we didn't send a Task Force, what else should we do? [...] if we hadn't reacted very strongly we probably couldn't survive as a government." Other politicians also worried about the impact of British submission to the Argentine challenge on London's credibility to stand firm in future crises with other adversaries in different parts of the world.⁶³³

The explanation demonstrates the importance of audience cost and the political feasibility in choosing a stricter punishment route after the deterrence failure. Although numerous factors such as strategic interest at stake, cost of military conflict, probability of victory, power projection capability, did not change much for London, the emotional outburst in Britain after Argentina's actual occupation of the Falklands dramatically increased the degree of the audience cost for backing down and the political feasibility to punish Buenos Aires. The Thatcher government became more resolved after the Cabinet

⁶³³ Boyce, *The Falklands War*, pp. 44-45.

and Parliamentary debates on April 2 and 3 due to the hardened atmosphere of British society. The general support from the parliament and the public for a tougher policy against Argentina also marginalized the voice of the opposition forces that could delay policy execution and made it politically much more feasible for London to escalate the crisis.

3-3. *Short-term Outcome: a Limited War*

The decision to send the Task Force, however, did not mean the outbreak of war. It was a three-week sailing distance from London to the Falklands, and Thatcher made it clear on April 3 that “I cannot foretell what orders the task force will receive as it proceeds.” Argentine navy and air force possessed equally powerful weapons that could inflict serious damage to British forces. The British Military calculated that a naval battle with Argentina could take away up to 3,000 English soldiers’ lives. Due to the enormously long logistical tail, the British Task Force could not afford many mistakes as sunken ships would not be reinforced shortly. Single loss of an aircraft carrier or failure in the amphibious operation could jeopardize the whole military enterprise. In this regard, although it would be a small-scale war, the outcome could be disastrous for Britain. Accordingly, Thatcher was hoping for the success of diplomacy before her fleet reached the islands.⁶³⁴

In order to keep diplomacy alive, the British forces should walk a fine line: preparing for the success of future military missions to retake the islands while not ruining the negotiation process by taking a too aggressive measure. Their first choice of action,

⁶³⁴ Ibid., pp. 79-80, 110.

thus, was declaring the “Maritime Exclusion Zone” (MEZ). A circle of 200-nautical-mile around the Falklands was established, and any Argentine battleships found within the zone would be treated as hostile and be “liable to be attacked by the British forces.” The exclusion zone meant the imposition of a blockade, yet London wanted to avoid legal complications regarding the use of the term, as President Kennedy preferred to call it “quarantine” during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The MEZ was announced on April 7 and was scheduled to come into force on April 12.

Second, the Task Force launched Operation Parquet and recaptured South Georgia Island on April 26 before entering the Falklands. The possibility of engaging in a fierce battle over the island was highly unlikely because South Georgia was located beyond Argentine air-cover and merely about 60 Argentine marines were garrisoned. Even so, nuclear submarines were deployed to deter any Argentine surface vessels from providing support to the Argentine garrison on the island. When Argentine planes arrived and hovered over the island, the British destroyers did not fire on them as they did not launch an airstrike on the British forces. The Operation Parquet, thus, vividly demonstrated the “fine distinctions between war and peace” that the Task Force tried to maintain.⁶³⁵

Unfortunately, the prospect of a diplomatic solution was rather bleak. First, Argentina was in a more advantageous position as soon as it occupied the island and maintained a lukewarm attitude towards peace proposals. Although Resolution 502 demanded withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falklands, it did not give London blank check to evict them from the island forcefully. U.S., EEC, and UN emphasized the

⁶³⁵ Ibid., pp. 81, 87-88, 98.

importance of a peaceful resolution, but the peace mediation would likely recommend a path fell short of full restoration of the British sovereignty over the island. The Thatcher government could not but reject the proposal, then London could easily be blamed for its intransigence and suffer from backlash. Also, if the British Task Force sinks an Argentine ship within the MEZ, this could provoke major anti-colonialist reactions in UN. This diplomatic advantage of Buenos Aires gave them the incentive to delay the negotiation process as much as possible until Britain made some mistakes and lost the support of the international community.⁶³⁶

Second, there was a fundamental difference between London and Buenos Aires in their ultimate foreign policy goals about the Falklands problem. They were ready to make concessions on specific issues of the territorial dispute such as simultaneous withdrawal of both forces, a temporal administration of the islands and its composition, and selection of an arbitrator between the two governments. However, it was almost impossible to find common ground between Britain's emphasis on the UN Charter Article 73 (self-determination, or "taking into account the rights and interests of the Islanders") and Argentina's demand, "the transfer of sovereignty over the islands."⁶³⁷ Both countries were on the verge of war precisely because of this fundamental difference and their continuous failure to narrow it down.

