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**WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SECURITY ANALYSIS CENTER**

**The Security Challenges
for the 2016
Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games**

Luis Bitencourt
Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies

July 2011

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The views expressed in this research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, Department of Defense, US Southern Command or Florida International University.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Brazilians greeted the long-awaited decision of making Rio de Janeiro the host of the 2016 Olympic Games with tremendous exhilaration. Although Rio's fantastic natural beauty certainly added to its attraction in hosting the games, its alarming rates of urban crime and violence largely associated with drug trafficking immediately triggered worldwide criticism, and put at issue its ability to guarantee the security for the games. Brazilians have been vying for a position as an emerging global economy and understand the importance of the Games for international prestige. This makes the stakes very high when hosting the Olympic Games in the wake of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, which will also be held in Brazil.

This paper explores these criticisms and assesses Rio's ability to prepare for this important event. The paper further explores the consensus that Brazilians will be more equipped to address actions taken by organized crime capable of affecting the Olympic Games than to face a terrorist attack. Brazil – and Rio – does not figure in the “terrorism map” as a region particularly linked to terrorism. Aside from uncorroborated suspicions of activities by terrorist organizations on the Tri-Border region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Brazil does not elicit many concerns regarding terrorism.¹ Yet, there is no way to guarantee that terrorist organizations will not try to make use of the 2016 Rio Olympic Games to advance their agenda. This being in mind, Rio and Brazil in general face a long road ahead to prepare, prevent, protect and respond to a possible terrorist attack during the 2016 Olympics. It is clear that prevention and preparation towards potential threats to the Games must

¹ U.S. Department of State has confirmed that this area may have been used to transport weapons and conduct financial affairs in the past. This type of activity has been made more difficult with the fortification of border controls in more recent times.

necessarily include cooperation and exchange of best practices with other countries.

INTRODUCTION

Widespread festivities ensued on October 2, 2009, after the International Olympic Committee (IOC) gathered in Denmark, Copenhagen, and selected Rio de Janeiro to host the 2016 XXXI Olympiad. Brazilians – including then President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – exploded in emotion and excitement with the long-awaited decision.² Nevertheless, just a few weeks after the first year-long anniversary of that memorable decision, the ability of Rio to hold the Olympic Games seemed to be seriously challenged. In November 2010, in a series of widespread attacks throughout Rio, dozens of motor vehicles were burned by criminals (reportedly, following the orders of notorious jailed drug dealers), as a reaction to the policy of community police, or more specifically, Pacification Police Units (UPP). These attacks also followed an incident in August of 2010, where a four-star hotel experienced a hostage standoff in the vicinity of the future site of the 2016 Olympics.³ Police officers had attempted to apprehend a convoy of gang members who were returning from a late night party and travelling from one *favela* (or slum) to another. Several officers were hurt and one gang member killed in the exchanges of gunfire that led up to the hostage situation, but the 5 guests and approximately 30 hotel employees taken captive were ultimately released without severe harm. Yet, as part of a continuing strategy of *favela* occupation, and in response to these events, the government acted decisively to occupy some *favelas* in the southern zone of Rio that had been for a long time under the control of criminals, or known to host factions of organized crime. With the help of the Brazilian Navy, armored cars, and the Brazilian Army, Rio military and civilian police invaded these slums, arrested

² 121st IOC Session, 2 October 2009: <http://www.olympic.org/olympic-games?articlenewsgroup=-1&articleid=110882>.

³ <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/world/americas/22brazil.html>.

several gang members who had not yet fled, and confiscated hundreds of weapons and large quantities of drugs.⁴

In the end, the police action was positive and certainly restricted criminal control in large portions of the city. However, the crisis produced graphic scenes via global news media of urban battle only found in situations of war and insurgency, and heightened concerns for the 2016 Olympic Games' security. Brazilian authorities were quick to brush away these concerns. Carlos Arthur Nuzman, President of Brazilian Olympic Committee (COB), stressed officially that the situation had proven not only the commitment and resolve of Brazilian authorities to face the drug related crime in Rio, but also – underscoring the public support by the general population for the police action – that the State was on the right track. Finally, he explained that Rio had already demonstrated its capacity to provide security to major sporting events – during the 2007 Pan American Games, for example – and that the security plan for the 2016 Olympic Games had been approved by the International Olympic Committee.⁵ Rio de Janeiro mayor Eduardo Paes also stated that the crisis offered a demonstration of the State's commitment to address the crime problem in Rio, and reassured that “in seven years, the violent situation in Rio will be completely different.”⁶

