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# Examining the Evidence on Social Polarization: Venezuelan Society Before and After the Election of Chávez (Working Paper Series No. 11)

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LACC Working Paper Series

**Examining the Evidence on Social  
Polarization: Venezuelan Society Before  
and After the Election of Chávez**

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WPS No. 11  
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## ***Introduction***

*“Chávez y su alianza política representan principal, aunque no exclusivamente, los intereses de los pobres y empobrecidos del proceso sociopolítico venezolano... En contraste, sus adversarios...han recibido el respaldo mayoritario de los sectores medios y altos de la población”* (López Maya 2004, 114).

“Chávez won [the 2000 elections] with the support of all social classes, including the top 10 percent of income earners. ... According to the data, support for Chávez was not rooted in class cleavages or class consciousness” (Molina and Pérez 2004, 120).

The two quotes above underscore a conflicting interpretation of Venezuelan society since President Hugo Chávez Frías was first elected to office in 1998. On the one hand, many scholars, like López Maya (2004), have recognized that Chávez’s position in the presidency exacerbated already existing class-based social polarization in the country. On the other, different scholars, including Molina and Pérez (2004), have asserted that Chávez’s election had little effect on social polarization in the country and that his surprising wins in 1998 and 2000 demonstrate the at least short-term cross-class nature of his support by the end of the 1990s.

Which of these contradictory hypotheses about Chávez and polarization in Venezuelan society is more accurate? The purpose of this study is to compare the two arguments reflected in the citations above by looking at the strength and nature of class polarization before and after Chávez came to power in 1998. In essence, the study seeks to understand how Chávez’s remarkable election in that year may have impacted social polarization in Venezuela.

In an attempt to increase our understanding of social polarization in Venezuela, the study performs a series of crosstabs and means tests in order to assess the association between social class and a series of political as well as economic and social variables in Venezuela in 1995 and 2000. In this way, the pages to follow compare the competing hypotheses on social polarization before and after Chávez came to power in an effort to understand better how Venezuelan society changed in the last five years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

I demonstrate that the strengthening of social polarization in Venezuela between 1995 and 2000 did *not* occur, a conclusion that supports the arguments of Molina and Pérez (2004) and others. Moreover, the associations between class and political, social, and economic variables were very weak in both years, lending further support to their

conclusions. That said, the association of the upper middle class in particular with different variables changed considerably between 1995 and 2000, suggesting that this class has reacted the most strongly to Chávez's election in 1998. Thus, while the strengthening of class-based social polarization may not have been apparent between 1995 and 2000, there were signs by 2000 that it could be materializing between the upper middle and more popular sectors of Venezuelan society.

The following pages are divided into four sections. The literature review provides a definition of social polarization as it is understood within the context of this study and also examines with more detail the two contrasting hypotheses on social polarization in Venezuelan society after 1998. The next section then looks at the statistical analyses used to test the competing hypotheses. It is followed by an analysis of the results from the tests performed. Finally, the last section will draw some initial conclusions about the strength and nature of social polarization before and after Chávez was elected.

### ***Review of the Literature***

Before examining social polarization in Venezuela, it is important to understand what we mean by polarization. In general, many scholars (Esteban and Ray 1994, Seshanna and Decornez 2003, Wolfson 1994) agree that polarization means a movement towards the poles on any given issue including, for example, low-income versus high-income groups, liberals versus conservatives, or the lower class versus the upper class, which is the principle continuum of interest for this study. Movement away from the middle and towards the poles of these continuums signifies a polarization on a topic. Thus, polarization can be defined by a "disappearing middle" (Wolfson 1994, 354).

In order for polarization to occur there must also be a concentration or convergence of groups around specific locations on the continuum. These clusters should share similar attributes internally, and they must have dissimilar attributes with other groups on the continuum (Esteban and Ray 1994, 819). With these characteristics in mind, then, Esteban and Ray identify three features that must be present in order for polarization to have occurred: (1) there must be homogeneity within each cluster; (2) there must be heterogeneity across clusters; and (3) there must be a small number of significantly sized groups (Esteban and Ray 1994, 824). These features are employed in the definition of polarization used for the Venezuelan case study examined here.

Scholarship on polarization in Venezuela is a relatively new trend. Prior to the meteoric rise of Hugo Chávez to power, the country was known for its uneventful and unusually stable democratic regime. Given the political and economic turmoil in many of its Latin American neighbors, Venezuela seemed an anomaly. Enriched economically by its vast oil reserves and bolstered politically by a pact between the two primary political parties,<sup>1</sup> Venezuela was able to weather the economic crisis of the 1980s and remained democratic despite the intense periods of civil war and military regimes outside of its borders (Naím 2001, 18). Because of the cross-class nature of the dominant political parties (Roberts 2003b, 56), the unity and homogeneity of Venezuelan society was in large part assumed. In many ways, Venezuela was considered a “near perfect” democracy (Ellner 2003, 7).

The Venezuelan political system endured for almost thirty years as a stable partyarchy (Coppedge 1994 and 1996). By the end of the 1980s, however, many Venezuelans began to question the “illusion of social harmony” (Naím 2001, 27) in the country. The two-party system was accused of being corrupt and exclusionary. The shift to neoliberalism drastically reduced the size of the public sector, limiting the corporatist and clientelist linkages they depended upon for support, while also sparking mass protests by the country’s lower and working classes throughout the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>2</sup>

Hugo Chávez arrived on the national stage during the heart of this period of social and political turmoil. A former lieutenant colonel in the army, Chávez was incarcerated for helping organize a failed coup attempt in 1992. Relatively unknown until the time of his imprisonment, he emerged from prison as a national hero to many who had long since rejected the political system in Venezuela (Canache 2002b, 14). Capitalizing on this newfound popularity, Chávez organized his own political party, the *Movimiento Quinta*

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<sup>1</sup> The Pact of Punto Fijo was signed in 1958 between the two principal political parties in Venezuela, *Acción Democrática* (AD) and *Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente* (COPEI). It consisted of an agreement between AD and COPEI to respect election results, consult between the two parties on controversial issues, and split political responsibility and patronage (Kornblith and Levine 1995, 45). Because of the Pact, the two parties ruled the political system (and alternated the presidency) for almost four decades. For more on this party system see Kornblith and Levine 1995, Myers 1998, and Coppedge 1994 and 1996.

