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REVOLUTIONARY GRENADA AND

THE

UNITED STATES

Dr. Ken I. Boodhoo

Dialogue #48

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PREFACE

Ken I. Boodhoo is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University. A student of Caribbean affairs and a native of Trinidad, Dr. Boodhoo has recently conducted research throughout the Eastern Caribbean and is completing a book-length work on the Grenadan Revolution and its destruction by the events of October, 1983, from which the present study is taken. Comments or inquiries about the paper are welcomed and should be addressed to the author at the Department of International Relations. Publication of this work has been made possible in part by a grant from the Florida International Foundation, Inc.

Mark B. Rosenberg
Director

Introduction

Just after midnight on October 25, 1983, a thirty-five member team of elite United States troops, the Delta Force, parachuted on to the island of Grenada. Its task was to clear the controversial new airport runway to permit the easy entry of thousands of U.S. forces to follow in a few hours. On the other side of the island U.S. Naval Seals, another crack unit, attempted to come ashore. Its objective was the old Pearl's Airport. Both these forward units of the U.S. suffered heavy casualties in proportion to their individual size. However, the immediate entry of over 15,000 U.S. combat troops, more than ten percent of the Grenadian population, supported by enormous air and sea power, assured the invading forces of a rapid victory over a largely demoralized group of the week-old Revolutionary Military Council.

The U.S. invasion of Grenada was formally at the invitation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, a group of English-speaking micro-states, of which Grenada itself, is a member. It came after a week of chaos in Grenada, highlighted by the assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, some of his cabinet members and large numbers of his supporters; the overthrow of the Peoples Revolutionary Government; the establishment of the dictatorial Revolutionary Military Council; the declaration of a harsh and repressive state of emergency.

Possibly what occurred on October 25, 1983 was the culmi-

nation of over thirty years of steadily escalating levels of violence and coercion in that country, that begun with the return of native son Eric Gairy to Grenada in 1950. Even though the Grenadian political system was formally patterned after the British Westminster model of parliamentary democracy, as the Gairy years progressed, the model became a facade for one-man rulership. In effect, Gairy evolved as a parliamentary dictator. Especially in his later years, his use of force and repression earned him the title of the "English-speaking Papa Doc". Gairy's government was overthrown in an early morning coup led by Maurice Bishop. Four and one half years later the Bishop government ended more brutally with the assassination of Bishop and some members of his Cabinet.

Just as the assassination of Maurice Bishop generally reflected the recent history of Grenada, in a similar manner, the U.S. invasion is in keeping with that country's tradition of relationship with hemispheric nations. The U.S. has intervened in the domestic affairs of regional states over thirty three times.

The formal rationale for the U.S. intervention was to protect the lives of U.S. citizens there, especially the American students attending the medical school; to forestall further chaos on the island; and the argument that Grenada, under Maurice Bishop, presented a security threat to the United States. The practical reasons, nevertheless, were more related to the very existence of the Bishop regime in Grenada. Within

a few days of the establishment of the Bishop government, the U.S. warned the regime against the establishment and strengthening of relations with Cuba. On precisely the day following this warning, Grenada announced the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Cuba. The stage was set for four and one-half years of rhetorical warfare between the two countries.

Not only was Grenada perceived as a security threat. Potentially, its establishment of an essentially anti-capitalistic economic system could also be a potential economic model for regional states. The Grenadian experiment was occurring at a time when the Caribbean economic condition was experiencing steady deterioration. Further the capitalist model of development: the Puerto Rican "Bootstrap" approach, had not only largely failed in Puerto Rico, but had further created economic stagnation in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, two close allies of the U.S.

To the degree that the Grenada model of self-reliance had begun to show some results: unemployment was reduced and basic needs met, could possibly have caused that model to be increasingly attractive for neighboring states. But because the model placed a reduced emphasis on the role of foreign investment as the motivation for economic development, meant that in the long run the U.S. investor's role in the region could have been substantially reduced. Since, historically, U.S. foreign policy has been concerned with the protection

and expansion of U.S. economic interests, it is unlikely that the U.S. would have permitted the Grenada model to be successful.

Why was it necessary for revolutionary Grenada to pursue a path of economic development largely contradicting previous models? Undoubtedly, the Bishop regime would argue that the models previously employed did not contribute to the alleviation of unemployment and meeting of the basic needs of the Grenadian population. Having therefore studied the past failures it would be almost inevitable that leadership would look to alternatives for restructuring the Grenadian economy.

The focus of this monograph is upon the four and one-half year experiment by Bishop and his group in Grenada, and the response of the United States to this experiment. It concludes with the belief that the U.S. will not permit the existence of any regime in the region, after Cuba, that threatens what the U.S. perceives as its vital interests in the hemisphere.

PART I

Revolutionary Grenada

On the morning of March 13, 1979, Maurice Bishop spoke to Grenadians on the newly declared Radio Free Grenada stating:¹

"At 4:15a.m. this morning the People's Revolutionary Army seized control of the army barracks at True Blue....the forces of the Grenada army were completely defeated....I am calling upon the...people...to join our armed revolutionary forces...Virtually all (police) stations have surrendered..."

Thus was Gairy's thirty-year domination of Grenada ended in a swift and bold stroke, and the English-speaking Caribbean experienced its first governmental change by non-peaceful means.

While the final act of overthrow was sudden and decisive, it was the indirect result of some years of planning and organization. Coard later stated² that the NJM, especially after the 1976 General Elections, was forced to quietly develop a "disciplined, organized, tightly-knit security-conscious party", as a consequence of Gairy's increased repression and the shutting off of public avenues for debate. This organization included the establishment of a clandestine armed wing of the party which served as the nucleus of the Peoples Revolutionary Army (PRA) - formerly established after the over-

throw of Gairy. Further the NJM had developed close linkages with sympathizers in both the Police services and the army. This linkage served both as a conduit for information and for arms.

On Saturday March 10, 1979, Bishop later claimed³, his contacts within the Police services informed him of a Gairy plan to search for and detain six leading members of the NJM. As a consequence, the group went into hiding. On the following Monday an army informant told the NJM that Gairy had planned to leave Grenada at noon on that day, leaving clear the opportunity to assassinate the NJM leadership. The NJM leadership immediately decided to stage a coup against the government. While Bishop later admitted⁴ the decision to stage the coup "was in a sense forced along by the events of the weekend", he willingly confessed "that it is (was) something we had thought about for months before".

Between Monday afternoon and into the evening plans were formulated and finalized for the attack. The group participating in this meeting were the NJM leadership and a few top officers of the provisional PRA. By midnight a total force of under 200 congregated in the vicinity of the True Blue army barracks. An approximately 45 member sector led by Hudson Hustin led the assault on the barracks. The soldiers were all asleep. They simply fled as their buildings burnt. Another group took over the radio station with hardly a shot fired. A number of small groups went to the homes of members of Gairy's Cabinet and took them into custody. Some members of the Mongoose

gang were also placed in jail. By that evening about 60 persons had been placed in custody. Two were killed during the brief skirmishes as Police Stations throughout the country began displaying the white flag of surrender.

In the brief planning for the coup the NJM had assumed that once the attacks begun, the attackers would be joined by large numbers of the discontented. Further it was hoped, as the numbers of attackers and supporters increased, Gairy's supporters, including those in the army and in the Police services would surrender. Fortunately for the NJM both assumptions proved correct.

Lawyer Victor Noel, a lower-ranking NJM member at the time of the coup, the future Attorney General and eventually detainee of the Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG), summarized popular attitude to the coup,⁵

"I must confess that the way it was done...made no difference to me, and I am positive to thousands and thousands of other freedom-loving Grenadians; all that mattered was that Gairy was out."

He continued,⁶

"the air of relief and instant jubilation in those days was truly like the dawn of a new day. Everywhere, men and women...were shaking hands warmly and embracing each other with feeling"

Ultimately, however, Noel became disenchanted with the PRG, lost his position and was imprisoned, not being released until the revolution ended in October 1983.

In his speech on the morning of the take-over Maurice

Bishop stated the broad objectives of the new government. He said⁷

"People of Grenada, this revolution is for work, for food, for decent housing and health service, and for a brighter future for our children and great-grandchildren. The benefits of the revolution will be given to everyone regardless of political opinion or which political party they support."

Thus did Maurice Bishop outline the broad goals of his government with the emphasis upon social and economic change for the Grenadian masses. While the emphasis was upon fulfilling the basic needs of the broad masses of the society, the rhetoric was nationalistic and populist in orientation. Very few could argue with the government's basic goals or even with the method of appeal. As the years progressed, nevertheless, the rhetoric of the revolution, became increasingly radical even "Marxist-Leninist". Thus the fundamental question of the Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG) has remained: how much was the revolution a revolution of vocabulary, and how much did it attempt to transform ideas and values. Further, it is significant to note that the NJM, practically, was split into two ideological wings, which nevertheless, did not detract from the harmony of the movement until the final few months. One tightly-knit group was the OREL, under Bernard Coard's leadership, with the emphasis upon the Marxist-Leninist approach to social relations. The remainder were the eclectic Bishop followers who from time to time appeared to vacillate between populism and social democratic inclinations. One of the more fascinating aspects of the revolution remains the harmonious

accommodation of the groups to each other until the final few months.

Political Policies and Program

A fundamental objective of Bishop's Movement for the Assemblies of the People (MAP) in the early 1970's, even before the establishment of the NJM, was to move Grenada away from the inherited British Westminster-form of government, to the innovative Assemblies of the People. The twenty-five year rule of Eric Gairy had demonstrated that while in principle, there was little fault with the British-type system of government, in practice parliamentary democracy, in Grenada, had indirectly permitted one-man authoritarian rulership, even in the presence of the formal apparatus of the Westminster system: constitution, Cabinet, elections and a parliament. This notion of power and decision-making emanating from the broadest groups in society was borrowed from the writings of Trinidadian Marxist C.L.R. James, who argued that the proletariat could have a significant impact upon the direction of the society.

