7-2021

Militarism and the Militarization of Public Security in Latin America and the Caribbean

Carlos Solar
University of Essex

MILITARISM AND THE MILITARIZATION OF PUBLIC SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

CARLOS SOLAR

The Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, part of FIU's Steven J. Green School for International & Public Affairs was founded in 1985 to establish, promote, and advance the study of public policy and national security studies. The Gordon Institute serves as the forefront of public policy discourse by leading, integrating, and delivering exceptional multidisciplinary education and research while improving the competitiveness and diversity of students and professionals entering the workforce. The Gordon Institute is centered on four pillars: Academics, Professional Education, Research, and Community Outreach, each serving the mission of shaping public policy and national security solutions in the 21st century.

Acknowledgments

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

What do citizens think about their governments militarizing public security? While scholars maintain that current militarism and militarization macro trends jeopardize the already fragile state of democracy worldwide,[1] less research exists on people's opinions on the constabularization of the military, whether they support it, and, if so, under what conditions. While the effects of militarism and the militarization of security are evident in the Americas, most notably transmitted via images of soldiers complementing and replacing law enforcement agencies at times of social crisis, this report seeks potential answers to what this means in theory and practice.

The paper provides officers and officials with an interpretation of militarism and militarization as two crucial concepts to understand the current strategic arena in the Western Hemisphere. Here, examples abound, from positively encouraging U.S. military partners in the region to integrate policies with feminist perspectives – a clear signal toward the shift in gender roles of the armed forces – to the less rewarding iron-fist use of the whole-of-military participation in non-traditional roles that have led to human rights abuses and increased societal turbulence.

To map the relationships between citizens and the state of militarism and militarization in Latin America and the Caribbean,[2] the report uses empirical evidence to identify critical issues that might explain militarism and militarization experiences, including whether the police or military interfere with the private lives of individuals and the extent to which the chief executive is threatened by military force. It seeks to explain factors contributing to the constabularization of the military[3] by questioning citizens' satisfaction with the police and the judiciary.

The report also reviews theories of support for the militarization of security and asks whether this support is linked to measures of liberal democracy, the rule of law, state fragility, military expenditure, and active-duty military personnel. Finally, it analyzes a set of determinants of public support for militarization in more detail, presenting the case studies of Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay.

The results show that citizens supporting their national armed forces' collaboration with the United States in security issues also support militarizing public security. The idea that people are willing to welcome U.S. military collaboration might be a crucial policy determinant considering the central component of "building partnerships," as stated in SOUTHCOM's strategy, *Enduring Promise for the Americas*.[4]

The paper has two main sections. First, it unpacks an up-to-date understanding of militarism and militarization, aiming to feed academic and policy debates. Having a greater perspective on what citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean think about militarizing public security is germane and judicious. Governments manage different economic, partisan, and social determinants to shape security, and public opinion is considered a significant factor that influences decision-making regarding crime and security.

This research should help distinguish drivers and obstacles for democracy and human rights currently blurred by state-centered perspectives on security, peace, and the rule of law. Such an agenda poses a series of related questions. What is the "failure" of criminal justice institutions saying, and how does it affect the armed forces? What are the underlying views of citizens toward the militarization of public security? What effect do democracy and the rule of law have on the support for militarization? Offering a more inclusive and society-centered perspective on militarism and militarization should provide information on how citizens demand development and peace, how governments have responded to popular claims for greater security, and finally, the complexity and overlapping governance of public security and defense.

The second section of the report will also help expand our knowledge of militarism and militarization informing security and defense planners, specifically those preparing tailored policies toward conflict and peace in the region. It gives facts and data-driven analyses to those running military programs with think-alike partners in the region. The outcomes of this research will also be a point of reference for military officers traveling to the region, as well as those completing postgraduate studies at war

colleges and military universities. The practical lessons of this research seek to aid in building expertise and academic resources transferable to local military and law enforcement officials across the Western Hemisphere.

MILITARISM AND MILITARIZATION

The term militarism is broadly defined as "the intrusion of military considerations into the process of political and diplomatic decision-making."[5] It is also referred to as adopting military values, beliefs, and mentalities into civilian daily life. Similar premises across the social sciences argue that militarism promotes martial, bellicose, and warrior-like attitudes in educational, cultural, economic, and class structures. Militarism pervades beliefs in many democratic practices across daily rituals at home, school, and the workplace.[6] On the other hand, militarization considers the processes in which nations absorb and aspire to military practices, modes of organization, and martial discourses. Militarized speeches and attitudes usually stand behind the growth of armies, weapons stockpiles, states of national security, and the overall integration of military images and language to popular culture.[7]

While military historians have described what militarism entails in the affairs of war, imperialism, peace, and globalization,[8] military sociologists contributed to this agenda by examining the social determinants of militarism on crime, media, sexuality, and religion.[9] Feminist and critical perspectives exhibited in the works of Cynthia Enloe,[10] Amina Mama and Margo Okazawa-Rey,[11] and Lynne Segal,[12] offer a great deal of knowledge on how race and gender perspectives counter trauma, pain, and bias as outcomes of militarism. Qualitatively, the ability of the military to dominate and influence government policies and social organization has long been recognized in the post-World War II era.[13] Quantitatively, William Eckhardt[14] and Alan Newcombe[15] laid fertile ground to grasp the social attitudes affecting militarism and militarization.[16]

This report is a partial view of militarism as there are too many cutting-edge theories about gender, ethnicity, religion, crime, and human rights that can help explain its current forms. Despite the exponential growth in the field, the sociological study of militarism has only partially captured public attitudes in reflexive and critical ways to inform policymakers. Many militaristic processes combining war and peace with military and civilian life are regarded as a large-scale problem. Societies give different meanings to the duties of the warrior class, from preserving humanity's security by enacting liberal values to imposing national unity through what some consider a perennial state of war mobilization.[17] Postmodern militarism and the effects of militarization as organized state violence are used today to "remedy" many social phenomena, from educating the young and vulnerable, countering transnational criminality, and crushing mass street protests, to most recently aiding in the fight against COVID-19.

Twenty-first century militarism has driven the military to perform social and political tasks. Against what others have predicted,[18] the armed forces remain highly connected to society in various ways. In turn, the public retains its confidence in the military.[19] Such forms of militarism demand a further explanation to inform policymakers at all levels.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

Due to a culture of global warfare expanding after September 11, 2001, and heavily influenced by the "American century,"[20] militarism is said to be profoundly affecting the ways civilians and organized institutions deal with issues of peace, security, crime, freedom, democracy, and national unity.

The ad hoc forms of militarism and militarization taking shape worldwide focus attention on the cultural and attitudinal differences between societal groups. Features of militarism still constitute the foundations of social life – symbols, language, culture, values, or national identity. Philippe Frowd and Adam Sandor, for example, find militarism "helpful for efforts to understand the fetishization of the state's organized coercive capacities," and

give meaning to militarization "as a way of grasping intervention practices' shift toward martial violence."[21] However, they claim that both terms lack powerful explanations on how "global and local actors avoid militarization," and how networks of actors and practices compete to sustain and push back militarism and militarization. West and Matthewman argue that the sociology of war and the military is better approached by overlapping relationships between the military and civil society.[22] Researchers should be mindful to focus on "cases of cultural shifts in the direction of militarism," and "the multi-dimensional ways that the military influences culture."[23] Anthropological approaches emphasize the study of influences, attitudes, and ideologies that explain militarism and warfare (e.g., defense expenditure, army size, training, and civil-military relations) and show concern about other factors such as ideals of masculinity and nationalism, patriotism, and globalism.[24]

Ironically, militarism is regarded by some in society and government as a solution to "restore" peace and societal order.[25] Nonetheless, state-organized violence has been shown to reinforce the brutal use of violence and systemic abuse of individuals and their collective rights and freedom. Sociological work regarding the debate on militarism and its effects on peace, violence, human rights, and genocide sheds light on the perpetual militarization of those in power to solve all-out war and civil conflict.[26]

In Africa, for example, Rita Abrahamsen describes a scenario where an unquestioning and "feel-good" attitude toward militarism enshrines the armed forces' influence in the name of development and their role to fight violent extremism.[27] In Latin America and the Middle East, the military has putative functions in fighting crime, often adding more abuses and violence, especially against the impoverished urban classes.[28] State agents (e.g., from the police and the armed forces) have suppressed crowds chanting for better living conditions.