<sup>2</sup> The *Caracazo*, which took place for five days starting on February 27, 1989, sparked bloody and traumatic urban riots that resulted in the deaths of dozens of Venezuelans (Kornblith and Levine 1995, 38-9).

*República* (MVR), and ran for president in 1998. He won handily in the second round, beating his closest opponent, Henrique Salas Römer, and winning 56.2% of the vote.

From the beginning, Chávez distinguished himself as a political outsider. Untainted by corruption and a “master of antipolitics” (Roberts 2003a, 37), he presented himself as the alternative to the two-party system that had dominated the political system for decades. In essence, Chávez drew distinctions between his appeal to the marginalized sectors of Venezuela society and the upper and middle-class nature of the political elite in the country (Ellner 2003b, 2).

Thus, Chávez openly recognized and exploited the social polarization that some argue (Roberts 2003b, López Maya 2004) had long existed in Venezuelan society. Indeed, because of his overt seduction of the poorer and working sectors in the country, many scholars have attributed to him at least partial blame for the polarized nature of Venezuelan society by the end of the 1990s. “*Repudiado y desconocido*” by some, “*amado y respetado*” by others (López Maya 2004, 104), the election of Hugo Chávez, they argue, exacerbated class-based polarization in Venezuela.

Importantly, these authors do not contend that Chávez is the primary cause of polarization in the country. For example, many (Roberts 2003b, López-Maya 2004) purport that class-based cleavages emerged more than ten years prior to Chávez’s first election. Roberts (2003b) highlights the longstanding economic crisis in the country as well as inconsistent market-based reforms as the impetus for social marginalization. The first clear sign of this, he argues, was in February 1989, when President Carlos Andrés Pérez implemented an economic austerity program. The severity of this measure, which compounded the effects of drastic cuts in social spending throughout the 1980s, provoked five days of violence and rioting, now known as the *Caracazo*.

Of note, Roberts points out, was the class-based nature of the *Caracazo*. Pérez’s economic measures were rejected much more forthrightly by the lower and working classes than the upper and middle classes (Roberts 2003b, 63). Social polarization, then, existed prior to Chávez’s ascent to the presidency. Yet, Roberts also recognizes the impact Chávez had in terms of institutionalizing social polarization during his first years in office. Once Chávez was in power, he recognizes, “the political loyalties of elite and popular sectors became more clearly differentiated” (Roberts 2003b, 56). Thus, while

Chávez may not be the original cause of social polarization in the country, he did help to express and exacerbate polarization after 1998.

Proponents of the hypothesis that there was more social polarization in Venezuela after Chávez became president agree with Roberts that Chávez exacerbated rather than provoked social polarization in the country. In particular, they identify three principle expressions of social polarization that were either initiated by Chávez or by his opponents: the 1998 presidential campaign, which polarized voters along class lines; Chávez's fiery rhetoric, which stoked polarization by actively courting the poor sectors of Venezuelan society while rejecting their richer counterparts; and the 2002 failed coup attempt, which was justified by some or reviled by others according to whether or not they supported Chávez.

For many scholars (Ellner 2003a, López Maya 2004), the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez, as well as the campaign leading up to it, reflected the growing social polarization in the country. For one, supporters for Chávez and his primary opponent, Henrique Salas Römer, were divided along class lines. The middle and upper class-led media (and their readers and viewers) preferred Salas Römer to Chávez. Indeed, the once divided middle class became united in their opposition to Chávez. For his part, Chávez lashed out aggressively at his adversaries – a style, as Ellner contends, that may have been oriented towards his lower class supporters (Ellner 2003a, 22). Chávez's campaign and his electoral victory, then, was an important one for underscoring the newly surfacing social polarization in the country.

The election of Chávez had further implications for polarization in the country. For example, his government formalized the “hegemonic fight” that had been playing out between two social poles in the country: one that represented the poor and impoverished in Venezuelan society and the other that symbolized the middle and upper classes in the country (López Maya 204, 114). While social polarization may have resulted from Venezuela's socioeconomic problems after the 1980s, it was exacerbated by the election of an “anti-politics” politician. It was also exacerbated by the actions of that politician once he took over the presidency.

Indeed, Chávez's fiery rhetoric as a presidential contender and then as president is also highlighted as a reason why Chávez exacerbated social polarization in Venezuela.

Specifically, as one author contends rather explicitly, “[Chávez] *ha recurrido permanentemente a un discurso pugnaz, discriminatorio y ofensivo descalificando a sus opositores y exponiéndolos al escarnio público*” (López Maya 2004, 115). He has provoked the opposition through his discourse, labeling them as oligarchs and differentiating his government from the elite in an effort to court the popular sectors. Exploiting the already prevalent polarization in the country (Roberts 2003a), Chávez explicitly appealed to the overwhelmingly poor majority, mostly to his advantage (Cannon 2004, 293).

Finally, for many (Cannon 2004, López Maya 2004), the failed coup attempt of April 2002<sup>3</sup> represented perhaps the clearest manifestation of social polarization in Venezuela after Chávez came to power. Organized primarily by the upper and middle class-based opposition, their attempt to depose Chávez was eventually overcome by a counter civil-military mobilization (comprised primarily by the lower classes) in support of the president (López Maya 2004, 115). That is, those who supported the coup and those who rejected it were divided clearly along class lines. Venezuelans, at the time, were either for Chávez or against him.

In many ways, for the “more polarization” scholars identified here, Chávez is a key ingredient for understanding why Venezuela became more socially polarized by the end of the 1990s. His blistering anti-elitist rhetoric, along with events such as his first election in 1998 and the failed coup attempt in 2002, helped to exacerbate the polarized nature of Venezuelan society since he took over the presidency. This “more polarization” literature, however, represents only one trend among current Venezuelan scholars. The other, equally pervasive view on the election of Chávez and the nature of Venezuelan society by the end of the 1990s contends that Venezuela was in fact *not* more polarized after Chávez’s elections. It is to this second perspective that we now turn.

To make their argument that, in the years between 1995 and 2000, Venezuelans may have been less polarized in terms of political support, the following authors (Canache 2002a and 2002b, Weyland 2003, and Molina and Pérez 2004) use both qualitative as well as quantitative analysis, an empirical element that is notably missing in

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<sup>3</sup> A complete analysis of the 2002 coup attempt is outside the scope of this paper. For a more detailed examination of the events that took place before, during, and after the coup, see Cannon (2004) and Ruiz Petit (2003).



the “more polarization” literature. Looking at different survey results between 1995 and 2000, these authors demonstrate that support for Chávez was cross-class in nature during the time of his first and second elections.<sup>4</sup> That is, contrary to the argument that the election of Chávez exacerbated social polarization in the country, this literature suggests that, in fact, Chávez in many ways united Venezuelans across class, at least in the short-term.