Although it is now five years prior to the 2016 Olympic Games, this paper addresses these questions with the intention of outlining the security concerns related to the Rio event, and recommends some preventive measures. With the

⁴ These events received daily coverage between November 21 and December 15, 2001 in most Brazilian newspapers, including: *O Globo*, *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, and *Folha de Sao Paulo* as well as by CNN World.

⁵ <http://noticias.r7.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticias/nuzman-promete-olimpiada-no-rio-com-total-seguranca-20101127.html>.

⁶ <http://esporte.ig.com.br/mais/2009/10/19/prefeito+do+rio+garante+seguranca+da+olimpiada+de+2016+8879910.html>.

2012 and 2014 Soccer World Cups – to take place in London and Brazil, respectively – in between, the paper looks at security circumstances unique to the Olympic Games in general and considers these circumstances in light of specific variables suggested by Rio de Janeiro. It adopts a familiar methodological framework used to analyze security situations, beginning with an analysis of possible threats and contrasting it with the measures planned by the State to face those threats. It also compares security challenges peculiar to past major sporting events as a means to identify lessons learned that may eventually be useful to Brazil.

WHAT SECURITY CONCERNS US?

Although the Rio 2010 security crises were very graphic and alarming, they are not necessarily a harbinger of the threats and the related ability of State to provide security during the Olympic Games. From the international standpoint, the preoccupation instigated by the 2010 security crises was more because they apparently put into question the capability of different Brazilian security forces to provide safety. However, they had little correlation to the threat eventually represented by those criminals to the Olympic Games, due to the measures that have been and will be taken prior to the Games. Moreover, the crises and their resolutions reveal very little about the major security concerns that revolve around potential terrorist threats. This is a legitimate concern not only because of the history of terrorist attacks during the Olympic Games, but also because this opportunity offers terrorists the visibility and ability to strike at multiple nations simultaneously.

There are therefore two distinct levels of threats that must be considered when analyzing security prospects for the 2016 Olympic Games: the first is represented by the current domestic threats associated with crime and local violence that have been haunting Rio for many decades *vis-à-vis* the ability of the State to reduce and control exposure of this

threat to the sporting events, the athletes, and the public; and the second is represented by the prospects of a terrorist attack during the Games, when the target will not necessarily be Brazil, but the Games themselves, and/or specific country delegations. To face the first level of threat, Rio's authorities have considerable experience and have been implementing a robust set of measures that should result in an improved security environment by 2016.

The second level, however, has a much more prominent international dimension and requires a strategic approach. On the one hand, Brazil does not figure among the usual targets of current terrorist organizations, the most notorious being those espousing Islamic extremism. Indeed, Brazil has thus far neither been threatened with nor been the target of terrorist activity, which lends some assurance to the organizers of the 2016 Olympics. On the other hand, this reality may exactly suggest to terrorists that Rio might therefore act as an ideal operational environment for the perpetration of terrorist attacks. Bearing this scenario in mind, Brazilian police forces are not geared towards this type of threat and its prevention, presenting a dilemma to those who responsible for the security of the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. Overall, security in the face of possible threats from uncertain sources will require careful preparedness and extraordinary cooperation among security institutions and countries involved.

THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC CRIME – ORGANIZED OR NOT – TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES

Although Rio's rampant crime rates raise security concerns related to the organization of a mega-sporting event at the magnitude of the Olympic Games, the preparedness to face them is completely different from the threat represented by terrorism. First of all, it is important to acknowledge the seriousness of the crime problem in Rio, previously raised before the IOC during the selection process. Yet the IOC

also noticed important progress made by Rio's government in its efforts to reduce crime, achieved primarily through the creation of Community Policing Programs. The IOC observed, for example that the city's homicide rate had dropped to 33 per 100,000 people in 2009, down from 39 per 100,000 the year before. Confident in the success of these programs, Rio's authorities expect the rate to continue falling despite a homicide spike from April through June. These are nevertheless much higher rates than other big cities, and in particular, other former Olympic competitors. For example, Chicago had 16 homicides per 100,000 in 2007 and 18 in 2008. Madrid presented 2 homicides per 100,000 for 2007 and 2008, whereas Tokyo had only 1 per 100,000 in both years.⁷

