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Carlos M. Rico
El Colegio de Mexico

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**EUROPEAN SOCIALISM, THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND
CENTRAL AMERICA: LOST (LATIN AMERICAN) ILLUSIONS?**

**Carlos M. Rico F.
El Colegio de México**

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PREFACE

Carlos M. Rico F. is a professor at the Centro de Estudios Internacionales at El Colegio de México. His publications include: U.S.-Latin American Relations in the Second Half of the Eighties (co-editor; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986) and "Las relaciones mexicano-norteamericanas y la paradoja del precipicio," in Humberto Garza (ed.), Fundamentos y prioridades de la política exterior de México (El Colegio de México, 1986).

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Richard Tardanico
Editor
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EUROPEAN SOCIALISM, THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND CENTRAL AMERICA:
LOST (LATIN AMERICAN) ILLUSIONS?

Carlos Rico F.

1.- Introduction.

The Central American crisis has become a particularly interesting terrain in which to analyze some of the "new realities" which characterize relations between the United States and other Western countries in the eighties. New realities indeed: an area of the world which until quite recently had such a low place in the agenda of international politics, U.S. foreign policy or even Interamerican relations that the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs in the early seventies devoted no more than 3% of his time to it¹ used as a case study to characterize much wider changes. That this is even possible is a result, basically, of two developments.

The first one is related precisely to the place which this area had in the context of international politics for most of this century as an almost undisputed North American preserve, in which other Western countries (with the exception of Britain's presence in Belize) had quite limited interests. Central America was not only the subregion of Latin America where the dominant presence of the United States was originally

¹ William D. Rogers, "U.S. behavior and European Apprehensions", in Joseph Cirincione (Ed.): Central America and the Western Alliance (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985).

established but also one of the first areas of the world in which Europeans accepted a leading role on the part of the emerging new world power. Thus, while the presence of European governments and non-governmental forces was quite open in South America during the interwar decades, the same was not the case in the isthmus, where the U.S. was able to develop an almost unchallenged presence even during its isolationist years. After the Second World War, while Latin America as a whole saw its international alternatives dwindle, Central America was confirmed as what I have called elsewhere an area of U.S. "hyperhegemony".²

The contrast between that reality and the present proliferation of international actors which, one way or another, have participated in the difficult process of transition launched by the 1979 triumph of the Sandinist Front of National Liberation in Nicaragua is indeed remarkable. And what makes this relevant to understand intra-West relations, in particular in the sphere of security perceptions, is the fact that among those new actors other Western governments, both from Europe and from Latin America have played important roles.

The second development is in turn related to the direction that such new participation has taken. Both the governments of the largest Latin American governments and several Western European public and private forces have been openly critical of the policies pursued by the Reagan

² Carlos Rico F. "Common Concerns and National Interests: The Contadora Experience and the Prospects for Collective Security Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere", paper prepared for the World Peace Foundation's Project on Collective Security in the Western Hemisphere, 1987.

Administration in the area, refusing to let the leadership role of the North Americans to be taken for granted. This has given rise to an interesting paradox in which at the same time that the U.S. government publicly bases its policy prescriptions to deal with the crisis on the defense of Western interests that it says are threatened by the Soviet Union and its allies, those other governments whose interests are also supposedly being defended refuse to share that perception of threat. In fact, those other Western countries seem to have some times perceived threats to their interests that emanates not from Soviet actions but from North American behavior in the area.

From a Latin American perspective there are other reasons, not directly connected to the problem of security perceptions but equally compelling, to carefully examine the extent of European involvement in the Central American crisis. They are in turn related to the possibility of taking that crisis, for precisely the same reasons that I have already summarized, as an example of the more general trends towards a more policentric international order in which new alternatives may be open for them. Since at least the end of the sixties, most governments of the region have attempted, with diverse results, to "break out" of the Western hemisphere and develop new alternatives which may increase their international bargaining power.³

³ Laurence Whitehead, "Debt, Diversification and Dependency: Latin America's International Political Relations", in Kevin Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (Ed.): The United States and Latin America in the 1980's: Contending Perspectives on a Decade of Crisis (Pittsburg: Pittsburgh University Press, 1986).

These Latin American efforts to "diversify dependency" have been widely chronicled. Two limitations of most of this literature must be noted in connection to the topic of this essay. In the first place the emphasis has been usually put on their economic dimensions. Secondly, increases in contacts between the region and extra-hemispheric powers are usually seen as the result of Latin American initiatives. Important aspects of the problem are thus frequently overlooked. Such is the case of the political dimensions of such diversification, not only in terms of the possibilities for restricted political alliances with governments beyond the Western Hemisphere, but also in terms of the contacts and mutual support which may be developed between different political forces of various Western countries. A second dimension not always adequately covered is related to the role that those alternative poles of relation, in this case the Europeans, may play (and have played in some instances) in the context of those efforts at **rapprochement**.

This essay tries to look at European involvement in Latin American affairs and its implications for perceptions in the sphere of security by taking the Central American crisis as an example of the potential disagreements which may crop up among Western countries in that issue area. With this in mind I focus my attention on a set of European political actors which are, at the same time, squarely within the parameters of what we may define as "the West", and most likely to place a different emphasis in their examination of security related questions: European Social Democrats. In examining them I will concentrate most of my attention on the international forum in which they participate (the

Socialist International) but I will also make some references to specific actions by national parties and even by governments in those cases where Socialist parties have been in power during the years of the Central American crisis.

The basic theme to be developed in this essay is centered around the expectations which the activism displayed by some of these forces awakened both in Europe and in Latin America in terms of its potential for creating a bridge between Latin American security perceptions and the key concerns shared in that issue-area by the main participants in the Western Alliance.

I take three steps in presenting my argument. The first section of the essay recapitulates the main antecedents to the European socialist's involvement in the Central American sub-region and more generally in Latin American affairs. The next part of the paper summarizes the main reasons that account for the expectations that were raised as a result of that participation. The third one examines their role in the context of the Central American crisis, focusing on their disagreements with the Reagan Administration. Finally I present a preliminary evaluation of the present state of European social democratic activities in connection with the Central American crisis and the potential for some increased participation by them in other issue areas and other parts of the region. Thus, after devoting the body of the essay to recording the main reasons that may be given to justify the hopes raised by such increased activism in the area I concentrate my final considerations on the subsequent dampening of those

expectations.

