

1991

Volume 3 Number 3, Summer 1991

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere



Part of the [Latin American Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

(1991) "Volume 3 Number 3, Summer 1991," *Hemisphere*: Vol. 3 : Iss. 3 , Article 1.

Available at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere/vol3/iss3/1

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) Publications Network at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hemisphere by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

Volume 3 Number 3, Summer 1991

Hemisphere

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Summer 1991

Volume Three • Number Three

Seven Dollars

Latin America's Burden of Corruption

Mario Diament, Allan Metz

The Politics of Caribbean Music

Daisann McLane, Deborah Pacini Hernandez

Samba World

Andrea Mantell Seidel

Garnier on Free Trade and Central America
Griffith on Free Trade and the Caribbean
Hernández and Bray on Privatizing Mexican Coffee
Oppenheimer on Boom and Bust in Guatemala
Katz on Bush's Trade Strategy
O'Connor on Cuba's Military Quandary
McCoy on Political Challenges in Suriname and Guyana



Hemisphere

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Summer 1991

Volume Three • Number Three

Seven Dollars

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor: Anthony P. Maingot
Deputy Editor: Richard Tardanico
Associate Editors: Eduardo A. Gamarra,
Mark B. Rosenberg
Assistant Editor: Sofia A. López
Book Review Editor: Kathleen Logan
Bibliographer: Marian Goslinga
Editorial Assistant: René Ramos
Circulation Manager: Raquel Jurado
Copy Editor: Michael B. Joslyn
Production Assistants: Michelle Acebo, Cristina
Finlay, Pedro P. García, Teresita Marill, Sontha
Strinko

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Janet M. Chernela	Dario Moreno
Rodolfo Cortina	Lisandro Pérez
Dennis J. Gayle	Luis P. Salas
Jerry Haar	Mark D. Szuchman
Suzanne Koptur	Kevin A. Yelvington
Raul Moncarz	

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Francisco Rojas Aravena	Anthony J. Payne
Ettore Botta	Guido Pennano
Bernard Diederich	Alejandro Portes
Wolf Grabendorff	Sally Price
Harry Hoetink	David Ronfeldt
Vaughan Lewis	Selwyn Ryan
Larissa A. Lomnitz	Steven E. Sanderson
Abraham F. Lowenthal	Saskia Sassen
Frank Manitzas	Carol A. Smith
Richard Millet	Yolande Van Eeuwen
Andres Oppenheimer	Arturo Villar
Robert A. Pastor	Juan Yanes

Hemisphere (ISSN 08983038) is published three times a year (Fall, Winter/Spring, and Summer) by the Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University. Copyright © 1991 by the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University. All rights reserved.

Hemisphere is dedicated to provoking debate on the problems, initiatives, and achievements of Latin America and the Caribbean. Responsibility for the views expressed lies solely with the authors.

EDITORIAL, CIRCULATION, AND ADVERTISING OFFICES: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199. Telephone: (305) 348-2894. FAX: (305) 348-3593. Please address manuscripts and editorial correspondence to the Deputy Editor.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: US, USVI, PR, and Canada: \$20 a year; \$36 for two years. Elsewhere: \$27 a year; \$50 for two years. Please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to *Hemisphere*.

This document was produced at a cost of \$7321.67 or \$3.66 per copy.

COMMENTARY

- Beyond Trade *by Leonardo Garnier* 2
The US and Cuba *by Anthony P. Maingot* 4

REPORTS

- Free Trade and the Caribbean *by Winston H. Griffith* 6
Mexico: Campesinos and Coffee *by Luis Hernández and David Bray* 8
Boom, Bust, and Chicle *by Andres Oppenheimer* 11
Bush Administration Trade Policy *by Julius L. Katz* 12
Cuba's Military Quandary *by Anne-Marie O'Connor* 14
Democratic Transitions? *by Terry L. McCoy* 16

FAXFILE

18

FEATURES

- Latin America's Burden of Corruption
Corrupt to the Core *by Mario Diament* 20
The Israeli-Colombian Connection *by Allan Metz* 24
Corruption in Colombia *Editorial from Semana (Bogotá)* 25
The Politics of Caribbean Music
Calypso Politics *by Daisann McLane* 30
Merengue: From Race to Gender *by Deborah Pacini Hernandez* 32

REVIEW FORUM

- Samba World *by Andrea Mantell Seidel* 34

PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

- Music and Dance *by Marian Goslinga* 38

Beyond Trade

by *Leonardo Garnier*

President George Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative offers two potential gains to the countries of Latin America: increased resources to finance national investment and widened access to the North American market. From these standpoints, the initiative could be a step forward for the economies south of the Rio Grande. Yet only by learning from the mistakes of the past can Latin America prevent this potential opportunity from becoming merely a new phase in the old process of impoverishing growth.

Growth with Development

When it comes to examining the recent past, the neoliberal critique of Latin American *desarrollismo* scores some points. Thus, overvalued currencies, subsidized interest rates, excessive protectionism, growing fiscal deficits, and irresponsible monetary policies are not the kind of features that lead to economic development. Nor, I must add, do the profit margins earned by oligopolies.

Central America and its Latin American neighbors must also

Leonardo Garnier is a professor in the Maestría en Política Económica para Centroamérica y el Caribe at the Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, and a member of the research and policy institute, Alternativas de Desarrollo. His recent publications include "Costa Rica: el proceso de desarrollo y la conformación del sistema de transportes (1986-1989)" (San José: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Ambientales y Tecnológicas, October 1990).

learn from the distant past. The key lesson from those dimly recollected years is this: not all forms of integration with the world economy permit the combination of local economic growth with social development. In light of current regional conditions, it is naive to assume that commercial and financial liberalization and the quest for macroeconomic balances by themselves will foster not only the resumption of economic prosperity,

The key lesson is that not all forms of integration with the world economy permit both local growth and social development.

but also the development of the economic, political, and social infrastructure so vital to the region's future. In Central America and similar economic zones in Latin America, the fundamental obstacles of extreme poverty, weak production capacity, fragile political institutions, and scarce financial and entrepreneurial resources are deeply entrenched. Unless these obstacles are addressed, export-oriented policies and the liberalization of economic life will lead to impoverishing growth—much as they did a century ago.

Concern for these obstacles has been conspicuously absent from

most of the structural adjustment programs implemented so far in Central America and the rest of Latin America. The Bush initiative and the bulk of the trade-bloc proposal in circulation are no exceptions. To be sure, such ideas are promising in terms of widening access to leading markets. But in spite of some attention to the financing of national investment, the financial measures considered tend not to transcend a narrow range of export production and to be conditioned on the weakening or dismantling of essential state supports. Hence, without serious modification, the implementation of the Bush initiative and related plans would fail to address—and, indeed, could exacerbate—the structural limitations of the hemisphere's less-developed countries.


Once again, producers throughout Latin America would be competing among themselves to sell their products at increasingly lower prices on the North American market. And once again, such competition would not revolve around the process of enhancing the value of local productive resources through the incorporation of advanced knowledge, technology, skills, or efficiency. On the contrary, it would be based on the cheapening of production through the widening use of low-wage, unskilled labor and the depletion of the region's natural resources. Not only would this pattern continue to depress Latin America's standards of living. It also would fail to reduce its vulnerability to technological advances and changes in trade policy in the US and other developed countries, which historically have eroded or undercut the region's export markets.

Heightened Competition


Within this framework, the Bush plan could present Central America with a particular problem. By generalizing many of the advantages of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) to Latin America in general, the plan could jeopardize the area's export opportunities. This is precisely the case with the advantages offered to countries like Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, which are of special interest to the US because of their role in the drug war; it is also the case with a US-Canada-Mexico free-trade agreement. So far, Costa Rica is the only Central American country to have taken advantage of the CBI in any significant way. In 1984-89 its non-traditional exports increased their portion of Costa Rica's total exports from 15% to 40%; in 1989 such exports accounted for only 12% to 20% of total exports from the region's other countries. If not properly negotiated, trade policies based on the Bush plan could close the CBI door in the face of Central America.

Insofar as it offers widened access to major international markets, Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is promising indeed. Nonetheless, for the long-range health of Latin America and the entire hemisphere, the Bush plan does not go far enough. What is also necessary is serious international commitment—by the US government, multilateral agencies, and Latin American governments themselves—to strengthen the region's economic, social, and political infrastructure. Doing so is the only way to promote growth with equity and democracy throughout the Americas. ■

EXPORTS, 1981-89



GDP PER CAPITA, 1981-89



The US and Cuba

by Anthony P. Maingot

To the extent that rationality is judgment based on a norm rather than any absolute standard of behavior, then one is tempted to call US-Cuban relations irrational. Certainly they appear to run against the norms of contemporary world practices and pronouncements about pragmatism and utilitarianism in international relations. Since the US is far more prominent in its power and foreign policy, the tendency is to start by analyzing its contradictory behavior. Compared to US treatment of other international "offenders," there is no doubt that its policy toward Cuba appears contradictory and out of character.

Listen to George Bush defend the granting of most-favored nation trading status to China: "Some argue that a nation as moral and just as ours should not taint itself by dealing with nations less moral, less just. But this counsel offers up self-righteousness draped in a false morality. You do not reform the world by ignoring it." In other words, contacts and trade, not isolation and embargoes, are the ways to bring about the changes you desire. This is in the best tradition of realism in US foreign policy. It echoes George F. Kennan saying that "the practice of government, after all, is a practical exercise and not a moral one," and Dean Acheson reminding us that "the vocabulary of morals and ethics is inadequate to discuss or test foreign policies of states." It is George Ball urging statesmen to avoid "moralistic

Anthony P. Maingot is editor of Hemisphere.

mush." Of course, while there have been idealists in US history (such as Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter), Bush is very much in the mold of mainstream US foreign policy tradition. This explains why the US deals with China and Syria, and dealt previously with Panama's Manuel Antonio Noriega and Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Again, in Bush's own words, a successful foreign policy means charting a "moral course through a world of lesser evils."

Since the Cuban revolution, the issue has been one of clashing US-Cuban interests, not lack of communication. Comparisons with US-Chinese relations are revealing.

The Absence of Pragmatism

So why all the apparent moralizing about Cuba? Is it that, of all the countries less moral than the US, only Cuba has crossed the line from "lesser evil" to "absolute evil"?

The answer is that the moralizing is only apparent. Separated from its rhetoric, Bush's policy towards Cuba can be explained in terms of some fundamental realities of contemporary diplomacy and international relations. Some comparisons with China are revealing.

First, there is the personal dimension. Bush, who headed the US mission in Beijing for two years, believes he knows what makes China tick. A similar personal attitude is said to govern his relations with Mexico. There is no evidence of any such personal sentiments towards Cuba. Bush is the eighth consecutive US president to have sour relations with Fidel Castro; secret and not-so-secret missions have been sent to Cuba by every one of these presidents, including Ronald Reagan, who sent General Vernon Walters to talk to Castro. The issue has always been one of clashing interests, not lack of communication. While nothing in Bush's experience with Castro disposes him to take any initiative in breaking a 32-year-old freeze, nothing in his foreign policy realm compels him in that direction either.

Bush is not unrealistic in believing that the 1,200 US companies with \$4.2 billion invested in China and the \$10.4-billion trade surplus China has with the US provide him with diplomatic leverage. With a free-enterprise culture quickly developing in South China and with Hong Kong already established as the Chinese economy's new financial center of gravity, Bush legitimately sees a slow but sure pace of change in China.

No such factors are evident in Cuba. Additionally, US pragmatism towards China is not an isolated case. The European Community,

Japan, the USSR, and even Taiwan are dealing with China. The exact opposite operates with Cuba. Even its former allies in Eastern Europe will trade only in terms of hard currency on the barrel-head, and those who invest in joint ventures in the Cuban tourist industry (i.e. Spain) are doing so in terms outrageously advantageous to themselves.

Trade is not the only arena where Cuba finds herself isolated. Former allies who owe Cuban internationalism more than just a debt of gratitude have quickly forgotten Cuba's expenditure of blood and capital on their behalf. The most blatant case is that of Angola's ruling MPLA, which, in signing a peace treaty with archenemy UNITA, did not even invite the Cubans to the party in Lisbon. In a world where even Angola's ardor has faded, it is not surprising that, when it comes to Cuba, there is so little international pressure on Bush to go the extra mile.

Finally, and critically, there is a fairly wide perception in Washington—and increasingly in Europe and Latin America—that Cuban politics and economics have deteriorated to the stage where there is little space for diplomacy and bargaining. Pragmatism's operational code is that nations utilize whatever leverage they can to achieve goals. Castro's own policy of the "zero option" appears to have removed, or at least to have kept well-concealed, whatever cards he has to play. Today, as for much of the past 32 years, the game appears more like solitaire than poker.

Cuban Stagnation

This dismal scenario is evident in the discourse in Havana and, as such, is doing nothing to mitigate hard-line attitudes in Washington. The reason is less Castro's opposition to *glasnost* and *perestroika* than his failure to show flexibility concerning blatant realities in Cuba itself. If a leader will not admit to evident failures at home—the way

the Chinese leadership has with their economy—why expect such admission in international relations?

A wide perception in Washington—and increasingly in Europe and Latin America—is that Cuban politics and economics have deteriorated to the stage where there is little space for diplomacy and bargaining.

A recent summary of a four-day retreat of some Cuban leaders discussed their answers to 423 questions (*Granma*, May 26, 1991). Two questions in particular—neither related to foreign policy per se—seem indicative of Cuba's ideological and decisionmaking stagnation. First, why hasn't agriculture responded to the needs of the popu-

lation? The leaders responded with a cliché; their explanation was that international "objective" and "conjunctural" factors combined with the lingering "negligencies and bad habits" of the working class to produce this disappointment. A more flexible and pragmatic elite would have gotten more realistic answers from listening to another question regarding the low level of productivity: why are these problems miraculously solved when the same worker offers his services privately on the black market? Predictably the leaders gave no answer.

Rather than attempting to find clues to US-Cuban relations in either irrationality or inconsistencies in the US stance, it might be more productive to view both sides as responding to 50 years of a very special (tutelary or imperialist, if you wish) relationship, followed by 32 years of revolution and hostility. The resulting set of relations and attitudes is *sui generis*.

What, then, is called for? First, it would seem, is to understand that nothing nationally, internationally, or within Cuba compels the US to cast its relationship with Cuba within a broader framework of pragmatism. Second, everything, nationally and internationally, compels Cuba to do just that. We may not know why Castro does not act more pragmatically, but there is no doubt that his failure to do so is the key to the current stalemate in US-Cuban relations. ■

Hemisphere welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be typed double-spaced, and are subject to editing for clarity and length.

Please address letters to: The Deputy Editor, Hemisphere, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199; FAX (305) 348-3593.

Free Trade and the Caribbean

by *Winston H. Griffith*

Caribbean industries such as garments, electronics, and data-processing—which the region's governments regard as crucial to its economic development—are the most likely losers in the creation of a North American trade bloc. Such industries are essentially labor-intensive assembly operations. They are dominated by US firms that have located plants in the Caribbean to avail themselves of its inexpensive labor force in order to enhance their international competitiveness. With the formation of a North American trade bloc, however, and the consequent removal of tariffs on Mexican products, many multinational assembly operations will relocate to Mexico, where labor is even less expensive than in most of the Caribbean.

The Balance Sheet

Wage rates in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and a few eastern Caribbean islands may well be competitive with the wage rate of Mexico. Nevertheless, the economic infrastructure of these Caribbean countries is much inferior to Mexico's, whose transportation and communication systems are well integrated with those of the US. What is more, Mexico is closer to the US than any Caribbean country, a particular advantage for head offices that prefer to closely moni-

Winston H. Griffith is associate professor of economics at Bucknell University. His recent publications include "CARICOM Countries and Appropriate Technology," World Development (June 1990).

tor production. In addition, the US government may encourage its country's firms that seek inexpensive, unskilled labor to locate in Mexico, based on the argument that doing so will help to reduce the flow of illegal Mexican migration to the US while boosting Mexican demand for US exports.

Mexico will out-compete the Caribbean not only for unskilled assembly jobs, but also for high-tech skilled jobs.

Though Caribbean countries will probably lose manufacturing investment to Mexico, some observers predict that the region will capture a significant amount of offshore data-processing activities. The reason, they say, is that Spanish-speaking Mexico cannot compete in this sphere with the English-speaking Caribbean. Arguably, however, this assertion exaggerates Mexico's disadvantages. Rising demand for English-language fluency in Mexico—which will occur with the formation of a North American trade zone—will likely lead to an increased supply of English-speaking Mexicans.

Not only will Mexico attract assembly operations and unskilled jobs, but based on its relative advantages in economic infrastructure, it will attract high-technology operations and skilled jobs as well. Ac-

cording to Kay R. Witmore, chair of Eastman Kodak, Mexico's infrastructure is "more or less up to Western-world economic capabilities" (*Financier*, September 1990). He adds that, when Eastman Kodak decided to establish a plant in Mexico, it hired Mexicans to build the factory, and that Mexican business managers are fully competitive with their US counterparts. Furthermore, Mexico's pool of high-technology labor for such enterprises is much larger, as well as less expensive, than the Caribbean's. While Caribbean islands tend to have well-educated work forces, they cannot compete with Mexico's in the realm of large-scale, high-technology management and production.