In Europe, militarism in the above terms has decelerated but has been exacerbated in other ways. Shaw argued that the process of demilitarization kicked in as countries reduced their conscription, defense expenditures, and most notably when societies became used to living without mass-scale wars and the intrusion of conflict and violence in domestic life.[29] Militarism across Western Europe may no longer be about open or direct military rule or the top military brass occupying a dominant position of decision-making and power across nations.[30] Critics would argue that while countries in Europe have steered away from "military imperialism," the United States, with its massive military establishment, reaches every corner of the world.[31]

Being the largest military power in the world raises questions for decision-makers in the United States and across the Western Hemisphere. Particularly relevant for SOUTHCOM's strategic priorities[32] evolving manifestations of militarism in the Americas reveal ongoing shifts in the broad national strategic scenario. The presence of Russia and China points to countries putting developmental and economic partnerships first, thus trying to acquire valuable means to maximize their developmental paths. Beijing and Moscow are highly militaristic countries and embrace diplomatic relations with the Americas based on providing governments with economic and security independence from Washington.

The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the U.S.-China and Russia divide as many countries have opted for the resources provided by Beijing and Moscow, most notably, acquiring vast quantities of vaccines made in the two countries to alleviate exhausted healthcare systems.[33] The COVID-19 militaristic response across the region has involved the military, who took an active role in delivering health-related services and security roles. In Brazil, for example, militarized responses to the pandemic (i.e., giving logistical responsibilities to the armed forces) corroborated the ongoing, extreme reliance on security forces to help the government execute and deliver social policy, although, under President Jair Bolsonaro, this began well before the pandemic.[34] In Chile, the military had previously suppressed the *estallido social* before turning to pandemic-related humanitarian roles and enforcing lockdown policies.[35] In Colombia, the armed forces also began supporting the police in urban areas and neighborhoods and considerably restricted individual liberties for long periods.[36]

In Mexico and the Northern Triangle, the pandemic exacerbated the ongoing trend of criminal organizations gaining control over communities, triggering governments to further rely on the armed forces for combating crime and violence.[37] In Peru, governments called for thousands of reserves to help enforce the national emergency, control quarantines, and aid in the flow of supply medical supply chains across the heavily populated provinces.[38] These sorts of responses to COVID-19 are not unique to Latin American and Caribbean nations. Around the world, leaders have securitized and declared war on COVID-19,[39] thus making one question what these and other current trends on militarism mean for the legitimacy of public institutions and the armed forces themselves.

MILITARISM IN THE AMERICAS

Militarism across parts of the Americas unfolds in unique ways, driven partly by the economic globalization of states (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia) navigating various budgetary restrictions and other financial and political-cultural processes from developing liberal democracies.[40] Since the end of the Cold War, internationalized military responses have given rise to a less intense but equally globalized militarism (e.g., from conflict intervention and peacekeeping operations in the Americas and abroad to growing military links Russia and China).[41] Many forms of militarization remain present, most notably in Venezuela and Brazil, where military reform has failed.[42] Examples include the military-industrial complex, the militarization of policing and intelligence agencies, the use of military contractors, the establishment of digital surveillance programs, recent armed interventions in urban contexts, and ongoing defensive and offensive cybersecurity and defense policies.[43] A. Coskun Samli maintains that "accelerating militarism is not likely to be beneficial to anybody with the possible exception of a few global corporate giants using globalization as a weapon to increase their economic gains."[44]

Yet, across the geographic Americas, some forms of militarization have decreased their rate of progress. This trend goes toward diminishing militaristic control over national resources and the military's overextended apparatus. Figure 1 shows a two-way graph with multiple y-axes. The left axis indicates the military dimension index measured by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project; the right axis shows military expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP).[45] At first sight, the extent to which the power base of the chief executive is determined by threat or force by the military has decreased, most notably in Central America, while the trend in South America has been irregular but generally in a downward fashion. This was not a problem until later in North America, where scores are usually low but have trended slightly upward since 2015.

Researchers have explored the link between militarism and globalization, operationalizing militarism by military expenditure, demonstrating that countries undergoing greater globalization have relatively large increases in militarization.[46] Since 2009, military spending in Latin America has shown a subtle but decreasing trend, after an increasing trend started in 2003. Military budgets as a proportion of gross domestic product have fallen, with most countries scoring below the 2 percent threshold except for the Colombian armed forces receiving 3.2 percent of the country's GDP, well above the average 1.2 percent of GDP across the region.

Previous studies have operationalized militarism as a quantifiable variable by measuring the total percentage of soldiers in a population.[47] For this purpose, Figure 2 shows the size of the armed forces by personnel in selected world regions. Like the trend captured in Graph 1, the percentage of armed forces personnel as a part of the total labor force in Latin America and the Caribbean has remained steady since the turn of the century, likewise South Asia. In the European Union, East Asia and the Pacific, North America, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of armed forces personnel has decreased. The extreme case is Venezuela, with military personnel accounting for 2.7 percent of the total labor force.

Another sign of reduced militarism is when the population has little desire for armies leading their countries if all else fails. Table 1 shows the responses of Latin Americans regarding whether the armed forces should take over when crime and corruption are high. The percentages indicate that among those countries scrutinized, both scenarios are not supported by an average difference of 10 percentage points in favor of those not justifying military takeovers in 2004-2018.

The data above demonstrates the plausible idea of austerity among armies, policymakers pushing toward demilitarization, and, up to a certain point, clearer boundaries between peace and war mobilization. However, militarism, as the ideology and belief that underlie militaristic tendencies, and militarization as the process by which militarism reaches civil society, have affected attitudes predicting strong confidence and support for national armies.

Graph 3 shows the levels of public trust in the armed forces, the police, and citizen support for the armed forces fighting crime and violence in a selection of Latin American and Caribbean countries. The scale in points (*x*-axis) is common to the confidence measures and the militarization of public security argument from 1 (no trust/strongly disagree) to 7 (a lot of trust/strongly agree). The results show that in all countries, confidence in the national police is below the levels of trust in the armed forces. Support for the idea of militarization of crime and violence is, on the other hand, more firmly supported with the largest levels of support in El Salvador, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Suriname.

FIGURE 1. MILITARY DIMENSION AND ARMED FORCES EXPENDITURE

Source: Author's creation with data from V-Dem Project and SIPRI.