2.- European Socialist Parties and Latin America: From the Years of Solitude to Increased Attention in Times of Crisis.

In a well known process which has its roots in the mid-nineteen century and in particular in the creation of the Second International in 1889, and its latter development, European political forces which posited socialism as their objective gradually became divided into two main currents. The communist movement, the first one of those tendencies, was increasingly perceived after the Russian Revolution of 1917 as closely tied to what was to become the main international competitor of the U.S. and as such attracted a fair deal of attention of students of international relations.

The second current, social democracy, attracted less attention among I.R. scholars, in particular in the United States. It was formed by those political parties and movements which, in their original thinking, argued that socialism could be achieved through the reform of capitalism, and which placed high value in the preservation, and expansion, of the political achievements of liberal democracy. Gradually these forces came to emphasize the reform of existing social, economic and political structures rather than their radical transformation.

Both of these movements developed international connections in other parts of the world. However, an interesting difference between them came

to be apparent in the first decades of the XXth century in terms of their ability to take roots in the less developed areas of the planet. While communist ideology developed in parts of Asia and Latin America, social democracy remained as basically a European phenomenon in spite of the efforts of different metropolitan socialist parties to promote the creation of like-minded political movements in the European colonies of the day.

This basic difference is particularly apparent in Latin America. According to one of the foremost historians of socialist thought, the region did not play an important role in any of the branches of the socialist movement at least until after the First World War.⁴ However, by the second decade of this century several communist parties were active in the area. On the other hand, for most of this century there has been only a very small number of parties formally affiliated with those organizations in which social democrats have joined forces. The most prominent exceptions to this situation in the early decades of the century were the socialist parties of Argentina and Uruguay which, after participating in the activities of the Second International, maintained their limited connections with their European counterparts. Political forces from both Brazil and Chile sporadically participated in those international efforts.⁵

⁴ G.D.H. Cole: Historia del Pensamiento Socialista (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1974), Vol IV, p. 273.

⁵ Ibid.

The difficult period social democracy went through from the beginning of the First World War until the mid forties can be seen as one of the causes of that situation. The reorganization of the international social democratic movement that culminates in 1951 with the creation of the Socialist International prepared the ground for a new period of international activity by European social democratic parties, several of which came to power in their respective countries. Such potential, however, was not fully developed until some years latter.

The attempt to find a "third way" between the dominant socioeconomic systems of the postwar world and the mixture of political liberalism, social and economic reformism and quite open anticommunism that characterized the early statements of principles of the organization had a double impact. They on the one hand alienated a good part of socialist forces in the world, which tended to perceive social democrats as too close to U.S. positions in the Cold War confrontation and, on the other, attracted the attention of several political forces in the underdeveloped areas of the world which were themselves trying to gain some distance from both superpowers.

The force of this attraction and the priority that social democrats gave to expanding it were limited during the fifties and sixties, by three sets of factors: (a) the perceived alignment of European socialism behind the United States, (b) the position taken by several European socialist parties during the process of decolonization which dominated North-South relations during that period and (c) the fact that during those years the

problems of European reconstruction were at the top of the list of priorities of most political forces in that area of the world.

Two different developments took place as those limiting circumstances changed. In the first place, once decolonization was basically completed and the Cold War started to melt down the potential appeal of the key aspects of European social democratic thinking for other regions of the world became increasingly apparent. Secondly, as their economic woes lessened, the attention devoted by the Europeans to relations with countries of the underdeveloped world other than their own colonies increased. A happy coincidence of circumstances took place and the efforts formally introduced by the Socialist International to stop being only "western and white"⁶ found a much better ground for expression under those conditions. In the next section of this essay I summarize some of the more particular reasons why European social democracy appealed to important segments of the Latin American political spectrum as a potential element in their international activities. At this point my interest is in recording the slow process of increased relations between European Social Democracy and Latin American political forces.

The road to increased Latin American participation in social democratic international activities was long. Not only were there relatively few political forces in the region which openly shared the

⁶ Karl-Ludwig Günsche and K. Lantermann: Historia de la Internacional Socialista (México: Nueva Imagen, 1979). Pp. 190-191. Quoted in Felicity Williams: La Internacional Socialista y America Latina (México: Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana-Azcapotzalco, 1984). P. 106.

stated thinking of the movement but during the fifties and sixties European social democratic parties concentrated their limited efforts to develop a "Third World constituency", as I have already suggested, in their former colonies. Such efforts, on the other hand, were to bear very limited fruits, which in turn became one of the reasons for the attention paid to Latin America in later years.

When the Socialist International was created in 1951 only two political parties of the region, again those of Argentina and Uruguay, were listed among its members.⁷ Jamaican socialists joined the International in 1952 and in 1955 a Latin American Secretariat of the organization was established in Montevideo,⁸ in which the Chilean Popular Socialist Party also participated. According to Felicity Williams, in its first six years the Secretariat was "in touch" with Socialist parties of Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and Peru, Colombia's Popular Socialist Party, Cuba's socialist Federation and the 26th of July movement, Democratic Action in Venezuela, Costa Rica's National Liberation Party, Peru's APRA, Bolivia's MNR, Paraguay's Partido Revolucionario Febrerista, the United Front of the Dominican Republic, in exile, and diverse European exile communities in Mexico.⁹

All this, however, did not bring noticeable changes to a situation

⁷ Felicity Williams op. cit. P. 90.

⁸ Michael Lowy, "Trayectoria de la Internacional Socialista en América Latina", Cuadernos Políticos Num. 29. July- September 1981.

⁹ Felicity Williams op. cit. Pages 194-195.

characterized by the almost total lack of interest on the part of the European socialist parties in relation to the 1954 coup in Guatemala and the denounced U.S. participation in that event.¹⁰ The Latin American Secretariat tried to steer a middle course between military dictatorships which in many cases were openly supported by the U.S. and the communist parties of the region whose militants were increasingly influenced by the example of the Cuban revolution after 1959. This was not easy in the context of the sixties, when the impact of the Cuban revolutionary process, on the one hand, and the commitment of many reformist forces to the U.S. sponsored Alliance for Progress, on the other, left a very limited space to social democrats who would emphasize a European connection.

It is, however, in the context of the early sixties that political parties from four Latin American countries (Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela) joined the International as observers, showing an increase in interest which led to the transformation of the Latin American Secretariat into a Liason Bureau in 1966. By the end of that decade Latin American parties linked to the organization constituted its second largest geographic component.

