

3-28-2017


Degree and Patterns of Formal NGO Participation within the United Nations Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC): An Appraisal of NGO Consultative Status Relative to Political Pluralism

Barry D. Mowell

Florida International University, bmowell@broward.edu

DOI: 10.25148/etd.FIDC001757

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd>

 Part of the [Comparative Politics Commons](#), [International Relations Commons](#), [Leadership Studies Commons](#), and the [Other International and Area Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Mowell, Barry D., "Degree and Patterns of Formal NGO Participation within the United Nations Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC): An Appraisal of NGO Consultative Status Relative to Political Pluralism" (2017). *FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations*. 3213.

<https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/3213>

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Miami, Florida

DEGREE AND PATTERNS OF FORMAL NGO PARTICIPATION WITHIN THE
UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (ECOSOC): AN
APPRAISAL OF NGO CONSULTATIVE STATUS RELATIVE TO POLITICAL
PLURALISM

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

POLITICAL SCIENCE

by

Barry D. Mowell

2017

To: Dean John Stack
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs

This dissertation, written by Barry D. Mowell, and entitled Degree and Patterns of Formal NGO Participation within the United Nations Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC): An Appraisal of NGO Consultative Status Relative to Political Pluralism, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

Eduardo Gamarra

Milena Neshkova

Susanne Zwingel

Markus Thiel, Major Professor

Date of Defense: March 28, 2017

The dissertation of Barry D. Mowell is approved.

Dean John Stack
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs

Andrés G. Gil
Vice President for Research and Economic Development
and Dean of the University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2017

© Copyright 2017 by Barry D. Mowell
All rights reserved.

DEDICATION

To the memory of my grandparents, John Howard Mowell, Rhoda Tilson Mowell, Cad Weston Rimer and Mary Laster Rimer. Your memories are continuing sources of inspiration.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the members of my dissertation committee Dr. Eduardo Gamarra, Dr. Milena Neshkova, Dr. Susanne Zwingel, and in particular to my committee chair Dr. Markus Thiel whose insight, kindness, generous time commitment, and infinite patience was critical in guiding me through the process. Without the encouragement and benevolent guidance of Dr. Thiel and the other members of my committee, it is not likely that this research or my terminal degree would have ever been completed.

I would also like to thank Dr. Astrid Arraras, Dr. Gamarra, Dr. Thiel and Dr. Zwingel for the guidance each gave me in the preparation for and completion of my comprehensive exams. Appreciation is also extended to Dr. Tatiana Kostadinova, Political Science Graduate Coordinator for the many questions she patiently answered and other assistance she kindly gave over the years. My thanks are also extended to the late Dr. Rebecca Mae Salokar, former Politics and International Relations Chair, Ms. Maria Elena Gil, Graduate Program Office Associate and Ms. Martha Rodriguez, Office Specialist for their kind assistance over the years and to each of the professors at FIU and the University of Miami that I had the privilege to study under while in the doctoral program.

My sincere appreciation is also extended to my wife Kim and stepson Neill for putting up with me and extending their moral support during the years of the PhD program and the research and writing of the dissertation.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
DEGREE AND PATTERNS OF FORMAL NGO PARTICIPATION WITHIN THE
UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (ECOSOC): AN
APPRAISAL OF NGO CONSULTATIVE STATUS RELATIVE TO POLITICAL
PLURALISM

by

Barry D. Mowell

Florida International University, 2017

Miami, Florida

Professor Markus Thiel, Major Professor

The United Nations (UN) has invested increasing levels of effort in recent decades to cultivate a more effective, diverse and democratic institutional culture via the inclusion of and interaction among international civil society organizations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to supplement the traditional role of states as the primary transnational actors. The principle vehicle for the UN-civil society dynamic is the consultative status (CS) program within the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), wherein a diverse range of nearly 5,000 transnational organizations ostensibly participate.

This research examined patterns of participation and the nature/level of CSO/NGO involvement within the UN, with particular focus upon ECOSOC. In examining participation patterns, the research identified patterns related to geographical/proportional representation among developed and developing regions and world regions in general and also as related to policy/issue areas represented. In terms of

involvement, the research sought to assess the types and degree of contributions being made by CSOs/NGOs in association with the UN. To address both areas, the research employed a two-prong methodology including (1) a detailed analysis of the UN's online integrated Civil Society Organizations (iCSO) database and (2) a comprehensive survey questionnaire mailed to a randomly-selected sample of 10% of all organizations holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.

The findings challenge the assumption that UN association with international civil society has realized pluralist ideals in that substantial variations were found to exist in the representation of policy/issue areas, with some areas far better represented than others. Perhaps more importantly, the research revealed that only a minority of organizations in the ECOSOC-CS program appear to be actively/regularly engaged with the UN, with a large minority of CS-accredited organizations engaged only periodically or to a more limited extent, and a substantial minority not participating/interacting in any way. Rather than exemplifying pluralism within the constructivist tradition, findings imply support for liberal institutionalist theories in that decades-long expansion of IGO influence has facilitated a corollary expectation of expanding international civil society and an associated expectation of linkages between transnational governance and democratic institutions on the one hand and transnational civil society on the other as a standardized norm.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM WITHIN UN-ECOSOC	1
General Statement of Problem Area & Research Purpose	1
Significance of Study	1
Origins of Research.....	4
Key Terminologies and Concepts	6
Theoretical Framework: A Summary Overview	17
Research Parameters	24
Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses	25
Research Design, Methodology and Instrumentation	26
Limitations.....	32
Summary	33
II. CHAPTER TWO: THEORIZING ON THE ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF CSOs/NGOs WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE	34
Introduction	34
CSOs/NGOs within IR Theory.....	36
Evolution and Growth of the CSO/NGO Phenomenon	44
ECOSOC’s Formal Relations with CSOs/NGOs	47
CSO/NGO Collaborations and Coalition-Building	52
Concepts of Pluralism and Democratization	55
Concepts of Transnational Democracy	59
Shortcomings of CSOs/NGOs in Maintaining Productive Relationships with the UN/IGO	62
Credibility Issues	70
Democratic Representation	73
Theory and Reality.....	75
III. CHAPTER THREE: MACRO-SCALE PATTERNS OF CSO/NGO ARTICIPATION WITHIN UN-ECOSOC	77
Introduction	77
Types of Organizations	80
Areas of Expertise and Fields of Activity	88
Scope and Scale of Operations of Organizations within the iCSO Database	93
Proportional Representation among Regions/Countries within the ECOSOC Consultative Status Program.....	102
Other Forms of UN Accreditation of CSOs/NGOs (Apart from ECOSOC Consultative Status).....	119
Overview of Analysis of iCSO Database	125
Findings Relative to Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses.....	129

IV. CHAPTER FOUR: APPRAISAL OF CSO/NGO PARTICIPATION AND BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION	137
Introduction	137
Participant Self-De-Selection from Survey and Possible Bias	138
Operationalization.....	140
Profile of Survey Participants.....	142
Survey Responses – General Background.....	146
Survey Responses – Accreditation and Representation	168
Survey Responses – Participation, Networking and Communication	176
Survey Responses – Barriers	190
How Could the UN Improve Experiences for Consultative Status	
Organizations	201
Overview of Survey Results	208
Findings Relative to Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses.....	210
 V. CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.....	 220
Introduction	220
Summary Overview of iCSO Database Analysis	225
Summary Overview of Survey Findings.....	231
Suggestions for Future Research	238
Concluding Observations	249
 REFERENCES.....	 261
 APPENDICES.....	 274
 VITA.....	 314

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
2.1 Perception of CSOs/NGOs in IR Theory	43
3.1 Organizations in Consultative Status with UN ECOSOC, 2016.....	80
3.2 iCSO Database Entries - Organizational Type and UN Consultative Status	83
3.3 iCSO Entries - Organizational Type by MDC (More Developed Countries) Region.....	84
3.4 iCSO Entries: Organizational Type by LDC* Region.....	85
3.5 UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by World Region	88
3.6 UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and Correlated with ECOSOC Consultative Status (CS) Accreditation Levels.....	91
3.7 UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and Correlated by MDC Regions.....	92
3.8 UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and Correlated by LDC Regions.....	93
3.9 Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by ECOSOC Consultative Status	96
3.10 Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by MDC Region	96
3.11 Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by LDC Region	97
3.12 Organization Type by Operational Scope/Scale in iCSO Database	98
3.13 Organizations Classified in the ICSO Database as Being Local Government Entities that are Alternatively International or Regional in Scope of Operations.....	101
3.14 Parity of ECOSOC Consultative Status Organizations by World Region and Relative to Proportion of Global Population	104
3.15 Twenty Most Populous Countries by Number of ECOSOC Consultative Status Organizations and Relative to Proportion of Global Population	105
3.16 Parity Scores (Percentage of all CS Organizations Relative to Percentage of Global Population) for 10 Democratic and 10 Non/Quasi-Democratic Countries	110
3.17 UN iCSO Database Entries by European Country/Sub-Region: Mediterranean, Northern, and Western Europe.....	113
3.18 UN iCSO Database Entries by European Country/Sub-Region: Former Soviet Eastern Europe and Non-Soviet Eastern Europe.....	114

3.19 UN Accreditation/Affiliation Programs for CSOs Apart from ECOSOC Consultative Status by World Regions	122
3.20 Other UN Accreditation/Affiliation Programs for CSOs by ECOSOC Consultative Status Level	124
4.1 Levels of Consultative Status Accreditation of NGO Survey Respondents versus Distribution of Accreditation Levels within CS Program Overall	143
4.2 Regional and LDC/MDC Distribution Patterns of (1) CSOs Randomly Selected for Survey, (2) All CSOs with ECOSOC CS, and (3) Relative to Proportion of Global Population	145
4.3 Responses to Whether CSO Goals for CS Program Had Been Achieved or Not: A Comparison of Broad/General Goals Versus Those Specific to a Particular Aspect of Organization’s Policy/Issue Area	150
4.4 Range of Additional Considerations Specified by Survey Respondents as Being Important to Their Decision to Obtain CS Accreditation	160
4.5 Range of Additional Considerations Specified by Survey Respondents as Benefits Derived from Their Organization Obtaining CS Accreditation	166
4.6 Designation of UN Representatives by Location and Number of Grounds Passes/IDs Reported Obtained per Site	171
4.7 CS-Accredited CSO Participation in Functions per UN Site	172
4.8 Participation in UN Conferences, Meetings and Workshops by Organizations Holding Consultative Status	178
4.9 UN Civil Society Networks/Coalitions Identified by CSOs as Groups with Which They Have Participated.....	181
4.10 Source and Frequency of Entities Contacting CS Accredited Organizations	185

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	PAGE
4.1 Degree to which Level/Type of Consultative Status Impedes CSO's Ability to Participate in UN Programs	155
4.2 Importance of General Prestige/Visibility Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status	156
4.3 Importance of Credibility in Fundraising Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status	156
4.4 Importance of Networking with Other Organizations Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status.....	157
4.5 Importance of Contributing/Exchanging Research with the UN and Other Organizations Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status.....	157
4.6 Importance of Contributing Written or Verbal Position Statements on Issues Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status	158
4.7 Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Connections with Other NGOs in the US	163
4.8 Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Connections with Other NGOs Internationally.....	163
4.9 Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Contributions to the UN.....	164
4.10 Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Prestige/Legitimacy Derived for Organization.....	164
4.11 Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Media Publicity	165
4.12 Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Aid in Fundraising.....	165
4.13 Level of CSO Difficulty in Accrediting UN Representatives within the CS Program.....	174
4.14 Degree to Which CS Organizations Feel the UN Values Their Participation	182
4.15 Degree to Which CSOs/NGOs Reported Networking with Other Organizations in the CS Program.....	183
4.16 Level of CSO Satisfaction with Email Communication with the UN	188
4.17 Level of Satisfaction with Telephone Communication with the UN	188

4.18 Level of Satisfaction with Fax Communications with the UN	189
4.19 Level of Satisfaction with Written Communication with the UN	189
4.20 Barriers: Understanding UN Processes (Clarity of Opportunities to Participate)	196
4.21 Barriers: Conference Registration	196
4.22 Barriers: Designation/Credentialing of UN Representatives	197
4.23 Barriers: Financial Commitment/Expenses.....	197
4.24 Barriers: Time/Personnel Commitment	198
4.25 Barriers: Quadrennial Report	198
4.26 Barriers: Geographical Proximity/Distance of UN Functions	199
4.27 Barriers: Support of Organization’s Board and/or Donors	199
4.28 Barriers: UN Restrictions Concerning Presentation of Written/Verbal Position Statements	200
4.29 Degree to Which Cost and Effort Associated with Consultative Status is Justified by Benefits Derived by Organizations	201

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CARICOM	Caribbean Community Market
CARIFTA	Caribbean Free Trade Association
CONGO	Conference of NGOs in consultative relationship with the United Nations
CBO	Community-based organization
CS	Consultative Status (with the UN Economic and Social Council)
CSD	Committee on Sustainable Development (of the United Nations)
CSO	Civil society organization
DPI	Department of Public Information (of the United Nations)
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
ENGO	Environmental NGO
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (of the United Nations)
FDO	Financing for Development Office (of the United Nations)
FFD	Financing for Development Office (of the United Nations)
GONGO	Government operated NGO
GSO	Grassroots support organization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICSO	Integrated Civil Society Organizations (of the United Nations)
IGO	Intergovernmental organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International nongovernmental organization
IO	International organization
LDC	Least (or Less) Developed Countries
MANGO	Market advocacy NGO
MDC	Most (or More) Developed Countries

MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Southern (South America) Common Market
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NPO	Nonprofit organization
NSA	Non-state actor
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PVO	Private voluntary organization
QUANGO	Quasi-autonomous NGO
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SMO	Social movement organization
TANGO	Technical assistance NGO
TNGO	Transnational NGO
TSO	Third sector organization
UN	United Nations
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VO	Voluntary organization
WSF	World Social Forum
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

I. CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM WITHIN UN-ECOSOC

General Statement of Problem Area & Research Purpose

A diverse range of civil society organizations has increasingly been involved with the United Nations. This includes record numbers of civil society organizations (CSOs) also known as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which hold formal consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the main organ for UN-civil society interaction. A primary goal of the UN has been to cultivate a more effective, diverse and democratic institutional culture via the active inclusion of and interaction among international organizations and civil society to augment the traditional role of states as the primary transnational actors within the organization. This study seeks to determine the patterns of participation and effectiveness of civil society organizations within the UN, with a particular focus on CSO/NGO participation within ECOSOC. As the number and diversity of organizations holding ECOSOC consultative status has increased, have the patterns of their involvement and influence changed?

Significance of Study

This study is significant for three reasons. Firstly, the UN practice of cultivating formal association with reputable international civil society organizations has expanded significantly in recent years and has been described as the most dynamic area of growth and change within the UN framework (Alger 2002). In 1946 when the practice was

initiated, only 41 CSOs/NGOs held formal consultative status with the UN, but as of 2016 the status was afforded to nearly 5,000 organizations of various types, representing a wide range of issues across the globe (United Nations 2016, 2). However, it is unclear what patterns of participation exist among the diverse range of CSOs/NGOs which have formal status with the UN. For example, what, if any, geographical patterns of participation exist? Early in its history of direct association with CSOs/NGOs the UN cultivated relationships with western organizations almost exclusively---largely reflecting a dearth of such organizations based in the developing world. In recent decades, a multitude of CSOs/NGOs have emerged in the developing world, many of which have pursued ties with the UN and may have eroded the western-centric dominance of the organizations within ECOSOC. However, other geographical patterns may be found to exist such as disproportionate representation of some world regions relative to others--- e.g. European and/or western CSOs/NGOs are more predominant than those headquartered in Africa. Also, topical patterns of participation may also exist via some issues and interest areas being proportionally better represented than others. This could be evidenced through the nature of the CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status as most are issue-specific in their focus and also by analyzing the participation of CSOs/NGOs in topic-specific initiatives. For example, human rights as an issue appears to be well represented within the UN-ECOSOC civil society framework, much more so than many other policy/issue areas. Analysis of geographical, topical and other patterns of participation among CSOs/NGOs is important in cultivating a general understanding of the inter-organizational dynamic. Importantly, most previous attempts to study such issues have focused upon one or very limited numbers of such organizations or have been

specific to a particular issue area such as human rights or development rather than seeking to understand overall patterns of civil society participation within an IGO (Tallberg et al 2013).

Secondly, the number of CSOs/NGOs with formal standing at the UN has grown exponentially, potentially allowing non-state actors an unprecedented level of access and input. Proponents of the trend see it as a catalyst for global justice and democracy in which more populations and issues are afforded a voice and in which civil society expertise on specific issues may contribute, but it is also viewed as a means for the UN to research and implement many multilateral initiatives such as the Sustainable (formerly “Millennium”) Development Goals, (Grady 2005; Pubantz 2005). Large-scale participation of civil society organizations within IGOs particularly in policy formulation roles also potentially enhances the legitimacy of the IGO (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010). Yet, a preliminary assessment of CSO/NGO participation in UN conferences suggests minimal actual participation by most of the organizations which have attained formal consultative status. A large number, possibly the majority, of CSOs/NGOs which have obtained formal status within the UN may never have engaged in any meaningful way with the organization, which would presumably diminish the claims related to a dramatically expanded role of civil society and democratic pluralism within the UN (Mowell 2015). To understand the effectiveness of civil society organizations within the UN framework, it is necessary to determine their degree of participation within the UN and also to understand the factors which encourage participation and barriers which may prevent participation.

Thirdly, analysis of patterns and the degree of participation may serve as a foundation for further research related to CSOs/NGOs and civil society at the United Nations such as understanding the political, fiscal or other reasons for CSO/NGO participation or the lack thereof. For example, should the study reveal that a key impediment to participation with ECOSOC is that many organizations do not fully understand the consultative status process (i.e., CSOs/NGOs do not know how to participate), future analyses could explore ways to better introduce the organizations to the UN bureaucracy and streamline their matriculation into the consultative status program. More profoundly, if many CSOs/NGOs fundamentally lack the organizational or fiscal ability or sincere commitment to engage with the UN via the program perhaps the consultative status program or its admission criteria for CSOs/NGOs should be scrutinized for viability.

Origins of Research

I served as the United Nations representative for two organizations holding consultative status with ECOSOC and was variously accredited to UN headquarters in New York, Geneva and Vienna. Additionally, I advised multiple CSOs/NGOs concerning consultative status and the application process and had an opportunity to communicate with the leadership of those organizations about possibilities of making contributions to the UN's work. While the experiences were not uniform, in many cases the CSOs/NGOs appeared less interested in actual collaboration and networking than in the (real or perceived) prestige and credibility such an association could potentially bring.

Some of the organizations seemed keenly interested in how UN-affiliated legitimacy could factor into publicity in general and donor/fundraising appeal specifically.

As this pattern repeated---though not universally---among different CSOs/NGOs with which I had involvement, I became curious as to the degree of participation of such organizations which held consultative status. I began to question whether I had experienced something unique or whether lack of genuine commitment to participate was common among CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with ECOSOC. As a part of a Florida International University graduate seminar on International Organizations, I undertook a preliminary examination of the UN iCSO database which seemed to indicate that lack of meaningful participation on the part of CSOs/NGOs with consultative status was commonplace. My initial assumption that my perceptions/experiences were likely atypical and that most accredited CSOs/NGOs were active participants began to change as I examined the database.

It turned out that many such organizations had not participated in any UN conference or other function in years---if ever---and it seemed that it was commonplace for CSOs/NGOs to lose their accreditation status due to inactivity. They may have officially designated UN representatives and submitted one or more required quadrennial reports, but neither of the latter denotes substantive participation or contribution. The preliminary analysis of the iCSO database did not reveal the full extent of participation rates or what accounted for them, but it became increasingly apparent that CSO/NGO unwillingness or inability to participate in UN forums may be a common phenomenon. Not only could I find nothing in the literature that specifically addressed lack of

participation among CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with ECOSOC, the UN and the majority of the literature tended to exalt the association as an example of strengthening of pluralistic and democratic traditions within transnational institutions, a view which contrasted sharply with my own experiences and preliminary foray into UN data. This research is the culmination of questions raised by the aforementioned problem and seeks to clarify the nature and extent of CSO/NGO affiliations with UN-ECOSOC and explore barriers to and catalysts for such interaction.

Key Terminologies and Concepts

A wide variety of terms and acronyms are used in this research. Many of the terms are perceived and used in a discordant manner by different scholars within the literature. For example, while some may regard *civil society organizations*, *nongovernmental organizations*, *nonprofit organizations*, and *voluntary organizations* as essentially synonymous, others may perceive one or all of the latter terms as distinct in some subtle regard and not use the terms interchangeably. Clarification of many of these often overlapping or conflicting terminologies as found in the literature and key concepts underlying the terminology is necessary to frame further discussion.

The concepts of *civil society* and *civil society organizations* (CSOs) are core components of this study. Linz and Stepan (1996, 116) offer a frequently cited description of civil society as being comprised of groups which freely self-organized independently of government influence which seek to “articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.” Waisman (2006) defined civil

society in similar light stating that it is “a slice of society, whose core is the web of voluntary associations that articulate interests and values, and their system of interaction, as long as these units are not under the control of the state” (Uhlen 2009, 272-73). In the broadest of senses, CSOs are all voluntarily organized associations independent of direct government and/or market control. In a tripartite division of societal activity, the realm of civil society is everything not found in the domains of government or business/commercial activity, wherein organizations pursue collectively goals (Thiel 2014). Early concepts of civil society regarded it as the mediating institutions that bridged the gap between the individual and the state (Himmelfarb 2000, 95). Reflecting such a three-part division, the term third-sector organization (TSO) has been used in the literature to refer to civil society/CSOs. Some scholars have a broad and inclusive view of civil society as being comprised of widely diverse professional and labor associations, religious organizations and perhaps most famously via his example of bowling leagues and their decline as symptoms of broader waning of American civil society, Putnam (2001) also includes recreational-related organizations.

Many regard civil society as having a potentially clear and vital role in that the latter and the private sector can be relied upon to more efficiently supplement or replace roles traditionally carried out by sovereign governments ranging from the provision of social and charitable services to even helping resolve complex international issues including even peaceful resolution of military conflicts (Haufler 2008). Perceptions of what constitutes civil society may also be influenced by political perspectives.

Addressing the latter phenomenon in the United States Eberly (2000) states:

For conservatives it (civil society) embodies a vision for a larger role for community-based charities, especially faith-based ones, which can be substituted for flawed government programs. Libertarians have recently embraced the term civil society...as a synonym for privatization, implying that the term's major attraction may be its usefulness in expanding the marketplace and limiting the state. Alternatively, many liberals see civil society as a means to deepen community participation in public projects, thereby improving both the performance of government and the public's acceptance of it.

Universal agreement does not exist concerning the parameters of what does and does not constitute civil society and also, what specifically is and is not a CSO. Many regard civil society as those organizations which are "striving to improve society" and to effect political and/or economic change via public activism (Edwards 2009, 2). Some scholars (e.g. Diamond 1994) eschew the inclusion of apolitical or informal organizations such as recreational associations as constituting civil society via the perception that such groups are more inwardly focused, private and yield less social or civic capital. Yet, commonly such organizations have a multifaceted character wherein a bowling league, religious group or book club can also have more direct and formal roles within the civic sphere via conducting voter registration drives, collecting donations for charitable or activism-related endeavors, or initiating programs working with youth or otherwise supporting civic good.

Questions can also potentially be raised as to the classification of labor groups or professional associations as civil society or CSOs. By virtue of their connection to

business and commerce-related issues would labor unions such as the Teamsters or professional associations such as the American Medical Association be best classified as manifestations of the civic sphere or the business sphere? Addressing questions surrounding how to classify political parties given their potential connection with or control of government, Edwards (2009, 28) contends that “political parties are in civil society when they are out of office and out of civil society when they are in.” Since the entire membership of the American Judges Association and the vast majority of members of the National Education Association or the National Air Traffic Controllers Association are employed by government entities, can they be regarded as “civil” society and divorced from the realm of government or alternatively from the realm of business as they are all concerned with the economic interests of their respective professions? While the classification of certain organizations including labor unions, professional associations and political parties remains a subjective and contested issue, examples exist of all of the latter types of organization being granted formal consultative status with the UN within the rubric of its international civil society outreach.

The terms *civil society* and *CSO* may not be completely interchangeable in the minds of many in that the former is a broader, more general and inclusive reference than the latter which refers to a more formally organized constituency which also has more defined agendas. While different interpretations of the term exist, most broadly the term *civil society* could be perceived to be comprised of most or even the entirety of a population and the totality of diverse views and interests it contains. Expansive models of associational life would include most non-state or non-market free associations within

a population as constituting civil society (Edwards 2009, 29). In contrast a CSO is a formally organized segment of the population coordinated behind the goal of promoting an agenda on behalf of a defined constituency. Registered voters or politically-active persons in the United States exemplify civil society, but neither could be regarded as a CSO, whereas the League of Women Voters is both an element of civil society and a CSO.

Some question also exists as to the “voluntary” character of certain civil society outlets in the Tocquevillian sense of totally free, libertine association. Uhlin (2009) notes that structural factors and various sources of societal pressure could make it difficult for many people to not join organizations such as party-related youth or civic groups in communist or authoritarian states, or religious-related organizations in deeply religious societies. Thus in some cases, what is perceived to be a voluntary association may be obligatory to at least some degree culturally or politically or at minimum subjecting individuals to direct or indirect pressure to participate. Many organizations are heavily funded via governmental or corporate sources raising questions as to autonomy as well. Also, larger CSOs generally have a paid professional staff to carry out core components of their mission. Due to such considerations, the terms *private voluntary organizations* or *voluntary organizations* (PVOs/VOs), sometimes proposed as a synonym for CSOs/civil society, have not become standard nomenclature within the literature, though some organizations including the US Agency for International Development (USAID) continue to utilize the terminology. The latter, which provided \$2.8 billion in funding to support such organizations in 2013, defines PVOs as “tax-exempt nonprofits that

leverage their expertise and private funding to address development challenges abroad” (USAID 2016).

Nonprofit organizations or NPOs, sometimes also described as *not-for-profit organizations*, are those non-governmental entities “organized for purposes other than generating profit and in which no part of the organization's income is distributed to its members, directors, or officers” (Cornell University 2016). NPOs are closely associated with the concept of charitable organizations, but distinguishable via their altruistic, non-commercial operational parameters, where at least theoretically some charitable organizations could be for-profit enterprises. Though the term NPO is not widely used in the contemporary literature of international relations it is often viewed as equivalent to or overlapping with the more commonly-referenced concepts of CSO or NGO entities as evidenced in the World Bank’s attempt to define *civil society*:

The World Bank has adopted a definition of civil society developed by a number of leading research centers: “the term *civil society* to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. *Civil Society Organizations* (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, *non-governmental organizations* (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations” (World Bank 2013).

The term *nongovernmental organization* or NGO came into usage within the UN via the organization's original charter in 1945 due to the need for the UN to formally differentiate between participation rights for state or IGO actors as opposed to what were often described at the time as *transnational private organizations*---i.e. international CSOs as opposed to specialized intergovernmental agencies (Willetts 1996). The League of Nations had previously referred to such groups merely as *private organizations*, while many such organizations themselves in the early 20th century self-described as *international institutes*, *international unions*, or *international organizations*. By the 1970s, the term *nongovernmental organization* or acronym NGO had emerged as common public usage via the popularization of UN institutional jargon (Willetts 2011). Presently, the term NGO is the preferred term within UN-ECOSOC whereas other UN bodies continue to use the term CSO.

The World Bank (2002, 1) offers the following definition for NGOs: "private organizations that pursue activities to relieve the suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development." Today the term/concept of NGOs is more widely referenced in the literature than certain comparable alternatives such as CSO or (P)VO, in part because of the perception that NGO may be a more delimited concept than many alternatives and also because NGOs are regarded by many as being the best-organized elements of civil society and accordingly having a greater chance of exerting influence upon state and transnational actors than less structured civil society entities (Riddell-Dixon 2008).

Willetts (1996) argues that there is essentially no practical difference between an NGO and a (P)VO, but the term NGO may imply neutral connotations and applicability to a broader segment of political actors, whereas (P)VO suggests moral approval of perhaps a more limited range of civil society. NGOs are also occasionally compared to social movement organizations (SMOs). While proponents of SMOs may often regard their enterprise as being somehow more progressive or dynamic than NGOs, this is not a correct perception as NGOs for the most part are components and direct manifestations of social movements. For example NGOs such as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children or A Child is Missing, Inc. could not have emerged as easily or flourished financially or otherwise without underlying social movements galvanizing public attention and advocating for the safety of children from abuse, abduction and other forms of victimization.

The United Nations classifies a highly diverse range of private entities as NGOs and in fact has only very general criteria for the designation: the organization must be (1) independent from government control, (2) not-for-profit, (3) non-criminal, and (4) not seek to challenge the government of a state either as a political party or by a narrow focus upon a human rights issue (Willetts 1996). Beyond the latter basic criteria, the nature and organization of NGOs varies widely. Interestingly, in terms of levels of operation, many UN-recognized NGOs are community-based organizations (CBOs) which operate on a local or regional level within a single country, and many others are national in scope, operating only within a single country. Local or national-level NGOs may still covet an association with the UN as a vehicle for networking and exchanging ideas with other

organizations, providing feedback to the international community concerning their areas of expertise or to pursue the possibility of international support for their operational goals. There is also a diverse range of NGOs according to policy focus areas and diversity of UN terminologies and classifications related to the latter such as environmental NGOs (ENGOS), market advocacy NGOs (MANGOs), and technical assistance NGOs (TANGOs).

In terms of functionality, NGOs are classified by many IOs including the World Bank into two basic categories, those with an operational focus and those with an advocacy focus. NGOs with an operational focus usually pursue positive change directly through projects such as the delivery of public welfare or other services, emergency relief, or environmental causes, usually on a local, regional or otherwise smaller scale (Willetts 2012). Examples of operational-oriented NGOs include the American Red Cross, Catholic Charities, and Food for the Poor. Advocacy-oriented NGOs strive to accomplish larger-scale change via influencing political systems on behalf of their specific causes such as human rights, animal rights, environmental policy, or other issues (Willetts 2012). Examples of NGOs principally focused upon advocacy include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the National Rifle Association, and the US Institute for Peace. It is also possible for an NGO to assume characteristics of both operations and advocacy with the World Wildlife Fund being a possible example.

It is worthy of mention that the term NGO has been subject to ongoing debate as to the verbiage and the underlying meaning(s) it conveys. Critics of the term note that it is a negative (“non”) description, seeking to address what it is not, rather than what it

is/does. For example, the term *pressure groups* has been suggested by some as a possible alternative in that the latter term more descriptively conveys what the organizations seek to achieve, apply pressure within a civic or political sphere to obtain desired outcomes (Willetts 1982). The existing acronym NGO has also been subject to attempts at reinterpretation in more positive light, including “Necessary-to-Governance Organizations” (Gotz 2008, 245; Jonsson 2010, 34). The latter term and concept raises another key issue as to how divorced such organizations actually are from government when NGOs often carry out government-related projects such as the provision of public services and are frequently dependent upon government funding, issues which will be explored more fully elsewhere in this research.

The line between civil society or NGOs as opposed to government or business is not always distinct. Many NGOs derive significant portions---in many cases the vast majority---of their funding from government and/or business sources. Concomitantly, in the case of many such organizations skepticism exists as to the degree of organizational independence in the face of financial dependency. In some cases governments or their functionaries have actually created and at least to some degree managed NGOs, which are termed government-operated NGOs (GONGOs) and may in reality be “non”-governmental or “civil” society organizations only in name (Hemment 2012). A lesser gradation of the latter may be quasi-autonomous NGOs (QUANGOs), which receive most or even all of their funding from governments and may pursue specific projects at the behest of government, but are not founded or directly managed by government---a model common in many countries such as Britain which has some 1,200 such

organizations (*The Guardian* 2012). In contrast, *social movement organizations* (SMOs) or *grassroots support organizations* (GSOs) better exemplify the concept of “civil” society in that they originate from widespread support within the population, presumably represent agendas derived from the citizenry and are bottom-up rather than hierarchical in origin and in terms of their locus of control and agenda-setting.

Other terms of significance to the research include those related to the international scope of civil society and NGOs. Of an estimated 10 million NGOs presently operating in the world today, the vast majority operate within a single country and often only within a geographically limited local area. The majority of such organizations are also relatively small, with 72% of NGOs in the United States having annual revenue of less than half a million dollars for example (NCCS 2007).

Approximately 40,000 NGOs are believed to be international in scope in that they operate in multiple countries (NGO.IN 2016). Within the literature, such entities which operate across international borders are variously referred to as *international nongovernmental organizations* (INGOs) or *transnational nongovernmental organizations* (TNGOs).

More broadly, *international organizations* or IOs are any governmental, business, or civil society organizations/NGOs operating in multiple countries—e.g. the United States Trade Representative, multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Exxon Mobil, and Amnesty International respectively. *Intergovernmental organizations* or IGOs are formal associations among state actors or their organs, with the United Nations, Arab League, European Union, and Organization of American States serving as examples.

For the sake of consistency and clarity and for the purposes of this research, the concepts of CSOs (though not necessarily civil society, which is arguably broader in scope) and NGOs are for the most part regarded as synonymous and interchangeable. The vast majority and possibly all CSOs could conceivably also be regarded as NGOs in the broadest of senses/uses of the term NGO and the terms are largely used interchangeably, including among most UN venues. In this study, preference is given to the term NGO, as is also the standard practice within the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the principle focus of this research.

Theoretical Framework: A Summary Overview

Dahl (1961) famously characterized the political process as an arena in which there is a diversity of actors/groups competing for and sharing power and attention. While different interpretations exist, at its most basic the concept of political pluralism contends that a truly democratic system must have more than one locus of power. The classical model of political pluralism as espoused by Dahl and Lipset (1981) essentially holds that decision-making and politics are primarily the domain of government but civil society and other non-governmental entities can exercise influence over the process (Hauss 2011). In terms of a national polity, power and the opportunity for input should not be vested solely in one party, demographic cohort, sub-region or other group but rather distributed equitably among as many segments as possible. Research conducted in the US has shown that political structures that are more pluralist may contribute to broader participation in policy issue-areas which affect the populace (Okoth 2013).

In recent decades, the concept of pluralism has received attention as related to the distribution of power and influence within the transnational institutions including the UN (e.g., as a catalyst for global democratization: DeMars 2005, Risse-Kappen ed. 1995, Willetts 1996; for the diversification of moral authority: Boli and Thomas eds. 1999, Gotz 2008, etc.). Historically, the UN has functioned as an association among states with national governments holding a monopoly on influence. For the first decades of its existence UN agenda-setting and the actions (e.g. relief, monitoring) undertaken internationally were carried out largely by state actors. The explosion in the number of international civil society organizations afforded the UN not just practical opportunities to diversify the implementation of its initiatives at the ground level via non-state, civil society organizations, but also to diversify the chorus of voices participating in the UN process and partly decentralize the focus away from state actors. Whereas national governments presumably represent the interests of their citizens, they may frequently reflect the political agendas of the elites or the regime in power. Civil society organizations such as NGOs have been perceived as having a more “bottom-up”, grassroots dynamic in which the views of the citizenry, often including marginalized segments of a society, may be better represented. Accordingly, increased direct UN involvement with NGOs would serve as a step in the direction of democratic pluralism and facilitate more interaction with non-state actors internationally. Also, the greater the diversity among NGOs in terms of regional/geographical representation and issue areas represented, the greater the contribution to pluralism. For the purposes of this research, political pluralism is defined as *sharing of influence among and active engagement of a diverse group of stakeholders within a political dynamic*. Relative to the relationship

between NGOs and UN-ECOSOC, an exploration of political pluralism entails assessments of the degree and nature of actual NGO engagement (i.e. is NGO influence actual/potential or largely symbolic?) and the degree of proportional and equitable NGO representation by country/region and by policy focus area.

The concept of pluralism as espoused in Kantian classical liberalism and liberal institutionalism contends that ideally democratic systems have decentralized power structures and significant influence and participation from diverse sources, rather than a limited segment of a polity. The latter has been described as the most compelling argument on behalf of UN involvement with civil society organizations in that it facilitates a multi-actor framework and contributes additional voices, perspectives and expertise to international forums/regimes which have traditionally been the almost exclusive domain of states (Mingst and Muldoon 2015; Whaites 1996; Willetts 2006). Succinctly, if vibrant civil society participation helps to foster democratic processes, increased roles of civil society within IOs will help facilitate democratic processes within the IO. Within the pluralist tradition of constructivism, NGOs are regarded as the principle organizing element and the voice of transnational civil society, and as representing the interests of people and grassroots movements, separate from and diffusing the power of states (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 11). Beginning in the 1990s, NGOs and civil society organizations in general were regarded as primary catalysts for the emerging pattern of bottom-up international democratization. Burgeoning global civil society including thousands of newly UN-affiliated NGOs sought increasingly proactive roles in contributing to global problem solving and transnational governance,

potentially competing with the influence of states within international regimes and functioning as agents of change upon states and transnational institutions via grassroots influence (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 10-13). The process of policy formulation also benefits from pluralism as stakeholders may potentially consult international/domestic policymakers during the formulation process, thus developing more effective and/or democratic policy (Bunea and Thompson 2015; Tallberg 2012). Additionally, pluralism holds that the actions of IOs/IGOs and states may become increasingly subject to the oversight of transnational civil society organizations and that such an outcome reflects democratic institutional trends (Keohane 1998).

Pluralism also entails considerations related to cultural diversity within egalitarian democratic institutions in that it advocates that all groups can maintain their distinctive identity and be afforded opportunities to participate and have their voices heard without being relegated to the margins (Abu-Laban 2008, 2). It can be regarded as an ethic of respect that places value on and prioritizes human diversity (Global Centre for Pluralism 2012). The United Nations advocates diversity in representation, and the expanding role of increasingly diverse (geographical, policy issue areas represented, etc.) ranges of NGOs within ECOSOC and other organizations reflects institutionalized commitment to pluralism. The UN has assumed a direct role in attempting to facilitate such pluralism within the consultative status framework via encouraging NGOs representing the historically marginalized (e.g., the global south, human/indigenous rights-related organizations) and providing funding to allow NGOs from developing nations to participate in UN forums. However, significant question exists as to whether such efforts

favoring plurality have yielded genuine improvements in the diversity of representation/ participation or whether they are largely symbolic (Kymlicka 2007, 3-25).

The theoretical perspective underpinning the proposed study is a critical appraisal of pluralist assumptions relative to the expanding role of CSOs/NGOs within the United Nations and the associated perceptions of the decentralization of power away from states, the diversification of perspectives geographically and culturally, and the strengthened role of civil society within the UN. The international community has become characterized in recent decades by decreasing dominance of state actors and concomitantly increasing involvement of non-state actors including NGOs (McKeon 2009, pg. 6; Pubantz 2005). The most significant non-state actors within the UN framework and global civil society in general are NGOs which continue to grow in number and influence within the UN and international arena (Bennessaieh 2011, pg. 72; Smith 2006, pg. 109; Hill 2008, pg. 129; Reimann 2006, pg. 45-67). Due to the latter trend and the understanding that NGOs make key contributions to civil society and democratic institutions, advocates of democratic pluralism within the UN regard the expansion of NGO influence within the organization as an appropriate means of diversifying input and for further democratizing global governance. Article 71 of the UN Charter (Appendix B) authorizes the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to form formal consultative arrangements with NGOs. UN conferences intentionally place state parties adjacent to NGOs in parallel conferences in order to impart a perception of pluralism and democracy (Anderson 2012, pg. 235). In 1996, NGOs with a national or regional scope were for the first time considered for formal accreditation with the UN,

with the goal of democratizing access---particularly for NGOs in developing nations (McKeon 2009, pg. 124).

However many scholars question the degree to which the expanded role of NGOs within the UN actually exemplifies democratic pluralism. Critics note that the increased profile of NGOs may be more perceptual or symbolic than substantive with regard to the balance of power and influence which overwhelmingly remains with state actors within international governance. Also, NGO representation at the UN may be more symbolic than substantive in terms of degree of active engagement of NGOs within the UN dynamic, as the theoretical number and diversity of NGOs in theoretical affiliation with the UN is not meaningful without active engagement.

Kotzian (2015) contends that civil society can theoretically strengthen democratic institutions within IOs/IGOs (1) via transmitting information between agents of international governance and the public and (2) by helping to hold organizations such as the UN accountable, but NGOs within the UN-ECOSOC framework appear to often fall short of one or both of the latter goals (particularly the second) in practice. McKeon (2009) and Omelicheva (2009) argue that while the UN has become increasingly inclusive of civil society, for various reasons such as limited channels of participation (not all UN organs permit extensive NGO participation and those that do usually regulate levels of participation via the NGOs affiliation status) and, logistical obstacles (NGO financial/personnel resources may impede participation) it has largely failed with regard to full incorporation of civil society into the global political process---i.e., formally affiliated NGOs often provide minimal if any input, and have little-no oversight role.

Carpenter (2010, pg. 216-217), Anderson (2012, pg. 222) and Willetts (2000, pg. 196) note that access to the UN is not available to all NGOs equally and that barriers such as the cost of attending UN conferences serve as significant impediments for many NGOs to participate. Hemment (2012) has suggested that a large portion of the NGOs created during the post-Cold War civil society expansion are “Potemkin NGOs”, either state funded/directed organs or that otherwise exist as civil society organizations more in name/theory than practice---i.e. devoid of ground-up, popular, grassroots support or active membership.

Many studies have addressed the expanding number and roles of NGOs globally in recent decades but few theories have been posited to address the actual behaviors of NGOs within the international arena such as patterns of participation regionally, topically or the degree to which they are actually engaged with the UN (Barnett and Finnemore 2006, 177-178). Many of the attempts to address the latter have been critical including Bloem, Attia and Dam (2008) who cite the challenges inherent to coordinating large numbers of NGOs and the associated issue of quantity versus quality of input. Carpenter (2010) also notes the politicization of the NGO screening committee/process and the otherwise un-level playing field financially or politically among NGOs that may seek association with the UN---e.g. an NGO with a harshly critical position against one or more national governments is more likely to be denied status. Cooley (2010) and Edwards (2009) note that many NGOs are so dependent upon state or corporate funding that many are arguably organs of states and state policies/agendas rather than independent entities. Thiel (2017) notes that to date, CSOs have been largely marginal players within

IOs including the EU with regard to agenda-setting and policy-development. The latter examples of political idiosyncrasies presumably call into question the UN-NGO program as a vehicle for democratic pluralism within the organization and also the legitimacy and independence of many NGOs and the nature and value of their contributions to the UN.

Research Parameters

This study proposes that the expansion of the number and role of NGOs in consultative status with the UN (ECOSOC) does not necessarily equate to meaningful collaboration between the UN and civil society, and accordingly the ideals of democratic pluralism are not being fully realized via this dynamic. Specifically, a large percentage---possibly the majority---of NGOs which have attained formal consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not appear to participate in UN functions (e.g. conference attendance, presentation of or assistance with research) or otherwise make any observable contribution to representing civil society at the UN. This study further proposes that analysis of patterns of NGO participation with UN-ECOSOC will reveal gaps with regard to geographical representation as well as gaps in issue areas both of which also undermine the tenets of democratic pluralism via claims of expanded NGO participation at the UN. Most empirical studies of NGOs at the UN have focused upon a limited number of organizations within a single issue area (Clark et al, 1998). A strength of this study is that its breadth of scope in seeking to analyze patterns of participation of all NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC will reveal macro-scale patterns within the institutional dynamic.

Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses

Questions:

#1a: What are the patterns of participation of NGOs in the UN-ECOSOC consultative status programs in terms of country and regional representation and are countries and world regions proportionally represented?

1b: What are the patterns of participation and proportional representation in terms of policy issue focus areas (e.g. human rights, environment, relief, etc.)?

1c: What types and degrees of participation exist among NGOs which hold consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council?

#2: Why do some NGOs in consultative status utilize the status to participate in UN functions, but others do not?

#3: Why do many NGOs holding consultative status fail to participate in any meaningful way in UN-ECOSOC functions?

Guiding Hypotheses:

1: Imbalances exist in patterns of participation of NGOs in consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council with regard to country/regional involvement (e.g. NGOs of developed states are proportionally better represented than those of developing states) and regarding the policy issues with which the NGOs are concerned.

2: A variety of factors including financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding of the process through which NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC can participate make some NGOs more active than others.

3: Given such constraints, most NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not participate in any meaningful way in UN meetings or otherwise make any substantive contribution (providing input at conferences, submitting research/data, etc.) to the UN goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society.

Research Design, Methodology and Instrumentation

The study will utilize a qualitative methodology in analyzing patterns of participation (institutional input) of NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC and in survey case studies of NGOs. Data obtained from the extensive UN integrated Civil Society Organizations (iCSO) online database will be analyzed for macro-scale patterns of CSO/NGO participation within UN-ECOSOC. Organizations with consultative status will be analyzed according to 1) region and country, 2) year and classification of UN status (general, special, and roster), 3) organizational type, 4) field and geographical scope of activity, and 5) degree of participation in UN meetings or other venues. Qualitative analysis of these data via a simple descriptive approach should be sufficient to operationalize the first guiding hypothesis and in part (i.e., some of the evidence supporting widespread lack of participation in the UN-NGO program) operationalize the third guiding hypothesis. These data will also help identify NGOs and their contact information to be selected for the empirical case study.

Individual survey case studies utilized CSOs/NGOs which identified English as at least one of several languages spoken in order to minimize logistical obstacles inherent to attempting to survey or otherwise obtain information from international organizations--- which should also increase survey participation rates among organizations selected for inclusion in the study. Utilizing random sampling, 10% percent of NGOs which have (1) obtained consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, (2) identified English language proficiency in their UN database profile, and (3) have a valid/complete email address listed in their contact information were selected for a survey (see Appendix A). The latter information used in sample selection is obtained from the publicly-available online UN iCSO database.

The random selection of CSOs/NGOs for inclusion in the case studies occurred according to the following procedures. Utilizing the publicly-accessible UN iCSO online database, an alphabetized list of all English-speaking organizations in consultative status with ECOSOC was generated. Of 4,601 NGOs with consultative status at the time the sample pool was selected, 4,383 (95.3%) were identified as speaking English as one of several languages. In alphabetical order, each CSO/NGO was numbered consecutively. The online resource www.stattrek.com was utilized to generate 439 random, non-duplicated numbers which served as the basis for sample selection in the research.