FIGURE 2. ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL IN SELECTED WORLD REGIONS

Source: Author's creation with data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.[50]

TABLE 1. COUP SUPPORT IN THE AMERICAS

	Coup is Justified when Crime is High (%)								
	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018	Total
Yes, a military takeover is justified	50.3	49.3	52.1	44	41.7	35.7	41.6	41.7	44.6
No, a military takeover is not justified	49.7	50.7	47.9	56	58.3	64.3	58.4	58.3	55.4
	Coup is Justified when Corruption is High (%)								
Yes, a military takeover is justified	51.9	45	47.9	43	40.3	42.7	40	40	44.1
No, a military takeover is not justified	48.1	55	52.1	57	59.7	57.3	60	60	55.9

Source: Author's creation with data from the The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer various rounds.[51]

FIGURE 3. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note and source: Observations indicate mean values. The militarization question used above was added to the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer.[52]

FIGURE 4. FREQUENCY IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE POLICE OR MILITARY INTERFERING WITH PEOPLE'S PRIVATE LIVES IN PERCENTAGES

Notes: Values recorded from 2017 through 2020.
Source: Created by author with data from World Values Survey.[53]

FIGURE 5. SATISFACTION WITH POLICE PERFORMANCE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Source: Author's creation with data from AmericasBarometer. The above question was used in the 2014 round of the survey.[54]

The relatively strong support for the militarization of public security in Latin America comes at a point when the role of the police and the military in people's private lives seems to be increasing. Figure 4 shows worldwide levels of security agents' interference in people's neighborhoods interrupting their daily activities. From the global sample, countries such as Argentina, Guatemala, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile show some of the highest percentages of the frequency in which the police or military interfere with private life, although in other countries, the percentages are quite low (e.g., Bolivia and Peru).

Against this background, evaluations of police performance at the local level generally show different perceptions and lesser or greater satisfaction with police performance. Figure 5 shows the constants of countries where a majority of the population is satisfied versus those in which most are unsatisfied with the police's performance in their neighborhood. Despite such evidence, it is challenging to visualize common patterns since some countries have been plagued by crime and violence, police corruption, and "tough on crime" policies. However, satisfaction with the police remains visible despite violent crimes and homicides escalating to unparalleled levels (e.g., El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, among others). Finally, greater percentages of police performance satisfaction are seen in the Caribbean (e.g., Suriname, the Bahamas, and Barbados).

Although official statistics in the region do not always indicate the "true" scale of crime, the miscarriages of the criminal justice system and the agencies in it (police, prosecutors, courts, prisons, among others) have had a cumulative effect on the reported victims of crime and violence and the non-victims who witnessed failures in the procedural and substantive nature of criminal justice. Table 2 shows confidence levels in the outcomes of justice in select Latin American and Caribbean countries across different rounds of the AmericasBarometer public opinion survey. At first glance, some exemplary countries where the militarization of public security has ignited recent debates seem to have populations with little confidence that the judiciary will punish the guilty. As mentioned earlier, there is less satisfaction with police performance in Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala, among other countries.

TABLE 2. CONFIDENCE THAT THE JUDICIARY WILL PUNISH THE GUILTY

	A lot + Some (%)	Little + None (%)	Total (%)	Year
Mexico	26.2	73.8	100 (N= 1546)	2019
Peru	28.1	71.9	100 (N= 1,509)	2019
Paraguay	28.2	71.8	100 (N= 1,509)	2019
Colombia	32.4	67.6	100 (N= 1,651)	2018
El Salvador	33.3	66.7	100 (N= 1,458)	2018
Guatemala	35.6	64.4	100 (N= 1,513)	2019
Belize	39.2	60.8	100 (N= 1,511)	2014
Guyana	40.6	59.3	100 (N= 1,488)	2014
Trinidad and Tobago	42.4	57.6	100 (N=4,072)	2014
Honduras	44.5	55.4	100 (N= 1,496)	2018
Dominican Republic	44.7	55.3	100 (N= 1,196)	2019
Nicaragua	50.3	47.6	100 (N= 1,510)	2019
Jamaica	50.5	49.5	100 (N= 1,394)	2019
Ecuador	52.2	47.8	100 (N= 1,517)	2016
Bahamas	54.9	45.1	100 (N= 3,332)	2014
Barbados	63.8	36.2	100 (N= 3,633)	2014
Suriname	75.2	24.8	100 (N= 3,661)	2014

Note and source: The question used above comes in country-specific surveys in different rounds of the AmericasBarometer.[55]

MACRO INDICATORS CORRELATED TO MILITARIZATION

In this section, five questions are posited and answered. First, is support for the militarization of security correlated to liberal democracy scores? If so, is there a positive or negative correlation? Second, is support for the militarization of crime and violence correlated to the rule of law? That is, is this a positive or negative association? Third, is support for the militarization of crime and violence linked to state fragility measures? For instance, while views on militarization progress or regress, what happens to measures on state fragility? Fourth, can support for the militarization of crime and violence be linked to higher levels of military expenditure? If so, is this a statistically significant association? Fifth, what is the correlation between supporting the militarization of crime and violence and the level of armed forces personnel? That is, while views on militarization are high or low, what is the degree of association with active-duty military personnel?

A few initial ideas can be understood by reviewing the descriptive statistics of what hereafter are the variables measuring the above questions. From Table 1, the sample of countries (N =18) in the study has a means of support for the militarization of crime and violence of 5.38 in a Likert Scale in which 1 is the lowest score, meaning strong disagreement, and 7 is the highest score, a firm agreement with the idea that the military should combat crime and violence. Scores in this measure range from a minimum of 4.48 in Uruguay to a maximum of 5.98 in El Salvador. One initial interpretation is that people in the countries surveyed welcome the idea that the armed forces should battle crime. This is understood by dividing the range of answers into two halves (from 1 to 3.5, meaning not agreeing to militarize public security, and from 3.6 to 7, agreeing to militarize it). Because the original scale is continuous, it should be treated as a continuum of preferences for an Ordinary Least Squares regression later in the analysis.[56]

The next item to account for is the liberal democracy index brought into question to measure whether there is a correlation with the militarization variable. Here, the scores from the 2020 dataset of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project correspond to each of the countries sampled.[57] A brief explanation of how this measure works will be presented shortly with a series of scatterplots with overlaid linear prediction plots. For now, there is an assumption that the liberal democracy score runs from 0 being the lowest to 1 being the greatest extent of what the ideal of liberal democracy achieves. Countries scored a mean of .48, with the lowest being Nicaragua (.06) and the highest Uruguay (.79).

Next, a measure of the rule of law was also taken from the V-Dem project dataset for 2020. In similar fashion to the previous indicator, this measure runs from 0 to 1. In Table 1, the sample scored a mean of .50, with the lowest score assigned again to Nicaragua and the highest to Uruguay.

The state fragility index covers a wide range of failure risk elements and, thus, complements the previous two measures on macro indicators. This measure runs contrary to expectations from 0 to 120, the latter indicating the worst situated country. The sample of countries in this analysis has a mean score of 63.5, with Uruguay scoring 33.4 points and Guatemala 79.2 points, the worst score in the sample.

Finally, there are two proxy measures of contemporary militarization elements a country can portray: the proportion of its military expenditure and the size of its active-duty military personnel. Both measures are captured as percentages, the former as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) and the latter as a proportion of the economically active population. Table 3 shows that countries spend a minimum of 0.4 percent of their GDP on military expenditure, as in the case of Guatemala, all the way to 3.2 percent of GDP in Colombia. Regarding armed personnel, the lowest proportions of active-duty personnel are 0.4 percent (Barbados, Jamaica, and Nicaragua) and the highest is 1.8 percent of the total labor force (Colombia).

From the information provided in Table 3, there is no empirically informed answer to whether the set of variables indicated are correlated in any way to the militarization argument. For that, there is a series of scatterplots with an overlaid linear prediction plot. Figure 4, for example, shows the relationship between the mean scores of whether the armed forces should combat crime and violence (hereafter, the militarization variable) with the liberal democracy scores. The extent to which the ideal of the liberal democracy model is achieved is a simplified measure of the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government (i.e., to what length is the exercise of executive power limited via constitutional civil liberties, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances).[59]

From Figure 4, there is a partial answer to whether support for the militarization of security is correlated to liberal democracy scores and if it is a positive or negative association. The line of best fit shown in red depicts a negative association meaning that when the militarization variable is high, liberal democracy scores are low. Because the liberal democracy score had a mean of 0.48, there is an assumption that some countries scored below and above this mark, and to the left and right of the militarization axis.