Beyond crime rates, however, Rio also attracts attention because of the visibility of its crime, caused by Rio's geography and distribution of slums clustered amongst its many mountains.⁸ Due to these characteristics, criminals have turned some of these *favelas* into their kingdoms, in which they impose power over dwellers and control drug traffic; and police enforcement is difficult unless a permanent presence is established (which is the rationale behind the UPPs). In addition, criminal gangs often engage in highly visible gun battles over the control of "drug sales points." This tendency, to the extent that it is unchecked, has reduced security among Rio's residents and undermined the legitimacy of the State. Highly visible police operations to curb the action of these criminals are inherently traumatic, especially when it becomes necessary to resort to military support to retake control of regions that again fall under the control of criminals. The link that exists between organized

⁷ For detailed statistics on Rio de Janeiro's crime rates, see, Secretaria de Estado de Segurança, *Estatísticas de Segurança Pública do Rio de Janeiro*, <http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=221>.

⁸ Rio has approximately 250 *favelas*, with a growing population of around 1.5 million. According to Brazilian authorities, about half of the *favelas* are believed to be under the influence or control of drug gangs.

and drug-related crime dominated by gangs and common crime in Rio is undeniable, and by means of one example, was made perceivable by the November 2010 occupation of a *favela* area known as the Alemão Complex; after having highly visible police and military operations, car robberies in Rio's wealthier Southern Zone came down 20 percent when compared to previous months.

Observing the situation from the Brazilian State perspective, it is clear that the UPP policy represents the most serious government attempt to tackle the problem and re-establish State control over many of these critical areas.⁹ According to Rio's Secretary for Public Security, José Mariano Beltrame, the criminal attacks unleashed in Rio during October and November of 2010 were manifestations of organized crime against the success of the UPPs. Ironically, however, these criminal attacks then contributed to the creation of momentum as well as public justification for the State to act decisively to both curb the crisis and establish control over the Alemão Complex. Moreover, in the face of the stakes represented by the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, this level of action was indeed warranted by Brazilian authorities.

In addition to the specific UPP program mentioned above, the overall police presence in the southern zone of Rio has also been bolstered, with additional police placed on the beaches and within neighborhoods during periods with

⁹ Pacification Police Units (UPPs) were created by Rio's Secretariat for Public Safety upon the principle of "communitarian police," including the notion of partnership with the population and other public safety institutions. Rio's original investment plan for these units earmarked US\$ 8 million and predicted a contingent of 60,000 officers by 2016. Official expectation is that by getting closer to the population and promoting social policies inside communities, police will reestablish control "over areas that for decades were occupied by narcotraffic and recently, also by militias." UPP Reporter, 9 January 2011, http://www.upprj.com/en/?page_id=445.


increased potential for criminal activity. During 2010, the Rio police force was increased by 2,000 officers, and an increase of 7,000 more is slated for 2011, with an overall goal of an increase from roughly 40,000 to 60,000 officers. The Military Police Battalion for Special Operations (BOPE) is also slated to increase by 50 percent before 2016.¹⁰ Given the continuity in political leadership and Brazil's improving economic situation, this trend is likely to continue.

Methodologically, the planning for the security of the Olympic Games may be conceived around a matrix based upon two main components: one defined by a tremendous influx of individuals to the city (over 10,500 athletes and country-delegations, tourists, journalists, local public, etc), and another defined by events and locations (the opening ceremony, sporting events, competition areas, parking lots, the Olympic Village, city hotels, airports, the transportation system, touristic spots and more. As can be seen in the map below, Rio's Olympic Games will happen in four distinct zones, defined by their compatibility with the Games' requirements, as well as by different socio-economic characteristics.¹¹

¹⁰ See <http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2010/12/31/esforcos-na-area-de-seguranca-ja-direcionam-rio-para-as-olimpiada-de-2016-923396400.asp>.