In this context, the shuttle diplomacy of U.S. representative General Alexander Haig and the Peruvian government's peace proposal was doomed to fail. Until the British

⁶³⁶ Ibid., pp. 81, 98.

⁶³⁷ Ibid., pp. 112-115.

Task Force arrived at the area, both governments had not progressed on a peaceful resolution. Once these forces took place on the scene, it is almost impossible for civilian leaders to control the commanding general of the military units fully. Following the military logic, the British submarine *Conqueror* attacked the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano*, one of the most serious threats to a British amphibious operation, outside the Exclusion Zone on May 2, killing 321 Argentine soldiers. Argentina retaliated by sinking the British HMS *Sheffield* incurring 24 casualties on May 4. Now both countries crossed the Rubicon, and the diplomacy was dead. They were officially at war.⁶³⁸

The developments of crisis from the first week of April to early May in 1982 demonstrate that the direct defensive deterrence failure ended up with war because both Argentina and Britain were determined not to concede to each other on the sovereignty issue over the Falklands. The audience cost that both governments should pay for backing down increased excessively, which made them very determined to stand firm during the negotiation process. The rational and cognitive deterrence theories, thus, explain the short-term outcome of the Falkland War better than feasibility or belief updating models.

3-4. *Long-term Outcome: Deterrence Restoration*

After hitting and sinking *Sheffield*, the Argentine air force continued to destroy and disabled numerous British battleships and auxiliaries during the British amphibious operations at Port San Carlos on East Falkland on May 20. Eventually, however, Argentine

⁶³⁸ Ibid., pp. 100-110.

forces were pushed back to Port Stanley by the British Task Force.⁶³⁹ The United States greatly supported the Royal Navy. To illustrate, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger allowed the British forces to use American communication channels, provided satellite photo-reconnaissance, and supplied advanced weapon systems such as the Sidewinder AIM-9L which enforced Argentine bombers drop bombs at low altitude and misfire.⁶⁴⁰ Argentine forces surrendered on June 15, 1982, which ended their short-lived occupation of the island. Almost 1,000 soldiers died, and 2,000 were wounded during the armed conflict.⁶⁴¹ The fundamental difference over the Falklands issue between London and Buenos Aires continues even today, yet Argentina never attempted another violent provocation to resolve the matter after the 1982 war. British deterrence was restored.

This project's research and rival hypotheses suggest two explanations for this successful restoration of the British direct defensive deterrence. First, the Thatcher government's policy choice to gradually escalate the crisis, eventually to the point of using violent measures, led Buenos Aires to update its belief about Britain's resolve, and not to challenge the status quo again. Second, it was because London fixed the problem that had caused the deterrence failure: Britain's low military and political feasibility to punish the challenger's defiance. Unfortunately, because the crisis occurred recently and the two countries did not experience additional crises after 1982, it is difficult to find archival

⁶³⁹ Allcock et al., *Border and Territorial Disputes*, pp. 556-557.

⁶⁴⁰ Boyce, *The Falklands War*, p. 92.

⁶⁴¹ Charles Maisonneuve, "The Falkland Islands: Military Lessons Learned," in Carine Berberi and Monia O'Brien Castro eds., *30 Years After: Issues and Representations of the Falklands War* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), p.141.

evidence that permits us to confirm the validity of these explanations. This section, thus, zeros in on examining what London did after the Falkland War.

