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Remembering James Nelson Goodsell

Don Bohning

Jim Goodsell, the long-time Latin American correspondent from the *Christian Science Monitor* had that great quality of being both a good reporter and a first-rate human being. I first met Jim in 1966 in the Dominican Republic in advance of that country's first post-civil war elections. I last saw Jim in mid-January 1996 when we had lunch to kick around some agenda ideas for the Fourteenth Annual Journalists and Editors Workshop. He will be missed.

Jim, as many of us dinosaurs, had grown increasingly concerned about the state of journalism and particularly foreign reporting in the modern age.

Jim, as many of us dinosaurs, had grown increasingly concerned about the state of journalism and particularly foreign reporting in the modern age. Despite the tremendous technological advances, in some ways, matters were much less complex and more straightforward 30 years or so ago. In that light, it might be more instructive attempting to predict the shape of foreign coverage into the 21st century by taking a look backwards to see how far we have come in the past three decades.

Communications were horrible 30 years ago. The main source of news into the newsroom was the teletype machine, roaring along at 60 words a minute. The same day *New York Times* was unavailable except for stories that moved on its wire service. Once the Sunday *Times* showed up in the newsroom on Tuesday. The one advantage was that you could write the same story a week after the *Times* had it, and no *Herald* reader would know the difference. United Press International was still fighting the good fight with the Associated Press. Editing was literally a cut and paste job.

The *Herald* did not even have a telex machine in the newsroom at that time. The only telex machine in the building was in advertising on the second floor. A case was finally made for a newsroom telex after the shooting by the US Marines of my predecessor, Al Burt, and a *Herald* photographer, Doug Kennedy, during the 1965 Dominican Republic Civil War—an incident which happened 31 years ago.

Lee Winfrey, another *Herald* correspondent from the Washington bureau was also in the Dominican Republic. It was impossible to get a telephone call in or out of the country. Two days after the shooting, the *Herald* had not heard from Winfrey and details of the incident and the condition of Al and Doug remained uncertain. Editors in the newsroom were cursing Winfrey until an employee from advertising called the newsroom and said there was this long telex downstairs on the machine that they could not figure out. He thought the telex might belong to the newsroom. It did. The telex gave Winfrey's detailed account of the shooting incident. The message had been on advertising's telex machine for well over 24 hours before anyone in that department had bothered to notify the newsroom.

As an anecdotal footnote to that incident, my first trip to the Dominican Republic came just a year later and it was the one in which I met Jim Goodsell. Goodsell, myself and, Nate Miller, the Rio-based correspondent for the *Baltimore Sun* (who went on to become a well-known naval historian) hired a taxi and drove to Santiago to interview Antonio Guzmán, Juan Bosch's vice presidential candidate in the upcoming elections, won by Joaquín Balaguer. The taxi driver was the same one who had been driving Al Burt and Doug Kennedy when they had been shot by the Marines a year earlier.

It was an era of erratic and ulcer-inducing telephone communications. To cover a breaking foreign story by telephone was virtually impossible. Calls had to be placed through an operator and, particularly in time of crisis, telephone lines were so jammed that it often took hours to get a call through. And if it happened to be a military coup, a frequent occurrence in the 1960s, telephone lines were most likely cut.

If you were on the road, getting stories back to the *Herald* was another problem. You either brought them back with you or took them to the local airport and shipped them by Pan Am Clipper cargo. When

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Don Bohning is a staff writer for the Miami Herald. *He has been with the* Herald *for 36 years.*


N T A R Y
James Nelson Goodsell
1929-1996

the flight arrived in Miami, someone had to go to the cargo area on the west side of the airport, pick up the package and clear it through customs. On more pressing stories, the only alternative was to file by telex, usually by punching the telex tape yourself.

The major airlines flying to Latin America then were Pan American, Braniff and Panagra. Nobody in Latin America had ever heard of American or United Airlines. And virtually every flight to South America stopped in Panama at 3:00 a.m. for a change of planes. If you needed to get a seat quickly on a sold-out Pan Am flight, you called Alice Flood at Pan Am's commercial desk.

Reporting itself was somewhat simpler. The Cold War was in full swing and the us-against-them mentality spilled over into much of the press. US officials still had substantial credibility, with the decline beginning in the late 1960s with Vietnam and accelerated by Chile and Watergate. Unlike today, women correspondents covering Latin America were a rarity. Georgia Anne "Geegee" Geyer is the only one I can recall, writing from Peru for the *Chicago Daily News* service.

It was not until the first half of the 1980s that portable computers came on the scene, not too long after direct telephone dialing. Until then, the Olivetti Letra 22 typewriter was the choice *de jour.* I still have two at home but cannot find anybody to recondition them. Juan Tamayo became the first person at the *Herald* to use a portable computer, sometime in the early 1980s. It was an Otrono and to call it portable is stretching the truth. I remember more than once Tamayo walking out of the office with that thing strapped on his back. Then came the Tandy 200, a laptop computer model.

That brings us up to the information and transportation revolution of recent years which has dramatically improved the timeliness of getting the news to the consumer. The revolution also has its downside, one being an increase in 'parachute' journalism which mitigates against good old-fashioned reporting. Now, a reporter can fly to a country that he has never been to before on a breaking story, having access in advance to virtually everything that has been written about the country. Once there, he can call down the latest wires, write an authoritative story, file it for the deadline and leave, without making a telephone call except to connect to his computer. As an example, I cite the recent inauguration of Rene Preval as Haiti's new president. A reporter from a major newspaper, which shall remain unnamed, was assigned at the last minute to cover the inauguration. Only slightly familiar with Haiti, he arrived mid-afternoon on inauguration day, after the ceremonies were over. Catching up on what had happened from colleagues and calling down the wires, he wrote and filed a story of the day's events, and left early the next morning, spending about 18 hours in the country. The story, which I later saw, was adequate but certainly did not contain much insight into Haiti's problems. There is also a trend toward more generalists among foreign correspondents as opposed to the specialists such as Jim Goodsell who dedicated their careers to a single region, whether it be Latin America, Africa or Asia.

> ***Journalists are reporters like Jim Goodsell who go off to uncomfortable and often dangerous places like Central America and Croatia and get on a military plane to chase after a visiting dignitary without giving it a second thought.***

I will venture no guesses as to what will happen on the technological side of journalism over the next few years, having myself barely gotten past the Tandy 200s and direct dial telephoning. I assume it is safe to say, however, that the changes are likely to be startling.

The major story themes will certainly continue to be related to the dramatic changes that began with the end of the Cold War. On the positive side, social issues will get much more attention, now that they are no longer subjugated to an ideological overlay. The war on drugs will remain a high profile topic. Coverage of free market economics and a hemisphere free trade area will get major attention. Changes of government—less so with overt military coups seemingly headed the way of the dodo bird—will also be covered. Terrorism, ethnic conflicts and border disputes will continue to capture headlines. The Internet will feed the influence of NGOs, human rights and advocacy groups, making it better able for them to get their messages out to the media and opinion makers.

In closing, I came across something recently written about another journalist, that struck me as particularly applicable to Jim Goodsell and today's journalism. Some of you will probably recognize the story. I would like to read it, substituting Jim's name for the other journalist, Nathaniel Nash.

From Tom Friedman's April 10 column in the *New York Times* on Nathaniel Nash, who died in the crash of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown's airplane:

With today's cacophony of magazine shows, Oprah-style interview sessions and talking head news commentaries, many people have lost sight of what real journalists do. Journalists do not appear on the McLaughlin show and scream at each other. Journalists do not interview mothers and daughters on daytime confession hours. Journalists do not have their own shock-jock radio shows. Unfortunately, though, these are the people many Americans see most often in quasi-journalist roles and these are the people they think of as journalists today.

Journalists are reporters like Jim Goodsell who go off to uncomfortable and often dangerous places like Central America and Croatia and get on a military plane to chase after a visiting dignitary without giving it a second thought—all to get a few fresh quotes, maybe a scoop, or even just a paragraph of color that no one else has...

Jim was a living reminder that to be successful, journalists do not have to be cynics. The book on Jim as a reporter was that he was too nice. His colleagues always doubted that anyone that nice could ever succeed in journalism, but somehow he triumphed over that handicap and went from one successful assignment to another. It was because Jim intuitively understood that there was a difference between skepticism and cynicism. This is a lesson a lot of us have forgotten. Skepticism is about asking questions, being dubious, being wary, not being gullible. Cynicism is about already having the answers—or thinking you do—about a person or an event. The skeptic says: "I don't think that's true; I'm going to check it out." The cynic says: "I know that's not true. It couldn't be. I'm going to slam him." There is a fine line between the two, but it is a line Jim always respected. ■

Comments delivered by Don Bohning, a 36-year veteran staff writer for the *Miami Herald*, at the Fourteenth Annual Journalists and Editors Workshop, Miami, May 2, 1996.

Popular Participation Bolivian Style

Margaret H. Peirce

When President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, the author of the 1985 draconian neoliberal reform which curbed Bolivia's hyperinflation, took office on August 6, 1993, few were willing to concede that his ambitious *Plan de Todos* (Plan for All) would succeed. One of the principal pillars of the plan was the notion of "popular participation," an innovative proposal to restructure Bolivia. Criticized by the opposition and highly praised by the international community, Sánchez de Lozada plugged along with his plan. In the past two years, while the rest of his Plan for All appears to have been bogged down, "popular participation" has begun to permeate all levels and corners of Bolivian society.

Implementing Participation

Following a massive media blitz on April 21, 1994, President Sánchez de Lozada succeeded in securing congressional approval for the revolutionary and controversial Popular Participation Law (PPL). The PPL divided Bolivia territorially into provincial sections, thereby putting the country under the political and administrative control of 308 newly created municipalities, which were endowed with provisional boundaries. The new municipal boundaries replaced 1,100 local governments.

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Each municipality is now responsible for infrastructure and development related to education, health, irrigation, sports, culture, and local roads. Municipalities receive coparticipation funds (i.e., central government-controlled tax revenues) to fulfill these needs.

The law provides for the legal recognition of urban *barrios* and rural communities as *Organizaciones Territoriales de Base* (Territorially Based Organizations or TBOs) and establishes oversight boards known as *comités de vigilancia* (vigilance committees). These committees are charged with planning projects and overseeing municipal governments. The PPL provides government funds and redistributes political power to the local level. According to World Bank economist Vicente Fretes-Cibis, "Other countries are now trying to decentralize, but Bolivia is the pioneer."

Empowering Civil Society

Bolivia's history of confrontational politics has frequently stood in the way of democratic governance. Social groups have relied on direct action protest, such as hunger strikes, blockades, work stoppages, marches, and takeovers of public buildings. Years of such behavior have led civil society to rely on these tools as the most significant form of political participation, eclipsing parties and the electoral arena. Since the transition to democracy in 1982, political parties on the national level have repudiated these methods, but local leaders and labor unions continue to rely upon these tactics to contest government action, especially the imposition of austerity measures and counternarcotics policy.

The stated goal of the Popular Participation Law is to improve the standard of living of the poor and traditionally marginalized sectors by incorporating them into the decision-making process, thereby curtailing direct action politics. A secondary goal of the PPL is to stamp out still existing traces of authoritarian behavior and replace it with a participatory democracy based upon consensus politics on all levels of society and government.

According to the 1992 Census, 70.5 percent of the Bolivian population is classified as poor, including 95.1 percent of the rural population and 52.6 percent of the urban population. Bolivia has the lowest life expectancy (61.8 years in 1994), the highest infant mortality rate (81.4/1,000 in 1994), a population with the least years of schooling (4), and the worst Human Development Index (122) of South America. Worse yet are the indicators of internal inequality. For example, infant mortality in 1992 in urban areas was 62/1,000 compared to 100/1,000 in the rural areas; 81 percent of urban dwellers had access to potable water in 1992 compared with only 19 percent of rural families; and finally, while only 9 percent of city dwellers are illiterate, the rural population is 37 percent illiterate. Intraregional inequality and internal differences in standard of living have prompted migratory flows, both international and rural-urban in nature. The 1992 Census, which is generally acknowledged to have undercounted the rural population, indicated that 57.5 percent of the population lives in urban areas (arbitrarily defined as cities of more than 2,000 inhabitants). One estimate suggests

Decentralizing political and economic power

that by the year 2000, 85 percent of Bolivia's population will live in urban centers with a population greater than 100,000. Santa Cruz and El Alto, for example, are expected to double their population in ten years. Many in the government and elsewhere suggest that the PPL was designed to offset this migratory trend.

Redistributing Participation Funds

With the change in the distribution of state resources via the coparticipation funds mandated by the PPL, funds are now assigned on a per capita basis, with approximately US$ 22.00 being allocated per resident (according to the 1992 Census). This amount compares favorably with the average US$ 14.77 distributed between 1989 and 1993, which ranged from a high of US$ 24.01 per capita in the department of La Paz to a low of US$ 1.50 in the department of Potosí. The average 1995 municipal budget is approximately US$ 420,000, while the median budget is about US$ 160,000 per year. Municipal coparticipation funds accounted for 20 percent of the national treasury's expenditures, or approximately US$ 144 million in 1995. The PPL mandates that 90 percent of coparticipation funds be directed towards investment in infrastructure, leaving 10 percent for administration. Complaints were thus heard from cash-strapped municipal governments.

These coparticipation funds include the 10 percent of treasury expenditures formerly assigned to the quasi-governmental Regional Development Corporations (RDCs), which, in accordance with the Administrative Decentralization Law passed on July 28, 1995, were eliminated in 1996. Some corporations, faced with the loss of their funding, entered into joint ventures with municipalities which lacked sufficient technical personnel; the municipality "contracted" the RDC to implement various rural development projects solicited by the TBOs and transferred the necessary funds to the RDC. Additionally, a Departmental Compensation Fund has been created for resource poor regional departments, such as Pando.

Eighty percent of the municipalities that received money in 1994 had never received any money from the national treasury. In 1994, 54 percent of coparticipation funds were directed toward cities and 45 percent toward provinces. The three major cities' share was 74.9 percent, down from 90.8 percent. With the transfer of responsibilities for infrastructure development and maintenance, some municipalities, especially those that were previously favored, may end up with fewer budgetary resources. However, to augment their budgets, the PPL gives municipalities the power to tax motor vehicles and real estate.

Municipal Governments

Before the passage of the PPL, only a limited number of provincial capitals had functioning municipal governments. As a result of the PPL, Article 203 of the 1967 Constitution, which states that municipal jurisdictions are to be determined and local governments established, is finally being enacted. The most populated municipality is that of La Paz, with 724,000 residents. The average municipal population is 21,000; however, the majority of municipalities are smaller and predominantly rural in nature. Approximately one-third of the municipalities have less than 5,000 inhabitants. These municipalities are encouraged to band together to form *mancomunidades* (commonwealths) to have access to funds through a PPL bank account.

Interviews with local and central government officials in the summer of 1995 indicated that the concept of popular participation was taking root far more readily in the rural areas than in the urban centers. There were more rural TBOs and vigilance committees than urban ones and more registered neighborhood groups in the marginal parts of the city than in the *casco viejo* (old city center). Urban centers already have health and educational facilities and basic utilities—water, electricity, sewerage, and telephone service. Rural areas, by comparison, lack almost all of these fundamental services and are, therefore, more motivated to work together to provide for these basic human needs.

Additionally, many rural communities already have their own forms of traditional local governance which can easily be recognized by the central government. Urban dwellers, on the other hand, have little incentive to organize on the local level. However, many argue that the remaining local governments that oppose the PPL will be forced to change their posture by the populace, who will demand the benefits from the newly available funds.