Canache (2002a, 2002b) looks at the nature of support toward Chávez before he was elected, in 1995, and in the year of his first election, or 1998. Arguing that Venezuela is a “fragile democracy” (Canache 2002b, 6), Canache contends that support for democracy in the country is more consequential than in other, more established and stable regimes. She thus assesses the nature of democratic support in Venezuela with regards to support for the incumbent, the political system, and for democracy as a regime. In 1995, she finds, support for Chávez, as an influential political leader, was concentrated in the hands of those who opposed democracy. This appeal was particularly strong among women, youth, and the poor (Canache 2002b, 150).

By 1998, however, the nature of his support had changed and, in particular, had broadened to encompass more than just those who were ambivalent towards democracy. While, in the year that Chávez was elected, those who were ambiguous about their support for democracy still represented an important Chávez constituency, he had also at this time garnered the support of those who supported democracy but were extremely unhappy with the country’s then current political system. A majority of voters shared a “disdain for the status quo and a willingness to hand the reins of government” over to Chávez (Canache 2002a, 83). In essence, by 1998 Chávez had unified Venezuelans against the political elite in the country. In this way, the country was less polarized at the time he was elected than just three years prior.

Another author (Weyland 2003) supports Canache’s claims that many Venezuelans were united in their high expectations of Chávez’s first administration. While ultimately a paper on the nature of economic voting in Venezuela, Weyland’s article also draws conclusions about the characteristics of Chávez’s supporters in 1998. Specifically, like Canache, he contends that in 1998 Venezuelans became unified in their

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<sup>4</sup> Chávez was elected president for a second time in 2000, after the adoption of a new Constitution in 1999.

hope and optimism towards Chávez (Weyland 2003, 825-6). Using a multinomial logit model, Weyland finds that Venezuelans dissatisfied with the actual state of democracy in the country were more likely to vote for Chávez. Thus, in 1998, when dissatisfaction was widespread among Venezuelans so, too, was support for Chávez. As a result, Chávez supporters were “socially heterogeneous and multiclass,” (Weyland 2003, 833) a conclusion that contradicts the “more polarization” literature examined above.

Finally, like Canache and Weyland, Molina and Pérez (2004) use empirical analysis to explain Chávez’s 2000 presidential victory, as well as the victory of the MVR in the National Assembly elections of the same year. They contend that government evaluation and personality politics were the primary reasons for Chávez’s re-election. Yet, they also draw some conclusions about the nature of polarization in Venezuela in 2000. Skeptical of the notion that “most of President Chávez’s support came from the lower classes, while the middle and upper classes rejected him,” Molina and Pérez demonstrate that, in fact, Chávez won his second term in office with the support of all social classes, including a portion of the highest income earners in the country (Molina and Pérez 2004, 119-120). They conclude that short-term variables, and not longstanding ones, such as structural cleavages, had the greatest impact on Venezuelan voters in 2000.

In all four works referenced above, empirical evidence is used to debunk the hypothesis that Venezuela became more socially polarized after Chávez took over the presidency. Instead, they argue, Venezuelans actually unified around Chávez for a short time, because they so strongly rejected the political system that preceded him. Interestingly, both Canache (2002a) and Weyland (2003) suggest that the nature of this cross-class support is most likely ephemeral. For example, although Chávez was elected with almost 60% of the vote in 2000, that same election was marked by high levels of abstention. This could suggest the emergence of “an undercurrent of dissatisfaction” toward Chávez and his government (Canache 2002a, 85), one that may have manifested itself only after the 2000 election had taken place.

Weyland, too, suggests that the origins of support for Chávez in 1998, that is, an “exalted optimism” in his government and a belief in his charisma, might have blinded Venezuelans from recognizing the painful reality that Chávez had not fulfilled many of his campaign promises (Weyland 2003, 825-826). Thus, Chávez’s honeymoon may be

limited to the first years of his presidency, when “wishful thinking” (Weyland 2003, 845) dominated Venezuelan society. After 2000, then, Venezuela could presumably become more polarized around the leader as sectors of society become less enchanted with his actions as president.

Leaving open this possibility that social polarization may only be just emerging in 2000, the literature above presents two contradictory hypotheses that can and should be tested in order to advance the literature on polarization in Venezuela. Given the two recurring trends in present-day Venezuelan scholarship, the hypotheses to be tested are the following:

Hypothesis #1 (H1): Venezuela is more polarized along class lines in 2000 than in 1995; social polarization was exacerbated after Chávez’s 1998 election.

Hypothesis #2 (H2): Venezuela is not more polarized along class in 2000 as compared to 1995; Chávez’s 1998 election did not exacerbate social polarization in the country.

The following section explains how these two hypotheses are tested, as well as the overall limitations to the study’s findings.

### ***Methodology***

To test these competing hypotheses, the study uses the World Values Survey (WVS), a cross-cultural standardized survey organized by Ronald Inglehart at the University of Michigan. The WVS covers a broad list of human values and goals pertaining to politics, economics, gender roles, family values, civic engagement, and religion, among others. In essence, the goal of the study, which is now entering into its fifth wave, is to “provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human concern” and identify cross-national variance in these areas (World Values Survey website).

Venezuela participated in two of the four waves of the WVS that have already been carried out: the third wave (March-April 1996) and the fourth (November-December 2000).<sup>5</sup> The timing of the two surveys in Venezuela straddles Chávez’s initial

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<sup>5</sup> The 1996 wave in Venezuela included 1500 respondents and was run by the DOXA Institute, in Caracas. Gustavo Mendez, Jose Molina, and Friedrich Welsch were the principal investigators who carried out the survey (University of Michigan, WVS website). The 2000 wave had 1,200 respondents and was organized

election to the presidency in 1998 and thus allows us to compare social polarization three years prior to his election (1995) and two years after he had been in office (2000). Unlike the other empirical analyses above, then, with the WVS we have an unprecedented opportunity to measure social polarization before and after his dramatic ascent to power. Moreover, the WVS allows us to measure polarization using the opinions and behaviors of Venezuelans themselves. This “mass opinion” approach (Canache 2002b, 72) to testing our competing hypotheses will add an important missing element to the debate on social polarization before and after Chávez became president.