Caribbean Strategy

Caribbean governments assert that the flow of direct foreign investment into their manufacturing sectors is vital to the economic growth and development of their countries. Insofar as their competitive edge in the world economy is based on low wages, however, the gap is widening between the development of local economic infrastructure and the needs of foreign manufacturing investors. Governments such as those of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have introduced policies to reduce the rate of wage growth and thus enhance their attractiveness to such investors. Even if these policies do prove successful in the short run, the long-run problem is that low-wage, low-productivity countries cannot compete with high-wage, high-productivity countries.

The reason for this problem is that high productivity—based on advanced technology and skilled

labor—offsets the disadvantage of high wages by reducing per unit labor costs. Thus, although wages are several times lower in the Caribbean than in the US, the latter's manufactured products tend to be more price competitive. Given Mexico's advantages over the Caribbean in advanced industry—including skilled labor in greater numbers and at lower cost—a North American trade bloc would lead US firms to transfer many of their high-technology operations not to the Caribbean but to Mexico. East Asian firms might also bypass the Caribbean to establish operations in Mexico, as a point of entry into the US and Canadian markets.

The Caribbean would be left, therefore, to compete with Mexico and the rest of the Third World for low-technology, low-skill activities by continually reducing wages and increasing other costly incentives to foreign investors. There lurks another competitor as well: technological innovation in developed countries, which threatens to displace low-wage export manufacturing in the Third World.

What are the implications for Caribbean agriculture? Though agriculture has fallen in absolute and relative importance to the Caribbean economy as a whole, it continues to generate substantial employment and foreign exchange. In view of the decline of the region's traditional mainstays, sugar and bananas, Caribbean governments have been trying to diversify their agricultural exports. They have done so by taking advantage of the Caribbean Basin Initiative to supply the US market with nontraditional fruits and vegetables, particularly during the winter.

The Caribbean, however, is already losing in its competition with Central and South American agriculture, and unless a North American free-trade accord excludes agricultural products, the Caribbean will also be pitted against Mexico. Moreover, if there are no restrictions on agricultural trade, some California farmers may find it worthwhile to transfer their operations to Mexico when they come to face water restrictions at home. In any case, the US may be more inclined to buy from Mexico than from the Caribbean, given that US purchases will strengthen the Mexican economy, increase its demand for US products, and possibly help to reduce the flow of illegal Mexican immigration.

Unlike manufacturing and agriculture, tourism in Caribbean countries such as Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands will probably be unaffected by a North American free-trade area. In Caribbean countries where tourism is a major economic contributor, governments need to ensure that tourism remains internationally competitive. In addition, they should do whatever possible to maximize linkages between tourism and the economy's other sectors.

Entrepreneurial Alternatives

If a North American free-trade agreement reduces the flow of foreign manufacturing investment into much of the Caribbean, the region's chronic unemployment will be aggravated. Resolving the unemployment problem through conventional macroeconomic tools may be beyond the ability of Caribbean governments. Since the un-

employed must strive to attain the most basic necessities, we can expect that they will create their own employment opportunities. What activities they will engage in, however, cannot be said for sure. In any case, some of this self-generated activity can help lay the foundation for a broadened and reinvigorated entrepreneurial class.

As such a class emerges, Caribbean governments must be prepared to assist its members to progress beyond the low end of production. Despite a significant amount of garment-sewing in the Caribbean, few local entrepreneurs have so progressed. In direct contrast stand the newly industrialized countries of Asia, where entrepreneurs who began at the low end of the production chain have commonly advanced—with substantial state support—to the high end. Indeed, even if the Caribbean should prove successful in attracting foreign manufacturing investment, Asian evidence points to the state's role in nurturing such a domestic entrepreneurial class as crucial to translating foreign investment into sustained local development.

The potential losses to Caribbean countries from the formation of a North American free-trade area may force regional leaders to deepen and broaden the Caribbean integration movement. So far, this movement had not moved beyond the level of a customs union, and involves only the former British colonies. Not that a deepened and broadened regional bloc will, by itself, solve the economic problems of the Caribbean. Nevertheless, it may mitigate some of the adverse consequences of a North American free-trade agreement. ■

Mexico: Campesinos and Coffee


by Luis Hernández and David Bray

In the fall of 1990 a ship filled with Brazilian coffee arrived at Veracruz, Mexico. There was nothing in Mexico's new import regulations, aggressively streamlined in a unilateral rush to promote a free-trade agreement with the US, to stop its entry. Somebody in the Mexican bureaucracy got nervous, however, and the ship was not allowed to unload.

Brazilian coffee is just one of the many threats to Mexico's small coffee farmers. The collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in July 1989, the subsequent dive in world coffee prices, a severe freeze in December 1989, and the accelerating privatization of the *Instituto Mexicano de Café* (INMECAFE) have combined to drive small coffee farmers into liberalized markets loaded with debt.

Mexico's small coffee growers are not enthusiastic about privatization, yet some of their organizations, particularly affiliates of the *Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafeteleras* (CNOOC), are ready to accept its challenges. What they need, however, are the means to find a competitive niche in the international market. Coffee is Mexico's third largest generator of foreign exchange, and an estimated 2 million rural Mexicans—mostly Indian and poor—live off its production. For them, privatization

Luis Hernández is the coordinator for Servicios de Apoyo Local al Desarrollo de Base, A.C., in Mexico City. David Bray is the foundation representative for Mexico with the Inter-American Foundation. The views presented in this article are not necessarily those of these institutions.



means they must swiftly master the intricacies of international trade. They must come to grasp what happens to their coffee once it leaves their farm gates, and learn to do whatever is possible to influence that process.

Intervention: Top-Down

The privatization of INMECAFE, one of many state enterprises being shed in the neoliberal campaign of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, dramatically changes the market context in which small coffee producers operate. Founded in 1958 as a technical assistance and research agency, INMECAFE expanded in the mid-1970s as one of the populist initiatives of the Luis Echevarría administration.

Prior to INMECAFE, marketing was monopolized by coffee czars such as the notorious Justo Fer-

nández of Veracruz, who commanded a huge network that bought coffee berries dirt-cheap from unschooled *campesinos* living days from the nearest road. In the mid-1970s INMECAFE began to stretch its wings to address this issue under the direction of Fausto Cantú Peña. On the international front, Cantú Peña sought Third World solidarity in commodity markets, even considering a possible alliance of coffee-producing nations with OPEC. In Mexico INMECAFE actively intervened in the production and marketing of coffee, organizing small coffee producers to receive credit and technical assistance. It also marketed their crops for them, freeing many of the small farmers from the grip of *coyotes*, the Mexican term for exploitative intermediaries. Cantú Peña himself fell victim to what he has called "sexennial cannibalism"—the corruption

associated with Mexico's six-year presidential terms—spending four years in *Reclusorio Norte* prison on charges of corruption. Despite this setback, INMECAFE continued to expand. By the harvest cycle of 1980-81, INMECAFE controlled 40% of Mexico's coffee exports, including the majority of the *campesinos'* production.

During the 1980s, however, the hostility of the large exporters and shifts in state policy caused INMECAFE's fortunes to decline. By the end of the decade its percentage of Mexico's coffee exports had plunged to less than 10%. Most tellingly, the vast majority of its small-farmer clientele had come to regard INMECAFE as just another *coyote*, while marketing losses had inflated its debt to some \$57 million. An internal report defined its operations as "highly inefficient, oversized, with little internal control." Although the *desincorporación* (the government's euphemism for privatization) of INMECAFE was slated to take place over three to five years, the organization's rapid accumulation of debt has led the government to accelerate the process to a matter of months.

Intervention: Bottom-Up

The disappearance of INMECAFE, accompanied by the destabilization of the world coffee market, is profoundly changing relations between the state, the market, and small coffee producers. In this context, CNOC has emerged as the major response of the autonomous *campesino* organizations. CNOC, which claims to have 20 affiliated organizations and nearly 50,000 members, is struggling to learn how to manage all aspects of coffee production, marketing, and exporting. It is also striving to maintain participatory dynamics in its member organizations, a challenge no private exporters have to address.

CNOC is based on organizational efforts at the grassroots level in various states, principally Chiapas, Guerrero, and Veracruz,



Top: Coffee harvesting in Chiltoyac, Veracruz. Bottom: Coffee processing at El Castillo plant near Jalapa, Veracruz (Photos by Anne Ternes)

since the late 1970s. Activist extension agents, priests, and students spread throughout the countryside during the 1970s, trying to reinvigorate Mexican democracy and to encourage grassroots economic initiatives. For coffee-producing *campesinos*, INMECAFE's pricing

policies and services provoked protests as well as organizing campaigns. Regional organizations such as the *Unión de Uniones de Ejidos* in Chiapas and the *Unión de Productores del Café* in Veracruz formed in the early 1980s around these issues. In 1982 the *Unión de*

Productores mobilized 10,000 coffee producers for a series of demonstrations capped by an occupation of the INMECAFE offices.

Rural organizational traditions permitted these groups to mobilize forces rapidly, enter into confrontations audaciously, and negotiate short-term gains. Nevertheless, they did not help in the methodical, long-term task of building a sustainable organization. Not until the late 1980s did the most advanced groups begin to carry out locally controlled rural development programs. These involved alternative health care, services for women, road construction, and provision of electricity, which complemented basic efforts to take direct control of the production and marketing of coffee.

In 1988 these regional organizations began to form a national network around their common concern with coffee. A meeting of coffee producers at the *Universidad Autónoma de Chapingo* in October 1988 led to the first negotiations between INMECAFE and a representative group of producers speaking as a national organization. In July 1989 the first national meeting of coffee organizations was held in Lachivizá, Oaxaca, which resulted in the signing of the *Convenio de Unidad y Acción* by 25 organizations in six Mexican states. In the same month, CNOC opened an office in Mexico City.

The nascent national organization was immediately shaken by the rupture of the International Coffee Agreement in July 1989 and the consequent downward slide of coffee prices. These events shoved CNOC into a struggle on multiple fronts: to improve the quality and marketing of its product; to gain legitimacy with the Mexican government; and to consolidate democratic organizations.

In CNOC's second national meeting, held in Chiltoyac, Veracruz, in October 1989, the organization articulated three lines of action: producer participation in decisionmaking on the restruc-

turing and *desincorporación* of INMECAFE; use of a trust fund collected from a tax on coffee exports (now called *Fideicomiso del Café* [FIDECAFE]) to support the collection and marketing of coffee; and the establishment by CNOC of a national exporting firm working on behalf of small coffee farmers. In January 1991 CNOC directly exported coffee produced by its members, following the example of the several regional organizations that had been exporting for several years. Later that year, CNOC began to market its own brand of toasted coffee, Aztec Harvests, in the US. Several of the affiliated organizations have been expanding production in organic coffee, looking for new market niches and ecologically sound production techniques.

In spite of CNOC's major strides, the task it faces could well prove overpowering. For example, it appears that FIDECAFE will become just another line of credit, out of reach for most small farmers. Moreover, though the Salinas government has announced plans to turn over INMECAFE's infrastructure to the *campesino* organizations, it refuses to confront the issue that most concerns them: their debts, or the fact that most of INMECAFE's coffee-processing plants are too large for the *campesino* organizations to manage. In the meantime, most small coffee producers remain, at best, ineffectively organized. Undoubtedly it is the small growers who will be the biggest losers in the privatization of Mexico's coffee industry. ■



Debt, Environment, Development, Human Rights, Technology, Agriculture and Economics . . .

Third World Quarterly has established a unique reputation over the past decade as the leading policy journal on contemporary Third World affairs.

Third World Quarterly lends an unmatched critical perspective on global problems and provides an analysis of important issues concerning the Asia/Pacific region, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East.

Third World Quarterly is published in January, April, July and October. Each issue runs to approximately 300 pages, over 80 of which are devoted to literature and book reviews - both fiction and non-fiction.

Past contributors have included:

Morris J. Blachman	Yasser Arafat	Rudiger Dornbusch
Kenneth Sharpe	Farouq Kaddoumi	Ibrahim F I Shihata
Louis René Beres	James Petras	Ali A Mazrui
Peter Flynn	Mahathir Mohamad	Haleh Afshar
Oliver Tambo	Guy Martin	Riordan Roett
Walden Bello	James Dinkerley	Feroz Ahmad
James Painter	Raul Alfonsin	Arturo Valenzuela
Laurence Harris	Barnett R Rubin	George Joffe
Carolina G Hernandez	Claudia Wright	Yezid Sayigh
Naseer Aruri	Robert C Johansen	Lionel Cliffe
Chibli Mallat		Shridath Ramphal
Nader Entessar	Alan Garcia Pérez	Sheldon W Simon

Price \$34.00/£23 p.a.

Subscription: Send your order to:
Circulation Manager, Third World Quarterly, Rex House,
1st Floor, 4-12 Lower Regent Street, London SW1Y 4PE

Boom, Bust, and Chicle

by *Andres Oppenheimer*


For many decades, Uaxactún, a jungle village in the heart of Guatemala's tropical forest, had only one source of income: its people sold chicle from the area's trees to major US chewing-gum companies. In recent years, however, a shift to synthetic gum by manufacturers has brought havoc to Uaxactún and nearby hamlets. "Things are not what they used to be," lamented José Mendoza Enríquez, 74, who began extracting chicle for the Chicago-based Wrigley Company more than 20 years ago. "When Wrigley left, the world came to a sudden end for us."

This remote village about 375 miles north of Guatemala City once had a landing strip where cargo planes from the capital came several times a month to pick up the gum shipments. There also was a general store. The Aviateca airline office in the village had a radio transmitter, which residents could use to seek help in emergencies. At one point, there was even talk of bringing electricity, water, and perhaps a telephone line to Uaxactún.

Today, Uaxactún's main links to civilization are gone. The village consists mainly of two rows of wooden shacks divided by an empty grass field that was once the airstrip. The general store has been converted into a town hall. The radio transmitter has disappeared—nobody knows how or where. The dirt road to the nearest town, Tikal, is flooded most of the year.

Andres Oppenheimer, a member of Hemisphere's editorial advisory board, is a Latin America correspondent for the Miami Herald.

About 125 families live in Uaxactún, many of them immigrants from even more remote jungle villages that also were hurt by the gum crisis. Some continue extracting chicle for a Japanese chewing-gum firm. Many have switched to marijuana cultivation to make a living.



A government worker who recently established a forest conservation outpost in a neighboring zone said the place "looked like a cemetery" when he arrived. "There were about 60 shacks, which were abandoned or destroyed," he said. "Some of the people had migrated south to Uaxactún, others had gone north to Mexico."

The *chicleros*—as the men who climb the trees to extract gum are known—have long been the most respected men in their communities. To get the chicle, they have to go deep in the jungle during the rainy season, when the acrazapota tree produces the most sap, defying torrential rains and snakes. Then they transport the chicle on mule back to the nearest town—often a three or four-day trip through the jungle.

There are an estimated 2,000 *chicleros* left in Guatemala's Petén

region, down from more than 10,000 two decades ago, officials say. Guatemala's chicle exports have dropped from 5 million pounds in the 1930s to about 950,000 pounds in 1990. Virtually all of Guatemala's chicle exports go to Japan. Companies there are sticking to natural materials to produce a "gourmet gum" that is more expensive but tastes better than the synthetic one, Guatemalan officials say.

A spokesman for Wrigley says the firm switched to synthetic gum in 1981. "The price of chicle got to such a high level that it became prohibitive for us to use it," he said.

Guatemalan forest officials are hoping to boost chicle sales in Japan and Europe, banking on the world trend toward natural foods. They say the *chicleros* are the best guarantee to stop the destruction of Guatemala's tropical forest by lumber companies and squatters who torch trees to clear land for their crops. "The *chiclero* cuts the tree, but doesn't kill it," said Santiago Billy, an official with the Guatemalan government's natural resources agency CONAMA. "He knows the tree will recover in five years, and that he will be able to use it again then."

But in Uaxactún, few expect the good old days of "La Wrigley," as the company was known here, to come back. "Nobody comes here anymore," said Mendoza Enríquez, the old-time *chiclero* who now runs a 47-man crew extracting chicle in Uaxactún. "This place is doomed." ■

Editor's Note: Adapted with permission from an article published in the Miami Herald (December 4, 1990).

Bush Administration Trade Policy

by Julius L. Katz

President George Bush's speech of June 27, 1990, laid out an ambitious long-term program for trade liberalization in the hemisphere. Over the months since the speech, we [the Bush administration] have been consulting with members of Congress, business, labor, and other interested groups in the US, and with the Latin American nations concerned, to begin the process of implementing the Initiative. We have reached some preliminary conclusions about our basic approach and developed criteria for implementing the policy.

Implementing the Initiative

Our approach has five main tenets. First, the US remains committed to the multilateral trading system. The success of the Uruguay Round is of the utmost importance to our free-trade initiatives in the hemisphere. The US cannot be the only market for Latin America, and outwardly oriented, competitive economic policies are the best guarantee of continuing growth and development. The Uruguay Round must also be the venue for dealing with the agricultural Gordian knot, which certainly cannot be solved in the Western Hemisphere alone. We anticipate that a failure of the Round would lead to an atmosphere far more conducive to protectionist and unilateral solutions and more skeptical of trade liberalization.

Second, the proposed negotiations on a free-trade agreement

Julius L. Katz is the deputy US trade representative.