It is during the late sixties that the increased attention paid by the European social democrats to relation with the developing world picks up speed. Several factors are involved in that change. A first element is the modified tone of international politics introduced by the German Federal

¹⁰ Michael Lowy op. cit. page 38.

Republic's **ostpolitik**. In this sense a second element which it seems necessary to bring into the analysis is related to the resurgence of the German social democratic party in the politics of its own country in the last years of the sixties.

Germany had two characteristics which helped it develop a leading role in the "Third World policies" of the Socialist International. The first one was related to the key role that German socialists had played in the movement in the years when it was still a part of the Second International. This leading role was confirmed with the influential participation that the SPD had in the process of revising social democratic ideology in the early fifties. Its **Bad Godesberg** program, made public in 1951 was very influential in the process of recreation of the International during the same year. The second factor had to do with the lack of former colonial possessions- a characteristic they shared with their Northern European counterparts- which imposed relatively fewer constraints in their behavior in relation to that of countries such as France or Great Britain.

The West Germans gave also several examples of the disagreements of important components of European social democratic parties with different aspects of U.S. foreign policy which were also to have an important role in their increased activism. Those disagreements, on the other hand, basically expressed concerns which were also relevant in other countries. Thus, the role that the German social democratic youth (the **Jusos**) played in prompting their party to a more activist role in "Third World affairs"

was clearly influenced by an event which had an important impact in youth movements throughout the world: the Vietnam war.

Other factors pushed in the same direction. In the context of the international economic difficulties of the early seventies, and in particular as a result of the first energy crisis, European governments, many of which were at that point under the control of social democratic parties, intensify the attention they pay to "Third World matters".

There were other, more particular, reasons for the increased attention that these European forces started to pay to Latin America in the context of their renewed attention to "Third World matters". Their emphasis on a kind of reformist welfare-statism seemed at that point to be domestically more viable in Latin America than in other areas of the underdeveloped world. This reflected the perception that some countries in the region were approaching the ranks of a "middle class of nations" , for which economic restrictions on reformism would be less acute. Even on purely economic grounds there were reasons for Latin America to attract European attention well beyond social democratic circles. The region was seen at the same time as a vast potential market, the most industrialize region of the developing world, an area rich in mineral and energy resources and apotential supply of relatively qualified but cheap labor.¹¹ And if all this was not enough, Latin America itself was committed to developing

¹¹ Jenny Pearce "Introduction" to The European Challenge: Europe's New Role in Latin America (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982). P. 6.

alternative poles of relation beyond the Western hemisphere and, for reasons which are discussed in the next section of this essay considered the European social democrats as an attractive option.

Three other factors contribute to draw the picture. The more general assertion of European interests during those years *vis a vis* the United States also contributed to the increase in reciprocal interest. The flexibility with which the International began to approach such thorny issues as the notion of political democracy members had to abide by certainly eased matters even more, in particular in relation to political parties which had their roots in populist movements seen in some cases by the European socialists as related to their own experiences with fascism. Finally, the important role that the Socialist parties of Spain and Portugal started to play in Socialist International circles after the fall of the last remnants of European fascism added a new element to the attention that Latin America could expect to receive in those same circles.

In the early seventies all these developments had created a set of very favorable conditions for the *rapprochement* between European social democracy and those forces which one could associate with Latin America's "democratic left". The 1971-73 experience of the Popular Unity government in Chile was the final element needed to catalize that interest. Several aspects of that experience contributed to increase European social democratic interest in Latin America. Chile's "electoral road to socialism" had attracted the attention of socialist political forces

worldwide practically from the moment of Allende's triumph.

For the social democrats it assumed a particularly important meaning since it seemed to prove that peaceful processes of transition were possible even in less developed areas of the world. Since "la vía chilena" openly aimed at not only reforming existing structures but at the "building of socialism" itself it also tended to capture the imagination of European political actors who perceived themselves as constrained by the political realities of their own countries to go "that far". The appeal of the Chilean experiment for these forces had several concrete expressions. Thus, the first time that the Bureau of the Socialist International met in Latin American soil took place in Santiago de Chile, during February, 1973.

The assassination of President Allende, the September 1973 coup and the levels that repression reached in the country in its wake galvanized the attention not only of European socialists but of wider segments of European and world public opinion. The Church Commission's U.S. Senate investigation on the role of the North American government in the destabilization of the Chilean government, in turn, increased the gap in the security perceptions of U.S. political elites and significant parts of the European political spectrum which saw many parts of the Chilean deposed coalition as their own. The words that Américo Ghioldi, exiled member of the Argentine Socialist Party, had used in his report on Latin America to the 1955 International Socialist Congress would find a more receptive audience almost 20 years later: "With pathetic blindness- he had

stated- that great country [the United States C.R.], claiming strategic reasons has provided arms to dictators who use them against their own peoples."¹²

In more than one sense, the fight against the Chilean military dictatorship supported by the United States would take on for a new generation of European socialists the flavor of something similar to the anti- fascist struggles that those social democratic militants who were themselves in charge of both the movement and their national parties by the early seventies had fought a quarter century before in their own countries. As other South American countries joined Chile in the road to authoritarianism the International's scope of attention on Latin America was widened.

In the second half of the seventies Latin America was second only to Europe itself as the area where the S.I. had more contacts, and its importance increased in the agenda of a movement which declared itself committed to changing its well deserved eurocentric image. The last years of the decade witnessed a series of high level meetings between important leaders of the movement and their Latin American counterparts, as well as the extension of Latin American participation to such political forces as Mexico's PRI, Brazil's MDB and El Salvador's MNR. The elections in the Dominican Republic at the end of the decade provided the International with a first case in which the possibility of concrete actions beyond

¹² As quoted in Felicity Williams: op. cit. P. 125.

declarations was validated.¹³

The XIV Congress of the International, held in Vancouver, Canada in November of 1978, represents the high water mark of the SI's Latin American involvement prior to the Central American crisis. Over twenty Latin American political parties and movements attended the Congress, among them the Sandinist Front of National Liberation.¹⁴ This in a sense symbolized the role that the sub-regional conflict would play as a key stimulus to those tendencies towards a greater European socialist involvement in Latin American issues that I have summarized. The crisis in fact became the new focus of European social democratic activities in the region during the eighties. Before examining the role of European social democrats in Central America, however I will present some of the factors which contributed, on the Latin American side to give those efforts a warm welcome.

