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The political party system and democratic crisis in Bolivia

Jennifer Marie Cyr
Florida International University

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THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AND
DEMOCRATIC CRISIS IN BOLIVIA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES
by
Jennifer Marie Cyr

2005
To: Interim Dean Mark Szuchman  
College of Arts and Sciences  

This thesis, written by Jennifer Marie Cyr, and entitled The Political Party System and Democratic Crisis in Bolivia, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this thesis and recommend that it be approved.

Astrid Arrarás

Timothy J. Power

Eduardo A. Gamarra, Major Professor

Date of Defense: July 8, 2005

The thesis of Jennifer Marie Cyr is approved.

Interim Dean Mark Szuchman  
College of Arts and Sciences  

Dean Douglas Wartzok  
University Graduate School  

Florida International University, 2005
DEDICATION

For Pablo.
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AND

DEMOCRATIC CRISIS IN BOLIVIA

by

Jennifer Marie Cyr

Florida International University, 2005

Miami, Florida

Professor Eduardo A. Gamarra, Major Professor

Using Kenneth Roberts' (2002) party-society linkages framework, this study
examined the reasons for the decline of the political party system in Bolivia after 2000.
The political party system that emerged in 1985 was connected to society primarily
through clientelist-based linkages. The economic and political model adopted after the
transition to democracy severely debilitated the party system's capacity to forge linkages
with society beyond clientelism.

Using interviews, survey data, and primary and secondary documents, the study
demonstrated that prolonged economic recession and social change revealed the
weaknesses of the linkages connecting the political party system with Bolivian society. It
concluded that the party system in Bolivia went into decline because it could not adapt to
the country's changing social landscape after 2000. The highly limited nature of
clientelist-based linkages in Bolivia suggests that they were ill-suited to withstand
economic recession and social crisis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewing the Literature</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bolivian Traditional Political Party System as a Case Study</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology and Analysis</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. HISTORICAL TRENDS IN BOLIVIAN POLITICS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatism and Clientelism</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pre-Revolutionary Period: Bolivia prior to 1952</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Period of Military Rule (1964-1978)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tortuous Transition to Representative Democracy (1979-1985)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE BOLIVIAN TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Era of Policy-Making: Pacted Democracy and the NPE</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintended Consequences: Assessing Governance in Bolivia</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Crisis and Social Change in Bolivia in the 1990s</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Emergence of Alternatives to the Traditional Political Party System</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. ANALYZING PARTY SYSTEM DECLINE</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examining the Electoral Evidence of Party System Decline</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing Bolivian Opinion on the Traditional Political Party System</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Party Politics after 2003</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing the Post-Political Crisis Vote</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

"El establecimiento de la democracia desde 1982 ha abierto un nuevo ciclo político en el país" (Lazarte 1991, 588).

"El 17 de octubre del 2003 quiebra con la lógica de la política consecuencial ... el centro hegemónico está vacío; hemos vuelto al debate de hace veinte años" (Mayorga, F. 2004).

In 1982, Dr. Hernán Siles Zuazo was elected President of Bolivia, officially marking the return to democracy in a country that had experienced almost twenty years of dictatorship, coups d'état, and intermittent and short-lived election cycles. Upon his call for new elections and his subsequent stepping down in 1985, a new era in Bolivian democracy would be forged – one consisting of successive coalition governments, or a pacted democracy, and accompanied by a strict neoliberal economic plan, the New Economic Policy (NPE, in Spanish).

Six coalitions and twenty-one years later, Bolivia’s political system confronted the worst crisis of its recent democratic history. The then one year old administration, headed by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), was forced to resign after months of protests, blockades, and calls for the dismantling of what many Bolivians would call his corrupt, exclusive, and ineffective coalition.1 Indeed, Sánchez de Lozada was not able to implement the majority of his economic and social policies in that first year. His negotiations with coca growers fell through, and plans to implement a 12.5% income tax hike and potentially sign a hydrocarbons deal were summarily rejected both by opposition in Congress and in the streets.

1 The Bolivian newspaper, La Razón, spells out in detail the events of October 2003, when Sánchez de Lozada was eventually forced to resign. See “21 Años,”: http://www.la-razon.com/Especial/Octubre/esp031010c.html (October 10, 2003).
With the forced resignation of Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia entered into a tumultuous period of political restructuring. The period was marked by the ascension of Sánchez de Lozada’s partyless vice president, Carlos Mesa Gilbert, to the presidency, the implementation of a law that expanded the right to run for office to citizen and indigenous groups, and the use of referenda on important policy-making issues such as the exportation of the country’s large gas reserves and regional autonomy. These post-2003 “anti-party” characteristics of Bolivia’s political system, along with 2004 polling results suggesting that the popularity of the country’s traditional political parties are at an all-time low, indicated that Bolivia’s political party system had been widely rejected and discredited by various sectors of society. The resulting party system decline forced the country to return, as Fernando Mayorga states above, to the political debates of twenty years past.

What can explain the dismantling of a political party system that had been both functioning and stable for almost twenty years? From where does a political crisis, such as the one experienced by Bolivia in the early twenty-first century, arise? The following pages seek to analyze the emergence and decline of the traditional political party system in Bolivia, identifying the primary reasons for and the subsequent legacies of the political crisis of 2003-2004.

The contents of this paper have important implications for issues of political representation in general. The question is asked: why do political party systems fail to be representative? Literature abounds (including O’Donnell 1996 and 1998, Huntington

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2 During the era of pacted democracy, coalition governments had been alternately run by three political parties: the MNR, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), and the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN). Henceforth, any use of the term “traditional political parties” or the “traditional political party system” in Bolivia will refer to these three parties.
on the difficulties faced by newly democratizing countries to make their nascent regimes work efficiently and effectively. This literature suggests that democratization has been superficial at best and a practical failure at worst. The analysis below works from the assumption that challenges to effective mediation between the state and society have impeded the process of democratization in countries like Bolivia. Assessing those challenges in the Bolivian case may shed some light on what might make political party systems, and hence representative democracy, work for many countries in the years ahead.

Using Kenneth Roberts’ (2002) party-society linkages framework, this study examines the reasons for the decline of the traditional political party system in Bolivia before, during, and after the political crisis of 2003. The following pages demonstrate that the weakly institutionalized political party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) that emerged after the transition to democracy in 1982 was sustained by clientelist-based patrimonial party-society linkages with primarily the urban middle class. The economic and political models adopted after the transition severely debilitated the party system’s capacity to expand these linkages. Different sectors of Bolivian society, including the newly politicized urban poor and rural classes, thus began to look elsewhere for alternative forms of representation that could accommodate their growing demands, including with political parties founded in the 1990s and the newly formalized citizen and indigenous groups in 2004.

The failure of the traditional political party system to maintain its linkages, as well as its inability to forge new linkages with Bolivian society, would be detrimental to its long-term sustainability. These failures, together with a prolonged economic crisis
and a longstanding tradition of corporatist-based mobilization in the country, exacerbated tensions between the traditional political parties and the newly empowered political forces both in Congress and in the streets. The findings of this study suggest that the traditional political party system in Bolivia was dependent upon middle class-based, clientelist party-society linkages for survival. Unable to accommodate the demands of the newly politicized urban and rural poor, the legitimacy and sustainability of the traditional political party system were severely undermined.

*Reviewing the Literature*

Political parties are essential for present-day Latin American democracies. This widely shared and longstanding belief (Schattschneider 1942, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1999, Lipset 2000, Levitsky and Cameron 2003) has helped orient democratic theory and scholarship in the region despite the challenges political party systems in most of Latin America have consistently confronted since the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) began in the 1970s.

The importance of political parties for representative democracy derives from their role as mediators between state and society. Sartori (1976) asserts that political parties are the institutional instrument of representation within the political system. They are independent agents that channel the demands of their constituents to government. That is, parties should be instruments for “representing the people by expressing their demands” (Sartori 1976, 27, emphasis in the original). Sartori underscores this expressive function of political parties. He contends that parties should use their power to wield influence in government. They should, in effect, be a “mechanism of retaliation and enforcement” of the “citizens’ ‘voices’” (Sartori 1976, 58).
Despite their implicit importance for representative democracy, political party systems in Latin America have been studied extensively by relatively few scholars. The literature that has been published is both thorough and illuminating with regards to several different characteristics of party systems in Latin America. Typically, academics use three theoretical approaches to study political party systems in the region. They develop classification schemes for understanding parties cross-nationally; study the institutional factors that might either weaken or strengthen party systems; and analyze the structural factors that bring about the emergence of parties and party systems and thus offer insight into why those systems might decline. While this last perspective provides the theoretical basis of the work at hand, each approach to Latin American party systems is fundamental for understanding the complex and dynamic lifeblood that has made representative democracies “workable” in the region (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 3).

The works of Sartori (1976), Downs (1957), Coppedge (1997), and Alcántara and Friedenberg (2001) utilize the first theoretical approach for examining political party systems. Specifically, they devise several different formulas for evaluating party system formation and identifying the parties that make up each system. Sartori’s denotes two dimensions for classifying party systems. He uses the number of parties in a system and the ideological difference among parties to categorize party systems into seven different classes (Sartori 1976, 125). Downs approaches systems from the spatial dimension and argues that systems tend to fall along a continuum in which parties fulfill the ideological demands of a society as determined by voters’ preferences.

Works such as these have provided the theoretical foundations for later assessments of party systems. In the case of Sartori and Downs, however, their texts
have been used primarily to understand the party systems of advanced industrial countries (Mainwaring 1999, 23). Thus, their applicability to the characteristics of political parties in newly democratizing countries such as those found in Latin America is limited.

Michael Coppedge (1997) produced a working paper with the particular purpose of classifying the major political parties from eleven different countries in Latin America. He collaborated with a series of specialists to characterize each country’s parties along the left/right axis, the secular/Christian divide, or as being personalist, environmental, regional, ethnic, or feminist (Coppedge 1997, 2). Similarly, Alcántara and Friedenberg identify two internal and three external characteristics of the political parties in eighteen different Latin American countries, in an effort to view a party not just as one part of a system’s “pluralistic whole” (Sartori 1976, 26) but also as an entity in itself with its own unique interests. The goal of all four of these classification systems is to allow for cross-national comparisons of political parties and party systems. Yet, in each case characterization is inevitably static, denying each party system any dynamism – a trait that is particularly important to consider in the context of democratization.

Linz (1994), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Mainwaring (1999) argue that institutional factors best explain the nuances of a country’s party system. They utilize the second theoretical approach for understanding Latin American political party systems. For Linz, the great debate centers on the merits of parliamentary versus presidential or semi-presidential systems. Presidentialism within the context of a weak multiparty system, he argues, feeds upon and exacerbates the weaknesses of parties by forcing the executive to bypass partisan entities in order to enact policy through individualist and often clientelistic means (Linz 1994, 35). Linz’s bias towards parliamentarism may help
in illuminating the weaknesses of presidential systems and, in the case of Bolivia, of hybrid presidential systems (Gamarra 1997). Having identified the debilities of these systems, however, Linz’s work cannot explain why a weakly institutionalized hybrid presidential system like Bolivia’s would last as long as it did; consequently, it cannot help explain which variables would eventually lead to that system’s decline.

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) use the institutional approach to differentiate party systems along an inchoate-institutionalized continuum, identifying four measures for evaluating to what extent a political party system is institutionalized. They argue, as does Mainwaring (1999), that greater institutionalization fosters a more stable and enduring democracy in a country. The consequences of a weakly institutionalized system, on the other hand, can profoundly affect a country’s “democratic survival,” since these systems are equated with a higher degree of personalism and uncertainty and weaker mechanisms of accountability (Mainwaring 1999, 38). Following Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mainwaring’s 1999 work hints at some of the possible implications of a weakly institutionalized system, not just for governance and representation, but for the survival of the regime in general. Ultimately, however, their classification scheme for party systems, as with Coppedge (1998) and Alcántara and Friedenberg (2001), is inherently limited in terms of understanding the dynamic nature of the post-transition party systems in countries like Bolivia. Thus, it is not able to expound upon the factors that bring about either the strengthening or, as in the case of interest here, the decline of political party systems.

The third theoretical approach to party systems is a structural one, and it comes closest to understanding the underlying forces that cause the emergence, and hence also
the potential decline or decay, of a political party system. Specifically, structuralists identify the existing social, economic, and political conditions that shape the nature and characteristics of an emerging party system. They provide an historical context for understanding why a party system is the way it is and in this way help illuminate the cracks and "fault lines" (Agüero and Stark 1998) in the system that could also bring about its decline.

For example, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) offer a look at the emergence of party systems in Western Europe. They argue that party systems arise out of alternative alliances and oppositions during the period of nation-building. The process of nation-building, they argue, is shaped by a two-dimensional space in which the political expressions of territorial-cultural and functional conflicts – also called cleavages – fall. How these conflicts emerge and how they are subsequently addressed will determine in large part the nature and alignment of political parties within a country (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 5-7).

Collier and Collier’s (1991) study on labor relations is another example. They look at the different policies adopted by eight Latin American countries in response to their growing labor movements. They argue that the decision to implement different labor policies led to the formation of different institutions that shaped the character of labor-state relations for years to come. The distinct institutional design chosen in each case sparked a process of political evolution that would ultimately determine the nature of each governmental regime and how it subsequently interacted with society (Collier and Collier 1991, 37). The analyses of Lipset and Rokkan and of Collier and Collier offer important insight on the emergence of party systems in specific countries at specific
times. That said, their approach is inherently limited to past historical periods: for Lipset and Rokkan, the era of the reformation and the French and Industrial Revolutions, and for Collier and Collier, the “initial incorporation” of the labor movement in their country set (Collier and Collier 1991, 22). As such, they cannot serve as a framework for addressing the emergence of party systems in general, including, for the purposes of this study, the Bolivian political party system that was established in the 1980s.

Coppedge (1998) argues that party systems in Latin America are either “established” or “chaotic” depending upon the nature of the political order prior to the expansion of political participation to the lower and middle classes and the time-frame in which such participation was granted (Coppedge 1998, 199). The impact of these two conditions influences party system development in terms of the cleavages that divide the parties, the legitimacy of the opposition, and the degree to which the parties are institutionalized. His work helps us to understand why certain party systems emerge in different Latin American countries, but it is less helpful in understanding the subsequent life cycle of each system, as well as its possible decline.

Kenneth Roberts’ work (2002) on Latin American political party systems overcomes the geographical and historical limitations of the aforementioned studies, putting forth a framework that allows us to understand party system decline at any point during a party system’s life cycle. Thus, his work applies to the Bolivian traditional political party system of the late 20th century. The scholar analyzes extant political party systems and the particular ways in which those systems interact with society. Viewing political parties as “vital intermediaries” between state and society (Roberts 2002, 13), he argues that there are five different party-society linkages that connect political parties to
their constituents. Political brokerage and patron-client linkages are based on the exchange of material benefits for political support. Encapsulating linkages, also known as corporatist or participatory linkages, forge powerful bonds between politicians and their constituents, who are generally organized into social blocs. Ideological and programmatic commitments form the basis of programmatic linkages, whereas personalistic linkages are characterized by the charismatic bond that forms between a party leader and voters. Finally, marketing linkages are based upon contingent and temporary connections that are formed primarily at electoral junctures and then quickly dissolve.

Importantly, these party-society linkages evolve. They are established when political parties can ally themselves with the social and economic cleavages in a given society at a given time. They decline or decay\(^3\) when the political party system does not adapt as the social and economic cleavages shift. Thus, Roberts develops a causal relationship between social and economic change and the effectiveness of a political party system. A political party system can avoid crises if it is able to adapt to and evolve with the changing nature of society. This proposition holds true at any point during a party system’s life cycle, giving the approach dynamism and long-term applicability. That is, it allows us to evaluate the status of a party system’s linkages with society at any

\[^3\] Roberts is not explicit about the meanings of party system decline and party system decay in his work (Roberts 2002, 2003) on party-society linkages. However, it is clear from the context in which he employs both terms that party system decline is used when a party system is dealigning from the linkages that formerly connected that system with society. Party system decay happens when the political parties have completely dealigned with society and, in the absence of the formation of new party-society linkages, have been unable to realign with that society and are dismantled completely. Venezuela’s party system is an example of party system decay, since the emergence of Hugo Chávez, as a populist non-party system leader, replaced the former system entirely. Party system decline, however, suggests that the process of dealignment of the political party system is still incomplete. Thus, party system realignment or total decay are both still very real possibilities.
given period and, unlike Coppedge’s theory above, is not limited to understanding only party system emergence.

Roberts (2002) is not alone in his theory about linkages. Conaghan (1996) specifically addresses the Andean region – Bolivia included – when she asserts that the problematic nature of democracy in the Andes is due to “faulty political linkages” (Conaghan 1996, 34). Moreover, Roberts (2003) further elaborates this idea of failing linkages in his analysis of the decline and eventual decay of the Venezuelan political party system in the 1990s. He contends that prolonged economic crisis and social change in Venezuela led to the erosion of the encapsulating and clientelist linkages that had been the primary mediating channels between state and society throughout the period of import substitution industrialization (ISI). In particular, the shift from a state-oriented economic policy to one based on neoliberal principles undermined corporatist relationships and thus aggravated the clientelist demands upon the much-reduced state. Unable to accommodate these demands, the strong linkages between state and society eroded, eventually causing the party system’s demise. The erosion of these linkages enabled the emergence of the unmediated (that is, essentially partyless) populist leadership of Hugo Chávez Frias.

Thus, the idea of linkages is important for understanding the state of alignment, dealignment, in the case where parties detach from their social moorings, or subsequent realignment of political parties vis-à-vis society. When these linkages have eroded, the mediating capacity of political parties is debilitated or severed, undermining the popularity and credibility of these representative institutions and making the creation of new linkages between parties and society increasingly difficult. Thus, the sustainability
or decline of a party system is dependent upon its ability to maintain societal linkages within a changing economic, political, and/or social context.

In the case of Venezuela, Roberts argues that the political party system failed to preserve its corporatist and clientelist linkages with Venezuelan society. The subsequent party system decline led to a surge in populism, dismantling the formerly institutionalized two-party system altogether. The analysis to follow will employ Roberts’ theory of party-society linkages to evaluate the state of Bolivia’s traditional political parties in the early 21st century, more then fifteen years after its party system was consolidated within the country’s newly established democratic regime. The emergence and subsequent crisis of Bolivia’s political party system serves as an opportunity for building an understanding of what conditions might lead to party system decline. This is important because, as Roberts acknowledges, literature on party decline and decay is scarce (Roberts 2003, 40).

