

January 1983

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**CARIBBEAN MIGRATION
AS A STRUCTURAL REALITY**

Dialogues # 13

January 1983


By: Anthony P. Maingot

PREFACE

The US Congress' inability to enact recent legislation vitally affecting the Caribbean suggests the continuing divergence of views regarding this region which is so important to US interests. In this Occasional Papers Series Dialogues, Dr. Anthony Maingot, Professor of Sociology at Florida International University and Associate Editor of Caribbean Review, examines the structural realities of Caribbean migration and the likely impact of the much discussed Caribbean Basin Initiative on migration flows throughout the Caribbean and the US.

This paper is a revised version which was earlier presented to the Conference on Caribbean Migration sponsored by Georgetown University and Greater Miami United at Miami, Florida on December 8, 1982. It alludes to the need for a Caribbean wide meeting on migration which might begin to harmonize immigration and emigration laws. In fact, such a gathering is long overdue. It could serve to establish a region-wide agenda of migration issues, complementary to and eventually replacing the fitful and unsatisfactory US initiatives on the issue.

Mark B. Rosenberg
Director




"CARIBBEAN MIGRATION AS A STRUCTURAL REALITY"

By

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Revised Version of Paper Presented
to the
Conference on Caribbean Migration
Sponsored by
Georgetown University
and
Greater Miami United
Miami, Florida
December 8, 1982



I. INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1982 the President of the Dominican Republic, Salvador Jorge Blanco, cautioned a meeting of U.S. and Caribbean Statesmen that the "massive" migration out of the Caribbean had become a "torrent". "The problem the United States faces," he warned, "is how to decrease their internal protectionist policies, so that instead of having more legal or illegal Caribbean emigrants, they should receive more regionally produced goods." President Jorge noted the incongruity that the costs incurred by the U.S. in 1980 to lodge and keep illegal Caribbean migrants was twice the U.S. bilateral assistance to the Dominican Republic that year. (1)

The Dominican President was not the only one to make a case for increased aid as a means of slowing down migration, legal and illegal; it is in fact also one of the arguments undergirding the Reagan Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative.

While there can be no arguments against increased assistance to the Dominican Republic and the Caribbean and even more urgently to the removal of barriers to Caribbean exports, there is little basis to the assumption that doing this will stop migration, in the Caribbean or elsewhere. The problem is simply too staggering. It is calculated for instance that the Third World will have to create some 600 million new jobs over the next twenty years in order to absorb the young adults entering the labor force.

(1) Speech to Sixth Annual Conference on the Caribbean.
Miami, Florida, December 7, 1982.

These young adults will represent some 40% of these Third World populations. (1) The case of Mexico illustrates the trend: with not quite 1/3 the population of the U.S., it adds in absolute numbers 2/3 more people to its population every year. Mexico will need a 6.5% growth rate per year plus a yearly outmigration of 250,000 just to keep up with the 3.5% growth in the workforce. (2) One need not belabor the point that the recent crisis in the Mexican economy leaves no one sanguine about such achievements. Similarly, the present political turmoil in Central America which^{is}/in so many respects a consequence of the structural economic crisis, will surely increase pressures for migration to the U.S. With some 400,000 to 500,000 Salvadoreneans already in the U.S., American authorities are presently deporting over 1,000 of them per month. With unemployment rates which vary between 20% in Costa Rica to 50% in Honduras, these economies appear incapable of creating enough^{jobs}/for these unemployed plus the 7 million new workers who will enter the market by the year 2000. As the Environmental Fund put it, in Central America "the potential migrants to the U.S. through the rest of this century are already born." (3) But population pressures are not the only reasons for a desire to migrate. This fact is illustrated by the case of Cuba, the only Caribbean Basin society presently experiencing a downward

(1) Citedly Richard E. Benedick, Coordinator of Population Affairs, U.S.S.D. before "Houston Media" Roundtable, 10/23/81.

(2) William P. Butz et. al., Demographic Challenges in America's Future, (Santa Monica, Calif., Rand, May 1982) p. 24.

(3) T.E.F. Data, September 1982, p. 2.

trend in fertility. It is evident that the factors causing that downward trend are the same ones which tend to "push" outmigration: the poor performance of the economy and the disappointment of expectations. (1)

These are only some of the more global or macrosociological facts, which make it appear that the expectation that a foreign assistance package such as the CBI will bring about radical shifts in pressures to migrate is misplaced. There are other reasons for scepticism.