3.- Too high hopes? Latin American Expectations and European Social Democracy.

Within Latin America's efforts at diversification Western Europe has

¹³ Pierre Schori: El desafío europeo en Centroamérica (San José: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1982). Pages 251-254.

¹⁴ Nueva Sociedad, Num.39, November/December 1979. P.12 It is interesting to note that Granada's New Jewel Movement also requested admission in the International, and that it was accepted in 1980. Also in 1980 a request for membership presented by Nicaragua's Movimiento Democrático Nicaraguense, headed by Alfonso Robelo, was denied.

occupied a very important place. This is true in the economic- particularly regarding trade- realm, but even more so in the political one. This is a reflection, both of the perception that Latin American political elites have of themselves and their countries as belonging to Western culture and civilization and of an extremely important reality: the terms of political debate in the region have interesting parallels with those which dominate in Europe. The reception given to European social democratic activities in the area has to be framed in this context.

Laurence Whitehead has pointed out how the differences between the U.S. government and the governments of Western Europe in terms of their "contrasting histories, their distinctive geopolitical roles, and their present differences of political structure...give rise to marked variations of conduct and motive."¹⁵ Without trying to take the comparison too far it may be proposed that there are some key points in which the terms of political debate in both Europe and Latin America are at the same time less "exceptional" than those of the United States and more similar between them. Thus, in both cases there is both a tradition of more Burkean conservatism and an active presence of Marxism as an important component of the worldviews of important segments of their public debate.

As a result of these factors it frequently seems to be easier for Latin

¹⁵ Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization", in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence whitehead (Eds.) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). P. 10.

Americans to interact with European political forces than with those of the United States or even of other regions which in fact may be seen as very important poles of relations in the economic sphere, such as Japan. There is one aspect of all this that is particularly relevant in connection to the attitudes of European social democrats in the Central American crisis. Even if social democratic parties have many times officially abandoned Marxism in their official declarations, the conceptual framework of this school of thought is not alien to the mind sets of many among their own militants. This many times helps in the development of a more understanding attitude vis a vis movements in other countries which may use that language in particular in comparison to the one which usually emanates from North American political elites. European social democrats seem to be better disposed to separate rhetoric from reality in those cases, in particular if they do not involve their own former colonies.

There are other reasons for the optimism with which European actions were received in "democratic left" circles in Latin America. The link between the lessening of East-West tensions in the early seventies and the increasing appeal of social democracy as an international movement is particularly important to note in the context of this essay. It is in fact interesting to point out that both *detente* and the renewed international activism of the Socialist International in "Third World affairs" were closely tied to the same individual who played a key role in their launching, first as Foreign Minister and Chancellor of the German Federal Republic and, after 1976, as chairman of the Socialist International:

The particular situation of Latin America in relation to both European decolonization and the East-West conflict gave a clearly dominant role to developments that took place in the second of those issue areas. After all, with the exception of some Caribbean islands and parts of Latin America's Atlantic coast which have been perceived both by international observers and by Latin Americans themselves as constituting separate realities, the problems associated with European colonization had been settled at a much earlier stage. This certainly helps the Europeans to maintain a more relaxed attitude in relation to events that take place in this area of the world rather than in their own spheres of immediate influence and its impact should not be discounted.

In my opinion, however, more weight should be assigned to the easing of East-West tensions in the late sixties and early seventies. The bipolar realities of the postwar world had had a particularly peculiar impact on Latin America, where being a part of the Western world and the United States' "back yard" many times seemed to be the two sides of the same coin. This was, of course, particularly bothersome to those political forces which were at the same time committed to reform and national self-determination and committed to essentially capitalist development programs. Finding alternatives, economic and political, within the West became an increasing concern for them. And once the automatic allignment of European social democracy with the United States on most international

¹⁶ Pierre Shori, op. cit.

issues crucial to the region was removed in the context of *detente*, it became increasingly attractive to those same forces.

In addition, European economic presence was limited¹⁷ and in fact was seen more as an alternative to U.S. complete domination than as a threat to sovereignty or national control over economic resources. This tended to diminish the concerns that the previous history of European economic involvement in the area may have raised. As Jenny Pearce has put it: "Latin America's traditional economic and political dependence on the United States and the strong resentment this has created within the region, have encouraged many to look positively toward European involvement".¹⁸ Thus, even if there were no differences in the substance of European activities in the region, the evaluation that Latin American elites made of them tended to emphasize their positive dimensions. But there were other factors involved in this welcome.

There was a perception, for example, that the Europeans were more willing to accommodate Latin American concerns in key areas of interest to the region than the North Americans had proven to be. Some antecedents in this regard dated back to the early seventies and the economic negotiations which dominated North-South relations during those years. I

¹⁷ A good summary of the limited economic presence of key European countries in the region is presented in Esperanza Durán: European Interests in Latin America (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985). See also Sistema Económico Latinoamericano: América Latina y la Comunidad Económica Europea: Problemas y Perspectivas (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1983).

¹⁸ Jenny Pearce, op. cit. P. 7.

have already made a reference to the increased attention to "Third World issues" that the economic problems of the early seventies helped spark on the part of European social democrats. Looked at from the other side of the table, that participation raised some expectations, connected to the fact that some of the European governments who took a leading role in North-South negotiations, in particular the social democratic ones, adopted a conciliatory tone which clearly contrasted with the first responses of the Nixon and Ford administrations in the United States to the demands of the developing countries. That response raised Latin American expectations regarding the role that European social democrats could play in the region's efforts to attain a more balanced set of international connections.

Some of the reasons behind that difference in European social democratic attitudes with respect to those held by U.S. elites are not difficult to point out. The kind of reformist welfare-statism promoted by the social democrats made them more pliable to demands for a "new international economic order" which dominated North-South discussions in the early seventies, taking the place that the struggle for decolonization had had before in that regard. In addition several of the social democratic parties governed over countries that had had a very limited colonial experience and carried less legacies from such a history. The role that the Northern European parties played in the global context of those negotiations can be related to this factor, for example.