Developing the ideas of the MAP, the 1973 NJM Manifesto declared⁸ that the Party

"stands solidly behind People's Assemblies as the new form of government that will involve all the people...To us, People's Assemblies will bring in true democracy."

But the Party recognized that the People's Assemblies would require some time to be organized, hence the Manifesto, initially, called for power to reside in the hands of a "Provisional Government", representing "a cross-section of the

population" among whose tasks would include the organization of the Assemblies. It was envisaged that the lowest level of assembly would bring together adults in a village; each village assembly would send two representatives to a Parish Assembly. At another level, but essentially similar in structure and purpose would be the Worker Assembly. All Assemblies were entitled to send representatives to a National Assembly, the latter replacing the parliament of the Westminster system. An elected Council of the National Assembly would be charged in effecting national decisions, and its members would head the special departments in the country's civil service.⁹

After the assumption to office the NJM established a People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) as the formal seat of legislative power. This fourteen member group included nine leaders of the NJM and five others, some of whom represented business and the GNP. Also included were a medical doctor and a school teacher. Ostensibly the PRG was the provisional government, as previously outlined in the NJM's Manifesto, which would ultimately give way to the National Assembly. Effective power over Grenada, nevertheless, was in the hands of the Central Committee of the NJM. The day-to-day running of the government was administered by the nine-member Political Bureau, a sub-set of the Central Committee. In a very practical sense, finally decision-making resided with Maurice Bishop, who, from the first day of the revolution, emerged as its leader, and ultimately, the leader of the country.

At the lowest level of organization and of decision-making was the system of parish and zonal councils, which,

at least in theory, assumed some of the consultative functions previously undertaken by the national parliament. While not fully organized and operational during the life of the PRG, these local councils did provide some opportunity for the ordinary people to participate in the affairs of the state. One of the best examples of such participation was the structuring of the National Budget for 1982.

The process for the preparation of the 1982 Budget began with a "Conference of Delegates of Mass Organizations on the Economy" held in late January 1982. About 1,000 delegates representing each of the mass organizations participated. This exercise was followed by a series of 25 zonal and parish Councils organized and held throughout the country. In addition, meetings were arranged with the private sector. Finally, another general conference on the economy was called. Altogether, approximately 20,000 people were involved in the budget-making process which culminated in the presentation of the completed budget by Finance Minister Bernard Coard in a public gathering at the National Convention Center on March 9th, 1982.¹⁰

Subsequent to the takeover of the government the PRG suspended the country's constitution and ruled through the issuance of "People's Laws". Initially, these "Laws" sought to legitimize the status of the government and to restructure more repressive legislation introduced by the Gairy regime. Ultimately, these "laws" served to consolidate control by the PRG over the state. Interestingly, the PRG did not alter the status of the office of Governor-General and office-holder,

Gairy-appointed, Paul Scoon. This fact was to play an important role, in the days following the death of Maurice Bishop as both the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States and the United States sought to legitimize their involvement in Grenada. They argued that Scoon represented the legitimate government of Grenada.

On the one level it could be argued that Bishop and the NJM were attempting to create a most unique and even utopian political system, which was more appropriate to the scale of the Grenadian society than was the Westminster system. The plan to involve the broad masses of the population in national decision-making was a most ambitious and difficult undertaking. Yet it may also be argued, with equal conviction, that the NJM's popular assemblies was simply one stage to moving Grenada toward the socialist model. And whereas Grenada had not yet arrived at the socialist stage - the coming into power of the working class, the revolution was in the intermediate position or the national democratic stage.

Repeatedly does one find the NJM claim that the revolution was at the "national democratic" stage. Bishop himself stated¹¹

"we see this revolution as being in the national democratic stage. We are an anti-imperialist party and government, and we believe that the process we are involved in at this time is an anti-imperialist, national democratic, socialist-oriented stage of development."

And on another occasion, as Bishop sought to explain "why

Grenada could not proceed straight away to the building of socialism", he emphasized,¹²

"(we) must first pass through a stage where we lay the basis...for the building of socialism. In other words, comrades, what we are now into (this national democratic stage) really means two things. What we are speaking about now is not socialist construction, not the socialist revolution, we are speaking about the national democratic revolution, we are speaking about socialist orientation."

Bishop sought to elaborate on the concept "national democracy" by stating "it is 'national' because it arose from a national liberation struggle". Further it was 'democratic' because "it aims to give or restore rights and freedoms to the majority of the people".¹³

Another ideologist of the NJM claimed¹⁴ that as a consequence of the particular structure of different economies, with particular respect to which group controls the system of production relations, it therefore follows that "each society takes its own route to revolution". Since, as he continued, "there is no 'orthodox' or 'traditional' route to revolutionary change." And since the structure of the Grenadian economy was characterized primarily by its dependent capitalist nature, this inevitably means that the society was dominated by the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois groups. As a consequence, the working class group remained relatively small. The national democratic stage will permit, an alliance of all groups, initially, to control the state, and further, ultimately lay the economic foundations for the eventual bringing into

power of the working classes. At least, rhetorically, Bishop appears to have endorsed this approach toward the transformation of the Grenadian society.¹⁵

The Economic Program

Undoubtedly, the Gairy regime had left the economy in a poor condition. Major problems faced by the new government were negative growth rates, unemployment running at about 45-50 percent, a major deficit in the country's balance of payments and a very high rate of inflation. Bishop had repeatedly emphasized that the major thrust of his party was toward meeting the basic needs of the majority of the society, who had suffered both as a consequence of Gairy's mismanagement, and further, because of the inherent structural weakness of the economy. Such weakness was engendered by the historical colonial economic domination and linkage; the consequent openness of the economy making it susceptible to the vicissitudes of the international market; and the acceptance of the dependent capitalist approach to 'development'.

Thus did the basic economic goal: providing for the needs of the poorer masses, coincide with the national democratic objectives espoused by the party. But again, the rhetoric of the revolution was not matched by the economic program pursued. Indeed, one of the major ironies of the NJM, was that its foremost exponent of Marxist-Leninism, Bernard Coard, who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, was by all accounts a cautious and prudent director of the state's economic policy. Thus, for instance, whereas

NJM leadership repeatedly spoke¹⁶ of the "movement to socialism, using the mixed-economy approach and the non-capitalist path", this was not reflected in national economic policy making.

Two major goals of the national democratic, non-capitalist path would inevitably have included the expansion of the state sector and the reduction of foreign-dominated ownership within the economy. But at the time of the NJM takeover, the Gairy government had already gained control of some former privately-owned estates under the "Land for the Landless" program. Thus did the Bishop government inherit 26 such state-controlled estates with an acreage of over 4,000 acres. By the fall of the Bishop regime the state controlled 34 farms totalling 7,156 acres. It is obvious therefore, that the vast majority of the land continued to remain in private hands, regardless of the rhetoric of state control.¹⁷

Another major plank of the national democratic path is the reduction in foreign control over the economy. However, as discussed in earlier chapters, Grenada's agriculture-oriented economy was controlled primarily by a small, local land-owning elite together with thousands of small farm holders. Foreign ownership was concentrated in banking and insurance, in the telephone and electricity services. The state quickly acquired the Grenada Electric Service and the Grenada Telephone Company, but nevertheless, moved much more slowly with regard to the banking sector.

By 1979 there were four foreign-owned banks in Grenada. Soon after the coup the small state 'agricultural' bank established by Gairy to provide loans to small farmers was transformed into the Grenada Development Bank with the same overall purpose. The Caribbean Development Bank, an agency of CARICOM, assisted with the financing of its Grenadian counterpart. Later, the National Commercial Bank was established by the PRG and quickly became the second-largest bank. It acquired the assets of the Royal Bank of Canada after that bank voluntarily decided to terminate its operations in Grenada. By 1983, approximately 45 percent of the banking industry was under state control. Two foreign-owned banks continued to function freely.

In addition to providing credit facilities to the small farmer through the Grenada Development Bank, the Marketing and National Import Board (MNIB) was established to seek out external markets for non-traditional agricultural exports. Nevertheless, the marketing of major crops: nutmegs, cocoa and bananas continued to be under the control of the statutory marketing boards. A more fundamental function of the MNIB was the exclusive right, given to it to import basic food necessities of the population, in particular, rice, sugar and powdered milk. Further, by also having the sole right to import cement, the PRG was attempting to make more affordable, housing construction to the poorer sectors. On importation of other food items the MNIB was just another competitor with the existing firms involved in the same activities. By thus

circumscribing the authority of the MNIB, the state continued to permit an active role for private enterprise. This respect for private ownership is also evident in the hotel industry.

In 1973 the NJM Manifesto¹⁸ had made a blunt declaration for the "complete nationalization of all foreign-owned hotels." It demanded that the tourism industry "for the first time serve the needs of Grenadians". To that extent, the NJM believed the tourist industry could meet the development demands of the society once it became responsive to local needs. Nationalization, it was then argued, would promote this end, by facilitating the integration of that industry, especially with regard to the development of backward linkages, within the total economy. Once in office, the party did not follow through with its declared intentions. The only hotels expropriated were the three owned by Eric Gairy and his four restaurants. The remainder of the industry was left virtually untouched.

Overall, nationalizations originally planned were ultimately not attempted. However, there was some steady development of state enterprises. Altogether some 32 state enterprises were in operation by October 1983. The early focus of these enterprises was toward increasing self-sufficiency of the economy. It was logical, therefore, that the state would turn to agro-industries, since some of the raw material was readily available. This in turn would reduce the food import bill, and alleviate the fiscal deficit situation. A plant was established for processing of local fruit into juices and jellies. Similarly, a fish processing plant was built by the

National Fisheries Corporation. The Sandino Housing Plant was established to produce prefabricated housing units. Nevertheless, in spite of the expansion of the state sector, by the end of the four year period, 1979-1983, it accounted for less than 25 percent of the Gross Domestic Product.