The competing hypotheses tested in this study address the exacerbation of a particular kind of polarization in Venezuela, that is, social polarization. Social polarization entails the concentration of groups or clusters based on class, ethnicity, or race (Lozada 2004, 196). The specific manifestation of social polarization measured below is class-based, since most of the literature on Venezuela referenced here focuses on the concentration of Venezuelan opinion and attitudes around class cleavages or clusters. Social polarization, it is argued, manifested itself through the “mutual resentment between lower classes and relatively privileged sectors of the population” (Ellner 2003a, 21).

In order to test our two competing hypotheses, this study compares social polarization in Venezuela in 1995 and 2000. If the analyses below reveal that 2000 is more polarized along class lines than five years prior, H1 is supported. If, on the other hand, 2000 is not more polarized or is as polarized along class lines as in 1995, H2 is supported. The methodology for measuring social polarization in Venezuela is threefold. First, the study determines the strength of polarization as expressed through class cleavages in 1995 versus 2000. It then analyzes the nature of the polarization, that is, where it converged among Venezuela’s different classes. Finally, it examines how social polarization impacted, if at all, support on different issues in Venezuela before and after Chávez’s 1998 election. By taking this multi-dimensional and comparative approach to the extent of social polarization in Venezuela in 1995 and 2000, we should be able to draw some conclusions about the competing hypotheses tested here.

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by the *Red Interuniversitaria de Cultura Política* (REDPOL). Headed by José Molina, this fourth wave entailed a random sample stratified by state and by municipality (World Values Survey website).

### *The Strength of Polarization in 1995 vs. 2000*

López Maya (2004), Lozada (2004), and Cannon (2004) support the notion that the election of Chávez has exacerbated the polarization of Venezuelan society. This polarization is expressed through the strengthening of class cleavages. Specifically, the upper and middle classes ally more with the conservative, anti-Chávez opposition, whereas the lower and working classes identify with the radical, left-leaning Chávez camp. The first part of the statistical analysis below addresses whether these class cleavages in 2000 are apparent with respect to 1995, as well as their associational strength. The third and fourth waves of the WVS provide questions that allow us to measure this relationship between class and ideology. These questions, along with all other WVS questions referenced in the following pages, are spelled out in full in Appendix A.

In both waves, the respondents are asked to identify where they fall along a range of different class categories: upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, and lower class. This subjective class variable is used throughout the analysis below to measure polarization along class lines, or social polarization. In the WVS, these subjective class categories are coded from 1 to 5, where the upper class is 1 and the lower class is 5. To avoid confusion in the interpretation of our tests, these categories were recoded so that the lower class is 1 and the upper class is 5. Moreover, because the survey respondents overwhelmingly classified themselves in the lower, working, and lower middle classes,<sup>6</sup> the upper and upper middle responses were joined to create one “Upper Middle” response.<sup>7</sup> By recoding this upper middle class, we fulfill the third feature of polarization identified by Esteban and Ray, that is, that there be a small number of significantly sized groups (1994, 824).

The WVS in both the third and fourth wave also asks respondents to rate themselves on a Left-Right scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is the most left-leaning and 10 is the most right-leaning. This Left-Right identification variable is used to measure the potential polarization of Venezuelan society, as divided into subjective class clusters,

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<sup>6</sup> Specifically, in 1995, the self-identified upper and upper middle classes made up 5.3% of the total population sample. In 2002, they were 19.1% of the sample.

<sup>7</sup> Henceforth in the study, the term “upper middle class” is used to refer to this combined variable. It is important to stress, however, that when I use this term I mean both the upper and middle classes and not just the elite sectors of Venezuelan society.

along this ideological continuum. To test this relationship, we run two different cross-tabs analysis. The first analysis measures the association of Left-Right identification, on the one to ten scale, by the four categories of subjective class identification. The second analysis is based upon the survey's mean response to the Left-Right identification in both 1995 and 2000. By recoding a Left-Right dummy variable in which Left self-identifiers are more than one standard deviation below the mean and Right self-identifiers are more than one standard deviation above the mean, it is possible to measure the association between class and unambiguously Left and Right self-identifiers.

By comparing the Chi-Square and Gamma from each of these tests in 1995 and 2000, we can determine whether there has been a strengthening of the association between class and ideology. That is, we can observe if the relationship between the upper middle class and the Right and the lower class and the Left has become more polarized. If this is the case, then social polarization will have increased between 1995 and 2000, supporting H1. If this is not the case, H2 is confirmed. Moreover, having isolated the unambiguously Left and Right respondents in each of the four class categories, it is possible to analyze the actual movement of the class clusters along the Left-Right continuum. In this way, we can evaluate if clustering has occurred increasingly away from the middle, a feature important to polarization (Wolfson 1994, 354). If, for example, the percentage of responses increases along this Left-Right dichotomous variable, then social polarization will have occurred, and H1 is supported. If the percentages stay the same or decrease, then H2 is supported.

#### *The Nature of Polarization in 1995 vs. 2000*

The second approach to measuring social polarization looks specifically at where polarization occurred among the four different subjective class categories between 1995 and 2000. Specifically, we run a means test in 1995 and 2000 of Left-Right identification by subjective social class, in order to obtain the standard deviations for each of the four individual class categories, that is, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, and lower class.

By comparing the intra-class standard deviations in 1995 and 2000, we can determine where the convergence of class-based opinion may have occurred. If, for example, the standard deviations diminished the most in the upper middle and lower

classes, then it can be argued that cleavages have been concentrated in these categories. In other words, clustering has occurred around those two classes, resulting in a hardening or homogenizing of intra-class opinion (Esteban and Ray 1994, 824). Polarization has converged in the upper middle and lower classes, and H1 would be supported. If the standard deviations of the individual class categories stay relatively unchanged, then H2 would be supported, since the nature of social polarization would not have changed between 1995 and 2000.

### *Social Polarization and Venezuelan Opinion*

Finally, once established the extent to which social polarization has occurred between 1995 and 2000, as well as the concentration of that polarization along the four class categories, the study examines how it is associated with different measures of political support. The purpose of this last analysis is to assess whether the polarization identified through the statistical tests above is reflected in manifestations of support for different variables relevant to the political context of the late 1990s. Is there a convergence of opinion around these issues similar to that which occurred between subjective class and Left-Right identification? Alternatively, is social polarization exacerbated in some areas but not in others between 1995 and 2000?