Latin America had played, through countries such as Brazil, Mexico and

Venezuela an important role in such efforts and the compromising attitude taken by the most important European social democratic leaders in such fora as the Brandt Commission was well received in the region.¹⁹

A second area in which the perceptions of European social democrats seemed to clearly differ from those of U.S. political elites was related to the question of economic, social and political change in the area, and particularly to its sources and likely direction. European social democrats tended to give more emphasis to the nationalistic aspects of those struggles than their North American counterparts. Such differences are openly aired in a letter to Willy Brandt by Swedish social democrat Olof Palme. That letter summarized the view of the "U.S. connection" in relation to the Chilean coup of the early seventies which came to prevail in social democratic circles, but clearly had wider implications:

The United States seem unable to understand and face in a constructive fashion the process of liberation which is already underway in the Latin American subcontinent. The position taken by the Americans in relation to the struggle of the Latin American peoples for freedom is as narrowminded and myopic as the one they took in the cases of China and Vietnam with people like Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh. The United States always feel threatened when a poor people fights for its national and social liberation, but that liberation is both necessary and unavoidable.²⁰

¹⁹ Jacqueline Roddick and Philip O'Brien, "Europe and Latin America in the Eighties", in The European Challenge...

²⁰ Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky and Olof Palme: La Alternativa socialdemócrata (Barcelona: Blume, 1977). P. 128.

A third area of differing perceptions between the U.S. and European Social democrats tended to bring the latter nearer the viewpoints of the Latin American "democratic left". Its subject matter was the weight and interpretation which should be given to Soviet actions in connection to Third World instability. At least in part that disagreement reflected the different international roles of the different allies. European social democrats tended to take a "regionalist" view, while the U.S. government - in a tendency that was reinforced as the Reagan administration started - favored a more "globalist" one. The basic differences between one and the other have been adequately summarized by Karel E. Vosskuler:

the regional approach accepts and values
the continuing diffusion of power,
appreciates the unique nature of the various
regional alignments, assumes rather limited
objectives behind Soviet policies in most Third World
areas, relies heavily upon diplomatic and economic
initiatives, favours maximum dissociation from regional
conflicts and relies rather more on multilateral
diplomacy, particularly within the framework of the
United Nations...the globalist approach...tends to
situate Third World conflict in an East-West context,
assumes global aspirations on the part of the Soviet
leadership, relies heavily on military force, attaches
great value to formal alliances and, at the same time,
shows a preference for bilateral diplomacy.²¹

A last area in which Latin American and European perceptions would come close in the context of the Central American crisis was in turn related to the similar roles that the largest Latin American countries and some of their European counterparts played as "medium-powers" in international politics. This was particularly important in relation to the emphasis they

²¹ Karel E. Vosskühler, "The EEC and the USA: Differing Politico-Economic Approaches", in Christopher Stevens (Ed.): EEC and the Third World: A Survey, Vol 3: The Atlantic Rift (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983).

put on the value of international law and accepted principles of international behavior as constraining factors of superpower activity, a factor that would become particularly relevant as the "low intensity warfare" directed at the Sandinista regime heated up in the mid-eighties.

As can be seen, there were interesting antecedents to the position that European social democrats were to take in relation to the Central American crisis. The description of that position constitutes the focus of the next section of this essay.

4.- Romancing the Revolution: European Socialism and the Central American Crisis.

There are some more specific elements of background to the kinds of positions taken by European social democrats in connection to the Sandinist revolution and, more generally, the Central American crisis. The first set is related to the fact itself that Central America is an area of the world where there are practically no European vital interests at stake. The second, in turn, to the initial response by parties affiliated to the Socialist International to the Cuban revolution in the late fifties. In that instance most of them reacted quite positively, even if with the increased radicalization of the process that initial enthusiasm tended to wane after 1961. Those social democratic forces which in Europe and elsewhere kept an open mind in relation to the Cuban revolution many times based their position on the perception that such process of radicalization and the growing ties that the Cuban revolution established with the Soviet

block were the result of misguided policies on the part of the U.S. government.

A final set of background elements which must be taken into account is related to the role that different Central American political actors and issues had played in the activities of the Socialist International even before the Sandinist revolution. I will call these "Central American elements of background". The difficult balances that European social democracy has had to maintain in the context of the crisis were in a sense announced by the kinds of connections it developed over the years in the sub-region.

I have already mentioned the fact that Costa Rica's Liberación Nacional had become an observer in the International as of 1966. The Costa Rican party had established a School of Political Education for young Latin American political leaders and union officials in 1959, which in 1968 changed its name to Centro de Estudios Democráticos de América Latina and became increasingly linked to the West German social democratic foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Liberación had become, even before the explosion of the Central American crisis, one of the most important Latin American associates of the International.

A second Central American element of background is related to the political support that European social democrats gave to the anti-Somoza struggle in Nicaragua. During the late seventies the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, along with the military regimes of Guatemala, had become

preferred targets for the social democrats, who tended to see them as the worst examples of the mistaken policies that the U.S. was perceived as pursuing in Latin America as a whole. The XIII Congress of the International which took place in late 1976 condemned human rights abuses in Guatemala and Nicaragua, as well as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Uruguay.

Nicaragua caught an increasing share of attention as the situation of that country deteriorated at the end of the decade. Venezuela's Acción Democrática and Costa Rica's Liberación Nacional contributed to this focus on Nicaragua. During 1978 the Socialist International demanded the cessation of "all arms shipments for the Somocista forces, in particular those coming from the United States" and offered "the support of its member parties for those groups within Nicaragua which are resisting the Somoza government as well as immediate assistance to a successor government in its task of reconstruction".²²

A final Central American element of background makes reference to the fact that important figures of the Salvadoran democratic left, which after the disappointing performance of the first two military juntas created in that country after the October 1979 coup joined the armed insurgents, had

²² Statements of the Secretary General of the organization, B. Carlsson made on the 13 and 21 of September of 1978 and reproduced in Socialist Affairs, Num.6, 1978. p. 171. Quoted in Williams: op. cit. Pages 251 and 252.

become by the late seventies formal officials of the organization.²³ The incorporation of the MNR as an observer in the Socialist International, another point of contact between those components of the Salvadoran democratic left which joined the armed insurrection and European social democrats, has already been mentioned.

With this series of factors as backdrop it is not surprising that European socialists were among the first international actors to rejoice in the Sandinist triumph and to offer material and political assistance to the Sandinist government; that the murders of Guatemalan opposition leaders, such as Manuel Colom Argueta, who had developed close ties to various European social democratic leaders reaffirmed their interest in the region; that some of them originally took a quite sympathetic view of the Salvadoran insurrection; or that, as the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua became more open, they had to search for ways to balance their commitments in the area.