The overall performance of the state enterprises, at best, demonstrated a checkered record. Many of these enterprises were run at a loss. The state farms for instance, even since the days of Gairy were showing substantial losses. All that the PRG was able to achieve was a reduction in these losses. A post-revolution analysis by Agriculture Minister Brizan claimed state farm losses at \$ 3.4 m. (\$G.) between 1981-83.¹⁹ This figure was lower than the Gairy years, while state farm acreage had almost doubled. The primary reasons for such losses and for problems with the country's agriculture in general, between 1979-83 were floodings due to the effects of Hurricane Allen in 1979, plant diseases, and world economic conditions which forced Grenada to stockpile its nutmeg crop. In addition, Coard himself admitted²⁰ that state enterprises suffered from weak management, lack of organization, low worker productivity and use of low level technology.

In order to rebuild the country's infrastructure, which deteriorated steadily during the last years of the Gairy regime, the PRG embarked on a dramatic program of state capital investments. In the last year of Gairy's rule, 1978, capital investment was \$8 m. This figure doubled in 1979, reached 40 m. in 1980, and by 1982 was over \$100 m.²¹ As a consequence,

whereas unemployment stood at 49 percent immediately prior to the coup, it dropped to 14.2 percent by 1982.²²

With the emphasis upon meeting basic needs, the government's economic program went beyond combatting the unemployment problem. Capital investments were directed to the areas that influenced the lives of the majority of the population. Basic necessities as pipe-home water and rural electrification programs were either upgraded, or begun in the areas where they were previously non-existent. By 1982, 49 miles of feeder roads and 15 miles of main roads were built, thereby facilitating the transportation of agricultural produce. Major transformations were undertaken in social welfare programs. Thirty-seven cents of every dollar of capital investment were directed toward health and education.²³ The number of doctors was almost doubled, from a ratio of 1:4000 in 1978 to 1:2700 in 1982.²⁴ Dental clinics increased from one to seven.

The PRG placed great emphasis upon development and expansion of educational programs. At the primary level, free books, uniform and lunches were provided for children from lower income families. Free secondary education, initiated in the last years of the Gairy regime, was fully implemented by the new government. While under Gairy Grenada had defaulted on its payments to the common University of the West Indies (UWI), thereby inhibiting access for qualified Grenadian students, these defaults were repaid. Over 110 Grenadian students were granted scholarships for study at U.W.I., and in Cuba, Mexico, the Soviet Union and in Europe.

While illiteracy in Grenada was relatively low, it was, nevertheless, substantially higher among the older population than the young. With the assistance of volunteers from other countries the Center for Popular Education was established to offer a basic literacy program directed to the adult population. The overall plan called for the eradication of adult illiteracy by 1985. A second phase of the program sought to eradicate functional illiteracy by offering night school programs for the adult working population. The total educational program of the PRG amounted to 21.3 percent of recurrent expenditure in 1981 and 22.5 percent in 1982.²⁵

In a comprehensive assessment of the Grenadian economy under PRG rule the World Bank²⁶ reported that while the government had "inherited a deteriorating economy", after three years

"Grenada has been one of the few countries in the Western Hemisphere that continued to experience per capita growth during 1981"

The Bank reported that the economy grew by 2.1 percent in 1979, 3 percent both 1980 and 1981 and 5.5 percent in 1982.²⁷

But any general assessment of the PRG's economic performance must take into consideration to what degree was the national democratic objectives of the revolutionary government fulfilled. Was the government in fact able to move the economy toward the socialist path. Most would probably agree that the vocabulary of the revolution was not matched by the practical economic policies pursued. After four years the vast majority of land acreage remained in private hands. The

PRG, in fact, did very little to confront the elite land-owning class. Much of state land had been inherited from the Gairy regime. State enterprises were established, yet contributed only one-quarter toward the GDP. The centers of economic power in St. Georges remained largely untouched. The establishment of the MNIB merely set the government in competition with the domestic capitalist class. There was no attempt to replace this class. It would appear that the government accepted the strictures of the dependent capitalist model, and where possible, sort to modify and to make it more efficient, while in the countryside, broad infrastructural programs were instituted in the attempt to meet basic needs. Together unemployment was dramatically reduced, at least over the short term, while popular aspirations increased. The basic structural problems of the economy, nevertheless, were not confronted. The incompatibility of this approach, was beginning to be apparent during the last few months of the revolution as the regime experienced rising dissent from among its supporters in the poorer classes. This situation of increasing uneasiness apparently hastened the revolution's demise.

The Human Rights Record.

Until the 1979 coup, Grenada's political system, at least formally, was patterned after that of its colonizer, Britain. Electoral politics is traditionally viewed as an important component of this system, giving the electorate the right to effect change if it so desires.. The Grenada coup,

therefore, was the first instance in both Grenada and in the English Caribbean where change was achieved by non-peaceful and non-electoral means.

In his first official speech to the country on the morning of the coup Bishop promised that freedom of elections would be restored. A month later Bishop²⁸ seemed less concerned about the immediacy and urgency of elections. He argued that an immediate priority was the "consolidation of the revolution". He suggested that after an enumeration of voters the country would be ready for elections. The fact remained that some four and one-half years later elections had not yet been held. By that time Bishop had taken the position that democracy was much more than "just an election", dismissing the idea of casting a ballot as "five second democracy".²⁹ In its place he consistently promoted the notion of a participatory democratic system, in accordance with the developing People's Assemblies, with the requirement that elected officials be continuously responsible and accountable to these assemblies. However, by mid-1983 Bishop had announced the establishment of a constitutional commission. It was anticipated that subsequent to the formulation of a new constitution elections would be held.

It is entirely possible that had the PRG government held an election, won by the NJM, such a government would yet be running the country today. An election would have provided the NJM the elusive legitimacy it always sought; would have released some of the domestic pressures for rapid solutions to domestic

problems; would also have served to nullify some of the constant criticism from the United States. But clearly within the NJM there were at least two opposing positions with regard to the holding of elections. The Marxist position of Bernard Coard would probably perceive of elections as a "bourgeois" exercise, and that power, once obtained, should be held. Bishop, himself, appeared to take the position that the people's assemblies was a more appropriate democratic form than the Westminster system. Yet after four years he established the constitutional commission as a forerunner to staging elections. But most fundamentally, the NJM did not encourage elections, because they were unsure of its outcome. Their past performance in electoral politics was only partially successful. There was always a core of the supporters of Gairy to be considered. But the fact remains that elections were never held. Grenadians were not provided the opportunity to express their views on the government by electoral means. The accepted norms of behavior which peoples of the English-speaking Caribbean states had grown accustomed to, had been thereby violated. The question of constitutional legitimacy dogged the regime both domestically and within the region.

The refusal to hold elections was part of a new system of relationships enunciated by the PRG with regard to the Grenadian population. Fundamental to the new relationship was a suspension of the 1974 Constitution, and rulership by the periodic declaration of Peoples Laws. Some of these laws violated the basic rights to the populace. For instance, People's Law No. 8

provided for preventive detention without charge or trial of persons suspected of endangering public safety. By 1981 over 100 people were detained under this law. By October 1983 it was believed that there were 78 political detainees at Richmond Hill Prison, and another 25 members of the Rastafarian sect held at the Hope Vale detention camp. In 1983, Amnesty International itself admitted to not knowing the total number of persons being held in preventive detention.³⁰

In addition to detention without trial, there were numerous allegations of ill-treatment and even torture of political detainees. Russell Budhlall and Layne Phillip, for instance, both claimed to be kicked, beaten and burnt while being held in detention.³¹ Amnesty International sought to investigate these charges but with limited success.³² However, Episcopal Archdeacon Huggins was permitted to conduct weekly religious services at Richmond Hill, which permitted him the opportunity to monitor activities there, and thrice-weekly visits were made by doctors to that prison.³³

While the traditional British common law system continued to be applicable for ordinary criminal offenses, the preventive detention system operated separately, thereby denying the individual the basic right to a fair, speedy and public trial. These cases were periodically reviewed by a three-member detention tribunal, under Bishop, in his capacity as Minister of Interior, according to a 1980 law. However, as a consequence of the irregular nature of this review process, a few were detained for almost the entire period of the PRG government.

Such were the cases of Lloyd Noel, a former NJM member, and the PRG's first Acting Attorney General, Leslie Pierre, editor of the Grenada Voice, a newspaper banned by PRG, and Tilman Thomas, a shareholder in that newspaper. These individuals were detained when the newspaper published its first issue after the coup, even though the paper had declared itself loyal to the revolution, while reserving the right to criticize. With the closure of the Voice, the Torchlight and the Catholic Focus, freedom of the press ended, and indeed, freedom of speech was severely curtailed.

While there were no direct attempts to curtail the freedom of worship it is clear that the PRG believed that the established churches were a threat to the revolution. In a detailed secret analysis of the Grenadian church it was repeatedly stated that the churches were opposed to, and even gearing up for a "confrontation with the government."³⁴ And while this conclusion might have been somewhat of an overstatement, it was almost inevitable that the church would be perceived as a threat to the revolution.

In a country of some 110,000 people over 70,000 were members of the Roman Catholic Church. Most of the others maintained membership in the Anglican or the Methodist churches, or in one of the many small, charismatic, American-led, non-traditional churches that had established bases in Grenada over the previous decade. In general, the Caribbean lower classes are deeply religious, and such groups in Grenada would undoubtedly have perceived the revolution as fundamentally "unchristian",

even as a threat to their religions. The growing feeling of suspicion and hostility was therefore mutual.