It is the theme of this presentation that the demographic and economic conditions in the Caribbean region combine with a set of social and historical factors to create a situation of migration best called "structural" as distinct from time or event-fixed. The direction of the flow might shift occasionally, the magnitude might vary but the pressures are constant and the movement will be constant until such pressures subside. Because it is driven by both material forces (geography, demography and economics) and because it is now an integral part of Caribbean consciousness, high rates of migration will most probably continue into the near future. (2)

Given this reality plus the apparent inability of the U.S.

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- (1) Cf. Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Lizandro Perez, "Socio-Economic Factors in Cuba's Fertility Decline", in Population and Development Review, Vol. 8 (September 1982), Pp. 513-37.
 - (2) Cf. Mary M. Kritz' discussion of the "complex and intricate pattern" of intraregional migration in Kritz, Charles B. Veely and Silvano M. Tomasini (ed.), Global Trends in Migration (N.Y. Center for Migration Studies, 1981), Pp. 208-233.

to implement existing immigration legislation or enact new ones,⁽¹⁾ it seems reasonable to look at the factors which led to this condition of structural migration. The analysis here is limited to legal migration which gives us more accurate figures as well as a window onto official policy. It is fair to assume, however, that where the pressures for legal migration are great so are the pressures for illegal movements.

II. CARIBBEAN MIGRATION: FIVE STRUCTURAL FEATURES

It is calculated that during the late 1970's and early 1980's some 80% of all immigrants to the U.S. came from Latin America and Asia. Proportionally, however, the nations of the Caribbean Basin provided the largest share. Korea, with 41 million people sent 29,248 immigrants to the U.S. in 1979; the nations of the Caribbean (excluding Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia) represent 39 million people but sent 92,000 legal immigrants to the U.S. that same year. Korea sent 711 per million and the average for Europe was 125 per million while for the Caribbean it was 1150 per million.

Further, in the Caribbean it is the island state which has been sending the highest number of immigrants to the U.S., to wit:

(1) The theme of this essay is premised on the assumption that the U.S. will remain a pluralist, civilian democracy in which the militarization of the borders or the curtailment of due process would be unthinkable.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Immigrants</u>	<u>#Per Mil. Pop.</u>
Barbados	.3 million	2,461	8,203/million
Dominican Republic	5.7 million	17,519	3,078/million
Haiti	6.1 million	6,433	1,054/million
Jamaica	2.2 million	19,714	8,960/million
Trinidad/ Tobago	1.1 million	5,225	4,750/million

While the European share of total immigrants went from 59% in 1951-60 to 19% in 1971-80, the West Indian share climbed from 5% to 18%. The Haitian share went up from 0.7% in 1957-61 to 3.6% in 1967-71 and 3% in 1972-76.

Clearly and evidently, the more viscious aspects of the racial bias which characterized so much of U.S. immigration policy up to 1965, have abated visibly while other less desirable legacies also appear to be in fast retreat today.

It is good to remember, however, that despite this past racial bias and despite the fact that the numbers of Caribbean people arriving now are greater, the movement has a long history. It takes time for any such movement to assume the structural features which Caribbean migration has today. We can identify five important dimensions to that structural reality which are best characterised as giving shape to a "pull" syndrome.

1. The self-contained geographical space which is the Caribbean. No major mountain barriers nor unmanageable bodies of water separate potential migrants from their destinies. Even the Caribbean Sea flows like a river from South to North as does the constant winds which are part of this stream; when and where

Caribbean man could not walk to his destination he rowed or sailed to it. He still does as the truly fantastic trek of the Haitian sailboat from that Island through the Bahamas to Florida demonstrates.

2. The movement to the U.S. tended to be preceded by earlier moves, very often to sites of U.S. financed or managed job opportunities. For instance, the building of the Panama Canal drew large numbers of West Indians to that site. Just from Barbados, 20,000 men were recruited, which was 10% of the island population and 40% of all adult males.⁽¹⁾ But as David McCullough writes, "... for every man who was picked to go to Panama there were five or more others eager for the chance."⁽²⁾ From Panama they moved to work in banana plantations and build railroads in the rest of Central America. West Indians also worked on U.S. owned plantations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic.⁽³⁾ Today these English-speaking Central Americans are moving to the U.S.