¹¹ <http://www.economist.com/node/14587915>.

RIO: PLANNED OLYMPIC ZONES



Source: <http://www.economist.com/node/14587915>.

The zones and the activities in each are:

- *Barra* area will be the “heart” of the Games. It will accommodate the Olympic Village and the media village.
- *Copacabana* neighborhood will host outdoor sports in temporary venues.
- Maracanã Stadium will host the Opening and Closing Ceremonies.
- *Deodoro* area will be used for other competitions.

The map below denotes the locations of *favelas* that have been the targets of recent operations to clear out drug trafficking (*Alemão Complex*, *Jacarezinho*, *Vila Cruzeiro*, and *Rocinha*).¹² *Rocinha* is one of the largest *favelas* in Rio and features the greatest development towards being an urbanized neighborhood. It has its own businesses and a residents’ association with municipal functions. The

¹² <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11852588>.

remaining *favelas* in the southern zone are occupied by UPPs, which maintain vigilance against drug trafficking.

RIO: MAIN *FAVELAS*



Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11852588>.

Infrastructure changes are scheduled to route Olympics traffic through a new metro under or around *Rocinha*. It would be advisable for Rio's risk prevention team to establish contact with *Rocinha's* residence association to monitor activity there – if they have not done so already – as it will be impossible to control every variable related to the *favela*. *Rocinha's* resident population has an interest in avoiding international incidents, and could be a valuable asset in security risk reduction. As for the primary tourist destinations in the southern zone – *Ipanema*, *Copacabana*, Downtown, and *Corcovado* – the density of officers stationed in these areas should limit the potential risks.

For the enforcement authorities, the most sensitive groups to be secured are the athletes and the country-delegations; and the priority areas are the Olympic village and the sporting events areas. But these do not represent security challenges much different from what the enforcement authorities are already familiar with. It necessitates securing the perimeter and establishing security rings and check points. The difference, of course, is the magnitude of the situation; yet this can still be managed with enough police forces, extensive training, and the most advanced techniques in threat detection.

The situation gets much more complicated, however, when security provision is extended to areas not directly related to sporting events – and when athletes are not competing and will be touring around the city. Criminals may very well use additional tourist spots, the public transportation system, hotels, airports, etc., and will certainly view them as opportunities to perpetrate robberies, harass people, or sell drugs. To limit and inhibit their actions, police presence is essential, including the establishment of checkpoints (for weapons, drugs, and known criminals) at critical points of access to Rio's downtown zone. Given the narrow transit corridors, this may be best carried out during specific events, at the zone's surrounding bottlenecks. With the massive influx of people, congestion will be a problem for response teams, but due to Rio's extensive experience with major events, this problem should not be insurmountable. Finally, the occurrence of lost participants or attendees in the surrounding areas can be avoided if the logistics are properly planned for, i.e. structuring public and athlete transportation in combination with advisory information regarding excursions to be avoided.

Brazilian authorities argue that they have gained credibility and experience by having hosted the 2007 Pan American Games with no incidents. Moreover, they say that they will have the opportunity to streamline their security planning in

two additional occasions prior to the 2016 Games, as Rio will host both The International Military Sports Council (CISM)'s 5th Military World Games in July 2011, and the 2014 FIFA World Cup (Soccer). The problem however is in the magnitude of the Olympics in comparison to these events: Olympics will bring much more athletes, delegations from many more countries, and will attract much more tourists than these other sports events.

THE SECURITY STRUCTURE

Before the IOC, the Brazilian Federal Government, through the Ministry of Justice, assumed financial and operational responsibility for the security of the Olympic Games. The National Public Security Secretariat (SENASP) of the Ministry of Justice was given the task of coordinating the efforts of federal, State, and city agencies related to the security operations of the Games, and was given a budget of US\$3.5 billion for security improvements over the next 4 years – as promised by Rio Governor Sergio Cabral during Brazil's presentation before the IOC in Copenhagen.¹³ Furthermore, the World Bank has recently pledged \$485 million in funding to address conditions in the *favelas* and public transportation needs, contingent upon specific improvements.¹⁴ With all of this funding in mind, it is now useful to carry out an assessment of the security resources Brazil has at its disposal.