If the focus is on the countries scoring above or below the mean values for the militarization variable, the mean value was 5.38. Although it is not this paper's intention to explore each country's contexts in detail, at least two groups become visually identifiable using the mean's values as cutting points: Those scoring high in militarization and low in liberal democracy (e.g., Brazil, Guatemala, Guyana, Paraguay, Mexico, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Honduras) and those scoring low in militarization and high in liberal democracy (e.g., Peru, Jamaica, and Suriname).[60] The full picture is revealed when looking at the correlation values shown in Table 2. Thus, the liberal democracy scores are negatively and statistically significant to the militarization variable (Pearson coefficient is moderate at $r = -.61$, $p < .05$).

TABLE 3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Militarization	18	5.38	.41	4.48	5.98
Liberal Democracy Score	16	.481	.19	.06	.79
Rule of Law	16	.508	0.51	.25	.93
State Fragility	18	63.5	12.1	33.4	79.2
Military Expenditure	15	1.28	0.71	.4	3.2
Armed Personnel	18	.85	0.41	.4	1.8

Sources: Authors' construction with data from AmericasBarometer, V-Dem Project, SIPRI, IISS, and the Fragile State Index.[58]

TABLE 4. CORRELATION ESTIMATES

	Armed Forces Should Combat	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Crime and Violence	18	5.38	.41	4.48	5.98
Liberal Democracy Score	-0.61*	.481	.19	.06	.79
Rule of Law	-0.70*	.508	0.51	.25	.93
State Fragility	0.655*	63.5	12.1	33.4	79.2
Military Expenditure	-0.24	1.28	0.71	.4	3.2
Armed Personnel	0.02	.85	0.41	.4	1.8

Note: * correlation coefficients significant at the 5 percent level or better

FIGURE 6. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY SCORES AND SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note: Line of best fit shown in red.
*Source*: Author's construction with data from the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer and V-Dem Project.[61]

FIGURE 7. RULE OF LAW AND SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note: Line of best fit shown in red.
Source: Author's construction with data from the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer and V-Dem Project.[63]

The same exercise uncovers the association between the rule of law and support for the militarization of crime and violence. Figure 5 shows a two-way linear prediction plot with the V-Dem project variable measuring the rule of law on the *y*-axis. The rule of law predictor measures a series of elements, including: the independence of the judiciary; the extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters; the existence of direct civil control over the police; the protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, and torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and the extent to which laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population.[62]

In Figure 5, most countries are in the lower right quadrant, where the lesser levels of the rule of law and higher levels of militarization meet. As exceptions, only Uruguay and Barbados show values greater than the mean of the rule of law and values lower than the mean of militarization. On the other hand, Trinidad and Tobago indicate lower levels of the rule of law and low levels of militarization, using the means for both measures as cutting points. The line of best fit shows a negative direction of the association between both variables, and the Pearson correlation estimate in Table 2 indicates a moderate to strong correlation ($r = -.70$, $p < .05$).

Next is the study of the relationships between state fragility and support for the militarization of crime and violence. The State Fragility Index ranks states' risk elements including the loss of physical control of territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, the inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.[64]

Figure 6 shows a two-way linear prediction plot with the state fragility variable on the *y*-axis and the militarization variable on the *x*-axis. The line of best fit shows a sharp ascending straight line indicating a possible positive relationship between the two variables. In Table 2, the correlation is positive and moderate ($r = .65$, $p < .05$). The higher the score in the state fragility index, the higher a country's risk elements are perceived. The sample of countries is, as Figure 6 suggests, highly concentrated in the quadrant

of high state fragility and high militarization, except for Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, the Bahamas, and Uruguay. Thus, according to the measures considered in the study, support for the militarization of crime and violence is linked to state fragility measures.

Finally, two elements concerning militarization are contrasted: military expenditure and the proportion of armed personnel. The results of the Pearson correlation in Table 2 show that neither of these two measures is statistically significant to the militarization variable.

Nonetheless, in Figure 7, countries with a higher mean perception that the armed forces should combat crime and violence tend to budget for military spending below 2 percent of the GDP benchmark. The only exception is Colombia, with a military expenditure of 3.2 percent of GDP, well above that of the rest of the sample. Figure 8 shows two different cases presented when exploring the relationship between armed forces personnel as a proportion of total labor force and militarization. On the one hand, Uruguay shows the lower mean for the militarization variables, although its active-duty personnel size is comparable to countries at the higher end of militarization, such as the Dominican Republic and El Salvador. From the analyzed sample, there is no support to argue that the militarization of crime and violence is linked to higher levels of military expenditure or a higher proportion of armed forces personnel.

FIGURE 8. STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE


Note: Line of best fit shown in red.
Source: Author's construction with data from the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer and Fragile States Index.[65]

FIGURE 9. MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note: Line of best fit shown in red.
Source: Author's construction with data from the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer round 2014 and SIPRI.[66]

FIGURE 10. ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL AND SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note: Line of best fit is shown in red.
Source: Author's construction with data from the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer round 2014 and IISS.[67]

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MILITARIZATION: HONDURAS, MEXICO, AND URUGUAY

In this section, case studies of Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay examine key socioeconomic and political beliefs potentially linked to one person's support for the militarization of crime and violence. Linear regression is modeled predicting associations between a continuous dependent variable and a set of independent variables. These three countries are used based on their different mean scores for what hereafter will be the dependent variable or "whether the armed forces should combat crime and violence" as included in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer (i.e., *militarization* variable). Honduras scored the highest mean (5.89), and Uruguay the lowest (4.48). It could be presumed that countries with different outcomes in their population's perception of militarization could provide an array of explanations on the association of the dependent variable with the selected independent variables.

A second evidence-based reason, and the strongest case to include Mexico (mean of militarization = 5.57) as a third case study, is to present countries with varied constitutional roles and missions given to the military in the fight against crime and violence. Other methodologies of case selection could have emphasized different elements, thus being representative of other subsets of countries different from the ones identified. However, these cases were chosen to provide a workable analysis capturing different base conditions that trigger the same response: the militarization of public security.

In Honduras, the military joined other constabulary forces to create military police units. This condition is seen in other countries where the armed forces are currently an active player among a web of crime-fighting institutions (e.g., El Salvador, Guatemala, and Bolivia). Since the 2013 formation of the Military Police of Public Order (*Policía Militar del Orden Público* or PMOP), there has been an increase in budgets given to the Secretariat of National Defense (*Secretaría de Defensa Nacional*) to implement broader roles and missions of public security

across Honduras.[68] Like other countries where the armed forces now command missions that often supersede paramilitary agencies dealing with policing and crime (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela), the Mexican military executes and takes a leading role in essential matters once performed by federal or local police and civilian agencies.[69] On the other hand, Uruguay is a country where a revamped legal framework allows it to focus on targeted missions, most likely against transnational organized crime (e.g., Argentina and Chile).[70] The Uruguayan military has limited roles in contrast to Honduras and Mexico (i.e., patrolling the border up to 20 kilometers inside its territory, except for urban areas). By law, it can run identification checks on people and vehicles and arrest in cases of flagrant crimes.

This paper hypothesizes that demographic factors will reveal different degrees of association with support toward militarization. Because militarism exacerbates gender inequalities replicating masculine and patriarchal features,[71] males are more likely to support militarization than females (H_1) based on the idea that women can perceive the military and militarism as hyper-masculinized institutions.[72] Those living in urban areas (H_2) are more likely to support the current phenomena of militarizing public security, as criminality and violence have had a more significant impact in bigger cities and peripheral urban areas with larger pockets of inequality.[73] Militarization also occurs in rural zones where other security problems have demanded traditional and non-traditional military approaches to fight organized crime linked to guerrillas and private paramilitary forces. For the sake of simplicity, this study will test the former idea only.

