The disastrous consequences of a drilling rig failure in Cuban waters will spread over a number of vital interests of the US and of nations in the Caribbean in the general environs of Cuba. The US fishing and tourist industries will take major blows from a significant oil spill in Cuban waters. Substantial ecological damage and damage to beaches could occur for the US, Mexico, Haiti and other countries as well.

The need exists for the US to have the ability to independently monitor the reality of Cuban oceanic oil development. The advantages of having an independent US early warning system providing essential real-time data on the possible failure of a drilling rig in Cuban waters are numerous. An ideal early warning system would timely inform the US that an event has occurred or is likely to occur in, essentially, real-time.

Presently operating monitoring systems that could provide early warning information are satellite-based. Such systems can indicate the locations of both drilling rigs and operational drilling platforms. The system discussed/proposed in this paper relies upon low-frequency underwater sound. The proposed system can complement existing monitoring systems, which offer ocean-surface information, by providing sub-ocean surface, near-real time, information. This “integrated system” utilizes and combines (integrates) many different forms of information, some gathered through sub-ocean surface systems, and some through electromagnetic-based remote sensing (satellites, aircraft, unmanned arial vehicles), and other methods as well. Although the proposed integrated system is in the developmental stage, it is based upon well-established technologies.

• The May 16, 2010 Parliamentary elections increased President Fernández political party to 31 out of 32 Senate seats, and 105 out of 183 Chamber of Deputies seats; this is a total increase of 18 seats from the previous term.
• Polls indicate that President Fernández has a 54 percent approval rating.
• Polls also indicate that Haiti is not among the most pressing issues of concern to Dominican citizens. Instead, 65 percent of the population identifies drug trafficking and corruption as the greatest concerns.
• The immigration debate will remain the major consideration in domestic politics in the Dominican Republic; 62.4 percent of Dominicans polled think that the military should be strengthened along the DR-Haitian border.

However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups.

It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region.

The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following:

• Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military;
• Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups.
• Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups;
• Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition;
• Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as:

• Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity.
• Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains.
• Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time.
• To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year.
• Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community.
• After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical.
• Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units.
• Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

Progress has been made across the region’s electric sector, beginning with reforms in the 1990s and the 1996 signing of a regional treaty aimed at the development of a regional energy integration project – the Central American Electrical Interconnection System, or SIEPAC. A fundamental SIEPAC goal is to set up a regional electric market and a regulatory system. Indeed, after many years of development, SIEPAC is poised to open a new chapter in Central America’s electric infrastructure and market. But this new era must contend with critical issues such as the need to consolidate the regional electric market, political issues surrounding the venture, and security concerns. Moreover, local conflicts, in different degrees, have become priorities for policymakers, and these are possible barriers to completing the project.

The goals of the SIEPAC project and of deepening the broader electric integration process are possible if national and regional decision makers understand that cooperative decision making will produce better results than separate national decision making. Enhanced regional understanding and cooperative decision making, combined with an effort to reorient the terminology and dialogue vis-à-vis energy efficiency in Central America, form the core recommendations of this paper.

The results of this study reveal that China – avoiding intra-regional competition through a strategic diversification of sectors – has been able to secure critical resources for its population as well as promote enduring alliances in the region that could represent a plausible cause of concern for U.S. interests. In this regard, China’s avoidance of a direct challenge to traditional partners’ influence has responded to the gaps left by a gradual, but steady lack of U.S. involvement.

• Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs.
• The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation.
• The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly.
• The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware.
• The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material.
• In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism.
• Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same.
• The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox.
• The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM.
• The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives.
• Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space.
• The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration.
• Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21^st century.
• Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region.
• The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes.
• Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states.
• The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean.
• RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment.
• Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous.

These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that:

• Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups.
• Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common.
• In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction.
• Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms.
• Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police.

However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed.

Measures targeted toward the military should include:

• Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service.
• A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups.
• More effective securing of military arsenals.
• Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

The Communist Party hypotheses helps explain how the historical and current structures of Party oversight of the military have been lacking in strength and reliability in Cuba, while they traditionally have been more robust in China and Vietnam. The BA hypotheses helps explain how, due to the lack of a strong civilian institutional oversight, the Cuban military has grown into a bureaucratic entity with many political officers holding autonomous positions of power, an outcome that is not prevalent in the Chinese and Vietnamese examples. Thus, with the establishment of a bureaucratic military government and with the absence of a strong party oversight, the Cuban military has been able to protect its economic endeavors while the Chinese and Vietnamese MBC regimes have contracted.

Indigenous groups, which have achieved greater political voice over the past decade, are protesting against government violations. These protests have reached the media and received international attention, leading the discourse on topics such as civil and human rights violations. When this happens, the State finds itself “between a rock and a hard place”: In a debate between indigenous groups’ rights and economic sustainability.

While South American states have historically opposed nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation. Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security community. On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of the international system. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a Venezuelan threat.

Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors.

Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups.

The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy.

Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime.

Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

Many of the Shi’ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chávez’ Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States.

Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new convert, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions.