The White Paper and Secretary John Nott's Defense Review published before the Falkland War identified the key security task of London was to enhance its capability to defend Britain from any Soviet attacks in Europe. Those security documents, thus, emphasized the need to maintain independent nuclear deterrence and to upgrade air defenses. Due to the tight budget constraints, this capability enhancement came at the expense of reducing the size of the fleet. This strategic priority of the British defense did not change even after the 1982 wars. The White Papers released in the aftermath of the war continued to define the Soviet Union as the major threat to London.⁶⁴²

What deserves our attention, however, is that London made two interesting decisions after the Falklands War. First, when replacing the equipment lost during the war, the Ministry of Defense prioritized securing tactical mobility. Helicopters, new T-22 frigates were purchased, and the two amphibious ships that were supposed to be scrapped according to the Nott's Review remained in service. London's measures demonstrate that the British forces decided to take a more balanced approach to defense policy: from overemphasizing London's commitment to NATO to maintaining and upgrading the strategic flexibility of its military forces. Second, despite the bad economic condition and tight budget, the British government decided to extend the British garrison on the Falklands. The crux of this "Fortress Falklands" policy was to construct new airbase for accommodating modern jet fighters, and to retain a sizable British forces on an around the

⁶⁴² Fourches, "Defence Policy and the Falklands War," pp. 121-124.

island. These policies imply that London learned a lesson from the war that “it is almost always better to deter a war than to fight a war, even if the war ends in victory.”⁶⁴³

Considering the measures Britain took after her victory of the 1982 war, it seems that London wanted to send a clear signal to Buenos Aires that her military feasibility problem had been addressed. The feasibility explanation, thus, passes the hoop test. However, this does not mean that Argentine leadership’s belief updating about the strong resolve of the British government to protect the Falklands did not have any impact on restoring the deterrence. Rather, it might be precisely the reason why the British Ministry of Defense focused on fixing the feasibility problem. Given that London already had demonstrated its resoluteness over the Falkland issue by dispatching the Task Force and fighting a costly war, what Britain needed to do further was reinforcing Britain’s weak point – her power projection capability. In this regard, both feasibility and belief updating explanations should not be rejected. Unfortunately, with the limitation in locating archival evidence, it is difficult to confirm whether they survive the smoking gun test or not.

⁶⁴³ Ibid., pp. 126-127; Gibran, *The Falklands War*, pp. 134-137, 140, 157-159.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Finding ways to establish a credible and successful deterrence has been the center of international security studies. Formulating a proper policy after its failure, however, is remarkably overlooked in the literature. In answering this question, this dissertation examines (1) causes for a challenger to defy the defender's direct defensive deterrent threat, (2) conditions for the defender's certain policy choice in the aftermath of the deterrence failure, (3) short- and long-term outcomes of each policy option and (4) the impact of nuclear weapons on the direct deterrence dynamics. By specifying the cause for the deterrence failure and conditions for the defender's policy choice, this research project sheds light on the origin of the crisis. With tracing the consequence of each policy choice after the deterrence failure, the dissertation lays out a foundation for predicting the effect of a policy option. Examining the impact of nuclear weapons during crises of deterrence failure helps us to correctly grasp what this doomsday machine does to the minds of policymakers.

This chapter, first, reviews and summarizes the key findings of the statistical analysis and the five case studies illustrated in the previous chapters. The second section discusses the policy implications of these findings. And lastly, it explains how this project adds to the existing literature on direct deterrence and identifies the limitations of this study and areas for future research.

1. Summary of the Findings: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses

The deterrence literature is composed of two main perspectives: Rational Deterrence and Cognitive Deterrence theories. They maintain a stark difference in identifying the conditions for a credible deterrent threat and making predictions about the crisis outcome. The gap, however, is remarkably narrowed down when it comes to cases of direct defensive deterrence: the defender's deterrent threat is deemed to be credible in the eyes of a potential challenger. Its failure indicates that the challenger is more likely a resolute aggressor given that it defied this credible threat. As the defender is also resolute in the direct deterrence situation, the challenge would most likely lead to war. The long-term implication of this defender's policy choice is not certain, however. Some scholars in the Rational Deterrence camp believe that the defender's choice of standing firm would restore the credibility of deterrence, whereas others see that the defender's action does not leave any systematic long-term impact. But both perspectives generally agree that the introduction of nuclear weapons into deterrence dynamics would reduce the possibility of crisis escalation and buttress the deterrence stability. These explanations and predictions of Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories form rival hypotheses for this research.