Popular Participation's Opponents

Powerful civic committees (similar to "friends of cities" groups) constituted by self-appointed influential businesspersons are opposed to the PPL. In the major cities, these politically dominant members of the business sector stand to lose political power, and therefore, as a matter of self-preservation, the civic committees are opposed to the legislation that actually benefits their cities.

Others contend that the PPL is only a redistribution scheme, rather than an increase in funding. This criticism, however, misses the point since the rationale behind the law is to improve the equity of the distribution of funds and increase participation at the local level.

The main criticism of the actual implementation of the plan is that coparticipation funds are being distributed to all municipalities that have filed an annual operation plan with the government, regardless of whether there is a functioning vigilance committee to provide accountability and transparency. Consequently, these funds are susceptible to corruption. And in the larger cites where TBOs have yet to be formed, the use of coparticipation funds is left to the discretion of the mayor and his/her municipal council. This practice increases the possibility of pork barreling.

Additionally, there is a conflict of interest and job function between the *junta municipal/consejo municipal* (municipal councils) and vigilance committees since both are designed to supervise the expenditures of municipal funds. There are also no provisions for the remuneration of committee members. Furthermore, municipal governments are receiving a tremendous increase in coparticipation funds without adequate administrative or legal training. However, several training assistance contracts have been signed with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs).

The central government's response to these criticisms has been that rather than spend twenty years ironing out all the possible wrinkles of the plan, it was preferable to pass the legislation and redistribute the funds to the people in an equitable manner. The rationale was that problems could be sorted out with time and experience.

On another front, some contend that the PPL is a politically motivated program to build the electoral base of the president's Nationalist Revolutionary Movement Party (MNR). Certainly, Sánchez de Lozada would like to be remembered as the president who took revolutionary steps to restructure the Bolivian government. By decentralizing political and economic power, however, Sánchez de Lozada is losing the ability to direct funds to MNR-controlled municipalities. If his hidden agenda were to exploit the program to bolster his party's image and election prospects, Sánchez de Lozada has encountered failure.

A cynical interpretation of the whole issue surrounding the pros and cons of the PPL is that if funds are likely to be stolen, at least now these funds will be stolen or misused by *many* on the local level rather than by a *few* at the national level. If this is the case, a perverse redistribution scheme is now in place. As the president said, "Even if they're drunk, they can't do a worse job than we've done."

Promotion and Participation

To promote the concept of popular participation and improve citizen awareness of the PPL, the Communications Department of the National Secretariat for Popular Participation in the Ministry of Sustainable Development has launched a campaign the likes of which Bolivia has never seen. Government and independent agencies are promoting the PPL. Moreover, these agencies are responsible for the multitude of pamphlets and discussion documents currently circulating throughout the country, many of which use a simple format and pictures to aid non-native Spanish speakers.

Interestingly, even the military is involved in this new initiative to fortify democracy. The Bolivian Armed Forces have traditionally been charged with helping to develop the country and actively participate in public works projects. New recruits are now routinely taught the intricacies of the PPL. When these recruits return to their communities, they serve as experts on the law.

Conclusion

Bolivia's PPL is indeed revolutionary and unique to Latin America. Bolivians have been given the political and economic tools to participate in their own governance. The PPL has taken root in rural areas and is igniting debate throughout the country. In short, areas that never before benefited from any national resources are receiving funds and are deciding how to spend them. Despite the kinks in the program and the funds' susceptibility to corruption and political influence, the PPL is certainly a step in the right direction.

The PPL appears destined to play a role in economic development and democratic governance in Bolivia. Coupled with a new Administrative Decentralization Law, the PPL could modernize the Bolivian state and empower the subordinate and less privileged parts of civil society. Vice President Víctor Hugo Cárdenas claims that these bold steps "will change the face of Bolivia." Thus, these historic developments should be monitored by other countries; lessons can be learned from this dramatic political and economic restructuring. ■

How Real Is the *Plano Real*?

Alfred Montero

On July 1, 1996, the *Plano Real* (Real Plan), Brazil's most watched, ongoing national event, turned two years old. Fernando Henrique Cardoso depended upon the plan's initial success in reducing Brazil's chronic mega-inflation to carry him to the Brazilian presidency in 1994. Three years later, the entire country is still monitoring monthly inflation rates and trade balance figures with bated breath to see if the plan will continue to deliver on Cardoso's campaign promises of low inflation and stable growth. Yet skepticism has been voiced in the business community and among international observers regarding the plan's emphasis on the appreciation of the national currency and the inability of congress and the presidency to push forward the much-needed constitutional reforms. The plan's long-term success cannot be assured without these reforms.

Three years later, the entire country is still monitoring monthly inflation rates and trade balance figures with bated breath to see if the plan will continue to deliver on Cardoso's campaign promises of low inflation and stable growth.

In mid-1994, Cardoso's plan was launched with the creation of a new currency, the *Real*, with a value anchored to the dollar. Unlike the monetary anchor in Argentina that strictly fixes the national currency to the dollar, the *Real* was allowed to float within "bands" established by the central bank. Similar to the European Monetary System's method of floating national currencies within "bands" linked to the Deutschemark, the viability of the *Real* has depended upon the stability of its value against the dollar. By buying dollars when the currency was negotiated at a low rate to the *Real* and selling when the rate was slightly higher, the central bank floated the value of the *Real* between high and low values, a tactic that guarded against sudden devaluations but nevertheless allowed the new currency to gradually devalue. Meanwhile, the central bank was periodically moving the "bands" within which the *Real* floated to the dollar. At the beginning of the plan, the *Real* traded at \$1.20, but by mid-1996, the *Real* traded at \$.98.

During its first few months, the Real Plan was a resounding success that assured the election of Cardoso as president in late 1994—without the need for a run-off. Annual rates of inflation fell from 11,161 percent during the pre-*Real* days to 24 percent in 1995 and an estimated 12-15 percent in 1996, the lowest Brazilian inflation rates since the 7 percent figure recorded in 1957. And, more importantly, the plan put an end to the inflationary expectations that in the past drove rates spiraling upwards. The slight increases in the monthly inflation rates of September and October 1994 generated widespread talk of the Real Plan's premature failure, but such expectations quickly subsided as monthly inflation rates continued on a stable, low trajectory. Presently, most Brazilian businesses work with nominal figures uncorrected for the expected rate of inflation; indexation of salaries for inflation is being phased out.

The success of the Real Plan, however, has not come cheaply to a country with a long history of failed stabilization plans. The "band" system kept the *Real* overvalued by at least 15-20 percent, although some international estimates suggest an overvaluation in the neighborhood of 30-40 percent. The price of keeping the *Real* stable at these levels required the expansion of large foreign dollar reserves, a task made more difficult by periodic trade deficits. The overvalued *Real* reduced the competitiveness of exports and put an end to several years of large annual trade surpluses. And, more importantly, the constitutional and fiscal reforms necessary for consolidating macroeconomic stability—privatization, tax reform, reducing the size of the public payroll, among others—were either delayed or implemented at a snail's pace.

"We are not Mexico!"

The dangers of an overvalued *Real* were made clear shortly after the December 1994 maxi-devaluation crisis in Mexico when a combi-

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Controversy over the thrust of economic reform

nation of large trade deficits and low dollar reserves left Ernesto Zedillo's government unable to prevent the dumping of $10 billion of short-term peso bonds by foreign speculators following an announced devaluation of the currency. The resulting crisis presented several lessons for Brazil.

First, the Mexican example emphasized the dangers of maintaining long-term, large trade imbalances and not enforcing a devaluation of the national currency. After several years of large annual trade surpluses ($15 billion in 1992, $13 billion in 1993 and $10 billion in 1994), Brazil ran its largest trade deficit in 15 years in 1995: $3.5 billion. The initial signs of a crisis—an $884 million trade deficit in December 1994 and one over $1 billion in February 1995—were enough to send central bank officials scrambling to counterattack the spreading fears of Brazil's impending "Mexicanization." Adamantly opposed to a Chilean-style maxi-devaluation, Cardoso's government employed more piecemeal methods to improve Brazil's alarming trade imbalances. In April 1995, the government increased tariffs on imported automobiles from 32 percent to 70 percent and slightly accelerated the pace of the *Real*'s gradual devaluation by use of the "band" system.

Second, the Mexican example pointed to the importance of maintaining high domestic dollar reserves to scare off foreign monetary speculators. This lesson proved especially valuable and costly in March 1995 when fears spread in the financial community that Argentina was without enough

reserves to save its banking system. The more serious "tequila" effect in Argentina generated anxieties among foreign investors in nearby Brazil. Brazilian central bank officials spent more than $7 billion of reserves in just one week to stabilize the *Real* against a possible run by speculators. The government's reaction also included reducing taxes on foreign direct investment and raising real interest rates, a move that increased the flow of foreign money from the money market into government debt paper.

Although the Real Plan survived the March 1995 scare, many international observers continued to criticize the Cardoso administration for not dealing with the fundamental problem of the currency's overvaluation. The most publicized criticism was voiced in an academic conference in Sydney, Australia, in May 1996 when Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist, Rudiger

Dornbusch, stated that the *Real* was overvalued 30-40 percent and that Brazil was well on its way to becoming another Mexico. Dornbusch's comments generated an immediate response on the São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro stock markets—both fell 2 percent. Brazilian government officials and economists lambasted Dornbusch's estimate of the *Real*'s overvaluation and pointed to foreign reserves of $45 billion, substantial increases in foreign direct investment (rather than in potentially speculative portfolio investment), and stabilizing trade balances during the second half of 1995 and the first half of 1996 as factors that suggested a situation most unlike that of Mexico. As Eliana Cardoso, one of Brazil's most prominent economists and Dornbusch's ex-wife declared in *Folha de São Paulo* in June: "We are not Mexico!"

An assessment of the Real Plan's performance up to its second anniversary reveals that both Dornbusch and his critics are right. The *Real* is certainly overvalued, but most estimates lie somewhere in the 10-20 percent range than in Dornbusch's 30-40 percent range. The main question is how fast the *Real* should be devalued. Dornbusch argued for a maxi-devaluation along the lines of the Chilean experience. Yet the inflationary effects seen in the Chilean case could prove disastrous in Brazil where memories of chronic inflation might generate another inflationary spiral following the initial devaluation.

Recent developments on Brazil's commercial and current accounts do not justify pushing the panic button of a maxi-devaluation. After the "tequila" effect scares of the first half of 1995, the country's trade balance improved and reached a small surplus of $1.1 billion during the second half of 1995 and a modest deficit of about $300 million in the first five months of 1996. An estimated $6 billion of new foreign direct investment, $3 billion of new portfolio investment, and $4 billion in unilateral transfers from emigrants are expected to finance this year's expected current account deficit of $15 billion. The shortfall will likely be made up by long-term finance from international agencies. These indicators suggest that the prospects for the *Real*'s stability have not dramatically worsened as the peso's before its collapse in December 1994.

The probabilities that privatization will rescue Brazil's decaying infrastructure are not good. Foreign firms are wary of venturing into this area since Brasilia has yet to regulate the process of granting public concessions.

In comparison to Mexico on the eve of the "tequila" crisis, Brazil is in a far better position. While the Mexican current account deficit stood at 7.8 percent of GDP, the trade deficit at 5 percent of GDP, and international reserves at only $6.3 billion before the crisis, Brazil's current account deficit is presently 2.4 percent of GDP, the commercial deficit stands at only .4 percent of GDP and international reserves are estimated to be as high as $55.4 billion.

More long-term indicators of the economy's health and the Real Plan's viability are the recent surges in foreign direct investment and export growth. Conservative estimates suggest that between $6 and $7 billion of new foreign direct investment will enter Brazil in 1996, a substantial increase in comparison to the last three to four years. An additional $3 billion will be invested in the subsidiaries of multinationals already in the country. Although slow in its implementation, the privatization process has recently generated new foreign investment with the sale of Rio de Janeiro's electricity distributor, Light, to an American firm. The demonopolization of public control over telecommunications systems has generated estimates of over $15-$20 billion of new foreign investment in that sector alone over the next five years as foreign firms scramble to take advantage of Brazil's large domestic market for cellular phones, satellite television and computer technology. Most telling of all for the *Real* is the fact that exports, after growing a paltry 2 percent during 1995, grew 10 percent in the first half of 1996, a good predictor of a trade surplus at year's end.

In comparison to these long-term investments, short-term capital composes a rather meager source of finance. Less than 10 percent of foreign reserves depend on short-term capital; much of this capital stays in the country three to four years on average. If these trends continue, and particularly if the commercial balance does not spiral out of control into the red, a Mexico-style collapse will be avoided.

The Importance of Reforms

The most important lesson of the Mexican example for the Real Plan's architects is also the one least heeded: the need to take concrete steps to get the fiscal deficit under control. In this area, Brazilian officials lack both courage and realism in the face of the country's problems, many of which are structural and long-term. The government's piecemeal approach of toying with gradual devaluations, employing selective tariffs and raising interest rates to contain domestic demand, may prop up the Real Plan in the short-term, but structural adjustments on the size of public expenditures, the ownership and size of state firms, the massive public payroll and the budgets of state governments are all necessary to make the plan successful in the long-term. On this point both international observers such as Dornbusch and Brazilian economists agree, although the country's politicians have been hesitant to take the aggressive action recommended by these experts.

Although moving at an overall slow pace, privatization is a key structural reform that has been attempted in recent years. The process peaked early when the Fernando Collor administration initiated the privatization of the state steel firms, beginning with Usiminas in 1991. Cosipa, Açominas, Acesita, and the National Steel Company followed, along with several other smaller steel and iron facilities. The Itamar Franco administration, however, barely initiated any new privatizations. During his presidential campaign, Cardoso promised to initiate and complete the privatization of Brazil's largest firm, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), the mining and transportation giant. This goal was set for 1996, but was delayed by congress until 1997. Indeed, only the privatization of Rio de Janeiro's Light in May 1996 for $2.2 billion—most of this amount in "live" money rather than public debt issues—reflected the Cardoso administration's best effort in this policy area.

Observers are quick to point out that practically all of the already privatized firms were "privatizable"—reasonably productive and potentially profitable before they were sold. By contrast, what lies ahead, with the exception of CVRD, are a number of irreparably unprofitable state firms, many of these in the area of infrastructure. Also, a great deal of public money, particularly loans at subsidized rates from the National Development Bank, was poured into Usiminas, Acesita and other state firms to restructure them—to make them more productive to eventually sell them off. Similarly significant levels of public expenditures on the federal road system, the country's decrepit ports, and the dilapidated railroad network are unlikely in the near future. The alternative of opening these areas to private concessions has only progressed slowly. Some states like Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais have taken the initiative by granting concessions on state and municipal roads and ports, often as part of an infrastructure loan with the World Bank, while national policies continue to stall in congress.

The probabilities that privatization will rescue Brazil's decaying infrastructure are not good. Foreign firms are wary of venturing into this area since Brasília has yet to regulate the process of granting public concessions. Thus far, investors have shown primary interest in either the already profitable steel production and energy distribution companies or high-tech sectors with promising domestic markets like telecommunications systems.