At the municipal level, Rio de Janeiro counts upon a municipal guard, which is basically a preventive police that has no investigative powers. At the State level, police command and control is under the State Secretary for Public

¹³ Sergio Cabral, Governor of Rio de Janeiro, presentation to the IOC, Copenhagen, Denmark, June 2009.

¹⁴ <http://en.mercopress.com/2011/03/17/world-bank-loan-to-improve-quality-of-life-in-rio-do-janeiro-s-favelas>.

Safety, which counts upon the Civilian Police (which has law enforcement authority to investigate crimes committed against criminal laws), as well as the Military Police (the State's main enforcement organization) to maintain order. Whereas the Civilian Police do not wear uniforms and do not conduct patrols, the Military Police are a uniformed police--considered an ancillary arm of the Brazilian Army--that patrols the streets. Military Police have the authority to arrest suspects, but generally transfer them to the Civilian Police. The State governor also has the Military Fire Brigade at his disposal, which, although it does not have police duties, acts as a critical part of the safety planning for events that involve large concentrations of people.

At the federal level, there are three police institutions: the Brazilian Federal Police, the Federal Highway Police, and the Federal Railway Police. The Federal Police, under the Ministry of Justice, hold enforcement responsibilities for crimes against the Federal Government and its agencies, international drug-trafficking and terrorism, and immigration and border control. The Federal Highway Police patrol federal highways and are responsible for maintaining order but not investigating crimes. The same is true for the Federal Railway Police: they patrol the federal railway system, but do not have a criminal investigation mandate. Again, these institutions may perform critical roles during the Games in regards to transportation systems.

Moreover, as a response to the rampant crime in urban centers, the Brazilian government created the National Public Security Force in November 2004. This is a specially trained and equipped body that incorporates elements from several police units for deployment in emergency situations. As it happened during the Pan American games, this force will likely be prepped for rapid emergency deployment prior to the Olympic Games; deployment itself depends upon a specific request by the State Governor to the Federal Government. However, these multiple security capacities

requires proper intelligence if they are to be utilized within the proper circumstances. Therefore, the following section sets out to describe Brazil's existing intelligence capabilities.

THE INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

Another important asset to the upcoming sporting events, and particularly to the Olympic Games, will be the Brazilian intelligence structure, especially given its historical orientation towards domestic concerns. Although intelligence organizations have existed within Brazil's government structure since 1929, its current doctrine was heavily influenced by the military dictatorship of 1964 to 1985. Widespread domestic goals and a broad concept of intelligence that valued any information that was important to the government's decision-making led the military to install an intelligence network that extended throughout the entire administration, including the federal government and States. The National Intelligence Service (SNI), whose chief had the status of Minister, could benefit from an extraordinary network that included police organizations centered around regional intelligence communities. Although the core of this system, which was extensively designed to sustain the authoritarian regime, was removed, its internal orientation remained. On December 1999, a new intelligence agency was created-- the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, (ABIN)--finally formalizing the Brazilian Intelligence System. The mandate of the Agency and the system, however, still leave extraordinary latitude for domestic intelligence incursions, even though some institutional checks were implemented.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the primary strengths of the ABIN are its ability to connect and coordinate federal level intelligence with regional level intelligence, as well as its utilization of regional intelligence

¹⁵ See law 9883/1999, December 7, 1999, http://www.abin.gov.br/modules/mastop_publish/?tac=Lei_9883_de_07%2F12%2F1999.

clusters, which were already successfully tested during the Pan American Games in 2007.

In terms of specific measures, the Government of Rio has established an Integrated Center for Command and Control (CICC) at the level of the State administration and is finalizing training plans for the police to operate in large events. In Brasília, as a result of an agreement between the Brazilian Ministry of Justice and the United Nations for Inter-regional Crime and Justice Investigation (UNICRI), the International Academy for Public Safety will be created. As a part of police training, Rio State administration is offering 73 Distance Learning Courses and will have another one in 2011--open to police and firefighters--which is specifically designed for the World Cup and the Olympic Games. Police attending these courses receive salary remuneration proportional to the courses they take. The Military Police Battalion for Special Operations (BOPE) will also receive training specifically designed for these events, which will include the areas of counterterrorism, hostage rescue, countering bomb threats, and language. Along the same lines, attention has been dedicated to the improvement of intelligence capabilities and to the exchange of police personnel with other countries, namely France, Spain, Colombia, the United States, and Italy. And finally, in February 2011, a corruption scheme uncovered by the Federal Police led to the arrest of 30 police officers and the replacement of the Chief of the Civil Police.¹⁶ This serves as an indicator of the Brazilian government's political will to redress with efficacy problems related to corruption.