The following hypothesis argues that the fewer years of education completed, the more likely individuals are to support the militarization of security (H_3). The link between the militarization of schools and the education of teenagers has been widely researched.[74] Youth are confronted with a "web of militarism," ranging from military recruiters visiting schools and paramilitary programs to career guidance promoting the armed forces,[75] making them more suited to support militarism and militarization. Previous research has emphasized that some military ethos initiatives usually target boys and girls

from disadvantaged backgrounds to make them "economically and socially productive," educating and socializing them through military service.[76] Another hypothesis is that household income will be negatively associated with militarization (H_4). This hypothesis is based on evidence that the military has covered institutional gaps and structural deficits when governments fail to implement social policy, subsequently affecting the lower and most vulnerable classes.[77]

Those trusting the military will also be more likely to support militarization (H_5). Because war, peace, soldiers, and the military institution pervade public consciousness, citizens might tacitly endorse the armed forces and support the militarization of public security as intertwined and indistinguishable phenomena.[78] On the other hand, those not trusting the police are more likely to support militarization (H_6) because the militarization of crime is an outcome of the failure of the police to provide peace and security. The military is regarded as different from the police, having greater confidence from the public than criminal justice and political institutions.[79]

Moreover, perceptions and experiences with insecurity can predict support for militarization among the public. First, victims of crime (H_7) and those believing gangs affect their neighborhoods (H_8) are more likely to support the militarization of crime. On the contrary, those who have been asked for a bribe (H_9), specifically from a soldier or military, will not support militarizing public security.

Another set of related variables measures different attributes of the military as an organization. Those believing the armed forces are well trained (H_{10}) and respect human rights (H_{11}) are more likely to support militarization. In addition, individuals who think the United States should work with their national armies to improve national security (H_{12}) are more likely to see some form of partnership capitalizing on the militarization of public security.

Finally, a positive relationship between those favoring coups when crime (H_{13}) and corruption (H_{14}) proliferate is more likely to support the militarization of public security. Pro-militarism and militarization attitudes will be associated positively with individuals who self-identify with authoritarian views. Historically, militarism has been related to advocating a militarized foreign policy and authoritarian forms of domestic control as the antithesis of progressive politics.[80] Those disappointed with democratically elected civilians will support militarization as a dominant force capable of solving crime and violence in a way that democratic institutions have been incapable of doing.[81]

Table 5 shows the coefficients of a linear regression model using militarization variables as the outcome.[82] The first set of variables are used as controls and include gender, place of residence, years of schooling, and monthly household income (see Appendix Table A1 for the variables used in the analysis and their recodification, and Table A2 for the variables summary statistics).

First, the results indicate that living in urban areas ($\beta = .21$, $p < .05$) compared to rural zones and higher household income are positively and statistically significant with the view that the armed forces should combat crime in Honduras, but not in Mexico or Uruguay. Another statistically important control variable is years of schooling, which is negatively associated with support for militarization in Uruguay.

Second, the following two variables assume support for political institutions. Here, the consideration is whether trust in the national police and the armed forces are significant predictors of militarization. The results suggest that trust in the police is negatively and statistically considerable with the militarization variable in Uruguay, and support for the armed forces is positively and statistically significant in Uruguay and Mexico. This is an expected but revealing finding for Uruguay. The results suggest that citizens prefer the military and support militarization (although, as mentioned before, to a lesser degree than in the other two countries).

Third, the model measuring victimization, gang presence, whether a soldier requested a bribe to account for individual experiences, and perceptions of insecurity included a subgroup of three variables. Surprisingly, none of the predictors turned out to be statistically significant toward explaining the militarization outcome.

TABLE 5. LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL FOR THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD COMBAT CRIME AND VIOLENCE

DV: Militarization	Honduras	Mexico	Uruguay
Gender	0.098 (0.082)	-0.033 (0.117)	-0.058 (0.1170
Residence	0.216* (0.092)	0.068 (0.2310	-0.343 (0.231)
Education	-0.013 (0.011)	0.004*** (0.016)	-0.066*** (0.016)
Income	0.034*** (0.011)	-0.017 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)
Trust in police	-0.019 (0.024)	-0.039*** (0.036)	-0.138*** (0.036)
Trust in military	0.034 (0.026)	0.218*** (0.038)	0.280*** (0.038)
Victim of crime	0.076 (0.027)	0.143 (0.137)	0.129 (0.1370
Gangs in neighborhood	0.001 (0.109)	-0.138 (0.130)	0.166 (0.130)
Soldier requested bribe	0.297 (0.182)	0.379 (1.869)	0.942 (1.869)
Military is well organized and trained	0.135*** (0.028)	-	-
Military respects human rights	0.029 (0.027)	0.134 (0.040)	0.059 (0.040)
Military should work with the U.S.	0.206*** (0.025)	0.099*** (0.028)	0.278*** (0.028)
Coup is justified when crime is high	0.098 (0.109)	0.248 (0.193)	0.403* (0.193)
Coup is justified when corruption is high	0.074 (0.102)	0.235*** (0.188)	0.805*** (0.188)
Constant	3.409*** (0.201)	3.471*** (0.352)	3.084*** (0.352)
Adj R-squared N	.14 1246	.17 947	.34 1096

Note: Regression coefficients with standard error in parentheses. * $p < .05$, * $p < .01$, * $p < .001$

Source: Author's construction with data from the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer.

Fourth, three variables related to the roles and missions of the armed forces were included to predict perceptions of preparedness and organization, respect for human rights, and cooperation with the United States. Only Honduran citizens were asked whether the armed forces were well trained and organized, which eventually became a statistically significant predictor of support for militarization. Mexicans believing the armed forces respect human rights are also willing to support the militarization of public security, but not citizens from Honduras or Uruguay. Finally, another unanticipated result is that in Honduras ($ß = .20$, $p <. 05$), Mexico ($ß = .09$, $p <. 05$), and Uruguay ($ß = .28$, $p <. 05$), cooperation with the U.S. military on security issues is positively and statistically correlated with militarization.

Fifth, the model included two variables asking citizens whether they support military coups. It turns out citizens supporting a military takeover in conditions of high crime and high corruption were statistically significant with the militarization variable in Mexico and Uruguay.

CONCLUSION

This report was written from a military sociology point of view aimed at scholars and policy officials with a multidisciplinary background and growing interest in exploring the intended and unintended effects of militarism and militarization in the Americas. The paper introduced critical theories of militarism understood as the way societies adopt martial, bellicose, and warrior-like attitudes to deal with daily problems. This paper also explored the notion that militaristic approaches capture decision-making processes by examining military missions and roles and the militarization of non-army institutions such as the police.