*The Bolivian Traditional Political Party system as a Case Study*

Bolivia serves as an interesting case for testing Roberts’ argument that prolonged social and economic change can lead to the erosion of party-society linkages and thus party system decline. The country is unique from Roberts’ Venezuelan case study because, up until the transition to democracy in 1982, the corporatist and clientelist linkages between political parties and society were extremely tenuous in the country. Thus, the traditional political party system that was established in 1985 initially had very weak linkages with the Bolivian populace. Instead of strengthening these linkages, however, the political and economic model adopted at that time exacerbated their inherent weaknesses.
In particular, the austerity measures embodied in the NPE reduced the size of the state and privatized the industries that provided the material and organizational resources needed to maintain corporatist linkages. The principle of pacted democracy diminished the role of the traditional political party system, preventing those parties from establishing new linkages with society beyond clientelist-based patrimonialism. When the country faced prolonged economic recession and social change after 2000, the party system was unable to maintain its clientelist linkages with society. Moreover, the longstanding political influence of other non-state actors, as well as the emergence of new political parties and social movements, served as attractive alternatives to traditional political party-based representation. After 2000, the convergence of these factors forced the political party system into decline.

The study to follow makes this argument by looking first at the state-society linkages that existed prior to the consolidation of the traditional political party system. After the National Revolution in 1952, the MNR’s attempt to establish an enduring hegemonic single-party system failed. This was due in part to the party’s inability to co-opt important sectors of Bolivian society within its party network. Its failure can also be attributed, however, to the unusual strength of the country’s Workers Central (in Spanish, the *Central Obrera Boliviana* [COB]), the nationally-based confederation of labor unions that stridently maintained its autonomy from the MNR’s grasp upon its creation in the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution.

When a coup d’état placed the military in charge after twelve years of increasingly debilitated MNR leadership, the influence of political parties in the Bolivian state disappeared almost entirely. Between 1964 and 1978, the struggle for control of the
country took place primarily between two other potent actors: the COB and the military. While the 1970s brought about the foundation of the other two political parties that would eventually form the "tripod" (Mayorga, R., 2002) of the country's traditional political party system, politics during this time was marked by either close alliances or sharp conflicts between the military and the unions (Lazarte 1991, 584). Thus, prior to the transition to representative democracy in 1982, the role of political parties as intermediaries between state and society was matched and at times undermined by both the COB and the military.

When the country restored the democratically elected president, Hernán Siles Zuazo, and his leftist coalition, Unidad Democrática y Popular (UDP), to power in 1982, the principle of party-led government would be reinitiated for the first time in thirty years. As a part of his broad-based coalition, Siles Zuazo initially incorporated the COB and the rural sectors into government, using the post-Revolution corporatist logic of co-government to coopt and integrate these influential constituencies into the state. Faced with one of the worst economic crises in the country's history, an opposition-led Congress, and the eventual failure of co-government with labor and the campesinos, however, Siles Zuazo was unable to maintain control of the country and was forced to call for early elections in 1985.


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4 The MIR was founded in 1971, the ADN in 1979.
Specifically, Paz Estenssoro and his team of technocrats established a precedent for congressionally supported coalition rule – called *democracia pactada*, or pacted democracy – while simultaneously implementing a “draconian austerity program,” known as the NPE, designed to put an end to the long-standing and severe economic crisis in the country (Gamarra 2003b, 298). In essence, in 1985, a distinct form of representative rule was established alongside a distinct model for economic reform.

Taken together, the 1985 reforms fashioned an unprecedented system for centralized economic and political decision-making unlike anything Bolivians had experienced in the past – what one scholar (Mayorga, F. 2004) has called a “hegemonic center”. Importantly, this center consisted of the dominance of the three traditional political parties that would alternate governance of the country in the form of coalitions from 1985 until the elections of 2002. It would be buoyed on both sides by the principle of pacted democracy and the NPE. The hegemonic center would be so strong that, as Fernando Mayorga suggests, it would forge coalitions out of political parties with an at times mutual dislike for each other and establish agreements from these coalitions to form public policies despite an at times strong opposition in the legislative branch (Mayorga, F. 2004).

The analysis to follow demonstrates that the strength of this hegemonic center of traditional political parties was fundamental in establishing the political stability necessary in order to make decision-making and the implementation of reforms possible. At the same time, this analysis suggests that the nature of Bolivia’s hegemonic center

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5 For example, the *Acuerdo Patriótico* (1989-93) between the leftist MIR and the conservative right-wing ADN and the most recent coalition between the MNR and the MIR (2002-2003).
weakened the traditional political party system’s linkages with society. The NPE destroyed any further capacity for the encapsulating, corporatist-based linkages that had traditionally linked Bolivian society to the state by drastically reducing the size of the country’s bureaucracy and privatizing most of the state-run industries that had served as the material foundations of the unions and as the source of patronage for the political parties. Moreover, conditions of scarcity and poor economic growth limited further the reach of this patronage-based clientelism, thus reducing the impact of the traditional party system’s primary linkage with society after 1985.

Despite the nature of the party-society linkages in Bolivia after the transition to democracy, the traditional political party system remained in power and was even stable until the end of the 1990s. All of this changed at the turn of the millennium. Faced with an acute two-year economic crisis, the resource-stricken government was trapped between addressing intense international pressures to curb the cultivation of coca and equally intense but contradictory internal demands from an increasingly politicized civil society. Here, the limitations of the clientelist-based linkages between the traditional political parties and society became evident. Oriented historically towards Bolivia’s urban middle class, these linkages could not sufficiently enfranchise the newly mobilized urban and rural sectors in the country. Thus, the sectors began to look beyond the traditional political parties for economic and social relief, turning their votes and thus their tacit support to the newly formed political parties that emerged in the 1990s and early 21st century.

This study suggests that since 2000, the decline of Bolivia’s traditional political party system became increasingly apparent. Indeed, by 2005, it appeared that the weak
linkages that connected the traditional political parties to Bolivian society had been all but severed. For one, the vice president-turned-president Carlos Mesa had no formal political party support and based his popular October Agenda\(^6\) on this fact. Furthermore, important policy decisions were removed from the realm of the legislature and left to the consideration of the Bolivian population at large. The referendum on the Hydrocarbons Law in July 2004 was an important example of this. A third important aspect of the post-2003 political system was the institutionalization of a Law of Citizen and Indigenous Groups (Ley de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y Pueblos Indígenas). This law allowed political candidates to run independently of political parties as a part of newly legislated citizen or indigenous groups.

Each of these institutional changes represented a move further away from the use of political parties as the sole channel of representation in the country’s democratic regime. They also reflected the degree to which linkages between these parties and society had eroded. As we will see in the chapters that follow, in the case of Bolivia, the decline of the traditional political party system had its roots, somewhat ironically, in the very economic and political reforms that made the party system possible in the first place. By 2005, the outcomes of this decline, that is, whether it would detach from society altogether or realign with society along new party-society linkages were still unclear.

Following Roberts’ party-society framework, then, the hypothesis tested in the proceeding pages is the following:

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\(^6\) Mesa took over the presidency with the promise to: organize a binding referendum on the extraction and processing of the country’s hydrocarbons; pass a new Hydrocarbons Law in accordance with that referendum; and realize a Constituent Assembly (La Razón, 18 October 2003). These three promises came to be known as his October Agenda.
Question #1: Why did Bolivia’s traditional political party system enter into decline after 2000?

Hypothesis #1: Bolivia’s traditional political party system entered into decline, because the weak clientelist linkages it had forged with Bolivian society were unable to adapt to shifting societal demands in the country after 2000.

Methodology and Analysis

Using Robert’s theory of party-society linkages in the case of Bolivia requires identifying the linkages that existed between political parties and society prior to the country’s transition to democracy in the 1980s. Thus, Chapter Two is dedicated to developing the political history of Bolivia from before the 1952 National Revolution until the transition to democracy in the early 1980s. It concludes that political parties were not the sole intermediary between state and society in the country’s political system during this time. Other political actors, including the military and the COB, served as equally powerful vehicles for representation in the country, and their linkages were based on clientelism and corporatism.

It is also necessary to analyze the emergence and evolution of the traditional political party system that would eventually enter into decline in the early 21st century. Chapter Three looks at the formulation and maturation of this party system throughout the 1980s and 1990s, examining the clientelist linkages forged with Bolivian society. It analyzes the role of pacted democracy and the NPE in hindering the capacity of the traditional political parties to sustain their linkages with society as well as forge new linkages. It also addresses the growing economic recession and accompanying social changes by the end of the 1990s. Constrained by the political and economic models adopted in 1985, the traditional political parties were unable to accommodate the growing
demands brought about by the economic crisis by the end of the century. In essence, while pacted democracy and the NPE brought both governance and stability to the country, they also enabled the decline of the traditional political party system.

Chapter Four examines the various manifestations of the erosion of party-society linkages in Bolivia. The analysis in this chapter is achieved through a triangulation of methods. Cross-national data from two different sets of surveys help gauge the opinions of Bolivian society during the period of traditional party system rule and during its decline. Professor Mitchell A. Seligson, with the support of the University of Pittsburgh and USAID, carried out nationwide surveys on the political culture of Bolivian democracy every two years since 1998. These data allow for a limited comparison of the changing views of a representative sample of Bolivians over a time period that began during the period of party system rule and continued through 2004. The Bolivian National Electoral Court (CNE, in Spanish) carried out, with the support of the Canadian Agency for International Development, the Second National Study on Democracy and Democratic Values in Bolivia during the second half of 2004. This nationwide effort used surveys, in-depth interviews, and focus groups to evaluate Bolivian perceptions toward and expectations of democracy. Analysis of these data supports this study’s contention that the traditional political parties in Bolivia became detached from their social moorings after 2000.

Additionally, interviews and seminars carried out during two trips to Bolivia in 2004 and 2005 emphasize the challenges faced by the party system after the transition to democracy in the 1980s and up until its eventual decline. Primary documents, including constitutional amendments and enacted legislation from the 1980s to 2003, provide the
historical context needed to support the evidence from the interviews and the interpretation of the aforementioned surveys and focus groups. Finally, secondary documents, including newspapers and other academic literature, serve to deepen the analysis and understanding of the events that took place throughout the period of Bolivian political history examined here. Altogether, the evidence demonstrates that the linkages connecting the traditional political party system with Bolivian society were unable to endure the economic and social changes after 2000.

One possible limitation of the paper is its external validity. While general trends in party-society linkages can and have been identified cross-nationally over time (Roberts 2002, 2003), the nature and evolution of the party-society linkages in the Bolivian case are inevitably case-specific. However, the impact of economic reforms on other weakly institutionalized political party systems, such as, for example, Ecuador or Peru, may prove to be similar to the Bolivian case. Thus, the evolution and decline of the party system in Bolivia can serve as a basis of comparison for understanding the emergence and decline of other political party systems in the region. This analysis makes the case, then, for future comparative work with other decayed or declining party systems in Latin America or beyond.
II. HISTORICAL TRENDS IN BOLIVIAN POLITICS

Understanding why certain linkages between political parties and society do or do not exist today is only possible by evaluating the historical context out of which those linkages arose. The three traditional political parties in Bolivia’s party system, the MNR, the MIR, and the ADN, emerged prior to the return to democracy in 1982. They each were founded for different reasons and during unique periods of the country’s political history. The goal of this chapter is to examine those periods prior to Bolivia’s transition to democracy and highlight the important characteristics of its political system during that time. The linkages between state and society forged then had a profound impact on the weak mediating capacities of the post-transition political party system.

As mentioned in Chapter One, Kenneth Roberts (2002) identifies five different types of linkages that have historically connected society to political parties in Latin America. He contends that, throughout the 20th century and particularly during the periods of economic growth based on import substitution industrialization (ISI), the bonds that existed in the region were primarily of a corporatist and clientelist nature (Roberts 2003, 44). Bolivia fits this generalization. Where they were present, the linkages between the country’s political parties and society between the 1950s and 1980s tended to be either clientelist or corporatist in character.

Chapter Two, then, develops the history of state-society linkages throughout Bolivian contemporary history. It is organized into four sections that address each of the important pre-democratic transition periods in recent Bolivian history. As the pages to follow demonstrate, the role of intermediary between state and society varied during each period. Prior to the 1952 National Revolution, the Bolivian political system consisted of
two parties that alternated power within a severely limited democratic regime. The linkages that existed reflected the Liberal and Conservative cleavages typical in Latin America at that time (Coppedge 1998). After 1952, a single hegemonic party, the MNR, dominated the country, forging linkages to society that were corporatist and clientelist-based. A succession of military regimes controlled the country after 1964; here, too linkages were primarily clientelist and corporatist in nature. The period of the tortuous transition to democracy beginning after 1978 marked a time when the state-society linkages were few but political actors who wanted power were many.

The chapter concludes that, while the traditional political parties emerged before the transition to democracy, their role as an intermediary between state and society was matched by that of both the military and the COB in terms of governance and representation. Thus, the linkages they forged with society were at best very tenuous. It is important to examine each of these periods, and the traditional political parties’ role in Bolivia’s political system during this time, because both were influential in determining the party-society linkages that emerged after 1985.

**Clientelism and Corporatism**

Before entering into the historical analysis, it is necessary to first clarify the study’s usage of corporatism and clientelism. As some authors acknowledge (Collier and Collier 1979), concepts like these tend to be used broadly to describe a range of different political behaviors. To avoid such confusion, each term is first defined here. Further reference to both clientelism and corporatism should be interpreted with each definition in mind. Corporatist bonds are constructed as vertically segmented relationships between a bureaucratic center (i.e. the state) and a network of legally recognized guilds and/or
corporations (for example, organized labor, campesino organizations, and the private sector). These organized sectors of society encapsulate individual interests collectively; in turn, the state addresses the demands and interests of the sectors (Kaufman 1977, 111).

The logic of representation behind corporatism contrasts with that which underlies a modern-day polyarchy (Dahl 1971, 1998) or representative democracy. Whereas representative democracies utilize political parties as the primary channels of mediation between state and society, in a corporatist system, these channels are practically eliminated in exchange for direct interaction between the state and sectorally-segmented society. As the Bolivian case demonstrates, the role of historically strong labor unions in the country has perpetuated conflicts between the state and society since the 1952 National Revolution. The struggle to determine who has the monopoly of representation within the Bolivian political system is one that has been ongoing since that time.

Clientelism consists of a particularistic exchange relationship between two actors of unequal power or status (Kaufman 1977, 113). Here, too, a vertical relationship exists between state and society. In this instance, however, the link between these actors is one based on the reciprocal exchange of goods and services. Clientelist-based linkages are inherently contingent upon these exchanges. Where resources are scarce, the fleeting and temporary character of the relationship is exacerbated. At the same time, resource scarcity foments clientelist behaviors. The capacity to mount social assistance or service provision programs are weakened and thus appeals for votes occur on a more individual level. As a result, incentives to collectively organize around programmatic appeals are virtually non-existent (Valenzuela 1977, 167). The paradox between scarcity and clientelism underscores the tenuous nature of linkages based on this type of behavior.
Clientelism thrives in an environment of scarcity but at the same time is severely limited in scope because of that scarcity and, accordingly, is vulnerable to change.

In the Bolivian case, clientelistic dynamics dominated the political system after the transition to democracy. Specifically, the state functioned almost exclusively through neopatrimonialism, or the logic of appropriating public office for private means. Dependent upon support networks to maintain rule, Bolivian leaders have continually drawn from state coffers in order to sustain and expand that support. As a result, the state becomes little more than a “personal resource to maintain [the neopatrimonial leader’s] rule” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 110). The weaknesses of these clientelist-based neopatrimonial linkages between the traditional political party system and society became apparent by the end of the 1990s, as subsequent chapters demonstrate. Like corporatism, however, these linkages connected the society to the state throughout the 20th century – well before the traditional political party system was established in 1985.

The analysis that follows looks at the evolution of the clientelist and corporatist-based linkages between state and society during Bolivia’s contemporary political history. By understanding how these linkages materialized prior to the adoption of representative democracy, it is possible to evaluate their impact on the role of the traditional political party system after 1985. Specifically, the role of the military and the COB was on par with and at times more influential than that of the traditional political parties prior to the democratic transition. Thus, the parties had to compete with each of these actors as intermediaries between the Bolivian state and the population. As a result, the traditional political party system maintained tenuous linkages with society heading into the period of representative democracy.
The Pre-Revolutionary Period: Bolivia prior to 1952

Prior to the 1952 National Revolution, Bolivia's political system was largely restricted to and controlled by a small set of political elites who were unified by similar economic interests. In particular, between 1884 and 1899, leadership of the country alternated between the Conservative and Liberal parties, and no more than ten percent of the adult male population was able to vote (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 400). At this time, too, the economic importance of Bolivia's tin industry was growing to its height, and most of the political activity was focused on the powerful tin barons, also known as *la rosca*, or three tin-exporting families who controlled most of the country's economic and thus political resources.

With the arrival of the twentieth century, the influence of the Conservative Party had largely dwindled, since most of its base consisted of the then declining silver oligarchy. Caudillo-based Liberal factions took over the struggle for power, and government became little more than "a commodity, a prize in the struggle between factions made up of the leaders drawn from the elite" (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 401). Politics at the time, then, was for a very select group of elites. The peasant groups, poor urban class sectors, and the growing middle class were largely excluded from participating in the limited two-party democracy.

All of this changed with Bolivia's defeat in the Chaco War (1932-1935). Called a "humiliating military disaster," the results of this war helped bring about the demise of the early twentieth century political elites (Malloy 1970, 322). At the time, the effects of the 1929 worldwide depression were being felt and Bolivia's tin industry was experiencing an unprecedented decline. This decline restricted the political elite's ability
to control the new labor groups that had emerged during the peak years of tin extraction and exportation. In the 1930s, then, the convergence of economic crisis, tin industry decline, and Bolivia’s tragic military loss served as important factors in rendering the Liberal party politicians, and la rosea in general, ineffective in controlling Bolivia’s increasingly mobilized and underrepresented society.

In the Liberal Party’s wake, new parties emerged that corresponded with the demands of the newly politicized sectors of Bolivian society. On the left, the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR, 1940) was founded, as well as the trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR, 1944), which became the primary party for the labor groups. The leftover oligarchy and other Bolivian elites found their political expression in the right-wing Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB, 1937). These parties fulfilled the class-based cleavages that emerged in the context of economic decline in the 1930s. However, their influence was unstable and short-lived. By 1950, for example, the PIR had already split, and a portion of the former PIR members formed the Partido Comunista de Bolivia (PCB). By the time of the National Revolution in 1952, the POR and the FSB had each factionalized into 14 different groups, and the PCB had divided into nine different groups. These factions reflected the importance of caudillos and private interests in party organization at that time (Calderón 1989, 203-4).