This dissertation suggests new theories, the feasibility of punishment and the belief updating models, which offer alternative explanations. Direct defensive deterrence can fail even when the challenger is not a determined aggressor. The challenger attempts to revise the status quo when it is militarily and politically *infeasible* for the defender to follow through on its threat. The defender, who was resolved before the crisis, could choose the path of inaction after the deterrence failure because it *updates* the challenger's type as a

capable and resolved aggressor given that the challenger defied the defender's credible threat. This infeasibility of punishment and belief updating would likely make the defender difficult to escalate the crisis and war would most likely not ensue. While the feasibility of punishment model does not expect that the defender's policy choice had any impact on the long-term outcome, the belief updating theory sees that the choice casts a long shadow on the future. The feasibility hypothesis believes that nuclear weapons are highly infeasible tools of punishment and do not affect the deterrence dynamics much. These propositions set the research hypotheses.

1-1. The Origin of the Challenge

In explaining the cause of direct defensive deterrence failure, the rival hypothesis attributes it to the challenger's level of resolve. The research hypothesis, however, ascribes it to the defender's military or political infeasibility to punish the challenger. Statistical trends uphold the feasibility hypothesis. As Table 3 shows, both military and political feasibilities were statistically significant, and they are negatively correlated with the aggressiveness in the challenger's policy choice when considered alone. The challenger's degree of interest at stake does have a significant impact on its behavior when its level of resolve is considered alone. However, in a fully specified model, only the military feasibility variable is statistically significant.

In the five selected cases, none of the challengers were resolved enough to launch a war against the defender. Those challengers in 1936, 1962, 1969, 1973, and 1982 crises and wars expected that their defiance against the defenders' direct defensive deterrence

would not be confronted by the latter's massive military retaliation. Germany, the USSR, China, Egypt, and Argentina were aware of colossal problems that Paris, Washington, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and London faced in punishing the challenge due to their limits in projecting offensive military capability. Furthermore, the challengers purposely imposed a *fait accompli* in a way to make it difficult for the defenders to respond militarily.

Although being aware that Germany was “not yet ready” to start a war in Europe, Hitler decided to challenge the French and Locarno powers' deterrent threat and remilitarized the Rhineland regime on March 7, 1936. He precisely mentioned that this was because the German defiance would *not* be “be answered by military action – though perhaps by economic sanctions” given that the military and political obstacles the defender confronted to implementing violent punishments.

The Soviet Premier Khrushchev decided to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in late May 1962, not because he was determined to start a nuclear war over Cuba but to protect it from an American invasion. The premier emphasized many times that nuclear wars were unwinnable and only an “idiot” would start it. His decision to defy the U.S. deterrence was based on his confidence that the missiles could be deployed and operationalized *secretly*. Once the installation of the missile bases completed, it would become “too late to do anything about them” due to their second-strike capability.

Beijing launched an ambush attack on Zhenbao/Damansky Island on March 2, 1969, not because it was determined to solve the territorial disputes by force but because it wanted to teach Moscow “a bitter lesson” and to prevent the Soviet intervention in the Chinese domestic politics. Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou believed that the PLA forces had a major advantage if the fight was confined to a local skirmish. Their decision was precisely based

on their prediction that the armed conflict between China and the USSR over the island would *not* escalate further into a full-scale war. The outbreak of a major war was deemed to be unlikely given the marginal interest at stake and the limited military feasibility of Moscow to launch a major counterattack in the Far East.

Egyptian President Sadat had no intention to start an all-out war with Israel when his army crossed the Suez Canal and imposed a two-front war for the latter with the help of Syria on October 6, 1973. He intended to recapture a small portion of Sinai territory that was taken away from them during the 1967 Six-Day War and demystify the Israeli invincibility and Arab inferiority. Sadat's peace initiatives to restore the Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula had reached a deadlock, and he believed that it was due to Israeli and American hubris not taking Arab states seriously. As soon as the president accomplished this goal by occupying Israel's fortress along the border and repulsed the first Israeli counterattack, Egyptian forces rapidly switched over to defensive posture and did not advance.