Three different kinds of actors have played important roles in terms of European socialist presence in the Central American crisis: governments that at different points have been under the control of these political forces, political parties and, finally, the Socialist International itself. The social democratic forces of various European countries have

²³ Perhaps the most prominent case was that of Hector Oqueli, member of the Salvadoran MNR, who in the late seventies became a member of the Secretariat in charge of Latin American affairs. Mr. Oqueli is at present a prominent figure in El Salvador's Democratic Revolutionary Front, which along with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front constitutes part of the armed opposition in that country: FDR-FMLN.

tended to rely on each one of these channels in different degrees. Recounting all the instances of their activity in the isthmus would be not only too lengthy but also unnecessary for the purposes of this essay. I will only recall some of the most important instances in order to illuminate the different security perceptions which these actors brought to bear in the context of the crisis.

How far we are from the indifference of 1954 becomes quite clear when one focuses on the actions of European governments, in particular those under the control of social democratic parties, in the context of the present Central American conflict. Two types of activity deserve special attention. The first one is related to the different programs of assistance aimed at maintaining open the options of the Sandinist revolution and the Salvadoran insurgents. European socialist governments participated in the initial efforts to finance the reconstruction of the Nicaraguan economy after the revolution. The socialist government of France went so far as to provide the Sandinist regime with U.S.\$ 15 millions in arms.²⁴

Social democrats were also among the primary moving forces in the launching of the dialogue started in San José, Costa Rica in September of 1984 which led to a new program of economic assistance to Central America on the part of the European Economic Community. The levels of aid involved in that program are quite limited, and the economic relations that Central

²⁴ Walter LaFeber, "The Reagan Administration and Revolutions in Central America" in Political Science Quarterly Spring 1984. P.10.

America maintains with the Europeans are not too different from those it has with the United States in qualitative terms, ²⁵ but their political significance can not be overlooked. The program, for example, formally included Nicaragua, in open disagreement with U.S. preferences which at that point were clearly directed at isolating the Sandinist regime.

The second area of governmental activity refers to more political kinds of support. The French socialist government was, again, particularly active in this respect in the early stages of the crisis. In this case an important example, not only for its own significance but also for the fact that it constitutes one of the most controversial instances of European-Latin American collaboration in the context of the crisis, is the joint **communiqué** which that government issued with its Mexican counterpart in August of 1981 regarding the civil war in El Salvador. In that **communiqué** both governments gave the Salvadoran FDR-FMLN the status of "representative political forces" and asked that the **frentes** be a part to any attempt to solve the civil war in that country. This represented the high point in the participation of both the Mexican and the French governments in the Salvadoran conflict. It was criticized by several Latin American countries as intervention in the domestic affairs of that Central American country. But it also served as the starting point for a series of resolutions passed by the United Nations in the following years which called on the Salvadoran government to negotiate with the **frentes**. In 1982, for example, the governments of France, Denmark, Greece and the

²⁵ Víctor Bulmer-Thomas, "Relaciones Económicas Entre Centroamérica y Europa Occidental", in Cuadernos Semestrales de Estados Unidos: perspectiva latinoamericana Num.18, Second semester of 1985.

Netherlands sponsored one such resolution which called for talks before the elections scheduled for that same year.²⁶

Other examples of French actions that represented significant departures of previous European attitudes in the area can also be pointed out. Thus, another significant instance for us, since it involved a reaction to U.S. activities in the area, was the offer made by President Mitterand to help the Nicaraguan government remove the mines that had been placed by the *contras* with the support of the intelligence services of the superpower in the Gulf of Fonseca.

A final expression of disagreements at the governmental level between the European socialist government and their North American counterpart was related to the degree of support that the former gave to the process of Contadora, initiated in early 1983 by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela as an alternative to the Reagan administration policies in Central America.²⁷ As a result of such support, for example, the European governments have invited the Contadora governments to their meetings with the Central Americans aimed at the establishment of the program for economic cooperation referred to in previous pages.

Not only the governments but also the parties and the International

²⁶ Frederick Tanner, "Un nuevo aspecto en la solución del conflicto en América Central: Europa y Contadora", in Cuadernos Semestrales de Estados Unidos: perspectiva latinoamericana, Num. 18, second semester of 1985.

²⁷ Frederick Tanner, op. cit.

itself have expressed their support for the Contadora process and provided, for example through the activities of the Ebert foundation, Western options for the Central American revolutionaries. But perhaps an even more interesting aspect of the activities of these other non-governmental actors is related to the role they have played in generating and making public alternative diagnoses and policy prescriptions to deal with the crisis. The most open differences with the U.S. interpretation of the roots and potential solutions to the Central American crisis came, in fact, to be presented at the level of party activity. Important political figures of European social democracy presented impassionate arguments for an alternative policy, which in some instances seemed to reflect a positive, and almost idealized, view of the revolutionary processes that were taking place in the region.

A case in point is that of Swedish Foreign Minister Pierre Schori's book El desafío europeo en Centroamérica,²⁸ published in Sweden in 1981 and in Costa Rica the following year. Shori presents basic themes that will dominate European social democratic visions of the crisis during its early years in some of the clearest language ever used by these political forces. A first component of the vision he presents is an awareness of the historical roots of present conflicts and of the role on nationalism and national liberation in them. "The history of the Caribbean- he states early in his book- is the history of the fight of the empires against the peoples of the region, as well as of the internal drive of those empires to eliminate one another. But it is also the history of the struggle of

²⁸ Pierre Schori op. cit.

the Caribbean natives to liberate themselves from their foreign masters".²⁹ This emphasis on nationalism and its impact on the Central American revolutions will repeat itself, in very different tones in practically all important statements that European social democrats will make in relation to the crisis.³⁰ Shori, however, goes farther than most of those statements in linking the historical past of the region to present problems. Thus, he finishes his first chapter with a series of statements which could have come from forces much further to the left in the political spectrum of either Europe or Central America:

Empire builders of the modern age seem to have inherited many of the prejudices of the first colonialists. They consider Latin Americans as unable to determine their own destiny. They firmly maintain that any effort of political and economic emancipation feeds on foreign countries and ideologies and that, as a result, it is necessary to save these nations for the "free world", even if this has to be done against their will and by the force of arms. This is, in great measure what puts the peoples of Central America today in the eye of the storm.³¹

Throughout the book the references to the U.S. as the main obstacle to the self determination of Central America and one of the main components of the present crisis are almost permanent. It is in fact difficult to choose quotes. What follows is almost a random selection:

²⁹ Ibid. P.14.