Specifically, we run cross-tabs analyses to measure the association between subjective class and support for the current or incumbent government; satisfaction in the previous government; whether the government should provide for individuals; and whether public or private-based industry should increase. The logic behind testing the four questions is that the opinions on each of these topics may have changed between 1995 and 2000, given the election of Chávez in 1998. For example, if polarization is more pronounced in 2000, one reflection of it would be with regards to incumbent support. Presumably, if Chávez is a polemic figure and the MVR explicitly cultivated party support based upon class lines (Molina and Pérez 2004, 120), two arguments of the “more polarization” literature, then support for the incumbent in 2000 should be much more class-based than in 1995, since the lower and working classes would support Chávez and the upper and middle classes would not. Following a similar logic, support (or lack thereof) for the previous regime would be more polarized in 2000 than in 1995, since the lower and working classes would be more likely to view the past regime

unfavorably in comparison to that of Chávez. On the other hand, if the upper middle class views Chávez negatively, then it might look more favorably on the previous regime.

The final two associations examine the responses to questions that run more closely along programmatic lines. For example the WVS asks if the government should ensure that everyone is provided for or if it is the role of people to provide for themselves. The responses range from 1, or total agreement with the former statement, to 10, or total agreement with the latter. It also poses the question of whether private or public (government) ownership of business should be increased, where 1 signifies total agreement with increasing private ownership and 10 means total agreement that government ownership should be increased.

Each of these questions should reflect the alleged ideological differences between Chávez supporters and the opposition (López Maya 2004). Given Chávez's populist rhetoric and his electoral campaign against privatizing such industries as PDVSA, the aluminum industry, and DIANCA (Ellner 2003, 15) the responses to these questions by those for and against Chávez would presumably be polarized. Specifically, anti-Chavista responses to both surveys should more strongly agree with people providing for themselves and an increase in private business. Chávez supporters should more strongly agree with the government ensuring that all are cared for and that businesses are publicly owned. If the hypothesis on more polarization (H1) is correct, the association between class and these two questions will be such that the lower and working classes (that is, Chávez supporters) would align with a more state-oriented view of social and economic policy and the upper middle class (the anti-Chavistas) will align with the more individually-oriented perspective. Moreover, this association will strengthen between 1995 and 2000.

Finally, in order to determine where polarization is occurring, a means test is carried out for all four questions to measure the change in intra-class standard deviations in 2000 versus 1995. By analyzing the shifts in standard deviations, we can compare where polarization is concentrated in terms of these four questions, just as we do with the Left-Right identification above. Thus, it will be possible to evaluate if manifestations of social polarization in Venezuela are consistent across different issues.

### *Limitations*



By evaluating each of these measures of social polarization, we can draw some conclusions about the nature and extent of polarization in 2000 versus 1995 and whether it has been exacerbated, as H1 purports, or not, as H2 asserts. There are a few limitations to this study that should be highlighted before examining the results of the analyses outlined here. For one, the measure of social class is unavoidably subjective in both the 1995 and 2000 surveys, since no other class measure was used consistently in both WVS waves. This inevitably means that the definitions for each of the class subcategories – upper, upper middle, lower middle, working, and lower classes – are entirely dependent upon the respondents’ understanding of how these different categories are defined.

Thus, the study loses validity, given that the class variable is not standardized along more objective, quantifiable, and thus more consistent lines. This limitation inescapably weakens any conclusions about social polarization, since there is no guarantee that our results can be replicated. On the other hand, some have argued that the perception of the general public may be more important in classifications like these than any formal measures, since polarization has more of a subjective quality to it than a more quantitative and objective measure of class-based clusters, such as actual income (Seshanna and Decornez 2003, 5). In other words, polarization may be felt more than it is observed or measured. Still, there is no conclusive evidence to support Seshanna and Decornez’s contention. For the purposes of understanding social polarization in Venezuela, then, further research should be carried out to support the initial conclusions drawn here.

The other limitations are more surmountable in terms of the conclusions we can draw about social polarization in 2000. For one, there is an overwhelming bias in both the 1996 and 2000 Venezuelan surveys towards the lower and working classes (see footnote 5 above). However, this should have a conservative impact on our results. That is, any association that is found between class and the different variables examined here would have had to overcome the small (but significant) N for the upper middle class in each survey and would thus strengthen our conclusions about social polarization after Chávez’s 1998 election. Moreover, the 2000 survey was carried out on the heels of Chávez’s second presidential victory, where he garnered a higher percentage of the popular vote (59.8%) than in 1998 (Molina and Perez 2004, 117). Presumably, support

for Chávez at this time would be more widespread than later in his second term, when his opposition became more organized and active.<sup>8</sup> This limitation should also have a conservative impact on the results below. Thus, any conclusions about an increase in social polarization after 1998, despite his popularity in 2000, would be more convincing.

## **Results<sup>9</sup>**

### *The Strength of Polarization in 1995 vs. 2000*

Table One in Appendix B<sup>10</sup> displays the results from the first crosstabs analysis, which measures the association between the full Left-Right identification variable (that is, coded from 1 to 10) and subjective class as well as the dummy Left-Right identification variable and subjective class. As the table demonstrates, both Models show statistically significant associations between class and the Left-Right measures. Both also have very small Gammas, however, which mean that the observed association between the two variables is very weak.

More importantly for the purposes of this study, the direction of the associations found in Model 1 and Model 2 changes from 1995 to 2000. For example, in 1995, the Gamma registers a negative value for both models, at -0.099 and -.213. This means that the higher the social class a respondent comes from, the more that respondent identifies with the Left. The upper middle class-left association strengthens in the second model, where only the unambiguously left-leaning and right-leaning respondents are included. This association contradicts the expected relationship between class and ideology, as hypothesized by the “more polarization” literature above. Yet, the association is also consistent with the social conditions that would have been necessary to bring Hugo Chávez to power. Associated with the Left in 1995, the upper middle classes may have been sympathetic to the populist, more leftist appeals of Chávez, helping him become elected in 1998.