The longstanding party that did emerge in the 1940s was the MNR. Founded by a group of frustrated middle-class politicians, the MNR attracted party members from the former PIR as well as from labor, the urban middle classes, and, by 1952, even the rural peasants. The trajectory that led the MNR to its position as a “large multigroup social coalition” (Mitchell 1977, 5) by the 1952 Revolution was an important one. The MNR
supported the coup that overthrew the tin baron oligarchy and brought General Gualberto Villarroel (1943-1946) to power. Villarroel’s government comprised an odd mix of primarily inexperienced military officers prone to violence and a faction of the MNR that, in flexing its newfound political muscles, began to formulate a party agenda based on far-reaching reforms (Klein 1971, 373). When Villarroel was eventually forced from the presidential palace and violently killed in 1946, the MNR leadership was exiled.

During the following six years, known as the sexenio, the MNR began to actively recruit party membership by setting up cells of the MNR party elite and their friends in various cities throughout the country. It also courted the labor sector heavily, concentrating primarily on “friendly union leaders,” since it viewed this sector as a potential ally for its reform-based agenda (Mitchell 1977, 27-29). Two of their primary recruitment strategies thus consisted largely of providing local posts to friends and loyal militantes and catering to the growing labor sectors through amicable union leaders. In essence, the bases of the political party – which has dominated party-based politics in the country since the 1952 National Revolution – were originally constructed through clientelist and corporatist linkages.

The 1930s and 1940s were marked with political instability, the growth of short-lived and personalist-based political parties, economic crisis, and the decline of the country’s single and most important export. The social impact of this decline included widespread unemployment and underemployment and the politicization of the disenfranchised urban and rural sectors, many of which became organized. In 1939, the

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7 He was eventually dragged out to the streets by a mob of students, teachers, and laborers in front of the Presidential Palace, shot, and hanged on a lamppost that directly faces the palace. That lamppost remains to this day, perhaps as a reminder to successive presidents of their potential fate if they do not effectively address the demands of the highly mobilized urban and rural lower classes.
Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia (CSTB) was founded, becoming the most important attempt to unify the smaller labor organizations in the country prior to the 1952 Revolution. The Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros (FSTMB) was established in 1944; it later developed into the most active branch of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) (García, et al. 2004, 34). While encouraged by some governments, these unions were in general systematically and violently repressed. By the period of the sexenio, when repression against them was the most pronounced, the unions were actively mobilizing against the government.

Thus, by the end of the 1940s, the two-party system that had controlled Bolivian politics since the end of the nineteenth century had completely diminished. In its place, a set of short-lived and highly fragmented political parties emerged. The MNR was one of the few parties to outlive this period; its clientelist and corporatist recruitment strategies enabled it to amass party support that crossed both classes and sectors. At the same time, the very sectors it was attracting, including the CSTB and the FSTMB, had developed their own organizational structures and were becoming increasingly vociferous in their demands. The accelerated development of new political actors took place while the country experienced a severe economic crisis sparked by the steep decline of the tin industry. It is perhaps not surprising that in the context of rapid political change, economic crisis, and growing social upheaval that a revolution would take place. The next section examines the 1952 National Revolution and the MNR-based single-party system that emerged upon its successful transformation of Bolivia’s political system.

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8 During the military regime of David Toro Ruilova (1936-1937), the unionization of mines was mandatory in cities like Oruro (Garcia 33).
After the Revolution: the MNR and Single-Party Rule (1952-1964)

On the morning of April 9, 1952, the MNR led a group of civilians to take over the government of Hugo Ballivián Rojas (1951-1952). What began as a rather straightforward coup d'état turned into a countrywide rebellion, as groups of mobilized miners, *fabriles*, truck drivers, university students, and *campesinos* joined forces with the MNR in toppling Ballivián (García, et al. 2004, 37). The fighting lasted three days and brought the MNR to power, with Víctor Paz Estenssoro as president. The initial accomplishments of the so-called National Revolution were numerous and notable. The new regime granted universal suffrage to all adults, age eighteen and older, and reduced what was left of the army to a minimum. The government also nationalized all minerals and created the *Corporación Minera de Bolivia* (COMIBOL) to manage their extraction. They founded the *Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos* (YPFB) to control the extraction and exportation of the country’s hydrocarbon reserves. Finally, the MNR-led government established a new national labor federation, called the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB), to oversee the organization of labor at the national level.

In instituting all of these reforms, the MNR built upon the support base it had begun to amass prior to the revolution and captured the loyalty of the unions, the rural *campesinos*, and the growing middle class. Capitalizing on this overwhelming support, Paz Estenssoro organized the MNR in an effort to make it the “political vertebrae” to which all segments of society were attached (Malloy 1977, 465). With the party’s fingers on the pulse of each sector, the government would in theory have relative autonomy to assert its authority and dominance on the national stage.
Rhetorically speaking, the project of the MNR was largely a populist one. As a “large multigroup social coalition,” the party supported a broad range of ambiguous national goals that appealed to many different groups from each of the classes. For example, it pitted the Bolivian “nación,” that is, Bolivian workers, the middle class, and peasants, against the “anti-nación,” or la rosca and its allies, in an effort to consolidate the loyalty of the wide majority of the population that had not benefited from the tin industry. Maintaining this broad support, however, was not as easy as receiving it initially. While the government worked to accomplish its own specific priorities, it responded to the growing discontent and demands of the members of its coalition by distributing jobs and resources in an effort to maintain internal control (Grindle 2003, 336).

Indeed, the original intentions of the MNR when it sparked the 1952 Revolution were far from revolutionary. As in 1943, the party supported unconstitutional means of gaining power in order to force itself into government. In 1952, their goal was to maintain power à la the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico or the Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela. The MNR had not anticipated, however, the massive support it would receive from the highly mobilized unions and campesinos. “Reluctant revolutionaries,” the party was unprepared to effectively manage the revolutionary changes that they spearheaded after April 1952 (Klein 1992, 231). It is in part for this reason that the MNR could not successfully control through co-optation the groups that had helped it come to power.

Two groups had particular influence during the revolution and remained influential after the MNR took over the government. For one, the peasantry was highly
mobilized, and, having been armed in the days leading up to the Revolution, potentially violent. They organized campesino unions and created formal militias that patrolled the countryside. The armed threat that the campesinos posed largely served as the impetus for the widespread land reform that the MNR pushed through in 1953 (Klein 1992, 234).

The second group that wielded unprecedented political influence was the newly formed COB. The MNR established the COB in an effort to control through integration the powerful leader of the FSTMB, Juan Lechín Oquendo. Formed as an “organization of social organizations”, the COB originally had an active role in the first MNR administration. By allowing the COB to serve with the MNR under the principle of co-gobierno, the MNR sought to control the more militant branches of the Central, including the FSTMB. This strategy backfired, however, and the COB became a “semi-sovereign institution that challenged the MNR’s every move” (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 403).

The importance of the FSTMB-turned-COB should not be unexpected. As a longstanding mono-exporting country, the nature of Bolivia’s economy had consequences for the labor movement. Whereas other countries instituted ISI as a growth strategy in the mid-twentieth century, Bolivia’s export-based economy was extended until the 1970s, putting the miners in a uniquely powerful position of negotiation vis-à-vis the state (Ibáñez 1998, 362-3). As a result, the power of the COB continually grew throughout the

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9 The COB included, at its foundation, the FSTMB, the Confederación de Trabajadores Fabriles, Confederación Ferroviaria, Federación de Empleados de Bancos y Ramas Afines, Sindicato Gráfico, Empleados del Comercio e Industria, Sindicato de Constructores y Albañiles, Sindicato de Planificadores, and the Confederación de Campesinos y Federación Agraria (García, et al. 2004, 38).

10 COB members named three labor ministers to the first cabinet. Lechín was named the Minister of Mines and Petroleum (Klein 1992, 232).
1950s and 1960s. During this time, the Central functioned organizationally at a level that was on par with the state. As previously mentioned, its members had high positions in the MNR-led government. At the same time, high-ranking government officials including, at one point, President Paz, participated actively in the COB’s organizational structure. The COB’s First Congress on October 31, 1954, for example, included the attendance of Paz and other high-ranking MNR delegates (García, et al. 2004, 38).

Like the MNR, the COB functioned in a hierarchical, corporatist manner. Made up, at its bases, of myriad local unions, the Central organized itself into regional and then national federations and confederations, with the Executive National Committee (CEN, in Spanish) at the organization’s peak. The influence of the COB over its members was all-consuming. As one author notes, for COB union members,

“Ya sea en el campo, la mina, la fábrica, el comercio o la actividad artesanal, la manera de adquirir identidad palpable ante el resto de las personas y de ser reconocido como interlocutor válido por las autoridades gubernamentales, es por medio del sindicato. Ahí queda depositada la individualidad social plausible, y el sindicato se erige como el interlocutor tácito entre sociedad civil y Estado” (García, et al. 2004, 43).

The COB functioned as a representative body for its members. Bolivian laborers of all shades defined themselves through the COB, and the COB represented that identity at the national level.

The growing political strength and popularity of the COB throughout Bolivia helped bring the demands of the workers to the national level. Its call for workers’ rights, better wages, and other services contradicted the developmental aims of the MNR, which sought to pursue national growth through government austerity. These contradictory logics of consumption on the one hand and accumulation on the other (Malloy 1970)
created serious tensions between the MNR and the COB, particularly in light of the country’s deepening economic crisis in the 1950s. By 1953, the country was essentially bankrupt and the government was having difficulties providing food and other staples to the population. Looking for financial relief, Paz Estenssoro signed a mineral purchasing agreement with the United States in exchange for twice the amount of aid to the country and millions of dollars worth of food (Klein 1992, 238). This assistance from the United States, while providing only temporary respite from the economic crisis, deepened Bolivia’s external dependence on aid and aggravated tensions with the COB.

These tensions were exacerbated further when the government, under the leadership of Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956-1960), implemented an IMF-imposed stabilization program to curb rising inflation. Rather than confront the ire of the miners and other labor sectors over this agreement, Siles Zuazo and his successor, Paz Estenssoro (1960-1964), worked to increasingly exclude labor from governmental negotiations by actively demobilizing the COB. At the same time, Paz Estenssoro was quietly strengthening the military once more, in an attempt to reassert the state’s monopoly of authority over the armed urban and rural sectors of Bolivian society (Malloy 1977, 473). In essence, the MNR was cutting the government off from the very social sectors that had brought it to power, while simultaneously feeding the political force that would eventually topple it in 1964. Thus, by the time the MNR’s twelve-year rule had come to a close, economic crisis had largely overshadowed the revolutionary achievements of the 1950s, and the political dominance of the MNR had been surpassed by the revitalized military and the ever-stronger labor sector.
In the twelve years of single party rule after the 1952 National Revolution, the MNR made many attempts to construct a cross-class, catch-all party bonded to society through clientelist and particularly corporatist linkages. Instead of successfully co-opting and integrating the organized sectors of Bolivian society to which it appealed, however, the MNR failed to integrate and control these sectors and, specifically, the COB. In essence, the MNR was unable to establish itself as the primary intermediary between the state and society. Instead, it inadvertently bolstered the role of the COB and the military, creating two powerful and enduring political actors who would struggle for political dominance from 1964 until the transition to democracy in 1982.

The Period of Military Rule (1964-1978)

Indeed, when a military regime overthrew Paz Estenssoro's government in 1964, a new period of politics began in Bolivia. For one, the formal political dominance of the military was constantly clashing with the intransigent political force represented by labor. The years of military rule were marked by an almost total repression of the COB. Notably, this period was the first since 1952 in which the COB was controlled by and subordinated to the state. The mines, for example, were declared military zones in the late 1960s in an effort to neutralize the negotiating power of the FSTMB. In the 1970s, with the arrival of the anti-left and extremely conservative regime of Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez, the COB was actively dismantled. By July 1975, almost all of the union leaders had been incarcerated or forced into hiding (García, et al. 2004, 59).

Throughout the 1960s and into the early part of the 1980s, the COB experienced serious blows to its organizational structure by successive military regimes that forcefully worked towards its eradication. Yet, the Central never entirely disappeared. It continued
to resist each military regime either clandestinely or openly and, at one point, was even allowed to overtly organize at the national level.\footnote{In June 1970, with the collaboration in part of the government of General Juan José Torres (1970-1971), the COB organized a Popular Assembly (Asamblea del Pueblo). The Assembly, which included the participation of 218 delegates from campesino groups and labor unions, among others, was intended to replace the former Bolivian parliament (Klein 1992, 253). While it failed to materialize into a functioning national body, the Popular Assembly did serve as an expression of the COB’s resilience throughout the entire military period.} The reformist regimes of the 1960s and early 1970s were eventually toppled by a far more conservative and repressive section of the military headed by Colonel Banzer. Along with banishing political parties, Banzer jailed leaders of the COB and diminished the importance of the campesino groups, which had been actively courted by both the Barrientos and Torres administrations. Under this environment of centralized control, Bolivia experienced its first economic boom in years (Klein 1992, 261).

Ironically, improvements in the economy also led to a resurgence in political activity by the COB and the FSTMB. In 1976, at their National Congress, the miners called for a hunger strike that lasted for four weeks before the armed forces could suppress it. Their protest fueled growing demands for the return of the exiled labor and political leaders, the reorganization of labor, and even elections (Lazarte 1991, 587). The COB’s success with initiatives such as this hunger strike reflected a growing disenchantment throughout the country towards Banzer and his regime. Indeed, as the COB grew in terms of support and unity, Banzer’s popularity – and popularity for military regimes in general – began to decline sharply. By 1978, it was clear that military leadership had run its course in Bolivia. In July of that year, Banzer succumbed to the growing internal resistance and called for democratic elections (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 117).
The impact of this fourteen-year military period would be felt well beyond its formal conclusion at the end of the 1970s. It left behind two clear legacies that, as the following chapters will show, continued to affect political representation in the country long after the transition to democracy. One clear legacy of this period of military rule was the use of corporatism and clientelist-based patrimonialism by successive leaders for controlling society and maintaining support for their non-constitutional rule. Under the leadership of René Barrientos Ortuño (1964-1969), for example, the government actively courted the support of the rural campesinos, strengthening a Pacto Militar Campesino (PMC) between this sector and the government. As a part of the PMC, the campesinos were organized into vertically structured groups that were controlled by local garrison commands (Gray-Molina 2003, 350). Barrientos clearly employed a corporatist logic in integrating the rural sectors into his government.

Other examples of corporatism abound during this period. In the 1970s, when the COB had been declared illegal, Banzer organized labor through the establishment of 1000 coordinadores legales that were appointed by the Ministry of Labor (Lazarte 1991, 584). Despite banning unionization during this time, these legal coordinators clearly retained vertical structures for addressing labor, much in the same way that the COB did. In 1974, on the heels of his autogolpe, Banzer also organized a corporatist-based assembly without the participation of political parties (Gamarra 2003b, 295). These examples demonstrate how the military sought to represent the country through sectoral

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12 The military period formally ended in 1978, that is, elections were carried out in 1979 to replace the military regime. Yet, as the next section will demonstrate, the institution did not willingly cede its power. Its attempts to retain control of the government through 1982 would lead some scholars to call this four-year period one of “tortuous transition” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 117).

13 In actuality, Barrientos co-governed with General Alfredo Ovando until July 1966.
interests instead of through political parties. In each case, labor was treated as a unified body to be addressed directly by government.

Clientelism was also pervasive during this time, particularly towards the end of the military period. By the end of the 1970s, for example, Banzer could no longer focus on restructuring the state and encourage economic growth as he had done during his first years in office. His popularity was, in fact, deteriorating rapidly. Thus, he turned his energies to maintaining control of the government through the distribution of jobs, contracts, tax breaks, and concessions – whatever he could do to muster enough support for his regime to continue (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 408). Indeed, with Banzer, the military institution in general became known for its clientelist-based patrimonial behavior. Under his centralized authority, the entire state apparatus was reduced to a mere extension of the executive branch, around which all political and economic activity revolved. As a result, the primary state-society linkage at this time centered on “extremely fluid lines of personalized patron-client links” emanating from Banzer (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 110).

The neopatrimonial nature of Banzer’s rule should not be surprising, as it was a tendency that dominated politics in the country since before the National Revolution. Patrimonialism emerged in Bolivia as a result of the country’s prolonged dependence upon publicly managed primary-product exportation, which stifled private sector growth and centralized economic and job-producing resources into the state. Thus, the urban, educated, job-seeking population in Bolivia inevitably turned to the state for employment, converting the country’s middle class into its political class (Malloy 1977, 476). By providing jobs, successive political leaders secured the support of those urban
sectors, fostering a relationship based on mutual patron-client dependence. The middle classes turned to politics as a means of employment; support for both military and civilian rulers alike was thus based on their ability to employ. In Banzer’s case, this job-based support translated into the dramatic growth of the public sector from 66,000 employees in 1970 to 171,000 employees in 1977 (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 112).

The dominance of the military along with the COB after 1964 highlights the second important legacy of the period. In effect, the role of the traditional political parties on the national scene was significantly reduced. For example, the MNR, after having ruled for twelve years, virtually disappeared during this time, although it did serve a subordinate (and temporary) role with Banzer’s government in the early 1970s. In general, however, as the military and labor were in outright conflict over political control in Bolivia, it was increasingly evident that political parties were not the sole intermediary between state and society. The representative role of successive military rulers and the COB matched that of the political parties. Political parties suffered as a result. Like the POR, FSB, and the PCB of the 1940s, the MNR experienced a period of serious internal fragmentation in the 1970s, weakening the party’s overall structure and diminishing even further its national importance. At one point, the MNR was split into 31 different factions (Calderón 1989, 202).

An important role that political parties did serve during this period was that of opposition to the military regimes. This was particularly the case of Banzer’s leadership.

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14 When Bánzer first came to power in 1971, he briefly shared government with the MNR and the FSB. This coalition, called the Frente Popular Nacional (FPN), remained in power until 1974, when Banzer declared an auto-coup and banished them from office. Scholars have called the MNR and the FSB “rump factions” during this period. Bolstering party support through the provision of public sector jobs, they did little more than drain resources from Banzer, who wanted control of the patronage flow for himself (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 109).
in the 1970s. When the Popular Assembly took place in 1970, the former university sector of the MNR organized a group of delegates and participated in the assembly under a new name, the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) (Klein 1992, 253). After Banzer’s takeover, the MIR served as a principal source of resistance to the repressive military ruler. Two other leftist parties also emerged during this time and joined the MIR in opposing Banzer: the leftist faction of the MNR, known as the MNRI, under the leadership of Hernán Siles Zuazo, and the *Partido Socialista* (PS), which was headed by Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz. Like the COB and the FSTMB, these new parties were severely repressed and even abolished after Banzer’s *autogolpe* (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 407).