The Galtieri regime invaded the Falklands on April 2, 1982, but it had no intention to initiate a major military conflict with London. The Argentine forces tried their best to minimize the British casualties while they occupied the island. The Argentine President Galtieri and his military advisors expected that the imposition of a new *fait accompli* would lead to the backing down of Britain given that her resolve to protect the Falklands was decreasing as illustrated by the decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance*. Furthermore, London's navy power was declined and believed to be lacking "the capability to respond 8,000 miles from home."

The regression analysis and case studies demonstrate that direct defensive deterrence failure is mostly not caused by determined aggressors who want to revise the status quo risking all-out wars. In the population of 192 deterrence failure cases, the challengers' policy choice in their defiance against the defenders' deterrence posture was more significantly influenced by the defender's military power projection capabilities than the former's interest at stake, probability of victory, or audience costs for accepting the status quo. In all five selected cases, those challengers were expecting minor resistance or non-violent punishments of the defenders. The finding attests that direct defensive deterrence most likely fails because the deterrent threat was considered non-credible due to its limitations in military and political feasibility to follow through, not because the challengers are warmongers.

1-2. Explaining the Defender's Response

The rival hypothesis's prediction of a challenger's high level of resolve in the crisis of direct defensive deterrence failure is based on its assumption that the defender is determined to follow through on its threat due to its significant interest at stake, the high audience cost for backing down, the tendency of loss aversion, the "endowment effect," and the logic of vengeance. Accordingly, the defender's policy choice in the aftermath of the deterrence failure would only correspond to the change in the probability of victory. As chances of victory in war increases, it would choose the more aggressive policy. On the other hand, the research hypothesis focuses on two variables. First, as expected by the challenger, the defender might be stuck with the quagmire prevents it from punishing the

challenger due to its limited military and political feasibility. Second, the defender's choice is affected by its belief updating about the challenger's resolve given that the latter attempted to revise the status quo despite the former's credible threat.

The two-stage logistic regression analysis shows that the defender's probability of victory fails to have a statistically significant impact on its policy choice after the deterrence failure. Instead, the challenger's policy choice and the defender's power projection capability are statistically significant factors, and they are positively correlated with the defender's policy direction. In other words, the more aggressive policy the challenger chooses and the more it becomes militarily feasible for the defender to punish the challenger, the more violent measures defender takes. This result demonstrates the validity of the research hypothesis.

The case studies on five deterrence failure crises reveal that those defenders were affected by numerous factors mentioned above including the probability of victory, the audience cost, the interest at stake, and their military and political feasibility to follow through. The feasibility variable, however, always exerted a significant impact on those policymakers during the deliberation process. Interestingly, the belief updating thinking was neither common nor strong when the defenders were devising countermeasures after the deterrence failure.

When Hitler attempted a coup against the Rhineland regime, Paris decided not to take any "isolated action," yet in effect, this choice led to the non-action path. Those civilian leaders including Foreign Minister Flandin, State Minister Paul-Boncour, and Prime Minister Sarraut wanted to launch "a military police operation" and punish the German provocation. The French military, however, rejected the idea as its army was "designed for the defense behind fortified stronghold" and lacked any "independent units"

that could be used to serve the purpose. War Minister Maurin and General Gamelin also emphasized that dictators would rarely back down, and Berlin crossed the Rubicon by challenging the Locarno Treaty, which indicated that Germany was determined to start a war to restore its sovereignty over the Rhineland. They, thus, suggested ordering general mobilization if Paris decided to punish Hitler. The French reaction, in this regard, was decided by (1) the *updated belief* in German determination given that it had taken an irreversible path; and (2) *non-feasibility* of punishment due to the purely defensive establishment of French forces.

After the U-2 reconnaissance flight revealed that Khrushchev defied President Kennedy's deterrent threats, the ExComm members urged airstrikes and invasion of Cuba to punish Moscow. But they, except for General Taylor and Special Assistant Bundy, swiftly changed their positions and recommended the blockade option as soon as the intelligence team informed the committee that eight MRBMs had got operationalized. Considering that the probability of victory in a nuclear exchange goes down to zero and its war cost reaches negative infinity, which should make the defender non-determined to stand firm, this general pattern supports the rival hypothesis. The level of the defender's resolve was the main cause of its policy choice. However, the major shift in the ExComm's policy debate did not occur until the confirmation that the Soviet nuclear missiles were ready to be fired. More importantly, those operationalized missiles did not prevent Taylor and Bundy from asserting the extensive airstrike route. Nuclear threats, thus, are not credible until it becomes militarily and politically feasible to follow through. Meanwhile, the belief updating occurred only in the mind of Kennedy, and all the other ExComm members did not follow the logic.