In 2000, however, the association is inverted. The upper middle class is no longer associated with the Left. Instead, the Gammas are positive in both models,

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<sup>8</sup> 2002 was a particularly active year for the opposition in Venezuela. Along with mounting an unsuccessful coup on 11 April 2002, they also carried out an extended general strike that would shut down much of the economic activity in the country.

<sup>9</sup> In order to be able to compare the results from 1995 and the 2000, the 2000 WVS was weighted to have the same N (1500) as the 1995 WVS. All the tests run below use the 2000 weighted variable.

<sup>10</sup> All tables referenced in the Results section can be found in Appendix B.

reflecting a relationship between class and ideology that is more closely aligned with the class cleavages hypothesized in H1. As in 1995, Model 2 registers stronger class-Left/Right relationships than Model 1 in 2000, providing additional support to the apparent shift in the measured associations. By 2000, then, the upper middle class allied itself more closely to the Right than the lower classes. Likewise, the lower classes were more strongly associated with the Left.

To explore in more detail the apparent ideological shift between 2000 and 1995, Table 2 provides the percentage of respondents from each class that identified themselves as unambiguously Left- or Right-wing. As the table shows, there does appear to be a shift among both the lower and upper middle classes in terms of Left-Right identification. Specifically, by 2000, the upper middle class that is unambiguously on the Right has risen by over 12% from 1995. Likewise, the lower class respondents identifying with the Left rose from 25.8% in 1995 to 46.3%, or more than twenty percentage points.

The association between subjective class and Right-Left identification follows the predicted relationship in H1, where the upper middle class is more closely aligned with the Right and the lower class with the Left. Yet, social polarization – that is, a greater concentration among class-ideological lines – was not as apparent. That is, while there were clusters of Left-Right identification among the lower class and upper middle class respondents in both 1995 and 2000, the movement of those classes away from the center between 1995 and 2000 – an indication of stronger polarization – was not evident. Instead, the upper middle and lower class clusters appeared to have switched places on the Left-Right continuum. For H1 to be more clearly supported, the concentration of class and Left-Right identification would have had to move closer to the Left-Right poles. This was not the case.

#### *The Nature of Polarization in 1995 vs. 2000*

Still, the substantial shift of the upper middle and lower classes in terms of their realignment along ideological lines between 1995 and 2000 merits further attention, as it is here that many authors (López Maya 2004, Roberts 2003b) have argued that the polarization has occurred most strongly. Was there a hardening of opinion among these classes between 1995 and 2000? If so, the case could be made that social polarization after Chávez's election was just beginning to manifest itself along ideological lines in

2000. This section, then, looks at the nature of social polarization in Venezuela before and after Chávez came to power, to see where it may have begun to materialize by 2000.

Table 3 shows the intra-class standard deviations that resulted from a means analysis of Left-Right identification by subjective class in both 1995 and 2000. By calculating the differences in standard deviation between the two survey years, we can determine how much more or less the responses of each social class fluctuated in 2000 as compared with 1995. Where the standard deviations decreased the most, yielding a higher value in terms of the difference between 1995 and 2000, we would expect a concentration or convergence of intra-class Left-Right identification to have taken place. This would lend support to the argument (H1) that there was greater social polarization along class lines after Chávez came to power. On the other hand, if the difference in standard deviation is negative, that is, the standard deviation is higher in 2000 than in 1995, then the Left-Right identification among that class would have diverged or become less concentrated between the two survey years, denoting a decrease in social polarization.

In fact, as Table 3 demonstrates, intra-class Left-Right identification became the most concentrated among the classes that Roberts and López Maya hypothesized. The positive difference in standard deviations is largest in the lower class (.431) and especially the upper middle class, where the standard deviation decreased by 0.557, or more than half a point on the ten-point Right-Left continuum. Table 3, then, portrays the greatest concentration of ideological identification in the upper middle and lower classes. There appears to be a hardening or homogenizing of opinion around these two classes.

The interpretation of Table 3 lends initial support to H1. Yet, it is important to note that the standard deviations across all four classes are still quite high, a finding that is consistent with the overall weak association between subjective class and Left-Right identification in Table 1. Still, as with Table 2, the results from the means test suggest that the opinion of the upper middle class in terms of where they find themselves on the Left-Right continuum shifted and became more concentrated in 2000 versus 1995. Thus, the more leftist political orientation associated with the upper middle class in 1995 could have been ephemeral and a reflection of the almost universal societal discontent towards the longstanding political parties in Venezuela. Likewise, the concentration of the upper

middle class along more right-oriented political lines in 2000 may be in reaction to the radical changes institutionalized by Chávez after his 1998 election.<sup>11</sup> This anti-Chavista reaction would most likely escalate following his second election in 2000, suggesting that polarization may only be just beginning to emerge in 2000.

#### *Social Polarization and Venezuelan Opinion*

Thus far, it appears that both H1 and H2 have underscored important characteristics of Venezuelan society in 2000: whereas social polarization appears to be emerging in 2000 in the hypothesized direction as indicated by H1, society did not necessarily become *more* polarized in 2000 versus 1995 – a conclusion that supports H2. The objective of the final four crosstabs tests in this section is to assess whether the emerging social polarization identified above is reflected in manifestations of support for different variables pertaining to the political context of the late 1990s. Does Venezuelan opinion towards these variables become more concentrated among the upper middle and lower classes in 2000, as with Left-Right identification? Or do the patterns of associations vary? As with the following sections, there is no definitive answer to these questions.

Table 4a portrays the association of incumbent support with subjective social class. Specifically, the upper middle class was more satisfied with the current government in 1995 than the lower class. In 2000, these associations shifted in the expected direction: the lower class was more satisfied with the incumbent, that is, Chávez, than the upper middle class, although the association is no longer significant and the Gamma associated with 2000 is even weaker than that of 1995. Thus, the pattern of association between subjective class and incumbent support was not sufficiently prevalent to merit significance in 2000.

It should be noted that this result is consistent with the overall support for Chávez at the time the survey was carried out. In 2000, Chávez was celebrating a presidential victory in which he received a higher percentage of total votes than in 1998. It makes sense, then, that his support at the time crossed classes. And, indeed, the intra-class

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<sup>11</sup> In particular, Chávez drafted a new constitution in which he strengthened the executive vis-à-vis the other branches by extending the term in office, allowing for re-election, and expanding the president's power over the Armed Forces. He has also adamantly pursued the centralization of industry and the Central Bank (Cannon 2004, 293). All of these initiatives represented a clear departure from the actions of the political elite who preceded him.

standard deviations of the incumbent support variable increased in 2000, as Table 4a also demonstrates, suggesting that social polarization had not yet materialized around support for Chávez. Thus, the results from Table 4a reflect support for H2.