Thus, security concerns relating to the crime threat for the 2016 Olympic Games can be measured against the policies and measures that have already been put in motion. The institutional reforms, investment in infrastructure, and

¹⁶ See, "New Female Police Is a First for Rio," *New York Times*, Feb 16, 2011.

additional resources committed to the provision of security for the Games are significant steps in deterring criminal activity. Not only are these changes bolstering that goal, they are also changing the landscape of Rio's security environment, adding the element of a "moving target," so to speak. As it becomes clearer that the Brazilian government is taking every measure possible to address the security situation from a criminal standpoint, it will also affect other potential threats to the Olympic Games originating from outside Brazil. This is especially the case given the worst types of criminals present in Rio, including organized groups with military class armaments, like the *Comando Vermelho*, and the *Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)*.¹⁷

TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO THE 2016 OLYMPIC GAMES

Thanks to the extraordinary progress of telecommunications, the Olympic Games have become *the* global mass media event with an unmatched capacity to capture and mesmerize the attention of millions of viewers. Yet due to this global media exposure, there are incentives in place for terrorism

¹⁷ *Comando Vermelho* is a Brazilian criminal organization founded in 1979 in the prison Cândido Mendes, on the Ilha Grande island, Rio de Janeiro, as a collection of ordinary convicts and left-wing political prisoners who were members of the *Falange Vermelha* (Red Phalanx), which fought the military dictatorship. During the entire 1990s the criminal organization was the strongest in all of Rio de Janeiro, but today the principal leaders have been arrested or are dead, and the organization is not as strong (http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Comando_Vermelho). *Primeiro Comando da Capital*, or *PCC* ("First Command of the Capital"), is a Brazilian prison gang and criminal organization founded in 1993 by inmates of Taubaté prison in Sao Paulo. PCC has been responsible for several criminal activities such as prison breaks, prison riots, drug trafficking and other similar activities (http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Primeiro_Comando_da_Capital).

that must not be ignored. The Olympic Games have become very attractive to those interested in promoting their political ideas – or perhaps to demonstrate their power – in the global arena.

Brazil is not normally associated with the perpetration or target of terrorism, particularly the terrorism motivated by ideological extremism. It has taken steps to control the porousness of the Tri-border region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), previously alleged to have been involved in terrorist activity following 9/11 but no evidence of a training camp or bomb-making facility has ever been produced. That being said, terrorist groups may not have a particular interest in hitting Brazil, but they may be interested in attacking other participant countries, or merely in advertising their respective agendas, and this could make the Rio Olympic Games a potential target.

South America has not been a stranger to terrorist acts, or even to terrorism perpetrated by Muslim extremism. In 1992, thirty people were killed in the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and in 1994 another bombing was leveled against the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) – also in Buenos Aires – killing 85 people. Other attacks, although under different motivations, had happened prior to that, in the context of domestic ideological and political conflicts. Colombia, for example, has been the target of bombings and kidnappings. Brazil has also recorded some cases of terrorism – such as bombings and kidnappings – that were perpetrated by leftist organizations during the country's military dictatorship (1964-1985); and its history also features the curious case of a failed terrorist attack perpetrated by government officials at odds with the country's political opening to democracy.¹⁸

¹⁸ On the evening of April 30, 1981, a bomb accidentally exploded during a concert in Rio de Janeiro (Rio Centro Pavilion) that had been organized to celebrate Labor Day. The bomb exploded within a car,

THE RISK AND VULNERABILITIES ASSESSMENT OF TERRORISM TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES

As previously stated, the current realities and strategic environment of Rio de Janeiro show that the risks of crime during the Olympic Games are much higher than the risks of a terrorist attack. Yet, when terrorist threats are analyzed via a comparative perspective, the intrinsic vulnerabilities of the 2016 games in Rio seem much higher than that for London in 2012. For example, recent terror attacks in the North Atlantic were made possible by the failure of passport screening and domestic security officials to identify known security liabilities; such shortcomings could easily transpire in Brazil, particularly since it currently offers few extraordinary obstacles for the entry into the country that are comparable to those of the U.S. and Britain.¹⁹