(FTA) with Mexico and Canada will come first. Mexico is by far our largest trading partner in Latin America, and a close neighbor with which we share many economic interests. As Bush stated in announcing the participation of Canada in the North American free-trade negotiations, such an agreement would be "a dramatic first step toward the realization of a hemispheric free trade zone." We would expect that whatever innovations in form or scope of a FTA that we develop in the North American free-trade process would be carried over to the later Enterprise for the Americas agreements as well.

The US cannot be the only market for Latin America, and outwardly oriented policies are the best guarantee of regional development.

Third, we are proceeding to conclude framework agreements on trade and investment with those countries and groups of countries that wish to work toward freer trade in the hemisphere. In fact, we began the trade liberalization process with Mexico in 1987 with the signing of just such a framework agreement. Completion of a framework agreement with a country or group of countries does not imply that the US will be proposing

free-trade negotiations with such countries immediately, but it does establish a channel to explore various trade liberalization options and promote the Enterprise for the Americas vision.

Fourth, and perhaps least appreciated, we see the creation of a free-trade area for the hemisphere as taking many years and stretching into the next decade. The commitment to open markets completely and on a reciprocal basis is a difficult one for any government to make. We know there will be many complications in negotiating such arrangements between the US and other countries in the hemisphere. As we explore possible opportunities and consider approaches, we believe it is essential to maintain a close consultative relationship with Congress.

Fifth, we should be prepared to negotiate with individual countries and in particular with groups of Latin American or Caribbean countries that associated to remove trade barriers among themselves. President Bush made this point in his June 27, 1990, speech. "... [T]he US stands ready to enter into free trade agreements with other markets in Latin America and the Caribbean—particularly with groups of countries that have associated for purposes of trade liberalization."

From the US perspective, negotiating with an integrated, fully open market created by a number of contiguous countries is attractive because it will provide us with access to a larger market and move us towards regional integration. This does not rule out concluding bilateral agreements where these are appropriate (e.g., Chile). Bilateral agreements can be a model

and incentive for other countries to undertake needed reforms. Our overall objective remains to encourage countries in this hemisphere to increase trade among ourselves and reduce barriers to subregional trade as part of the overall process of promoting free trade throughout the hemisphere.

Indicators of Readiness

Regarding the timing and pace of negotiations, a variety of economic and political factors will affect our recommendations. Again, I want to emphasize that any decisions to proceed will not be taken without consultations with Congress and, in particular, with the members of this committee.

To be a realistic candidate, a country or countries must have the institutional capacity to fulfill the long-term, serious commitments involved, and the economic policies required for the success of the FTA. In particular, we would expect that a prospective partner be committed to a stable macroeconomic environment and market-oriented policies before negotiations begin.

Another aspect of readiness is a country's commitment to the multi-lateral trading system. We have been clear that we will only negotiate agreements fully consistent with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

To ensure this linkage between GATT and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, we will look to see that our prospective FTA partners have demonstrated progress in achieving open trade regimes and that they are members in good standing of GATT. Such a policy will also be helpful in assuring our nonregional trading partners that the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is in their interest as well. ■

Editor's Note: Edited excerpts of testimony before the Committee on Finance, US Senate, April 24, 1991.



FLACSO / CHILE

Area de Relaciones Internacionales y Militares

BRIDGES OVER THE TURBULENCE

Latin American Political Concertation in the 80's
by **Alicia Frohmann**

The eighties were not just a "lost decade" in the development of Latin America. This was also the decade of the region's redemocratization and of the creation of new mechanisms of political dialogue and consensus, such as those which gave birth to Contadora and to the Group of Eight (or Rio Group).

The development of these novel ways of dealing with regional politics was a slow, gradual process, which involved learning from past experiences and establishing mutual trust. Both the process of concertation, expressed through the achievement of political consensus, as well as the process of integration, which seeks opening up markets and establishing mutually complementary economies, mature at a slow pace, following an almost biological rhythm after the initial impulse. This book deals with the various phases of the Latin American concertation process during the eighties, the successive challenges which had to be confronted, as well as the achievements and limitations which became manifest throughout the years.



Send your order to **FLACSO / CASILLA 3213 / CORREO CENTRAL / SANTIAGO / CHILE**

cono sur

CONO SUR is published by the area of International Relations and Military Affairs of the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, FLACSO-Chile. It is oriented towards the analysis of issues affecting Latin American international relations, especially those concerning relations with the United States and the region. The views are presented from a Latin American perspective, with an interdisciplinary focus and the aim of promoting a peaceful coexistence and promoting a better understanding among nations.

CONO SUR is published six times a year and has provided an important link among members of the academic world, professionals, government officials, politicians, student and union leaders, members of the armed forces and the church in Latin America. This journal attempts to reach not only specialists in international relations, but also makers of public opinion and government decisions, who need a global perspective on issues concerning the external links of the region. The contributors to **CONO SUR** are specialists on the issues covered and come from regional, U.S., and European research centers, universities, international agencies and governments.

The director of **CONO SUR** is Augusto Varas and the editor is Alicia Frohmann. The board of directors consists of Pilar Armanet, Sergio Bitar, Fernando Bustamante, Robert Devlin, Joaquín Fernando, Jorge Heine, José Miguel Insulza, Luis Maira, Carlos Eduardo Mena, Emilio Meneses, Francisco Orrego, Francisco Rojas Aravena, Luciano Tomassini, Manfred Wilhelmy and Boris Yopo.

Annual subscription: **AMERICA LATINA US\$ 10** (air mail US\$ 2) **U.S., CANADA AND OTHER COUNTRIES US\$ 20** (air mail US\$ 5).
Send your check to **FLACSO / CASILLA 3213 / CORREO CENTRAL / SANTIAGO / CHILE**

Cuba's Military Quandary

by Anne-Marie O'Connor

The Cuban military has quietly retired more than 200 officers from a force with strong ties to a war hero executed by firing squad in 1989 on cocaine trafficking charges. Some believe the retirements were the most recent purge of officers linked to Major General Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez, who was executed with three other officers. Ochoa enjoyed tremendous popularity among many officers of the so-called *Ejército Occidental*—Cuba's most powerful military force—which he commanded.

Some also speculated that the charismatic 57-year-old general could have become a threat to Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Rumors that he and other officers were bidding for power persist in Havana. "They're getting rid of everything that smells of Ochoa," said a mid-level Cuban government official related to a recently ousted colonel.

"It appears to have been a purge," a European diplomat said. "The same has not happened in any of Cuba's other armies." No revolutionary general alive more personified the image of the romantic, dashing "*internacionalista*" than Ochoa, who Castro honored as a "Hero of the Cuban Republic" in 1984. In 1987-88 Ochoa commanded Cuban forces assisting Angola's Marxist regime in its civil war against US and South African-backed rebels. That is why the retirements in the *Ejército Occidental* attracted so much diplomatic attention, particularly since they ap-

peared to mainly affect officers who had served in Africa.

In July 1990 Cuba's state-run *Radio Rebelde* reported that more than 100 officers from the *Ejército Occidental* were retired. According to *Radio Rebelde*, in January 1991 another group of officers was retired, 70% of whom had served abroad. It mentioned that 109 distinguished service medals were passed out, indicating that at least that number of officers left army life.

An overriding concern is sustaining Cuba's enormous military machine.

In the opinion of one Latin American diplomat, military cut-backs are to be expected with the end of the Angola conflict, particularly since the Cuban military was greatly expanded in the 1970s and 1980s to play a role in that conflict. That does not, however, explain why the cuts are being made in only one sector. "It's probable that there were people tied to Ochoa among them," said the diplomat, who represents a country that has friendly relations with Cuba. "Ochoa had top commands in Angola and Ethiopia for a long time, and strong loyalties form under such circumstances. He galvanized the discontent of a certain group of officers, and his credentials—as a hero of the revolution and a mili-

tary commander—were very good. Ochoa was a threat to power, and Fidel is power."

The announcement of the retirements followed an intriguing editorial in the June 1990 issue of *Bastión*, the Cuban army's official magazine. The article concerned an internal review of "general problems of military discipline in the armed forces." It also promised to "expose" deficiencies within the ranks, and that these shortcomings would be "identified with names and surnames, which will facilitate measures for eradicating them."

Supporters Remain

Even Castro's close allies were shocked by the court-martial and executions of Ochoa and the three other officers, the biggest domestic scandal since the 1959 revolution. There are still supporters of the Cuban revolution who privately defend Ochoa, claiming he was not involved in drug trafficking for personal gain. "He did it all for the *Ejército Occidental*—so they could live better, and have things like tape players and televisions," said one government official who knew Ochoa personally. "The revolution only addresses people's spiritual needs, but they have material needs as well."

Eliminating Ochoa and other potential challenges within the military is only one of Castro's concerns. An overriding concern is sustaining the enormous Cuban military machine. Several problems are already quite apparent.

Like many US Vietnam veterans, Cuban soldier Víctor Puentes was frustrated and bitter at his fate when he completed his combat tour in Angola. Puentes, 24, volun-

Anne-Marie O'Connor is a Latin America and Caribbean correspondent for *Cox Newspapers*.

teered for duty in Angola in 1987 because he thought it would help him overcome a bad high school record that left him only two career choices: the police or the military. When he was wounded by rebel shelling and decorated, he was certain he would attain his goal: admission to the Havana university program that would train him in government administration.

Dashed Dreams

Puentes's dream began to crumble during the three months he spent in a mental hospital for treatment for shell shock. "We were all doped up. They gave me modeling clay to play with, as if I was some kind of a nut. I just threw mine at the wall," he said. When he returned to Cuba in 1989, he was again offered a common path for poor students: a job as a policeman. Dispirited, Puentes now works occasional construction jobs.

Puentes, like more than half of the Cuban troops who served, is black. He believes his treatment is a symptom of racial prejudice. "This is not fair," he fumes, sitting in his sparse room in a colonial multifamily dwelling on a narrow Havana street. "They say racism was eradicated by the revolution, but this shows it still exists."

Other Angola veterans contentedly accept the high pay and perks offered to the corps of privileged hard hats building tourist hotels and the sports complex for the summer 1991 Pan American games. It beats life as a cop or a farm worker. Luis Angel García, a member of the elite Blas Roca construction brigade, makes as much in salary as some senior government officials by building Spanish-financed tourist hotels. He does not enjoy the same fringe benefits, like a car or roomy apartment. Even so, he does not share other veterans' frustrations. "I'm a complete revolutionary," García said, "and I stand by everything (Cuban leader Fidel) Castro says. If the Yankees invade, I will grab a gun

and fight." Another Blas Roca member, Nicolás Leiva, 29, said service in Angola was "a true school of life" that deepened his commitment to the revolution.

Francisco Díaz, a 38-year-old cab driver and Angola veteran of another generation, said veterans who complain today are too young to know the difficulties of life in the first years of the revolution and understand the advances that have been made. "They had it easy in Angola. They gave them tape players, music, good food, and nice places to stay," said Díaz, shaking his head. "It was a true sacrifice for the troops when I was there. These kids are spoiled."

These personal accounts reflect the story at the level of the average Cuban citizen: it is a complex situation with mixed emotions that makes prediction difficult. The macroeconomic realities, however, are more severe and will surely have an impact on the military.

A Step Backward

As Cuba struggles to cope with changes in the communist world,

it is facing another challenge at home—finding jobs for the thousands of Angola veterans who have returned to a country beset by severe economic crisis and drastically reduced opportunities for nearly everyone. Cuban economic planners are grappling furiously with the backlash caused by the switch to free-market trade by former socialist allies. Thousands of workers have been laid off from state entities that are to be reduced by as much as 80%, and diminished Soviet oil shipments have forced factory closures.

"The two principal problems in Cuba are the youth and the military," said a European diplomat. "They take people returning from Angola and put them to work in agriculture. Cutting (sugar) cane far away from home isn't exactly what a captain had in mind, especially after a privileged life as an officer with a driver and assistants. It is a very serious problem, not because it could foment a civil war, but because it forms a very large base of social pressure at a time when industries are closing factories to save petroleum." ■

The *first* teachers' guide to explore Latin America and the Caribbean from a global perspective

Latin America and the Caribbean from a Global Perspective

A Resource Guide for Teachers

Pedro R. Bermúdez and Bárbara C. Cruz

This ten-part resource guide is a self-contained series of lessons on Latin America and the Caribbean based on the Hanvey model of global awareness. The lessons focus upon economic development, human rights, immigration issues, the role of women, and environmental concerns.

Price: \$21.00

To order, please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199. (305) 348-2894; FAX (305) 348-3593.

Democratic Transitions?

by Terry L. McCoy


Suriname and Guyana share the same ambiguous condition: they are *in* South America but not *of* it. With populations of only 360,000 and 750,000 respectively, these two nations are the smallest on the continent, and their histories have rendered them even more marginal. They are the creations of Dutch and British colonialism respectively, and are populated largely by the descendants of African slaves and indentured Asians imported as plantation laborers. Independence came in 1966 for Guyana, nine years later for Suriname.

Political developments in Suriname and Guyana in the late 1970s and most of the 1980s also ran counter to what was happening elsewhere in South America. Instead of moving toward democracy, they headed in the opposite direction. Suriname fell to military rule, while Guyana stagnated under a one-party regime. By the late 1980s political openings appeared in both countries. Liberalization continues, but functioning democracies are not assured.

Suriname

Of the two, Suriname's transition to democracy has been the more problematic. Its armed forces seized power on Christmas Eve of 1990. Although they promised to hold elections within 100 days, skepticism regarding their real

Terry L. McCoy is a political scientist and director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. He has written extensively on the Caribbean.



character and intentions was well deserved since they had issued similar pronouncements in August 1980. At that time the army and its leader—Sergeant Dési Bouterse—overthrew the government, promising to end feuding and corruption and to return Suriname quickly to civilian hands. Instead Bouterse assumed the presidency and presided over seven years of political repression and economic mismanagement, the latter being carried out under the banner of Third World socialism. During the holidays of Christmas 1982 the regime apprehended, tortured, and then murdered 15 of its opponents.

The people of Suriname responded to the Christmas massacre, the deteriorating economic situation, and a Maroon rebellion in the interior by leaving in large numbers. International attention, and pressure, was not long in coming. The Dutch, who had quietly supported Bouterse's takeover, suspended their large development aid package in 1984, while Washington expressed its unhappiness over

Bouterse's warm relations with Cuba and Libya. The alleged ties of the regime to cocaine trafficking also aggravated relations with the US. In the face of a growing Cuban presence on the South American continent, both Venezuela and Brazil joined the diplomatic campaign against Bouterse. The escalating external pressure, plus Bouterse's delusion that he was in fact popular, led him to hold an election at the end of 1987. The organization formed to promote his candidacy—the New Democratic Party—was soundly defeated by the New Front, a coalition of traditional ethnic parties.

Despite losing the election, Bouterse retained much of his power, and the civilian government that was inaugurated in January 1988 was forced to name him commander of the armed forces. Bouterse proceeded to undercut the badly divided civilian authorities at every turn and to intimidate the civilian population. When the ruling New Front rejected his call in late 1990 to incorporate the

armed forces into the cabinet, Bouterse mobilized his troops to remove the constitutional government.

Guyana

The news from neighboring Guyana is somewhat more encouraging, in spite of the country's tenuous history of democracy. Since independence, Guyana has been locked in the suffocating embrace of the People's National Congress (PNC). Forbes Burnham's PNC came to power with covert assistance from the US and Britain, both of whom feared another electoral victory by

fair vote since the East Indians hold numerical superiority over the Creoles represented by the PNC. But the opposition and Guyanese in exile have been effective in mobilizing external pressure on the government to take the final steps toward elections. A breakthrough occurred when Hoyte agreed to a visit by former US president Jimmy Carter in October 1990. Asked to serve as an international observer, Carter insisted on a firsthand examination of the electoral system.

The Hoyte government's agreement to undertake the two reforms recommended by Carter—a house-

by Prime Minister George Price of Belize, helped clear the remaining obstacles to acceptable elections in the fall of 1991.

Point of Departure

Suriname and Guyana are both at critical points in their political development. Elections do not guarantee good government, but without them the two countries are guaranteed the continuation of bad governments. International concern and pressure have been instrumental in moving Guyana toward genuinely meaningful elections for the first time in its history.

utiny was likewise deciding the armed forces of to honor its pronouncements. Held on May ey returned Suriname ale. The international must now insist that officials be given the govern, an essential step synchronization of local crenents with regional transitions. ■

Hemisphere

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Provoking debate on the region's problems, initiatives and achievements . . .

Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Hemisphere

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Provoking debate on the region's problems, initiatives and achievements . . .

Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

House

sulta
ng House (MACH)
wide since 1969.

Mexican books
ations.
ervices for

odical book

13-319, Delegación
15) 674-05-67 and

Democratic Transitions?


by Terry L. McCoy

Suriname and Guyana share the same ambiguous condition: they are *in* South America but not *of* it. With populations of only 360,000 and 750,000 respectively, these two nations are the smallest on the continent, and their histories have rendered them even more marginal. The creations of Dutch and British colonialism respectively, and related largely by the descent of African slaves and Indian Asians imported as plantation laborers. Independence came in 1966 for Guyana, nine years later for Suriname.

Political developments in Suriname and Guyana in the 1980s and most of the 1990s are counter to what was happening elsewhere in South America. Instead of moving toward democracy, they headed in the opposite direction. Suriname fell to military rule while Guyana stagnated under a one-party regime. By the late 1990s, political openings appear in both countries. Liberalization continues, but functioning democracies are not assured.