This historical experience of West Indians with migration and with U.S. capital and business abroad created two additional characteristics critical to a "structural" condition of migration:

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- (1) By the 1970's Barbados' Crude Emigration Rate (emigration as a percent of native born inhabitants to just the U.S.A. and Canada continued to be 10.5% despite a zero population growth rate.
 - (2) The Path Between the Seas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), p. 475.
 - (3) Jose del Castillo found that British West Indians were second only to Haitians in the Dominican sugar estates in the 1920's (La inmigración de braceros... 1900-1930. Santo Domingo: Cuadernos del ENDIA, No. 7).

(a) An attitude that migrating was the best avenue for success and that exercising such an option was a "right". There was group approval for individual decisions to migrate and group expectations about remittances and future sponsorships of others.

(b) The necessary social-cultural enclaves, those social networks which attracted others and facilitated their entry and success were built either directly in the U.S. or in the intermediate, U.S.-controlled areas in the Caribbean. As important as these "stepping stones" migrations to the U.S. were, there was of course a significant direct movement from the West Indies to the U.S. and this, despite the racially-biased immigration system in operation in the 1900-10 period. During that decade 30,000 arrived; in 1910-20, some 60,000; and during the 1920's some 40,000. By 1930 West Indian blacks were about 1% of the U.S. black population and about 25% of the population of Harlem.

The presence of such a "critical mass" was both cause and effect of the third feature of Caribbean migration.

3. The successful assimilation of Caribbean man. Thomas Sowell notes that as early as 1901, West Indians owned 20% of the Black businesses in Manhattan, were represented beyond their numbers in the professions, while second generation West Indians have higher incomes than U.S. blacks and whites and have below average unemployment rates. They also have lower rates of fertility and crime than either black or white Americans. Sowell's explanation that "West Indians were much more frugal,

hard-working and entrepreneurial", and that, "their children worked harder and out-performed native black children in school,"⁽¹⁾ describes many other immigrant groups.

They certainly also illustrate the success of more recent Caribbean migrants: Cubans and Haitians. These success stories, then act as powerful incentives to their countryman to move to the U.S.A. also.

4. A final structural characteristic of Caribbean movements has to do with the continuing role in international relations of ethnicity both in official policy as well as in what is today known as transnational forces, i.e., forces which operate independent from official or governmental actions.

This is one of the most difficult areas to analyze because while we are dealing with attitudes and perceptions as realities on the one hand there can be no doubt that official policy formulation also continues to be important. It is evident for instance that the 1965 changes in immigration law were strongly influenced by the ideas of Lynden Johnson's Great Society which in turn had been influenced by the civil rights movement. American blacks made the linkage between their gains in civil rights with the rights of foreign blacks to equal access to U.S. residence through immigration reform. This tendency to linkage

(1) Ethnic America (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 219.

continues and has generated renewed awareness of two critical roles played by ethnicity.

(a) The first is in internal U.S. politics. Caribbean migrants (both black and white) have been quick to recognize that while the "immigration problem" is a secular one in this society, the race and ethnic problem is very much also a moral problem. Even before they become citizens they learn the value of ethnic bargaining and have made great strides through the use of the mechanisms created by U.S. laws generally and Civil Rights movement specifically. ⁽¹⁾

(b) The second demonstrates the link between foreign policy and immigration policy. Once Fidel Castro decided that Cuba was an "Afro-Latin" nation and began to use race in international politics--the linkages with South Africa and other racially-tense areas logically make U.S. foreign policy towards the Caribbean sensitive to the race issue.

The point is, of course, that as Table No. 1 demonstrates, the Caribbean Basin is predominantly black or mixed. Race and ethnicity will continue to play an important role in international politics and therefore also in U.S. thinking and actions on immigration policy.

(1) Cf. Anthony P. Maingot, "Ethnic Bargaining and the Non-Citizen: Haitians and Cubans in Miami", Report to the U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs, Miami, Florida, 1981; also by Maingot on this subject, "Ideology, Politics, and Citizenship in the American Debate on Immigration Policy: Beyond Consensus," in Mary M. Kritz (ed.), U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 1982) Pp. 361-379.