After the local battles on the Zhenbao/Damansky Island on March 2 and 15, 1969, Moscow embarked on its “dual strategy” combining diplomatic and military measures against China. The USSR sought to settle down the border issue by repeatedly offering negotiations while giving the Chinese periodic bloody noses. The major Soviet retaliation against China’s provocation over the island took place in Tielieketi/Zhalanshkol in Xinjiang province on August 13. This Soviet move is interesting because Moscow responded in the western part of the border even though Beijing challenged the status quo in the east. This Soviet choice of the Xinjiang area for avenging their defeats in May reveals that Moscow indeed had some problem with projecting their military forces towards the eastern border. The Soviets anticipated that a major war could follow after their retaliation because they updated China’s level of resolve after the Zhenbao/Damansky conflict. Moscow, thus, believed that it would be more advantageous to have a war on the western border. Both the military feasibility to follow through and the belief updating played an important role in determining the Soviet reaction towards the Chinese challenge.

Israel’s decision to fight back against the Egyptian and Syrian invasion is not very interesting as the challengers did not leave many options to Tel Aviv. Israel was determined to defend its border and had the military and political capability to switch over its strategic posture from direct defensive deterrence to defense. Her decision, thus, was supported by both Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theories and the feasibility of punishment model. On the other hand, the Thatcher government could have some time (about three weeks) to deal with the Falklands crisis as the Royal Navy should sail to the islands in the South Atlantic Ocean located 8,000 miles away from London. Due to its marginal interest at stake and enormous difficulties in projecting her power over the long-distance, Britain first chose to

diplomatically resolve Argentina's illegal occupation of the Falklands accompanied by economic sanctions. When these non-violent measures failed to derive any change from the Galtieri regime, London decided to sink the Argentine light cruiser *General Belgrano* and started the war. The decision was made not because of the strategic significance of the island or a high probability of victory. Rather, it was motivated by the emotional outburst in the British society that made it politically very costly for Prime Minister Thatcher to back down and rapidly increased London's political feasibility to punish Buenos Aires. The dynamics of belief updating was not found in the relevant archives and secondary sources on the British policy choice after Argentina's challenge.

In sum, while the regression analysis supports the research hypothesis, case studies demonstrate that both rival and research hypotheses are not rejected when they are tested against the five deterrence failure crises. The defenders' level of resolve played an important role during the deliberation process in most cases. When they confronted with severe military and political obstacles to executing the punishment policy, they had to adjust the aggressiveness in their response or to choose a geographically distanced area for avenging what the challenger did somewhere else. The only variable that continued to exert significant influence on the defender's policy choice was the defender's military feasibility to punish the challenger. Belief-updating thinking is found in a couple of leaders' minds, which led them to use more caution in devising countermeasures. However, its role in deciding the defender's policy route is quite limited as the rationale had never shared by the majority of policymakers during the decision-making process.

1-3. Short- and Long-term Outcomes

The rival hypothesis predicts that the failure of direct defensive deterrence would most likely end up with war given that both the defender and the challenger are determined not to back down. The research hypothesis, however, expects that the deterrence failure would not lead to war. First, most challengers are opportunists rather than determined aggressors who defy the deterrence on account of their belief that it is militarily and politically infeasible for the defenders to punish them. Second, the belief updating dynamics could make the defender revise its level of resolve and decide not to escalate the crisis fearing the risk of a costly war.

Statistical analysis upholds the research hypothesis. The majority of crises (44.79%) terminated without any violence. The two factors, (1) the defender's political feasibility to punish the challenger and (2) the challenger's level of resolve, have a statistically significant impact on this short-term outcome. Case studies also show that either the defender or the challenger backed down in the course of crisis development (i.e. France and the signatories of the Locarno Treaty and Khrushchev), or both sides did not escalate the armed clashes into a full-scale war involving destruction of densely populated cities. The military and political feasibilities, rather than the belief updating, were at the center of this peaceful termination of crisis or the short-term outcome of limited wars.