Suriname

Of the two, Suriname's transition to democracy has been the most problematic. Its armed forces seized power on Christmas Eve, 1990. Although they promised to hold elections within 100 days, skepticism regarding the



Subscribe now to *Hemisphere!*

- 1 Year (3 Issues): \$20 US, Canada, PR, USVI \$27 elsewhere
 2 Years (6 Issues): \$36 US, Canada, PR, USVI \$50 elsewhere

 Name

 Address

 City/State/Province/Zip

 Country

Please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Hemisphere
 Latin American and Caribbean Center
 Florida International University
 Miami, FL 33199

Subscribe now to *Hemisphere!*

- 1 Year (3 Issues): \$20 US, Canada, PR, USVI \$27 elsewhere
 2 Years (6 Issues): \$36 US, Canada, PR, USVI \$50 elsewhere

 Name

 Address

 City/State/Province/Zip

 Country

Please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Hemisphere
 Latin American and Caribbean Center
 Florida International University
 Miami, FL 33199

Terry L. McCoy is a political scientist and director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. He has written extensively on the Caribbean.

armed forces into the cabinet, Bouterse mobilized his troops to remove the constitutional government.

Guyana

The news from neighboring Guyana is somewhat more encouraging, in spite of the country's tenuous history of democracy. Since independence, Guyana has been locked in the suffocating embrace of the People's National Congress (PNC). Forbes Burnham's PNC came to power with covert assistance from the US and Britain, both of whom feared another electoral victory by Cheddi Jagan, the Marxist leader of Guyana's East Indians. Ironically it was Burnham who led Guyana down a radical path, declaring it a "cooperative socialist republic" and establishing warm relations with the socialist bloc. Operating behind a thin façade of parliamentary democracy, Burnham resorted to intimidation, gerrymandering, and electoral fraud to keep himself and the PNC in power.

When Burnham died in 1984, he was succeeded by his first vice president and prime minister, Hugh Desmond Hoyte. The country Hoyte inherited has continued to decline economically. The real per capita income of Guyana is lower in 1991 than it was in 1960. The capital city of Georgetown is in a state of advanced physical decay with crumbling buildings, frequent power outages, and endemic street crime. Tens of thousands of Guyanese have emigrated, settling in the US and Canada. In desperate need of international assistance, Hoyte moderated the policies of his predecessor, adopting more market-oriented economic policies and liberalizing the political climate.

Yet the Hoyte government resisted the free and fair elections demanded by opposition politicians, who pointed out that Hoyte's mandate rested on the rigged elections of 1985. It was assumed that electoral opponent Jagan would win a

fair vote since the East Indians hold numerical superiority over the Creoles represented by the PNC. But the opposition and Guyanese in exile have been effective in mobilizing external pressure on the government to take the final steps toward elections. A breakthrough occurred when Hoyte agreed to a visit by former US president Jimmy Carter in October 1990. Asked to serve as an international observer, Carter insisted on a firsthand examination of the electoral system.

The Hoyte government's agreement to undertake the two reforms recommended by Carter—a house-to-house voter enumeration to update registration lists and the counting of ballots at the polling place instead of at a central location—gave hope that the way had finally been cleared for national elections acceptable to all parties. Though the government subsequently appeared to maneuver to scuttle the possibility of honest elections, a second international mission in March and April 1991, led

by Prime Minister George Price of Belize, helped clear the remaining obstacles to acceptable elections in the fall of 1991.

Point of Departure

Suriname and Guyana are both at critical points in their political development. Elections do not guarantee good government, but without them the two countries are guaranteed the continuation of bad governments. International concern and pressure have been instrumental in moving Guyana toward genuinely meaningful elections for the first time in its history. Outside scrutiny was likewise decisive in forcing the armed forces of Suriname to honor its pronouncement on elections. Held on May 25, 1991, they returned Suriname to civilian rule. The international community must now insist that the elected officials be given the power to govern, an essential step toward the synchronization of local political currents with regional democratic transitions. ■



Mexican Academic Clearing House (MACH)

Materiales Académicos de Consulta
Hispanoamericana/Mexican Academic Clearing House (MACH)
has been exporting library materials worldwide since 1969.

- *MACH* sells single and multiple copies of Mexican books and serials, including government publications.
- *MACH* handles selective blanket order services for academic libraries.
- *MACH* gives free referral service and periodical book lists.

Write for further information to MACH, Apartado Postal 13-319, Delegación Benito Juárez, 03500 México, D.F. Telephone numbers (915) 674-05-67 and (915) 674-07-79. Fax number (915) 673-62-09.

Insider briefs on people and institutions shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Abortion Follow-Up

On the heels of the state of Chiapas's decision to legalize abortion in December 1990, another Mexican state is debating the legalization of abortion. Officials in the state of Quintana Roo recently introduced a new abortion law that was opposed, not surprisingly, by the Catholic Church and the right-wing *Partido Acción Nacional*. An unexpected objection came, however, from the leftist *Partido de Revolución Democrática* (PRD). According to the *Latin American Weekly Report* (March 21, 1991), the PRD joined the conservative anti-abortion coalition out of fears that the new law would not prevent veterinarians from issuing the medical certificate required as a prerequisite for an abortion.

Caribbean AIDS

"AIDS in the Caribbean," published in *Courier* (March-April 1991), surveys the impact of, and attitudes toward, AIDS in the English-speaking Caribbean. The author, Elizabeth White, points out the general population's hesitance to use condoms as protection against the spread of the disease. According to White, "... it is still common to hear a man or woman say that they will now use a condom with their 'outside man/woman' but that they are reluctant to use one with their 'main man/woman' as this would indicate to their partner that they have an outside relationship or that they suspect that their partner has one."

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg

Fidel: "Just Say No"

Readers across the US are receiving a flyer advertising a new publication: the "End of the Cuban Connection." Nothing unusual about that, except that it isn't from Random House, Harper & Row, or even the Council on Drug Abuse. It's from Havana's José Martí Publishing House. The publication is the Cuban government's explanation of the trial and execution of much-decorated General Arnaldo Ochoa—a "hero of the revolution," no less—who was implicated in narcotics trafficking by Fidel Castro himself. The flyer declares that Castro has been "extremely puritanical" about drugs, and goes on to paint the Cuban leader as the original "just say no" kind of guy. "Fidel gets high on revolution, Cuban rum and his own rhetoric," claims the circular, leaving readers to wonder if the items are in the right order.

There's No Place like Home

Even as the number of rafters leaving Cuba and safely arriving in South Florida has catapulted from 467 in all of 1990 to more than 1,000 so far during 1991, some rafters are trying to return to Cuba. One rafter, who survived the Florida Straits crossing in May 1990, is jobless and sleeps in a friend's 1981 Chevrolet. The refugee told the *Miami Herald* (June 14, 1991), "I've applied for jobs everywhere, but no one calls. There's nothing. I won't steal, so I prefer to go back to Cuba." A father, who arrived by raft in April 1990, and his son, who arrived a month later, are both jobless and facing eviction

from their Hialeah, Florida, apartment. The father told the *Herald* (June 15, 1991), "To be exploited, to live poorly and barely get by, I can do that in my own land and with my family."

Sweet Exports

The *Banco Central* of Nicaragua is now publishing the monthly *Nicaragua Economic Report*. According to the inaugural edition (March 1991), the publication provides "a window on events and activities in both the public and private sectors which are transforming the economic system of our nation." What are the agents of the economy's transformation? The *Report* observes that melons will be the first Nicaraguan export to the US since 1985. More than 1,200 acres of honeydew and cantaloupe were scheduled to be exported to the US market in the late spring of 1991.

Spring Cleaning

Built in Mexico in 1933, the 18th of March refinery accounted for about 7% of the country's oil refining capacity. But it also accounted for about 88,000 tons of contaminants into the city's thin, smog-choked air. To illustrate his commitment to fighting air pollution, Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari ordered an immediate shutdown of the refinery on March 18, 1991. His next target will be the city's 40,000 taxis, all of which will be fitted with catalytic converters in the next two years.

Terminator

The Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) has published a critique of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (April 17, 1991). The critique asserts that NED needs closer oversight from Congress because of the organization's inability to provide systematic and thorough reviews of its grantees. According to COHA, NED has "conducted backdoor operations" and uses a "secretive manner." COHA's solution? It endorsed a bill (H.R. 117) filed by Representative Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) that mandates the "termination" of NED to avoid wasting taxpayer dollars "on a leftover dinosaur from the past days of the evil empire."

Hernán Cortez, by Oliver Stone

Movie director Oliver Stone has tapped US actor Willem Dafoe as the star for his new film project on Hernán Cortez, the Spanish conquistador. The new project will be supported by the government of Mexico and the *Comisión Nacional* of Spain, and is one of 12 cinema projects being sponsored by the *Sociedad Estatal* of Spain.

El Puma

From Caracas, popular singer José Luis Rodríguez ("El Puma") has announced a new campaign to promote US tourism in Latin America. Known as "Go South America," the campaign will feature El Puma himself as the program's spokesman.

¿No hay huevos rancheros?

Responding to changing demographics in the US, McDonald's is now adding breakfast burritos and chicken fajitas to its fast-food menu. According to one fast-food market research firm, restaurant sales of Mexican food grew at a compounded rate of 8.6% during the late 1980s, or about four times as fast as the sale of hamburgers. Taco Bell is leading the Mexican fast-food charge. The company's sales grew by 19% in 1990.

All that Jazz and More

Michel Camilo, a jazz pianist born in the Dominican Republic, is receiving rave reviews for his latest album, *On the Other Hand* (Epic Records). Trained at the National Conservatory of the Dominican Republic and later at the Juilliard and Manes schools of music, Camilo was first noticed while he was playing in saxophonist Paquito D'Rivera's band in the early 1980s. Perhaps better known in Europe than in the US, Camilo blends Caribbean rhythms into his contemporary jazz compositions. The musician's buoyant sound is fast becoming a trademark of the new Latin jazz.

Strange Bedfellows?

One of the hottest applied research projects in Latin America has recently been completed in Bogotá, Colombia. Titled "Bogotá Needs Red Light Districts," the \$150,000-study found there are

14,211 female prostitutes and 1,087 brothels in a 900-square block area of downtown Bogotá. A truly interdisciplinary team—sociologists, psychologists, and prostitutes—conducted the actual research. The project was commissioned by the city's button-down chamber of commerce, whose president, Mario Suárez Melo, told one US reporter (*The Miami Herald*, July 8, 1991) that "Bogotá is an immense red light district" that needs to be regulated.

On the Move

Robert Kurz, formerly on the staff of Congressmen Michael Barnes and Richard Gephardt, has been appointed to the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the Committee on Government Operations of the US House of Representatives.

Ramón Daubon has been named program representative for the Ford Foundation in Santiago, Chile. Daubon, who received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pittsburgh, worked with the Inter-American Foundation as representative for Chile and Argentina in 1981-85. Prior to his appointment, he was vice president for the National Puerto Rican Coalition in Washington.

Donna Hrinak, formerly deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Honduras and political counselor at the US embassy in Venezuela, has been named deputy assistant secretary of state for the Caribbean and Mexico.

Corrupt to the Core

by Mario Diament

Against a backdrop of debt crisis, capital flight, and growing poverty, the burden of corruption weighs heavily upon the lives of Latin Americans

The downfall of Antonio Ermán González in January 1991—Argentina's third minister of the economy since Carlos Menem assumed the presidency a year and a half before—was caused by more than one circumstance. Undoubtedly, however, the main cause was corruption. Precipitating Ermán González's resignation was the disclosure of US Ambassador Terence Todman's letter to him on December 10, 1990, complaining that the US-based Swift-Armour company was being pressured by Argentine government officials for payoffs to expedite imports of necessary machinery. The person who offered to be the intermediary for that transaction was President Menem's brother-in-law and advisor, Emir Yoma.

Menem's immediate reaction to Todman's letter was to accuse the executives of Swift-Armour—and indirectly Ambassador Todman—of orchestrating a campaign to discredit Argentina. When the US Department of State confirmed the letter's contents, Menem replied that "the State Department is more preoccupied with what is happening in Argentina than with what is

happening in the US, where corruption cases are really alarming."

Menem was correct in his assessment of the magnitude of corruption in the US. He was wrong, though, in comparing it with corruption in Argentina and, by extension, with corruption in Latin America. In the case of the US, corruption exists within the system; whereas in the case of Argentina and Latin America, corruption is the system.

*In the case of the US,
corruption exists
within the system.*

*In the case of Latin
America, corruption is
the system.*

The distinction is not merely semantic. It refers to the more fundamental issue of the differences that exist between the work ethic and the mentality of Latin Americans and North Americans. Some

recent cases of corruption in the US, such as the savings-and-loan situation, involve billions of dollars with long-lasting and disastrous consequences. Five prestigious US senators, including a former presidential candidate, have been investigated because of their ties with at least one delinquent savings-and-loan, and no less than President George Bush's son, Neil, has been indicted because of his role in another.

This, however, is a case of corruption within the system. As despicable as the case is, the system's foundations remain intact, thus enabling it to purge itself. Even though corrupt government officials, police officers, and judges exist, their presence constitutes an exception and not the rule. Moreover, the US system displays not only the strict separation of powers, but also a widespread moral conviction regarding duty, responsibility, and obedience to law and order. This separation of powers and moral conviction ensure that the US system can outlive and transcend its own perversions.

On the other hand, corruption in Latin America is not merely a social deviation, it is a way of life. Abuse of power is so naturally incorporated into society that to modify it would require major surgery on a national level. In Latin America, then, the system is unable to

Mario Diament, an Argentine playwright and journalist, is a columnist with El Nuevo Herald in Miami.

purge itself from its perversions because they are precisely the foundation upon which it is built.

Corruption is not just an Argentine phenomenon. In Venezuela they call it *tajada*; in Mexico, *mordida*; in Peru, *pagos*; and in Argentina, *coima*. Each country coins corruption differently, but the principle is everywhere the same. In Venezuela, for example, the situation has gone so far that the first volume of a *Diccionario de la corrupción, 1959-1979* was recently published in Caracas. The volume presents 60 leading cases of government corruption in alphabetical order. (Volume two will be published shortly.) And in Mexico, where an estimated 80% of all businesses and individuals are tax evaders, only two cases of tax evasion were prosecuted by federal authorities between 1921 and 1988.

In Latin America, the individual and the law are so blatantly estranged from one another that judicial pronouncements are looked upon as acts of whim or convenience rather than expressions of justice. If Latin Americans are quizzical about the law, it is because their daily life is a necessary concatenation of violations.

The primary reason for this condition is not the widely held belief that Latin Americans are by nature anarchic. It is, rather, the abusive and wanton manner in which those in power have historically applied the law: as an instrument for exercising their power rather than for carrying out justice. It is thus no surprise that the maxim, "*hecha la ley, hecha la trampa*" ("where there is a law, there is a trap") seems to have taken hold as the first amendment of Latin America's unspoken constitution.

Latin Americans have an ontological sense that the shortest distance between two points is not necessarily a straight line. In order to accomplish any sort of transaction, the first step is to find a friend, then a well-positioned person who takes bribes. Only then can the transaction relevantly proceed. The bribe, therefore, is the price of participating in a system where all negotiations are controlled by the powerful.

Latin Americans have an ontological sense that the shortest distance between two points is not necessarily a straight line. In order to accomplish any sort of transaction, the first step is to find a friend, then a well-positioned person who takes bribes.

Latin Americans are so immersed in corruption—large and small, official and personal—that they have become desensitized to its numerous manifestations. The police officers who rob or the judges who take bribes are no

longer outcasts of the system: they are the system. Latin Americans have become so convinced that these day-to-day immoralities are indispensable for survival in the jungle that they fail to see their own role in sustaining it.

The Maradona Affair

The case of international soccer star Diego Maradona exemplifies the dangers and perfidies natural to such a jungle. It illustrates the subtle ways in which an apparently insignificant episode may be used to cover up a corruption scandal implicating top government officials and members of a president's immediate family.

The life of Diego Armando Maradona is the classic tale of the rise and fall of a pop culture hero. The oldest of an illiterate peon's seven children, Maradona parlayed his breathtaking skills on the soccer field into an escape from the wretched poverty of metropolitan Buenos Aires. As a mere 16-year-old, *El Pibe de Oro* ("the Golden Boy") galvanized the public's emotion during Argentina's victory over Hungary. Later he rocketed to fortune, signing with Barcelona for a world-record \$10 million. In one play during the 1986 World Cup he danced around six British defenders, scoring a goal for the textbooks. A player without peer, he then led Naples to three consecutive championships.

This is the Maradona who dazzled the world. The Maradona who chartered a plane to jet his friends from Rome to Buenos Aires for his million-dollar wedding. Whose charisma led President Menem to name him sports ambassador of Argentina.

Then came the fall. First there were discipline problems in the Naples team and rumors of a dissolute life. Then there was a confrontation with João Havelange, president of the International Soccer Federation. In March 1991 the Italian Soccer Federation announced the suspension of Maradona for 15 months after tests indicated recent drug use. Finally, on April 26, Maradona was arrested while using cocaine with two childhood friends in a ramshackle Buenos Aires apartment.

The media shifted from the glorious image of Maradona's outstretched arms accepting a championship trophy to the tragedy and disgrace of the hero's drug-dilated pupils. The international press labeled Maradona the "fallen angel." Yet something seems amiss in this story—a curious temporal progression, a bothersome chain of events that leads one to look beyond the personal tragedy of Maradona to the wider political context of Argentina in crisis. For instance, was it by chance that the police raided the apartment where Maradona happened to be using cocaine?