Getting the fiscal deficit under control also means cutting expenditures at the state and federal levels on the expansive and redundant civil service. Spending on the federal civil service constituted 74 percent of federal tax receipts (excluding receipts transferred to the states and cities) in 1992. The 1988 Constitution made wholesale dismissals in the civil service extremely difficult to implement, and recent attempts to reform the Magna Carta in this area have met with stiff resistance from different political groups as diverse as the conservative governors from the Northeast and the leftist labor unions. Thus far, such reforms are stuck in congress, although some state governments have had some success. Minas Gerais recently reduced its public payroll by providing incentive plans for voluntary retirement.

Federal and state tax receipts have increased over the last three years as a result of the modernization of tax collection agencies and the prosecution of tax evasion. Yet the tax system is still too chaotic and inefficient. Each state government, for example, may set its own tax rates on commerce of goods and services, creating extra costs for businesses wishing to conduct interstate commerce in states with higher tax rates. Attempts to create a more nationally unified tax system continue to draw much attention in Brasília, but significant steps have yet to be taken.

A more immediate problem is the financial system which has suffered from a wave of bankruptcies that followed the government's hike in interest rates (during the Mexico crisis) to exorbitant levels. Spreads of 65 percent and 90 percent have been a common occurrence. As a result, a number of Brazil's largest banks threatened to collapse. In response, the Cardoso administration created PROER, a public bail-out program for promoting financial mergers and restructuring. Despite a significant commitment of $13 billion during the first seven months of PROER's existence, confidence in Brazilian banks continues to flag. Already larger and more costly bail-outs are required to save key banks. BANESPA, the state bank of São Paulo, was recently bailed out of its close to $10 billion debt. Banco Nacional, a large private bank fraught with cases of fraud, is currently negotiating a $6.7 billion bail-out. Whatever the success of PROER in rescuing the financial system, paying for this program will be a challenge. Dealing with the weight of these expenditures on the state's fiscal budget deficit over the course of the next few years will demand significant structural reforms now.

The combination of a large influx of dollars during the Real Plan and increasing public expenditures has already generated an internal debt crisis to rival the external debt crisis of the 1980s. The use of the public debt in the implementation of monetary policy, privatization and financial reform has created an internal debt estimated at $150 billion. If structural reforms are not implemented soon, the full weight of this debt may cause faith in the *Real* to soon crumble.

Eliminating the "Brazil Cost"

The Real Plan may have provided firms with stable prices with which to do business, but it also created added pressures to adjust to more competitive global markets. The overvalued *Real* forced many exporters to reduce labor costs by downsizing their staff, modernizing their plant and equipment, and increasing the productivity of their workers and their links with suppliers. Firms able to adjust to the new terms of trade could make the transition. Most firms, however, shrunk significantly or collapsed before the double hit of the *Real*'s overvaluation and the high interest rates that the plan required.

Recent developments in the auto parts sector highlight the trouble domestic firms have had in adjusting to global competition. The trade balance for Brazilian auto parts fell from a surplus of $1.4 billion in 1989 to $500 million in 1995. Employment decreased by 30,000 jobs at the beginning of 1995 as firms scrambled to reduce their production costs. Meanwhile, the high cost of capital produced a significant drop in imports: from 16 percent to 2 percent during the Real Plan. The result was the closure of dozens of auto parts firms and large buy outs of the most productive Brazilian firms by multinationals possessing more advanced technology and access to capital. In June 1996, Metal Leve, the crown jewel of Brazilian auto parts, was purchased by the German giant Mahle in association with its domestic competitor, Cofap.

For firms in auto parts, textiles, footwear, and other industrial sectors, the costs of doing business in Brazil—the so-called Brazil cost with all its inherent inefficiencies (poor infrastructure, prolonged downtime, untrained labor and lack of access to technology and capital)—required significant restructuring of production and employment. Most firms have reduced their production and labor costs and have boosted their productivity. The average industrial firm after 1992 increased its productivity 7 percent.

Although salaries increased approximately 30 percent during the Real Plan, total employment dropped. One indicator of the immensity of this restructuring is the fact that the Brazilian economy currently produces 31 percent more than it did four years ago but the economy employs fewer people. Estimates of unemployment in the Greater São Paulo area often reach 16-18 percent, despite increasing economic activity.

The process of productive restructuring might well have been inevitable with trade liberalization, but the Real Plan certainly accelerated the restructuring process and made it more difficult for most firms to cope with the changes. This point reveals significant limitations in the Cardoso government's approach on the economy. By relying almost completely on macroeconomic policy, the administration has been late in realizing how the Real Plan has affected the economy. Recent concerns of avoiding a Mexico-like crisis and reversing politically troubling unemployment rates have only led to additional piecemeal measures. For example, the National Development Bank created in June 1996 a series of financial programs to promote exports and is currently studying the possibilities of a national financial system for small- and medium-size firms to increase employment.

Evaluation: Lessons Learned?

The main lesson from the first two years of the Real Plan is that there is more to stabilizing an economy's growth than bringing down inflation. A few years ago, a relatively low rate of inflation would have satisfied most Brazilians, but now, increasingly larger numbers of businesses, labor unions and consumer organizations are demanding government action to alleviate structural problems such as unemployment, the high cost of capital and the inadequacy of infrastructure. Dealing with these problems requires a state capable of intervening in the economy, and in Brazil, such a state requires the constitutional and administrative reforms that policy makers and politicians seem so reluctant to tackle. Added to these problems is the macroeconomic necessity of keeping the *Real* on the path of a gradual devaluation. This option will help exports and consequently growth, but more diversified policy responses are needed to address unemployment and the problems of the financial system.

In the end, Dornbusch's criticism of the Real Plan is a welcomed warning that shocked Brazilian policy makers and society into evaluating the choices they have made during the last two years. The warning signaled that everything was not all right simply because inflation remained low. Disaster may not be around the corner, but if the reforms are not implemented soon, Dornbusch's premonition may come true. ■

Back to Basics

Leonardo Ferreira

Is the second oldest democracy of Latin America in "clear and present danger" of destruction? Novelist Tom Clancy and the US government would assumedly answer 'apparently.' On March 1, 1996, eight months before the US presidential vote, the White House decertified Colombia as an uncooperative state in the war against drugs, as a republic where even its president is at the mercy of drug cartels by accepting payments of up to six million dollars in the last election (1994).

Colombians are not living through another *Violencia*, the conflict which caused a minimum of 200,000 deaths following World War II. As a precaution against violence, recent administrations have banned live broadcasts of terrorist and subversive acts including communiques and interviews with narcotraffickers or guerrilla groups. Yet, a democracy such as Colombia, weak and in fear, needs remedies far from media controls, beyond sweeping legal reforms or presidential recalls. Colombia requires—deserves—a fresh social agenda stemming from the effective protection of fundamental liberties and prerogatives.

In Search of Salvation

For two decades, to paraphrase Archbishop Pedro Rubiano, drug corruption was an "elephant"—Colombia's adopted symbol for dishonesty—sitting supposedly undetected in the presidential palace's foyer. How could a retired army sergeant amass a one-billion-dollar fortune without being suspected of narcotrafficking? Thousands of Colombians, particularly members of the elite, contributed to the moral erosion of the country by profiting from drug proceeds. As President Samper acknowledges, "Let's not be hypocrites. This society went about tolerating drug trafficking in such a way that what we need is an escape for all of us, not just for me."

Presidential candidate Alvaro Gómez proposed in 1990 a "National Salvation Movement." After being kidnapped by the guerrilla and defeated in three presidential elections, Gómez insisted that Colombia was ill and in need of radical reform. On November 2, 1995, he was assassinated.

Colombian society has been historically shaped by armed conflicts. To understand its character, it is essential to examine the relationship between political unrest and human rights.

The Right to Live

There are no definite numbers on the casualties of Colombia's drug war. Colonel José Leonardo Gallego, director of the antinarcotics police, has revealed that over 8,400 individuals fell victims to drug terrorism in the last decade. Forty percent of these individuals were murdered, including one minister of justice, one attorney general, four presidential candidates (notably, Luis Carlos Galán in 1989), eighteen magistrates, fifteen judges, hundreds of police officers, public officials, party militants, and civilians.

Journalist María Jimena Duzán, author of an authoritative book on drug cartels, calculates her homeland's sacrifice at 60,000 lives in the second half of the 1980s. A CBS station in Miami estimates the country's death toll at nearly 45,000 people, and *Latin American Guide* claims there were 30,050 assassinations in this Andean state between 1993-94. No one really knows how many people have died in the so-called Colombian drug war.

Foreign commentators attribute this violence to the "aggressive" habits of Colombians, primarily radical politics and drug trafficking. For these commentators, the former "South American Athens"—Santafé de Bogotá—may very well be "the most dangerous city on earth." Colombians reject, even resent this behavior label as simplistic and discriminatory, recognizing narcotrafficking as the source of most human rights crimes, primarily murder and kidnapping.

The Right to Peace

The last Colombian constitutional convention concluded that there is no democracy without harmony. On July 5, 1991, the new 'Magna Carta' commanded every citizen to work for peace and the protection of fundamental rights as the basis for tolerance and coexistence.

Five years into the enactment of the new constitution, however, targeted killings, kidnapping, and other forms of aggression continue. In 1995, Human Rights Watch condemned Colombia as a nominal democracy where torture remains a daily reality, impunity is the rule, and "disposable" people (street children, homosexuals, and beggars) are murdered in "social-cleansing orgies" by paramilitary squads often linked to the military.

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The one message—basic rights!

It took drug cartels, death squads, *sicarios* (hired criminals), guerrillas, and narcopolitical and military conspirators less than a decade to push Colombia down a slope of death, corruption, and lawlessness. Anyone could be killed or kidnapped. *Criptón* TV news director Diana Turbay, for instance, daughter of former president Julio César Turbay (1978-82), was not as lucky as Juan Carlos Gaviria, brother of OAS Secretary General César Gaviria, who was kidnapped and miraculously freed thanks to Fidel Castro's intervention. Soon after César Gaviria assumed the Colombian presidency, Diana Turbay was killed while being rescued in a crossfire between the police and the *Extraditables*, the squadron set up by Pablo Escobar. *Noticia de un Secuestro* (News of a Kidnapping), García-Márquez's latest book, describes this tragic episode as the "bestial drama" lived by Colombians for more than twenty years.

Freedom of Expression

Days before chief editor Raúl Echavarría of Cali's *Occidente* was assassinated in September 1986, Guillermo Cano of *El Espectador* deplored the "narcotized state of public opinion." After mounting a strong defense of extradition as a compelling instrument against drug cartels, Cano was machine-gunned, in December 1986, in front of his daily, the oldest newspaper in Colombia. On September 2, 1989, the *Extraditables* tried to literally kill Cano's *El Espectador* by igniting a car bomb next to the newspaper's building in Bogotá. Yet, virtually destroyed, the newspaper never stopped printing.

Cano is only one of many media martyrs. Duzán estimates that 70 reporters were murdered between 1986-91. One night in 1982, while working for *El Espectador*, María Jimena Duzán survived a midnight dynamite explosion. Sylvia, her younger sister, was not as fortunate. On February 26, 1990, on assignment for a British TV documentary in a guerrilla town, Sylvia Duzán and three peasant leaders were killed by paramilitary men including an off-duty police officer. According to the Inter-American Press Association, out of 144 journalists murdered in the Americas between 1988-93, 57 died in Colombia.

Under pressure, despite powerful incentives to look the other way, Colombian journalists maintain a brave front to keep their audiences informed. In this struggle, Article 20 of the 1991 Constitution plays a pivotal role, guaranteeing everyone's liberty to express thoughts and opinions (including the right to disclose and receive truthful and impartial information). Indeed, the new constitution defines communication as a competitive, participatory, and socially responsible activity. A chapter on social, economic, and cultural rights also intends to "protect" the freedom and independence of the journalism profession. Old notions of public order, social morality, and state of emergency have, at least on paper, given way to ideas of popular freedom, impartiality, and fairness.

The Supreme Court decides what this rhetoric means in practice. For years, social responsibility has been an attractive but disappointing theory in Colombia, inasmuch as there are no guidelines on *when* and *how* reporters are deemed responsible. In an overly commercialized environment, defamation is a crime and its defense limited when compared to systems where libel is a civil matter. News on social issues are exempted, but media organizations must prove the truthfulness of their assertions. Public officials and public figures regularly force the press to retract statements without having to prove actual malice. Sometimes news organizations complain about authorities being "too tolerant with [critics], letting them do and say whatever they want." Unfortunately, freedom of expression for many Colombians is still a privilege, not a right.

Social Participation

The new constitution introduced notions of utmost importance for the country such as the People's Defender (Ombudsman), the *Fiscalía* (to fight back impunity), the Constitutional Court, and limitations on the power of presidents to declare emergencies—thus ending the pernicious "state of siege" of previous decades. Other revolutionary concepts were also introduced to the Colombian legal system. These elements included the people's right to receive impartial information and to take *tutela* action (guarding fundamental rights), the legality of a dual citizenship, and basic economic and cultural amenities such as the right to live in a healthy environment.

Legal reforms rarely bring instant change—if at all. The unequal distribution of wealth, the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, the lack of basic needs, and the persistent climate of violence against children are huge barriers to the participatory society the 1991

Constitution envisions. Access to fundamental domains such as information, education, technology, and the arts is shrinking rather than expanding. As with freedom of the press, there has been little advancement in social participation.

A first wave of privatization gave the wrong impression that Colombia was better off. Improvements, if any, have hardly reached the needy. In his inaugural speech, President Samper vowed a *Pacto Social* whereby special attention will be paid to the poor. Within a few days, the "Contract with Colombia" was reduced to a series of scandals involving the president himself.

Colombia has shown a preference for a *modus vivendi* typified by aggravated levels of socioeconomic concentration, speculation, monopolization, intolerance and discrimination. The law of the jungle has taken over the country's ethics.

Self-Determination

Sovereignty, the people's right to secure their own future free from external interference, is a fervent issue in Colombia. In fact, self-determination seems more and more important insofar as numerous Colombians feel politically, economically, and even ethnically discriminated by the industrialized world. The US decertification, the constant threat of US commercial sanctions, and the repeated harassment of Colombian nationals at US/European embassies and ports of entry have heightened the sentiment of anti-imperialism against world powers, particularly the United States.

President Clinton, who has never set foot in the Americas in spite of the "Miami spirit" of the 1994 summit, has a policy towards Latin America as unpredictable as Colombia's immediate future. In the meantime, Colombians watch the news. A 1996 national survey by the US Department of Health showed that use of cocaine, LSD, and marijuana among teenagers rose a 105 percent between 1992-95. Public broadcasters report that cocaine is as easy to get as a pint of Häagen-Dazs ice cream or a pack of Marlboros in North America. Self-determination is a touchy issue in the Andean region, largely because of the First World rhetoric about the war on narcotics.

In Need of Action

Respect for life and peace must be the priority for any democratic progress in Colombia. This country needs a serious peace plan implementing a lasting cease-fire, an open amnesty with the guerrilla and the paramilitary, and a reform of the armed forces and the justice system.

While protecting its national sovereignty, Colombia should improve both its image and relations with the North. Therefore, Colombians must repeal the prohibition on nonextradition of nationals. Respect for international law is imperative if the goal is to demand committed action from other countries against illegal drugs. Colombia could internationalize this problem by placing arrested drug traffickers in the hands of the U.N. and other multilateral bodies. If necessary, world drug tribunals ought to be created giving narcotrafficking the rank of a crime against humanity.

Human rights in Colombia also means the obligation to guarantee safe and ample freedom of expression, particularly the right to criticize government officials without intimidation. The social responsibility of the press cannot be an excuse to censor speech. In the end, the key towards resolving this country's social problems lies in the right of the impoverished to participate in society. Decisive action against absolute poverty is the only way out of the dilemmas of this hemisphere. Colombians need competent action to safeguard their basic human rights. ■

One Step Forward, Ten Steps Back

Gerardo González

Cuban society is facing a very complex economic and political situation. The events surrounding the February 24, 1996 downing of two civilian aircraft and the subsequent announcement from the Communist Party politburo of a new ideological offensive, complicated the domestic scene at a time when several factors augured a more propitious framework for a transition on the island. Such a transition pointed toward an economic and political restructuring with different characteristics from the prevailing structure.

One Step Forward

The economic results of 1995 and a "softening" in the relations with the US were two positive factors which could pave the way for future change. While it is premature to state that the Cuban economy has entered into a phase of sustained recovery, the results thus far have demonstrated that the downward spiral has been halted. In contrast to the weak economic growth of 1994, which was basically inflationary and driven by the recovery of a few nonproductive services, the 2.5 percent growth rate achieved in 1995 was more impressive. This growth rate was largely the result of significant increases in productive sectors such as nickel (64.4 percent), tobacco (52 percent), and steel (45.7 percent). (These sectors have benefited from important doses of foreign investment.) The recovery had three other important dimensions: a significant increase in exports (20 percent); the stabilization of the exchange rate relative to the US dollar; and, the reduction of the fiscal deficit to 3.6 percent of GDP.

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The transformation occurring in Cuban society is a result of a strategy to confront the impact of a crisis. These changes are incipient but in the mid- to long-term, they will signify a new economic and social restructuring of the island. The presence of foreign investment in the most dynamic sectors of the economy produced substantial changes in the way in which modes of production, distribution and consumption are organized. These changes have had grave repercussions in other sectors of the national economy, forced to seek internationally competitive levels and to acquire the same technological and organizational patterns prevalent in the mixed and private sectors. A significant impact has been felt in the productive matrix which will imply major shifts in the nature of the productive sector. First, state administrators will have to adapt to the market-oriented culture brought in by foreign investors and will have to forego state paternalism—administrators could derive a greater share of power due to their contacts with the world market. Second, labor relations in all state enterprises will also undergo a severe transformation. As a result, a contradiction has developed due to the state's requirement of high levels of capital accumulation and labor intensive technological and productivity norms.

Such a scenario inevitably implies the appearance of new conflictive areas and the shifting of power quotas to the emerging entrepreneurial elite. As a consequence, it also implies the obsolescence of many mechanisms, practices, and participation arrangements that characterized the previous paternalistic scheme. Thus, there will be a need to develop a process of adjustment and institutional development capable not only of dealing with these contradictions but also of empowering workers with mechanisms in tune with the new reality.

The adoption of market norms has implied a cardinal variation from the rules of the game that guided the Cuban economy and society for more than three decades. Under the socialist project, the state played a highly centralized role based on the notion that only the central government—possessing a national perspective of the problems and armed with vast financial assets—was capable of protecting all social interests and achieving the principal national objectives which included: creating a basic infrastructure; developing key sectors of the economy; guaranteeing social justice; and ensuring national independence.

While these considerations were justified at certain historical moments, the adoption of uniform measures to carry out national objectives did not necessarily satisfy the demands of distinct social sectors. As a result, these sectors were totally subordinated to the central government.

With the onslaught of the crisis, state prerogatives and decision-making capacity became restricted by

In the clutches of the past

the dramatic scarcity of resources, which severely penalized the interests and necessities of the social sectors that depended on the state. In this context, the 1993 reforms placed the market in open competition with the state as the source for the redistribution of income, resources, and place of survival. As a result, important segments of the population enjoyed a relative liberalization from state tutelage as they resorted to the market in search of economic roles and resources that the state could no longer deliver.

On the political front, the state was also forced to make concessions. With the collapse of the socialist camp and the precipitation of the economic crisis, the ideological dogmas that sustained the government began to crumble—as did the capacity of the Communist Party to exercise control. Thus, in Cuban society, a gradual clamor for a "socialization" of power and for a forum for political debate began to develop. Cuba's leadership attempted to abort or prevent these social demands from playing a role in state institutions. To the government's dismay, a period of rich public debate emerged as of 1990 thus becoming an "informal marketplace of debate." One of the most significant moments came during the discussion for the convocation of the Fourth Party Congress. Thousands of proposals were made, revealing the plurality of opinions that could be found in Cuba in the early 1990s.

The vocalization of demands was also the result of the maturation of a 'social subject' who had a high participation potential but was trapped in an institutional arrangement that frustrated the accumulated political energy. By the 1990s, Cuban society had experienced radical changes. The most noteworthy included: substantial increases in schooling levels; the entry into public life of new generations whose socialization process differed markedly from previous ones; the incorporation of a highly qualified, technical and professional female workforce; notable increases in urbanization; and an intense process of politization and political maturation. Moreover, nearly one-third of the voting age population was born after 1959; nearly two-fifths of the labor force was female; and almost one million persons had completed university and technical studies and were professionally employed in production, service, and public administration sectors. In short, Cuban society had undergone a process of "autonomization" which was evident in the expression of positions that sometimes conflicted with official dictates. Also, there has been an emergence of new economic actors (e.g., entrepreneurial technocrats linked to the world market and self-employed workers) whose medium- and long-term interests are not necessarily compatible with the socialist project—future political tensions could arise.

Beginning in 1993, these changes were anchored to the course of US-Cuba relations. The Clinton administration's decision to modify traditional immigration policy regarding



A cartoon from a Cuban newspaper, *Juventud Rebelde*. The caption reads, "I'm renting it to some foreigners." The snail is referring to his shell, of course.

Cuban immigrants, its initial intention to veto the Helms-Burton Bill, and the decision to implement the Torricelli Law's Track Two provision, implied a significant change in the treatment of Cuba. The new policy rejected confrontation and became one of "bridge building." If one considers seriously rumors regarding the possibility of bolder actions toward Cuba during Clinton's second term, the arrival of a period of slackening of tensions would support economic reform and strengthen Cuban civil society.

Ten Steps Back

Cuban leadership was not oblivious to the socioeconomic transformation and its political and ideological costs. However, it reacted slowly to direct the transformation. It was not a coincidence that the reforms were delayed despite the fact that the economic situation demanded a transformation of the system. Reforms were allowed only when the crisis reached a point where the government was losing the ability to govern (as exemplified by the events of the Summer of 1994). A bold step might have been a policy to propose a new development strategy based on the requirements for economic efficiency (including institutional, procedural and normative reforms in the political sphere). One of the conditions to resolve the severe economic crisis may be to search for some coherence between the political and economic spheres. The objective would be to resolve the contradictions which spring from the economic transformation. Cuba's political leadership, however, has elected against innovative economic change and the introduction of political reforms. Instead, it has confronted current and future political trends with traditional mechanisms. Such a choice is not strange to a leadership which has always stressed ideological supremacy over other factors.

The decision to block tolerance and autonomous action—which had been allowed in recent years because of the Revolution's internal and external weaknesses and less as a result of a will for change—was taken when the course of US foreign policy moved in concert with domestic events. In my view, the catalyst was the decision on the part of dissident groups to form a single organization named *Concilio Cubano* and the announcement of February 24, 1996, as the launching date. The US move toward reconciliation was perceived by Cuba's leadership as an assault on its traditional power base. In this sense, it is worth noting that the Revolution constructed its domestic and international policy based on the notion of "fortress under siege" which mandated the need to protect national security and which served to justify political intolerance and stringent control measures. Under a nonconfrontation scenario with the United States, the absence of the traditional popular mobilization element would force Cuba's leadership to deal with a novel political situation. It was advantageous for Cuba's leaders to continue living under the tense situation that has characterized relations with its northern neighbor—at least until these leaders eliminate or control internal political discontent. As a result, the shooting down of the two airplanes on February 24, 1996, was a calculated political decision by the Cuban government to unravel the Clinton administration's intentions to seek closer ties with Cuba. The incident also provided an excuse to flame nationalist sentiment and launch the "ideological offensive" Fidel Castro announced before the Central Committee.

The announcement of this offensive signified a regression—ten steps back—in the political life of the island. In 1986, a Process of Rectification was initiated under a different context; however, it heralded what would occur a decade later. The Process of Rectification was born with a high ideological content. Its central argument, to rescue "*lo nacional,*" found a fertile ground in the popular patriotic sentiment fueled by hostile US postures and by the pro-capitalist trends in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Rectification was explained not only as the only genuine socialist alternative (given the capitulation of former allies), but also as the only alternative through which the Cuban nation could guarantee its survival. Now as then, the arguments of the Cuban government are similar.

Future Perspective

Cuban events and change are always likely to generate controversy and a number of interpretations. This essay has only provided a partial interpretation of the contradictory transformation that unfolded—and will continue to unfold in Cuba. Many questions remain unanswered; perhaps the most relevant is whether the events of 1996 will abort any possibility of a transition on the island.

Given the complexity of the situation, only a few clues on Cuba's future can be provided which may be significant in any scenario. An important premise must be noted. Despite the government's claims that measures aimed at combating the crisis are temporary, these have defined, and will continue to define, a Cuban reality that will be difficult to revert.

In the short- and medium-term, progress will depend on three distinct factors: the form that the much announced ideological offensive will take; the economic results obtained in 1996, especially the sugar harvest; and the policy that the reelected Clinton administration adopts in the near future toward Cuba. ■

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The following areas are meant to be suggestive of the broad scope of the conference: the development of the social, cultural, political, and economic institutions of the island during the colonial and Republican eras; the antecedents and consequences of the Revolution of 1959; analysis of the contemporary Cuban reality; manifestations of national identity in the arts, literature, and popular culture; migration and the dynamics of Cuban communities outside the island; Cuba-U.S. relations; and the importance of race, class, gender, and political culture in the development of the Cuban nation, both on the island and in its diaspora.

Persons interested in participating should submit a detailed one-page abstract of the paper they propose to present. We also accept proposals from those who wish to organize panels and roundtables.

The CRI will offer a limited number of modest travel grants to graduate students and junior scholars who would otherwise not be able to attend the conference. Indication of interest and need for such support should be submitted with the abstract.

Deadline for the submission of abstracts is **April 30, 1997.**

For more information or to send your abstract, contact:

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CRI

Perspectives on Regional Trade

Thomas M. Leonard

Four University of North Florida professors,[1] who recently completed a two-year study under the auspices of a grant from the United States Department of Education, concluded that the "opening" of Cuba will have a greater impact upon the Caribbean community than the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Furthermore, intraregional commercial relations are more important to the South American countries than NAFTA.

When Congress passed—and President William J. Clinton signed—the NAFTA agreement in late 1993, there was widespread concern of its potential damage to the United States economy. Little attention was given in the US to the possible impact that NAFTA might have upon the Caribbean and South American countries. Although the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) established a series of commissions to study the issue, the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) countries only started an examination of NAFTA's significance to the region in 1996.

As part of the project, the team visited three CARICOM countries (Barbados, Belize and the Dominican Republic) and the four MERCOSUR countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). With the exception of Argentina, the United States embassy staff in each country provided the team with an introductory briefing on the nation's contemporary economy and politics, followed by interviews with personnel in various government ministries, private research organizations, and members of the business sector.

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The Caribbean Community

The origins of CARICOM can be traced to 1973 when several former British colonies agreed to establish a free trade area. Since then CARICOM has grown into a regional association representing 15 nations with the mandate to deal with intra-Caribbean and global trade.

The CARICOM nations visited by the team were selected because of their economic differences: Barbados has the best managed economy in the Caribbean community, Belize seeks to secure its future as the most recently independent Caribbean nation and, the Dominican Republic holds a special relationship with the United States "807" industries. Despite the diversity, each shares common concerns about its economic future.

Barbados and Belize are former British colonies that profit from two important legacies: a literate population and a functioning democratic form of government. In contrast, the Dominican Republic has a Spanish tradition and since its independence in 1844 has been marred by a series of dictatorships. Each also shares a history of government serving elitist interests. This legacy has been successfully challenged in Barbados and is now being challenged in Belize and the Dominican Republic. Clearly, these traditions provide guidance for the future, and bespeak that Barbados is the most confident of the three, Belize less so and the Dominican Republic the least confident.

Only the Dominican Republic anticipates an adverse impact upon its economy as a result of the NAFTA accords. The Republic is home to 17 Free Trade Zones where numerous US electric, garment and pharmaceutical plants operate under "807" status. According to this arrangement, parts are shipped to the Dominican Republic for assembly and returned to the US duty-free or near so. With NAFTA, Dominican officials expect that there will be no future expansion of these operations, but rather that new US investments in assembly plants will go to Mexico where wages and transportation costs are much lower. The Barbadian government does not share the Dominicans' concern because it views NAFTA as addressing an economy of the past. Instead, Barbados anticipates that its future rests not with manufacturing but with informatics, telecommunications and offshore financial services. Belizean officials do not anticipate that NAFTA will have an adverse impact upon its economy, save for the trucking industry which delivers goods from the wharf at Belize City to businesses in the Yucatán region of southern Mexico and the western border of Guatemala. Otherwise, more pressing needs lay in agricultural development (to cut the importation of foodstuffs) and the development of a labor force to meet the needs of light industrial production and an expanded tourist industry.

CARICOM, MERCOSUR and NAFTA revisited

The proposed Graham-Gibbons Bill in the United States Congress does not excite spokespersons in all three countries. This bill offers to extend NAFTA's trade agreements to the Caribbean community, but with the potential demand for preliminary agreements on intellectual property rights, government procurement policies and offshore banking, allegations have arisen of US interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

If NAFTA does not arouse much interest in these countries, the anticipated "opening" of Cuba does. All three advocate the lifting of the US embargo against Cuba, viewing the embargo as an immoral act that contributes to the suffering of the Cuban people without bringing political change to the island. Despite this position, two countries—the Dominican Republic and Belize—admittedly stand to lose should Cuba "open up." Both the Dominicans and the Belizeans anticipate a loss for the tourist industries. Curiosity would cause visitors to flock to Cuba despite the Dominican Republic's well-established tourist industry and Belize's special place on the *Mundo Maya* route. The Dominicans and Belizeans also fear Cuban competition in citrus and sugar exports and for dollar investment. (The Dominican Republic's tobacco industry might also be jeopardized.) In contrast, the Barbadians stand much more confidently since they anticipate an increase in tourism because their location at the far end of the Caribbean will not be lost to cruise ships stopping at Cuba. Furthermore, in anticipating a future in electronic service industries, Cuba will not be a competitor.

The Southern Cone

MERCOSUR embraces four southern cone countries—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay—and has as its goal the elimination of trade barriers among the member countries. The economies of these countries are diverse and at various stages of development, with Brazil being the richest, followed by Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Politically, these countries share the experience of shedding military rule and returning to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, Paraguay's democracy was reaffirmed just two days prior to the team's arrival in Asunción, when an attempted military coup was squelched under US pressure.

The NAFTA agreement is not a major issue for any of these countries. Instead, officials criticized the US for its lack of consistent policy toward the southern hemisphere. In fact, interest in this region was reignited late in President George Bush's administration after a ten-year lapse. Reaching an agreement with the US will be difficult. Like their CARICOM counterparts, the MERCOSUR countries are wary of Washington's insistence on preliminary agreements dealing with intellectual property rights, procurement and the environment. Each is also critical of US tariff protection for selected industries and of the maze of red tape that confronts businesspersons seeking access to the US market.

While acknowledging the influential economic power of the United States, spokespersons in each nation embrace the Brazilian proposal to unite all South America into one trading partnership before dealing with NAFTA and the United States. Each also accepts the "four plus one" concept whereby individual MERCOSUR countries would conclude agreements with other Latin American republics. Bolivia and Chile joined MERCOSUR in mid-1996 on an associate status. Efforts to expand MERCOSUR now include Venezuela, with the ultimate objective of uniting MERCOSUR with the Andean Community, CARICOM and CACM nations.

If the Andean nations are looked upon favorably as trading partners, Chile is viewed with suspicion and awe. Chile's failure to enter NAFTA was placed at the Mexican 'doorstep' because Mexico feared the loss of its primary position as an extension of the US economy. The decision prompted the Chilean government to look toward MERCOSUR. Most believe that Chile will want to protect its economic advances of the past ten years. Yet, Paraguayans view Chile's participation in MERCOSUR as a counterweight to Argentina and Brazil. Spokespersons in Montevideo, Uruguay, and Bahía Blanca, Argentina, are hopeful that a trans-Andean transportation system would link those port cities with Concepción, Chile, thus providing the east coast cities with the economic benefits that would come from the commercial linkage between the eastern and western hemispheres.

One US official described MERCOSUR as a stormy Latin American marriage, and indeed it is. No one denies that Brazil is MERCOSUR's engine and that the future of the southern cone rests upon Brazil's economic health. Yet nationalistic jealousies persist. Argentines express eternal optimism that they will catch up with the Brazilians—a game-point score that the latter will not permit. Meanwhile, the Paraguayans are tired of being treated like a "stepson" by their larger neighbors. Only the Uruguayans seem resigned to their secondary status and, by staying out of the fracas, hope to become home to MERCOSUR's secretariat.

Beyond nationalistic rivalries, MERCOSUR confronts several problems, the most contentious being the common external tariff. Each nation wants to protect particular industries, such as automobiles and computer software, from outside competition. There is also a need to harmonize labor, tax and investment laws, a difficult task because of the varied impact that harmonization would have upon each nation. Admittedly, Paraguay and Uruguay do not have the funds to develop the infrastructure necessary to play a significant role in commerce, prompting a fear of being left behind. And while intra-MERCOSUR trade has flourished, each nation continues to run an overall trade deficit, which may lead to agreements outside MERCOSUR. For example, the Brazilians hope to reach an accord with China on agricultural goods and Paraguay hopes to find a special niche in the Chilean market for processed meats and toiletries.

Socioeconomic segments within each country face problems that may not be MERCOSUR driven, but which will impact upon future economic cooperation. All government spokespersons dismissed as an "interesting concept" the suggestion that the contemporary rush toward privatization of state-owned industries parallels the actions of the late nineteenth-century Latin American liberals that resulted in higher prices and lower wages at home while profits were sent abroad. One US embassy official dismissed this suggestion with the observation that any change is described as neoliberal. But to the person on the street, higher prices and lost jobs are real and his/her consternation is vocally expressed on the streets of Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Opposition to modernization in Paraguay comes from the traditional landed elite and nearly 200,000 small farmers and state employees who fear that the nation's favorable investment laws and privatization plans will cost them dearly. Brazil's older industrial class in São Paulo and residents in the economically underdeveloped northeast region oppose integration, while the military is wary of any international agreement that deals with telecommunications.

Despite these obstacles, there is agreement in all four capitals that the progress made in MERCOSUR surpasses that of the European Union at the same point in development and that all parties are committed to continued economic cooperation.

Implications for the United States

While the benefits of NAFTA continue to be debated in the United States, this study concludes that the agreement has little significance to the Caribbean and southern cone nations, save the Dominican Republic. Instead, officials in the CARICOM and MERCOSUR communities link their nation's future economic development to domestic and regional issues, not to decisions made in Washington. In reality, however, such positions may be sheer folly because Caribbean trade is closely tied to the United States. In the southern cone, Brazil's effort to lead a South American consortium to challenge US economic power is purely an admission of economic weakness. ■

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[1] Thomas M. Leonard, professor of History; Steven K. Paulson, professor of Marketing; Jeffrey W. Steagall, associate professor of Economics; and William J. Wilson, professor of Statistics.

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A Non-Profit Organization Dedicated to the Protection of the Peruvian Tropical Rain Forest and Provision of Medical Services to its Native People

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Unearthing Grassroots Power

Eduardo Silva

The fate of tropical forests has captured the imagination of the world for over a decade. Many studies have diagnosed the proximate and deeper causes of deforestation and sketched out policy proposals to stem, halt, or reverse the process. In this debate, the "shifted cultivator"—the poor, land-hungry people who invade the forests in search of subsistence living—often bears the brunt of the blame. Because demographic pressure and maldistribution of agricultural land throw these people onto the frontier in large numbers, policy prescriptions focus on family planning, halting colonization projects and road-building, and advocating land reform, all the while stressing the need for parks and reserves, and the capacity to manage them. This policy preference is often interpreted as an attempt to keep people from the forest in order to preserve it. As laudable as those goals are, serious questions remain. What will be the fate of people who inhabit the forest? Are they to be driven out? Are they to be blamed for deforestation as they seek to survive?

For some time, poverty has been perceived as a major contributor to environmental degradation, especially in rural areas. Consequently, in the latter half of the 1980s, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, the Brundtland Commission, focused on basic needs as a necessary component of sustainable development, in tandem with a redirection of economic growth along a more environmentally friendly path, population control, and citizen participation. How to balance economic growth, environmental quality, social equality, and participation remains a complex policy issue.

Under the assumption that forests are multiple use zones that can and do provide their inhabitants with a living, the grassroots development approach promotes agroforestry, community forestry and reforestation, wood harvesting, the ranching of native fauna, extractive reserves, and ecotourism.

In forest policy, the grassroots development approach most directly addresses the livelihood concerns of economically and socially underprivileged forest dwellers. Under the assumption that forests are multiple use zones that can and do provide their inhabitants with a living, this approach promotes agroforestry, community forestry and reforestation, wood harvesting, the ranching of native fauna, extractive reserves, and ecotourism. Policies and projects based on this approach promote the conservation of forests at the community level. These policies encourage local self-reliance and control of economic resources, the use of appropriate technologies that mimic natural processes and emphasize the linkage of communities to markets.

Grassroots Development Politics

The experiences of Mexico, Costa Rica, and Brazil over the past 15 years provide some insights into the politics of crafting policies and projects that promote grassroots development in the forest sector. In the 1980s, Mexico promoted community forestry among forest *ejidos* (communal farms that arose as a result of the Mexican revolution). Based on sound silvicultural practices, these grassroots development models show how communities organize to sustainably harvest forests, build human capital, provide employment at better wages, and generate, reinvest, and distribute profits to the community. Costa Rica developed a robust community reforestation program in the Pacific northwest. In accordance with a land tenure system based on private property rights, family farmers belonging to cooperatives avail themselves of government incentives to reforest with native or exotic species. The cooperative mediates between the government and the farmers and provides members with technical and financial support. These cases show that community forestry is feasible under both communal and individual forms of land tenure rights. With the creation of extractive reserves—and a commitment to legalize Indian land claims—Brazil offers a case of explicit recognition of forests as multiple use zones,

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stressing its nontimber services: nuts, rubber, fibers, and other agricultural products.

Understanding the politics that influenced the movement toward grassroots development in forestry requires analyzing actors, interests, and power in the context of economically and culturally defined social groups, state institutions and actors, and external factors. These, however, are only the essential building blocks; the dynamics of coalition building between these elements lies at the heart of the politics involved. The aggregation of the capabilities of the different actors constitutes the coalition's power.

What kinds of pro-grassroots development coalitions have been successful? The Mexican and Costa Rican cases suggest one path. Favorable outcomes in those cases depended on the formation of coalitions between organized communities and state and international actors that supported grassroots development. Two elements were crucial to the success of the coalitions. First, the communities were actively seeking help to either reverse an abrupt economic decline or to counter socioeconomically advantaged groups with whom they were locked in a struggle over natural resources. Second, relevant state institutions were sympathetic to grassroots development from the outset. In contrast, the Brazilian case exemplified coalition building in the absence of state support for grassroots development. Domestic social and ecological groups required strong support from international actors—US environmental pressure groups persuaded the Congress of the United States to threaten Brazil with blockage of World Bank loans.

These cases demonstrate that organized communities seeking to overcome a specific difficulty are the bedrock of grassroots development coalitions. Such communities actively seek allies to help solve their problems and have a vital interest in implementing proposed solutions. State actors (whenever available) play crucial roles in these coalitions; they can protect peasant and indigenous leaders from their enemies. Together with nongovernmental organizations and international actors sympathetic to grassroots development, state actors can also provide technical expertise, extension services, and funds. But only *organized* communities will be able to use these to best avail. If communities are not organized, community forestry projects should make organization the first priority. Wherever possible, such efforts should build on existing grassroots organizations even if they have little or no experience in forestry. Otherwise, competition between new and old groups can virtually ruin any project.

Given the difficulties of grassroots development, the tide has turned against this approach as a solution to the livelihood question for forest dwellers.

Grassroots development is difficult. It can be costly in terms of time (easily up to 10 years worth of project commitment). This type of development is capital intensive, especially in terms of human capital (technical expertise), extension services, and financial support. Moreover, grassroots development requires great flexibility. It can also be politically costly because support for socioeconomic underprivileged groups can generate powerful enemies.

Given these difficulties, the tide has turned against grassroots development as a solution to the livelihood question for forest dwellers. The reflux is rooted in the desperate need of governments to generate export commodities to repay crushing foreign debt loans, the concomitant bankruptcy of states, and the emphasis on orthodox market economics and biodiversity. In this context, arguments for large-scale industrial logging or tree plantations to generate foreign exchange through exports and direct foreign investment are gaining popularity. Moreover, grassroots development has taken a back seat to a focus on parks and reserves as a means to conserve biodiversity in many multilateral institutions and international organizations.

Toward a New Conservationism

Although policies that promote large-scale timber industries are generally at odds with grassroots development, the same is not true of conservation. A "new conservationism" is emerging. This philosophy recognizes that the viability of parks and reserves depends in no small measure on their ability to offer solutions to the livelihood issues that bedevil impoverished rural populations. The application of grassroots development-style projects in buffer zones should reduce pressure to exploit the core areas of parks or reserves that contain essential habitats.

The utility of the buffer zone concept for development purposes may depend on whether it is narrowly or broadly interpreted. If reduced to areas immediately surrounding a park or reserve, a buffer zone may be of limited utility. The numbers of families and the area covered would be severely restricted. Success may draw families from the rest of the country where farmers and peasants are being subjected to bankruptcy and expulsion as the economics of agriculture concentrates land in the hands of agribusiness. Under these conditions, the defense of gains by those who benefit from grassroots development projects in a buffer zone could lead to either social tension, land invasions of protected areas, or both. A broader conceptualization of parks and reserves as integral parts of "areas of conservation" which are linked to each other might offer better chances of success—Costa Rica is currently experimenting with variations of this idea. Theoretically, areas of conservation distribute grassroots development-oriented projects more broadly across the country and cover many activities, such as watershed management, integrated small-scale agriculture, forestry, reforestation, and extractive activities.

While the "new conservationism" offers the prospect of integrating grassroots development with biodiversity protection, the extent to which this promise becomes reality also depends on politics. The funding for such efforts, and their conceptualization, lies mostly in the hands of multilateral lending organizations and conservationist nongovernmental organizations in the developed nations, especially the United States. The apprehension of grassroots development-oriented groups in developing countries is that these international actors—and their domestic sources of support—are dominated by persons *primarily* concerned with habitat protection. Thus, all too often, the obligatory community development component of project grant competitions is poorly conceived, underfunded, and excessively limited in its reach. In short, the community development portion of the project runs the risk of being stillborn. In other proposals, such as joint implementation of carbon offset agreements and bioprospecting, sharing funds with grassroots development projects is simply not on the agenda.

The "new conservationism" and the funds attached to it thus provide an opportunity for generating grassroots development projects, but we must not assume that intellectual recognition and project requirements automatically translate into action. Given the central role of international agencies, converting this opportunity into reality may involve generating broad coalitions similar to the ones that obliged the World Bank to make the environment a more central concern—and that forced the Brazilian government to establish extractive reserves. These coalitions would necessarily involve international nongovernmental organizations that take the nexus between grassroots development and environment seriously in alliance with forces (peasant organizations, nongovernmental organizations, unions, and political parties) within developing countries. In order to generate support for their cause among the citizens of developed nations who are mainly interested in species preservation, such coalitions would have to demonstrate that parks and reserves cannot survive where human populations live in degradation. A campaign around those themes might build pressure—including from the US Congress—to pay more serious attention to the integration of projects that sustain "alternative" livelihoods in conjunction with nature conservation. This is a difficult task and the current political winds may not favor it. But if the process of grassroots mobilization and coalition building is not begun in expectation of more politically propitious times, we run the risk of accepting rhetoric for reality, the shell for the content. ■

F A X

Insider briefs on people and institutions shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Lather Up with Hemp

California voters gave patients who suffer from certain diseases the right to smoke marijuana for medicinal purposes last November. Jamaica had another idea about what to do with hemp. In August, the ministry of agriculture told Reuters that Jamaica would begin cultivating industrial hemp on an experimental basis. The hemp would be used to produce soaps, textiles, animal feed, cosmetics, and paper products. The ministry claimed that the hemp would not contain the psychoactive chemical found in marijuana; measures would be instituted to prevent any tampering with the industrial variety. Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey had no reaction regarding Jamaica's plan, but the Clinton administration has already threatened US physicians who prescribe marijuana with arrest. Might Jamaica face decertification?

Expand at Your Own Risk

According to a Kroll Associates report, Japanese and other foreign multinational executives have been kidnapped by Mexican gangs and are likely to face increasing threats in the future unless they and their companies are better prepared to check the problem. Three factors may account for the increase in foreign kidnappings: the kidnappers are never caught, the companies pay quickly and handsomely, and foreign executives are easy targets—they are not protected by the security measures that Mexican executives have adopted as a result of their own experience. The case that put this trend into perspective was the August 1996 kidnapping of Mamoru Konno, president of the Sanyo Video Component Corporation, who was freed by his captors after his company paid $2 million in ransom. The lamentable situation at the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, may reflect another twist. Although denied by Japanese officials, MRTA rebels allegedly kept business executives longer than others hoping that their companies would disburse hefty ransoms for their release.

How Tough is Tough?

Proponents of the Helms-Burton Law have been making some noise that positive results of the legislation are already being felt. In early December 1996, the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU) adopted a "common position" on European policy for the support of democracy in Cuba. This position had the consensus of the 15 member states, including Spain, which had submitted a harsher proposal. In the text, the EU encouraged the peaceful transition to democratic pluralism and the respect for human rights in Cuba. The EU rejected coercive measures that would, according to the Council, worsen the situation in Cuba. Under the terms of the common position, the EU and its member states agreed to: continue the dialogue with Cuban authorities; continue humanitarian aid—subject to an agreement on its distribution (a Spanish condition); evaluate the evolution of Cuba's domestic policy; and continue economic actions geared toward greater openness. Closer relations between Cuba and the EU will now depend on the Cuban government's willingness to introduce political reforms. The US State Department commended the EU for its "tougher" stance and suggested that the White House might consider waiving penalties against European firms that do business on the island.

A Madman in Love

The transition to democracy in Latin America brought with it a long dry spell of Latin American presidents who were foreign trained, highly sophisticated, and perhaps a bit too boring. In 1996, however, the swearing in of Abdala Bucaram as president of Ecuador has provided a good dose of entertainment, although not all Ecuadoreans are amused. As is now common knowledge, one of Bucaram's first activities as president was to record a CD—"A Madman in Love"—with Los Iracundos, a 1970s Uruguayan pop group. As if taping the CD were not enough, sources present at the Tenth Iberoamerican Summit in Santiago report that Bucaram personally gave copies of the CD to any Iberoamerican president who would take one. If you are interested in listening to the singing president, the *St. Petersburg Times* allows you to dial in to get a small sample. Dial (813) 898-0019 and select the category code 1051. Frank Sinatra, he is not.

Edited by Eduardo A. Gamarra

A Ghost from the Past

When President Caldera took office in 1993, the centerpiece of his campaign was to end corruption in Venezuela. His call went over very well and became one of the most significant pillars of the Summit of the Americas held in Miami in 1994 and the basis of a region-wide pledge to fight corruption. The sincerity of Caldera's campaign, however, was questioned in an article by Edward Epstein in the *New Yorker* (September 23) which claims that the late Armand Hammer paid $3 million in bribes to top government officials of Caldera's first government in 1971 to secure oil rights for Occidental Petroleum. Apparently Hammer recorded the conversations with Venezuelan government officials. In 1976, President Carlos Andres Perez paid $40 million in compensation after his government nationalized the oil sector. Caldera may be suffering from a bad case of born-again transparency.

It Is Never Too Late

Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, one of the Cali Cartel's principal leaders (who has been serving time in Bogotá's La Picota prison) has decided that he will use his spare time to obtain a degree in business administration. According to *Semana* (September 23), Rodriguez paid 90 thousand pesos for a distance learning course from the Universidad del Sur. His guards at La Picota report that the diligent student spends several hours a day on his new project. State Department officials have stated that Rodriguez spends the rest of his time managing the old businesses he left behind in Cali—old habits die hard.

Cat on a Hot Tin Roof

Six years after being credited with rescuing Argentina's economy from the brink of chaos, former Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo has embarked on a campaign that has President Menem and his supporters angry. Cavallo has made accusations that a "mafia" operates with impunity in Argentina. His calls have generated a great deal of attention; the Radicales, members of the principal opposition party, have called him to testify in Congress while the Peronistas have gone to the courts to prevent Cavallo from speaking out. It is unlikely that Cavallo will be sentenced or that he will lose credibility because of the confrontation with his former employer. He has already made a name for himself as an international consultant. His first client is none other than Abdala Bucaram of Ecuador.

A Dark Crusade

While the Peruvian government bragged about the dismantling of the MRTA, the guerilla group was apparently busy expanding its international network. As early as 1993, Nestor Cerpa, the leader of the group that took over the Japanese embassy in Lima, was busy orchestrating kidnappings in Bolivia. Sources close to the Bolivian government claim that the MRTA, or groups linked to this organization, carried out a number of kidnappings before the November 1995 abduction of Samuel Doria Medina, the entrepreneur whose family paid over $1 million in ransom. The Bolivian government confirmed in late December that Cerpa and his group moved in and out of the country using falsified documents. The war chest that MRTA accumulated to carry out the Japanese embassy assault was the product of a number of ransoms paid by prominent Bolivian and Peruvian families for the liberation of their relatives.

Honduran Virtual Reality

The Honduran army announced in late December 1996 that it was stripping Colonel José Guadalupe Reittel Caballero of his title as military attaché in Mexico and confining him to house arrest in Tegucigalpa. It appears that the intrepid Colonel has written a paper entitled "El Informe 2000: una realidad virtual de las fuerzas armadas de Honduras" which, among other factors, states that the army is destined to disappear, just like dinosaurs, because of growing internal corruption. The report notes that the chief of the army runs the institution as though it were a private hacienda and that "while the generals use military ships and boats to import Italian ceramics and sumptuous lamps for their mansions, the officers subsist with low salaries." The Honduran army is taking these charges seriously. Spokesperson Colonel Mario David Villanueva claimed that "Reittel Caballero is lying... and will be punished for his crime." ■

The Last Hurrah

Gary Brana-Shute

Newspapers in the United States and, especially, the Netherlands, trumpeted the May 1996 victory of the multiethnic New Front over former military commander and one-time dictator Desi Bouterse's National Democratic Front (NDP) as Suriname's conclusive return to and preference for "democracy." The forces of evil—not to mention abundant patronage—were held at bay.

The victory was a slim one. Composed of the Afro-Creole Suriname National Party (NPS), the East Indian Progressive Reform Party (VHP), the Javanese Party of National Unity and Harmony (KTPI), and a small Creole-dominated labor party, the Suriname Labor Party (SPA), the delicately balanced New Front coalition scored 24 of the 51 National Assembly seats. The statist NDP, headed by Desi Bouterse since his removal as Commander-in-Chief of the military in 1992, weighed in with 16 seats. The Democratic Alternative (DA) '91, comprised of multiethnic yuppies, got four; Pendawalima, a Javanese splinter party, surprised all and copped four; while Alliantie, a breakaway group from the NDP, won a modest three. Less than 60 percent of the electorate turned out.

Elections in Suriname 1987-1996

Party	1987	1991	1996
New Front	40	30	24
NDP	3	12	16
DA '91	X	9*	4
Pendawalima	4	2**	4
Alliantie	X	X	3
Party for the Development of the Interior(ABOP)	X	X	0
Progressive Workers and Farmers Party (PALU)	4	X	X

*9 in four-member coalition **2 in coalition with DA '91

Our first revelation is that no one party has a majority to form a government in Suriname's parliamentary system. Eugenia Charles's warning resonates—"Coalitions don't work in the Caribbean." Second, in the context of Suriname's arcane laws, the Speaker of the Assembly (a post long-held by Jagarnath Lachmon, octogenarian leader of the VHP), requires a majority vote (26) of the Assembly—which he barely received in late July. Both the President and the Vice President of the Republic must be elected by the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority vote (34). If the majority vote is not achieved, the selection process is thrown into a nationwide forum of local, district, and nationally elected officials, numbering 869 participants (51 national parliamentarians, 106 district representatives, and 712 subdistrict officials). This setback occurred in 1991 and it took five months to seat an executive.

Electoral results since the first post-dictatorship elections in 1987 have shown a marked decline in the fortunes of the (New) Front.

I will spare the reader the intricacies, betrayals, personality spats, and policy disputes which culminated in party breakups, realignments, and the emergence of new coalitions. The salient point is that in Suriname, the opposition outnumbers the New Front by 27 to 24 and the New Front is compelled to make a coalition government. Meanwhile, the successes of the NDP have grown consistently and dramatically since its first post-dictatorship run at the polls—when the NDP clearly was the political arm of the military. In fact, the NDP's gain from 1991 to 1996 is greater than the apparent four seats since two members of the NDP broke away to form Alliantie, thus making the absolute gain of the NDP leap from a real base of 10 to 16.

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The end of ethnic politics in Suriname

The Decline of the New Front

How then do we account for the continuing decline of the multiethnic New Front, the surge in strength of the NDP, and the ongoing social and economic problems which plague Suriname's "race to nationhood over ethnic terrain," as Brakette Williams snappily sums up the conundrum?

In describing Suriname, tourist brochures use words and phrases such as luscious, fecund, a tropical paradise, and a veritable United Nations with each ethnic group's bountiful hospitality surpassing the other. This codification was never true. With yearly visits, I have seen a nation grow desperate, cynical, anxious, and hostile. The urban proletariat is impoverished, the middle class lives on the edge of bankruptcy, and youth are disenfranchised and have given up on the neocolonial politics of the old Fronters and their grey-beard supporters. Revenues from narcotics transshipping and money laundering flow through the country's veins—keeping it alive—together with wildcat gold mining along the Litani and Maroni Rivers, and uncontrolled timber cutting in Suriname's vast jungle interior. By the way, it takes about US$ 18 million per month to keep Suriname running (the country is the size of the state of Georgia and has a population of approximately 400,000). Dutch aid, held up after the abuses of the 1980s, looms like an obsession; yet Suriname ignores the strict measures of a structural adjustment plan recommended by every outside donor and government. The Front/New Front governments of 1987 and 1991 (the former deposed by a "telephone" coup in 1990) have not proven themselves up to the job and have evidenced a marked inability to govern under stress. The country, especially the young, want a "strong" man or at least a fresh start from the old ethnic parties, elite cartels, and consociational deal making.

Desire Delano Bouterse, fifty years old, former military commander, de facto head of government during the 1980s, head of the NDP (although not a candidate for office) and renowned as a *doe-man* rather than a *taki-man* (a doer rather than a talker) is the richest man in Suriname. Bouterse amassed his fortune, converted it into political capital, galvanized the aspirations of his new supporters, and positioned himself as leader of a very powerful opposition—almost rehabilitating himself from alleged murderer to politician.

NDP's slogan *leti a faya* (light the fire) appeared all over Paramaribo and the poorer, Creole neighborhoods. NDP planners had targeted youth as long ago as the 1987 elections and marketed their now aging leadership as young(er), vital, and class rather than ethnic-oriented (the 1970s slogan "socialism is love" is alive and well in Suriname). The NDP pitched a class-based nationalism and played on anticolonial resentment and the energetic—but half-baked—aspirations of frustrated youth. At one mass meeting, the young swooned over Desi's thundering call for "order, discipline, and organization" and for a moment it was as if one was living in Maurice Bishop's Grenada. One extra seat was picked up in Paramaribo.

The jungle interior, inhabited by Maroons and Amerindians, proved to be the NDP's richest harvest. The districts of Para, Marowijne, Brokopondo, and Sipaliwina together make 13 seats, of which the NDP won seven, up from three in 1991. All of Suriname's Amerindians voted NDP as did more than half of the Maroons, both groups fed up with the Front's ineffectiveness during and after the civil war of the late 1980s. The NDP spent fortunes in the bush, gave away chain saws, arranged small-scale timber and gold contracts and concessions, and dispensed cash. As one Djuka Maroon said at the Dritabikki polling station: "We walk with hungry bellies and the NDP puts rice in them."

The urban poor and jungle dwellers were not the only supporters of the NDP. Many intellectuals, leaders, and middle-class functionaries swung their votes to NDP. "How can any self-respecting Surinamer vote for the corrupt, do-nothing New Front?" I was repeatedly asked by former Fronters. The renegade New Fronters' complete commitment to NDP doctrine—nationalistic and a multiethnic political party (the only one in Suriname)—was tempered by only one doubt: the lingering presence of Desi Bouterse. Although the former commander has shown a credible effort to redefine himself and many say that he is "rehabilitated" (after the murders of 1982 and other civil rights abuses), others fear that he and the local cocaine-fueled "mafia" would take over the country.

If the NDP is strong, why is the New Front so weak? In a nutshell, the New Front is old, exhausted, corrupt, and without a vision. To be fair, throughout the late 1970s and since 1987 the New Front has kept the risk of ethnic conflict low by venturing little beyond politics and the consociational convention of distributing graft and patronage up and down and around the ethnic system of party favoritism. While patronage was given to the East Indians, the Creoles, and the Javanese, the Maroons and the Amerindians were left empty-handed—that is why the Front lost the interior in 1996.

Years ago Rosemary Brana-Shute wrote about women's political clubs in a traditional neighborhood in lower class Paramaribo. The women had pledged their loyalty to the NPS, not based on ideology but *diepie bri-bri*, a "religious belief." Those women are all old now, dead or have migrated to the Netherlands; in fact, virtually the entire group supporting the New Front is middle aged or older. The melodies heard during political rallies brought to the forefront the generation gap: the NDP played hip hop, reggae, and ragga while, at New Front rallies, the only object missing was Lawrence Welk's bubble machine.

The End of Ethnicity

The ethnic strangle hold—*apan'jit*—on Suriname's political choices has loosened over the years, primarily in the aftermath of the revolution, civil war, and the return of the expatriots from the Netherlands with their university degrees and experiences (and, like Trinidad, consisting of an increasingly "mixed group" of voters). Suriname's political choices have increased dramatically, with six different parties/coalitions comprised of 13 separate political parties running in 1996. Class and ideology have conclusively entered the discourse; linkages have been made as follows: New Front, ethnic-centrist; NDP, multiethnic, nationalist-socialist; DA '91, multiethnic, business/private sector oriented; Alliantie, similar to NDP's stance but distancing itself from Bouterse and the military; Pendawalima, Javanese-centrist; and ABOP—a creation of the former rebel Ronnie Brunswijk—Maroon.

The New Front's first chore was to establish a government and negotiations were going on with DA '91 and Pendawalima—the political distance between the three parties is not that great although the personalities heading the parties are all testy. If a deal is cut and if it sticks, it would yield a majority of 32 seats; enough to obtain a government and a speaker of the parliament but not a president. The three-party coalition would actually be comprised of eight political parties (New Front—four, DA '91—three, and Pendawalima).

You can bet the yuppies in DA '91 will not want the ancient Jagarnath Lachmon as speaker. This tender reed of a coalition must then nudge its choice of vice president and president through an 869 member national forum. The New Front has the local, district, and national simple majority to advance its candidate—probably, once again, the taciturn Ronald Venitiaan. This choice though would jeopardize its National Assembly coalition with the two partners who want a more dynamic (and a less black nationalist) leader. Meanwhile, the NDP and Alliantie will be probing for every weakness in the coalition's armor and strengthening themselves for a snap election—which they have publicly said they will work for in two to three years. Particularly vulnerable are labor unions which have become increasingly disenchanted with their representation through SPA of the New Front. It is claimed that the head of SPA, Fred Derby, can no longer control nor direct the powerful labor constituency.

Will the New Front hold? The most often heard cliché is that as the economy improves the fortunes of the party in power will advance. I do not see that happening. With Suriname's ethnic occupational specialization, the economic improvement of one ethnic group will occur at the relative expense of another. Sooner or later, some sort of structural adjustment program must be mounted, the military must be further downsized and professionalized, and the rampant crime, corruption, and narcotics trafficking must be brought under control. (The editor of a leading Suriname newspaper claims that 50% of GDP circulates as drug-related money [remember the $18 million?].)

The formalities of Suriname's democracy have functioned and the election of 1996, like 1991 and 1987, was open, secret, and without irregularities. Look for another one in about two years and keep your eyes on the NDP.

Postscript

By early August 1996, parliamentary coalitions had taken shape. Five members of the East Indian VHP faction of the Front coalition bolted from their party, declared themselves VHP 2000, and formed an alliance with the NDP. Moreover, DA '91 and Pendawalima, each with four seats, declared themselves the "middle block" and tentatively agreed to work in coalition with the Front. With the Front now down to 19 seats, its allied strength in parliament stood at 27. The NDP was able to count on VHP 2000 and Alliantie—and a combined force of 24 seats. Two rounds of presidential voting took place in the National Assembly and proved inconclusive; candidates Venitiaan (Front) and Wijdenbosch (NDP) were virtually running neck and neck, and neither obtained the requisite two-thirds vote. Thus, the election of a president was thrown to the Peoples' Representatives Committees before September 8th when the mandate of the government expired. Whether the Front coalition could hold on for even this long was the object of intense speculation and all eyes were on the KTPI faction of the Front (whose members were unhappy with the number and nature of cabinet seats they were being offered). Meanwhile, in early August, the 18th-century National Assembly building and two government ministries mysteriously burned to the ground. (There is a tradition of political arson in Suriname.)

The five VHP 2000 parliamentarians left the Front, the equivalent of a political gaping chest wound. Yet even more damage was inflicted in late August. Willie Soemita, who always made sure his Javanese KTPI was in government, was lured away by the NDP and bolted from the Front with his five seats. The NDP and its allies now controlled 26 seats with the brain-dead Front holding only 14 seats. Even if the Front could hang onto the "middle block" and their eight seats, the Front would have controlled only a minority 22 seats to the NDP's 26. With support from two of Alliantie's three seats, the NDP coalition numbered a steamroller 28. The NDP could then form a government and, with this momentum, could surely have swayed the Peoples' Representatives Committees to vote their man, Jules Wijdenbosch, to the Presidency. This development would have pleased Desi Bouterse.

On September 5, 1996, the assembled United Peoples' Committees voted 438 to 407 in favor of Jules Wijdenbosch as President of Suriname. Pretap Rhadakishun, favorite of the breakaway VHP 2000 block, was elected Vice President. The old New Front is dead and politics as we know it in Suriname has been transformed. The question is, will the NDP resort to its authoritarian traditions of the 1980s or will the young ideologues of the "new politics" prevail. My money is on the former scenario. ■

Unwanted Fame

Joseph Rogers

While President Leonel Fernández has committed his new administration to an agenda to consolidate democracy and provide economic opportunities in the Dominican Republic, another potentially corrosive process is underway in this country. In Santo Domingo's halls of power and academic circles, the prospect of a new political and economic era is discussed with excitement and anticipation. Not discussed, however, is the ongoing problem of narcotics trafficking and the consolidation of power by Dominican drug trafficking organizations. The Dominican Republic is now considered by the US DEA the command, control, and communications center for Caribbean drug trafficking activities. Dominican organizations oversee and monitor most of the logistical requirements to move cocaine: aircraft, boats, global positioning systems for transportation, and radios and cellular phones for communications and management of organizations that stretch from New York to Colombia. The consolidation of power by Dominican narcotics trafficking organizations has the potential to undermine the Fernández agenda.

The Dominican Republic has been a key transshipment point for illicit narcotics throughout the 1990s. A number of factors contribute to this phenomenon. The most important is the close link between the Dominican Republic and New York, where most of the cocaine, and recently Colombian heroin, is destined. Dominicans have become an important force in New York's political and economic life, with over an estimated 500,000 residents.

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The San Francisco Connection

The Dominican Republic lies midway between the United States and Colombia, the source of most of the cocaine consumed in the US. Dominican traffickers share a language and cultural legacy with their Colombian partners. In recent years, they have developed close ties at the production, transportation, and distribution points of the cocaine trade. Furthermore, they have been able to exploit well-developed family and business ties in New York. Consequently, Dominican traffickers have become prominent players in the US cocaine trade.

At home, a long history of Machiavellian ploys and political corruption has encouraged behavior that further facilitates Dominican participation in the drug trade. A prominent Dominican counter-drug official traces the origins of the Dominican drug trade to groups that were exiled by President Joaquín Balaguer in 1965. This official points to a group from San Francisco de Macoris as the most notable example. This region has a long history of resistance against authority and familiarity with arms. The San Francisco group developed an "ends justify the means" ideology, and once exiled, sought funds to overthrow the Balaguer government. One way the group obtained funds was by forming a drug trafficking "cartel." Today, many Dominican traffickers hail from San Francisco de Macoris.

In addition, some judges, politicians, and law enforcement personnel can be bought for the right price. The low wages of public servants in the Dominican Republic allow the traffickers to buy the services of these bureaucrats at a relatively low cost. The inability of these institutions to pursue, prosecute, and punish traffickers is another structural feature encouraging Dominicans to participate in the lucrative drug trade.

Dominican drug trafficking organizations have evolved since the formation of the San Francisco Cartel in the 1960s. In the 1980s, the Colombians developed trust in Dominican traffickers as a group that could effectively move and distribute Colombian cocaine—while remitting the proceeds. In fact, Dominicans modeled their drug trafficking "style" after the Colombians, becoming more and more sophisticated with time. As the Dominicans achieved success in running drug trafficking enterprises, they displaced the formidable Jamaican "posses" in New York. Underlying the Dominicans' success was a willingness to use violence to protect their drug trafficking "turf" and product.

By the 1990s, Dominican drug traffickers had moved into other cities where large numbers of Dominicans resided. Today, Dominicans control distribution centers around Boston and

Dominican Republic—headquarters for narcotraffickers

Baltimore and provide other trafficking groups with cocaine in Washington, D.C., Richmond, and other East Coast cities. In 1993, a US congressional report called the Dominicans the second largest cocaine distributors on the East Coast, after the Colombians.

The Dominican Republic is now considered by the US DEA the command, control, and communications center for Caribbean drug trafficking activities.

Command and Control

Meanwhile, Dominican traffickers were perfecting their craft at home. Dominicans had long been involved in smuggling illegal aliens across the Mona Channel, in small craft called *yolas*, to Puerto Rico. Soon drugs were included in these trips, proceeding to New York and elsewhere without passing through Customs. In addition, large numbers of legal and illegal Dominicans remained in Puerto Rico, further strengthening this link in the cocaine trafficking chain.

United States counterdrug policies further propelled Dominican groups toward the pinnacle of the drug trafficking world. When President Clinton took office in 1993, he announced a "controlled shift" to transfer technical assets from the "transit zone" in the Caribbean to the Andean supply countries of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. Two radar sites in the Dominican Republic were removed, leaving US and Dominican counterdrug forces with an inability to detect aircraft below 5,000 feet. As a result, traffickers renewed the practice of the 1980s to drop loads after flying over Dominican airspace. Technology plays a key role as more sophisticated radios, cellular phones and global positioning systems are used by traffickers. Dominican trafficking groups have used these communication modes along their east coast, where drugs can be moved directly to Puerto Rico, and increasingly in a mountainous corridor between Baní and Barahona, northward to Puerto Plata. Aircraft have become too valuable an asset for pilots to land and risk detection, arrest and seizure of planes.

Free Trade and Drugs

One of the most notable features about Dominican drug trafficking organizations is their flexibility. Just as law enforcement officials were starting to understand these activities, trafficking groups changed their *modus operandi.* A recent shift in the traffickers' strategy may be the most difficult for the Dominican government and the US DEA to counter: the use of cargo containers and free trade zones. These zones may ensure that most of the goods that leave the Dominican Republic do so without inspection. According to US DEA, with one customs inspector for every 15 or 20 companies, Dominican traffickers have allegedly resorted to placing some of their cocaine in cargo containers bound for the US, with little risk of detection. If this trend continues, traffickers will be able to compartmentalize their operations, leaving one person responsible for the transportation part of the operation, without a direct link to those ultimately receiving the cocaine. The use of the free zones is especially worrisome because one of the pillars of President Fernández's economic reform program is expanding the free trade zones and increasing unfettered commerce.

The Eastern Caribbean

Dominican drug trafficking organizations have used their expertise to control the cocaine trade in New York, Puerto Rico, and now, St. Maarten and St. Kitts. Dominican groups began using these eastern Caribbean islands to avoid detection. In this region, they employ methods similar to those used in smuggling aliens and drugs across the Mona Channel, and move the cocaine through Puerto Rico to New York. Dominicans have expanded these operations to other islands and now control most of the cocaine traffic in the Caribbean.

Modern-Day Distinction

If the trends highlighted above are correct, the Dominican Republic has earned the label of command, control and communications center of Caribbean drug trafficking. From the Dominican Republic, 15 major trafficking organizations control the movement of drugs across the Caribbean to the continental United States. These groups have become so proficient at moving cocaine through the Caribbean, that in some operations, Colombians may actually work for the Dominicans. Furthermore, according to New York narcotics officers, some New York-based Dominican groups have gone directly to Colombia to negotiate prices and arrange transportation. The Dominicans also retain responsibility for the distribution of drugs in New York's Washington Heights. The execution of these tasks requires the use of sophisticated communications and management techniques. The compartmentalization of operations is a popular way of ensuring that the organization becomes less vulnerable to dismantling. In short, Dominicans have become a major cocaine trafficking group in the United States.

United States counterdrug officials have apparently recognized this trend and have committed the same type of sophisticated electronic intelligence gathering equipment used in Colombia to the Dominican Republic. Seizures have risen in the last three fiscal years, from 2,000 kilos in 1993 to over 4,000 in 1996. However, the exact amount of cocaine transiting through the Dominican Republic remains unclear. The increase may reflect better reporting techniques rather than a net increase in trafficking.

In many ways, President Fernández and his group of advisors find themselves between the proverbial rock and a hard place. To deliver on the promise of opening the political and economic processes in the Dominican Republic, President Fernández must pursue policies that encourage greater trade and safeguard the rights of all Dominicans. The process of democratic consolidation is daunting in the best of circumstances. With increasingly powerful drug trafficking organizations in the Dominican Republic, President Fernández could face challenges similar to those that undermine Colombian democracy. ■



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The European Connection

Peter A. Penfold

To the Latin American drug trafficker, the Caribbean represents just one entity through which the merchandise can pass to reach the lucrative markets of the United States and Europe. The drug trafficker ignores—but at the same time exploits—the region's territorial boundaries and national differences. By using various routes through different Caribbean countries, the drug trafficker spreads the risk of detection. Meanwhile, due to the local spillover effect of the drug trade, the drug trafficker also spreads more widely throughout the region the problems associated with drugs.

The view held by most Caribbean states in the past was that drug trafficking was not their problem—it was a problem for the Latin American producer countries and the North American and European consumer countries. They, the Caribbean countries, just happened to be on the route through which the drugs passed. The traffickers, though, began to pay those who helped the flow of drugs through the Caribbean in kind as well as in cash; a local demand was created, drug abuse and drug-related crime increased, and governments came to realize that drug trafficking was in fact a problem. Some countries, often with outside assistance particularly from the United States and Britain, took measures to counter the flow of drugs. The traffickers, however, continued to exploit the weakest links in the chain of efforts to curtail the trade, whilst many of the small island states continued to turn a blind eye, either to benefit from the boost to their economies from the injection of drug money, or because they felt powerless to act individually against the vast resources available to the drug traffickers.

Attempts by the countries of the Caribbean to come together and to cooperate more closely have generally met limited success—even with common language groups. Cross-language cooperation (e.g., English/Spanish) has been virtually nonexistent. A regional approach offers the only effective way to fight the drug problem in the Caribbean. The region abounds with regional organizations, but apart from odd exceptions such as the West Indies cricket team and the University of the West Indies, few have been much more than fora for meeting and talking.

European Union Initiative

In April 1996, a team of eight European Union (EU) Drug experts produced a report which formed the basis for the Plan of Action adopted at a meeting organized by the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and hosted by Barbados in May 1996. Over 250 delegates from every Caribbean country attended, alongside delegations from North America and Europe. For the first time, the nations of the Caribbean adopted a raft of practical proposals to strengthen the regional effort against the drug problem. The Plan of Action was an encouraging step to turn the tide against the flow of drugs.

The European Union team was comprised of experts from Britain, France, the Netherlands and Spain, countries with the closest traditional links with the Caribbean. This team's collective antidrug experience covered all aspects of the drug problem, from police and customs interdiction, prosecution and money laundering, to demand reduction and rehabilitation. The EU team included a French professor of toxicology, a Dutch prosecutor, a Spanish police officer, and a former governor of a British Caribbean territory. The team's coordinator, representing the European Commission, had been the UNDCP's representative in the region for the previous three years. This range of interests and expertise gave the team unprecedented access and cooperation from all the countries of the region.

Gaps and Weaknesses

As mandated by the European heads of government—on the initiative of British Prime Minister John Major and French President Jacques Chirac—the team brought to the forefront a number of significant gaps and weaknesses in the regional effort to combat the drug problem, and made specific practical proposals on how to fill these gaps and overcome these weaknesses. The team noted, for example, that in spite of a plethora of intelligence gathering systems operating

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A regional approach to fighting drugs in the Caribbean

throughout the region, it was still not possible for every single country to be able to pass drug-related intelligence information directly, quickly, and securely to any other country in the region. This drawback was highlighted when, in the absence of such a communications network, members of the team had to facilitate a link between Jamaica and Curaçao. Also with regard to law enforcement/interdiction measures—and recognizing that, in essence, the Caribbean is a sea mass over or through which most of the drugs transit—the EU team advocated the establishment of subregional coast guards, tasked and equipped to strengthen the maritime effort against drug trafficking.

As one reformed addict in the Turks and Caicos Islands told members of the EU team, "the message against drugs has to be as powerful as the drugs themselves."

Ineffective Implementation

The different legal jurisdictions which operate in the Caribbean, based upon English, French, Dutch, and Spanish systems, mean that uniformity of legislation is not a reality, but, as is shown within the European Union itself, there is much scope for closer harmonization of antidrug legislation. Consequently, bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements on antidrug cooperation can be negotiated.

The EU team found inadequate the implementation of the legislation. All too often drug offenders fail to get convicted in Caribbean courts through weaknesses in judicial prosecution. When a drug trafficker is caught in a Caribbean country, a highly paid and experienced lawyer appears on the island to defend the trafficker. Such lawyers are able to move from one jurisdiction to another without any difficulty, and have acquired a degree of expertise in drug-related cases. Often these lawyers are too well matched against the overworked and underpaid prosecuting counsels of governments. The EU experts proposed developing a regional cadre of experienced drug prosecutors who could be made available to assist any Caribbean country.

Precursors and Essential Chemicals

The Caribbean is particularly vulnerable to the illegal transit of precursors and essential chemicals, which convert coca leaf into cocaine. Yet, the EU team found that virtually nothing is being done to establish effective control mechanisms. Legitimate use of precursors and essential chemicals must be strictly monitored and enforced. A company which manufactures paint, for example, requires acetone to dilute color pigments when producing its products. If the national authorities do not know the exact amount of acetone required by the manufacturer for legitimate use, then how can they control the importation of the legitimately required quantities? There is another problem over re-invoicing, a common practice in the import/export business. Precursors and essential chemicals, normally shipped by sea, are described and quantified on the original shipping manifests and invoices at the port of loading. However, these can be modified or changed once the vessel is at sea. The vessel may also then head to a different destination, with a "modified" cargo under a different description and with revised quantities. Unless the original manifest and invoices are forwarded by Customs at the port of loading to Customs at the port of discharge, then no effective control is possible.

In the Caribbean, responsibility for the control of precursors and essential chemicals is usually given to ministries of health or industry, which rarely have the necessary investigative or enforcement powers to control movement of these products. The Netherlands Antilles is the sole exception where local legislation has been enacted with adequate control powers entrusted to relevant official bodies.

Links with Latin America

Given that the source of most of the Caribbean's serious drug problem is Latin America, the EU team found it surprising that there are virtually no links between the two regions to combat the drug problem. The team proposed the establishment of Drug Liaison Officer posts manned by Caribbean officials in key Latin American countries such as Colombia and Venezuela. To be really effective, such officers would need to act on behalf of all Caribbean countries. A closer coordination of Caribbean law enforcement effort would be required.

The Ganja Dilemma

It is impossible to address the drug problems of the Caribbean without addressing the marijuana or ganja problem. Ganja is the most widely abused drug in the Caribbean and the only one that is locally grown and produced (although there are reports of poppies being grown in remote areas of Belize and Guyana). Ganja abuse reportedly dates back to the introduction of indentured workers from India following the abolition of slavery. The word *ganja* is itself a Hindu word. The drug has acquired an accepted socioreligious use throughout the region, primarily connected with the Rastafarians, the socioreligious sect identified with the late Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie, also known as Ras Teferi. However, not only Rastas use ganja.

The EU experts' report discarded the myth that marijuana is not harmful, or at least, less harmful than, for example, alcohol or tobacco. Medical opinion shows that one cannot generalize the effects of marijuana. These depend upon the toxicity, which can vary greatly depending upon the concentration of THC. The health risks of marijuana, however, should not be ignored. Drug rehabilitation centers in Jamaica are constantly dealing with the problem of marijuana abuse; for many addicts, marijuana has been the "gateway" drug to more harmful ones (such as cocaine and heroin). In light of presentations made by Caribbean Commissioners of Police and others who decry having to tie up large numbers of their forces on the eradication of cannabis, the team, somewhat controversially, supported the view that the eradication of ganja and the arrest for simple possession should be given a lower priority within law enforcement efforts. The EU team also supported a call for a study on alternatives for dealing with the problems of the growing and smoking of ganja.

Demand Reduction/Rehabilitation

Most people in the Caribbean do not associate marijuana with the evils of other drugs; demand reduction/public education programs are undermined because of this lack of association. Although every government has some form of public information campaign against drugs, the message is not getting through, especially to the youth in the communities. As one reformed addict in the Turks and Caicos Islands told members of the EU team, "the message against drugs has to be as powerful as the drugs themselves." The EU team advocated stronger, more targeted campaigns—merely copying the messages given in North American and European countries is not the answer. Each Caribbean country must devise its own campaign, learning from the experience of others, but taking into account its own cultural and sociological identities. The practice of attributing the street value when publicizing drug seizures and confiscations does not help. The fact that *x* amount of drugs has street value of *y* millions of dollars may actually encourage the young to engage in drug trafficking. The real value of seized and confiscated drugs is the potential number of lives that may have been saved, and the number of families which may have been spared misery, deprivation and hardship.

Rehabilitating drug offenders is a worthwhile but expensive and time-consuming task. This activity lends itself to closer regional collaboration. The EU team recommended the establishment, throughout the region, of a network of residential rehabilitation/detoxification centers modeled on facilities such as Sandilands in the Bahamas. These facilities should complement the necessary outpatient centers on every island. The team also noted the need to rehabilitate drug offenders in prison. Other than in Cuba, the majority of inmates in Caribbean prisons are on drug convictions. Sadly, many young offenders imprisoned for simple possession emerge (after six months of incarceration in cramped cells with drug traffickers) more prone to follow a life of drugs and crime.

At the end of the day, rehabilitation or interdiction efforts, however seemingly successful, will merely curb or contain the drug problem. To make a serious impact, one must reduce the demand. All government representatives who collaborated with the EU team claimed that drug demand reduction commanded a high priority in their government programs. However, when asked what percentage of government revenue was actually channeled towards demand reduction programs, the answers were invariably disappointing.

At Stake

The drug problem is not merely one of law enforcement or health. The problems associated with drugs and drug trafficking represent the greatest threat to the stability and development of the Caribbean. These problems are now undermining democracy in the region. Drugs feed corruption, and corruption is voracious. Drug money can buy governments and finance political parties. The corruption from drugs eats away at the fabric of societies until the democratic institutions needed to sustain democracy collapse. Caribbean democracy is under threat from the onslaught of the drug menace. The region needs to come together, as never before, to fight the drug problem. ■

The Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology (HCET) and the Latin American and Caribbean Center would like to announce the formation of their partnership

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Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology

S P E C I A L

A Photographic Retrospective

James Nelson Goodsell passed away in January 1996, leaving behind a legacy of thirty years of coverage of Latin America and the Caribbean for the *Christian Science Monitor.* Those who knew his work and his character remember Goodsell's unselfish nature. He shared his knowledge and experience with numerous reporters who covered the region with him. His readers and viewers will always remember his insightful columns and probing interviews. In the final phase of his life, Jim shared his wisdom with students at the University of Miami and with colleagues from the *Miami Herald* and Florida International University.

In death, the legacy of his work continues to enlighten all who share a passion for the region. Thanks to Jim's widow, Rhoda "Missy" Ford, *Hemisphere* is able to share with its readers a small selection of thousands of photographs taken by Goodsell in the 1960s and early 1970s. The Goodsell collection includes audio and video tapes, transcripts of interviews, thousands of slides, and other material that documents four decades of Latin American and Caribbean history. In addition to the photographs reproduced here, for example, the collection includes Goodsell's interviews with Sandinista leaders, the Contra opposition, and others involved in the Central American conflict of the 1980s.

The collection is available for viewing at Florida International University's library. The pictures reproduced here are also part of a digital library available on the Latin American and Caribbean Center web site (http://www.fiu.edu/~lacc). The Goodsell collection will ensure that Jim's work will continue to inspire journalists, academics and students. ■

"We have problems...there is discontent...there is irritation." (Original caption.) Prime Minister Fidel Castro frankly admits that Cuba is facing a serious crisis, 1970.

F E A T U R E

From the archives of the late James Nelson Goodsell

"President for Life," Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, 1970. Pomp and circumstance while Haiti is bled dry.

Linden Forbes Burnham, former prime minister of Guyana and Cheddi Jagan's former ally from the People's Progressive Party.



A young Cheddi Jagan contemplates Guyana's future, 1965.



Bobby Kennedy, on a trip through the Amazon with Jim Goodsell, early 1960s. So many unfulfilled dreams.

Eduardo Frei, Sr. casts his vote, 1964. Thirty years later, his son Eduardo Jr. would rule Chile.



Juan Bosch, poet and octogenarian leader and founder of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) and current leader of the Partido Liberación Dominicana (PLD). Shown here in 1965.

A "young" Joaquín Balaguer gives a press conference shortly after being elected president in 1966.

Former Colombian president Carlos Lleras Restrepo threatens to resign in midst of constitutional crisis, 1968.


Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deño, leader of the failed Dominican guerilla movement of the late 1960s.

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, vice president of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and member of the Political Bureau, 1967. Proponent of the Soviet model for the Cuban economy.

Symbols of different times. Chilean president Salvador Allende—a few years before his assassination in a coup—and Fidel Castro are greeted by a Chilean crowd, 1971.

Leaders of like mind. Stokely Carmichael and Haydée Santamaria share a platform with Fidel Castro, late 1960s.

R E V I E W

Leviathan and Lilliputians

Jorge Rodríguez Beruff

The United States and the Caribbean
by Anthony P. Maingot,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Caribbean Maritime Security
by Michael A. Morris,
London: Macmillan, 1994.

The works under review bring a new perspective to the analysis of the relations between the hemisphere's Leviathan and Lilliputians. At first glance, *The United States and the Caribbean* appears written for the US academic market and can serve as a text for courses on the Caribbean; this book can also be considered a worthwhile contemporary source for policy makers interested in the region. A closer examination, however, reveals the book's more essential character. *The United States and the Caribbean* contributes to the Caribbean political and intellectual debate on the most effective approach that Caribbean leaders should take, given the huge asymmetries of power and geopolitical reality of existing within the US "sphere of influence." Anthony Maingot consciously places his views within a historically defined "centrist" position. According to Maingot, the region's approach to the US should fall halfway between the polar response of total subservience and intransigent confrontation. Hence, he dissents from the (allegedly) radical anti-imperialist stance of one of his intellectual mentors, Gordon Lewis.

Maingot stresses that from a Caribbean viewpoint, negotiation with the US based on common goals is the only viable approach. Currently, the common goals can be described as the struggle against drugs and its spinoff of corruption and money laundering, regional security, the promotion of democratic institutions and, what he calls the "synergies" of the US-Caribbean relationship: cultural links and trade.

Throughout the book, Maingot offers examples of successful attempts at negotiation by Caribbean leaders—even at the height of the Cold War—and underscores the many failures of leaders such as Cheddi Jagan of Guyana, Michael Manley of Jamaica, and Maurice Bishop of Grenada. Wily Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago is seen as a Caribbean politician who knew how to maximize his maneuverability while not openly breaking with the US. Maingot also describes with great relish Williams's twists and turns in playing the "Cuba card." More broadly, Maingot's sympathies lie with the postwar generation of reformist political leaders known as the *izquierda democrática,* which included José Figueres, Luis Muñoz Marín, Rómulo Gallegos, and Rómulo Betancourt.

According to Maingot, nationalism and radical anti-imperialism, grounded on historical grievances, have been obstacles in dealing with the US. Maingot argues that "some of the more enduring attitudes and perceptions have to do with symbolic, not material grievances or satisfactions." The author associates these ideological trends to what he calls "state-centric" conceptions of sovereignty. Consequently, he raises the issue of the meaning of sovereignty in the Caribbean. Maingot believes that sovereignty should not be considered the static and absolute "state of grace" of the Grotian tradition, but a dynamic concept intrinsically related to the democratic expression of the interests of the populations of Caribbean societies. Sovereignty, therefore, should be exercised within the confines of the region's relationship of "complex interdependence" with the US. Consequently, the author pays much attention to the polar cases of Cuba and Puerto Rico.

Regarding the structure of the book, the first three chapters trace, in broad outline, the historical development of US-Caribbean relations from the 19th century through World War II. In his account of the historical roots of the US-Caribbean relations, Maingot equivocally asserts that these roots have been grounded, from the US vantage point, in geopolitical and security considerations. In the introduction, he states, "if one were to choose a single word to encapsulate Caribbean history, that word would have to be 'geopolitics,' the relationship between geography and international relations."

Maingot's conception of geopolitics, however, precludes any consideration of the interplay among economic, military, and political interests during the period he discusses. In fact, the author dismisses the importance of economic factors.

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Geoeconomics is excluded as an important component of geopolitics. Nevertheless, the discussion of current trends, challenges, and threats to the region focuses on such issues as migration and the internationalization of crime, which clearly have economic implications.

The first two chapters deal with US interventionism up to 1935. The most interesting contribution of these chapters is the perceptive observation of the lasting imprint left in the regional collective memory by the arrogant and racist attitudes displayed by the US. The third chapter, the most original and interesting in this part of the work, discusses strategic military developments during World War II, particularly the decisive impact of the "Battle of the Caribbean" waged against the German submarine offensive. The consideration of two other aspects of the strategic situation, namely, the importance attached to air war and the geopolitical role of Brazil prior to 1941, would have strengthened Maingot's sharp analysis.

Part Two of the book includes three chapters on US "containment" strategies in Central America and the Caribbean and the policies toward the English-speaking Caribbean during the Reagan era. Particularly interesting is chapter 4, which contrasts the outcomes of the political processes in Costa Rica and Guyana, as well as the prominent role played by the CIA during this era. The author, however, did not dwell much on the 1965 US invasion of the Dominican Republic, an event that perhaps did not fit well into the main thrust of his argument.

The concluding part of the book focuses on several dimensions of the contemporary regional situation that impinge on both US and Caribbean interests and create common basis for collaboration. These areas include the internationalization of corruption and violence, the "offshore" development strategy and its relationship to corruption and money laundering, migration, and the promotion of democracy.

Part Three is another high point of the book. Chapters 8 and 9, in particular, are excellent, and make persuasive arguments about the magnitude of some of the threats posed to both the state and the private sector. In short, Maingot's book is a scholarly, well-written, consciously polemical, and thought-provoking contribution to Caribbean scholarship. *The United States and the Caribbean* should be read by Caribbean intellectuals and political leaders of all persuasions.

Although Michael Morris deals with a narrower topic than Maingot, in several ways *Caribbean Maritime Security* is related to Maingot's work, notably to the pertinence of a geopolitical approach to international relations in the Caribbean and the new challenges to regional security in the post-Cold War era. Unlike Maingot's book, the work by Morris explores an aspect of the regional situation on which there is a glaring dearth of information and research. *Caribbean Maritime Security* is therefore a unique contribution to the literature on regional security that should stimulate further research on naval and maritime issues.

Morris notes the apparent paradox represented by the evident importance of the maritime dimension of Caribbean history, on the one hand, and the apparent neglect of maritime policies by Caribbean states, on the other. This contradiction is of particular concern to the author as "...maritime affairs and security promise to be central to the future of Caribbean states." The importance of naval and maritime matters to the Caribbean has been enhanced by the expansion of national maritime zones brought about by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and by the dual challenges of seaborne illegal migration and the burgeoning drug trade. Naval policy in the Caribbean relates mainly to national coast guard capabilities, since only large states such as the United States have the capacity to project conventional naval power based on large navies. Thus, the book focuses mainly on coast guards and their "offshore enforcement" role.

In Chapter 2, the author provides a much needed overview of existing naval forces and capabilities. In his typology, only Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico have offshore territorial defense capabilities. Cuba and the Dominican Republic are classified as having inshore territorial defense capabilities, and in both cases the tendency points toward a possible weakening of those capabilities. (The end of Soviet support is mentioned in the case of Cuba and the obsolescent equipment and budgetary constraints of the Dominican Republic is also discussed.) The rest of the naval forces of Central

America and the Caribbean are classified as "token." Morris also divides the regional coast guards into three groups: multimission, inshore, and port and harbor. This chapter also provides invaluable material on personnel, military expenditure, arms transfers, and US assistance.

The third chapter and an appendix provide a general overview of the naval aspects of the Cold War in the Caribbean, analyzing the role of the US, the USSR, Cuba and other Caribbean states. The author argues that never throughout the Cold War, except during the Cuban missile crisis, did the sporadic and limited presence of the USSR (or the mainly defensive naval potential of Cuba) pose a major naval challenge to the US. Morris's argument underscores how blown out of proportion was Cuba's "naval threat" during the heyday of the Cold War. Yet, missing from this chapter is a discussion of the US base system and the naval command structure relevant to the Caribbean.

In the next two chapters, Morris turns to more contemporary issues with evident maritime security implications: illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Concerning the former, he describes the maritime flows of emigrants from Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic to the US, and provides an appendix with a useful migration chronology. Morris suggests that a more restrictive US immigration policy, without major internal changes within Caribbean societies, will result in continued illegal migration flows.

In reference to drug trafficking, Morris emphasizes the importance of interdiction for both the US and Caribbean states. Despite some successes in interdiction efforts, such as Operation Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), the flow of drugs to the US continues, and new routes to Europe have emerged. A feature of this flow is the fluidity and capacity of drug operators to shift routes. Thus, Morris is able to persuade us that drugs and migration will continue to engage the naval and coast guard capabilities of the US and regional states.

One of the many geostrategic issues discussed in *Caribbean Maritime Security* is that of Caribbean straits or Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). According to the writer, 10 of the 26 strategically important straits are located in the Caribbean. Moreover, these straits played vital roles in the US-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, the Caribbean straits lose importance from a conventional military perspective, but they retain their relevance as routes for illegal immigration and drug trafficking. This point is further developed in chapter 7. Morris believes that "with the decline of the Cold War, local security issues have gained prominence and the islands have greater leeway in dealing with them." He suggests that besides challenges posed by drugs and migration, maritime boundary delimitation and ocean management may have even greater maritime importance for small Caribbean states. According to Morris, maritime policy is an area requiring increased international collaboration.

In sum, *Caribbean Maritime Security* is a required reading for scholars and policy makers interested in contemporary issues of Caribbean international relations and security. This book represents the only comprehensive study on Caribbean naval capabilities and coast guard forces.

The United States and the Caribbean and *Caribbean Maritime Security* provide new and original approaches to studying regional problems, while suggesting important issues for future research and scholarship. ■

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