With regard to the long-term outcome of crisis actors' policy choice after the deterrence failure, both Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theories and this dissertation's two new theories do not suggest a uniform prediction. While the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus predicts that reputation of standing firm does not have any systematic impact on future

crisis actors' thinking, others argue that reputation can be transferable for similar enough cases (i.e., proximity in time, same potential challenger, same region/issue-area/regime, etc.) and the crisis involving a significant interest at stake. The Cognitive Deterrence theory points out the action-reaction paradox in crisis actors' strategic thinking, and the reputation could make both self-defeating and self-fulfilling prophecies.

The feasibility of punishment model agrees with the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus. The challenger's decision to revise the status quo is based on the defender's military and political feasibility at the moment, not its action in the previous crises. The belief updating model, however, anticipates that reputation for standing firm casts a long shadow and prevents further crises over the same issue.

Statistical trends uphold the reputation skeptics like the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus and the feasibility model. After the failure of direct defensive deterrence, 48.44% defenders did not experience another crisis during the subsequent five-year period (deterrence restoration) while 45.83% of them had to deal with the additional crisis over the same issue (deterrence collapse). However, none of the two-stage logistic regression models finds that the long-term outcome of the crisis is systematically affected by policy choices of the defender and the challenger during the crisis. The only relevant variable in explaining the long-term outcome is the crisis outcome of stalemate, which should encourage crisis actors to engage in another conflict.

The case studies also fail to identify a sufficient condition for deterrence restoration. The Rhineland Crisis was the only case that led to deterrence collapse. In this crisis, Hitler decided to start another crisis over Czechoslovakia not only because he updated his belief about the defenders' level of resolve based on the Locarno signatories' in-action during the

Rhineland Crisis; but also because he was convinced that London and Paris were lack of the political feasibility to follow through. For all the other four cases, Washington, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and London did not experience another deterrence failure crisis with the same challengers. Deterrence was restored. However, as there were no additional crises (the cases of “dogs that did not bark”), it is difficult to say with certainty that among the various factors listed in the literature, which was the sufficient condition for the restoration of direct defensive deterrence. Testing rival and research hypotheses for this particular question require an alternative method, and possibly, a new dataset.

1-4. The Impact of Nuclear Weapons

The final question tested in this study is the impact of nuclear weapons on direct defensive deterrence. Nuclear revolutionists argue that the crisis actors’ possession of nuclear weapons would buttress the stability of deterrence. The direct deterrence would rarely fail; and even if it fails, it should not escalate into a major war. On the other hand, the nuclear pessimists believe that the impact of introducing nuclear weapons into deterrence dynamics would be marginal due to the paradox of “strategic stability-tactical instability”; their overly destructive power and tactical redundancy; and the logic of “self-deterrence.” The feasibility of punishment model agrees with the pessimist. Nuclear weapons would start to affect deterrence dynamics only after those crisis actors secure reliable military capabilities to deliver those weapons. Even if they successfully satisfy this military feasibility condition, the enormous political cost to use these horrible weapons should continue to minimize the possibility of their actual use.

Regression analyses in Chapter 3 support the argument of nuclear pessimists. When the defender's economic openness to the international community increases – implying its political feasibility to implement nuclear punishment decreases, the challenger chose more violent policies. Although the defender's policy choice is not affected by the challenger's nuclear capability, it is greatly influenced by the challenger's policy choice. This challenger's policy choice is mostly caused by the defender's military and political feasibility to impose nuclear sanctions against the challenger. The defender's military feasibility of nuclear punishment was a statistically significant factor in deciding the short-term outcome. The long-term outcome of crisis, however, was not systematically influenced by the nuclear variable.

Case studies reveal that nuclear weapons indeed had some calming effect during the crisis. Washington did neither take airstrike nor invasion routes after detecting the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Beijing launched a limited war against the USSR over a small and strictly confined area. Egypt was refrained from escalating the conflict into a full-scale war after its successful crossing of the Suez Canal. Buenos Aires made every effort not to kill any British soldiers when the Argentine forces occupied the Falklands. In this regard, some researchers argue that nuclear deterrence was effective as it had eliminated excessively violent measures from the crisis actors' policy options.