The church sought to counteract the impact of the revolution upon the minds of its adherents by aggressive sermonizing, the publication of pamphlets, and the introduction and encouragement of the reading of the Jerusalem Bible, written in simple novel form. It also sought dialogue with the PRG and was further involved in state development projects. The government, on the other hand, assumed, with some justification, that the church, and in particular, the Roman Church was "hostile toward the Grenada Revolution",³⁵ and sought to combat this assumed hostility. Having concluded³⁶ that

"the church in the immediate period (was) the most dangerous sector for the development of internal counter revolution,"

a secret report recommended the building of mass organizations, the organization of community programs, removal of "deeply religious" head teachers from the school system, introduction of political education in the schools and strengthen contacts with Latin American clergy "linked to the theology of liberation."³⁷

The consolidation of the revolution, domestically, did not detract from the external relationships developed and pursued by the PRG. Indeed the leadership promoted such relationships aggressively, in spite of the fact that much of these relationships served to escalate the level of tensions between Grenada and the United States. To a great extent the

revolution believed that the building of national independence, domestically, was inextricably linked to independence in foreign policy and from support received from external actors.

PART II

Grenada in the International Environment

In the five years between the granting of political independence and the takeover of the government by the Bishop group, Grenada's foreign policy was dominated by Eric Gairy. Gairy occupied both the positions of Prime Minister and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yet it was primarily the eccentricities of the leader, not only his formal position, which influenced the foreign policy of the state. Gairy for instance, was born in humble surroundings, was dark skinned and had a limited education. He was generally looked upon as socially inferior and rejected by the Grenadian elite. In that context it is interesting that he vigorously pursued a foreign policy of recognition and respect for Grenada and for himself. In 1975, for instance, in his annual address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated³⁸

There are some truly great people in every part of the globe. It is not the place or the size of the place in which he was born, nor the family to which he was born, nor the colour of the skin that makes him truly great.

It appears that Gairy transferred his feeling of low self-esteem to the perceptions of others concerning the state. Hence in an apparent effort to convince himself of how others viewed Grenada he said,³⁹

We are the smallest member of the United Nations Organization but we are enamoured, we are loved, we are esteemed and respected by virtue of the contribution we make in matters of regional importance and in matters of international magnitude.

Gairy further believed that for Grenada to gain international recognition and respect it was incumbent upon himself to introduce new and different issues to the international community. This is possibly one reason why he introduced such bizarre matters as the Unidentified Flying Objects, the Bermuda Triangle and psychic research, to the discussion at the United Nations. Another reason for his interest and promotion of these matters may have arisen from his religious fervor. Gairy was deeply religious in a somewhat animistic sense, thus in his five addresses to the United Nations one of his major themes was the "Universality of God." He tried for those years to convince the U.N. Organization to discuss this issue, believing as he did that it would thereby contribute to the alleviation of world tension!

This was the background to Grenadian foreign policy as the PRG assumed control of the government five years after independence. Undoubtedly, Grenada, specifically Prime Minister Gairy, had shaped a quite unorthodox foreign policy path, and one which would have been difficult for any succeeding government to follow. The PRG, nevertheless, had much earlier determined the route it would follow, since this route was originally outlined in the 1973 Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement (NJM).⁴⁰

The pre-Independence NJM proposals for the country's participation in regional and in international affairs were not unlike the party's program for domestic change. Indeed, the NJM seemed to accept the position that restructuring of the society, internally, would require new orientations, in the context of the accepted pro-Western Commonwealth Caribbean foreign policy, in its international affairs as well. Since the NJM believed that restructuring of the domestic economy would require a cessation of the external economic linkages: in terms of ownership, foreign investment, general external dependence etc. the party proposed a foreign policy that⁴¹

support[ed] the organization of Non-Aligned Nations in their courageous attempts to prevent big-power domination of their economies and internal politics and propose to join that Organization at the earliest possible opportunity.

In addition, the NJM Manifesto supported the political and economic integration of the Caribbean, while emphasizing the belief that the existing Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM) was an ineffective vehicle for this purpose. The NJM was critical of CARICOM since it believed the latter did little to meaningfully involve the poorer masses in the integration process. Further the NJM's proposals called for the integration of the entire region transcending colonially-imposed artificial boundaries. CARICOM has only involved English-speaking countries in the region. In the broader realm of international affairs, the Manifesto condemned the

U.S. involvement in the affairs of South Asian countries; supported liberation struggles throughout the world; and demanded the ostracism of South Africa from the community of nations.

It is therefore clear that the NJM was determined, from the beginning, to chart a course, both domestically and internationally, that challenged the prevailing behavior of regional states, with the exception of Cuba. And moreover, such a course ultimately violated the prescriptions of the United States for the hemisphere, thereby making the prospects for confrontation with that hegemonic power almost inevitable.

Upon assuming control of the country in March 1979, the PRG faced two immediate and urgent problems arising from domestic pressures which together served to influence the foreign policy of the state. The first was the fear that Gairy would seek to lead an invasion of the island and return to power. The second involved the determination of the PRG to rebuild the Grenadian economy and the consequent need for external assistance to achieve this.

The PRG was genuinely fearful of a Gairy-takeover and their possible inability to prevent this. The fear was based upon ten years of opposition to Gairy and the awareness of his willingness to do whatever was necessary to remain in power. Bishop and his supporters were painfully aware of their bloody and brutal confrontations with Gairy, and now that he was forced out, would he not be willing to resort to the same

tactics that he used while in office? Gairy himself had declared in interviews in the U.S. his determination to return to leadership of Grenada. Further, Bishop claimed to have secured evidence implicating some of Gairy's U.S. underworld supporters, who had earlier found a safe haven in Grenada, for collecting arms to stage a takeover.⁴²

To counteract a possible Gairy-led invasion the PRG quickly acted on two fronts. Firstly, it called upon regional states to grant formal recognition of the new government, requesting the same from traditionally friendly Western states. This would have granted the regime much-coveted international legitimacy, thereby making illegal any attempts by Gairy to win power. Secondly, and more practically, Bishop made an international plea for arms to outfit his Fledging Peoples Revolutionary Army, in order to defend the state against possible attack. He especially requested military support from the United States, Canada, Britain and from neighboring territories.

Whereas the English-Caribbean had been embarrassed by Eric Gairy's antics, Grenada was left very much to its own during the Gairy years. However, the Bishop-led takeover galvanized Caribbean leadership into action. While privately these states were pleased that Gairy was forced out, they, to some degree, objected to the manner in which it was done. While firstly, political change in the English Caribbean, in accordance with the Westminster system, was always achieved peacefully, Caribbean leadership began to wonder whether a precedent

was now established for similar change in their own countries. There were immediate calls for a regional meeting to discuss the Grenada situation. While enthusiastic recognition was immediately granted by Jamaica and Guyana, the latter regime, especially, depending upon force to maintain political control, recognition from Barbados and Trinidad was subdued. Members of the Eastern Caribbean Associated states hastily arranged two meetings, seeing the situation as a family problem. Recognition from the broader international community was ultimately gained.

The call for arms to defend the state and the immediate request, too, for economic support to reconstruct the economy did not bring tangible immediate assistance. A few countries, Jamaica and Guyana, particularly, responded in accordance with their limited resources. Trinidad remained quietly hostile. Barbados, eventually, was much more openly antagonistic. Many larger countries adopted a wait-and-see attitude. The single exception was Cuba.

The relationship between the NJM and Cuban leadership pre-dated the March 1979 takeover in Grenada. Bishop and Whiteman had visited Havana in August, 1977, for instance, and while there discussed the significance of the Cuban revolution and of socialism for Grenada.⁴³ Undoubtedly, Bishop was a greater admirer of Fidel Castro. Indeed, some have speculated, though no evidence has ever been provided, that the efficiency of the overthrow of Gairy could only have been achieved with Cuban assistance.

In April 1979, the PRG obtained its first shipment of arms from the Cuban government. Within a few months both countries approved an agreement which provided Grenada with a broad range of technical support services, training and personnel to develop the social and economic infrastructural base. This was quickly followed by the arrival of a small group of Cuban medical and dental technicians which permitted the establishment of medical services in rural Grenada. Under Gairy these services were offered primarily in the capital St. Georges, and in few smaller towns.

In addition to support for infrastructural development the Cubans offered a broad economic assistance package. To facilitate self-sufficiency in food, Cuba donated twelve fishing boats and corresponding technical support for the establishment of a Grenada fishing industry. Trade ties were steadily expanded with Grenada purchasing basic commodities, cement and sugar, from Cuba. Later, Cuba offered a number of scholarships for university study and organized cultural exchanges between these countries.

The strengthening of relationships between Grenada and Cuba was part of a broad pattern of new relationships never before sought by any English-speaking Eastern Caribbean state in the international system. Significant among these relationships was the immediate decision to seek entry into the Non-aligned Movement which was in keeping with the proposals of the 1973 NJM Manifesto. Grenada was admitted to that Movement and participated in the Sixth Summit Conference held in Havana in

September 1979. Grenada was later elected to the co-ordinating Bureau of that Organization.

It was at the Havana Conference, and a few months later in a rally at Managua, Nicaragua, did Bishop outline the broad tenets of the country's foreign policy. Bishop outlined the following principles:⁴⁴

1) that Latin America and the Caribbean region should be recognized as a zone of peace. There must be an end to the Monroe Doctrine, and all other doctrines aimed at perpetuating hegemonism.

2) the right of self-determination for all peoples must be recognized and respected in practice.

3) the principle of ideological pluralism must be respected in practice.

4) there must be an end to the arming and financing of counter-revolutionaries.