³⁰ See, for example, Fernando Morán, "Europe's Role in Central America: A Spanish Socialist View", in Andrew J. Pierre (Ed.): Third World Instability: Central America as a European American Issue (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985).

³¹ Shori: op. cit. P.21.

In those cases where the national puppets have not been able to repress popular reivindications for reform the new colonial power has not vacillated in intervening directly. We saw it in Guatemala in 1954 and we are seeing it this year in El Salvador.³²

The revolutionaries found much inspiration in the rebels of previous generations. But the main motor for their actions was, of course, the situation of their own country and not the result of opinions imported from Moscow or Havana. On the other hand, measures and decisions taken in the United States, the big neighbor of the Central Americans, have an immense role.³³

The shark has eaten many sardines throughout the years. In the history of the U.S. Marine corps 180 cases of intervention between 1800 and 1934 are mentioned...³⁴

...communism is not and has never been an important force in Latin America...in practice only a reactionary policy on the part of the United States can create possibilities for communism... History clearly shows that Latin America's struggle for liberation is not an extension of the East-West confrontation. The majority of the peoples of Central America do not know and are not likely to want any communism. They want today what they wanted seventy years ago: land and liberty.³⁵

When are they going to understand that the identification with the most reactionary regimes of Latin America is counterproductive and that a sustainable anti-Soviet strategy requires an attempt to lay bridges to governments which

32 Ibid. P. 28.

33 Ibid. P. 37.

34 Ibid. P.43.

35 Ibid. P. 94-95.

have popular support?³⁶

The tone itself of such statements is interesting. It is hard to find the same kind of language in other European social democratic statements and it is doubtful that many among them would endorse the language used. But the open contradiction that they announce with the interpretations of the sources of instability that the Reagan administration brought to bear in the conflict was widely shared in those circles.³⁷ It is easy to see why the basic assumptions of the initial public statements of the U.S. government, which tended to put the blame for the conflict on Soviet-Cuban activities, was seen by European social democratic forces not only as unrealistic but also as self-serving. And without accepting that basic diagnose of the roots of crisis in Central America it was very difficult for them to share the prescriptions proposed to deal with it. The emphasis on military measures was thought to be misguided since it did not address the real sources of the conflict; isolating Nicaragua was perceived as short sighted, since that country was not seen as already a part of the Soviet camp and as a result the best way to avoid that result was to keep its options open within the west,³⁸ etc.

³⁶ Ibid. P. 210.

³⁷ See, for example, the text of a document prepared under the auspices of German and Dutch social democrats which was to be endorsed by most European social democratic parliamentarians: The Central American Crisis: A European Response (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 1984). See also the critique of the Kissinger report presented by two influential members of the British Parliament in Stuart Holland and Donald Anderson: Kissinger's Kingdom: A Counter Report on Central America (London: Spokesman, 1984).

³⁸ Ibid. P.11.

It must be stressed that these were points spoused not only by the left wing of the movement. They represented a much wider consensus which in fact went beyond the social democratic ranks in Europe. A final point which made them all the more relevant for the topic of this essay was that they represented disagreements with the U.S. government over means rather than policy objectives. Wolf Grabendorff has adequately summarized the complex mix of basic agreement in terms of the aims to be pursued and disagreement on the best means to do achieve them that has characterized the security perceptions of European social democrats, on the one hand, and the Reagan administration, on the other. According to him, there is a basic agreement among most European political forces and their North American counterparts in relation to the following interests:

- to prevent the Central American countries from adhering to the socialist bloc
- to avoid regional and internal instability due to interstate or intrastate violence
- to guarantee economic cooperation through the support of free market economies
- to further economic development and social justice through bilateral and multilateral aid programs³⁹

These shared interests, however, do not change the basic reality that there are significant disagreements on the diagnoses of the crisis

³⁹ Wolf Grabendorff, "Western European Perceptions of the Crisis in Central America", in Wolf Grabendorff, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede and Jorg Todt: Political Change in Central America: Internal and External Dimensions (Boulder: Westview, 1984). P. 289.

preferred by these partners in the Atlantic Alliance. From the European social democratic view the crisis is best characterized as

- a north-south problem in and of the Western Hemisphere;
- a problem deeply rooted in the historical relationship of the United States with its southern neighbors;
- a test case for the United States to come to terms with the solution of its informal empire;
- a test case for the Western powers to deal with revolutionary change and self-determination in the Third World;
- a problem of how to restrain the military engagement of the Soviet Union and/or radical Third World states;
- a problem of how to avoid a superpower confrontation in the region and the resulting spillovers.⁴⁰

As I have emphasized earlier in this essay, those different diagnoses in turn lead to different emphases in terms of policy prescriptions. A comparison of those proposals advanced by the European social democrats with the policy preferences of the largest Latin American governments⁴¹ makes it very clear that they shared precisely those crucial points in which they in turn disagreed with the North American government. During the first few years of the Central American crisis European social democrats seemed to be going in a direction which could satisfy the expectations placed in them by many Latin American political actors. They certainly contributed during those years to the basic Latin American

⁴⁰ Wolf Grabendorff, "The Central American Crisis: Is there a Role for Western Europe?" in Joseph Cirincione (Ed.): Central America and the Western Alliance (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985). P. 129.

⁴¹ See, for example, Carlos Rico, op. cit.

objective of avoiding a situation in which the crisis could be placed in a strict East-West context. After 1982, however, a perceptible change took place in the Central American activities of the European social democrats which cast severe doubts on the realism of those hopes. My concluding remarks touch on these final topics.

5.- Final Considerations.

The high point of European social democratic interest in the Central American crisis lasted a little more than three years. After 1982 a new period was opened during which a gradual disentanglement on their part was in progress. European attention was renewed with the efforts at developing a program of economic cooperation launched with the San José meeting of September of 1984.⁴² Such attention, however, had important differences with the initial period of Western European commitment. It was a governmental enterprise which included all governments of the EEC rather than only those under social democratic control. Social democratic forces themselves took an increasingly restrained attitude. The Spanish socialist government, in particular, seemed constrained by an apparent desire to keep good working relations with all its former colonies in the isthmus, which brought it to a conscious effort not to "take sides" in the conflict. Little by little the Nordic socialists became the most important Western European alternatives for the Sandinist government and the revolutionary movement in El Salvador.