For policy purposes, the report concentrated on regional issues of pressing importance, including conflict, social inequality, and violence, to understand why some argue we live under a perennial state of war mobilization and growing criminalization of human conduct. As scholars have contended, recent events around the world, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the

terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the global financial crash, shed light on militarism affecting lay citizens and organized institutions.[84]

The paper reported on new empirical links considering militaristic attitudes perceived by the public and informed by whether it thinks one of the roles of the military is to keep or re-establish peace in their countries. Theoretically, militaristic attitudes recreate the fundamental link between armies and conflict, establishing an "other," different from the "self," deemed the enemy of peace. Authors including Horace Campbell,[85] Michael Mann,[86] and Jacqui True[87] agree that the idea of a world becoming less prosperous and more violent reinforces societal symbols based on military preparation for war and perpetual dominance of a militarized peace. The "other" is usually constructed by exacerbating features that criminals and those affecting peace through the means of violence can portray.[88]

Attitudes toward militarism give the armed forces the role of defending values, such as freedom and democracy, which justify, prioritize, and sustain military influence to deter perceived threats such as criminality. Militarization is, among other things, the extension in time and place of the functions of the military. Such roles are often beyond the scope of the institution. However, from humanitarian aid to securing voting stations, postmodern missions ultimately portray an image of security, protection, bonding, family, kinship, and the unification of humans beyond military bases.[89]

This report explores militarism via various macro factors, including democratic consolidation. For example, in some parts of Europe, militarism is regarded as incongruent with democracy after the revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century.[90] A look at history since the creation of armies has proven that mass armies become "instrument[s] of usurpation and tyranny at home, and of oppression abroad." Liberals learned that their self-imposed "democratic practices" unintendedly resulted in the further militarization of society, most notably making conscription and military values "authentic" manifestations of civil society.[91]

In Latin America and the Caribbean, nations maintaining militarized societies might see militarism go unchallenged, and even worse,

turned against the people's will, especially if the ruling elites are disconnected from the interest and sympathies of the general populace. Still, there is hope if large, influential, and powerful organizations such as the U.S. defense establishment starts questioning what militarism and militarization mean and consequently discuss – at the highest levels of policy-making – how militarism affects society, violence outside armed conflict, criminality, human rights, and environmental protection. This paper sets the ground for such debate.

APPENDIX

	Recodification
DV: Militarization	The Armed Forces ought to participate in combating crime and violence. How much do you agree or disagree? 1 (min) to 7 (max)
Gender	0 = female; 1 = male
Residence	0 = female; 1 = male
Education	How many years of schooling have you completed? 0 (min) to 18 (max)
Household Income	Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children? 0 (min) to 16 (max)
Institutional confidence	
Police	To what extent do you trust the National Police? 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot)
Armed Forces	To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot)
Security	
Victim of crime	Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats, or any other type of crime? 0 = no; 1 = yes
Gangs	To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none? 0 = not at all or a little; 1 = some or a lot
Bribe	In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe? 0 = no, 1 = yes
Military	
Training and organization	To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces are well trained and organized? 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot)
Human rights	To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces respect human rights nowadays? 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot)
Work with the United States	To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces of the United States of America ought to work together with the Armed Forces to improve national security? 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot)
Coups	Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would it be justified under the following circumstances.
Against crime	When there is a lot of crime. 0 = no, 1 = yes
Against corruption	When there is a lot of corruption. 0 = no, 1 = yes

TABLE A1. VARIABLES AND THEIR RECODIFICATION FOR MODEL IN FIGURE 9

Source: Author's construction with data from the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer.[92]

TABLE A2. SUMMARY STATISTICS

	N	Mean	Std. Dev	Min-Max
Militarization	1557	5.89	1.50	1 – 7
Gender	1561	.50	.50	0 – 1
Residence	1561	.54	.49	0 – 1
Education	1559	7.40	5.33	0 – 18
Income	1430	6.14	4.51	0 – 16
Trust in police	1555	3.80	1.94	1 – 7
Trust in military	1549	4.84	1.94	1 – 7
Victim of crime	1558	.18	.38	0 – 1
Gangs in neighborhood	1539	.19	.38	0 – 1
Soldier requested bribe	1560	.06	.22	0 – 1
Military is well organized and trained	1524	5.03	1.78	1 – 7
Military respects human rights	1525	4.13	1.80	1 – 7
Military should work with the U.S.	1537	5.72	1.75	1 – 7
Coup is justified when crime is high	1465	.31	.46	0 – 1
Coup is justified when corruption is high	1472	.41	.49	0 – 1

HONDURAS

	N	Mean	Std. Dev	Min-Max
Militarization	1507	5.57	1.61	1 – 7
Gender	1535	.49	.50	0 – 1
Residence	1535	.80	.39	0 – 1
Education	1533	9.19	4.38	0 – 18
Income	1168	8.56	4.03	0 – 16
Trust in police	1527	3.33	1.82	1 – 7
Trust in military	1494	5.01	1.72	1 – 7
Victim of crime	1530	.23	.42	0 – 1
Gangs in neighborhood	1511	.34	.47	0 – 1
Soldier requested bribe	1520	.013	.11	0 – 1
Military respects human rights	1461	4.26	1.74	1 – 7
Military should work with the U.S.	1450	4.56	2.15	1 – 7
Coup is justified when crime is high	1410	.47	.49	0 – 1
Coup is justified when corruption is high	1407	.52	.49	0 – 1
Coup is justified when corruption is high	1472	.41	.49	0 – 1

MEXICO

	N	Mean	Std. Dev	Min-Max
Militarization	1489	4.48	2.26	1 – 7
Gender	1512	.47	.49	0 – 1
Residence	1512	.93	.24	0 – 1
Education	1511	9.69	4.00	0 – 18
Income	1397	9.86	4.73	0 – 16
Trust in police	1502	4.22	1.82	1 – 7
Trust in military	1395	4.24	1.98	1 – 7
Victim of crime	1511	.22	.42	0 – 1
Gangs in neighborhood	1480	.26	.44	0 – 1
Soldier requested bribe	1512	.001	.025	0 – 1
Military respects human rights	1374	4.70	1.74	1 – 7
Military should work with the U.S.	1368	3.22	2.29	1 – 7
Coup is justified when crime is high	1469	.26	.43	0 – 1
Coup is justified when corruption is high	1461	.29	.45	0 – 1
Coup is justified when corruption is high	1472	.41	.49	0 – 1

URUGUAY

END NOTES

1. Peter B. Kraska, "Militarization and Policing: Its Relevance to 21st Century Police," Policing 1, no. 4 (2007): 501–13; Gustavo A. Flores-Macías and Jessica Zarkin, "The Militarization of Law Enforcement: Evidence from Latin America," Perspectives on Politics (2019): 1–20; and Beatriz Magaloni and Luis Rodriguez, "Institutionalized Police Brutality: Torture, the Militarization of Security, and the Reform of Inquisitorial Criminal Justice in Mexico," American Political Science Review 114, no. 4 (November 3, 2020): 1013–34.

2. Rut Diamint, "A New Militarism in Latin America," Journal of Democracy 26, no. 4 (2015): 155–68; and David Pion-Berlin and Miguel Carreras, "Armed Forces, Police and Crime-Fighting in Latin America," Journal of Politics in Latin America 9, no. 3 (2017): 3–26. See also Felix Martin, Militarist Peace in South America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

3. Otwin Marenin, "Police and the Military Nexus," in Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice, eds. Gerben Bruinsma and David Weisburd (New York: Springer, 2014), 3559–67.

4. United States Southern Command, "United States Southern Command Strategy 'Enduring Promise for the Americas,'" May 2019, www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/SOUTHCOM_Strategy_2019.pdf?ver=2019-05-15-131647-353.

5. V.R. Berghahn and Hugh Bicheno, "Militarism," in The Oxford Companion to Military History, ed. Richard Holmes, Charles Singleton, and Spencer Jones (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

6. Martin Shaw, Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Jonathan D. Caverley, Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Cynthia H Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); and Rachel Woodward, Research Agenda for Military Geographies (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2019).

7. Roberto J. González and Hugh Gusterson, "Introduction," in Militarization: A Reader, eds. Roberto J. González, Hugh Gusterson, and Gustaaf Houtman (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2019), 1–26.

8. Richard Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," Naval War College Review 55, no. 3 (2002): 9; Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jonathan Dunnage et al., "Understanding Militarism after the End of the Cold War: History, International Relations, and Media Studies Ask New Questions," History Compass 17, no. 12 (2019): 1–13.