Furthermore, could terrorists find easy access to weapons and explosives in Rio? This is the point where criminal activities in Rio converge with terrorist threats. If each criminal organization has access to weaponry – including weapons with high lethal power – terrorists would not encounter major obstacles in obtaining the weapons necessary for an eventual attack. And as crime and drug traffic have overwhelmingly demonstrated, Brazilian borders are so extensive and porous that it makes it tremendously difficult to effectively control the inflow of these powerful

killing the Brazilian Army Sargent Guilherme Pereira do Rosario, and injuring the Brazilian Army Captain Wilson Dias Machado. Investigation following the incident demonstrated that the bomb – which exploded prematurely – was part of a plot designed by extreme right sectors of the government to thwart Brazil's on-going process towards democracy. The intention of the perpetrators was to interrupt the concert and blame the extreme left for the terrorist attack. However, the event ended up hastening the deterioration of the military dictatorship in Brazil and the return to democracy.

¹⁹ This underscores the importance of screening arrivals before they are allowed on Brazilian soil.

items into the country. Neither can we discard the use of criminal networks to facilitate weapons and explosives transfers to terrorist cells. That said, current impediments to the entry of terrorist “commandos,” weapons, and explosives can indeed be surpassed, which as a whole, could carry overarching negative consequences. For example, from the terrorist’s perspective – and assuming we are dealing with ideological/religious extremists – Brazil may be perceived as a location that can provide valuable assets for the sustainment and support necessary for the preparation of an attack. As the forensics of other terrorist attacks have demonstrated, the existence of a supporting network already in place is of critical importance to the attackers.²⁰

The other fact to be analyzed then is the Brazilian government forces’ ability to anticipate and prevent a terrorist attack. This relies intensively upon the intelligence capability and, as we have seen before in this paper, Brazil does not have a strong history of foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence; conversely, the Brazilian Intelligence System’s domestic orientation is a liability when it comes to terrorism originating from abroad. Therefore, Brazil’s ability to anticipate a terrorist attack will rely extensively upon partner intelligence organizations interested in sharing tactics and techniques with their Brazilian counterparts. And certainly, Brazil will count upon reputable intelligence organizations equally interested in preventing a terrorist attack. The challenge will relate to the need for coordination and exchanges well before the actual Games. A related challenge will be the usual reluctance of intelligence organizations (even within the same country) to share substantive intelligence. Therefore, Brazilian intelligence organizations should soon begin to coordinate intelligence

²⁰ See 9-11 Commission Report Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Edition: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html>.

with their counterparts – particularly with the Americans, Israelis, British, and Germans – and define cooperation protocols and exchanges aimed at the Olympic Games.

Preventive policing and security of the premises are also of course essential to avoid or to reduce the impacts of a terrorist attack during the Olympic Games. As we have seen, the terrorist attack that occurred during the Munich games was made easier to execute because of inadequate police at the Olympic village. However, country authorities are also reluctant to adopt safety measures that could appear to be excessive or draconian. Indeed, absolute security could transform the Olympic village and sports stadiums into highly restrictive areas, and this is not what the organizers want. The key is to strike the right balance, and this is a challenge whose solution resides in the use of specially trained “not-in-uniform” police units. Again, the incorporation of lessons learned from previous Olympic Games is essential and puts tremendous pressure on Brazilians to closely track the measures and procedures adopted at the 2012 London Olympic Games.

Perhaps the most vulnerable component of the 2016 Olympic Games will be Rio’s congested urban transportation system, even though the original plan for the 2016 Games anticipated several changes to the transportation infrastructure. Furthermore, preventive measures are also difficult because the existing system was not designed with extraordinary security concerns in mind. This was illustrated, for example, when on March 12, 2009, a small hijacked plane crashed in a shopping center parking lot within the city of Goiania, after having flown over the city for approximately 2 hours. The victims were no more than the hijacker himself – who was not a terrorist but rather a disturbed man – and his kidnapped 5-year-old daughter, but it could have been worse. The occurrence effected debate over Brazil’s air space vulnerability, since the plane had no flight plan, and was considered a threat by Brazilian air defense authorities. The

Rio Olympics will therefore require specific protocols – including military participation – for the likelihood of similar circumstances.