Ironically, Banzer himself eventually became known as a strong defender of democracy. After his call for democratic elections in 1978, the military colonel abandoned the military and established the civilian-based political party, *Acción Democrática Nacionalista* (ADN). This ideologically conservative party incorporated elements of the former FSB into its program and thus captured the support of the private sector and the urban elite who were alienated from the left-leaning opposition parties of the 1970s. During the years of tortuous transition, between 1979 and 1982, Banzer became a fierce opponent of the military juntas that overthrew the civilian leadership of Walter Guevara Arce (August 1979-November 1979) and Lydia Gueiler Tejada (November 1979-July 1980).\(^\text{15}\) As a result, Banzer was perceived as one of the leading

\(^\text{15}\) Guevara was overthrown in a coup d'état led by Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch (1-16 November 1979). Gueiler was overthrown in a coup d'état headed by General Luis García Meza (July 1980-August 1981).
proponents of democracy at that time (Klein 1992, 270); his repressive military leadership appeared to be all but forgotten by his supporters.

Thus, the 1960s and 1970s represented a time of intense political conflict, repression, and resistance. Notably, the political parties had to compete for its role as intermediary with the military and the unions. Dominated by linkages based on corporatism and clientelist-based neopatrimonialism, this period did not prepare Bolivians for the representative democracy to come. The final section will look briefly at the country’s difficult transition to democracy and highlight the important characteristics of its first and overwhelmingly unsuccessful attempt at coalitional rule.

The Tortuous Transition to Representative Democracy (1979-1985)

The transition period between 1978 and 1982 has been called “one of the darkest chapters in Bolivian political history” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 154) and rightly so. In less than four years, the country had seven different leaders, only two of which were civilian. General Luis García Meza (July 1980-August 1981) was the single most ruthless and repressive leader that Bolivians had known in the twentieth century. The sustained and systematic character of his malevolence “terrified” Bolivian society and wrecked havoc on his opponents and particularly labor, the campesinos, the Church, and the left-leaning political parties (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 145). Indeed, the obstinacy of the military in relinquishing its hold on political power in the country prolonged Bolivia’s transition process.

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16 For an excellent analysis of the transition to democracy in Bolivia, see Chapter Four of Malloy and Gamarra (1988).
Yet, the military did eventually surrender national political control, and upon Banzer's call for elections, the political system was exposed to an outpouring of formally repressed state and non-state actors who wanted their piece of the democratic action. These groups included labor, the peasantry, a newly organized confederation for the private sector, and regionally-based civic committees. More than democracy, these groups each wanted to fill the power vacuum left behind by the military (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 118). The organizational and political successes of each of these groups highlighted the failure of the political parties to capture that vacuum and replace the military as the sole intermediary channel between the state and society. This was the case even as a coalition of left-leaning political parties, called the Unión Democrática y Popular (UDP), was successful in electing their candidate, Hernán Siles Zuazo (1982-1985), to the presidency.

The political influence of the COB surged after 1978, primarily because of its important role in fomenting resistance to the military prior to the transition to democracy. It was clearly in the COB’s interests of survival and growth to topple the military regime. In the 1970s, the possibility of democracy presented itself, and the COB pursued it doggedly. The hunger strikes and blockades outlined above worked toward this goal. Even during the period of García Meza, when the repression of unions was at its height (García, et al. 2004, 66), the COB continued to organize and resist the military. The COB’s role in bringing the tortuous transition to an end, as well as its extended history of political prominence in Bolivia, instilled in the COB a sense of entitlement to political power in 1982. As a result, once the UDP assumed power, the COB agreed to work only

17 The UDP consisted of the MNRI, the MIR, and the Partido Comunista de Bolivia (PCB).
with the executive branch, bypassing political parties and the Congress entirely in the pursuit of its own interests (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 411). For the COB, direct access to the executive was a right they had earned.

Bolivian businesses also became organized after 1978, forming the Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (CEPB). The CEPB represented private sector interests, and, like the COB, it preferred to lobby directly with the executive after 1982. Indeed, in terms of political influence at the national level, the CEPB became for the private sector what the COB was for the working class (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 169).

The rural peasantry also organized during the transition period. In 1979, three different campesino organizations came together to form the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). The CSUTCB, which joined the COB in 1981, became the strongest extra-institutional voice for campesinos (Klein 1992, 273) and maintained its political relevance into the early 21st century. The COB, CEPB, and the CSUTCB represented their constituents along corporatist lines, contradicting the logic of what was soon to become a representative democracy.

Another growing political force materialized at the regional level during this time. In part due to Banzer’s development of the country’s eastern lowlands, regional rivalries developed throughout Bolivia that began to vie for the resources of the state even before the transition to democracy. After 1975, however, regional civic committees attracted more supporters by questioning the principles of a centralized state (Calderón 1989, 210).

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18 In 1978, three autonomous peasant confederations existed: the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos (CNC), which had coordinated the PMC; the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari (MRTK), which would later become a political force in the 1980s and 1990s; and Movimiento Indio Tupac Katari (MITKA), also a political party at that time (Malloy and Gamarra 124-5). By 1979, the leaders of the three organizations came together to join a unified confederation, called the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB).
They maximized their political backing by capitalizing on the clearly unstable and vacuous central authority at that time. Their call for regional autonomy never subsided, and it became a primary issue in the post-2003 political context.

The political parties that emerged during this time did so in a context of weak political power vis-à-vis the other rival political actors. Yet, once the ban on political parties was lifted in 1978, more than seventy parties formed, the majority of which were merely an expression of personal ambitions. Called “taxi parties,” Bolivians joked that the parties could “hold their conventions in a taxi cab” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 124). The larger and more important political parties, including the MNR, the ADN, the UDP, and even the FSB also capitalized on this period to gain political support.

What the parties did not lack in terms of quantity, they did lack with respect to the experience needed to manage the atrophied nature of national politics after 1978. Indeed, the presence and strength of the non-party actors during the transition reflected the initial failure of the political parties to fill the political vacuum left behind by the military. As party politicians battled with the military for control of the state, it was clear that there was no central governing authority to effectively manage the country. Interests were thus represented by the COB, CSUTCB, CEPB, and the Civic Committees. The sustained presence of these groups even after the arrival of the UDP to power reflects a much more problematic consequence of the transition period: the parties were unable to recapture political power once the chaos of the transition had subsided.

The inability of the political parties to assert political control in the country became apparent during the leadership of Hernán Siles Zuazo of the UDP (1982-1985). The coalition had problems from the start. Despite their ideological similarities, the
MNRI, MIR, and PCB had different goals for the administration. As a result, the coalition began to fragment internally. The MIR became disaffected first. Unhappy with what they perceived as Siles' reliance upon international technocrats, his inability to confront the emerging cocaine organizations, and his general lack of an economic plan, the six MIRista ministers collectively resigned from the president's cabinet (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 168). Internal disagreements and fragmentations throughout the administration forced Siles to spend much of his time shuffling his cabinet and putting out political fires with his allies.

Meanwhile, Bolivians were suffering the effects of an already acute economic crisis. Mounting international pressures to enact an austere economic program resulted in the adoption of a series of IMF-sponsored austerity packages designed to stabilize the economy. These measures contradicted the ideology of the coaltional government and ran counter to the demands of the coalition's principal supporters and particularly the COB (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 164). The government's capitulation to international demands angered the COB, which ultimately distanced itself from the UDP.

The independence of the COB vis-à-vis the left-leaning political parties in the UDP reflected those parties' inability to maintain the overwhelming support their coalition had received upon assuming office in 1982. Indeed, the Central exerted unusual influence over the coalition's economic and political decisions. For example, in 1983, when Siles' coaltional unity was faltering, the president invited the COB to join him in co-governing the country. His invitation was an attempt to control the organization by

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19 The crisis, which began in the 1970s, accelerated under UDP rule. The growth rate of the gross national product (GNP) was falling, as was the GNP per capita: in 1981, this figure had fallen 4.1%, and by 1982, it had dropped another 11.1%. Exports died off while the fiscal deficit almost doubled (Mayorga, R. 1987, 23).
integrating it into government while also a clear appeal to the COB as his strongest non-state supporter. As a result, the COB produced a *Programa de Emergencia*, spelling out its conditions for establishing *co-gobierno*, including miners’ control of COMIBOL, workers’ co-management of all other state enterprises, and the immediate postponement of all foreign debt servicing (Urioste 1987, 289). Before the UDP could reject or accept this Program – they negotiated over the deal for months – the COB withdrew its offer for *co-gobierno*, ultimately opting in 1984 to actively resist the UDP and push for a more socialist government. By this time, the Central had become such a potent political force that one author concluded that no government would ever be able to ignore the COB in formulating an economic plan. The organization had become too powerful (Castro and Gomez 1987, 196).

The growing role of the COB in government alarmed the CEPB. Strongly opposed to the socialist tendencies of the COB, it began to act more vociferously in the defense of private sector interests. The intense and enduring conflicts that emerged between the CEPB and the COB would complicate Siles’ governing capacities (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 169-172). The president tried to appease the antagonistic groups through efforts of *concertación*, hoping to win the support of the CEPB and the COB by making concessions to both of them. The attempts were unsuccessful, however, and Siles ended up satisfying neither group entirely (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 174). By 1985, it was clear that the UDP was unable to effectively subordinate other national political forces to its party-based political system. Indeed, the popularity of groups like the COB and the CEPB appeared to be growing.
Thus, although the UDP represented the first instance of political party rule in the country after more than thirty years, it became clear very quickly that political parties did not have a monopoly of representation or political control in Bolivia. In particular, the COB and the CEPB appeared to be capturing the support of new societal cleavages based upon growing class differences. The COB’s strength and influence intensified during this period, suggesting that it had retained the support of most of its urban poor and rural followers despite the election of a left-leaning coalition. The CEPB became increasingly organized in reaction to the COB, capturing the support of those urban sectors alarmed by the Central’s growing influence. Thus, although the military had effectively disappeared from national politics by the early 1980s, the fragility of the party-based coalition in power, along with the emergence and growing influence of non-state actors during that time, demonstrated the weak grip that political parties had over Bolivian society. Party-society linkages of any kind by 1985 were largely absent.

Conclusion

The failure of the UDP government brought to a close a tumultuous and politically unstable era of history in Bolivia. Beginning with the dismantling of the two-party system of Liberals and Conservatives in the 1940s, centralized national control in the country continually unraveled throughout the rest of the twentieth century, despite different attempts to transform the political system. The National Revolution sought to restructure the country by opening up politics to greater participation and leveling the political playing field between different classes and ethnicities. The military period sought to stimulate economic growth and political order through mechanisms of social
control. The UDP attempted to incorporate different political actors into its decision-making process. In compromising with everyone, the coalition satisfied no one.

The legacies of these different political periods would not bode well for representative democracy. For one, there existed a strong tendency by most political actors, including the military, the COB, and the political parties, to appeal to society along corporatist and clientelist lines. Thus, the tradition of representation through political parties (instead of through different sectors of society) was cultivated only through the establishment of highly dependent patron-client networks. In effect, the role of political parties as the sole intermediary between state and society was increasingly challenged by that of other political actors, including the COB and the military, throughout much of the second half of the 20th century in Bolivia.

Because the traditional political parties were unable to emerge as the primary state-society intermediary before 1985, the linkages that those parties could create with society were extremely limited. The MNR government of 1952 and the UDP government of 1982 both employed mechanisms of corporatism, and, in the case of the MNR, clientelism, to appeal to and maintain the support of the population at large. These were the only two instances of clearly established party rule after the 1940s. The rest of the period saw other political actors, including the military and labor, actively working against parties for their own political gain. In most instances, the political parties lost the battle for national control:

"Estos intentos reiterados de eliminar a los partidos y de establecer vínculos sin intermediarios entre los ciudadanos y el Estado ocurrieron durante momentos autoritarios y afectaron, a la larga, la capacidad de los partidos de forjar vínculos más amplios con la sociedad" (Calderón and Gamarra 2003, 15).
Thus, by 1985, links between political parties and society were extremely tenuous. Notions of corporatism and clientelist-based neopatrimonialism plagued political behavior, and other non-state actors had emerged that could hold their own in the struggle for political power. Given the dramatically unstable environment in which elections took place in 1985, it was remarkable that a political system was finally forged that, in spite of the legacies of the fifty years past, could ensure governance and stability in the country. Entering into the “honeymoon period” of the political party system (Chávez, et al. 2004), however, the consequences of the political and economic reforms of that year were not entirely positive. Chapter Three looks at the period of stable party system rule in Bolivia, making the case for why the party system – despite its emergence against all odds in 1985 – was ultimately unsustainable.
III. THE BOLIVIAN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

In 1985, although Bolivia’s economic and political systems were close to shambles, the country was able to pull off a successful round of free and fair elections. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, who became president for the third time that year, and his administration instituted a coalition-style government, based on the principle of pacted democracy, and at the same time implemented a strict economic austerity package, called the *Nueva Política Económica* (NPE). These two reforms stabilized the economy and relocated political authority in the state, allowing for the successful formulation of four more administrations between 1989 and 2002. As the pages to follow demonstrate, pacted democracy and the NPE also impacted the traditional political party system’s ability to maintain its linkages with society.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it will examine in detail the components of both pacted democracy and the NPE, as well as the successes of each in returning the locus of political and economic control to the state. In particular, they enabled reforms in the 1990s that would not have been possible prior to the democratic transition given the atrophied nature of politics during that time. Yet, pacted democracy and the NPE had a detrimental impact on the linkages that existed between society and the state at the same time that the traditional political party system took over the role as sole intermediary. For one, the corporatist linkages fostered by the COB were essentially eradicated with the Central’s demise after the adoption of the NPE. Meanwhile, the principle of pacted democracy promoted the neopatrimonial behaviors that dominated the political system prior to the transition to representative democracy. It also fostered executive-centric policymaking and a strong internal political party hierarchy, preventing
party democratization and inhibiting the formation of party-society linkages beyond that of clientelist-based neopatrimonialism.

The second objective of the chapter is to outline the growing economic and social problems in Bolivia by the end of the 1990s. As the country entered into an extended-economic recession, Bolivian society underwent social changes fueled by the crisis. These changes included the increase of unemployment and underemployment with a simultaneous rise in university graduates. At the same time, new political parties and social movements emerged that expressed different sectors’ discontent toward the traditional political party system and threatened the monopoly of representation secured by that system since 1985. As Roberts argues in his party-society framework, by the end of the 1990s, the conditions were set in Bolivia for the dealignment of the traditional political parties from society. Facing prolonged economic crisis and social change, the traditional political party system confronted major shifts in societal demands.

Thus, the following pages address the successes of the economic and political models adopted in 1985 as well as their unintended consequences for the linkages that connected the traditional political party system with society. Given the economic crisis and the subsequent social changes of the late 1990s, the limitations of the existing clientelist-based linkage would become evident as different Bolivian sectors turned their support toward the newly formed political parties and social movements. Ironically, the successes of the 1985 political and economic model would ultimately be detrimental to the traditional political party system’s monopoly of representation in the country, setting the stage for party system decline after 2000.
The Era of Policy-Making: Pacted Democracy and the NPE

The outcome of the 1985 presidential elections was close; indeed, elections between 1985 and 2002 never produced a simple majority winner.²⁰ Whereas the ADN’s candidate, Hugo Bánzer, received the highest number of popular votes, the MNR’s second place finisher, Paz Estenssoro, eventually assumed the presidency. Despite anger among party factions in both the ADN and the MNR, the two party leaders forged a pact that put Paz Estenssoro in the presidency and guaranteed that the ADN would support his leadership by creating an MNR-friendly congressional majority. The legislative coalition would back Paz Estenssoro in exchange for the MNR’s support for an ADN presidency in 1989.

The MNR-ADN coalition, which was called the Pacto por la Democracia, would be the first of five coalitions formulated under the principle of pacted democracy. This innovative approach to governance was successful in resolving any potential impasse between the president and the legislature in Bolivia, ensuring political stability on the one hand and governance on the other. Indeed, because they could count on the support of a Congressional majority, the successive presidents between 1985 and 2002 were successful in implementing important social, political, and economic reforms. Given the historic struggle for power and authority that existed in the country prior to 1985, the accomplishments of pacted democracy cannot be overstated. It was clear from the beginning of the MNR-ADN alliance that conditions for a “stable and conventional regime” had been set in the country (Whitehead 2001, 28).

²⁰ Article 90 of the 1967 Constitution stipulated that, if no presidential candidate received 50% of the votes plus one, the President would ultimately be elected by Congress in a second round race among the top three popular vote recipients. In 1994, this rule was changed so that only the top two recipients could be considered for President.
The principle of pacted democracy also underscored the nature of the democratic regime that was put into place in 1985. Called a "hybrid presidential" regime, Bolivia's government consisted of both parliamentary and presidential characteristics (Gamarra 1997, 363-4). As mentioned above, if first round general presidential elections did not garner a majority (50% plus one) winner, the Congress was responsible for electing the president. All in all, the "mainspring of the system [was] a dynamic common in parliamentary regimes: the politics of coalition" (Mayorga, R. 1997, 149). Electoral coalitions allowed parties to appeal broadly to their constituents, and coalitions within Congress chose the president. Once the president had been chosen, however, the principles of presidentialism took over. The legislative function thereafter served to support the coalitional government in place, and the executive branch was not beholden to parliamentary confidence.

Thus, the primary political actors after 1985 were the political parties that comprised each ruling coalition. While the transition to democracy had produced more than seventy different political parties, the actual alternation of power after 1985 was focused on the three traditional political parties, the MNR, the MIR, and the ADN. This was due in part to a political reform in 1979, which abruptly halted the explosion of political parties by requiring those parties that did not receive 50,000 votes in a given election to pay for their share of ballot printing costs (Van Cott 2000, 166). The reform helped establish a political party system consisting primarily of the three traditional political parties, because they had the financial and political resources to fulfill the requirements of the 1979 legislation.
From 1985 to 2002, then, the MNR, MIR, and ADN, as the traditional parties in the country’s political party system, alternated the presidency. Between 1985 and 1989, Paz Estenssoro led the *Pacto por la Democracia*. In the period of 1989-1993, Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR) became president with the support of the *Acuerdo Patriótico*, an alliance between the MIR, the ADN, and the small, Christian Democrat party, the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC). After 1993, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR, 1993-1997) assumed office through the *Pacto por la Gobernabilidad*. This coalition included the MNR along with the MRTK, an MIR spin-off called the *Movimiento Bolivia Libre* (MBL), and the *Unión Cívica Solidaridad* (UCS). In 1997, Hugo Bánzer (ADN, 1997-2002) became the president with the support of the *Compromiso por Bolivia*, a coalition that consisted of the MIR, UCS, PDC, *Conciencia de Patria* (CONDEPA), and the *Nueva Fuerza Republicana* (NFR).