9. Bryan Mabee, "From 'Liberal War' to 'Liberal Militarism': United States Security Policy as the Promotion of Military Modernity," Critical Military Studies 2, no. 3 (2016): 242–61; Victoria M. Basham, "Raising an Army: The Geopolitics of Militarizing the Lives of Working-Class Boys in an Age of Austerity," International Political Sociology 10, no. 3 (2016): 258–74; and Michael Mann, "Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: A Contribution from Comparative and Historical Sociology," International Theory, 2010, 221–39.

10. "Gender, War and Militarism: Making and Questioning the Links," Feminist Review 88, no. 1 (2008): 21–35.

11. "Militarism, Conflict and Women's Activism in the Global Era: Challenges and Prospects for Women in Three West African Contexts," Feminist Review 101, no. 1 (July 1, 2012): 97–123.

12. "Gender, War and Militarism: Making and Questioning the Links."

13. Kurt Lang, "Military Sociology," Current Sociology 13, no. 1 (March 1, 1965): 1–26.

14. William Eckhardt, "The Factor of Militarism," Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 2 (1969): 123–32.

15. William Eckhardt and Alan G. Newcombe, "Militarism, Personality, and Other Social Attitudes," Conflict Resolution 13, no. 2 (1968): 210–19.

16. In his survey study on Canadian adults and university students, Eckhardt, "The Factor of Militarism" (1969):132, found that militarism was significantly correlated with the ideological factors of conservatism, nationalism, religiosity, lack of internationalism, lack of knowledge of foreign affairs, and political cynicism; and with the personality factors of extraversion, misanthropy, faulty childhood discipline, lack of social responsibility, neuroticism, and lack of empathy.

17. Rita Abrahamsen, "Return of the Generals? Global Militarism in Africa from the Cold War to the Present," Security Dialogue 49, no. 1–2 (January 1, 2018): 19–31; and Yagil Levy, "What Is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization," Armed Forces and Society 42, no. 1 (2016): 75–98.

18. Charles C. Moskos, J. A. Williams, and David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

19. Peter B. Kraska, "Militarizing American Police," in Routledge Handbook of Critical Criminology (New York: Routledge, 2018), 222–33; and Marjan Malešič and Maja Garb, "Public Trust in the Military from Global, Regional and National Perspectives," in Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio and Marina Nuciari (New York: Springer, 2018), 145–59.

20. Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso, 2003).

21. "Militarism and Its Limits: Sociological Insights on Security Assemblages in the Sahel," Security Dialogue 49, no. 1–2 (2018): 71.

22. Brad West and Steve Matthewman, "Towards a Strong Program in the Sociology of War, the Military and Civil Society," Journal of Sociology 52, no. 3 (2016): 482–99.

23. West and Matthewman, "Towards a Strong Program," 491.

24. Hugh Gusterson and Catherine Besteman, "Cultures of Militarism: An Introduction to Supplement 19," Current Anthropology 60, no. S19 (2019): S3–14.

25. Diamint, "A New Militarism in Latin America."

26. Gregory Hooks and James Rice, "War, Militarism, and States: The Insights and Blind Spots Of Political Sociology," in The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization, ed. Thomas Janoski et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 566–84.

27. "Defensive Development, Combative Contradictions: Towards an International Political Sociology of Global Militarism in Africa," Conflict, Security and Development 19, no. 6 (2019): 543–62.

28. Loïc Wacquant, "The Militarization of Urban Marginality: Lessons from the Brazilian Metropolis," International Political Sociology 2, no. 1 (2008): 56–74; and Salih Can Açiksöz, "He Is a Lynched Soldier Now: Coup, Militarism, and Masculinity in Turkey," Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 13, no. 1 (2017): 178–80.

29. Shaw, Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century.

30. Alexander M. Golts and Tonya L. Putnam, "State Militarism and Its Legacies: Why Military Reform Has Failed in Russia," International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 121–58.

31. Ismael Hossein-Zadeh, The Political Economy of U.S. Militarism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 27–28; Bacevich, The New American Militarism; and Ken Cunningham, "Permanent War? The Domestic Hegemony of the New American Militarism," New Political Science 26, no. 4 (2004): 551–67.

32. "United States Southern Command Strategy 'Enduring Promise for the Americas,'" Congressional Research Service, "United States Southern Command Command (SOUTHCOM)," March 17, 2020, fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11464.pdf.

33. Paulo Esteves and Cobus Van Staden, "US and Chinese COVID-19 Health Outreach to Africa and Latin America : A Comparison," Africa Portal, South African Institute of International Affairs, November 30, 2020, www.africaportal.org/publications/us-and-chinese-covid-19-health-outreach-africa-and-latin-america-comparison/.

34. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, "Pandemic and Political Unrest in

Brazil and Nicaragua," July 23, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25641.

35. Claudio A. Méndez, "The Politics of the COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Chile," in Coronavirus Politics: The Comparative Politics and Policy of COVID-19, ed. Scott L. Greer et al. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021), 522–37.

36. International Crisis Group, "Leaders under Fire: Defending Colombia's Front Line of Peace," Crisis Group Latin America Report No. 82, October 6, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31392.8.

37. International Crisis Group, "Virus-Proof Violence: Crime and COVID-19 in Mexico and the Northern Triangle," Crisis Group Latin America Report No. 83, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31475.7.

38. Kristina Mani, "'The Soldier Is Here to Defend You.' Latin America's Militarized Response to COVID-19," World Politics Review, April 21, 2020, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28700/from-peru-to-venezuela-military-forces-take-the-lead-in-coronavirus-responses.

39. Adam Moe Fejerskov and Johannes Lang, "War on the Virus: Military Responses to COVID-19 Challenge Democracies and Human Rights around the World," Danish Institute for International Studies, December 2020, www.europeansources.info/record/war-on-the-virus-military-responses-to-covid-19-challenge-democracies-and-human-rights-around-the-world/; Nina Wilén, "The Military in the Time of COVID-19," PRISM 9, no. 2 (2021): 20–33, www.jstor.org/stable/27008973; and John L. Clarke, "Pandemics and Armed Forces: Which Roles Are Appropriate?," Connections: The Quarterly Journal 19, no. 2 (2020): 77–88, connections-qj.org/article/pandemics-and-armed-forces-which-roles-are-appropriate.

40. Carl Boggs, "Overview: Globalization and the New Militarism," New Political Science 24, no. 1 (2002): 9–20; Jean Joana and Frédéric Mérand, "The Varieties of Liberal Militarism: A Typology," French Politics 12, no. 2 (2014): 177–91; and Carlos Solar, "Introducing Change in Public Service Organizations under Austerity: The Complex Case of the Governance of the Defence in the United Kingdom," Politics & Policy 48, no. 4 (August 12, 2020): 700–726.

41. Margaret Myers, "Going Local: An Assessment of China's Administrative-Level Activity in Latin America and the Caribbean," Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, Florida International University, November 2020, gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/research/publications/going-local-chinese-engagement-exec-summary-m-myers.pdf.

42. Golts and Putnam, "State Militarism and Its Legacies: Why Military Reform Has Failed in Russia."

43. David Kinsella, "The Global Arms Trade and the Diffusion of Militarism," Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security, Theory (2012): 104–16; Clement Guitton, "Cyber Insecurity as a National Threat: Overreaction from Germany, France and the UK?," European Security 22, no. 1 (2013): 21–35.

44. A. Coskun Samli, Globalization from the Bottom Up (New York: Springer Publishing, 2008), 22.

45. For the military expenditure indicator, I have grouped countries encompassing Latin America and the Caribbean. These are Aruba, Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curaçao, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Martin (French part), Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, Paraguay, El Salvador, Suriname, St. Maarten (Dutch part), Turks and Caicos Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela, British Virgin Islands, and the Virgin Islands (U.S.).