Table 4b reveals the results of the association between satisfaction in the previous regime and subjective class in both survey years. Here, the shift in associations between the two variables between 1995 and 2000 reflects more closely the perceived shifts in Table 1. That is, in 1995, the upper middle class was associated with lower levels of satisfaction in the previous regime than the lower class, a pattern that corresponds with the upper middle classes more positive appraisal of the incumbent at that time.

By 2000, this association had inverted. While the lower class was more closely associated with negative views of the past regime, the upper middle class was much more satisfied with that regime. Here, the association between class and previous regime satisfaction is weaker than in 1995, although the Gammas for both years are in general very low. Still, opinions on the previous regime were the most strongly concentrated in the upper middle and lower classes in 2000 versus 1995, suggesting, as with Table 3 above, that social polarization may be materializing between these two groups in 2000, particularly with regards to their assessment of the previous regime.

The final two tabs look at the potential manifestations of social polarization along more programmatic variables. In particular, Table 4c displays the results of the association between government responsibility and subjective class in 1995 and 2000. Table 4d gives the results of the relationship between an increase in public or private-owned businesses and subjective class. The logic behind each of these tests is that if Venezuelan classes are becoming more polarized along ideological lines, then that polarization should be reflected in survey questions that address social and economic policy. The crosstabs analyses in Tables 4c and 4d allow us to address these perspectives.

The results from Table 4c suggest that there is an association between government responsibility and subjective class in 1995, although that positive association is no longer significant by 2000. Specifically, the perspective that people should be responsible for themselves is no longer significantly associated with the upper middle class. Indeed, in 2000, government responsibility in general is no longer related to subjective class. This

conclusion is supported by the fluctuation in standard deviations between 1995 and 2000. Whereas the working class varied the most in terms of their responses to this question between both survey years, the convergence of intra-class opinion on this question across the four class categories was almost non-existent. Clearly, classes are no more polarized around this issue than they were in 1995, a conclusion that supports H2. It also lends credence to the arguments of Molina and Pérez (2004) and Naím (2001) that Venezuelans of all classes may have placed an unusual amount of hope in the capacity of the incumbent government to alleviate the socioeconomic problems in the country after Chávez's 1998 election.

Finally, the association between an increase in public versus private-owned companies and subjective class reflects the shift in associations denoted in both Tables 1 and 4b. Whereas, somewhat surprisingly, the upper middle class was more closely associated to a desire for an increase in publicly-owned industries in 1995, this association had switched in the expected direction by 2000. That is, by 2000, the higher the class in which you identified yourself, the more likely you were to support an increase in private enterprise. The fluctuations in standard deviations between 1995 and 2000 reflect this shift in associational patterns. Three of the four classes (the lower middle class is the exception) diverged with regards to their response to this question in 2000 versus 1995, although the increase in standard deviations were in general quite small.

Overall, the results from these four crosstabs analyses suggest that social polarization had not been exacerbated along subjective class lines, as H2 hypothesized. Yet, in two of the four tests carried out, the associations measured support the contention that social polarization may have begun to take shape in 2000. Specifically, satisfaction toward the previous regime and the belief in more public or private-owned businesses experienced shifts in their associational patterns in a direction that supports greater social polarization along upper middle/lower class lines.

Of importance, too, was the role the upper middle class had in changing associational patterns in many of the crosstabs carried out here. In particular, where opinions did converge in 2000 versus 1995, they appeared to do so most strongly in this social class. This was true for both Right-Left identification and satisfaction with the previous regime. The hardening of the opinions and perspectives of this class may reflect

their growing negative reaction to Chávez after 1998 but particularly in 2000 and beyond, as asserted by much of the polarization literature (López Maya 2004, Cannon 2004).

In general, however, given the statistical analyses carried out here, it is too early to support either H1 or H2 definitively. On the one hand, H2 is supported by the associational patterns identified above: the intensity of the predicted associations between subjective class and different variables did not strengthen, as the literature says it should in order for there to be polarization. On the other hand, there was clearly activity and change registered along class lines between 1995 and 2000; in most cases, these associational shifts moved in the direction hypothesized in H1. The Left-Right identification of Venezuelans, as well their perspective on different political, social, and economic questions, did show a modest convergence around the upper middle and lower classes. In this sense, the intensity of social polarization may very well have intensified in the years following 2000.

### ***Conclusion***

Given the mixed results of the analyses above, it is only possible to draw tentative conclusions about the nature of social polarization in Venezuela in 2000 versus 1995. While social polarization did not necessarily strengthen between the two survey years available for this study, the associational patterns used to measure that polarization did shift in the direction that the “more polarization” literature had hypothesized. Thus, it seems that social polarization was only beginning to materialize in the most recent WVS wave.

Indeed, it is clear that something happened between 1995 and 2000 to cause the observed shifts in associational patterns between subjective class identification and the variety of variables tested here. These inverse shifts in associations were especially prevalent among the upper middle class, a characteristic that may represent a foreshadowing of that class’s role among the opposition in the years to come, a conclusion that was hinted at by Canache (2002a) and Weyland (2003) but never developed fully. Specifically, the upper middle class nature of the anti-Chavistas in 2002 – that is, those responsible for both the failed coup attempt and the extended general strike – suggest that the burgeoning social polarization identified in 2000 was not just an anomaly. If the interpretations presented here are correct, and social polarization was



only in its beginning stages in 2000, then we should expect social polarization to deepen during the rest of Chávez's controversial presidency. Thus, it will be important to continue to explore the associations between subjective class and different social, political, and economic variables in the years to come, particularly as the fifth wave of the WVS becomes available after 2006.

This study has served to further the discussion on the state of polarization in Venezuela, demonstrating through quantitative analysis that the debate on social polarization in the country is by no means over and should continue. For it is clear that past notions of Venezuela as a "near perfect" democracy veiled underlying political tensions among and within the country's social classes. The analyses here have helped flesh out some of those tensions. Work in the future should explore them even further, in order to understand their implications and underlying causes.