5) there must be firm commitment to the ideals of disarmament and world peace.

6) there must be respect for the sovereign equality, legal equality, and territorial integrity of [our] countries.

7) the right of any country to freely join whatever international organization it wants.

One of the clearest early indications of the stringently anti-imperialistic stance of Grenada was on the occasion of the U.N. General Assembly's first vote to condemn the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. While this resolution was

overwhelmingly approved, Grenada voted against the condemnation, and thus in support of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Bishop later sought to explain this vote, which was not in keeping with the position of the Non-aligned Movement, by claiming ⁴⁵

Non-alignment to us is a positive concept embodying beliefs in positive principles. As we see it, our first duty as a young revolutionary country that believes in non-alignment is always to support the further development of the world revolutionary process.

This convoluted explanation contributed little to an understanding of Grenada's vote for it is difficult to understand what "positive principles" Bishop was able to employ in support of the invasion. Further it was certainly a new interpretation to argue that non-alignment "always" supported the "world revolutionary process".

A more practical explanation of the Grenada vote was probably the desire of this young radical government, to demonstrate, somewhat naively, to the Soviet Union that it was willing to be counted, in the face of international opposition, as a friend of the latter - an immature attempt to demonstrate political maturity. Further, and equally naively, Grenada appeared to be signalling to the United States its determination to act autonomously regardless of the domination of the latter over hemispheric relations. Earlier Bishop had announced to the United States "we are not in anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for sale".⁴⁶ The vote in support of the Soviet

Union was Grenada's repudiation of the philosophy of "backyardism" or its more recognized synonym "spheres of influence".

The determination of Grenada to chart an uncompromisingly independent foreign policy course; its development of close relations with Cuba and later, the Soviet Union; its determination to establish friendly relationships with revolutionary governments, especially with Nicaragua and with Surinam; and its rhetorical war with the United States, altogether served only to exacerbate relations with the latter. Bishop would nevertheless have argued it was the United States that initiated this hostile relationship.

United States Relations with Grenada.

The United States' relationship with Grenada can be meaningfully examined only in the context of historical patterns of relationships between the giant of the north and the formerly colonial territories of the South. Indeed, America's interactions with its southern neighbors pre-dated the former's independence. Independence for the United States only served to strengthen its economic interests within the region, to the extent that when the Haitian slaves revolted in the late eighteenth century, Washington displayed few qualms about sacrificing democratic idealism for crass economic self-interest by siding with the Haitian planter class.

In 1823, President Monroe laid the broad outline for America's future relationship with its southern neighbors in what subse-

quently became known as the Monroe Doctrine. This Doctrine sought to guarantee the independence of hemispheric countries from foreign intervention while pledging the United States not to interfere in their affairs. Within a few years the idea of Manifest Destiny was added, promoting the belief that U.S. economic and political superiority must inevitably lead to hemispheric domination.

Toward the latter part of the nineteenth century gunboat diplomacy went hand in hand with dollar diplomacy to extend the U.S. economic penetration, and ultimately, its hegemony over the hemisphere. The Spanish-American War provided the initiative for the formal entry of the U.S. into Caribbean Basin countries at this time. From then onwards the U.S. became a significant colonial power in the region. Its domination ranged from the outright annexation of Puerto Rico to the appropriation of the canal corridor in Panama. Temporary occupations occurred in Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Cuba represents probably the best example of the interface between economic considerations and U.S. policy of Caribbean domination.

In the late nineteenth century the U.S. steadily expanded its economic investments in Cuba especially in the sugar industry. Following Spain's defeat, massive amounts of U.S. capital entered Cuba. U.S. investments grew from \$50 million in 1895 to \$200 million by 1906 and increased by over six fold to \$1.24 billion by 1924. This economic penetration was accompanied by military occupation and the establishment of a

a U.S. military government. Yet Cuba was granted a compromised independence in 1902, with the insertion of the Platt Amendment into its constitution, which gave the U.S. among other rights, the right to intervene to protect Cuban independence.

Against the background of the Platt Amendment, President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 declared his "corollory" to the Monroe Doctrine. Essentially, the Corollory re-emphasized U.S. hegemony over the hemisphere, declaring its right and responsibility to the maintenance of hemispheric peace. It was not until Franklin Roosevelt's enunciation of the "Good Neighbor Policy", in 1934 did the U.S. conclude a new treaty with Cuba effectively abrogating the Platt Amendment. It is worthy to point out that the U.S. occupation of Cuba in 1898 was the first of thirty-three such military interventions in this hemisphere, until the invasion of Grenada some eighty-five years later.

The Cuban pattern was repeated throughout the northern Caribbean, initially, and then over the entire region: a policy of military occupation accompanied by economic penetration. To that extent, what is taking place in Grenada post-October 1983 follows a U.S. pattern for the region which originated in Cuba in 1898. Whereas the northern island, especially Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic were the first to be dominated, the southern territories were yet colonies, primarily of England. As the latter began its withdrawal by mid-twentieth century, the U.S. sought to fill

both the economic and security vacuum. By this time the U.S. "Bootstrap" approach to economic development was firmly in place in Puerto Rico, and being adapted at a furious pace throughout the region. This approach, ostensibly, brought U.S. capital and technology together with Caribbean resources and abundant cheap labor in a tax haven environment, to promote industrialization as the means to development.

By the 1970's almost one-half of U.S. trade, two-thirds of its imported oil, and over fifty percent of its imported strategic minerals entered the country by way of the Panama Canal or through Caribbean waters. While some of these strategic materials merely passed through the region, a significant proportion originated there. In recent years, Jamaica has supplied over 50 percent of U.S. bauxite and alumina imports. Further toward the end of the decade about 70 percent of U.S. oil imports and over 80 percent of its residual fuel imports came from Caribbean refineries. Over the past century, therefore, the Caribbean has been developed as a safe and secure haven for a substantial proportion of United States' foreign investments and a major source for some strategic materials. Further, located on the soft under-belly of the U.S., strategically close, with numerous potential harbors, the Caribbean in the "wrong" hands presents a vital security threat to the U.S. For these two reasons, therefore, the U.S. has maintained a close watchful eye over the region during the present century, permitting only those regimes,

including that of the Somoza's in Nicaragua and the Duvalier's in Haiti, willing to serve its interests.

In keeping with its traditional objectives for the Caribbean, the establishment of the Bishop government in Grenada must have been the cause for great concern within the U.S. Department of State. The English Caribbean had become accustomed to change by peaceful means. Moreover, change, whenever it occurred, did not signal restructuring of economic or political relationships with the West. Bishop threatened to achieve both these objectives. Even more significantly, Caribbean states, with the possible exception of Jamaica, had, even by the late nineteen seventies, in spite of formal recognition, maintained a policy of distancing themselves from Cuba. America's nemesis in the Caribbean continued to be isolated some twenty years after Castro's coming into power. It was known that Bishop and some of the NJM had made previous trips to Cuba. Since 1973 their Manifesto,⁴⁷ while not mentioning Cuba by name, had called for "genuine integration of all the Caribbean", and saluted the "just and heroic struggle being waged on Caribbean soil."

On the second day of the NJM takeover, in its first meeting with U.S. representatives, the new government pleaded for economic assistance to rebuild the country. The American Consul-General assured the Bishop government that he would encourage his government to provide the necessary assistance.

One month later no such aid had been granted, but in the meantime two sets of circumstances laid the basis for the souring of relations between the U.S. and Grenada. Gairy from his base in California, repeatedly declared on radio the need for a counter-coup and called for the U.S. to support him in this attempt. The Bishop government, claiming to find evidence in Grenada supporting Gairy's initiatives, issued pleads of its own for military assistance to repel any possible counter-coup. Likewise it continued making appeals for economic assistance. The second circumstance arose from the almost immediate positive response from the Cuban government with economic and later, security assistance.

On April 7, about three weeks after the initial takeover, a Cuban delegation arrived in Grenada to open talks on assistance programs. The U.S. was immediately angered, moving from a posture of cautious acceptance to one of confrontation. Within a few days U.S. ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Frank Ortiz, arrived in Grenada, sternly lecturing Bishop and his government of the hazards of the establishment of a working relationship with Cuba.⁴⁸ He expressed his government's formal displeasure concerning establishment of relations between Grenada and Cuba, and threatened adverse implications for Grenada's tourist industry if such relationship was permitted to continue. Ambassador Ortiz informed the Bishop government that U.S. aid program to the region was provided only on a multi-lateral basis, through the Caribbean Development Bank. He suggested

that Grenada look to that Bank for aid assistance. Additionally, Ortiz offered the now famous \$5,000 which according to his successor, Sally Shelton was⁴⁹ "the then-allowed level of funding per project which an Ambassador could make from [the] Special Development Assistance Fund". Bishop looked upon this offer as a gratuitous insult.

Ortiz ended his discussion with the Grenada government by handing Prime Minister Bishop a formal statement⁵⁰ prepared by his government which stated in part

although my government recognizes your concerns over the allegations of a possible counter-coup, it also believes that it would not be in Grenada's best interest to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba.

The young revolutionary government of Grenada was utterly incensed by the callousness of the U.S. approach. It served further to confirm the suspicions of this youthful group that the giant of the north had not eschewed the "Big Stick" attitude in the conduct of its foreign relations. Three days later Bishop in a national radio address responded to the U.S. ultimatum stating⁵¹

From day one of the revolution we have always striven to have and develop the closest and friendliest relations with the United States, as well as with Canada, Britain, and all our Caribbean neighbours....But no one must misunderstand our friendliness as an excuse for rudeness and meddling in our affairs, and no one, no matter how powerful and mighty they are, will be permitted to dictate to the

government and people of Grenada who we can have friendly relations with and what kind of relations we must have with other countries.