According to police sources, suspicion of narcotics trafficking had led the police to stake out the apartment for a week. Some initial versions indicate Maradona was apprehended there by coincidence. Yet later versions indicate that the *Superintendencia de Drogas Peligrosas de la Policía Federal* had been tracking Maradona for several days. A story in the Buenos Aires daily *Clarín* claims that agents of the US Drug Enforcement Administration participated in the operation.

Why would the Argentine police—overwhelmed as they have been by a crime wave that oppresses Buenos Aires, as well as by many major cases of corruption involving entrepreneurs, politicians, television stars, and government bureaucrats—devote precious time and resources to tracking and arresting a national hero for the rela-

tively minor crime of personal drug use? After all, Maradona did not appear to have been involved in drug trafficking. His behavior, while carrying stiff punishment under Argentine law, was no threat to society; the primary victim of his behavior was Maradona himself. Anyone reasonably familiar with Argentina knows that the Maradona drug bust was highly unusual, that

Something seems amiss in the Maradona story, a bothersome chain of events that leads one to look beyond the personal tragedy of Maradona to the wider political context of Argentina in crisis.

the striking violation of various unwritten codes raises more questions than it answers. For instance, it is customary that in a typical police case involving a celebrity, decisions are transferred to higher levels of authority, and can even be handled by the president himself. This means that, if the police had encountered Maradona unexpectedly, they would have done everything in their power to remove him from the scene without calling attention to his presence.

What happened, however, was just the opposite: the police detained Maradona *after* calling the press. Clearly they sought the wid-

est publicity possible. Why? Who stood to gain from a publicity coup of this magnitude? Is it just coincidence that as Maradona was being arrested for cocaine use, a major scandal stemming from the alleged participation of members of President Menem's own family in a narcotics trafficking operation came under investigation by the Spanish ministry of justice? New evidence was appearing daily regarding Argentina's transformation into a haven for the laundering of drug money, and Washington was pressuring the Menem government to take a serious stand against narco-traffickers.

These problems seemed to reach a peak during the very week Maradona was taken into custody. First, on April 19, the minister of economy, Domingo Cavallo, had to postpone a trip to the US and Europe in the face of growing criticism over Argentina's lack of action against narco-traffickers. On the 20th the influential newspaper *La Nación* featured a headline proclaiming that there was "Growing Official Concern about Drug Trafficking," and reported that the US government was pressuring the Menem administration to permit Argentina's armed forces to participate in a campaign against narco-traffickers. On the 25th the *Wall Street Journal* published an article entitled "Drugs: The Argentine Connection," which provoked great concern among Argentine authorities in light of the *Journal's* international prestige. On the 26th the police arrested Maradona.

Surely the "Golden Boy" was taken by surprise. He was accused to hard play. But this was a different kind of game, and he didn't know the rules. ■

Editor's Note: Extracted from two columns (February 7 and May 2, 1991) of El Nuevo Herald.

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)



Fuente de la India, Havana.

**Cuba in the 1850s
Through the Lens of
Charles DeForest Fredricks**

Robert M. Levine

"Previously unpublished, these photographs document a turning point in Cuban life, as the island was on the verge of social, economic, and technological modernity. . . . This intriguing little album will delight both students of Latin American history and photography buffs."—*Booklist*

University of South Florida Press
Cloth \$22.95

**Jamaican Sayings
With Notes on Folklore,
Aesthetics, & Social Control**

G. Llewellyn Watson

"A rich and compelling collection that will make a significant contribution to the study of Jamaican/West Indian/black folklore and culture."—Daryl Cumber Dance, Virginia Commonwealth University

Florida A & M University Press
January 272 pp. 6 X 9 Cloth \$29.95

Conchtown USA

Bahamian Fisherfolk in Riviera Beach, Florida
Photographs and Text by Charles C. Foster

Folk Songs and Tales collected by Veronica Huss

"The combination of folklore, oral history, and photographs makes this a work of interest to general readers and scholars alike."—Stetson Kennedy

Florida Atlantic University Press
April 160 pp. 8 1/2 X 11 Paper \$24.95

**Amphibians and Reptiles
of the West Indies**

Descriptions, Distributions, & Natural History
Albert Schwartz and Robert W. Henderson

"A definitive synopsis of West Indian herpetofauna."

—George R. Zug, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution

University of Florida Press
May 740 pp. 7 X 10 Cloth \$75.00

New from University Presses of Florida

**U.S. Policy in Central America
The Endless Debate**

Dario Moreno

"An excellent analysis of the evolution of U.S. Central American policies under the Carter and Reagan administrations that exposes the roles played by competing strategic visions and bureaucratic interest groups in shaping two of the most dramatic failures in recent U.S. foreign policy."—Andrew A. Reding, World Policy Institute

Florida International University Press
Cloth \$26.95 Paper \$14.95

**Central America and the Middle East
The Internationalization of the Crises**

Edited by *Damián J. Fernández*

"This valuable contribution addresses a neglected dimension of the current crisis and goes far to explain why Central American conflict has been so hard to resolve."


—G. Pope Atkins, U.S. Naval Academy

Florida International University Press
Cloth \$26.95 Paper \$15.95

**The Libro de las profecías
of Christopher Columbus**

An en face editon

Translation and commentary by
Delno C. West and August Kling



"Perhaps the most important single volume on Columbus ever published in English. . . . The authors' classification of Columbus's piety as 'evangelical' will be controversial, but is exactly right. He was as cosmopolitan in his piety as in his cosmography."—Leonard Sweet, president, Union Theological Seminary

University of Florida Press
May 288 pp. 8 1/2 x 11 Cloth \$49.95

Through your local full-service bookseller, or direct from: University Presses of Florida, 15 N.W. 15th St., Gainesville, Florida 32611. 904-392-1351. Include \$3.00 (UPS) or \$2.00 (bookpost) shipping for the first book, \$.50 for each additional book. Florida residents add 6% sales tax to book price.

The Israeli-Colombian Connection

by Allan Metz

The story of retired Israeli military figures training Colombian drug couriers and coordinating weapons sales reads like a spy thriller complete with exotic locations in the Caribbean and Central America. Drug cartels, weapons, killings, and a complex trail of money traced through Latin American and US bank accounts are all part of the sordid activities of retired colonel Yair Klein and his Hod Hahanit ("Spearhead Ltd.") security company. A major story in the Israeli media since accusations were first raised in 1989, revelations of Spearhead's activities in training Colombian drug paramilitary forces were followed by charges that the colonel also coordinated arms sales between Israel and the notorious Medellín drug cartel. As a screen for these activities, Klein used sales to the Caribbean nation of Antigua.

These accusations were examined in detail by Senator William Roth's (R-DE) Investigations Subcommittee based on testimony, bank records, and other documentation. The subcommittee concluded that the Klein case is a classic illustration of the worldwide arms trade and its criminal connections.

Transnational Web

The subcommittee investigation provided further clarification of the secretive money trail and con-

Allan Metz is assistant professor and assistant subject specialist for Latin America at the University Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

clusively dispelled Klein's claims that he had no involvement in arms trading and that the Antiguan government paid for them. The Senate hearings disclosed that Klein paid the Israeli Military Industries (IMI), a branch of the foreign ministry, for the arms via a complex series of financial transactions whose source was the "Spearhead Ltd." account in a Panamanian

The nexus involves drug cartels, weapons, killings, and a complex international trail of money.

bank. Since the Panamanian government did not cooperate with the Senate investigation, the issue of whether the money in Klein's account in Panama was deposited there by Colombian drug figures is still unresolved. Nonetheless, the Senate report concluded, "in spite of our lack of access to relevant foreign bank records . . . , the money for the Antiguan weapons shipment probably came from the same source where the weapons eventually ended up—Rodríguez Gacha of the Medellín cartel."

Besides the Panamanian bank account, another connection to Panama was made in the Senate report. On February 13, 1989, \$100,000 was paid into the Bank Hapoalim account of IMI's Miami representative—Brigadier General

Pinchas Shahar—by Colonel Eduardo Herrera Hassan, a Panamanian leader who at that time was involved in the movement to oust then strongman General Manuel Noriega. It is generally known that a paramilitary school Klein and Maurice Sarfati—an Israeli citizen resident in Antigua since 1983—had intended to establish in Antigua was to have been involved in training forces to overthrow Noriega.

By early 1989 it had already been established that Klein had trained drug gangs in Colombia and he eventually went to trial in Israel. According to Klein's attorney Yigal Shapira: "It's not as if he committed a murder or anything This is like a contractor who builds without a license. We are talking about a two to five-month suspended sentence." At the sentencing hearing on January 3, 1991, however, the judge thought otherwise. Klein received a one-year suspended sentence, three years probation, and a fine of \$75,000 from the Jerusalem Magistrates Court for the export of military expertise without proper licensing. In her decision, Judge Miriam Bernstein also noted the great harm done by Klein to Israel's reputation and the conduct of its foreign relations.

Colombian officials took a much dimmer view of Klein's activities. They linked Klein and Spearhead to the training of the cartel's paramilitary to perform assassinations, massacres, bombings, and other acts of terrorism. They claim Klein's training contributed to the assassination of Colombian presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán on August 18, 1989, and the bombing of a commercial airliner

in November 1989, which killed 117 people. General Miguel Maza Márquez, director of the *Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad* (a Colombian equivalent to the FBI), charged in a February 1990 press conference that Klein was "the person who has done the most damage to Colombia . . . (and) who trained these people in the making of bombs and is responsible for this aggression." Almost a year later, Colombian foreign minister Luis Fernando Jaramillo Correa protested Klein's lenient sentence: "We are seeing how the judicial systems of other countries are quite tolerant of actions which flagrantly

Corruption in Colombia

A recent UN study demonstrated that, taken on a worldwide basis, the costs of corruption committed by public employees was ten times greater than the costs of illegal acts committed by common criminals.

The case is certainly proven in Colombia. In fact, in Colombia the problem is so huge that no one knows what to do about it. The most recent study on criminality in Colombia indicates that, while all crimes were growing at an annual rate of 39.7%, those described as committed by public employees were growing by 164.1%. Despite this skyrocketing rate, there are few convictions. The one thing everyone agrees with, therefore, is that something has to be done, and the sooner the better. The rate of administrative corruption has reached such heights that coverage on corruption takes up more space in the local press than coverage on terrorism.

During the first eight days in March 1991, public opinion was exposed to what seemed like an inexhaustible list of crimes and irregularities committed by Colombian administrators. The public attorney's office was investigating 29 parliamentarians and 1,261 customs officials for possible unlawful enrichment, and indicated it had also sanctioned 507 members of the armed forces. The reality is that our court system, our various comptrollers, state prosecutors, and other fiscal agencies cannot handle the magnitude of complaints and accusations. Between 1988 and 1990 the *Administración de Impuestos Nacionales* fired 102 and suspended another 151 employees. In the *Instituto de Seguros Sociales* the number of firings and suspensions already reached 40 during the first two months of 1991. The nation's attorney general, which is normally capable of handling 15,000 disciplinary cases per year, is currently handling 49,155 disciplinary processes. In the municipality of Bogotá, 2,000 employees are being investigated. Without doubt, the administrative crime of choice today is illicit enrichment. It is on this charge that 29 parliamentarians, 48 judges and magistrates, 65 directors of public municipal corporations, 68 directors of decentralized institutes, 72 members of the armed forces, 88 members of the national police, 92 popularly elected mayors, and 149 employees of the *Dirección General de Aduanas* are being investigated by the special investigations unit of the attorney general's office.

Corruption is a disease to which the country appears to have become accustomed. There is even talk now of an entrenched bureaucratic-administrative "cartel." Everyone agrees that an anticorruption drive can no longer be deferred. Only a month ago [February 1991], ex-president Carlos Lleras Restrepo, in an editorial in *Nueva Frontera* entitled "The Thieves," lambasted the multiple acts of theft and delinquency of duties. He described several cases representing losses to the treasury of more than 3 billion pesos. These included the falsification of titles of ownership in the Salinas housing project, the disappearance of ownership certificates from the *Caja de Vivienda Militar*, the stealing of jewels and money on deposit in the *Banco Popular* of Santa Marta, and the falsification of identity certificates of the *Banco Central*

Continued on page 27

Editor's Note: Edited version of an editorial appearing in Semana (Bogotá), March 12, 1991.

The Israeli-Colombian Connection

by Allan Metz

The story of retired Israeli military figures training Colombian drug couriers and coordinating weapons sales reads like a spy thriller complete with exotic locations in the Caribbean and Central America. Drug cartels, weapons, killings, and a complex trail of money traced through Latin American and US bank accounts are all part of the sordid activities of retired colonel Yair Klein and his Hod Hahanit ("Spearhead Ltd.") security company. A major story in the Israeli media since accusations were first raised in 1989, revelations of Spearhead's activities in training Colombian drug paramilitary forces were followed by charges that the colonel also coordinated arms sales between Israel and the notorious Medellín drug cartel. As a screen for these activities, Klein used sales to the Caribbean nation of Antigua.

These accusations were examined in detail by Senator William Roth's (R-DE) Investigations Subcommittee based on testimony, bank records, and other documentation. The subcommittee concluded that the Klein case is a classic illustration of the worldwide arms trade and its criminal connections.

Transnational Web

The subcommittee investigation provided further clarification of the secretive money trail and con-

Allan Metz is assistant professor and assistant subject specialist for Latin America at the University Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

clusively dispelled Klein's claims that he had no involvement in arms trading and that the Antiguan government paid for them. The Senate hearings disclosed that Klein paid the Israeli Military Industries (IMI), a branch of the foreign ministry, for the arms via a complex series of financial transactions whose source was the "Spearhead Ltd." account in a Panamanian

Pinchas Shahar—by Colonel Eduardo Herrera Hassan, a Panamanian leader who at that time was involved in the movement to oust then strongman General Manuel Noriega. It is generally known that a paramilitary school Klein and Maurice Sarfati—an Israeli citizen resident in Antigua since 1983—

The nexus involves drug cartels, weapons, killings, and a complex international trail of money.

bank. Since the Panamanian government did not cooperate with the Senate investigation, the issue of whether the money in Klein's account in Panama was deposited there by Colombian drug figures is still unresolved. Nonetheless, the Senate report concluded, "in spite of our lack of access to relevant foreign bank records . . . , the money for the Antiguan weapons shipment probably came from the same source where the weapons eventually ended up—Rodríguez Gacha of the Medellín cartel."

Besides the Panamanian bank account, another connection to Panama was made in the Senate report. On February 13, 1989, \$100,000 was paid into the Bank Hapoalim account of IMI's Miami representative—Brigadier General

in November 1989, which killed 117 people. General Miguel Maza Márquez, director of the *Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad* (a Colombian equivalent to the FBI), charged in a February 1990 press conference that Klein was "the person who has done the most damage to Colombia . . . (and) who trained these people in the making of bombs and is responsible for this aggression." Almost a year later, Colombian foreign minister Luis Fernando Jaramillo Correa protested Klein's lenient sentence: "We are seeing how the judicial systems of other countries are quite tolerant of actions which flagrantly violate international law and even the laws in those countries In any case, it is once again disappointing to see how justice operates in the rest of the world."

Even prior to this sentencing hearing in early 1991, however, most observers believed the Klein trial had come too late, and proved insufficient to soothe Colombia's intense anger at Israel's indirect role in narcoparamilitary outrages. For example, on June 9, 1989, then Colombian president Virgilio Barco Vargas made paramilitary training (which is what Klein had been involved in) a criminal offense punishable by prison terms of up to 20 years. Another blow to Israeli-Colombian relations was NBC news broadcast on August 22, 1989, of a Spearhead promotional videotape showing Klein training Colombian drug militias. The video was then repeated on the other major networks, creating a linkage in the public mind between Israel and the drug cartels. The publicity surrounding the broadcast thus proved to be a great embarrassment for Israel—a country that takes pride in portraying itself as a leader in the struggle against terrorism.

As for Klein, he was only too willing to cast aspersions on the Colombian government. On August 25, 1989, he declared: "I estimate that there is no organization in Colombia that is not linked to

Corruption in Colombia

A recent UN study demonstrated that, taken on a worldwide basis, the costs of corruption committed by public employees was ten times greater than the costs of illegal acts committed by common criminals.

The case is certainly proven in Colombia. In fact, in Colombia the problem is so huge that no one knows what to do about it. The most recent study on criminality in Colombia indicates that, while all crimes were growing at an annual rate of 39.7%, those described as committed by public employees were growing by 164.1%. Despite this skyrocketing rate, there are few convictions. The one thing everyone agrees with, therefore, is that something has to be done, and the sooner the better. The rate of administrative corruption has reached such heights that coverage on corruption takes up more space in the local press than coverage on terrorism.