TABLE No. 1

The racial structure of the population of the Caribbean islands, 1960*

	<i>Caribbean Islands (total)</i>		<i>Greater Antilles</i>		<i>Lesser Antilles</i>		<i>Bahamas</i>	
	<i>1000</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>1000</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>1000</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>1000</i>	<i>%</i>
Whites	7 800	39.6	7 700	44.6	80	3.4	23	20
Negroes	7 800	39.6	6 000	34.8	1 720	73.2	90	80
Mulattoes	3 670	18.6	3 550	20.6	120	5.1	—	—
Asian Indians	350	1.8	—	—	350	14.9	—	—
Indians and Mestizos	80	0.4	—	—	80	3.4	—	—
Total	19 700	100.0	17 250	100.0	2 350	100.0	113	100

* approximate figures

Source: Helmut Blume, The Caribbean Islands, (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1974).

5. The fifth and final characteristic is less permanent than the previous four but appears to have become enough of a part of U.S. thinking on immigration to be considered structural. We refer here to the fact that both law and sentiment seem to provide strong and enduring support to the principle of family reunification as one of the centerpieces of immigration law. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy appointed by President Carter recommended in 1980 that "the reunification of families continue to play a major and important role in U.S. immigration policy." Similarly the ill-fated Simpson-Massoli Bill of 1982 retained this principle of family reunification eventhough it established a zero-sum situation between different groups of relatives ("preferences"). Be that as it may, the fact is this principle of family reunification takes on a mathematical dimension when we observe that, as Tables No. 1, A and B demonstrate, the number of Caribbean people already in the legal immigration pipeline is substantial: 438,841 in all seven preference categories. Again, we note the demand from the islands by observing that the Hispanic Caribbean with 32 times more population than the Insular Caribbean has less than 5 times the active visa applicants. By checking the meaning of each preference in Appendix "A" and noting the numbers in Tables No. 1 (A) and (B) you note the significance of second and fifth preferences, indications of the strength of both the immediate and extended Caribbean family systems. These strengths become part of the "structure" through

its contribution to their networks, their success and their sense of "right" to migrate. (1)

These five features, therefore, are parts of a "pull" syndrome: they mutually reinforce each other, gaining strength as they interact over time.

To this point the argument has dealt with only one half of any migration equation: the "pull" of the targetted area of settlement. One has to deal with the central idea behind the CBI intended which was to sufficiently improve conditions in the sending countries so as to mitigate the pressure of the "push" factors. As it turns out, however, a set of forces are operating in these sending countries which are structural and not of easy solution.

THE STRUCTURE OF CARIBBEAN "PUSH" FACTORS

In his fundamentally influential 1950 treatise on economic development in the West Indies, W. Arthur Lewis made the assertion that "the case for rapid industrialization in the West Indies rests chiefly on over-population." Agriculture could not do it: industrialization in manufacturing was the answer but, even this, only partly so; as Lewis understood it: "There are two other principal opportunities, namely the development of the tourist industry, and emigration." (2)

(1) It is interesting to see the spirited W.I. defence of the H-2 Program in operation since 1942 and which today hires some 16,000 British West Indians. It is generally regarded as "legitimately" a West Indian program just as Mexicans regard movement to the U.S.A. as historically legitimate.

(2) "The Industrialization of the British West Indies", Caribbean Economic Review, II (May 1950). Sir Arthur Lewis was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1980.

Even before Lewis ~~treatise~~ and certainty after it, the assumption of continued and uninterrupted high rates of migration had become an integral part of West Indian thinking and planning on economic development. The Barbados Development Plan, 1979-1983, for instance, makes projections for population and employment based-on three assumptions: a stable pattern of mortality, a marginal decline in fertility and "a continuation of the level of emigration experienced in the post censal period..." And as Arthur Lewis had theorized three decades earlier,^{so}/the Barbadians also project^{ed} that while the level of employment in agriculture would remain static, there was to be some increase in agricultural productivity. The real growth would be in manufacturing, expected to grow by 4.9%, and services (government and tourist), expected to grow by 5%.

The problem is that neither in Barbados -- where fertility rates have been dropping -- nor in the rest of the Caribbean -- where they have not -- are things working out the way they were supposed to. Table No. 4 shows that, as Lewis predicted, agriculture has not been able to absorb new labor but that, unlike what he predicted, its productivity has also been dropping.

Table No. 4

AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT, SELECTED TERRITORIES, 1960 AND 1970 (percentage of total)				
Territory	1960		1970	
	Employment	Output	Employment	Output
Barbados	26	28	16	14
Guyana	37	26	29	19
Jamaica	39	12	29	8
Trinidad and Tobago	21	12	16	5
ECCM	46	36	32	22

Source: The World Bank, The Commonwealth Caribbean
(John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 119.

That land hunger or scarcity is not the central problem can be seen from the case of Guyana or indeed Trinidad where the government holds large tracts of "crown lands". The move away from the land results from very complex forces which have yet to be fully analyzed in the region. It is, however, a reality that every country in the Caribbean is today so heavily dependent on food imports that as President Jorge Blanco put it, "It can hardly be imagined what would happen if no food from abroad would reach the Caribbean for only two months."

But the Caribbean crisis has an even more complex dimension: while natives abandon agriculture to migrate to cities or abroad they are partly substituted by migrants from less developed areas. These migrants, many of them illegals, work both in subsistence and truck farming as well as in large scale export crop agriculture. Haitians now constitute 90% of the labor in Dominican sugar and 30% of that country's coffee work force. Colombians stream over the border into Venezuela replacing Venezuelans who move to the cities, ⁽¹⁾ Eastern Caribbean "small islanders" in Barbados and to some extent in Trinidad. The experience has been that these same migrants soon become candidates for another migratory step -- to the U.S. This certainly has been the case with the Haitians who moved to the Bahamas ⁽²⁾ and the Leeward Islanders who move to the U.S. Virgin Islands. This last case provides an especially vivid picture of the dimensions of the population movements in the area: in 1970 it was calculated that 37.9% of the population of the U.S.V.I. had moved to the U.S. mainland and Canada while the percentage of foreign born residents in those islands was 34.1%. The U.S.V.I. has become a "transshipment" station, and so have other islands.

It is good to remember, thus, that while the U.S.A. remains the first choice of Caribbean migrants it is not the only one.

(1) On this score see the excellent work of S. Sassen-Koob, "Economic Growth and Immigration in Venezuela", in M. M. Kritz and D.T. Gurak (eds.), International Migration Patterns in Latin America, International Migration Review (Fall 1979), Pp. 455-474.

(2) Cf. Dawn Marshall, The Haitian Problem: Illegal Migration to the Bahamas (Mona, Jamaica: ISER, 1978).

The phenomenon is regional and so is the concern and action directed at it. The case of Trinidad and Tobago illustrates this point.

III. TRINIDAD AS SENDER AND RECEIVER

The case of Trinidad and Tobago illustrates better than most the terrible predicament these islands confront in the 1980's. It also demonstrates what has become a region-wide phenomenon: the efforts made to keep in-migration to a minimum even as its own out-migration increases.

Trinidad did not enact an immigration ordinance until 1936 and that ordinance -- of very limited reach -- remained the only legislation in this area until the 1969 Immigration Act. This legislative inaction, however, did not mean that there had been no concern over illegal immigration; it simply was not a major issue. This changed in the late 1950's and early 1960's during the period of the West Indies Federation, a Federation which did not include provisions for free movement of labor. It hardly mattered. The government of Trinidad and Tobago noted in 1960 that the expectations of an open door into the island were widespread and had created pressures which were "formidable and intolerable..." and concluded that "the answer is planned migration." (1)

(1) Government of Trinidad-Tobago, Economic Development of the Independent, W.I. Fed., P.O.S. Office of the Premier, October 1960, p. 11.

It was clear then that one of the major barriers to any form of association in the West Indies was fear of the free movement of labor. Even associations of much more limited scope such as the long discussed idea of the formation of a unitary state with the neighboring island of Grenada was rejected partly because of the fear of an increase of Grenadian migration into Trinidad. (1)

The fact remained, however, that with or without Federation or with or without a unitary state political arrangement, illegal migration from the Eastern Caribbean continued into Trinidad. Between January 1958 and November 1959, 75% of the 10,135 visitors from these islands overstayed their permits and disappeared into the large resident, illegal populations in Trinidad. Such was the magnitude of the movement that in 1957 migrants from Grenada represented 6% and those from St. Vincent 4.3% of Trinidad's population. (2) In fact, by the mid 1970's the Trinidad government regarded the problem as so acute that an important Task Force recommended a Caribbean-wide harmonization of the laws pertaining to immigration and emigration. It also recommended such measures as identity cards and prosecution of those hiring illegal aliens, (3) anticipating similar recommendations in the U.S.A. by eight years thus.

(1) Trinidad-Tobago: Report of the Economic Commission, January 1965, Pp. 35-40.

(2) Trinidad-Tobago: Report of the Caribbean Task Force. P.O.S., February 1974, Pp. 90-95.

(3) Ibid, p. 96.

There was, and is, reason for Trinidad officials to worry. Despite continued 5-year plan projections of full employment, unemployment since 1965 grew at roughly 4 per cent per year while new job slots increased by 1.4% per year. Should this rate continue, it is projected that by 1985 there will be some 100,000 unemployed or 20.4% of the 1985 labor force,⁽¹⁾ despite the fact that this figure includes a 6,895 per year exit from the labor force through out-migration.

This dismal panorama has been changed very little by the enormous investment of petrodollars to industrialize the Island's economy. Although very much on the lines recommended by Arthur Lewis in 1950, the results of these efforts have not been encouraging for the longer run. The IMF recently reported that of a total of TT\$11.5 billion in surplus revenues deposited in the Development Fund between 1974 and 1981, TT\$8.6 billion have been disbursed in the attempt to convert the island into a major energy-based industrial country.

Despite these major efforts to reduce unemployment and despite a dip in joblessness in 1981 and 1982, there does not appear to be any long-range prospects that the trend has been reversed. Migration, as one would expect, is on the increase, especially it appears among skilled workers and professionals.

(1) Cf. Trevor M. A. Farrell, "The Unemployment Crisis in Trinidad-Tobago", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 1978), Pp. 117-152.

In the 1970's between 60 and 70% of these emigrants were professionals, managers, and skilled workers. During 1962 and 1968, Trinidad lost 143 doctors and dentists, 170 engineers, 629 nurses, 784 teachers and 909 other professionals -- in their majority in the productive 20 to 34 age group. (1)

It is calculated that the English-speaking Caribbean is losing some 14,000 skilled personnel per year. (2) A review of the figures in Tables No. 2 and 3 indicates that proportionate to population West Indians apply under Preference Six in greater numbers than those from the Hispanic Caribbean. Facilities with English and a better level of public education partly account for this but in general, it is an integral part of the historical structure of Caribbean population movements.

The frustrations/^{created}by this movement even after such heavy investments in the economy were clearly evident in the last presentation made by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago before his Party's Annual Congress. Noting the massive loss of skilled personnel and professionals he described the general picture: (3)

(1) Trinidad-Tobago: The Emigration of Professions, Supervisory, Middle Level and Skilled Man-Power from Trinidad-Tobago, 1962-1968. P.O.S., 1970.

(2) Report... Caribbean Task Force, 1974, p. 91.

(3) Forged from the Love of Liberty. Selected Speeches of Dr. Eric Williams. Port-of-Spain: Longman, 1981, p. 443.

In the British Caribbean it has been estimated that the annual average rate of emigration in relation to the actual increase in the population was as follows in the decade of the sixties: Jamaica, 55%, Trinidad and Tobago, 53%, Barbados, 87%, St. Lucia, 53%, St. Vincent, Grenada and Dominica, well over 70%; St. Kitts-Nevis, 142%, Montserrat, 124%.

Williams then concluded by lamenting that "there will soon be no West Indians left in the Caribbean". . . . more an expression of his frustration than a statement of reality given the rate of population growth.

CONCLUSION

The ill-fated Caribbean Basin Initiative was clearly one of the most far-reaching initiatives towards the Caribbean ever attempted by a U.S. administration. Measures such as the CBI deserve to be supported on the merits of their trade and investment incentives which will surely benefit the area. They are not, and cannot be, a cure for the pressures towards out-migration in the area. To advocate their implementation on those grounds might make good sense politically given the U.S. population's mood regarding immigration, it is not good sociology as existing experiences in the area demonstrate.

The remarkably successful Haitian industrialization initiative -- now 20 years old -- has managed to employ a total of 60,000 workers in textile, electronics and sports assembly factories. This is less than half the 140,000 annual new

additions to the population. But even if the U.S. admitted 140,000 Haitians per year this will still leave the island over populated and impoverished.

The case of Haiti, like that of Trinidad and so many other islands in the Caribbean, illustrates several aspects of the area's reality:

1. The industrialization programs launched in the late 1950's to absorb the excess of population has not stopped migration; it has tended to change its complexion making it more professional and skilled worker;
2. Migrants from lesser developed areas move into the rural sectors, replacing the existing natives: "small islanders" in Barbados and Trinidad, Haitians into Dominican Republic.
3. Caribbean states are becoming increasingly self-conscious about their porous borders while also more concerned with keeping the U.S. door open as they deal with unemployment.

It is apparent that even open doors (whether they be in the Dominican Republic, Trinidad, or the USA) will not solve the basic problems of development and underdevelopment in the area. Migration, however, is a reality and one which generally has been beneficial to both receiving and sending societies. Given the overall level of concern about it among all governments in the region, it appears that a Caribbean-wide set of understandings on migration and immigration is long overdue.

APPENDIX "A"

First Preference	Unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (20%)
Second Preference	Spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens (20%)
Third Preference	Members of the professions, scientists and artists (10%)
Fourth Preference	Married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (10%)
Fifth Preference	Brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens (24%)
Sixth Preference	Skilled or unskilled workers needed in the United States (10%)
Seventh Preference	Conditional entrants (Refugees) fleeing communism or an area of the Middle East (6%)
Non-Preference	Other qualified immigrants as visa numbers are not required for applicants in the seven preferences.

TABLE NO. (A)

ACTIVE IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICANTS BY JAN. 1, 1982

THE INSULAR CARIBBEAN

Country	Total Popul. (000)	Density (inh/km ²) (US \$)	GDP Per Cap.	Total	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Non-Pref
Antigua	75	169	950	4,691	10	391	3	49	1,796	1,283	1,159
Bahamas	226	17	2,620	253	5	83	3	20	104	11	27
Barbados	260	605	1,940	2,794	26	646	5	61	1,455	509	92
Belize	136	7	886	1,438	26	479	3	32	764	80	54
Dominica	82	104	630	1,086	8	203	10	3	738	80	44
Anguilla	6	132	660	204	--	42	--	2	138	--	22
Montserrat	14	135	970	356	3	53	--	7	275	16	2
St. Kitts/Nevis	60	152	660	6,695	18	411	4	30	1,442	2,807	1,983
Grenada	110	320	530	1,493	7	351	7	16	783	288	41
St. Lucia	120	195	630	1,404	--	209	3	7	666	115	404
Guyana	830	4	550	9,017	43	1,791	10	215	6,387	535	36
Jamaica	2,130	186	1,110	43,005	474	10,087	82	2,324	19,339	1,950	8,749
St. Vincent/ Grenadines	111	286	436	950	6	184	5	19	441	177	118
Trinidad/ Tobago	1,140	222	3,403	4,455	56	1,503	11	119	2,224	283	259
TOTALS	5,300	2,534	15,975	77,841	682	16,433	146	2,904	36,552	8,134	12,990

TABLE No. _____ (B)

ACTIVE IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICANTS BY JAN. 1, 1982

THE HISPANIC, CIRCUM-CARIBBEAN

Country	(000)* Pop.	Density** Inh/Km ²	(US \$) GDP Per Cap	Total	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Non- Pref.
Colombia	25.6	21.9	1,181	10,867	40	1873	23	146	8215	505	65
Costa Rica	2.3	39.5	2,202	801	15	62	--	22	616	43	43
Cuba	9.8	84.9	--	19,635	626	2,241	1	1,541	14,773	6	447
Dom. Republic	5.7	104	1,078	25,389	109	15,711	4	122	7,479	86	1,878
El Salvador	5.0	204	1,087	4,180	25	1,655	--	51	1,828	401	220
Guatemala	7.7	60	655	3,746	24	893	8	78	2,259	338	145
Nicaragua	2.6	17	926	3,419	13	672	18	91	2,503	87	35
Panama	1.9	24	1,776	9,488	43	337	1	67	1,984	89	35
Haiti	6.1	174	289	6,742	26	2,413	--	31	3,989	284	35
Honduras	4.0	27	651	4,253	48	1,377	--	146	2,555	100	27
Mexico	71.3	34	2,345	271,582	2,310	76,242	30	21,116	56,854	1,471	113,546
Venezuela	18.4	15	4,010	1,078	12	134	5	75	528	72	252
TOTALS	160.4	804.3	16,200	361,180	3,291	103,610	90	23,486	103,586	3,482	116,728

* 1982

** 1980