And relying upon the formal symbols of stateness which is all that a microstate possesses, Bishop continued⁵²

Grenada is a sovereign and independent country, although a tiny speck on the world map, and we expect all countries to strictly respect, our independence just as we respect theirs. No country has the right to tell us what to do... We are not in anybody's backyard and we are definitely not for sale.

In an act of seeming defiance of the United States, Grenada established formal diplomatic relations with Cuba the next day. This, however, was more likely a move that had been under consideration for some time. The die was cast. The war of words began. From there onwards relations with the United States went down hill, just as Grenada-Cuban relations steadily developed.

It may be considered that U.S. Ambassador Ortiz committed a major blunder in his first major discussion with the Grenadians which set the stage for a rapid deterioration of relations between the countries. However, while Ortiz's dictatorial diplomatic style was his own, his message was not. To that extent, his style was secondary to the message from the Department of State: Grenada must be willing to have minimal relations with Cuba in order to gain the blessing and the support of the United States. A failure to do so meant that Grenada must be willing to face the consequences. The U.S. Administration's demands of Grenada were no different

from the demands upon Nicaragua. Pres. Reagan demanded that Nicaragua say "Uncle" to the United States. One could even speculate that the U.S. was willing to push Grenada toward Cuba, if only then to be able, later, to attack it for being a friend of the Communists!

It appears that the State Department took an exceedingly tough stand against Grenada, right from the outset, because of the belief that Bishop and his NJM, even before the takeover, were close to Cuba. Rationalizing this tough position a State Department official said⁵³

We think they've been committed to a close association with Cuba from day one...think of the precedent it would set...Throughout the region, there are little-bitty leftist groups with power ambitions. If we improve relations with Grenada at no cost to the (pro-Cuban) government, imagine what it would say to other putative authorities in the eastern Caribbean.

After the invasion a senior State Department official said⁵⁴ similarly "nothing the U.S. did or failed to do would have made any difference". The message from Washington was exceedingly clear: the U.S. would not tolerate or negotiate with any country, within its sphere of influence, that believed its sovereignty permitted the right to engage in independent foreign policy. Relatedly, the mind-set suggested by this attitude was that a friend of Cuba was almost automatically, an enemy of the United States. To that extent, then, the quarrel with Grenada was ultimately not over the issue of the future of democracy or of disrespect for human rights -

especially since the U.S. does not appear to have serious problems with Haiti on these issues - but over the right of a sovereign state, under the shadow of a major power, to choose its friends.

While expressing skepticism that a "more sustained experiment with a positive U.S. policy would have succeeded," former U.S. ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Sally Shelton, chided the U.S. administration, in a post-invasion analysis, for not trying, and stated⁵⁵

I do believe...that the Carter and Reagan policies of distancing ourselves from Grenada, of refusing to exchange ambassadors, of declining to engage in serious discussions ...were not conducive to improving relations and providing an alternative to Cuba.

Instead of attempting to mend relations after Ortiz's disconcerting visit to Grenada, both countries escalated the rhetorical war which only served to further exacerbate relations. For instance, as Grenada prepared to participate in the Non-Aligned conference scheduled for Havana, a few months later, the U.S. sent a cable to Grenada requesting that it defend anticipated attacks at the Conference, on the Organization of American States, by Cuba. Grenada could have chosen to politely ignore that cable or even sent a private reply to the U.S. Instead, said Bishop,⁵⁶ publicly announcing the contents of the message,

we decided to come to this conference to speak out loudly and clearly on the side and in the interests of the suffering and oppressed people of the world and of those countries and regions fighting for

their freedom, independence, and national liberation.

And to further annoy the United States, while cementing Grenada's relations with Cuba, Bishop sought to extol the virtues of Cuba stating⁵⁷

if there was no Cuba the world would have not seen the first socialist revolution in the West in this century. If there were no Cuba we would not have been reminded of the very important lesson that blockades, barricades, and isolation cannot stop a serious and determined people from consolidating their revolutionary process...Cuba laid the basis for Grenada.

Yet Ambassador Shelton, while scolding the U.S. for not making a determined effort to develop relations with Grenada, remains unconvinced that the latter was serious concerning the development of such relations.⁵⁸ She asserts that at least the Carter Administration initially attempted to work with Grenada, but that three issues made this difficult. The first concerned the conflict over aid to Grenada and the Administration's determination that Grenada work through the Caribbean Development Bank. The second was with regard to the expressed desire of the PRG to have Eric Gairy extradited to stand trial. Shelton claims that the Grenadian government did not appear serious about returning Gairy to Grenada, since they refused to work with the U.S. Department of Justice to process the request. Conflict over the arrest in the U.S. of two Grenadians charged with illegally exporting arms to Grenada constituted the third issue. This issue resolved itself when the Grenadians jumped

bail returning to their country.

What Shelton does not mention is that about the same time, as reported in the Washington Post, the National Security Council had developed a plan for the blockade of Grenada. While that plan was not operationalized, Grenada could not fail to have comprehended the message from the U.S. Further when Shelton, herself, was sent to replace Ortiz as Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, the U.S. refused to accredit her to Grenada. Similarly the U.S. refused to recognize the credentials of Dessima Wilhaims as Grenada's ambassador to this country. Without a formal exchange of ambassadors there was no attempt at establishing a serious dialogue between the two countries.

Unable to force the Grenada government to bend to its wishes, the U.S. extended its propaganda war from late 1979 and onwards. The media was employed to create a picture of an increasingly repressive country, becoming more steadily aligned with the Soviet Union, and therefore one not safe for U.S. tourists. The State Department advised travel agencies against recommending Grenada. Grenada's voting with the Soviet Union on the Afghanistan issue provided the U.S. with additional propaganda material. Further the U.S. brought pressure to bear on its allies and upon international lending agencies, against the provision of economic assistance for Grenada.

Grenada responded in the only way it knew how: an escalation of its rhetorical war. Further to Bishop's address at the Non-Aligned conference in September 1979, two speeches, within

a few months afterwards, portrayed the degree of hostility between the countries. In the first of these speeches⁵⁹ delivered at St. Georges to commemorate the first anniversary of the revolution Bishop again expressed the "greatest debt of gratitude to the Cubans." He again reiterated his earlier point that there could have been no Grenadian revolution without the earlier Cuban revolution. But his harshest words were again reserved for the U.S. Obliquely criticizing the Monroe Doctrine approach of the U.S. he said

to those who continue to believe that the world begins and ends next door in America, to those who continue to believe that the United States...have the right to regard this entire area as a lake, as an extension of America, as part of their backyard, we say, "No, we are not in anybody's backyard."

The second of these speeches⁶⁰ was delivered in Havana on the occasion of the May Day celebration in 1980. Again Bishop publicly attacked the Monroe Doctrine approach of the U.S., demanding respect based on sovereign equality and independence.

It was, however, Grenada's decision to build a new airport, and the generosity of Cuba toward the building of that airport, that most dramatically escalated the level of tensions between the two countries. What Grenadians saw as a powerful symbol of their resolve and determination to achieve economic development, the United States saw as a symbol of the Soviet's presence in the hemisphere.

The Airport Issue

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan, in his nationally-
televised "Star Wars" speech declared ⁶¹

on the small island of Grenada...the Cubans with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building an airfield with a 10,000 foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an airforce...More than half of all American oil imports now pass through the Caribbean...The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada...can only be seen as power project into the region.

For six days following, various U.S. television crews sought the supposed Grenadian military base, the supposed military communication facilities, and thirdly, the so-called military barracks, none of which were found. This did not prevent the Reagan Administration from resurrecting the same false charges as partial rationale for the invasion eight months later. What was important for President Reagan was that his rhetoric and the accompanying satellite pictures of the airport site would win the minds of his U.S. audience, thus providing a foundation of popular support for invasion a few months later.

The PRG did not initiate the idea of an airport at Point Salines. Since the Second World War the British had selected that area as the most appropriate site. After the War a British consulting firm Scott, Wilson, Kirkpatrick and Partners had re-confirmed the earlier decision. The reason was obvious. The existing airport at Pearl's was located between the mountain range and the sea. Its runway was 5,500 feet with no room for expansion. There were no facilities for night landings. Tourists

attempting to vacation in Grenada were required to overnight in either nearby Trinidad or Barbados since obviously the existing airport could only accommodate smaller aircraft. This additional expense, and the generally unfavorable attitude of both Trinidad and Barbados to the PRG, would not have encouraged the Grenadian tourist industry. After some initial hesitancy the PRG had embraced tourism as a major contributor to the development process. And in this regard the World Bank had recommended the development of the tourist industry to promote financial solvency. In its 1982 Memorandum, the World Bank anticipated the positive impact of the completion of the airport for the expansion of the Grenadian tourist industry.⁶²

At the time the PRG was seeking aid to construct the airport, there were already ten airports in the region of the size contemplated by Grenada. The country was also aware that the construction of a 9,000 foot runway and airport in neighboring St. Lucia had increased tourism there by almost 300 percent. Ironically, the airport at Barbados, extensively used by the U.S. during the invasion, was extended to 11,000 feet during the 1970's. In none of these previous cases did the United States question the length and purpose of the airports.

Some six months after obtaining power the PRG began seeking funds to build the airport. The government first approached the United States, Britain, Canada, European, Arab and Caribbean countries for assistance. Not only did the United States flatly

refuse but brought pressure on its allies to do the same. In 1981, the European Economic Community and Grenada organized a conference to seek co-financing for the project. The U.S. again pressured its allies to stay away. Some succumbed to this pressure. Grenada's request to the International Monetary Fund for \$8 million was halved under pressure upon the Fund by the United States. However, with assistance provided by Cuba, the EEC, acting independently of its individual members, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, some Scandinavian countries and Venezuela, airport construction began.