However, this “crystal ball effect” was activated only when the Soviet forces had secured a reliable power projection capability to deliver those nuclear warheads during the Cuban Missile Crisis. More importantly, those nuclear weapons of Moscow, Tel Aviv, and London failed to prevent their adversaries from taking military measures and from deterring the outbreak of wars in 1969, 1973, and 1982. China, Egypt, and Argentina were convinced

that their opponents would not impose nuclear sanctions as long as they restrict the scope of war not to include the defenders' major cities. This prediction was accurate: none of those defenders with nuclear capability used their doomsday machine to punish those challengers.

Due to their inherently limited tactical value because of their destructive power to overkill and enormous political and possibly economic costs involving their actual use, nuclear weapons are hardly an attractive tool of punishment. This fundamental problem of nuclear option almost always lacking political feasibility to follow through could encourage the challenger to revise the status quo below the nuclear threshold. This intrinsic infeasibility of nuclear punishment and the challengers' subsequent impulse to defy against the nuclear deterrence are confirmed by the process-tracing analysis of the four selected crises.

2. Policy Implications and Future Areas of Research

What are the policy implications of this dissertation's findings? As this project provides a more comprehensive list of variables for deterrence success/failure and crisis outcomes, it helps the policy circle to formulate desirable security policies in the aftermath of deterrence failure.

First, a defender should not make any deterrent threat if it is militarily and politically not feasible to follow through. The literature has overemphasized the role of signaling a high level of resolve in making a successful deterrent threat. The Costly Signaling model's recommendations to increase the audience cost as a key to deterrence

success is a classic example. However, public pledges repeatedly made by the Sarraut cabinet failed to deter German remilitarization of the Rhineland failed in 1936. Obama administration's effort to dissuade the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons by setting a "red line" publicly, also failed in 2013. Demonstrating a strong resolve to follow through on the threat is not a sufficient condition for deterrence success. The first threshold that needs to be satisfied with the success is to secure and maintain the feasibility of punishment, not demonstrating a high level of resolve.

Second, it is premature for the defender to update its belief about the challenger's type as a determined aggressor after the direct defensive deterrence failure. The population of the deterrence failure from 1918 to 2015 reveals that a majority of challengers were rather opportunists. Prudent strategic thinking should always go two ways. The deterrence might fail because of the challenger's being extremely dissatisfied with the status quo and resolute in revising it. However, it is also very possible that the failure was caused by the deficiencies in the defender's deterrence posture. Identifying the right origin of the problem should be the first step in devising a proper countermeasure after the deterrence failure.

Third, fixing the military and political infeasibility to punish the potential challenger is a matter of utmost importance in the aftermath of the defensive deterrence failure. The defender should credibly signal to the challenger that it has secured (1) enhanced weapon systems that could overcome geographic obstacles and penetrate the adversary's defense system; and (2) all-party and wide public support for tougher measures. This move might not derive any positive outcomes if the challenger was indeed a warmonger. But in most cases, addressing this feasibility problem would spur a de-escalation move of the challenger.

Fourth, the utility of nuclear weapons for deterrence needs to be discounted. The feasibility model suggests that punishment too difficult to be imposed can never buttress deterrence stability. Political, economic, and normative costs involving the use of these weapons have soared since their bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the political feasibility of nuclear sanction has plummeted accordingly. The backbone of deterrence, thus, should be carefully arranged conventional weapons rather than all-destructive nuclear weapons.

This dissertation research is not without limitations. The most significant problem is that the project could not find a method to properly test hypotheses about the long-term outcome of each crisis actor's policy choice. Also, although the selected cases in this study include all possible policy choices of the defender, every challenger in the five cases is the authoritarian government. The selection, thus, does not fully represent the population of direct defensive deterrence failure. Lastly, the dissertation does not analyze further on why some policymakers are more open to the Bayesian updating while others are not. As this belief updating is assumed in the analysis of most incomplete information games in the formal modeling, identifying the conditions for the Bayesian updating should have enormous theoretical implications. Future studies need to focus on addressing these issues.

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PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

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