⁴² José Miguel Insulza, "Europa, Centroamérica y la Alianza Atlántica", in Cuadernos Semestrales de Estados Unidos: perspectiva latinoamericana, Num 18, second semester of 1985.

There are several reasons for such a shift. They have to do with changes in European politics, the activities undertaken by other governments in relation to the conflict and the development of the Central American crisis itself. Among the most important of the first set of changes was the consolidation of Conservative rule in two important Western European countries, Germany and Great Britain, and the increasing problems of the Socialists in France. The first two were among the first European members of the Atlantic Alliance to change their original policy of providing options to the Sandinist regime within the West. In that sense, at least part of the restraint exhibited after 1984 by the European social democratic governments reflected the nature itself of the multilateral exercise in which all of them participated starting that year.

The French were a good example of another interesting set of circumstances: just as their relative lack of vital interests in Central America had given them a freer hand to act in more "progressive" ways than was the case in their own former colonies, it also made them less likely to pay the price implied by opposition to the policy in their own country and on the part of the U.S. government. Complicating matters in either one of those arenas as a result of policies adopted in connection with a relatively secondary issue in their agenda seemed unnecessary.

This brings us to our second set of developments. Actions by both the United States government and those of Latin American countries in the immediate vicinity of the conflict were important in limiting the

commitment of European social democrats. As regards the first one, the displeasure of conservative North American thinkers with the activities of the Western European socialists in connection with the Central American crisis⁴³ was not a secret, even at the beginning of the Reagan administration. The Administration itself gave clear signs of concern. In February 1981 Ambassador Eagleburger visited the main Western European capitals in an effort to sell the U.S. government's views on the crisis. The following year a National Security Council memorandum was leaked to the North American press in which the effort to change the attitudes of the Socialist International in connection to the Central American crisis was presented as one of the key priorities in the Administration's Central American agenda. As the priority assigned by the Reagan administration to the sub-regional conflict became increasingly clear the perception of potential costs to be paid by those forces that insisted on developing alternative policies also grew.

It is of course very difficult, with the information available in public sources at this point, to prove any instances of open pressure on these government or political groups or to establish clear lines of causality between their changes of behavior and U.S. displeasure. But that both such displeasure and the U.S. government's intention to correct its sources were well known to the parties involved is difficult to deny.

Taking a more relaxed attitude on the part of Western Europe's

⁴³ See, for example, Irving Kristol, "Should Europe be Concerned About Central America?", in Andrew J. Pierre (Ed.): op. cit.

political forces was made easier as a consequence of the actions of those Latin American governments that became identified as the "Contadora group". In a sense, the existence of the Latin American effort and the commitment of key Latin American countries to sustaining it made it relatively easier for the European governments to simply transform their own efforts into support for the regional initiative. And, as with many other such instances of formal support many times its concrete expressions were quite limited.

As regards the evolution of the Central American crisis itself, two developments seem particularly relevant. The first one was the increased Soviet support for the Nicaraguan revolution and the radicalization of the process itself. As had been the case with the Cuban revolution, many social democrats saw both as almost inevitable results of the pressure put on the revolutionary regime by the U.S. But whatever its causes the result itself, with all its implications, remained. And even as some social democrats still struggled to keep some space open for the Nicaraguans, the more open changes of other European governments significantly changed the context in which their alternative policies had to be pursued.

The attitudes of other European political forces- in this case the Christian democratic parties of key countries such as, again, Germany- were also particularly relevant in the context of the second Central American development: the seeming consolidation of the Duarte government in El Salvador.

But whatever the reasons for the dampening of European social democratic activities in Central America, their apparent restraint brought about a clear sobering of Latin American expectations regarding their potential role as counterweights of U.S. presence in the sub-region at the political level. Such revision of previous hopes has centered on two kinds of considerations. In the first place, the already mentioned limited extent of their economic commitment, in particular when compared with the kinds of resources that the Reagan Administration has been willing to involve in support of its own policy preferences. Secondly, the increasingly critical tone of the evaluation that many of those social democratic parties have tended to make of the internal politics of the Nicaraguan revolution, which do not seem to take into account the national emergency created for that country by the low intensity warfare directed from Washington. It would seem as if these European political forces were consciously or unconsciously playing into the hands of precisely one of the objectives of such strategy -to bring about an increase in Nicaragua's international isolation. Such critical tone increased with the failure of the efforts undertaken during the 1984 Rio de Janeiro meeting of the International to bring the Sandinists and then **contra** leader Arturo Cruz to agree on terms that would guarantee the latter's participation in the Nicaraguan electoral process of that same year.

Two final elements must be included in the evaluation of the European social democratic retreat. The first one points to the fact that the Central American revolutionary forces still enjoy the sympathy of

important segments of European social democratic constituencies, as the reception given to the Nicaraguan President and Vice-President in their European tours amply shows. As a result of this, even if they limit their support of the Sandinist revolution they still can not publicly support the policies pursued by the Reagan administration. This in turn is important for those forces which oppose them within the U.S. and which can point to European disagreements as one proof of their mistaken nature. In a sense, we seem to face a "juego a cuatro bandas" in which European public opinion support limits the public statements of their governments, which in turn affects the domestic North American political debate in ways which limit the North American administration's ability to act in accordance with its own preferences.

The second point which must be included in our evaluation is in turn related to the changing political circumstances of key South American countries where four factors that were touched on in previous sections of this essay may help to bring a renewed European social democratic presence in that part of the continent. First, there is a stronger tradition of both social democratic and European presence in South America than is the case in the Isthmus. Secondly, European economic and other interests involved in that part of the world are considerably more important. Third, significant sectors of those countries' left have tended to move in an increasingly social democratic direction. Finally, the United States seem to be willing to tolerate a greater degree of "heterodox" behavior there than seems to be the case in what it clearly still considers its own Mediterranean.

Part II of the History of the Renewed Presence of European Social Democracy in Latin America, in sum, may have to be written from a Southern Cone perspective, now that Part I seems to have ended in a clearly anti-climactic note...perhaps the story will include more adventurous turns in that second installment.