The composition of each successive coalition is noteworthy. For one, pacted democracy clearly brought together parties that, programmatically speaking, were complete opposites. The *Acuerdo Patriótico*, for example, consisted of the MIR and the ADN – two parties that were ideological antitheses. Moreover, while the three traditional political parties headed each of these coalitions, it is notable that other small parties allied with the MNR, MIR, or ADN in order to garner the seats necessary for a congressional majority. Over time, these coalitions grew: whereas the *Pacto por la Democracia* had only two political parties, the *Compromiso por Bolivia* included six. The evolution of these pacts highlights three electoral features of Bolivia’s political party system. First, in

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21 In 2000, Banzer resigned because of serious complications from an illness, which would eventually take his life. His vice president, Jorge Quiroga, assumed the presidency after his resignation and served out the rest of the term.
the struggle for the presidency, none of the traditional political parties ever received a clear majority. Second, the voting share of each of the parties rarely grew and in most cases dropped with each successive election; hence the need for a greater number of parties to obtain a majority. Finally, the appearance of new political parties suggests that, while the traditional parties maintained primary control of the party system, they were unsuccessful in maintaining their constituent base over the medium to long term.

At the same time that the principle of pacted democracy was adopted, Paz Estenssoro and his administration were also working frantically to implement a package of economic reforms that could effectively address the “perilous state” of the Bolivian economy in 1985 (Grindle 2003, 323). On August 29, 1985, the president enacted Supreme Decree 21060, or the *Nueva Política Económica* (NPE), as his response to the crisis. An orthodox economic shock program, the objectives of the NPE were to end hyperinflation and adopt the foundations of a market-oriented economy. Measures incorporated into the NPE included devaluation, liberalization, wage and salary freezes, and the reduction of the public sector. Called a “silent revolution,” the NPE represented a completely new approach to economic development, changing the former model of state-based growth and opening the economy to foreign investment and trade (Mayorga, R. 1997).

The NPE was initially successful in curbing inflation and stimulating growth. By 1987, inflation had fallen from its 1985 peak of 20,000 percent to a much more manageable 14.5 percent. The GNP registered positive growth, at 4.7 percent, and per capita income had climbed almost US$200.00 from its 1985 figure to US$620.00 (Grindle 2003, 324). Following his predecessor’s lead, when Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-
1993) took over the presidency, he continued with the austere economic principles adopted in 1985. In particular, in 1990 he issued Supreme Decree 22407, which continued to privatize industry and downsize the public sector. By 1992, 100 of the 159 state-owned enterprises had been sold to the private sector (Grindle 2003, 324).

The implementation of the NPE represented one of the first decisive actions of the Pacto por la Democracia, leaving little doubt that the locus of political and economic control had been returned to the state. Yet, upon announcing the policy, Paz Estenssoro was met with considerable resistance from the labor unions as represented by the COB. The Central wanted to compensate for the austere nature of the NPE by increasing workers’ wages. Instead of addressing these demands or attempting to negotiate with the COB, as his predecessor Siles Zuazo had done, Paz Estenssoro literally dismantled the unions. He shut down union headquarters and arrested their leaders, and he closed COMIBOL, which resulted in the laying off of 23,000 of the 28,000 miners (Healy 1988/1989, 100). Between 1985 and 1987, the total work force in state-owned companies fell from 32,000 to 7,000 (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 203), and by 1988, public sector employment had been reduced by 17 percent (Grindle 2003, 324). Under SD 22407, these figures presumably declined even more.

The impact of these repressive measures was immediate. The COB was almost completely destroyed, its material bases effectively purged because of the massive layoffs. By the end of the 1980s, the COB would be little more than a “shadow of its former self” at the national level (Healy 1988/1989, 100). Thus, the NPE eradicated one of the most active and influential political actors of the mid- to late 20th century. Moreover, by dismantling the Central, Paz Estenssoro effectively removed the corporatist linkage that
had connected the COB with society. As one author notes, by the end of the 1980s, the
demands of the COB had been, for all intensive purposes, “pulverized” (García, et al.
2004, 625).

By breaking down the Central, the corporatist bonds that had unified the labor
sectors were broken down as well. Consequently, the poor urban and rural classes, who
had largely identified with and were organized through the COB, found themselves
without the primary intermediary structure that had represented their demands since the
National Revolution. These disenfranchised classes would thus need to look elsewhere –
and presumably to the traditional political party system – for representation. With the
adoption of the principle of pacted democracy and the NPE, then, Paz Estenssoro
effectively set the stage for a period of renewed economic growth and for a democratic
regime in which the traditional political parties – and no longer the COB – would be the
sole intermediary between society and government.

The effects of these accomplishments were profound in terms of governance.
Bolstered by four successive rounds of executive-friendly Congressional majorities, the
1990s served as a decade for implementing innovative political, social, and economic
policies and laws. After nearly fifty years of unstable regimes, it was significant that,
beginning in 1985, the country’s political system was finally able to make decisions on
policy and, more importantly, act upon those decisions.

The achievements of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s (MNR, 1993-1997)
presidency in terms of reforms reflected a clear example of the government’s
policymaking capabilities after 1985. In 1993, Sánchez de Lozada became the president
of Bolivia for the first time with the promise of enacting far-reaching reforms that would
change both the social and political design of the country and its strategy for growth and investment. *El Plan de Todos* included the formal recognition for the first time of the rights of the indigenous peoples of the country; the capitalization of state-owned industry, through the Law of Capitalization; education reform; and political and fiscal decentralization, through the Law of Popular Participation (LPP) and the Law of Decentralization.\(^{22}\) Along with *El Plan de Todos*, constitutional reforms were also adopted in 1994, creating single member districts for 50 percent of the seats in Congress’ lower house, extending the presidential term to five years, and amending Article 90 so that only the top two presidential contenders could be considered in the second round congressional elections\(^ {23}\) (Gamarra 2003a, 306).

It is important to mention the success of *El Plan de Todos* and the constitutional reforms, because they signal the extent to which the role of political and economic decision-making was returned to the Bolivian state. Prior to 1985, as Chapter Two describes, political control was divided among many different state and non-state actors. In the years following the adoption of the NPE and pacted democracy, this political atrophy was no longer evident. Indeed, Bolivia’s political system became a model of stability in the region (Interview D, 6 May 2005). Upon eliminating the destabilizing threat represented by the corporatist-based demands of the COB and guaranteeing legislative support of the executive branch, Bolivia achieved stability and was able to govern for the first time in decades.

\(^{22}\) A detailed look at each of the aspects of *El Plan de Todos* is beyond the scope of this study. However, other academics examine the impact of the Plan’s components, including Gamarra (2002), Grindle (2003), Gray-Molina (2003), and Kohl (2003).

\(^{23}\) Previously, the top three candidates could vie for the presidency.
Throughout the 1990s, Bolivia was heralded internationally for its capacity to recover from a difficult transition period and establish a democratic and stable political system. Yet, the impact of the successes of pacted democracy and the NPE, including in terms of political stability and the introduction of reforms, was not entirely positive. As the next section illustrates, the economic and political models adopted after 1985 would become seriously problematic for the traditional political party system, underscoring its dependence upon neopatrimonialism and weakening the traditional political parties' capacity to forge new linkages with society. Moreover, they inadvertently fostered the emergence of new political actors that would challenge the traditional political party system's authority.

*Unintended Consequences: Assessing Governance in Bolivia*

The principle of pacted democracy and the alternation of political control among the three traditional political parties, while creating the conditions for governability and reforms, fostered other outcomes that negatively impacted the traditional political party system. Specifically, the nature of pacted democracy promoted neopatrimonialism, encouraged executive-centric policymaking, and prevented the internal democratization of the political parties. As a result of these tendencies, the role of the traditional political parties within the political system was drastically reduced, limiting their capacity to forge linkages with Bolivian society.

The very nature of pacted democracy promoted the neopatrimonial relationships that had long connected the political parties to Bolivian society and particularly the urban-based middle-cum-political class. The dependence upon coalition-building, combined with the ultimate independence of the executive branch from congressional
confidence, cultivated the tendency for the traditional political parties to focus on securing and maintaining inter-party coalitional support. That is, successive but varied coalitions of generally the same resource-hungry political parties created governments focused on “the recomposition of client-patron networks and [the] redistribution of political patronage” (Gamarra 1997, 392). This logic of empleomanía shaped political party competition in the formulation of pacts and ensured the survival of the coalition once the president was elected. As a result, in order to perpetuate their role in the political system, the traditional political parties were often more interested in controlling patronage than they were in governing effectively (Gamarra 1997, 376-8).

It is important to remember, too, that one of the measures of the NPE mandated the drastic reduction of the public sector. While this was ultimately detrimental to the COB, eradicating the organizational and material resources needed to maintain its linkages with the poor urban and rural classes, it also had a negative impact on the linkages that connected the traditional political parties with the middle class. Because politics was essentially “the only game in town” (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 80) for urban, middle class job-seekers, when the opportunities for employment were drastically reduced through the NPE, the support base of the traditional political parties was also severely threatened. The traditional political parties presumably had to scramble to fulfill their patronage-based promises in what was left of the public sector. Thus, the dynamics of the political system reinforced the neopatrimonial role of the traditional political parties as patronage pushers, even as their capacity to follow through on those promises diminished.
Another feature of the post-1985 political system was the executive-centric nature of decision-making. The principle of pacted democracy guaranteed the president a Congressional majority that would consistently back his policies. With the support of this legislative majority assured, the need to work with Congress in formulating policies was greatly reduced. As a result, the executive branch controlled most of the decision-making power. The president and his cabinet were able to largely bypass the political parties in Congress in the policymaking process (Gamarra 1997, 375), preferring instead to use technocrats for the formulation of policies and to impose those policies through executive or supreme decree.

In fact, the extensive use of technocrats and decrees prevailed throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The clearest example of both of these phenomena occurred with the NPE. Dissatisfied with the strategy proposed by the MNR’s own economic team, Paz Estenssoro consulted with an independent group of technocrats, including two Harvard academics, famed economist, Jeffrey Sachs, and two businessmen, to construct the NPE (Conaghan 1992, 216). The NPE actually came into effect with Paz’s Supreme Decree 21060. Thus, the economic policy was largely a result of a handful of individuals and a presidential decree. Despite boasting a pro-government coalition in an effort to promote cooperation between the executive and legislative branches, in this instance the Congress was bypassed almost entirely.

Other examples of decretismo and the use of technocrats abound. Paz Estenssoro issued most of his economic and social reforms through Supreme Decree; Paz Zamora followed his predecessor’s lead when he deepened the NPE through SD 22407. Sánchez de Lozada’s El Plan de Todos was shaped almost in its entirety by international and
national advisors who were not affiliated to any political party. MNR party members, for example, were not involved in the development of the LPP; ministers were even denied access to meetings on the topic (Grindle 2003, 331-332).

The use of technocrats and decrees in the formulation and implementation of policy – particularly in the case of the most important reforms of the period – fostered the perception that political parties were nothing more than electoral vehicles for presidential candidates (Interview B, 6 May 2005). Once the president was elected, consultation with Congress and with party members in general was not a priority. Thus, the role of the political parties in the legislative branch was to provide little more than tacit support to executive-induced and executive-formulated policies.

The concentration of decision-making power into the executive branch was reinforced by a hierarchical organizational structure within the traditional political parties themselves. The leaders of the MNR, MIR, and ADN wielded an unrivalled political influence over political party members, reducing the role of those members considerably within the party (Calderón and Gamarra 2003, 8-9). Each party leader formulated the policies that would be filtered down to, carried out, and supported by the other members and representatives of his party. The top-down nature of the traditional political parties inhibited internal party democratization and the formulation of local and regional leaders. In essence, the traditional party leaders were the political parties.

In recognition of the need to decentralize the hierarchical nature of political authority within the parties, Congress passed the Law of Political Parties in 1997. The Law imposed gender and ethnic-based quotas for party candidates and called upon the parties to develop a primary system through which those candidates would be selected.
Yet, the traditional political parties failed in their efforts to internally democratize. While filled with good intentions, the Law of Political Parties was never actually enforced and was only ratified in 1999 (Mayorga, F. 2004). Instead of democratizing internal political party structures, the Law only succeeded in raising the expectation that such reforms might take place. When they never actually did, a burgeoning mistrust and animosity toward the traditional political parties was reinforced (Mayorga, F. 2004).24

Pacted democracy, then, proved to be a double-edged sword for Bolivia’s traditional political party system. While creating the conditions for governance and policy-making, it also fostered neopatrimonialism and executive-centric policymaking and reinforced the internal hierarchical nature of the political parties. In effect, the principle of pacted democracy restricted the role of the primary actors of the political system, that is, Bolivia’s traditional political parties. Their responsibilities did not extend beyond the promotion of patronage and their duty to implicitly support their party leader and, when they were part of the executive-friendly coalition, their president.25

The severely diminished role of the political parties within the context of pacted democracy limited their abilities to foster linkages with society. As one author notes, in

24 In fact, the dislike for the traditional political party system and the three political parties that comprised it was evident from early on after the transition to democracy. Many scholars have noted that “opinion polls consistently [placed] parties in a highly unfavorable light,” and “politicians and their parties [were] perceived as corrupt, and distrust of politicians is profound” (Domingo 2003, 147 and Gamarra 2003, 12). As early as 1989, scholars sought to understand why the MNR, MIR, and the ADN were so strongly “questioned” by Bolivian society (Calderón 1989). Clearly, the traditional political parties faced an uphill battle in terms of connecting with Bolivian society.

25 That is not to say that the political parties were beholden to remain loyal to the president upon joining the pact that elected him. In fact, political parties could and periodically did abandon the ruling coalition and join the Congressional opposition. Condepa left the Compromiso por Bolivia (1997-2002) along with the NFR, which also was a late joiner to and early abandoner of Sánchez de Lozada’s second term in office (2002-2003). Notably, none of the three traditional political parties ever abandoned a coalition once they joined it.
the 1990s, the traditional political parties were reduced to little more than electoral machines and *repartidores de cargos* (Interview B, 6 May 2005). Loyal party militants during campaign periods were rewarded with jobs and other benefits between election cycles, underscoring the neopatrimonial nature of inter-party bargaining in the formation of pacts and keeping party members from addressing the demands of the electorate.

As a result, after 1985 and particularly in the 1990s, the linkage that the traditional political parties were able to maintain with society was centered on clientelist-based neopatrimonialism and, more specifically, the circulation of jobs. Indeed, job distribution in the public sector was widespread through 2002. As Table 3.1 in Appendix 1 indicates, employment in the non-financial public sector remained steady between 1994 and 2002, despite the growing economic recession that hit Bolivia after 1998 (discussed in detail in the next section). Specifically, in 1994, non-financial public sector employees were 7.79% of the estimated economically active population. By 2002, this percentage had only dropped marginally to 6.64%. In actual numbers, although the change in public sector employment was negative, it represented a total increase of 17,769 workers (IMF 2000, 2003).

Employment in the central administration alone also remained remarkably steady. Between 1994 and 2002, the number of workers in the central administration, taken as a percentage of the economically active population, had only diminished by 0.36%. Given the deepening economic recession after 1998, the increase in the number of workers required to maintain the central administration employment levels as a percentage of the active population was notable, particularly given the NPE-mandated decline in public
sector employment after 1985. These figures demonstrate the importance of the circulation of state-based jobs in the 1990s. They support the contention that the traditional political parties were dependent upon these posts and upon empleomanía in general, even when that support contradicted the principles of the state’s economic policy.

The adoption of the principle of pacted democracy and the NPE provided an unprecedented opportunity in Bolivia’s political history for the traditional political parties. By eradicating the political force of other pre-1985 actors such as the COB, the traditional political party system became the sole voice of expression and mediation between the state and society. Yet, the unintended consequences of political stability, that is, the promotion of patrimonialism, executive-centric policymaking, and hierarchical internal party structures, diminished the role of the traditional political parties in the political system, preventing those parties from fostering linkages with society beyond that of neopatrimonialism. As the next section argues, the strength of this clientelist-based linkage would be tested by the serious economic and social changes taking place by the end of the 1990s.

Economic Crisis and Social Change in Bolivia in the 1990s

Bolivia’s economy underwent a great deal of fluctuation between 1985 and 2003, experiencing periods of both modest growth and modest decline. Notably, despite the privatization measures in 1985, as mandated by the NPE, and the capitalization law enacted with Sánchez de Lozada’s Plan de Todos, the country’s growth rates never

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26 Between 1998 and 2002, the total number of workers employed by the central administration increased by 5,201 (IMF 2000, 2003).
skyrocketed and rarely climbed above 5% of GNP. Indeed, as one economist asserts, since 1950, the country’s average growth rate was just below three percent. At its height, growth topped seven percent of GNP in different years during the 1960s and 1970s. Negative growth rates reached almost -10 percent of GNP in 1953, dipping again in 1957 as well as during the UDP administration (UDAPE 2004, 12).

The economic recession of 1998 intensified these fluctuations in growth, exacerbating the longstanding unstable nature of Bolivia’s economy. Appendix 1 includes three different tables that reveal the nature and impact of this recession, which lasted for more than five years. Table 3.2 portrays the sharp drop in the annual growth rate of Bolivia’s economy, as a percentage of GDP, between 1998 and 1999. From a growth rate of over five percent by 1998, the drop to just above zero was quite dramatic, especially since it came on the heels of a relatively stable growth period between 1994 and 1998. The country had yet to recuperate from that drop by 2002, although the rates of growth did increase again after 2000.

Accompanying the ensuing economic recession after 1998 was an increase in open unemployment rates, as Table 3.2 also indicates. Importantly, whereas the economy began to recover its positive growth rate after 2000, unemployment continued to rise. By 2003, the rate of the unemployed topped ten percent. At its height, in 2003, it reached 12.3 percent. The Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA) has projected that the unemployment rate will remain in the double digits at least through 2005 (CEDLA, 04/29/05).

Table 3.3 depicts the fiscal deficit between 1985 and 2005 (projected), indicating that the debt of the Non-Financial Public Sector (SPNF in Spanish) with pensions had
reached a level similar to that of 1985, or at the height of the economic crisis of the UDP. While the deficit subsequently decreased after peaking in 2002, Table 3.3 demonstrates that the government was spending beyond its means throughout the 1990s and even more so during the peak of the economic recession at the end of the 1990s. Clearly, the principles of economic austerity as advocated by the NPE were no longer being pursued by the state. Indeed, since 1990 and most likely before then, Bolivia’s government consistently spent more money than it received (UDAPE 2004, 22).