Here, practices and protocols developed by the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the wake of September 11, 2001 – including measures to improve inter-agency relationships and armed forces joint responses – could be of exceptional utility for Brazilians to consider.²¹ This is an area where U.S. cooperation may be particularly welcome. By the same token, information on the protocols and contingency plans developed by the U.S. military for pre-deployment in anticipation of major public events may also be useful to Brazilian authorities.²²

Finally, should a terrorist attack occur and cause massive casualties or a disruption of essential services, Rio de Janeiro and its surrounding cities will count upon its emergency units and hospitals. The Civil Defense Secretariat is also equipped to prepare for and help in times of major disasters. But again, the problem lies within the potentially large-scale nature that a disaster wrought by a terrorist attack might bring. For example, the January 2011 flood and mudslide in the nearby region of Petropolis – which left a death toll of over 600 – demonstrated the fragility of the system to deal with major disasters; relief teams could not reach and deliver help to several critical areas for days, and the region’s hospitals were quickly overwhelmed. Therefore, another option might be to rely upon the preparedness and the resources of the military, which in turn must rely upon pre-deployed emergency kits and ready-to-be-deployed field hospitals.

²¹ See the Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, 2008-2013: “One Team, One Mission, Securing our Homeland,” http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf.

²² See CRS Report: Homeland Security Roles and Missions for the U.S. Northern Command, updated June 3, 2008.

CONCLUSIONS

Considering Brazil's existing security capabilities, and some good yet modest improvements in police action, it appears that urban crime's relevant effect upon the Olympic Games will be minor. Moreover, as the federal government did prior to and during the 2007 Rio Pan American Games, it will again deploy massive forces during the 2016 Games – including the use of military – to strengthen local prevention and enforcement capabilities. It has therefore already demonstrated a capacity to establish security belts that prevent criminals from gaining access to athletes and tourists during past major events, while today the government continues to implement innovative policies to address organized crime and a more centralized urban transportation network.

Although Rio and Brazil show thus far no apparent connection to terrorist organizations, a terrorist attack during 2016 Rio Olympic Games cannot be discarded. Terrorists seek targets that allow them to hit their enemies or promote their political causes, and large events such as the Olympics can of course offer these possibilities. Furthermore, Rio's Olympic Games could be perceived as an attractive soft target because of Brazil's unfamiliarity with terrorism.

Brazil does have significant governmental forces to prevent and respond to a potential terrorist attack, and the government has signaled that they will put all of these forces into place. However, there is a clear problem when it comes to the country's lack of familiarity with foreign-based terrorist threats, which will require specific preparation, training, and cooperation with foreign institutions. Additional measures will also be necessary to improve the command and control over Brazil's various agencies prior to and during the games, making consultation with more experienced actors essential. For example, elements of the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD),

sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command, may eventually be useful to Brazilians. The Southern Command has developed considerable experience in facing non-conventional threats and disaster response; experience which can be applied to major public event preparation and emergency response. An ACTD program that may be particularly interesting to Brazilians is the Counter-Bomb/Counter-Bomber (CB2) program, which is designed to prevent attacks with improvised explosive devices (IED); another ACTD goal is to develop capabilities for improving joint and interagency relationships, which is also critical for Brazilian preparation towards the Olympic Games.²³

Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian authorities still have a long way to go in preparing for the 2016 Olympic Games. Some preliminary steps have been adopted, such as the creation of an integrated command and control center, but this is only the beginning. As similar events happened around the world have demonstrated, effective security demands long term preparation capable of reassuring an efficient inter-agency coordination. For this, organizational preparation is needed, and modernization of forces is fundamental. Moreover, security plans must stem from realistic considerations about threats that do not respect boundaries or neutrality values. Of paramount importance, Brazil must expedite its security preparations for the coming Games.

²³ See U.S. Southern Command website:
<http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/scienceTech.php>.

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