Overall, Cuba's contribution to the airport construction project was substantial--about 40 percent of total cost. However, most of this contribution was in the form of manpower--about 300 workers, and construction supplies. Cuba developed a quarry and built the first rock-crushing plant and asphalt mixing facility--illustrations of the low level of pre-existing infrastructure, and the need for modernization of Grenada. In addition, excavation work at the airport was undertaken by Layne Dredging Company of Miami, and the airport's communication system was being installed by Plessey, a British company.

Most Grenadians supported the airport project enthusiastically, purchasing almost one million (E.C.) dollars of "airport bonds" to help finance construction. To them it was the major symbol of their independence and their determination to achieve economic development. President Reagan, however, saw the airport

as a major propaganda weapon in the Administration's war with Grenada. The U.S. denounced the effort as an attempt by the Soviet Union and Cuba to extend their power further into the region. The argument presented was that the airport would serve as a Cuban-Soviet military base which would thereby threaten the security of the United States. Further, the State Department added, the new airport would provide a refuelling stop for Cuban planes on their way to Angola and also, the Soviet Union with an important beachhead to control shipping lanes through which much U.S. oil passes. Cuba, however, had been flying to Angola since 1975, and obviously, much earlier, had resolved its refuelling problems. Also neither Trinidad nor Venezuela, the two countries whose shipping could have been potentially affected, ever complained. In fact, neither supported the U.S. invasion. But even within State Department, itself there was skepticism concerning the Administration's hysteria over the airport.⁶³ One official confessed to "not being terribly worried" about the airport construction elaborating that he "never put much stress on the strategic importance of this whole region." Another hypothesized that U.S. opposition to the airport construction had served only to "push Bishop further to the left."

The United States, from 1979 until the invasion in late 1983, continued to charge that the airport threatened U.S. security, and ultimately employed that charge as one of the reasons for its invasion. Shortly after the invasion the British

company Plessey denied that the airport could have been used for military purposes, pointing to a number of the facilities unavailable at the airport, including, for instance, underground fuel tanks, which would have been necessary. Further, since the British government underwrote the financing for the Plessey contract, it certainly would not have done so if military purposes were intended.⁶⁴

The final paradox of the airport issue is that the United States was one of the first countries from which Grenada sought assistance when the PRG decided to build its airport. Bishop's rationale to the U.S. and to others was that a new airport would contribute to the expansion of the tourist industry, and therefore, to the development process. Not only did the U.S. reject that request, but it urged others to do the same. It eventually invaded Grenada on the pretext that the airport threatened its national security. This invasion was achieved with much cost: loss of life on all sides, economic destruction, moral prestige of the U.S. - although the latter does not figure prominently in the Reagan foreign policy. Now that Grenada is under U.S. domination, the latter provided a generous \$21 million grant, of U.S. taxpayers money to complete this project. The rationale for this grant is that the airport would contribute substantially to tourism development - the argument Maurice Bishop had presented in the first place!

Grenada, Cuba and the USSR: The Military Connection

Under Prime Minister Gairy, Grenada had established a small army upon gaining Independence. In addition to the regular Police services, Gairy had also organized an assortment of secret paramilitary groups, among which was the notorious Mongoose gang, all of which were personally loyal to Gairy. The PRG dismantled the army and the secret branches replacing them with the popular-based Peoples Revolutionary Army. By 1983, the army numbered close to 600 full-time soldiers. The army was required, during conditions of peace, to be fully involved in community development projects.

In addition to the permanent army the PRG established a voluntary militia. While at first somewhat disorganized, a bomb explosion at a public rally in June 1980, ostensibly directed at the leadership of the PRG, encouraged the government to reconstitute and re-organize the militia. Members, however, maintained their civilian jobs and were unpaid for serving in the militia. They were drawn from a wide cross-section of the population and numbered between 2,000 to 2,500 members. There were plans to further develop the country's overall defense forces.⁶⁵

There is no simple answer to the obvious question: Why did the PRG consider it necessary to organize a relatively large defense force? Initially, the PRG was undoubtedly fearful that former Prime Minister Gairy, with some form of U.S. assistance,

would lead a counter coup. Further efforts were organized within Grenada,⁶⁶ for example, the "De Raveniere Plot" and the "Budhall Gang" to destabilize the regime. Finally, there was the bomb explosion, apparently intended to eliminate the leadership of the PRG, at the rally to celebrate Heroes Day. With regard to external threats, the PRG repeatedly expressed the fear of an invasion by the United States. Putting together the domestic and external threats, the PRG undoubtedly would have believed it was necessary to arm itself to defend the revolution.

For its part, the United States, with some support from leadership in the Eastern Caribbean, claimed that the militarization of Grenada was for the sole purpose of spreading the Grenada model into neighboring territories. Indeed, this was one of the major reasons presented by Eastern Caribbean leaders for their 'invitation' to the U.S. to enter Grenada. To this former ambassador Shelton has responded⁶⁷

I have not been convinced by the available evidence that Grenada was training West Indian leftists from neighboring islands in the subversion of democratically elected governments. The evidence presented to me had been, quite simply, very thin.

As the Grenada - Cuban relationship steadily developed, and ultimately expanded to close relations with the Soviet Union, also, the PRG negotiated five military assistance agreements: three with the Soviet Union, one with Cuba, and one with North Korea. There is some evidence that a military relationship may have also existed with Czechoslovakia and with Bulgaria.

In general, the three agreements between Grenada and the Soviet Union provided for the shipment of arms to the former; specialist training in the Soviet Union; and intelligence and security training for a few Grenadians. In the first of these agreements,⁶⁸ for instance, the Soviet Union was required to provide equipment valued at 5 million roubles, with an Annex to this Agreement detailing the type and quantity of such equipment. Article 6 paragraph 2 required that the terms of the agreement be secret.

The second agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded on July 27, 1982,⁶⁹ and increased the value of Soviet military support to 10 million roubles. It also provided for extensive training for Grenadians in the Soviet Union, and by Soviet specialists in Grenada, in the operation of the military equipment. The third agreement was an extension, from 1984-1986, of the terms of the previous agreement. Both agreements⁷⁰ required that the

Government of Grenada shall take all the necessary measures to ensure keeping in secret the terms and conditions of the deliveries, all the correspondence and information connected with the implementation of the present Agreement.

The preamble to the Grenada-Cuba Military Collaboration Agreement⁷¹ stated that the Agreement's purpose was with "the aim of making a contribution to the strengthening of the defensive capacity of Grenada". The primary focus of the Agreement was the provision of Cuban military specialists to assist in the

organization, instruction and "combative and campaign training" and the development of "mobilization plans for the defense of the country". An Annex to this Agreement called for the eventual stationing of 27 "permanent specialists" and 12 short-term specialists in Grenada. Under Article 111 provision was also made for the granting of scholarships to Grenadian military personnel for study in Cuba.

In an Agreement⁷² signed on April 14, 1983 in Pyongyang between Cuba and North Korea, the latter agreed to provide "weapons and ammunitions" amounting to \$12 million. Again it was emphasized that "both sides shall strictly keep the secrecy" of the agreement.

It was naive of the PRG not to assume that the completion of military agreements with the Soviet Union, Cuba and North Korea would almost inevitably draw Grenada closer toward the Soviet bloc. And further, not to expect that the bloc would expect a quid pro quo. Yet equally naively, the Bishop regime stubbornly defended its right to conduct relations, and conclude agreements with whatever state it alone determined, based upon independence, sovereignty and formal equality. More pragmatically, was the ever present fear of invasion from the United States, and the need to defend against this. Though it is difficult, in this regard, to understand how Bishop could have conceived of defending against the awesome military might of the United States.

In retrospect, the collection of arms, eventually found by the U.S., consequent upon the agreements, provided the latter with some rationalization for the invasion, after the fact. Yet again, the U.S. callously manipulated the facts of the arms cache and hence U.S. public opinion. To support the argument that Grenada was being prepared as a military base, and thus the necessity for the invasion, the U.S. claimed to find warehouses filled with arms. In actuality, according to the Chicago Sun Times,⁷³ "the weapons in one of the warehouses turned out to be sacks of rice and cans of sardines". And further

as for the three warehouses that did have weapons - they weren't stacked to the ceiling, as the president said. They were about one-fourth full. Many of the rifles were made in 1870...Others were WW II vintage...very little modern weaponry.

In addition, the U.S. found some mortars, submachine guns and rocket propelled grenades. Grenada, correctly or incorrectly, would have argued that such arms were required to defend the state.

The U.S. Response

It is obviously impossible for the outsider to know whether the U.S. was aware, before the invasion, of the existence of Grenada's military agreements. Regardless, the U.S. Administration discounted the prospect for diplomatic negotiation, choosing instead economic destabilization, subversion and the

threat of force to return Grenada to Western domination. Thus 'Ocean Venture '81' was staged at Vieques Island near Puerto Rico utilizing 120,000 troops, 250 warships and over 1,000 aircraft. The training exercise, code-named 'Amber and the Amberdines', the official name for Grenada being Grenada and the Grenadines, involved the capture of Amber, hold elections and install a government friendly to the United States. The PRG could have hardly missed the message. There were further attempts at destabilization.

In 1983 it was revealed⁷⁴ that CIA Director William Casey had proposed a covert action plan, two years earlier, against Grenada and Surinam. It was dropped only after strenuous objections by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The plan, eventually was never dropped, only postponed. By late 1982, the U.S. had inspired a Caribbean Mutual Defense pact between Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica and Antigua, financed by U.S. military aid to the member countries. Vere Bird, Prime Minister of Antigua rationalized⁷⁵ "in this region we cannot afford to have another Cuba or Grenada".