During the first eight days in March 1991, public opinion was exposed to what seemed like an inexhaustible list of crimes and irregularities committed by Colombian administrators. The public attorney's office was investigating 29 parliamentarians and 1,261 customs officials for possible unlawful enrichment, and indicated it had also sanctioned 507 members of the armed forces. The reality is that our court system, our various comptrollers, state prosecutors, and other fiscal agencies cannot handle the magnitude of complaints and accusations. Between 1988 and 1990 the *Administración de Impuestos Nacionales* fired 102 and suspended another 151 employees. In the *Instituto de Seguros Sociales* the number of firings and suspensions already reached 40 during the first two months of 1991. The nation's attorney general, which is normally capable of handling 15,000 disciplinary cases per year, is currently handling 49,155 disciplinary processes. In the municipality of Bogotá, 2,000 employees are being investigated. Without doubt, the administrative crime of choice today is illicit enrichment. It is on this charge that 29 parliamentarians, 48 judges and magistrates, 65 directors of public municipal corporations, 68 directors of decentralized institutes, 72 members of the armed forces, 88 members of the national police, 92 popularly elected mayors, and 149 employees of the *Dirección General de Aduanas* are being investigated by the special investigations unit of the attorney general's office.

Corruption is a disease to which the country appears to have become accustomed. There is even talk now of an entrenched bureaucratic-administrative "cartel." Everyone agrees that an anticorruption drive can no longer be deferred. Only a month ago [February 1991], ex-president Carlos Lleras Restrepo, in an editorial in *Nueva Frontera* entitled "The Thieves," lambasted the multiple acts of theft and delinquency of duties. He described several cases representing losses to the treasury of more than 3 billion pesos. These included the falsification of titles of ownership in the Salinas housing project, the disappearance of ownership certificates from the *Caja de Vivienda Militar*, the stealing of jewels and money on deposit in the *Banco Popular* of Santa Marta, and the falsification of identity certificates of the *Banco Central*

Continued on page 27

Editor's Note: Edited version of an editorial appearing in Semana (Bogotá), March 12, 1991.

drugs, from the government downwards."

In a later development, on March 25, 1991, the Jerusalem District Court rejected a libel suit filed by Klein against Ron Ben-Yishai, a reporter for the Tel Aviv newspaper *Yediot Aharonot*. Ben-Yishai reported that Klein and his colleagues, four of whom are plaintiffs, had been "security instructors" for the Medellín cartel. The judge determined that Ben-Yishai had written in good faith and that his article was in the public interest. She also ruled favorably in the reporter's countersuit by awarding him a small amount in damages.

The US Senate subcommittee provided additional facts on the Israeli connection. It noted that Klein and his associates worked with paramilitary groups led by Rodríguez Gacha and the Medellín cartel. They described Israeli mercenary activities in Colombia as "a sordid tale of greed and intrigue" and related how Klein's firm gave three training courses that included basic infantry and weaponry instruction, defensive and body-guard techniques, and explosives detection. The Senate report further stated that: "Israeli embassy personnel knew Yair Klein was operating in Colombia, but no action was taken against him until after reports of his activities surfaced in the media Hopefully, Klein's subsequent criminal prosecution and conviction under Israeli law indicate that the Israeli government intends to monitor such activities more closely in the future."

This conclusion was also reached in the final report of the one-man Commission of Inquiry for Antigua and Barbuda. The author, British Queen Counsel, Louis Blom-Cooper, described the affair as a "wicked enterprise." While he did not believe the Israeli government had any knowledge the weapons were destined for Colombia, he did find that Israel had been negligent in its failure to exercise control over the IMI. The report

listed a number of aspects of the transaction for the sale and purchase of the guns and ammunition ". . . which showed a lack of care."

Although the focus of his inquiry was Antigua, Blom-Cooper did make some comments and recommendations regarding Israel. He suggested further investigation into and monitoring of Israeli citizens' actions abroad and also the establishment of a UN registry of end-user certificates. These proposals seem not only reasonable but necessary. There is a grey area involving the activities of these retired military officials as private citizens and their activities on behalf of government or industry. Many are employed in Israel's profitable arms export sector as dealers, trainers, and technical advisors to a number of Third World countries that seek Israel's technology and expertise.

For example, one of the key figures in the case, Brigadier General Pinchas Shahar, who served as a link between the IMI and Klein and his Spearhead, is currently in Israel. There he is employed by the Elul arms company, owned by Koor, the holding company of the Israeli labor federation. The Klein-Spearhead affair was not a total aberration; Klein and Shahar fit the common profile of the activist retired officer.

Have Guns, Will Travel

Klein describes himself as "an expert in war against terrorists and an expert in war against guerrillas I am brave and a little adventurous." With "ice-blue" eyes and closely cut hair, Klein fits the image of an Israeli military hero. He was born on a kibbutz, where many war heroes came from. Immediately following completion of technical school, Klein joined Company 890, the country's first elite paratroop unit. He led helicopter troops and "secret 'antiterrorist' operations." He fought in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and following retire-

ment in 1979 he started a restaurant and operated a service station. These pursuits proved to be too tame for Klein's restless spirit. He observed that "Some people like to knit. I like to help people defend themselves. I go in where the government can't go, where it can't allow its name to be used." Klein's Spearhead company sold clothes and hardware in the early 1980s to Beirut-based Christian Falangist militias and to the South Lebanon Army, a militia with ties to Israel located along the border between Israel and Lebanon. He later extended his operations to Latin America, including Guatemala and Colombia.

One can understand, therefore, the critical and timely nature of Blom-Cooper's point concerning the role of former Israeli military figures who are involved in selling weapons and military expertise to the highest bidder. This issue constitutes a national debate in Israel. In addition it raises questions about the Defense Ministry's responsibility to control the export of Israeli weaponry and military expertise, and how former Israeli military personnel like Klein became involved in such illegal activities. Israel has had a long-standing interest in selling its surplus military hardware to the Third World. Israel's two major parties, Likud and Labor, have long opposed the passage of laws that would allow the Knesset to control the sale of military exports and prohibit sales to certain nations. Israeli middlemen such as Klein have been successful in manipulating Israel's desire to maximize military exports—the main reason for Israel's indiscriminate weapons sales policy—to suit their own enterprises.

The government claims its arms trade is essential to support the country's strategic internal needs for manufacturing and developing arms. In the mid-1980s the arms trade accounted for some 25% of Israel's industrial exports.

Latin America became a significant Israeli market for war mate-

riel when the US terminated or reduced military sales to several governments accused of committing human rights violations. Official Israeli military sales to the Colombian government amount to hundreds of millions of dollars. Since 1986 the Israeli government has mandated that firms providing overseas military or security training apply for a license from the Defense Ministry for each project. This action was taken after the Iran-contra affair revealed that Israeli arms traders were involved in Oliver North's plan to sell weapons to Iran in order to raise funds for the contra war against the Sandinistas. According to the Defense Ministry, 800 Israelis and Israeli companies have received licenses to export weapons and technology. Israeli security officials admit, however, that it is much harder to monitor the export of ex-military men's expertise than to control weapons exports. For example, Israeli trainers have been linked to government repression of guerrillas in Guatemala and to security protection for the former Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega. Israel also had ties with Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza until his overthrow in 1979. This dubious record prompted the independent Israeli newspaper *Hadashot* to wonder in an editorial: "What are our boys doing in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and not just those places?"

New Twist

But the Klein-Spearhead case marks a departure from past activities. It is the first time Israelis have been charged with training narcotics armies. According to the Tel Aviv daily *Yediot Aharonot*, Israeli involvement with the drug militias is of great concern to Israeli government officials: "This time the issue is not aid to guerrilla groups, rebels or even fascist government(s), as was customary until now. Now it is Israeli merce-

Continued from page 25

Hipotecario. "The national treasury," he concluded, "has been a victim of thieves who deserve to be punished. Thieves and what thieves . . . never before has so much been stolen. Crime but also official indifference. Poor country!"

Experts identify the costs of corruption under four broad consequences. First, corruption destroys the efficiency of the state by squandering its resources and debilitating its actions against mismanagement. Such corruption can even lead to threats to the public health: for instance, shoddy construction, use of dated or tainted medicines, or the redirection of basic food stuffs from children's hostels to other uses—all known to have occurred recently in Colombia.

Second, corruption engenders an absurd distortion in the distribution of income by making the rich richer and the poor poorer. The poor get poorer, for instance, when public projects for the more disadvantaged parts of the population are either not completed or are completed at substandard levels because of corruption.

Third, the incentives of corruption are contrary to the development of the society: they spawn the insidious idea that it is easier to get rich by working for the state than by starting a private and productive business. This idea militates against the creation of new jobs. Half of the administrative positions of a certain rank are occupied by people nominated by political bosses, not by career bureaucrats.

Fourth, corruption incurs serious political costs: immorality, cynicism, institutional instability, and the legitimization of armed rebellion against the state. Colombia's most serious problem is the political system's lack of legitimacy among the masses. This problem stems from the widespread corruption, and it is illusory to think that constitutional reform will solve it.

How can we confront a problem of such magnitude? The first step requires the political will to put an end to the scourge, or at least to reduce it to manageable proportions. The will was shown when the presidency created the *Consejería de Moralización Administrativa*, even though there already are voices opposing it. An analogous system was used with complete success in Hong Kong, formerly one of the most corrupt spots on earth. There a commission of five people of impeccable credentials, invested with full powers to penetrate banking secrecy, tap telephones, intercept the mails, and trail suspects was successful. In Colombia the *Consejería* ought to be supported by the most modern investigatory technology, among these prosecutors with full powers, accountants, computer-assisted audits, electronic surveillance of financial transfers, and communications of various types.

But the crusade against corruption goes even further: the comptroller general has contracted *Fedesarrollo* to do the first study ever on the state of corruption in Colombia. To be completed by the end of 1991, it represents an attempt to diminish the trend of social decomposition.

Given the opening and internationalizing of Colombia's economy, corruption is a graver obstacle than is the inefficiency of the ports or the absence of railroads. In the final analysis, the discrediting of the governing classes is the most serious consequence of the high level of demoralization. ■

(Translated by Hemisphere staff)

naries who served in elite units and have agreed to serve the drug cartels for hundreds of thousands of dollars per person." Motti Amichai, an Israeli foreign ministry spokesman, declared that Klein's actions violated Israeli law and ran counter to Israeli policy, which is "strongly committed to the war on drugs." Israel has tough antidrug laws, and drugs are a cultural taboo. It is ironic, then, that allegations of Israeli involvement with drug traffickers coincide with Israel's considerable increase in drug abuse. Colombian intelligence officials, however, have expressed skepticism over the Israeli government's denials of knowledge about Klein's activities. According to an anonymous senior official: "The Israeli government would have to be very

foolish or very naive not to have known what was going on . . . And the Israelis are neither. But the truth is, as this shows, they will sell anything to anyone if the price is right."

Meanwhile, in Israel, the Klein-Spearhead incident received a mixed response among public officials. To Justice Minister Dan Meridor it represented a "serious injury to Israel's image, to the image of the [Israel Defense Forces]. It is important that it remains positive, of a patriotic army conducting a righteous war in a moral way." Foreign Minister Moshe Arens demonstrated similar indignation when he promised the government would "do everything in our power to enforce the law and prevent all aid by Israelis to

the drug cartel." According to Meir Amit, former director of Mossad, Israel's equivalent to the CIA: "The greatest damage is that, rather than being known as producers in agriculture, in genetics, in medicine, our trademark is now in the security business, whether it be weapons or support systems." Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, on the other hand, was not as categorical: "It's unpleasant to hear about Israelis involved in such ugly business, but there are Israelis all over the world doing things the state cannot be held responsible for." He was also quoted as saying: "I don't know if all the information, allegations, incriminations are true. I know our people. I know our officers. I cannot believe that they have been involved in such crimes . . ."

Ariel Sharon, who tends toward military solutions to most of Israel's problems, was even more equivocal. "Klein and his associates," he stated, "have already been judged. It's simply unbelievable. With our own hands we are making Israel responsible for the subject of drugs in Colombia." In reaction to Sharon's defense of Klein, Yossi Sarid, a leftist Knesset member of the Citizens' Rights Party and a major figure in the Israeli peace movement, was adamant: "A bluffer like Klein needs a lot of defending because his version of events concerning banana growers is itself a banana version—here and there soft, here and there rotten."

Klein's defense can be seen as disingenuous or cynical and perhaps even both. Even the benefit of hindsight, he says, may not have been sufficient to guarantee that his training was not utilized for criminal purposes. And if something did go awry, he protests it was because he was "an innocent abroad." He asks rhetorically: "Do you know any genuine fighters who are not naive? Yes, there was naïveté in this." And then, the ultimate attempt at personal vindication: ". . . it's also naive to think there is justice in the world." ■

Links

HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT



"Links provides the best overview I have seen of critical issues affecting the health of disadvantaged peoples. It is a must for anyone concerned with the links between health and social justice."

—David Werner,
author of *Where There Is No Doctor*

Subscription to **Links**:

\$12 for one year; \$25 institutions and foreign;
\$3 for individual copies

Send your name and address along with a check to:
Links, P.O. Box 202, New York NY 10276.

STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES ANNOUNCES

TWO NEW PUBLICATIONS ON THE CARIBBEAN

Publication No. 41 (\$25.00)
**Nova Scotia and the Fighting Maroons:
A Documentary History**

Guest Editor
Mavis C. Campbell

Preface and Acknowledgement
Introduction
A Documentary History
Notes
Appendix
Note on Author

To Order, indicate the number of copies for each issue, providing your name and address, and mail to the address below:

___ Publication No. 41 (\$25.00)
___ Publication No. 43 (\$25.00)

**Add \$2.00 for Postage/Handling
For Orders Under 10 Copies
ORDERS OVER 10 WILL BE SHIPPED UPS
AND BILLED ACCORDINGLY**

YOUR NAME _____

STREET ADDRESS _____

CITY _____

STATE/ZIP CODE _____

MAIL TO:

Studies in Third World Societies
Department of Anthropology
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, VA 23185
PHONE 804/221-1055/1056

Publication No. 43 (\$25.00)
**Resistance and Rebellion in Suriname:
Old and New**

Guest Editor
Gary Brana-Shute

Introduction
Gary Brana-Shute

The History of the Suriname Maroons
Wim Hoogbergen

Slave Religion in Suriname
Humphrey Lamur

Legal Resistance to Slavery in Eighteenth Century
Suriname
Rosemary Brana-Shute

The 'Usual Barbarity' of the Asians?
Indenture and Resistance in Suriname
Rosemarijn Hoefte

The Maroon Insurgency: Anthropological
Reflections on the Civil War in Suriname
H. U. E. Thoden Van Velzen

Suriname: Transcending Ethnic Politics the Hard
Way
Edward Dew

Old Shoes and Elephants: Electoral Resistance in
Suriname
Gary Brana-Shute

Preludes to the Exodus: Surinamers in the
Netherlands
Gert Oostindie

A Reluctant Embrace: Suriname's Idle Quest for
Independence
Peter Meel

Dissonance in Discourse: The Politics of Afro-
Surinamese Culture in Netherlands
Wilhelmina van Wetering

Calypso Politics

by Daisann McLane

The rhythms of music and politics are tightly synchronized in Caribbean societies such as Trinidad, as reflected in the calypso diplomacy of Abu Bakr's failed coup and its aftermath

When the rebel leader Yasin Abu Bakr and his followers captured Trinidad and Tobago's House of Parliament and broadcasting studios in an attempted coup in July 1990, one of the first things they did—after taking the prime minister and his cabinet hostage—was turn Trinidad's television station into calypso MTV. Until the authorities jammed their broadcasts, the rebel group Jamaat al Muslimeen ran continuous videos of politically aware calypso singers like David Rudder, Watchman, and Cro Cro in between Abu Bakr's running commentary. Abu Bakr's stint as revolutionary video host demonstrated what Trinidadians have long known: calypso (and *soca*, the modern multitrack studio version of this traditional music) is as important as politics in this lively, noisy, multiethnic Caribbean democracy.

Calypso Messages

Since Trinidad's independence from Britain in 1962, the messages of calypso have influenced the speeches of prime ministers and the decisions of judges, and calypso

Daisann McLane, a former calypso singer, is a free-lance writer on Latin American and Caribbean music.



records have helped parties win—and lose—elections. In using the music as a political tool, Abu Bakr was following a time-tested Trinidad formula (in fact, one of his advisers was a former calypso promoter).

Despite his "calypso diplomacy," Abu Bakr's revolution failed to attract popular support, and the attempted coup resulted in dozens of deaths, a wave of looting that de-

stroyed several blocks of the capital, and five months of martial law.

Abu Bakr, who is now in prison, may have failed in this purpose, but he helped revitalize the nation's music. This skipping, syncopated Caribbean pop has made some inroads in the US market, but in past years it has sounded as spent as the petrodollars that used to overflow from Trinidad's treasury.

Every year calypsonians write and record new songs timed to Carnival season. But because of the coup, releases in 1990-91 have had an added resonance: they try to make sense of it all by examining the economic and social issues that provoked the unrest. The songs of Carnival 1991 were equal parts psychic housecleaning, national catharsis, and political analysis. Indeed, for the non-Trinidadian, recent releases by Cro Cro, Watchman, Superblue, Black Stalin, and David Rudder provide a lively seminar on Caribbean history and current events—with a beat.

The biting antigovernment commentary of Cro Cro and Watchman often seems crude: both calypsonians refer in their songs to a reported incident during the July 1990 siege in which the rebels allegedly shoved a female minister's underpants down the prime minister's throat. But the rough language and barbed cynicism of both singers reflect post-coup public sentiment—a profound anger over

economic mismanagement and alleged corruption in the government of Prime Minister Arthur N. R. (Robbie) Robinson. There is also a certain sympathy for Abu Bakr's intentions, if not for his methods.