Questionnaires containing primarily fixed choice (i.e. number line) items and a small number of open-ended items will be distributed by email to selected NGOs with the goal of understanding why the organizations have or have not participated in the UN consultative status program in which they were accepted. Follow up by phone and/or

email with some participants will permit elaboration/clarification of survey responses if necessary. Survey/interview data will be analyzed in an interpretive-qualitative manner so as to address the second and third guiding hypothesis. Information derived from both the UN iCSO database and surveys/interviews will be analyzed via content analysis and descriptive reporting. In an effort to increase response rates and also to aid in the candor of information furnished, anonymity will be provided in that the names of the CSOs/NGOs, persons affiliated with them or any other identifying characteristics will be withheld by the researcher from the study or any publications derived from the study.

Following the initial email informing randomly selected participants of the study and requesting that they complete and submit the survey, several follow-up/reminder emails were sent approximately every 10 days to 2 weeks. Such follow-up intervals are traditionally deemed appropriate by survey researchers as shorter intervals risk being perceived as irritating, and longer intervals don't convey importance, allow more potential participants to forget about the study/request and risks needlessly prolonging the time needed for data collection (Burton 2000; Edwards 1997; Mangione 1995). All follow-up contacts contained the original survey and consent form as an attached Word document for the convenience of potential respondents who may have deleted or misplaced the original email, a practice commonly recommended by survey researchers (e.g., Dillman et al 2009; Thach 1995). Each follow-up contained a slightly different message emphasizing a different reason to participate or other piece of information, as research has shown that the latter approach, rather than a repetition of the identical message, could be more effective in eliciting responses (Cialdini 1984; Dillman et al

2009; Hildreth et al 2006). The first reminder was sent November 10-12, 2016 and succinctly stressed the importance of the study, its brief nature, and my availability to promptly answer any questions concerning the study via email. A second reminder was emailed November 22-23 which mentioned each of the latter again and also emphasized my willingness to send the survey in other languages as well and notice that the deadline for submission had been extended through December 2. The third and final follow-up was sent on December 2 indicating that the deadline had passed but that late submissions would still be accepted if submitted promptly.

Literature related to survey research suggests that subsequent contacts/reminders regarding surveys yield progressively diminishing returns with regard to response rate and this was generally my experience in this study (Dialsingh 2008; Gideon 2012). Many survey researchers note that response rates for subsequent follow-ups can yield as little as half the prior return rate, meaning that once three follow-up reminders have been sent the likelihood of any significant number of responses from further follow-ups would likely be close to zero and thus not justifiable (Gideon 2012; Mangione 1995). In the period following the initial email contacts with potential respondents---and prior to any follow-up reminders being sent, a total of 22 surveys were submitted. Subsequently, 21 more were submitted after the first follow-up email, 16 after the second, and 3 after the third for a total of 62 survey responses, yielding a response rate of 14.1%. The majority of surveys were submitted via email attachments, but 5 were submitted by mail, and 1 by fax. All of the latter options were made available to participants for their convenience/preference and with the goal of maximizing rate of response.

High response rates for academic research of this type can be difficult to achieve. Survey research literature note the existence of long-term trends in declining response rates to all types of surveys, possibly the result of increased volumes of spam over time (Panel on a Research Agenda for the Future of Social Sciences Data Collection 2013; Gorard 2003). In addition to multiple follow-up emails and allowing multiple modes of submission at participants' discretion (email, mail or fax), several other steps were undertaken in an effort to increase the questionnaire response rate. Prior to distribution and following several rounds of editing, the number of questions included in the survey was reduced by nearly one-half from the original version and additionally several items that were originally more open-ended were converted to fixed-choice items in an effort to make the survey less daunting and time-consuming to potential respondents. Assurances of anonymity and an extension of the original submission deadline are both recommended strategies for increasing response rates in the literature concerning survey research and both approaches were employed in this study (Ballantyne 2005; Dommeyer et al 2002).

Response rates can vary substantially depending upon the type of survey being conducted. Internal surveys such as those undertaken by employers with their workers, universities with their students, or businesses with their clients or suppliers tend to have higher response rates than external surveys in which the researcher is seeking to obtain input from a target audience with which no existing connection or exists. For example, Nulty (2008) found an average online response rate to 9 different internal higher education surveys in which institutions sought input from their enrolled students to be

33%. Formal surveys such as those using questionnaires and requiring signed consent forms generally yield lower response rates than informal studies such as more casual market research surveys (OECD 2001). The response rate for surveys targeted to specific individuals is often considerably higher than surveys undertaken for organizations, and whereas offering incentives may boost response rates when surveying individuals, incentives have not been demonstrated to increase response rates from organizations surveyed (Baruch 2008). Surveys undertaken face-to-face (which is of course not practical for many studies including this research) have been shown to produce substantially higher rates of response than indirect methods such as mail or email, and paper-based surveys are often touted as yielding better results than online or email surveys (Burton 2000; Nulty 2008).

In nearly every respect, the nature of this survey research aligned with those studies traditionally characterized by lower response rates: external, formal---and requiring consent documentation, indirect rather than face-to-face, email rather than paper, and targeting organizations rather than individuals. Given the latter parameters, a realistic minimum goal for a survey response rate with a study of this type may commonly be set at approximately 10% (OECD 2001; Panel on a Research Agenda for the Future of Social Sciences Data Collection 2013). It should also be noted that a growing consensus in the literature stresses that higher response rates do not necessarily guarantee data quality and conversely lower rates do not necessarily mean that data obtained is in any way weak or biased (e.g. Groves 2006; Massey and Tourangeau 2013; Peytchev 2013).

In hindsight, it is possible that at least a slightly higher response rate could have been achieved via use of a web-based survey, as many participants seemed to lack the basic technical skills to scan documents or even open the questionnaire as a Word file. Among those with basic computer proficiencies, a fully-online survey may have elicited more response through convenience as a potentially quicker and easier way to participate. However, the design and implementation of a functional web-based survey platform was beyond my technical capabilities and such a format would still not absolve participants from reading and following short, basic instructions related to completing and submitting the survey. Also, the formal procedural requirement of a signed consent form may have proven difficult to adequately address via an online survey as those with limited computer skills would likely not be able to attach an electronic signature and those only willing to provide feedback via a website for questionnaire items, may have been less likely to print, sign, and scan or otherwise submit the consent form (which if completed/submitted separately from the online questionnaire could also become difficult to pair with the correct survey), meaning many questionnaires may have been unusable without accompanying consent documentation.

Limitations

The first guiding hypothesis in its entirety and a portion of the third (participation in UN meetings) are addressed via analysis of data for all NGOs in consultative status and accordingly the study findings are generalizable. However, given the relatively large number of NGOs, the percent needed for statistical significance, the focus upon only

English-speaking NGOs, and the possibility of obtaining a small sample size (i.e. those NGOs which have failed to participate in a prestigious UN program may not be inclined to complete/submit a detailed questionnaire---either via the time commitment involved and/or the reality/perception of self-reporting inadequate participation), a case study approach is undertaken, the results of which are not necessarily generalizable to all NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC. Also regarding the second and third guiding hypotheses, NGO participation may be curtailed by external factors beyond the control/influence of the organizations such as the level of accreditation granted by the UN (general, special, roster) which in effect restricts the type and extent of participation.

Summary

To the researcher's knowledge this is the first comprehensive academic study of macro-level patterns of regional and topical (policy focus area) participation on the part of all NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. It may also be among the first such studies which seeks to identify and explain specific reasons for engagement or the lack thereof on the part of NGOs in consultative status. Lastly, the study will seek to appraise the findings within the theoretical framework of political pluralism in assessing the place and contributions of NGOs within the UN dynamic as either meaningful or as more symbolic.

II. CHAPTER TWO:

THEORIZING ON THE ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF CSOs/NGOs WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Introduction

Speaking at the World Economic Forum in 1999, then UN Secretary Kofi Annan famously suggested that a tripartite model of cooperation between the UN (and other IGOs), civil society organizations such as NGOs and labor unions, and business was needed to sufficiently address many pressing and complex international issues such as environmental protection and human rights (Ottaway 2001). Externally, CSOs/NGOs can serve useful purposes for transnational institutions as monitors of international law and norms in areas such as human rights or environmental standards, as facilitators of beneficial socio-economic programs, or as disseminators of aid among other roles. Internally, although such organizations have little official authority at the UN or most other IGOs, through their advocacy roles they can nonetheless allow additional voices to be heard and exert influence and in recent years CSOs/NGOs have successfully promoted new environmental agreements, helped to strengthen human rights, and helped achieve arms control measures among other achievements (Paul 2000).

The UN is the primary forum for policy formulation and rule-making in the fields in which most INGOs function and accordingly it stands to reason that CSOs/NGOs with an international scope would seek to cultivate relationships with the UN and its bodies (Paul 2000). By gaining knowledge of procedures and language used at the UN and other

IGOs, elements of civil society including CSOs/NGOs may learn how to effectively use international instruments associated with democratic traditions such as compliance reporting to advance domestic or transnational agendas in various policy areas including human or environmental rights (Riddell-Dixon 2008). Within democratic institutions whether at the sub-state, state or transnational level, CSOs/NGOs can potentially foster and reinforce democratic ideals and practices via aggregation and representation of stakeholder interests and also via mitigating government power---i.e. civil society is beneficial for democracy (Uhlin 2009). In short, stronger bonds between institutions of governance and institutions related to civil society can in turn strengthen democratic traditions.

By the late 20th century, NGOs were widely regarded as the most important element of civil society, facilitating public services and heavily contributing to the democratization trends sweeping much of the world, but in recent years the perception concerning CSOs/NGOs internationally has begun to shift toward criticism, with increasing calls that they may not be as effective as touted, many of them have little-no relationship to any real public, and via competing with and potentially undermining state actors they are undermining national sovereignty and democracy rather than reinforcing it (Jordan and Tuijl 2006). This chapter examines existing literature to address the theoretical underpinnings of the UN's association with CSOs/NGOs, its evolution and nature, and the potential shortcomings in the association.

CSOs/NGOs within IR Theory

Within IR theory, the role of civil society as an agent of influence and change within the international system has historically either been dismissed or downplayed. As recently as the 1980s, CSOs/NGOs were omitted from theory formulations in IR, likely as a reflection of state-centric theorizing and a dearth of information/understanding concerning the organizations (Mingst and Muldoon 2015, 67). The latter state of affairs has begun to change in recent decades as many international relations scholars have increasingly moved toward the study of non-state actors including civil society (Barnett and Sikkink 2008). Increasingly, academicians, as well as states and IOs are moving away from the long-prevailing view of CSOs/NGOs as negligible actors on the global stage (Liebert and Trenz 2013; Scholte 2011; Steffek and Hahn 2010).

The theoretical frameworks that do regard NGOs and civil society as having relevance do not agree as to the nature or source of their influence. To gain insight into variations in how CSOs/NGOs are perceived within the international framework, it is necessary to briefly address often conflicting views concerning the latter within each of several principle theoretical schools within IR: realism, Marxism, the English School, (neo) liberal institutionalism, behaviorist approaches such as structural sociological theories, and constructivism/pluralism. Particular attention is paid to pluralism, normally considered a strand of constructivism, as it is arguably the IR theory which gives the most consideration to the role of NGOs and civil society within the international system (Thiel 2010, 7117).

Preoccupied with power and states as the almost exclusive purveyors of power within the international system, realists (e.g. Walt) discount the importance of all non-state actors including CSOs/NGOs. Realists discount the autonomous agency of NGOs as only realized if allowed by states which weigh such decisions upon their own vested national interests, meaning the impact of CSOs/NGOs or IOs in general is limited to their role as instruments/surrogates of states' interests (Andersen 2015, 45-46). Classical realist perspectives ignore the expanding influence of CSOs/NGOs and other elements of civil society in recent decades, yet within the UN structure, the vast majority of real influence remains with member states and states have used their preeminence to successfully limit the expansion of CSO/NGO influence into key areas such as the General Assembly and Security Council.

If classical realism presents an oversimplified model of an international system characterized by competition for power so does its chief theoretical opponent Marxism, but with different agents vying for their own interests. Marxist theory regards class conflict as the catalyst for competition and in turn as the primary vehicle for an anarchical world system. Yet it conceives of transnational capitalist elites as maintaining power within societies via maintaining control of the state and its organs of power (Willett 2011, 115). As in all major theories within international relations, different internal strands exist, but Marxist theory like realism discounts the importance of CSOs/NGOs or civil society, or views them as the extended arm of the state or possibly corporate shells, rather than an impartial non-governmental . The agendas of

CSOs/NGOs would not be viewed as distinct from the political or economic environments which gave birth to or finance such organizations.

In some respects, the English School within IR theory mirrors realism in that the former also sees an established society of states as the primary purveyor of structure within the international system. However, the English School also sees at least the potential for a broader, more diverse international society which at least potentially transcends and competes with state actors. Hedley Bull (1977) viewed the emergence of a more pluralistic international system with some degree of trepidation in that by challenging the primacy of state actors and their sovereignty, new voices on the world stage competing with states for influence may serve to undermine an already anarchical international order (Bellamy and McDonald 2004). Such views are consistent with the actions of many UN member states which have historically sought to prevent the potential erosion of sovereignty or international influence by non-state actors.

Many aspects of neorealist and neoliberal theories are comparable including their shared attitudes favoring free-market globalization as beneficial to the state, leading some theorists to place both within the rubric of neo-utilitarianism (Willettts 2011, 116). Neorealist and neoliberal theorists also have similar perspectives concerning the place of CSOs/NGOs within the international dynamic. Both remain state-centered, as they regard national governments as the principle actor on the international stage, though both neorealists and neoliberals regard the state as less monopolistic in influence than do classical realists. Both also allow for non-state actors including CSOs/NGOs to wield at least some state-delimited influence within the international system. Neoliberal theorists

regard IOs as mediums through which states may coordinate their interests, and CSOs/NGOs as equivalent to interest groups, whose voices may be louder than ever, but are still not central to norm-setting or functionality in the international arena (Andersen 2015, 46).

Liberal institutionalism, one of several variants within the liberal school, contends that the spread of international institutions helps foster peace and cooperation. The latter goals being achieved via dissemination of democratic ideals, increased economic interdependence, and increased levels of intergovernmental collaboration---and they regard all of the latter as largely the products of state actions (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 10). In other words, liberal institutionalists regard NGOs and international civil society as a byproduct derived from larger international trends such as increasing levels of economic and political interdependence, rather than as a catalyst for bringing such transitions about. The latter theory would regard the expansion of the ECOSOC consultative status program not as a catalyst for change or as a phenomenon of the CSO's doing but rather as a manifestation of institutional/societal expectation that transnational civil society should be given more voice.

Analysis of the distribution of power and influence within a system and understanding the nature of the power dynamic may entail behaviorist models and approaches such as observing decision-making processes and competition among competing agendas. Some such models are actor-centric such as rational-choice institutionalism which entail some real or perceived benefit to be derived by transnational actors or power-oriented institutionalism which regards transnational CSOs/NGOs as a

reflection of the power and influence of states (Tallberg et al 2013). In contrast, structural theories of sociological institutionalism stress that many elements of transnational institutions are embedded in sociocultural norms (Giddens 1986; Hall and Taylor 1996). The latter theories strive to explain the nature of changing institutional practices by assessing the sociocultural legitimacy of the actors as opposed to rationalist means-end calculation (Thiel 2017, 35). For example, CSOs/NGOs may be regarded as the vehicle via which disenfranchised populations may be included in the decision-making process by IGOs or other institutions which value diversity and wish to become more inclusive in elevating their status (Benhabib 2009).

Behaviorist concepts are commonly seen as having common ground with pluralism. Within the scope of international politics, the concept of pluralism can refer to a range of things, though some core ideas lie at the heart of the concept. In the broadest of senses, constructivism in general denotes pluralism in that constructivism takes into account a diverse, pluralistic range of considerations in examining how a complex social dynamic impacts international politics. The emergence of constructivism began in response to rationalist theories, including neorealism and neoliberalism, which perceive actors and their motives as materialists which pursue resources or other forms of power. Rationalists assume that the international system is driven by states which are rational actors striving to maximize their own material advantages and that their actions can be understood entirely by the conduct of individual actors (states), without regard to the complex, diverse and frequently changing socio-cultural systems within which the interactions occur (Ruggie 1998, 9).

When constructivism emerged as a school of thought in the 1980s it facilitated a larger focus on non-state actors, and it remains the sole mainstream IR theory which emphasizes a significant role for CSOs/NGOs within the international political dynamic (Andersen 2015, 46-47). Presently, most IR theorists regard constructivism as a descendent of the idealist perspective in that it stresses the roles of ideas, values, and discourses in shaping the political realm---taking a wider and more multifaceted view than many previous theories which merely viewed the IR arena as a competition among states to attain their vested interests (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 10-11). Unlike conventional liberalism, constructivist thought deconstructs---rather than assuming as a given---and effectively discounts the traditional views related to anarchy, power, and state actors, all of which are regarded as products of many societal variables. The entire international dynamic and the variables which influence it are social constructs that frequently change and evolve (Wendt 1992, 422-424). Accordingly, NGOs and other manifestations of civil society as reflections of the complex societal dynamic should have some significance within the international system. Addressing how CSOs/NGOs factor into the more nuanced and multifaceted theoretical framework of constructivism Andersen (2015, 46-47) states:

Constructivism puts emphasis on the dynamics behind the spread of norms and ideas in the international system, and NGOs play a central role in this...as they embody values and act independently of governments. They function as norm entrepreneurs/transmitters within what many see as an emerging global civil society. Constructivism calls attention to the frequent interactions between

NGOs and states...(but) the goal is not to replace the state-centrism of early theorizing.

Within constructivism there are variations concerning the nature of CSOs/NGOs within the international framework, essentially a dichotomy between the globalist and pluralist camps. More narrowly, the plural(ist) school of liberal constructivism contends that the social and ideational considerations flow from the bottom up, as opposed to the globalist school within constructivism which sees norms and ideas as being more hierarchical in nature and trickling down from states, IGOs and other macro-scale actors (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 11). This distinction is important in attempting to define the role of NGOs, as pluralists see such manifestations of civil society as significant agents of international influence. Exploring this, DeMars and Dijkzeul (2015, 11-12) state:

In the pluralist school of idealist constructivism, NGOs are understood as the articulate and organized element of transnational civil society, acting largely independent of government. Pluralists portray NGOs as servants of the poor in grassroots development, or prophetic voices of the voiceless lobbying governments and the UN, or transnational pilgrims in an emancipatory passage from oppressive rule to self-regulating community. Pluralism reiterates, in abstract theoretical terms, the representative claims articulated by the NGOs themselves.

In contrast with the pluralist framework, within the globalist school of idealist constructivism, international norms are “implemented” or “enforced” through the actions of CSOs/NGOs collecting information and reporting on the norm compliance of states,

IGOs, MNCs and other actors, a model that many observers argue is evident in how CSOs/NGOs function within the framework of the UN and other IGOs (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; Clark 2001; Martens 2000; Weiss and Gordenker 1996). Whereas realists discount the influence of civil society and other non-state actors outright, liberal institutionalists merely perceive CSO/NGO growth largely as a bi-product of increased influence of international institutions and globalization rather than a significant source of influence upon the international dynamic (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015). Such conflicting views concerning the place of NGOs within the framework of IR theory is presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Perception of CSOs/NGOs in IR Theory

<u>IR Theory</u>	<u>Perception of CSOs/NGOs</u>
Realism	CSOs/NGOs are insignificant compared to states.
Liberal Institutionalism	CSOs/NGOs are largely symptoms of spreading international institutions, but do not comprise an important element of them or significantly influence them.
Global Constructivism	CSO/NGO power/influence flows primarily from international norms downward to states.
Plural Constructivism	CSO/NGO power/influence flows in a single direction from societies upward to states

(adapted from DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015)

Evolution and Growth of the CSO/NGO Phenomenon

While the concept of CSOs/NGOs and the perception of the latter as one element of democratic society slowly emerged and expanded in the 19th century, the most substantial growth in the total number and transnational nature of civil society has occurred since the mid-twentieth century. The postcolonial era in the decades following WWII was an important time for the growth of NGOs and civil society globally, as in the preceding colonial period, governments customarily did not encourage the growth of such groups, seeing them as threats to the power structure (Kwesiga and Namisi 2006). In the decades following decolonization, CSOs/NGOs acquired an increasingly prominent role in developing countries in the provision of services and distribution of aid, as evidenced in the tenfold increase in developmental aid dispersed by international organizations between 1970-1985 (Jokic 2013). During the latter years of the Cold War in the 1980s and early 1990s, a substantial expansion in the number and influence of CSOs/NGOs occurred internationally and this upsurge, particularly in groups related to human and political rights or free market economic reform are often credited with playing a role in the decline in authoritarianism and movement toward democracy characteristic of the era. Increasing numbers of CSOs/NGOs with international focus were founded in many areas in an effort to meet community needs or promote interests, with one estimate claiming that some 25,000 organizations could reasonably be classified as INGOs (those with affiliates/programs in multiple countries) by the year 2000, up from less than 400 a century earlier and 6,000 in 1990 (Paul 2000; Jokic 2013). As of 2016, the Union of International Associations' *Yearbook of International Organizations* lists over 38,000 active and some 30,000 dormant CSOs/NGOs that operated in 2 or more countries and

obtained financial support from more than one state, their definitional criteria for being an INGO (UIA 2016).

The type and degree of CSO/NGO involvement with the UN has evolved over time, with the principle venue of interaction being the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a body established in 1946. Hundreds of organizations were in attendance at the conference establishing the UN at the end of WWII, setting a precedent for continuing cooperation and by 1950 formal consultative arrangements with CSOs/NGOs and a framework of rules regulating the affiliations were established (Willetts 1996). Article 71 of the UN Charter (see Appendix B) is the primary vehicle for UN-civil society relations and serves as the basis of the formal consultative status program. It states that ECOSOC “may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.”

A highly diverse and ever-expanding range of CSOs/NGOs and policy areas including those with a transnational, state-specific and even sub-state focus are represented within the UN-ECOSOC consultative status program, reflecting a high degree of flexibility on the part of the NGO Committee regarding matriculation into the program. In fact, one source of criticism has been a lack of consistent admission standards in that many CSOs/NGOs with an obscure focus or whose mission is otherwise very tangentially related to the work of the UN. Examples of the latter include the

International Federation of International Furniture Removers and the European Cyclists' Federation both of which currently hold Roster consultative status (which is the level of accreditation usually---though not always---held by organizations with a highly narrow/specialized focus) and the International Federation of Psoriasis Associations which holds Special consultative status, normally reserved for organizations with a broader scope of mission relative to UN activities. Many examples exist of CSOs/NGOs with similarly narrow focus, with at best indirect relevance to the UN's work, being awarded consultative status while others with a comparable or even far more relevant and appropriate scope and mission are denied. Despite such controversies and the occasional attempt on the part of state actors or other entities to limit the number of organizations involved with the UN, Willetts (1996, 43) explains that the consultative status program and the number of organizations involved in it has expanded rapidly in recent years for a combination of reasons:

First, international NGOs that already existed when the UN was formed, or that were established in the early years, often only had branches in Western countries and have subsequently expanded to become truly global, gained more resources and increased legitimacy. Second, groups that previously saw no reason to work with the UN, or were suspicious that their independence might be compromised, have seen how the system works and decided that they could benefit from consultative status. Third, many new NGOs are being formed, as new areas of economic activity develop or new issues move

into the global agenda. Fourth, as existing groups gain greater resources, experiences and skills, they may expand their scope of activities.

ECOSOC's Formal Relations with CSOs/NGOs

ECOSOC formally accredits NGOs according to three gradations of influence which determine degree of access and input: general consultative status, special consultative status, and roster consultative status. The type of accreditation determines the right and ability to circulate documents, access to informal preparatory meetings, observation of various proceedings, and the opportunity to speak at certain functions (UN 1999). General status is afforded to the relatively small number of organizations that are global in scope, directly involved with most areas of ECOSOC activities and are perceived to be capable of making “substantive and sustained” contributions. As of August 10, 2016, of 4,707 CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status only 147 or 3.1% held this level of accreditation. General status allows organizations to submit written statements of up to 2,000 words to ECOSOC bodies on subjects in which the organization has specialized knowledge. Many of the organizations which hold General status are among the world’s best known and most respected CSOs/NGOs including Greenpeace, Oxfam International, Rotary International, Save the Children, and World Vision International for example.

Organizations with special status are those with operations in multiple countries, expertise in a less diverse range of issues with which ECOSOC is concerned, but are potentially capable of making contributions in several such areas. Special status

classification affords less influence than general status and CSOs/NGOs holding this accreditation level may not propose items for the provisional agenda of ECOSOC or one of its bodies but these NGOs are allowed to submit written statements of up to 500 words (Cassese 1979). As noted in Table 3.1, Special status is by far the most common accreditation level among organizations in consultation with ECOSOC, with 3,574 organizations or 75.9% holding the latter designation. Organizations holding General or Special status are required by ECOSOC to submit a brief report every four years in which organizations succinctly (maximum total of 700 words for all responses combined) address each of eight items: (1) an introduction to the organization; (2) the CSO's/NGO's aims and purposes; (3) any changes occurring during the period that significantly impacted the CSO's/NGO's mission; (4) an overview of the organization's contributions to the work of the UN; (5) an overview of the CSO's/NGO's participation in UN meetings; (6) examples of the CSO's/NGO's cooperation with UN bodies; (7) initiatives taken by the CSO/NGO in support of Sustainable (formerly 'Millennium') Development Goals; (8) any additional relevant information the organization wishes to share with the United Nations Committee on NGOs which reviews the quadrennial reports. Failure to submit the quadrennial report may result in loss of ECOSOC consultative status and failure to remain active or provide adequate information in the report may result in the downgrade of an organization's status, information which at least as yet is not publicly disclosed by the UN.

Roster status is for those organizations that are often less transnational in scope, usually focused on a more narrow issue area and can make an occasional useful

contribution in their area(s) of expertise. Organizations with Roster status may only submit written statements if specifically invited to do so by the UN and the CSO's/NGO's representatives may only attend public meetings directly relevant to their field of specialization. Roster status is the second most common type of ECOSOC consultative status with some 986 (20.9%) organizations holding this level of affiliation. Just as CSOs/NGOs can be downgraded from inactivity or lose consultative status entirely, they may also petition to upgrade their status to gain greater access within ECOSOC and each year numerous organizations apply to transition from Roster to Special (most commonly) or Special to General status.

An assumption underlying this study is that the degree of participation of CSOs/NGOs will to at least some degree be impacted by the level of consultative status they hold, i.e. presumably a higher percentage of those holding General status will be active participants as opposed to those with Special status due to both the breadth of operational scope and the increased opportunity to participate. Likewise, it may be that the smallest participation rates will be among CSOs/NGOs holding Roster Status as theirs is the narrowest scope of operations and the most restrictive type of ECOSOC status wherein for example submission of written statements is not a right or a matter of routine. However, such assumptions cannot be taken for granted. Also, the potential influence of organizations holding Special or Roster status should not be entirely discounted, certainly when weight of their numbers and proportional representation is taken into consideration. While organizations with General status presumably have a greater degree of opportunity to participate within the ECOSOC system, they constitute scarcely more than 3% of

organizations holding consultative status at present (see Table 3.1). In contrast, those organizations with Special status comprise nearly 76% and those with Roster status 21%, meaning even with lower proportional rates of participation, CSOs/NGOs holding a lower tier accreditation status within ECOSOC could nonetheless be better represented in conferences than those with General status and could potentially be making meaningful contributions.

While ECOSOC remains the primary venue for UN-civil society interaction, other outlets also exist for formal interaction with other UN bodies. CSOs/NGOs may be granted formal association with the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) which facilitates access, but not participation in UN meetings. The number of organizations with a DPI affiliation has increased markedly over time, from 200 in 1968 to over 1,300 in 2016 (Global Policy Forum 1999; DPI 2016). Informal dialog also occasionally exists between the NGO Working Group of the UN Security Council with accredited NGOs (UN 1999). Limited formalized NGO participation arrangements also exist with certain other UN bodies and affiliated organizations including the International Labor Organization; UN Conference on Trade and Development; UN Development Program; UN International Children's Fund; World Health Organization; UNAIDS; UN High Commission for Refugees; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN; and the World Intellectual Property Organization (UN-CONGO 2006). With regard to such bodies, the UN may provide one-time, temporary accreditation for a specific meeting or other function which does not equate to a permanent affiliation or consultative status.

The United Nations is not the only prominent IGO to establish formal relationships with civil society organizations. For example, the World Bank has for many years prioritized associations with CSOs/NGOs, facilitated partnership opportunities, disseminated CSO/NGO-related information, and hosted seminars and discussion groups on the roles of CSOs/NGOs in international governance (Ottaway 2001). CSOs/NGOs played important roles in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as in many of its functions including providing information for investigations and trials (Hill 2008). Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) have long maintained association with CSOs/NGOs having expertise in economic/trade-related matters and both have held public consultations and policy forums with CSOs/NGOs, and have often solicited their feedback concerning IMF and WTO policies (IMF 2016; Vifell 2010; WTO 2016). Some 1,300 international CSOs/NGOs were present for the WTO's infamous Seattle conference in 1999 (Seters 2008). Most major regional IGOs such as the African Union, Arab League, Commonwealth of Nations, European Union, and Organization of American States have established formal programs that facilitate varied degrees of cooperation and communication with CSOs/NGOs and most provide at least some form of funding for such organizations in order to assist in performing certain functions such as education or emergency relief. Some significant IGOs also have established an official associative status for cultivating more formal standing relationships with CSOs/NGOs. Prominent examples include the Council of Europe which implemented such a program in 1993 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which via its "researcher in residence" program grants archival access to representatives of

approved organizations. Institutional culture in general, guidelines for CSO/NGO participation, and opportunities for meaningful input can pose intervening obstacles for those organizations which seek to cultivate relationships with the UN or other IGOs, and one potential catalyst for overcoming such barriers and furthering policy agendas can be constructive interaction (e.g. information sharing) and coalition-building among CSOs/NGOs.

CSO/NGO Collaborations and Coalition-Building

Often civil society organizations are most effective when they engage in collaborate efforts via formal coalitions with each other and with other entities such as business, labor or governmental actors (Paul 2000). Collaborative efforts between multiple CSOs/NGOs working in conjunction, particularly when there is also support from state actors, have been cited in various studies as facilitating change with regard to numerous international policy initiatives. Examples include the international movement which led to the 2008 global treaty banning cluster munitions (Bolton and Nash 2010), advocacy coalitions which have helped bring about action and accountability in health initiatives for women and children in many world regions (WHO 2012), and the successful efforts of CSOs/NGOs working with labor unions to ban sandblasting processes in jeans manufacturing in Europe that were potentially harmful to workers' health (Kryst 2012). CSOs/NGO coalitions working in collaborative effort behind a common goal increasingly rival or even exceed the influence of state actors as evidenced in relief efforts for Typhoon Haiyan wherein civil society fundraising coalitions outpaced

the contributions of national governments in many wealthy industrialized countries (GHA 2014).

The phenomenon of INGO coalition-building has emerged over time. Coalition building and collaborative efforts among civil society organizations is certainly not a new phenomenon as evidenced by the founding of such organizations as the World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations in 1855, the International Veterinary Congress in 1863, the International Federation of Metal Workers Organizations in 1893 or perhaps more famously the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 1919 (Ritchie 1995). However, the scope and frequency of international cooperation among CSOs/NGOs and between the latter and other elements of civil society, business and government has expanded in recent decades.

Organizations with common interests and policy goals may find their level of influence and the likelihood of success in influencing policy is greater if they undertake a combined effort or at least present the public image of a united front. For example, in the area of development CSO/NGO coalitions have been formulated behind the idea that policy reforms are critical for increasing visibility and public access to the decision-making process and for promoting alternative strategies (Udall 1998). Variations exist concerning the exact organization and structure of CSO/NGO coalitions, and they make take the form of---ranging from most-to-least formally organized: umbrella organizations, networks, or caucuses (Willetts 1996). Entities such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, which counts over 1,000 individual CSOs/NGOs as members, are referred to as umbrella organizations in order to denote the presence within one broad

framework of a variety of different organizations in formal, long-term association that nonetheless maintain distinct identities and governance. Issue-based CSO/NGO networks such as the prototype International Baby Foods Action Network, made up of nearly 300 autonomous groups in 168 countries, are less formal in their organizational structure than umbrella organizations and may be organized behind the goal of exchanging information, mobilizing supporters, or coordinating combined efforts (Ibid). The least formally integrated variant among transnational CSO/NGO partnerships is a caucus, wherein a group of organizations unite on a more short-term basis essentially as lobbyists at a particular international event such as a UN conference in an effort to achieve specific objectives at the event, after which the association will customarily dissolve (Ibid). An example of the latter is the Youth Caucus at the 2016 UN DPI/NGO Conference in Korea.

Balanced, egalitarian and harmonious partnerships within coalitions can be difficult to establish and maintain given sometimes significant differences in agendas, culture, influence, political and ideological background, and power that can exist and serve as centrifugal forces between different organizations (Brown and Fox 1998). The latter problems become compounded as the size, diversity and range of issues with which an CSO/NGO coalition may be dealing expand. As the result of such complexities, such coalitions can be fluid in terms of their dynamic and composition and they commonly dissolve, with many never intended to be more than a temporary alliance for a common cause.

Concepts of Pluralism and Democratization

Within the context of analyzing democracy, the concept of pluralism is associated with a school of thought in liberal political science that focused upon multiple sources of political power/input and that regarded democracy as the internal regulation of society via competition among various groups over power and social privileges (Dahl 1956).

Attempts to characterize pluralism usually share the core view that what is desirable and egalitarian about democratic systems is that their functioning cannot be reduced to any single hierarchy or idea (Karppinen 2013). The epistemological foundation of pluralism within democratic institutions is the concept that diversity in all its forms is a social and political good that safeguards against the dominance of one particular agenda (Smith 2006, 21–22). Karppinen (2013, 30) states that “premised on the impossibility of unambiguously establishing truth, right or good, especially in social and political affairs, pluralism has been widely celebrated as the cornerstone of the liberal conception of democracy.” Pluralism within transnational civil society is also often regarded as a potentially important vehicle for the transmission of global norms, including those related to democracy and human rights (Edwards 2009).

Within pluralist concepts, a distinction exists between liberal pluralists who tend to stress rights-oriented issues such as protection and inclusion of minorities and participatory or deliberative democracy pluralists who emphasize public empowerment through voting and other participative processes (Cohen and Arato 1997). Pluralism’s importance to democracy may be viewed in slightly different terms by the two camps. For liberal pluralists the “marketplace of ideas and individual choice” is sacrosanct,

whereas for deliberative democrats pluralism is a catalyst for improving the “epistemic quality of public deliberation and discursive reconciliation of disagreement” (Karppinen 2013, 29). Galston (2002, 3) notes that liberal pluralists support the minimum conditions for maintenance of public order such as rule of law and authorities that can enforce it. As he elaborates on some of the core tenants of liberal pluralism, it’s relevance to the UN dynamic is clear...

Liberal pluralists...also endorse “minimal universalism”, the moral and practical necessity of organizing public life so as to ward off, to the greatest extent possible, the great evils of the human condition such as tyranny, genocide, cruelty and humiliation, mass starvation and deadly epidemics. This overlaps with contemporary movements for universal human rights and provision of basic needs.

Political pluralism can be interpreted to mean different things in different contexts. Some conceptions of pluralism on a global scale regard it essentially as an egalitarian collaboration for mutual interest, such as---for the purposes of this research---diversifying voices which can be heard at the UN in pursuit of increased opportunity for input and oversight within international governance. Exploring the latter perspective, Verweij (2011, 201) states that “pluralism postulates that the world system is not made up of dependencies between unequal parties, but rather of voluntarily created interdependencies that are to the benefit of most actors involved.” As he further elaborates, his vision of global pluralism as a cooperative framework evokes parallels to the fundamental principles of neorealism:

The enormous growth of transnational trade, services, investment, travel, and education increasingly ties together the fortunes and interests of non-state, but also of governmental actors. In the forever changing and partially interwoven ‘cobwebs’ of economic, financial, and social relations that are thus created, political power is increasingly diffused among a multitude of state and non-state actors (Verweij 2011, 201-202).

One of the core concepts important to pluralism and its relationship to democratic institutions is the issue of power, specifically how power is distributed and shared. The objective of egalitarian balance within democratic institutions is achieved via power and influence being distributed among widely diverse and often competing interest groups (Held 2006). Such a balance will not necessarily reflect perfect equilibrium or pluralism in its ideal form, as certain elements within a polyarchical dynamic may often wield more power and influence than others. In fact, it may be naïve to dismiss the existence of elites within a political dynamic in favor of a purist vision of pluralism in that within even the most democratic societies or institutions some elements (e.g. people, interest groups) will always exert more influence and control than others (Lindblom 2002; Schattschneider 1975). The latter reality does not necessarily preclude the existence of pluralism as a phenomenon, but instead potentially reframes the nature of pluralism (“elite pluralism”) within democratic systems as a process wherein diverse elements are given voice and opportunity to pursue equilibrium---even if perfect equilibrium within a power dynamic is not achieved (Blokland 2016).

Considerable differences of opinion exist as to the nature of power and how it is distributed. While a constructivist perspective may regard power and its distribution among various elements competing for it as being a more fluid process, the structuralist perspective may contend that power distributions are resilient and long-term or permanent in nature, possessing a tendency to remain at least largely with traditionally dominant elements (e.g. states). Within pluralist traditions, no single source is regarded as having a complete monopoly and concomitantly, some degree of distribution of power must exist. Such a distribution could exist also in terms of the dichotomy of potential power as opposed to actual power, as many pluralists contend that potential power commonly transcends actual power wielded and that merely having the realistic potential to exert power and influence reflects pluralistic, egalitarian distribution at least to some degree. Keck and Sikkink (1998, 95) argue that CSOs within a transnational arena can exhibit any of four distinct types of political power: information politics---the supply/movement of information, symbolic politics---i.e. claim-making using symbols or actions, leverage politics---ability to call upon influential political actors, and accountability politics---i.e. ability to hold IOs accountable (Thiel 2017).

With regard to this research, the degree to which CSOs/NGOs in formal association with the UN have actually contributed to pluralism and transnational democracy is called into question. Within the UN-civil society dynamic, specifically the ECOSOC consultative status program with CSOs/NGOs, there does not appear to be a distribution of power (actual or potential) inclusive of CSOs as UN-member states retain largely monopolistic control---agenda setting, policy formulation, oversight, etc. As

noted in the study's first research questions, uneven patterns of participation may exist in terms of regional representation and also with regard to policy issues focus areas, meaning not all regions or issue areas may be proportionally represented via civil society presence within the UN framework. Specifically, the formal pathway between CSOs/NGOs and UN-ECOSOC, the most meaningful manifestation of UN interaction with transnational civil society thus far cultivated, may exist more in name and idea rather than practice, in which case the program's contribution to democratic pluralism at the UN has fallen short of initial expectations.

Concepts of Transnational Democracy

Democracy has become a key concept among those who advocate increased legitimacy for international political institutions, but defining a vision of transnational democracy is a subjective process (Nasstrom 2010). As a concept or system, democracy is not constrained to any one level of government, but is to be found in the juxtaposition of a multiplicity of self-governing and self-organizing entities constituted on diverse spatial scales from the local to the global (Agne 2010; McGrew 2002). Perhaps the central idea underlying democracy is that it is rule by the people, or more narrowly---rule by a polity, which poses difficulties in democratizing international governance institutions such as the UN as there is no single polity or body of people from which to establish a democracy (Nasstrom 2010). Echoing the latter sentiment, Bartelson (2010, 218) states that "global political authority is relatively weak and decentralized, and the pluralistic makeup of global society has conspired against the formation of a global

demos that could provide global institutions with the kind of legitimacy that derives from popular consent.” Legitimacy within the context of political institutions, transnational or otherwise, reflects the popular recognition as rightful by those over whom the institution claims to possess authority (Bartelsen 2010; Reus-Smit 2007). Describing the efforts of CSOs/NGOs to influence transnational development organizations and other IGOs, potentially including roles as legitimizing agents, Udall (1998, 391) describes the primary goal as the promotion of “democracy and development alternatives that are socially just and environmentally sound.”

Whether or not IGOs such as the UN can or should be models of democratic norms in every respect is one of the key political controversies in the current age of globalism (Agne 2010). Some scholars have argued that expectations for democratic traditions at the transnational level are a given and that they are intrinsically useful and necessary in global politics and can help frame and reinforce democratic societal norms and expectations for state-level democratic traditions (Bohman 2007). Archibugi (2008) contends that while most benefits of democracy can perhaps be more readily experienced at the national or local level, the principles of democracy should not stop at the level of international governance, particularly in the loosely governed, yet increasingly interconnected global society of today which impacts people’s lives to such a degree. He argues that even if a perfectly democratic transnational system cannot be achieved, it is possible to grant global public opinion a greater role---certainly extending beyond just that of western nations---in order to increase the legitimacy of world political arenas, and

potentially address many problems facing the world while still allowing for the self-determination and sovereignty of nations (Ibid).

While at face value the prospect of increased democracy within transnational institutions sounds wholly positive, innocuous and free of controversy, the concept can be problematic. Issues related to even the partial transfer of sovereignty from state to transnational institutions remain highly controversial and politically charged, even galvanizing public opinion as witnessed recently when a majority of British voters opted out of the EU principally over the real or perceived process of national sovereignty potentially being eroded via a transnational entity, with similar national-sovereignty movements growing in other EU member states as well. Yet, eroding or replacing state sovereignty in favor of some variation of a global liberal democratic body is not the only pathway of furthering increased democratic pluralism within the international community (Agne 2010). Addressing this, Agne (2010, 178) explains:

From a different perspective, democratization of global politics is neither driven nor constituted by governments but by voluntary associations of individuals who act within and beyond their national boundaries and with a significant degree of independence from governments...Exactly what actors should be regarded as fulfilling the criteria of voluntary association is a matter of debate. All observers include NGOs and social movements. Some also include private companies, labor unions, and philanthropic foundations.

Shortcomings of CSOs/NGOs in Maintaining Productive Relationships with the UN/IGOs

Sandel (2000) notes that if the increasingly globalized character of contemporary world economics and politics needs more transnational forms of governance, it remains unclear whether international forums, civil society or otherwise, can inspire the shared identity, allegiance or commonality of perspectives upon which democratic transnational governance would depend. The concept of a truly global civil society as opposed to a patchwork of disparate, competing groups reflective of contrasting national and regional agendas may in fact not be realizable in the short-term via the UN or other IGOs as catalysts. Sandel (2000, 289) discusses the difficulty inherent in forging such a global integration within the context of what is arguably the most successful supranationalistic body to date, stating that “even the European Union, one of the most successful experiments in supranational governance, has so far failed to cultivate a (true) common European identity sufficient to fully support its mechanisms of economic and political integration.” Similarly, Thiel (2011) concludes that the transnational political space/culture of the EU is to a great degree limited, often containing significant constraints such as nationalistic agendas that impede the emergence of a truly consolidated and transnational European identity.

The roles to potentially be played by CSOs/NGOs within international institutions and the justifications for such organizations to be given access remain subject to debate. While a common perception exists within the arena of international governance that states and IGOs can benefit from utilizing civil society in roles such as policy experts,

providers of services, and compliance monitors, knowledge of the effectiveness of CSOs/NGOs related to each of the latter and the complex variables related to such roles remains tenuous at best (Tallberg 2010). Considerable question exists concerning the legitimate, effective impact of CSOs/NGOs within the UN and other transnational bodies. For example, in assessing the impact of civil society advocacy campaigns, including some high profile initiatives, upon projects related to development within the World Bank, Fox and Brown (1998, 534-535) concluded their collective impact was negligible and amounted to little more than “window dressing.”

Rational-choice institutionalism and the proposition that institutions are created or integrated to address shortcomings or improve functional efficiency within a system may offer potential insight as to the possible motives of governments and IGOs in collaborating with civil society institutions (Tallberg 2010). In offering a well-formulated rational functionalist account seeking to justify CSO/NGO involvement in international or state governance, Raustiala (1997, 719) argues that “rather than undermining state sovereignty, active NGO participation enhances the abilities of states to regulate globally...(and) the empirical pattern of NGO participation has been structured across time and policy areas to reap those gains.” Governments and IGOs that potentially see benefit to be derived (whether real or perceived) from direct, formal associations with CSOs/NGOs may pursue such arrangements out of self-interest rather than altruism or ideological commitment. Accordingly, many government and IGOs may not be engaging global civil society behind the goals of furthering pluralism or democracy-building but because they regard such organizations as having something they

need (O'Brien et al 2000). International institutions may be to a great degree the outcomes of strategic choices made by state actors in response to needs/problems related to issues such as transaction costs and problems of monitoring and enforcement (Deitelhoff 2009; Kalm 2010).

Other theoretical perspectives regard emerging transnational norm conformity rather than intrinsic self-interest as primary motivating factors for increased NGO and civil society access to international governance. In short, more IGOs are in general granting CSOs/NGOs access to their institutional processes out of the perception that this is a newly standardized norm and expectation within the framework of transnational politics that such actions bolster democratic legitimacy. Within the field of international relations, such an approach is supported by sociological institutionalism and constructivism which focus upon processes of norm diffusion and institutional replication as catalysts for construction and spread of international norms. Addressing such processes, Tallberg (2010, 50-51) explains:

This norm conceives of NGOs as representatives of an emerging global civil society, whose organized participation can address the democratic deficits of traditional international institutions. States and institutions have either come to adopt this through socialization, or adapted strategically to it for purposes of legitimizing existing governance structures. The norm originates from various sources: international law, development ideology, normative democratic theory, and domestic political structures. This approach predicts that practices of transnational access will become increasingly homogeneous, with extant

differences explained by variation in the spread and consolidation of the norm of global participatory democracy.