There is considerable speculation concerning the active and extensive involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in Grenada during the Bishop regime. Some have pointed to the fact that the NJM disintegrated extremely rapidly. The C.I.A.'s history of promoting internal divisions within target groups have been long recognized. Some also speculate⁷⁶ that

the Grenadian army was thoroughly penetrated by the CIA, and it is even possible that there were collaborators on the Central Committee itself.

For a U.S. invasion to be acceptable it was necessary to have chaos in Grenada, and even the assassination of the leader.

The late Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados told a number of British government officials, in early October that he anticipated problems, even assassinations in Grenada. That was three weeks before the death of Bishop. U.S. ambassador to France, Evan Galbraith, told French reporters the U.S. invasion had been planned two weeks before the actual date. That was even before the death of Bishop. He later retracted the statement. Finally, it was widely reported⁷⁷ that at least one student at the medical school was a member of the CIA.

Grenada remained a relatively open society during the Bishop years. It would have been very simple to establish a CIA operation in the country. Since that country was openly antagonistic toward the U.S. it is inconceivable that it would not have received the close attention of U.S. intelligence community.

Undoubtedly, the PRG must have felt increasingly threatened by the continued destabilizing pressures from the U.S. and the seeming inability to achieve a thaw in relations with Washington. This was a major reason for Bishop's trip to the U.S. in June 1983 when he stated⁷⁸

bad relations do not make sense. From our

point of view, the need to ensure that even more American visitors come to our country every year is a critical and burning need.

Yet another objective of the trip was ⁷⁹ to "try again to establish some form of official contact with the government of the United States." Bishop was not very successful in these efforts. The U.S. did not permit meetings with officials of the Reagan Administration. Bishop met with middle level State Department officers and with a representative of the National Security Council.

Ironically for Bishop, his attempt to mend relations with the U.S. served only to increase factionalism within the NJM. Within the Central Committee of the party, its leader was increasingly perceived as soft, indeed "petit bourgeois" rather than "Marxist-Leninist". This situation culminated in a division in the party which ultimately destroyed the Revolution.

Conclusion

The final chapter of revolutionary Grenada is well-known history. Within two months of Bishop's return to Grenada an open conflict broke out in the Central Committee of the NJM. The majority of the Committee charged Bishop with poor leadership skills and lacking in "ideological purity." This majority supported a proposal for joint leadership of the party: with Bishop being required to share leadership with Coard. Bishop agreed hesitatingly to accept the proposal yet asking for time to consider its ramifications.

Whereas Coard and his faction had continuously placed the leadership struggle in the context of ideological 'purity' and the demand for the party to play a vanguard role, it would appear that what ultimately occurred was a struggle for power; for control over the party and the state. The debate over ideology, then, was primarily a tool to obscure what was essentially a grab for power, motivated by greed and selfishness.

On his return from a brief overseas trip, Bishop and a few of his colleagues were placed under house arrest on October 13, 1983. When private negotiations for a peaceful solution failed, thousands of Grenadians stormed Bishop's home and released him from house arrest. Within an hour the crowd, led by Bishop congregated at Fort Rupert. Armoured cars appeared on the scene. Bishop and five supporters were separated from the crowd and summarily executed. Between 50 and 400 others were also killed when bullets were fired into the crowd. On October 25, 1983 the United States invaded.

Officially, the U.S. did not "invade" Grenada - even though President Reagan himself first described it as such - but was "invited" to participate in a "Caribbean force", upon the request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). U.S. forces numbered over 10,000, the Caribbean support group was about 300 members, many of whom were not representative of OECS countries. Much of the U.S. arguments for invasion have proven to be legal fiction.⁸⁰ Further, the U.S. began planning

for an invasion almost one week before being "invited" to participate.⁸¹

The ultimate rationale, from the viewpoint of the United States, ex post facto, is that much documentation concerning the linkages between Grenada and Cuba, the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries was located and promptly taken to Washington. Thus the U.S. claimed to demonstrate that Grenada was drifting toward the USSR, precisely as the U.S. had warned - neglecting of course, to concede, that as a sovereign state Grenada, legally, possessed the right to conduct its own foreign relations. Further the U.S. claimed to find huge arms caches, ostensibly supporting their argument that Grenada was being prepared as a military base.

Much of the future of Grenada and the Eastern Caribbean lies directly in the hands of the U.S., even more than it did in the past. Indeed, if anything, one of the major lessons of Grenada must be that the U.S. is now more willing to pursue its goals, aggressively, regardless of the attitude of other states. The objectives of the U.S. for the hemisphere has, traditionally, been two-fold: one, that the region does not threaten the national security of the U.S.; two, that the region maintain a safe and stable climate for U.S. investments. That was the lesson of the U.S. invasion of Dominican Republic in 1965, and it is the lesson of Grenada in 1983. The legacy for the

Dominican Republic, twenty years later, is a society standing on the edge of chaos. The legacy for Grenada cannot be different.

Footnotes

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2. Caribbean Sun, April-May 1979. Quoted in Grenada: The Peaceful Revolution. Washington, EPICA Task Force. 1982. p.54.
3. Trinidad Express. April 1st, 1979. An interview with Maurice Bishop. This Trinidad daily newspaper was generally considered to be unfavorable to the Grenada revolution from late 1979 onwards. It strongly endorsed the U.S. invasion.
4. Ibid.
5. Lloyd Noel, "March 13 Coup and After". Jamaica, Daily Gleaner November 18, 1981. This conservative newspaper was continuously critical of the Bishop regime strongly endorsing the U.S. invasion which it termed an invasion of Caribbean forces supported by the U.S.
6. Ibid.
7. Marcus and Taber, op. cit., p. 25.
8. Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement was reproduced in Independence for Grenada: Myth or Reality. Trinidad, Institute of International Relations. 1974. p. 143-156.
9. Ibid., p.153.
10. For further details of the making of the 1982 budget see To Construct From Morning: Making the People's Budget in Grenada. St. George's, Fedon Publishers, 1982.
11. Interview with Maurice Bishop in World Marxist Review. 1982.
12. "Lines of March for the Party". A speech by Maurice Bishop to a 'general meeting of the party'. St. George's. September 13, 1982. p.3.
13. Ibid., p. 4.

14. Jacobs and Jacobs, Grenada the Route to Revolution. Havana, Casa de las Americas. 1980. p. 32.
15. Lines of March. op.cit., p. 4-6.
16. See for instance Marcus and Taber, op.cit. p.22. See also Jacobs and Jacobs, op.cit., Chapter IV.
17. Speech by Agriculture Minister Brizan was reported in the Trinidad Guardian. February 20, 1985. p.5.
18. NJM Manifesto. op.cit., p. 148.
19. Brizan in Trinidad Guardian, op.cit.
20. As quoted in S. Ryan, "The Grenada Questions." Caribbean Review Vol. XIII. No. 3. p. 39.
21. Marcus and Taber. op.cit., p. 294.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 295.
24. In the post-invasion period Grenada has undoubtedly suffered from a reduction in the number of doctors, since improved medical facilities during the Bishop period was the consequence of the presence of Cuban doctors and paramedics, all of whom have since returned to their country.
25. S. Ryan, op.cit., p. 7.
26. Economic Memorandum on Grenada. World Bank, August 1982.
27. Ibid.
28. Bishop's interview with the Trinidad Express. op. cit.
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30. Amnesty International Report 1983. London, Amnesty International Publications. 1983. p. 138.
31. Letters of Complaint from Russell Budhall and Layne Phillips. Mimes. June 1983.
32. Amnesty International Reports 1983. op. cit.
33. Country Reports of Human Rights Practices for 1983. Department of State. February, 1984. p. 569.

34. Secret Report on an Analysis of the Church in Grenada.
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Photocopy. 15 March. 1983.
35. Ibid.
36. Secret Report. Analysis of the Church in Grenada.
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12 July 1983. p.5.
37. Ibid., p.6.
38. D. Webster. The Role of "Leader Personality" in the
Foreign Policy of Grenada. M.A. Thesis. University of
the West Indies, Trinidad. October, 1983. The author
provides an interesting analysis of the foreign policy
of Gairy in Chapter II.
39. As quoted in Ibid., p. 46.
40. NJM Manifesto. op.cit., p. 154.
41. Ibid.
42. Marcus and Taber, op.cit., p. 29-30.
43. Ibid., p. 16-23.
44. Ibid., p. 75-77.
45. Ibid., p. 74.
46. Ibid., p. 31. The express "backyard" in its usage in the
Caribbean has a particular pejorative connotation.
47. NJM Manifesto. op.cit., p. 154.
48. Marcus and Taber. op.cit., 27-28.
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50. Marcus and Taber. op.cit., p. 27-28.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 31.

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The Atlantic Monthly. Colorado. February, 1984. p. 86-87.
54. Letter of Otto Reich, U.S. Department of State to Caribbean Review. op.cit., p. 4.
55. Sally Shelton, op.cit., p.5.
56. Marcus and Taber, op.cit., p.56.
57. Ibid., p. 54-55.
58. Sally Shelton, op.cit., p. 2-5.
59. Marcus and Taber, op.cit., p. 80 ff.
60. Ibid., p. 96-100.
61. An exerpt from Mr. Reagan's speech was reported in "Grenadian Menace", The Nation, 16 April, 1983. p.466.
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63. As quoted in M. Massing, op.cit., p. 83.
64. New York Times. 3 November 1983.
65. Request for Military Assistance to the Peoples Revolutionary Armed Forces of Grenada from the Armed Forces of the USSR. (Photocopy) 2nd July, 1982.
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79. Ibid.
80. See for instance American Journal of International Law, Vol. 78. No. 1. January, 1984. p. 131-175.
81. Report by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command on Operation Urgent Fury, to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. 28 February, 1984. The heavily censored public version of this Report provides interesting insights to the U.S. invasion.