Cro Cro, one of the best lyricists of Trinidad's younger generation, presents an elegant, well-tooled argument that captures street-level opinion about Abu Bakr. His "Say a Prayer for Abu Bakr," delivered in a low-key tenor spiked with irony and softened with wit, demonstrates that the calypso form is one of the last repositories of English-language rhetoric in the 20th century: "In this democratic society/The coup was wrong without a doubt/If all o' you was so against Robbie/Why de hell didn't you vote him out?/But then again if you wait til election/Man might have had to start eating man/So don't blame Abu Bakr, don't fuss/Bakr did it for all of us."

The title of Watchman's top song of the 1991 Carnival season, "Attack with Full Force," is lifted from a statement issued by Robinson to the Trinidad military during his imprisonment by the rebels. But Watchman, a student leader at the University of the West Indies, turns the tables and takes the prime minister's order as a mandate to attack the Robinson administration. Watchman, still in his 20s, is the brashest and most critical voice in calypso today. (It was his video that Abu Bakr played on national TV in the early hours of the coup attempt.) And Watchman knows how to use symbolism to maximum effect: he performed "Attack" wearing the camouflage fatigues of the army special forces team that captured the rebels.

In Trinidad dissent in music is business as usual. During the six-week Carnival period, calypsonians speak the unspeakable—and politicians put up with it, perhaps because this ritual serves to diffuse discontent that might otherwise find more turbulent channels. As the calypsonian David Rudder explains: "Calypso helps keep our so-

ciety on an even keel. The songs become our violent acts. We kill each other with song."

Nevertheless, when it comes time for the state-sponsored Calypso Monarch competition, an annual event to select the best calypso composition, moderation rules. For the February 10, 1991, contest, which was nationally televised, Cro Cro censored his line about the infamous panties. And when the ballots were tallied, he and Watchman (who kept the underwear in) had been defeated by the calypso veteran Black Stalin, whose coup composition, "Look on the Bright Side," was a masterpiece of ambiguity. The song never explains whether the "bright side" is a return to normalcy or the hoped-for electoral defeat of Robinson.

Calypso helps keep our society on an even keel. The songs become our violent acts. We kill each other with song.

Stalin, a Rastafarian in his early 50s with waist-length dreadlocks and a gleeful, insinuating rasp, usually pitches his commentary to the left of center; a three-time Calypso Monarch, his is the voice of the Trinidadian working class. But this year, Stalin threw a curve. His other song of the season, "Black Man Feel to Party," bounced and "wined"—Trinidad slang for hip rotation—its way up the dance charts to become one of the season's top-three party tunes. Trinidad audiences delighted at the sight of the politically conscious Stalin hamstringing it up on stage as a rheumatic, middle-aged husband, urging his wife to come out and dance "like we used to do before the children come."

Less "Jam and Wine"

"Feel to Party," with its bubbly, scat-sung groove, is an example of the most important, and lasting, effect the coup has had on calypso. Over the last four years, the party records produced by Trinidad's calypso stars had come under increased fire for their musical predictability and repetitious "jam and wine" topics. But, after the traumatic experience of the coup attempt, Trinidadians seem to have lost patience with empty lyrics.

All the top dance-hall *soca* records of 1991, even the ones not specifically political, have had a clever twist, a story, or a slangy series of puns to tickle the public imagination. In Bally's "Calypso Coup," "back back," a hip motion, becomes "back Bakr." In David Rudder's love song, "Nuff Respect," the woman calls the shots—highly unusual in the macho culture.

As is always the case when major events shake Trinidad, there was one perfect song: Superblue's "Get Something and Wave." A tour de force of sociopolitical pop, "Wave" uses the off-center drumbeat of Trinidad's African-derived Spiritual Baptists and taps into religious symbols.

Superblue's joyful exhortation to wave something galvanized a country in which flags are a key element in the rituals of three important local religions: Shango, Hindu, and Muslim. (Abu Bakr's coup occurred on Hosay, an Islamic holiday usually marked by a parade with small flags.) The thousands of fluttering cloths that burst out of nowhere every time "Wave" was played at Carnival weren't just a fad—the flags represented an affirmation of Trinidad's multi-ethnic culture and determination to bind the wounds of the coup. Or, as Rudder explains: "Calypso is an art form that laughs at pain. That's the way we deal with our blues. We begin to heal ourselves immediately, through our culture and our music." ■

Merengue: From Race to Gender

by Deborah Pacini Hernandez

Energetic and brassy, the many varieties of *merengue* are the Dominican Republic's most popular dance music. Yet *merengue's* driving rhythm blasts far beyond the dance floor. Imbedded in the music's long and rich history are the evolving tensions and resolutions of race, class, and culture in the making of Dominican national identity.

Merengue dates from the years 1822-44, when Dominicans struggled to end Haiti's occupation of their territory. The story goes that a song ridiculing a wounded flag-bearer who deserted the battlefield emerged at a spontaneous victory celebration, and that *merengue's* particular dance step—in which one foot drags behind the other—was the result of revelers mimicking the injured coward's limping gait.

While colorful and engaging, this account likely reflects the desire to portray the Haitian occupiers in unfavorable light, as well as Dominican sentiment that denies Haitian musical influence. Indeed, Dominicans have never quite forgiven Haiti for having made the Dominican Republic the only country in Latin America to have been subjugated by blacks. Their denial of African heritage was solidified under the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo (1930-61), whose racist policies included the 1937 massacre of

thousands of persons of Haitian descent and the prohibition of folk traditions with clear African or Haitian antecedents. By local standards the Dominican population is 73% mulatto, 16% white, and 11% black. Nevertheless, the negritude movements that surfaced in Caribbean countries such as Haiti, Cuba, and Jamaica have been notably absent in the Dominican Republic.

Merengue has evolved as contested terrain for debate about the Dominican Republic's national identity, from the issue of African roots to the empowerment of women.

In contrast with the Dominican interpretation, Haitian music historians claim that their country's *meringue* is the precursor of *merengue*. Others regard Cuba or Puerto Rico as the music's birthplace. In any case, the Dominican Republic is clearly the site where *merengue* has taken strongest hold.

Merengue was originally rural music that enlivened events of all sorts, from weddings and saints' day festivals to cockfights and Sunday gatherings. In addition, *meren-*

gue songs were vehicles of social commentary for illiterate people. Given *merengue's* roots in vernacular culture, it not surprisingly became a symbol of the Dominican Republic's national identity. Its acceptance spread into the country's upper classes during the US occupation of the country in 1916-24. In promoting this acceptance, composers transformed *merengue* from rural folk to urban salon and dance music.

The next phase of *merengue's* evolution took place during the 31-year Trujillo dictatorship. Trujillo used reward and threat to coopt the music, turning it into a mouthpiece for his concentration of power. In so doing, he orchestrated the refashioning of *merengue* into a symbol of his regime's power and modernity, gaining the music definitive entry into the ballrooms of the urban elite. The political cost, however, was tremendous. Not only did Trujillo tolerate no *merengue* lyric critical of his rule; his immense power forced any musician of stature who remained in the country to literally sing his praises. Among the forgettable song titles were "*Veneremos a Trujillo*" ("Let Us Venerate Trujillo"), "*Trujillo es grande e inmortal*" ("Trujillo is Great and Immortal"), and "*Trujillo protector de choferes*" ("Trujillo the Protector of Drivers").

Remarkably, after Trujillo's death in 1961 *merengue* was not discredited, but instead became a symbol of Dominican society's new openness and progress. Johnny Ventura, one of the first and most successful of the new breed of *merengueros*, shed the ballroom *orquesta* trappings of the Trujillo era in favor of a smaller, more energetic *combo* style. Influenced in part


Deborah Pacini Hernandez is assistant director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. Her recent publications include "Cantando la cama vacía: Love, Sex and Gender Relationships in Dominican bachata," Popular Music (1990).

by US rock-and-roll, Ventura's *combo* introduced glittery costumes, fast-paced choreography, and spicy, satirical lyrics. By the late 1970s *merengue* achieved a successful presence in the international music scene.

Meanwhile, *merengue* became contested terrain for debate within the Dominican Republic about the country's national identity. This debate came to include intellectual currents that sought to forge a new socially and politically progressive identity, one that would credit Dominican musical traditions with clear African roots. Recognition of African contributions to Dominican culture and music was not won easily. In response to one declaration of *merengue's* African origins, Luis Senior, a leading *merengue* band leader, wrote an article vehemently stating that "This outlandish statement is unpatriotic!"

By the early 1980s *merengue* displaced *salsa* as the preferred dance music of Latin Americans throughout the hemisphere. In the euphoria, divisive discussion of *merengue's* African origins seems to have been left behind. Taking its place is a signal of profound change in Dominican society: the stepping to the forefront of women in *merengue* ensembles, such as *La Media Naranja* and *Las Chicas del Can*, not just as singers but as instrumentalists as well. Trombones, trumpets, bass, congas, and synthesizers—formerly the exclusive domain of men—are increasingly in the hands of women. So too are the lyrics, which are coming to reflect female points of view. As Belkis Concepción with *Las Chicas del Can* sings in "El Gran Poder" ("The Great Power"): "Oyeme bien, trátala bien/Que a diferencia de ayer/Hoy existe el gran poder/De la mujer/Hoy ella tiene libertad/Para poder defender/Su igualdad, su dignidad/Y el gran amor de la mujer" ("Listen to me, treat her well/Unlike yesterday/Today there's the great power/Of woman/Today she's got the freedom/To be able to defend/Her equality, her dignity/And woman's great love"). ■

¡Ya salió la Guía del Periodismo Centroamericano!



Esta publicación de 188 páginas contiene:

- Nombres de más de 3.000 periodistas
- Datos sobre 27 periódicos
- Información sobre 208 emisoras de radio
- Detalles de 34 canales de televisión
- Más datos sobre revistas y periódicos
- Nombres de las escuelas de periodismo y sus profesores
- Las corresponsalías

Y un cúmulo de información útil sobre Centroamérica y Panamá.

Sólo 45 dólares.

Ingresos de la venta de la Guía están destinados a un fondo para el funcionamiento de un centro de entrenamiento para periodistas centroamericanos.

Sí, envíeme _____ ejemplar/es de la Guía del Periodismo Centroamericano

Nombre _____

Dirección _____

Ciudad _____ País _____

Escriba su cheque a nombre de CAJP Endowment Fund y envíe este formulario a:

PROCEPER
Apartado 1253-1002
San José
Costa Rica

Central American Journalism Program
Florida International University
North Miami, FL 33181
USA

Samba World

by Andrea Mantell Seidel

Samba

by Alma Guillermoprieto. New York: Knopf, 1990. 244 pp. \$19.95.

Amarmalade-thick river of people swept past; outlandish dancers in feathers and capes, ballgowns and G-strings, hundreds of drummers; thousands of leaping princes singing at the top of their lungs. In the ocean of feathers and banners, faces emerged: brown, white, pink, tan, olive" (p. 6).

So begins Alma Guillermoprieto's introduction to the mesmerizing world of Carnival and samba—song, story, music, and dance—in Rio de Janeiro. *Samba* is centered around the Mangueira samba school. The school, one of hundreds scattered throughout the *favelas*—the ramshackle slums on the hillsides of Rio—is composed of black Brazilians who unite for the single purpose of parading together through the main streets of Rio at Carnival time. After many months of strenuous and costly preparation, each of the *favelas* sends up to 5,000 dancers and musicians, elaborately costumed in the school's official colors, to compete in the Carnival parade.

As the narrative unfolds, Guillermoprieto portrays the venerable

and popular Mangueira samba school as much more than a mere gathering of individuals; it becomes a metaphor for joy, pride, and hope amid the violence, drugs, poverty, and racism that pervade existence in the *favelas*. Poised at the heart of community life, the schools serve, in part, to reconnect the blacks of the *favela* to their African "roots," to the *candomble* gods whose origin lies in West Africa's Yoruba religion, and to a buried Brazilian past nearly obliterated by the dominant white government and the Catholic Church.

Poised at the heart of community life, the samba schools reconnect the blacks of the favela to their African roots and Brazilian past.

With sensitivity and passion, Guillermoprieto traces the complex history and culture of samba from its turn-of-the-century roots in Brazilian slave culture to the extravagant, commercialized displays of contemporary Carnival—which is now a vital part of mainstream Brazilian society. The beat of samba, felt in its pulsing 2/4 time and in its sensuous, hypnotic dance rhythms, defines the rhythms of social life and organization in the

favelas. Story, song, and dance samba serve as the primary repositories of historical identity in an Afro-American culture that lacks its own written history.

The beat of samba is also powerfully expressed in Guillermoprieto's rhythmic, potent language. Born in Mexico, trained as a dancer, and a journalist by profession, Guillermoprieto writes with a journalist's eye for detail and immediacy tempered with a dancer's sense of rhythm and kinetic power. Through her vivid portraits and lush, poetic narratives, the intimate fabric of community life is revealed; first the months, then the weeks, the days, and at last, the tensions and passions of the final hours of Carnival unfold.

"A beautiful black youth with a blank face and a body like a snake weaves through the early-morning drinkers with a friend. The friend, an ostrich-like bird with sparkling midnight-blue plumage, emerges from the back of the minute, flesh-colored bikini the youth is wearing and rears its richly feathered neck along the boy's supple spine . . . The floats tower like magical kingdoms in the glorious morning that is breaking, and a mute, awed crowd stands around them, still for once, just staring" (p. 209).

Carnival Societies

At the time of Guillermoprieto's writing, the Mangueira samba school had captured the grand Carnival prize two years in a row. She records the school's quest for a "triple crown" during the year she lived in Rio and participated in the Carnival preparations. The Mangueira school prided itself, not in the elaborateness of their costumes

Andrea Mantell Seidel holds a joint position as assistant professor in the Department of Theater and Dance at Florida International University and in the New World School of the Arts Dance Division, Miami. She recently directed and performed in the Eleanor King Memorial Dance Program at the Lincoln Center Library of Performing Arts, in New York City.

as did the higher class white society, but in the sense of cultural grounding, or "root," it endeavored to keep alive. Dona Neuma, one of the influential matriarchs of the school's directorate, proudly proclaims that "it's not our costumes that win . . . the crowd goes crazy for us because we have root and we have spirit. And the soul of that is the *baianas*." The *candomble* temples of Rio de Janeiro were originally set up by *baianas* ("Aunts of Bahia"), freed women slaves who brought the cult with them when they emigrated from Bahia. To this day, all samba schools have a contingent of "*baianas*" in honor of these women.

With the dawn of the 20th century, an emerging class of black artisans, skilled laborers, and professionals aspired to transcend their African roots. As a result, they began to adopt the latest European fashions and behaviors. Instead of chanting and drumming, black Carnival took on a new "civilized" air. The advent of Brazilian radio in 1923 and its broadcasts of samba music heralded the "Samba Era" in mainstream white society, and the black music and dance of Brazil acquired a national following.

The author recounts how the schools represent "carnival societies," hierarchies of class and color now institutionalized in the Carnival parade. The most prestigious are the stars of the parade, white men and women, who ride high on the grandest floats in glittering, bejeweled costumes. Below them are the floats with nearly nude dancing women—whites, light-skinned black women, or mulattos. The poverty-stricken majority—dark-skinned *favelados*, both male and female—must parade on the road as

the cost of the floats are prohibitive to them.

In subsequent chapters, Guillermprieto leads us through a magical, paradoxical world: one of decadent splendor and poignant exuberance. Although this world is observed and vividly recorded, she fails to delve beneath the surface of

The advent of Brazilian radio in the 1920s heralded the "Samba Era" in mainstream white society, and black music and dance acquired a national following.

events and explore the nature and meaning of these paradoxes in the world that transcends the isolated confines of the *favela*. Herein lies the book's greatest weakness. On the one hand, as a dancer, I admire her ability to capture the soul of the samba with freshness and directness, unencumbered by the weight of analysis and interpretation. On the other, as a dance ethnologist, I was often frustrated by her failure to penetrate to the heart of its meaning. Ana, an attractive, but impoverished *bamba*, a woman wise in the ways of the samba world, advised Guillermo-prieto to "forget about the notetak-

ing" and "to stop trying to write down what happens": "If you don't give in to the spirit of carnival, if you don't let it overwhelm you, you'll never understand what it's like, so how will you be able to explain it to others? If you have the experience, you won't forget a minute of it" (p. 195).

In this moment, we are confronted by the dilemma faced by all those who seek to understand a culture different from their own. Undoubtedly, deep understanding involves a process of "letting go": an immersion of the self in the rich wholeness of the experience. Nevertheless, samba and Carnival, like other masquerades and festivals worldwide, are complex cultural and symbolic events. They demand a degree of analysis, reflexivity, and interpretation to understand and communicate them effectively to others.

Shock and Laughter

Although *Samba* is rich with historical reference, its descriptive, non-analytical style leaves too many questions unanswered to make it the definitive study that it could be. For example, we learn that "only women dance in the central space while men dance along the edges of the road and that the real *bambas* dance in all-male groups" (p. 18). We do not learn, however, what these facts reveal about social relations between men and women. Moreover, we do not learn how this event relates to similar occurrences in other festivals and masquerades throughout the world.