It is likely that many different theoretical perspectives are at least partly applicable in attempting to explain growing civil society influence within transnational governance. As intergovernmental organizations have become more prevalent and have grown in power and influence, many including the UN have arguably become increasingly sensitive to perception and criticism related to the need for democratic norms to be institutionalized and accordingly, the theories espoused by sociological institutionalism and constructivism in terms of CSOs/NGOs at least partly addressing a democratic deficit are not without merit. However, participation of civil society or other non-state actors within IGOs is significantly older than relatively recent concerns regarding the democratic traditions of global or regional governance (Charnovitz 1997; White 1968). If the UN or other IGOs can more efficiently distribute aid or provide other services, or receive worthwhile expertise or something else of potential benefit through associations with CSOs/NGOs---which is almost certainly the case in at least many instances---then rational-choice institutionalism is also at least partly applicable in explaining the phenomenon.

A range of other considerations may also have played at least some role in the trending associations between IGOs and civil society, some of which examine the motivations of civil society rather than governments or IGOs. For example, if certain political decisions are increasingly made and policy increasingly formulated in transnational settings superseding the state, it is reasonable to expect CSOs/NGOs with

vested interests to pursue status as transnational actors as well in order to have a voice at that level of decision-making (Steffek 2010). Also, it has been theorized that under certain circumstances CSOs/NGOs might seek to directly engage with IGOs to sidestep a national government that is either repressive toward them or otherwise not responsive to the needs or interests of the organization (Steffek 2010; Keck and Sikkink 1998). As an additional example of processes driving CSOs/NGOs to seek standing in the transnational arena, it has been suggested that many civil society actors are not necessarily autonomous actors and are dependent upon their environments and actors within their orbits for resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Resource-dependency theory contends that NGOs or other organizations depend upon economic, material or political resources which they obtain from actors within their environment and thus interaction with actors is necessary, as is the expansion of the parameters of the environment to the international arena in order to pursue additional resources (Liese 2010).

Many observers believe that at present CSOs/NGOs may have grown their scope, status and responsibilities beyond the realistic limits of their operational capabilities (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; Thompson 2008). Increasingly, questions have been raised concerning the roles for which CSOs/NGOs are suited to play, to whom they should be accountable and where they fit within the structures of governance locally, nationally and internationally (Jordan and Tuijl 2006). One of the highest profile and harshest public critics of the expanded role of CSOs/NGOs within the international arena is John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the United Nations, who has expressed misgivings concerning the “extra-national clout of NGOs” within global governance and concern that “civil

society sees itself as beyond national politics”, which is one of the reasons its recent successes have such profoundly anti-democratic implications (Bolton 2000; Charnovitz 2006). In analyzing Bolton’s staunch opposition to the integration of NGOs within international governance, Charnovitz (2006, 24-25) notes that...

The problem as analyzed by Bolton is that NGO participation ‘provides a second opportunity for intrastate advocates to reargue their positions, thus advantaging them over their opponents who may be either unwilling or unable to reargue their cases in international fora’. Moreover, he contended that ‘the civil society idea actually suggests a “corporative” (authoritarian corporatism) approach to international decision-making that is dramatically troubling for democratic philosophy because it posits “interests” (whether NGOs or businesses) as legitimate actors along with the popularly elected governments’...Bolton does not advocate suppressing NGOs, but he seems to want government (and the UN) to shut its eyes to them.

While few criticisms of the expanded role of CSOs/NGOs go as far as the latter analogy to corporatist agendas, other critical appraisals have been offered. McKeon (2009, 2) argues that the problem does not lie with the trend of growing influence of such organizations within international governance---regarding the latter trend as a potentially positive development for democratic traditions---but rather that such integration has fallen short of expectations. She states that civil society’s influence within the UN and other IGOs has “failed thus far to move from generic and often episodic participation to

meaningful incorporation of these actors into global political process.” Thompson (2008) notes that although the number of CSOs/NGOs active within the global arena including the UN has expanded greatly in recent decades, it remains unclear that their ability to actually influence agendas and outcomes is significant or has kept pace with their expanding numbers.

The very success of the expanding numbers and diversity of NGOs and international civil society is potentially creating a logistical dilemma. Just within the framework of the United Nations, the presence of literally thousands of CSOs/NGOs with consultative status and thousands more with less formal affiliations, each potentially vying for influence and promoting its agendas, has brought diversity to the international arena but simultaneously made many logistical considerations more cumbersome and problematic including making it increasingly difficult for states, IGOs and other actors to decide which voices they will listen to and making it more difficult for each CSO/NGO to provide input (Thompson 2008).

Another issue receiving critical scrutiny from some observers is the inconsistent and often contradictory manner in which different types of actors are treated within the organizational dynamic. Exploring the harsher scrutiny faced by civil society in vetting and regulatory processes as opposed to treatment afforded to commercial interests McKeon (2009, 171) cites the following contrasting circumstances occurring during a recent conference of the Rome-based UN Food and Agriculture Organization:

...Few absurdities in the way the UN works are more flagrant than the zeal that is invested in vetting and policing CSOs as compared with the relative

indifference to the antics of representatives of transnational corporations...A delegation member of a highly respected NGO was carried off to be interrogated by the Italian police for passing notes around inviting delegations to refrain from electing the US to the FAO Council following the invasion of Iraq. At the same time, the transnational sugar lobby conducted itself outrageously in a FAO technical committee, attempting to purchase developing country votes and intervening in a heavy-handed way in the discussions. Yet no disciplinary action was taken.

The NGO consultative status program with ECOSOC has long been a politicized process and many examples exist of political machinations and controversy within the system. During the Cold War a number of international CSOs/NGOs including several labor organizations became sympathetic to the Soviet Union leading to internal dissent and to many pro-western elements within the groups to calve off and form their own rival organizations with the backing of western governments (Willetts 1999). From the inception, political problems have arisen with CSOs/NGOs that offer criticisms of the governments of specific (often authoritarian) states, usually related to human rights issues. Traditionally, the ensuing response of states to the latter has been to deny the right of IOs or other external actors to interfere in their sovereign affairs and also to denounce CSOs/NGOs and the UN's NGO system in general (Willetts 1999). Currently, the UN is caught between a past tradition of international governance by sovereign state actors and the emerging need for transnational governance incorporating CSOs/NGOs

and other non-state actors on an equitable basis and thus far it has been unable to integrate the two competing paradigms cohesively (McKeon 2009).

The second and third research questions inquire as to why some organizations with UN consultative status participate in the program and others do not, and what factors account for participation or the lack thereof. The answers to the latter questions may shed light on the processes regulating the association between CSOs/NGOs and the UN and also the degree to which it is equitable, egalitarian and as such a catalyst for democratic pluralism within international governance or conversely if obstacles to meaningful participation are unevenly distributed among types of NGOs, policy areas, or world regions. The survey component of the research in particular may shed light on how and why many CSOs/NGOs fall short of making meaningful contributions through their association with the UN.

Credibility Issues

An interesting dichotomy also exists concerning CSOs/NGOs and issues related to legitimacy or trust. In one sense, CSOs/NGOs are held in high regard. For example, the 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer found that such organizations were the most trusted institutions globally, while confidence in elected officials, government institutions and business was significantly lower and continuing to decline (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; ETB 2014). However, many scholars are calling for reappraisals and increasingly challenging the status and legitimacy afforded to CSOs/NGOs which ostensibly hold governments and other entities accountable within transnational regimes but often fall

short of substantive accountability themselves (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; Peruzzotti 2006; Jordan and Tuijl 2006).

A curious dichotomy is also visible with the concept of CSOs/NGOs helping to facilitate democratic norms within international organizations such as the UN. An expanded and formalized presence of civil society allows a larger number and more diverse array of voices to potentially be heard and hopefully adds to the perspectives contributed by state actors and the commercial sector. This role of civil society as a catalyst for democracy within international institutions is arguably its most important role in that it at least potentially affords a voice to the grassroots and concomitantly strengthens democracy and international policy formulation through advocacy (Clark 2008). However, NGOs and other manifestations of civil society pose governance concerns in that many, possibly most, are not strictly democratic, have oligarchical, charismatic, unelected (by popular vote) or largely unaccountable leadership with limited membership and participatory rights---many of the same undemocratic characteristics that civil society criticizes and seeks to reform if found within government (Albrow and Holland 2008).

In the 1980s continuing into much of the 1990s, the burgeoning number and strength of NGOs and civil society in general was lauded as symptomatic of the advancement of democracy and strengthening of pluralism via the perception that voices were being given to larger numbers and more diverse segments of populations and such a view was especially true of regions such as Eastern Europe that had historically been characterized by authoritarian rule. Many aid donors also started to view CSOs/NGOs as

more reliable, capable and honest aid recipients than governmental entities, particularly in regions associated with autocratic, unstable, or corrupt histories (Armstrong 2006). Even if NGOs/CSOs did not have popularly elected leadership or otherwise had much if any accountability their growth was initially equated with the advancement of pluralistic democracy. Addressing this evolving perceptual trend and its eventual revision, Peruzzotti (2006, 43) explains:

For many years, particularly when those organizations largely operated in authoritarian environments, the issue of the representativeness and accountability of civic actors could easily be brushed aside given the illegitimate nature of many domestic governments and the continuous threat they presented to any form of social activity that dared to challenge and expose their abuses of power and human rights. However, the increased presence of democratically-elected governments in developing countries makes it difficult to keep avoiding an analysis of the relationship between civil society actors and representative institutions.

By the late-1990s, among many nations that had long-established democratic traditions and increasingly among emerging democracies constructing the institutional frameworks of freedom, the perception that NGOs were hallmarks of democracy or that they were the voices of the people was being increasingly challenged. Elected officials in particular began to increasingly question the popular perception of CSOs/NGOs as democratic institutions, as representatives of populations or even appreciable segments thereof, and in the case being made by many NGOs and other civil society elements that

their organizations should have voices comparable if not equal to that of elected national governments within transnational institutions including the United Nations. Criticisms centered upon the issues that the organizations are often led by groups of self-appointed rather than popularly-elected leaders, many such organizations are not even membership-based, and many are not often exposed to comparable levels of public scrutiny or accountability as governmental bodies---i.e. the claims of NGOs and civil society to reflect democratic trends fell short with regard to representation and accountability (Peruzzotti 2006). Whereas within representative democracy elected officials are the primary architects of policy formulation and decision-making, there is no real means of ensuring that CSOs/NGOs represent their constituencies and as the result legitimacy issues can be raised (Kroger 2013).

Democratic Representation

The study of representation within democratic institutions has primarily focused upon the political input of individual citizen voters (e.g. Przeworski et al 1999).

However, the importance of civil society should not be discounted, as a representative government presumes a meaningful interaction between the system of governance and various manifestations of those represented (Peruzzotti 2006, 44-45). Peruzzotti (2006, 47) argues that both representation and accountability can be enhanced by civil society in two respects:

First, civil society enhances representative government by adding new voices and concerns to the political agenda, thematizing novel issues, and

criticizing existing public policies and legislation. Second, civil society can also contribute to improve the quality of representative arrangements by demanding effective legal accountability.

Accountability can be thought of as the “ability to ensure that officials are answerable for their behavior in the sense of being forced to inform and justify their decisions and of being eventually sanctioned for those decisions (Peruzzotti 2006, 45).” Similarly, Paul (1992, 1047) defines accountability as “holding individuals and organizations responsible for performance.” Both definitions were framed principally with public officials in mind, which begs the question as to how or if a private, autonomous CSO/NGO can be subject to accountability standards deemed suitable for public agencies.

If accountability is by its very nature an externality in that it requires a capacity for control by elements not part of the body being held accountable, then improved accountability and transparency on the part of CSOs/NGOs could perhaps best be achieved via the vehicle of internal and external reporting requirements (Armstrong 2006; Mulgan 2000). In addition to heightened expectations for self-regulation, the World Bank and other IGOs have supported the practice of CSOs/NGOs reporting to government agencies and donors concerning their finances and activities, and also extending the right for legitimate government inspectors to enter the premises of such an organization or site(s) under its control to check conditions and inspect records, even at random (Ibid). In many countries such as Uganda or the Philippines, both CSOs/NGOs and governments are perceived to have roles in ensuring accountability via formal

oversight (Okwaare and Chapman 2006). For example, an outcome of the inspection and oversight process is that some form of official designation such as the certification of an organization being in “good standing” may be conveyed, indicating the legitimate status of the group and its conformity with accountability practices to donors and others (Golub 2006).

In addition to their own accountability, NGOs and other civil society organizations can potentially make substantive contributions as agents of accountability and change within government, including transnational institutions. By monitoring and denouncing rights violations or the subvention of the law or due process, and also via facilitating efforts to improve the procedures and agencies that frame and regulate the conduct of government or the commercial sector, organs of civil society can strengthen and often activate vehicles of legal accountability. Historically IGOs have asserted that they derive accountability from the governments of member states, which at least in the case of democratic nations have citizens which elect governments to represent their interests at all levels including international forums and thus citizens are represented indirectly with their national governments retaining ultimate control of representation (Kovach 2006).

Theory and Reality

Many of the goals of democratic pluralism within the context of transnational governance are potentially admirable. Such objectives include giving voices to marginalized peoples, issues and regions that may not otherwise receive attention

internationally, the diversification of international agenda setting and discourse beyond the traditionally state-centric approach, and the facilitation of communication and collaborative effort within global civil society. The practical realization of such objectives as theorized in the literature would indeed serve to democratize, diversify and concomitantly lend additional legitimacy to transnational governance in general and the operations of IGOs such as the United Nations.

However, it is my contention that such goals have not been fully realized. Despite the commonly-held perception of the UN's interaction with NGOs and global civil society as a successful manifestation of the principles of democratic pluralism within transnational governance, the realities of the relationship may in many respects fall short. The guiding hypotheses of this research contend that: (1) imbalances (gaps) exist regarding CSO/NGO participation with the UN both in terms of regional involvement and with regard to policy areas; (2) a combination of various factors facilitate varied degrees of participation or the lack thereof among different CSOs/NGOs; and (3) although a formal association may exist officially, most organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC make little-no contribution to the UN's goal of substantive engagement with pluralist international civil society.

III. CHAPTER 3:

MACRO-SCALE PATTERNS OF CSO/NGO PARTICIPATION WITHIN UN-ECOSOC

Introduction

The first 2 research questions inquire as to (1) the patterns of participation of NGOs/CSOs in the UN-ECOSOC consultative status (CS) program in terms of the proportionality of country and regional representation, and (2) the patterns of participation and proportional representation in terms of policy issue/focus areas such as human rights, development, etc. These questions led to the formulation of the first guiding hypothesis which contends that imbalances exist in patterns of participation of organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC with regard to country/regional involvement (e.g. CSOs of developed states are proportionally better represented than those of developing states) and regarding the policy issue areas with which the organizations are concerned. The UN's publicly available iCSO database provides detailed statistics concerning the names and types of organizations in the CS program, their locations, policy/focus areas, and level of CS accreditation. The latter datasets were used to operationalize the first guiding hypothesis.

Between June-September 2016, the United Nation's iCSO database was analyzed to identify macro-scale patterns of participation on the part of civil society organizations at the UN, with a focus upon CS organizations within ECOSOC. The following four broad data categorizations were analyzed: (1) organization type; (2) geographical

scope/scale of organizations; (3) types of formal UN accreditations held; and (4) policy/focus areas primarily as evidenced via database categorizations of fields of expertise. To identify spatial patterns such as geographical plurality, each of the latter four categories was cross-referenced with six world regions: Africa, Anglo-America (the US and Canada), Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Oceania (essentially-Australia and New Zealand). The iCSO database also has a category indicating “no region specified”, but as the numbers for the latter appeared to in most cases be negligible and in any event would not contribute to understanding spatial patterns, data in the latter category was not analyzed. Each of the four categories was also cross-referenced with the accreditation levels (General, Special, Roster) of NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC as the latter organizations are in theory the most important vehicle for formal UN interaction with civil society and as such the most important focus of the research.

It is worth noting that the data provided in the UN iCSO database is fluid in that it appears to be updated on at least a monthly basis, if not even more frequently in some instances. This of course means that the statistics obtained from the database may vary somewhat from month to month as some organizations are removed for inactivity or perhaps more commonly, newly affiliated organizations are added on an ongoing basis throughout the year. An example of the fluid and ever-changing nature of the information provided by the database can be seen in terms of the breakdown of NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC. As reflected in Table 3.1, the number of NGOs by accreditation level and in total varied over the three separate occasions (July, October,

and November) in 2016 when the database was consulted, though the variations were not great. Given the volume of information and the time-consuming nature of obtaining these data, it was not possible that all data for each category could be extracted at the same moment, but rather data was obtained progressively over the course of several weeks---principally between July and October 2016. Accordingly, slight numerical incongruities may exist among data sets gathered across categories from one month to the next.

Such variations are not thought to have had any significant impact upon this research, merely anchoring the findings or research procedures to the iCSO data reflecting a particular month or other point in time as would also be the case in most any other research-related undertaking. For example---with regard to sample selection, as noted in Chapter 1, of 4,601 CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status in August 2016, 4,383 (95.3%) were identified within the iCSO database as speaking English at least as one of several languages. In alphabetical order, all 4,383 organizations were numbered consecutively in the same order as they were listed within the database. The online resource www.stattek.com was utilized to generate 439 random, non-duplicated numbers which served as the basis for the 10% sample selection in the research. Beginning with analysis of types of organizations, subsequent sections provide overviews of findings with regard to those randomly selected CSOs/NGOs which returned survey questionnaires.

Table 3.1: Organizations in Consultative Status with UN ECOSOC, 2016

Accreditation Level	July	October	November
General Status	144 (3.2%)	147 (3.1%)	151 (3.2%)
Special Status	3437 (75.4%)	3572 (76%)	3595 (75.9%)
Roster Status	979 (21.5%)	986 (21%)	993 (20.9%)
Total	4560	4705	4739

Types of Organizations

The UN's iCSO database establishes 15 organizational categories according to typology, as listed in Table 3.2. At the time these data were tabulated for the research (August-September 2016), a total of 39,329 entries existed for *Organization Type* within the iCSO database. Many organizations were subjectively classified and cross-listed among multiple, partially-overlapping categories. For example an NGO providing university scholarships or otherwise promoting academic advancement for indigenous people could potentially be categorized under the organizational typologies *Academics*, *Indigenous*, and (the oddly broad category of) *NGOs* among others.

Adding to the subjective nature of organizational classification within the database is the delimitation of what is or is not an NGO. While just over 72% of entries were officially classified as being NGOs, it appears that the vast majority (in excess of 90%) of organizations listed by organizational type meet most definitional criteria as non-governmental organizations. Of the 15 categories utilized for organization type, perhaps

the best examples of non-NGO typologies include *IGOs* (0.9%), *Local Government* (0.6%), *Media* (0.4%), and *Private Sector* (1.8%), which collectively only comprise 3.7% of total entries listed. Most of the latter organizational classifications would also strain to meet even the broadest and most inclusive definitional criteria as to what constitutes civil society institutions despite being listed in the UN database of international civil society organizations.

Considerable range existed in terms of numbers of entries corresponding to each of the 15 organizational typologies. As reflected in Tables 3.2-3.4, the organizational types with the largest number of entries were *NGOs* (28,361 entries or 72.2% of all entries), *Indigenous* (2,385 or 6.1%), *Associations* (2,287 or 5.8%), *Academics* (1,389 or 3.5%), and *Foundations* (1,126 or 2.9%). Of the latter, the categories of *NGOs*, *Associations*, and *Foundations* collectively make up nearly 81% of all entries yet due to the lack of any clear definitional criteria used by the UN to distinguish between them (and other categories as well), substantial overlap and subjectivity exists among organizational typologies. The latter reality, in effect limits the potential usefulness of the data/findings in this category, blurring the distinctions among different types of organizations, and making it difficult to assess variations and possible unevenness among types of organizations---e.g. most/all organizations classified as *Ageing*, *Foundations*, *Indigenous*, are likely *NGOs* in scope. Classifications with the fewest number of entries were *Local Governments* (225 or 0.6%), *Media* (172 or 0.4%), *Cooperatives* (128 or 0.3%), *Ageing* (118 or 0.3%), with *Trade Unions* having the least number of entries (88

or 0.2%). Collectively, entries for the latter 5 categories constituted only 1.8% of organizations classified by typology.

One of the more interesting patterns revealed from analysis of the iCSO database is the relatively modest representation of NGOs/CSOs actually holding consultative status (CS) with UN-ECOSOC among the total number of organizational entries. The latter affiliation program is regarded as the most substantive and formal vehicle for UN interaction with international civil society. However among organizational typology entries, organizations with consultative status are disproportionately under-represented and comprise only small fractions of the entries. As of October 2016, of 39,329 institutional entries according to organization type, only 4,705, slightly less than 12% of the total entries, corresponded to those holding consultative status. In only 2 categories--NGOs and Foundations---did entries related to consultative status organizations reach even low double digits as a percentage of total organizations listed in the iCSO database. As reflected in the data provided in Table 3.2, in many individual categories NGOs/CSOs holding CS comprised a negligible fraction of the total institutional entries by organizational type: Cooperatives 3.1%, Academics 2.3%, Indigenous 2.3%, Institutions 1.3%, Private Sector 1.3%, IGOs 1.1%, Media 0.6%, and Local Government 0.0%. If the assumption can be made that those NGOs with CS are customarily among the civil society institutions most actively engaged with the UN (a perception furthered by the UN itself), a possible implication of this numerical underrepresentation within the iCSO database is that many of the nearly 40 thousand entries are for organizations that in reality may not be engaged with the UN to any substantive degree contrary to what an

organization's listing within the database may imply. The latter perception is bolstered by the presence within the iCSO database of many organizations that have previously been stripped of CS due to inactivity, including several NGOs with which I am personally familiar and that to the best of my knowledge have never had any substantive form of interaction with the UN before or after removal of consultative status.

Table 3.2: iCSO Database Entries - Organizational Type and UN Consultative Status

Org. Type	Overall Total (%)	General Status	Special Status	Roster Status (CS Total/%)
Academics	1389 (3.5%)	1	31	0 (32/2.3%)
Associations	2287 (5.8%)	1	171	5 (177/7.7%)
Disability	731 (1.9%)	0	49	0 (49/6.7%)
Foundation	1126 (2.9%)	3	113	1 (117/10.4%)
Indigenous	2385 (6.1%)	1	53	0 (54/2.3%)
Institution	395 (1.0%)	0	5	0 (5/1.3%)
I.G.O.	355 (0.9%)	0	3	1 (4/1.1%)
Local Govt.	255 (0.6%)	0	0	0 (0/0%)
Media	172 (0.4%)	0	1	0 (1/0.6%)
N.G.O.	28361(72.2%)	138	3108	978 (4224/14.9%)
Others	819 (2.1%)	0	13	0 (13/1.6%)
Private Sector	720 (1.8%)	0	9	0 (9/1.3%)
Trade Union	88 (0.2%)	0	5	1 (6/6.8%)
Ageing	118 (0.3%)	1	9	0 (10/8.5%)
Cooperative	128 (0.3%)	2	2	0 (4/3.1%)
Totals:	39329	147	3572	986 (4705/12.0%)

Table 3.3: iCSO Entries - Organizational Type by MDC (More Developed Countries)
Region

Org. Type	Overall Total (%)*	Europe	Anglo-America**	Oceania***	(MDC Total/%)*
Academics	1389 (3.5%)	260	405	44	(709/51.0%)
Associations	2287 (5.8%)	652	162	45	(859/37.6%)
Disability	731 (1.9%)	95	103	24	(222/30.4%)
Foundation	1126 (2.9%)	231	183	23	(437/38.8%)
Indigenous	2385 (6.1%)	116	430	135	(681/28.6%)
Institution	395 (1.0%)	73	50	9	(132/33.4%)
I.G.O.	355 (0.9%)	116	35	10	(161/45.4%)
Local Govt.	255 (0.6%)	29	21	4	(54/21.2%)
Media	172 (0.4%)	28	27	5	(60/34.9%)
N.G.O.	28361(72.2%)	4126	3922	558	(8606/30.3%)
Others	819 (2.1%)	161	158	18	(337/41.1%)
Private Sector	720 (1.8%)	135	147	21	(303/42.1%)
Trade Union	88 (0.2%)	28	7	4	(39/44.3%)
Ageing	118 (0.3%)	23	24	10	(57/48.3%)
Cooperative	128 (0.3%)	23	24	7	(54/42.2%)
Totals:	39329	6096 (15.5%)	5698 (14.5%)	917(2.3%)	(12711/32.3%)

*Overall totals and percentages include entries for which no region was specified.

**The UN iCSO Database denotes “North America” as 1 of 6 regional categories, but only provides data for the 2-country region of Canada and the United States. The geographically correct term for the Canada/U.S. sub-region of North America is “Anglo America”. The database provides statistics for Mexico and the countries of the Caribbean and Central America---all of which are located on the North American continent---within the regional category “Latin America and the Caribbean”.

***The region known as Oceania is customarily regarded as being comprised of Australia, New Zealand, and numerous Pacific Island microstates and dependencies. Nearly all NGOs identified within the Oceania category of the iCSO database were in either Australia or New Zealand and accordingly data for this region was regarded as representative of MDCs rather than LDCs.

Table 3.4: iCSO Entries: Organizational Type by LDC* Region

Org. Type	Overall Total**	Africa	Asia	Lat. Am. & Carib.	(LDC Total/%**)
Academics	1389	5	233	238	(476/34.3%)
Associations	2287	753	300	375	(1428/62.4%)
Disability	731	171	217	67	(455/62.2%)
Foundation	1126	192	275	221	(688/61.1%)
Indigenous	2385	333	340	472	(1145/48.0%)
Institution	395	62	110	91	(263/66.6%)
I.G.O.	355	85	76	32	(193/54.4%)
Local Govt.	255	44	40	87	(171/67.1%)
Media	172	40	46	25	(111/64.5%)
N.G.O.	28361	7610	6111	1888	(15609/55.0%)
Others	819	132	158	134	(424/51.8%)
Pvt. Sector	720	137	103	169	(409/56.8%)
Trade Union	88	17	17	16	(50/56.8%)
Ageing	118	19	29	13	(61/51.7%)
Cooperative	128	24	28	22	(74/57.8%)
Totals:	39329	9524 (24.2%)	8083 (20.6%)	3850 (9.8%)	(21557/54.8%)

*The terms LDC (Less/Least Developed Countries) and MDC (More Developed Countries) are used in this study to draw a basic distinction between regions characterized predominantly by more highly developed economies as opposed to those primarily characterized by emerging economies. It should be stressed that such distinctions may be at least partly subjective in nature and that homogeneity does not exist within each region concerning development levels. Less developed nations exist within MDC regions (e.g., Moldova in Europe) and many countries within regions broadly classified as predominantly LDC/developing are highly developed (e.g., Japan in Asia). Also, given the rapid economic growth experienced in recent decades by many emerging nations such as China and India, the development status of many historically LDC nations has improved markedly and may be better characterized as gradations between such dichotomous classifications such as MDC vs. LDC or developed vs. developing. However, within regional studies it remains customary to classify Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean as (predominantly) LDC/developing regions and Anglo-America, Europe and Australia/Oceania as (predominantly) MDC regions (e.g. Getis, Bjelland and Getis 2014; Rubenstein 2014).

**Overall totals and percentages include entries for which no region was specified

As reflected in Tables 3.3 through 3.5, the UN's iCSO database contains substantially more entries for organizations headquartered in LDC regions than for historically economically and politically dominant MDC regions. Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean had 9,524, 8,083 and 3,850 database entries respectively and a collective total of 21,457 entries, meaning 62.8% of all region-specific entries (34,168 entries had a regional categorization, several thousand others were categorized as "no region specified") according to organizational type were for entities in predominantly LDC regions. Europe, Anglo-America and Oceania had 6,096, 5,698, and 917 entries respectively for a combined total of 12,711 entries or 37.2% of all regions according to organizational type. It appears that both in terms of total number of entries and percentage of all such entries, LDCs are better represented within the fabric of UN relations with international civil society as reflected in the iCSO database than at any prior point.

It is also worth noting that within the iCSO database categorizations by organizational type, LDC regions have the largest total number of organizations listed in 11 of 15 categories. As reflected in Table 3.4, Asia leads in 6 categories: disability, foundations, institutions, media, ageing, and cooperatives. Latin America and the Caribbean leads in 3 categories: indigenous, local government, and private sector. Africa has the largest number of entries in the 2 categories of associations and NGOs. As is illustrated in Table 3.3, among MDC regions, Europe had the largest number of entries in the categories of associations and IGOs and Anglo America led in number of entries for academics. Oceania, with its comparatively small population, led no category in total

number of entries. The remaining topical category “others” was fairly evenly divided among most world regions.

While such statistics derived from the iCSO database do not address depth or substance of participation, numerically they indicate record *degrees* of parity and plurality between civil society organizations among developed and developing nations and among most world regions. In short, the civil society organizations of developing nations are at least on paper better represented within the UN framework than at any point in history. However it must be noted that complete parity does not exist when compared to proportion of world/regional population. As noted in Table 3.5, the three MDC regions of Anglo-America, Europe and Oceania collectively constitute just 15.3% of the world’s population in 2016 but they are headquarters to 37.2% of all institutional entries by organizational type in the iCSO Database. Conversely, Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean collectively comprise 84.7% of the world’s population but are home to just 62.8% of institutional entries listed in the database. However the latter disparity stems primarily from the acute underrepresentation of CSOs/NGOs from Asia. Although Asia accounts for nearly 60% of the earth’s population it is the host region for only 23.6% of entries listed in the iCSO database by organizational typology. Both Africa and also Latin America and the Caribbean are home to a higher percentage of civil society organizations listed in the iCSO database than they comprise of the world’s population, a trait they share with MDC regions---though Anglo-America, Europe and Oceania possess even more favorable balances of civil society representation in the database relative to their proportion of global population. Such disproportional

Table 3.5: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by World Region

World Region	Number of iCSO Database Entries by Org. Type (%*)	Population of World Region (% of 2016 World Pop.)**
Africa	9,524 (27.9%)	1,216.1 million (16.4%)
Asia	8,083 (23.6%)	4,436.2 million (59.7%)
Anglo America	5,698 (16.7%)	360.5 million (4.9%)
Europe	6,096 (17.8%)	738.8 million (9.9%)
Latin America & Caribbean	3,850 (11.3%)	641.0 million (8.6%)
Oceania	917 (2.7%)	39.9 million (0.5%)
Totals	34,168*	7,432.5 million

*(www.worldometers.info 2016)

*Total and percentages do not include entries for which no region was specified

representation was also found in other categories analyzed in the iCSO database including areas/fields of CSO/NGO expertise.

Areas of Expertise and Fields of Activity

The iCSO database compiles statistics related to the expertise and specialized fields of activity of organizations into 11 categories. Analysis of this dataset was undertaken to help cultivate a clearer understanding of the variations within focus areas of UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs and also as correlated to ECOSOC consultative status as well as to obtain an overview of spatial patterns. The focus was upon identifying macro-scale patterns for each of the 11 categories. Each category provided more specific data

subsets ---for example, the category “Population” further breaks down CSO fields of activity into subsets including international migration, morbidity and mortality, population growth, reproduction among others. However, the large number of subcategories (e.g. 68 specialties related to the category Economic and Social, and 50 for Sustainable Development) associated with each area posed logistical issues in terms of the practicality of the time commitment required for analysis, the inability to easily display findings for all subcategories within the research findings, and the limited value understanding subcategory patterns offered to a study, focused upon macro-scale patterns.

As reflected in Table 3.6, among the 11 categories organized by fields of activity/expertise, the *Economic and Social* category contained the most entries with 18,939 or 23.5% of the total. Entries related to *Social Development* with 14,106 (17.5%), *Sustainable Development* with 14,062 (17.5%), and *Gender Issues/Women* with 11,719 (14.6%) were also well represented within the categorizations, but outside the latter 4 fields, total numbers of entries were considerably more modest. As anticipated, the smallest numbers of entries were associated with the region-specific categories of *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (1,777/2.2%), *New Partnership for Africa’s Development---NEPAD* (2,041/2.5%), and *Peace/Development in Africa* (2,761/3.4%). The smallest number of entries among non-region-specific categories were for *Statistics* with 2,797 (3.5%) and *Financing for Development* with 3,962 (4.9%), reflecting the highly specialized nature of both areas of expertise.

Largely repeating the pattern found with analysis by organizational type, organizations with ECOSOC consultative status comprised small percentages of entries sorted according to fields of activity/expertise. Of 80,440 entries only 11,785 or 14.7% were associated with organizations holding ECOSOC consultative status (CS), principally special status (84.7% of CS-related entries), as indicated in Table 3.6. Representation of CS organizations varied substantially across the 11 categories with entries related to *Economic and Social* issues having the largest---though meager---percentage at 20.2%, followed by *Gender Issues/Women* at 16.4%, and *Sustainable Development* at 13.1%. The smallest percentages of entries associated with organizations holding consultative status were in the region-specific categories *Peace and Development in Africa* at 9.6%, *Conflict Resolution in Africa* at 9.6%, and *NEPAD* (New Partnership for African Development) at 8.1%.

Analysis of iCSO data along regional lines revealed some interesting patterns related to CSO/NGO fields of activity/expertise. As can be seen in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, with 65.7% of the total, LDC regions had the largest number of overall entries and also had the most entries in each of the 11 subcategories. Entries for Asian-based CSOs led in the 4 subcategories *Economic and Social*, *Public Administration*, *Social Development*, and *Statistics*, with entries for African-based CSOs leading in all 7 remaining areas. Among both MDC and LDC regions, entries were most numerous for the 4 subcategories of *Economic and Social*, *Social Development*, *Sustainable Development*, and *Gender Issues/Women*. The subcategories with the smallest number of entries were also the same for both MDC and LDC regions: *Statistics*, and the 3 region-specific subcategories of

Peace/Development in Africa, Conflict Resolution in Africa, and NEPAD. Among MDC regions, Europe had the most entries in 10 of 11 subcategories, with Anglo-America leading in entries related to *Gender Issues/Women* as the lone exception. In all 11 subcategories, Latin America and the Caribbean was in 5th place and Oceania last among the 6 world regions analyzed. Analysis of the scope and scale of organizational operations revealed similar regional variations/disparities.

Table 3.6: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and Correlated with ECOSOC Consultative Status (CS) Accreditation Levels

Field of Activity/Expertise	Total # Entries(%)	General Status	Special Status	Roster Status (CS Total / %)
Economic and Social	18939(23.5%)	144	2759	920 (3823 / 20.2%)
Financing for Devt.	3962(4.9%)	14	416	24 (454 / 11.5%)
Gender Issues/Women	11719(14.6%)	74	1713	130 (1917 / 16.4%)
Population	4016(5.0%)	16	483	13 (512 / 12.7%)
Public Administration	4260(5.3%)	11	436	13 (460 / 10.8%)
Social Development	14106(17.5%)	56	1652	122 (1830 / 13.0%)
Statistics	2797(3.5%)	10	325	13 (348 / 12.4%)
Sustainable Devt.	14062(17.5%)	68	1632	141 (1841 / 13.1%)
Peace/Devt. in Africa	2761(3.4%)	8	246	10 (264 / 9.6%)
Conflict Res. in Africa	1777(2.2%)	4	161	6 (171 / 9.6%)
NEPAD	2041(2.5%)	4	158	3 (165 / 8.1%)
Totals:	80440	409	9981	1395 (11785 / 14.7%)

Table 3.7: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and Correlated by MDC Regions

Field of Activity/ Expertise (Totals)	Europe	Anglo- America	Oceania	MDC Totals (%)
Economic and Social (18939)	3643	3413	501	7557
Financing for Devt. (3962)	706	570	75	1351
Gender Issues/Women (11719)	1741	1743	251	3735
Population (4016)	708	510	73	1291
Public Administration (4260)	746	592	79	1417
Social Development (14106)	2270	1986	316	4572
Statistics (2797)	451	384	47	882
Sustainable Devt. (14062)	2352	2006	336	4694
Peace/Devt. in Africa (2761)	460	431	8	899
Conflict Res. in Africa (1777)	281	252	6	539
NEPAD (2041)	278	220	14	512
Totals: (80440)	13636(17.0%)	12107(15.1%)	1706(2.1%)	27449(34.2%)

Table 3.8: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and Correlated by LDC Regions

Field of Activity/ Expertise (Totals)	Africa	Asia	Lat. Am. & Carib.	LDC Totals (%)
Economic and Social (18939)	4331	4689	2056	11076
Financing for Devt. (3962)	1219	1068	331	2618
Gender Issues/Women (11719)	3869	3280	865	8014
Population (4016)	1205	1152	379	2736
Public Administration (4260)	1092	1292	468	2852
Social Development (14106)	3860	4197	1499	9556
Statistics (2797)	728	928	260	1916
Sustainable Devt. (14062)	3959	3773	1643	9375
Peace/Devt. in Africa (2761)	1587	264	36	1887
Conflict Res. in Africa (1777)	1029	205	22	1256
NEPAD (2041)	940	524	83	1547
Totals: (80440)	23819(29.6%)	21372(26.6%)	7642(9.5%)	52833(65.7%)

Scope and Scale of Operations of Organizations within the iCSO Database

The iCSO database contained a total of 30,538 entries sorted by operational scope and scale of UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs. Of those entries, 61.2% (18,694) were for organizations headquartered in LDC regions and 38.8% (11,844) for those in MDC regions, again reflecting strong representation of organizations based in LDCs, but lack of parity relative to their proportion of the world's population. Organizations were categorized as to whether their scope of operations was international, regional, national,

or local in character and the total numbers involved indicate some degree of overlap in that a single organization may be listed in multiple regions and also under more than one categorization as to scope of operations.

Given the nature of the iCSO database as providing information related to international civil society organizations that ostensibly have some connection with the UN, it was expected that entries for organizations which are international in scope would be dominant, but that was not necessarily the case. Entries with an international categorization totaled 10,620 or 34.8% of all entries categorized by operational scope, the largest number of entries among the gradations of scope/scale, but not overwhelmingly so. The second largest number of entries was for national organizations with 10,097 or 33.1% of entries. Somewhat surprisingly, organizations with only a local scope of operations were well represented within the iCSO database with 5,844 or 19.1% of entries overall. Organizations with a regional scope of operations (those with some form of presence in or involvement with a small number of countries in the same geographical vicinity) had 3,977 or 13% of entries.

Interestingly, considerable variations between organizations headquartered in MDCs versus LDCs existed among the operational scope categories, as can be seen in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. Among entries categorized as international in their scope of operations which was the most common categorization with 10,620 total entries, Europe with 3,364 (31.7% of total) and Anglo-America with 3,318 (31.2%) entries, dominated. The latter reflecting the preponderance of externally-oriented organizations which are at least in part established around the goal of delivery of aid or services to developing areas

abroad. In all three remaining categories related to operational scope, (regional, national, and local) entries for LDC-based organizations were overwhelmingly dominant, with Africa having by far the most entries for regional (1,147 – 28.8% of total) and national (3,665 – 36.3%) categories, followed by Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and in distant 4th, 5th and 6th place, the MDC regions of Europe, Anglo-America and Oceania respectively. Among entries categorized as local in their scope of operations, Asia had the most (1,664 – 28.5%), followed by Africa (1,441 – 24.7%), with the remaining 4 regions in the same sequence as previously mentioned.

These findings might at first glance imply a dichotomous situation in which LDC regions appear to be more commonly characterized by more bottom-up approaches to NGO/civil society operations, whereas in MDCs a more top-down, hierarchical model may often prevail in terms of the international dynamic. However, this dichotomy between MDCs and LDCs may also be a reflection of the differences in funding realities as more LDC-based organizations that are local, national or regional in scope may seek external sources of financing and other forms of assistance internationally (funding from MDCs, IGOs etc.) and pursue a presence within IGOs or transnational civil society to better facilitate such a funding approach---and the latter conclusion is at least tacitly supported by survey data discussed in Chapter 4 . In contrast, comparable organizations (i.e., also local or national in scope with a bottom-up orientation) within MDCs may be less intrinsically-motivated to pursue international relationships as the latter may appear to be of less practical importance to them in terms of financial support, legitimacy or otherwise.

Table 3.9: Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by ECOSOC Consultative Status

<u>Operational Scope/Scale</u>	<u>General Status</u>	<u>Special Status</u>	<u>Roster Status</u>	<u>Totals</u>
International	121	1836	329	2286 (49.9%)
Regional	12	308	25	345 (7.5%)
National	6	1002	97	1105 (24.1%)
Local	8	327	513	848 (18.5%)
Totals:	147 (3.2%)	3473 (75.8%)	964 (21.0%)	4584

Table 3.10: Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by MDC Region

<u>Operational Scope/Scale</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Anglo- America</u>	<u>Oceania</u>	<u>MDC Total (%/Overall Total)</u>
International	3364	3318	251	6933 (22.7%)
Regional	543	516	227	1286 (4.2%)
National	885	647	258	1790 (5.9%)
Local	864	792	179	1835 (6.0%)
MDC Totals:	5656	5273	915	11844 (38.8%)

Table 3.11: Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by LDC Region

Operational Scope/Scale	Africa	Asia	Lat. Am. & Carib.	LDC Total (%/Overall Total)
International	1315	1722	650	3687 (12.1%)
Regional	1147	846	698	2691 (8.8%)
National	3665	3195	1447	8307 (27.2%)
Local	1441	1664	904	4009 (13.1%)
LDC Totals:	7568	7427	3699	18694 (61.2%)

Somewhat surprisingly, of all 30,538 organizational entries categorized according to operational scope/scale, only 4,584 (15.0%) were for organizations which actually held consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. Among the latter, organizations with an international scope of operations were prevalent with 2,286 entries or 49.9% of the total as noted in Table 3.09. Organizations with a national or local operational scope followed with 1,105 (24.1%) and 848 (18.5%) respectively and in turn only 345 (7.5%) organizations with a regional scope. As expected, the level of consultative status most common (75.8% overall) across all categories of operational scope was Special Status, with Roster Status (21.0%) being the second-most common.

Table 3.12: Organization Type by Operational Scope/Scale in iCSO Database

Organization Type	International	Regional	National	Local	Total
Academic	724	208	266	162	1360
Association	791	197	876	232	2096
Disability	175	67	273	81	596
Foundation	480	116	348	91	1035
Indigenous	587	463	628	773	2453
Institution	153	38	110	40	341
IGO	188	47	53	24	312
Local Govt.	39	13	42	106	200
Media	75	15	37	11	138
NGO	7000	1797	7166	7949	23912
Others	264	61	157	243	725
Private Sector	347	68	164	65	644
Trade Union	26	10	36	5	77
Ageing	25	9	55	15	104
Cooperative	42	7	41	27	117

Several interesting patterns emerged from cross-referencing organizations in the iCSO database by the 15 organizational typologies and the 4 gradations of operational scope. As reflected in Table 3.12, in 8 of 15 organizational typology categories, international scope of operation was the most common, often by a wide margin: academic, foundations, institutions, IGOs, media, others, private sector, and cooperatives. National operational scope was prevalent in 4 organizational typologies: associations, disability, trade unions, and ageing. Local operational scope was the most common in 3 organizational typologies: indigenous, local government, and NGOs. Regional operational scope did not have the largest or even second largest number of database entries in any of the 15 organizational typologies.

Oddly, only 106 (53%) of 200 organizations with a typological classification of local government within the database were categorized as having a local scope of operations. Among local government entities, the iCSO database classified 39 as having an international operational scope, 13 as regional and 42 as national. While it is perhaps to be expected that some subjectivity be involved in the classification of international civil society organizations into categories, scrutiny of the organizations actually listed in the iCSO database raises questions as to how organizations came to be categorized as having an international, regional, national or local scope of operations. Table 3.13 displays 33 of the 39 organizations classified by the iCSO database as being “Local Government” entities that have an “international” scope of operations, concepts that would seem to be self-contradictory. For example, it is difficult to comprehend how the Guinea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Development Institute or the

Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (Honduras) could be regarded as local government entities. Likewise, it is not clear how the Central Bureau of Statistics of Aruba, the Municipal District of Andoas (Peru), or the Provincial Council (of Kandy, Sri Lanka) could be classified as having an international scope of operations. Table 3.13 also displays organizations classified by the iCSO database as being “Local Government” entities that are “regional” in operational scope, many of which also do not appear to be ideal examples of either of the latter categories---e.g. the National Association on Early Childhood does not appear to be either a local government entity or regional in its scope of operations. Such issues within the categorizations of operational scope are not unique examples as unusual misclassifications and inconsistencies can be found throughout the iCSO database.

Other examples of potential misclassification of organizations within the iCSO database can be seen within the IGO organizational typology. While 188 (60.3%) of 312 entries were deemed to be international in terms of their operational scope, 47 (15.1%) were classified as regional in scope. The latter categorization is logical in that IGOs can/do exist for smaller or more regional or sub-regional groups of countries (e.g. CARICOM, CARIFTA, and MERCOSUR) as well as existing at the global or macro scale. More unusual is the categorization of 53 IGOs (17%) as national in operational scope and 24 (7.7%) as local. Examples from the iCSO database of IGOs deemed to be local in scope of mission include the Bureau of Normalization of Quebec, the New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services, the Office of the Council of State

Table 3.13: Organizations Classified in the ICSO Database as Being Local Government Entities that are Alternatively International or Regional in Scope of Operations

<u>Organizations Classified as both “Local Govt.” and “International” in Scope</u>	<u>Organizations Classified as both “Local Government and “Regional” in Scope</u>
C40 Climate Leadership Group	Energie & Umweltagentur Niederosterreich
Camara Municipal de Bauru	Haryana Forest Department
Caucus de Femmes elues Locales du Mali	Hon. Governor Roel Ragay Degamo
Central Bureau of Statistics Aruba	ICLEI Africa
Climate Alliance	Instituto Natureza do Tocantins
Clinton Senior Center	Mashhad Municipality
Direct Email Marketing	Pauline Gregory-Lewis
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians	Principalia di Mindanao
Empresas Publicas de Medellin	Regione Abruzzo
Governo do Estado do Acre	The National Assoc. on Early Childhood
Grand Duchy of Flandrensis	Undersecretariat of Treasury, Agric. Dept.
Guinea Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Urban Policy Unit, Govt. of KPK, Pakistan
International Development Institute	
Ministry of Planning & Devt. Corporation	
Municipalidad Distrital de Andoas	
Oluyole Local Government	
Prefeitura de Campinas	
Principado Ilheu de Pontinha	
Principality of Kaharagia	
Principato di Burke Island	
Provincial Council	

(Ghana), and the Pilipino United Party of the Philippines, Inc., none of which appear to be either IGOs or local in their scope/scale of operations.

Proportional Representation among Regions/Countries within the ECOSOC

Consultative Status Program

Proportionality is an element of plurality important to this study in that understanding the degree to which regions are proportionally represented is a reflection of the degree of spatial parity in the relationship between the UN and transnational CSOs. Earlier in this chapter study data as displayed in Table 3.5 illustrated that iCSO entries organized by organizational type were proportionally imbalanced in that the number of entries for all MDC regions were greater relative to their share of global population than entries for LDC regions, with entries from Asia-based CSOs especially underrepresented. Analysis of data specific to entries for organizations with consultative status revealed an even greater degree of disproportionate dominance of MDC-based organizations as reflected in Table 3.14.

While the predominantly MDC regions of Europe, Anglo America and Oceania collectively comprise only 15.3% of the world's 2016 population, they are the headquarters of 61.2% of organizations that presently hold consultative status with UN-ECOSOC, reflecting MDC-based organizations are represented at a rate four times greater than their proportion of the global population. Europe comprises 9.9% of the global population yet is home to 32.5% of CSOs holding consultative status, Oceania comprises 0.5% of the population yet hosts 2.2% of CSOs with consultative status (of 96

Oceania-based organizations identified as having consultative status, 70 (73.0%) were in Australia or New Zealand, a reflection as to why Oceania was regarded as a predominantly MDC region in this study), but Anglo America was even more disproportionately dominant as it constitutes only 4.9% of the global population but is headquarters to 26.5% of CSOs holding consultative status.

LDC/developing regions comprise 84.7% of the world's population yet are home to only 38.7% of the organizations listed as holding consultative status. Africa constitutes 16.4% of the global population yet is headquarters to a comparable, though slightly smaller 15.3% of CSOs with consultative status. Latin America and the Caribbean comprise 8.6% of the world's population yet are home to just 5.4% of organizations with consultative status. By far the largest proportional underrepresentation among MDC regions is for Asia which constitutes 59.7% of the global population yet was identified as headquarters to only 18.0% of CSOs presently holding consultative status. Such findings clearly support the contention of the first guiding hypothesis that imbalances exist within the CS program with regard to proportional parity among countries and regions and also between developed and developing areas.

It is worthy to note that disparities also exist among MDC versus LDC regions with regard to the type/level of consultative status held. General consultative status is the highest level of accreditation and affords the greatest degree of access and input as discussed in Chapter 2. Of the 6 world regions delimited within the iCSO database the 3 with the smallest percentage of general status CSOs were all MDC/developing regions:

only 1.2% of African-based CS organizations hold General Status, only 2.8% of Asia-based CS organizations, and 2.5% among those based in Latin America and the Caribbean. While no general status organizations were identified as being based in Oceania, 5.4% of Europe-based CSOs holding consultative status were accredited at the general level and 3.2% for those headquartered in Anglo America. However, the largest percentages by far among CS organizations for roster status, presumably the most restrictive accreditation level in terms of opportunities to participate in ECOSOC processes, were also for CSOs based in Europe (20.2% of CS organizations held Roster Status) and Anglo America (19.1%), perhaps mitigating any real or perceived dominance the latter regions potentially possess via having a greater proportion of CSOs in general consultative status.

Table 3.14: Parity of ECOSOC Consultative Status Organizations by World Region and Relative to Proportion of Global Population

	General Status	Special Status	Roster Status	Total / % of all CS orgs	% of World Population
Africa	8	624	42	674 / 15.3%	16.4%
Asia	22	704	68	794 / 18.0%	59.7%
Europe	78	1066	289	1433 / 32.5%	9.9%
LA/Carib.	6	198	34	238 / 5.4%	8.6%
Anglo Am.	37	909	223	1169 / 26.5%	4.9%
Oceania	0	83	13	96 / 2.2%	0.5%
Total	151	3584	669	*4404	

*Number reflects those organizations holding consultative status identified by region within the iCSO database. Over 300 organizations with consultative status were classified as “no region specified” within the database.

Table 3.15: Twenty Most Populous Countries by Number of ECOSOC consultative status Organizations and Relative to Proportion of Global Population

Country	2016 Population / % of World Total	Number of ECOSOC CS Orgs. / % of Total CS Orgs.
China	1,382.3 million / 18.6%	54 / 1.2%
India	1,326.8 million / 17.9%	217 / 4.9%
U.S.	324.1 million / 4.4%	1026 / 23.3%
Indonesia	260.6 million / 3.5%	12 / 0.3%
Brazil	209.6 million / 2.8%	30 / 0.7%
Pakistan	192.8 million / 2.6%	76 / 1.7%
Nigeria	186.9 million / 2.5%	138 / 3.1%
Bangladesh	162.9 million / 2.2%	34 / 0.8%
Russia	143.4 million / 1.9%	63 / 1.4%
Mexico	128.6 million / 1.7%	36 / 0.8%
Japan	126.3 million / 1.7%	68 / 1.5%
Philippines	102.3 million / 1.4%	23 / 0.5%
Ethiopia	101.9 million / 1.4%	9 / 0.2%
Vietnam	94.4 million / 1.3%	3 / 0.07%
Egypt	93.4 million / 1.3%	30 / 0.7%
Germany	80.7 million / 1.1%	78 / 1.8%
Iran	80.0 million / 1.1%	46 / 1.0%
DR Congo	79.7 million / 1.1%	47 / 1.1%
Turkey	76.6 million / 1.1%	33 / 0.7%
Thailand	68.1 million / 0.9%	18 / 0.4%

Using the iCSO database, a case study analysis was undertaken to glean variations among countries in terms of degree of proportional representation/parity within the ECOSOC consultative status program. Table 3.15 presents data from the case study of the world's 20 most populous countries---more logistically practical than examining all of approximately 200 countries in the world---relative to the number of organizations holding consultative status headquartered in each and the percentage of the latter relative to the total (global) number of CS organizations for which a regional association was specified in the iCSO database. Of the countries, 11 were in Asia, 4 in Africa, 2 each in Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean, and 1 in Anglo America. Many of the same patterns related to proportional equity (or lack thereof) as previously presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.14. Countries in LDC/developing regions were in general underrepresented relative to the proportion of population they contain---with Asia-based CS organizations the most underrepresented, and most countries in MDC regions disproportionately overrepresented.

Of the 20 most populous countries, only 3 were in predominantly MDC regions: Germany, Russia and the US. Among CSOs holding ECOSOC consultative status, those based in the US were represented vastly out of proportion to the country's percentage of global population. While the US contains only 4.4% of the world's population, 23.3% of all organizations holding CS (for which a region was specified in the iCSO database) are headquartered in the US. Germany was also disproportionately overrepresented though by a more modest margin, constituting 1.1% of global population and hosting 1.8% of all CS organizations. Russia, which for the purposes of this study was regarded as being in

Europe, was the only country from a predominantly MDC region to be proportionally underrepresented with 1.9% of global population but home to only 1.4% of all CS organizations.

With the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which achieved parity with 1.1% of global population and hosting 1.1% of all CS organizations, and Nigeria, which was overrepresented among all CS organizations at 3.1% relative to its percentage of global population at 2.5%, all other 15 countries from predominantly LDC/developing regions were underrepresented in the consultative status program relative to their proportion of global population, though to widely varying degrees. China, the world's most populous country was among the most proportionally underrepresented with 18.6% of the world's total population but home to a mere 1.4% of all organizations holding consultative status. India, the second most populous state was also proportionally underrepresented though not to the same degree with 17.9% of the world's population but headquarters to only 4.9% of CS organizations. The most underrepresented country by far among the 20 most populous states was Vietnam, with a population of nearly 95 million---1.3% of the global total---yet home to only 3 CS organizations, or 0.07% of CSOs in formal association with ECOSOC.

Another interesting pattern can be seen in the data collected for the most populous countries. Of the 20 countries listed in Table 3.15, Freedom House (2016), which annually evaluates all countries as to the degree of freedom/democracy present, classifies 10 as being "free" (democratic) and 10 as being either "not free" or only "partially free" (undemocratic or quasi-democratic). Those regarded by the organization as being

free/democratic include: Bangladesh, Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the US. Those deemed as being unfree/undemocratic include China, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. The latter breakdown presents an interesting opportunity to expand the brief country case study in order to also compare proportional representation within the consultative status program between democratic and non-democratic countries.

Much scholarship has been devoted to the issue of civil society within authoritarian or quasi-democratic regimes including the reality that although it may exist in some form, civil society may often be diminished or heavily “regulated” (e.g. Cosby 2012; Lewis 2013). Even as regimes may begin to transition toward democratic processes and institutions, civil society institutions may often be weak and remain under the auspices of state organs or merely a reflection of the wariness of a historically-subjugated polity to be openly associated with often politically tinged civic activism in a public sphere (Diamond 1994; Howard 2002). If domestic civil society may often be stunted in non/quasi-democratic societies, it stands to reason that transnational civil society may be muted to an even further degree as such regimes may not be willing to permit alternative voices to have a forum within the international arena. The results of the analysis largely support the latter perspectives and reflect a higher degree of underrepresentation for most of the world’s 10 most populous countries deemed to be non or partially-democratic.

As reflected in the right column of Table 3.15, of the 10 countries with the lowest percentages of all CS organizations, 6 are non/quasi-democratic. Of the 5 lowest

percentages, 4 are non/quasi-democratic countries: Ethiopia with 0.2%, the Philippines with 0.5%, Thailand with 0.4%, and Vietnam with 0.07%. In an effort to objectively compare degrees of parity among the 20 countries, the percentage of all CS organizations headquartered in each country was divided by the percentage it comprises of the global population, yielding a parity score. A parity score of 100% (DR Congo) indicates an equal proportion of CS organizations based in the country relative to its share of global population. Scores greater than 100% indicate overrepresentation within the CS program relative to a country's percentage of global population (US with 529.5% overrepresentation proportional to population, Germany with 163.6% overrepresentation, and Nigeria with 124.0% overrepresentation) and scores less than 100% denote underrepresentation. Table 3.16 displays the parity scores in descending order and compares results for democratic and non/quasi-democratic countries. All 3 parity scores reflecting overrepresentation within the CS program were for democracies: the US, Germany and Nigeria. While scores for many democratic countries also fell below 100% parity, the average score for the 10 most populous democracies was 111.5%, indicating overrepresentation in the CS program relative to population. Only 1 of the 10 most populous non/quasi-democratic countries achieved parity (DR Congo) with the majority of the rest falling far short. Of the 4 lowest parity scores, 3 were for non/quasi-democratic countries: Ethiopia with 14.3% parity, China with 6.5%, and Vietnam with 5.4%. One of the starkest contrasts was with the average parity score for the 10 most populous non/quasi-democratic states: 48.8%, less than half the mean parity score for the 10 democratic states.

Table 3.16: Parity Scores (Percentage of all CS Organizations Relative to Percentage of Global Population) for 10 Democratic and 10 Non/Quasi-Democratic Countries

<u>Democratic Country</u>	<u>Parity Score</u>	<u>Non/Quasi-Democratic Country</u>	<u>Parity Score</u>
US	529.5%	DR Congo	100.0%
Germany	163.6%	Iran	91.0%
Nigeria	124.0%	Russia	73.7%
Japan	88.2%	Turkey	63.6%
Pakistan	65.4%	Egypt	53.8%
Mexico	47.1%	Thailand	44.4%
Bangladesh	36.4%	Philippines	35.7%
India	27.3%	Ethiopia	14.3%
Brazil	25.0%	China	6.5%
Indonesia	8.6%	Vietnam	5.4%
Average Score:	111.5%	Average Score:	48.8%

The often substantial variations among countries and regions with regard to levels of transnational civil society involvement with the UN found via the latter two analyses closely mirrors the results of a case study undertaken as a test case in the early stages of this research. In 2015 I used the iCSO database to gauge proportional representation of countries and sub-regions of Europe with regard to UN associations. The method involved identifying the number of entries in the iCSO database for each European country corresponding to 13 of the 15 categories (all categories except “collectives” and “other”) for organization type. In turn the total population for each country expressed in millions was divided by the total number of entries specific to the country within the iCSO database related to organizational typology (not specific to just organizations with consultative status). For example, the iCSO database indicated 3 CSOs for Iceland which has a population of 0.317 million, a number which divided by 3 (for the total CSOs/NGOs listed in the database) yields 9.5 CSO entries per million people. The resulting score---the number of iCSO database entries per million people in the country’s population---is a different numerical approach than that used in the analysis illustrated in Table 3.16 but nonetheless an effective means of objectively comparing parity among countries regarding the degree to which their CSOs had any associations with the UN. This case study of the 50 countries of Europe was inordinately time consuming, requiring several weeks of data compilation and analysis, and thus was not repeated for all 200 or so countries on earth as an element of the main research. However, as a case study it lends insight into often substantial variations among countries and among sub-regions, patterns that are likely to be found in other world regions outside Europe and the study

also revealed a noteworthy gap between EU and non-EU nations regarding indications of CSO involvement with the UN.

Comparisons of the proportional representation (parity) of the CSOs of countries/regions at the UN could potentially be approached in many different ways. For example, it may prove interesting to undertake such a study of CSO parity at the UN via weighting for various economic influences---i.e. to what degree do countries' degree of CSO representation reflect aspects of their economic size or influence? According to the data presented in Tables 3.15 and 3.16, the United States is vastly overrepresented by having large numbers of US-based CSOs involved with the UN, far out of proportion to the US percentage of global population. If countries' percentage of global GDP were weighted rather than proportion of population, the results would diminish such an appearance of overrepresentation at least to some degree---as the US accounts for approximately 16% of global GDP and around 23% of CSOs which hold consultative status with UN-ECOSOC are US-based. If countries were weighted based upon the portion of the UN budget they funded, the US would essentially have parity within the ECOSOC consultative status dynamic, as it finances approximately one-fourth of the UN budget and is headquarters to a comparable share of the CSOs which hold consultative status.

Table 3.17: UN iCSO Database Entries by European Country/Sub-Region: Mediterranean, Northern, and Western Europe

<u>Region/ Country</u>	<u>N./iCSO entries (N./iCSO) per million people (entries)</u>	<u>Region/ Country</u>	<u>N./entries per (N./iCSO) million people (entries)</u>
<u>Northern Europe</u>		<u>Western Eur./British Isles</u>	
Denmark	13.8 (77)	Andorra	10.6 (32)
Finland	9.3 (49)	Austria	13.3 (109)
Iceland	9.5 (3)	Belgium	31.1 (325)
Norway	19.9 (102)	Britain	14.4 (915)
Sweden	13.3 (129)	France	9.4 (623)
Mean: 13.1 (72)		Germany	3.8 (306)
		Ireland	15.9 (77)
<u>Mediterranean Europe</u>		Liechtenstein	54.1 (2)
Cyprus	13.7 (16)	Luxembourg	17.3 (9)
Greece	6.2 (67)	Netherlands	14.8 (250)
Italy	7.4 (455)	Switzerland	68.6 (553)
Malta	29.1 (12)	Mean: 23.0 (291)	
Monaco	290.3 (9)	Mean w/o microstates: 21.4 (395)	
Portugal	4.8 (52)	Mean w/o microstates/Switz.: 14.7 (372)	
San Marino	90.0 (3)		
Spain	6.4 (306)		
Turkey	2.1 (169)		
Vatican	1000.0 (1)		
Mean: 145.1 (109)			
Mean w/o Microstates: 6.8 (178)			

Table 3.18: UN iCSO Database Entries by European Country/Sub-Region: Former Soviet Eastern Europe and Non-Soviet Eastern Europe

<u>Region/ Country</u>	<u>N./iCSO entries (N./iCSO) per million people (entries)</u>	<u>Region/ Country</u>	<u>N./entries per (N./iCSO) million people (entries)</u>
<u>Former Soviet Eastern Europe</u>		<u>Non-Soviet Eastern Europe</u>	
Armenia	9.2 (28)	Albania	10.6 (32)
Azerbaijan	7.0 (68)	Bosnia-Herz.	4.4 (17)
Belarus	0.6 (6)	Bulgaria	4.8 (33)
Estonia	7.2 (9)	Croatia	5.4 (24)
Georgia	14.0 (69)	Czech Rep.	2.7 (29)
Latvia	3.7 (8)	Hungary	3.2 (32)
Lithuania	4.0 (14)	Kosovo	0.5 (1)
Moldova	7.3 (26)	Macedonia	12.0 (25)
Russia	1.4 (200)	Montenegro	18.5 (12)
Ukraine	2.1 (92)	Poland	0.9 (33)
	Mean: 5.7 (52)	Romania	2.8 (60)
		Serbia	4.9 (35)
		Slovakia	1.7 (9)
		Slovenia	3.0 (6)
		Mean: 5.4 (25)	

While this research did not explore proportional weights for economic considerations it did seek to address variations in parity (proportional plurality) via case studies of countries and regions and assess the degree to which their CSOs/NGOs were represented within the UN framework, with proportion of population being the most obvious means of weighting for influence and objectively appraising degrees of parity. In this research, each of two case studies that were undertaken for analysis of proportionality/parity among countries used distinct approaches. The approach taken to examine degrees of parity for the 20 most populous countries weighted each based upon their proportion of global population. The approach taken in examining European countries and sub-regions did not account for proportion of world population, but rather provided a score reflecting the number of iCSO database entries per million people in the countries' populations. An unforeseen outcome was that disproportionately high scores could be yielded for many microstates and for certain other countries. For example, only 1 organization was identified in the database for Vatican City, yet given its population (1,000), the resulting score of 1,000 CSO/NGO entries per million people in the national population not only distorts the reality for that single country, but potentially distorts averages for the sub-region in which the country is located and the entirety of Europe. Additionally, certain other countries---Switzerland in particular---due to unique circumstances as host to many IGOs and NGOs may also present an issue with distortion of averages. For these reasons, distinction is made in Table 3.17 and in the discussion between (1) overall averages (means) for sub-regions and (2) averages that exclude data for microstates and/or Switzerland in order to present a more realistic average.

As reflected in Tables 3.17 and 3.18 substantial variation existed between some European sub-regions and often among countries within a single sub-region. Western Europe (for purposes of this discussion Western Europe as a sub-region is comprised of France, Germany, Andorra, the 3 Benelux nations and the 3 Alpine nations---Austria, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland), Britain and Ireland had the highest averages for both mean number of CSO entries in the database and CSO entries per million people. Even if disproportionately high averages for Switzerland and the microstates are removed from consideration, the remaining 7 countries of the sub-region had the highest mean number of CSO entries at 372 and the highest mean of 14.7 entries per million people. Of the 7 remaining countries within the sub-region Britain with 915 and France with 623 had by far the highest numbers of CSO entries in the database, but tempered by their large populations, they averaged 14.4 and 9.4 entries per million people respectively. Comparatively, Ireland had only 77 CSO entries in the database, but factored into its relatively small population, it attained a score of 15.9 entries per million people. Germany had the lowest number of CSO entries in the database per million people with 3.8, only around one-eighth that of Belgium, a prominent focal point for IGO and NGO activity, with 31.1 CSO entries per million people.

The countries of Northern Europe (geographically defined as the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, plus the historically and otherwise associated countries of Iceland and Finland) exhibited the second highest score for number of CSO entries per million people at a mean of 13.1 for all 5 nations. The latter statistic ranged from a low of 9.3 in Finland to a high of 13.8 in Denmark, a narrower

range of fluctuation than found in most European sub-regions analyzed. The region was third among the European sub-regions in terms of actual number of CSO entries with a mean of 72, and a range of between 3 for Iceland and 129 for Sweden.

Excluding microstates, Mediterranean Europe had the second highest mean of 178 CSO entries per country and the third highest score per million people with a mean of 6.8 among the 6 non-microstates. As can be seen in Table 3.17, the latter statistic was considerably inflated by the inclusion of the microstates, particularly the Vatican. Even if data from microstates is excluded, like the findings for Western Europe, results for the region demonstrated considerable variation, ranging from a low in 2.1 entries per million people in Turkey (included as (a) a portion of Turkish territory lies northwest of the straits connecting the Aegean and Black Seas---widely accepted as a boundary between Europe and Asia, and (b) Turkey is pursuing EU membership and closely orbits with the continent economically and otherwise) to 13.7 in Cyprus. Substantial fluctuations also existed among total number of CSO entries per country ranging from Cyprus with 16 to Italy with 455.

Data for Eastern European countries formerly a part of the Soviet Union and those that were not was tabulated separately. My initial thought process was that since in general more westernization and economic development (i.e., increases in most measures of standard of development) has occurred in the areas of Eastern Europe that were never part of the Soviet Union, the latter may exhibit stronger indications of transnational civil society as measured by the iCSO database. However, this did not prove to be the case, as only slight differences existed between these 2 classifications of Eastern Europe and both

in terms of total CSO/NGO entries per country (mean of 52 for former Soviet areas, 25 for non-Soviet areas) and number of entries per million people (mean of 5.7 for former Soviet areas, 5.4 for non-Soviet areas), the data collected favored former Soviet nations.

Within both categories of Eastern European countries, substantial variations existed. Among formerly Soviet areas the average number of total entries per country ranged from 6 in Belarus to 200 in Russia and number of entries per million people ranged from 0.6 in Belarus to 14 in Georgia. Among countries never a part of the USSR, Kosovo had the lowest score of any European nation in terms of number of CSO entries per million people with 0.5 and with only 1 organization reported in the iCSO database, tied with the Vatican for the lowest total number of CSO entries in Europe. Romania had the largest number of total CSO entries with 60 and Montenegro with 18.5 had the largest number per million people.

The statistical contrast between Eastern European countries versus that of other parts of the continent was striking. If microstates are excluded, European countries had a mean of 127 total CSO/NGO entries per country and 9.5 entries per million people of population---if data from Switzerland is also excluded the numbers drop to 117 and 8.1 respectively. For purposes of comparison, if the latter numbers (those excluding all 7 microstates and Switzerland) are used, they dwarf the averages for all 24 Eastern European countries: 36.2 mean total CSO/NGO entries per country and 5.5 entries per million people of population. Clearly plurality in the form of equitable proportional parity does not exist among Europe's sub-regions and there is no reason to suspect that this phenomenon of wide sub-regional variation is atypical.

In comparing data between countries that were EU members versus countries that were not, substantial contrast was also found to exist. Among the 28 EU-member states the mean number of iCSO database entries was 144 yielding a mean of 9.4 entries per million people in population---excluding microstates yielded a mean of 154 entries and 8.3 per million people. Numbers for EU candidates (6 nations at the time: Albania, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey) produced a comparable though slightly higher score of 9.6 iCSO database entries per million people and a mean of 46 entries per country. The 16 European nations that were neither EU members nor candidates for admission had a mean 99.6 iCSO database entries per million people and 74 entries per country, with both numbers substantially inflated by the inclusion of 5 microstates and Switzerland. Exclusion of the latter 6 nations from consideration yielded a considerably lower mean of 6.7 entries per million people and 60.9 entries per country. The exclusion of microstates from both tallies and of Switzerland from the results of the non-EU states---likely reasonable steps given the statistical anomalies they represent, gives the EU members a nearly 20% higher score of 8.3 database entries per million people versus the non-EU states with 6.7.

Other Forms of UN Accreditation of CSOs/NGOs (Apart from ECOSOC Consultative Status)

While the primary formal vehicle for UN affiliation with transnational civil society is the consultative status program within ECOSOC, other venues also exist, usually specific to a particular purpose or event. In some instances, CSOs/NGOs are

accredited specifically so that they may participate in a special summit or symposium in which case the accreditation is temporary, ending with the conclusion of the event. An example of such a temporary accreditation regime was that associated with the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) which took place in South Africa between August and September 2002 and formally accredited over 700 participating organizations. An additional and smaller-scale example of temporary accreditation specific to a project or summit is the UN's recurring conference related to Small Island Developing States (SIDS). At the 3rd SIDS conference held in Samoa in 2014, in addition to the representatives of states which were in attendance, 23 CSOs/NGOs were formally accredited as participants.

Other more long-standing forms of UN accreditation of representatives of civil society also exist, perhaps the best known of which are the programs related to the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the Department of Public Information (DPI) and the Financing for Development Office (FDO). Established by the General Assembly in 1992, the CSD has since its inception sought to engage with as diverse a range of stakeholders as possible, including the accreditation of hundreds of CSOs/NGOs which have interest in its mission. The DPI was established in 1946 to promote awareness of UN programs, often via establishing various constituencies internationally including collaborations with over 1,500 CSOs/NGOs, many of which have a formal accreditation with DPI. FDO (which is also variously referenced by the acronyms FFD and FfDO) was established within the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 2003 to provide sustained support and follow-up for initiatives related to international

development, one element of which is the NGO Committee on Financing for Development which accredits organizations both as full and associate members.

As was expected, analysis of the numbers for other UN affiliation programs for CSOs/NGOs revealed them to have only fractions of the involvement of the ECOSOC consultative status program. To the best of my knowledge, the 5 programs analyzed are the most viable alternatives to the CS regime for UN engagement with international civil society, but each of the 5 deals with a more narrow policy niche than the flagship ECOSOC forum which was intended to be more general in scope. As indicated in Table 3.19, the DPI program for CSOs/NGOs had by far the most region-specific (entries with no region specified were not included in the data table and were generally negligible in number) entries at 868, most of which were from organizations headquartered in Anglo-America (404 or 46.5%) or Europe (222 or 25.6%). The DPI accreditation program for CSOs/NGOs appears to present organizations with opportunities for engagement throughout the year, whereas the other 4 programs, even if theoretically ongoing in a couple of cases (CSD and FDO), seem to be primarily focused around periodic summits or other special events, thus providing a more limited dynamic for interaction.

Of the remaining affiliation programs, the summit-specific civil society accreditation regime of WSSD had the second-largest number of region-specific entries with 603, most of which were from Anglo-America (142 or 23.5%), followed closely by Asia (136 or 22.6%) and Europe (134 or 22.2%). The CSD program had the third-largest number of entries at 425, the largest numbers of which were from Anglo-American (116

Table 3.19: UN Accreditation/Affiliation Programs for CSOs Apart from ECOSOC
Consultative Status by World Regions

Region	CSD	DPI	FDO	WSSD	SIDS	Totals
Africa	49	44	63	117	1	274
Asia	91	94	20	136	2	343
LA & Car	73	59	18	51	6	207
LDC Totals	213(50.1%)	197(22.7%)	101(57.1%)	304(50.4%)	9(60.0%)	
Anglo Am	116	404	28	142	2	692
Europe	77	222	38	134	3	474
Oceania	19	45	10	23	1	98
MDC Totals	212(49.9%)	671(77.3%)	76(42.9%)	299(49.6%)	6(40.0%)	
Totals:	425	868	177	603	15	2088

or 27.3%) or Asian (91 or 21.4%) organizations. The FDO program contained only 177 total entries, most commonly from African (63 or 35.6%) or European (38 or 21.5%) organizations. The most narrow in geographical or circumstantial focus of any of the 5 programs, the iCSO Database only yielded 15 entries for SIDS, most commonly from Latin America and the Caribbean (6 or 40.0%) reflecting the presence and influence of Caribbean microstates and small states within the program.

While these 5 CSO affiliation programs are distinct from the ECOSOC consultative status (ECOSOC-CS) regime, I was curious to see the degree of overlap between organizations with consultative status and those participating in any of the alternative affiliations. Although the initial expectation was that overlap would exist in that most organizations participating in these 5 programs would also hold consultative status with ECOSOC, this does not appear to be the case according to the data collected from the iCSO website. As noted in Table 3.20, the largest number of entries for ECOSOC-CS organizations was in the DPI program. The latter had 393 CS organizations as affiliates, by far the highest ratio (393:868 or 45.3%) relative to the total number of entries among any of the 5 CSO affiliate programs, but still not an indication that most DPI organizations also hold ECOSOC-CS. Ratios of the number of ECOSOC-CS organizations relative to total number of entries for each of the 4 other alternative accreditations were much lower, seemingly confirming that most organizations within each of these alternative CSO/NGO affiliation programs in fact do not also hold ECOSOC consultative status simultaneously: CSD 114:425 (26.8%); FDO 32:177 (18.1%); WSSD 98:603 (16.3%); SIDS 1:15 (6.7%).

Whereas the ECOSOC consultative status program is broader and more diverse in its range of policy foci, each of the 5 alternative accreditation programs is markedly narrower in focus and in potential applicability to the operational parameters of civil society organizations. However, the narrow focus of the 5 alternative programs may actually appeal to certain CSOs with highly specialized interests to a greater degree than the more general forums of ECOSOC-CS, to which such specialized (e.g. oriented toward development financing) CSOs/NGOs may feel they have less to contribute. In short, the ECOSOC-CS program may not be competing to a great degree with these 5 alternative affiliation programs for the same civil society organizations as affiliates.

Table 3.20: Other UN Accreditation/Affiliation Programs for CSOs by ECOSOC Consultative Status Level

Other UN Accreditation	General Status	Special Status	Roster Status	Totals
CSD	6	33	75	114
DPI	41	258	94	393
FDO	0	25	7	32
WSSD	2	77	19	98
SIDS	0	1	0	1
Totals:	49	394	195	638

Evidence of this can also be seen in the data collected for the CSD program in Table 3.20. In no other instance in this study did entries for ECOSOC affiliates with Roster Status substantially outnumber those holding Special Status within a category. As Special Status is by far the most common accreditation status within the ECOSOC affiliation program (see Table 3.1 – as of November 2016, 75.6% held Special Status and 20.9% held Roster Status), organizations holding that level of accreditation would presumably always outnumber those with other accreditation levels. Yet within the CSD program 75 (65.8%) of 114 ECOSOC-CS organizations held Roster Status. Roster Status is for organizations with a specialized and limited scope, circumstances which seem to apply to each of these 5 programs to varying degrees at least in comparison to the potentially broader parameters of the ECOSOC-CS regime. In 4 of the 5 alternative affiliation programs, the percentage of Roster Status organizations is higher than the ECOSOC-CS average of 20.9%, intimating that these alternative UN-accreditation programs may appeal to CSOs/NGOs with more specialized parameters. The following sections provide a summary overview of findings from analysis of the iCSO database and their significance to relevant research questions and guiding hypotheses.

Overview of Analysis of iCSO Database

Throughout much of the 20th century what few examples existed of transnational civil society were predominantly located in MDC/developed regions, but the explosive growth of NGOs globally over the course of recent decades has facilitated more balance in the number, distribution and influence of civil society organizations. Just as the

governments of predominantly LDC/developing regions have become increasingly active within transnational organizations in recent decades, civil society in the global south has also become increasingly visible within the global arena (Tandon and Kak 2008). By the 1990s NGOs and civil society among LDCs were rapidly emerging and were becoming comparable in numbers to their northern counterparts, yet sometimes continued to be overshadowed politically within international forums by northern organizations which were better organized and financed (Tandon and Kak 2008). Tandon and Kak (2008, 80-81) elaborate on the challenges faced by global south NGOs in obtaining a voice in the UN and international community:

Emerging civil society in Asia, Africa and Latin America (initially) had weak capacity in the areas of intellectual material, institutional capacities, and local/regional coordination, as well as a lack of regulatory frameworks in many countries. Most governments of these southern countries had a “suspicious” orientation toward CSOs and it was therefore necessary to create a modern framework of regulation for government-NGO relations...In 1991, the idea of strengthening civil society by uniting NGOs on a global stage manifested in CIVICUS: the World Alliance for Citizen Participation which (facilitated) unprecedented strength and global outreach for participating organizations.

While issues such as freedom to operate independently of government influence, political parity (clout) domestically and abroad, and funding/resource availability may in some instances continue to favor MDCs within contemporary transnational civil society,

significant progress toward parity has been made and the CSOs/NGOs of the developing world may be more vibrant than at any point in history. For example, in recent decades communist China has witnessed substantial growth in the total number and variety of NGOs, yet compared with counterparts in many other regions, Chinese NGOs have not fully matured and many have a reputation for corruption or perhaps more commonly, poor leadership and ineffectiveness (Xiaoguang and Li 2006). A further example can be evidenced in Indonesia in which NGOs and civil society is vibrant and thriving today, under decades of the Soeharto dictatorship civil society was viewed with suspicion by the government which sought to control it rather than support or engage with it (Antlov, Ibrahim and Tuijl 2006).

Rates of progress have not been uniform, particularly when comparing circumstances in democratic versus non-democratic countries---which usually have a regional correlation via the global north/south dichotomy. The prevalence of democracy and other regime types can vary regionally and at least historically such patterns may have correlated with the presence of NGOs and civil society or the lack thereof, as customarily the latter have been more closely associated with democratic rather than authoritarian traditions. For example, the dearth of democracy in much of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) has impeded the advance of organized civil society which has struggled for the mere right of free association more so than working toward achieving specific policy objectives such as human rights, and this situation has not been helped by the breakdown or absence of popular movements such as organized labor, often a catalyst for civil society elements in other world regions (Sayed-Said 2004). Not

only have most states in the Middle East restricted the growth and expansion of civil society internally, but such restrictions have also contributed to the isolation of groups in the region from interacting with each other and at the international level (Samad and Mohamadieh 2008). However, even under such circumstances an often more muted form of civil society has played an increasingly important role in observing and reporting on compliance with both human rights, environmental and other initiatives in many countries around the world and accordingly such organizations are rightly regarded as elements of the international contract helping to regulate behavior in those policy areas (Lake 2000).

Interestingly, such uneven patterns of civil society development could be seen in data gleaned from this research. Imbalances in representation and participation of CSOs/NGOs were consistently visible in statistics derived from the database. Civil society in developed/MDC regions was usually overrepresented to a substantial degree relative to proportion of population, while that of developing/LDC areas---particularly Asia---was consistently underrepresented proportionally. At least some of the latter disparity can be attributed to contrasts in economic prowess between the global north and south, as organizations in developing nations may often lack the financial resources to fully participate in international conferences, etc. Other factors such as democratic versus authoritarian political climate in the host country can also be seen within the data presented in this research to impact the degree of participation of CSOs/NGOs within international forums such as UN-ECOSOC. The following provides a summary

overview of the findings revealed via analysis of the UN iCSO database as related to the first two research questions and first guiding hypothesis.

Findings Relative to Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses

As has been previously discussed, the concept of pluralism within a political dynamic is somewhat subjective and open to interpretation. For definitional clarity, this study defined political pluralism succinctly in Chapter 1 as *the sharing of influence among and active engagement of a diverse group of stakeholders within a political dynamic*. Following the exploration of statistics gleaned from the iCSO database and analysis of plurality within the UN dynamic with transnational civil society, perhaps a slightly more detailed definition of political plurality can be framed: *the equitable and (to the greatest extent feasible) proportional distribution of influence among as many segments of society as possible in order that broader input and participation in policy issue areas be facilitated*. As noted in Chapter 1, for the UN dynamic with transnational civil society this means that the greater the diversity of representation among civil society in terms of regional/geographical representation as well as representation of policy/issue areas, the greater the degree of contribution from diverse sources, and the influence of pluralism.

Relative to the relationship between the United Nations and transnational civil society, an exploration of political pluralism entails assessments of the degree and nature of actual CSO/NGO engagement (i.e. is the influence of civil society at the UN actual/potential or largely symbolic?) and the degree of proportional and equitable civil

society representation. Analysis of the UN iCSO database revealed clear answers to the first research question and to the elements of the second research question and first guiding hypothesis as related to proportional representation and regional/geographical equity. In gauging proportional representation across policy/issue areas substantial imbalances could also be seen among countries/regions.

Research Questions

1a – What are the patterns of participation of NGOs in UN-ECOSOC programs in terms of country and regional representation and are world regions and countries proportionally represented?

Much of the data derived from the iCSO database does not address depth or substance of participation. However, the fact that in many categories (e.g., organizational type) entries for LDC/developing regions outnumber those of MDC/developed regions indicate notable improvement in degrees of parity and plurality within the UN-civil society dynamic between developed and developing nations and among most world regions. In short, the civil society organizations of LDC/developing nations are at least on paper better represented within the UN framework than at any point in history, though such improvement with regard to increased inclusion and participation of historically underrepresented countries and world regions does not necessarily mean that plurality in the form of proportional parity has been achieved.

In analyzing the iCSO database, this research used a multifaceted approach in exploring the first research question and gauging the degree of plurality in terms of proportional representation among regions and countries within the UN dynamic with transnational civil society. One element entailed analysis of parity among world regions with regard to the spatial distribution of all organizations presently holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. While sizable numbers of organizations from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean did have consultative status, in all three regions their numbers were not equivalent to their proportions of global population---with Asian-based CSOs being especially underrepresented within the ECOSOC program. Conversely CSOs/NGOs based in the predominantly developed regions of Anglo America, Europe and Oceania were overrepresented relative to those regions' share of global population.

The latter findings were mirrored in a case study of the 20 most populous countries in the world and the degree to which each was represented proportionate to its share of global population within the ECOSOC consultative status program. Among the 17 countries located in predominantly developing/LDC regions all but 2 were proportionally underrepresented, mostly by wide margins. All 3 of the countries in predominantly developed/MDC regions were overrepresented within the consultative status program relative to their percentages of global population. This case study also afforded an opportunity to compare data between democratic and non-quasi-democratic nations regarding CSO representation within the UN dynamic. Among the 10 most populous countries deemed to be democratic, the mean parity score was 111.5% (overrepresentation relative to population) while among the 10 countries deemed

non/quasi-democratic, a substantially lower mean of 48.8% (underrepresentation) contrasted sharply. The latter findings help illustrate that disparities between the vibrancy of civil society in the global north and south could reflect a combination of not just economic disadvantages in less developed areas, but also political considerations, as the majority of non/quasi-democratic regimes are found in the global south.

An additional case study was undertaken in which the 50 countries of Europe and the sub-regions in which they are located were examined for spatial patterns regarding general entries (not specific to the ECOSOC consultative status program) in the iCSO database. The analysis compared the total number of entries in the database as well as scoring each on the number of database entries per million people in each country's population. The contrast between the 26 higher income countries of Mediterranean, Northern and Western Europe---areas never under communist rule, with the 24 lower-income, former communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe was stark with the former far better represented within the CS program. Data within this region-specific case study was also analyzed according to whether countries were (1) in the EU, (2) EU candidates--at the time, or (3) neither members nor candidates to join the EU. The 28 EU members had the highest mean number of CSO entries with 154 and second-highest mean of 8.3 entries per million people. EU candidates had the highest mean CSO entries per million people with 9.6 and the lowest mean of 46 entries per country. Non-EU members/candidates had the lowest mean by far with 6.7 entries per million people, but an average of 60.9 entries per country, a larger number than EU-candidate countries, but less than half that of EU members.

1b – What are the patterns of participation and proportional representation in terms of policy/issue focus areas?

In undertaking analyses of policy/topical areas as represented within the UN iCSO database, patterns of regional participation could usually be evidenced. The database was analyzed for general entries (not just those NGOs/CSOs currently holding ECOSOC consultative status) related to organizational type and fields of activity/expertise as specified by the UN. Additionally, data was also examined regarding NGO/CSO scope and scale of operations, and with regard to UN CSO accreditation/affiliation programs outside ECOSOC-CSO programs that generally had narrower policy/focus areas (e.g., Commission on Sustainable Development). Consistently in each of the latter categories examined, data revealed overrepresentation of CSOs based in predominantly MDC/developed world regions and underrepresentation of those in predominantly LDC/developing regions with regard to the regions' proportions of global population.

The study did not identify any substantial deficiencies in the form of gaps in broad policy/issue areas, but fluctuation was found across topical and policy areas in terms of numbers of CSOs involved reflecting diversity of specializations and interest areas. It was expected that greater numbers of CSOs would be connected to broader policy areas such as economic/social development as opposed to more narrow and specialized focus areas such as statistical analysis or finance and such patterns were revealed in the study. Among organizations with CS analyzed by organizational type---if

the oddly broad database category of “NGOs” is excluded, the most common categories were indigenous at 6.1% followed by associations and academics with 5.8% and 3.5%, respectively. The least common were ageing and cooperatives, each with 0.3% and trade unions with 0.2%. Among entries sorted by fields of activity/expertise, the most common were those related to economic and social with 23.5%, followed by social development and sustainable development, each with 17.5%. The least common were entries related to statistics with 3.5% and the region-specific categories of NEPAD and conflict resolution in Africa with 2.5% and 2.2%, respectively.

Guiding Hypotheses

1. Imbalances exist in patterns of participation of NGOs in consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council with regard to country/regional involvement (e.g. NGOs of developed/MDC states are proportionally better represented than those of developing/LDC states) and regarding the policy issues with which the NGOs are concerned.

Analysis of statistics obtained from the UN iCSO database via descriptive statistics strongly supports the contention of the first guiding hypothesis that proportional imbalances exist within the UN-civil society framework. Consistently, many distinct case study elements of the research, drawing upon the iCSO database and using a variety of comparative measures demonstrated that UN-affiliated NGOs/CSOs headquartered in

the predominantly MDC/developed regions of Anglo America, Europe and Oceania are disproportionately overrepresented relative to those regions' percentage of global population. Conversely, NGOs/CSOs based in the predominantly LDC/developing regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, while often large in overall numbers, are as a whole disproportionately underrepresented relative to their percentage of global population. The latter inequity in proportional representation/parity was found to be especially stark for Asian-based NGOs/CSOs.

Substantial imbalances were also found to exist across policy/focus areas with which NGOs/CSOs within the CS program are concerned. For example, in examining entries by organizational typology, NGOs/CSOs related to academics, indigenous issues, or foundations were well represented, whereas those related to ageing, labor or media were scarcely represented. Likewise, examination of database entries classified by fields of expertise revealed certain fields such as economic and social, social development, sustainable development, and women/gender issues to be represented to a considerably greater degree than other ostensibly important fields such as finance, population/demography, public administration, and statistics.

Accordingly both components of the first guiding hypothesis appear to have been confirmed via analysis of the iCSO database in that imbalances clearly exist with regard to both regional/country representation as well as policy issues. Chapter 4 analyzes results of survey data to address the second and third guiding hypotheses, which assert respectively that a range of factors in combination lead to some organizations to participate more than others in the CS program and that due to such factors most

organizations within the CS program do not participate/contribute in any meaningful way.

IV. CHAPTER FOUR:

APPRAISAL OF CSO/NGO PARTICIPATION AND BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION

Dahl (1982) famously opined that “like individuals, organizations ought to possess some autonomy, and at the same time they should also be controlled. Crudely stated, this is the fundamental problem of pluralist democracy.”

Introduction

The 3rd component of the initial research question inquires as to the type and degree of participation which exists among organizations holding consultative status (CS) with UN-ECOSOC, the primary vehicle for UN interaction with international civil society. The final two research questions ask why some organizations within the CS program participate and other do not, and also how many CS-accredited organizations fail to participate in UN-ECOSOC functions? The latter research questions led to the formulation of the first and second guiding hypotheses which respectively stipulate that a variety of factors such as financial ability and time/personnel commitments contribute to some CS-organizations being more active than others and that most organizations within the CS program are inactive and thus do not contribute in any meaningful way to the UN goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society. These guiding hypotheses were operationalized via a detailed survey questionnaire (provided in Appendix A)

mailed to a random selection of 10% of all CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.

Participant Self-De-Selection from Survey and Possible Bias

Some indication exists that many---possibly most---subjects randomly selected to participate in the study may have opted out of participating in the survey due to reluctance to report little-no activity within the UN consultative status program. During the course of the study, it was not uncommon to receive questions from participants addressing a range of issues. The most common single topic about which I was approached related to NGO's dearth of participation with the UN. Five participants contacted me to ask for guidance or express concerns related to the latter, often framing the comments as "many of the questions do not apply to us" as they had not participated in any programs or otherwise communicated with or made any contribution to the UN. Most of these participants also stated some variant to the effect that they did not want to "bias" or "skew" the data by responding with consistent 0s or 1s to number line or other survey items attempting to gauge levels of participation. Several made comments to the effect that they had "done nothing" or "had nothing to report" and thus did not feel they could/should participate in the research.

My responses always stressed that such responses were perfectly valid, made positive contribution to the research, and also that if only the most active organizations self-report their experiences, the results would be skewed from the other direction. Participants were reassured that activity levels within the program appeared to vary

widely and that they appeared to be many other NGOs with participation rates similar to their own. Also, I always stressed that responses were totally anonymous and the identities of respondents and the NGOs with which they are affiliated would always be kept completely confidential, information which had also been provided in the survey/consent documentation and in the introductory email. Those efforts were largely in vain as only 1 of those 5 subjects returned the survey questionnaire and that respondent---with whom I spent more time communicating than any other participant---left many survey items blank rather than provide scores so low as to indicate little-no participation or communication within the consultative status program or little-no benefits derived from the affiliation.

In addition to the latter experience, the average responses for survey items attempting to gauge levels of participation in its various forms were in general higher than I had initially expected at the start of the research. Among the 62 questionnaires returned, most indicated high-moderate number-line scores in terms of networking, perceptions as to UN valuation of CSO participation, and the degree to which participation in the CS program is justified. Most respondents also reported via other objective survey items participating in an NGO coalition (51.6%), and most reported participating in at least 1 UN forum at the New York (78.2%) and Geneva (50.9%) headquarters, though not at Vienna (20.0%) or the regional UN offices. Most (75.4%) also reported communicating with the UN since being in the CS program with email and telephone calls being the most common mediums. A majority (61.2%) of respondents also indicated that they had presented a written statement at a UN venue, although only a

minority (40.3%) indicated they had presented a verbal statement, and smaller percentages still indicated that they had actually been asked to present a written or verbal statement.

The possibility must be considered that portions of the survey data compiled during the course of this research could demonstrate bias favoring (over-representing) the NGOs that are more active participants in the consultative status program. If true, actual rates of participation on the part of NGOs within the UN-ECOSOC consultative status program may be less than numbers derived from this study indicate. There is no known reason why data bias favoring (via over-representation of) inactive NGOs would have resulted in findings skewed in that direction as those organizations would logically be less inclined than more active NGOs to submit a completed questionnaire and also among those which did submit the survey, less active organizations may be more inclined to omit responses to many individual survey items rather than report data they may regard as unfavorable to them. Accordingly, if data generated in this survey are skewed, it is in the overestimation rather than underestimation of activity levels of NGOs within the consultative status program.

Operationalization

Most questions contained in the survey instrument were objective in nature and allow for numerical appraisal and comparison in addition to allowing for ease of response and minimal time commitment on the part of participants. Number lines were utilized for most (32 of 48---or 67% of total) survey items, wherein respondents indicated their

reaction/score along a range of between 10 (high) to 0 (none/no) applicability. The number lines as printed in the survey utilized only whole numbers, but as many respondents marked scores between 2 whole numbers, half scores were recorded---i.e. a response circling, underlining, highlighting (etc.) only the number 5 was recorded as a score of 5, but a marking/indication falling between 5 and 6 on the printed number line was recorded as 5.5. The mean score for each number line item was tabulated and the latter along with the graphed distribution of responses is provided in the analysis. Additionally, in an effort to better understand and analyze responses to number line items and the range of responses, a percentage breakdown of responses is provided according to whether they were high, medium/moderate or low-range scores. The latter scoring was undertaken via division of all 21 possible numerical scores into 3 equidistant ranges: scores ranging from 10-7---high; 6.5-3.5---moderate/medium; 3-0 low.

In addition to number line items, 13 other questions (27%) included in the survey were objective in nature, requiring responses that were either numerical or otherwise quantifiable, allowing for objective analysis and comparison. As was also the case with number-line items, these questions generally had a high rate of completion among returned surveys, with the vast majority of respondents providing data for all 13 items. These survey items were analyzed according to numerical totals and on a breakdown of percentage of responses.

Only 3 survey items were open-ended discussion questions. Given the overall length of the survey and time commitment needed to complete and submit the questionnaire, the number of subjective discussion-oriented questions---the most time-

consuming items to complete, was minimized in an effort to avoid adversely impacting response rate. The responses to the subjective, open-ended survey items were evaluated via qualitative content analysis. All such responses were read to identify the nature of feedback and what patterns existed among responses. Via coding of feedback, response categories were created to aid in framing and analyzing content of discussions and also to allow for some degree of objective comparison. For example, with regard to the initial question as to ‘why did your organization seek consultative status with the UN?’, responses were found to fall into 1 of 2 basic categories: reasons specific to the particular mission/scope of the CSO; or reasons that were more general in scope. The follow up to the latter question, asked if those goals had been achieved and why or why not. Responses were found to fall into 1 of 4 types: yes---unqualified; yes---partly or qualified; no; or unknown/TBD. The third open-ended item asked how the UN could improve the experience for organizations in the CS program. The latter yielded a widely diverse range of comments, but which could be sorted/organized around 10 distinct themes---some more commonly cited in the feedback than others: access, bureaucracy, communication, expertise, fairness/equity, funding, general guides, networking/capacity-building, meetings, specific to policy/focus areas of organization.

Profile of Survey Participants

As illustrated in Table 4.1, the number of questionnaires returned was roughly proportionate to the overall percentage of CS organizations holding Special accreditation status. However, among survey respondents, those with General status were

disproportionately overrepresented and those with Roster status disproportionately underrepresented---both to substantial degrees. The latter patterns cannot be attributed to skewed sampling and survey participant selection as the proportion of CSOs randomly selected for the survey closely mirrored the distribution of accreditation levels of the general population, partial confirmation that the random sampling process yielded a representative sample. As previously discussed, it is my belief that a self-(de)selection occurred with the surveys wherein those CS organizations with higher levels of UN activity/involvement (e.g. those holding General status) would be more likely to report this and return the survey questionnaire, and conversely those with little-to-no UN involvement (possibly disproportionately concentrated as a pattern among Roster status organizations) would be less intrinsically motivated to complete the survey and in effect self-incriminate.

Table 4.1: Levels of Consultative Status Accreditation of NGO Survey Respondents versus Distribution of Accreditation Levels within CS Program Overall

Accreditation Levels of 439 Randomly Selected CSOs		Accreditation Levels of Survey Respondents	Accreditation Levels of all CSOs (Nov. 2016)
General	16 (3.6%)	14 (23.3%)	151 (3.2%)
Special	339 (77.2%)	43 (71.7%)	3595 (75.9%)
Roster	84 (19.1%)	3 (5%)	993 (20.9%)
Total	439	60*	4739

*Of 62 returned surveys, 2 respondents did not identify their level of accreditation

Table 4.2 presents a comparison of the spatial and MDC/LDC distribution patterns of CSOs randomly selected to receive the survey questionnaire relative to distribution of all CSOs with CS status and regional proportion of world population. The regional distributions of those organizations randomly selected to receive the survey questionnaire closely mirrors the regional distributions of all CSOs holding consultative status with Un-ECOSOC, an indication of the validity and representative nature of the sample selections. Overall, 33.9% of CSOs randomly selected were from predominantly LDC/developing regions, while the latter constitute 38.7% of all organizations within the CS program. Likewise 66.1% of CSOs randomly selected were from predominantly MDC/developed areas, with the latter comprising 61.3% of all CS organizations.

Data obtained for this comparison illustrates the lack of regional parity within the CS program overall. While the 3 predominantly LDC/developing regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean collectively constitute 84.7% of the world's population, as of November 2016 only 38.7% of CSOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC were headquartered in those regions. Although all 3 developing regions were proportionally underrepresented within the program, the disparity was especially great with regard to Asia, which comprises 59.7% of the world's population yet is host to only 18% of organizations within the CS program. Conversely, the 3 predominantly MDC/developed regions of Anglo America, Europe and Oceania collectively make up just 15.3% of the global population yet all 3 were proportionally overrepresented and collectively host 61.3% of all CSOs holding consultative status.

Table 4.2: Regional and LDC/MDC Distribution Patterns of (1) CSOs Randomly Selected for Survey, (2) All CSOs with ECOSOC CS, and (3) Relative to Proportion of Global Population

<u>Regional Distribution of 439 of Randomly Selected CSOs</u>	<u>Regional Distribution of all CSOs w/ CS</u>	<u>Regional Proportion of Global Population</u>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------

Predominantly LDC/Developing Regions

Africa	57 (13% of 439)	674 (15.3% of 4404)	16.4%
Asia	70 (15.9%)	794 (18.0%)	59.7%
Latin Am/Car	22 (5%)	238 (5.4%)	8.6%
Totals:	149 (33.9%)	1706 (38.7%)	84.7%

Predominantly MDC/Developed Regions

Anglo Amer	130 (29.6%)	1168 (26.5%)	4.9%
Europe	154 (35.1%)	1434 (32.6%)	9.9%
Oceania	6 (1.4%)	96 (2.2%)	0.5%
Totals:	290 (66.1%)	2698 (61.3%)	15.3%

Survey Responses – General Background

The first 2 survey items were also 2 of the 3 open-ended discussion questions. Respondents were asked why their organization sought consultative status with the UN and in turn were asked if those goals had been achieved and why or why not. Of 62 survey questionnaires returned, the vast majority---57 (91.9%) provided feedback for one or both of these items. In general responses for the first survey item related to why the organization sought CS with the UN were more detailed than information provided for the follow up question inquiring as to whether those goals had been realized. Responses to the first question were organized into 2 basic categories: those that are specific to the policy/focus area of a particular organization/respondent; and those that were more general in scope.

Of the respondents addressing the first question, 18 (31.6%) cited reasons that were specific to the policy/focus area of their specific CSO as motivating factors for seeking consultative status. For example, a labor-related CSO responded that it sought to represent workers and unions interests and protect their rights, stating that “it is inconceivable that the UN or any other major international institution function without direct involvement and input of trade union organizations.” Another highly specialized CSO indicated their desire to contribute their expertise in risk governance/management and identify collaboration opportunities and stay updated as to international developments related to the latter. Development-related issues (economic or human/social) were the most commonly cited policy/issue areas as drivers. Several

responses also touched upon the organization's desire to increase its profile specifically within the policy/issue area(s) in which it specialized.

The majority of responses---39 (68.4%)---focused upon a diverse array of more general motivating factors. Among the most common responses were those indicating a desire to be involved in various respects with the UN including the ability to attend conferences and obtain information about international issues. Others referenced the goal of networking or otherwise interacting with other NGOs. Sharing of information or best practices or international outreach in general were commonly cited motivating factors. Several respondents were also quite candid in that they explained that no or few clear goals for their participation in the CS program had ever been defined.

Overall, there seemed to be a roughly equal division between the number of altruistic motivators (e.g., contribute expertise to the UN; collaborative research/projects) as opposed to incentives of a more intrinsic nature (e.g., increased credibility or visibility for the organization; new funding opportunities) revealed by respondents, with altruistic/external motives being provided slightly more commonly. Interestingly, respondents citing mostly or entirely altruistic/external motives for seeking consultative status with the UN were somewhat more likely to indicate their goals for participating in the CS program had been achieved than organizations which listed more intrinsic motivations for participating. The implication of the latter is that the CSOs whose sole or top priority was to contribute are perhaps more likely to find success and satisfaction than those organizations which chiefly sought some form of tangible benefit from the association.

In some respects the follow-up question to the first survey item yielded more interesting results, particularly with regard to measuring participation and the considerations which promote or impede the latter---the focal points of the second and third guiding hypotheses. Among the 56 respondents providing feedback as to whether their goals for seeking CS with the UN had been realized, 26 (46.4%) indicated “yes”, a 2:1 margin over the 13 (23.2%) organizations which indicated “no”. In justifying their responses, those organizations reporting that their goals had been realized had most commonly sought to enhance their profile/visibility internationally, participate in UN forums/functions, or to facilitate better networking, idea-sharing or other forms of communication internationally. While some respondents indicating one or more of the latter as goals, noted they had not been achieved, the majority of the organizations indicating that no goals had been achieved via the CS program either (1) indicated lack of clearly framed goals from the outset, or (2) had originally sought specific benefits for their organization which at least in some cases (i.e., funding opportunities or “UN training”) may have been unrealistic.

An additional 8 respondents gave feedback that could be best described as a qualified or partial “yes”. Such a response would indicate realization of only some of multiple objectives or only partial achievement of a stated objective. For example, one respondent noted in the first question that their goal was to “obtain recognition via the UN system as an exceptional NGO and also to use the forum to share thoughts and ideas.” In the follow up question the same respondent noted that they had only partially realized their goals in that they “welcome the recognition (via the CS accreditation) but

find it difficult to share information or promote their organization's expertise" due to logistical barriers such as time, personnel and funding constraints. If such responses are included with feedback equating to an unqualified "yes", a total of 34 respondents (60.7%) indicated they at least some of the goals which motivated their organization to pursue CS affiliation.

A total of 9 respondents (16.1%) essentially indicated that they could not effectively judge whether or not their goals for the CS program had been achieved. In some cases respondents indicated that they have not held CS long enough yet to assess whether their goals have been achieved, although in 2 such cases respondents have possessed the accreditation for several years. In other cases, it appears the organizations at least initially had intentions of participating but as yet have not due to logistical constraints. One such respondent noted that the levels of attainment of their goals in the CS program are as yet unclear as "the channels (for participation) are not convenient". Another indicated that they are still seeking "ways to contribute and work within the UN system in ways that our finances and other limitations allow." While not all respondents elaborated specifically as to why they were unable to realize their initial goals relative to the CS program, among those that did provide details, limited organizational resources including financial constraints were the most commonly mentioned theme.

One of the more interesting patterns to emerge from analysis of the follow-up question as to whether goals had been achieved and why/why not, was the dichotomy of responses related to the organizational goal's breadth of scope. As indicated in Table 4.3, among the 56 respondents providing feedback for the survey item, 18 (32.1%) had

indicated in the previous question that their organizational incentive for seeking CS accreditation was linked to some specific aspect of the CSOs policy/issue area such as development, labor, or human rights. The majority of respondents addressing this survey item---38 or 67.9%---did not cite goals specific to their organization’s policy/focus area, but indicated more general objectives such as participation in UN forums, have a voice in

Table 4.3: Responses to Whether CSO Goals for CS Program Had Been Achieved or Not: A Comparison of Broad/General Goals versus Those Specific to a Particular Aspect of Organization’s Policy/Issue Area

Responses from CS Organizations Indicating Highly Mission/Policy-Specific Goals for CS Program Participation

Responses: N and Percentage of Total

<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>Partial or Qualified Yes</u>	<u>Total Responses</u>
7 (38.9%)	5 (27.8%)	5 (27.8%)	1 (5.6%)	18

Responses from CS Organizations Indicating Broader, More General Goals for CS Program Participation

Responses: N and Percentage of Total

<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>Partial or Qualified Yes</u>	<u>Total Responses</u>
19 (50%)	8 (21.1%)	4 (10.6%)	7 (18.4%)	38

international issues, interact with other NGOs, enhanced credibility, etc. Among those respondents indicating goals specific to their organizational scope/focus, notably fewer (38.9%) indicated “yes” or partially/qualified yes (5.6%) as to their goals within the CS program being attained as opposed to responding organizations which had specified broader, more general goals (50% - yes, 18.4% partially/qualified yes). More respondents indicating CS program goals specific to their CSOs policy/focus areas also indicated “no” (27.8%) or “unknown” (27.8%) regarding achievement of said goals than was the case with those indicating more general goals (21.1% - no, 10.6% unknown). A possible conclusion is that some organizations within the CS program may find it easier to realize goals that are more general in focus rather than objectives specific to particular aspects of their organizational mission and in turn may find the experience of participation in the CS program more fulfilling.

Regardless of the breadth of goals which initially motivated the organizations’ to pursue CS accreditation, the sometimes detailed and impassioned feedback of many of the respondents indicating that they have not achieved their goals during their experiences with the CS program contribute to understanding many obstacles within the dynamic. For example, common themes in the survey findings were that many CS-accredited organizations lack the resources to participate and/or do not know how to derive meaningful benefits from the program. One respondent indicated that “all we have received (from the UN) are invitations to conferences, but our organization...lacks the resources to attend. One time we were able to attend an ECOSOC conference, but the

benefits to our organization were unclear...and nothing learned seemed immediately relevant to our needs.”

Another potentially important issue for the CS organizations which hoped to interact with representatives of foreign governments---for reasons such as impacting policy formulation internationally---is the segregation of civil society venues from country delegations and other UN bodies and the potentially inadequate space available for NGOs to function effectively within the CS program. One respondent provided detailed feedback concerning the latter trend, stating that “in the last decade we have seen at the UN, the shrinking of physical and communication space and the NGOs are now cordoned off into the ‘ghetto’ of the Church Centre, Salvation Army, Armenian Centre and other venues for our meetings, called (by the UN) ‘parallel events’ either opposite the UN Building or even further away.” The respondent continued: “This means that it is very rare indeed for official government delegates ever to attend the parallel events where very different messages and information...can be relayed, different from the formal speeches in the UN Building.”

A different respondent noted that one potential solution to the shortage of meeting/communication space for NGOs might exist in the form of coalitions: “The large number of CS organizations means that all cannot speak at official meetings, but often multiple views can be presented through a single speaker who represents a larger group of organizations.” However, the survey results indicate only around one-half of respondents have ever participated in an NGO coalition and among those which do it seems unlikely that the views of each NGO could be heard on each issue of potential


importance to them. No solution appears to be in sight in terms of the segregation of CS organizations via the 'parallel event' approach. One respondent noted that although they had been hosting events and otherwise actively participating at the UN for the past 18 years, "over the last decade (since the implementation of the 'parallel events' strategy) I feel that no one making policy, i.e. government delegates, can hear us and so our issues are ignored." Among the organizations recently admitted to the CS program which hoped to proactively influence international policy-making, but see no substantive opportunity to do so, and among the long-time participants who have witnessed their initial access to international delegations and UN bodies which contribute to policy formulation progressively erode, it is understandable that some degree of disillusionment may occur and that the latter and the combined realization of increasingly limited access to corridors of power and influence could potentially undermine the ability or willingness of organizations to fully participate in the CS program.

The third survey question inquired as to the level of CS accreditation of participants and whether they felt the classification level was appropriate. Of the 45 responses to the latter portion of the question, the vast majority---39 or 86.7%---deemed their organization's classification/accreditation level within the CS program as appropriate, including all respondents from General Status organizations. However 2 of 3 (66.7%) Roster Status organizations which submitted the completed survey indicated they found their organizational classification/accreditation level inappropriate, as did 4 of 43 (9.3%) organizations with Special Status. While the questionnaire did not specifically ask respondents to elaborate as to why, it can be inferred that in all 6 cases, the CSOs

believed a higher level of CS accreditation was more suitable for their organizations. It is worth noting that the question regarding appropriate accreditation level had among the lowest response rates of any survey item, with only 45 (72.6%) of 62 respondents answering, indicating that many participants were either unsure as to the appropriateness of their CS accreditation level or were otherwise uncomfortable addressing the question directly.

Participants were also asked via a number-line question to indicate the degree to which their CS accreditation level/type impeded their ability to participate in UN programs, with 10 denoting a very high degree of difficulty and 0 no difficulty. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, a total of 56 respondents had a mean score of 3.7 indicate low-moderate levels of difficulty posed by their CS status. 31 (55.4%) of 56 respondents indicated a low score of 3 or less and 15 (26.8%) indicated a moderate-range score of between 3.5 to 6.5. However, a substantial minority of 10 respondents (17.9%) indicated a high score of between 7-10, conveying real or perceived difficulty posed by their consultative status accreditation level in interacting with the UN---presumably the restrictions placed on the ability to make formal statements. As was previously discussed (see page ___), CS organizations with General status have the most freedom and flexibility in conveying positions on issues, with those holding Special status are more restricted, followed by Roster status which imposes the greatest restrictions.

Figure 4.1: Degree to which Level/Type of Consultative Status Impedes CSO's Ability to Participate in UN Programs



Another survey item asked respondents to indicate on number lines how they would rate the importance of each of 5 specific considerations concerning their organization's desire to have UN consultative status. The factors specified were: (1) general prestige/visibility, (2) credibility in fundraising, (3) networking with other CSOs/organizations, (4) contributing/exchanging research with the UN and other organizations, and (5) contributing written or verbal position statements on issues. Figures 4.2-4.6 provide the total number, mean and range of number line responses for each of the latter 5 items.

Figure 4.2: Importance of General Prestige/Visibility Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status




Figure 4.3: Importance of Credibility in Fundraising Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status




Figure 4.4: Importance of Networking with Other Organizations Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status




Figure 4.5: Importance of Contributing/Exchanging Research with the UN and Other Organizations Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status





Figure 4.6: Importance of Contributing Written or Verbal Position Statements on Issues Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status



The variation in mean scores across the 5 considerations was not substantial, with general prestige/visibility scoring highest at 7.7, followed closely by networking with other organizations, contributing written/verbal position statements, and contributing/exchanging research with the UN and other organizations with means of 7.6, 7.4, and 7.2 respectively. All of the latter can be regarded as high-range scores and reflect almost equally high importance afforded by most respondents for each of the latter 4 considerations. The remaining item, credibility in fundraising yielded a somewhat lower mean score of 6.0, which although still moderately high, indicates fundraising was not a primary concern for most and was of the least importance among the considerations respondents were specifically asked to rate.

Participants also had the option of specifying other considerations important to their organization's desire to obtain consultative status. A total of 15 respondents specified a diverse range of other factors not addressed in the 5 number line options. All of the additional considerations specified were rated high (7-10) in importance, and 7 of the factors were rated 10 on the scale, denoting utmost importance. Table 4.4 presents a comprehensive list of each of the additional considerations as specified by respondents. Not all of the comments were detailed and some were not directly linked to the question at hand (e.g. "our CS level impedes us"), but some of the comments were insightful. For example, several related directly to the national circumstances in which the CSO was based including participation in advocacy that would be limited in the home country. Several organizations also specified considerations specific to their policy areas or scope of mission.

In an effort to gauge the types of actual positive impacts (as opposed to initial goals/incentives for obtaining CS addressed in a previous survey item) UN consultative status has had upon CSOs within the program, as well as general patterns and motivations for participation, participants were asked to use number line scores to rate the beneficial impact of each of 6 areas specified in the questionnaire: (1) making meaningful connections with other NGOs in the US; (2) making meaningful connections with other NGOs internationally; (3) making meaningful contributions to the UN; (4) general prestige/visibility; (5) media publicity; and (6) aiding in fundraising. Figures 4.7-4.12 provide the total number, mean and range of number line responses for each of the 6 survey items.

Table 4.4: Range of Additional Considerations Specified by Survey Respondents as Being Important to Their Decision to Obtain CS Accreditation

Recruiting for organization

Joining other UN organizations (UNFCCC)

Interaction with Other NGOs within our country

Create awareness of global interdependency among UN membership

Legitimize our work when lobbying the government

Participate in global advocacy processes that are limited by our own national government

Universal peace

New ideas

Media coverage of UN involvement

Raise awareness about needs/rights of people with intellectual disabilities

Submit accurate data/information about our country (Iran)

Political considerations in determining the status of our organization

Advance the cause of families globally

Discussion

Our level of (CS) accreditation impedes us

Considerable variation in mean scores existed across the 6 areas, with 3 areas achieving either high or moderate-high mean scores and 3 with moderate or low-moderate scores. The highest mean and the only mean which would qualify as a high-range score in terms of benefits derived from the CS program was the 7.1 average for *prestige/legitimacy earned for your organization*. A similar survey item asking respondents why they initially sought consultative status also ranked prestige as the highest consideration, seemingly indicating that this goal of enhanced status via official association with the UN is both a top initial priority and one that has been largely realized as a benefit by organizations within the program responding to the survey.

Making meaningful contributions to the UN and *making meaningful connections with other organizations internationally* had the next highest mean scores of 6.4 and 6.1 respectively, both falling in the upper end of the moderate range for scores. Interestingly, both of the latter survey items relating to benefits realized also had roughly equivalent survey questions related to initial motivation for pursuing CS with the UN. In both cases the mean scores for benefits realized were substantially lower (by a full point or more), implying that although many CSOs feel an overall positive impact was experienced it may have fallen short of initial expectations formulated at the onset of pursuing/obtaining consultative status.

Substantially lower mean scores were obtained for the remaining 3 survey items within the category. *Media publicity for your organization* and *making meaningful connections with other NGOs in the US* had means of only 4.8 and 4.7 respectively, denoting that neither were generally regarded as a primary benefit by respondents.

Beyond initial press attention that may be derived upon first obtaining formal accreditation with UN ECOSOC, it stands to reason that CSOs with little-no substantive activity level within the program would not receive further media attention. Initially I did not know what to expect in response to the item gauging connection with US-based civil society. Given the prominence of US-based CSOs internationally in general and within the CS program in particular and also given the importance of the US as a source of funding and other support for initiatives related to international civil society, I had been curious to see if non-US organizations specifically coveted building relationships with US counterparts, but survey findings indicate that the latter clearly is not the case for most respondents.

The lowest mean score for the series of items inquiring as to organizational benefits derived from the CS program were for *aid in fundraising for your organization*, with 3.9---the lowest mean score obtained for any number line item in the study. The latter results parallel the mean score for *credibility in fundraising*, which also scored lowest among items gauging initial motivation for obtaining CS accreditation. The survey results related to fundraising were among the more surprising outcomes of the study. Though I did not have a clear sense as to whether UN affiliation would actually prove to be beneficial in fundraising (through prestige/credibility of association etc.) in reality, I had initially assumed it would be among the top priorities or perceived advantages among CSOs seeking to obtain CS. Survey results clearly indicated that at least for the majority of respondents neither was the case.

Figure 4.7: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Connections with Other NGOs in the US




Figure 4.8: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Connections with Other NGOs Internationally




Figure 4.9: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Contributions to the UN




Figure 4.10: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Prestige/Legitimacy Derived for Organization




Figure 4.11: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Media Publicity





Figure 4.12: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Aid in Fundraising



Participants were also given the option of indicating “other” as a beneficial impact of obtaining CS and were asked to specify. A total of 10 respondents volunteered such information, with most of the comments being scored positively and 1 comment scored at 0: “no known/observable benefit derived”. A comprehensive summary of the comments offered is provided in Table 4.5. The majority of the comments related to legitimacy or credibility which had been represented as a number line item, though respondents often elaborated as to how (or with what entity) credibility had been enhanced. In two instances respondents noted how CS status had benefited their organization with regard to its specific policy area or scope of mission---i.e., personal safety awareness, connections with exchange students. One response centered upon benefitting from obtaining general information stemming from the CS program.

Table 4.5: Range of Additional Considerations Specified by Survey Respondents as Benefits Derived from Their Organization Obtaining CS Accreditation

Educational resources/materials and useful information

Shows our work has international respect & we may be able to influence international policies

Awareness of personal safety issues

Credibility/legitimacy to participate in national processes

Credibility when offering consulting or collaborating

Beneficial impact with national government (Bangladesh)

Credibility/trust in relationship with government

Credibility with our beneficiaries (donors)

Legitimacy when lobbying government and political parties

Meaningful connections with US exchange students

No known/observable benefit derived

Within the “general background” section of the questionnaire participants were also asked which leader/position within their organization was chiefly responsible for seeking CS with the UN. In constructing the survey, I hoped that this item may help shed some light on why some CSOs within the CS program participate and some do not. For example, if the goal of obtaining CS accreditation was in most cases initiated by a board member or other person (e.g., donor or volunteer) other than a member of senior leadership in charge of day-to-day operations, perhaps lack of managerial support for the association with the UN could be inferred. However, the latter was not found to be the case among respondents, with around two-thirds indicating it was senior management within their organization that bore most responsibility for seeking CS accreditation. Among the fixed-choice options the most common response was executive director with 34.4%, followed closely by CEO with 31.3%. 15.6% of respondents indicated that one or more board members were primarily responsible. Participants also had the option of indicating “other” and asked to specify the job title, an option chosen by 18.8% of respondents. A fairly diverse range of titles/responses were provided with president, secretary general, director of a specific division/program, or a committee or committee chair the most common responses.

In a question also relatable to the questionnaire section regarding participation, organizations receiving the survey were asked if their organization had ever communicated with the UN since obtaining CS accreditation---excluding the routine required submission of quadrennial reports. The goal of the latter survey item was obviously to help gauge degrees and patterns of participation of CSOs within the CS

program. Of 61 surveys answering the question, a large majority---75.4%---indicated that they in fact had communicated with the UN. The manner in which organizations communicated and the frequency of interactions are explored in the “participation” and “networking/communications” sections of the survey, findings of which are discussed beginning on page 173.

Survey Responses – Accreditation and Representation

UN offices are geographically dispersed throughout many world regions. The largest---and via serving as the seat of the General Assembly, Security Council and many other key UN bodies, the most important---UN presence is its primary headquarters in New York. The Geneva headquarters is second in size and also in importance as it is home to some 25 major UN divisions/programs including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the World Health Organization. Third in size and significance is UN headquarters in Vienna, host to several UN agencies/programs including the International Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, the UN maintains regional headquarters in 5 locations: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia---North Africa; Bangkok, Thailand---Asia and the Pacific; Beirut, Lebanon---Mideast and Western Asia; Nairobi, Kenya---Sub-Saharan Africa; and Santiago, Chile---Latin America and the Caribbean.

As part of the effort to discern patterns and degree of CSO participation with the UN, the survey questionnaire contained items designed to gauge levels of participation at different UN locations: each of the 3 UN headquarters in New York, Geneva and Vienna

and also 4 of the 5 regional offices---in an oversight, reference to Nairobi was not included in the survey, but as almost no respondents indicated any presence or history of activity at the regional centers, the latter omission likely had little impact on the study findings. The first such survey item asked participants to indicate if a representative of their CSO has successfully obtained a UN grounds pass/ID (the latter is a higher standard for the designated UN representative of a CSO---rather than merely submitting names of intended representatives---as obtaining the grounds pass requires their physical presence on site and often indicates the representative actually attended a function at the site) for each of 7 locations. Those indicating that representatives had obtained passes/IDs were asked to indicate the number of representatives obtaining passes/IDs for each site.

UN guidelines allow each organization holding consultative status to designate up to 7 representatives for annual passes at each of the 3 UN headquarters locations (up to 9 temporary passes may also be requested which are valid for up to 3 months), and up to 2 representatives for each regional site. It was expected that CSO-designated representatives would be concentrated in New York and the other 2 headquarters sites in descending order of site importance with far fewer representatives designated at regional offices and as illustrated in Table 4.6, this is precisely what the survey data reflected. 42 CSOs indicated their representatives had successfully obtained their credentials for New York, followed by 26 for Geneva and 9 for Vienna. Only 2 organizations (both based in the Mideast---one of these in Lebanon) reported credentialed representatives for Beirut, and only 1 organization (based in Africa) reported credentialed representation for Addis Ababa, with 0 reported for Bangkok or Santiago. The mean number of CSO

representatives among organizations reporting representation at the sites was highest at 5.0 in New York, followed by Geneva with 2.5 and Vienna with 1.9. The 2 regional offices each had a mean of 1 designated representative.

These distributions are logical in that organizations are designating representatives where there are larger numbers of UN offices/programs, larger UN staffs and consequently potentially more opportunities to participate in UN functions via their consultative status. Many of the UN's most important organs and conferences are based in New York, as is ECOSOC itself, the parent organization of the CS program and chief catalyst of the UN-civil society dynamic. Smaller numbers of other UN agencies/projects are headquartered in Geneva and in turn Vienna and both sites are often host to conferences though not at the size or frequency associated with New York. Regional UN offices have considerably smaller staffs, more narrow scope of operations and are principally host to projects or conferences that are specific to their respective geographical areas such as regional economic commissions. The CSOs that via their CS accreditation designate representatives to the regional UN offices likely are either headquartered in that region or have a large proportion of their programs specific to the region. The latter reality was reflected in the survey findings as the only respondents reporting credentialed representatives at regional offices of the UN were headquartered in the same region---if not even the same country.

Table 4.6: Designation of UN Representatives by Location and Number of Grounds Passes/IDs Reported Obtained per Site

<u>UN Headquarters/ Regional Office</u>	<u>N of Respondents Designating Representatives for Site</u>	<u>Mean N of Reprs. Obtaining ID/Grounds Pass for Site</u>
New York	42	5.0
Geneva	26	2.5
Vienna	9	1.9
<u>Regional Offices</u>		
Addis Ababa	1	1
Bangkok	0	0
Beirut	2	1
Santiago	0	0

In attempting to assess commitment to and participation in the CS program, participants were asked what total number of UN representatives their organization will have obtained a UN grounds pass/ID (for all sites combined) in a typical year. Among the 55 respondents answering the question, 4.2 was the mean total. The latter was perhaps slightly higher than anticipated, but the range of responses to the survey item was considerable, with the majority of respondents indicating only 1 or 2 representatives typically obtained credentials annually, and a minority of respondents indicating numbers higher than the mean.


Another survey item asked participants to indicate the UN site(s) at which they have ever participated in meetings, conferences or other functions since obtaining consultative status. As expected and indicated in Table 4.7, the responses closely mirrored the data for accredited representatives by UN sites. The majority of respondents (43 or 78.2% of responses) indicated participation at some form of event at the UN's New York headquarters, followed by Geneva (28/50.9%) and Vienna (11/20.0%) respectively. Only small numbers of respondents indicated ever having participated in any event at a UN regional site, with Santiago, Chile earning the smallest total (2/3.6%).

Table 4.7: CS-Accredited CSO Participation in Functions per UN Site

<u>UN Headquarters/ Regional Office</u>	<u>N of Respondents Designating Representatives for Site (% of Responses)</u>
New York	43 (78.2%)
Geneva	28 (50.9%)
Vienna	11 (20.0%)
<u>Regional Offices</u>	
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	3 (5.5%)
Bangkok, Thailand	4 (7.3%)
Beirut, Lebanon	4 (7.3%)
Santiago, Chile	2 (3.6%)

Asked to assess the overall difficulty involved in the process of accrediting their UN representatives, respondents were asked to rate the level of difficulty on a number line with 10 indicating a very high level of difficulty and 0 indicating no difficulty. As can be seen in Figure 4.13, the mean response among 57 answers was 4.9, which at face value would seem to indicate that the designation and credentialing of UN representatives does not pose a substantial challenge for most CS-accredited organizations. However, among all responses, 20 or 35.1% were 7 or higher, regarded as a higher range score on the number line as constructed. The exact same number of responses, 20 or 35.1% denoted a low score of 0-3.5. In other words, for every organization which reported little-no difficulty with the process of designating/credentialing their organizational representatives to the UN, another organization reported high levels of difficulty. The results of this survey item may serve as a good insight into barriers to participation. For example, if more than one-third of CS program participants experience difficulty with what should be a relatively straight-forward process---a process explained in detail in both print and online literature made available to accredited CSOs---more complex undertakings such as conference participation and understanding the process of providing statements and engaging with coalitions/networks of other CSOs may prove daunting.

Figure 4.13: Level of CSO Difficulty in Accrediting UN Representatives within the CS Program



The final item in the accreditation/representation section asked respondents to select from forced-choice options in order to best characterize the nature of their organization’s UN representative(s). The strategy of including this survey item was that it may lend insight into the nature and degree of CSO participation within the CS program. Specifically, if very few board members or donors were designated as UN representatives, that may possibly indicate lack of support/enthusiasm from the latter segments for the CS program, potentially helping to explain low levels of organizational participation. However, survey results indicated board members were commonly

appointed as CSO's UN representatives with respondents indicating a total of 52 in the role, the 2nd most common response. The most common characterization of the nature of UN representatives was full-time employee, with 67 denoted in that role, with a tie for the 3rd most common response between donors (indicating their appointment is not uncommon) and part-time employees, each with 29 representatives in the roles. The forced-choice options for this item did perhaps shed some light on what was likely *not* a primary driver of lack of participation within the CS program as results showed board members and donors were often designated as UN representatives, implying support and interest in the program on their part. However, forced-choice responses to this survey item did not identify issues related to designation of UN representatives that may impede participation.

Participants also had the option to indicate "other unpaid supporter" of their organization. Interestingly, the latter received the highest number of responses to the survey item with 84 (32.2%) of 261 total responses. This level of response for "other" had not been anticipated and consequently participants were not asked to specify the title/nature of other UN representatives. However, some respondents did voluntarily denote the title or background with the most common responses including former employee (of various titles/responsibilities), former board member/chair, or the chair of various types of advisory committees within the organization such as a governmental affairs or public relations committee.

Survey Responses – Participation, Networking and Communication

The questionnaire items addressing participation and networking/communication (both forms of participation) are especially important to the contention of the third guiding hypothesis that most organizations within the CS program do not participate in the program in a meaningful way. These questionnaire items are also of foundational importance to the second guiding hypothesis in that survey findings (e.g. absence of communication) may help in understanding some of the factors responsible for lack of participation on the part of many CS-accredited organizations and why some are more likely to participate than others. While survey findings in general indicated somewhat low to moderate levels of activity, the totality of data derived from these sections of the questionnaire does not conclusively support the guiding hypothesis that *most* organizations in the CS program do not participate in any meaningful way or fail to make any substantive contribution within the UN-civil society dynamic. The findings do however show minimal communication between most CSOs and the UN or secondary entities (other UN-affiliated CSOs, foreign governments, other IGOs) and also indicate that only a minority of respondents have ever hosted/organized a meeting or other event at a UN forum and only slightly more than half have ever participated with other CSOs in any UN-related network or coalition.

Participants were asked approximately how many UN-related conferences, meetings or workshops their CSO has attended in 3 different time periods: 2005-present, 1995-2005, and pre-1995. The results for the most recent time period are potentially the most useful as the majority of organizations holding CS have likely acquired the

accreditation within the last decade, meaning most respondents likely did not have CS prior to 2005. As can be seen in Table 4.8, 47 (75.8%) of 62 respondents reported their organization had participated in a UN-related function since 2005. However the mean number of UN functions attended was skewed by 5 organizations which reported attending 100 or more functions---2 of these CSOs reported over 200. If data from these 5 organizations is omitted, the resulting mean number of UN functions attended drops to 13.6, a figure that likely more closely reflects the reality of most CSOs that do participate in the CS program and a number that is more consistent and realistic in comparison with the mean numbers reported for earlier time periods. The decline in number/mean of responses almost certainly reflects that fewer survey respondents had attained CS prior to 2005 or 1995, rather than respondents becoming increasingly active over the time period, as upon examination of the 47 CSOs indicating activity at some point since 2005, most did not hold CS accreditation prior that that period. Interestingly, the considerably smaller mean number of UN functions attended prior to 1995 would be consistent with the more limited number of formal outlets/forums for UN interaction with civil society that would have been available in the early 1990s and prior.

The second survey item related to participation, asked a short series of questions as to whether organizations had made written or verbal statements at a UN forum and in either case if they had been asked by the UN to do so. Perhaps the most important contribution that CS organizations can make within the UN framework and the most significant form of expression available to them is to present written or verbal statements

related to their fields of expertise. Further, being asked by a UN body to present a position statement on an issue implies a valuation of CSO input on the part of the UN and also conveys that the organizations within the CS program are viewed by the UN as relevant, competent and capable of making a worthwhile contribution to its body of work. Accordingly, gauging the number of written or verbal statements and the degree to which they were actually requested by the UN offers a meaningful glimpse into the nature and

Table 4.8: Participation in UN Conferences, Meetings and Workshops by Organizations Holding Consultative Status

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>N Respondents Not Listing 0</u>	<u>Mean N per Respondent*</u>
2005-present	47	27.5* (19.4/13.6*)
1995-2005	16	14.7
Pre-1995	6	9.5

* The mean number of UN functions attended per respondent for the period 2005-present is skewed by a small percentage of respondents who reported abnormally large numbers: 5 CSOs reported 100 or more, with 2 of those reporting 200 or more. If only data from the latter 2 organizations is omitted, the mean drops to 19.4 and is further reduced to 13.6 if data from all 5 outliers is excluded. Such statistical outliers were not present in data reported for the earlier time periods.

degree of participation of CS organizations---the core issue in the third guiding hypothesis.

A majority of respondents, 38 (61.2%), indicated that they had presented a written statement. Of the latter, only 24 (38.7% of all survey respondents) had been asked by the UN to do so. Less than half of all survey respondents, 25 (40.3%), indicated that they had made a verbal statement at a UN forum. Only 18 respondents (29.0%) reported having been asked by the UN to present a verbal statement. It is curious that only a small percentage of respondents indicated ever being asked by the UN to present written or verbal statements. Critical interpretations of the latter could include a variety of possible conclusions including: (1) exponential growth of the CS program and the number of CSOs participating means that there are more organizations within the dynamic than can be effectively used/consulted as originally intended; (2) wide variations could exist in terms of the real/perceived credibility and competence of CS organizations with many CSOs not deemed by the UN to be as worthy of being solicited for input; (3) many of the CSOs awarded CS have such a narrow or obscure focus that there is little they can effectively contribute to the often broader issues with which the UN is concerned---which in turn raises the question of why such organizations were admitted to the CS program; (4) perhaps ECOSOC and other UN organs understand that many organizations in the CS program---especially smaller CSOs---either cannot (e.g., financially) or will not participate and thus does not bother with formal requests soliciting their participation. It is worth noting that given the general wording of the survey item, respondents may have broadly interpreted the wording inquiring if they had “been asked” to provide position

statements to include general invitations sent out en masse to many organizations via conference announcements, which means the number of organizations that have specifically been approached by the UN to provide statements is potentially lower than the survey data suggests.

Asked if their organization had ever organized or hosted a meeting or other event at the UN, only 26 respondents (41.9%) of 62 to submit the survey questionnaire indicated in the affirmative. Asked if their organization had ever participated in any way with any NGO network(s)/coalition(s) active within the UN framework, the response rate was only slightly better with 32 respondents (51.6%) indicating that they had done so in the past. The latter survey item also asked respondents to provide the names of the network(s) or coalition(s) with which they had participated. Table 4.9 provides a comprehensive list of all such groups identified by the 18 respondents providing feedback. A total of 43 networks/coalitions were listed across a diverse range of policy/issue areas including human rights and social issues, democracy, development, and environmental issues. While some of the networks/coalitions were temporary in nature, intended to serve a purpose for a specific conference or that otherwise only existed briefly, many are long-term in nature such as many of the standing UN groups for which multiple respondents indicated an affiliation (e.g. NGO Major Group).


One of the survey items designed to determine how CSOs perceive the UN-civil society dynamic asked participants to score on a number line the degree to which they felt that the UN values the participation of their organization, the results of which are provided in Figure 4.14. Among 57 respondents in total, the mean score was a somewhat

mediocre 5.9, conveying that many of the CSOs do not feel valued to a great degree by the UN. A large number of respondents did in fact feel that their participation was valued, as among the responses, 23 or 40.4% scored 7 or higher on the number line, indicating a high degree of valuation as perceived by the CSOs. The largest number of

Table 4.9: UN Civil Society Networks/Coalitions Identified by CSOs as Groups with Which They Have Participated

Arab Forum for Environment/Devt.	NGO Committee on Social Devt.
Arab Network for Environment/Devt.	NGO Committee on CSW (3)
CEDAW	NGO Major Group (2)
Civil Society Network	The 3 Right-holder Group
Climate Change Network – Nigeria	Trade Union Organizations
Coalition for the Rights of the Child	UN DPI Office
CONGO	UN Interagency Network (2)
CONGO Committee on Child Rights	UN Women (2)
CRIN	UNAC Coalition
CSD Civil Society Forum	UNEP-TUNZA
CSW-GO	UNESCWA Beirut Office
ECE Forum – Geneva	UNFEM (2)
Equality Now	UNPFA
Equality without Reservation	VAWG
Global Campaign-Equal Nationality	Water Event - Geneva
Global Compact	Women in Conflict Environments
Human Settlements/UN Habitat	Women Learning Partnership
IANSAs	Women’s NGOs
Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature	World Mission Foundation
KARAMA (End Violence...Arab Women)	World We Want PSG
National Endowment for Democracy	WWSF - Geneva
NGO COA	


Figure 4.14: Degree to Which CS Organizations Feel the UN Values Their Participation



responses, 24 or 42.1%, fell within the moderate range of a score of 3.5 to 6.5, with more respondents selecting a mid-range score of 5 than any other point on the number line. A total of 10 respondents or 17.6% of all surveys submitted indicated a score of 3 or less, 4 of which (7.0%) indicated a number line score of 1 or less.

Using a number line to illicit responses, participants were asked to what degree their organization networked with other organizations in the CS program. As noted in Figure 4.15, among 60 responses, the mean score was a somewhat tepid 5.5 on a number line scale of 10. Nearly half of respondents (28 or 46.7%) indicated a score of 7 or higher, denoting a higher degree of networking with other CSOs. However, the majority of responses fell within the moderate (13 or 21.7%) or low (19 or 31.7%) range, with 6 respondents indicating a score of 0, denoting no networking-related interaction whatsoever.

Figure 4.15: Degree to Which CSOs/NGOs Reported Networking with Other Organizations in the CS Program



Several survey items sought to explore the nature and frequency of communication among organizations related to the CS program. The goal of the later was that such questions would serve as a means of assessing the nature and levels of CSO participation and in general the findings showed minimal-no communication for most organizations. The first such survey item asked participants if since obtaining consultative status have (1) other CSOs affiliated with the United Nations, (2) foreign governments, or (3) a UN agency/office initiated contact and if so, how many times in total.

The findings, as displayed in Table 4.10, indicate that only a minority of respondents had been directly contacted by any of the latter entities and in those cases, the frequency of contact has in general not been. A total of 23 respondents indicated their organization had been directly contacted by either UN-affiliated CSOs or by a UN agency/office. The mean number of contacts by other UN-affiliated CSOs was 61.7, but this number was skewed to a substantial degree by a single respondent claiming to have been contacted more than 1,000 times. If the latter outlier is removed, the mean number of contacts reported from other UN-affiliated CSOs is 19.0, likely more representative of reality for those respondents reporting data for this survey item. The mean number of times respondents reported being contacted by a UN agency/office was 17.3. A more modest total of 14 respondents reported being contacted by foreign governments, a mean total of 20.1 times.

Table 4.10: Source and Frequency of Entities Contacting CS Accredited Organizations

<u>Source of Contact</u>	<u>N Respondents Reporting Contact</u>	<u>Mean N Contacts per Respondent*</u>
UN-affiliated NGOs	23	61.7* (19.0*)
Foreign Governments	14	20.1
UN Agency/Office	23	17.3

* The mean number of times contacted by UN-affiliated NGOs is skewed by one respondent's claim of having been contacted over 1,000 times. If data derived from this single outlier is omitted, the mean drops to 19.0

In an effort to understand, the nature of communication that was occurring, respondents indicating that their organization had been directly contacted by one of the latter sources were asked to specify the purpose of the communication via forced-choice options: (1) general information sharing/introductions, (2) collaboration/sharing of research, (3) specific question about UN process, (4) specific question about the CSOs organizational scope/mission. The most common responses were for *general information sharing/introductions* and *collaboration/sharing of research* which received 34 and 28 responses, respectively. *Specific question about UN processes* or *the CSO itself* each received a more modest 19 responses. Participants also had the option of indicating “other” and were asked to briefly specify the nature/purpose of the communication. A total of 7 respondents indicated “other” and those responses centered around the following topics: coalition issues, donations/fundraising, joint statements/events, and position papers.

In an effort to gauge degree and patterns of participation with the UN, survey participants were asked to indicate which of 4 forms of communication (if any) they had used to pose a question/request to the UN and how many times they had used each medium: email, telephone, fax, writing. Relatively small numbers of respondents indicated that they had communicated with the UN using any of the mediums. Email was the most commonly used method of communicating with the UN, with 34 respondents (54.9% of those returning the survey) indicating its use for a mean of 7.1 times each. Given that most respondents appear to have held CS accreditation for a number of years, the frequency of email communication for most does not appear to be great and even poorer for other mediums. Only 19 respondents (30.6%) reported having called the UN--a mean number of 5.4 times each. 15 respondents (24.2%) indicated having written to the UN---a mean number of 5.9 times each. As expected, communication by fax machine was the least common medium with only 8 respondents (12.9) indicated they had done so---a mean of 4.9 times each.

This survey item also used number lines to ask participants to rate their level of satisfaction with the speed and substance of the communication experience with the UN for each of the 4 mediums with 10 denoting complete satisfaction and 0 complete lack of satisfaction, the results of which are presented in Figures 4.16-4.19. Although a small percentage of respondents indicated low scores denoting dissatisfaction, the mean responses for each category were all mid-range and in each category there were more scores denoting high satisfaction levels than the opposite. Mean scores were comparable across all categories with satisfaction levels reported highest for fax (6.5), email (6.4),

and writing (6.3) respectively, with telephone (5.6) the least satisfying medium for communicating with the UN reported by the CSOs. Survey findings suggest that most CSOs do not perceive major communication problems to exist with the UN and accordingly, the latter issue is likely not a substantial barrier to participation with the CS program.

The range and distribution of responses to most survey items related to participation, networking and communication indicates that a small percentage of organizations in the CS program are very active, most organizations are minimally-moderately active or active only occasionally, and a substantial minority do not appear to participate. The latter observations may vary somewhat depending upon the measure being utilized. For example, less than half of respondents had ever presented a verbal statement at a UN function and only around one-third had ever been asked to provide either a written or verbal statement. Less than half of organizations submitting the survey reported ever having networked with other CS organizations and frequency of communication and meeting attendance related to the CS program overall appear to be minimal for most CSOs. However, other indications exist denoting at least moderate levels of participation, such as the fact that more than half of CS organizations reported participating in a UN-related network/coalition or presented a written statement at some point (though both may be infrequent activities for most CSOs). Also, despite evidence indicating a somewhat tepid degree of overall engagement, most CS organizations feel that the UN values their participation to a moderate-high degree.

Figure 4.16: Level of CSO Satisfaction with Email Communication with the UN




Figure 4.17: Level of Satisfaction with Telephone Communication with the UN




Figure 4.18: Level of Satisfaction with Fax Communications with the UN





Figure 4.19: Level of Satisfaction with Written Communication with the UN



Survey Responses – Barriers

The second guiding hypothesis contended that a variety of factors including financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding the process(es) through which organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC can participate, contribute to a disparity wherein some organizations participate in the CS program and others do not. Accordingly a portion of the survey questionnaire was devoted to identifying barriers and the degree to which they may be impeding some CSOs within the program from participating. Participants were asked to use number lines to rate each of 9 considerations as barriers to their participation within UN programs, with a score of 10 denoting a substantial barrier, and 0 denoting no barrier. The responses and distributions of the latter for each individual item are presented in Figures 4.20 through 4.28.

Only 4 of the 9 items yielded mean scores higher the midpoint of 5, denoting more respondents than not viewed the items as barriers to participation. *Financial commitment/expense* earned the highest mean response of 6.8. The distribution of responses for the item was also telling in that 36 (61.0%) of 59 respondents scored the item within the high range of 7-10, indicating that the clear majority found financial expenses to be a substantial impediment to participating in the CS program. The second highest mean score of 5.9 was for *geographical proximity/distance of UN functions*. Again, the distribution of responses placed the majority, 31 (53.4%) of 58 respondents, within the high range indicating this consideration is a barrier for most CSOs, and given travel costs, this consideration is likely inexorably linked with financial commitment as an obstacle. The other two items having yielded mean scores above midpoint were

time/personnel commitment and *understanding UN processes (clarity of opportunities to participate)* which earned 5.6 and 5.4 respectively. With both of the latter survey items the distribution of responses was somewhat more even and although the largest number of responses fell within the high range of 7-10 for both items---25 (41.7%) of 60 responses for *understanding UN processes* and 25 (43.1%) of 58 responses for *time/personnel commitment*---responses indicate that most organizations providing feedback do not regard either consideration as a substantial barrier.

Mean scores for the remaining 5 items related to barriers were comparable and all within the lower end of the moderate range along the number line. The lowest mean score of 4.0 was for *UN restrictions concerning presentation of written/verbal policy statements*. A brief overview of restrictions as related to the CS accreditation levels of CSOs is provided in Chapter 2 on page 46. In short, organizations accredited with General Status within the CS program have the least restrictions and most flexibility in formally presenting positions to UN bodies, followed by those with Special Status which have additional restrictions, and lastly those with Roster Status which have the most restrictions. Responses to this survey item appeared to largely reflect the accreditation level of respondents. Among the surveys examined with regard to this item, those submitted by Roster Status organizations tended to score the item as being more of a barrier, whereas surveys submitted by organizations accredited with General Status universally indicated little-no concern with this item as a barrier to participation. Among the 56 respondents providing feedback for this number line item, 25 (44.6%) scored within the low range of 0-3, 17 (30.4%) fell within the moderate range, and the smallest

number of 14 (25%)---though a sizeable minority---scored within the high range indicating a perception of the issue as a substantial barrier to participation. It is likely that had (1) CSOs with General Status not been overrepresented and (2) those with Roster Status not been underrepresented in the numbers of surveys returned, the results for this survey item would have been slanted at least somewhat more toward the issue being a barrier to participation.

Conference registration and designation/credentialing of UN representatives tied with a mean number line score of 4.1. Nearly half of all respondents in both categories also scored in the low range of 0-3 (no-minimal barrier posed) on the number line with most of the remainder scoring both items in the moderate/mid-range. While minorities of respondents (24.6% and 24.1% respectively) did provide high scores indicating the areas as barriers, the clear majority of respondents did not see either consideration as an obstacle. The results of these survey items are not surprising as considerable effort has been made by the UN in recent years to simplify and streamline both processes---e.g. clarifying print and web-based guidelines and transitioning both to fully online processes. However, it is clear from the survey responses that a substantial minority of CS organizations still find the processes confusing and/or difficult.

The survey item *quadrennial reports* had a mean score of 4.2. As explained on page 196, the completion and submission of quadrennial reports is at present a fairly simple, streamlined, fully online process that should require minimal time commitment and pose minimal difficulty for most CS organizations to complete. Interestingly however, 9 (18.0%) of 50 respondents scored the item within the high range of 7 or above

indicating they perceive it as a notable barrier, and 4 (8%) respondents scored the item at 10. While respondents were not given an opportunity to elaborate on their reasoning it is possible that the infrequent nature of the report, perhaps combined with typically high turnover of staff at many CSOs may combine to confuse organizations, straining their institutional memories as to the procedure of completing such tasks only once every few years. Adding to the confusion, the UN periodically changes paperwork requirements, shifting submission of quadrennial reports from paper submission to an exclusively web-based process a few years ago for example.

The final number line item in the barriers section of the survey, *support of organization's board and/or donors*, had a mean score of 4.3. No preconceived notion existed as to what the results may ultimately be for this item, but it was hoped that some visible pattern may emerge to help understand why some CS organizations do not appear to participate within the program. For example, if a substantial proportion of respondents scored the issue within the high range as a barrier, it would be obvious that lack of donor or board support was a key driver in minimal-no participation. However, the latter was not the case. Only 14 (25%) of 56 respondents scored the item at 7 or higher, an indication that a sizable minority of CS organizations are potentially experiencing obstacles related to boards/donors, but not most. 25 (44.6%) respondents scored the item 3 or less, with 8 (14.3%) scoring it as 0 and 17 (30.4%) assigned a mid-range score indicating only moderate barriers posed.

In examining the returned questionnaires it appears that a disproportionate number of organizations indicating board/donor support as barriers to participation in the

CS program also indicated no-minimal activity in many respects. Most such organizations appear to have fewer accredited UN representatives, have participated in fewer UN conferences/forums and networking venues, and are less likely to have presented a verbal or written statement at a UN function than CSOs reporting no barriers posed by board members or donors. Several possibilities exist in terms of the minority of CSOs that lack board or donor support for participation in the CS program and the correlation with the latter findings. For example, upon initially seeking CS affiliation the time/cost of active participation in the program may not have been readily apparent to many CSOs' boards/donors and upon matriculating into the program, as such commitments became more obvious, support could have eroded with a commensurate perception that funding and staff time could be better directed elsewhere. Political considerations such as opposition to globalization or the UN in general may also serve to taint the perspective of some donors and board members, preventing or diminishing their support for the affiliation.

The survey questionnaire also provided participants an opportunity to indicate "other" as a barrier to participation and asked them to specify those additional considerations not addressed via other number line options. Only 3 respondents provided such feedback, potentially indicating that barriers and potential barriers to participation had been surmised adequately in the options provided in the questionnaire. Responses included: "general (UN) bureaucracy"; "information about the community of NGOs with consultative status and access to the organizations is difficult", and "completing all documentation online and writing reports is difficult". Neither the first nor second

response was surprising, as the UN is frequently perceived as a bureaucratic morass and in particular it can be difficult to obtain detailed information including specific contact information for CS organizations, even when consulting the iCSO database---which often has missing or incomplete information. The third response concerning difficulty in completing/submitting documentation is somewhat harder to understand given the minimal paperwork requirements, detailed instructions provided and normally fully-online processes (and this comment was made by a CSO in a MDC/developed region) associated with the CS program.

Separate from the multi-part survey items which sought to assess barriers to participation or benefits derived from CS accreditation, organizations were asked to use a number line in addressing one of the single-most important questions posed by the survey: to what degree is the cost and effort of obtaining and maintaining UN consultative status justified by the benefits derived by your organization? In a sense, the question gauges satisfaction levels of respondents based upon their experiences with the CS program (which in turn potentially sheds light on CSO participation/contributions), with a number line score of 10 indicating highly justified and 0 indicating not justified at all. The key underlying implication is that if affiliated CSOs do not feel that the time, effort or financial commitment is justifiable relative to any real or perceived benefit derived, then it is understandable that the participation level of such organizations would be minimal.

Figure 4.20: Barriers: Understanding UN Processes (Clarity of Opportunities to Participate)




Figure 4.21: Barriers: Conference Registration




Figure 4.22: Barriers: Designation/Credentialing of UN Representatives




Figure 4.23: Barriers: Financial Commitment/Expenses




Figure 4.24: Barriers: Time/Personnel Commitment




Figure 4.25: Barriers: Quadrennial Report




Figure 4.26: Barriers: Geographical Proximity/Distance of UN Functions




Figure 4.27: Barriers: Support of Organization's Board and/or Donors






Figure 4.28: Barriers: UN Restrictions Concerning Presentation of Written/Verbal Position Statements



Among the 55 respondents addressing the survey item, the response was largely favorable, as by a nearly 4 to 1 margin, more respondents indicated high levels of justification relative to benefits derived by their organization. As seen in Figure 4.29 the mean number line score was 6.7. Over half of respondents, 31 or 56.4%, scored the item 7 or higher, with 16 or 29.1% indicating only moderate (or possibly---partial) levels of justification with mid-range scores of between 3.5 to 6.5 on the number line. However, a small minority of respondents, 8 or 14.5%, conveyed that in their experiences the effort and cost of involvement with the CS program was largely not justified by any benefits derived. As an alternative means of viewing patterns of responses, if the score distribution is analyzed via midpoint, 16 respondents or 29.1% of the total---a more substantial minority, indicated a score of 5 or less denoting marginal-no justification for involvement in the CS program.

Figure 4.29: Degree to Which Cost and Effort Associated with Consultative Status is Justified by Benefits Derived by Organizations



How Could the UN Improve Experience for Consultative Status Organizations?

One of the last items included in the survey questionnaire was the third of three open-ended discussion questions which asked participants to comment on how the UN could improve the overall experience for organizations in the ECOSOC consultative status program. Of 62 questionnaires returned, 49 (79.0%) respondents provided feedback for this item. The entirety of the respondents’ diverse and often insightful comments and suggestions can be correlated to ten different issue areas---among which some overlap exists: access, bureaucracy, communication, elitism/fairness, expertise,

funding, general guides/training, meetings, networking and capacity building, or issues specific to the CSOs policy/focus area.

Of the latter topics, issues related to meetings and other UN forums were mentioned most frequently with 14 respondents or 28.6% of those commenting on the survey item offering feedback. The majority of the comments complained about the lack of geographical diversity in scheduled UN meetings/conferences and suggested that either key events should be rotated among world regions or that smaller, secondary functions should be held in multiple world regions or even among CS organizations within the same country in order to permit broader participation. Many comments also suggested more functions specific in scope to policy/issue areas as a catalyst for increased opportunities to participate. Respondents also commented as to the need for more advance notice of functions, easier registration processes, more briefing of and interaction between CSOs leading up to meetings, more time allotted for verbal presentations, and the difficulty some CS organizations (principally those in the global south with more limited internet infrastructure) experience with connecting to UN webinars online.

Suggestions related to the need for assistance with funding for attending UN functions were the second-most frequently cited issue. A total of 12 respondents, principally from LDC/developing areas, noted financial difficulties as an obstacle to their participation in UN forums. Most suggested that the UN should prioritize at least partial subsidies for travel expenses for CS organizations attending sanctioned events. Several noted that if funding directly from the UN was not available that efforts could be

undertaken to help CSOs with limited financial means identify and network with corporate sponsors or other donors in order that smaller grassroots organizations and those from less affluent countries might be better empowered to participate in the UN-civil society dynamic.

Just behind money-related challenges, respondents also commonly called for improvements in disseminating general guidelines/information or training CS organizations so that they could better understand UN processes and how to participate. A number of respondents suggested that better, clearer, more detailed, more user-friendly, and regularly updated print or online guidelines are needed, with several specifically noting that such information should include information related to expectations and best practices in order to better facilitate involvement from organizations accredited within the CS program. Multiple respondents suggested that more structured, formalized guidance is needed, especially for CSOs new to the CS program---as the latter experience a steep learning curve, in order that they understand how to contribute/function. Establishment of a UN-ECOSOC training department/staff specific to the CS program or pairing newly accredited CS organizations with veteran CSOs within the program in an informal mentorship were mentioned as possible pathways to improve the participation levels within the CS program.

Many suggestions were also offered related to improving communication in various respects. Several respondents expressed desire for the UN to be more proactive in communicating opportunities for CSOs to contribute. Various specific means of achieving the latter were suggested including the use of regular newsletters, regular

updates of online documentation/information, and the use of comprehensive and detailed calendars of upcoming UN forums---calendars which could also potentially be organized to show opportunities to participate by geographical region or policy/issue areas. Some respondents also stressed the need for better administrative contact information for UN offices/bodies to be provided including the possibility of point of contact information for each scheduled conference or other specific event open to CS organizations. One respondent noted that “obtaining answers to even basic questions remains a challenge beyond the ability of the current system.”

Issues related to access received feedback from multiple survey respondents, with the most common criticism relating to inability to present verbal or written statements to key organs such as the General Assembly or otherwise meet with the UN delegations of member states. One respondent noted that “rarely do government delegates hear NGOs’ verbal statements---only other NGOs”, with another adding that “without access to or communication with member states the input of NGOs is of limited effectiveness.” This appears to be a somewhat common concern on the part of many organizations in the CS program which may have at least initially seen their roles as potentially having impact upon international policy and/or that of member states. Calls for improved access did not exclusively center upon increasing access to UN organs and state delegations as multiple respondents also noted that the original Major Groups (organizations/coalitions among CSOs in the CS program) no longer incorporate new organizations and that it can be very difficult for many CSOs outside the geographical areas of UN forums to participate---an issue which could be at least partly addressed via increased use of video-teleconferencing

and also more advance notice of meetings/events. While issues/recommendations related to access were not the most frequently cited, many of the comments/suggestions received were among the most fervent and impassioned received via the survey including the observations of one respondent bemoaning inadequate access who states that “when CSOs are at the UN we are merely tolerated, not really listened to.” Likewise, another organization indicated that “CSOs and UN-civil society initiatives are referenced more and more in UN literature, but in practice (CSOs) have less and less voice.”

Suggestions related to how the UN bureaucracy might be improved to benefit the CS program were offered by many respondents. The majority of such comments centered around certain processes/requirements being needlessly long and/or inordinately time consuming. Several respondents mentioned reports in general, the procedural steps involved in designating UN representatives and in obtaining grounds passes for them, and multiple respondents specifically mentioned the need to improve the lengthy and time-consuming process of processing NGO name changes within the UN bureaucracy. Bureaucratic and procedural norms related to conferences may also be a source of challenges for some CSOs, as one noted that “when making verbal statements you never know when you might be called so you must be ready all day and not even leave to take a break.” Two respondents, both from developing nations, also noted the difficulty involved in obtaining visas for countries in which UN events were located. While the latter issue falls outside the purview and control of the UN, the range and frequency of comments related to institutional bureaucracy, clearly indicates opportunities for improvement exist.

Issues related to networking, advocacy and other forms of capacity building also received suggestions for improvement from multiple respondents. Several comments highlighted the need for an organized community management effort within the UN wherein spaces could be provided for more interaction among NGOs which might perhaps involve establishing more forums (if even electronic/online venues)---especially as side venues at key conferences---so that organizations in the CS program might better communicate. One such suggestion noted that to date, most networking or coalition efforts were solely driven by the NGOs themselves within most UN venues and that the UN should assume a more proactive role in facilitating such interactions. Specifically, it was suggested that the UN could assist in putting NGOs in same/similar fields in contact with each other, and even further, organizations could be paired with others in the CS program to assist in completion of tasks such as carrying out research or implementing initiatives on behalf of the UN in the field. Essentially, many respondents saw need and opportunity for the UN to facilitate capacity-building programs to boost NGO performance and participation.

A smaller number of comments related to suggestions for improvement within the CS program were related to issues of fairness and elitism. More broadly, several suggestions supported incorporating NGOs in agenda setting within the UN and its various bodies so as to make the organization more egalitarian and less state-centric. Multiple respondents also felt strongly that certain types of organizations tended to be “left behind” and not included equitably even within the parameters of just the CS program. For example, multiple comments touched upon the possibility of elitism in that

greater participation is needed from the global south and also from smaller grassroots organizations which may struggle to compete with well-funded multinational organizations for an effective voice within the UN or otherwise. While respondents offered no concrete solutions to such obstacles it is clear that many CS organizations view the disparate power structure within the CS program as a continuing impediment.

Some respondents also offered suggestions related to CSO expertise and how it is shared within the CS program. Much of the commentary essentially conveyed that many CSOs feel under-utilized as a source of expertise in their policy focus areas. One respondent suggested that expertise categories should be more clearly defined and in turn NGOs in each area should be consulted as need arises by the UN and other entities. NGOs could also be associated formally with specific UN offices/bodies related to their scope of mission which could better utilize their expertise as a knowledge resource. It was also suggested that a greater focus could be placed upon consultative work or that the UN could involve CS organizations with field research or other projects which could provide mutual benefit and also contribute to capacity building.

Lastly, some suggestions focused upon issues that were specific to the policy/issues area(s) of the respondent's organization. For example, a trade union participating in the CS program suggested that the UN should recognize the role/mandate of worker's unions within the broader community of NGOs. An NGO focused upon drug policies noted that efforts to support NGO participation in drug policy must be maintained and expanded to include state members/delegations. An organization specializing in the role of families stressed that the UN and its bodies must consider the

significance of and impacts upon families in its deliberations. One respondent noted that without regard to policy/issue area, many CS organizations are research-oriented and as such could prove useful to the UN in both providing objective input and in analysis.

Overview of Survey Results

Indications exist that the 439 organizations in the CS program randomly chosen to receive the survey questionnaire were a viable representative sample. As noted in Table 4.2 the regional distribution of participants randomly selected closely paralleled the regional distributions of all organizations in the CS program. Also, the accreditation levels of organizations randomly selected closely mirrored the distribution of accreditation levels of all organizations in the program, as depicted in Table 4.1. However, with regard to the latter, among CSOs actually returning the survey, organizations holding General status were somewhat overrepresented and those with Roster status underrepresented in what may have been self-selection by more active organizations and self-deselection by those that are less active or inactive. Though the surveys are believed to be a representative sample, due primarily to a modest response rate of just over 14%, no claim is made that the results are generalizable to all CSOs in the CS program or otherwise in association with the UN.

Many of the survey items yielded results that had been expected. For example, in assessing motivations for seeking CS accreditation I assumed enhanced prestige/visibility for the organization, networking with other CSOs or the UN, and contributing written/verbal statements on issues were primary motives and this was confirmed via the

responses. I had also expected the UN headquarters in New York to be the focal point of accreditation of representatives and attendance of conferences, followed in distant second place by Geneva with minimal-no participation at other UN sites and this precise pattern was revealed by survey data. My initial impression was that substantive communication was not occurring between organizations within the CS program and the UN, foreign governments, or with other CS accredited CSOs and this was largely (though not uniformly) evidenced in the survey results.

Other survey outcomes were unexpected. Respondents' perceptions of UN valuation of their contributions via the CS program were substantially higher than I had anticipated. Organizations reported participating in NGO networks/coalitions and having presented written statements to greater degrees than expected. More respondents indicated that their participation in the CS program was justified by benefits derived than I had anticipated. Among the comments offered in response to the open-ended, subjective items, the degree to which many organizations expected tangible benefits---especially access to UN or other international funding---was somewhat surprising as were the multiple references to difficulty in obtaining travel visas as a barrier to participation, an obstacle I had not previously considered. Broadly, although levels of participation within the CS program could be fairly described as anemic for many, possibly most, CSOs/NGOs, survey results in general indicated somewhat higher levels of activity than I had initially anticipated.

Findings Relative to Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses

Research Question

1c. What types and degrees of participation exist among NGOs which hold consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council?

This question was partially addressed (or at least inferred) via the analysis of the iCSO database as discussed in Chapter 3. As indicated in Table 3.2, a diverse range of organizational types and topical/policy areas are represented among NGOs in the CS program with indigenous organizations, associations, academic entities, foundations, and disability organizations among the most common represented. Table 3.6 provides an overview of the fields of activity and expertise of NGOs within the CS program, the majority of which were related to the following areas: economic and social, gender issues/women, sustainable development, social development, or population issues. As illustrated in Table 3.15, less than one-half (49.9%) of NGOs in the CS program are classified as international in their scope of operations, with the remainder being national (24.1%), local (18.5%) or regional (7.5%) in scope. Analysis of the database also confirmed that ECOSOC is by an overwhelming degree the principle vehicle for formal NGO interaction with the UN, for although a range of accreditation options exist with other UN organs including DPI or CSD, as can be seen in Table 3.21---ECOSOC's consultative status program for NGOs dwarfs all other UN-civil society partnerships in terms of the number of organizations involved.

Analysis of the survey questionnaire results revealed additional details concerning the type and degree of participation of NGOs in the CS program. The majority (75.4%)

of respondents indicated they had communicated with the UN since admission to the CS program though the survey results cannot speak to the frequency and substance of the communication. The majority of respondents indicated the successful appointment of one or more UN representative(s), and attendance at a minimum of 1 UN conference/meeting, though both tend to be confined to either the UN's New York or Geneva headquarters and the frequency of credentialing representatives and attending UN functions appears to be modest for the majority of CS organizations. While most respondents (61.2%) reported having presented a written statement at the UN, the frequency of the latter could not be judged and only a minority of respondents reported ever having presented a verbal statement (40.3%) or having been asked by the UN to present a written (38.7%) or verbal (29.0%) statement. Only slightly more than half (51.6%) of respondents indicated their organization had ever participated in any NGO network/coalition at the UN and less than half (41.9%) reported their organization ever having organized/hosted a meeting or other event at a UN forum.

While the study did not provide a complete picture, the information it did yield seems to indicate that a small minority of organizations in the CS program are involved to a substantial degree and regularly participate in some way, a (perhaps larger) minority of organizations are mostly to entirely disengaged---either never having participated in the first place or withdrawing from active participation at some point, and a majority of organizations are involved to a minimal-to-moderate degree or only sporadically participate throughout the time they have held CS status. A range of possibilities exist in potentially explaining the latter pattern: (1) some organizations were primarily concerned

with prestige/credibility derived from an official association/accreditation with the UN (as some survey data suggests) and never intended to make meaningful contributions; (2) some organizations may have initially had the intention to participate but were unable to realize any intrinsic benefit to their organization from the affiliation and consequently either minimized or ceased their efforts to participate; (3) some may have had largely or entirely extrinsic motives and at least initially sought to contribute expertise/perspective rather than derive benefits, but a range of barriers such as financial or logistical hurdles as identified in the survey findings impeded their ability to do so; (5) those organizations that are larger, possess more resources financially and otherwise and that are truly international in their scope of operations, are much better positioned to participate in ECOSOC-CS or similar initiatives, than smaller organizations with less resources.

Research Question

2. Why do some NGOs in consultative status utilize the status to participate in UN functions but others do not?

Guiding Hypothesis

2. A variety of factors including financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding of the process through which NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC can participate make some NGOs more active than others.

In the early conceptualization stage of this research it was obvious that substantial variations existed in terms of NGO participation levels within the CS program. Multiple NGOs with which I was personally familiar had either lost their CS accreditation through inactivity or were barely retaining the status via an occasional modicum of effort. However, simultaneously it was clear that other organizations were active and successful participants within the program. Prior to undertaking the research, I suspected that a range of certain considerations in combination facilitated participation on the part of some organizations and impeded it in others. Not all considerations would impact every NGO within the program in the same way or to the same degree, but my initial thoughts as to possible impediments gave rise to the 9 number-line items and certain other survey questions designed to gauge barriers to participation. Given the reluctance of the UN to directly address such issues (and potentially admit that its primary outreach effort to international civil society may not be as vibrant as portrayed) and the scarcity of literature and any previous studies directly addressing the phenomenon of lack of participation within the CS program, not until the survey data was obtained and analyzed could the impact of such factors be confirmed and at least partly understood.

The most important survey instrument for assessing impediments to participation was the section in which participants used number lines to assess each of the 9 specified factors as barriers. In analyzing mean scores, it was very clear that each of the factors were barriers to at least some organizations, but they varied by degree of importance. Financial commitment/resources was the most commonly identified impediment to participation, closely followed in importance geographical proximity/distance of UN

functions, time/personnel commitment, and understanding UN processes (clarity of opportunities to participate, all of which yielded mean scores above the midpoint of the number line. Fewer respondents identified lack of board/donor support, the quadrennial report, designation/credentialing of representatives, conference registration or UN restrictions concerning presentation of written/verbal statements as substantial impediments but each of the latter were identified as barriers by a minority of organizations. Given the option of specifying other barriers, respondents also cited the UN bureaucracy, completion/submission of reports and other documents, and lack of access to information about other NGOs in the CS program as substantial impediments.

Other survey items were also incorporated to assess barriers to participation. Asked to denote on a number line the degree to which their organization's CS accreditation level impedes participation, over 41% of respondents indicated a score at the midpoint or higher on the number line indicating a moderate to high degree of difficulty posed. Participants were similarly asked to assess the difficulty of designating and accrediting their organization's UN representatives, with over 59% denoting a score at the midpoint or higher indicating most organizations saw the process as posing moderate to high degrees of difficulty. Survey items addressing communication levels demonstrated moderate to minimal contact between most NGOs and the UN with a minority of NGOs conveying dissatisfaction with the speed/substance of the communication with the UN. Only a minority of respondents reported ever having been asked by the UN to present a verbal or written statement and a substantial minority conveyed that they feel the UN does not value the participation of their organization

within the CS program. The final survey item contained in the questionnaire asked respondents to use a number line to assess the degree to which the cost and effort of obtaining and maintaining CS is justified by the benefits derived, wherein a sizeable minority of over 29% provided a number line score ranging from 0, denoting not justified at all) to a midline score of 5, denoting only somewhat justified.

Responses to subjective, open-ended survey items mirrored the findings of the fixed-choice questions. A wide range of factors were cited in response to why the organization sought CS accreditation, why organizational goals within the CS program had or had not been achieved and how could the UN improve the experience in the CS program. Among the more common impediments to participation cited by respondents were financial considerations and difficulties related to understanding and managing the UN bureaucracy, both of which were referenced in the second guiding hypothesis. Other commonly cited barriers included logistical and other difficulties related to attending meetings, difficulties in communicating and networking with other CSOs, lack of access or ability to share expertise, fairness issues such as limitations on CSOs in the global south, and general lack of clarity regarding mission or how to contribute within the dynamic---the latter also being cited as an example of a possible barrier in the second guiding hypothesis. Interestingly, it seemed that CSOs with narrow goals that were specific to their policy/issue area and that were more intrinsic in nature were more likely to report those goals having been achieved within the CS program than counterparts which had formulated broader and more extrinsic goals---e.g. seeking to contribute to the work of the UN rather than derive funding or other benefits. Organizations within the CS

program also seemed more likely to participate and report successful experiences if they were larger with more employees and better funding. The CS accreditation level of organizations also appeared to factor into their participation level and experiences with those holding General status (somewhat over-represented among survey respondents) being on average more likely to participate and cite fewer barriers to participation, while those holding Roster status (under-represented among survey respondents), appearing less likely to participate and more likely to cite certain issues as barriers, such as ability to provide input. The content of the survey feedback appears to clearly confirm the second guiding hypothesis in that: A variety of factors including financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding of the process through which NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC can participate make some NGOs more active than others.

Research Question

3. How many NGOs holding consultative status fail to participate in any meaningful way in ECOSOC functions?

Guiding Hypothesis

3. Given such constraints, most NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not participate in any meaningful way in UN meetings or otherwise make any substantive

contribution (providing input at conferences, submitting research/data, etc.) to the UN goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society.

The 3rd research question may prove difficult to definitively answer in an objective fashion short of the UN tracking and releasing such data. Based upon my own experiences and anecdotal information, it appears that a large percentage of NGOs lose their consultative status within a few years of obtaining the status (submitting examples of participation is a requirement of the mandatory quadrennial report) via inactivity. However, statistics related to such attrition do not appear to be made publically available by UN-ECOSOC which touts the CS program as the pinnacle achievement in the international governance-civil society dynamic. External research and tracking of such attrition would prove extraordinarily tedious in that currently nearly 5,000 organizations are in the CS program and would also require long-term effort as a 1-year grace period is offered for quadrennial report submission and it is possible to stave off ejection from the CS program for at least 1 cycle via citing justification of non-participation---meaning some CSOs might be inactive for 5 or even 10 years prior to losing their accreditation.

The manner in which the third research question and third guiding hypothesis are framed may also pose difficulties in that appraising what does or does not constitute “meaningful” participation is likely subject to a wide range of interpretation. For example, does the designation/credentialing of UN representatives, timely submission of quadrennial reports and informal communication with other CSOs within the CS program constitute “meaningful” participation or should a requirement for formal involvement such as attendance at a UN venue be the standard? Does attending 1 UN

conference/event per quadrennial report cycle (4 years) constitute “meaningful” participation or should the standard be attendance at one event per calendar year? Is mere attendance at a UN conference/event sufficient for attaining “meaningful” participation or should an expectation exist that a verbal or written statement be presented or some other substantive contribution be made beyond merely a periodic physical presence at a UN venue? In retrospect, this research could have established specific parameters as to the minimum criteria for “meaningful” participation---e.g. “once per calendar year, the organization either officially attends a UN conference/event or otherwise makes a substantive contribution via submission of a written statement, submission of research/data, formal collaboration in the field, etc.” However, even with benefit of such a demarcation, debate could ensue as to the standard established for “meaningful”.

Perhaps of greater importance is the reference in the third guiding hypothesis to “most” organizations in the CS program not participating. To a large degree, the survey findings were mixed in this regard. Most survey respondents did not indicate that they had credentialed representatives or participated at UN functions in Geneva, Vienna or any of the regional offices of the UN, though most had done both relative to the primary UN headquarters in New York. Most respondents indicated they had not ever presented a verbal statement or been asked by the UN to present a verbal or written statement, but most did indicate that they had presented a written statement (with many apparently doing so of their own accord without invitation) at some point. Less than half reported ever having organized/hosted a meeting or other event at a UN forum, but slightly more

than half reported that their organization had participated in an NGO network/coalition at some point during their tenure in the CS program. Most noted that they had never been contacted by UN-affiliated NGOs, foreign governments, or a UN body, but most indicated having contacted the UN at some point via email or telephone (though not fax or writing) with questions at some point. While *many* organizations within the CS program do not appear to be active, and *most* respondents may not have engaged in any one of several specific types of activities, the contention of the third guiding hypothesis as worded---that most organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not participate in any meaningful way or make any substantive contribution---is not supported by the survey findings and is therefore not supported.

V. CHAPTER FIVE:

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Introduction

A diverse range of civil society organizations has increasingly been involved with the United Nations (UN). This includes record numbers of civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which hold formal consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the main organ for UN interaction with international civil society. A primary goal of the UN has been to cultivate a more effective, diverse and democratic institutional culture via the active inclusion of and interaction among international organizations and civil society to augment the traditional role of states as the primary transnational actors within the organization. This study identified patterns of participation and effectiveness of civil society organizations within the UN, with a particular focus on participation within ECOSOC.

This study is significant for three reasons. Firstly, the UN practice of cultivating formal association with reputable international civil society organizations has expanded markedly in recent years and has been described as the most dynamic area of growth and change within the UN framework (Alger 2002). In 1946 when the practice was initiated, only 41 CSOs/NGOs held formal consultative status with the UN, but currently the status is afforded to nearly 5,000 organizations of various types, representing a wide range of

issues across the globe (United Nations 2016, 2). However, it has been largely unclear what patterns of participation exist among the diverse range of CSOs/NGOs which have formal status with the UN. Analysis of geographical, topical and other patterns of participation among NGOs is important in cultivating a general understanding of the inter-organizational dynamic. Importantly, most previous attempts to study such issues have focused upon one or very limited numbers of CSOs/NGOs or have been specific to a particular issue area such as human rights or development rather than seeking to understand overall patterns of civil society participation within an IGO (Tallberg et al 2013).

Secondly, the number of CSOs/NGOs with formal standing at the UN has grown exponentially, theoretically allowing non-state actors an unprecedented level of access and input. Proponents of the trend see it as a catalyst for global justice and democracy in which more populations and issues are afforded a voice and in which CSO expertise on specific issues may be contributed, but it is also viewed as a means for the UN to research and implement many multilateral initiatives such as the Sustainable (formerly “Millennium”) Development Goals, (Grady 2005; Pubantz 2005). Large-scale participation of civil society organizations within IGOs particularly in policy formulation roles also potentially enhances the legitimacy of the IGO in that it contributes to the appearance of pluralistic and democratic approaches (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010). Yet, a preliminary assessment of CSO/NGO participation in UN forums suggests minimal-to-no actual participation by most of the organizations which have attained formal consultative status. A large number, possibly the majority, of CSOs/NGOs which have obtained

formal status within the UN may never have engaged in any meaningful way with the organization, which would presumably diminish the claims related to a dramatically expanded role of civil society and democratic pluralism within the UN (Mowell 2015). To understand the effectiveness of civil society organizations within the UN framework, it is necessary to determine their degree of participation within the UN and also to understand the factors which encourage participation and barriers which may prevent participation.

Thirdly, analysis of patterns and the degree of participation may serve as a foundation for further research related to civil society at the United Nations such as understanding the political, fiscal or other reasons for CSO/NGO participation or the lack thereof. Impediment to CSO/NGO participation identified in this research, can serve as the focus for future analyses designed to explore ways to introduce CSOs/NGOs to the UN bureaucracy, streamline their matriculation into the consultative status program, or otherwise facilitate greater degrees of participation. More profoundly, if many NGOs fundamentally lack the organizational or fiscal ability or sincere commitment to engage with the UN via the program perhaps the consultative status program or its admission criteria for NGOs should be scrutinized for viability.

To the best of my knowledge this is the first comprehensive academic study of macro-level patterns of regional and topical (policy focus area) participation on the part of organizations holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. It may also be among the first studies which endeavors to identify and explain specific reasons for engagement or the lack thereof on the part of organizations in consultative status. Lastly, the study

appraises the findings within the theoretical framework of political pluralism in assessing the place and contributions of CSOs/NGOs within the UN dynamic.

The research findings yielded mixed results in terms of the three guiding hypotheses. The first guiding hypothesis contended that imbalances exist in patterns of participation of organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC with regard to country/regional involvement (e.g. NGOs of developed states/regions are proportionally better represented than those of developing states/regions) and also regarding the policy/issues areas with which the organizations are concerned. Exhaustive analysis of data contained in the UN's publicly available iCSO (integrated Civil Society Organizations) database, designed to illustrate the degree and nature of UN involvement with international civil society, conclusively proves a disproportionate underrepresentation of CSOs/NGOs from developing regions (relative to their composition of world population) and overrepresentation of those headquartered in developed regions. The database also revealed substantial variations in the degrees to which policy/issue areas were represented, confirming the second element of the guiding hypothesis.

The second guiding hypothesis alleged that a variety of factors including financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding of the process through which CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC can participate collectively contribute to some organizations within the CS program being more active/engaged than others. Both the second and third guiding hypotheses were operationalized via use of a detailed survey questionnaire emailed to a randomly selected pool of 439 organizations

(10% of the total) identified as currently holding consultative status and as speaking English as at least one of several languages. A total of 62 CSOs/NGOs (over 14% of those receiving the questionnaire) submitted the survey and those respondents revealed a diverse and complex range of factors that account for wide variations in participation within the program, including a number of considerations that had not been anticipated such as difficulty experienced by representatives of organizations in obtaining visas to travel to UN functions. The information yielded by the survey clearly supports the second guiding hypothesis in that a diverse range of considerations collectively serve as barriers to participation in the consultative status program for many organizations.

The third guiding hypothesis contended that given such diverse obstacles, most NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not participate in any meaningful way in UN meetings or otherwise make any substantive contribution (providing input at conferences, submitting research/data, etc.) to the UN goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society. While survey data as well as certain types of data revealed in the iCSO database analysis both paint a somewhat anemic picture of CSO/NGO participation within the CS program, the findings do not conclusively support the third guiding hypothesis, in part due to the subjective manner in which it was worded. What does or does not constitute “meaningful” participation or a “substantive” contribution is subject to individual interpretation and not prone to objective measurement as worded. In hindsight, this guiding hypothesis could have been framed more narrowly with definitive and measurable parameters such as establishing a minimum threshold of attendance at one UN event per year on average for meeting standards for “meaningful” or

“substantive” involvement. Yet clear indications do exist of a lack of substantive participation on the part of many organizations in the CS program. The study indicates that only a small minority of organizations within the CS program appear to be actively/regularly engaged, with a larger number of CSOs/NGOs making only minimal or infrequent contributions, while a large number appear to be mostly-to-completely disengaged. Details concerning the latter and the research findings related to the first and second guiding hypotheses, including summations of the most interesting and important findings stemming from the study are provided in the next sections.

Summary Overview of iCSO Database Analysis

Analysis of the iCSO database yielded a range of interesting findings, one of the first of which was that CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC comprised only a small minority of the organizations listed in the iCSO database. For example, among all entries categorized by organizational type, only 12% were in the CS program. If the assumption can be made that the CS program is comprised of the international civil society organizations most actively engaged with the UN, a perception furthered by the UN itself, a possible implication of this numerical underrepresentation within the iCSO database is that many of the nearly 40 thousand database entries are for organizations that in reality may not be engaged with the UN to any real degree contrary to what an organization’s listing within the database may imply. The latter perception is bolstered by the presence within the iCSO database of many organizations that have previously been stripped of CS due to inactivity, including several NGOs with which I am

personally familiar and that to the best of my knowledge never had any substantive form of interaction with the UN before or after removal of consultative status.

There also appear to be irregularities and inconsistencies with how certain organizations and other data are classified within the iCSO database, though whether through error in data input (the frequency of odd classifications implies the latter is not the case), or capriciousness or arbitrariness on the part of the UN's NGO committee or others designating categories for organizations. The most glaring examples of odd (miss)classification of organizations were evidenced via analysis of the scope/scale of CSOs. Surprisingly, only 34.8% of all organizational entries were classified as international CSOs/NGOs in scope of operations, with 33.1% classified as national, 19.1% as local, and 13% as national in scope. Odd inconsistencies were visible in terms of which types of organizations were deemed to have which scope/scale of operations. For example, only 53% of organizations with the typological classification of "local government" were also classified as having a local scope of operations, with many instead categorized as having international or national scope when that is apparently not the case. Such incongruities cause concern as to the reliability of the data and its classification within the iCSO system.

In addition to drawing attention to possible misclassification of organizations, analysis of the scope/scale data revealed an interesting contrast in that substantially larger percentages of organizations in LDC/developing regions were classified as being local, national or regional in scope rather than international. For example, only 6% of organizations in MDCs were classified as local in scope, but 13.1% in LDCs. Only 5.9%

of organizations in MDCs were classified as national in scope, but 27.2% in LDCs. If the latter data can be believed it may indicate (1) greater inclinations on the part of CSOs/NGOs in developing regions to look externally/internationally (to the UN or other IGOs) for potential sources of support, and/or (2) that civil society in developing regions is more bottom-up rather than hierarchical in its orientation as has been suggested in the literature.

Proportionality is a component of plurality of critical importance to this study in that understanding the degree to which regions are proportionally represented is a reflection of the degree of spatial parity and equitable pluralism in appraising the relationship between the UN and transnational CSOs. Analysis of data specific to entries for organizations with consultative status revealed a disproportionate dominance of MDC-based organizations. In most categories, there are more CS organizations headquartered in LDC/developing regions than MDC/developed regions, but LDCs are proportionally underrepresented relative to the portion of global population that they comprise. The predominantly MDC regions of Europe, Anglo America and Oceania collectively comprise only 15.3% of the global 2016 population, but are headquarters to 61.2% of organizations that presently hold consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. Among MDC regions, Anglo America was the most disproportionately overrepresented as it constitutes only 4.9% of the global population but is headquarters to 26.5% of CSOs holding consultative status.

LDC/developing regions comprise 84.7% of the world's population yet are headquarters to only 38.7% of the civil society organizations listed as holding

consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. By far, the largest proportional underrepresentation among LDC regions is for Asia which constitutes 59.7% of the global population yet was identified as headquarters to only 18.0% of organizations in the CS program. Interestingly, LDC/developing regions are also severely underrepresented proportionally among organizations holding General Status, the highest accreditation level within the CS program, and the level which provides the greatest degree of access and least restrictions within the UN framework. Of the 6 world regions delimited within the iCSO database, the 3 with the smallest percentage of General Status CSOs were all LDC/developing regions: only 1.2% of African-based CS organizations hold General Status, only 2.8% of Asia-based CS organizations, and 2.5% among those based in Latin America and the Caribbean.

A case study of the world's 20 most populous countries was also undertaken as a gauge of proportional plurality/representation. The findings not only reinforced the conclusion that CSOs based in LDC regions/countries were proportionally underrepresented but also allowed for a new type of comparative analysis related to proportionality, the representation of democratic versus nondemocratic countries within the CS program. Of the 20 most populous countries, 10 were deemed by most recent FreedomHouse analysis to be democratic and 10 quasi/non-democratic. Of the 10 countries with the lowest percentages of all CS organizations, 6 were non/quasi-democratic and 4 of the 5 countries that were the most underrepresented proportionally were non/quasi-democratic. Only 1 of the 10 most populous non/quasi-democratic countries (DR Congo) was deemed to be represented in the CS program proportionally to

its population. The underlying implication of the findings is that regime type and level of freedom may be important factors in determining degree of civil society representation within international forums.

An additional case study sought to determine degrees of variation (in representation of CSOs/NGOs in the CS program) among countries and sub-regions of the same geographical region. Europe was selected as this regional case study because (1) it is home to approximately one-quarter of the world's countries---providing a large pool of countries to analyze, and (2) CSOs/NGOs headquartered on the continent appeared to be well-represented within the consultative status program. As expected, the degree of representation within the CS program varied widely among countries and also among sub-regions. Proportional to population, the least represented countries by wide margins were those of Eastern Europe, likely reflecting a combination of both financial limitations (reflecting the East's status as the least wealthy region of Europe) and also the political reality that scarcely one generation has passed since the end of authoritarian rule and the gradual and ongoing emergence of civil society. The case study also revealed that CSOs from EU member states, or states which were EU candidates were proportionally far better represented within the CS program than those headquartered in non-EU/non-candidate countries, indicating the supportive role that the EU plays for European CSOs/NGOs (Thiel 2017).

Proportionality is also a potentially important consideration with regard to policy/issue areas in that it is desirable for some degree of equity to exist in the representation of different issues and policy areas. The first guiding hypothesis

specifically addressed issues of proportionality and imbalanced representation both in regard to country/regional involvement and the policy/issues areas with which the CSOs/NGOs are concerned. Widely varied and uneven degrees of representation of policy issue areas were found to exist within the UN-civil society framework. Among classifications according to organizational typologies within the iCSO database, the organizational types specific to the CS program with the largest number of entries were Foundations (10.4%), Ageing (8.5%), Associations (7.7%), Labor (6.8%), and Disability (6.7%). The organizational types specific to the CS program with the least representation were Institutions (1.3%), Private Sector (1.3%), IGOs (1.1%), Media (0.6%), and Local Governments (0.0%).

Database classifications according to fields of expertise also varied widely by degree of representation across policy issue areas. Representation of CS organizations varied substantially across the 11 categories organized by fields of expertise with entries related to Economic and Social issues having the largest percentage at 20.2%, followed by Gender Issues/Women at 16.4%, Sustainable Development at 13.1%, and Social Development at 13%. Outside the latter fields, total numbers of entries were more modest, with the smallest degrees of representation associated with 3 fields specific to Africa, each of which remained in single digits. Outside the CS program, iCSO database listings related to both organizational typology and field of expertise showed even greater degrees of imbalance. These findings support the contention of the first guiding hypothesis that imbalances exist regarding the representation of policy/issue areas within the CS program.

A final element of the iCSO database analysis sought to determine the degree to which the ECOSOC-CS program was the primary outlet for civil society participation at the UN in comparison to several other UN accreditation/affiliation programs for CSOs/NGOs. Five such programs were evaluated including those of the Commission on Sustainable Development, Department of Public Information, Financing for Development Office, Small Island Developing States, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Analysis of the numbers for the other five UN affiliation programs for CSOs/NGOs revealed them to have only small fractions of the involvement of the ECOSOC consultative status program. The DPI accreditation program had the largest number of accredited organizations with 868 (compared to nearly 5,000 organizations in the ECOSOC-CS program) and it appears to present organizations with opportunities for engagement throughout the year, whereas the other 4 programs---even if two (CSD and FDO) are theoretically ongoing---seem to be focused around periodic summits or other special events, thus providing a more limited dynamic for participation with the UN.

Summary Overview of Survey Findings

The survey questionnaire was designed to operationalize the second and third guiding hypotheses. As discussed in some detail at the beginning of Chapter 4, there is evidence to suggest that to at least some degree participant self-(de)selection occurred contributing to possible bias in the survey results. Those organizations which are more active were perhaps in turn more likely to complete/submit the survey and those more inactive less inclined to do so. In short, a disproportionately high survey response rate

among organizations which hold General status---likely the most engaged organizations within the CS program, a disproportionately low response rate for organizations which hold Roster status---the most restrictive accreditation status and likely the least engaged organizations within the CS program, combined with survey results that in some respects indicated somewhat higher levels of engagement than anticipated are the basis of the latter perception. In the event such bias does exist, it does not invalidate the survey results as no known impact would have occurred regarding the operationalization of the second guiding hypothesis and with regard to the third guiding hypothesis, the findings revealed CSO/NGO participation levels that could at best be described as tepid, a level of involvement that would likely only be reduced further if any such bias could have been controlled. The latter issues aside, the survey likely contributes to better understanding of the UN-civil society dynamic and yielded a range of interesting results---some of which were unexpected, an overview of which is provided in the following section.