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## 2000 World Values Survey Questions:

### Subjective Class Identification

(X045): People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:

- [01] Upper class
- [02] Upper middle class
- [03] Lower middle class
- [04] Working class
- [05] Lower class
- [-1] Don't know
- [-2] No answer
- [-3] Not applicable
- [-4] Not asked in survey

### Left-Right Identification

(E033): In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

- |         |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |       |
|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
| 1       | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10    |
| Left    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Right |
| DK = 99 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |       |

### Incumbent Support

(E125): How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

- [01] Very satisfied
- [02] Fairly satisfied
- [03] Fairly dissatisfied
- [04] Very dissatisfied
- [-1] Don't know
- [-2] No answer
- [-3] Not applicable
- [-4] Not asked in survey

### Support for Previous Regime

(E112): Rate political system: In countries where no regime change has taken place: ten years ago

- [01] Bad
- [02] 2
- [03] 3
- [04] 4
- [05] 5
- [06] 6
- [07] 7
- [08] 8
- [09] 9
- [10] Very good
- [-1] Don't know
- [-2] No answer
- [-3] Not applicable
- [-4] Not asked in survey

### Private versus Government Ownership

Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree

completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

(E036):

1: Private ownership of business should be increased

10: Government ownership of business should be increased

#### Government Responsibility

Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

(E037):

1: People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves

10: The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for

APPENDIX B

**TABLE 1**  
**Left-Right Self-Identification by Subjective Class**  
 (Crosstabs Analysis)

	<u>Model 1</u>		<u>Model 2</u>	
	1995	2000	1995	2000
Chi Square (df)	57.08** (27)	58.062*** (27)	9.06* (3)	7.85* (3)
Gamma	-0.099	0.056	-.213	.143

Source: World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001

N = 1500 in both Models

\* Significant at < 0.05

\*\* Significant at .001

\*\*\* Significant at .000

Notes:

Model 1: where subjective class coded (1) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Left-Right Self-Identification coded (1) Left to (10) Right.

Model 2: where subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Left-Right Self-Identification coded (0) Left and (1) Right.



**TABLE 2**  
**Concentration of Unambiguously Left vs. Unambiguously Right Identification by Subjective Class**  
(Crosstabs Analysis, in percentage)

	<b>1995</b>		<b>2000</b>	
	Left	Right	Left	Right
<b>Lower</b>	25.8	74.2	46.3	53.7
<b>Working</b>	37.2	62.8	35.5	64.5
<b>Lower Middle</b>	41.5	58.5	28.3	71.7
<b>Upper Middle</b>	46.4	53.6	34.1	65.9
<b>Chi Square (df)</b>	9.06(3)*		7.85(3)*	
<b>Gamma</b>	-.213		.143	

*Source:* World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001

N(1995) = 531

N(2000) = 468

\* Significant at <0.05

*Notes:* Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Left-Right Self-Identification coded (0) Left and (1) Right.

**TABLE 3**  
**Left-Right Identification by Subjective Class**  
**1995 vs. 2000**  
(Standard Deviations)

	<u>1995</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Lower Class	3.076	2.645	0.431
Working Class	2.972	2.843	0.129
Lower Middle Class	2.987	2.583	0.404
Upper Middle Class	3.194	2.637	0.557
Total	3.015	2.655	0.36

*Source:* World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001  
N(1995) = 1090  
N(2000) = 1213

**TABLE 4a**  
**Satisfaction with Incumbent by Subjective Class**  
**1995 vs. 2000**

(Standard Deviation, Crosstabs analysis)

	<u>1995</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Lower Class	0.857	0.937	-0.08
Working Class	0.746	0.941	-0.195
Lower Middle Class	0.845	0.953	-0.108
Upper Middle Class	0.764	0.922	-0.158
Total	0.798	0.942	-0.144
Chi Square (df)	32.43*** (9)	13.06 (9)	
Gamma	-.055	0.047	

*Source:* World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001

N(1995) = 1462

N(2000) = 1470

\*\*\* Significant at .000

*Notes:* Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Satisfaction with Incumbent coded (1) Very Satisfied to (4) Very Dissatisfied.

**TABLE 4b**  
**Satisfaction with Previous Regime by Subjective Class**  
**1995 vs. 2000**

(Standard Deviation, Crosstabs analysis)

	<u>1995</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Lower Class	3.476	2.76	0.716
Working Class	3.207	3.228	-0.021
Lower Middle Class	3.344	2.826	0.518
Upper Middle Class	3.259	2.694	0.565
Total	3.300	2.868	0.432
Chi Square (df)	79.72*** (27)	50.144** (27)	
Gamma	-0.061	0.002	

*Source:* World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001

N(1995) = 1430

N(2000) = 1455

\*\* Significant at .004

\*\*\* Significant at .000

*Notes:* Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Satisfaction with Previous Regime coded (1) Very Bad to (10) Very Good.

**TABLE 4c**  
**Government Responsibility by Subjective Class**  
**1995 vs. 2000**  
(Standard Deviation, Crosstabs analysis)

	<u>1995</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Lower Class	3.567	3.45	0.117
Working Class	3.303	3.609	-0.306
Lower Middle Class	3.498	3.439	0.059
Upper Middle Class	3.454	3.417	0.037
Total	3.414	3.464	-0.05
Chi Square (df)	68.45*** (27)	31.74 (27)	
Gamma	.026	.012	

*Source:* World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001

N(1995) = 1393

N(2000) = 1490

\*\*\* Significant at .000

*Notes:* Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Opinions about Government Responsibility coded (1) Government should be Responsible to (10) People should be Responsible.

**TABLE 4d**  
**Public vs. Private-Owned Business by Subjective Class**  
**1995 vs. 2000**

(Standard Deviation, Crosstabs analysis)

	<u>1995</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Lower Class	3.326	3.349	-0.023
Working Class	3.106	3.364	-0.258
Lower Middle Class	3.455	3.255	0.2
Upper Middle Class	3.118	3.304	-0.186
Total	3.244	3.315	-0.071
Chi Square (df)	97.59*** (27)	41.953** (27)	
Gamma	0.014	-0.034	

*Source:* World Values Survey 1995-1996, World Values Survey 2000-2001

N(1995) = 1346

N(2000) = 1438

\*\* Significant at .03

\*\*\* Significant at .000

*Notes:* Subjective class coded (2) Lower Class to (4) Upper Middle Class and Opinions about Public vs. Private-Owned Business coded (1) More Private-Owned Business to (10) More Public-Owned Business.