46. "Militarism and Globalization: Is There an Empirical Link?," Quality and Quantity 52, no. 3 (2018): 1349–69. The countries sampled included France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

47. Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James, Civil-Military Dynamics, Democracy, and International Conflict (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

48. I modeled a two-way graph with a line of best fit (results omitted from the analysis)

to confirm the direction of the association of the armed forces personnel variable and time (measured in years).

49. Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, et al., "V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10," Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2020; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "Military Expenditure Database," 2020, www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

50. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "The Military Balance," 2020.

51. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book)," 2019, datasets.americasbarometer.org/database/index.php.

52. AmericasBarometer, "LAPOP: Country Questionaire, 2014," 2014, www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2014.php.

53. Christian Haerpfer, Ronald Inglehart, Alfredo Moreno, Christian Welzel, Knesiya Kizilova, Jaime Diez-Medrano, Marta Lagos, Pippa Norris, Eduard Bi Ponarin, "World Values Survey: Round Seven – Country-Pooled Datafile" (Madrid and Vienna: JD Systems Institute and WVSA Secretariat, 2020).

54. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book)," 2014.

55. AmericasBarometer.

56. The statistical analyses in this report were conducted using STATA; a do-file is available upon request.

57. Coppedge et al., "V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10."

58. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book);" Michael Coppedge et al., "V-Dem Codebook v9. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project," 2020, www.v-dem.net/en/data/reference-materials-v10/; SIPRI, "Military Expenditure Database;" International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "The Military Balance;" and Fund for Peace, "State Fragility Index: Methodology," 2021.

59. Coppedge et al., "V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10."

60. The same exercise could take the variables' means as cutting points for countries scoring low in militarization and liberal democracy scores and those scoring low in militarization and high in liberal democracy scores.

61. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book);" and Coppedge et al., "V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10."

62. Coppedge et al., "V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10."

63. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book);" and Coppedge et al., "V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10."

64. Fund for Peace, "State Fragility Index: Methodology."

65. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book);" and Fund for Peace, "State Fragility Index: Methodology."

66. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book);" and SIPRI, "Military Expenditure Database."

67. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book);" and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "The Military Balance."

68. Washington Office on Latin America, "El Papel de Las Fuerzas Armadas En La Seguridad Publica En Honduras," August 2020, www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FFAA-HN-ESP-9.9.pdf.

69. Mary Beth Sheridan, "As Mexico's Security Deteriorates, The Power of the Military Grows," The Washington Post, December 17, 2020, www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/mexico-losing-control//mexico-military-security-drug-war/.

70. Sonia Alda Mejias, "Los Nuevos Roles de Las Fuerzas Armadas Uruguayas y Argentinas: La Contribución a La Lucha Contra El Narcotráfico, Siguiendo La Tendencia Regional," Real Instituto Elcano, July 31, 2018, www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari94-2018-alda-nuevos-roles-fuerzas-armadas-uruguayas-argentinas-lucha-contra-narcotrafico.

71. Melissa S. Herbert, "Feminism, Militarism, and Attitudes toward the Role of Women in the Military," Feminist Issues 14, no. 2 (1994): 25–48.

72. Maryam Khalid, "Feminist Perspectives on Militarism and War: Critiques, contradictions,

and collusions," The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements, Oxford Online (July 2014): 632–50.

73. Flores-Macías and Zarkin, "The Militarization of Law Enforcement: Evidence from Latin America."

74. Seth Kershner and Scott Harding, "Militarism Goes to School," Critical Military Studies 5, no. 3 (2019): 191–94.

75. Suzie M. Abajian, "Drill and Ceremony: A Case Study of Militarism, Military Recruitment and the Pedagogy of Enforcement in an Urban School in Southern California" (Los Angeles: UCLA, 2013), escholarship.org/uc/item/3vg767qx%0A.

76. Victoria M. Basham, "Raising an Army: The Geopolitics of Militarizing the Lives of Working-Class Boys in an Age of Austerity," International Political Sociology, Volume 10, Issue 3 (September 2016): 259, doi.org/10.1093/ips/olw013.

77. Diamint, "A New Militarism in Latin America," 162–63.

78. Bacevich, The New American Militarism.

79. Carlos Solar, "Trust in the Military in Post-Authoritarian Societies," Current Sociology, November 16, 2020, doi.org/10.1177/0011392120969769.

80. Matthew Johnson, Militarism and the British Left, 1902–1914 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

81. Max Singer, "Militarism and Democracy in El Salvador," Society 27, no. 6 (1990): 49–56; Gusterson and Besteman, "Cultures of Militarism: An Introduction to Supplement 19;" Philip G. Zimbardo, James N. Breckenridge, and Fathali M. Moghaddam, "Culture, Militarism, and America's Heroic Future," Culture and Psychology 21, no. 4 (2015): 505–14.

82. Model diagnostics checked how well the data met the assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The models for Mexico and Honduras reported acceptable values for heteroskedasticity and omitted variable bias and multi-collinearity. In the case of Uruguay, values were slightly over the threshold to consider a possible specification error, thus making future research essential in reconsidering the model.

83. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book)."

84. Bryan Mabee and Srdjan Vucetic, "Varieties of Militarism: Towards a Typology," Security Dialogue 49, no. 1–2 (January 1, 2018): 96–108; Mann, "Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: A Contribution from Comparative and Historical Sociology;" and Ron Smith, "Aspects of Militarism," Capital & Class 7, no. 1 (1983): 17–32.

85. Horace G. Campbell, "The Quagmire of US Militarism in Africa," Africa Development 45, no. 1 (2020): 73–115.

86. Michael Mann, "Have Wars and Violence Declined?," Theory and Society 47, no. 1 (February 2018): 37–60.

87. Jacqui True, "Are War and Violence Really in Decline?," Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 5 (2014): 487–94, 10.1080/10357718.2014.947354.

88. Joanna Tidy, "Fatherhood, Gender, and Interventions in the Geopolitical: Analyzing Paternal Peace, Masculinities, and War," International Political Sociology 12, no. 1 (2018): 2–18; and Sara Meger and Julia Sachseder, "Militarized Peace: Understanding Post-Conflict Violence in the Wake of the Peace Deal in Colombia," Globalizations 17, no. 6 (2020): 953–73.

89. Kim Jodi, "Militarization," in The Routledge Companion to Asian American and Pacific Islander Literature, ed. Rachel C. Lee (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).

90. Carl Schurz, "Militarism and Democracy," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 13, no. 12 (1899): 82–83.

91. Doron Avraham, "German Liberalism and the Militarisation of Civil Society, 1813-1848/49," European Review of History 17, no. 4 (2010): 605–28.

92. AmericasBarometer, "Data Sets (Data File and Code Book)."

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CARLOS SOLAR, Ph.D.

Carlos Solar is a lecturer in Sociology and member of the Centre for Criminology at the University of Essex, United Kingdom. He previously was a British Academy postdoctoral fellow at Oxford University. His research fits broadly under the areas of democratic governance, criminology, and military studies. He is the author of Government and Governance of Security: The Politics of Organized Crime in Chile (New York: Routledge, 2018). His peer-reviewed articles have been published in such journals as the Journal of Cyber Policy, Current Sociology, Global Crime, Policy Studies, British Politics, Journal of Strategic Studies, Politics and Policy, International Studies, Contemporary Politics, International Politics, Democracy and Security, Peace Review, Latin American Policy, Mexican Studies, and Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.

FIU | Steven J. Green
School of International
& Public Affairs
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY