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More Than a Passing Fad

G. Philip Hughes

Remember the Summit of the Americas? A year ago, President Clinton and the presidents and prime ministers of 33 other nations from the Western Hemisphere gathered in Miami for a meeting whose goal, President Clinton said, was "to create a whole new architecture for the relationship between the nations and the peoples of the Americas, to ensure that *dichos* become *hechos,* that words are turned into deeds."

The Miami Summit was intended to be – and was – different from the previous meetings of Western Hemisphere leaders in 1956 and 1967. For one thing, all the leaders attending were democratically elected; a fact which underscored Cuba's isolation as the last remaining dictatorship in Latin America. For another, leaders from the more recently independent nations of the Caribbean were included.

Perhaps the two most important differences from the past summits were these: The Summit leaders reached consensus on negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005 *and* they agreed that this Summit – unlike its predecessors – would not end with pious declarations but with a disciplined follow-up program of action.

The goal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, adopted just a year after the ratification of NAFTA accord with Mexico and Canada, was sweeping, ambitious and visionary. Its adoption reflected the profound transformation that had occurred in U.S.-Latin American relations over last decade. By contrast, the last time the Western Hemisphere's leaders met – at Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1967 – the U.S. was pointedly left out of the Latin American Common Market which the leaders planned to complete by 1980.

A year has now passed since the ringing declarations and bright promise of the Miami Summit. It's time to take stock of what has been achieved and what remains to be done to reach the goals our leaders set.

At one level, the "Summit follow-up process" – as it is bureaucratically dubbed – is a great process. Perhaps typical of government programs, the process is doing well what governments do best: a myriad of working groups, symposia, implementation review groups, ministerial meetings and such discussing, reviewing, recommending, drafting, revising, resubmitting and so forth on recommended actions for each of the Summit's 23 – count them, 23 – main goals.

Of course, not all Summit goals are created equal. Some have received and probably are destined to receive scant attention, while the goal of hemispheric trade liberalization – the very centerpiece of the Summit – has been the focus of very deliberate work. In this sense, the "Summit process" is working.

Indeed, policy wonks and trade gurus in both the private and public sector can take satisfaction in the fact that a meeting of the hemisphere's trade ministers in Denver last June set up seven (of 11 planned) working groups to chart the course of building a hemispheric free trade area. Moreover, they can also look with satisfaction on the fact that these working groups will all have met at least twice before the trade ministers meeting held in Colombia in March.

As sheer process, then, this is wonderful – and at one level– necessary "stuff." But in the year since President Clinton claimed his political and foreign policy victory at the Miami Summit, what substantively has been accomplished to advance the goal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas? Not that much.

While the Clinton Administration never spelled out its long-range game plan or strategy for reaching the hemispheric Free Trade Area goal, it had one straightforward and modest goal after the adoption of NAFTA: to reach an agreement to bring Chile into NAFTA in 1995.

No one disputes the fact that Chile's economic reforms make it the most qualified Latin American candidate to join NAFTA. With economic growth rates averaging more that 6 percent from 1990 to 1994, the Chileans have vanquished inflation, maintained stable currency, thoroughly privatized state-owned enterprises, and brought about a number of necessary market-opening reforms. Because of these advances – and with very few economic sectors directly competitive with domestic U.S. industries – many thought that Chile had a better case for NAFTA membership than Mexico. Indeed, many policy makers today believe that Chile's membership in NAFTA would be a fitting valediction for its successful

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A look at the Summit of the Americas one year later

transition from the Pinochet dictatorship to democracy.

But where do we stand in taking this next, historic step toward building a free trade community among our neighbors in this hemisphere? Unfortunately, about the same place as a year ago. It seems that in the months since the Summit of the Americas, interest group politics and presidential electioneering have delayed, if not derailed, the Free Trade Area of the Americas agenda. And both the Congress and the president are at fault.

The Clinton Administration, in seeking congressional approval for "fast track" negotiating authority, has insisted that it be empowered to include agreements on the labor and environmental standards – backed up by the possibility of trade sanctions – in any agreement on which Congress would then have only a yes or no vote. While on Capitol Hill, the Republican majority in Congress has been unwilling to further solidify the precedent that trade agreements should be vehicles for imposing U.S. social agendas on other friendly, democratic nations. Like the earlier debate over NAFTA, the Congress and the president are once again locked in debate over whether social issues should take precedence in economic negotiations.

To date, despite several honest broker attempts to craft a compromise, the impasse on this issue seems complete. And as the U.S. enters a presidential election year, this situation may suit everyone's political interests just fine.

For the Clinton administration, insisting on a linkage between future trade agreements with Chile – or any other country – and sanctions on labor and environmental standards, pleases its core labor and environmental constituencies. And if the administration's insistence on these conditions held up any agreement during the election year, these same constituencies probably wouldn't mind; almost by definition, they are not big advocates of open markets and free trade.

The Republicans too have little to lose if the trade agreement with Chile should fall by the wayside. Failing to reach agreement with the Clinton administration on new trade negotiating authority could keep the divisive issue of trade liberalization – which pits protectionist-populist conservatives against free market economic conservatives – off the campaign trail. Moreover, it would deny President Clinton a trade victory in an election year.

Perhaps this is the reason why majority leader and presidential candidate Bob Dole has had a change of heart backing the Free Trade for the Americas initiative. As Senator Dole – who earlier worked hard to round up votes for NAFTA and for the Uruguay Round GATT agreement – recently declared on the Senate floor, "We need to step back from this unprecedented whirlwind of new trade agreements" ... and "focus on our domestic house, on the actions we can take here at home that will improve our global competitiveness."

Of course, political ambition on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue is not the only reason for the stalemate on the building of a Hemispheric free trade zone. In the wake of Mexico's peso crisis, it is understandable that last year's unbridled enthusiasm for free trade expansion in the Americas should be considerably tempered. No one can watch the currency of one of our largest trading partners plummet over 60 percent in value in a year without being sobered.

In this climate, it's easy to lose sight of the fact that none of this has anything to do with NAFTA. The peso crisis was the result of poor management by the Mexican government of its spending and international borrowing. It could have happened with or without NAFTA, with similar results.

Having NAFTA in place is probably helping both the U.S. and Mexico weather the peso crisis more effectively. On the Mexican side, it has locked Mexico into a correct strategy of growing out of its economic crisis, rather than closing its economy to imports and trade as it did during its financial crisis of the early 1980s. For the U.S., having NAFTA in place has helped preserve U.S. exports to Mexico. Even in the midst of Mexico's worst modern economic crisis, U.S. exports to Mexico remain above pre-NAFTA levels.

Overall, given the peso crisis and the presidential posturing, it is easy to lose sight of what is at stake for the U.S. in the effort to build a Free Trade Area of the Americas. Simply put, the following is at stake: in a region that for generations has regarded the U.S. and its business and economic interests with fear and suspicion, that has periodically nationalized, taxed, restricted or otherwise tried to limit U.S. business penetration of many

of its markets, the opportunity for a real, enduring opening is at hand.

Throughout Latin America, countries that once pursued closed economic systems are turning away from their old models and embracing policies of privatization and openness to foreign investment and trade. In fact, as free trade has been found to bring in its wake lower prices, job creation, greater consumer satisfaction, innovation and growth, our southern neighbors are actively liberalizing their trading arrangement with each other. MERCOSUR, a customs union of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, is presently negotiating with Chile, Bolivia, and even the European Union to liberalize market access.

Thus, our European competitors could easily attain free market access to the entire South American market before the U.S. and its NAFTA partners. We simply cannot afford to be left behind; the cost to our economy would be tremendous. As the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown said last June in Denver, "We know that free trade brings greater prosperity. The U.S. alone stands to create 2 million more jobs as Latin America incomes continue to climb and U.S. exports increase over the next eight years."

With the stalemate of progress on free trade negotiations with Chile, the momentum of the Miami Summit of the Americas is being lost. With it we risk losing the historic opportunity to replace generations-old suspicions about U.S. business interests in Latin America with a climate of openness and partnership. Equally important, we risk losing the resulting economic growth potential for all the societies of the hemisphere.

Our leaders in the Congress and the White House should not let this opportunity fall by the wayside. ■

A Matter of Deconstruction

Jean Grugel and Anthony Payne

The concept of "Latin America and the Caribbean" (LAC) is dead; long live a vision of "the Americas" with many different component parts. That is to dramatize, but not to distort, the conclusion to which we have been inexorably drawn as a result of research undertaken at the University of Sheffield in England over the last two years. We have been working as part of a team investigating the emergence of a number of regionalist projects in the contemporary world order and have focused our attention on the implications for the LAC countries of the recent and important U.S. turn toward a form of regionalism in its own hemisphere. This shift of U.S. policy impacts the economic shape of the LAC region. Our full conclusions are set forth in our respective chapters in Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds), *Regionalism and World Order,* published by St. Martin's Press in New York in March 1996. What follows here is the broad outline of the argument we make.

The necessary starting point is a sense of the variations in the relatively long history of U.S. relations with the rest of the Americas. The key point is that the politics of the recent past (defined as the Cold War period) have been distinctive, not typical. They were characterized by the way in which the U.S. perceived itself as a hegemonic power and associated its credibility in the eyes of both its enemies and allies in all parts of the world with its capacity to maintain and demonstrate control of its own hemispheric community – its "backyard."

The control of drug trafficking is not made easier by the freeing of markets; and environmentalism challenges many of the favored prescriptions of the Washington-driven neoliberal economic consensus.

Viewed historically, however, this period constitutes one of several different phases which can be detected in the unfolding of U.S. policy within the Americas. Broadly, these reflect a progression in the U.S. position from national consolidation in the 19th century; to the assertion of regional power status in the Caribbean and Central America in the first 30 years of this century; to a tentative wider embrace of (unequal) partnership with Latin America from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s; to the acquisition after 1945 of a globally hegemonic position with all its attendant symbolic ramifications for the whole of the hemisphere; and finally to the ultimately unsuccessful reassertion of that hegemony under Reagan in the 1980s. From such a perspective, the Cold War years stand not as an exemplar or a norm, but merely as an episode.

Moreover, this era was novel in the longer history of U.S. relations within the Americas in that the imperatives of global hegemony required the U.S. to have a strategic concern for all developments in all parts of the hemisphere. Nowhere was too small, no incident too insignificant, to draw a U.S. response, provided that it could be connected to the global agenda. For the first time, therefore, U.S. foreign policy treated the whole region as if it was a coherent unit. In other words, it was the U.S. – not the regional states themselves – which created our contemporary understanding of "Latin America and the Caribbean" as a region. It did so for reasons of national advantage in the very specific context of the Cold War. Quite obviously, it did not develop the concept in order to facilitate the integration or liberation of LAC. Indeed, the consequence for the countries of LAC was an enforced prioritization of their relations with Washington and the establishment of very tight boundaries within which they could pursue their own developmental goals. The Cold War years are of obvious importance and not only because they are the immediate backdrop to the present. But now that they have passed, new considerations bear upon the making of U.S. policy for its own hemisphere. In order to understand what these present trends are, we need to think in a more fluid way than the LAC concept allows.

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Rethinking the labels of "Latin America and the Caribbean"

There certainly cannot be any doubt that the U.S. has been particularly active in relating to LAC states in a variety of policy areas since the beginning of the 1990s, and that relations between the U.S. and the rest of the Americas are closer now than for many years. As the Miami Summit of the Americas showed, the dominant political discourse in the region is currently characterized by notions of "partnership, synergy and cooperation." Old Cold War concepts like "threat, war and subversion" have been deemphasized. It is also necessary to concede that the Bush administration, so often derided for its lack of vision, developed a distinctive view of the way it wanted LAC to develop over the final years of this century. In that sense, the Enterprise for the Americas bids can be seen as a genuinely historic speech which picked up existing trends and assembled them into a new agenda for the Americas. In more theoretical terms, it can be said to represent the initiation of a U.S. project to offset the loss of global hegemony (which, as already indicated, the Reagan administration had unsuccessfully tried to reclaim) by the establishment of a regional hegemony in the Americas across economic, security and ideological agendas.

To begin with, the Clinton administration was slow to see the implications and benefits of such a project, but it eventually caught up and has now etched out a policy framework for the Americas which links free trade, democracy and security in a more direct fashion than Bush ever managed. In short, Bush and Clinton have been able to advance quite significantly the regional project set out in the Enterprise for the Americas. Nevertheless, our research suggests that they have not fully succeeded in engineering a U.S. regional hegemony across the Americas. In fact, there are good reasons for believing that something of a high tide may have already have been reached and that the trend of U.S. policy over the remaining years of the decade may accordingly be one of retreat and growing difficulty. Three reasons stand out in our argument, two of which will be briefly highlighted and one explored in slightly greater depth since it relates directly to the disintegration of the concept of LAC.

The U.S. remains the hub of the new Americas, but it has not created and almost certainly does not need to create an even regional hegemony across all parts of the hemisphere.

First, there are real contradictions between the contemporary economic and security agendas developed by the U.S. for the Americas. Put starkly, economic liberalization and democratization, which appear as complementary from Washington's perspective, are in fact far from comfortable bedfellows. Notwithstanding the rhetoric to the contrary, the control of drug trafficking is not made easier by the freeing of markets; and environmentalism, if taken seriously, challenges many of the favored prescriptions of the Washington-driven neoliberal economic consensus.

Second, the U.S. Americas project is not grounded domestically on a firm social and political base. The fact is that the regionalist option has been deployed in U.S. politics by a variety of groups for different, often mutually exclusive, reasons and the many contradictions that this has entailed have not been worked through, let alone resolved. The coalitions that passed NAFTA or supported the invasion of Haiti were, at best, fragile. At worst, as the debate about Proposition 187 in California shows, the policy issues of the Americas have the capacity to penetrate and divide U.S. society and politics in a very harmful fashion. Either way, the increasingly fragmented nature of the U.S. state/society complex in the mid-1990s does not augur well for the further and full development of the wider enterprise for the Americas initially set out by Bush.

Third, it had become apparent during the course of the last few years that the U.S. is not equally concerned with all parts of the Americas. It does not have to take a view of LAC as a whole – something which it felt necessary to do by way of example in the era of global hegemony – and it accordingly draws increasingly important distinctions between its policies toward different parts of the former LAC region.

This is the facet of our research that we want to stress and explore a little further in the remainder of this article. For what has emerged in the last few years is a reordering of U.S. involvement based on the

evolution of two new "maps" and the former does not relate easily or neatly to the latter. Washington in effect now has only fragmented demands to make upon LAC states: the need to resolve immigration problems with others and the necessity to control drugs flows from and through still others. Put another way, there are both winners and losers within the old LAC as a consequence of the new regionalist policies of the U.S., and it is an important part of developing a more nuanced understanding of relations within the Americas that this is fully grasped.

The new economic map favors Mexico in the most obvious way. Not only is it a member of NAFTA, but that membership enables it to play a key role in the implementation or obstruction of any future plans to extend hemispheric free trade. Other potential beneficiaries include Chile, which was promised free trade talks before anybody else as a reward for its early program of liberalization and has lately been given a target date for NAFTA accession of January 1, 1997. Through their membership in the Group of Three with Mexico, both Venezuela and Colombia also edge closer by proxy to the U.S. market and toward a U.S. seal of approval. By contrast, other members of the Andean Pact, such as Peru and Bolivia, have been left to plummet into recession and would struggle to compete within a putative hemispheric free trade bloc. Caribbean and Central American countries are severely damaged, at least relatively, by the advent of NAFTA and have resorted to making a case for parity with Mexican terms of entry into the U.S. market, a strategy that can only succeed if they can find some way of regaining their former Cold War priority in Washington. The only potential challenge to this U.S.-drawn map is to be found within the MERCOSUR countries. Brazil has flirted with the idea of trying to build an alternative subregional bloc organized around a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA), but the latest signs are that it is already backing away from this prospect.

The new security map of the Americas is rather different, but equally uneven. The issues which the U.S. currently defines as central to its security – immigration, the environment and drugs – require the design of policies to be applied above all on the periphery of the new political economy, namely the Caribbean, Central America and the depressed Andean countries of Bolivia and Peru. In security terms, the Southern Cone countries are a long way from the U.S. mainland – and there is no doubt that in the post-Cold War age, the signal of concern weakens the further it moves away from U.S. territory. Only in Mexico, in fact, does the U.S. recognize the need to respond with an integrated set of policies from trade and investment to immigration and drugs.

In sum, LAC, as we have known it for 30 to 40 years, has been comprehensively "deconstructed." The new Americas is composed of different subregions, each with a different economic and security agenda and each with different relations with the U.S. The U.S. remains the hub of the new Americas, but it has not created and almost certainly does not need to create an even regional hegemony across all parts of the hemisphere. As for observers of the Americas, we have no choice but to follow the logic of the trends described here. This means that we must focus the best part of our future investigative and analytical efforts upon a proper disaggregation of the different parts of what we once thought of simply as "Latin America and the Caribbean." ■

And Justice For All?

Brad Bullock

Central American politics tend to generate a healthy skepticism about the significance of elections. Guatemala's history certainly inspires little optimism. Yet, these elections promised to be different from those of Guatemala's past, and there were reasons for some excitement about their potential significance for Guatemala's future. As it turned out, were they significant? Speculation is dangerous business, and it may be too early to speculate about the eventual ramifications of the electoral results. But the event itself held hopeful signs that Guatemala is moving toward constructive change, and maybe even a lasting peace.

Guatemala is a country in urgent need of change and of peace. It is one the poorest nations in Latin America. Inequality is staggering – around 4 of every 5 Guatemalans live below the poverty line. At least 27 percent of the population is landless, while around 2 percent of the landowners control 65 percent of the land. Although indigenous people comprise more than 60 percent of Guatemala's 11 million citizens, their basic needs and rights have been ignored or denied for centuries; over 1 million are internally displaced from their land and a half million more have fled to refugee camps across the Mexican border.

Guatemala's social indicators are all near the bottom for Latin America: nearly half the population is illiterate; infant mortality stands at about 60 deaths per 1,000 live births (compared to about 9 for the U.S.); two-fifths of its people (mostly children) suffer from malnutrition. It is at the top of the rankings, however, for human rights violations: in 1995, through July alone, there were over 10,200 reported cases. Its people are now driven down by more than three decades of exceptional corruption, inefficiency, oppression, and bloody civil conflict (over 150,000 deaths and another 50,000 "disappeared," mostly indigenous people at the hands of the military or paramilitary death squads). These realities, and fear, characterize Guatemalan life.

Powerful international forces are making new demands of the Guatemalan leadership while growing national forces are challenging the status quo from within.

Now change appears imminent. Powerful international forces are making new demands of the Guatemalan leadership while growing national forces are challenging the status quo from within. Stark realities and an atmosphere ripe for change – within this context we may best understand the complexities of Guatemala's 1995 elections and what made them unique.

Pre-election Context

One difference was the sense that there was finally a window through which Guatemalans might expect fair and more representative elections. Peace negotiations with URNG insurgents made headway on important issues and produced promises for further agreements. The *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (URNG) agreed to a cease-fire during the election period. The U.N. mission to verify the Guatemalan Human Rights Accords was in place, including a revision of the legal system and other measures enacted to challenge the traditional atmosphere of military impunity. Never before had so many international observers been invited by the government to witness the elections.

Another difference was the greater number of groups invested in this event by comparison to past elections (in contrast, say, to those held in 1990). Guatemala is in an area of the world where elections are typically ignored by the North, but the international community expressed notable interest in these elections. Why so much interest and why, especially, U.S. interest? Preceding the elections, the causes of Rigoberta Menchú and Jennifer Harbury drew attention to Guatemala and produced international pressure on government officials to speed up the peace process. More representative elections and a peaceful transition of power, in this context, became a test of Guatemala's commitment to peace.

Rigoberta Menchú, an indigenous Guatemalan and former exile, received a 1992 Nobel Peace Prize for her work publicizing the horrors of the civil war and the long struggle of her people to secure land and basic human rights. As an international figure, Menchú monitored

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Electing change in Guatemala

pre-election events and drew attention to continuing acts of violence or intimidation that could compromise the integrity of the peace process or the elections. A good example is her public denouncement of the military slaying of 13 indigenous people in Copán. Menchú's public statements about the alleged kidnapping of her nephew, just days before the election, also brought considerable international attention and put the Guatemalan state on the defensive. The kidnaping turned out to be an extortion plot by her relatives.

As with Ms. Menchú's public denouncements, the ongoing Harbury case has kept the world focused on extra-judicial acts of violence by the Guatemalan military. On a grander scale, it has damaged the credibility of the U.S. role as global peace-maker and has made U.S. statements about pushing Guatemala's "race for peace" sound ingenuous. The end of the Cold War and the lack of a credible "communist threat" in the area has fostered increasing intolerance for U.S. manipulations of regional politics.

New U.S. policy officially emphasizes defending human rights, resolving prolonged conflicts, and restoring just, representative democracies in place of autocratic military regimes. The sincerity of these policies was bolstered by highly public U.S. operations in Haiti, but it was tarnished by the series of embarrassing pre-election revelations tying the CIA to Guatemalan military officials involved in a number of killings or disappearances. For example, Colonel Julio Alpírez was already an "asset" on the CIA payroll in 1990 when he ordered the brutal slaying of U.S. citizen Michael Devine (just months after Alpírez graduated from the U.S. School of the Americas in Ft. Benning, GA.). He is the same officer responsible for the extrajudicial execution of Harbury's husband, Efraín Bamaca, in 1992. Such incidents doubtlessly influenced the replacement of ousted president Serrano, in 1993, with Ramiro de León Carpio, former ombudsman of human rights.

Military acts of impunity have continued. Alpírez "escaped" the same night he was jailed and remains at large. Here again were revelations that jeopardized both the tenuous peace process and the elections, and for once the world was watching. Both governments were left with more reasons than ever to ensure the success of the elections, and although the U.S. issued official statements from a neutral position, it is likely that a stronger message to Guatemalan (and CIA) officials was delivered behind the scenes.

These elections included earnest participation by the left for the first time since the 1954 coup. A leftist coalition of parties called the New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG) wisely chose Jorge González del Valle as its candidate for president and Mayan leader Juan León Alvarado for vice president. Mr. González carries impressive credentials: economics studies at Yale and Columbia, former president of the Bank of Guatemala, two stints as Latin American director of the IMF, and executive positions with several multinational financial institutions. In a private meeting he explained that the FDNG provided voters with a viable alternative to conservative parties, an alternative that would include the interests of unions, women, Mayan groups, and human rights organizations. As a new movement, the FDNG focused on making inroads at the local and state levels. In many cases, they supported independent civic committees running indigenous candidates for mayor rather than run their own candidates.

Ironically, the political participation of the left was precipitated by the rise of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), an extreme right-wing party led by Efraín Rios Montt. During his short reign from 1982-83, Rios Montt's infamous "scorched earth" counterinsurgency policies left over 15,000 dead. A dismal 17 percent of registered voters turned out for the special 1994 congressional elections, due partly to a URNG boycott; the FRG won 32 out of 80 seats and Rios Montt was made president of the Congress. Rios Montt's announcement that he would run for president as the FRG candidate sent a wake-up call to the left. Although Rios Montt and then his wife were eventually ruled ineligible to run for president, it was still Rios Montt's party. FRG campaign posters showed Rios Montt in the center, between candidates Alfonso Portillo and Carlos Aníbal Mendez, his arms around their shoulders. In fact, the party's own slogan was, "Portillo to the presidency, Rios Montt to power."

Indigenous groups were also invested in these elections. One reason was the participation of the FDNG. The URNG broke precedent and did not call on citizens to boycott the elections. Another factor was the newly established Rigoberta Menchú Foundation, an agency for advancing the causes of indigenous

Guatemalans. The Foundation's first major project was to mobilize the indigenous vote; it directed campaigns to register indigenous people in rural areas and sponsored local workshops to educate largely illiterate *campesinos* about the electoral process.

Pamphlets and posters were distributed in Mayan dialects rather than Spanish, and Menchú made several public appearances endorsing the 1995 elections as a tool for voicing indigenous issues. Careful to remain nonpartisan, she spoke at a final rally marking the official close of the campaign period; the speech encouraged her people to overcome their apathy or fears and vote for whom would best represent them. And, for once, there were some indigenous candidates on the ballot. Indigenous citizens exercised their right to form independent civic committees and ran their own candidates at the local mayoral level, marking a new epoch in Guatemalan elections.

Guatemala's traditional power base did not present a unified front. The military and the economic elite demonstrated divided loyalties that contributed to some uneasy alliances. Those focused on preserving the national status quo leaned toward parties on the far right, such as Rios Montt's FRG. This included military hardliners, who found no reason to accommodate the URNG, and the CACIF, a powerful group representing the private sector. Military *institutionalistas*, more open to negotiated peace and a revised role for the army, and a rising group of international financiers supported parties not so far to the right, particularly the new Party of National Advancement (PAN). Representing the "modernizing right," the PAN's presidential candidate, Alvaro Arzú, rode this support to a lead in the pre-election polls.

In the end, there were 19 presidential candidates representing 23 parties. Yet amid signs that new forces were shaping an event akin to real democratic elections, Guatemala's electoral process still serves to protect the power of the Ladino minority through what may be called structural fraud. Balloting is done by hand from computer-generated sheets containing the names of everyone who has voted in the last several elections. Only the final stages of vote counting are done electronically. Many of the dead and missing have not been purged from the rolls, yet this does not always stop them from casting votes, as Guatemalans will wryly tell you.

Many of the dead and missing have not been purged from the rolls, yet this does not always stop them from casting votes, as Guatemalans will wryly tell you.

New registrants and all voters must present a *cédula*, or national identity card, and replacing a *cédula* requires birth documents and some courage. Over decades of civil war, hundreds of rural villages were utterly destroyed and hundreds of thousands of indigenous people were internally-displaced or became refugees; *cédulas* and other records have been burned, confiscated, or lost in flight. Children born in flight or in hiding are now coming of age to register but have no official papers.

Voters are also required to return to their birthplace, or where their *cédula* was issued, to cast their ballots. The time and expense to travel, sometimes great distances, and the lost hours of work are the hardest on the rural, and largely indigenous, poor. Finally, due to complaints about manipulations and "anomalies" in the 1991 decennial census, political representation is still based on the census from 1981. Given the high birth rates in indigenous districts, one can understand why a Ladino government might favor such a method.

Other types of structural fraud seem more endemic to these particular elections. The ballots were 8.5 inch by 11 inch sheets covered with colorful party symbols. Since virtually every local, state, and national position in the country was up for grabs, a typically illiterate voter received five separate color-coded ballots that had to be properly marked, folded, and returned to corresponding table slots. The presidential ballot alone presented 10 symbols, coincidentally arranged so that those of the PAN and the FRG – the two leading parties – held the prominent positions on the page. The process was confusing and lengthy, and thus potentially discouraging. After waiting in line, voters averaged between four and five minutes to mark and stuff the ballots. This raises another issue: each voting table was assigned 600 potential voters who had to vote at that table during the 12 hours polls were open. Even if voters averaged only two minutes to complete the entire process, only 360 voters per table would make it through. The TSE responded to this observation by declaring that anyone still waiting in line when the polls closed would be allowed to vote, but it was not always the case.

Election Results

As commonly predicted, no presidential candidate won a majority, resulting in a January 7, 1996 runoff between the PAN and the FRG. The PAN's Arzú was declared the

victor with just over 51 percent of the vote. PAN took 42 out of 80 congressional seats in the November elections and now enjoys a solid majority position from which to push its neoliberal economic agenda. The FRG won the second largest number of seats in congress, making it the largest minority party. Most notable, however, was the respectable showing by the leftist FDNG coalition, which was predicted to get less than 2 percent of the vote; instead, it won almost 8 percent of the vote and 6 congressional seats, giving marginalized groups a new voice in the national power structure. The FDNG also collected four mayoral victories. These victories, though nominally small, hearten an incipient grass-roots movement for change.

People finally want to know whether the elections were fair. I believe that generally they were, given the limits of the electoral process. From my observations, there was little to suggest that the local people were engaged in anything but an earnest attempt to carry out their duties with integrity. With few exceptions, infractions were minor. The table volunteers, many of whom worked from about 6 a.m. until 11 p.m., received 50Q each (about $8) from the TSE for their efforts. The military basically stayed away and there was no serious election day violence. The presence of international teams helped remove blatant forms of fraud at lower levels. Certainly, there were denouncements for fraud and intimidation at particular polling places – disturbances included threats of force and reports of ballot-stuffing or ballot-burning – but such incidents were fewer than in past elections.

Fraud at a higher level cannot be ruled out. Despite assurances from the TSE about the results, internationals and representatives from the several parties continue to express grave misgivings about the 45-minute, nationwide power outage that interrupted the vote tally (the official explanation was that a tree had fallen on a power line!). For another unsettling bit of news, the government actually printed a total on 39 million ballots, more than twice the amount required even if all 3.6 million registered voters showed up to vote. We never did get a good explanation for why so many extra ballots were printed nor learn what happened to them. Yet, the most disturbing aspect of the elections remains the structural problems built into the electoral process itself. These problems help to explain a lighter rural turnout for the presidential run-off, although nobody expected indigenous citizens to be highly motivated to for either candidate.

The Final Analysis

The event became a symbolic turning point for Guatemala – a harbinger of better things. Elections will have mattered a great deal. However, in a volatile new world order, reforms depend more than ever on external forces that appear beyond the control of the government or the people. Even if Arzú's neoliberal policies or the promise of an extension of NAFTA agreements improve economic growth, this alone may only aggravate economic disparities. Selling off public enterprises, creating free trade zones, and more *maquilas* will not address human rights violations or landlessness.

At least the PAN's narrow presidential victory makes progressive reforms more likely. Human rights activists were mortified by Portillo's announcement that upon his victory, Rios Montt would be appointed head of the new National Security Commission (giving him more power than the defense minister). Had the FRG won the election and effectively restored Rios Montt to power, it would have represented a giant step backward for Guatemala. At best, the result would have meant business as usual.

As the new president, Arzú's effectiveness will be challenged by high crime and unemployment rates, chronic poverty, and continuing concerns over human rights violations. He must still work with an entrenched oligarchy. But his biggest challenges will be completing the peace negotiations and revising the role of the military – still one of the most powerful forces in Guatemala. ■

The Economics of Security

Patrice M. Franko

Latin America has undergone three profound changes in its security environment in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. The end of the Cold War has transformed the international security arena, realigning actors and objectives. At the same time, most Latin American nations were undertaking the difficult process of democratization, fundamentally altering the relationship between civilians and the military in the public arena. Finally, the pursuit of political opening was accompanied by economic liberalization. Given the long experience with import substitution industrialization, the move toward a market-driven development strategy is a revolution in the economic paradigm for the region.

An Overview

Neoliberalism effectively ended import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies that dominated the economic landscape in the region from the 1950s through the 1980s. In contrast to the state-centered inward looking policies of ISI, neoliberalism places the international market at the center of the development process. The neoliberal model, dubbed the Washington Consensus to reflect the positions of the IMF, the World Bank and the U.S. government, encourages price liberalization, deregulation of markets, virtual free trade, unrestricted capital movements, private sector activity and the use of monetary policy instruments. This is a radical change from the arguments as to international price instability, the need for state incentives for growth, the focus on technology acquisition by the state to complement markets, and the use of fiscal policy to promote growth in the ISI package. What implications does neoliberalism have for security policy in the region?

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Cutting defense expenditures along with other items in the budget is not necessarily a bad thing. The decline in defense spending in the region, however, has largely taken place in a policy vacuum.

The Neoliberal Model

A core assumption of neoliberalism is the proposition that the private market performs better than the state in the allocation of resources. Its implementation is first and foremost about limiting the economic choices a state makes in the development process. It is no accident that the rise of neoliberalism coincided with the end of access to easy money. Even without the strict conditions of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, tight resources forced nations to make tough choices between competing ends. The neoliberal model replaces active axe chopping on the part of the government with the passive workings of the market.

Defense, nevertheless, is not market driven. The quintessential public good, the responsibility for security decision making falls on the shoulders of government – a government increasingly constrained in its ability to pursue a wide range of options. With fewer resources, the opportunity costs of making one choice versus the other increase. As a result, governments have cut back on spending in the defense sector. Figure 1 shows the simultaneous decline in military spending (Milex) and central government expenditure (CGE) in the region. (Note the different scales for each as represented by two vertical axes.) In 1983, central government expenditures in Latin America were $335.8 billion; military expenditures were $22.9 billion, approximately 6.8 percent of every government dollar spent. After a decade of structural adjustment, in 1993 central government expenditures fell to $282.4 billion and military expenditures registered $17.4 billion or 6.2 percent of government spending. In South America the real growth rate of military expenditures was -2.1 percent over the decade; in Central America -19.6 percent. In sharp contrast, military spending in the developing world as a whole declined -0.7 percent. The decline of the armed forces in South America reflected these cuts in expenditures, decreasing -3.2 percent over the period; in Central America the decrease was 2.7 percent. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reported that the average annual force ratio, or the numbers in the armed forces compared to the population fell 5

Security forces face the music

Figure 1: Trends in Central Government Expenditure and Military Spending



Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 1983-1993

percent in South America and 4.7 percent in Central America.

Cutting defense expenditures along with other items in the budget is not necessarily a bad thing. The decline in defense spending in the region, however, has largely taken place in a policy vacuum. As cogently argued by Francisco Rojas Aravena in *"Procesos de Decisiones en el Gasto Militar Latinoamericano" (Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad,* Año 9, Vol. IX, No. 3, Julio-Septiembre 1994), defense policy in Latin America has not responded to the changes in the internal or external environments. Appropriations for defense are undertaken on an historical basis, minus cuts by necessity. The overall shape of government has changed, but the execution of defense policy has not been radically altered. Neoliberalism as accompanied by democratization requires a fresh vision of defense spending in the region. Rather than policy by default, scarce resources should be deployed to meet clearly defined objectives that reflect the new international and domestic realities.

A rearticulation of defense policy in the new strategic environment must responsibly ask the question whether additions to defense spending exceed the costs. As every economics principles student knows, efficiency in a market is achieved where the marginal benefits of an action equal the marginal costs. If the additional costs of a particular objective exceed the addition to benefits per dollar spent, the activity should not be undertaken.

This hard nosed equation is driven by the assumption that one can accurately measure both costs and benefits. Consider the option of participating in multilateral peacekeeping operations. The addition to cost is easily estimated, and if international agencies cover some portion of the participants' salary and benefits, the direct costs may indeed appear to be minimal. Indirect costs should also be included; if the military is engaged in multilateral activities, it is not doing something else. For some, ironically, this is a benefit, arguing that if the military is engaged in Bosnia or Haiti, it is not meddling in politics at home. For others, soldiers sent abroad to keep the peace in another nation are resources not applied within domestic borders.

Benefits are even harder to estimate. Participation in peacekeeping operations brings with it training, especially in terms of interoperability with other forces. It is argued that a degree of professionalization occurs as Latin militaries work side by side with NATO soldiers. Participation in peacekeeping may also bring prestige and favor in the international community.

At the risk of traumatizing those who hated principles of microeconomics, it is useful to think of this discussion in graphic terms. Assume that we can group levels of participation in peacekeeping operations starting from a minimal level, A, over increasing amounts, ending in option F. We note that the benefits of peacekeeping, like any other good facing diminishing returns, tend to decrease as we engage in more of it. Arbitrary numbers have been assigned to the vertical axes, showing that initially peacekeeping brings benefits in terms of prestige and training, but as more peacekeeping is undertaken there are fewer additional benefits. Armed forces have been trained, the international community has sent its thanks, and the benefits diminish.

Figure 2: Relative Costs and Benefits of Peacekeeping Operations



Costs increase with increasing levels of engagement. At level E, for example, we see that the costs of peacekeeping far exceed the benefits. Activity should be cut back to the level where the addition to benefits just equals the cost.

As difficult as these costs and benefits are to estimate, it is imperative to do so. Decreases in resources available to the military require hard choices in defense policy. In a democratic society this debate should take place as an annual, transparent part of defense appropriations.

One of the key difficulties in applying marginal analysis is the problem of time. Marginal costs and benefits accrue not only in the present but also in the future. If resources are directed toward humanitarian assistance, the cost may come out of programs in modernization. Investments postponed in technological development may multiply over time. Comparing defense and nondefense spending, many of the objectives of the neoliberal model have been of a short-term nature. Central government expenditures are cut to meet fiscal targets today. National security is about investments for the future. The costs of neglecting a coherent long-term defense strategy may escalate in the long run.

Despite the difficulties of accounting for time or of exactly measuring the benefits and the costs, such exercises are the basis for sound policy planning. It is easy to say that peacekeeping or regional defense activity is good; the harder question is to estimate just how much it will add to a nation's security over time and at what level multilateral programs will detract from other missions. The scarce resources available to governments under neoliberalism makes efficiency matter more.

Social Costs of Stabilization

Under neoliberalism, all central government expenditures are scaled back. The process of structural adjustment involves a painful retrenchment of social spending. Programs designed to address poverty, social safety nets and employment suffer. Local and national governments, pared down in the name of cost-cutting and efficiency, find it hard to meet the needs of the poor. The World Bank estimates that Latin America will have to invest $60 billion annually just to catch up with existing demands for water, transportation, electricity, sewage, ports and telecommunications. Investments in the social sectors are even more overwhelming.

As the state is less equipped to tackle these social and infrastructure deficits, there is an increased likelihood of violence. The uprising in Chiapas, Mexico and the anarchy in *favelas* in Brazil are indicators of the degree of social decay and the failure to meet these mounting problems with peaceful means. The rising rate of violent crimes in the region has pushed governments, including Brazil, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela, to call their armies into the street. In the Dominican Republic the army was called in to end three days of rioting ignited by a bus fare increase. The Bolivian army was called out to stop a teachers march in La Paz. It is not coincidental that when the Venezuelan government authorized increases on the order of 40 percent for 44 basic food items at the end of February 1995, the defense minister presented President Caldera with a plan for containing violence in the capital.

People are tired of waiting for the gains from economic adjustment. They want a decent standard of living with increasing opportunity for their children – not further sacrifice. The region's bishops blamed neoliberalism for the problems of extreme poverty at a conference in Mexico on May 7, 1995. Said Venezuela's Roberto Luckert, " The cruel neoliberalism [has created] a barrel of gunpowder which could go off any time [by installing] the dictatorship of the market and making the dollar its God."

Not only has spending on social services suffered in the painful adjustment demanded by neoliber-

alism, but the ability to respond to crises has also been weakened. As local governments attempt to address a multiplicity of demands with limited resources, spending on law enforcement is cut along with social services. Local police forces are unable to react to maintain internal peace. Given the limited capacity of law enforcement, the military is increasingly being called upon to maintain internal order. The experience of Guatemala, Brazil, Mexico and Peru are clear examples of the failure of civilian law enforcement to meet the rising tide of violence.

This puts militaries in a policy bind. On the one hand, militaries don't perceive their primary function as keeping the internal peace. One doesn't join the military to fight gang wars in slums. Yet civilian authorities, unable to contain crises, have ordered the military to keep the internal peace. Until resources are available for enhanced law enforcement, it is likely that militaries will continue to be called upon to execute police functions. Well organized and disciplined, militaries perform well. This has led to an improved public profile of the military as an institution. Public opinion apparently has a short memory for costs of military government. When confronted with social chaos, the public is increasingly clamoring for the military to step in to maintain internal peace. Clearly, this has a cost in terms of the consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, without a strengthening of the capacity of the state to both attend to poverty and the conflict that is created by social problems, one should not be surprised by more tanks in the *favelas*.

Preventive Policies

Militaries, ever the defensive planners, are looking to dissipate the internal threats to stability. Rather than combat its citizens, the military is working to eradicate the conditions leading to conflict and instability. Humanitarian and nation building activities have increased in Latin America, as the armed forces are employed in preventing the sources of violence.

People are tired of waiting for the gains from economic adjustment. They want a decent standard of living with increasing opportunity for their children – not further sacrifice.

A study by the *Centro para la Paz y la Reconciliación* showed defense spending accelerating in Central America, a trend accepted by a fearful public faced with the fact that more than 60 percent of the region's 30 million inhabitants are living below the poverty line. Once again, as in reacting to violence, the engagement of the military in the provision of social services is not the best policy choice. Construction workers, not colonels, should be building roads. Teachers, not soldiers, should be promoting literacy. Green brigades, not green berets, should be working to improve environmental conditions. But as the capacity of the state to meet the social needs has been emasculated, the military is increasingly moving to provide emergency services that are not being funded in civilian programs.

Class distinctions may also play into the internal security vacuum. Wealthy neighborhoods in Latin America have addressed the problem of increasing social tension by moving to the market to purchase security. Clovis Brigagão, of the *Centro de Estudios Brasil-Estados Unidos, Universidad Candido Mendes* in Rio de Janeiro, has informed me that private security forces guard the entrances to upscale neighborhoods, and every building from the middle class up has a doorman that doubles as an inspector. As in the United States, malls with private security agents have replaced city centers as safe shopping meccas. As the wealthy abdicate public spaces for the haven of private protection, this undermines the ability of municipalities to finance local and state police forces. Already stretched to maintain law and order, civilian governments in Brazil, Bolivia, and Guatemala find the military the only option to keep the internal peace.

Privatization of Defense

The drive toward privatization of public enterprises in neoliberalism has not missed the defense industries in the region. EMBRAER, the Brazilian state aeronautical firm, has been privatized, with the Ministry of Aeronautics retaining a controlling share for reasons of national security. FAMAE, which claims to be the oldest munitions firm in the region, has moved from state ownership to state management of the defense acquisition process. Argentina has embarked on a wholesale privatization of its defense sector.

Privatization of military production has its advantages. EMBRAER is better able to raise capital in international markets, will be freed from restrictive labor laws, and will have more flexibility in product development than it did with a stronger partnership with the Brazilian Air Force. FAMAE is better positioned to meet the needs of the Chilean armed forces by purchasing essentially in the private market and taking advantage of an open bidding process to procure at the lowest possible cost. By subcontracting through competitive bids, the firm doubled sales in 1994. The

needs of the Chilean military are better met through efficient use of modernization resources. In Argentina the privatization of defense firms has added to the credibility of its international liberalization package.

But privatization of defense production may have political and technological costs. Private firms are less accountable to foreign policy objectives. A comparison of the historical activity of EMBRAER with that of ENGESA, the private tank producer in Brazil, is telling. State-owned EMBRAER's customer list – which includes the United States, European and other Latin nations – was significantly different from the clients of ENGESA, which included Libya, Iraq and Angola. The activities of Hugo Piva and his Brazilian engineering firm HOP in Iraq caused considerable diplomatic tension during the Gulf War, significantly damaging U.S.-Brazilian relations. The possible sales of armaments from Argentina and from Chile to supply Ecuador in its conflict with Peru point to the difficulties of control under free markets.

The privatization of defense production in the region must be accompanied by strong and coherent control of exports. This, however, brings with it internal political costs. Tides of nationalism swell when munitions control laws are exported seemingly wholesale from the U.S. State Department. The difficulty in passing such a bill in Brazil is instructive. Home grown, subregional export control regimes may prove more promising, should the political will exist.

Internationalization has, by necessity, accompanied the privatization of defense in the region. Not only in Latin America, but throughout the industrializing world as well, going it alone in the defense arena is not financially viable. Joint ventures and co-production agreements are the vehicles to capture economies of scale in defense production. EMBRAER has long had international partners; ENAER and ASMAR in Chile have collaborated with the Israelis, among others. Internationalization of defense production is not new, but the pace is accelerating.

The privatization of defense production in the region must be accompanied by strong and coherent control of exports.

While joint ventures are, in a sense, the only game in town, their costs should be acknowledged. The historical rationale for defense production in the region has included a desire for autonomous procurement and development of indigenous technological capabilities. While the weight placed on technological development was certainly stronger in Brazil and Argentina than in Chile, the impetus to promote national capabilities in high technology items through the locomotive of defense was present. Under import substitution, especially in Brazil and Argentina, state-centered technological development was to break the bottlenecks to industrial change. Technological acquisition in the neoliberal model is centered in the international private market. The primary actor, rather than state centers of research and development, is the multinational defense firm. Whether this, on balance, brings benefits or costs over the long run remains to be seen. At the very least, one must monitor the technological gains and losses in the defense arena if the national security goals of autonomy are retained.

The International Market

A critical part of neoliberalism is a successful export drive. Exports generate hard currency which can be reinvested for growth or used to reduce external liabilities. One of the shortcomings of import-substitution industrialization was its neglect of exports as an engine for growth. But over-exporting also has its costs. The race to export has pressured the resource capacity of nations to sustain the external orientation. This problem of resource conflicts has been alarmingly evident in the fishing skirmishes. Countries such as Argentina, Canada, Peru, Chile and Brazil want control over coastal fishing beyond their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) guaranteed in the Law of the Sea Treaty. They argue that it is imperative to police beyond the 200-mile limit as stocks are being depleted by hundreds of fishing vessels from Spain, South Korea, Taiwan and Russia – and the fish don't neatly confine themselves to the arbitrated limit. Defending coastal resources has led to international incidents. This becomes less surprising when international market earnings from exports of seafood have overtaken traditional export fare such as beef in Argentina. Economic resource conflicts become an issue of military security when diplomacy fails to resolve competing claims.

Other resource-driven conflicts have arisen in areas where borders are not clearly defined or defensible. The confrontations on the Brazilian-Venezuelan border, for example, are driven by the property rights of the *garampeiros* in search of gold. Migration problems are caused by the lack of opportunity in both the rural and urban sectors. The same conflicts may have taken place under the old development model. Today, however, economic actors are more vulnerable to the vagaries of the market without the strong safety net of the state.

The focus on competition in the international marketplace has raised the stakes in the international growth game. Ironically, the competitiveness of the neoliberal market creates externalities that can only be solved by cooperation. As countries are linked by invisible market flows, they are at once fierce rivals and mutually dependent, particularly in addressing the problems the market creates. Permeable borders increase the flow of contraband and people. There is sentiment in Brazil that opening up coastal and inland navigation to foreign companies endangers national sovereignty. Narcotrafficking has found internationalization to its advantage. Competition in markets has led to the need for cooperation in security and environmental policies to address the conflicts created by the drive toward global production. In contrast to the use of force by the state to defend mercantile interests in the precapitalist era, globalized market structures will demand new forms of military cooperation to enhance security.

New Patterns

Douglas MacArthur said, "There is no security on this earth; there is only opportunity." What are the opportunities we need to consider to improve security both within and between nations given the challenges of the neoliberal model?

- **Map Defense Resources into a Policy Framework:** To address the inconsistencies in defense inputs and outputs, security spending must be mapped into a policy framework. National and regional security objectives must be redefined and appropriations made to reflect the changed security environment. While this sounds so obvious, it is not a simple task. Nationally, vested interests of various parts of the armed forces may be at stake. It will be difficult to ask, on a line-by-line basis, whether the additional dollar spent in one program exceeds its potential benefits in another.

- **Civic and Humanitarian Action: Reversing the Permanent Emergency:** Given the increase in social tensions and the limited resources of the state to address them, the military will be asked to perform internal policing functions. For many militaries in the region, this has long been defined as complementary to their mission of guaranteeing national security. Ideally, police forces and social services are the front line in ensuring internal peace. When this fails, however, the military objective is to contain the emergency. One of the important policy tasks is to plan for the disengagement of the military after the crisis is over. Handing off humanitarian action to civilian agencies is as important as responding to the initial stages of a crisis. Given that in the medium-term the military is going to continue to be an asset in the hands of civilian governments trying to make do with less, planning for the mechanisms of coordination between military and civilian agencies should enhance the effectiveness of public policy.

- **Consolidating Institutional Reform in the Security Arena:** Reorienting the defense policy debate to reflect new political and economic realities will require the development of new institutional flexibility. In his essay "Latin America's Journey to the Market" (*Journal of Democracy,* Fall 1994), Moises Naím suggests that stage one of the marketization process involved changing the set of economic rules; stage two, he contends, is the hard work of consolidating institutions. This must include military institutions or the military will become a dinosaur in the new democratic arena.

- **Extend Regional Security Cooperation:** The challenges of the market for the region demand greater cooperation in the hemisphere. Economies of scale can be captured in purchasing compatible systems. Inter-operability is one gain; another can be found in regional service and maintenance depots. Working together to attract high technology industries improves regional bargaining power, rather than ceding the control to divide and conquer to the multinational firms. An inventory of terms and conditions of multinational partnerships in the production of defense-related materials might enhance bargaining power in technology transfer agreements. Regional annual meetings of procurement staffs for branches of the services would not only enhance transparency but also identify areas for cooperative buying arrangements. While cooperation in defense procurement and production might seem to run against the historical tide of secret arms races for superiority, it is likely that the security threats facing Latin America in the coming decades will demand not defense against neighboring armies, but cooperatively combating forces beyond one nation's control.

A Pragmatic Neoliberalism

The purpose of this essay was not to argue that neoliberalism be thrown out, but rather that policy be directed at the challenges this new paradigm presents. This essay is a call for pragmatism – an acknowledgment that all development strategies have their costs and benefits. The challenges that the neoliberal model has raised for the security environment merit both short- and long-term policy adjustments. Addressing the complicated relationships in the economic and security marketplace can serve to enhance the performance of both. ■

FAX

Insider briefs on people and institutions shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Kidnapping Business

Kidnapping in Latin America has reached epidemic proportions. The February 1996 edition of *U.S./Latin Trade* notes that kidnapping of foreign and national executives is a growing business. Weak and often corrupt law enforcement and wealth disparity account for the increase. Paradoxically, economic growth in the region has increased the opportunities for kidnappers as more business executives have arrived in each country. Gone are the days when guerrillas kidnapped people in the name of some ideology; today, kidnapping is conducted as an income redistribution mechanism. In this new scenario, governments are discovering that offering guerrillas amnesty and integration into political life is not an attractive offer when millions can be made through kidnapping and extortion.

MRTA Expands

Intelligence reports have long reported that the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru* (MRTA), the Peruvian guerrilla group claimed to have been dismantled by President Fujimori, has expanded its operations into Bolivia. In December 1995, MRTA members were arrested in La Paz and Montevideo accused of kidnapping Samuel Doria Medina, a wealthy industrialist and former minister of planning. Following nearly 60 days in captivity, Doria Medina was released after paying a hefty ransom. The MRTA has apparently recruited well in Bolivia; high ranking members of the *Central Obrera Boliviana,* were also arrested in connection with the kidnapping.

Edited by Eduardo A. Gamarra

Paz Zamora's Visa Pulled

In January 1996, the U.S. embassy in La Paz, Bolivia announced that it was revoking former president Jaime Paz Zamora's visa. Former party chief Oscar Eid Franco and Paz Zamora's sister Edith, two of the former president's closest allies, also had their visas canceled. Since early 1994, accusations that Paz Zamora and his party, the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* had close connections with narcotics traffickers have led to the imprisonment of Eid Franco and a complete crisis in the MIR. Paz Zamora has already announced that he will run for office in 1997 despite U.S. actions.

Walmart in Brazil

In the January 21 edition of *El Nuevo Herald,* Katherine Ellison reported that a real "Walmart Revolution" has occurred in Brazil. Walmart recently opened two so-called Supercenters in the outskirts of Brazil; over 10,000 clients mobbed the store when it opened and supervisors were forced to shut the doors three times to prevent an avalanche. On the second day, the store shut down two hours early after selling out its inventory. But not everyone is pleased with Walmart's success. The president of Nestle accused the Arkansas- based company of dumping practices to keep prices artificially low. As occurred in the United States, the most affected are small retailers who cannot compete with the low prices offered by megastores.

Crime and Punishment

The Honduran military is feeling a bit ambivalent these days. General Luis Alonso Discua, commander of the armed forces and alleged to have been involved in serious human rights violations in the 1980s, was named alternate ambassador to the United Nations. This post is significant because Honduras currently holds a seat on the Security Council. At the same time, however, the Honduran Supreme Court ruled that 10 military officers could be prosecuted for the disappearance of six students in 1982. It is still unlikely that any officer will ever face trial.

Palito Goes to College

Palito Ortega, the former governor of Tucumán, Argentina has always sought ways to improve himself. He grew up as a street child and went on to become revered by millions of Latin Americans for his romantic songs and movies. Ortega is now getting ready to face the most serious challenge of his life; he is preparing to run for the presidency in the year 2000. In January, his staff told *Hemisphere* that as part of a strategy to become president, he intends to pursue a degree in International Relations at Florida International University.

Investment Declines

According to the foreign investment superintendency of Venezuela, for-

eign investment in Venezuela declined by 43 percent between January and November 1995 in comparison to the same period in 1994. Investment capital reached only $239.8 million, down from $435.2 million in 1994. Most economists believe that the decline is rooted in the exchange controls imposed in July 1994.

Abide by WTO Ruling?

Venezuela and Brazil became the first nations to test U.S. resolve to abide by the rulings of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO ruled in January that the U.S. Clean Air Act imposed standards that interfere with free trade. The Clinton administration was preparing to appeal the ruling which states, among other things, that the U.S. must pay trade sanctions until 1998 if it does not abide by the decision. WTO guidelines must prevail when they are in conflict with environmental standards established by specific member countries.

NAFTA Delayed

In late December, the U.S. government dealt another blow to the implementation of NAFTA by delaying Mexican truckers access to highways in the Southwest. After promising not to oppose Mexican truckers from entering into New Mexico, Arizona and California, Secretary Federico Peña gave into pressures from border officials, traffic safety groups, the Teamsters and politicians seeking to capitalize on the anti-NAFTA sentiment. These groups noted that Mexican trucks do not meet U.S. safety and other standards. Mexican truckers, however, believe that it is all a calculated attempt to allow U.S. trucking firms to control the market. Secretary Peña announced that an agreement would be signed after a new round of talks with Mexican officials about improving trucking safety.

Government Perks

President Ernesto Samper issued a decree on January 18, 1996 that seeks to end the perquisites of public office. Under the terms of the decree, Colombian government functionaries are forbidden from travelling in first class and cannot host parties with public funds. They also cannot charge business cards, Christmas cards, and personal phone calls/faxes to the Colombian taxpayers. The objective of the decree is to reduce public spending by approximately $200 million, but is also part of a campaign to clean up the government's image.

Perks of Office II

While the Colombians were busy cutting government perks, President Fujimori was defending the right of the National Police to appropriate for personal use real estate confiscated from narcotics traffickers. In November 1995, press reports stated that eight generals of the National Police kept for themselves luxurious homes in Lima that were seized from narcotics gangs. According to the report, the homes were used for parties with a "lot of liquor and numerous young ladies." President Fujimori called the reports an attempt by narcotics traffickers to force him to change the leadership in the National Police.

Carriers to the Andes

The U.S. Department of Transportation approved a Continental Airlines request to be allowed to fly to Peru and Colombia. Beginning on March 16, 1996, Continental will introduce round trip flights between Newark, Lima and Bogotá. Continental will compete with American Airlines for the Andean market.

Saved by a Whisker

President José María Figueres of Costa Rica managed to keep his mustache despite a promise to shave it in exchange for a $5,000 donation from Gillette to the National Children's Hospital. The kidnapping of two European women on January 1 put a damper on the shaving ceremony. Standing in for President Figueres was Costantino Urcuyo, a well-known academic and a member of Congress, who sacrificed his mustache.

Wine Race

A January 15 Associated France Press report noted that Argentina has surpassed Chile in the export of wine. In 1995, Argentina exported 182.8 million liters, compared to Chile's 102.2 million. Spain purchased 84 percent of Argentine wine exports. Chile still dominates Latin American wine exports to the United States. ■

The Samper Scandal

Mary Beth Sheridan

To many people, he symbolized the best and the brightest of Latin America's young elite. Smart? At a mere 25, Ernesto Samper led a national banking association. Cultured? He had rubbed elbows with the wealthy elite since his days at an exclusive Bogotá prep school. Charming? The witty Samper endeared himself to big city journalists and coffee bean pickers.

It was not a surprise he would win Colombia's presidency in 1994. But today, to the shock of Colombians, the onetime golden boy is embroiled in South America's biggest political scandal – battling charges that he came to power in a deal with the largest cocaine kingpins.

Samper staunchly denies knowing leaders of the Cali cartel, which supplies up to 80 percent of U.S. cocaine. He says that if any drug money entered his campaign, it happened "behind my back." He points to this administration's success in dismantling the cartel, jailing six top chieftains.

Critics, however, call the 45-year-old Samper a tragic symbol of Colombia's recent history. For years, many Colombians tolerated drug traffickers, even as they quietly spread their tentacles through Congress, the courts, the police. Today, it's not just Samper who is under attack. It's a country's history.

Historical Permissiveness

In early 1984, Spanish police burst into an elegant apartment in downtown Madrid. They slapped handcuffs on Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela, the Colombian who one day would be called chief of the world's cocaine trade.

"If this infiltration [of drug money] happened, in no way – I repeat – no way did this compromise the political will of government in the fight against drug trafficking."

U.S. authorities had already been seeking Rodríguez Orejuela for six years on trafficking charges. Police scooped up thousands of dollars, records of his drug shipments and address books overflowing with private phone numbers. One was Ernesto Samper's.

The book never became public, and authorities barely noticed. Samper, at the time, was merely a Bogotá councilman. But even if he were more important – then-President Belisario Betancur was also listed – many Colombians probably would have shrugged it off. "Here there was historical permissiveness with contraband [smuggled] emeralds, drugs," noted Fernando Cepeda, a Colombian political scientist.

The Rodríguez Orejuela brothers – Gilberto and Miguel – were considered a new breed, "gentlemen" smugglers. Although they were wanted in the United States, they were running legal businesses in Colombia – radio stations, drug stores, the Banco de los Trabajadores. "[Gilberto] was president of a bank. The politicians lined up to take his money," noted Patricia Lara, publisher of the newsweekly *Cambio 16*.

Samper declined to be interviewed for this article or to answer written questions.

Dangerous Liaisons

Cesar Villegas, a businessman with an uncanny resemblance to Danny de Vito, was the kind of guy a lot of Colombians warmed to. Extroverted. Funny. Generous. He and Samper met while they were graduate students, and Villegas said the friendship grew through the years. When Samper, then a presidential candidate, was wounded by a gunman in 1989, Villegas flew in a Canadian specialist to operate on his friend. Villegas lent Samper his Miami apartment to recuperate. "We had a great affinity," Villegas said. "You only do these things for close friends."

Last year Villegas' name surfaced in taped telephone conversations that linked him to the Rodríguez Orejuelas. In what was dubbed the "narcocassette" scandal, the Rodríguez Orejuelas discussed making large contributions to Samper's campaign. The Cali leaders mention meeting with Villegas – describing him as an "emissary" of someone seeking funds on behalf of a presidential candidate.

Villegas insists he met the Rodríguez Orejuelas only two or three times in the mid-1980s when all three were investors in the professional soccer business. "Two or three times isn't anything," he said. But in the fall of 1995, the United States pulled Villegas' visa, in part because

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A symbol of Colombia's drug history

of concerns raised by the narcocassette scandal, according to U.S. officials.

Villegas wasn't Samper's only dangerous liaison. When Venezuelan police broke up an alleged money-laundering ring on the Colombian border in October 1993, they were startled to discover Samper's home phone number in the address book of financier Sinforoso Caballero, a senior Venezuelan judicial source said. U.S. intelligence sources suspect Caballero of being a major money launderer though his case was later overturned on appeal. The Venezuelan Supreme Court is considering the case. Caballero, when contacted by *The Miami Herald,* denied knowing Samper or laundering money.

Last August, a more shocking friendship came to light. Colombian news programs broadcasted a tape of Samper chatting warmly by phone with Elizabeth Montoya de Sarria, the wife of a suspected drug trafficker. Samper, in a statement, said the Sarrias weren't under investigation at the time of the conversation last year. But talk of Jesús Sarria's alleged trafficking had swirled for years, according to Colombian intelligence officials.

Latter Day Moonshiners

Rumors about Samper's past contacts with notorious people so concerned his aides in the 1994 campaign that they warned Samper to be careful, a senior Liberal Party politician said, speaking on condition of anonymity. Nevertheless, Samper held a key pre-election meeting with another presidential hopeful, General Miguel Maza Márquez, at the home of Alberto Giraldo. The journalist was widely known as a "public relations man" for the Rodríguez Orejuelas. Giraldo is now in jail on suspicion of accepting cartel money.

If Samper's friendships would be unheard of for a U.S. politician, they weren't that unusual in Colombia. Over the years, drug traffickers have gained increasing influence in politics and the nation's favorite sport, soccer. Many Colombians felt they were hard to avoid.

The Cali Cartel didn't seem so bad. Often pictured in pinstriped suits, the Rodríguez Orejuelas appeared a cut above the Medellín Cartel's Pablo Escobar, whose group was known for assassinating police and presidential candidates.

"There was violence [by Cali traffickers] but within the business," said Francisco Thoumi, author of a book on drug trafficking. In its zeal to track down the violent Escobar, the government even worked with helpful Cali members, officials said privately. Of course, not all Colombians were blasé about the Cali group; some scrupulously avoided any links. But in a country where much economic activity was illegal or semilegal, in which the justice system was paralyzed and drug use fairly low, many people shrugged off drug traffickers as the equivalent of Prohibition era moonshiners. "It's unlikely that, just because the United States says, 'this is bad,' society sees it that way," Thoumi says.

An Invigorated Justice System

Just a year ago, when the narcocassettes first surfaced, the public and the press were incredulous. Newspapers quickly buried the implications about the respected Samper. "They seemed absurd," said María Jimena Duzán, a prominent Colombian columnist. But it was a different Colombia that received the news that Samper's campaign treasurer had been arrested in July 1995. Stunning the nation, Santiago Medina testified that the Samper campaign had received at least $6 million from the Cali Cartel – perhaps half the campaign budget. In exchange, he said, Samper promised to ease conditions for the surrender of the drug lords.

Newspapers descended on the story with a fury. Times had changed. At this point, 13 congressmen and the national auditor general were under investigation in a probe into drug corruption. It was led by Alfonso Valdivieso, the dynamic new attorney general who enjoys extraordinary independence under Colombia's 1991 constitution.

Increasingly skeptical newspapers pounced on evidence of campaign irregularities and contributions from alleged traffickers. Even decade-old contacts between politicians and cartel members became news. The newsweekly *Cambio 16,* for example, trumpeted a radio license granted to Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela by minister Noemí Sanín in 1986. Sanín, who is expected to run for president in 1998, has replied that at the time Rodríguez Orejuela faced no criminal charges. "This is the change that Valdivieso is causing," said Lara, publisher of *Cambio 16.* "This is a most important change in the country."

Samper responded to allegations about drug money in his campaign by pointing to his government's crackdown on the cartels, launched last spring under strong U.S. pressure. "If this infiltration [of drug

money] happened, in no way – I repeat – no way did this compromise the political will of government in the fight against drug trafficking," he told CNN in an interview in August 1995. "The truth is, at this moment, six of the seven chiefs of the Cali Cartel are prisoners."

At Samper's request, a congressional committee investigated whether he accepted drug money. [The committee found no evidence to indict Samper and the U.S. complained that it had not been a very serious effort. In any event, Samper was cleared.] Three of his top campaign aides are in prison, suspected of taking campaign contributions. "There has been a radical change, said Cepeda, the political scientist. "Before people did business [with traffickers], bought from them, sold to them, went to their parties. That's history."

Enrique Parejo, an anti-drug crusader and former justice minister, chalks up the difference to an invigorated justice system. "For the first time, there is evidence," Parejo said. "The miracle has come in putting people in important positions who looked for evidence – and found it."

A change in the easygoing attitude of Colombians toward traffickers could be crucial for U.S. interests. U.S. officials have long been frustrated by the traffickers' ability to influence laws and win official favors.

Few doubt that the drug lords will seek to contribute to future campaigns. But candidates will likely be far more careful.

"Samper has turned into a symbol, a personification of the rejection of drug trafficking, said Enrique Santos, managing editor of the Bogotá daily *El Tiempo.* "Samper is paying for everyone's broken plates." ■

Revised version of article which appeared in *The Miami Herald* November 5, 1995 p1 and 31A.

The Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology (HCET) and the Latin American and Caribbean Center would like to announce the formation of their partnership

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The Art of Narcofunding

Eduardo A. Gamarra

In the past decade, Latin American democracy has been defined largely by the holding of regular and competitive elections. Every country has placed a great deal of weight on the electoral ritual that occurs every two, four, five, and/or six years. Without a doubt, periodic electoral contests are crucial to the deepening of the democratization process in the region.

The prevalence of elections, however, has brought to the surface a disturbing trend: allegations of illicit funds entering electoral campaigns. In the past two years, political parties and their candidates in Bolivia and Colombia have been charged with receiving campaign contributions from narcotics traffickers. Candidates in other countries have succumbed to the same type of electoral financing. Those who have remained immune to this trend are likely to face similar situations in the near future.

Two reasons account for this trend. First, running for office in Latin America has become a very expensive venture. The costs of hiring U.S. consultants, conducting surveys, and mounting electoral machines have skyrocketed in the past few years, forcing parties to turn primarily to the drug industry. The absence of large private sector donors and fund-raising campaigns has also contributed to this disturbing trend.

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Second, as in most democratic systems, the sad reality is that money buys votes and influences policy. Increasingly, traffickers have attempted to purchase candidates with the objective of securing favorable treatment, interrupting efforts to conduct counternarcotics operations, and securing policy initiatives that favor their industry. In this sense, drug traffickers behave no differently than the average corporate donor to a U.S. campaign.

The U.S. has confronted a very significant dilemma. Promoting democracy and free elections has come up against the reality of illicit drug tainted campaign funds.

Because no laws exist prohibiting drug lords from contributing to the electoral campaigns of their favorite candidates, the situation in Latin America is particularly difficult. No country in the region has adopted serious campaign financing reform legislation. Thus, all electoral campaigns in the future will be affected in some measure by the presence of illicit funds.

In this context, the U.S. has confronted a very significant dilemma. Promoting democracy and free elections has come up against the reality of illicit drug tainted campaign funds. Responding to this issue has not been easy and has led to trying circumstances in the immediate past, especially when the winning candidates are the ones under suspicion. This situation has occurred twice in the past six years. Jaime Paz Zamora of Bolivia in 1989, and Ernesto Samper of Colombia in 1994 allegedly accepted funds from traffickers to run their campaigns. This essay compares the narcotics-related funding in Bolivia and Colombia and examines U.S. responses in each case.

Drugs, Lies and Videotapes

In 1988, as Bolivia prepared to enter into its national electoral cycle, videos and pictures compromising nearly every major political party with drug lords surfaced. Despite a great deal of U.S. concern, these were quickly brushed aside and the campaign went on as scheduled.

Despite placing third in 1989, the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria's* (MIR) Jaime Paz Zamora became president of Bolivia thanks to a congressional runoff. Paz Zamora, a promising Social Democrat, was one of the prominent figures posing in the so-called *narcofotos* with Isaac "Oso" Chavarría, considered one of Bolivia's top drug traffickers. Accusations surfaced that Chavarría had donated $100,000 to the MIR's campaign.

U.S. drug enforcement agents and then U.S. ambassador Robert S. Gelbard were aware of the allegations. Arguing that Bolivian democracy was too fragile, they did nothing to make the issue public. Instead, prominent MIR members socialized with Gelbard and continued their cozy relationship with Chavarría. Gelbard did note, however, his concerns about drug-related corruption

Electoral campaigns and U.S. policy

to his superiors in Washington but, at least in the initial rounds, did nothing to bring the issue to public light.

In his few years as ambassador, Gelbard established a huge counternarcotics bureaucracy in Bolivia, by far the largest in Latin America. Was knowledge of Paz Zamora's links with Chavarría used to justify the construction of this huge enterprise? Were U.S. interests best served by keeping the information about Paz Zamora a secret?

During Paz Zamora's four years in office, the U.S. established a series of rigid counternarcotics parameters. It sought and obtained the eradication of coca fields, designed an extradition law, and militarized the entire counternarcotics effort in Bolivia as both a militarized police and regular units of the armed forces participated in operations throughout the country.

Paz Zamora and his most prominent supporters, however, played a strange game of chicken with the United States and with Gelbard. Each time a counternarcotics operation was to occur, information was leaked to traffickers, forcing the U.S. to keep Bolivians out of the loop. In 1991, Paz Zamora named Colonel Faustino Rico Toro to head the *Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico.* Rico Toro was known to have had a long involvement with drug trafficking. Ambassador Gelbard cut off U.S. assistance, Rico Toro resigned and business seemed to go on as usual in bilateral relations. Subsequent ministers of interior, FELCN commanders and others were allegedly tainted by the drug industry as well. Still the U.S. funded Bolivia and certified the Paz Zamora government's compliance with anti-drug efforts.

Paz Zamora stepped down in August 1993 and went about his duties as a former president. He was invited to the Wilson Center, he was invited to serve on an international peace negotiating team in Chiapas, and prepared himself to run for re-election in 1997. In February 1994, however, the U.S. turned over information linking Paz Zamora to Chavarría. Every piece of information was the same as what was available in 1988 in the videotapes and photographs. With Paz Zamora out of office, the consequences on Bolivian democracy were less significant but in some measure destabilizing. The current Sánchez de Lozada government launched a major investigation into Paz Zamora's so-called *narcovínculos* and jailed prominent members of the MIR. For all intents and purposes, Paz Zamora's re-election bid in 1997 has been halted. And, the U.S. has canceled the former president's multiple entry visa into the U.S.

In short, U.S. interests may have been best served by working with Paz Zamora despite evidence linking him and his party to prominent drug traffickers. Moreover, Bolivian democracy survived because the U.S. chose not to accuse a sitting president with narcolinks.

Sampergate

Allegations of narcofunding of electoral campaigns in Colombia have been around for at least a decade. None, however, ever reached the proportions of the current scandal involving President Ernesto Samper. The events are rather well known. In mid-May 1994, shortly after being defeated in the second round, Conservative party candidate Andrés Pastrana announced that he had come across tapes linking Ernesto Samper's campaign to the Cali Cartel. The tapes revealed a conversation between Alberto Giraldo, a rather controversial journalist and presumed spokesperson for the Cali Cartel, and one of the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers. Presenting himself as an intermediary for the Liberal Party, Giraldo requested a contribution from the Cali Cartel.

Ernesto Samper denied all allegations, suggesting that they were part of Pastrana's effort to become president despite the electoral defeat. State Department and DEA officials, however, believed that there was substance to the charges. State Department officials met with Samper in New York City before his inauguration in mid- 1994 to warn him of the possible consequences on U.S.-Colombian relations if the charges were not investigated and cleared. Nonetheless, Samper was inaugurated president. Shortly thereafter, Republicans in the U.S. Congress pushed for increasing pressure on Colombia, pressed for decertification, and for the imposition of trade sanctions. The DEA and State Department initiated a much less publicized campaign to force Samper to come clean.

Despite State Department and DEA concerns, the Colombian situation was placed on the backburner while the Clinton administration embarked on the planning of the Summit of the Americas. For most of 1994, the U.S. said little in public about the electoral funding scheme.

In the context of the Summit of the Americas planning process, Colombia put forth a proposal to combat money laundering, which went on to become part of the Summit Action Plan signed by all 34 heads of state who attended the December 1994 event in Miami. On a few occasions both President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore praised Samper for Colombia's efforts to combat drugs. These commendations did not reflect the underlying tensions between Washington and Bogotá and caught U.S. drug enforcement officials off guard.

While Samper looked good in Miami pledging to combat money laundering, the reality in Colombia was quite different. The Colombian Congress refused to pass a law that would have looked into illicit sources of fortunes. It also did not consider campaign financing reform proposals.

In sharp contrast to the feel good ambiance of the Miami Summit, in March 1995 the U.S. Congress approved President Clinton's recommendation that Colombia receive "national interest certification," a new category that essentially placed Colombia in a situation of noncompliance with counternarcotics efforts. Moreover, the DEA's main man in Bogotá departed Colombia labeling the country a "narcodemocracy." This partial certification and the DEA's comments sparked a great deal of Colombian nationalism and added to a pattern of general deterioration of U.S.-Colombian relations.

To mitigate U.S. pressure, Samper embarked what might be termed the most significant offensive ever launched against the Cali Cartel. In one year, six prominent members of the Cali Cartel were arrested, including the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers and José Santa Cruz Londoño. Samper's efforts aimed to demonstrate to Washington that if his campaign in 1994 had been funded by traffickers, he would not have brought them down so quickly.

The U.S. faces two options: to pursue a public and moral crusade to force corrupt politicians out of office and generate a great deal of turmoil, instability, and anti-americanism; or, to design a covert effort to force corrupt government officials in Latin America to accept counternarcotics operations in the name of saving democracy.

Despite these efforts, the U.S. viewed the Colombian situation with skepticism. Questions regarding the campaign financing scandal were still there. The allegations against Samper and the Liberal Party became more significant as key people in the campaign, such as Santiago Medina, the treasurer, came forth with accusations that the president knew of the scheme to solicit funds from the Cali Cartel. Moreover, the U.S. was uncertain about the sentences to be imposed on Cali drug traffickers and the ability of the Colombian government to keep them in prison. The dramatic escape of José Santa Cruz Londoño in January 1996 confirmed U.S. concerns.

To fight accusations of a cover-up, Samper named a congressional commission to look into the charges. In theory, the congressional commission could have found enough evidence to initiate an impeachment-like process against Samper. In late September, Samper faced nine hours of questioning by the congressional commission.

The investigation into the scandal and U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia received a considerable boost when Guillermo Palomari, the former treasurer of the Cali Cartel, turned himself over to U.S. authorities. Once in U.S. territory, Palomari's revelations to the DEA confirmed many of the statements provided by Santiago Medina.

On December 6, 1995, the congressional commission appointed by Samper to look into the allegations ruled that it had found no evidence to indict the president. U.S. authorities expressed disbelief and accused the congressional commission of having ruled on a partisan basis. In Washington's eyes, the ruling confirmed suspicions that a well orchestrated cover-up was in the works. U.S. reaction again sparked nationalistic cries and accusations of intrusion into Colombia's domestic affairs. Given the congressional ruling, the U.S. placed all of its hopes on the investigation launched in early 1995 by Attorney General Alfonso Valdivieso. Valdivieso was widely supported by U.S. authorities who perceived him as honest. Valdivieso's investigation, however, was lengthy and slow.

Events in Colombia moved very quickly following the congressional clearing of Samper. The U.S. stood by silently as major actors in the drug funding scandal confirmed the allegations. The most serious occurred on January 22, 1996 when former defense minister and campaign manager Fernando Botero told a Colombian news team and the U.S.-based Univision television network that he had known of the payments, that Samper had lied all along, and that a cover-up had been orchestrated.

Calls for Samper's resignation came from nearly every sector of Colombian society. U.S. State Department and DEA officials kept

silent in public but acknowledged in private conversations their desire to have Samper step down. In the meantime, U.S. officials prepared the annual certification report for Congress. With Samper clinging to office, U.S. decertification and the imposition of trade sanctions appeared a very distinct possibility.

In short, U.S. drug policy in Colombia went through four phases. First, State Department officials headed by Robert Gelbard sought to confront Samper, presumably to force an early resignation. Second, the U.S. chose to keep the narcofunding scandal out of the public limelight while the Summit of the Americas was in the works. Third, it waited for Colombian congressional and judicial authorities to investigate Samper and simultaneously applied national interest certification. Finally, the U.S. applied a silent approach, hoping that Samper would resign without signs of direct interference from Washington. Did this approach work or did it contribute to the most serious political crisis faced by Colombia since at least the 1950s?

Conclusion

U.S. responses in these two cases highlight the complexity of dealing with the proliferation of narcofunding of Latin American electoral campaigns. Supporting democracy and pursuing drug policy has proven to be quite difficult when elected officials cater to traffickers and solicit campaign contributions from them.

From the comparison between Paz Zamora and Samper, one conclusion might be that in the interests of maintaining political stability and furthering U.S. interests, the allegations ought to be handled privately. The outcome in Bolivia was clear. U.S. policy interests were served in the short term as the government followed Washington drug policy dictates. At the same time, Bolivia's incipient democracy was maintained.

In Colombia, the very public battle between U.S. officials and the Samper government has created a very tense situation in bilateral relations and, more significantly, has precipitated the country's worst political crisis of the second half of the 1900s. The situation in Colombia is different in scale to the Bolivia in that it draws a lot more attention in the United States because of the Cali Cartel specter. Nevertheless, it is not clear at this juncture whether U.S. interests have been served best by the public trial of President Samper.

Finally, despite the Paz Zamora and Samper experiences, it is unlikely that Latin American political parties and their candidates will refuse funds from drug lords to fund their electoral campaigns. Campaign financing reform laws are unlikely in the near future, drug trafficking is not likely to slow down, and democratic elections are likely to continue. The U.S. faces two options: to pursue a public and moral crusade to force corrupt politicians out of office and generate a great deal of turmoil, instability, and anti-Americanism; or, to design a covert effort to force corrupt government officials in Latin America to accept counternarcotics operations in the name of saving democracy. ■

In the Balance

David Pion-Berlin

In Argentina, military subordination to civilian control is hardly a topic of conversation anymore. The army's acceptance of democracy is presumed and serves only as a point of departure for serious discussion on other matters, such as the modernization of defense, Argentina's role in the new world order, or its participation in United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping missions abroad. Those who are familiar with Argentina's militarized past and its historically weak civilian institutions may bristle at the notion that the praetorian era is a thing of the past. They may conclude that current Argentine views reflect wishful thinking more than realistic appraisals of the balance of force. Perhaps it is too soon to write off the armed forces as a powerful and dangerous political actor, but there may be something to this new found air of optimism.

The unobstructed transfer of power from a Radical Party government to a Peronist government on July 8, 1989, marked an important milestone in the process of democratic reconstruction. Not since the 1920s had one elected president peacefully transferred power to another, with the military sitting quietly on the sidelines. Now with Carlos Menem's re-election as president, the pattern of orderly democratic succession continues. Perhaps the greatest test of compliance has been the military's extraordinary restraint in the face of declining prerogatives and a diminished sphere of influence. Reductions in the military budget for salaries, operations and procurement, the privatization of military holdings, the termination of important missile projects, and legislative restraints on all internal security missions were both unprecedented and unrelenting. All went virtually unchallenged by the armed forces.

Those who are familiar with Argentina's militarized past and its historically weak civilian institutions may bristle at the notion that the praetorian era is a thing of the past.

The armed forces is still an important institution with its own interests to defend, but there is a great difference between the extralegal forms of military pressure used in the past and the institutionalized pressure exhibited today. With few exceptions, the military's objections to policy are expressed through proper channels. Officials privately and diplomatically register their complaints with the defense minister, while military *enlaces* (lobbyists) take their cause directly to the Congress.

When so many scholars have insisted for so long that military corporate interests must be satisfied to secure compliance, it is curious indeed that an equilibrium has been achieved in Argentina, despite the losses suffered by the armed services. Who or what is ultimately responsible for this state of affairs?

Equilibrium

These achievements began prior to the current Menem and the previous Alfonsín administrations. Perhaps the first steps toward equilibrium were the military's own self-destructive acts. The unquestionable political and economic failures of the *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* (Proceso), along with Argentina's defeat in the 1982 War of the South Atlantic (Malvinas/Falklands), left indelible marks on the men of arms and the society they had refused to serve. The military was stained by its participation in a regime notorious for repression, self aggrandizement and incompetence. Argentine society bore the brunt of this and held the armed forces both morally and politically responsible.

The Proceso junta presided over a ruined economy and turned a limited counterinsurgency operation into a dirty war against civilians. The resulting loss of faith in programmatic objectives led to the emergence of serious cleavages along personalities, branches of service and ideologies. These contributed not only to the regime's hasty demise, but to a profound demoralization of the profession itself. This condition was then exacerbated by defeat in war and subsequent revelation of deficient, improvisational and error-ridden military conduct. The armed forces' dismal performance in governance and in war contributed to the degeneration of the institution, allowing incoming civilian governments to accomplish far

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Argentina's delicate civil-military equilibrium

more than would have been possible in the absence of military defeat.

Alfonsín led the charge, using the power of his office to further restrict the military's political reach, punish it for past offenses and curb its economic appetite. His program heightened the military's fears about the new democratic order, as it sought to impose, rather than court, military subordination to civilian rule. The reduction of military prerogatives, without sufficient compensation, contributed to deep resentment at the middle and lower ranks, eventually spilling over the rebellions of 1987 and 1988.

It is easy to blame Alfonsín for the nation's instability and to credit Menem for the restoration of that stability. But it would be a mistake to suggest that the Radical Party chief did nothing more than bequeath to his successor a problematic civil-military relationship. Whatever else can be said about Alfonsín's human rights strategy, the sentencing of the ex-commandants weakened the principle of impunity and made evident the democratic regime's refusal to allow military transgressions to go unanswered. In setting new limits, Alfonsín altered the parameters of the civil-military game, creating opportunities for his successors to interact with the armed forces without the fear of a military coup. Menem could reward good behavior knowing that to concede was not to capitulate; that one reward would not unleash a torrent of new and unreasonable military demands which, if unfulfilled, would generate calls for a change of regime. Conversely, Menem could withhold rewards to the armed forces in order to husband or redistribute scarce resources, confident that the armed forces would abide by the decision.

Facing Down the "Carapintadas"

The new civil-military equilibrium also owes its existence to the manner in which both Alfonsín and Menem dealt with the military rebels, or *carapintadas* (painted faces) as they were called. After the Holy Week revolt of April 1987, the ruling Radical Party lost some ground by calling for a partial amnesty for human rights offenders. The move was widely perceived as caving in to rebellious colonel Aldo Rico. But in other aspects, Alfonsín held his ground. He refused to yield to their demands that the next chief of the army be selected from a list of five candidates hand-picked by Rico, and instead appointed General José Dante Caridi. He did not grant immunity to the rebels, and had his military command manipulate assignments and promotions in a way that marginalized Rico's loyalists.

With the appointment of General Caridi, Alfonsín established a precedence of defying the *carapintadas.* This continued under Menem, who, over the objection of the *carapintadas'* Alí Seineldín, designated General Isidro Cáceres as the new army head. Beginning with Cáceres, each subsequent promotion within the army weakened the hand of the *carapintadas* while strengthening the hand of the "pure professional," men like Cáceres who were linked neither to mutiny nor bureaucratic inaction. As pure professionals, these soldiers are strict observers of military rank and, for the most part, remain uncompromisingly subordinate to the constitutional order and its elected officials. General Martín Bonnet, Cáceres's successor, and General Martín Balza, the current head of the army's general staff, fall into these categories. Personnel changes of this sort have produced a military command which is both respected by the rank and file and respectful of the governing authorities.

Menem's contribution to the current state of civil-military relations is often misunderstood. It is taken for granted that his October 1989 pardon of some 216 officers charged with mutiny and human rights abuses paved the way for improved relations. But balancing his forgiveness was the firmness with which he responded to the abortive coup attempt of December 1990. The uprising, which resulted in 13 deaths (two of the victims were soldiers) and 350 injuries, was particularly embarrassing to the president, coming as it did on the eve of a scheduled visit to Argentina by former U.S. President George Bush. The angry commander-in-chief quickly ordered troops to extinguish the uprising and urged the Military Supreme Council to mete out stiff punishment for the perpetrators. Fifteen co-conspirators, including Seineldín, lost their military status and remain behind bars

Like Alfonsín before him, Menem set careful limits on permissible military action. But unlike Alfonsín, the Peronist leader has also been able to establish a rapport with the armed services. There is a mutual understanding and respect which has translated into greater self-restraint on the part of the military. With the burden of prosecution for past

transgressions lifted, but with the knowledge that future ones will not be tolerated, the officer corps has cooperated with policies that in another time and context would have been intolerable.

Cavallo, Can you Spare a Dime?

Nowhere is this more apparent than with the military budget. While defense expenditures plummeted by 40 percent during the first three years of the Alfonsín administration, cuts were even steeper and more sustained under Menem. Military spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) went from 2.75 percent in Alfonsín's last year to 2.15 percent in Menem's first year, to less than 2 percent thereafter. The army's budget (not expenditures) went from 560 million pesos in 1987 to 105 million by 1991, an 81 percent decline. By 1993, there was no money left in the accounts of either the army, air force or navy for new equipment or maintenance. To date, this situation has not improved, although modest salary measures are projected to make the new all-volunteer army more attractive to recruits. Unable to support themselves or their families on meager military salaries, many officers leave the barracks by midday to hold down jobs in the civilian sector. Others have simply abandoned the services all together. But by and large, the armed forces have accepted these changes.

The objective of the Menem government has not been to punish the armed forces, but rather to fulfill macroeconomic goals as set by the all-powerful economics minister, Domingo Cavallo. Among Argentine defense specialists, the consensus is that limits to military spending are established by Cavallo and no one else. And for Cavallo, there are three compelling reasons why the armed forces must try to make do with less.

The first is that all sectors in Argentine society have been called on to do exactly the same. The watchwords under Menem have been "shared sacrifice." In spreading the costs of austerity, the government has been able to diffuse opposition to what surely has been a painful adjustment program. And it is that program, Cavallo claims, which has allowed the nation to experience an impressive economic recovery, marked by the elimination of the fiscal deficit, the lowering of monthly inflation to less than a percentage point in 1995 (and a negative rate for the month of August) and the restoration of stability and growth to an economy that had seen neither in decades.

In coming to terms with its own disreputable past, the military has helped rehabilitate its standing. The Argentine nation is the beneficiary.

The second reason, equally persuasive, is that the nation no longer needs a large military because the threatening environment of the past has changed. The war with Great Britain is over, tensions with Chile have been eased considerably through the signing of border agreements, and Argentina's perennial rival to the north, Brazil, is now an economic partner in the newly created free-trade zone known as MERCOSUR. Cooperation and integration, rather than geopolitical rivalry, characterizes relations between these Southern Cone neighbors, rendering the military threat to Argentina's sovereignty lower than it has been in recent memory. Since defensive needs are assessed in proportion to risk, then significant spending reductions were probably warranted.

Third, Argentina is a perfect test case of the theorem that bigger is not necessarily better. In 1982, the country's 200,000-man military, with an impressive stockpile of weapons, and a 37 percent share of all public sector expenditures (compared to 16.6 percent in Chile), went down in defeat at the hands of the British. Rapacious military spending could not purchase the kind of defense the country needed. Now, the military command is the first to admit that what Argentina needs is a leaner, more efficient, and more cost effective fighting force.

The downsizing of the Argentine military has been going on for some time now. Army conscripts, who numbered 64,640 in 1983, were down to just 13,000 by 1992. A member of the army's general staff reported in 1993 a 12 percent decline in the officer corps, and an overall 32 percent reduction in army units – including corps (40 percent), brigade commands (8.3 percent) artillery commands (100 percent), and logistical units (54 percent) – all between 1983-1992. The report goes on to describe changes in the organic structure of the army, the movement of combat brigades and regiments, and the redeployment of troops, all allegedly guided by strategic logic to transform the army into an organization that is "agile, versatile, flexible and courageous." While many of these changes have actually occurred, it is dubious that such transformations have been carefully orchestrated by strategic design. What is more probable is that the army, and the military in general, have simply taken compensatory measures to conform to a budget which is 70 percent smaller than it was a decade ago.

This kind of knee-jerk downsizing that responds to economic logic without sufficient regard for the security needs of the country has

many Argentine defense specialists concerned. Strategically-minded structural reform is the solution, but the military cannot or will not reform itself. Unfortunately, clear guidelines from the political authorities have not been forthcoming. As expected, years of persistent budget-cutting without reform has set limits on military tolerance. By 1993, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military's operating capacity was at a meager 20 percent (compared to 60 percent on the eve of the Malvinas War) This alarming statistic ushered negotiations with Defense Minister Oscar Camilión, where Cavallo finally agreed to raise the ceiling on military expenditures with a 22 percent increase in supplemental funding for housing, clothing and other personnel-related items. Shortly thereafter, he approved the procurement of 36 U.S. skyhawk A-4M training planes needed to replace roughly one-half of the aircraft lost in the Malvinas War.

A New Civil-Military Culture

This agreement perhaps best typifies the new civil-military climate in Argentina. Conflicts of interest and perception among the armed services, the Ministry of Defense, and the rest of the government persist, but do not explode into full-scale confrontation. Contacts are routinized, and problems are solved within the framework of institutions.

But more impressive than the rapprochement between the military and executive branch has been the discovery of common ground between the military and civil society. Before, each side remained incommunicado with the other, unable or unwilling to break through the barriers of distrust. These days, not a month goes by in Argentina without contact between military and civilian defense specialists. What began as a single sociology seminar on defense issues held at the University of Buenos Aires in 1984, has blossomed into a near permanent civil-military dialogue made possible through the creation of a host of organizations dedicated to bringing together experts from both sides. Military and civilian research centers, commissions with the Peronist and Radical parties, and even the joint military command itself have sponsored initiatives to produce a cross-fertilization of opinions and ideas. As a result, a small but viable "defense establishment" not only yields defense-related knowledge but also perpetuates the new culture of openness between soldiers and citizens.

This new culture is remarkable in light of recent history. As a result of the "Dirty War" and its acts of terror, the military thoroughly disgraced and ostracized itself from the larger Argentine community. But recently, the armed forces have gone a long way toward bridging the gulf that separated it from society through demonstrations of remorse. Revelations of misdeeds by underlings have led senior commanders to acknowledge that their services committed legally and morally unacceptable acts. The army chief went furthest, stating that both those who gave the orders and those who followed were responsible. In coming to terms with its own disreputable past, the military has helped rehabilitate its standing. The Argentine nation is the beneficiary.

Challenges on the Horizon

The first challenge is an institutional one. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Defense still represents a weak link in the chain of command. Under Menem, officials with no particular background in defense have been appointed temporarily for political reasons, only to be withdrawn when convenient. Rapid personnel turnover results in discontinuity, which in turn breeds unfamiliarity and institutional memory failure. The pattern can only be broken if the Menem government and its successors begin to acknowledge the critical importance of the defense ministry in maintaining good relations with the armed forces.

The current lack of ministerial continuity and expertise commonly translates into lack of will, which poses the next challenge to Argentina, namely one of leadership. Until the president and his ministerial appointees step up to the plate to establish clear defense and security goals for the nation, further progress is unlikely. The chief executive must have defense vision, which the defense minister and his staff can then translate into concrete objectives, strategies and programs. Indeed, the Law of Defense requires the minister and his advisory council to elaborate all hypotheses of conflict and war, and to direct and coordinate all those defense activities not already delegated to the president. To date, the lack of presidential and ministerial leadership has created a vacuum which the armed services themselves might be tempted to fill.

Finally, Menem must avoid the temptation to subordinate all defense needs to economic criteria. To date, he has deferred to Domingo Cavallo, his economics minister, who has held the defense budget hostage to short-term fiscal fluctuations. This prevents the services from undertaking reforms based on long-term strategic forecasting. Instead, according to the director of Naval Programming and Budgeting, they must now resort to "situation planning" based on current budgetary realities. In the future, there must be a balance between economic and military necessities, if the armed forces are to thoroughly modernize and professionalize. Reason must prevail at the political level as Argentina advances toward civilian control over the armed forces and democratic consolidation. ■

The Second Coming

Aldo C. Vacs

On July 8, 1995, Carlos S. Menem began his second term as president of Argentina. Following in the footsteps of Juan Domingo Perón, the founder of the Peronist movement and the only Argentine president elected to two consecutive terms, Menem promoted a constitutional amendment allowing his re-election and won an impressive majority in the May 1995 electoral contest. Under the terms of the 1994 constitutional reform, the presidential period was shortened from six to four years. Menem's presidency will last until July 1999.

Unlike Perón's attempt, the legality of the 1994 constitutional reform was not disputed by the opposition. It was generally accepted that Menem's victory had been secured observing all liberal democratic procedures. For the first time since 1930, Argentina completed more than one decade of uninterrupted democracy in a political climate in which the opposition endorsed the legitimacy of the elected authorities and the military remained subordinated to them. Constitutional guarantees and freedoms were respected, there was lively political competition, and a large majority of the population, despite socioeconomic problems, supported the preservation of the democratic regime.

The Initial Conditions

The general elections of May 1995 confirmed Argentina's changing political configuration. The ruling *Partido Justicialista* (Justice Party – PJ) obtained a comfortable victory. Menem gathered close to 50 percent of the votes, making it unnecessary to organize a runoff presidential election. The PJ won most congressional and gubernatorial races, increased its majority in the Chamber of Deputies to 133 seats – thereby securing its own quorum – and captured 10 of the 14 governorships in dispute. In contrast, the main opposition party, the *Unión Cívica Radical* (Radical Civic Union – UCR) suffered a major defeat, gathering less than 17 percent of the votes, losing a number of congressional seats, and winning in only four provinces. The runner-up in the elections was a new center-left coalition, the *Frente del País Solidario* (Front for a Solidarity Country – FREPASO), which obtained 29 percent of the presidential votes and elected 29 deputies, although it did not win any governorship. Other smaller political groups and coalitions, with the exception of a few provincial parties with strong local support, performed poorly and failed to win any congressional seats.

The May 1995 election ratified a majority of the electorate's preference for Menem and the PJ, who were perceived as the guarantors of economic stability and social peace. The results also confirmed the continuous electoral decline of the UCR, resulting partially from a collective memory of hyperinflation, social turmoil and political instability that characterized Alfonsín's final months as president. Moreover, the UCR's poor performance resulted from voter rejection of the agreement reached between Alfonsín and Menem on the constitutional reform which had eroded the party's image as an opposition force.

The electoral emergence of FREPASO, a coalition of center-left parties, is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it marked the end of the long period of Radical-Peronist bipartisan electoral predominance. Second, a significant portion of the population, dissatisfied with Menem's policies and practices, was looking for new political alternatives that promised less orthodox economic programs, more progressive social policies, and the elimination of governmental corruption. FREPASO filled that void.

In this context, Menem counted on a number of positive factors to secure the success of his second administration. Politically, he relied on his popularity, control of the PJ, influence over a congressional majority and most provincial authorities, and the relative weakness and divisions of the opposition. Economically, there was substantial support for the economic program implemented since 1991 by Menem and his minister of economy, Domingo Cavallo, which eliminated inflation and promised to generate renewed economic growth and modernization.

The administration also counted on a favorable international climate as relations with the United States, Western Europe (including Great Britain) and the rest of Latin America remained friendly and cooperative. Finally, the relative consolidation of the democratic regime, demonstrated by the absence of any military or civilian threats to political stability, created an unprecedented opportunity to complete the political economic restructuring that Menem had championed since 1989 – the

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Fancy footwork keeps Carlos Menem alive

development of a free market economy and the strengthening of liberal democracy.

Unanticipated Quandaries

The auspicious circumstances surrounding Menem's second coming were soon affected by international and domestic developments that tested the administration's competence and lessened its popularity. Since early 1995, the Argentine economy felt the reverberations of the Mexican economic crisis – the so-called "Tequila Effect" – that led to the outflow of capital, inability to attract new financial flows, declining reserves, plummeting of the stock market, rise of interest rates and a deepening recession. By May 1995, the domestic situation deteriorated as credit and consumption fell, unemployment grew and fiscal crises began to affect many of the provincial governments.

Paradoxically, this critical situation enhanced Menem's electoral chances as most voters trusted his and Cavallo's capacity to overcome the difficulties. Based on the 1989 hyperinflationary experience, most voters still questioned the Radicals' economic aptitude and doubted that a FREPASO administration would have the necessary expertise.

At the time of Menem's second inauguration in July 1995, the expected recovery had not materialized and the socioeconomic crisis had worsened. Unemployment reached a record 18.6 percent, with some of the largest urban areas going over 20 percent, while another 11.4 percent of the economically active population remained underemployed. Interest rates remained very high, fluctuating between 16 percent and 23 percent. Consumption plummeted, with sales declining 35 percent compared to the first semester of 1994 and commercial bankruptcies escalating. Many provincial administrations were unable to pay salaries. Central Bank reserves continued to decline while the capital outflow persisted as more than $8 billion in bank deposits fled the country in the first half of the year. Economic projections anticipated that the economy would contract by 1 percent in 1995, and zero growth could be expected in 1996.

Government attempts to deal with the crisis by reducing employers' social security contributions and taxes on foreign investment, lowering the banks' reserve requirements, increasing unemployment subsidies and coverage, and expanding some social programs were not enough to reverse the trend. The impact of these measures was limited by Cavallo's decision to preserve the convertibility program and not devaluate the peso, maintain a fiscal surplus to pay the public debt, and his refusal to transfer funds to the provincial governments. As a result, the expectations of economic recovery remained focused on the prospects of attracting new inflows of capital, a possibility that did not materialize as foreign investors remained reluctant and Argentina's international credit rating dropped.

The uncertainty concerning the country's economic prospects was heightened by a number of provincial demonstrations and riots involving public employees who demanded payment and rejected cuts in their salaries, strikes and demonstrations against unemployment, and rumors of disagreements between Menem and Cavallo that could lead to the latter's resignation. The crisis became more acute when the administration's internal disagreements led to public attacks against Cavallo's economic and social policies by other members of the cabinet, Peronist legislators and ambassadors, and the governor of Buenos Aires province and Menem's expected political heir, Eduardo Duhalde.

Cavallo reacted by denouncing the involvement of some of his critics in governmental corruption and their participation in organized "mafias" which solicited kickbacks and bribes and engaged in extortion, influence peddling and money laundering. Soon the antagonists became aware of the potential political and economic costs associated with this strife and tried to downplay the severity of the accusations. Menem attempted to calm the situation, calling for a truce and ratifying his confidence in Cavallo and the economic plan. It was too late, however, to contain the negative fallout of the confrontation.

The aftermath of the quarrel included an intensification of the administration's internal disputes, growing concern with corruption, a decline of public confidence in the administration, and continuous doubts on the part of foreign investors and lenders about the stability of Cavallo and his economic program.

Setbacks and Tensions

Under these circumstances, Menem lost some of the support that he had rallied at the time of his second inaugural. Public opinion polls indicated that Cavallo's image improved as a result of his attacks on corruption – but Menem, his cabinet

and the Peronist party suffered a significant decline in popularity. The political risks resulting from this situation were compounded by the fact that a number of gubernatorial, runoff and complementary elections were scheduled before the end of 1995.

In August, the gubernatorial elections in the province of Santa Fe ended in a scandal as candidates of different Peronist factions and the opposition denounced fraud and called for a new vote. In Tierra del Fuego and Neuquén, provincial parties won the respective governorships. The PJ lost the municipal elections in some of the largest urban centers, such as Rosario and Córdoba, and in several smaller provincial cities.

The most severe setback occurred in early October 1995 in the senatorial election held in the federal capital and the runoff gubernatorial election in Chaco province. In the federal district – the city of Buenos Aires – Graciela Fernández Meijide, the FREPASO candidate, leader of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and human rights activist, won by a landslide, carrying all the electoral precincts. Second place was carried by the UCR. The Peronist candidate, Antonio E. González, a former minister of economics and defense and close friend of Menem, finished a distant third. Although the Peronist defeat was not a complete surprise due to the long history of *porteño* support for opposition candidates, most striking was the difference in the number of votes. Even more ominous, from the administration's perspective, was the defeat in Chaco – the former province of President Perón and a traditional stronghold of Peronism – where a Radical politician won the runoff vote against the PJ candidate. In both cases, post-election polls indicated that the crucial factors influencing voters was concern over corruption and unemployment.

While these negative political developments unfolded, the Menem administration confronted growing social unrest, particularly in the provinces. In Córdoba, Jujuy, Mendoza, Río Negro, Salta and San Juan, public employees, teachers and other workers clashed with police as demonstrations called to resist salary cuts, dismissals and payment delays ended in riots. At the same time, the pro-Menem General Confederation of Labor demanded solutions to the unemployment problem in an attempt to retain control over the workers and contain the demonstrations against the economic policies organized by two labor confederations that remained in the opposition.

New Challenges

Confronted with these problems, Menem attempted to regain control over the situation by minimizing internal strife, distancing himself from corruption, trying to reestablish foreign confidence in his administration, and making some concessions in terms of income and social policies. After ordering his collaborators to cease their quarrels, Menem blamed the press for having created a false image of dissension. Meanwhile, some officials who were accused of corruption – such as those in the National Bank – were dismissed and others – such as the authorities of the taxation agency and the postal service – became the target of congressional and judicial investigations.

In October 1995, to regain foreign economic confidence, Menem travelled to the United States, where he assured business audiences that the economic program would not be modified and that Cavallo would not be replaced. Back home, in an attempt to defuse social tensions, Menem also met with labor representatives, promising to preserve the union's role in providing health services, to increase employer contributions to the unions' social service programs, and to protect real wages.

Some of these moves tend to contradict each other and may not help to solve the problems. The confirmation of most appointed officials makes it inevitable that internal disputes will once again arise and continue to weaken the administration. The dismissal of those involved in blatant corruption and the investigations underway could expose new scandals and generate growing distrust among the public. The preservation of Cavallo and his policies could deepen the recession and further discourage foreign capital from returning to the country. The fulfillment of the promises made to labor groups may reduce profits and reinforce the reluctance of domestic and foreign actors to expand their economic activities while perpetuating the recession.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Menem has demonstrated an uncanny ability to overcome political and socioeconomic difficulties that would have ruined other presidents' popularity or even caused their removal. The economic emergencies of 1989 and 1991 were successfully overcome; scandals such as the laundering of drug money and bribes demanded from foreign companies by Menem's relatives and associates have been disregarded; political backlashes and electoral setbacks have proved to be temporary, and past social explosions have been contained. Thanks to a combination of political dexterity with a good dose of fortune and opposition weaknesses, Menem was able to regain political control and return to center stage in better condition than before. Thus, if past experience is a reliable indicator, the second Menem administration may repeat the pattern of the first term. With economic and social events often taking Menem to the brink of a political abyss, he may still come back strengthened in his authority and popularity. ■

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

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Journeys North

Clifford E. Griffin

Post-War Caribbean Migration to Britain: The Unfinished Cycle
By Margaret Byron
Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 1994, pp. 221.

Pilgrims From the Sun: West Indian Migration to America
By Ransford W. Palmer
New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995, pp. 101

These books continue the exploration of Caribbean migration and offer insights into this phenomenon by focusing respectively on the post-war migration of Caribbean nationals to the United Kingdom and to the United States.

Post-war Caribbean Migration to Britain analyzes the origins, motivations, strategies, and levels of success of a special category of migrants – non-recruited labor migrants – from the island of Nevis, who emigrated to Britain during the post-war years. The study is rich in anecdotes from interviews with a number of these migrants, which provide many insights into the migration ordeal. Many readers would recognize that these experiences are not specific to Nevisian migrants but reflect those of Jamaicans, St. Lucians, and other Caribbean sojourners as well. These insights are obtained through an analysis of issues including occupational opportunities and mobility, interpersonal relationships, housing, gender, and the importance of social networks.

Byron's central argument is that non-recruited migration has evolved into a major survival strategy for Caribbean individuals and families. This development is the result of a "migration ideology," which is inherited and perpetuated by generations of Caribbean people. This ideology "comprises the goals and attitudes towards migration, which, often unconsciously as far as the migrants are concerned, assist the smooth flow of a supply of labor to industries in the core countries." Byron demonstrates this "migration ideology" by drawing upon 1987 survey data of Nevisian schoolchildren ranging in age from 11 to 19 years old. One conclusion drawn from the overall survey is that migration is both glamorized and institutionalized as a survival and advancement option and, therefore, produces a "latent" supply of migrant labor for richer countries.

Given this propensity to migrate, which is a product of Caribbean history, several propositions are advanced to explain some of the dynamics of non-recruited migration. First, social networks are essential structures in facilitating the process of non-recruited migration. Second, these networks reproduce exploitation of migrants by avoiding or minimizing the provision of essential services for the migrants. Third, migrants are unlikely to achieve their desired goals due to constraints imposed upon them by the system and the contexts in which they live in Britain.

The centrality of social networks is aptly demonstrated in this analysis. Essentially, social networks act as an organizing force in facilitating non-recruited migration and migrants' goals in the face of restrictive structures. Such underemphasis has created a distorted picture of Caribbean migrants as a disorganized and disunited group. This book counters that perspective.

Finally, in addressing the problematic subject of return migration, Byron analyzes several variables that influence the decision to return home. They include the importance of the return element in the migrant calculus, conditions under which return migration is likely, conditions and factors likely to prevent return, and the effect on local economic, family and cultural systems of the return movement. *Post-War Caribbean Migration to Britain* goes beyond George Gmelch's *Double Passage: The Lives of Caribbean Migrants Abroad and Back Home* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), by anchoring itself in a strong theoretical framework and providing fresh insights into the study of Caribbean migration.

Pilgrims From the Sun, which is much broader in scope, attempts to explain a second wave of migration, that of large numbers of people from the Anglophone Caribbean to the United States. The period of analysis begins during the early 1960s in the wake of two events: the implementation of Britain's new and highly restrictive immigration policy and the movement toward independence by then British colonies. Coincident with these events was the economic boom in

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the United Sates and a liberalization of U.S. immigration laws in 1965. This largely economic analysis assesses some of the collateral impacts of migration on both the sending countries and the United States, in general, and Kings County (Brooklyn) in the state of New York in particular. The central proposition is that Caribbean migration to the United States is driven primarily by economics, and that accelerated growth is the antidote to this propensity to migrate.

Palmer advances two general arguments. First, migration has benefitted the United States much more than the sending countries, largely because of the resulting brain drain. The point seems rather obvious since existing theories contend that highly skilled, gainfully employed individuals are highly likely to migrate. Earnings at home enable them to set aside enough money to meet the challenge of resettling and securing employment in the host country. Palmer shows the extent to which governments in the Anglophone Caribbean indeed have subsidized economic development in the United States by providing a constant supply of highly trained personnel such as doctors and nurses. The United States siphons off these skills by wage inducements and by providing those trained in the U.S. with the chance for permanent residency. U.S. immigration policy of reuniting families is also a factor.

Palmer views this pattern of migration as essentially the result of "push-pull" economic factors, and attributes little, if any, to other "push" factors such as politics. Politics precipitated increased emigration from Guyana during the Burnham era; from Trinidad and Tobago following the Black Power Riots in 1970; from Jamaica in the 1970s during Michael Manley's first tenure; from Grenada toward the end of the Gairy period; and also from Grenada during the rule of the People's Revolutionary Government. Moreover, a significant number of migrants are highly skilled/educated people and often formidable political opponents in several countries where their involvement in politics often leads to politically volatility. Thus, immigration contributes to political stability by providing an escape valve for political discontents.

Second, Palmer contends that migrants from the Anglophone Caribbean and their offspring who are born in the U.S. have been more successful at realizing the American dream – at least economically and educationally – than have African-Americans. Unfortunately, no comparative data on numbers of college graduates or any such indicators are provided to substantiate this claim. Afro-Caribbeans, however, have not been as successful as African-Americans in translating their economic and educational successes into political power. For example, the ratio of Caribbean-Americans to African-Americans in political office (city, county, state, and federal government) is quite small.

The danger of Palmer's argument is that it supports those who wish to keep the black community divided and powerless. Such people claim that African-Americans are lazy and shiftless, and are wedded to welfare. Palmer facilitates this by arguing that "the majority of the West Indians in Brooklyn live in black enclaves and rarely interact socially with the white population... have maintained an ethnic identity separate from the rest of the black population... beyond the work place, they strive to maintain their West Indianness and therefore their separate cultural identity" (p.20). But, continues Palmer, "while West Indians strive to maintain their ethnic and cultural identity in America, their socioeconomic success depends on the larger black population" (p.21). Clearly, the presence of such an homogenized community provides the researcher with the opportunity to collect quantitative and qualitative data about the experiences of these migrants.

Thus, while *Pilgrims From the Sun* is timely, it appears to have bitten off more than it can chew. It is not grounded in any coherent theoretical framework. The reader is given no overall statement of purpose and methodology; neither is the reader given any insights into why this is an important and instructive study. The study tries too hard to "prove" the economic linkage between migration decisions and economic growth/development in the Anglophone Caribbean and understates the importance of other contributory factors. These include political factors as well as what could be described as a natural propensity among people from the Caribbean to migrate. Caribbean people migrate because it is the thing to do. At the same time, while issues such as recruited, unrecruited and ille-

gal migrants; the role of remittances; the relationship between migration, employment, occupation, and trade; and "countermigration" are addressed, they are only glossed over in this 101-page volume.

The author commits the fallacy of the single cause by attempting to extrapolate from the single case results of his study. According to Palmer, "because Jamaica has the largest population of all the English-speaking Caribbean countries, it is used to illustrate the economic impact of the closing and opening of the population escape valve" (p. 14). Geography and population size are not sufficient to explain the economic impact of migration policy. Economic base/structure is a critical factor. Trinidad and Tobago, for example, has always had a more diversified and robust economy than Jamaica, and more migration alternatives because of this and close geographical and cultural connections with the South American mainland. Finally, no mention is made of the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, the destinations of many migrants from eastern Caribbean islands such as Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Lucia.

Palmer claims that "a plausible argument can also be made that migration, especially the migration of skilled people, accelerated the economic decline of Jamaica by depriving the productive units of the economy of productive skills. This led to the underutilization of plant capacity... As a consequence, the productive base of the economy shrunk... the tax base also shrunk." The question is, what caused this emigration of skills? Manley's democratic socialist policies angered the United States, which pressured the International Monetary Fund to withhold loans to the government of Jamaica. At the same time, not only did Burnham's misguided policies and his choice of a cooperative socialist path to development contribute to problems in Guyana, major Western countries did not embrace him either. Hence, it is simplistic to attribute Jamaica's (and the Anglophone Caribbean's) economic decline to emigration, rather than see emigration as a rational response to external forces as well as domestic politics.

In describing the political behavior of Caribbean nationals in Hartford, Connecticut, Palmer presents the following argument, which represents a huge leap of logic: "The hard work and earnestness that have shaped their economic success have also shaped the political orientation of their leaders. The only West Indian to be elected to the Hartford City Council, Colin Bennett, ran as a Republican and was elected four times. And the president of the Hartford chapter of the Jamaica Progressive League... is also a Republican. There appears to be a right of center drift in the politics of this middle class community." The author provides no data to show the political orientation of this Caribbean community. Neither is there any evidence that the Caribbean community voted for Bennett. Even if they did, did they vote for him because they, like him, are Republicans, or simply because he is from the Caribbean? In sum, *Pilgrims From the Sun* does not offer any new perspectives on this important aspect of the Caribbean reality. ■

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

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Through the Lens

Marian Goslinga

Photographic archives and collections constitute important legacies and have increasingly become a focal point for research. Photography, as a discipline by itself, has also attained a respectable standing and, in recent years, has drawn many adherents to its cause. In 1992, Edward Ranney published a survey of recent photobooks specifically dealing with Latin America in which he summarized the existing literature on both aspects of the subject (*Latin American Research Review*, v. 26, no. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 235-246). Ranney's work was brought up to date by Wendy Watriss and Lois Zamora (eds.) in their *Image and Memory: Latin American Photography, 1865-1992*, published by Rice University Press (Houston, Texas) in 1994. This bibliography will start where Ranney, Watriss and Zamora left off, listing materials published within the last three years – 1993 to mid-1995. Included will be items covering the entire region, individual countries – Mexico providing the most entries – as well as works on individual photographers (i.e. Guillermo Kahlo, Mariana Yampolsky, Manuel Alvarez Bravo, Graciela Iturbide, Flor Garduño, etc.). It is noteworthy that among the leading Latin American photographers of today, women make up the majority.

Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and Caribbean librarian at Florida International University.

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