One of the more important components of the survey and the first of three open-ended questions asked participants why their organization sought consultative status and whether those goals had been realized. Slightly less than one-third of responses (31.6%) were reasons specific to the policy/issues areas of the CSO, such as a labor organization seeking to bring international attention to workers' issues. The majority (68.4%) of responses were a diverse range of more general considerations, many of which were extrinsic in nature. Interestingly, those respondents indicating more general or extrinsic goals such as "contributing to the UN" or "networking with other NGOs" were more likely to indicate having at least partly achieved those goals and also report higher levels

of satisfaction with the CS program. Among respondents addressing whether the goals had been achieved, 46.4% indicated “yes”, with an additional 24.3% providing a partial or qualified “yes” in response, for a combined (at least partial) success rate of 60.7%. A substantial minority of 23.2% indicated that their initial organizational goals for the CS program had not been achieved and another 16.1% of respondents indicated that they could not determine whether goals had been realized or not, with the most common accompanying reason being they had not been in the CS program long enough to have seen any impact---though nearly all such comments were from organizations which had been in the program for at least several years, a sufficient time to have participated in some way.

Many obstacles to achieving organizational goals and participating in the CS program were reported via the survey, among the most commonly cited of which were lack of financial resources, not understanding how to effectively participate or derive benefit from the program, segregation from the UN and member governments, and feeling ignored/powerless with little opportunity. Accreditation level was not cited as an impediment by any organizations holding General consultative status (the highest accreditation level with the least restrictions) and only by a minority holding Special status. However, a notable minority of 17.9% of all respondents did indicate that their accreditation level posed an impediment to participating, including the majority of the small number of Roster status (the most restrictive status) organizations responding.

To better understand the UN-civil society dynamic, participants were asked to indicate on number lines how they would rate the importance of each of 5 specific

considerations concerning their organization's desire to obtain UN consultative status. The highest mean response (7.7) response was for prestige/visibility, followed by networking with other organizations (7.6), contributing written or verbal statements (7.4), and contributing/exchanging research (7.2), with credibility in fundraising (6.0) the least important consideration. To gauge how outcomes compared to initial expectations, participants were also asked to use number line scores to rate the beneficial impact of each of 6 areas specified in the questionnaire. Indicating successful alignment with many initial objectives, mean responses were highest for prestige/legitimacy (7.1), making meaningful contributions to the UN (6.4), and establishing connections with other NGOs/organizations (6.1). The areas reported as yielding the least benefits were media publicity (4.8), making connections with NGOs/organizations in the US (4.7), and--- consistent with the low mean scores in the responses to initial goals for the CS program--aid in fundraising (3.9) for the organization.

In exploring the contention of the second guiding hypothesis that a diverse range of factors impeded participation in the CS program, participants were asked a series of questions related to barriers, the first of which used a series of number lines to assess the importance of each of 9 potential obstacles. Of the latter, 4 of 9 items yielded mean scores higher than midpoint, indicating most respondents viewed them as moderate-to-substantial barriers. The highest among these with a mean score of 6.8 (on a scale of 0-10) was *financial commitment*, with the somewhat interrelated issues of *geographical proximity/distance* (5.9) and *time/personnel commitment* (5.6) following closely behind, and *understanding UN processes* (5.4) rounding out the 4 highest scoring items. Only a

minority of respondents indicated lack of *board/donor support* as a barrier but interestingly, in examining the returned questionnaires it appears that a disproportionate number of organizations indicating board/donor support as barriers to participation in the CS program also indicated no-minimal activity in many respects. Most such organizations appear to have designated fewer UN representatives, have participated in fewer UN forums, and are less likely to have presented verbal or written statements at a UN function than organizations indicating no barriers posed by board members or donors. Several possibilities exist in terms of the minority of organizations that lack board or donor support for participation in the CS program and the correlation with the latter findings. For example, upon initially seeking CS affiliation the time/cost of active participation in the program may not have been apparent to many boards/donors and upon entering the CS program---as such commitments became more obvious, support could have eroded with a commensurate perception that funding and staff time could be better directed elsewhere. Political considerations such as opposition to globalization or the UN in general may also serve to taint the perspective of some donors and board members, preventing or diminishing their support.

Other barrier-related questions also yielded insight. One of the more telling questions contained in the survey asked participants to denote the degree to which they felt that the cost/effort of obtaining consultative status is justified by the benefits their organization has derived from the affiliation. The majority of responses were at least marginally favorable but a substantial minority (29.1%) scored the number line item at mid-point or less, indicating they perceive the intrinsic worth of their participation to be

in question. In an open-ended question, participants were also asked how the UN might improve the experience for organizations within the CS program. Respondents' diverse and often insightful comments and suggestions were analyzed and correlated to ten distinct issue areas---among which some overlap exists: access, bureaucracy, communication, elitism/fairness, expertise, funding, general guides/training, meetings, networking and capacity building, or issues specific to the CSOs policy/focus area. Among the latter, issues related to meetings and other UN forums (28.6%), funding (24.5%) were the most commonly cited, followed by the need for general guides/training, improvement in communication, and increased access were mentioned most frequently with the majority of respondents commenting on some combination of the latter 5 issues. Smaller numbers of respondents touched upon other issues such as fairness/elitism.

Principally, to test the third guiding hypothesis that most organizations do not participate in the CS program, but also to potentially shed light on the range of obstacles to participation as addressed in the second guiding hypothesis, survey respondents were asked to provide details concerning their designated UN representatives. Most (78.2%) indicated that their organization had designated representatives at UN headquarters in New York, which also had the highest mean number (5.0) of representatives obtaining grounds passes. Only slightly more than half (50.9%) of respondents indicated representatives had been designated in Geneva, and a small minority (20.0%) reported representatives accredited to Vienna. Almost no organizations reported designating representatives at UN regional offices. While most respondents did not indicate the process of designating and credentialing their UN representatives as problematic at least

to some degree, the process did appear to be an issue for some. A large minority (35.1%) indicated difficulty experienced during the process, a large enough number that the issue should be regarded as a potentially important barrier to participation. Respondents were also asked to characterize the nature/background of their UN representatives with the most common being full-time employees and board members of the CSOs/NGOs followed in frequency by donors and part-time employees.

In seeking to get at the core premise of the third guiding hypothesis, participants were asked a range of questions related to participation including networking and communication. The vast majority (75.8%) of respondents indicated having attended at least 1 UN function since 2005. If a small number of abnormal outliers among responses are excluded, the mean total number of events respondents reported attending during the period is 13.6 or slightly more than 1 per year. Most organizations (75.4%) also indicated that they had communicated with the UN at least once since obtaining consultative status, ordinarily via email or phone---with most reporting somewhat tepid satisfaction levels with the speed and substance of the communication experience with the UN. Less than half (40.3%) indicated that their organization had ever hosted or organized a meeting/event at the UN and only slightly more than half (51.6%) reported ever having participated in an NGO coalition/network.

Most (61.2%) reported having presented a written statement at least once but only 38.7% reported ever having been asked to do so. Less than half reported having presented a written statement with only 29.0% indicated they had ever been asked to do so. Critical interpretations of the latter could include a variety of possible conclusions

including: (1) exponential growth of the CS program and the number of CSOs/NGOs participating means that there are more organizations within the dynamic than can be effectively used/consulted; (2) wide variations could exist in terms of the real/perceived credibility and competence of CS organizations with many CSOs/NGOs not deemed by the UN to be as worthy of being solicited for input; (3) many of the CSOs/NGOs awarded CS have such a narrow or obscure focus that there is little they can effectively contribute to the often broader issues with which the UN is concerned---which in turn raises the question of why such organizations were admitted to the CS program; (4) perhaps ECOSOC and other UN organs understand that many organizations in the CS program---especially smaller organizations---either cannot (e.g., financially) or will not participate and thus does not solicit their participation. Only a minority of respondents report ever having been contacted by other organizations in the CS program, foreign governments, or the UN and those that did indicated it was usually related to general information sharing/introductions or collaboration opportunities. Asked to what degree they feel the United Nations values the participation of their organization, a tepid mean response of 5.9 was yielded for a number line range of 1-10, conveying that a substantial number of organizations in the CS program feel alienated or underappreciated regarding the UN.

Suggestions for Future Research

Although several rounds of editing and trimming ultimately reduced the length of the survey questionnaire to a considerable degree, the final version was 10 pages in

length and contained approximately 48 items depending upon how one may count some multi-part questions. Given the in-depth nature of the questionnaire, I was largely pleased to have obtained a completion/return rate approaching 15% and invested significant effort (e.g., via follow-up emails/reminders) in order to attain that rate of return. Accordingly, adding additional items to the survey questionnaire would likely not have been prudent and would have almost certainly reduced the response rate substantially. If the latter reality did not serve as an impediment and survey length were no option, as can be evidenced in the following 7 examples---there are a number of additional survey questions that with benefit of hindsight may have yielded useful insights into the research and should potentially be considered for incorporation in any future follow-up study.

In retrospect, exploration of certain issues would have been useful additions to the survey (were it not for the limiting factor of the economy of space)---e.g.:

- Ideally, one or more survey items could attempt to assess the learning curve concerning how and over what period of time an organization ultimately learned to participate/contribute after obtaining consultative status.
- Although the survey did not directly address the issue of agenda setting either in terms of gauging its frequency/prevalence or levels of (dis)satisfaction among CSOs/NGOs with regard to the latter, the issue surfaced in the comments of multiple respondents and is potentially a substantial issue related to engagement in the CS program. The average organization in the CS program appears to have little-no input as to selecting the times or locations of civil society

meetings/functions or perhaps even more importantly in the planning of the agendas of such events.

- Degree of access also appears to be an issue of concern based upon the feedback provided by multiple respondents, but the survey did not attempt to directly explore the latter. It is apparent that many organizations in the CS program feel limited access exists to UN organs, national delegations/representatives, and even other CSOs/NGOs and NGO coalitions such as original major groups, a situation which may foster alienation and limited participation.

Minor questionnaire tweaks/additions aside, there are numerous examples of research that should be explored in any future study of a similar nature. It is perhaps not unusual that research can generate new questions as it simultaneously provides answers to others and this study was no exception, as additional research is needed to fully understand many of the study findings both related to analysis of the iCSO database and the survey. Having served on the boards of directors of multiple nonprofit organizations, I am particularly interested in the role of directors in supporting or opposing an organizations association with the UN and although the study sought to at least in part address the issue, many questions remain. For example, why in 25% of cases is there such inadequate support on the part of a CS organization's board and/or donors that respondents reported this as a substantial barrier to participation in the program? Does lack of board/donor support reflect financial concerns---travel/participation costs funds

that could be better spent elsewhere? Is it a reflection of political animosity on the part of donors or board members toward the UN and globalization in general?

The research has raised numerous other questions as well. For example, many survey respondents reported contributing verbal or written statements to the UN or in some way contributing/exchanging research with the UN and/or other CSOs/NGOs since matriculation into the ECOSOC CS program. However, it remains unclear how often and to what degree this activity has manifested into effectual policy change or formulation at the UN or otherwise at the international level. Finding some means of objectively assessing the latter would permit a more meaningful appraisal of the tangible benefit derived from the primary collaboration between the UN and international civil society and could do much in addressing whether the CS program is as yet a viable catalyst for effective partnership or mere window dressing.

The survey findings indicated that only a minority of respondents had ever been asked by the United Nations to present a written (38.7%) or verbal statement (29.0%) at a UN venue, likely a reflection of the large and ever increasing numbers of CSOs/NGOs in the CS program. It would be interesting to obtain more data related to such requests and the organizations that received them in an effort to glean patterns related to participation and UN interests related to consultations with civil society. For example, are there specific policy/issue areas such as human rights or development that are far more (or less) likely to receive input requests from the UN? Do such requests favor CSOs/NGOs from certain world regions or of certain sizes (i.e. capacities) or organizational typologies? Have patterns related to the latter questions varied over time or remained largely

consistent---e.g., are trends visible in policy/issues areas in which the UN is willing to consult civil society?

This research suggests that a sharp dichotomy exists between CS organizations accredited at the General level versus the Roster level. While a definitive or generalizable conclusion cannot be made due mainly to the disproportionately low rate of surveys returned from Roster status CSOs/NGOs, the questionnaire data that was submitted indicates far higher levels of both participation and satisfaction on the part of General status organizations within the CS program, whereas organizations with Roster status were both least likely to be active participants and most likely to indicate substantial barriers to participation (with Special status CSOs/NGOs positioned between the two extremes). The question of how to better engage Roster status organizations within the CS program so they feel less marginalized and might be better empowered to contribute in meaningful ways would appear to be a potentially important area for future research to explore. The implication also exists that reforms are potentially needed in the process by which CSOs/NGOs are accredited and classified within the CS program in order to better screen organizations less likely to participate.

Not all suggestions for future research stem directly from the findings of this research. The UN iCSO database is updated frequently and often expanded to include new or expanded datasets. At the time this research was being undertaken a new dataset addressing meeting participation of UN-affiliated CSOs was in the initial stages of being added to the database. At the time of writing no data as yet populated the system, but it was organized by meeting type (policy/topic) and session/year according to 8 categories:

Financing for Development; Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues; Public Administration; Social Development; Status of Women; Sustainable Development; UN Forum on Forests; and the Conference on States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Depending upon the category, when available data options will ultimately span up to 20 years or more, going as far back as 1992. As this research progressed throughout 2016, I continually checked this dataset to determine if it had become functional in the hope of incorporating it into the study, but at the time the study concluded it had still not been populated with data. As no data was available to examine, it is unclear whether statistics provided will be specific to organizations within the CS program or (more likely) reflective of all UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs---the latter is standard for most datasets within the system. In either case such data would prove invaluable in formulating a detailed understanding of the nature and degree of participation within the UN-civil society dynamic. Accordingly, one of the strongest recommendations for any future research related to the scope of this study and seeking to expand upon its findings is to comprehensively analyze statistics related to meeting participation on the part of UN-affiliated CSOs at such time in the future that the latter dataset is functionally available. Such an analysis would allow more detailed picture and objective determination as to the degree of participation of organizations within the UN-civil society dynamic.

The UN dynamic with civil society is perpetually changing both in terms of policy/issue areas and also with regard to the degree of pluralism UN involvement with civil society. Had this study been undertaken several decades ago it would have found

much more modest levels of interaction across all policy/issue areas and of course due to a combination of factors including changing societal norms and evolving technology some areas in which there is collaborative effort between the UN and civil society today had yet to attain a status of universal acceptance/importance or even be conceived as focal areas or opportunities for collaboration---e.g. human (LBGT) rights, sustainable development, cyber-crime. Also, although this study confirmed that perfect pluralism such as proportional representation of all world regions in general or developing areas in particular as yet does not exist within the UN-civil society relationship, far lower degrees of proportionality and pluralism would have existed in the past. Accordingly, a longevity or otherwise future study mirroring the goals and parameters of this research will be necessary in coming years if the nature and degree of the continually evolving dynamic between the UN and international civil society is to be adequately understood in the future.

Opportunities also exist to expand upon research into proportional plurality. This research undertook case studies of Europe (approximately 25% of the world's countries) and also the 20 most populous countries on earth to determine the degree to which patterns of participation within the UN-CSO dynamic varied across sub-regional lines and from country to country. Regional and sub-regional comparative analyses of other areas of the world would be useful in cultivating a more complete understanding of spatial variations in parity/pluralism within the dynamic. For example, at the time the research was being conceptualized and planned, the degree to which Asian CSOs/NGOs were underrepresented within the framework was not fully understood. Also, depending

somewhat on what one accepts as the boundaries of the continent, Asia is home to approximately the same percentage of the world's states as Europe. The latter reality combined with the aforementioned lack of proportional plurality within the UN-civil society dynamic would seem to necessitate that any future geographical case studies of this phenomenon include Asia and its sub-regions.

It may be especially useful to understand detailed patterns in terms of the types and numbers of CSOs/NGOs which have lost their consultative status. This remains something of a mystery as the UN does not draw attention to or release data related to the phenomenon, but based upon personal observations and anecdotal evidence it appears that fairly substantial numbers of organizations that matriculate into the CS program lose the status by the time their first or second quadrennial report is due. The latter implies programs are subject to attrition via inactivity, as the primary purpose of the quadrennial report is to ascertain the type and frequency of CSO/NGO participation in the CS program. If appreciable percentages of organizations given CS accreditation are washing out after a few years due to non-participation, the legitimacy of the ECOSOC-CS program as a forum for global civil society would lose credibility, and it is likely for that very reason that the UN---likely the only realistic source of obtaining or tracking such data---will not be readily forthcoming with such statistics, making such a study difficult at best.

The processes wherein applicant organizations are either selected or rejected for admission to the CS program as well as the manner in which successful applicants are designated with an accreditation level of General, Special or Roster appear to be

potentially interesting areas for future research. The degree to which both of the latter may be politically charged and may reflect possible biases on the part of the NGO committee and its decision-making processes was well beyond the scope of this research but would be interesting areas to explore in a future study. For example, to what degree has the cultural pendulum swung away from organizations that are pro-Israel/Judaism, Christian or socially conservative in theme or mission? To what degree do international political rivalries surface in the process---e.g. are CSOs/NGOs in Ukraine, or the Baltic States blocked or scrutinized as applicants to a greater degree due to the influence of Russia within the UN? Rather than a political agenda, can inconsistencies be shown to exist in the CS screening/accreditation process stemming more simply from arbitrariness, capriciousness or poor judgement?

In a potentially related matter, further effort should be made to explore correlations between regime type (democratic vs. not) and levels of representation/participation of CSOs/NGOs within the UN framework. By way of a case study comparing 10 countries that were democratic to 10 that were not, this research demonstrated a substantial gap in civil society involvement at the UN between the typologies. A broader analysis exploring levels of participation among all non/quasi-democratic states and the reasons and mechanics which account for their proportional underrepresentation could shed light not just on the inner dynamic of the ECOSOC-CS program, but more broadly on transnational democracy and civil society. How commonly do national governments, the primary focal point and source of influence within the UN, use their influence to block the UN ascension of CSOs/NGOs from their

own countries that may have a contrasting agenda with the regime? Is the latter scenario the primary factor in the underrepresentation of CSOs/NGOs from nondemocratic countries or is much of the phenomenon merely a reflection of civil society not being as vibrant or commonplace in such countries as opposed to democratic regimes?

More broadly, a comparative analysis of many of the particular circumstances of CSOs/NGOs in different countries and regime types could be useful in gleaning patterns and understanding imbalances in levels of civil society participation with the UN internationally. For example, it would be interesting to assess levels of and variations in government funding and support for CSOs/NGOs as correlated to representation and participation of those organizations at the UN---e.g. are countries in which QUANGOs or otherwise state-affiliated/founded CSOs represented to a greater or to a lesser degree within UN-ECOSOC. Such research would be a monumental undertaking, but would perhaps be attainable via a case study approach of select countries as illustrative of typologies.

The issue of access and more broadly, the degree to which UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs have utilized that forum to actually impact policy formulation or research agendas of member states would be fertile ground for future studies. Any such research would likely need to explore case studies of geographical areas (sub-regions) and or issue areas such as development or human rights in order to be manageable in scope, but would likely prove useful in further elucidating the degree to which the UN-civil society partnerships have potentially born fruitful outcomes rather than merely existing as an illusory or idealistic nod to global civil society on the part of the world's preeminent

IGO. If such research indicates that UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs do contribute to policy formulation among member states via the UN forum, then the UN-civil society dynamic would be vindicated to a great degree, but it remains unclear that the latter is the case and such an exploration was beyond the scope of this study.

It may prove useful to better understand patterns of civil society involvement and participation at each UN headquarters and regional office and cultivate a more detailed picture of how/why variations exist. For example, it would be relatively easy to construct a survey instrument to determine the specific types of programs/conferences organizations participate in at each UN location along with the frequency of participation. In turn, correlations could potentially be made between types of CSOs/NGOs (accreditation level, MDC/LDC background, policy/issue areas, etc.) and which UN locations they are most and least likely to have involvement with as a part of civil society outreach programs---e.g. are organizations headquartered in (certain) predominantly LDC/developing regions more likely to participate in UN forums in Geneva, Vienna or at UN regional sites and if so, due to what factors (e.g. easier to obtain travel visas)?

Information yielded from research into the latter areas might potentially shed light as to how greater participation and greater degrees of plurality/proportionality might be achieved within the UN-civil society dynamic. Such findings could help to address which other UN environments (UN programs based in Geneva, Vienna or regional offices) might be conducive to formal associations with civil society similar to the CS program within ECOSOC, a potentially valuable area to explore in future studies assessing ways to expand participation. For example, if regions such as Asia are

proportionally underrepresented at forums in New York, the seat and focal point of ECOSOC and the CS program, perhaps it is justified via the desire for pluralism within the UN-civil society framework for additional linkages either via expansion of ECOSOC programs or creating new non-ECOSOC civil society partnerships at other UN locations including regional offices. Research into the justification and feasibility of such strategies may prove beneficial as a catalyst for reforming and improving pluralism and proportionality within the system.

Concluding Observations

To the researcher's knowledge this is the first comprehensive academic study of macro-level patterns of regional and topical (policy focus area) participation on the part of all CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. It may also be among the first such studies which seeks to identify and explain specific reasons for engagement or the lack thereof on the part of CSOs/NGOs in consultative status. Most empirical studies of civil society at the UN have focused upon a limited number of organizations within a single issue area (Clark et al, 1998). A strength of this study is that its breadth of scope in seeking to analyze patterns of participation of all CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC did reveal macro-scale patterns within the institutional dynamic including uneven regional and policy/issue representation and relatively modest levels of participation on the part of most UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs attributable to a diverse range of factors. The study proposed that the expansion of the number of CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with the UN (ECOSOC) has not

necessarily equated to meaningful collaboration between the United Nations and transnational civil society, and accordingly the ideals of democratic pluralism are not being fully realized via this dynamic and the study findings to a great degree support the latter perspective.

As Foucault famously stated in exploring the concept of why power and influence should ideally be widely diffused throughout many political constellations, “I don’t want to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state (Foucault 1980, 122).” A central theme underlying this study was the balance of power and influence (and whether or not the latter exists in reality) between the UN and transnational civil society as manifested in the ECOSOC consultative status program. If for example CSOs/NGOs in consultative status contribute power to the UN, it is likely in the form of legitimacy in that the relationship at least cultivates an impression of engagement with civil society and effort being made to implement pluralist democratic norms. Likewise, the CSOs/NGOs in formal association with the UN appear to derive a real or perceived legitimacy and increase in status from the relationship. In exploring the status and influence of CSOs/NGOs in consultative status, this research found little indication of power diffusion or that the traditional authority and influence of non-state is in danger of being eroded by transnational civil society within the UN dynamic.

International civil society can make positive contributions and serve useful purposes for transnational institutions as a vehicle for achieving myriad goals including monitoring human rights and international law, facilitating research in the field,

disseminating aid and services to those in need, providing council and expertise in specialized fields. Potentially one of the most critical contributions international civil society can make is to serve as a catalyst for democratic norms in that establishing stronger bonds between democratic governance (at all levels including transnational governance) and institutions of civil society can in turn help to strengthen and engrain democratic traditions. In many respects a strong civil society is beneficial for democratic traditions in that, for example, if integrated within democratic institutions whether at the sub-state, state or transnational level, civil society may potentially foster and reinforce democratic ideals and practices via the aggregation and representation of stakeholder interests and also via the mitigation of government authority (Uhlen 2009). Likewise, by gaining knowledge of procedures and language used at the UN and other IGOs, elements of civil society may learn how to effectively use international instruments associated with democratic traditions such as compliance reporting to advance domestic or transnational agendas in various policy areas including human or environmental rights (Riddell-Dixon 2008).

It would be difficult to study the phenomenon of transnational civil society without concepts related to pluralism being central considerations and an appraisal of pluralism within the UN-civil society dynamic hinges upon how the concept is perceived and defined. In the broadest of senses, pluralism refers to inclusiveness in the incorporation of diverse voices within any process of deliberation or decision/policy-making. Dahl (1956) perhaps most famously encapsulated this broad concept of pluralism as being associated with a school of thought within classical liberalism that

focused upon multiple sources of political influence and that regarded democracy as the internal regulation of society through competition among many varied types of groups over power and social privileges. Karppinen (2013) stressed that efforts to characterize pluralism usually share the core view that what is desirable and egalitarian about democratic systems is that their functioning cannot be reduced to any single hierarchy or idea, which for the purposes of the UN or other IGOs may mean that state-centric representation could potentially be broadened to in some capacity include civil society, business, sub-state actors/governments and other diverse interests.

In the latter broad sense, the UN has made commendable progress in achieving levels of pluralism unprecedented in its history. The UN advocates diversity in representation, and the increasingly heterogeneous (geographical, policy issue areas represented, etc.) mixture of NGOs within ECOSOC reflects a strong institutional commitment to pursuing pluralism. The UN has assumed a direct role in attempting to facilitate such pluralism within the consultative status framework via encouraging organizations representing the historically marginalized (e.g., the global south, human/indigenous rights-related organizations) and providing at least some funding and other support to empower more CSOs/NGOs from developing nations to participate in UN forums. More civil society organizations are currently listed as being in formal consultative status with UN-ECOSOC than at any point in history. There is better representation of total numbers of organizations from LDC/developing regions than at any point as is also likely the case in terms of the range and diversity of policy/issue areas represented by civil society organizations in association with the UN.

However, significant question exists as to whether such efforts favoring plurality have yielded genuine improvements in the diversity of representation/ participation or whether they are largely symbolic (Kymlicka 2007, 3-25). CSO/NGO representation at the UN may be more symbolic than substantive in terms of degree of active engagement of civil society within the UN dynamic, as the number and diversity of CSOs/NGOs in theoretical affiliation with the UN is not meaningful without active engagement. Also, as discussed at some length in the research, proportional plurality---representation commensurate to the proportion comprised of a population---as yet does not truly exist with CSOs/NGOs headquartered in predominantly MDC/developed regions overrepresented proportionally at the UN and those based in principally LDC/developing regions proportionally underrepresented, grossly so in the case of Asia.

The concept of pluralism as espoused in Kantian classical liberalism and liberal institutionalism contends that ideally democratic systems have decentralized power structures and substantial influence and participation from diverse sources, rather than a limited segment of a polity. The latter has been described as the most compelling argument on behalf of UN involvement with civil society organizations in that it facilitates a multi-actor framework and contributes additional voices, perspectives and expertise to international forums/regimes which have traditionally been the almost exclusive domain of state actors (Mingst and Muldoon 2015; Whaites 1996; Willetts 2006). However, virtually all substantive influence within the UN remains with member states and states have used their preeminence to successfully limit the expansion of CSO/NGO influence into key areas such as the General Assembly and Security Council

and to in effect segregate representatives of civil society via the practice of “parallel” venues.

The concept of pluralism within the framework of international politics can be narrowly defined. Pluralist perspectives within constructivism potentially give the most consideration to the role of NGOs and civil society within the international system (Thiel 2010, 7117). Constructivist ideals in general denote pluralism in that constructivism takes into account a diverse, pluralistic range of considerations in examining how a complex dynamic of societal and other factors can impact transnational politics. The transnational dynamic and the factors which influence it are social constructs that routinely change and evolve and accordingly, CSOs/NGOs as increasingly common manifestations of the complex societal dynamic should have some significance within the international system (Wendt 1992, 422-424). Pluralists within the constructivist tradition see the manifestation and expansion of transnational civil society organizations as the growth of significant elements of bottom-up transformative influence upon international politics.

Succinctly, if vibrant civil society participation helps to foster democratic processes, increased roles of civil society within the UN and other IGOs will help facilitate democratic processes within such organizations. Within the pluralist tradition of constructivism, CSOs/NGOs are regarded as the principle organizing element and the voice of transnational civil society, and as representing the interests of people and grassroots movements, separate from and diffusing the power of states (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 11). Pluralism also contends that the actions of IOs/IGOs and states may

become increasingly subject to the oversight of transnational civil society organizations and that such an outcome reflects democratic institutional trends (Keohane 1998). This research revealed no evidence that organizations within the consultative status program were diffusing the authority of member states or exercising any form of oversight over state or institutional authority within the UN.

Furthermore, while many participants in the ECOSOC consultative status program may well be grassroots, non-hierarchical organizations in nature, many others are funded or otherwise heavily influenced by state actors. In at least some instances state-financed or otherwise heavily state-influenced CSOs/NGOs have established a visible presence (if perhaps not a substantial impact) within the UN via the ECOSOC consultative status program. However, whatever presence/voice these and other CS-affiliated CSOs possess is primarily the result of the willingness of UN member states to permit their acceptance into the consultative status program. The latter reality appears reflective of both neorealist and neoliberal theories related to the transnational dynamic in that non-state actors are being allowed only as much influence or attention on the global stage as state actors are willing to cede to them, rather than cultivating power or influence in their own right.

Transnational CSOs/NGOs are diverse in terms of their origins and functionality in that some appear to fit the global model of constructivism wherein power and influence flows downward to civil society from state or supra-state sources (e.g. QUANGOs) and other CSOs/NGOs better exemplify the plural(ist) constructivist model wherein they may originate at the local/grassroots level and ultimately influence policy at

the state-level and beyond. Liberal institutionalism, an additional theoretical framework, views debates as to whether influence is hierarchical (top-down) or bottom-up in nature as largely irrelevant in that the latter theory posits that CSOs/NGOs are for the most part merely symptomatic of spreading international institutions, but do not constitute an important element of them or influence international politics/policy to any substantial degree. IGOs including the UN thus may endeavor to pay at least superficial attention to civil society because of the perception that some role afforded to civil society is becoming a transnational norm and political/democratic expectation.

This study found a small minority of CSOs/NGOs to be regularly and actively engaged within the UN-civil society dynamic via the ECOSOC consultative status program. However, in general those organizations that participate do so to minimal degrees or only sporadically and a large minority of CS-accredited CSOs/NGOs do not appear to participate in any appreciable way. By implication, if the interaction between the United Nations and potentially most of the civil society institutions with which it presumably has the closest linkages is at best weak or sporadic, it is difficult to imagine that via such programs the UN through trickle-down approaches has substantial impact locally (i.e., global constructivist theory) or alternatively that local or state-based civil society is reaching upward and outward to impact international policy to any substantive degree.

The findings of this research revealed little indication of the existence of either such dynamic, but may indicate that the reasons for minimal or non-participation within the ECOSOC-CS program are even more varied and complex than initially realized.

Rather than global or plural constructivism, the findings of this study may imply support for liberal institutionalist theories in that decades-long expansion of IGOs as a trend, has facilitated a corollary expectation of expanding international civil society and an associated expectation of linkages between transnational governance and democratic institutions on the one hand and transnational civil society on the other as a standardized norm. Liberal institutionalists merely perceive CSO/NGO growth largely as a bi-product of the increased influence of international institutions and globalization rather than a significant source of influence upon the international dynamic (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015). In the broadest of senses, the latter ideas also at least partly mirror some constructivist concepts concerning the expansion of norms/expectations.

One can also see the possible applicability of rational-choice institutionalism in that a formalized linkage between the United Nations and international civil society was created in the form of the ECOSOC consultative status program behind the goal of addressing real or perceived shortcomings---e.g. the need for more pluralistic and democratic representation and potentially enhanced bureaucratic/program functionality (or at least cultivating the appearance of achieving one or both of the latter) within the UN dynamic. More IGOs are granting CSOs/NGOs access to their institutional processes out of the perception that this is a newly standardized norm and via the expectation within the framework of transnational politics that such actions bolster democratic legitimacy. Within the field of international relations, such a dynamic is supported by sociological institutionalism and constructivism both of which focus upon processes of

norm diffusion and institutional replication as catalysts for construction and spread of international norms.

The expanding numbers of CSOs/NGOs within ECOSOC's consultative status program and growing diversity in terms of geographical and policy/issue areas represented within the CS program may be more theoretical than functional as a trend within the UN dynamic. The study revealed little indication of CS-affiliated CSOs as agents of democratization, serving as effective vehicles of representation of international stakeholders, or of CSOs within the CS program holding any tangible form of oversight with regard to the UN or its member states. In that the vast majority of NGOs within the CS program appear to make negligible if any contribution within the UN framework, realist, Marxist and English School theorists appear to have been proven at least partly correct via their state-centric views of how the UN and transnational political systems function. Reflective of structuralist visions of how a transnational political dynamic operates, within the United Nations, member states have maintained their near total monopoly on power and influence and seem poised to continue doing so for the foreseeable future. In the process of safeguarding their hegemony state actors have in effect diminished the potential influence of transnational civil society within the UN's institutional fabric.

The dualistic pluralist concept of realized/actual versus potential power is an interesting area to explore within the context of the UN ECOSOC dynamic. This study found no evidence of CSO/NGO erosion of the power, influence or sovereignty of UN member states, nor was there any evidence of any real capacity for

oversight/accountability of the UN or its members. The only plausible case to be made for realized power on the part of CS-affiliated CSOs would be as purveyors of useful information. However, given the degree to which CSOs/NGOs are segregated from member states and many important UN organs (e.g., the General Assembly and Security Council) and denied access to both of the latter, it is difficult to see how the vast majority of organizations within the consultative status program could claim to have achieved influence even via information politics as a medium.

The issue of potential power is perhaps less clear. No indication exists that CSO access, input, or oversight capacity within the UN framework is poised to expand to any appreciable degree in the immediate future. Such expansions could only happen via the willingness and complicity of most member states, most of which---reflective of structuralist perspectives---have throughout the more than 70 years of the UN's existence shown little-to-no willingness to forfeit their monopoly on political influence within the organization. However, some potential at least theoretically exists for limited expansion of the influence of organizations within the CS program such as improved access to UN organs of secondary importance or expanded roles with regard to information sharing, consultation, or implementation of UN initiatives in the field by CS-affiliated CSOs/NGOs.

As intergovernmental organizations have become more prevalent and have grown in power and influence, many including the UN have potentially become more sensitive to perception and criticism related to the need for democratic norms (e.g. the inclusion of diverse sources of input) to become more fully institutionalized. In the case of the UN

ECOSOC consultative status program, extensive and continually expanding formal linkages between the UN and transnational civil society have been established. However, an actual capacity for vibrant, verdant exchange or an environment in which either a globalist or pluralist vision of a constructivist dynamic within transnational governance is being fully realized, has perhaps not as yet been achieved.

REFERENCES

- Abu-Laban, Yasmineen. 2012. "Pluralism as Process: The Role of Liberal Democratic Institutions." *Global Centre for Pluralism 2008 Expert Roundtable*.
http://www.pluralism.ca/images/PDF_docs/pluralism_papers/abu_laban_paper_pp6.pdf
(February 28, 2016).
- Agne, Hans. 2010. Does Global Democracy Matter? Hypothesis on Famine and War. In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*. eds. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Albrow, Martin and Fiona Holland. 2008. "Democratizing Global Governance: Achieving Goals while Aspiring to Free and Equal Communication." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*. Eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, ON: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Algar, Chadwick. 2002. "The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: From Article 71 to a People's Millennium Assembly." *Global Governance* 8(1) (January-March): pp. 93-117.
- Andersen, Morten. 2015. "How to Study NGOs in Practice: A Rational Primer." In *The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory*. eds. William DeMars and Dennis Dijkzuel. New York, NY: Routledge (Global Institutions Series).
- Anderson, Kenneth. 2012. *Living with the UN: American Responsibilities and International Order*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Antlov, Hans, Rustam Ibrahim and Peter van Tuijl. 2006. "NGO Governance and Accountability in Indonesia: Challenges in a Newly Democratizing County." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter Tuijl. London: Earthscan.
- Archibugi, Daniele. 2008. *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward a Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Armstrong, Patricia. 2006. "The Limits and Risks of Regulation: The Case of the World Bank-supported *Draft Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relating to NGOs*." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter Tuijl. London: Earthscan.
- Ballantyne, C. 2003. "Measuring Quality Units: Considerations in Choosing Mandatory Questions." Paper presented at the *Evaluations and Assessments Conference: A Commitment to Quality*. University of South Australia, Adelaide, November 24-25.
- Barnett, Michael and Kathryn Sikkink. 2008. "From International Relations to Global Society." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Baruch, Yehuda and Brooks Holtom. 2008. "Survey Response Rate Levels and Trends in Organizational Research." *Human Relations* 61(8): 1139-1160.
- Bellah, Robert. 2000. "The Good Society: We Live through Our Institutions." In *The Essential Civil Society Reader*, ed. Don Eberly. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Bellamy, Alex and Matt McDonald. 2004. "Securing International Society: Towards an English School Discourse of Security," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 39(2): 307-324.
- Benessaieh, Afef. 2011. "Global Civil Society: Speaking in Northern Tongues?" *Latin American Perspectives* 38(6) (November).
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2009. "Claiming Rights Across Borders." *American Political Science Review* 103(4) (November): 691-704.
- Bloem, Renate, Isolda Attia and Phillippe Dam. 2008. "The Conference of NGOs (CONGO): The Story of Strengthening Civil Society Engagement with the United Nations." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*, Eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, Ontario CA: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Blokland, Hans. 2016. *Pluralism, Democracy and Political Knowledge: Robert A. Dahl and His Critics on Modern Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Bohman, J. 2007. *Democracy Across Borders: From Demos to Demol*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Boli, John and George Thomas, Eds. 1999. *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bolton, John. 2000. "Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?" *Chicago Journal of International Law*. 1: 205-216.
- Bolton, Matthew and Thomas Nash. 2010. "The Role of Middle Power-NGO Coalitions in Global Policy: The Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban." *Global Policy* 1(2) (May): 172-84.
- Bossche, P. 2008. "NGO Involvement in the WTO: A Comparative Perspective." *Journal of International Economic Law*. 11(4): 717-749.
- Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society*. London: Macmillan.
- Bunea, Adriana and Robert Thompson. 2015. "Consultations with Interest Groups and the Empowerment of Executives: Evidence from the European Union." *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 28(4) (October): 517-531.
- Burton, Dawn. 2000. *Research Training for Social Scientists: A Handbook for Postgraduate Researchers*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE

- Carpenter, R. 2010. "Governing the Global Agenda: "Gatekeepers" and 'Issue Adoption' in Transnational Advocacy Networks." In *Who Governs the Globe?*, Eds. Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore and Susan Sell. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Cassese, Antonio. 1979. "How Could Nongovernmental Organizations Use UN Bodies More Effectively?" *Universal Human Rights* 1(4) (October-December): 73-80.
- Charnovitz, S. 1997. "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance." *Michigan Journal of International Law* (18): 183-286.
- Clark, Ann. 2001. *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Charnovitz, Steve. 2006. "Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations in Global Governance." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*, ed. Lisa Jordan and Peter Tuijl. London: Earthscan.
- Cialdini, R.B. 1984. *Influence: How and why people agree to things*. New York, NY: William Morrow.
- Clark, Ann, Elisabeth Friedman and Kathryn Hochstetler. 1998. "The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights and Women." *World Politics* 51(1) (October): 1-35.
- Clark, John. 2008. "The Globalization of Civil Society." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*. Eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, ON: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Cohen, Jean and Andrew Arato. 1997. *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought).
- Cooley, Alexander. 2010. "Outsourcing Authority: How Project Contracts Transform Global Governance Networks." In *Who Governs the Globe?*, Eds. Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore and Susan Sell. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Cornell University Legal Information Institute. 2016. "Nonprofit Organizations." https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/non-profit_organizations (July 13, 2016).
- Cosby, Kerry. 2012. "In Defense of Civil Society." *Foreign Policy*. December 20: 10-16.
- Dahl, Robert. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dahl, Robert. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, Robert. 1982. *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Deitelhoff, N. 2009. "The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICC Case." *International Organization* (54): 421-56.
- DeMars, William. 2005. *NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics*. London: Pluto Press.
- DeMars, William and Dennis Dijkzuel. 2015. "Introduction: NGOing." In *The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory*. Eds. William DeMars and Dennis Dijkzuel. New York, NY: Routledge (Global Institutions Series).
- Department of Public Information of the United Nations. 2016. *DPI-NGO Online Directory*. <http://outreach.un.org/ngorelations/membership/dpingo-directory/> (August 12, 2016).
- Diamond, Larry. 1994. "Toward Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 5(3): 4-17.
- Dialsingh, I. 2008. "Mail Survey." In *Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods*. www.sagereference.com/survey/Article_n282.html (November 1, 2016).
- Dillman, D.A., J. Smyth and L. Christian. 2009. *Internet, Mail and Mixed-Mode Surveys: The Tailored Design Method, 3rd edition*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- Dommeyer, C.J., P. Baum and R.W. Hanna. 2002. "College Student's Attitudes Toward Methods of Collecting Teaching Evaluation: In-class Versus Online." *Journal of Education for Business* 78(2): 11-15.
- Eberly, Don. 2000. "Meaning, Origins, Applications of Civil Society." In *The Essential Civil Society Reader*, ed. Don Eberly. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Edelman Trust Barometer. 2014. www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2014-edelman-trust-barometer (July 3, 2016).
- Edwards, Jack. 1997. *How to Conduct Organizational Surveys: A Step-by-Step Guide*. Thousand Oaks, CS: SAGE.
- Edwards, Michael. ed. 2009. *Civil Society*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Foucault, Michael. 1980. "Truth and Power." In *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Freedom House. 2016. "Freedom in the World Report." <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016> (December 15, 2016).
- Galston, William. 2005. *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Getis, Arthur, Mark Bjelland and Victoria Getis. 2014. *Introduction to Geography*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

- Giddens, Anthony. 1986. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gideon, Lior. 2012. *Handbook of Survey Methodology for the Social Sciences*. New York, NY: Springer Science and Business Media.
- Global Centre for Pluralism. 2012. "Defining Pluralism." Global Centre for Pluralism: Pluralism Papers, No. 1.
http://www.pluralism.ca/images/PDF_docs/defining_pluralism_EN.pdf (February 27, 2016).
- Global Humanitarian Assistance. 2014. "In Focus: NGO Fundraising Coalitions and Typhoon Haiyan." GHA Report 2014. <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GHA-2014-In-focus-NGO-fundraising-coalitions-and-Typhoon-Haiyan.pdf> (June 21, 2016).
- Global Policy Forum. 1999. *The United Nations and Civil Society: Report of the Thirtieth UN Issues Conference*.
<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/177/31816.html> (August 12, 2016)
- Golub, Stephen. 2006. "NGO Accountability and the Philippine Council for NGO Certification: Evolving Roles and Issues." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter Tuijl. London: Earthscan.
- Gorard, Stephen. 2003. *Quantitative Methods in Social Science Research*. London, UK: A & C Black.
- Gotz, Norbert. 2008. "Reframing NGOs: The Identity of an International Relations Non-Starter." *European Journal of International Relations* 14(2) (June): 231-258.
- Grady, Heather. 2005. "Opportunities for the UN and Civil Society to Collaborate More Effectively." *Development in Practice* 15(1) (February): pp. 70-76.
- Groves, R.M. 2006. "Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70(5): 646-675.
- Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44 (5): 936-57.
- Haufler, Virginia. 2008. "Civil Society, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Conflict Prevention." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*. Eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, ON: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Hauss, Charles. 2011. *Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Held, David. 2006. *Models of Democracy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Hemment, Julie. 2012. "Youth Voluntarism, and Potemkin NGOs: Making Sense of Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia." *Slavic Review* 71(2) (Summer): 234-260.
- Hildreth, W., Gerald Miller and Jack Rabin. 2006. *Handbook of Public Administration, Third Edition*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
- Hill, Gina. 2008. "A Case of NGO Participation: International Criminal Court Negotiations." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*. Eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, Ontario CA: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Himmelfarb, Gertrude. 2000. "The Demoralization of Society: What's Wrong with the Civil Society." In *The Essential Civil Society Reader*, ed. Don Eberly. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Howard, Marc. 2002. "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society." *Journal of Democracy* 13(1): 157-169.
- International Monetary Fund. 2016. "Factsheet: The IMF and Civil Society Organizations." IMF. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/civ.htm> (June 20, 2016).
- Jokic, Aleksander. 2013. "Go Local: Morality and International Activism." *Ethics and Global Politics* 6(1): 39-62.
- Jonsson, Christer. 2010. "Capturing the Transnational: A Conceptual History." In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*, eds. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Jordan, Lisa and Peter Tuijl. 2006. "Rights and Responsibilities in the Political Landscape of NGO Accountability: Introduction and Overview." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter Tuijl. London: Earthscan.
- Kahn, Sara. 2010. "Limits to Transnational Participation: The Global Governance of Migration." In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance*. eds. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Karppinen, Kari. 2013. *Rethinking Media Pluralism*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keohane, Robert. 1998. "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy* (Spring): 82-96.
- Kotzian, Peter. 2015. "Holding International Governance to Account: Do Civil Society Organizations Have a Chance to Exert Accountability?" *Journal of International Organizations Studies* 6(2): 5-25.

- Kovach, Hetty. 2006. "Addressing Accountability at the Global Level: The Challenges Facing International NGOs." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter Tuijl. London: Earthscan.
- Kröger, Sandra. 2013. "Creating a European Demos? The Representativeness of EU Level Umbrella Groups." *Journal of European Integration*. 35 (5): 583–600.
- Kryst, Melanie. 2012. "Coalitions of Labor Unions and NGOs: The Room for Maneuver of the German Clean Clothes Campaign." *Interface*. 4(2) (November): 101-29.
- Kwesiga, Jassy and Harriet Namisi. 2006. "Issues in Legislation for NGOs in Uganda." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter Tuijl. London: Earthscan.
- Kymlicka, Will. 2007. *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press: 3-25.
- Lake, David. 2000. "Global Governance: A Relational Contracting Approach." In *Globalization and Governance*, eds. Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey Hart. London: Routledge.
- Lewis, David. 2013. "Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse." *Journal of Civil Society* (3): 325-340.
- Liebert, Ulrike and Hans-Joerg Trenz. 2013. *The New Politics of European Civil Society*. New York: Routledge.
- Liese, Andrea. 2010. "Explaining Varying Degrees of Openness in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)." In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance*. eds. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Lindblom, Charles. 2002. *The Market System: What It Is, How It Works, and What to Make of It*. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.
- Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour. 1981. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Expanded Edition*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mangione, Thomas. 1995. *Mail Surveys: Improving the Quality*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Martens, Kerstin. 2000. "NGO Participation at International Conferences: Assessing Theoretical Accounts." *Transnational Associations* (3): 115-126.
- Massey, D.S. and R. Tourangeau. 2013. "Where Do We Go From Here? Nonresponse and Social Measurement." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 645(January): 222-236.