The effects of the post-1998 economic recession extended far beyond the macro-economic level. For one, World Bank figures indicate that the gross national income (GNI) per capita dropped by nine percent between 1999 and 2003. Whereas the average income per capita was US$990 at the end of 1999, that figured had dropped to US$900 by 2003. The implications of this loss are much more significant given the percentage of the population that lives below the poverty line in Bolivia, or 62.7 percent in 1999 (WDI 2004). Moreover, although government expenditures consistently exceeded its annual budget, spending in most social sectors dropped during this period. As Table 3.4 indicates, after 1998, investments in basic sanitation and housing and urban planning experienced a net decline. Investments in education and culture and health also declined after 2000, despite surges in investment in these areas when the economic recession began.

The impact of the 1998 economic recession, then, was felt at the individual and familial levels. For one, the sharp decrease in per capita incomes aggravated an already untenable poverty level in the country. Moreover, the drop in social sector investment exacerbated the government’s inability to address the basic demands of the impoverished
urban and rural sectors. Notably, despite the social impacts of the economic recession, enrollment rates at the university level grew sharply at the end of the 1990s. In 1996, total enrollment in public universities was at 151,260 students; the newly enrolled in that year accounted for 29,222 of that total. By 2002, the number of total enrolled had jumped to 240,428, reflecting an increase of 89,168 students, or 59%. The newly enrolled totaled 42,782 in 2002, which denotes a 46% increase in the number of enrolled students during the seven-year period (UDAPE Dossier, 2004). The increases in enrollment reflected a general demographic boom in the country that occurred in the 1990s: between 1992 and 2001, the overall population of Bolivia increased by 28.8% (INE 2003).

As these data illustrate, Bolivia entered into a period of economic recession after 1998 that not only exacerbated the country’s financial debts but also aggravated unemployment and underemployment levels. At the same time, university graduation rates sky-rocketed along with the country’s overall population, increasing the number of educated job-seekers just as employment rates were dropping. By the end of the 1990s, then, Bolivia was experiencing the kind of profound economic problems that Roberts highlights in his party system decline framework. The social impact of this growing crisis, including a simultaneous increase in an educated population and unemployment, fueled a growing frustration among Bolivians toward the political system – and the traditional political parties – that had enabled such a crisis to take place (Interview A, 4 May 2005). It is not surprising, then, that just as the frustration toward the traditional political parties was mounting, new political parties and social organizations emerged to reflect that discontent.
The Emergence of Alternatives to the Traditional Political Party System

The latter-half of the 1990s was marked by the emergence of several new political leaders with strong, albeit in some cases ephemeral, popular support. The appearance of five political parties during the decade reflected the growing "informalization of politics" in Bolivia, that is, a process by which political parties developed in the periphery and specifically against the traditional political party structures (Lazarte 1991, 595). In particular, the UCS, Condepa, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), the Movimiento Indio Pachacuti (MIP), and the NFR came to the national fore during the 1990s, representing a growing challenge to the traditional political parties’ electoral and political dominance.

The UCS and Condepa were founded in the latter half of the 1980s by Max Fernández and Carlos Palenque respectively. Both parties rose to meteoric levels of popularity upon their creation, primarily because of the popularity of the two leaders. Fernández and Palenque were viewed as humble individuals who, in contrast with the elite-born traditional party leaders, worked hard to get where they were (Mayorga F. 2003, 104). Fernández, the president of the country’s beer company, used his vast material resources to carry out obras visibles (visible works), winning more popular support every time he paved a road. Palenque, a television personality for the urban and primarily indigenous poor, had broad charismatic appeal because he was culturally similar to his constituents: they dressed the same, spoke the same, and carried out the same rites and traditions (Lazarte 1991, 594).

Both parties emerged as a popular alternative to the traditional political parties because, as one author argues, they fulfilled the role of provider ("asistencialista") that
the traditional parties could not fill given the adoption of both pacted democracy and the NPE (Mayorga F. 2003, 104). The campaigns and campaign promises of the UCS and Condepa revolved around the provision of hospitals, schools, and playgrounds. Palenque and Fernández appeared to give directly from their pockets, presiding over the ribbon-cutting ceremony of each of their visible works. In this way, they cultivated a charismatic, almost personal relationship with their followers, creating a direct link between their constituents and themselves (Lazarte 1991, 600-601). Their actions were also clientelist in nature. Most of the votes they garnered were a result of the public services they provided.

While both the UCS and Condepa heavily criticized the traditional political party system, they ultimately joined forces with it in the 1990s. They gave their implicit support to pacted democracy and to the hegemony of the three traditional political parties when they joined those parties in two different ruling coalitions (Mayorga, F. 2003, 108). By the end of the decade, however, new political parties had emerged that were not supportive of the traditional party leaders nor the political system that sustained them. The MAS and the MIP are examples of these “anti-systemic” parties (Gamarra 2003a, 4).

The MAS was established as the political wing of the Six Federations of coca growers in the Chapare region. Building its bases initially through the defense of the cocalero’s right to cultivate his crop, the MAS’ popularity expanded rapidly at the end of the 1990s. This was largely because of the appeal of its anti-American stance after the

27 Specifically, the UCS formed part of the Pacto por la Gobernabilidad (1993-1997), under Sánchez de Lazada, and both UCS and Condepa joined the ADN in the Compromiso por Bolivia (1997-2002), although Condepa would later withdraw from the pact.
controversial implementation of *Plan Dignidad*\(^{28}\) Since then the MAS challenged, both formally in Congress and informally in the streets, the neoliberal, pro-American stances of the Banzer and second Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2003) administrations. Like Palenque and Fernández, Morales has tremendous charismatic appeal and has accumulated a lot of political and even financial capital, not just domestically but also at the international level (Gamarra 2003a, 18).

The MIP was founded under the leadership of Felipe Quispe in 2000. An indigenist party, that is, one that wants to reclaim Bolivia for its original, indigenous inhabitants, Quispe’s MIP has called for the creation of a worker/campesino-led government (Gamarra 2002, 21). While gaining six seats in the National Congress after 2002, Quispe has actively and vociferously worked against the institutions and principles of representative democracy. Indeed, as his dream of a government composed of workers and *campesinos* suggests, Quispe’s vision of democracy is a manifestation of the corporatist notions upheld by the COB and the CSUTCB (of which Quispe is also the leader). At one point, the MIP leader declared that he was only a part of the lower house so that he could work to destroy the system from the inside (Fundación Milenio 2004, 22).

Finally, a third political party to emerge from its *Cochabambino* stronghold in the late 1990s was the *Nueva Fuerza Republicana* (NFR). Headed by Manfred Reyes Villa,

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28 In 1998, President Banzer implemented a US-induced coca eradication plan that wiped out nearly all the coca fields in the Chapare. The effects of the so-called *Plan Dignidad* were disastrous for the coca growers, not only because it dramatically reduced the financial benefits of coca cultivation, but also because it seriously damaged the informal sectors that had developed alongside the country’s coca industry. The effects of *Plan Dignidad* also unintentionally transformed Morales and the MAS from a local phenomenon into a national actor (Gamarra 2004).
the NFR was transformed from a strong locally-based party\textsuperscript{29} to a nationally recognized one during the 2002 presidential elections, in which Reyes was a serious contender. While Reyes ultimately lost the presidency in 2002, he did join Sánchez de Lozada’s mega-coalition in the latter part of its existence, only to drop out once more before the President’s forced resignation in October 2003. As with the MAS and the MIP, the NFR has been an active critic of the traditional political parties since that time and has called for a general overhaul of the political and economic models adopted in 1985 (Mayorga, F. 2003, 116).

Unlike Condepa and UCS, the MAS, MIP, and in some periods the NFR, strongly opposed the traditional political party system. Yet, their popular appeal was very similar to that of Condepa and the UCS: it was based on clientelism and, in the case of the MIP and the MAS, corporatist notions of representation. Like Fernández, Reyes Villa attracted many followers through his campaign of \textit{obras visibles}. Quispe channeled the demands of the rural and labor sectors as the head of both the MIP and the CSUTCB. Morales, who has conformed to the political system much more since his emergence as a prominent political figure after Sánchez de Lozada’s fall, began his political ascent as head of the prominent coca sector (Mayorga, F. 2003, 117). In all three cases, their primary linkages with society were either based on clientelist or corporatist appeals. And, like UCS and Condepa, the parties each arose out of perceived deficits in the traditional political party system.

\textsuperscript{29} Reyes was the mayor of Cochabamba – the third largest city in Bolivia after Santa Cruz and La Paz – from 1993-2002.
These new political parties were not the only actors to emerge in the 1990s as direct or indirect threats to the traditional political parties’ electoral and political dominance. Beginning in 2000, other powerful, non-state forces materialized in response to and as a result of the changing social landscape in the country. In particular, civil society organizations and social movements emerged that began to directly challenge policy decisions taken by the state. Defending the rights of the poor urban and rural sectors, indigenous peoples, local unions, and other community-based organizations, these groups were able to represent sectors of Bolivian society that felt largely disconnected from the formal political process. They expressed their discontent primarily by reviving the strategy of blockades, protests, and hunger strikes that had in the past been used with great success by the COB. This “politics of the street” (Calderón 1982) was in large part supported in Congress by the MAS and the MIP. Thus, in many ways, the opposition employed a two-prong strategy for resisting the state and what was largely perceived as its neoliberal and pro-American stance: “lo que no consigas en el parlamento, se consigue en la calle” (Chávez, et al. 2004).

One of these groups formed in response to a sudden spike in the cost of water in the city of Cochabamba. In 1998, the regional company that provided water to a majority of the homes in the city was privatized and turned over to the international consortium, Aguas del Tunari. The Coordinadora del Agua y la Vida was formed as a response to this privatization with the objective of defending the right of the city’s population to water and other basic services (García, et al. 2004, 626). Headed by Oscar Olivera, the Coordinadora organized a series of mobilizations, strikes, and even an informal referendum condemning Aguas de Tunari after it had announced a 35% increase in the
cost of water. By April 2000, the contract with *Aguas del Tunari* was retracted (García, et al. 2004, 629). The *Guerra del Agua* was successful, and the model used by the *Coordinadora* was replicated by other groups during future conflicts in the country (Interview A, 4 May 2005; Interview B, 6 May 2005).

Several examples of these conflicts materialized in the latter half of 2000, just on the heels of the *Guerra del Agua*. In September, coca growers in the Chapare organized a series of road blockades, refusing to clear the highways until the government halted their coca eradication strategy and their plans to construct a US-financed military base. Around the same time, the increasingly active teachers unions organized a series of protests with both urban and rural teachers. They demanded a salary increase and the modification of different aspects of the administration’s education reform. The CSUTCB also sparked a round of protests that led to violent confrontations between the group and the Bolivian armed forces. As a result of the conflict, more than a dozen campesinos were killed (Gamarra 2002, 13-14).

Each of these incidents reflected the growth of a new set of unified social forces that was beginning to threaten the traditional political parties’ hold over political control. As one interviewee noted (Interview A, 4 May 2005), whereas these social movements were largely incapable of resolving many of the country’s social, political, and economic problems, they were able to bring these issues to light, forcing the government to address them. After 2000, this pattern of protest, negotiation, and conflict resolution was continuously exploited by different organized sectors of Bolivian society, because, as many have noted (Gamarra 2002, Interview A, 4 May 2005), it was far more successful at producing results than the severely inefficient political system.
Thus, even though the COB had been dismantled by the NPE, the corporatist tradition it represented lived on and began to manifest itself in new ways by the end of the 1990s. The emergence of political parties like the MAS and the MIP and of social movements in defense of the rights of cocaleros, teachers, and rural campesinos reflected this revived tradition. The corporatist nature of these groups starkly contrasted with the representative nature of the traditional political parties. Whereas the party leaders advocated institutional changes for renewing democracy in Bolivia, the emerging social leaders advocated the use of mechanisms of direct participation (Calderón and Gamarra 2003, 15). Moreover, the new political parties and social movements appealed to the poor urban and rural classes, underscoring the middle class-based nature of the traditional political parties’ patrimonial appeal. And the allure of the new parties and movements was growing: their successes in confronting the government through the Guerra del Agua demonstrated that their popular support had become strong enough to banish a multinational from the country.

In effect, by 2000, the strength of these new political actors was on par with that of the traditional political parties. The “dichotomy” (Gamarra 2002, 28) of the two groups in terms of political power led many to conclude that there existed, by the early 21st century, dos institucionalidades (two institutionalities, in English) in Bolivia: one, as represented by the country’s formal political institutions and particularly the traditional political parties and the other corresponding to the país profundo, or the non-state political forces harkening back to the formerly organized urban and rural sectors (Interview A, 4 May 2005; Gamarra 2002, 14). In many ways, the two institutionalities in Bolivia represented a return to the struggle for political power that existed in the
country prior to the transition to democracy. As in the 1960s and 1970s, the central
governing authority in Bolivia had been replaced by competing political factions, each
which their own contrasting definition of what representation should entail. The role of
the traditional political party system as the sole intermediary between state and society
was clearly under attack.

Conclusion

By 2000, then, it was evident that the linkages that the traditional political party
system maintained with society were threatened. The reasons for this were twofold. On
the one hand, the principle of pacted democracy, while promoting political stability at
least in the short-term, effectively isolated the political party system from Bolivian
society. Executive-centric policy-making and implementation diminished the importance
of political parties and reduced their role to one of job distribution and inter-party
bargaining. As such, the traditional political parties were hard-pressed to develop
linkages with society beyond that of clientelist-based neopatrimonialism. Historically
tied to the urban middle classes, the limitations of this party-society linkage began to
manifest by the end of the 1990s in the wake of the economic recession. As the number
of jobless Bolivians grew, so too did the discontent toward the traditional political
parties. The emergence of new parties and social movements supports this contention.

Moreover, corporatist notions of representation dating back to the MNR’s dream
of forging a single-party hegemonic democracy after the National Revolution had never
died away. The COB represented the notion throughout the 1960s and 1970s. While the
NPE was able to abolish the Central in 1985, the political parties, constrained as they
were by the limited extent of patrimonialism, were unable to capture the support of the
disenfranchised laborers. By the end of the 1990s, new social movements and political parties entered onto the political scene, reviving the corporatist tradition and reconnecting with the poor urban and rural classes that had been disenfranchised after the dismantling of the COB. Their accomplishments both in the streets and at the ballot box imply that many Bolivians still responded to these kinds of linkages. Thus, the political parties were not only incapacitated by the weaknesses of pacted democracy. They were also debilitated by the renewed calls for corporatism by the newly politicized poor urban and rural sectors.

As a result, by 2000, the clientelist-based linkages that the traditional political parties were able to sustain with society were being tested by growing domestic pressures for change. The economic recession, changing social dynamics, and successful non-state political mobilizations threatened the dominance of the traditional political party system. Its weak, or what one interviewee has called “thin,” linkages with society were vulnerable to the convergence of economic, political, and social change in the country (Interview A, 4 May 2005). By the beginning of the 21st century, it became increasingly apparent that the party system was in danger of decline. Chapter Four argues that the traditional political party system did enter into decline after 2000 and looks at the specific manifestations of this decline, both prior to the political crisis of 2003 and after Sánchez de Lozada’s forced resignation.
IV. ANALYZING PARTY SYSTEM DECLINE

Chapter Three examined the conditions of economic crisis and social change in Bolivia by the end of the 1990s, setting the stage for traditional political party system decline. The purpose of this chapter is to make the case that the traditional party system actually entered into decline after 2000 and examines how that decline has been expressed since then. To do this, it focuses on four different manifestations of the erosion of the clientelist-based party-society linkages in Bolivia.

The first section looks at the electoral expressions of the traditional party system decline. It notes a gradual decline in voter abstention and an increase in electoral volatility by the end of the decade. The 2002 presidential elections are a further indication of the discontent toward the traditional political parties: while the MNR was able to win the presidency, its win was by the narrowest of margins. Overall, the loss in voter share of the three traditional political parties in 2002 was profound. Moreover, the legislative shake-up after the elections produced a Congress that was bitterly divided along traditional-new political party lines, complicating executive-legislative relations and weakening the traditional political parties vis-à-vis the opposition in Parliament.

Bolivian opinion on the traditional political parties between 1998 and 2004 represents the second manifestation of the decline of the party system. The second section of the chapter analyzes the wealth of information produced by two sets of surveys and focus groups carried out in Bolivia between 1998 and 2004. Notably, confidence in political parties, and the traditional political parties in general, was low in 1998 and had decreased even further by 2004. Four years into the 21st century, most Bolivians felt that political parties were not necessary for democracy, nor was the principle of pacted
democracy that underscored their democratic regime. Finally, Bolivians reserved their most negative opinions for the traditional political parties. Whereas some of the newer political parties, including the MAS, were viewed in a more positive light, by 2004, it was clear that the traditional political parties had lost the confidence of society. These expressions of discontent serve as another indicator of the decline of the traditional political party system.

The third section delves briefly into a new phenomenon that has emerged since Sánchez de Lozada's forced resignation in 2003. Specifically, it looks at the surfacing of "anti-party" policies after his downfall, including the use of referenda for important policymaking decisions, the call for a Constituent Assembly, and a law that allows non-political party candidates to run for office. The presumption underlying this section is that such policies would not have been passed if not for the overwhelming rejection of the traditional political parties after 2000. The erosion of the linkages between the traditional parties and society was reflected in the replacement of those political parties with other electoral and policymaking alternatives.

Finally, given the "anti-party" political context after the fall of Sánchez de Lozada, the last section examines the results from the first electoral race to take place after the political crisis of that year. As might be expected, the traditional political parties fared very poorly in the December 2004 municipal elections. On the other hand, new political parties, and particularly the MAS, were much more successful at the local level. This last section, then, looks at the decline of the traditional political party system while also highlighting the possible transformation of party politics from a system centered on the three traditional political parties to one that comprises the newer political parties.
Examining the Electoral Evidence of Party System Decline

Some scholars have argued that the first two signs of dealignment in a country are electoral volatility and voter abstention (Hagopian 1998). These electoral trends indicate the "rising tide of citizen disinterest, disillusion, and disaffection" toward their political parties and the political system in general (Hagopian 1998, 118). They are, in essence, good snapshot measures of the state of the linkages between political parties and society. In the case of Bolivia, because the political system was ruled by the alternation of power between the MNR, MIR, and ADN, any surge in electoral volatility or decline in voter abstention after 1985 can be attributed in large part to the "disinterest, disillusion, and disaffection" towards these three traditional political parties. This assumption underlies the analysis to follow.

Voter abstention intensified by the end of the 1990s and particularly during the 2002 presidential elections. The percentage of registered voters who abstained from voting grew consistently during the decade. In 1993, 18.34% of registered voters abstained. By 1997, this figure had risen to 22.46%, and in the presidential elections of 2002, the abstention percentage topped out at 24.8% (Mayorga, R. 2002, 96).\(^{30}\) Electoral volatility also increased between the 1997 and 2002 elections, although it had been high since the second democratic election in 1985. While the volatility level\(^{31}\) was 46.19 after the 1997 election, it rose to 50.27 in 2002 (Political Database of the Americas, 1999, 2000a, 2000b), suggesting a rather dramatic shift in voter shares between the two

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\(^{30}\) These figures represent the total number of registered voters who abstained as a percentage of the total population who is eligible to vote (that is, over 18 years of age) but is not necessarily registered to vote.

\(^{31}\) The volatility levels are according to the Pedersen's Index. For each of the three elections (1993, 1997, 2002), the top eight voter share percentages were used. The author compiled the data and determined the volatility level using the Political Database of the Americas (2000a, 2000b, 2002).
elections. Indeed, a closer look at the 2002 national election is merited, as the high electoral volatility represented primarily a turn from the traditional political parties to three newer parties, the MAS, the NFR, and the MIP.

The traditional political parties did not fare well in the 2002 national election, particularly in comparison with past years. Prior to 2002, the three traditional political parties taken together captured the majority of the votes in each election. Table 4.1 in Appendix 2 compares the voter share, as a percentage of total votes, of the MNR, ADN, and MIR (labeled “Traditional”) in each national election since 1989 with the voter share of the next three top placers in each election (labeled “Next Three”). In 1989, for example, the MNR, ADN, and MIR together won 65.41% of the total popular vote, whereas the three parties that placed fourth, fifth, and sixth in terms of voter share, in this case, Condepa, Izquierda Unida (IU), and Partido Socialista-1 (PS-1), captured only 20.76%. By 2002, the three traditional political parties together received only 42.16% of the voter share and were no longer the top three finishers. The MAS, MIP, and the NFR, on the other hand, received 47.94% of the vote. For the first time, three non-traditional political parties captured a larger percentage of the voter share than the traditional parties.

The impact of this shift in voter shares was dramatic. For one, the ADN virtually disappeared from the national stage, and the MIR finished in fourth place behind two new political parties, the NFR and the MAS, as well as the MNR. For its part, the MNR managed to receive the highest number of votes, but it did so with only a very slight plurality.\footnote{On June 30, 2002, official first round election results, as taken from the Comité Nacional Electoral of Bolivia, were the following at the national level: MNR, 22.46%; MAS, 20.94%; NFR, 20.91%; MIR, 20.91%;} New political parties, on the other hand, did surprisingly well: the MAS
placed a close second behind the MNR, the NFR received the third highest percentage of votes, and the MIP ended in fifth place after the MIR. The 2002 results suggest, at least electorally speaking, that the traditional political parties no longer dominated the political system as they had for the past fifteen years.\footnote{Another author has taken a different spin on the 2002 national elections. Considering the poor electoral results of the MNR, MIR, and ADN, he argues that traditional political party system was in fact quite resilient after 2002. By forming an alliance between the MNR and the MIR, the principle of coalitions was preserved; the party system converted from a tripod of three parties to a vertical column consisting of two (Mayorga, R. 2002, 78). This study suggests that his analysis is overly optimistic given the polarized nature of politics that resulted from the MNR-MIR alliance, the character of which is discussed below.}

The MAS and the MIP were two of the clear winners in 2002; together they accounted for almost 30% of the Congress, giving them the power to veto when voting as a bloc. In particular, the MIP won five seats in the lower house, and the MAS won thirteen. Beyond their electoral triumph, the symbolic victory of the MAS and the MIP was also important. Representing in many ways the demands of the social movements that had dominated the streets after 2000, their congressional victory meant that, for the first time, these informal political forces would have an institutional voice in government.

The political society in Bolivia, as defined by the three traditional political parties, had converged with the country's proactive civil society in the Congress (Mayorga, F. 2002, 141). Despite this unprecedented opportunity for cross-party collaboration, however, the Congress split down traditional/new party lines. The MNR formed an uneasy pact with the MIR and UCS, and the NFR, MAS, and MIP would serve as a forceful and dominant opposition in the legislature.

Indeed, the antagonistic nature of President Sánchez de Lozada's \textit{Pacto Plan} \textit{Bolivia} cannot be overstated. The hostile relationship between the MNR and the MIR

\begin{itemize}
  \item MIP, 6.09%;
  \item UCS, 5.51%;
  \item ADN, 3.39%;
  \item LyJ, 2.72%;
  \item PS, 0.65%;
  \item MCC, 0.63%;
  \item CONDEPA, 0.37%.
\end{itemize}

16.31%; MIP, 6.09%; UCS, 5.51%; ADN, 3.39%; LyJ, 2.72%; PS, 0.65%; MCC, 0.63%; CONDEPA, 0.37%.
distracted the coalition from dealing with the growing economic and social problems in the country. Moreover, it exacerbated the patronage-driven nature of the pact: the two principal parties fought for every Ministry, Embassy, and any other governmental job available. Some argued that it was more patronage-based than any other coalition before it (Gamarra 2003b, 290). Although the hegemony of the traditional political parties prevailed, then, past guarantees of governability and political stability were no longer assured. A vociferous, opposition-led Congress fostered this instability.

The shift in votes from the traditional to the new political parties in the 2002 national election reflected a dealignment of the traditional parties with society. An increase in voter abstention, which had reached its height in 2002, along with the high electoral volatility compared to 1997, support this contention. Moreover, even though the MNR and the MIR managed to form a Congressional coalition in which traditional political party control was maintained, the antagonistic and tenuous nature of the pact reflected the extent to which their dominance had been debilitated. As one author argues, it appeared, in 2002, that pacted democracy had “run its course” (Gamarra 2003b, 290).

*Assessing Bolivian Opinion on the Traditional Political Party System*

It could be argued that the 2002 presidential election results were an electoral anomaly and a short-term reaction to the aggravated economic and social context in which they were carried out. Other indicators measured from 1998 on, however, suggest that the relative losses of the MNR, ADN, and MIR were instead a manifestation of an intensified discontent toward the traditional political parties, the Congress, and even the President during that time. In particular, by 2004, Bolivian opinion towards the
traditional political parties and the political system in general had dropped to very low levels. The following pages look at different expressions of this discontent.

Most of the survey data below refer to "political parties" as a group and not specifically to the three traditional political parties (MNR, MIR, ADN) that are the focus of this study. That said, an assumption of the proceeding analysis is that most of the discontent measured in the surveys was directed in particular to the three traditional political parties. There are two reasons for this. One, as the study has already demonstrated, the three traditional political parties dominated the party system from 1985 on. Thus, most of the anger toward the party system was in fact directed to these three parties and not to "political parties" as a group. The unexpected electoral success of the new political parties, including the MAS and the MIP, in 2002 and 2004 (to be discussed below), support this contention.

Moreover, most of the anti-party discourse elaborated by the social movements and new political parties after 1998 was directed explicitly at these three parties. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that the traditional political parties would have been conflated with the political party system in general within these surveys, although there is no evidence that definitively supports this supposition. Nevertheless, the last part of this section is dedicated to survey results (Appendix 4, Table 4.6) that actually differentiate between the confidence levels of different political parties. The lowest levels are reserved for the three traditional political parties – a fact that supports the assumption that underlies the following pages.

Between 1998 and 2004, then, a representative sample of Bolivians was asked to respond to a series of questions about different political institutions in the country. The
group had to specify how much confidence they had in political parties, Congress, the President, and the municipal government, among others. Given a scale of 1 to 7, the respondents would choose 1 if they had no confidence at all in the institution and 7 if they had a lot of confidence. Appendix 3 provides the results for each of the questions in the four survey periods. In the four tables, the black bar represents an aggregate of the two lowest ratings, that is, the sum of the percentage of respondents who had no confidence in each institution (a rating of 1) and the percentage of respondents who gave 2 as their answer on the 1 to 7 scale. Accordingly, the white bar is an aggregate of the percentage of respondents who gave the two highest ratings possible on the seven-point scale.

As expected, the overall confidence is lowest and the most pronounced in the case of the political parties. Notably, the highest confidence towards political parties accounted for only 5.7% of the total respondents surveyed in 2002. This jump from the much lower “highest” ratings in 1998, 2000, and 2004 may be a result of the presidential elections of that year. While highly unpopular, Sánchez de Lozada did represent a change from the Banzer/Quiroga administration, whose popularity had suffered greatly after the Guerra del Agua and throughout the rest of their term, when the number of protests, blockades, and governmental stand-offs escalated in the country.

Overall, however, the political parties fared poorly in each of the four survey periods. At their best, in 1998, the percentage of respondents who had the lowest levels of confidence in the political parties was just under 50% of the total population sample. The most pronounced differences in levels of confidence were recorded in 2000 and 2004, when the “lowest” percentage reached almost 60% of the sample. In general, the
differences between the highest and lowest levels of confidence towards the political parties increased between 1998 and 2004, although these increases were not uniform.

The 2000 sample is notable because it registered a spike in the lowest confidence ratings for three of the four institutions listed: political parties, the President, and the Congress, although to a lesser degree. This suggests that the effects of the economic recession and growing social unrest after 1998 were exacerbating the already poor confidence levels of each of these institutions. As such, these results contradict the argument that the 2002 elections were simply an anomaly. Discontent, as registered in terms of voter abstention, electoral volatility, and low levels of institutional confidence, had existed in the years prior to the presidential elections in 2002.

What is perhaps most surprising from the 2000 data set is that the municipal governments did not register a similar spike in lowest confidence ratings as the other institutions. Instead, the difference between the highest and lowest confidence ratings stayed almost constant during the seven years of the survey set, suggesting that, while the municipalities did not earn greater levels of trust among Bolivians, they did not lose their confidence either. The relative stability of confidence levels for municipal governments with respect to political parties, Congress, and the President, suggest that Bolivians may be more satisfied with governance at the local versus the national level.

Admittedly, the time period covered in these tables is rather short. Data on attitudes towards the political parties in Bolivia prior to 1998 would have strengthened the conclusions drawn here about their progressive decline during subsequent years, when data was available. The tables do, however, provide an initial glimpse of the confidence among Bolivians towards their institutions during the height of the era of
acted democracy and before the political party system began to decline. Indeed, in 1998, the economic and social impact of the recession had yet to be felt in its entirety. Still, as expected, two years later the recession’s effects had exacerbated the low levels of confidence of many Bolivians towards their political institutions, especially at the national level.

In 2004, Bolivia’s National Electoral Court (CNE in Spanish) carried out another round of surveys and focus groups in an attempt to capture Bolivians’ attitudes towards political parties, other political actors, and with regards to democracy in general, just one year after the 2003 political crisis and Sánchez de Lozada’s forced resignation. The initial results from this project provide additional support to the argument that the political party system is in a state of decline. Appendix 4 contains a series of different tables indicating the opinion of Bolivians on the importance of political parties and other political institutions. As the following analysis suggests, attitudes towards political parties and the political party system in 2004 were decisively low.

Table 4.2, for example, represents the responses given to the question of whether political parties are necessary for democracy. As the results indicate, almost 81% of the respondents felt that political parties are considered only somewhat or not at all necessary for democracy in the country. Indeed, whereas only 15.4% of those surveyed believed that parties were very necessary for democracy, 24.3% thought that they were not at all necessary. The most common response for this question was that political parties were only somewhat necessary for democracy. This attitude clearly contradicts the theoretical notion that political parties are fundamental for representative democracy. It also implies
that, while democracy is still supported in the country, the political party system in
Bolivia is no longer considered an important aspect of that regime.

It was not just the political parties that were no longer considered fundamental for
democracy in Bolivia. The principle of pacted democracy that has sustained the party
system since 1985 was also questioned by the respondents in the 2004 survey. As Table
4.3 indicates, most Bolivians do not believe that party alliances are valuable. Of those
surveyed, 76.4 percent felt that there were better forms of government that did not rely
upon Congressional pacts. Only 16 percent felt that the parties should continue to form
alliances in Parliament, suggesting that the notion of pacted democracy, at least in terms
of Bolivian opinion, had, in fact, “run its course.”

The CNE 2004 survey also asked Bolivians to evaluate a list of nineteen different
institutions in terms of their contributions to democracy; how well they work; if they are
trustworthy; if they are corrupt; or whether they should be eliminated altogether, if given
the choice. From this set of five questions, the CNE developed two measures that
ordered the nineteen institutions in terms of how positively or how negatively they were
perceived. The results from this question set are important because, unlike the Seligson
data above, they include not only the confidence level of each institution, but they also
evaluate how well the institution is perceived to be working and how much it has
contributed to democracy (CNE 2004, 76). Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide the results for the
two measures. The institutions with the most positive image, as denoted in Table 4.4,

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34 In the survey, respondents were asked to identify, from the list of nineteen institutions plus an option for
none of the above, which of the set of institutions they perceived as (1) contributing the most to democracy;
(2) working the best; (3) the most corrupt; (4) having the most confidence; and (5) worthy of elimination.
The first, second, and fourth options contributed to the positive image of an institution. The third and fifth
options contributed to its overall negative image. The scores for each institution were then tallied.
Percentages were determined according to those results and based on a total of 300 percentage points.
include the Catholic Church, the mayors, the Ombudsman, the press, and Civic Committees. Notably, political parties only score above the Armed Forces and transnational companies in terms of their positive image.

As with the Seligson data on institutional confidence between 1998 and 2004, Table 4.5 indicates that the political parties have by far the most negative image of all nineteen institutions. Parliament comes in a distant second. In general, most of the national political institutions, that is, political parties, Parliament, government, as well as the police and the Armed Forces, maintain a very low positive image, particularly in comparison with local or community-based institutions. Civic committees, the Mayor, and neighborhood juntas, on the other hand, receive a relatively high ranking in terms of their positive image. Here, as with the Seligson data, there is a difference in the assessment of the work and democratic contributions of local level political and community-based institutions versus their national counterparts. It appears that Bolivians are, in general, more satisfied with their local institutions than they are with those at the national level.

It is important to make a distinction between the traditional political parties of the country’s party system from the new political parties that emerged during and after the 1990s. Another aspect of the survey suggests that Bolivians have differing opinions about the traditional versus the newer political parties. Given a list of eight different political parties, those surveyed had to state whether they had a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each. Table 4.6 indicates the responses for the MNR, MIR, MAS, Movimiento sin Miedo (MSM), ADN, UCS, MIP, NFR, and Unidad Nacional (UN). The results listed represent the subtraction of the percentage who responded unfavorably to those
who responded favorably. As the table demonstrates, all of the political parties have an unfavorable image. Three of the least favorable percentages, however, can be attributed to the three traditional political parties: the MIR has an aggregate image of -65%; the MNR, -66%; and the ADN, -76%. The MIP and the UCS also have comparably low ratings, reflecting the polarizing nature of the former (as well as its limited electoral reach over the long term) and the ephemerality of the latter, particularly after the death of its leader.

Notably, the parties that register the most favorable image relative to the traditional political parties are all new, having only emerged in the past five to ten years. The MAS clearly fares best, with a -30% overall rating. Morales’ political party, along with the UN and the MSM, each received an overall negative rating that was under 50 percent. These numbers lend additional support to the possibility that the 2002 presidential election results were not just an anomaly. The image of the traditional political parties is very low, particularly in comparison with other political parties. In 2002, their unfavorable image was reflected in their unusually low share of the total votes; in 2004, this attitude has clearly been sustained. On the other hand, the newer parties have a much more favorable image, suggesting that may serve as a more attractive electoral option in the future.

35 The Frente Unidad Nacional (UN) is a political party founded in Cochabamba on December 12, 2003, by a former MIR member, Samuel Doria Medina. Doria was subsequently elected as the head of the party on April 4, 2004 (Fundación Milenio 2004, 23). A successful businessman and one of the richest people in Bolivia, Doria’s reputation as a political outsider has helped him to become a strong contender for the 2007 presidential elections. Movimiento sin Miedo (MSM) was founded in 1999 by another former MIR member, Juan del Granado. Currently the reelected mayor of La Paz, the party is strongest in this political capital. Like Condepa or the UCS of the 1990s, the MSM has been successful because of del Granado’s ability to carry out obras visibles in the city (Gamarra 2005, 13). Del Granado’s potential presidential candidacy may be hampered by the party’s inability to extend its electoral reach beyond the department of La Paz.
Overall, the results from the CNE survey indicate that most Bolivians were disillusioned and unhappy with the traditional political parties and the party system in 2004. While none of the political parties were perceived in an overly positive light, the traditional political parties were the most maligned of all. Moreover, a majority no longer believed that political parties or their coalitions were necessary for democracy. As such, the CNE survey results lends support to the contention that the weak links that the traditional political parties once had society were eroded, particularly in the year following the 2003 political crisis.

Anti-Party Politics after 2003

Another aspect of the decline of the traditional political parties was the conspicuous absence of those parties in terms of the promises made and the laws implemented since the fall of Sánchez de Lozada. Indeed, the new, ‘partyless’ president, Carlos Mesa Gilbert, assumed office without the formal backing of any political party, promising to dedicate his term to the fulfillment of three lofty objectives: to carry out a binding referendum on the exportation of the country’s hydrocarbons; to modify the existing Hydrocarbons Law according to the referendum; and to organize a Constituent Assembly to reform Bolivia’s constitution. The goals of his “October Agenda,” along with a law passed in 2004 that allows other citizen and indigenous groups to put forth candidates for election alongside political parties, represented a new trend in policy-making after the 2003 political crisis. They reflected a move away from party-based governance and the traditional political party system that had been central to representative democracy in country since 1985.
One fundamental element of Mesa’s “October Agenda” was his pledge to organize a referendum on the Hydrocarbons Law. This referendum, which was carried out on July 18, 2004, bypassed the political parties in Congress and brought the issue of if and how to export Bolivia’s natural gas reserves directly to Bolivians for them to decide. In essence, the referendum was promoted and even celebrated as a mechanism of direct citizen participation. The information drive carried out by the government prior to its realization heralded the referendum as an expression of direct democracy. Mesa’s campaign worked. Each of the five points of the referendum was eventually approved, although as of the time of writing an interpretation of the referendum results had yet to be formulated that could be successfully translated into law.

The other important goal of Mesa’s agenda was the organization of a Constituent Assembly. Calls for sweeping constitutional reform had been made continuously by many different groups, including the MAS, the CSUTCB, the Coordinadora del Agua, the teachers’ unions, and student movements, since the politically tumultuous year of 2000. As the discontent toward the political party system grew after that time, so too did the calls for a Constituent Assembly. The Assembly, while not explicitly undermining the role of political parties as in the case of the hydrocarbons referendum, did threaten to undermine their dominance. Indeed, many supporters of the Assembly called for the

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36 The author was in La Paz and Cochabamba in June 2004, only a few weeks prior to the referendum vote. Propaganda about the vote, in the form of pamphlets, posters, and even street-wide banners in both cities marketed the referendum to citizens by portraying it as a mechanism of “democracia directa”.

37 The length of each of the five questions, as well as their highly technical nature, has led the many critics of the referendum to conclude that, even though the referendum was overwhelmingly approved, the content of each question is so ambiguous that different sectors have entirely different interpretations of what that approval means. As a result, by June 2005 the language of the new Hydrocarbons Law had not yet been approved in both houses of Congress and by the President. In early May 2005, Congress was able to agree upon a draft Law. Ultimately, however, Mesa demurred from rejecting or passing the Law, and it was sent back to Congress for further consideration.
abolishment of the traditional political parties as a condition of its organization (Gamarra 2002, 13).

In early July 2004, just weeks before the hydrocarbons referendum, another piece of important legislation passed that altered the electoral landscape and the notion of representation in Bolivia. The *Ley de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y Pueblos Indígenas* (henceforth referred to as the *Ley*) allowed citizens to run for office outside of political party structures through *agrupaciones ciudadanas* (citizen groups) or *pueblos indígenas* (indigenous groups). The goals of the *Ley* included the “reconfiguración del sistema político y la puesta en escena de nuevos mecanismos de representación popular” (Rocha 2004). In essence, the *Ley* was passed as a mechanism to eliminate the monopoly of the political parties as the sole channel of representation of citizens in government. Mesa himself proclaimed that the *Ley* represented “parte del camino hacia la participación de la ciudadanía” (*Los Tiempos* 8 July 2004). The *Ley* provided an innovative way for citizens to participate in politics without having to go through political party structures.

The hydrocarbons referendum, the proposed Constituent Assembly, and the *Ley de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y Pueblos Indígenas* were each promoted by the Mesa administration as opportunities for the direct participation of citizens in the democratic process. In each case, the hegemonic nature of the traditional political party system was directly or indirectly jeopardized. The referendum took the policy-making process from Congress and gave it to the population at large. The *Ley* allowed for non-party candidates to compete with political party members for elected positions. The Constituent Assembly threatened to change the nature of the political system completely. The desire among many Bolivians for each of these acts, and the willingness of the Mesa
administration to attempt to carry them out, were another reflection of the traditional political party system's decline in the country.

Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that, if the traditional political parties had not become dealigned with society, citizen demands to essentially replace them with citizen or indigenous groups or to bypass them altogether with policymaking referenda would not have materialized. Unhappy with the traditional political parties' political performance between 1985 and 2003, Bolivians sought and supported legislation after that period that promoted new forms of participation and representation. As with the growing voter abstention rates and electoral volatility in 2002 and the survey results between 1998 and 2004 by both Seligson and the CNE, the post-2003 political developments in Bolivia reflected the severe nature of the dealignment and decline of the country's traditional political party system.

**Assessing the Post-Political Crisis Vote**

It is important to mention one more event in Bolivia, because in many ways it represented the culmination of the decline of the political party system after 2000 and since Sánchez de Lozada's downfall. On December 5, 2004, municipal elections were held in the country. These elections marked the first instance in which the Ley was put into practice and thus the first instance in which non-party candidates could compete with political parties for Municipal Council positions and the mayor's seat. On that day, 345 citizen groups, 59 indigenous groups, 17 political parties, and 2 political alliances were on the ballot. The results from the municipal elections are illuminating. Whereas the
indigenous and citizen groups fared quite poorly, the new political parties, and the MAS in particular, were the clear electoral winners. The MAS obtained 453 council seats nationwide; its closest competitor was the MNR with 196 council seats. Despite its second place finish, the MNR, along with the MIR and the ADN, did not do well comparatively. Together the three parties garnered a mere 16.29 percent of the total vote share. The MNR essentially disappeared from the urban centers, and the ADN captured only 2.55 percent of the total number of votes (Gamarra 2005, 12).

On the other hand, the new political parties were as successful if not more so than the three traditional political parties. The MAS, as mentioned above, won the most council seats, although it did not win any mayoral seats in Bolivia’s ten principle urban centers. It also demonstrated the broadest national voter spread of any political party or citizen group. Other new parties, however, also did quite well. The MSM, Plan Progreso (PP), and the UN each received between five and ten percent of the total vote share (8.74%, 6.58%, and 5.89% respectively), which, when taken together, exceeds the total percentage of votes of the traditional political parties. As one author noted, the success of these leaders reflected a conservative calculation on the part of voters to reward those mayors who had performed obras visibles in the past (Gamarra 2005, 13).

38 In fact, some indigenous groups were successful at gaining council seats and in a few cases the Mayor’s position in small rural municipalities. While citizens groups won council seats and a few key Mayoral positions in the urban centers, in most cases these groups provided little more than organizational support to former political party members that had abandoned their party in the hopes of finding electoral victory on their own. See the National Electoral Court’s web site for the official results from the elections: http://www.cne.org.bo.

39 That is, the nine departmental capitals – Cobija, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Santa Cruz, Sucre, Tarija, Trinidad – and El Alto. While not obtaining any mayoral seats, the MAS did win council seats in seven of the ten principle cities, including four in Cochabamba, three in La Paz, two in El Alto, and one council seat each in Sucre, Oruro, Santa Cruz, and Tarija.
These newer political parties met their citizens' demands and were subsequently rewarded for their work.

Overall, the results from the 2004 Municipal Elections are noteworthy for two reasons. On the one hand, they reflect a further decline of the traditional political party system in both principle and practice. The presence of a large quantity of indigenous and citizen groups implied that many Bolivians sought representation (albeit for the most part unsuccessfully) through groups other than political parties. In practice, they demonstrated that new political parties were preferred over the traditional ones, at least at the local level. Moreover, the elections demonstrated that Bolivians could and did differentiate between the traditional and new political parties. Indeed, while the traditional political party system fared poorly in the Municipal Elections, the rejection of political parties in general was not at all evident. These findings support the CNE 2004 Survey results, which indicated that the new political parties had a far less negative image in comparison with their traditional counterparts.

Thus, it is important to discriminate between the decline of the traditional political party system and the endurance of the notion of political parties in general in Bolivia. That is, despite post-2003 trends in the country towards downplaying the role of political parties, it is clear that most Bolivians recognize that, at least at the local level, certain political parties and their leaders have been successful in meeting the needs of their constituents. The traditional political party system, on the other hand, has clearly been in a state of decline since 2000. The results from the 2004 Municipal Elections support this assessment. While the traditional political parties have not dropped out entirely from the
local or national electoral scene in Bolivia, it is clear that they are no longer in control of
the country’s political system, as they once were.

Conclusion

The case of Bolivia supports Roberts’ contention that a political party system is in
decline when it becomes detached from its social moorings. After 2000, the dealignment
and hence decline of the traditional political party system in Bolivia materialized in four
different ways: electorally, through the opinions of Bolivians, with the surge in “anti-
party” initiatives, and in the 2004 Municipal Elections. In each instance, the detachment
of the traditional political parties from society, as well as the discontent of Bolivians
towards those parties, was evident.

Specifically, survey results from 1998 on suggest that this discontent toward the
traditional political party system had been strong since the end of the 1990s. By 2004,
neither the traditional parties nor the principle of pacted democracy had the support of
most Bolivians. Moreover, after the forced resignation of Sánchez de Lozada, the surge
in “anti-party” policy initiatives reflected a shift in societal demands to more direct forms
of democratic participation. The use of referenda and the adoption of a law that allowed
non-party candidates to run for office are examples of this. Unhappy with the traditional
political parties, many different sectors began to search for new forms of representation
in the country.

The most pronounced evidence of this search for new forms of representation was
manifested in the shifts in voter shares both in the 2002 and 2004 elections. In 2002,
more Bolivians supported non-traditional political parties than ever before, and the
legislative shake-up that ensued fostered a weak traditional party-led ruling coalition
against a strong Congressional opposition. The 2004 Municipal Elections suggest that new linkages with society may be materializing with the new political parties, including, in particular, the MAS. In both instances, the new political parties emerged as the preferred electoral option for many Bolivians.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the 2002 and 2004 election results demonstrated that the clientelist-based patrimonial linkages fostered by the traditional political parties were no longer sufficient to capture votes either at the local or national level, reflecting those parties’ inability to adapt to shifting societal demands, as represented by the newly politicized urban poor and rural classes. The new political parties, on the other hand, were successful in appealing to these sectors along more corporatist lines. This shift in voter shares, along with the negative Bolivian opinion towards the traditional political parties and the emergence of “anti-party” initiatives after 2003, reflected the limitations of the ties that bonded the traditional parties to society. The middle class focus of their patrimonial-based linkages would prove insufficient as the urban poor and rural classes began to articulate their demands by the end of the 1990s.

Thus, it seems clear that the traditional political party system in Bolivia entered in decline after the turn of the millennium, as the preceding pages have demonstrated. Yet, it is important to distinguish between party system decline and party system decay in the Bolivian case. Although the traditional political party system has become dealigned with society, it is still too early to conclude that political parties are no longer capable of establishing new linkages with society. The next few years in Bolivia, then, will be fundamental for the fate of the country’s political party system. They will ultimately
determine whether the country’s traditional political parties are able to forge new connections with society or whether they will fall into eventual decay.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

"Un pensador italiano decía: 'lo viejo se resiste a morir y lo nuevo no ha nacido'. [En Bolivia,] estamos en una transición difícil" - José Ortiz Mercado (El Nuevo Día, 1 June 2003).

In 1985, the leaders of the MNR and the ADN sat down together in an effort to address the political instability and economic crisis that had plagued the country since the tortuous transition to democracy began in the late 1970s. Because of their meeting, the country's political system would be dramatically changed. As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, the principle of pacted democracy and the NPE would bring both stability and instability to Bolivia. Relief from the economic crisis and the recentralization of power into the state allowed the ruling coalitions to govern, shepherding in a decade of economic, political, and social reforms.

The political system adopted in 1985 proved to be a doubled-edge sword, however. For, whereas the NPE was successful in dismantling the COB and hence diminishing their corporatist-based bonds with different sectors of society, the traditional political party system, constrained by the limitations of pacted democracy, was ultimately unable to capture the support of these sectors. The clientelist-based patrimonial linkages they did maintain with society were too weak and too narrow to appease or encapsulate the growing needs of the population, particularly by the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the traditional political party system endured at the base of the country's hegemonic center for more than five presidential terms, sustained by the promise and potential of their innovative reforms.

As Roberts theorized, with the arrival of an economic recession in 1998 and with it a period of profound social change, the linkages between the traditional political parties
and society began to erode. The subsequent evidence of party system decline was manifested in myriad ways: at the ballot box, with the post-2003 “anti-party” political initiatives, and as represented through the opinions and perspectives of Bolivians themselves. By the middle of 2005, it was apparent that the traditional political party system was in a period of extended decline. They no longer had control of the political and economic system that they had helped to create.

Given Bolivia’s political history, as examined in Chapter Two, it is perhaps not surprising that the traditional political parties were unable to forge stronger linkages with society. After all, political parties and the political party system are relatively alien concepts for Bolivians. Accustomed to corporatist notions of political organization, the arrival of political parties as the sole mediator between state and society was something new in Bolivian politics. Historically speaking, political parties were unable to serve this primary intermediating role in the country, particularly with respect to the COB and the military. As a result, since 1985, the conceptual difference between political parties and social movements was never really articulated. The MAS is an example of the ambiguous roles of political actors in the modern-day representative system. Neither entirely political party nor social movement, the MAS has been able to exploit both roles depending on the circumstances. Notably, the MAS is considered the most popular and most powerful political party in the country today.

Thus, despite the remarkable accomplishments of pacted democracy and the NPE, Bolivia’s present-day political system has retained many political behaviors that contradict the notion of representative democracy. After 2000, the atomization of power and loss of centralized political control, along with the ongoing economic crisis,
essentially reflected a revival of the country's politically charged past. Roberts would argue that this tumultuous period represents the critical moment in which the country's traditional political parties must adapt to the shifting societal demands in an effort to realign itself with society and recover their position as the sole channel of mediation between state and society. Given the climate of political instability and insecurity in Bolivia, the conditions for party-society realignment seem less than optimal. Yet, the foundation of a political party system based on new linkages with society is not impossible.

Indeed, the question to ask in the coming months and years is not if the Bolivian political party system will be able to forge new linkages with society. Rather, the pending issues are which linkages should be formed in Bolivia and how those linkages will be established so that they can endure in the long term. With these questions in mind, this study raises two issues that can contribute to Roberts' theory on party-society linkages. Regarding the question of which party-society linkages to establish, Roberts makes no normative claims about the five types of linkages that he identifies as connecting different Latin American political party systems with their respective societies. Clientelism is no "better" and no "worse" than marketing or corporatist-based linkages in his framework. Instead, Roberts' analysis focuses on the particular historical context in which the different linkages tend to emerge and decline.

Yet, the Bolivian case examined here suggests that the clientelist-based neopatrimonial linkages that connected the traditional political parties with society were not sufficient for accommodating the growing demands of the newly mobilized urban poor and rural sectors. The highly limited and weak nature of clientelism in Bolivia
indicates that this linkage is ill-suited to endure sustained economic recession and social and political crises, particularly in a country where the democratization process is still highly unstable. Thus, in an effort to extend Roberts’ party-society framework and deepen our overall understanding of Latin American political party systems, it may be useful to consider which linkages might best foster the connection between political parties and society in countries like Bolivia.

Additionally, it seems important to begin to consider how the linkages between political parties and society can be established initially and then sustained during periods of prolonged economic crisis and social change. Roberts gives no insight regarding how a political party can adapt to shifting societal demands. The Bolivian case here demonstrated that the traditional political parties were unable to adapt. By examining cases of successful party adaptation to societal change, it is possible to envision how this adaptation could take place in countries like Bolivia. Part of the answer, as elaborated in this study, may be to consider how the extant political system in a country impacts the ability of political parties to develop linkages with society. Pacted democracy, for example, was positive in terms of enabling governance and stability in Bolivia. It also, however, limited the role of the traditional political parties and prevented them from establishing stronger linkages with society.

The case of Bolivia underscores the vital importance of deepening our understanding of party-society linkages in a country. Political party systems are, after all, the fundamental actor in a representative democracy. The fact that they enter into decline is undesirable, then, for the regime in general. Moreover, Bolivia is not the only country in which party-society linkages may currently be very weak. The multiplication of
political parties in Ecuador, along with the historically high levels of electoral volatility in the country, suggests that the problem of weak party-society linkages extends beyond Bolivia into the rest of the Andes. Roberts has already addressed the case of party system decay in Venezuela, and the decline of the Peruvian party system prior to Alberto Fujimori’s autogolpe in 1993 is another example to investigate. On the other hand, the stability of Colombia’s two-party system is an apparent anomaly given the political instability of its neighbors. Indeed, the Andean region may serve as the ideal setting for looking comparatively at the formation and erosion of party-society linkages. Future research should begin here.

For now, however, we can conclude that the traditional political party system in Bolivia is at a crossroads. Far from realignment but still not in complete decay, the coming years will be decisive ones for the MNR, MIR, and ADN, as well as the political party system in general. Given Bolivia’s tumultuous political history and the recent proliferation of powerful political actors, the next years will no doubt be difficult ones as well. Perhaps José Ortiz said it best in his citation of an Italian thinker above: Bolivia is indeed in a difficult transition.
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**INTERVIEWS**

Interview A. 4 May 2005. La Paz, Bolivia.

Interview B. 6 May 2005. La Paz, Bolivia.
Interview C. 6 May 2005. La Paz, Bolivia.

Interview D. 6 May 2005. La Paz, Bolivia.

SEMINARS


DATABASES


NEWSPAPERS

La Razón
“La caída.” La Razón, October 2003
10 October 2003
18 October 2003
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Los Tiempos
14 August 2003
7 July 2004
8 July 2004
5 December 2004
10 December 2004
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“El gobierno no logra reducir la tasa de desempleo de dos dígitos,” CEDLA, 29 April 2005.


Economist Intelligence Unit:


Table 3.1

Annual Public Sector Employment as Percentage of Economically Active Population (1994-2002)

Source: Compiled by author using IMF 2000, 2003 and ECLAC 1999. Annual economically active population is an estimate based on methods developed by CELADE (see http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/Poblacion/9/LCG2059/BD64int00i.htm).
APPENDIX 1

Table 3.2

Growth and Unemployment

Source: Adapted from UDAPE 2004, 12.
APPENDIX 1

Table 3.3

Comparing the Deficit over Time

Source: UDAPE 2004, 22.
Table 3.4

**Public Investment in Social Sector**

Source: UDAPE 2005.
Table 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Next Three</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>65.41</td>
<td>20.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>42.16</td>
<td>47.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Political Database of the Americas (2000a, 2000b, 2002).
In each year above, Traditional refers to the three traditional political parties, that is, the MNR, MIR, and ADN.

In 1989, Next Three refers to Condepa, IU, and PS-1. In 1993, Next Three refers to UCS, Condepa, and Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL). In 1997, Next Three refers to UCS, Condepa, and MBL. In 2002, Next Three refers to the MAS, NFR, and MIP.
APPENDIX 3

Confidence in Political Parties

Confidence in Congress

Confidence in the President

Confidence in Municipal Government

Table 4.2

Political Parties are Necessary for Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>56.60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>15.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at All</td>
<td>24.30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>NS/NR</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2904
Source: CNE 2004, 80; translations by author
APPENDIX 4

Table 4.3

The Value of Party Alliances in Congress

- Other forms of government exist without alliances, 76.40%
- They should form alliances, 16%
- NS/NR, 7.60%

N = 2904
Source: CNE 2004, 81; translations by author
Table 4.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Image per Institution</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Transnationals</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Political Parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>COB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prefects</td>
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<td>Private Sector</td>
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<td>Supreme Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Media</td>
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<td>Ombudsman</td>
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<td>Catholic Church</td>
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N = 2904, base = 300
Source: CNE 2004, 77; translations by author
### Table 4.5

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<tr>
<td>Ombudsmen</td>
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<td>Catholic Church</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Other Churches</td>
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<td>Private Sector</td>
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<td>Supreme Court</td>
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<td>Transnationals</td>
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<td>Political Parties</td>
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N = 2904, base = 300

Source: CNE 2004, 79; translations by author
Table 4.6

Image of Political Parties

N = 2904
Source: CNE 2004, 80; translations by author