While conducting this research, no websites directly claiming to be linked to Hezbollah were found, although there numerous sites hosted by that group that were active until around 2006. Several of the inactive links are supportive of Hezbollah as a political party. No websites linked to al Qaeda were found. Yet a substantial Internet network remains operational. Much of the outreach for Shi’ite Muslims, closely tied to Iran, is sponsored on numerous websites across the region, including El Salvador, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia. Numerous Facebook forums for discussion are also hosted around Latin America. These links must be viewed in the context of the rapidly expanding diplomatic, intelligence, political and economic ties of Iran in recent years with the self-proclaimed Bolivarian states.

Given the sparse literature available and the rich vein of un-mined information on the sites cited as well as others that one could find with additional research, the cyber network of Islamist groups remains one of the least understood or studied facets of their presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. It merits significantly more investigation.

In this context, this paper discusses the mechanisms used by Latin American governments, particularly the new authoritarianism of the left, to silence dissident voices. Many of these mechanisms are legal, found in laws related to personal injury and defamation. Others have been of constitutional nature, invoking states of emergency or national security concerns. Some governments have used institutional means to close down newspapers and other sources of information.

Current media conditions in Latin America show growing polarization. This has led to considerable levels of violence and intimidation against editors, journalists, and news crews in several countries. It is precisely this type of deterioration of fundamental rights that leads to questioning the strength and sustainability of Latin American democracies.

As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate.

The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.

This article traces how these factors influenced the decision to intervene in Latin America during the era of Dollar Diplomacy and during the Cold War. It concludes with three possible scenarios that could lead to a reemergence of an American interventionist policy in Latin America. It makes the argument that even though the United Sates has not intervened in Latin America during the twenty-two years, it is far from clear that American interventions in Latin America will be consigned to the past.

Since 1999 when Argentina’s oil production peaked at approximately 800,000 barrels per day, there has been a 24 percent decrease in its oil output. The country’s oil reserves have also been in steady decline. Yet, the recently enacted reforms by Argentina’s government to incentivize foreign investment in the oil industry seem to be working, allowing investors to negotiate the terms of exploration directly with local governments.

As a result, foreign investment is increasing, as well as new willingness to finance exploration of untapped reserves. Also, the discovery of shale oil in Argentina may provide the potential to become a key exporter in the region. Nonetheless, there are challenges that need to be overcome and it may be years before the various oil projects underway become profitable. The success of current oil projects, coupled with the potential of shale oil, new discoveries and the sustainability of the current energy policy reforms will likely determine if Argentina is finally able to fulfill its potential and exert itself as an oil exporter country in Latin America.

President Chávez has built an impressive record of electoral victories; winning every electoral contest except one since coming to power in 1999. He continues to receive relatively high levels of support among sectors of Venezuelan society. However, there is evidence of growing discontent with high crime rates, high levels of inflation, and significant corruption in the public administration. Using data from the AmericasBarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2008 and 2010, this paper seeks to examine the basis of Chávez’s popular support.

In general, the AmericasBarometer findings suggest that Venezuelans support for President Chávez is closely linked to the access to social programs and that as long as the government is able to fund these social programs or missions, particularly MERCAL and Barrio Adentro, it will possess an important tool to garner and sustain support for President Chávez. Our analysis, however, also indicates that evaluations of the national economic situation, more than crime or insecurity, are a key factor that could undermine support for the regime.

Paraguay features a farm sector in a state of crisis, in which cattle-ranchers, peasants and agro-exporting companies live in a constant strife. The Paraguayan Departments that are the most affected by this situation are Concepciόn, San Pedro, Canindeyú y Caazapá, which also suffer from a weak government presence. This deficiency has made these departments ripe for drug-trafficking activity by Brazilian groups such as Primer Comando Capital (i.e., First Capital command), also PCC and Comando Vermelho, (i.e., The Red Command). That is why many peasants, now recruited by EPP, have joined the drug-trafficking business and that, not only as marihuana growers but as “campanas” (i.e., early warning sentinels) for the organization. This helps shape their attitudes for their future involvement in all areas of drug-trafficking.

Paraguayan society is the result of social inequity and inequality, such as those resulting from a lack of opportunity. Although Paraguay has successfully recovered from the last world economic crisis, economic growth, by itself, does not ensure an improvement in the quality of life. As long as such economic and social gaps persist and the government fails to enact the policies that would result in a more just society and toward EPP neutralization or containment, the latter is bound to grow stronger.

In this context, the situation in Paraguay calls for more research into the EPP phenomenon. It would also seem necessary for Paraguay to promote an open national debate that includes all sectors of society in order to raise consciousness and to induce society to take actual steps to eliminate the EPP, as well as any other group that might arise in the immediate future. EPP has strong connections with the Frente Patriόtico Manuel Rodríguez in Chile and other armed groups and peasant movements in other countries of this region. Although most governments in the region are aware that the armed struggle is not a solution to current problems, it might be worth it to hold a regional debate about armed or insurgent groups in Latin American to seek common strategies and cooperation on dealing with them since the expansion of these armed groups is a problem for all.

The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves.

The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities.

The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure.

Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.