- McGrew, A. 2002. "Transnational Democracy." In *Democratic Theory Today*, eds. A. Carter and G. Stokes. Cambridge: Polity.
- McKeon, Nora. 2009. *The United Nations and Civil Society: Legitimizing Global Governance – Who's Voice?* New York: Zed Books.
- Mingst, Karen and James Muldoon. 2015. "Global Governance and NGOs: Reconceptualizing International Relations for the 21st Century." In *The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory*. Eds. William DeMars and Dennis Dijkzuel. New York, NY: Routledge (Global Institutions Series).
- Mowell, Barry. 2015. "UN Integrated CSOs: A Preliminary Analysis of Patterns by World Region, CSO Type, and Millennium Goal/Monterrey Areas." *European Union Center for Excellence (EUCE) Symposium - Florida International University*. Miami, FL. February 23.
- Mulgan, R. 2000. "Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept." *Public Administration* 78(3): 555-573.
- Nasstrom, Sofia. 2010. "Democracy Counts: Problems of Equality in Transnational Democracy." In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance*. eds. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- National Center for Charitable Statistics. 2007. "The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Facts and Figures from the *Nonprofit Almanac 2007*." Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
- NGO.IN. 2016. "NGO." <http://www.ngo.in/> (June 22, 2016).
- Nulty, Duncan. 2008. "The Adequacy of Response Rates to Online and Paper Surveys: What Can be Done?" *Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education*. 33(3): 301-314.
- O'Brien, R., A. Goetz, J. Scholte and M. Williams. 2000. *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- OECD. 2001. *Social Sciences for Knowledge and Decision Making*. Paris, France: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Publishing.
- Okoth, Simon. 2013. "Do Pluralist Power Structures Enhance Involvement in Decision-Making by NGOs." *African Social Science Review* 6(1).
- Okwaare, Sarah and Jennifer Chapman. 2006. "Chameleons and Accountability: Linking Learning with Increasing Accountability in ActionAid International Uganda and the Ugandan Land Alliance." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter Tuijl. London: Earthscan.
- Omelicheva, Mariya. 2009. "Global Civil Society and Democratization of World Politics: A Bona Fide Relationship or Illusory Liason?" *International Studies Review* 11(2) (March): 109-132.

- Ottoway, Marina. 2001. "Corporatism Goes Global: International Organizations, Nongovernmental Organization Networks, and Transnational Business." *Global Governance* 7(3) (July-September): 265-292.
- Panel on a Research Agenda for the Future of Social Science Data Collection, Committee on National Statistics, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council, National Academies Press. 2013. *Nonresponse in Social Science Surveys: A Research Agenda*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
- Paul, James. 2000. "NGOs and Global Policy-Making." *Global Policy Forum*. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/31611-ngos-and-global-policy-making.html> (February 21, 2016).
- Peruzzotti, Enrique. 2006. "Civil Society, Representation and Accountability: Restating Current Debates on the Representativeness and Accountability of Civic Associations." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles & Innovations*. eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl. London: Earthscan.
- Peytchev, A. 2013. "Consequences of Survey Nonresponse." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 645(January): 88-111.
- Przeworski, A., S. Stokes and B. Mannin eds. 1999. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Pubantz, Jerry. 2005. "Constructing Reason: Human Rights and the Democratization of the United Nations." *Social Forces* 84(2) (December): 1291-1302.
- Putnam, Robert. 2001. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. London: Simon and Schuster.
- Raustiala, K. 1997. "States, NGOs and International Environmental Institutions." *International Studies Quarterly* 41: 719-740.
- Reimann, Kim. 2006. "A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(1) (March): 45-67.
- Reus-Smit, C. 2007. "International Crisis of Legitimacy." *International Politics* 44: 153-174.
- Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. 2008. "Facilitating NGO Participation: An Assessment of Canadian Government-Sponsored Mechanisms for the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development and the Beijing Conference on Women." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*. eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, ON: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas Ed. 1995. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Ritchie, Cyril. 1995. "Coordinate? Cooperate? Harmonise? NGO Policy and Operational Coalitions." *Third World Quarterly* 16(3) (September): 513-24
- Rubenstein, James. 2014. *The Cultural Landscape: Introduction to Human Geography*. New York, NY: Prentice-Hall.
- Ruggie, John. 1998. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." In *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Samad, Ziad and Kinda Mohamadieh. 2008. "The Arab NGO Network for Development: A Case Study on Interaction between Emerging Regional Networking and Global Civil Society." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*. Eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, ON: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Santal, Michael. 2000. "Democracy's Discontent: The Procedural Republic." In *The Essential Civil Society Reader*, ed. Don Eberly. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Sayed-Said, Mohamad. 2004. "Global Civil Society: An Arab Perspective." In *Global Civil Society*. Eds. Helmut Anheier, Mary Kaldor, and Marlies Glasius. London: Sage Publications.
- Schattschneider, Elmer. 1975. *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Boston, MA: Cengage.
- Scholte, Jan-Aart. 2011. *Building Global Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Seters, Paul van. 2008. "Approaching Global Civil Society." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*. Eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, ON: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Smith, Courtney. 2006. *Politics and Process at the United Nations: The Global Dance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Smith, Martin. 2006. "Plurality." In *The State: Theories and Issues*, ed. Colin Hay, Michael Lister, and David Marsh. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Steffek, Jens. 2010. "Explaining Patterns of Transnational Participation: The Role of Policy Fields." In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance*. eds. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Steffek, Jens and Kristina Hahn, eds. 2010. *Evaluating Transnational NGOs*. New York: Palgrave.
- Tallberg, Jonas. 2010. "Transnational Access to International Institutions: Three Approaches." In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance*. eds. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.

- Tallberg, Jonas and Christer Jonsson. 2010. "Transnational Actor Participation in International Institutions: Where, Why, and with What Consequences?" In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance*. eds. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Tallberg, Jonas. 2012. "Civil Society and Global Democracy: An Assessment." In *Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives*. Eds. Caniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, and Raffaele Marchetti. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tallberg, Jonas, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito and Christer Jonsson. 2013. *The Opening Up of International Organizations: Transnational Access in Global Governance*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tandon, Rajesh and Mohini Kak. 2008. "Amplifying Voices from the Global South: Globalizing Civil Society." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*. Eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, ON: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Thach, L. 1995. "Using Electronic Mail to Conduct Survey Research." *Educational Technology*. March-April, 27-31.
- The Guardian*. 2012. "Every QUANGO in Britain." 7 July.
- Thiel, Markus. 2010. "Transnational Actors." In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*. Ed. Robert Denemark. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Thiel, Markus. 2011. *The Limits of Transnationalism: Collective Identities and EU Integration*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thiel, Markus. 2017. *European Civil Society and Human Rights Advocacy*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Thompson, Andrew. 2008. "Laying the Groundwork: Considerations for a Charter for a Proposed Global Civil Society Forum." In *Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*. Eds. James Walker and Andrew Thompson. Waterloo, ON: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Uhlin, Anders. 2009. "Which Characteristics of Civil Society Organizations Support What Aspects of Democracy? Evidence from Post-communist Latvia." *International Political Science Review*. 30(3) (June): 271-95.
- Union of International Associations. 2016. *Yearbook of International Organizations*. <http://www.uia.org/yearbook> (August 12, 2016).
- *United Nations. 2011. *Working with ECOSOC: An NGOs Guide to Consultative Status*. <http://csonet.org/content/documents/BrochureLite.pdf> (February 1, 2016).

United Nations. 1999. "The United Nations and Civil Society: Report of the Thirtieth UN Issues Conference."

<http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/archive/Issues99.pdf> (June 29, 2016).

United Nations Conference on NGOs. 2006. NGO Participation Agreements at the UN and in Other Agencies of the UN System.

https://www.itu.int/council/groups/stakeholders/Resources/Non-Paper%20on%20NGO%20Participation%20in%20the%20UN%20System3%20_CONGO_.pdf (August 12, 2016).

USAID. 2016. "Private Voluntary Organizations." <https://www.usaid.gov/pvo> (July 13, 2016).

Verweij, Marco. 2011. *Clumsy Solutions for a Wicked World: How to Improve Global Governance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vifell, Asa. 2010. "WTO and the Environmental Movement: On the Path to Participatory Governance?" In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance*. eds. Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tallberg. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.

Waisman, Carlos. 2006. "Autonomy, Self-regulation, and Democracy: Tocquevillean-Gellnerian Perspectives on Civil Society and the Bifurcated State in Latin America." In *Civil Society and Democracy in Latin America*, Eds. Richard Feinberg, Carlos Waisman, and Leon Zamosc. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Weiss, Thomas and Leon Gordenker eds. *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is what States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46(2) (Spring): 391-425.

Whaites, Alan. 1996. "Let's Get Civil Society Straight: NGOs and Political Theory." *Development in Practice* 6(3) (August): 240-244.

White, L. 1968. *International Non-Governmental Organizations: Their Purposes, Methods, and Accomplishments*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Willetts, Peter. 2012. "What is a Non-Governmental Organization?" UNESCO Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems. <http://www.eolss.net/> (July 14, 2016).

Willetts, Peter. 2011. *Nongovernmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance*. New York: Routledge.

Willetts, Peter. 2006. "The Cardoso Report on the UN and Civil Society: Functionalism, Global Corporatism, or Global Democracy?" *Global Governance* 12(3) (July-September): 305-324.

Willetts, Peter Ed. 1996. *The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-governmental Organizations in the UN System*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Willetts, Peter. 2000. "From 'Consultative Arrangements' to 'Partnership': The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN." *Global Governance* 6(2) (April-June): 191-212.

Willetts, Peter. 2011. *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance*. New York: Routledge.

Willetts, Peter. 1982. "Pressure Groups as Transnational Actors." In *Pressure Groups in the Global System*, ed. Peter Willetts. London: Frances Pinter.

World Bank. 2013. "Defining Civil Society."
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20101499~menuPK:244752~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html> (July 13, 2016).

World Bank. 2002. "Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society Engagement in World Bank Supported Projects: Lessons from OED Evaluations."
[http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/851D373F39609C0B85256C230057A3E3/\\$file/LP18.pdf](http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/851D373F39609C0B85256C230057A3E3/$file/LP18.pdf) (July 14, 2016).

World Health Organization. 2012. "Building Advocacy Coalitions for Greater Action and Accountability." WHO.
http://www.who.int/pmnch/media/news/2012/advocacy_building_coalitions.pdf (June 20, 2016)

World Trade Organization. 2016. "WTO and NGOs." WTO.
https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm (June 20, 2016).

Worldometers (a). 2016. "World Population by Region."
<http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/#region> (November 1, 2016).

Worldometers (b). 2016. "Countries in the World by Population."
<http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/> (December 10, 2016).

Xiaoguang, Kang and Feng Li. 2006. "NGO Governance in China: Achievements and Dilemmas." In *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter Tuijl. London: Earthscan.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

NGOs in Consultative Status with UN-ECOSOC

General Background

1. Why did your organization seek Consultative Status with the UN?

2. Have these goals been achieved during your experience with the UN? Why or why not?

3. What is your classification as an NGO in Consultative Status with the UN?

General Status () _____

Special Status () _____

Roster Status () _____ Do you feel your present classification is appropriate? Y ___ N ___

4. To what degree does this classification assist or impede your ability to participate in UN programs?

(10 denotes a very high degree of difficulty, 0 denotes no difficulty)

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

5. Following obtaining your accreditation, has your NGO ever communicated with the UN (not counting submission of quadrennial reports)?

Yes _____

No _____

6. On a scale of 0 (not important) to 10 (utmost importance) how would you rate the importance of each of the following considerations concerning your organization's desire to have UN Consultative Status?

General prestige/visibility for organization

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Credibility in fundraising

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Networking with other NGOs/organizations

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Contributing/exchanging research with the UN and other organizations

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Contributing written or verbal position statement on issues

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Other (please specify) _____

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

7. Within your organization, who was most responsible for seeking UN Consultative Status?

CEO _____

Executive Director _____

Board Member(s) _____

Other (please specify title _____) _____

8. How would you rate the **beneficial impact** upon your NGO of obtaining UN Consultative Status in each of the following respects? (10 denotes highly beneficial, 0 denotes no benefit directly derived)

Making meaningful connections with other NGOs in the US

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Making meaningful connections with other NGOs internationally

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Making meaningful contributions to the UN

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Prestige/legitimacy derived for your organization

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Media publicity for your organization

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Aid in fundraising for your organization

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Other (please specify: _____)

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Other (please specify: _____)

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Accreditation/Representation

1. Please indicate if a designated representative of your organization has successfully obtained a UN Grounds Pass/ID for each of the following UN headquarters/offices ...

New York Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: _____

Geneva Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: _____

Vienna Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: _____

Regional Offices

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Y ___ N___ If Yes, # of representatives obtaining pass/ID: _____

Bangkok, Thailand Y ___ N___ If Yes, # of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: _____

Beirut, Lebanon Y ___ N___ If Yes, # of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: _____

Santiago, Chile Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining pass/ID: _____

2. In a typical year what total number of representatives of your organization will have completed accreditation and obtained a UN Grounds Pass: _____

3. At which of the following UN headquarters/offices has your organization participated in meetings/conferences or some other function?

New York _____

Geneva _____

Vienna _____

Regional Offices

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia _____

Bangkok, Thailand _____

Beirut, Lebanon _____

Santiago, Chile _____

How would you assess the overall ease/difficulty of designating and accrediting your organization's representatives to the UN?

(10 denotes a very high degree of difficulty, 0 denotes no difficulty)

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

4. Which of the following best characterizes the nature of your designated UN representatives?

Full-time employee(s) of your NGO _____ (# in this category _____)

Part-time employee(s) of your NGO _____ (# in this category _____)

Board member(s) of your NGO _____ (# in this category _____)

Donor(s) to your NGO _____ (# in this category _____)

Other unpaid supporter(s) of your NGO _____ (# in this category _____)

Participation

1. Approximately how many UN conferences/meetings/workshops has your organization attended in the following periods:

2005-present: _____

1995-2005: _____

Pre-1995: _____

2. Aside from attending conferences has your organization...

Presented a written statement at the UN? Yes____ No____

Presented a verbal statement at the UN? Yes____ No____

Been asked by UN to present a written statement? Yes____ No____

Been asked by UN to present a verbal statement? Yes____ No____

3. To what degree do you feel that the UN values the participation of your NGO? (10 denotes extremely high valuation, 0 denotes total lack of valuation)

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

4. Has your organization ever organized/hosted an event (e.g., meeting among NGOs) at the UN?

Yes____ No____

Networking/Communication

1. To what degree has your organization networked with other NGOs in Consultative Status with the UN? (10 denotes a very high degree of interaction, 0 denotes no interaction at all)

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

2. Since you obtained Consultative Status have any of the following directly contacted you?

UN-affiliated NGOs Y____(estimated # of times: _____) No____

Foreign governments Y____(estimated # of times: _____) No _____

UN agency/office Y____(estimated # of times: _____) No _____

If yes, for what purpose did the other NGO(s) contact you (check all that apply):

General information sharing/introductions _____

Collaboration/sharing of research _____

Specific question about UN process _____

Specific question about your NGOs mission _____

Other (please specify_____)

3. To what degree has your organization communicated with the UN with a question/request via the following mediums? (below each please rate level of satisfaction with the speed/substance of reply from UN: 10 denotes complete satisfaction, 0 denotes complete lack of satisfaction)

Have you emailed the UN? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, how many times: _____
10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Have you called the UN? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, how many times: _____
10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Have you faxed the UN? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, how many times: _____
10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Have you written the UN? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, how many times: _____
 10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

4. Has your organization ever participated in any NGO network(s)/coalition(s) active within the UN framework? Y_____ N_____ Name(s) of network(s)/coalition(s):

Barriers

1. How would you rate each of the following as barriers to NGO participation with UN programs? (10 denotes significant barrier, 0 denotes no barrier at all)

Understanding UN Processes (Clarity of Opportunities to Participate)

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Conference Registration

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Designation/Credentialing of UN Reps

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Financial Commitment/Expenses

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Time/Personnel Commitment

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Quadrennial Report

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Geographical proximity/distance of UN functions

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Support of your NGO's board and/or donors

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

UN restrictions concerning presentation of written/verbal position statements

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Other (please specify _____)

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

2. How could the UN improve the overall experience for NGOs with Consultative Status?

3. To what degree is the cost and effort of obtaining and maintaining UN Consultative Status justified by the benefits derived by your organization? (10 denotes highly justified, 0 denotes not justified at all)

10-----9-----8-----7-----6-----5-----4-----3-----2-----1-----0

Name of survey respondent: _____ NGO: _____

Anonymity in this study is guaranteed. Respondents' identities and the identities of participating NGOs will be known only to the researcher and neither will ever be revealed to any third party, nor will the identity of respondents/NGOs ever be published in any research derived from this study.

APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1996/31 – CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS

United Nations

Resolution 1996/31

Economic and Social Council

49th plenary meeting

25 July 1996

1996/31. Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations

The Economic and Social Council,

Recalling Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling also its resolution 1993/80 of 30 July 1993, in which it requested a general review of arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations, with a view to updating, if necessary, Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968, as well as introducing coherence in the rules governing the participation of non-governmental organizations in international conferences convened by the United Nations, and also an examination of ways and means of improving practical arrangements for the work of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations and the Non-Governmental Organizations Section of the Secretariat,

Recalling further its decision 1995/304 of 26 July 1995,

Confirming the need to take into account the full diversity of the non-governmental organizations at the national, regional and international levels,

Acknowledging the breadth of non-governmental organizations' expertise and the capacity of non-governmental organizations to support the work of the United Nations,

Taking into account the changes in the non-governmental sector, including the emergence of a large number of national and regional organizations,

Calling upon the governing bodies of the relevant organizations, bodies and specialized agencies of the United Nations system to examine the principles and practices relating to their consultations with non-governmental organizations and to take action, as appropriate, to promote coherence in the light of the provisions of the present resolution,

Approves the following update of the arrangements set out in its resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968:

ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Part I

PRINCIPLES TO BE APPLIED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIVE RELATIONS

The following principles shall be applied in establishing consultative relations with non-governmental organizations:

1. The organization shall be concerned with matters falling within the competence of the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies.
2. The aims and purposes of the organization shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The organization shall undertake to support the work of the United Nations and to promote knowledge of its principles and activities, in accordance with its own aims and purposes and the nature and scope of its competence and activities.
4. Except where expressly stated otherwise, the term "organization" shall refer to non-governmental organizations at the national, subregional, regional or international levels.
5. Consultative relationships may be established with international, regional, subregional and national organizations, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and criteria established under the present resolution. The Committee, in considering applications for consultative status, should ensure, to the extent possible, participation of non-governmental organizations from all regions, and particularly from developing countries, in order to help achieve a just, balanced, effective and genuine involvement of non-governmental organizations from all regions and areas of the world. The Committee shall also pay particular attention to non-governmental organizations that have special expertise or experience upon which the Council may wish to draw.
6. Greater participation of non-governmental organizations from developing countries in international conferences convened by the United Nations should be encouraged.

7. Greater involvement of non-governmental organizations from countries with economies in transition should be encouraged.
8. Regional, subregional and national organizations, including those affiliated to an international organization already in status, may be admitted provided that they can demonstrate that their programme of work is of direct relevance to the aims and purposes of the United Nations and, in the case of national organizations, after consultation with the Member State concerned. The views expressed by the Member State, if any, shall be communicated to the non-governmental organization concerned, which shall have the opportunity to respond to those views through the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations.
9. The organization shall be of recognized standing within the particular field of its competence or of a representative character. Where there exist a number of organizations with similar objectives, interests and basic views in a given field, they may, for the purposes of consultation with the Council, form a joint committee or other body authorized to carry on such consultation for the group as a whole.
10. The organization shall have an established headquarters, with an executive officer. It shall have a democratically adopted constitution, a copy of which shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and which shall provide for the determination of policy by a conference, congress or other representative body, and for an executive organ responsible to the policy-making body.
11. The organization shall have authority to speak for its members through its authorized representatives. Evidence of this authority shall be presented, if requested.

12. The organization shall have a representative structure and possess appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making processes. Any such organization that is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement shall be considered a non-governmental organization for the purpose of these arrangements, including organizations that accept members designated by governmental authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organization.

13. The basic resources of the organization shall be derived in the main part from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members. Where voluntary contributions have been received, their amounts and donors shall be faithfully revealed to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. Where, however, the above criterion is not fulfilled and an organization is financed from other sources, it must explain to the satisfaction of the Committee its reasons for not meeting the requirements laid down in this paragraph. Any financial contribution or other support, direct or indirect, from a Government to the organization shall be openly declared to the Committee through the Secretary-General and fully recorded in the financial and other records of the organization and shall be devoted to purposes in accordance with the aims of the United Nations.

14. In considering the establishment of consultative relations with a non-governmental organization, the Council will take into account whether the field of activity of the organization is wholly or mainly within the field of a specialized agency, and whether or

not it could be admitted when it has, or may have, a consultative arrangement with a specialized agency.

15. The granting, suspension and withdrawal of consultative status, as well as the interpretation of norms and decisions relating to this matter, are the prerogative of Member States exercised through the Economic and Social Council and its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. A non-governmental organization applying for general or special consultative status or a listing on the Roster shall have the opportunity to respond to any objections being raised in the Committee before the Committee takes its decision.

16. The provisions of the present resolution shall apply to the United Nations regional commissions and their subsidiary bodies *mutatis mutandis*.

17. In recognizing the evolving relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations, the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, will consider reviewing the consultative arrangements as and when necessary to facilitate, in the most effective manner possible, the contributions of non-governmental organizations to the work of the United Nations.

Part II

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

18. A clear distinction is drawn in the Charter of the United Nations between participation without vote in the deliberations of the Council and the arrangements for consultation. Under Articles 69 and 70, participation is provided for only in the case of States not members of the Council, and of specialized agencies. Article 71, applying to non-governmental organizations, provides for suitable arrangements for consultation. This distinction, deliberately made in the Charter, is fundamental and the arrangements for consultation should not be such as to accord to non-governmental organizations the same rights of participation as are accorded to States not members of the Council and to the specialized agencies brought into relationship with the United Nations.

19. The arrangements should not be such as to overburden the Council or transform it from a body for coordination of policy and action, as contemplated in the Charter, into a general forum for discussion.

20. Decisions on arrangements for consultation should be guided by the principle that consultative arrangements are to be made, on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling the Council or one of its bodies to secure expert information or advice from organizations having special competence in the subjects for which consultative arrangements are made, and, on the other hand, to enable international, regional, subregional and national organizations that represent important elements of public opinion to express their views. Therefore, the arrangements for consultation made with each organization should relate to the subjects for which that organization has a special competence or in which it has a special interest. The organizations given consultative status should be limited to those whose activities in fields set out in paragraph 1 above qualify them to make a significant

contribution to the work of the Council and should, in sum, as far as possible reflect in a balanced way the major viewpoints or interests in these fields in all areas and regions of the world.

Part III

ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIPS

21. In establishing consultative relationships with each organization, regard shall be had to the nature and scope of its activities and to the assistance it may be expected to give to the Council or its subsidiary bodies in carrying out the functions set out in Chapters IX and X of the Charter of the United Nations.

22. Organizations that are concerned with most of the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies and can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Council that they have substantive and sustained contributions to make to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in fields set out in paragraph 1 above, and are closely involved with the economic and social life of the peoples of the areas they represent and whose membership, which should be considerable, is broadly representative of major segments of society in a large number of countries in different regions of the world shall be known as organizations in general consultative status.

23. Organizations that have a special competence in, and are concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council and its subsidiary bodies, and that are known within the fields for which they have or seek consultative status shall be known as organizations in special consultative status.

24. Other organizations that do not have general or special consultative status but that the Council, or the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, considers can make occasional and useful contributions to the work of the Council or its subsidiary bodies or other United Nations bodies within their competence shall be included in a list (to be known as the Roster). This list may also include organizations in consultative status or a similar relationship with a specialized agency or a United Nations body. These organizations shall be available for consultation at the request of the Council or its subsidiary bodies. The fact that an organization is on the Roster shall not in itself be regarded as a qualification for general or special consultative status should an organization seek such status.

25. Organizations to be accorded special consultative status because of their interest in the field of human rights should pursue the goals of promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.

26. Major organizations one of whose primary purposes is to promote the aims, objectives and purposes of the United Nations and a furtherance of the understanding of its work may be accorded consultative status.

Part IV

CONSULTATION WITH THE COUNCIL

Provisional agenda

27. The provisional agenda of the Council shall be communicated to organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status and to those on the Roster.

28. Organizations in general consultative status may propose to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations that the Committee request the Secretary-General to place items of special interest to the organizations in the provisional agenda of the Council.

Attendance at meetings

29. Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status may designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. Those on the Roster may have representatives present at such meetings concerned with matters within their field of competence. These attendance arrangements may be supplemented to include other modalities of participation.

Written statements

30. Written statements relevant to the work of the Council may be submitted by organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on subjects in which these organizations have a special competence. Such statements shall be circulated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the members of the Council, except those statements that have become obsolete, for example, those dealing with matters already disposed of and those that had already been circulated in some other form.

31. The following conditions shall be observed regarding the submission and circulation of such statements:

- (a) The written statement shall be submitted in one of the official languages;
- (b) It shall be submitted in sufficient time for appropriate consultation to take place between the Secretary-General and the organization before circulation;
- (c) The organization shall give due consideration to any comments that the Secretary-General may make in the course of such consultation before transmitting the statement in final form;
- (d) A written statement submitted by an organization in general consultative status will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 2,000 words. Where a statement is in excess of 2,000 words, the organizations shall submit a summary which will be circulated or shall supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon a specific request of the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations;
- (e) A written statement submitted by an organization in special consultative status or on the Roster will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 500 words. Where a statement is in excess of 500 words, the organization shall submit a summary which will be circulated; such statements will be circulated in full, however, upon a specific request of the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations;
- (f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Council, or the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, may invite organizations on the Roster to submit written statements. The provisions of subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) above shall apply to such statements;

(g) A written statement or summary, as the case may be, will be circulated by the Secretary-General in the working languages, and, upon the request of a member of the Council, in any of the official languages.

Oral presentations during meetings

32. (a) The Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall make recommendations to the Council as to which organizations in general consultative status should make an oral presentation to the Council and on which items they should be heard. Such organizations shall be entitled to make one statement to the Council, subject to the approval of the Council. In the absence of a subsidiary body of the Council with jurisdiction in a major field of interest to the Council and to organizations in special consultative status, the Committee may recommend that organizations in special consultative status be heard by the Council on the subject in its field of interest;

(b) Whenever the Council discusses the substance of an item proposed by a non-governmental organization in general consultative status and included in the agenda of the Council, such an organization shall be entitled to present orally to the Council, as appropriate, an introductory statement of an expository nature. Such an organization may be invited by the President of the Council, with the consent of the relevant body, to make, in the course of the discussion of the item before the Council, an additional statement for purposes of clarification.

Part V

CONSULTATION WITH COMMISSIONS AND OTHER SUBSIDIARY ORGANS OF THE COUNCIL

Provisional agenda

33. The provisional agenda of sessions of commissions and other subsidiary organs of the Council shall be communicated to organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status and those on the Roster.

34. Organizations in general consultative status may propose items for the provisional agenda of commissions, subject to the following conditions:

(a) An organization that intends to propose such an item shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations at least 63 days before the commencement of the session and before formally proposing an item shall give due consideration to any comments the Secretary-General may make;

(b) The proposal shall be formally submitted with the relevant basic documentation not later than 49 days before the commencement of the session. The item shall be included in the agenda of the commission if it is adopted by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

Attendance at meetings

35. Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status may designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the commissions and other subsidiary organs of the Council. Organizations on the Roster may have representatives present at such meetings that are concerned with matters within

their field of competence. These attendance arrangements may be supplemented to include other modalities of participation.

Written statements

36. Written statements relevant to the work of the commissions or other subsidiary organs may be submitted by organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on subjects for which these organizations have a special competence. Such statements shall be circulated by the Secretary-General to members of the commission or other subsidiary organs, except those statements that have become obsolete, for example, those dealing with matters already disposed of and those that have already been circulated in some other form to members of the commission or other subsidiary organs.

37. The following conditions shall be observed regarding the submission and circulation of such written statements:

- (a) The written statement shall be submitted in one of the official languages;
- (b) It shall be submitted in sufficient time for appropriate consultation to take place between the Secretary-General and the organization before circulation;
- (c) The organization shall give due consideration to any comments that the Secretary-General may make in the course of such consultation before transmitting the statement in final form;
- (d) A written statement submitted by an organization in general consultative status will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 2,000 words. Where a statement is in excess of 2,000 words, the organization shall submit a summary, which will be circulated, or shall

supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon the specific request of the commission or other subsidiary organs;

(e) A written statement submitted by an organization in special consultative status will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 1,500 words. Where a statement is in excess of 1,500 words, the organization shall submit a summary, which will be circulated, or shall supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon the specific request of the commission or other subsidiary organs;

(f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the chairman of the relevant commission or other subsidiary organ, or the commission or other subsidiary organ itself, may invite organizations on the Roster to submit written statements. The provisions in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) above shall apply to such statements;

(g) A written statement or summary, as the case may be, will be circulated by the Secretary-General in the working languages and, upon the request of a member of the commission or other subsidiary organ, in any of the official languages.

Oral presentations during meetings

38. (a) The commission or other subsidiary organs may consult with organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status either directly or through a committee or committees established for the purpose. In all cases, such consultations may be arranged upon the request of the organization;

(b) On the recommendation of the Secretary-General and at the request of the commission or other subsidiary organs, organizations on the Roster may also be heard by the commission or other subsidiary organs.

Special studies

39. Subject to the relevant rules of procedure on financial implications, a commission or other subsidiary organ may recommend that an organization that has special competence in a particular field should undertake specific studies or investigations or prepare specific papers for the commission. The limitations of paragraphs 37 (d) and (e) above shall not apply in this case.

Part VI

CONSULTATIONS WITH AD HOC COMMITTEES OF THE COUNCIL

40. The arrangements for consultation between ad hoc committees of the Council authorized to meet between sessions of the Council and organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status and on the Roster shall follow those approved for commissions of the Council, unless the Council or the committee decides otherwise.

Part VII

PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CONVENED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR PREPARATORY PROCESS

41. Where non-governmental organizations have been invited to participate in an international conference convened by the United Nations, their accreditation is the prerogative of Member States, exercised through the respective preparatory committee. Such accreditation should be preceded by an appropriate process to determine their eligibility.

42. Non-governmental organizations in general consultative status, special consultative status and on the Roster, that express their wish to attend the relevant international conferences convened by the United Nations and the meetings of the preparatory bodies of the said conferences shall as a rule be accredited for participation. Other non-governmental organizations wishing to be accredited may apply to the secretariat of the conference for this purpose in accordance with the following requirements.

43. The secretariat of the conference shall be responsible for the receipt and preliminary evaluation of requests from non-governmental organizations for accreditation to the conference and its preparatory process. In the discharge of its functions, the secretariat of the conference shall work in close cooperation and coordination with the Non-Governmental Organizations Section of the Secretariat, and shall be guided by the relevant provisions of Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) as updated.

44. All such applications must be accompanied by information on the competence of the organization and the relevance of its activities to the work of the conference and its preparatory committee, with an indication of the particular areas of the conference agenda and preparations to which such competence and relevance pertain, and should include, inter alia, the following information:

- (a) The purpose of the organization;
- (b) Information as to the programmes and activities of the organization in areas relevant to the conference and its preparatory process and the country or countries in which they are carried out. Non-governmental organizations seeking accreditation shall be asked to confirm their interest in the goals and objectives of the conference;
- (c) Confirmation of the activities of the organization at the national, regional or international level;
- (d) Copies of the annual or other reports of the organization with financial statements, and a list of financial sources and contributions, including governmental contributions;
- (e) A list of members of the governing body of the organization and their countries of nationality;
- (f) A description of the membership of the organization, indicating the total number of members, the names of organizations that are members and their geographical distribution;
- (g) A copy of the constitution and/or by-laws of the organization.

45. In the evaluation of the relevance of applications of non-governmental organizations for accreditation to the conference and its preparatory process, it is agreed that a determination shall be made based on their background and involvement in the subject areas of the conference.

46. The secretariat shall publish and disseminate to Member States on a periodic basis the updated list of applications received. Member States may submit comments on any of the applications on the list 14 days from receipt of the above-mentioned list by Member States. The comments of Member States shall be communicated to the non-governmental organization concerned, which shall have the opportunity to respond.

47. In cases where the secretariat believes, on the basis of the information provided in accordance with the present resolution, that the organization has established its competence and the relevance of its activities to the work of the preparatory committee, it shall recommend to the preparatory committee that the organization be accredited. In cases where the secretariat does not recommend the granting of accreditation, it shall make available to the preparatory committee its reasons for not doing so. The secretariat should ensure that its recommendations are available to members of the preparatory committee at least one week prior to the start of each session. The secretariat must notify such applicants of the reasons for non-recommendation and provide an opportunity to respond to objections and furnish additional information as may be required.

48. The preparatory committee shall decide on all recommendations for accreditation within 24 hours after the recommendations of the secretariat have been taken up by the preparatory committee in plenary meeting. In the event of a decision not being taken within this period, interim accreditation shall be accorded until such time as a decision is taken.

49. A non-governmental organization that has been granted accreditation to attend a session of the preparatory committee, including related preparatory meetings of regional commissions, may attend all its future sessions, as well as the conference itself.

50. In recognition of the intergovernmental nature of the conference and its preparatory process, active participation of non-governmental organizations therein, while welcome, does not entail a negotiating role.

51. The non-governmental organizations accredited to the international conference may be given, in accordance with established United Nations practice and at the discretion of the chairperson and the consent of the body concerned, an opportunity to briefly address the preparatory committee and the conference in plenary meetings and their subsidiary bodies.

52. Non-governmental organizations accredited to the conference may make written presentations during the preparatory process in the official languages of the United Nations as they deem appropriate. Those written presentations shall not be issued as official documents except in accordance with United Nations rules of procedure.

53. Non-governmental organizations without consultative status that participate in international conferences and wish to obtain consultative status later on should apply through the normal procedures established under Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) as updated. Recognizing the importance of the participation of non-governmental organizations that attend a conference in the follow-up process, the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, in considering their application, shall draw upon the documents already submitted by that organization for accreditation to the conference and

any additional information submitted by the non-governmental organization supporting its interest, relevance and capacity to contribute to the implementation phase. The Committee shall review such applications as expeditiously as possible so as to allow participation of the respective organization in the implementation phase of the conference. In the interim, the Economic and Social Council shall decide on the participation of non-governmental organizations accredited to an international conference in the work of the relevant functional commission on the follow-up to and implementation of that conference.

54. The suspension and withdrawal of the accreditation of non-governmental organizations to United Nations international conferences at all stages shall be guided by the relevant provisions of the present resolution.

Part VIII

SUSPENSION AND WITHDRAWAL OF CONSULTATIVE STATUS

55. Organizations granted consultative status by the Council and those on the Roster shall conform at all times to the principles governing the establishment and nature of their consultative relations with the Council. In periodically reviewing the activities of non-governmental organizations on the basis of the reports submitted under paragraph 61 (c) below and other relevant information, the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall determine the extent to which the organizations have complied with the principles governing consultative status and have contributed to the work of the Council, and may recommend to the Council suspension of or exclusion from

consultative status of organizations that have not met the requirements for consultative status as set forth in the present resolution.

56. In cases where the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations has decided to recommend that the general or special consultative status of a non-governmental organization or its listing on the Roster be suspended or withdrawn, the non-governmental organization concerned shall be given written reasons for that decision and shall have an opportunity to present its response for appropriate consideration by the Committee as expeditiously as possible.

57. The consultative status of non-governmental organizations with the Economic and Social Council and the listing of those on the Roster shall be suspended up to three years or withdrawn in the following cases:

(a) If an organization, either directly or through its affiliates or representatives acting on its behalf, clearly abuses its status by engaging in a pattern of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations including unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against Member States of the United Nations incompatible with those purposes and principles;

(b) If there exists substantiated evidence of influence from proceeds resulting from internationally recognized criminal activities such as the illicit drugs trade, money-laundering or the illegal arms trade;

(c) If, within the preceding three years, an organization did not make any positive or effective contribution to the work of the United Nations and, in particular, of the Council or its commissions or other subsidiary organs.

58. The consultative status of organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status and the listing of those on the Roster shall be suspended or withdrawn by the decision of the Economic and Social Council on the recommendation of its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations.

59. An organization whose consultative status or whose listing on the Roster is withdrawn may be entitled to reapply for consultative status or for inclusion on the Roster not sooner than three years after the effective date of such withdrawal.

Part IX

COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

60. The members of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall be elected by the Council on the basis of equitable geographical representation, in accordance with the relevant Council resolutions and decision 1/ and rules of procedure of the Council. 2/ The Committee shall elect its Chairman and other officers as necessary.

61. The functions of the Committee shall include the following:

(a) The Committee shall be responsible for regular monitoring of the evolving relationship between non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. With a view to fulfilling this responsibility, the Committee shall hold, before each of its sessions, and at other times as necessary, consultations with organizations in consultative status to

discuss questions of interest to the Committee or to the organizations relating to the relationship between the non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. A report on such consultations shall be transmitted to the Council for appropriate action;

(b) The Committee shall hold its regular session before the substantive session of the Council each year and preferably before the sessions of functional commissions of the Council to consider applications for general consultative status and special consultative status and for listing on the Roster made by non-governmental organizations and requests for changes in status, and to make recommendations thereon to the Council. Upon approval by the Council, the Committee may hold other meetings as required to fulfil its mandated responsibilities. Organizations shall give due consideration to any comments on technical matters that the Secretary-General of the United Nations may make in receiving such applications for the Committee. The Committee shall consider at each such session applications received by the Secretary-General not later than 1 June of the preceding year, on which sufficient data have been distributed to the members of the Committee not later than six weeks before the applications are to be considered.

Transitional arrangements, if possible, may be made during the current year only.

Reapplication by an organization for status, or a request for a change in status, shall be considered by the Committee at the earliest at its first session in the second year following the session at which the substance of the previous application or request was considered, unless at the time of such consideration it was decided otherwise;

(c) Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status shall submit to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations through the

Secretary-General every fourth year a brief report of their activities, specifically as regards the support they have given to the work of the United Nations. Based on findings of the Committee's examination of the report and other relevant information, the Committee may recommend to the Council any reclassification in status of the organization concerned as it deems appropriate. However, under exceptional circumstances, the Committee may ask for such a report from an individual organization in general consultative status or special consultative status or on the Roster, between the regular reporting dates;

(d) The Committee may consult, in connection with sessions of the Council or at such other times as it may decide, with organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on matters within their competence, other than items in the agenda of the Council, on which the Council or the Committee or the organization requests consultation. The Committee shall report to the Council on such consultations;

(e) The Committee may consult, in connection with any particular session of the Council, with organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on matters within the competence of the organizations concerning specific items already in the provisional agenda of the Council on which the Council or the Committee or the organization requests consultation, and shall make recommendations as to which organizations, subject to the provisions of paragraph 32 (a) above, should be heard by the Council or the appropriate committee and regarding which subjects should be heard. The Committee shall report to the Council on such consultations;

(f) The Committee shall consider matters concerning non-governmental organizations that may be referred to it by the Council or by commissions;

(g) The Committee shall consult with the Secretary-General, as appropriate, on matters affecting the consultative arrangements under Article 71 of the Charter, and arising therefrom;

(h) An organization that applies for consultative status should attest that it has been in existence for at least two years as at the date of receipt of the application by the Secretariat. Evidence of such existence shall be furnished to the Secretariat.

62. The Committee, in considering a request from a non-governmental organization in general consultative status that an item be placed in the agenda of the Council, shall take into account, among other things:

(a) The adequacy of the documentation submitted by the organization;

(b) The extent to which it is considered that the item lends itself to early and constructive action by the Council;

(c) The possibility that the item might be more appropriately dealt with elsewhere than in the Council.

63. Any decision by the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations not to grant a request submitted by a non-governmental organization in general consultative status that an item be placed in the provisional agenda of the Council shall be considered final unless the Council decides otherwise.

Part X

CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARIAT

64. The Secretariat should be so organized as to enable it to carry out the duties assigned to it concerning the consultative arrangements and the accreditation of non-governmental organizations to United Nations international conferences as set forth in the present resolution.

65. All organizations in consultative relationship shall be able to consult with officers of the appropriate sections of the Secretariat on matters in which there is a mutual interest or a mutual concern. Such consultation shall be upon the request of the non-governmental organization or upon the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

66. The Secretary-General may request organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status and those on the Roster to carry out specific studies or prepare specific papers, subject to the relevant financial regulations.

67. The Secretary-General shall be authorized, within the means at his disposal, to offer to non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship facilities that include:

(a) Prompt and efficient distribution of such documents of the Council and its subsidiary bodies as shall in the judgement of the Secretary-General be appropriate;

(b) Access to the press documentation services provided by the United Nations;

- (c) Arrangement of informal discussions on matters of special interest to groups or organizations;
- (d) Use of the libraries of the United Nations;
- (e) Provision of accommodation for conferences or smaller meetings of consultative organizations on the work of the Economic and Social Council;
- (f) Appropriate seating arrangements and facilities for obtaining documents during public meetings of the General Assembly dealing with matters in the economic, social and related fields.

Part XI

SECRETARIAT SUPPORT

68. Adequate Secretariat support shall be required for fulfilment of the mandate defined for the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations with respect to carrying out the wider range of activities in which the enhanced involvement of non-governmental organizations is envisaged. The Secretary-General is requested to provide the necessary resources for this purpose and to take steps for improving the coordination within the Secretariat of units dealing with non-governmental organizations.

69. The Secretary-General is requested to make every effort to enhance and streamline as appropriate Secretariat support arrangements, and to improve practical arrangements on such matters as greater use of modern information and communication technology, establishment of an integrated database of non-governmental organizations, wide and timely dissemination of information on meetings, distribution of documentation,

provision of access and transparent, simple and streamlined procedures for the attendance of non-governmental organizations in United Nations meetings, and to facilitate their broad-based participation.

70. The Secretary-General is requested to make the present resolution widely known, through proper channels, to facilitate the involvement of non-governmental organizations from all regions and areas of the world.

Notes

1/ Council resolutions 1099 (XL) and 1981/50 and Council decision 1995/304.

2/ Rule 80 of the rules of procedure of the Council.

VITA

BARRY MOWELL

- 1993 M.A., Geography
East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN
- 1999 Ed.S., Curriculum and Instruction
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN
- 2002 Ed.D., Social Science Education
University of Georgia
Athens, GA
- 2006 M.A., Religious Studies
Florida International University
Miami, FL
- 2008 M.S., Nonprofit Management
Florida Atlantic University
Boca Raton, FL
- 2011 M.B.A., Marketing
Lynn University
Boca Raton, FL
- 2012 M.A., Political Science
Florida International University
Miami, FL
- 2012-2017 Doctoral Candidate
Political Science
Florida International University

SELECT PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

Mowell, Barry D. 1996. "Volunteer Teaching on the University Campus: The Controversy and the Need for Recognition and Study." *The Journal of Graduate Teaching Assistant Development*. Volume 3, No. 3 (Spring).

Brook, Diane, Samuel Hinton, and Barry Mowell. 1997. "Resources for Teaching about Sub-Saharan Africa." *Social Education*. Volume 61, No.7 (November/December).

- Mowell, Barry D. 1997. "Expenditure of Student-Time per Degree: Application of the 'Breneman Wheel'/'Student-Year-Cost Measure' to PhD Programs in Geography." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Florida Society of Geographers, Jacksonville, FL.
- Mowell, Barry D. 2006. "The Status of Geography in Florida's Community College System." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Florida Society of Geographers, St. Petersburg, FL.
- Mowell, Barry D., ed. 2006. *Teaching about the Islamic World*. Washington, DC: National Council for Geographic Education.
- Mowell, Barry D., ed. 2010. *Sub-Saharan Africa in the Classroom*. Washington, DC: National Council for Geographic Education.
- Mowell, Barry D. 2010. "Profile of Eastern Africa: Geopolitical and Historical Perspectives." In *Sub-Saharan Africa in the Classroom*. Washington, DC: N.C.G.E.
- Mowell, Barry D. 2010. "Sub-Saharan Africa in Cinema: 80 Films with Political, Historical, or Economic Themes." In *Sub-Saharan Africa in the Classroom*, ed. Barry Mowell. Washington, DC: National Council for Geographic Education.
- Mowell, Barry D. 2013. "Political, Historical and Cultural Context of Central Asian Cinema." In *Social and Cultural Change in Central Asia: The Soviet Legacy 1924-1995*, eds. Sevket Akyildiz and Richard Carlson. London: Routledge.
- Mowell, Barry D. 2013. "Operation Just Cause: The US Invasion of Panama." In *Routledge Handbook of U.S. Diplomatic and Military History: 1865 to the Present*, eds. Christos Frenzos and Antonio S. Thompson. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Mowell, Barry D. 2015. "Patterns of Participation of NGOs with UN-ECOSOC Consultative Status." Paper presented at the European Union Center of Excellence Conference: European Civil Society - Legitimacy through cooperation? Miami, FL.
- Mowell, Barry D. 2016. "Domestic and Transnational Dimensions of Narcoterrorism and Countermeasures in Mexico." In *Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Studies*, eds. S. Romaniuk, et al. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Mowell, Barry D. 2016. "Comparative Analysis of Counterterrorism Issues, Policies and Institutions in Northern Europe and the Baltic States." In *Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Studies*, eds. S. Romaniuk, et al. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Mowell, Barry D. 2017. "US Nuclear Weapons Policy and Strategy." In *The Future of US Warfare*, eds. Scott Romaniuk and Francis Grice. New York: Taylor and Francis.