Sexual ambivalence, ubiquitous throughout Carnival in the blatant transvestism and in the pervasive cross-gender dressing, is discussed

but not explored as a critical issue: "Like the devotees of Ishtar, the sex-changing goddess of Babylon, Dona Diva and her friends would switch clothing. On the first morning of carnival, the women members of her dirty block would wear mens' jackets inside out, the men would dress up as women, and then we'd party the whole day long (pp. 196-7) . . . a man in black lingerie, garter belt and high heels . . . more men in their wives' clothing, one with a smear of red lipstick across his mouth. Even those who aren't cross-dressed sport a sprig of rue sacred to the warrior god Ogun" (p. 213).

In rituals and festivals, inversions and distortions of age, sex, or status, with the additional element of play (burlesque, caricature, and parody) help to give definition and clarity to that which is considered "normal" in a society. By collapsing boundaries and confusing or eras-

ing the distinctions between the normal and abnormal, right and wrong, sacred and secular, the boundaries of moral and social codes of behavior are made clearer.

*Shock and laughter
free the participants
from the harsh
realities of mundane
life.*

By giving license to normally shocking displays and violations of social norms, festival participants and observers are opened up to the immediacy of experience

through shock and laughter. The society is freed from the harsh realities of mundane life and the members are renewed and transformed through the catharsis.

In the final chapters of *Samba*, Guillermoprieto describes the shocking freedom and libertinism of Carnival and the displays of decadent behavior. Carnival becomes an opportunity for "sustained episodes of intense, unambivalent joy" (p. 195): "Black and white, dancers and klutzes thrown together into the same joyous mess—free, liberated, glamorous and hilarious at the same time, returned to the innocence of pure unrestrained exhibitionism, posturing and primping and wiggling our hips . . . yelling at the top of our voices and flouncing our backsides . . ." (pp. 189-90).

For the reader as well, *Samba*, despite its weaknesses, provides a welcome respite from our encumbered, everyday world. ■

N E C C A

NETWORK OF EDUCATORS' COMMITTEES ON CENTRAL AMERICA

*supporting Central Americans' efforts for human rights,
social justice, and democracy by providing:*

Resources on Central America

Tools for teaching K-12, college and community groups; useful for ESL, Language Arts, Spanish, Social Studies, Regional Studies; interactive lessons, bilingual texts, histories, poetry, prose . . .

Central American Tours

Including school visits, village stays; meetings with Ministers of Education, U.S. Aid officials and teachers' union leaders as well as exchange tours bringing Central American educators to the U.S. . . .

Central America in Context

Slide Show presentations and forums on the historical roots of current events with strategies for teaching Central American students and for teaching North Americans about the region . . .

Model Educational Programs

The Books Project uses process-based writing strategies to bring the voices of Central American refugee children into the classroom as they publish their own bilingual stories . . .

New Titles! Caribbean Connections, 6 Part Series!

For brochure, order forms, or information:

NECCA, Dept. H, 1118 22nd Street, NW Washington D.C. 20037 (202) 429-0137, FAX (202) 429-9766

transaction

New and Recent Books on Latin America

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA

Tom J. Farer

In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on such issues as right- and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this fascinating manner, fusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin America since the end of World War II. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America (he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. His essays combine a sophisticated analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.

ISBN: 0-88738-155-3 (cloth)

448 pp.

\$39.95

THREE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS

GINO GERMANI, PABLO GONZALES CASANOVA, FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO

Joseph A. Kahl, new Introduction by Peter B. Evans

This is the long overdue second edition of Joseph A. Kahl's masterful *Modernization, Exploitation, and Dependency* in Latin America. In the book, Kahl describes, examines and introduces the life and work of three of the most important figures in the development of comparative politics and political sociology: Gino Germani (Argentina), Pablo Gonzales Casanova (Mexico) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil). As Peter B. Evans points out in his splendid Introduction, the book has not lost its importance and attractiveness in the years that have passed. Rather, the subsequent developments in comparative scholarship, as exemplified in the fate of modernization and dependency theory, have only highlighted the influence of the three Latin Americans.

ISBN: 0-88738-169-3 (cloth)

\$24.95

ISBN: 0-88738-700-4 (paper)

240pp.

\$14.95

POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR

John D. Martz

In this book, John D. Martz probes the differences and similarities between military authoritarianism and democratic pluralism through an analysis of the politics of petroleum in Ecuador. Martz uses a textured and detailed analysis of global oil companies and nationalist politics to trace the growth and evolution of Ecuador's petroleum industry. Against this interplay of politics and the nationalistic struggle against multinational pressures, he compares policymaking under military and civilian government.

ISBN: 0-88738-132-4 (cloth)

432 pp.

\$34.95

REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA 1964-1985

James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra

This volume focuses on two decades of political life in Bolivia, from the overthrow of civilian president Victor Paz Estenssoro in November, 1964 until his return to office in August, 1985. The body of the book provides an account of the main contours of political economy in Bolivia from 1964 until 1985. The authors also present an interpretative analysis of the problem of regime formation in Bolivia by focusing on the alternations among various authoritarian and democratic modes of governance. In a concluding chapter the authors provide an analytical framework tying Bolivia into more regional trends concerning the questions of regime formation and transition. Bolivia is seen as an extreme case of a common set of problems that have pervaded the region during this period.

ISBN: 0-88738-159-6 (cloth)

256 pp.

\$29.95



Transaction Publishers

Dept. LA 9 Rutgers-The State University,
New Brunswick, NJ 08903

Music and Dance

by Marian Goslinga

With the passing of Dame Margot Fonteyn de Arias in February 1991, the world's attention was briefly focused on a legend who not only personified classical dance but represented Panama (and indirectly all of Latin America) as ambassador to Great Britain. The music and dance of Latin America were thus propelled to a certain prominence, although these two branches of the fine arts have always been popular exponents of the region's national consciousness.

While most Latin American countries actively support the concept of a national dance company, the *Ballet Folklórico de México* being the most famous, musical reviews are also being published all over the continent. Among the more prestigious are the *Revista musical chilena*, *Revista musical de Venezuela*, *Revista musical puertorriqueña*, and, from Mexico, *Heterofonía* and *Pauta*.

Unfortunately for the researcher, no recent or definitive bibliography of Latin American music exists. The gathering of relevant information about the region's music thus requires the perusal of many divergent sources. In answer to this need, Malena Kuss's *Latin American Music: An Annotated Bibliography of Reference Sources and Research Materials* (New York: Garland, forthcoming) is slated to provide 3,000 entries on the topic. A preliminary version of this bibliography, with 1,093 entries, was published as Volume IV in the "Work in Progress" series of *Music in the Life of Man. A World History* (Paris: International Music Council, UNESCO, 1984). Until Kuss's bibliography is published, the most comprehensive reference work in the field will remain the 20-volume *New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians* (Stanley Sadie, general editor; Gerard Béhague, area editor for Latin America; London: Macmillan, 1980).

Other valuable tools for those seeking information include the series of articles by Malena Kuss and John M. Schechter in *Latin American Masses and Minorities: Their Images and Realities*, volume 2 (Madison, Wis.: SALALM Secretariat, 1987), as well as the monthly guide, *The Music Index: The Key To Current Music Periodical Literature* (Detroit, Mich.: Information Services), which indexes more than 225 periodicals by subject and author. In addition, the "Music" section contained in the *Humanities* volume of the *Handbook of Latin American Studies* (Austin: University of Texas Press), currently being compiled by Robert Stevenson, is very useful.

Last but not least, current sources of information can also be found in the *Inter-American Music Review* and the *Latin American Music Review*, as well as *Ethnomusicology's* regular section "Current Bibliography, Discography, and Filmography." General music periodicals such as *Billboard* and *The Village Voice* also include sections featuring material specifically on Latin American music.

What follows is a selective list of materials on music and dance in Latin America and the Caribbean published since 1990.

Accommodation and Resistance in Andean Ritual Dance. Deborah A. Poole. *Drama Review*, v. 34 (Summer 1990), p. 98.

An Analysis and Adaptation of Brazilian Folk Music into a String Method Comparable to American Models for Use in the Brazilian Music Education System. Linda Louise Kruger. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1990. 533 p. [Thesis—University of Missouri-Columbia.]

Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and Caribbean librarian at Florida International University.

Barbados/Caribbean Jazz Festivals. Michael Bourne. *Down Beat* (October 1990), p. 50.

Brazil: A Kaleidoscope of Sound. Mário de Aratana. *UNESCO Courier* (March 1991), p. 15.

Brazilian Beat Heats Orangina in France: Musical Campaign Links Drink to Lambada Sound. Peter S. Green. *Advertising Age* (September 11, 1990), p. 30.

The Burning Rhythms of Haiti. Larry Birnbaum. *Spin*, v. 5 (March 1990), p. 80.

Canary Islands Bristle with the Sounds of the Caribbean. Carlos Agudelo. *Billboard* (March 17, 1990), p. 84.

Chilean Musicians' Discourse of the 1980's: A Collective Poetics, Pedagogy, and Socio-Aesthetics of Art and Popular Music. Juan Pablo González. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1990. 474 p. [Thesis—University of California, Los Angeles.]

A Comparative Study of the Existing Inservice Music Programs in Puerto Rico with the Beginning Teacher Assistance Programs from

the States of Virginia, Florida and Georgia. Gary Abraham Morales. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1990. 391 p. [Thesis—University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.]

La danza en el Perú. A. Yori. *Monsalvat*, no. 179 (February 1990), p. 28-29.

Demystifying South American Rhythms. Jorge Morel. *Guitar Player*, v. 24 (May 1990), p. 84+.

Der Tango. Stefan Gies. *Musik und Bildung*, v. 22 (April 1990), p. 213-15.

Ethnography of Rumba: Dance and Social Change in Contemporary Cuba. Yvonne La Verne Payne Daniel. *Dissertation Abstracts International*, v. 50 (April 1990), p. 3275A.

Everywhere We Go, We Are in Danger: Ti Manno and the Emergence of a Haitian Transnational Identity. N Glick-Schiller, G. Fouron. *American Ethnologist*, v. 17 (May 1990), p. 329-47 [Ti Manno is a well-known Haitian musician.]

The Evolution of Reggae in Jamaica. Lawrence McLellan, Jr. *Inter-American Music Review*, v. 10 (1990), p. 51-60.

Exits and Entrances: Current Craze on the Brazilian Dance Called Lambada. Robert Farris Thompson. *Artforum*, v. 28 (Summer 1990), p. 26.

Festival de la Habana 1989. L. Markowski. *Musik und Gesellschaft*, v. 40 (January 1990), p. 33-34.

Flash Dance of the 90's. Douglas Mercado. *Americas*, v. 42 (May-June 1990), p. 3. [About the lambada.]

A Glimpse of Afro-Caribbean Music in the Early Seventeenth Century. Dominique René de Lerma. *Black Music Research Journal*, v. 10 (1990), p. 94-96.

Gracias a la vida: Das Lateinamerika-Festival in Utrecht. Ulrich Koch, Ursula Koch. *Musik und Gesellschaft*, v. 40 (May 1990), p. 258-61

Grupo Corpo from Brazil Tours U.S.A. Antonio José Faro. *Dance Magazine*, v. 64 (November 1990), p. 14. [About the Brazilian ballet company.]

La guitare en Amérique latine: La Colombie, le bambuco. Francisco González. *Les Cahiers de la Guitare*, no. 33 (1990), p. 14-16.

History, Analysis and Performance Practice of the Brazilian Modinha from the Eighteenth Century to the Present. Maritza Helmen Freda Mascarenhas. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1990. [Thesis—University of Miami.]

It's Hip, but Is It Happenin'?: Lambada's Lot like Sex, except More Overrated. Charles Leerhisen. *Newsweek*, v. 115 (January 29, 1990), p. 60.

Jamaica's Dancehall Style Takes Hold. Paul J. Wexler. *Rolling Stone*, no. 573 (March 8, 1990), p. 60.

Jazz Goes to Rio, Sao Paulo, Too. Robin Tolleson. *Jazz Times* (January 1990), p. 10.

L.A. Embraces Lambada Craze. Michael Stremfel. *Los Angeles Business Journal* (March 9, 1990), p. 1

The Lambada Craze. Richard Gehr. *Spin*, v. 6 (April 1990), p. 128.

Lambada Hopes to Dance Its Way into the U.S. Market. Thom Duffy, Chris McGowan. *Billboard* (January 13, 1990), p. 6+.

Lambada Soviet-Style. Steven Shabard. *World Press Review*, v. 37 (July 1990), p. 46.

Latin American Piano Music. Enrique Alberto Arias. *Clavier*, v. 30, no. 2 (1991), p. 20+.

Leaping across Frontiers. Jan Hanvik. *Americas*, v. 42, no. 4 (1990), p. 56-57 [Discusses Latin American modern dance and the American Dance Festival.]

Lusting for Lambada. Nicholas Jennings. *Macleans*, v. 103 (February 5, 1990), p. 52-53.

Mehr als Mariachis: Streifzüge durch die Musik Mexikos. Monika Fürst-Heidtmann, Gunthild Heidtmann. *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik*, v. 151 (February 1990), p. 16.

Mexican Cumba Is a Far Cry from Its Caribbean Progenitor. Carlos Agudelo. *Billboard* (May 19, 1990), p. 56.

Michel Camilo: Caribbean Jazz Classic. Larry Birnbaum. *Down Beat*, v. 57 (March 1990), p. 24-25.

Music of Brazil: An Explosion of Creativity from Rio to Bahia.

Gerald Seligman. *Stereo Review*, v. 55 (August 1990), p. 66-69.

Music: Burning Down the House. Erik Davis. *The Village Voice*, v. 35 (February 13, 1990), p. 74. [Music in Haiti.]

Music: Rub-a-dub. Julian Dibbell. *The Village Voice*, v. 35 (January 30, 1990), p. 82-83. [About the lambada.]

Nara Leao, Brazil's Poetess of Modern Song. Mark Holston. *Americas*, v. 42 (January-February 1990), p. 1-5.

On the Scene: Argentina, Alive and Well. A. Deusebio. *Jazz Forum*, no. 122 (1990), p. 5. [Jazz in Argentina.]

Play It or Die. Phil Patton. *Esquire*, v. 115, no. 3 (March 1991), p. 72. [About music in Colombia.]

Puerto Rican Piano Music of the Nineteenth Century. Alberto Héctor Hernández. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1990. 152 p. [Thesis—Columbia University Teachers College.]

Research Centers and Sound Archives of Traditional Music in Latin America. E. Morenocha. *Fontes Artis Musicae*, v. 37, no. 2 (1990), p. 179-91.

Roses from the South. Michael Ponder. *The Strad*, v. 101 (January 1990), p. 18-19. [About Argentinian music.]

Salsa Music: Primary Dimensions of Meaning in an Expressive Cultural Form—The Puerto Rican Experience as Chronicled via Salsa Lyric Poetics. Barbara Kay Vargas. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1990. [Thesis—University of California, Irvine.]

Salsa: Puerto Rican and Latino Music. Felix M. Padilla. *Journal of Popular Culture*, v. 24 (Summer 1990), p. 87

Scambada: Dirty Dancing All the Way to the Bank. Richard Gold. *Variety*, v. 338 (March 1990), p. 1+. [About the lambada dance craze in Brazil.]

The Secret of Good Latin Jazz. Charles Gerard. *Jazz Educators Journal*, v. 22 (1990), p. 63-65.

The Sound of Brazil: Follow the Music and Let It Guide You to the Heart of the Country. John Krich. *The New York Times Magazine*, v. 140 (October 21, 1990), p. 28, col. 1.

South of the Border: A Caballo. John Santos. *Modern Drummer*, v. 14 (March 1990), p. 72.

Speaking in Tongues. Craig Bromberg. *Rolling Stone* (January 11, 1990), p. 48-49.

Stagium Battles Social Ills. Robert Johnson. *Dance Magazine*, v. 65, no. 3 (March 1991), p. 13. [About Mark Gidali and Decio Otero, founders of Brazil's Stagium dance company.]

Structure, Context, and Strategy in Musical Ethnography. Thomas Turino. *Ethnomusicology*, v. 34, no. 3 (Fall 1990), p. 399-412. [Specifi-

cally refers to the Fiesta de la Cruz in Conima, Peru.]

A Theory on the Origin of the Organ's Quintadena. Ralph Blakeley. *The Musical Times*, v. 131 (March 1990), p. 163+. [About the history of traditional Peruvian organ music.]

Tito Puente: King of the Middle World. Fred Bouchard. *Down Beat* (May 1991), p. 20-21

Tow to Tango. Rob Prince. *Folk Roots*, no. 83 (May 1990), p. 31+.

Uptown Dominica (Merengue). Daisann McLane. *Spin*, v. 6 (May 1990), p. 86.

With Guiros and Maracas: Hispanic Christian Music in a Charismatic Church. Milagros Agostini Quesada. *The Hymn*, v. 41 (1990), p. 30-33.

The Women of Merengue. Mark Holston. *Americas*, v. 42 (May-June 1990), p. 54. [About women musicians in Latin America.]

Worldstyle: Wasting Away in Lambadaville. Lee Jeske. *Cash Box*, v. 53 (February 17, 1990), p. 9.




New Publication

The Changing Hemispheric Trade Environment: Opportunities and Obstacles

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg

Prominent scholars and policymakers analyze options for hemispheric trade, including the likely impact of a North American free trade agreement and a single European market and the roles of Japan and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 165 pp. \$11.95 (paperback)

Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199; (305) 348-2894; Fax (305) 348-3593.



Hemisphere
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
University Park
Miami, Florida 33199

Non Profit Org.
U.S. Postage
PAID
Miami, FL 33199
Permit No. 3675